{"context":"[Wjhile the FDPA specifically provides for victim impact evidence, 18 U.S.C. SS 3593, there is no parallel provision allowing for execution impact evidence. Asking the jury to sentence a defendant to life is not mitigating evidence.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"502 F.3d 931, 991","parenthetical":"approving of district court not allowing witnesses to offer opinions on what jury's verdict should be","sentence":"United States v. Mitchell, 502 F.3d 931, 991 (9th Cir.2007) (approving of district court not allowing witnesses to offer opinions on what jury\u2019s verdict should be); United States v. Caro, 461 F.Supp.2d. 459, 465 (W.D.Va.2006) (\u201c[A]n express plea for mercy to the jury from a defendant\u2019s witness is not mitigating evidence that could aid the jury in their decision making.\u201d); see also Stenson v. Lambert, 504 F.3d 873, 892 (9th Cir.2007) (noting there are no federal cases requiring the admission of execution impact testimony); Jackson v. Dretke, 450 F.3d 614, 617-18 (5th Cir.2006); but see Jackson, 450 F.3d at 620 (Dennis, J., dissenting)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"504 F.3d 873, 892","parenthetical":"noting there are no federal cases requiring the admission of execution impact testimony","sentence":"United States v. Mitchell, 502 F.3d 931, 991 (9th Cir.2007) (approving of district court not allowing witnesses to offer opinions on what jury\u2019s verdict should be); United States v. Caro, 461 F.Supp.2d. 459, 465 (W.D.Va.2006) (\u201c[A]n express plea for mercy to the jury from a defendant\u2019s witness is not mitigating evidence that could aid the jury in their decision making.\u201d); see also Stenson v. Lambert, 504 F.3d 873, 892 (9th Cir.2007) (noting there are no federal cases requiring the admission of execution impact testimony); Jackson v. Dretke, 450 F.3d 614, 617-18 (5th Cir.2006); but see Jackson, 450 F.3d at 620 (Dennis, J., dissenting)."},"case_id":4143915,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Indeed, in other cases, outside of Maryland, the doctrine has been applied after the completion of a trial in the underlying case.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"626 N.W.2d 281, 287","parenthetical":"\"The case- within-a-case doctrine requires that, but for the attorney's alleged negligence, litigation would have ended with a more favorable result for the client.\"","sentence":"See McIntire v. Lee, 149 N.H. 160, 816 A.2d 993 (2003) (malpractice established after jury determined that evidence that was not introduced in the underlying trial was relevant and should have been introduced); Prince v. Garruto, Galex & Cantor, Esqs., 346 N.J.Super. 180, 787 A.2d 245 (App.Div.2001) (ordering a trial on the merits to determine when omission of a witness in previous trial constituted malpractice); see also Meyer v. Maus, 626 N.W.2d 281, 287 (N.D.2001) (\u201cThe case- within-a-case doctrine requires that, but for the attorney\u2019s alleged negligence, litigation would have ended with a more favorable result for the client.\u201d); Aubin v. Barton, 123 Wash. App. 592, 98 P.3d 126, 134 (2004) (\u201c[T]he trial court hearing the malpractice claim retries, or tries for the first time, the client\u2019s cause of action that the client contends was lost or compromised by the attorney\u2019s negligence, and the trier of fact decides whether the client would have fared better but for the alleged mishandling.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"malpractice established after jury determined that evidence that was not introduced in the underlying trial was relevant and should have been introduced","sentence":"See McIntire v. Lee, 149 N.H. 160, 816 A.2d 993 (2003) (malpractice established after jury determined that evidence that was not introduced in the underlying trial was relevant and should have been introduced); Prince v. Garruto, Galex & Cantor, Esqs., 346 N.J.Super. 180, 787 A.2d 245 (App.Div.2001) (ordering a trial on the merits to determine when omission of a witness in previous trial constituted malpractice); see also Meyer v. Maus, 626 N.W.2d 281, 287 (N.D.2001) (\u201cThe case- within-a-case doctrine requires that, but for the attorney\u2019s alleged negligence, litigation would have ended with a more favorable result for the client.\u201d); Aubin v. Barton, 123 Wash. App. 592, 98 P.3d 126, 134 (2004) (\u201c[T]he trial court hearing the malpractice claim retries, or tries for the first time, the client\u2019s cause of action that the client contends was lost or compromised by the attorney\u2019s negligence, and the trier of fact decides whether the client would have fared better but for the alleged mishandling.\u201d)."},"case_id":3690484,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Indeed, in other cases, outside of Maryland, the doctrine has been applied after the completion of a trial in the underlying case.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"malpractice established after jury determined that evidence that was not introduced in the underlying trial was relevant and should have been introduced","sentence":"See McIntire v. Lee, 149 N.H. 160, 816 A.2d 993 (2003) (malpractice established after jury determined that evidence that was not introduced in the underlying trial was relevant and should have been introduced); Prince v. Garruto, Galex & Cantor, Esqs., 346 N.J.Super. 180, 787 A.2d 245 (App.Div.2001) (ordering a trial on the merits to determine when omission of a witness in previous trial constituted malpractice); see also Meyer v. Maus, 626 N.W.2d 281, 287 (N.D.2001) (\u201cThe case- within-a-case doctrine requires that, but for the attorney\u2019s alleged negligence, litigation would have ended with a more favorable result for the client.\u201d); Aubin v. Barton, 123 Wash. App. 592, 98 P.3d 126, 134 (2004) (\u201c[T]he trial court hearing the malpractice claim retries, or tries for the first time, the client\u2019s cause of action that the client contends was lost or compromised by the attorney\u2019s negligence, and the trier of fact decides whether the client would have fared better but for the alleged mishandling.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[T]he trial court hearing the malpractice claim retries, or tries for the first time, the client's cause of action that the client contends was lost or compromised by the attorney's negligence, and the trier of fact decides whether the client would have fared better but for the alleged mishandling.\"","sentence":"See McIntire v. Lee, 149 N.H. 160, 816 A.2d 993 (2003) (malpractice established after jury determined that evidence that was not introduced in the underlying trial was relevant and should have been introduced); Prince v. Garruto, Galex & Cantor, Esqs., 346 N.J.Super. 180, 787 A.2d 245 (App.Div.2001) (ordering a trial on the merits to determine when omission of a witness in previous trial constituted malpractice); see also Meyer v. Maus, 626 N.W.2d 281, 287 (N.D.2001) (\u201cThe case- within-a-case doctrine requires that, but for the attorney\u2019s alleged negligence, litigation would have ended with a more favorable result for the client.\u201d); Aubin v. Barton, 123 Wash. App. 592, 98 P.3d 126, 134 (2004) (\u201c[T]he trial court hearing the malpractice claim retries, or tries for the first time, the client\u2019s cause of action that the client contends was lost or compromised by the attorney\u2019s negligence, and the trier of fact decides whether the client would have fared better but for the alleged mishandling.\u201d)."},"case_id":3690484,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Indeed, in other cases, outside of Maryland, the doctrine has been applied after the completion of a trial in the underlying case.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"malpractice established after jury determined that evidence that was not introduced in the underlying trial was relevant and should have been introduced","sentence":"See McIntire v. Lee, 149 N.H. 160, 816 A.2d 993 (2003) (malpractice established after jury determined that evidence that was not introduced in the underlying trial was relevant and should have been introduced); Prince v. Garruto, Galex & Cantor, Esqs., 346 N.J.Super. 180, 787 A.2d 245 (App.Div.2001) (ordering a trial on the merits to determine when omission of a witness in previous trial constituted malpractice); see also Meyer v. Maus, 626 N.W.2d 281, 287 (N.D.2001) (\u201cThe case- within-a-case doctrine requires that, but for the attorney\u2019s alleged negligence, litigation would have ended with a more favorable result for the client.\u201d); Aubin v. Barton, 123 Wash. App. 592, 98 P.3d 126, 134 (2004) (\u201c[T]he trial court hearing the malpractice claim retries, or tries for the first time, the client\u2019s cause of action that the client contends was lost or compromised by the attorney\u2019s negligence, and the trier of fact decides whether the client would have fared better but for the alleged mishandling.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"98 P.3d 126, 134","parenthetical":"\"[T]he trial court hearing the malpractice claim retries, or tries for the first time, the client's cause of action that the client contends was lost or compromised by the attorney's negligence, and the trier of fact decides whether the client would have fared better but for the alleged mishandling.\"","sentence":"See McIntire v. Lee, 149 N.H. 160, 816 A.2d 993 (2003) (malpractice established after jury determined that evidence that was not introduced in the underlying trial was relevant and should have been introduced); Prince v. Garruto, Galex & Cantor, Esqs., 346 N.J.Super. 180, 787 A.2d 245 (App.Div.2001) (ordering a trial on the merits to determine when omission of a witness in previous trial constituted malpractice); see also Meyer v. Maus, 626 N.W.2d 281, 287 (N.D.2001) (\u201cThe case- within-a-case doctrine requires that, but for the attorney\u2019s alleged negligence, litigation would have ended with a more favorable result for the client.\u201d); Aubin v. Barton, 123 Wash. App. 592, 98 P.3d 126, 134 (2004) (\u201c[T]he trial court hearing the malpractice claim retries, or tries for the first time, the client\u2019s cause of action that the client contends was lost or compromised by the attorney\u2019s negligence, and the trier of fact decides whether the client would have fared better but for the alleged mishandling.\u201d)."},"case_id":3690484,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Indeed, in other cases, outside of Maryland, the doctrine has been applied after the completion of a trial in the underlying case.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"malpractice established after jury determined that evidence that was not introduced in the underlying trial was relevant and should have been introduced","sentence":"See McIntire v. Lee, 149 N.H. 160, 816 A.2d 993 (2003) (malpractice established after jury determined that evidence that was not introduced in the underlying trial was relevant and should have been introduced); Prince v. Garruto, Galex & Cantor, Esqs., 346 N.J.Super. 180, 787 A.2d 245 (App.Div.2001) (ordering a trial on the merits to determine when omission of a witness in previous trial constituted malpractice); see also Meyer v. Maus, 626 N.W.2d 281, 287 (N.D.2001) (\u201cThe case- within-a-case doctrine requires that, but for the attorney\u2019s alleged negligence, litigation would have ended with a more favorable result for the client.\u201d); Aubin v. Barton, 123 Wash. App. 592, 98 P.3d 126, 134 (2004) (\u201c[T]he trial court hearing the malpractice claim retries, or tries for the first time, the client\u2019s cause of action that the client contends was lost or compromised by the attorney\u2019s negligence, and the trier of fact decides whether the client would have fared better but for the alleged mishandling.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"626 N.W.2d 281, 287","parenthetical":"\"The case- within-a-case doctrine requires that, but for the attorney's alleged negligence, litigation would have ended with a more favorable result for the client.\"","sentence":"See McIntire v. Lee, 149 N.H. 160, 816 A.2d 993 (2003) (malpractice established after jury determined that evidence that was not introduced in the underlying trial was relevant and should have been introduced); Prince v. Garruto, Galex & Cantor, Esqs., 346 N.J.Super. 180, 787 A.2d 245 (App.Div.2001) (ordering a trial on the merits to determine when omission of a witness in previous trial constituted malpractice); see also Meyer v. Maus, 626 N.W.2d 281, 287 (N.D.2001) (\u201cThe case- within-a-case doctrine requires that, but for the attorney\u2019s alleged negligence, litigation would have ended with a more favorable result for the client.\u201d); Aubin v. Barton, 123 Wash. App. 592, 98 P.3d 126, 134 (2004) (\u201c[T]he trial court hearing the malpractice claim retries, or tries for the first time, the client\u2019s cause of action that the client contends was lost or compromised by the attorney\u2019s negligence, and the trier of fact decides whether the client would have fared better but for the alleged mishandling.\u201d)."},"case_id":3690484,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Indeed, in other cases, outside of Maryland, the doctrine has been applied after the completion of a trial in the underlying case.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[T]he trial court hearing the malpractice claim retries, or tries for the first time, the client's cause of action that the client contends was lost or compromised by the attorney's negligence, and the trier of fact decides whether the client would have fared better but for the alleged mishandling.\"","sentence":"See McIntire v. Lee, 149 N.H. 160, 816 A.2d 993 (2003) (malpractice established after jury determined that evidence that was not introduced in the underlying trial was relevant and should have been introduced); Prince v. Garruto, Galex & Cantor, Esqs., 346 N.J.Super. 180, 787 A.2d 245 (App.Div.2001) (ordering a trial on the merits to determine when omission of a witness in previous trial constituted malpractice); see also Meyer v. Maus, 626 N.W.2d 281, 287 (N.D.2001) (\u201cThe case- within-a-case doctrine requires that, but for the attorney\u2019s alleged negligence, litigation would have ended with a more favorable result for the client.\u201d); Aubin v. Barton, 123 Wash. App. 592, 98 P.3d 126, 134 (2004) (\u201c[T]he trial court hearing the malpractice claim retries, or tries for the first time, the client\u2019s cause of action that the client contends was lost or compromised by the attorney\u2019s negligence, and the trier of fact decides whether the client would have fared better but for the alleged mishandling.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"malpractice established after jury determined that evidence that was not introduced in the underlying trial was relevant and should have been introduced","sentence":"See McIntire v. Lee, 149 N.H. 160, 816 A.2d 993 (2003) (malpractice established after jury determined that evidence that was not introduced in the underlying trial was relevant and should have been introduced); Prince v. Garruto, Galex & Cantor, Esqs., 346 N.J.Super. 180, 787 A.2d 245 (App.Div.2001) (ordering a trial on the merits to determine when omission of a witness in previous trial constituted malpractice); see also Meyer v. Maus, 626 N.W.2d 281, 287 (N.D.2001) (\u201cThe case- within-a-case doctrine requires that, but for the attorney\u2019s alleged negligence, litigation would have ended with a more favorable result for the client.\u201d); Aubin v. Barton, 123 Wash. App. 592, 98 P.3d 126, 134 (2004) (\u201c[T]he trial court hearing the malpractice claim retries, or tries for the first time, the client\u2019s cause of action that the client contends was lost or compromised by the attorney\u2019s negligence, and the trier of fact decides whether the client would have fared better but for the alleged mishandling.\u201d)."},"case_id":3690484,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Indeed, in other cases, outside of Maryland, the doctrine has been applied after the completion of a trial in the underlying case.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"malpractice established after jury determined that evidence that was not introduced in the underlying trial was relevant and should have been introduced","sentence":"See McIntire v. Lee, 149 N.H. 160, 816 A.2d 993 (2003) (malpractice established after jury determined that evidence that was not introduced in the underlying trial was relevant and should have been introduced); Prince v. Garruto, Galex & Cantor, Esqs., 346 N.J.Super. 180, 787 A.2d 245 (App.Div.2001) (ordering a trial on the merits to determine when omission of a witness in previous trial constituted malpractice); see also Meyer v. Maus, 626 N.W.2d 281, 287 (N.D.2001) (\u201cThe case- within-a-case doctrine requires that, but for the attorney\u2019s alleged negligence, litigation would have ended with a more favorable result for the client.\u201d); Aubin v. Barton, 123 Wash. App. 592, 98 P.3d 126, 134 (2004) (\u201c[T]he trial court hearing the malpractice claim retries, or tries for the first time, the client\u2019s cause of action that the client contends was lost or compromised by the attorney\u2019s negligence, and the trier of fact decides whether the client would have fared better but for the alleged mishandling.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"98 P.3d 126, 134","parenthetical":"\"[T]he trial court hearing the malpractice claim retries, or tries for the first time, the client's cause of action that the client contends was lost or compromised by the attorney's negligence, and the trier of fact decides whether the client would have fared better but for the alleged mishandling.\"","sentence":"See McIntire v. Lee, 149 N.H. 160, 816 A.2d 993 (2003) (malpractice established after jury determined that evidence that was not introduced in the underlying trial was relevant and should have been introduced); Prince v. Garruto, Galex & Cantor, Esqs., 346 N.J.Super. 180, 787 A.2d 245 (App.Div.2001) (ordering a trial on the merits to determine when omission of a witness in previous trial constituted malpractice); see also Meyer v. Maus, 626 N.W.2d 281, 287 (N.D.2001) (\u201cThe case- within-a-case doctrine requires that, but for the attorney\u2019s alleged negligence, litigation would have ended with a more favorable result for the client.\u201d); Aubin v. Barton, 123 Wash. App. 592, 98 P.3d 126, 134 (2004) (\u201c[T]he trial court hearing the malpractice claim retries, or tries for the first time, the client\u2019s cause of action that the client contends was lost or compromised by the attorney\u2019s negligence, and the trier of fact decides whether the client would have fared better but for the alleged mishandling.\u201d)."},"case_id":3690484,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Indeed, in other cases, outside of Maryland, the doctrine has been applied after the completion of a trial in the underlying case.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"626 N.W.2d 281, 287","parenthetical":"\"The case- within-a-case doctrine requires that, but for the attorney's alleged negligence, litigation would have ended with a more favorable result for the client.\"","sentence":"See McIntire v. Lee, 149 N.H. 160, 816 A.2d 993 (2003) (malpractice established after jury determined that evidence that was not introduced in the underlying trial was relevant and should have been introduced); Prince v. Garruto, Galex & Cantor, Esqs., 346 N.J.Super. 180, 787 A.2d 245 (App.Div.2001) (ordering a trial on the merits to determine when omission of a witness in previous trial constituted malpractice); see also Meyer v. Maus, 626 N.W.2d 281, 287 (N.D.2001) (\u201cThe case- within-a-case doctrine requires that, but for the attorney\u2019s alleged negligence, litigation would have ended with a more favorable result for the client.\u201d); Aubin v. Barton, 123 Wash. App. 592, 98 P.3d 126, 134 (2004) (\u201c[T]he trial court hearing the malpractice claim retries, or tries for the first time, the client\u2019s cause of action that the client contends was lost or compromised by the attorney\u2019s negligence, and the trier of fact decides whether the client would have fared better but for the alleged mishandling.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"ordering a trial on the merits to determine when omission of a witness in previous trial constituted malpractice","sentence":"See McIntire v. Lee, 149 N.H. 160, 816 A.2d 993 (2003) (malpractice established after jury determined that evidence that was not introduced in the underlying trial was relevant and should have been introduced); Prince v. Garruto, Galex & Cantor, Esqs., 346 N.J.Super. 180, 787 A.2d 245 (App.Div.2001) (ordering a trial on the merits to determine when omission of a witness in previous trial constituted malpractice); see also Meyer v. Maus, 626 N.W.2d 281, 287 (N.D.2001) (\u201cThe case- within-a-case doctrine requires that, but for the attorney\u2019s alleged negligence, litigation would have ended with a more favorable result for the client.\u201d); Aubin v. Barton, 123 Wash. App. 592, 98 P.3d 126, 134 (2004) (\u201c[T]he trial court hearing the malpractice claim retries, or tries for the first time, the client\u2019s cause of action that the client contends was lost or compromised by the attorney\u2019s negligence, and the trier of fact decides whether the client would have fared better but for the alleged mishandling.\u201d)."},"case_id":3690484,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Indeed, in other cases, outside of Maryland, the doctrine has been applied after the completion of a trial in the underlying case.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"ordering a trial on the merits to determine when omission of a witness in previous trial constituted malpractice","sentence":"See McIntire v. Lee, 149 N.H. 160, 816 A.2d 993 (2003) (malpractice established after jury determined that evidence that was not introduced in the underlying trial was relevant and should have been introduced); Prince v. Garruto, Galex & Cantor, Esqs., 346 N.J.Super. 180, 787 A.2d 245 (App.Div.2001) (ordering a trial on the merits to determine when omission of a witness in previous trial constituted malpractice); see also Meyer v. Maus, 626 N.W.2d 281, 287 (N.D.2001) (\u201cThe case- within-a-case doctrine requires that, but for the attorney\u2019s alleged negligence, litigation would have ended with a more favorable result for the client.\u201d); Aubin v. Barton, 123 Wash. App. 592, 98 P.3d 126, 134 (2004) (\u201c[T]he trial court hearing the malpractice claim retries, or tries for the first time, the client\u2019s cause of action that the client contends was lost or compromised by the attorney\u2019s negligence, and the trier of fact decides whether the client would have fared better but for the alleged mishandling.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[T]he trial court hearing the malpractice claim retries, or tries for the first time, the client's cause of action that the client contends was lost or compromised by the attorney's negligence, and the trier of fact decides whether the client would have fared better but for the alleged mishandling.\"","sentence":"See McIntire v. Lee, 149 N.H. 160, 816 A.2d 993 (2003) (malpractice established after jury determined that evidence that was not introduced in the underlying trial was relevant and should have been introduced); Prince v. Garruto, Galex & Cantor, Esqs., 346 N.J.Super. 180, 787 A.2d 245 (App.Div.2001) (ordering a trial on the merits to determine when omission of a witness in previous trial constituted malpractice); see also Meyer v. Maus, 626 N.W.2d 281, 287 (N.D.2001) (\u201cThe case- within-a-case doctrine requires that, but for the attorney\u2019s alleged negligence, litigation would have ended with a more favorable result for the client.\u201d); Aubin v. Barton, 123 Wash. App. 592, 98 P.3d 126, 134 (2004) (\u201c[T]he trial court hearing the malpractice claim retries, or tries for the first time, the client\u2019s cause of action that the client contends was lost or compromised by the attorney\u2019s negligence, and the trier of fact decides whether the client would have fared better but for the alleged mishandling.\u201d)."},"case_id":3690484,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Indeed, in other cases, outside of Maryland, the doctrine has been applied after the completion of a trial in the underlying case.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"98 P.3d 126, 134","parenthetical":"\"[T]he trial court hearing the malpractice claim retries, or tries for the first time, the client's cause of action that the client contends was lost or compromised by the attorney's negligence, and the trier of fact decides whether the client would have fared better but for the alleged mishandling.\"","sentence":"See McIntire v. Lee, 149 N.H. 160, 816 A.2d 993 (2003) (malpractice established after jury determined that evidence that was not introduced in the underlying trial was relevant and should have been introduced); Prince v. Garruto, Galex & Cantor, Esqs., 346 N.J.Super. 180, 787 A.2d 245 (App.Div.2001) (ordering a trial on the merits to determine when omission of a witness in previous trial constituted malpractice); see also Meyer v. Maus, 626 N.W.2d 281, 287 (N.D.2001) (\u201cThe case- within-a-case doctrine requires that, but for the attorney\u2019s alleged negligence, litigation would have ended with a more favorable result for the client.\u201d); Aubin v. Barton, 123 Wash. App. 592, 98 P.3d 126, 134 (2004) (\u201c[T]he trial court hearing the malpractice claim retries, or tries for the first time, the client\u2019s cause of action that the client contends was lost or compromised by the attorney\u2019s negligence, and the trier of fact decides whether the client would have fared better but for the alleged mishandling.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"ordering a trial on the merits to determine when omission of a witness in previous trial constituted malpractice","sentence":"See McIntire v. Lee, 149 N.H. 160, 816 A.2d 993 (2003) (malpractice established after jury determined that evidence that was not introduced in the underlying trial was relevant and should have been introduced); Prince v. Garruto, Galex & Cantor, Esqs., 346 N.J.Super. 180, 787 A.2d 245 (App.Div.2001) (ordering a trial on the merits to determine when omission of a witness in previous trial constituted malpractice); see also Meyer v. Maus, 626 N.W.2d 281, 287 (N.D.2001) (\u201cThe case- within-a-case doctrine requires that, but for the attorney\u2019s alleged negligence, litigation would have ended with a more favorable result for the client.\u201d); Aubin v. Barton, 123 Wash. App. 592, 98 P.3d 126, 134 (2004) (\u201c[T]he trial court hearing the malpractice claim retries, or tries for the first time, the client\u2019s cause of action that the client contends was lost or compromised by the attorney\u2019s negligence, and the trier of fact decides whether the client would have fared better but for the alleged mishandling.\u201d)."},"case_id":3690484,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Indeed, in other cases, outside of Maryland, the doctrine has been applied after the completion of a trial in the underlying case.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"626 N.W.2d 281, 287","parenthetical":"\"The case- within-a-case doctrine requires that, but for the attorney's alleged negligence, litigation would have ended with a more favorable result for the client.\"","sentence":"See McIntire v. Lee, 149 N.H. 160, 816 A.2d 993 (2003) (malpractice established after jury determined that evidence that was not introduced in the underlying trial was relevant and should have been introduced); Prince v. Garruto, Galex & Cantor, Esqs., 346 N.J.Super. 180, 787 A.2d 245 (App.Div.2001) (ordering a trial on the merits to determine when omission of a witness in previous trial constituted malpractice); see also Meyer v. Maus, 626 N.W.2d 281, 287 (N.D.2001) (\u201cThe case- within-a-case doctrine requires that, but for the attorney\u2019s alleged negligence, litigation would have ended with a more favorable result for the client.\u201d); Aubin v. Barton, 123 Wash. App. 592, 98 P.3d 126, 134 (2004) (\u201c[T]he trial court hearing the malpractice claim retries, or tries for the first time, the client\u2019s cause of action that the client contends was lost or compromised by the attorney\u2019s negligence, and the trier of fact decides whether the client would have fared better but for the alleged mishandling.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"ordering a trial on the merits to determine when omission of a witness in previous trial constituted malpractice","sentence":"See McIntire v. Lee, 149 N.H. 160, 816 A.2d 993 (2003) (malpractice established after jury determined that evidence that was not introduced in the underlying trial was relevant and should have been introduced); Prince v. Garruto, Galex & Cantor, Esqs., 346 N.J.Super. 180, 787 A.2d 245 (App.Div.2001) (ordering a trial on the merits to determine when omission of a witness in previous trial constituted malpractice); see also Meyer v. Maus, 626 N.W.2d 281, 287 (N.D.2001) (\u201cThe case- within-a-case doctrine requires that, but for the attorney\u2019s alleged negligence, litigation would have ended with a more favorable result for the client.\u201d); Aubin v. Barton, 123 Wash. App. 592, 98 P.3d 126, 134 (2004) (\u201c[T]he trial court hearing the malpractice claim retries, or tries for the first time, the client\u2019s cause of action that the client contends was lost or compromised by the attorney\u2019s negligence, and the trier of fact decides whether the client would have fared better but for the alleged mishandling.\u201d)."},"case_id":3690484,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Indeed, in other cases, outside of Maryland, the doctrine has been applied after the completion of a trial in the underlying case.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"ordering a trial on the merits to determine when omission of a witness in previous trial constituted malpractice","sentence":"See McIntire v. Lee, 149 N.H. 160, 816 A.2d 993 (2003) (malpractice established after jury determined that evidence that was not introduced in the underlying trial was relevant and should have been introduced); Prince v. Garruto, Galex & Cantor, Esqs., 346 N.J.Super. 180, 787 A.2d 245 (App.Div.2001) (ordering a trial on the merits to determine when omission of a witness in previous trial constituted malpractice); see also Meyer v. Maus, 626 N.W.2d 281, 287 (N.D.2001) (\u201cThe case- within-a-case doctrine requires that, but for the attorney\u2019s alleged negligence, litigation would have ended with a more favorable result for the client.\u201d); Aubin v. Barton, 123 Wash. App. 592, 98 P.3d 126, 134 (2004) (\u201c[T]he trial court hearing the malpractice claim retries, or tries for the first time, the client\u2019s cause of action that the client contends was lost or compromised by the attorney\u2019s negligence, and the trier of fact decides whether the client would have fared better but for the alleged mishandling.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[T]he trial court hearing the malpractice claim retries, or tries for the first time, the client's cause of action that the client contends was lost or compromised by the attorney's negligence, and the trier of fact decides whether the client would have fared better but for the alleged mishandling.\"","sentence":"See McIntire v. Lee, 149 N.H. 160, 816 A.2d 993 (2003) (malpractice established after jury determined that evidence that was not introduced in the underlying trial was relevant and should have been introduced); Prince v. Garruto, Galex & Cantor, Esqs., 346 N.J.Super. 180, 787 A.2d 245 (App.Div.2001) (ordering a trial on the merits to determine when omission of a witness in previous trial constituted malpractice); see also Meyer v. Maus, 626 N.W.2d 281, 287 (N.D.2001) (\u201cThe case- within-a-case doctrine requires that, but for the attorney\u2019s alleged negligence, litigation would have ended with a more favorable result for the client.\u201d); Aubin v. Barton, 123 Wash. App. 592, 98 P.3d 126, 134 (2004) (\u201c[T]he trial court hearing the malpractice claim retries, or tries for the first time, the client\u2019s cause of action that the client contends was lost or compromised by the attorney\u2019s negligence, and the trier of fact decides whether the client would have fared better but for the alleged mishandling.\u201d)."},"case_id":3690484,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Indeed, in other cases, outside of Maryland, the doctrine has been applied after the completion of a trial in the underlying case.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"ordering a trial on the merits to determine when omission of a witness in previous trial constituted malpractice","sentence":"See McIntire v. Lee, 149 N.H. 160, 816 A.2d 993 (2003) (malpractice established after jury determined that evidence that was not introduced in the underlying trial was relevant and should have been introduced); Prince v. Garruto, Galex & Cantor, Esqs., 346 N.J.Super. 180, 787 A.2d 245 (App.Div.2001) (ordering a trial on the merits to determine when omission of a witness in previous trial constituted malpractice); see also Meyer v. Maus, 626 N.W.2d 281, 287 (N.D.2001) (\u201cThe case- within-a-case doctrine requires that, but for the attorney\u2019s alleged negligence, litigation would have ended with a more favorable result for the client.\u201d); Aubin v. Barton, 123 Wash. App. 592, 98 P.3d 126, 134 (2004) (\u201c[T]he trial court hearing the malpractice claim retries, or tries for the first time, the client\u2019s cause of action that the client contends was lost or compromised by the attorney\u2019s negligence, and the trier of fact decides whether the client would have fared better but for the alleged mishandling.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"98 P.3d 126, 134","parenthetical":"\"[T]he trial court hearing the malpractice claim retries, or tries for the first time, the client's cause of action that the client contends was lost or compromised by the attorney's negligence, and the trier of fact decides whether the client would have fared better but for the alleged mishandling.\"","sentence":"See McIntire v. Lee, 149 N.H. 160, 816 A.2d 993 (2003) (malpractice established after jury determined that evidence that was not introduced in the underlying trial was relevant and should have been introduced); Prince v. Garruto, Galex & Cantor, Esqs., 346 N.J.Super. 180, 787 A.2d 245 (App.Div.2001) (ordering a trial on the merits to determine when omission of a witness in previous trial constituted malpractice); see also Meyer v. Maus, 626 N.W.2d 281, 287 (N.D.2001) (\u201cThe case- within-a-case doctrine requires that, but for the attorney\u2019s alleged negligence, litigation would have ended with a more favorable result for the client.\u201d); Aubin v. Barton, 123 Wash. App. 592, 98 P.3d 126, 134 (2004) (\u201c[T]he trial court hearing the malpractice claim retries, or tries for the first time, the client\u2019s cause of action that the client contends was lost or compromised by the attorney\u2019s negligence, and the trier of fact decides whether the client would have fared better but for the alleged mishandling.\u201d)."},"case_id":3690484,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Because this jurisdictional challenge arises in the context of a motion to register a foreign judgment, this Court must look to the rendering state's law-- that is, Oklahoma's substantive law -- to determine whether the Oklahoma court had personal jurisdiction over Mr. Frazee. The facts and circumstances considered in determining whether personal jurisdiction exists are those found by the registering and enforcing jurisdiction, rather than the rendering jurisdiction.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"159 S.W.3d 462, 465-66","parenthetical":"applying New York substantive law to the facts found by the Missouri court","sentence":"See Gletzer v. Harris, 159 S.W.3d 462, 465-66 (Mo.App.2005) (applying New York substantive law to the facts found by the Missouri court); see also Whipple v. JSZ Fin. Co., 885 So.2d 933, 936 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2004) (applying Texas substantive law to the facts found by the Florida court)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"885 So.2d 933, 936","parenthetical":"applying Texas substantive law to the facts found by the Florida court","sentence":"See Gletzer v. Harris, 159 S.W.3d 462, 465-66 (Mo.App.2005) (applying New York substantive law to the facts found by the Missouri court); see also Whipple v. JSZ Fin. Co., 885 So.2d 933, 936 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2004) (applying Texas substantive law to the facts found by the Florida court)."},"case_id":7321757,"label":"a"}
{"context":"As discussed in this Court's prior Decision and Order, \"[t]he Second Circuit has instructed that;where a Magistrate Judge conducts an evidentiary hearing and makes credibility findings on disputed issues of fact, the district court will ordinarily accept those credibility findings.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"892 F.2d 16, 19","parenthetical":"\"Had the district court rejected the magistrate's conclusions regarding the credibility of the central witnesses without hearing live testimony from those witnesses, troubling questions of constitutional due process would have been raised.\"","sentence":"United States v. Lawson, 961 F.Supp.2d 496, 499 (W.D.N.Y. 2013) (citing Carrion v. Smith, 549 F.3d 583, 588 (2d Cir. 2008) (\u201c[A] district judge should normally not reject a proposed finding of a magistrate judge that rests on a credibility finding without having the witness testify before the judge.\u201d (quoting Cullen v. United States, 194 F.3d 401, 407 (2d Cir. 1999)))); Grassia v. Scully, 892 F.2d 16, 19 (2d Cir. 1989) (\u201cHad the district court rejected the magistrate\u2019s conclusions regarding the credibility of the central witnesses without hearing live testimony from those witnesses, troubling questions of constitutional due process would have been raised.\u201d); see also United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 675-76, 100 S.Ct. 2406, 65 L.Ed.2d 424 (1980) (district court is not required to rehear witness testimony when accepting a magistrate judge\u2019s credibility findings)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"447 U.S. 667, 675-76","parenthetical":"district court is not required to rehear witness testimony when accepting a magistrate judge's credibility findings","sentence":"United States v. Lawson, 961 F.Supp.2d 496, 499 (W.D.N.Y. 2013) (citing Carrion v. Smith, 549 F.3d 583, 588 (2d Cir. 2008) (\u201c[A] district judge should normally not reject a proposed finding of a magistrate judge that rests on a credibility finding without having the witness testify before the judge.\u201d (quoting Cullen v. United States, 194 F.3d 401, 407 (2d Cir. 1999)))); Grassia v. Scully, 892 F.2d 16, 19 (2d Cir. 1989) (\u201cHad the district court rejected the magistrate\u2019s conclusions regarding the credibility of the central witnesses without hearing live testimony from those witnesses, troubling questions of constitutional due process would have been raised.\u201d); see also United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 675-76, 100 S.Ct. 2406, 65 L.Ed.2d 424 (1980) (district court is not required to rehear witness testimony when accepting a magistrate judge\u2019s credibility findings)."},"case_id":12265964,"label":"a"}
{"context":"As discussed in this Court's prior Decision and Order, \"[t]he Second Circuit has instructed that;where a Magistrate Judge conducts an evidentiary hearing and makes credibility findings on disputed issues of fact, the district court will ordinarily accept those credibility findings.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"892 F.2d 16, 19","parenthetical":"\"Had the district court rejected the magistrate's conclusions regarding the credibility of the central witnesses without hearing live testimony from those witnesses, troubling questions of constitutional due process would have been raised.\"","sentence":"United States v. Lawson, 961 F.Supp.2d 496, 499 (W.D.N.Y. 2013) (citing Carrion v. Smith, 549 F.3d 583, 588 (2d Cir. 2008) (\u201c[A] district judge should normally not reject a proposed finding of a magistrate judge that rests on a credibility finding without having the witness testify before the judge.\u201d (quoting Cullen v. United States, 194 F.3d 401, 407 (2d Cir. 1999)))); Grassia v. Scully, 892 F.2d 16, 19 (2d Cir. 1989) (\u201cHad the district court rejected the magistrate\u2019s conclusions regarding the credibility of the central witnesses without hearing live testimony from those witnesses, troubling questions of constitutional due process would have been raised.\u201d); see also United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 675-76, 100 S.Ct. 2406, 65 L.Ed.2d 424 (1980) (district court is not required to rehear witness testimony when accepting a magistrate judge\u2019s credibility findings)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"district court is not required to rehear witness testimony when accepting a magistrate judge's credibility findings","sentence":"United States v. Lawson, 961 F.Supp.2d 496, 499 (W.D.N.Y. 2013) (citing Carrion v. Smith, 549 F.3d 583, 588 (2d Cir. 2008) (\u201c[A] district judge should normally not reject a proposed finding of a magistrate judge that rests on a credibility finding without having the witness testify before the judge.\u201d (quoting Cullen v. United States, 194 F.3d 401, 407 (2d Cir. 1999)))); Grassia v. Scully, 892 F.2d 16, 19 (2d Cir. 1989) (\u201cHad the district court rejected the magistrate\u2019s conclusions regarding the credibility of the central witnesses without hearing live testimony from those witnesses, troubling questions of constitutional due process would have been raised.\u201d); see also United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 675-76, 100 S.Ct. 2406, 65 L.Ed.2d 424 (1980) (district court is not required to rehear witness testimony when accepting a magistrate judge\u2019s credibility findings)."},"case_id":12265964,"label":"a"}
{"context":"As discussed in this Court's prior Decision and Order, \"[t]he Second Circuit has instructed that;where a Magistrate Judge conducts an evidentiary hearing and makes credibility findings on disputed issues of fact, the district court will ordinarily accept those credibility findings.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"892 F.2d 16, 19","parenthetical":"\"Had the district court rejected the magistrate's conclusions regarding the credibility of the central witnesses without hearing live testimony from those witnesses, troubling questions of constitutional due process would have been raised.\"","sentence":"United States v. Lawson, 961 F.Supp.2d 496, 499 (W.D.N.Y. 2013) (citing Carrion v. Smith, 549 F.3d 583, 588 (2d Cir. 2008) (\u201c[A] district judge should normally not reject a proposed finding of a magistrate judge that rests on a credibility finding without having the witness testify before the judge.\u201d (quoting Cullen v. United States, 194 F.3d 401, 407 (2d Cir. 1999)))); Grassia v. Scully, 892 F.2d 16, 19 (2d Cir. 1989) (\u201cHad the district court rejected the magistrate\u2019s conclusions regarding the credibility of the central witnesses without hearing live testimony from those witnesses, troubling questions of constitutional due process would have been raised.\u201d); see also United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 675-76, 100 S.Ct. 2406, 65 L.Ed.2d 424 (1980) (district court is not required to rehear witness testimony when accepting a magistrate judge\u2019s credibility findings)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"district court is not required to rehear witness testimony when accepting a magistrate judge's credibility findings","sentence":"United States v. Lawson, 961 F.Supp.2d 496, 499 (W.D.N.Y. 2013) (citing Carrion v. Smith, 549 F.3d 583, 588 (2d Cir. 2008) (\u201c[A] district judge should normally not reject a proposed finding of a magistrate judge that rests on a credibility finding without having the witness testify before the judge.\u201d (quoting Cullen v. United States, 194 F.3d 401, 407 (2d Cir. 1999)))); Grassia v. Scully, 892 F.2d 16, 19 (2d Cir. 1989) (\u201cHad the district court rejected the magistrate\u2019s conclusions regarding the credibility of the central witnesses without hearing live testimony from those witnesses, troubling questions of constitutional due process would have been raised.\u201d); see also United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 675-76, 100 S.Ct. 2406, 65 L.Ed.2d 424 (1980) (district court is not required to rehear witness testimony when accepting a magistrate judge\u2019s credibility findings)."},"case_id":12265964,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In order to preserve the notice purpose of Rule 8(c) and the discretionary structure of Rule 15(a), we hold that Rule 8(c) means what it says: a party must first raise its affirmative defenses in a responsive pleading before it can raise them in a dispositive motion. The Fifth Circuit has interpreted Rule 8(c) similarly.","citation_a":{"signal":"but cf.","identifier":"807 F.2d 414, 417-18","parenthetical":"unpled affirmative defense not waived when raised at trial at \"pragmatically sufficient time\"","sentence":"But cf. Lucas v. United States, 807 F.2d 414, 417-18 (5th Cir.1986) (unpled affirmative defense not waived when raised at trial at \u201cpragmatically sufficient time\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"530 F.2d 91, 96","parenthetical":"unpled affirmative defense cannot be raised on summary judgment unless summary judgment motion is first responsive pleading","sentence":"See Ashe v. Corley, 992 F.2d 540, 545 n. 7 (5th Cir.1993); Funding Systems Leasing Corp. v. Pugh, 530 F.2d 91, 96 (5th Cir.1976) (unpled affirmative defense cannot be raised on summary judgment unless summary judgment motion is first responsive pleading)."},"case_id":3707621,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In making its finding, the judge also found that the \"fortress theory\" applied at least to some extent, even though no drugs were involved here. This theory originated in cases involving 18 U.S.C. SS 924(c)(1), which provision penalizes anyone who, \"during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime[,] ... uses or carries a firearm.\" The theory was a means for courts to find that a defendant \"used\" a firearm, even where there was no evidence that the defendant had fired, brandished, or even picked up the weapon.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"878 F.2d 937, 944","parenthetical":"\"[I]f it reasonably appears that the firearms found on the premises controlled or owned by a defendant and in his actual or constructive possession are to be used to protect the drugs or otherwise facilitate a drug transaction, then such firearms are used 'during and in relation to' a drug trafficking crime.\" (quoting 18 U.S.C. SS 924(c","sentence":"See United States v. Grant, 545 F.2d 1309, 1312 (2d Cir.1976) (finding \u201cuse,\u201d based on the fact that the social club that housed the defendants\u2019 drug operation was a \u201cveritable fortress\u201d); see also United States v. Henry, 878 F.2d 937, 944 (6th Cir.1989) (\u201c[I]f it reasonably appears that the firearms found on the premises controlled or owned by a defendant and in his actual or constructive possession are to be used to protect the drugs or otherwise facilitate a drug transaction, then such firearms are used \u2018during and in relation to\u2019 a drug trafficking crime.\u201d (quoting 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 924(c)(1))). Though the Supreme Court has curtailed the theory in relation to \u00a7 924(c)(1) by holding that the term \u201cuse\u201d in \u00a7 924(c)(1) means \u201cactive employment\u201d and not merely possession, see Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 150, 116 S.Ct. 501, 133 L.Ed.2d 472 (1995), the theory is still applicable in \u00a7 2K2.1(b)(5) cases because the latter provision contains the additional word \u201cpossessed.\u201d"},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"545 F.2d 1309, 1312","parenthetical":"finding \"use,\" based on the fact that the social club that housed the defendants' drug operation was a \"veritable fortress\"","sentence":"See United States v. Grant, 545 F.2d 1309, 1312 (2d Cir.1976) (finding \u201cuse,\u201d based on the fact that the social club that housed the defendants\u2019 drug operation was a \u201cveritable fortress\u201d); see also United States v. Henry, 878 F.2d 937, 944 (6th Cir.1989) (\u201c[I]f it reasonably appears that the firearms found on the premises controlled or owned by a defendant and in his actual or constructive possession are to be used to protect the drugs or otherwise facilitate a drug transaction, then such firearms are used \u2018during and in relation to\u2019 a drug trafficking crime.\u201d (quoting 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 924(c)(1))). Though the Supreme Court has curtailed the theory in relation to \u00a7 924(c)(1) by holding that the term \u201cuse\u201d in \u00a7 924(c)(1) means \u201cactive employment\u201d and not merely possession, see Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 150, 116 S.Ct. 501, 133 L.Ed.2d 472 (1995), the theory is still applicable in \u00a7 2K2.1(b)(5) cases because the latter provision contains the additional word \u201cpossessed.\u201d"},"case_id":9088588,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In making its finding, the judge also found that the \"fortress theory\" applied at least to some extent, even though no drugs were involved here. This theory originated in cases involving 18 U.S.C. SS 924(c)(1), which provision penalizes anyone who, \"during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime[,] ... uses or carries a firearm.\" The theory was a means for courts to find that a defendant \"used\" a firearm, even where there was no evidence that the defendant had fired, brandished, or even picked up the weapon.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"545 F.2d 1309, 1312","parenthetical":"finding \"use,\" based on the fact that the social club that housed the defendants' drug operation was a \"veritable fortress\"","sentence":"See United States v. Grant, 545 F.2d 1309, 1312 (2d Cir.1976) (finding \u201cuse,\u201d based on the fact that the social club that housed the defendants\u2019 drug operation was a \u201cveritable fortress\u201d); see also United States v. Henry, 878 F.2d 937, 944 (6th Cir.1989) (\u201c[I]f it reasonably appears that the firearms found on the premises controlled or owned by a defendant and in his actual or constructive possession are to be used to protect the drugs or otherwise facilitate a drug transaction, then such firearms are used \u2018during and in relation to\u2019 a drug trafficking crime.\u201d (quoting 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 924(c)(1))). Though the Supreme Court has curtailed the theory in relation to \u00a7 924(c)(1) by holding that the term \u201cuse\u201d in \u00a7 924(c)(1) means \u201cactive employment\u201d and not merely possession, see Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 150, 116 S.Ct. 501, 133 L.Ed.2d 472 (1995), the theory is still applicable in \u00a7 2K2.1(b)(5) cases because the latter provision contains the additional word \u201cpossessed.\u201d"},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"516 U.S. 137, 150","parenthetical":"\"[I]f it reasonably appears that the firearms found on the premises controlled or owned by a defendant and in his actual or constructive possession are to be used to protect the drugs or otherwise facilitate a drug transaction, then such firearms are used 'during and in relation to' a drug trafficking crime.\" (quoting 18 U.S.C. SS 924(c","sentence":"See United States v. Grant, 545 F.2d 1309, 1312 (2d Cir.1976) (finding \u201cuse,\u201d based on the fact that the social club that housed the defendants\u2019 drug operation was a \u201cveritable fortress\u201d); see also United States v. Henry, 878 F.2d 937, 944 (6th Cir.1989) (\u201c[I]f it reasonably appears that the firearms found on the premises controlled or owned by a defendant and in his actual or constructive possession are to be used to protect the drugs or otherwise facilitate a drug transaction, then such firearms are used \u2018during and in relation to\u2019 a drug trafficking crime.\u201d (quoting 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 924(c)(1))). Though the Supreme Court has curtailed the theory in relation to \u00a7 924(c)(1) by holding that the term \u201cuse\u201d in \u00a7 924(c)(1) means \u201cactive employment\u201d and not merely possession, see Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 150, 116 S.Ct. 501, 133 L.Ed.2d 472 (1995), the theory is still applicable in \u00a7 2K2.1(b)(5) cases because the latter provision contains the additional word \u201cpossessed.\u201d"},"case_id":9088588,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In making its finding, the judge also found that the \"fortress theory\" applied at least to some extent, even though no drugs were involved here. This theory originated in cases involving 18 U.S.C. SS 924(c)(1), which provision penalizes anyone who, \"during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime[,] ... uses or carries a firearm.\" The theory was a means for courts to find that a defendant \"used\" a firearm, even where there was no evidence that the defendant had fired, brandished, or even picked up the weapon.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"545 F.2d 1309, 1312","parenthetical":"finding \"use,\" based on the fact that the social club that housed the defendants' drug operation was a \"veritable fortress\"","sentence":"See United States v. Grant, 545 F.2d 1309, 1312 (2d Cir.1976) (finding \u201cuse,\u201d based on the fact that the social club that housed the defendants\u2019 drug operation was a \u201cveritable fortress\u201d); see also United States v. Henry, 878 F.2d 937, 944 (6th Cir.1989) (\u201c[I]f it reasonably appears that the firearms found on the premises controlled or owned by a defendant and in his actual or constructive possession are to be used to protect the drugs or otherwise facilitate a drug transaction, then such firearms are used \u2018during and in relation to\u2019 a drug trafficking crime.\u201d (quoting 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 924(c)(1))). Though the Supreme Court has curtailed the theory in relation to \u00a7 924(c)(1) by holding that the term \u201cuse\u201d in \u00a7 924(c)(1) means \u201cactive employment\u201d and not merely possession, see Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 150, 116 S.Ct. 501, 133 L.Ed.2d 472 (1995), the theory is still applicable in \u00a7 2K2.1(b)(5) cases because the latter provision contains the additional word \u201cpossessed.\u201d"},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[I]f it reasonably appears that the firearms found on the premises controlled or owned by a defendant and in his actual or constructive possession are to be used to protect the drugs or otherwise facilitate a drug transaction, then such firearms are used 'during and in relation to' a drug trafficking crime.\" (quoting 18 U.S.C. SS 924(c","sentence":"See United States v. Grant, 545 F.2d 1309, 1312 (2d Cir.1976) (finding \u201cuse,\u201d based on the fact that the social club that housed the defendants\u2019 drug operation was a \u201cveritable fortress\u201d); see also United States v. Henry, 878 F.2d 937, 944 (6th Cir.1989) (\u201c[I]f it reasonably appears that the firearms found on the premises controlled or owned by a defendant and in his actual or constructive possession are to be used to protect the drugs or otherwise facilitate a drug transaction, then such firearms are used \u2018during and in relation to\u2019 a drug trafficking crime.\u201d (quoting 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 924(c)(1))). Though the Supreme Court has curtailed the theory in relation to \u00a7 924(c)(1) by holding that the term \u201cuse\u201d in \u00a7 924(c)(1) means \u201cactive employment\u201d and not merely possession, see Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 150, 116 S.Ct. 501, 133 L.Ed.2d 472 (1995), the theory is still applicable in \u00a7 2K2.1(b)(5) cases because the latter provision contains the additional word \u201cpossessed.\u201d"},"case_id":9088588,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In making its finding, the judge also found that the \"fortress theory\" applied at least to some extent, even though no drugs were involved here. This theory originated in cases involving 18 U.S.C. SS 924(c)(1), which provision penalizes anyone who, \"during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime[,] ... uses or carries a firearm.\" The theory was a means for courts to find that a defendant \"used\" a firearm, even where there was no evidence that the defendant had fired, brandished, or even picked up the weapon.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[I]f it reasonably appears that the firearms found on the premises controlled or owned by a defendant and in his actual or constructive possession are to be used to protect the drugs or otherwise facilitate a drug transaction, then such firearms are used 'during and in relation to' a drug trafficking crime.\" (quoting 18 U.S.C. SS 924(c","sentence":"See United States v. Grant, 545 F.2d 1309, 1312 (2d Cir.1976) (finding \u201cuse,\u201d based on the fact that the social club that housed the defendants\u2019 drug operation was a \u201cveritable fortress\u201d); see also United States v. Henry, 878 F.2d 937, 944 (6th Cir.1989) (\u201c[I]f it reasonably appears that the firearms found on the premises controlled or owned by a defendant and in his actual or constructive possession are to be used to protect the drugs or otherwise facilitate a drug transaction, then such firearms are used \u2018during and in relation to\u2019 a drug trafficking crime.\u201d (quoting 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 924(c)(1))). Though the Supreme Court has curtailed the theory in relation to \u00a7 924(c)(1) by holding that the term \u201cuse\u201d in \u00a7 924(c)(1) means \u201cactive employment\u201d and not merely possession, see Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 150, 116 S.Ct. 501, 133 L.Ed.2d 472 (1995), the theory is still applicable in \u00a7 2K2.1(b)(5) cases because the latter provision contains the additional word \u201cpossessed.\u201d"},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"545 F.2d 1309, 1312","parenthetical":"finding \"use,\" based on the fact that the social club that housed the defendants' drug operation was a \"veritable fortress\"","sentence":"See United States v. Grant, 545 F.2d 1309, 1312 (2d Cir.1976) (finding \u201cuse,\u201d based on the fact that the social club that housed the defendants\u2019 drug operation was a \u201cveritable fortress\u201d); see also United States v. Henry, 878 F.2d 937, 944 (6th Cir.1989) (\u201c[I]f it reasonably appears that the firearms found on the premises controlled or owned by a defendant and in his actual or constructive possession are to be used to protect the drugs or otherwise facilitate a drug transaction, then such firearms are used \u2018during and in relation to\u2019 a drug trafficking crime.\u201d (quoting 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 924(c)(1))). Though the Supreme Court has curtailed the theory in relation to \u00a7 924(c)(1) by holding that the term \u201cuse\u201d in \u00a7 924(c)(1) means \u201cactive employment\u201d and not merely possession, see Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 150, 116 S.Ct. 501, 133 L.Ed.2d 472 (1995), the theory is still applicable in \u00a7 2K2.1(b)(5) cases because the latter provision contains the additional word \u201cpossessed.\u201d"},"case_id":9088588,"label":"b"}
{"context":". The State's assertion that the prosecution \"bears no burden with regard to the finding of mitigating circumstances or the weighing process\" is not only irrelevant, for the reasons explained above, but is refuted by the decisions of the Nevada Supreme Court.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"The State has the burden of ... proving that aggravating circumstances exist and are not outweighed by any mitigating circumstances.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Floyd v. State, 118 Nev. 156, 42 P.3d 249, 258 (2002) (en banc) (per curiam) (\"The State has the burden of ... proving that aggravating circumstances exist and are not outweighed by any mitigating circumstances.\u201d), abrogated on other grounds by Grey v. State, 178 P.3d 154 (Nev.2008) (enbanc); see also Witter, 921 P.2d at 896 (rejecting the argument that Nevada's death penalty statute \"shifts the burden of proof to the defendant to prove that mitigating circumstances outweigh aggravating circumstances\u201d); accord Blake v. State, 121 Nev. 779, 121 P.3d 567, 580 (2005) (en banc)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"921 P.2d 896, 896","parenthetical":"rejecting the argument that Nevada's death penalty statute \"shifts the burden of proof to the defendant to prove that mitigating circumstances outweigh aggravating circumstances\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Floyd v. State, 118 Nev. 156, 42 P.3d 249, 258 (2002) (en banc) (per curiam) (\"The State has the burden of ... proving that aggravating circumstances exist and are not outweighed by any mitigating circumstances.\u201d), abrogated on other grounds by Grey v. State, 178 P.3d 154 (Nev.2008) (enbanc); see also Witter, 921 P.2d at 896 (rejecting the argument that Nevada's death penalty statute \"shifts the burden of proof to the defendant to prove that mitigating circumstances outweigh aggravating circumstances\u201d); accord Blake v. State, 121 Nev. 779, 121 P.3d 567, 580 (2005) (en banc)."},"case_id":4219306,"label":"a"}
{"context":"2. Because Singh suffered past persecution at the hands of the Indian police, he is entitled to the presumption that the threat of persecution against him exists nationwide, and the government bears the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he could reasonably relocate to avoid future persecution. The generalized information relied on by the BIA falls short of providing substantial evidence to support the determination that a preponderance of the evidence showed that Singh could reasonably relocate free of future persecution to other parts of the country.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"281 F.3d 1069, 1077","parenthetical":"mere passage of time cannot rebut the presumption of future persecution","sentence":"See also Salazar-Paucar v. INS, 281 F.3d 1069, 1077 (9th Cir.2002) (mere passage of time cannot rebut the presumption of future persecution)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"175 F.3d 732, 737-38","parenthetical":"country report stating it was \"generally possible to seek internal resettlement\" was insufficient to overcome presumption","sentence":"See Singh v. Ilchert, 69 F.3d 375, 380 (9th Cir.1995); Borja v. INS, 175 F.3d 732, 737-38 (9th Cir.1999) (en banc) (country report stating it was \u201cgenerally possible to seek internal resettlement\u201d was insufficient to overcome presumption)."},"case_id":5908783,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Lastly, the argument here that the jury could find sufficient proof on this record of venue by a preponderance of the evidence is particularly cogent because, unlike some of our prior cases, there was no evidence before the jury that Mr. Kelly committed any of the charged criminal conduct in any place other than where he was tried, the District of Utah. Accordingly, there were no competing venue possibilities.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"111 F.3d 751, 751","parenthetical":"noting that a jury's guilty verdict signals a proper finding of venue \"[wjhere the entirety of the defendant's illegal activity is alleged to have taken place within the trial jurisdiction, and no trial evidence is proffered that the illegal act was committed in some other place or that the place alleged is not within the jurisdiction\"","sentence":"See Miller, 111 F.3d at 751 (noting that a jury\u2019s guilty verdict signals a proper finding of venue \u201c[wjhere the entirety of the defendant\u2019s illegal activity is alleged to have taken place within the trial jurisdiction, and no trial evidence is proffered that the illegal act was committed in some other place or that the place alleged is not within the jurisdiction\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"392 F.2d 306, 306","parenthetical":"concluding that, where the theft at issue occurred in Kansas -- -where defendant was tried -- \"[tjhere is not a sufficient relationship between the fact of possession [of items from the theft] in Oklahoma and ... receiving and possessing in Kansas\" to support a finding of venue in Kansas","sentence":"Cf. Jenkins, 392 F.2d at 306 (concluding that, where the theft at issue occurred in Kansas \u2014 -where defendant was tried \u2014 \u201c[tjhere is not a sufficient relationship between the fact of possession [of items from the theft] in Oklahoma and ... receiving and possessing in Kansas\u201d to support a finding of venue in Kansas). Accord United States v. Greene, 995 F.2d 793, 801 (8th Cir.1993) (agreeing with defendant charged with manufacturing marijuana that where the only evidence of venue in the Southern District of Iowa was holes in a map purporting to show marijuana fields and the holes were \u201cdistributed both inside and outside\u201d that district, \u201conly by speculating could a reasonable jury have found that any of the marijuana fields was in the district of indictment\u201d)."},"case_id":5897525,"label":"a"}
{"context":"(Id.) (emphasis added). In other words, the discretion that the Park Road Standards provide to the NPS concerns functions such as design, construction, and reconstruction -- not the maintenance of roadways. This interpretation of the Park Road Standards is wholly in line with the reading by various circuit courts.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"453 F.3d 1150, 1150","parenthetical":"\"[I]t does not follow that the Standards' basic, scientific safety specifications may be disregarded, particularly those that do not require redesigning or reconstructing the [roadways].\"","sentence":"See Soldano, 453 F.3d at 1150 (\u201c[I]t does not follow that the Standards\u2019 basic, scientific safety specifications may be disregarded, particularly those that do not require redesigning or reconstructing the [roadways].\u201d); see also Mitchell, 225 F.3d at 364 (\u201cUnder these guidelines, the Park Service\u2019s decision about how and when to reconstruct Route 209 would seem to be a discretionary decision ... .\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"225 F.3d 364, 364","parenthetical":"\"Under these guidelines, the Park Service's decision about how and when to reconstruct Route 209 would seem to be a discretionary decision ... .\"","sentence":"See Soldano, 453 F.3d at 1150 (\u201c[I]t does not follow that the Standards\u2019 basic, scientific safety specifications may be disregarded, particularly those that do not require redesigning or reconstructing the [roadways].\u201d); see also Mitchell, 225 F.3d at 364 (\u201cUnder these guidelines, the Park Service\u2019s decision about how and when to reconstruct Route 209 would seem to be a discretionary decision ... .\u201d)."},"case_id":4036020,"label":"a"}
{"context":".Many of the cases address how to remedy inadequate or defective repairs.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"448 S.W.2d 718, 718","parenthetical":"finding no repairs were made due to parties' disagreement over the correct measure of damages","sentence":"See, e.g., Barbee, 262 S.W.2d at 123-24 (finding more than twenty items on the insured\u2019s vehicle were repaired improperly or not repaired at all; the court concluded the repairs did not restore the car to its former condition and value); Roberdeau, 231 S.W.2d at 951-52 (finding some repairs made but additional repairs could have restored vehicle to the same or as good condition); see also Cope, 448 S.W.2d at 718 (finding no repairs were made due to parties' disagreement over the correct measure of damages). Other cases address the consequences of an insurer\u2019s inappropriate decision to repair rather than declare the vehicle a total loss."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"231 S.W.2d 951, 951-52","parenthetical":"finding some repairs made but additional repairs could have restored vehicle to the same or as good condition","sentence":"See, e.g., Barbee, 262 S.W.2d at 123-24 (finding more than twenty items on the insured\u2019s vehicle were repaired improperly or not repaired at all; the court concluded the repairs did not restore the car to its former condition and value); Roberdeau, 231 S.W.2d at 951-52 (finding some repairs made but additional repairs could have restored vehicle to the same or as good condition); see also Cope, 448 S.W.2d at 718 (finding no repairs were made due to parties' disagreement over the correct measure of damages). Other cases address the consequences of an insurer\u2019s inappropriate decision to repair rather than declare the vehicle a total loss."},"case_id":11152124,"label":"b"}
{"context":"This interpretation of Section 141(b) comports with how our law has developed. Under the common law, \"the voluntary assumption of management responsibility by the directors carried with it a concomitant vested right to serve out the full term for which they were elected unless there was cause for removal....\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"134 A.2d 852, 857","parenthetical":"recognizing common law authority of stockholders to remove a director for cause","sentence":"Drexler, supra, \u00a7 13.01, at 13-2; see Roven v. Cotter, 547 A.2d 603, 608 (Del.Ch.1988) (\u201cAt common law a director had a vested right in his position arising from his duties and responsibilities to the corporation.\u201d); see also Campbell v. Loew\u2019s, Inc., 134 A.2d 852, 857 (Del.Ch.1957) (Seitz, C.) (recognizing common law authority of stockholders to remove a director for cause)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"547 A.2d 603, 608","parenthetical":"\"At common law a director had a vested right in his position arising from his duties and responsibilities to the corporation.\"","sentence":"Drexler, supra, \u00a7 13.01, at 13-2; see Roven v. Cotter, 547 A.2d 603, 608 (Del.Ch.1988) (\u201cAt common law a director had a vested right in his position arising from his duties and responsibilities to the corporation.\u201d); see also Campbell v. Loew\u2019s, Inc., 134 A.2d 852, 857 (Del.Ch.1957) (Seitz, C.) (recognizing common law authority of stockholders to remove a director for cause)."},"case_id":7290086,"label":"b"}
{"context":"We conclude Coleman's evidence was insufficient to show constructive discharge, a hostile work environment, or any adverse employment action; rather, the evidence showed her treatment by supervisors was due to her poor performance.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"234 F.3d 391, 395-96","parenthetical":"holding prima facie case for hostile work environment includes showing of severe conduct that affected term, condition, or privilege of employment","sentence":"See Ross v. Douglas County, 234 F.3d 391, 395-96 (8th Cir.2000) (holding prima facie case for hostile work environment includes showing of severe conduct that affected term, condition, or privilege of employment); Breeding v. Arthur J. Gallagher & Co., 164 F.3d 1151, 1156-59 (8th Cir.1999) (holding prima facie case of discrimination includes showing of adverse employment action; constructive discharge could satisfy element of adverse employment action, but there was no constructive discharge where evidence did not support that discrimination, rather than actual performance problems, prompted reprimands and poor evaluations); see also Helfter v. UPS, Inc., 115 F.3d 613, 616 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding conclusory statements in affidavits and deposition testimony, \u201cstanding alone, are insufficient to withstand a properly-supported motion for summary judgment\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"115 F.3d 613, 616","parenthetical":"holding conclusory statements in affidavits and deposition testimony, \"standing alone, are insufficient to withstand a properly-supported motion for summary judgment\"","sentence":"See Ross v. Douglas County, 234 F.3d 391, 395-96 (8th Cir.2000) (holding prima facie case for hostile work environment includes showing of severe conduct that affected term, condition, or privilege of employment); Breeding v. Arthur J. Gallagher & Co., 164 F.3d 1151, 1156-59 (8th Cir.1999) (holding prima facie case of discrimination includes showing of adverse employment action; constructive discharge could satisfy element of adverse employment action, but there was no constructive discharge where evidence did not support that discrimination, rather than actual performance problems, prompted reprimands and poor evaluations); see also Helfter v. UPS, Inc., 115 F.3d 613, 616 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding conclusory statements in affidavits and deposition testimony, \u201cstanding alone, are insufficient to withstand a properly-supported motion for summary judgment\u201d)."},"case_id":1062921,"label":"a"}
{"context":"We are unpersuaded by Vonneida's contention that evidence of his 24-year old conviction was unfairly prejudicial. With respect to its age, \"[t]he legislative history of Rule 414 reveals that Congress meant its temporal scope to be broad, allowing the court to admit evidence of Rule 414 acts that occurred more than 20 years before trial.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"624 F.3d 511, 511-12","parenthetical":"holding redacted 19-year-old conviction for sodomy by forcible compulsion was properly admitted in prosecution for sexual exploitation of a minor to prove defendant's \"propensity and proclivity\"","sentence":"United States v. Larson, 112 F.3d 600, 605 (2d Cir.1997) (emphasis added) (affirming admission of victim testimony regarding prior acts of molestation that occurred 16 to 20 years prior to trial); see also Davis, 624 F.3d at 511-12 (holding redacted 19-year-old conviction for sodomy by forcible compulsion was properly admitted in prosecution for sexual exploitation of a minor to prove defendant\u2019s \u201cpropensity and proclivity\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"112 F.3d 600, 605","parenthetical":"affirming admission of victim testimony regarding prior acts of molestation that occurred 16 to 20 years prior to trial","sentence":"United States v. Larson, 112 F.3d 600, 605 (2d Cir.1997) (emphasis added) (affirming admission of victim testimony regarding prior acts of molestation that occurred 16 to 20 years prior to trial); see also Davis, 624 F.3d at 511-12 (holding redacted 19-year-old conviction for sodomy by forcible compulsion was properly admitted in prosecution for sexual exploitation of a minor to prove defendant\u2019s \u201cpropensity and proclivity\u201d)."},"case_id":4127528,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Most circuits have held that in reviewing decisions of plan administrators under the arbitrary and capricious standard, the re-; viewing court may consider only the evidence that the administrators themselves considered.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"72 F.3d 1066, 1071","parenthetical":"\"[A] district court's review under the arbitrary and capricious standard is limited to the administrative record.\"","sentence":"See Miller v. United Welfare Fund, 72 F.3d 1066, 1071 (2d Cir.1995) (\u201c[A] district court\u2019s review under the arbitrary and capricious standard is limited to the administrative record.\u201d); Lee v. Blue Cross\/Blue Shield, 10 F.3d 1547, 1550 (11th Cir.1994) (requiring courts \u201cto look only to the facts known to the administrator\u201d); Taft v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc\u2019y, 9 F.3d 1469, 1471-72 (9th Cir.1993) (fearing that examination beyond the administrative record would too easily lead to findings of abuse of discretion, defeating the goal of ERISA to resolve disputes expeditiously); Abnathya v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 2 F.3d 40, 48 n. 8 (3d Cir.1993) (holding that evaluations submitted after the committee\u2019s final decision cannot be considered in determining whether the decision was arbitrary and capricious); Oldenburger v. Central States Southeast & Southwest Areas Teamster Pension Fund, 934 F.2d 171, 174 (8th Cir.1991) (\u201cWe limit our review to the evidence that was before a pension fund\u2019s board of trustees when the final decision was made.\u201d); Perry v. Simplicity Eng\u2019g, 900 F.2d 963, 967 (6th Cir.1990) (noting that both de novo and arbitrary and capricious standards of review do \u201cnot mandate or permit the consideration of evidence not presented to the administrator\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"974 F.2d 631, 638-42","parenthetical":"allowing district courts to look beyond the administrative record to review the administrator's plan interpretation, but not to review \"the historical facts underlying a claim\"","sentence":"But see Wildbur v. ARCO Chem. Co., 974 F.2d 631, 638-42 (5th Cir.1992) (allowing district courts to look beyond the administrative record to review the administrator\u2019s plan interpretation, but not to review \u201cthe historical facts underlying a claim\u201d). Nevertheless, Chambers urges us to disregard Sandoval and these other cases for three reasons."},"case_id":11940768,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Most circuits have held that in reviewing decisions of plan administrators under the arbitrary and capricious standard, the re-; viewing court may consider only the evidence that the administrators themselves considered.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"10 F.3d 1547, 1550","parenthetical":"requiring courts \"to look only to the facts known to the administrator\"","sentence":"See Miller v. United Welfare Fund, 72 F.3d 1066, 1071 (2d Cir.1995) (\u201c[A] district court\u2019s review under the arbitrary and capricious standard is limited to the administrative record.\u201d); Lee v. Blue Cross\/Blue Shield, 10 F.3d 1547, 1550 (11th Cir.1994) (requiring courts \u201cto look only to the facts known to the administrator\u201d); Taft v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc\u2019y, 9 F.3d 1469, 1471-72 (9th Cir.1993) (fearing that examination beyond the administrative record would too easily lead to findings of abuse of discretion, defeating the goal of ERISA to resolve disputes expeditiously); Abnathya v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 2 F.3d 40, 48 n. 8 (3d Cir.1993) (holding that evaluations submitted after the committee\u2019s final decision cannot be considered in determining whether the decision was arbitrary and capricious); Oldenburger v. Central States Southeast & Southwest Areas Teamster Pension Fund, 934 F.2d 171, 174 (8th Cir.1991) (\u201cWe limit our review to the evidence that was before a pension fund\u2019s board of trustees when the final decision was made.\u201d); Perry v. Simplicity Eng\u2019g, 900 F.2d 963, 967 (6th Cir.1990) (noting that both de novo and arbitrary and capricious standards of review do \u201cnot mandate or permit the consideration of evidence not presented to the administrator\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"974 F.2d 631, 638-42","parenthetical":"allowing district courts to look beyond the administrative record to review the administrator's plan interpretation, but not to review \"the historical facts underlying a claim\"","sentence":"But see Wildbur v. ARCO Chem. Co., 974 F.2d 631, 638-42 (5th Cir.1992) (allowing district courts to look beyond the administrative record to review the administrator\u2019s plan interpretation, but not to review \u201cthe historical facts underlying a claim\u201d). Nevertheless, Chambers urges us to disregard Sandoval and these other cases for three reasons."},"case_id":11940768,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Most circuits have held that in reviewing decisions of plan administrators under the arbitrary and capricious standard, the re-; viewing court may consider only the evidence that the administrators themselves considered.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"974 F.2d 631, 638-42","parenthetical":"allowing district courts to look beyond the administrative record to review the administrator's plan interpretation, but not to review \"the historical facts underlying a claim\"","sentence":"But see Wildbur v. ARCO Chem. Co., 974 F.2d 631, 638-42 (5th Cir.1992) (allowing district courts to look beyond the administrative record to review the administrator\u2019s plan interpretation, but not to review \u201cthe historical facts underlying a claim\u201d). Nevertheless, Chambers urges us to disregard Sandoval and these other cases for three reasons."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"9 F.3d 1469, 1471-72","parenthetical":"fearing that examination beyond the administrative record would too easily lead to findings of abuse of discretion, defeating the goal of ERISA to resolve disputes expeditiously","sentence":"See Miller v. United Welfare Fund, 72 F.3d 1066, 1071 (2d Cir.1995) (\u201c[A] district court\u2019s review under the arbitrary and capricious standard is limited to the administrative record.\u201d); Lee v. Blue Cross\/Blue Shield, 10 F.3d 1547, 1550 (11th Cir.1994) (requiring courts \u201cto look only to the facts known to the administrator\u201d); Taft v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc\u2019y, 9 F.3d 1469, 1471-72 (9th Cir.1993) (fearing that examination beyond the administrative record would too easily lead to findings of abuse of discretion, defeating the goal of ERISA to resolve disputes expeditiously); Abnathya v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 2 F.3d 40, 48 n. 8 (3d Cir.1993) (holding that evaluations submitted after the committee\u2019s final decision cannot be considered in determining whether the decision was arbitrary and capricious); Oldenburger v. Central States Southeast & Southwest Areas Teamster Pension Fund, 934 F.2d 171, 174 (8th Cir.1991) (\u201cWe limit our review to the evidence that was before a pension fund\u2019s board of trustees when the final decision was made.\u201d); Perry v. Simplicity Eng\u2019g, 900 F.2d 963, 967 (6th Cir.1990) (noting that both de novo and arbitrary and capricious standards of review do \u201cnot mandate or permit the consideration of evidence not presented to the administrator\u201d)."},"case_id":11940768,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Most circuits have held that in reviewing decisions of plan administrators under the arbitrary and capricious standard, the re-; viewing court may consider only the evidence that the administrators themselves considered.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"974 F.2d 631, 638-42","parenthetical":"allowing district courts to look beyond the administrative record to review the administrator's plan interpretation, but not to review \"the historical facts underlying a claim\"","sentence":"But see Wildbur v. ARCO Chem. Co., 974 F.2d 631, 638-42 (5th Cir.1992) (allowing district courts to look beyond the administrative record to review the administrator\u2019s plan interpretation, but not to review \u201cthe historical facts underlying a claim\u201d). Nevertheless, Chambers urges us to disregard Sandoval and these other cases for three reasons."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that evaluations submitted after the committee's final decision cannot be considered in determining whether the decision was arbitrary and capricious","sentence":"See Miller v. United Welfare Fund, 72 F.3d 1066, 1071 (2d Cir.1995) (\u201c[A] district court\u2019s review under the arbitrary and capricious standard is limited to the administrative record.\u201d); Lee v. Blue Cross\/Blue Shield, 10 F.3d 1547, 1550 (11th Cir.1994) (requiring courts \u201cto look only to the facts known to the administrator\u201d); Taft v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc\u2019y, 9 F.3d 1469, 1471-72 (9th Cir.1993) (fearing that examination beyond the administrative record would too easily lead to findings of abuse of discretion, defeating the goal of ERISA to resolve disputes expeditiously); Abnathya v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 2 F.3d 40, 48 n. 8 (3d Cir.1993) (holding that evaluations submitted after the committee\u2019s final decision cannot be considered in determining whether the decision was arbitrary and capricious); Oldenburger v. Central States Southeast & Southwest Areas Teamster Pension Fund, 934 F.2d 171, 174 (8th Cir.1991) (\u201cWe limit our review to the evidence that was before a pension fund\u2019s board of trustees when the final decision was made.\u201d); Perry v. Simplicity Eng\u2019g, 900 F.2d 963, 967 (6th Cir.1990) (noting that both de novo and arbitrary and capricious standards of review do \u201cnot mandate or permit the consideration of evidence not presented to the administrator\u201d)."},"case_id":11940768,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Most circuits have held that in reviewing decisions of plan administrators under the arbitrary and capricious standard, the re-; viewing court may consider only the evidence that the administrators themselves considered.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"974 F.2d 631, 638-42","parenthetical":"allowing district courts to look beyond the administrative record to review the administrator's plan interpretation, but not to review \"the historical facts underlying a claim\"","sentence":"But see Wildbur v. ARCO Chem. Co., 974 F.2d 631, 638-42 (5th Cir.1992) (allowing district courts to look beyond the administrative record to review the administrator\u2019s plan interpretation, but not to review \u201cthe historical facts underlying a claim\u201d). Nevertheless, Chambers urges us to disregard Sandoval and these other cases for three reasons."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"934 F.2d 171, 174","parenthetical":"\"We limit our review to the evidence that was before a pension fund's board of trustees when the final decision was made.\"","sentence":"See Miller v. United Welfare Fund, 72 F.3d 1066, 1071 (2d Cir.1995) (\u201c[A] district court\u2019s review under the arbitrary and capricious standard is limited to the administrative record.\u201d); Lee v. Blue Cross\/Blue Shield, 10 F.3d 1547, 1550 (11th Cir.1994) (requiring courts \u201cto look only to the facts known to the administrator\u201d); Taft v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc\u2019y, 9 F.3d 1469, 1471-72 (9th Cir.1993) (fearing that examination beyond the administrative record would too easily lead to findings of abuse of discretion, defeating the goal of ERISA to resolve disputes expeditiously); Abnathya v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 2 F.3d 40, 48 n. 8 (3d Cir.1993) (holding that evaluations submitted after the committee\u2019s final decision cannot be considered in determining whether the decision was arbitrary and capricious); Oldenburger v. Central States Southeast & Southwest Areas Teamster Pension Fund, 934 F.2d 171, 174 (8th Cir.1991) (\u201cWe limit our review to the evidence that was before a pension fund\u2019s board of trustees when the final decision was made.\u201d); Perry v. Simplicity Eng\u2019g, 900 F.2d 963, 967 (6th Cir.1990) (noting that both de novo and arbitrary and capricious standards of review do \u201cnot mandate or permit the consideration of evidence not presented to the administrator\u201d)."},"case_id":11940768,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Most circuits have held that in reviewing decisions of plan administrators under the arbitrary and capricious standard, the re-; viewing court may consider only the evidence that the administrators themselves considered.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"900 F.2d 963, 967","parenthetical":"noting that both de novo and arbitrary and capricious standards of review do \"not mandate or permit the consideration of evidence not presented to the administrator\"","sentence":"See Miller v. United Welfare Fund, 72 F.3d 1066, 1071 (2d Cir.1995) (\u201c[A] district court\u2019s review under the arbitrary and capricious standard is limited to the administrative record.\u201d); Lee v. Blue Cross\/Blue Shield, 10 F.3d 1547, 1550 (11th Cir.1994) (requiring courts \u201cto look only to the facts known to the administrator\u201d); Taft v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc\u2019y, 9 F.3d 1469, 1471-72 (9th Cir.1993) (fearing that examination beyond the administrative record would too easily lead to findings of abuse of discretion, defeating the goal of ERISA to resolve disputes expeditiously); Abnathya v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 2 F.3d 40, 48 n. 8 (3d Cir.1993) (holding that evaluations submitted after the committee\u2019s final decision cannot be considered in determining whether the decision was arbitrary and capricious); Oldenburger v. Central States Southeast & Southwest Areas Teamster Pension Fund, 934 F.2d 171, 174 (8th Cir.1991) (\u201cWe limit our review to the evidence that was before a pension fund\u2019s board of trustees when the final decision was made.\u201d); Perry v. Simplicity Eng\u2019g, 900 F.2d 963, 967 (6th Cir.1990) (noting that both de novo and arbitrary and capricious standards of review do \u201cnot mandate or permit the consideration of evidence not presented to the administrator\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"974 F.2d 631, 638-42","parenthetical":"allowing district courts to look beyond the administrative record to review the administrator's plan interpretation, but not to review \"the historical facts underlying a claim\"","sentence":"But see Wildbur v. ARCO Chem. Co., 974 F.2d 631, 638-42 (5th Cir.1992) (allowing district courts to look beyond the administrative record to review the administrator\u2019s plan interpretation, but not to review \u201cthe historical facts underlying a claim\u201d). Nevertheless, Chambers urges us to disregard Sandoval and these other cases for three reasons."},"case_id":11940768,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment originated in the post-Civil War era when Congress purposely intended to resolve lingering racial inequalities from disparate application of state laws; it is an instrument by which the federal government may correct official discrimination at the state, commonwealth, or territorial level.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"118 U.S. 356, 369-71","parenthetical":"opining that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees equal enjoyment of fundamental liberties and privileges, including the franchise, which is the foundation to all civil rights","sentence":"Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369-71, 6 S.Ct. 1064, 30 L.Ed. 220 (1886) (opining that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees equal enjoyment of fundamental liberties and privileges, including the franchise, which is the foundation to all civil rights); see also Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 665-67, 86 S.Ct. 1079, 16 L.Ed.2d 169 (1966) (invalidating a poll tax as a discriminatory test for wealth which is irrelevant to protecting the integrity of elections). \u201cThese provisions are universal in their application, to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any differences of race, of color, or of nationality; and the equal protection of the laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws.\u201d"},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"383 U.S. 663, 665-67","parenthetical":"invalidating a poll tax as a discriminatory test for wealth which is irrelevant to protecting the integrity of elections","sentence":"Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369-71, 6 S.Ct. 1064, 30 L.Ed. 220 (1886) (opining that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees equal enjoyment of fundamental liberties and privileges, including the franchise, which is the foundation to all civil rights); see also Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 665-67, 86 S.Ct. 1079, 16 L.Ed.2d 169 (1966) (invalidating a poll tax as a discriminatory test for wealth which is irrelevant to protecting the integrity of elections). \u201cThese provisions are universal in their application, to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any differences of race, of color, or of nationality; and the equal protection of the laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws.\u201d"},"case_id":3219344,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment originated in the post-Civil War era when Congress purposely intended to resolve lingering racial inequalities from disparate application of state laws; it is an instrument by which the federal government may correct official discrimination at the state, commonwealth, or territorial level.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"invalidating a poll tax as a discriminatory test for wealth which is irrelevant to protecting the integrity of elections","sentence":"Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369-71, 6 S.Ct. 1064, 30 L.Ed. 220 (1886) (opining that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees equal enjoyment of fundamental liberties and privileges, including the franchise, which is the foundation to all civil rights); see also Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 665-67, 86 S.Ct. 1079, 16 L.Ed.2d 169 (1966) (invalidating a poll tax as a discriminatory test for wealth which is irrelevant to protecting the integrity of elections). \u201cThese provisions are universal in their application, to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any differences of race, of color, or of nationality; and the equal protection of the laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws.\u201d"},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"118 U.S. 356, 369-71","parenthetical":"opining that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees equal enjoyment of fundamental liberties and privileges, including the franchise, which is the foundation to all civil rights","sentence":"Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369-71, 6 S.Ct. 1064, 30 L.Ed. 220 (1886) (opining that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees equal enjoyment of fundamental liberties and privileges, including the franchise, which is the foundation to all civil rights); see also Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 665-67, 86 S.Ct. 1079, 16 L.Ed.2d 169 (1966) (invalidating a poll tax as a discriminatory test for wealth which is irrelevant to protecting the integrity of elections). \u201cThese provisions are universal in their application, to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any differences of race, of color, or of nationality; and the equal protection of the laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws.\u201d"},"case_id":3219344,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment originated in the post-Civil War era when Congress purposely intended to resolve lingering racial inequalities from disparate application of state laws; it is an instrument by which the federal government may correct official discrimination at the state, commonwealth, or territorial level.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"invalidating a poll tax as a discriminatory test for wealth which is irrelevant to protecting the integrity of elections","sentence":"Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369-71, 6 S.Ct. 1064, 30 L.Ed. 220 (1886) (opining that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees equal enjoyment of fundamental liberties and privileges, including the franchise, which is the foundation to all civil rights); see also Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 665-67, 86 S.Ct. 1079, 16 L.Ed.2d 169 (1966) (invalidating a poll tax as a discriminatory test for wealth which is irrelevant to protecting the integrity of elections). \u201cThese provisions are universal in their application, to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any differences of race, of color, or of nationality; and the equal protection of the laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws.\u201d"},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"118 U.S. 356, 369-71","parenthetical":"opining that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees equal enjoyment of fundamental liberties and privileges, including the franchise, which is the foundation to all civil rights","sentence":"Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369-71, 6 S.Ct. 1064, 30 L.Ed. 220 (1886) (opining that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees equal enjoyment of fundamental liberties and privileges, including the franchise, which is the foundation to all civil rights); see also Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 665-67, 86 S.Ct. 1079, 16 L.Ed.2d 169 (1966) (invalidating a poll tax as a discriminatory test for wealth which is irrelevant to protecting the integrity of elections). \u201cThese provisions are universal in their application, to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any differences of race, of color, or of nationality; and the equal protection of the laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws.\u201d"},"case_id":3219344,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment originated in the post-Civil War era when Congress purposely intended to resolve lingering racial inequalities from disparate application of state laws; it is an instrument by which the federal government may correct official discrimination at the state, commonwealth, or territorial level.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"opining that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees equal enjoyment of fundamental liberties and privileges, including the franchise, which is the foundation to all civil rights","sentence":"Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369-71, 6 S.Ct. 1064, 30 L.Ed. 220 (1886) (opining that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees equal enjoyment of fundamental liberties and privileges, including the franchise, which is the foundation to all civil rights); see also Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 665-67, 86 S.Ct. 1079, 16 L.Ed.2d 169 (1966) (invalidating a poll tax as a discriminatory test for wealth which is irrelevant to protecting the integrity of elections). \u201cThese provisions are universal in their application, to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any differences of race, of color, or of nationality; and the equal protection of the laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws.\u201d"},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"383 U.S. 663, 665-67","parenthetical":"invalidating a poll tax as a discriminatory test for wealth which is irrelevant to protecting the integrity of elections","sentence":"Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369-71, 6 S.Ct. 1064, 30 L.Ed. 220 (1886) (opining that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees equal enjoyment of fundamental liberties and privileges, including the franchise, which is the foundation to all civil rights); see also Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 665-67, 86 S.Ct. 1079, 16 L.Ed.2d 169 (1966) (invalidating a poll tax as a discriminatory test for wealth which is irrelevant to protecting the integrity of elections). \u201cThese provisions are universal in their application, to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any differences of race, of color, or of nationality; and the equal protection of the laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws.\u201d"},"case_id":3219344,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment originated in the post-Civil War era when Congress purposely intended to resolve lingering racial inequalities from disparate application of state laws; it is an instrument by which the federal government may correct official discrimination at the state, commonwealth, or territorial level.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"opining that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees equal enjoyment of fundamental liberties and privileges, including the franchise, which is the foundation to all civil rights","sentence":"Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369-71, 6 S.Ct. 1064, 30 L.Ed. 220 (1886) (opining that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees equal enjoyment of fundamental liberties and privileges, including the franchise, which is the foundation to all civil rights); see also Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 665-67, 86 S.Ct. 1079, 16 L.Ed.2d 169 (1966) (invalidating a poll tax as a discriminatory test for wealth which is irrelevant to protecting the integrity of elections). \u201cThese provisions are universal in their application, to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any differences of race, of color, or of nationality; and the equal protection of the laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws.\u201d"},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"invalidating a poll tax as a discriminatory test for wealth which is irrelevant to protecting the integrity of elections","sentence":"Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369-71, 6 S.Ct. 1064, 30 L.Ed. 220 (1886) (opining that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees equal enjoyment of fundamental liberties and privileges, including the franchise, which is the foundation to all civil rights); see also Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 665-67, 86 S.Ct. 1079, 16 L.Ed.2d 169 (1966) (invalidating a poll tax as a discriminatory test for wealth which is irrelevant to protecting the integrity of elections). \u201cThese provisions are universal in their application, to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any differences of race, of color, or of nationality; and the equal protection of the laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws.\u201d"},"case_id":3219344,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment originated in the post-Civil War era when Congress purposely intended to resolve lingering racial inequalities from disparate application of state laws; it is an instrument by which the federal government may correct official discrimination at the state, commonwealth, or territorial level.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"opining that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees equal enjoyment of fundamental liberties and privileges, including the franchise, which is the foundation to all civil rights","sentence":"Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369-71, 6 S.Ct. 1064, 30 L.Ed. 220 (1886) (opining that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees equal enjoyment of fundamental liberties and privileges, including the franchise, which is the foundation to all civil rights); see also Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 665-67, 86 S.Ct. 1079, 16 L.Ed.2d 169 (1966) (invalidating a poll tax as a discriminatory test for wealth which is irrelevant to protecting the integrity of elections). \u201cThese provisions are universal in their application, to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any differences of race, of color, or of nationality; and the equal protection of the laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws.\u201d"},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"invalidating a poll tax as a discriminatory test for wealth which is irrelevant to protecting the integrity of elections","sentence":"Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369-71, 6 S.Ct. 1064, 30 L.Ed. 220 (1886) (opining that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees equal enjoyment of fundamental liberties and privileges, including the franchise, which is the foundation to all civil rights); see also Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 665-67, 86 S.Ct. 1079, 16 L.Ed.2d 169 (1966) (invalidating a poll tax as a discriminatory test for wealth which is irrelevant to protecting the integrity of elections). \u201cThese provisions are universal in their application, to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any differences of race, of color, or of nationality; and the equal protection of the laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws.\u201d"},"case_id":3219344,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment originated in the post-Civil War era when Congress purposely intended to resolve lingering racial inequalities from disparate application of state laws; it is an instrument by which the federal government may correct official discrimination at the state, commonwealth, or territorial level.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"opining that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees equal enjoyment of fundamental liberties and privileges, including the franchise, which is the foundation to all civil rights","sentence":"Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369-71, 6 S.Ct. 1064, 30 L.Ed. 220 (1886) (opining that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees equal enjoyment of fundamental liberties and privileges, including the franchise, which is the foundation to all civil rights); see also Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 665-67, 86 S.Ct. 1079, 16 L.Ed.2d 169 (1966) (invalidating a poll tax as a discriminatory test for wealth which is irrelevant to protecting the integrity of elections). \u201cThese provisions are universal in their application, to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any differences of race, of color, or of nationality; and the equal protection of the laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws.\u201d"},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"383 U.S. 663, 665-67","parenthetical":"invalidating a poll tax as a discriminatory test for wealth which is irrelevant to protecting the integrity of elections","sentence":"Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369-71, 6 S.Ct. 1064, 30 L.Ed. 220 (1886) (opining that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees equal enjoyment of fundamental liberties and privileges, including the franchise, which is the foundation to all civil rights); see also Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 665-67, 86 S.Ct. 1079, 16 L.Ed.2d 169 (1966) (invalidating a poll tax as a discriminatory test for wealth which is irrelevant to protecting the integrity of elections). \u201cThese provisions are universal in their application, to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any differences of race, of color, or of nationality; and the equal protection of the laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws.\u201d"},"case_id":3219344,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment originated in the post-Civil War era when Congress purposely intended to resolve lingering racial inequalities from disparate application of state laws; it is an instrument by which the federal government may correct official discrimination at the state, commonwealth, or territorial level.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"opining that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees equal enjoyment of fundamental liberties and privileges, including the franchise, which is the foundation to all civil rights","sentence":"Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369-71, 6 S.Ct. 1064, 30 L.Ed. 220 (1886) (opining that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees equal enjoyment of fundamental liberties and privileges, including the franchise, which is the foundation to all civil rights); see also Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 665-67, 86 S.Ct. 1079, 16 L.Ed.2d 169 (1966) (invalidating a poll tax as a discriminatory test for wealth which is irrelevant to protecting the integrity of elections). \u201cThese provisions are universal in their application, to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any differences of race, of color, or of nationality; and the equal protection of the laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws.\u201d"},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"invalidating a poll tax as a discriminatory test for wealth which is irrelevant to protecting the integrity of elections","sentence":"Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369-71, 6 S.Ct. 1064, 30 L.Ed. 220 (1886) (opining that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees equal enjoyment of fundamental liberties and privileges, including the franchise, which is the foundation to all civil rights); see also Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 665-67, 86 S.Ct. 1079, 16 L.Ed.2d 169 (1966) (invalidating a poll tax as a discriminatory test for wealth which is irrelevant to protecting the integrity of elections). \u201cThese provisions are universal in their application, to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any differences of race, of color, or of nationality; and the equal protection of the laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws.\u201d"},"case_id":3219344,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment originated in the post-Civil War era when Congress purposely intended to resolve lingering racial inequalities from disparate application of state laws; it is an instrument by which the federal government may correct official discrimination at the state, commonwealth, or territorial level.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"invalidating a poll tax as a discriminatory test for wealth which is irrelevant to protecting the integrity of elections","sentence":"Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369-71, 6 S.Ct. 1064, 30 L.Ed. 220 (1886) (opining that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees equal enjoyment of fundamental liberties and privileges, including the franchise, which is the foundation to all civil rights); see also Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 665-67, 86 S.Ct. 1079, 16 L.Ed.2d 169 (1966) (invalidating a poll tax as a discriminatory test for wealth which is irrelevant to protecting the integrity of elections). \u201cThese provisions are universal in their application, to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any differences of race, of color, or of nationality; and the equal protection of the laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws.\u201d"},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"opining that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees equal enjoyment of fundamental liberties and privileges, including the franchise, which is the foundation to all civil rights","sentence":"Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369-71, 6 S.Ct. 1064, 30 L.Ed. 220 (1886) (opining that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees equal enjoyment of fundamental liberties and privileges, including the franchise, which is the foundation to all civil rights); see also Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 665-67, 86 S.Ct. 1079, 16 L.Ed.2d 169 (1966) (invalidating a poll tax as a discriminatory test for wealth which is irrelevant to protecting the integrity of elections). \u201cThese provisions are universal in their application, to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any differences of race, of color, or of nationality; and the equal protection of the laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws.\u201d"},"case_id":3219344,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Op. at 253 n.4. If discovery reveals that the Greek government knew its revocation would cause losses to investors in this country, then the revocation may constitute \"an act outside the territory of the United States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere\" that \"causes a direct effect in the United States,\" triggering the third exception.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"Argentina's rescheduling of payment dates for bonds caused direct effect in United States within third exception where bond payees had designated their accounts in New York as the place of payment, and Argentina made some interest payments into those accounts before announcing that it was rescheduling the payments\"","sentence":"See Callejo v. Bancomer, S.A., 764 F.2d 1101, 1112 (5th Cir.1985) (action against Mexican bank for breach of obligations under certificates of deposit issued to American investors comes within third exception where bank \u201cengaged in a regular course of business conduct\u201d with investors \u201cover a several-year period,\u201d having \u201ccalled them in the United States, mailed the certificates to them there, and remitted payments through an American correspondent bank\u201d); cf. Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 112 S.Ct. 2160, 119 L.Ed.2d 394 (1992) (Argentina\u2019s rescheduling of payment dates for bonds caused direct effect in United States within third exception where bond payees had designated their accounts in New York as the place of payment, and Argentina made some interest payments into those accounts before announcing that it was rescheduling the payments\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"764 F.2d 1101, 1112","parenthetical":"action against Mexican bank for breach of obligations under certificates of deposit issued to American investors comes within third exception where bank \"engaged in a regular course of business conduct\" with investors \"over a several-year period,\" having \"called them in the United States, mailed the certificates to them there, and remitted payments through an American correspondent bank\"","sentence":"See Callejo v. Bancomer, S.A., 764 F.2d 1101, 1112 (5th Cir.1985) (action against Mexican bank for breach of obligations under certificates of deposit issued to American investors comes within third exception where bank \u201cengaged in a regular course of business conduct\u201d with investors \u201cover a several-year period,\u201d having \u201ccalled them in the United States, mailed the certificates to them there, and remitted payments through an American correspondent bank\u201d); cf. Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 112 S.Ct. 2160, 119 L.Ed.2d 394 (1992) (Argentina\u2019s rescheduling of payment dates for bonds caused direct effect in United States within third exception where bond payees had designated their accounts in New York as the place of payment, and Argentina made some interest payments into those accounts before announcing that it was rescheduling the payments\u201d)."},"case_id":11833778,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Op. at 253 n.4. If discovery reveals that the Greek government knew its revocation would cause losses to investors in this country, then the revocation may constitute \"an act outside the territory of the United States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere\" that \"causes a direct effect in the United States,\" triggering the third exception.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"Argentina's rescheduling of payment dates for bonds caused direct effect in United States within third exception where bond payees had designated their accounts in New York as the place of payment, and Argentina made some interest payments into those accounts before announcing that it was rescheduling the payments\"","sentence":"See Callejo v. Bancomer, S.A., 764 F.2d 1101, 1112 (5th Cir.1985) (action against Mexican bank for breach of obligations under certificates of deposit issued to American investors comes within third exception where bank \u201cengaged in a regular course of business conduct\u201d with investors \u201cover a several-year period,\u201d having \u201ccalled them in the United States, mailed the certificates to them there, and remitted payments through an American correspondent bank\u201d); cf. Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 112 S.Ct. 2160, 119 L.Ed.2d 394 (1992) (Argentina\u2019s rescheduling of payment dates for bonds caused direct effect in United States within third exception where bond payees had designated their accounts in New York as the place of payment, and Argentina made some interest payments into those accounts before announcing that it was rescheduling the payments\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"764 F.2d 1101, 1112","parenthetical":"action against Mexican bank for breach of obligations under certificates of deposit issued to American investors comes within third exception where bank \"engaged in a regular course of business conduct\" with investors \"over a several-year period,\" having \"called them in the United States, mailed the certificates to them there, and remitted payments through an American correspondent bank\"","sentence":"See Callejo v. Bancomer, S.A., 764 F.2d 1101, 1112 (5th Cir.1985) (action against Mexican bank for breach of obligations under certificates of deposit issued to American investors comes within third exception where bank \u201cengaged in a regular course of business conduct\u201d with investors \u201cover a several-year period,\u201d having \u201ccalled them in the United States, mailed the certificates to them there, and remitted payments through an American correspondent bank\u201d); cf. Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 112 S.Ct. 2160, 119 L.Ed.2d 394 (1992) (Argentina\u2019s rescheduling of payment dates for bonds caused direct effect in United States within third exception where bond payees had designated their accounts in New York as the place of payment, and Argentina made some interest payments into those accounts before announcing that it was rescheduling the payments\u201d)."},"case_id":11833778,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Op. at 253 n.4. If discovery reveals that the Greek government knew its revocation would cause losses to investors in this country, then the revocation may constitute \"an act outside the territory of the United States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere\" that \"causes a direct effect in the United States,\" triggering the third exception.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"764 F.2d 1101, 1112","parenthetical":"action against Mexican bank for breach of obligations under certificates of deposit issued to American investors comes within third exception where bank \"engaged in a regular course of business conduct\" with investors \"over a several-year period,\" having \"called them in the United States, mailed the certificates to them there, and remitted payments through an American correspondent bank\"","sentence":"See Callejo v. Bancomer, S.A., 764 F.2d 1101, 1112 (5th Cir.1985) (action against Mexican bank for breach of obligations under certificates of deposit issued to American investors comes within third exception where bank \u201cengaged in a regular course of business conduct\u201d with investors \u201cover a several-year period,\u201d having \u201ccalled them in the United States, mailed the certificates to them there, and remitted payments through an American correspondent bank\u201d); cf. Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 112 S.Ct. 2160, 119 L.Ed.2d 394 (1992) (Argentina\u2019s rescheduling of payment dates for bonds caused direct effect in United States within third exception where bond payees had designated their accounts in New York as the place of payment, and Argentina made some interest payments into those accounts before announcing that it was rescheduling the payments\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"Argentina's rescheduling of payment dates for bonds caused direct effect in United States within third exception where bond payees had designated their accounts in New York as the place of payment, and Argentina made some interest payments into those accounts before announcing that it was rescheduling the payments\"","sentence":"See Callejo v. Bancomer, S.A., 764 F.2d 1101, 1112 (5th Cir.1985) (action against Mexican bank for breach of obligations under certificates of deposit issued to American investors comes within third exception where bank \u201cengaged in a regular course of business conduct\u201d with investors \u201cover a several-year period,\u201d having \u201ccalled them in the United States, mailed the certificates to them there, and remitted payments through an American correspondent bank\u201d); cf. Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 112 S.Ct. 2160, 119 L.Ed.2d 394 (1992) (Argentina\u2019s rescheduling of payment dates for bonds caused direct effect in United States within third exception where bond payees had designated their accounts in New York as the place of payment, and Argentina made some interest payments into those accounts before announcing that it was rescheduling the payments\u201d)."},"case_id":11833778,"label":"a"}
{"context":". We note that even in non-constitutional cases, the admission of the out-of-court statement of a criminal cohort can be harmful error when the statement is the only direct evidence of the defendant's participation in the crime.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"961 S.W.2d 459, 459-60","parenthetical":"co-defendant's statement that Za-rychta directed him repeatedly to shoot victim was probably given great weight by jury when only other evidence of Zarychta's aid or encouragement was receipt for box of ammunition","sentence":"See, e.g., Zarychta, 961 S.W.2d at 459-60 (co-defendant\u2019s statement that Za-rychta directed him repeatedly to shoot victim was probably given great weight by jury when only other evidence of Zarychta's aid or encouragement was receipt for box of ammunition); see also Cofield v. State, 857 S.W.2d 798, 805 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1993) (statement by Cofield's companion that they had smoked crack cocaine together before police arrived and arrested them was only direct evidence Cofield had possessed cocaine, where paraphernalia was found in Co-field\u2019s car but only companion possessed cocaine), off d, 891 S.W.2d 952 (Tex.Crim.App. 1994)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"857 S.W.2d 798, 805","parenthetical":"statement by Cofield's companion that they had smoked crack cocaine together before police arrived and arrested them was only direct evidence Cofield had possessed cocaine, where paraphernalia was found in Co-field's car but only companion possessed cocaine","sentence":"See, e.g., Zarychta, 961 S.W.2d at 459-60 (co-defendant\u2019s statement that Za-rychta directed him repeatedly to shoot victim was probably given great weight by jury when only other evidence of Zarychta's aid or encouragement was receipt for box of ammunition); see also Cofield v. State, 857 S.W.2d 798, 805 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1993) (statement by Cofield's companion that they had smoked crack cocaine together before police arrived and arrested them was only direct evidence Cofield had possessed cocaine, where paraphernalia was found in Co-field\u2019s car but only companion possessed cocaine), off d, 891 S.W.2d 952 (Tex.Crim.App. 1994)."},"case_id":9278634,"label":"a"}
{"context":". We note that even in non-constitutional cases, the admission of the out-of-court statement of a criminal cohort can be harmful error when the statement is the only direct evidence of the defendant's participation in the crime.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"statement by Cofield's companion that they had smoked crack cocaine together before police arrived and arrested them was only direct evidence Cofield had possessed cocaine, where paraphernalia was found in Co-field's car but only companion possessed cocaine","sentence":"See, e.g., Zarychta, 961 S.W.2d at 459-60 (co-defendant\u2019s statement that Za-rychta directed him repeatedly to shoot victim was probably given great weight by jury when only other evidence of Zarychta's aid or encouragement was receipt for box of ammunition); see also Cofield v. State, 857 S.W.2d 798, 805 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1993) (statement by Cofield's companion that they had smoked crack cocaine together before police arrived and arrested them was only direct evidence Cofield had possessed cocaine, where paraphernalia was found in Co-field\u2019s car but only companion possessed cocaine), off d, 891 S.W.2d 952 (Tex.Crim.App. 1994)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"961 S.W.2d 459, 459-60","parenthetical":"co-defendant's statement that Za-rychta directed him repeatedly to shoot victim was probably given great weight by jury when only other evidence of Zarychta's aid or encouragement was receipt for box of ammunition","sentence":"See, e.g., Zarychta, 961 S.W.2d at 459-60 (co-defendant\u2019s statement that Za-rychta directed him repeatedly to shoot victim was probably given great weight by jury when only other evidence of Zarychta's aid or encouragement was receipt for box of ammunition); see also Cofield v. State, 857 S.W.2d 798, 805 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1993) (statement by Cofield's companion that they had smoked crack cocaine together before police arrived and arrested them was only direct evidence Cofield had possessed cocaine, where paraphernalia was found in Co-field\u2019s car but only companion possessed cocaine), off d, 891 S.W.2d 952 (Tex.Crim.App. 1994)."},"case_id":9278634,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Coleman says his convictions for the two 1975 armed robberies were consolidated for sentencing because he was sentenced for both robberies on the same day in the same court and received concurrent sentences. These facts, in and of themselves, simply do not suggest that the cases were consolidated for sentencing.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"905 F.2d 1296, 1303","parenthetical":"defendant's receiving concurrent sentences for separate offenses does not mean that the cases were consolidated for sentencing","sentence":"See United States v. Smith, 905 F.2d 1296, 1303 (9th Cir.1990) (defendant\u2019s receiving concurrent sentences for separate offenses does not mean that the cases were consolidated for sentencing); United States v. Jones, 899 F.2d 1097, 1101 (11th Cir.1990) (same); United States v. Flores, 875 F.2d 1110, 1114 (5th Cir.1989) (same)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"898 F.2d 46, 46","parenthetical":"sentencing of two cases on same day does not necessitate finding of consolidation","sentence":"See also Metcalf, 898 F.2d at 46 (sentencing of two cases on same day does not necessitate finding of consolidation)."},"case_id":42537,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The individual voter plaintiffs may be harmed by the issuance of this stay. But we find that this harm does not outweigh the other three factors.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"734 F.3d 419, 419","parenthetical":"\"While we acknowledge that Planned Parenthood has also made a strong showing that their interests would be harmed by staying the injunction, given the State's likely success on the merits, this is not enough, standing alone, to outweigh the other factors.\"","sentence":"See Planned Parenthood, 734 F.3d at 419 (\u201cWhile we acknowledge that Planned Parenthood has also made a strong showing that their interests would be harmed by staying the injunction, given the State\u2019s likely success on the merits, this is not enough, standing alone, to outweigh the other factors.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"504 U.S. 428, 441","parenthetical":"\"[T]he right to vote is the right to participate in an electoral process that is necessarily structured to maintain the integrity of the democratic system.\"","sentence":"Cf. Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 441, 112 S.Ct. 2059, 119 L.Ed.2d 245 (1992) (\u201c[T]he right to vote is the right to participate in an electoral process that is necessarily structured to maintain the integrity of the democratic system.\u201d)."},"case_id":4266138,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The individual voter plaintiffs may be harmed by the issuance of this stay. But we find that this harm does not outweigh the other three factors.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[T]he right to vote is the right to participate in an electoral process that is necessarily structured to maintain the integrity of the democratic system.\"","sentence":"Cf. Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 441, 112 S.Ct. 2059, 119 L.Ed.2d 245 (1992) (\u201c[T]he right to vote is the right to participate in an electoral process that is necessarily structured to maintain the integrity of the democratic system.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"734 F.3d 419, 419","parenthetical":"\"While we acknowledge that Planned Parenthood has also made a strong showing that their interests would be harmed by staying the injunction, given the State's likely success on the merits, this is not enough, standing alone, to outweigh the other factors.\"","sentence":"See Planned Parenthood, 734 F.3d at 419 (\u201cWhile we acknowledge that Planned Parenthood has also made a strong showing that their interests would be harmed by staying the injunction, given the State\u2019s likely success on the merits, this is not enough, standing alone, to outweigh the other factors.\u201d)."},"case_id":4266138,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The individual voter plaintiffs may be harmed by the issuance of this stay. But we find that this harm does not outweigh the other three factors.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"734 F.3d 419, 419","parenthetical":"\"While we acknowledge that Planned Parenthood has also made a strong showing that their interests would be harmed by staying the injunction, given the State's likely success on the merits, this is not enough, standing alone, to outweigh the other factors.\"","sentence":"See Planned Parenthood, 734 F.3d at 419 (\u201cWhile we acknowledge that Planned Parenthood has also made a strong showing that their interests would be harmed by staying the injunction, given the State\u2019s likely success on the merits, this is not enough, standing alone, to outweigh the other factors.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[T]he right to vote is the right to participate in an electoral process that is necessarily structured to maintain the integrity of the democratic system.\"","sentence":"Cf. Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 441, 112 S.Ct. 2059, 119 L.Ed.2d 245 (1992) (\u201c[T]he right to vote is the right to participate in an electoral process that is necessarily structured to maintain the integrity of the democratic system.\u201d)."},"case_id":4266138,"label":"a"}
{"context":"But Fortress misconstrues the nature of its own activities in Massachusetts by comparing them with the actions of the defendants in the \"manipulative purchase\" line of cases. In Buccellati and Edberg, the defendants sold their products only on their own websites; they did not place their products into the national stream of commerce through online retailers. Further, the Buccellati and Edberg plaintiffs initiated the defendants' contacts with the forum by seeking out their websites, and in one ease even used a third-party buyer to conceal the true location of the purchaser.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"935 F.Supp.2d 620, 620","parenthetical":"\"Jurisdictional discovery also revealed that Defendants' website ... has made only one sale in [the forum] ... to Plaintiffs' New York-based private investigator .... \"","sentence":"See Buccellati, 935 F.Supp.2d at 620 (\u201cJurisdictional discovery also revealed that Defendants\u2019 website ... has made only one sale in [the forum] ... to Plaintiffs\u2019 New York-based private investigator .... \u201d); see also Edberg, 17 F.Supp.2d at 107 (noting that the defendant\u2019s contact with the forum was not caused by its \u201cpromotion, advertising, or sales activities,\u201d but by the plaintiff hiring a third party to purchase the defendant\u2019s product)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"17 F.Supp.2d 107, 107","parenthetical":"noting that the defendant's contact with the forum was not caused by its \"promotion, advertising, or sales activities,\" but by the plaintiff hiring a third party to purchase the defendant's product","sentence":"See Buccellati, 935 F.Supp.2d at 620 (\u201cJurisdictional discovery also revealed that Defendants\u2019 website ... has made only one sale in [the forum] ... to Plaintiffs\u2019 New York-based private investigator .... \u201d); see also Edberg, 17 F.Supp.2d at 107 (noting that the defendant\u2019s contact with the forum was not caused by its \u201cpromotion, advertising, or sales activities,\u201d but by the plaintiff hiring a third party to purchase the defendant\u2019s product)."},"case_id":4262906,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Based on this fact and the plain language of the statute, the Government maintains that Vial is not entitled to file a second or successive SS 2255 motion because, even if Bailey announced a rule of constitutional law, the Court did not explicitly state that the rule was available on collateral review. Vial protests such a literal reading of the statute, arguing that Bailey is available on collateral review pursuant to Supreme Court precedent.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"499 U.S. 467, 494","parenthetical":"noting that \" 'a showing that the factual or legal basis for a claim was not reasonably available' \" constitutes cause for failing to raise the claim in a previous proceeding","sentence":"See Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 16-17, 83 S.Ct. 1068, 1077-78, 10 L.Ed.2d 148 (1963) (concluding that an intervening change in the law justifies the filing of a \u00a7 2255 motion on an issue previously decided); see also McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 494, 111 S.Ct. 1454, 1470, 113 L.Ed.2d 517 (1991) (noting that \u201c \u2018a showing that the factual or legal basis for a claim was not reasonably available\u2019 \u201d constitutes cause for failing to raise the claim in a previous proceeding) (quoting Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 2645 (1986))."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"373 U.S. 1, 16-17","parenthetical":"concluding that an intervening change in the law justifies the filing of a SS 2255 motion on an issue previously decided","sentence":"See Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 16-17, 83 S.Ct. 1068, 1077-78, 10 L.Ed.2d 148 (1963) (concluding that an intervening change in the law justifies the filing of a \u00a7 2255 motion on an issue previously decided); see also McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 494, 111 S.Ct. 1454, 1470, 113 L.Ed.2d 517 (1991) (noting that \u201c \u2018a showing that the factual or legal basis for a claim was not reasonably available\u2019 \u201d constitutes cause for failing to raise the claim in a previous proceeding) (quoting Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 2645 (1986))."},"case_id":11991262,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Based on this fact and the plain language of the statute, the Government maintains that Vial is not entitled to file a second or successive SS 2255 motion because, even if Bailey announced a rule of constitutional law, the Court did not explicitly state that the rule was available on collateral review. Vial protests such a literal reading of the statute, arguing that Bailey is available on collateral review pursuant to Supreme Court precedent.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"373 U.S. 1, 16-17","parenthetical":"concluding that an intervening change in the law justifies the filing of a SS 2255 motion on an issue previously decided","sentence":"See Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 16-17, 83 S.Ct. 1068, 1077-78, 10 L.Ed.2d 148 (1963) (concluding that an intervening change in the law justifies the filing of a \u00a7 2255 motion on an issue previously decided); see also McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 494, 111 S.Ct. 1454, 1470, 113 L.Ed.2d 517 (1991) (noting that \u201c \u2018a showing that the factual or legal basis for a claim was not reasonably available\u2019 \u201d constitutes cause for failing to raise the claim in a previous proceeding) (quoting Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 2645 (1986))."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"111 S.Ct. 1454, 1470","parenthetical":"noting that \" 'a showing that the factual or legal basis for a claim was not reasonably available' \" constitutes cause for failing to raise the claim in a previous proceeding","sentence":"See Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 16-17, 83 S.Ct. 1068, 1077-78, 10 L.Ed.2d 148 (1963) (concluding that an intervening change in the law justifies the filing of a \u00a7 2255 motion on an issue previously decided); see also McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 494, 111 S.Ct. 1454, 1470, 113 L.Ed.2d 517 (1991) (noting that \u201c \u2018a showing that the factual or legal basis for a claim was not reasonably available\u2019 \u201d constitutes cause for failing to raise the claim in a previous proceeding) (quoting Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 2645 (1986))."},"case_id":11991262,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Based on this fact and the plain language of the statute, the Government maintains that Vial is not entitled to file a second or successive SS 2255 motion because, even if Bailey announced a rule of constitutional law, the Court did not explicitly state that the rule was available on collateral review. Vial protests such a literal reading of the statute, arguing that Bailey is available on collateral review pursuant to Supreme Court precedent.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting that \" 'a showing that the factual or legal basis for a claim was not reasonably available' \" constitutes cause for failing to raise the claim in a previous proceeding","sentence":"See Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 16-17, 83 S.Ct. 1068, 1077-78, 10 L.Ed.2d 148 (1963) (concluding that an intervening change in the law justifies the filing of a \u00a7 2255 motion on an issue previously decided); see also McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 494, 111 S.Ct. 1454, 1470, 113 L.Ed.2d 517 (1991) (noting that \u201c \u2018a showing that the factual or legal basis for a claim was not reasonably available\u2019 \u201d constitutes cause for failing to raise the claim in a previous proceeding) (quoting Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 2645 (1986))."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"373 U.S. 1, 16-17","parenthetical":"concluding that an intervening change in the law justifies the filing of a SS 2255 motion on an issue previously decided","sentence":"See Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 16-17, 83 S.Ct. 1068, 1077-78, 10 L.Ed.2d 148 (1963) (concluding that an intervening change in the law justifies the filing of a \u00a7 2255 motion on an issue previously decided); see also McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 494, 111 S.Ct. 1454, 1470, 113 L.Ed.2d 517 (1991) (noting that \u201c \u2018a showing that the factual or legal basis for a claim was not reasonably available\u2019 \u201d constitutes cause for failing to raise the claim in a previous proceeding) (quoting Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 2645 (1986))."},"case_id":11991262,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Based on this fact and the plain language of the statute, the Government maintains that Vial is not entitled to file a second or successive SS 2255 motion because, even if Bailey announced a rule of constitutional law, the Court did not explicitly state that the rule was available on collateral review. Vial protests such a literal reading of the statute, arguing that Bailey is available on collateral review pursuant to Supreme Court precedent.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"83 S.Ct. 1068, 1077-78","parenthetical":"concluding that an intervening change in the law justifies the filing of a SS 2255 motion on an issue previously decided","sentence":"See Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 16-17, 83 S.Ct. 1068, 1077-78, 10 L.Ed.2d 148 (1963) (concluding that an intervening change in the law justifies the filing of a \u00a7 2255 motion on an issue previously decided); see also McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 494, 111 S.Ct. 1454, 1470, 113 L.Ed.2d 517 (1991) (noting that \u201c \u2018a showing that the factual or legal basis for a claim was not reasonably available\u2019 \u201d constitutes cause for failing to raise the claim in a previous proceeding) (quoting Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 2645 (1986))."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"499 U.S. 467, 494","parenthetical":"noting that \" 'a showing that the factual or legal basis for a claim was not reasonably available' \" constitutes cause for failing to raise the claim in a previous proceeding","sentence":"See Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 16-17, 83 S.Ct. 1068, 1077-78, 10 L.Ed.2d 148 (1963) (concluding that an intervening change in the law justifies the filing of a \u00a7 2255 motion on an issue previously decided); see also McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 494, 111 S.Ct. 1454, 1470, 113 L.Ed.2d 517 (1991) (noting that \u201c \u2018a showing that the factual or legal basis for a claim was not reasonably available\u2019 \u201d constitutes cause for failing to raise the claim in a previous proceeding) (quoting Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 2645 (1986))."},"case_id":11991262,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Based on this fact and the plain language of the statute, the Government maintains that Vial is not entitled to file a second or successive SS 2255 motion because, even if Bailey announced a rule of constitutional law, the Court did not explicitly state that the rule was available on collateral review. Vial protests such a literal reading of the statute, arguing that Bailey is available on collateral review pursuant to Supreme Court precedent.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"111 S.Ct. 1454, 1470","parenthetical":"noting that \" 'a showing that the factual or legal basis for a claim was not reasonably available' \" constitutes cause for failing to raise the claim in a previous proceeding","sentence":"See Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 16-17, 83 S.Ct. 1068, 1077-78, 10 L.Ed.2d 148 (1963) (concluding that an intervening change in the law justifies the filing of a \u00a7 2255 motion on an issue previously decided); see also McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 494, 111 S.Ct. 1454, 1470, 113 L.Ed.2d 517 (1991) (noting that \u201c \u2018a showing that the factual or legal basis for a claim was not reasonably available\u2019 \u201d constitutes cause for failing to raise the claim in a previous proceeding) (quoting Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 2645 (1986))."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"83 S.Ct. 1068, 1077-78","parenthetical":"concluding that an intervening change in the law justifies the filing of a SS 2255 motion on an issue previously decided","sentence":"See Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 16-17, 83 S.Ct. 1068, 1077-78, 10 L.Ed.2d 148 (1963) (concluding that an intervening change in the law justifies the filing of a \u00a7 2255 motion on an issue previously decided); see also McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 494, 111 S.Ct. 1454, 1470, 113 L.Ed.2d 517 (1991) (noting that \u201c \u2018a showing that the factual or legal basis for a claim was not reasonably available\u2019 \u201d constitutes cause for failing to raise the claim in a previous proceeding) (quoting Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 2645 (1986))."},"case_id":11991262,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Based on this fact and the plain language of the statute, the Government maintains that Vial is not entitled to file a second or successive SS 2255 motion because, even if Bailey announced a rule of constitutional law, the Court did not explicitly state that the rule was available on collateral review. Vial protests such a literal reading of the statute, arguing that Bailey is available on collateral review pursuant to Supreme Court precedent.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"83 S.Ct. 1068, 1077-78","parenthetical":"concluding that an intervening change in the law justifies the filing of a SS 2255 motion on an issue previously decided","sentence":"See Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 16-17, 83 S.Ct. 1068, 1077-78, 10 L.Ed.2d 148 (1963) (concluding that an intervening change in the law justifies the filing of a \u00a7 2255 motion on an issue previously decided); see also McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 494, 111 S.Ct. 1454, 1470, 113 L.Ed.2d 517 (1991) (noting that \u201c \u2018a showing that the factual or legal basis for a claim was not reasonably available\u2019 \u201d constitutes cause for failing to raise the claim in a previous proceeding) (quoting Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 2645 (1986))."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting that \" 'a showing that the factual or legal basis for a claim was not reasonably available' \" constitutes cause for failing to raise the claim in a previous proceeding","sentence":"See Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 16-17, 83 S.Ct. 1068, 1077-78, 10 L.Ed.2d 148 (1963) (concluding that an intervening change in the law justifies the filing of a \u00a7 2255 motion on an issue previously decided); see also McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 494, 111 S.Ct. 1454, 1470, 113 L.Ed.2d 517 (1991) (noting that \u201c \u2018a showing that the factual or legal basis for a claim was not reasonably available\u2019 \u201d constitutes cause for failing to raise the claim in a previous proceeding) (quoting Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 2645 (1986))."},"case_id":11991262,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Based on this fact and the plain language of the statute, the Government maintains that Vial is not entitled to file a second or successive SS 2255 motion because, even if Bailey announced a rule of constitutional law, the Court did not explicitly state that the rule was available on collateral review. Vial protests such a literal reading of the statute, arguing that Bailey is available on collateral review pursuant to Supreme Court precedent.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"concluding that an intervening change in the law justifies the filing of a SS 2255 motion on an issue previously decided","sentence":"See Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 16-17, 83 S.Ct. 1068, 1077-78, 10 L.Ed.2d 148 (1963) (concluding that an intervening change in the law justifies the filing of a \u00a7 2255 motion on an issue previously decided); see also McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 494, 111 S.Ct. 1454, 1470, 113 L.Ed.2d 517 (1991) (noting that \u201c \u2018a showing that the factual or legal basis for a claim was not reasonably available\u2019 \u201d constitutes cause for failing to raise the claim in a previous proceeding) (quoting Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 2645 (1986))."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"499 U.S. 467, 494","parenthetical":"noting that \" 'a showing that the factual or legal basis for a claim was not reasonably available' \" constitutes cause for failing to raise the claim in a previous proceeding","sentence":"See Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 16-17, 83 S.Ct. 1068, 1077-78, 10 L.Ed.2d 148 (1963) (concluding that an intervening change in the law justifies the filing of a \u00a7 2255 motion on an issue previously decided); see also McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 494, 111 S.Ct. 1454, 1470, 113 L.Ed.2d 517 (1991) (noting that \u201c \u2018a showing that the factual or legal basis for a claim was not reasonably available\u2019 \u201d constitutes cause for failing to raise the claim in a previous proceeding) (quoting Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 2645 (1986))."},"case_id":11991262,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Based on this fact and the plain language of the statute, the Government maintains that Vial is not entitled to file a second or successive SS 2255 motion because, even if Bailey announced a rule of constitutional law, the Court did not explicitly state that the rule was available on collateral review. Vial protests such a literal reading of the statute, arguing that Bailey is available on collateral review pursuant to Supreme Court precedent.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"concluding that an intervening change in the law justifies the filing of a SS 2255 motion on an issue previously decided","sentence":"See Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 16-17, 83 S.Ct. 1068, 1077-78, 10 L.Ed.2d 148 (1963) (concluding that an intervening change in the law justifies the filing of a \u00a7 2255 motion on an issue previously decided); see also McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 494, 111 S.Ct. 1454, 1470, 113 L.Ed.2d 517 (1991) (noting that \u201c \u2018a showing that the factual or legal basis for a claim was not reasonably available\u2019 \u201d constitutes cause for failing to raise the claim in a previous proceeding) (quoting Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 2645 (1986))."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"111 S.Ct. 1454, 1470","parenthetical":"noting that \" 'a showing that the factual or legal basis for a claim was not reasonably available' \" constitutes cause for failing to raise the claim in a previous proceeding","sentence":"See Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 16-17, 83 S.Ct. 1068, 1077-78, 10 L.Ed.2d 148 (1963) (concluding that an intervening change in the law justifies the filing of a \u00a7 2255 motion on an issue previously decided); see also McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 494, 111 S.Ct. 1454, 1470, 113 L.Ed.2d 517 (1991) (noting that \u201c \u2018a showing that the factual or legal basis for a claim was not reasonably available\u2019 \u201d constitutes cause for failing to raise the claim in a previous proceeding) (quoting Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 2645 (1986))."},"case_id":11991262,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Based on this fact and the plain language of the statute, the Government maintains that Vial is not entitled to file a second or successive SS 2255 motion because, even if Bailey announced a rule of constitutional law, the Court did not explicitly state that the rule was available on collateral review. Vial protests such a literal reading of the statute, arguing that Bailey is available on collateral review pursuant to Supreme Court precedent.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"concluding that an intervening change in the law justifies the filing of a SS 2255 motion on an issue previously decided","sentence":"See Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 16-17, 83 S.Ct. 1068, 1077-78, 10 L.Ed.2d 148 (1963) (concluding that an intervening change in the law justifies the filing of a \u00a7 2255 motion on an issue previously decided); see also McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 494, 111 S.Ct. 1454, 1470, 113 L.Ed.2d 517 (1991) (noting that \u201c \u2018a showing that the factual or legal basis for a claim was not reasonably available\u2019 \u201d constitutes cause for failing to raise the claim in a previous proceeding) (quoting Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 2645 (1986))."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting that \" 'a showing that the factual or legal basis for a claim was not reasonably available' \" constitutes cause for failing to raise the claim in a previous proceeding","sentence":"See Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 16-17, 83 S.Ct. 1068, 1077-78, 10 L.Ed.2d 148 (1963) (concluding that an intervening change in the law justifies the filing of a \u00a7 2255 motion on an issue previously decided); see also McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 494, 111 S.Ct. 1454, 1470, 113 L.Ed.2d 517 (1991) (noting that \u201c \u2018a showing that the factual or legal basis for a claim was not reasonably available\u2019 \u201d constitutes cause for failing to raise the claim in a previous proceeding) (quoting Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 2645 (1986))."},"case_id":11991262,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The advanced progress of discovery, the length of time since removal, and the more substantial involvement of the Court tip the balance of interests closer to retention of jurisdiction here than in Thelen. Similar to Thelen, however, is the fact that the state law claims here are departing on a motion to dismiss, not summary judgment.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"988 F.Supp. 1255, 1261","parenthetical":"where plaintiff conceded summary judgment on the federal claim eleven months after removal, court found the resources invested in pre-trial administration justified retaining jurisdiction","sentence":"See id. at *2 (distinguishing voluntary dismissal of claims from a concession of the merits on summary judgment, finding voluntary dismissal weighed in favor of remand) (citing Hansen v. Sioux By-Products, 988 F.Supp. 1255, 1261 (N.D.Iowa 1997) (where plaintiff conceded summary judgment on the federal claim eleven months after removal, court found the resources invested in pre-trial administration justified retaining jurisdiction)); see also Grain Land Coop v. Kar Kim Farms, 199 F.3d 983, 993 (8th Cir.1999) (when the district court has invested substantial resources in ruling on summary judgment, it is not an abuse of discretion for the court to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, even when all federal claims are disposed of before trial) (citing Murray v. Wal-Mart, Inc., 874 F.2d 555, 558 (8th Cir.1989) (a substantial investment of judicial time and resources may justify a district court\u2019s exercise of jurisdiction over state law claims even when all federal claims are dismissed)); cf. Brandenburg v. Housing Auth. of Irvine, 253 F.3d 891, 900 (6th Cir.2001) (\u201cthe usual course is for the district court to dismiss the state-law claims without prejudice if all federal claims are disposed of on summary judgment.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"253 F.3d 891, 900","parenthetical":"\"the usual course is for the district court to dismiss the state-law claims without prejudice if all federal claims are disposed of on summary judgment.\"","sentence":"See id. at *2 (distinguishing voluntary dismissal of claims from a concession of the merits on summary judgment, finding voluntary dismissal weighed in favor of remand) (citing Hansen v. Sioux By-Products, 988 F.Supp. 1255, 1261 (N.D.Iowa 1997) (where plaintiff conceded summary judgment on the federal claim eleven months after removal, court found the resources invested in pre-trial administration justified retaining jurisdiction)); see also Grain Land Coop v. Kar Kim Farms, 199 F.3d 983, 993 (8th Cir.1999) (when the district court has invested substantial resources in ruling on summary judgment, it is not an abuse of discretion for the court to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, even when all federal claims are disposed of before trial) (citing Murray v. Wal-Mart, Inc., 874 F.2d 555, 558 (8th Cir.1989) (a substantial investment of judicial time and resources may justify a district court\u2019s exercise of jurisdiction over state law claims even when all federal claims are dismissed)); cf. Brandenburg v. Housing Auth. of Irvine, 253 F.3d 891, 900 (6th Cir.2001) (\u201cthe usual course is for the district court to dismiss the state-law claims without prejudice if all federal claims are disposed of on summary judgment.\u201d)."},"case_id":3800299,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Moreover, that some additional litigation may later arise to enforce an injunction does not itself justify abstaining from deciding a constitutional claim. Any plaintiff who obtains equitable relief under 42 U.S.C. SS 1983 enforcing his constitutional rights against a state official may need to return to court to ensure compliance with the judgment.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"upholding procedures established by the district court to ensure compliance with an injunction","sentence":"See, e.g., Gluth v. Kangas, 951 F.2d 1504 (9th Cir.1991) (upholding procedures established by the district court to ensure compliance with an injunction); cf. Brown v. Plata, \u2014 U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 1910, 1946, 179 L.Ed.2d 969 (2011) (\u201cA court that invokes equity\u2019s power to remedy a constitutional violation by an injunction mandating systemic changes to an institution has the continuing duty and responsibility to assess the efficacy and consequences of its order.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"131 S.Ct. 1910, 1946","parenthetical":"\"A court that invokes equity's power to remedy a constitutional violation by an injunction mandating systemic changes to an institution has the continuing duty and responsibility to assess the efficacy and consequences of its order.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Gluth v. Kangas, 951 F.2d 1504 (9th Cir.1991) (upholding procedures established by the district court to ensure compliance with an injunction); cf. Brown v. Plata, \u2014 U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 1910, 1946, 179 L.Ed.2d 969 (2011) (\u201cA court that invokes equity\u2019s power to remedy a constitutional violation by an injunction mandating systemic changes to an institution has the continuing duty and responsibility to assess the efficacy and consequences of its order.\u201d)."},"case_id":4067451,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Moreover, that some additional litigation may later arise to enforce an injunction does not itself justify abstaining from deciding a constitutional claim. Any plaintiff who obtains equitable relief under 42 U.S.C. SS 1983 enforcing his constitutional rights against a state official may need to return to court to ensure compliance with the judgment.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"A court that invokes equity's power to remedy a constitutional violation by an injunction mandating systemic changes to an institution has the continuing duty and responsibility to assess the efficacy and consequences of its order.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Gluth v. Kangas, 951 F.2d 1504 (9th Cir.1991) (upholding procedures established by the district court to ensure compliance with an injunction); cf. Brown v. Plata, \u2014 U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 1910, 1946, 179 L.Ed.2d 969 (2011) (\u201cA court that invokes equity\u2019s power to remedy a constitutional violation by an injunction mandating systemic changes to an institution has the continuing duty and responsibility to assess the efficacy and consequences of its order.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"upholding procedures established by the district court to ensure compliance with an injunction","sentence":"See, e.g., Gluth v. Kangas, 951 F.2d 1504 (9th Cir.1991) (upholding procedures established by the district court to ensure compliance with an injunction); cf. Brown v. Plata, \u2014 U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 1910, 1946, 179 L.Ed.2d 969 (2011) (\u201cA court that invokes equity\u2019s power to remedy a constitutional violation by an injunction mandating systemic changes to an institution has the continuing duty and responsibility to assess the efficacy and consequences of its order.\u201d)."},"case_id":4067451,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Code of Children and Adolescents of Peru art. 74(e). Such patria potestas rights, which Correa received when the Children were born, are recognized as \"rights of custody\" within the meaning of the Hague Convention.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"230 F.3d 459, 459","parenthetical":"holding that patria potestas rights under Mexican law are custody rights under the Hague Convention","sentence":"See Whallon, 230 F.3d at 459 (holding that patria potestas rights under Mexican law are custody rights under the Hague Convention)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"445 F.3d 346, 350","parenthetical":"holding that German law presumptively confers joint custody upon both parents until a court enters a contrary order","sentence":"Cf. Bader v. Kramer, 445 F.3d 346, 350 (4th Cir.2006) (holding that German law presumptively confers joint custody upon both parents until a court enters a contrary order)."},"case_id":4360110,"label":"a"}
{"context":"District courts have discretion to treat Rule 12(b)(1) motions as either facial or factual challenges to their subject matter jurisdiction.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"220 F.3d 176, 176","parenthetical":"\"A Rule 12(b)(1) motion may be treated as either a facial or factual challenge to the court's subject matter jurisdiction.\"","sentence":"See Gibbs v. Buck, 307 U.S. 66, 71-72, 59 S.Ct. 725, 83 L.Ed. 1111 (1939) (\u201cAs there is no statutory direction for procedure upon an issue of jurisdiction, the mode of its determination is left to the trial court.\u201d); 5B Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure \u00a7 1350 n.47 (3d ed. 2004); see also Gould Elecs., Inc., 220 F.3d at 176 (\u201cA Rule 12(b)(1) motion may be treated as either a facial or factual challenge to the court\u2019s subject matter jurisdiction.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"307 U.S. 66, 71-72","parenthetical":"\"As there is no statutory direction for procedure upon an issue of jurisdiction, the mode of its determination is left to the trial court.\"","sentence":"See Gibbs v. Buck, 307 U.S. 66, 71-72, 59 S.Ct. 725, 83 L.Ed. 1111 (1939) (\u201cAs there is no statutory direction for procedure upon an issue of jurisdiction, the mode of its determination is left to the trial court.\u201d); 5B Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure \u00a7 1350 n.47 (3d ed. 2004); see also Gould Elecs., Inc., 220 F.3d at 176 (\u201cA Rule 12(b)(1) motion may be treated as either a facial or factual challenge to the court\u2019s subject matter jurisdiction.\u201d)."},"case_id":5897451,"label":"b"}
{"context":"District courts have discretion to treat Rule 12(b)(1) motions as either facial or factual challenges to their subject matter jurisdiction.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"220 F.3d 176, 176","parenthetical":"\"A Rule 12(b)(1) motion may be treated as either a facial or factual challenge to the court's subject matter jurisdiction.\"","sentence":"See Gibbs v. Buck, 307 U.S. 66, 71-72, 59 S.Ct. 725, 83 L.Ed. 1111 (1939) (\u201cAs there is no statutory direction for procedure upon an issue of jurisdiction, the mode of its determination is left to the trial court.\u201d); 5B Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure \u00a7 1350 n.47 (3d ed. 2004); see also Gould Elecs., Inc., 220 F.3d at 176 (\u201cA Rule 12(b)(1) motion may be treated as either a facial or factual challenge to the court\u2019s subject matter jurisdiction.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"As there is no statutory direction for procedure upon an issue of jurisdiction, the mode of its determination is left to the trial court.\"","sentence":"See Gibbs v. Buck, 307 U.S. 66, 71-72, 59 S.Ct. 725, 83 L.Ed. 1111 (1939) (\u201cAs there is no statutory direction for procedure upon an issue of jurisdiction, the mode of its determination is left to the trial court.\u201d); 5B Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure \u00a7 1350 n.47 (3d ed. 2004); see also Gould Elecs., Inc., 220 F.3d at 176 (\u201cA Rule 12(b)(1) motion may be treated as either a facial or factual challenge to the court\u2019s subject matter jurisdiction.\u201d)."},"case_id":5897451,"label":"b"}
{"context":"District courts have discretion to treat Rule 12(b)(1) motions as either facial or factual challenges to their subject matter jurisdiction.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"As there is no statutory direction for procedure upon an issue of jurisdiction, the mode of its determination is left to the trial court.\"","sentence":"See Gibbs v. Buck, 307 U.S. 66, 71-72, 59 S.Ct. 725, 83 L.Ed. 1111 (1939) (\u201cAs there is no statutory direction for procedure upon an issue of jurisdiction, the mode of its determination is left to the trial court.\u201d); 5B Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure \u00a7 1350 n.47 (3d ed. 2004); see also Gould Elecs., Inc., 220 F.3d at 176 (\u201cA Rule 12(b)(1) motion may be treated as either a facial or factual challenge to the court\u2019s subject matter jurisdiction.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"220 F.3d 176, 176","parenthetical":"\"A Rule 12(b)(1) motion may be treated as either a facial or factual challenge to the court's subject matter jurisdiction.\"","sentence":"See Gibbs v. Buck, 307 U.S. 66, 71-72, 59 S.Ct. 725, 83 L.Ed. 1111 (1939) (\u201cAs there is no statutory direction for procedure upon an issue of jurisdiction, the mode of its determination is left to the trial court.\u201d); 5B Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure \u00a7 1350 n.47 (3d ed. 2004); see also Gould Elecs., Inc., 220 F.3d at 176 (\u201cA Rule 12(b)(1) motion may be treated as either a facial or factual challenge to the court\u2019s subject matter jurisdiction.\u201d)."},"case_id":5897451,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Section 2255(f) does not define \"judgment of conviction\" or \"final.\" Nonetheless, we have concluded that when a defendant does not appeal his conviction or sentence, the judgment of conviction becomes final when the time for seeking that review expires.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"218 F.3d 1252, 1253","parenthetical":"noting that when no direct appeal was taken from the original judgment of conviction, the judgment of conviction became final when the time for filing a direct appeal expired","sentence":"Mederos v. United States, 218 F.3d 1252, 1253 (11th Cir.2000) (noting that when no direct appeal was taken from the original judgment of conviction, the judgment of conviction became final when the time for filing a direct appeal expired); Akins v. United States, 204 F.3d 1086, 1089 n. 1 (11th Cir.2000) (\u201cA conviction ordinarily becomes final when the opportunity for direct appeal of the judgment of conviction has been exhausted.\u201d); cf. Clay v. United States, 537 U.S. 522, 527, 123 S.Ct. 1072, 1076, 155 L.Ed.2d 88 (2003) (\u201cFinality attaches when this Court affirms a conviction on the merits on direct review or denies a petition for a writ of certiorari, or when the time for filing a certiorari petition expires.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"537 U.S. 522, 527","parenthetical":"\"Finality attaches when this Court affirms a conviction on the merits on direct review or denies a petition for a writ of certiorari, or when the time for filing a certiorari petition expires.\"","sentence":"Mederos v. United States, 218 F.3d 1252, 1253 (11th Cir.2000) (noting that when no direct appeal was taken from the original judgment of conviction, the judgment of conviction became final when the time for filing a direct appeal expired); Akins v. United States, 204 F.3d 1086, 1089 n. 1 (11th Cir.2000) (\u201cA conviction ordinarily becomes final when the opportunity for direct appeal of the judgment of conviction has been exhausted.\u201d); cf. Clay v. United States, 537 U.S. 522, 527, 123 S.Ct. 1072, 1076, 155 L.Ed.2d 88 (2003) (\u201cFinality attaches when this Court affirms a conviction on the merits on direct review or denies a petition for a writ of certiorari, or when the time for filing a certiorari petition expires.\u201d)."},"case_id":4095325,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Section 2255(f) does not define \"judgment of conviction\" or \"final.\" Nonetheless, we have concluded that when a defendant does not appeal his conviction or sentence, the judgment of conviction becomes final when the time for seeking that review expires.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"123 S.Ct. 1072, 1076","parenthetical":"\"Finality attaches when this Court affirms a conviction on the merits on direct review or denies a petition for a writ of certiorari, or when the time for filing a certiorari petition expires.\"","sentence":"Mederos v. United States, 218 F.3d 1252, 1253 (11th Cir.2000) (noting that when no direct appeal was taken from the original judgment of conviction, the judgment of conviction became final when the time for filing a direct appeal expired); Akins v. United States, 204 F.3d 1086, 1089 n. 1 (11th Cir.2000) (\u201cA conviction ordinarily becomes final when the opportunity for direct appeal of the judgment of conviction has been exhausted.\u201d); cf. Clay v. United States, 537 U.S. 522, 527, 123 S.Ct. 1072, 1076, 155 L.Ed.2d 88 (2003) (\u201cFinality attaches when this Court affirms a conviction on the merits on direct review or denies a petition for a writ of certiorari, or when the time for filing a certiorari petition expires.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"218 F.3d 1252, 1253","parenthetical":"noting that when no direct appeal was taken from the original judgment of conviction, the judgment of conviction became final when the time for filing a direct appeal expired","sentence":"Mederos v. United States, 218 F.3d 1252, 1253 (11th Cir.2000) (noting that when no direct appeal was taken from the original judgment of conviction, the judgment of conviction became final when the time for filing a direct appeal expired); Akins v. United States, 204 F.3d 1086, 1089 n. 1 (11th Cir.2000) (\u201cA conviction ordinarily becomes final when the opportunity for direct appeal of the judgment of conviction has been exhausted.\u201d); cf. Clay v. United States, 537 U.S. 522, 527, 123 S.Ct. 1072, 1076, 155 L.Ed.2d 88 (2003) (\u201cFinality attaches when this Court affirms a conviction on the merits on direct review or denies a petition for a writ of certiorari, or when the time for filing a certiorari petition expires.\u201d)."},"case_id":4095325,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Section 2255(f) does not define \"judgment of conviction\" or \"final.\" Nonetheless, we have concluded that when a defendant does not appeal his conviction or sentence, the judgment of conviction becomes final when the time for seeking that review expires.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"218 F.3d 1252, 1253","parenthetical":"noting that when no direct appeal was taken from the original judgment of conviction, the judgment of conviction became final when the time for filing a direct appeal expired","sentence":"Mederos v. United States, 218 F.3d 1252, 1253 (11th Cir.2000) (noting that when no direct appeal was taken from the original judgment of conviction, the judgment of conviction became final when the time for filing a direct appeal expired); Akins v. United States, 204 F.3d 1086, 1089 n. 1 (11th Cir.2000) (\u201cA conviction ordinarily becomes final when the opportunity for direct appeal of the judgment of conviction has been exhausted.\u201d); cf. Clay v. United States, 537 U.S. 522, 527, 123 S.Ct. 1072, 1076, 155 L.Ed.2d 88 (2003) (\u201cFinality attaches when this Court affirms a conviction on the merits on direct review or denies a petition for a writ of certiorari, or when the time for filing a certiorari petition expires.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"Finality attaches when this Court affirms a conviction on the merits on direct review or denies a petition for a writ of certiorari, or when the time for filing a certiorari petition expires.\"","sentence":"Mederos v. United States, 218 F.3d 1252, 1253 (11th Cir.2000) (noting that when no direct appeal was taken from the original judgment of conviction, the judgment of conviction became final when the time for filing a direct appeal expired); Akins v. United States, 204 F.3d 1086, 1089 n. 1 (11th Cir.2000) (\u201cA conviction ordinarily becomes final when the opportunity for direct appeal of the judgment of conviction has been exhausted.\u201d); cf. Clay v. United States, 537 U.S. 522, 527, 123 S.Ct. 1072, 1076, 155 L.Ed.2d 88 (2003) (\u201cFinality attaches when this Court affirms a conviction on the merits on direct review or denies a petition for a writ of certiorari, or when the time for filing a certiorari petition expires.\u201d)."},"case_id":4095325,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Section 2255(f) does not define \"judgment of conviction\" or \"final.\" Nonetheless, we have concluded that when a defendant does not appeal his conviction or sentence, the judgment of conviction becomes final when the time for seeking that review expires.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"537 U.S. 522, 527","parenthetical":"\"Finality attaches when this Court affirms a conviction on the merits on direct review or denies a petition for a writ of certiorari, or when the time for filing a certiorari petition expires.\"","sentence":"Mederos v. United States, 218 F.3d 1252, 1253 (11th Cir.2000) (noting that when no direct appeal was taken from the original judgment of conviction, the judgment of conviction became final when the time for filing a direct appeal expired); Akins v. United States, 204 F.3d 1086, 1089 n. 1 (11th Cir.2000) (\u201cA conviction ordinarily becomes final when the opportunity for direct appeal of the judgment of conviction has been exhausted.\u201d); cf. Clay v. United States, 537 U.S. 522, 527, 123 S.Ct. 1072, 1076, 155 L.Ed.2d 88 (2003) (\u201cFinality attaches when this Court affirms a conviction on the merits on direct review or denies a petition for a writ of certiorari, or when the time for filing a certiorari petition expires.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"A conviction ordinarily becomes final when the opportunity for direct appeal of the judgment of conviction has been exhausted.\"","sentence":"Mederos v. United States, 218 F.3d 1252, 1253 (11th Cir.2000) (noting that when no direct appeal was taken from the original judgment of conviction, the judgment of conviction became final when the time for filing a direct appeal expired); Akins v. United States, 204 F.3d 1086, 1089 n. 1 (11th Cir.2000) (\u201cA conviction ordinarily becomes final when the opportunity for direct appeal of the judgment of conviction has been exhausted.\u201d); cf. Clay v. United States, 537 U.S. 522, 527, 123 S.Ct. 1072, 1076, 155 L.Ed.2d 88 (2003) (\u201cFinality attaches when this Court affirms a conviction on the merits on direct review or denies a petition for a writ of certiorari, or when the time for filing a certiorari petition expires.\u201d)."},"case_id":4095325,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Section 2255(f) does not define \"judgment of conviction\" or \"final.\" Nonetheless, we have concluded that when a defendant does not appeal his conviction or sentence, the judgment of conviction becomes final when the time for seeking that review expires.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"A conviction ordinarily becomes final when the opportunity for direct appeal of the judgment of conviction has been exhausted.\"","sentence":"Mederos v. United States, 218 F.3d 1252, 1253 (11th Cir.2000) (noting that when no direct appeal was taken from the original judgment of conviction, the judgment of conviction became final when the time for filing a direct appeal expired); Akins v. United States, 204 F.3d 1086, 1089 n. 1 (11th Cir.2000) (\u201cA conviction ordinarily becomes final when the opportunity for direct appeal of the judgment of conviction has been exhausted.\u201d); cf. Clay v. United States, 537 U.S. 522, 527, 123 S.Ct. 1072, 1076, 155 L.Ed.2d 88 (2003) (\u201cFinality attaches when this Court affirms a conviction on the merits on direct review or denies a petition for a writ of certiorari, or when the time for filing a certiorari petition expires.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"123 S.Ct. 1072, 1076","parenthetical":"\"Finality attaches when this Court affirms a conviction on the merits on direct review or denies a petition for a writ of certiorari, or when the time for filing a certiorari petition expires.\"","sentence":"Mederos v. United States, 218 F.3d 1252, 1253 (11th Cir.2000) (noting that when no direct appeal was taken from the original judgment of conviction, the judgment of conviction became final when the time for filing a direct appeal expired); Akins v. United States, 204 F.3d 1086, 1089 n. 1 (11th Cir.2000) (\u201cA conviction ordinarily becomes final when the opportunity for direct appeal of the judgment of conviction has been exhausted.\u201d); cf. Clay v. United States, 537 U.S. 522, 527, 123 S.Ct. 1072, 1076, 155 L.Ed.2d 88 (2003) (\u201cFinality attaches when this Court affirms a conviction on the merits on direct review or denies a petition for a writ of certiorari, or when the time for filing a certiorari petition expires.\u201d)."},"case_id":4095325,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Section 2255(f) does not define \"judgment of conviction\" or \"final.\" Nonetheless, we have concluded that when a defendant does not appeal his conviction or sentence, the judgment of conviction becomes final when the time for seeking that review expires.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"Finality attaches when this Court affirms a conviction on the merits on direct review or denies a petition for a writ of certiorari, or when the time for filing a certiorari petition expires.\"","sentence":"Mederos v. United States, 218 F.3d 1252, 1253 (11th Cir.2000) (noting that when no direct appeal was taken from the original judgment of conviction, the judgment of conviction became final when the time for filing a direct appeal expired); Akins v. United States, 204 F.3d 1086, 1089 n. 1 (11th Cir.2000) (\u201cA conviction ordinarily becomes final when the opportunity for direct appeal of the judgment of conviction has been exhausted.\u201d); cf. Clay v. United States, 537 U.S. 522, 527, 123 S.Ct. 1072, 1076, 155 L.Ed.2d 88 (2003) (\u201cFinality attaches when this Court affirms a conviction on the merits on direct review or denies a petition for a writ of certiorari, or when the time for filing a certiorari petition expires.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"A conviction ordinarily becomes final when the opportunity for direct appeal of the judgment of conviction has been exhausted.\"","sentence":"Mederos v. United States, 218 F.3d 1252, 1253 (11th Cir.2000) (noting that when no direct appeal was taken from the original judgment of conviction, the judgment of conviction became final when the time for filing a direct appeal expired); Akins v. United States, 204 F.3d 1086, 1089 n. 1 (11th Cir.2000) (\u201cA conviction ordinarily becomes final when the opportunity for direct appeal of the judgment of conviction has been exhausted.\u201d); cf. Clay v. United States, 537 U.S. 522, 527, 123 S.Ct. 1072, 1076, 155 L.Ed.2d 88 (2003) (\u201cFinality attaches when this Court affirms a conviction on the merits on direct review or denies a petition for a writ of certiorari, or when the time for filing a certiorari petition expires.\u201d)."},"case_id":4095325,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The district court properly granted summary judgment to defendants Kanalakis and Barrera because Braninburg failed to establish a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether these defendants personally participated in any constitutional violations.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"891 F.2d 240, 242","parenthetical":"party opposing summary judgment must present \"significant probative evidence tending to support its claim that material, triable issues of fact remain\"","sentence":"See Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir.1989) (supervisor is liable for constitutional violations of subordinates only if he \u201cparticipated in or directed the violations, or knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them\u201d); see also Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir.1989) (party opposing summary judgment must present \u201csignificant probative evidence tending to support its claim that material, triable issues of fact remain\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"880 F.2d 1040, 1045","parenthetical":"supervisor is liable for constitutional violations of subordinates only if he \"participated in or directed the violations, or knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them\"","sentence":"See Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir.1989) (supervisor is liable for constitutional violations of subordinates only if he \u201cparticipated in or directed the violations, or knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them\u201d); see also Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir.1989) (party opposing summary judgment must present \u201csignificant probative evidence tending to support its claim that material, triable issues of fact remain\u201d)."},"case_id":3997171,"label":"b"}
{"context":"A court can also reduce entries which \"are too vague to sufficiently document the hours claimed.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"2005 WL 3789085, at *5","parenthetical":"twenty percent reduction in the total number of hours billed was warranted based on record replete with vague entries such as, \"Study and Review file,\" \"Telephone call with client,\" \"Letter to Silkey,\" and \"Research\"","sentence":"Kirsch, 148 F.3d at 172 (upholding reduction of 20% for entries such as \u201cletter to court,\u201d \u201cstaff conference,\u201d or \u201cwork on motion\u201d); see also Trustees of the Bricklayers & Allied Craftworkers Local 5 New York Retirement, Welfare & Training Funds v. Helmer-Cronin Const., Inc., No. 03 Civ. 748(MDF), 2005 WL 3789085 at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Oct.24, 2005) (twenty percent reduction in the total number of hours billed was warranted based on record replete with vague entries such as, \u201cStudy and Review file,\u201d \u201cTelephone call with client,\u201d \u201cLetter to Silkey,\u201d and \u201cResearch\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"148 F.3d 172, 172","parenthetical":"upholding reduction of 20% for entries such as \"letter to court,\" \"staff conference,\" or \"work on motion\"","sentence":"Kirsch, 148 F.3d at 172 (upholding reduction of 20% for entries such as \u201cletter to court,\u201d \u201cstaff conference,\u201d or \u201cwork on motion\u201d); see also Trustees of the Bricklayers & Allied Craftworkers Local 5 New York Retirement, Welfare & Training Funds v. Helmer-Cronin Const., Inc., No. 03 Civ. 748(MDF), 2005 WL 3789085 at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Oct.24, 2005) (twenty percent reduction in the total number of hours billed was warranted based on record replete with vague entries such as, \u201cStudy and Review file,\u201d \u201cTelephone call with client,\u201d \u201cLetter to Silkey,\u201d and \u201cResearch\u201d)."},"case_id":4158545,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In those cases, one party to a transaction violates a duty to the other party when it secretly bribes the latter's agents. Commonly, a seller bribes employees of a buyer in order to ensure that the buyer remains a customer of the seller.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"468 F.3d 97, 97","parenthetical":"noting that, in light of the statutory purposes, \"we can hardly conceive of a duty more clearly implicated than the obligation of recipients not to make side-payments to these inspectors\"","sentence":"See, e.g., JSG Trading II, 235 F.3d at 610-11 (affirming the Secretary\u2019s description of \u201ca duty of produce sellers not to corrupt agents and employees of their buyers\u201d); JSG Trading Corp. v. Dep\u2019t of Agric., 176 F.3d 536, 543 (D.C.Cir.1999) (\u201cJSG Trading I\u201d) (affirming a construction of the implied duty clause to include commercial bribery); Sid Goodman & Co. v. Dep\u2019t of Agric., 945 F.2d 398 (4th Cir.1991) (per curiam) (unpublished table decision), available in 1991 WL 193489, at *3 (accepting as reasonable the Secretary\u2019s construction of the clause as imposing an \u201cimplied duty to deal fairly with other members in the industry,\u201d and that such duty is violated by commercial bribery); cf. G & T, 468 F.3d at 97 (noting that, in light of the statutory purposes, \u201cwe can hardly conceive of a duty more clearly implicated than the obligation of recipients not to make side-payments to these inspectors\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"235 F.3d 610, 610-11","parenthetical":"affirming the Secretary's description of \"a duty of produce sellers not to corrupt agents and employees of their buyers\"","sentence":"See, e.g., JSG Trading II, 235 F.3d at 610-11 (affirming the Secretary\u2019s description of \u201ca duty of produce sellers not to corrupt agents and employees of their buyers\u201d); JSG Trading Corp. v. Dep\u2019t of Agric., 176 F.3d 536, 543 (D.C.Cir.1999) (\u201cJSG Trading I\u201d) (affirming a construction of the implied duty clause to include commercial bribery); Sid Goodman & Co. v. Dep\u2019t of Agric., 945 F.2d 398 (4th Cir.1991) (per curiam) (unpublished table decision), available in 1991 WL 193489, at *3 (accepting as reasonable the Secretary\u2019s construction of the clause as imposing an \u201cimplied duty to deal fairly with other members in the industry,\u201d and that such duty is violated by commercial bribery); cf. G & T, 468 F.3d at 97 (noting that, in light of the statutory purposes, \u201cwe can hardly conceive of a duty more clearly implicated than the obligation of recipients not to make side-payments to these inspectors\u201d)."},"case_id":3865498,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In those cases, one party to a transaction violates a duty to the other party when it secretly bribes the latter's agents. Commonly, a seller bribes employees of a buyer in order to ensure that the buyer remains a customer of the seller.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"176 F.3d 536, 543","parenthetical":"affirming a construction of the implied duty clause to include commercial bribery","sentence":"See, e.g., JSG Trading II, 235 F.3d at 610-11 (affirming the Secretary\u2019s description of \u201ca duty of produce sellers not to corrupt agents and employees of their buyers\u201d); JSG Trading Corp. v. Dep\u2019t of Agric., 176 F.3d 536, 543 (D.C.Cir.1999) (\u201cJSG Trading I\u201d) (affirming a construction of the implied duty clause to include commercial bribery); Sid Goodman & Co. v. Dep\u2019t of Agric., 945 F.2d 398 (4th Cir.1991) (per curiam) (unpublished table decision), available in 1991 WL 193489, at *3 (accepting as reasonable the Secretary\u2019s construction of the clause as imposing an \u201cimplied duty to deal fairly with other members in the industry,\u201d and that such duty is violated by commercial bribery); cf. G & T, 468 F.3d at 97 (noting that, in light of the statutory purposes, \u201cwe can hardly conceive of a duty more clearly implicated than the obligation of recipients not to make side-payments to these inspectors\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"468 F.3d 97, 97","parenthetical":"noting that, in light of the statutory purposes, \"we can hardly conceive of a duty more clearly implicated than the obligation of recipients not to make side-payments to these inspectors\"","sentence":"See, e.g., JSG Trading II, 235 F.3d at 610-11 (affirming the Secretary\u2019s description of \u201ca duty of produce sellers not to corrupt agents and employees of their buyers\u201d); JSG Trading Corp. v. Dep\u2019t of Agric., 176 F.3d 536, 543 (D.C.Cir.1999) (\u201cJSG Trading I\u201d) (affirming a construction of the implied duty clause to include commercial bribery); Sid Goodman & Co. v. Dep\u2019t of Agric., 945 F.2d 398 (4th Cir.1991) (per curiam) (unpublished table decision), available in 1991 WL 193489, at *3 (accepting as reasonable the Secretary\u2019s construction of the clause as imposing an \u201cimplied duty to deal fairly with other members in the industry,\u201d and that such duty is violated by commercial bribery); cf. G & T, 468 F.3d at 97 (noting that, in light of the statutory purposes, \u201cwe can hardly conceive of a duty more clearly implicated than the obligation of recipients not to make side-payments to these inspectors\u201d)."},"case_id":3865498,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In those cases, one party to a transaction violates a duty to the other party when it secretly bribes the latter's agents. Commonly, a seller bribes employees of a buyer in order to ensure that the buyer remains a customer of the seller.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"accepting as reasonable the Secretary's construction of the clause as imposing an \"implied duty to deal fairly with other members in the industry,\" and that such duty is violated by commercial bribery","sentence":"See, e.g., JSG Trading II, 235 F.3d at 610-11 (affirming the Secretary\u2019s description of \u201ca duty of produce sellers not to corrupt agents and employees of their buyers\u201d); JSG Trading Corp. v. Dep\u2019t of Agric., 176 F.3d 536, 543 (D.C.Cir.1999) (\u201cJSG Trading I\u201d) (affirming a construction of the implied duty clause to include commercial bribery); Sid Goodman & Co. v. Dep\u2019t of Agric., 945 F.2d 398 (4th Cir.1991) (per curiam) (unpublished table decision), available in 1991 WL 193489, at *3 (accepting as reasonable the Secretary\u2019s construction of the clause as imposing an \u201cimplied duty to deal fairly with other members in the industry,\u201d and that such duty is violated by commercial bribery); cf. G & T, 468 F.3d at 97 (noting that, in light of the statutory purposes, \u201cwe can hardly conceive of a duty more clearly implicated than the obligation of recipients not to make side-payments to these inspectors\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"468 F.3d 97, 97","parenthetical":"noting that, in light of the statutory purposes, \"we can hardly conceive of a duty more clearly implicated than the obligation of recipients not to make side-payments to these inspectors\"","sentence":"See, e.g., JSG Trading II, 235 F.3d at 610-11 (affirming the Secretary\u2019s description of \u201ca duty of produce sellers not to corrupt agents and employees of their buyers\u201d); JSG Trading Corp. v. Dep\u2019t of Agric., 176 F.3d 536, 543 (D.C.Cir.1999) (\u201cJSG Trading I\u201d) (affirming a construction of the implied duty clause to include commercial bribery); Sid Goodman & Co. v. Dep\u2019t of Agric., 945 F.2d 398 (4th Cir.1991) (per curiam) (unpublished table decision), available in 1991 WL 193489, at *3 (accepting as reasonable the Secretary\u2019s construction of the clause as imposing an \u201cimplied duty to deal fairly with other members in the industry,\u201d and that such duty is violated by commercial bribery); cf. G & T, 468 F.3d at 97 (noting that, in light of the statutory purposes, \u201cwe can hardly conceive of a duty more clearly implicated than the obligation of recipients not to make side-payments to these inspectors\u201d)."},"case_id":3865498,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In those cases, one party to a transaction violates a duty to the other party when it secretly bribes the latter's agents. Commonly, a seller bribes employees of a buyer in order to ensure that the buyer remains a customer of the seller.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"468 F.3d 97, 97","parenthetical":"noting that, in light of the statutory purposes, \"we can hardly conceive of a duty more clearly implicated than the obligation of recipients not to make side-payments to these inspectors\"","sentence":"See, e.g., JSG Trading II, 235 F.3d at 610-11 (affirming the Secretary\u2019s description of \u201ca duty of produce sellers not to corrupt agents and employees of their buyers\u201d); JSG Trading Corp. v. Dep\u2019t of Agric., 176 F.3d 536, 543 (D.C.Cir.1999) (\u201cJSG Trading I\u201d) (affirming a construction of the implied duty clause to include commercial bribery); Sid Goodman & Co. v. Dep\u2019t of Agric., 945 F.2d 398 (4th Cir.1991) (per curiam) (unpublished table decision), available in 1991 WL 193489, at *3 (accepting as reasonable the Secretary\u2019s construction of the clause as imposing an \u201cimplied duty to deal fairly with other members in the industry,\u201d and that such duty is violated by commercial bribery); cf. G & T, 468 F.3d at 97 (noting that, in light of the statutory purposes, \u201cwe can hardly conceive of a duty more clearly implicated than the obligation of recipients not to make side-payments to these inspectors\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"1991 WL 193489, at *3","parenthetical":"accepting as reasonable the Secretary's construction of the clause as imposing an \"implied duty to deal fairly with other members in the industry,\" and that such duty is violated by commercial bribery","sentence":"See, e.g., JSG Trading II, 235 F.3d at 610-11 (affirming the Secretary\u2019s description of \u201ca duty of produce sellers not to corrupt agents and employees of their buyers\u201d); JSG Trading Corp. v. Dep\u2019t of Agric., 176 F.3d 536, 543 (D.C.Cir.1999) (\u201cJSG Trading I\u201d) (affirming a construction of the implied duty clause to include commercial bribery); Sid Goodman & Co. v. Dep\u2019t of Agric., 945 F.2d 398 (4th Cir.1991) (per curiam) (unpublished table decision), available in 1991 WL 193489, at *3 (accepting as reasonable the Secretary\u2019s construction of the clause as imposing an \u201cimplied duty to deal fairly with other members in the industry,\u201d and that such duty is violated by commercial bribery); cf. G & T, 468 F.3d at 97 (noting that, in light of the statutory purposes, \u201cwe can hardly conceive of a duty more clearly implicated than the obligation of recipients not to make side-payments to these inspectors\u201d)."},"case_id":3865498,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Under these circumstances, the jury was authorized to conclude that Love was not negligent.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"trial court did not err in denying Willis' motion for directed verdict","sentence":"See also Willis v. Love, 232 Ga. App. 543 (502 SE2d 487) (1998) (trial court did not err in denying Willis\u2019 motion for directed verdict)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"215 Ga. App. 479, 480","parenthetical":"in rear-end collision cases, issues of liability are for the jury to decide","sentence":"See James v. Tyler, 215 Ga. App. 479, 480 (1) (451 SE2d 506) (1994) (in rear-end collision cases, issues of liability are for the jury to decide). Accordingly, Lucas\u2019 claim is without merit."},"case_id":903768,"label":"b"}
{"context":"There is no indicated preference for one course over another. Refusal on the part of defendant to withdraw the plea and proceed to trial does not entitle him or her to specific performance of the original plea agreement.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"584 N.Y.S.2d 228, 228","parenthetical":"affirming judgment of lower court denying defendant specific performance of original plea deal","sentence":"Tesiero, 584 N.Y.S.2d at 228 (affirming judgment of lower court denying defendant specific performance of original plea deal); see also Walker, 591 N.Y.S.2d at 77 (finding defendant\u2019s refusal to withdraw plea did not entitle him to specific performance of the original plea deal, and holding lower court appropriately gave defendant option to either withdraw plea or accept a one-year jail sentence after it indicated it was no longer willing to impose negotiated sentence in light of its review of presentence probation report and victim impact statement); Pittman, 514 N.Y.S.2d at 88 (holding defendant\u2019s refusal to withdraw plea when afforded opportunity by sentencing court,- which had reviewed pre-sentence report and found terms of plea deal inappropriate, was not entitled to specific performance of original plea); cf. People v. Jenkins, 11 N.Y.3d 282, 869 N.Y.S.2d 370, 898 N.E.2d 553 (2008) (defendant not entitled to specific performance of plea bargain where he failed to uphold his end of deal which required him to provide documentary proof of attendance in drug rehabilitation program); People v. Curdgel, 83 N.Y.2d 862, 611 N.Y.S.2d 827, 634 N.E.2d 199 (1994) (defendant who initially cooperated with prosecution pursuant to plea agreement, but then willfully acted to eliminate his usefulness as a prosecution witness, was. not entitled to specific performance)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"591 N.Y.S.2d 77, 77","parenthetical":"finding defendant's refusal to withdraw plea did not entitle him to specific performance of the original plea deal, and holding lower court appropriately gave defendant option to either withdraw plea or accept a one-year jail sentence after it indicated it was no longer willing to impose negotiated sentence in light of its review of presentence probation report and victim impact statement","sentence":"Tesiero, 584 N.Y.S.2d at 228 (affirming judgment of lower court denying defendant specific performance of original plea deal); see also Walker, 591 N.Y.S.2d at 77 (finding defendant\u2019s refusal to withdraw plea did not entitle him to specific performance of the original plea deal, and holding lower court appropriately gave defendant option to either withdraw plea or accept a one-year jail sentence after it indicated it was no longer willing to impose negotiated sentence in light of its review of presentence probation report and victim impact statement); Pittman, 514 N.Y.S.2d at 88 (holding defendant\u2019s refusal to withdraw plea when afforded opportunity by sentencing court,- which had reviewed pre-sentence report and found terms of plea deal inappropriate, was not entitled to specific performance of original plea); cf. People v. Jenkins, 11 N.Y.3d 282, 869 N.Y.S.2d 370, 898 N.E.2d 553 (2008) (defendant not entitled to specific performance of plea bargain where he failed to uphold his end of deal which required him to provide documentary proof of attendance in drug rehabilitation program); People v. Curdgel, 83 N.Y.2d 862, 611 N.Y.S.2d 827, 634 N.E.2d 199 (1994) (defendant who initially cooperated with prosecution pursuant to plea agreement, but then willfully acted to eliminate his usefulness as a prosecution witness, was. not entitled to specific performance)."},"case_id":4014699,"label":"a"}
{"context":"There is no indicated preference for one course over another. Refusal on the part of defendant to withdraw the plea and proceed to trial does not entitle him or her to specific performance of the original plea agreement.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"584 N.Y.S.2d 228, 228","parenthetical":"affirming judgment of lower court denying defendant specific performance of original plea deal","sentence":"Tesiero, 584 N.Y.S.2d at 228 (affirming judgment of lower court denying defendant specific performance of original plea deal); see also Walker, 591 N.Y.S.2d at 77 (finding defendant\u2019s refusal to withdraw plea did not entitle him to specific performance of the original plea deal, and holding lower court appropriately gave defendant option to either withdraw plea or accept a one-year jail sentence after it indicated it was no longer willing to impose negotiated sentence in light of its review of presentence probation report and victim impact statement); Pittman, 514 N.Y.S.2d at 88 (holding defendant\u2019s refusal to withdraw plea when afforded opportunity by sentencing court,- which had reviewed pre-sentence report and found terms of plea deal inappropriate, was not entitled to specific performance of original plea); cf. People v. Jenkins, 11 N.Y.3d 282, 869 N.Y.S.2d 370, 898 N.E.2d 553 (2008) (defendant not entitled to specific performance of plea bargain where he failed to uphold his end of deal which required him to provide documentary proof of attendance in drug rehabilitation program); People v. Curdgel, 83 N.Y.2d 862, 611 N.Y.S.2d 827, 634 N.E.2d 199 (1994) (defendant who initially cooperated with prosecution pursuant to plea agreement, but then willfully acted to eliminate his usefulness as a prosecution witness, was. not entitled to specific performance)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"514 N.Y.S.2d 88, 88","parenthetical":"holding defendant's refusal to withdraw plea when afforded opportunity by sentencing court,- which had reviewed pre-sentence report and found terms of plea deal inappropriate, was not entitled to specific performance of original plea","sentence":"Tesiero, 584 N.Y.S.2d at 228 (affirming judgment of lower court denying defendant specific performance of original plea deal); see also Walker, 591 N.Y.S.2d at 77 (finding defendant\u2019s refusal to withdraw plea did not entitle him to specific performance of the original plea deal, and holding lower court appropriately gave defendant option to either withdraw plea or accept a one-year jail sentence after it indicated it was no longer willing to impose negotiated sentence in light of its review of presentence probation report and victim impact statement); Pittman, 514 N.Y.S.2d at 88 (holding defendant\u2019s refusal to withdraw plea when afforded opportunity by sentencing court,- which had reviewed pre-sentence report and found terms of plea deal inappropriate, was not entitled to specific performance of original plea); cf. People v. Jenkins, 11 N.Y.3d 282, 869 N.Y.S.2d 370, 898 N.E.2d 553 (2008) (defendant not entitled to specific performance of plea bargain where he failed to uphold his end of deal which required him to provide documentary proof of attendance in drug rehabilitation program); People v. Curdgel, 83 N.Y.2d 862, 611 N.Y.S.2d 827, 634 N.E.2d 199 (1994) (defendant who initially cooperated with prosecution pursuant to plea agreement, but then willfully acted to eliminate his usefulness as a prosecution witness, was. not entitled to specific performance)."},"case_id":4014699,"label":"a"}
{"context":"There is no indicated preference for one course over another. Refusal on the part of defendant to withdraw the plea and proceed to trial does not entitle him or her to specific performance of the original plea agreement.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"defendant not entitled to specific performance of plea bargain where he failed to uphold his end of deal which required him to provide documentary proof of attendance in drug rehabilitation program","sentence":"Tesiero, 584 N.Y.S.2d at 228 (affirming judgment of lower court denying defendant specific performance of original plea deal); see also Walker, 591 N.Y.S.2d at 77 (finding defendant\u2019s refusal to withdraw plea did not entitle him to specific performance of the original plea deal, and holding lower court appropriately gave defendant option to either withdraw plea or accept a one-year jail sentence after it indicated it was no longer willing to impose negotiated sentence in light of its review of presentence probation report and victim impact statement); Pittman, 514 N.Y.S.2d at 88 (holding defendant\u2019s refusal to withdraw plea when afforded opportunity by sentencing court,- which had reviewed pre-sentence report and found terms of plea deal inappropriate, was not entitled to specific performance of original plea); cf. People v. Jenkins, 11 N.Y.3d 282, 869 N.Y.S.2d 370, 898 N.E.2d 553 (2008) (defendant not entitled to specific performance of plea bargain where he failed to uphold his end of deal which required him to provide documentary proof of attendance in drug rehabilitation program); People v. Curdgel, 83 N.Y.2d 862, 611 N.Y.S.2d 827, 634 N.E.2d 199 (1994) (defendant who initially cooperated with prosecution pursuant to plea agreement, but then willfully acted to eliminate his usefulness as a prosecution witness, was. not entitled to specific performance)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"584 N.Y.S.2d 228, 228","parenthetical":"affirming judgment of lower court denying defendant specific performance of original plea deal","sentence":"Tesiero, 584 N.Y.S.2d at 228 (affirming judgment of lower court denying defendant specific performance of original plea deal); see also Walker, 591 N.Y.S.2d at 77 (finding defendant\u2019s refusal to withdraw plea did not entitle him to specific performance of the original plea deal, and holding lower court appropriately gave defendant option to either withdraw plea or accept a one-year jail sentence after it indicated it was no longer willing to impose negotiated sentence in light of its review of presentence probation report and victim impact statement); Pittman, 514 N.Y.S.2d at 88 (holding defendant\u2019s refusal to withdraw plea when afforded opportunity by sentencing court,- which had reviewed pre-sentence report and found terms of plea deal inappropriate, was not entitled to specific performance of original plea); cf. People v. Jenkins, 11 N.Y.3d 282, 869 N.Y.S.2d 370, 898 N.E.2d 553 (2008) (defendant not entitled to specific performance of plea bargain where he failed to uphold his end of deal which required him to provide documentary proof of attendance in drug rehabilitation program); People v. Curdgel, 83 N.Y.2d 862, 611 N.Y.S.2d 827, 634 N.E.2d 199 (1994) (defendant who initially cooperated with prosecution pursuant to plea agreement, but then willfully acted to eliminate his usefulness as a prosecution witness, was. not entitled to specific performance)."},"case_id":4014699,"label":"b"}
{"context":"There is no indicated preference for one course over another. Refusal on the part of defendant to withdraw the plea and proceed to trial does not entitle him or her to specific performance of the original plea agreement.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"584 N.Y.S.2d 228, 228","parenthetical":"affirming judgment of lower court denying defendant specific performance of original plea deal","sentence":"Tesiero, 584 N.Y.S.2d at 228 (affirming judgment of lower court denying defendant specific performance of original plea deal); see also Walker, 591 N.Y.S.2d at 77 (finding defendant\u2019s refusal to withdraw plea did not entitle him to specific performance of the original plea deal, and holding lower court appropriately gave defendant option to either withdraw plea or accept a one-year jail sentence after it indicated it was no longer willing to impose negotiated sentence in light of its review of presentence probation report and victim impact statement); Pittman, 514 N.Y.S.2d at 88 (holding defendant\u2019s refusal to withdraw plea when afforded opportunity by sentencing court,- which had reviewed pre-sentence report and found terms of plea deal inappropriate, was not entitled to specific performance of original plea); cf. People v. Jenkins, 11 N.Y.3d 282, 869 N.Y.S.2d 370, 898 N.E.2d 553 (2008) (defendant not entitled to specific performance of plea bargain where he failed to uphold his end of deal which required him to provide documentary proof of attendance in drug rehabilitation program); People v. Curdgel, 83 N.Y.2d 862, 611 N.Y.S.2d 827, 634 N.E.2d 199 (1994) (defendant who initially cooperated with prosecution pursuant to plea agreement, but then willfully acted to eliminate his usefulness as a prosecution witness, was. not entitled to specific performance)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"defendant not entitled to specific performance of plea bargain where he failed to uphold his end of deal which required him to provide documentary proof of attendance in drug rehabilitation program","sentence":"Tesiero, 584 N.Y.S.2d at 228 (affirming judgment of lower court denying defendant specific performance of original plea deal); see also Walker, 591 N.Y.S.2d at 77 (finding defendant\u2019s refusal to withdraw plea did not entitle him to specific performance of the original plea deal, and holding lower court appropriately gave defendant option to either withdraw plea or accept a one-year jail sentence after it indicated it was no longer willing to impose negotiated sentence in light of its review of presentence probation report and victim impact statement); Pittman, 514 N.Y.S.2d at 88 (holding defendant\u2019s refusal to withdraw plea when afforded opportunity by sentencing court,- which had reviewed pre-sentence report and found terms of plea deal inappropriate, was not entitled to specific performance of original plea); cf. People v. Jenkins, 11 N.Y.3d 282, 869 N.Y.S.2d 370, 898 N.E.2d 553 (2008) (defendant not entitled to specific performance of plea bargain where he failed to uphold his end of deal which required him to provide documentary proof of attendance in drug rehabilitation program); People v. Curdgel, 83 N.Y.2d 862, 611 N.Y.S.2d 827, 634 N.E.2d 199 (1994) (defendant who initially cooperated with prosecution pursuant to plea agreement, but then willfully acted to eliminate his usefulness as a prosecution witness, was. not entitled to specific performance)."},"case_id":4014699,"label":"a"}
{"context":"There is no indicated preference for one course over another. Refusal on the part of defendant to withdraw the plea and proceed to trial does not entitle him or her to specific performance of the original plea agreement.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"584 N.Y.S.2d 228, 228","parenthetical":"affirming judgment of lower court denying defendant specific performance of original plea deal","sentence":"Tesiero, 584 N.Y.S.2d at 228 (affirming judgment of lower court denying defendant specific performance of original plea deal); see also Walker, 591 N.Y.S.2d at 77 (finding defendant\u2019s refusal to withdraw plea did not entitle him to specific performance of the original plea deal, and holding lower court appropriately gave defendant option to either withdraw plea or accept a one-year jail sentence after it indicated it was no longer willing to impose negotiated sentence in light of its review of presentence probation report and victim impact statement); Pittman, 514 N.Y.S.2d at 88 (holding defendant\u2019s refusal to withdraw plea when afforded opportunity by sentencing court,- which had reviewed pre-sentence report and found terms of plea deal inappropriate, was not entitled to specific performance of original plea); cf. People v. Jenkins, 11 N.Y.3d 282, 869 N.Y.S.2d 370, 898 N.E.2d 553 (2008) (defendant not entitled to specific performance of plea bargain where he failed to uphold his end of deal which required him to provide documentary proof of attendance in drug rehabilitation program); People v. Curdgel, 83 N.Y.2d 862, 611 N.Y.S.2d 827, 634 N.E.2d 199 (1994) (defendant who initially cooperated with prosecution pursuant to plea agreement, but then willfully acted to eliminate his usefulness as a prosecution witness, was. not entitled to specific performance)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"defendant not entitled to specific performance of plea bargain where he failed to uphold his end of deal which required him to provide documentary proof of attendance in drug rehabilitation program","sentence":"Tesiero, 584 N.Y.S.2d at 228 (affirming judgment of lower court denying defendant specific performance of original plea deal); see also Walker, 591 N.Y.S.2d at 77 (finding defendant\u2019s refusal to withdraw plea did not entitle him to specific performance of the original plea deal, and holding lower court appropriately gave defendant option to either withdraw plea or accept a one-year jail sentence after it indicated it was no longer willing to impose negotiated sentence in light of its review of presentence probation report and victim impact statement); Pittman, 514 N.Y.S.2d at 88 (holding defendant\u2019s refusal to withdraw plea when afforded opportunity by sentencing court,- which had reviewed pre-sentence report and found terms of plea deal inappropriate, was not entitled to specific performance of original plea); cf. People v. Jenkins, 11 N.Y.3d 282, 869 N.Y.S.2d 370, 898 N.E.2d 553 (2008) (defendant not entitled to specific performance of plea bargain where he failed to uphold his end of deal which required him to provide documentary proof of attendance in drug rehabilitation program); People v. Curdgel, 83 N.Y.2d 862, 611 N.Y.S.2d 827, 634 N.E.2d 199 (1994) (defendant who initially cooperated with prosecution pursuant to plea agreement, but then willfully acted to eliminate his usefulness as a prosecution witness, was. not entitled to specific performance)."},"case_id":4014699,"label":"a"}
{"context":"There is no indicated preference for one course over another. Refusal on the part of defendant to withdraw the plea and proceed to trial does not entitle him or her to specific performance of the original plea agreement.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"defendant who initially cooperated with prosecution pursuant to plea agreement, but then willfully acted to eliminate his usefulness as a prosecution witness, was. not entitled to specific performance","sentence":"Tesiero, 584 N.Y.S.2d at 228 (affirming judgment of lower court denying defendant specific performance of original plea deal); see also Walker, 591 N.Y.S.2d at 77 (finding defendant\u2019s refusal to withdraw plea did not entitle him to specific performance of the original plea deal, and holding lower court appropriately gave defendant option to either withdraw plea or accept a one-year jail sentence after it indicated it was no longer willing to impose negotiated sentence in light of its review of presentence probation report and victim impact statement); Pittman, 514 N.Y.S.2d at 88 (holding defendant\u2019s refusal to withdraw plea when afforded opportunity by sentencing court,- which had reviewed pre-sentence report and found terms of plea deal inappropriate, was not entitled to specific performance of original plea); cf. People v. Jenkins, 11 N.Y.3d 282, 869 N.Y.S.2d 370, 898 N.E.2d 553 (2008) (defendant not entitled to specific performance of plea bargain where he failed to uphold his end of deal which required him to provide documentary proof of attendance in drug rehabilitation program); People v. Curdgel, 83 N.Y.2d 862, 611 N.Y.S.2d 827, 634 N.E.2d 199 (1994) (defendant who initially cooperated with prosecution pursuant to plea agreement, but then willfully acted to eliminate his usefulness as a prosecution witness, was. not entitled to specific performance)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"584 N.Y.S.2d 228, 228","parenthetical":"affirming judgment of lower court denying defendant specific performance of original plea deal","sentence":"Tesiero, 584 N.Y.S.2d at 228 (affirming judgment of lower court denying defendant specific performance of original plea deal); see also Walker, 591 N.Y.S.2d at 77 (finding defendant\u2019s refusal to withdraw plea did not entitle him to specific performance of the original plea deal, and holding lower court appropriately gave defendant option to either withdraw plea or accept a one-year jail sentence after it indicated it was no longer willing to impose negotiated sentence in light of its review of presentence probation report and victim impact statement); Pittman, 514 N.Y.S.2d at 88 (holding defendant\u2019s refusal to withdraw plea when afforded opportunity by sentencing court,- which had reviewed pre-sentence report and found terms of plea deal inappropriate, was not entitled to specific performance of original plea); cf. People v. Jenkins, 11 N.Y.3d 282, 869 N.Y.S.2d 370, 898 N.E.2d 553 (2008) (defendant not entitled to specific performance of plea bargain where he failed to uphold his end of deal which required him to provide documentary proof of attendance in drug rehabilitation program); People v. Curdgel, 83 N.Y.2d 862, 611 N.Y.S.2d 827, 634 N.E.2d 199 (1994) (defendant who initially cooperated with prosecution pursuant to plea agreement, but then willfully acted to eliminate his usefulness as a prosecution witness, was. not entitled to specific performance)."},"case_id":4014699,"label":"b"}
{"context":"There is no indicated preference for one course over another. Refusal on the part of defendant to withdraw the plea and proceed to trial does not entitle him or her to specific performance of the original plea agreement.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"584 N.Y.S.2d 228, 228","parenthetical":"affirming judgment of lower court denying defendant specific performance of original plea deal","sentence":"Tesiero, 584 N.Y.S.2d at 228 (affirming judgment of lower court denying defendant specific performance of original plea deal); see also Walker, 591 N.Y.S.2d at 77 (finding defendant\u2019s refusal to withdraw plea did not entitle him to specific performance of the original plea deal, and holding lower court appropriately gave defendant option to either withdraw plea or accept a one-year jail sentence after it indicated it was no longer willing to impose negotiated sentence in light of its review of presentence probation report and victim impact statement); Pittman, 514 N.Y.S.2d at 88 (holding defendant\u2019s refusal to withdraw plea when afforded opportunity by sentencing court,- which had reviewed pre-sentence report and found terms of plea deal inappropriate, was not entitled to specific performance of original plea); cf. People v. Jenkins, 11 N.Y.3d 282, 869 N.Y.S.2d 370, 898 N.E.2d 553 (2008) (defendant not entitled to specific performance of plea bargain where he failed to uphold his end of deal which required him to provide documentary proof of attendance in drug rehabilitation program); People v. Curdgel, 83 N.Y.2d 862, 611 N.Y.S.2d 827, 634 N.E.2d 199 (1994) (defendant who initially cooperated with prosecution pursuant to plea agreement, but then willfully acted to eliminate his usefulness as a prosecution witness, was. not entitled to specific performance)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"defendant who initially cooperated with prosecution pursuant to plea agreement, but then willfully acted to eliminate his usefulness as a prosecution witness, was. not entitled to specific performance","sentence":"Tesiero, 584 N.Y.S.2d at 228 (affirming judgment of lower court denying defendant specific performance of original plea deal); see also Walker, 591 N.Y.S.2d at 77 (finding defendant\u2019s refusal to withdraw plea did not entitle him to specific performance of the original plea deal, and holding lower court appropriately gave defendant option to either withdraw plea or accept a one-year jail sentence after it indicated it was no longer willing to impose negotiated sentence in light of its review of presentence probation report and victim impact statement); Pittman, 514 N.Y.S.2d at 88 (holding defendant\u2019s refusal to withdraw plea when afforded opportunity by sentencing court,- which had reviewed pre-sentence report and found terms of plea deal inappropriate, was not entitled to specific performance of original plea); cf. People v. Jenkins, 11 N.Y.3d 282, 869 N.Y.S.2d 370, 898 N.E.2d 553 (2008) (defendant not entitled to specific performance of plea bargain where he failed to uphold his end of deal which required him to provide documentary proof of attendance in drug rehabilitation program); People v. Curdgel, 83 N.Y.2d 862, 611 N.Y.S.2d 827, 634 N.E.2d 199 (1994) (defendant who initially cooperated with prosecution pursuant to plea agreement, but then willfully acted to eliminate his usefulness as a prosecution witness, was. not entitled to specific performance)."},"case_id":4014699,"label":"a"}
{"context":"There is no indicated preference for one course over another. Refusal on the part of defendant to withdraw the plea and proceed to trial does not entitle him or her to specific performance of the original plea agreement.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"defendant who initially cooperated with prosecution pursuant to plea agreement, but then willfully acted to eliminate his usefulness as a prosecution witness, was. not entitled to specific performance","sentence":"Tesiero, 584 N.Y.S.2d at 228 (affirming judgment of lower court denying defendant specific performance of original plea deal); see also Walker, 591 N.Y.S.2d at 77 (finding defendant\u2019s refusal to withdraw plea did not entitle him to specific performance of the original plea deal, and holding lower court appropriately gave defendant option to either withdraw plea or accept a one-year jail sentence after it indicated it was no longer willing to impose negotiated sentence in light of its review of presentence probation report and victim impact statement); Pittman, 514 N.Y.S.2d at 88 (holding defendant\u2019s refusal to withdraw plea when afforded opportunity by sentencing court,- which had reviewed pre-sentence report and found terms of plea deal inappropriate, was not entitled to specific performance of original plea); cf. People v. Jenkins, 11 N.Y.3d 282, 869 N.Y.S.2d 370, 898 N.E.2d 553 (2008) (defendant not entitled to specific performance of plea bargain where he failed to uphold his end of deal which required him to provide documentary proof of attendance in drug rehabilitation program); People v. Curdgel, 83 N.Y.2d 862, 611 N.Y.S.2d 827, 634 N.E.2d 199 (1994) (defendant who initially cooperated with prosecution pursuant to plea agreement, but then willfully acted to eliminate his usefulness as a prosecution witness, was. not entitled to specific performance)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"584 N.Y.S.2d 228, 228","parenthetical":"affirming judgment of lower court denying defendant specific performance of original plea deal","sentence":"Tesiero, 584 N.Y.S.2d at 228 (affirming judgment of lower court denying defendant specific performance of original plea deal); see also Walker, 591 N.Y.S.2d at 77 (finding defendant\u2019s refusal to withdraw plea did not entitle him to specific performance of the original plea deal, and holding lower court appropriately gave defendant option to either withdraw plea or accept a one-year jail sentence after it indicated it was no longer willing to impose negotiated sentence in light of its review of presentence probation report and victim impact statement); Pittman, 514 N.Y.S.2d at 88 (holding defendant\u2019s refusal to withdraw plea when afforded opportunity by sentencing court,- which had reviewed pre-sentence report and found terms of plea deal inappropriate, was not entitled to specific performance of original plea); cf. People v. Jenkins, 11 N.Y.3d 282, 869 N.Y.S.2d 370, 898 N.E.2d 553 (2008) (defendant not entitled to specific performance of plea bargain where he failed to uphold his end of deal which required him to provide documentary proof of attendance in drug rehabilitation program); People v. Curdgel, 83 N.Y.2d 862, 611 N.Y.S.2d 827, 634 N.E.2d 199 (1994) (defendant who initially cooperated with prosecution pursuant to plea agreement, but then willfully acted to eliminate his usefulness as a prosecution witness, was. not entitled to specific performance)."},"case_id":4014699,"label":"b"}
{"context":"There is no indicated preference for one course over another. Refusal on the part of defendant to withdraw the plea and proceed to trial does not entitle him or her to specific performance of the original plea agreement.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"591 N.Y.S.2d 77, 77","parenthetical":"finding defendant's refusal to withdraw plea did not entitle him to specific performance of the original plea deal, and holding lower court appropriately gave defendant option to either withdraw plea or accept a one-year jail sentence after it indicated it was no longer willing to impose negotiated sentence in light of its review of presentence probation report and victim impact statement","sentence":"Tesiero, 584 N.Y.S.2d at 228 (affirming judgment of lower court denying defendant specific performance of original plea deal); see also Walker, 591 N.Y.S.2d at 77 (finding defendant\u2019s refusal to withdraw plea did not entitle him to specific performance of the original plea deal, and holding lower court appropriately gave defendant option to either withdraw plea or accept a one-year jail sentence after it indicated it was no longer willing to impose negotiated sentence in light of its review of presentence probation report and victim impact statement); Pittman, 514 N.Y.S.2d at 88 (holding defendant\u2019s refusal to withdraw plea when afforded opportunity by sentencing court,- which had reviewed pre-sentence report and found terms of plea deal inappropriate, was not entitled to specific performance of original plea); cf. People v. Jenkins, 11 N.Y.3d 282, 869 N.Y.S.2d 370, 898 N.E.2d 553 (2008) (defendant not entitled to specific performance of plea bargain where he failed to uphold his end of deal which required him to provide documentary proof of attendance in drug rehabilitation program); People v. Curdgel, 83 N.Y.2d 862, 611 N.Y.S.2d 827, 634 N.E.2d 199 (1994) (defendant who initially cooperated with prosecution pursuant to plea agreement, but then willfully acted to eliminate his usefulness as a prosecution witness, was. not entitled to specific performance)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"defendant not entitled to specific performance of plea bargain where he failed to uphold his end of deal which required him to provide documentary proof of attendance in drug rehabilitation program","sentence":"Tesiero, 584 N.Y.S.2d at 228 (affirming judgment of lower court denying defendant specific performance of original plea deal); see also Walker, 591 N.Y.S.2d at 77 (finding defendant\u2019s refusal to withdraw plea did not entitle him to specific performance of the original plea deal, and holding lower court appropriately gave defendant option to either withdraw plea or accept a one-year jail sentence after it indicated it was no longer willing to impose negotiated sentence in light of its review of presentence probation report and victim impact statement); Pittman, 514 N.Y.S.2d at 88 (holding defendant\u2019s refusal to withdraw plea when afforded opportunity by sentencing court,- which had reviewed pre-sentence report and found terms of plea deal inappropriate, was not entitled to specific performance of original plea); cf. People v. Jenkins, 11 N.Y.3d 282, 869 N.Y.S.2d 370, 898 N.E.2d 553 (2008) (defendant not entitled to specific performance of plea bargain where he failed to uphold his end of deal which required him to provide documentary proof of attendance in drug rehabilitation program); People v. Curdgel, 83 N.Y.2d 862, 611 N.Y.S.2d 827, 634 N.E.2d 199 (1994) (defendant who initially cooperated with prosecution pursuant to plea agreement, but then willfully acted to eliminate his usefulness as a prosecution witness, was. not entitled to specific performance)."},"case_id":4014699,"label":"a"}
{"context":"There is no indicated preference for one course over another. Refusal on the part of defendant to withdraw the plea and proceed to trial does not entitle him or her to specific performance of the original plea agreement.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"defendant not entitled to specific performance of plea bargain where he failed to uphold his end of deal which required him to provide documentary proof of attendance in drug rehabilitation program","sentence":"Tesiero, 584 N.Y.S.2d at 228 (affirming judgment of lower court denying defendant specific performance of original plea deal); see also Walker, 591 N.Y.S.2d at 77 (finding defendant\u2019s refusal to withdraw plea did not entitle him to specific performance of the original plea deal, and holding lower court appropriately gave defendant option to either withdraw plea or accept a one-year jail sentence after it indicated it was no longer willing to impose negotiated sentence in light of its review of presentence probation report and victim impact statement); Pittman, 514 N.Y.S.2d at 88 (holding defendant\u2019s refusal to withdraw plea when afforded opportunity by sentencing court,- which had reviewed pre-sentence report and found terms of plea deal inappropriate, was not entitled to specific performance of original plea); cf. People v. Jenkins, 11 N.Y.3d 282, 869 N.Y.S.2d 370, 898 N.E.2d 553 (2008) (defendant not entitled to specific performance of plea bargain where he failed to uphold his end of deal which required him to provide documentary proof of attendance in drug rehabilitation program); People v. Curdgel, 83 N.Y.2d 862, 611 N.Y.S.2d 827, 634 N.E.2d 199 (1994) (defendant who initially cooperated with prosecution pursuant to plea agreement, but then willfully acted to eliminate his usefulness as a prosecution witness, was. not entitled to specific performance)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"591 N.Y.S.2d 77, 77","parenthetical":"finding defendant's refusal to withdraw plea did not entitle him to specific performance of the original plea deal, and holding lower court appropriately gave defendant option to either withdraw plea or accept a one-year jail sentence after it indicated it was no longer willing to impose negotiated sentence in light of its review of presentence probation report and victim impact statement","sentence":"Tesiero, 584 N.Y.S.2d at 228 (affirming judgment of lower court denying defendant specific performance of original plea deal); see also Walker, 591 N.Y.S.2d at 77 (finding defendant\u2019s refusal to withdraw plea did not entitle him to specific performance of the original plea deal, and holding lower court appropriately gave defendant option to either withdraw plea or accept a one-year jail sentence after it indicated it was no longer willing to impose negotiated sentence in light of its review of presentence probation report and victim impact statement); Pittman, 514 N.Y.S.2d at 88 (holding defendant\u2019s refusal to withdraw plea when afforded opportunity by sentencing court,- which had reviewed pre-sentence report and found terms of plea deal inappropriate, was not entitled to specific performance of original plea); cf. People v. Jenkins, 11 N.Y.3d 282, 869 N.Y.S.2d 370, 898 N.E.2d 553 (2008) (defendant not entitled to specific performance of plea bargain where he failed to uphold his end of deal which required him to provide documentary proof of attendance in drug rehabilitation program); People v. Curdgel, 83 N.Y.2d 862, 611 N.Y.S.2d 827, 634 N.E.2d 199 (1994) (defendant who initially cooperated with prosecution pursuant to plea agreement, but then willfully acted to eliminate his usefulness as a prosecution witness, was. not entitled to specific performance)."},"case_id":4014699,"label":"b"}
{"context":"There is no indicated preference for one course over another. Refusal on the part of defendant to withdraw the plea and proceed to trial does not entitle him or her to specific performance of the original plea agreement.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"defendant not entitled to specific performance of plea bargain where he failed to uphold his end of deal which required him to provide documentary proof of attendance in drug rehabilitation program","sentence":"Tesiero, 584 N.Y.S.2d at 228 (affirming judgment of lower court denying defendant specific performance of original plea deal); see also Walker, 591 N.Y.S.2d at 77 (finding defendant\u2019s refusal to withdraw plea did not entitle him to specific performance of the original plea deal, and holding lower court appropriately gave defendant option to either withdraw plea or accept a one-year jail sentence after it indicated it was no longer willing to impose negotiated sentence in light of its review of presentence probation report and victim impact statement); Pittman, 514 N.Y.S.2d at 88 (holding defendant\u2019s refusal to withdraw plea when afforded opportunity by sentencing court,- which had reviewed pre-sentence report and found terms of plea deal inappropriate, was not entitled to specific performance of original plea); cf. People v. Jenkins, 11 N.Y.3d 282, 869 N.Y.S.2d 370, 898 N.E.2d 553 (2008) (defendant not entitled to specific performance of plea bargain where he failed to uphold his end of deal which required him to provide documentary proof of attendance in drug rehabilitation program); People v. Curdgel, 83 N.Y.2d 862, 611 N.Y.S.2d 827, 634 N.E.2d 199 (1994) (defendant who initially cooperated with prosecution pursuant to plea agreement, but then willfully acted to eliminate his usefulness as a prosecution witness, was. not entitled to specific performance)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"591 N.Y.S.2d 77, 77","parenthetical":"finding defendant's refusal to withdraw plea did not entitle him to specific performance of the original plea deal, and holding lower court appropriately gave defendant option to either withdraw plea or accept a one-year jail sentence after it indicated it was no longer willing to impose negotiated sentence in light of its review of presentence probation report and victim impact statement","sentence":"Tesiero, 584 N.Y.S.2d at 228 (affirming judgment of lower court denying defendant specific performance of original plea deal); see also Walker, 591 N.Y.S.2d at 77 (finding defendant\u2019s refusal to withdraw plea did not entitle him to specific performance of the original plea deal, and holding lower court appropriately gave defendant option to either withdraw plea or accept a one-year jail sentence after it indicated it was no longer willing to impose negotiated sentence in light of its review of presentence probation report and victim impact statement); Pittman, 514 N.Y.S.2d at 88 (holding defendant\u2019s refusal to withdraw plea when afforded opportunity by sentencing court,- which had reviewed pre-sentence report and found terms of plea deal inappropriate, was not entitled to specific performance of original plea); cf. People v. Jenkins, 11 N.Y.3d 282, 869 N.Y.S.2d 370, 898 N.E.2d 553 (2008) (defendant not entitled to specific performance of plea bargain where he failed to uphold his end of deal which required him to provide documentary proof of attendance in drug rehabilitation program); People v. Curdgel, 83 N.Y.2d 862, 611 N.Y.S.2d 827, 634 N.E.2d 199 (1994) (defendant who initially cooperated with prosecution pursuant to plea agreement, but then willfully acted to eliminate his usefulness as a prosecution witness, was. not entitled to specific performance)."},"case_id":4014699,"label":"b"}
{"context":"There is no indicated preference for one course over another. Refusal on the part of defendant to withdraw the plea and proceed to trial does not entitle him or her to specific performance of the original plea agreement.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"defendant who initially cooperated with prosecution pursuant to plea agreement, but then willfully acted to eliminate his usefulness as a prosecution witness, was. not entitled to specific performance","sentence":"Tesiero, 584 N.Y.S.2d at 228 (affirming judgment of lower court denying defendant specific performance of original plea deal); see also Walker, 591 N.Y.S.2d at 77 (finding defendant\u2019s refusal to withdraw plea did not entitle him to specific performance of the original plea deal, and holding lower court appropriately gave defendant option to either withdraw plea or accept a one-year jail sentence after it indicated it was no longer willing to impose negotiated sentence in light of its review of presentence probation report and victim impact statement); Pittman, 514 N.Y.S.2d at 88 (holding defendant\u2019s refusal to withdraw plea when afforded opportunity by sentencing court,- which had reviewed pre-sentence report and found terms of plea deal inappropriate, was not entitled to specific performance of original plea); cf. People v. Jenkins, 11 N.Y.3d 282, 869 N.Y.S.2d 370, 898 N.E.2d 553 (2008) (defendant not entitled to specific performance of plea bargain where he failed to uphold his end of deal which required him to provide documentary proof of attendance in drug rehabilitation program); People v. Curdgel, 83 N.Y.2d 862, 611 N.Y.S.2d 827, 634 N.E.2d 199 (1994) (defendant who initially cooperated with prosecution pursuant to plea agreement, but then willfully acted to eliminate his usefulness as a prosecution witness, was. not entitled to specific performance)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"591 N.Y.S.2d 77, 77","parenthetical":"finding defendant's refusal to withdraw plea did not entitle him to specific performance of the original plea deal, and holding lower court appropriately gave defendant option to either withdraw plea or accept a one-year jail sentence after it indicated it was no longer willing to impose negotiated sentence in light of its review of presentence probation report and victim impact statement","sentence":"Tesiero, 584 N.Y.S.2d at 228 (affirming judgment of lower court denying defendant specific performance of original plea deal); see also Walker, 591 N.Y.S.2d at 77 (finding defendant\u2019s refusal to withdraw plea did not entitle him to specific performance of the original plea deal, and holding lower court appropriately gave defendant option to either withdraw plea or accept a one-year jail sentence after it indicated it was no longer willing to impose negotiated sentence in light of its review of presentence probation report and victim impact statement); Pittman, 514 N.Y.S.2d at 88 (holding defendant\u2019s refusal to withdraw plea when afforded opportunity by sentencing court,- which had reviewed pre-sentence report and found terms of plea deal inappropriate, was not entitled to specific performance of original plea); cf. People v. Jenkins, 11 N.Y.3d 282, 869 N.Y.S.2d 370, 898 N.E.2d 553 (2008) (defendant not entitled to specific performance of plea bargain where he failed to uphold his end of deal which required him to provide documentary proof of attendance in drug rehabilitation program); People v. Curdgel, 83 N.Y.2d 862, 611 N.Y.S.2d 827, 634 N.E.2d 199 (1994) (defendant who initially cooperated with prosecution pursuant to plea agreement, but then willfully acted to eliminate his usefulness as a prosecution witness, was. not entitled to specific performance)."},"case_id":4014699,"label":"b"}
{"context":"There is no indicated preference for one course over another. Refusal on the part of defendant to withdraw the plea and proceed to trial does not entitle him or her to specific performance of the original plea agreement.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"defendant who initially cooperated with prosecution pursuant to plea agreement, but then willfully acted to eliminate his usefulness as a prosecution witness, was. not entitled to specific performance","sentence":"Tesiero, 584 N.Y.S.2d at 228 (affirming judgment of lower court denying defendant specific performance of original plea deal); see also Walker, 591 N.Y.S.2d at 77 (finding defendant\u2019s refusal to withdraw plea did not entitle him to specific performance of the original plea deal, and holding lower court appropriately gave defendant option to either withdraw plea or accept a one-year jail sentence after it indicated it was no longer willing to impose negotiated sentence in light of its review of presentence probation report and victim impact statement); Pittman, 514 N.Y.S.2d at 88 (holding defendant\u2019s refusal to withdraw plea when afforded opportunity by sentencing court,- which had reviewed pre-sentence report and found terms of plea deal inappropriate, was not entitled to specific performance of original plea); cf. People v. Jenkins, 11 N.Y.3d 282, 869 N.Y.S.2d 370, 898 N.E.2d 553 (2008) (defendant not entitled to specific performance of plea bargain where he failed to uphold his end of deal which required him to provide documentary proof of attendance in drug rehabilitation program); People v. Curdgel, 83 N.Y.2d 862, 611 N.Y.S.2d 827, 634 N.E.2d 199 (1994) (defendant who initially cooperated with prosecution pursuant to plea agreement, but then willfully acted to eliminate his usefulness as a prosecution witness, was. not entitled to specific performance)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"591 N.Y.S.2d 77, 77","parenthetical":"finding defendant's refusal to withdraw plea did not entitle him to specific performance of the original plea deal, and holding lower court appropriately gave defendant option to either withdraw plea or accept a one-year jail sentence after it indicated it was no longer willing to impose negotiated sentence in light of its review of presentence probation report and victim impact statement","sentence":"Tesiero, 584 N.Y.S.2d at 228 (affirming judgment of lower court denying defendant specific performance of original plea deal); see also Walker, 591 N.Y.S.2d at 77 (finding defendant\u2019s refusal to withdraw plea did not entitle him to specific performance of the original plea deal, and holding lower court appropriately gave defendant option to either withdraw plea or accept a one-year jail sentence after it indicated it was no longer willing to impose negotiated sentence in light of its review of presentence probation report and victim impact statement); Pittman, 514 N.Y.S.2d at 88 (holding defendant\u2019s refusal to withdraw plea when afforded opportunity by sentencing court,- which had reviewed pre-sentence report and found terms of plea deal inappropriate, was not entitled to specific performance of original plea); cf. People v. Jenkins, 11 N.Y.3d 282, 869 N.Y.S.2d 370, 898 N.E.2d 553 (2008) (defendant not entitled to specific performance of plea bargain where he failed to uphold his end of deal which required him to provide documentary proof of attendance in drug rehabilitation program); People v. Curdgel, 83 N.Y.2d 862, 611 N.Y.S.2d 827, 634 N.E.2d 199 (1994) (defendant who initially cooperated with prosecution pursuant to plea agreement, but then willfully acted to eliminate his usefulness as a prosecution witness, was. not entitled to specific performance)."},"case_id":4014699,"label":"b"}
{"context":"There is no indicated preference for one course over another. Refusal on the part of defendant to withdraw the plea and proceed to trial does not entitle him or her to specific performance of the original plea agreement.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"defendant who initially cooperated with prosecution pursuant to plea agreement, but then willfully acted to eliminate his usefulness as a prosecution witness, was. not entitled to specific performance","sentence":"Tesiero, 584 N.Y.S.2d at 228 (affirming judgment of lower court denying defendant specific performance of original plea deal); see also Walker, 591 N.Y.S.2d at 77 (finding defendant\u2019s refusal to withdraw plea did not entitle him to specific performance of the original plea deal, and holding lower court appropriately gave defendant option to either withdraw plea or accept a one-year jail sentence after it indicated it was no longer willing to impose negotiated sentence in light of its review of presentence probation report and victim impact statement); Pittman, 514 N.Y.S.2d at 88 (holding defendant\u2019s refusal to withdraw plea when afforded opportunity by sentencing court,- which had reviewed pre-sentence report and found terms of plea deal inappropriate, was not entitled to specific performance of original plea); cf. People v. Jenkins, 11 N.Y.3d 282, 869 N.Y.S.2d 370, 898 N.E.2d 553 (2008) (defendant not entitled to specific performance of plea bargain where he failed to uphold his end of deal which required him to provide documentary proof of attendance in drug rehabilitation program); People v. Curdgel, 83 N.Y.2d 862, 611 N.Y.S.2d 827, 634 N.E.2d 199 (1994) (defendant who initially cooperated with prosecution pursuant to plea agreement, but then willfully acted to eliminate his usefulness as a prosecution witness, was. not entitled to specific performance)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"591 N.Y.S.2d 77, 77","parenthetical":"finding defendant's refusal to withdraw plea did not entitle him to specific performance of the original plea deal, and holding lower court appropriately gave defendant option to either withdraw plea or accept a one-year jail sentence after it indicated it was no longer willing to impose negotiated sentence in light of its review of presentence probation report and victim impact statement","sentence":"Tesiero, 584 N.Y.S.2d at 228 (affirming judgment of lower court denying defendant specific performance of original plea deal); see also Walker, 591 N.Y.S.2d at 77 (finding defendant\u2019s refusal to withdraw plea did not entitle him to specific performance of the original plea deal, and holding lower court appropriately gave defendant option to either withdraw plea or accept a one-year jail sentence after it indicated it was no longer willing to impose negotiated sentence in light of its review of presentence probation report and victim impact statement); Pittman, 514 N.Y.S.2d at 88 (holding defendant\u2019s refusal to withdraw plea when afforded opportunity by sentencing court,- which had reviewed pre-sentence report and found terms of plea deal inappropriate, was not entitled to specific performance of original plea); cf. People v. Jenkins, 11 N.Y.3d 282, 869 N.Y.S.2d 370, 898 N.E.2d 553 (2008) (defendant not entitled to specific performance of plea bargain where he failed to uphold his end of deal which required him to provide documentary proof of attendance in drug rehabilitation program); People v. Curdgel, 83 N.Y.2d 862, 611 N.Y.S.2d 827, 634 N.E.2d 199 (1994) (defendant who initially cooperated with prosecution pursuant to plea agreement, but then willfully acted to eliminate his usefulness as a prosecution witness, was. not entitled to specific performance)."},"case_id":4014699,"label":"b"}
{"context":"There is no indicated preference for one course over another. Refusal on the part of defendant to withdraw the plea and proceed to trial does not entitle him or her to specific performance of the original plea agreement.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"514 N.Y.S.2d 88, 88","parenthetical":"holding defendant's refusal to withdraw plea when afforded opportunity by sentencing court,- which had reviewed pre-sentence report and found terms of plea deal inappropriate, was not entitled to specific performance of original plea","sentence":"Tesiero, 584 N.Y.S.2d at 228 (affirming judgment of lower court denying defendant specific performance of original plea deal); see also Walker, 591 N.Y.S.2d at 77 (finding defendant\u2019s refusal to withdraw plea did not entitle him to specific performance of the original plea deal, and holding lower court appropriately gave defendant option to either withdraw plea or accept a one-year jail sentence after it indicated it was no longer willing to impose negotiated sentence in light of its review of presentence probation report and victim impact statement); Pittman, 514 N.Y.S.2d at 88 (holding defendant\u2019s refusal to withdraw plea when afforded opportunity by sentencing court,- which had reviewed pre-sentence report and found terms of plea deal inappropriate, was not entitled to specific performance of original plea); cf. People v. Jenkins, 11 N.Y.3d 282, 869 N.Y.S.2d 370, 898 N.E.2d 553 (2008) (defendant not entitled to specific performance of plea bargain where he failed to uphold his end of deal which required him to provide documentary proof of attendance in drug rehabilitation program); People v. Curdgel, 83 N.Y.2d 862, 611 N.Y.S.2d 827, 634 N.E.2d 199 (1994) (defendant who initially cooperated with prosecution pursuant to plea agreement, but then willfully acted to eliminate his usefulness as a prosecution witness, was. not entitled to specific performance)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"defendant not entitled to specific performance of plea bargain where he failed to uphold his end of deal which required him to provide documentary proof of attendance in drug rehabilitation program","sentence":"Tesiero, 584 N.Y.S.2d at 228 (affirming judgment of lower court denying defendant specific performance of original plea deal); see also Walker, 591 N.Y.S.2d at 77 (finding defendant\u2019s refusal to withdraw plea did not entitle him to specific performance of the original plea deal, and holding lower court appropriately gave defendant option to either withdraw plea or accept a one-year jail sentence after it indicated it was no longer willing to impose negotiated sentence in light of its review of presentence probation report and victim impact statement); Pittman, 514 N.Y.S.2d at 88 (holding defendant\u2019s refusal to withdraw plea when afforded opportunity by sentencing court,- which had reviewed pre-sentence report and found terms of plea deal inappropriate, was not entitled to specific performance of original plea); cf. People v. Jenkins, 11 N.Y.3d 282, 869 N.Y.S.2d 370, 898 N.E.2d 553 (2008) (defendant not entitled to specific performance of plea bargain where he failed to uphold his end of deal which required him to provide documentary proof of attendance in drug rehabilitation program); People v. Curdgel, 83 N.Y.2d 862, 611 N.Y.S.2d 827, 634 N.E.2d 199 (1994) (defendant who initially cooperated with prosecution pursuant to plea agreement, but then willfully acted to eliminate his usefulness as a prosecution witness, was. not entitled to specific performance)."},"case_id":4014699,"label":"a"}
{"context":"There is no indicated preference for one course over another. Refusal on the part of defendant to withdraw the plea and proceed to trial does not entitle him or her to specific performance of the original plea agreement.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"514 N.Y.S.2d 88, 88","parenthetical":"holding defendant's refusal to withdraw plea when afforded opportunity by sentencing court,- which had reviewed pre-sentence report and found terms of plea deal inappropriate, was not entitled to specific performance of original plea","sentence":"Tesiero, 584 N.Y.S.2d at 228 (affirming judgment of lower court denying defendant specific performance of original plea deal); see also Walker, 591 N.Y.S.2d at 77 (finding defendant\u2019s refusal to withdraw plea did not entitle him to specific performance of the original plea deal, and holding lower court appropriately gave defendant option to either withdraw plea or accept a one-year jail sentence after it indicated it was no longer willing to impose negotiated sentence in light of its review of presentence probation report and victim impact statement); Pittman, 514 N.Y.S.2d at 88 (holding defendant\u2019s refusal to withdraw plea when afforded opportunity by sentencing court,- which had reviewed pre-sentence report and found terms of plea deal inappropriate, was not entitled to specific performance of original plea); cf. People v. Jenkins, 11 N.Y.3d 282, 869 N.Y.S.2d 370, 898 N.E.2d 553 (2008) (defendant not entitled to specific performance of plea bargain where he failed to uphold his end of deal which required him to provide documentary proof of attendance in drug rehabilitation program); People v. Curdgel, 83 N.Y.2d 862, 611 N.Y.S.2d 827, 634 N.E.2d 199 (1994) (defendant who initially cooperated with prosecution pursuant to plea agreement, but then willfully acted to eliminate his usefulness as a prosecution witness, was. not entitled to specific performance)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"defendant not entitled to specific performance of plea bargain where he failed to uphold his end of deal which required him to provide documentary proof of attendance in drug rehabilitation program","sentence":"Tesiero, 584 N.Y.S.2d at 228 (affirming judgment of lower court denying defendant specific performance of original plea deal); see also Walker, 591 N.Y.S.2d at 77 (finding defendant\u2019s refusal to withdraw plea did not entitle him to specific performance of the original plea deal, and holding lower court appropriately gave defendant option to either withdraw plea or accept a one-year jail sentence after it indicated it was no longer willing to impose negotiated sentence in light of its review of presentence probation report and victim impact statement); Pittman, 514 N.Y.S.2d at 88 (holding defendant\u2019s refusal to withdraw plea when afforded opportunity by sentencing court,- which had reviewed pre-sentence report and found terms of plea deal inappropriate, was not entitled to specific performance of original plea); cf. People v. Jenkins, 11 N.Y.3d 282, 869 N.Y.S.2d 370, 898 N.E.2d 553 (2008) (defendant not entitled to specific performance of plea bargain where he failed to uphold his end of deal which required him to provide documentary proof of attendance in drug rehabilitation program); People v. Curdgel, 83 N.Y.2d 862, 611 N.Y.S.2d 827, 634 N.E.2d 199 (1994) (defendant who initially cooperated with prosecution pursuant to plea agreement, but then willfully acted to eliminate his usefulness as a prosecution witness, was. not entitled to specific performance)."},"case_id":4014699,"label":"a"}
{"context":"There is no indicated preference for one course over another. Refusal on the part of defendant to withdraw the plea and proceed to trial does not entitle him or her to specific performance of the original plea agreement.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"defendant not entitled to specific performance of plea bargain where he failed to uphold his end of deal which required him to provide documentary proof of attendance in drug rehabilitation program","sentence":"Tesiero, 584 N.Y.S.2d at 228 (affirming judgment of lower court denying defendant specific performance of original plea deal); see also Walker, 591 N.Y.S.2d at 77 (finding defendant\u2019s refusal to withdraw plea did not entitle him to specific performance of the original plea deal, and holding lower court appropriately gave defendant option to either withdraw plea or accept a one-year jail sentence after it indicated it was no longer willing to impose negotiated sentence in light of its review of presentence probation report and victim impact statement); Pittman, 514 N.Y.S.2d at 88 (holding defendant\u2019s refusal to withdraw plea when afforded opportunity by sentencing court,- which had reviewed pre-sentence report and found terms of plea deal inappropriate, was not entitled to specific performance of original plea); cf. People v. Jenkins, 11 N.Y.3d 282, 869 N.Y.S.2d 370, 898 N.E.2d 553 (2008) (defendant not entitled to specific performance of plea bargain where he failed to uphold his end of deal which required him to provide documentary proof of attendance in drug rehabilitation program); People v. Curdgel, 83 N.Y.2d 862, 611 N.Y.S.2d 827, 634 N.E.2d 199 (1994) (defendant who initially cooperated with prosecution pursuant to plea agreement, but then willfully acted to eliminate his usefulness as a prosecution witness, was. not entitled to specific performance)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"514 N.Y.S.2d 88, 88","parenthetical":"holding defendant's refusal to withdraw plea when afforded opportunity by sentencing court,- which had reviewed pre-sentence report and found terms of plea deal inappropriate, was not entitled to specific performance of original plea","sentence":"Tesiero, 584 N.Y.S.2d at 228 (affirming judgment of lower court denying defendant specific performance of original plea deal); see also Walker, 591 N.Y.S.2d at 77 (finding defendant\u2019s refusal to withdraw plea did not entitle him to specific performance of the original plea deal, and holding lower court appropriately gave defendant option to either withdraw plea or accept a one-year jail sentence after it indicated it was no longer willing to impose negotiated sentence in light of its review of presentence probation report and victim impact statement); Pittman, 514 N.Y.S.2d at 88 (holding defendant\u2019s refusal to withdraw plea when afforded opportunity by sentencing court,- which had reviewed pre-sentence report and found terms of plea deal inappropriate, was not entitled to specific performance of original plea); cf. People v. Jenkins, 11 N.Y.3d 282, 869 N.Y.S.2d 370, 898 N.E.2d 553 (2008) (defendant not entitled to specific performance of plea bargain where he failed to uphold his end of deal which required him to provide documentary proof of attendance in drug rehabilitation program); People v. Curdgel, 83 N.Y.2d 862, 611 N.Y.S.2d 827, 634 N.E.2d 199 (1994) (defendant who initially cooperated with prosecution pursuant to plea agreement, but then willfully acted to eliminate his usefulness as a prosecution witness, was. not entitled to specific performance)."},"case_id":4014699,"label":"b"}
{"context":"There is no indicated preference for one course over another. Refusal on the part of defendant to withdraw the plea and proceed to trial does not entitle him or her to specific performance of the original plea agreement.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"514 N.Y.S.2d 88, 88","parenthetical":"holding defendant's refusal to withdraw plea when afforded opportunity by sentencing court,- which had reviewed pre-sentence report and found terms of plea deal inappropriate, was not entitled to specific performance of original plea","sentence":"Tesiero, 584 N.Y.S.2d at 228 (affirming judgment of lower court denying defendant specific performance of original plea deal); see also Walker, 591 N.Y.S.2d at 77 (finding defendant\u2019s refusal to withdraw plea did not entitle him to specific performance of the original plea deal, and holding lower court appropriately gave defendant option to either withdraw plea or accept a one-year jail sentence after it indicated it was no longer willing to impose negotiated sentence in light of its review of presentence probation report and victim impact statement); Pittman, 514 N.Y.S.2d at 88 (holding defendant\u2019s refusal to withdraw plea when afforded opportunity by sentencing court,- which had reviewed pre-sentence report and found terms of plea deal inappropriate, was not entitled to specific performance of original plea); cf. People v. Jenkins, 11 N.Y.3d 282, 869 N.Y.S.2d 370, 898 N.E.2d 553 (2008) (defendant not entitled to specific performance of plea bargain where he failed to uphold his end of deal which required him to provide documentary proof of attendance in drug rehabilitation program); People v. Curdgel, 83 N.Y.2d 862, 611 N.Y.S.2d 827, 634 N.E.2d 199 (1994) (defendant who initially cooperated with prosecution pursuant to plea agreement, but then willfully acted to eliminate his usefulness as a prosecution witness, was. not entitled to specific performance)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"defendant who initially cooperated with prosecution pursuant to plea agreement, but then willfully acted to eliminate his usefulness as a prosecution witness, was. not entitled to specific performance","sentence":"Tesiero, 584 N.Y.S.2d at 228 (affirming judgment of lower court denying defendant specific performance of original plea deal); see also Walker, 591 N.Y.S.2d at 77 (finding defendant\u2019s refusal to withdraw plea did not entitle him to specific performance of the original plea deal, and holding lower court appropriately gave defendant option to either withdraw plea or accept a one-year jail sentence after it indicated it was no longer willing to impose negotiated sentence in light of its review of presentence probation report and victim impact statement); Pittman, 514 N.Y.S.2d at 88 (holding defendant\u2019s refusal to withdraw plea when afforded opportunity by sentencing court,- which had reviewed pre-sentence report and found terms of plea deal inappropriate, was not entitled to specific performance of original plea); cf. People v. Jenkins, 11 N.Y.3d 282, 869 N.Y.S.2d 370, 898 N.E.2d 553 (2008) (defendant not entitled to specific performance of plea bargain where he failed to uphold his end of deal which required him to provide documentary proof of attendance in drug rehabilitation program); People v. Curdgel, 83 N.Y.2d 862, 611 N.Y.S.2d 827, 634 N.E.2d 199 (1994) (defendant who initially cooperated with prosecution pursuant to plea agreement, but then willfully acted to eliminate his usefulness as a prosecution witness, was. not entitled to specific performance)."},"case_id":4014699,"label":"a"}
{"context":"There is no indicated preference for one course over another. Refusal on the part of defendant to withdraw the plea and proceed to trial does not entitle him or her to specific performance of the original plea agreement.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"514 N.Y.S.2d 88, 88","parenthetical":"holding defendant's refusal to withdraw plea when afforded opportunity by sentencing court,- which had reviewed pre-sentence report and found terms of plea deal inappropriate, was not entitled to specific performance of original plea","sentence":"Tesiero, 584 N.Y.S.2d at 228 (affirming judgment of lower court denying defendant specific performance of original plea deal); see also Walker, 591 N.Y.S.2d at 77 (finding defendant\u2019s refusal to withdraw plea did not entitle him to specific performance of the original plea deal, and holding lower court appropriately gave defendant option to either withdraw plea or accept a one-year jail sentence after it indicated it was no longer willing to impose negotiated sentence in light of its review of presentence probation report and victim impact statement); Pittman, 514 N.Y.S.2d at 88 (holding defendant\u2019s refusal to withdraw plea when afforded opportunity by sentencing court,- which had reviewed pre-sentence report and found terms of plea deal inappropriate, was not entitled to specific performance of original plea); cf. People v. Jenkins, 11 N.Y.3d 282, 869 N.Y.S.2d 370, 898 N.E.2d 553 (2008) (defendant not entitled to specific performance of plea bargain where he failed to uphold his end of deal which required him to provide documentary proof of attendance in drug rehabilitation program); People v. Curdgel, 83 N.Y.2d 862, 611 N.Y.S.2d 827, 634 N.E.2d 199 (1994) (defendant who initially cooperated with prosecution pursuant to plea agreement, but then willfully acted to eliminate his usefulness as a prosecution witness, was. not entitled to specific performance)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"defendant who initially cooperated with prosecution pursuant to plea agreement, but then willfully acted to eliminate his usefulness as a prosecution witness, was. not entitled to specific performance","sentence":"Tesiero, 584 N.Y.S.2d at 228 (affirming judgment of lower court denying defendant specific performance of original plea deal); see also Walker, 591 N.Y.S.2d at 77 (finding defendant\u2019s refusal to withdraw plea did not entitle him to specific performance of the original plea deal, and holding lower court appropriately gave defendant option to either withdraw plea or accept a one-year jail sentence after it indicated it was no longer willing to impose negotiated sentence in light of its review of presentence probation report and victim impact statement); Pittman, 514 N.Y.S.2d at 88 (holding defendant\u2019s refusal to withdraw plea when afforded opportunity by sentencing court,- which had reviewed pre-sentence report and found terms of plea deal inappropriate, was not entitled to specific performance of original plea); cf. People v. Jenkins, 11 N.Y.3d 282, 869 N.Y.S.2d 370, 898 N.E.2d 553 (2008) (defendant not entitled to specific performance of plea bargain where he failed to uphold his end of deal which required him to provide documentary proof of attendance in drug rehabilitation program); People v. Curdgel, 83 N.Y.2d 862, 611 N.Y.S.2d 827, 634 N.E.2d 199 (1994) (defendant who initially cooperated with prosecution pursuant to plea agreement, but then willfully acted to eliminate his usefulness as a prosecution witness, was. not entitled to specific performance)."},"case_id":4014699,"label":"a"}
{"context":"There is no indicated preference for one course over another. Refusal on the part of defendant to withdraw the plea and proceed to trial does not entitle him or her to specific performance of the original plea agreement.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"defendant who initially cooperated with prosecution pursuant to plea agreement, but then willfully acted to eliminate his usefulness as a prosecution witness, was. not entitled to specific performance","sentence":"Tesiero, 584 N.Y.S.2d at 228 (affirming judgment of lower court denying defendant specific performance of original plea deal); see also Walker, 591 N.Y.S.2d at 77 (finding defendant\u2019s refusal to withdraw plea did not entitle him to specific performance of the original plea deal, and holding lower court appropriately gave defendant option to either withdraw plea or accept a one-year jail sentence after it indicated it was no longer willing to impose negotiated sentence in light of its review of presentence probation report and victim impact statement); Pittman, 514 N.Y.S.2d at 88 (holding defendant\u2019s refusal to withdraw plea when afforded opportunity by sentencing court,- which had reviewed pre-sentence report and found terms of plea deal inappropriate, was not entitled to specific performance of original plea); cf. People v. Jenkins, 11 N.Y.3d 282, 869 N.Y.S.2d 370, 898 N.E.2d 553 (2008) (defendant not entitled to specific performance of plea bargain where he failed to uphold his end of deal which required him to provide documentary proof of attendance in drug rehabilitation program); People v. Curdgel, 83 N.Y.2d 862, 611 N.Y.S.2d 827, 634 N.E.2d 199 (1994) (defendant who initially cooperated with prosecution pursuant to plea agreement, but then willfully acted to eliminate his usefulness as a prosecution witness, was. not entitled to specific performance)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"514 N.Y.S.2d 88, 88","parenthetical":"holding defendant's refusal to withdraw plea when afforded opportunity by sentencing court,- which had reviewed pre-sentence report and found terms of plea deal inappropriate, was not entitled to specific performance of original plea","sentence":"Tesiero, 584 N.Y.S.2d at 228 (affirming judgment of lower court denying defendant specific performance of original plea deal); see also Walker, 591 N.Y.S.2d at 77 (finding defendant\u2019s refusal to withdraw plea did not entitle him to specific performance of the original plea deal, and holding lower court appropriately gave defendant option to either withdraw plea or accept a one-year jail sentence after it indicated it was no longer willing to impose negotiated sentence in light of its review of presentence probation report and victim impact statement); Pittman, 514 N.Y.S.2d at 88 (holding defendant\u2019s refusal to withdraw plea when afforded opportunity by sentencing court,- which had reviewed pre-sentence report and found terms of plea deal inappropriate, was not entitled to specific performance of original plea); cf. People v. Jenkins, 11 N.Y.3d 282, 869 N.Y.S.2d 370, 898 N.E.2d 553 (2008) (defendant not entitled to specific performance of plea bargain where he failed to uphold his end of deal which required him to provide documentary proof of attendance in drug rehabilitation program); People v. Curdgel, 83 N.Y.2d 862, 611 N.Y.S.2d 827, 634 N.E.2d 199 (1994) (defendant who initially cooperated with prosecution pursuant to plea agreement, but then willfully acted to eliminate his usefulness as a prosecution witness, was. not entitled to specific performance)."},"case_id":4014699,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Instead, we hold the contract for deed passed sufficient interest in Lot 13 for appellees to have exclusive possession of Lot 13 and the Disputed Area and commence adverse possession of the Disputed Area for their own benefit.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"453 S.W.2d 461, 464","parenthetical":"a purchaser in possession pursuant to a contract for deed is entitled to the condemnation award in an eminent domain case","sentence":"See Graves, 958 S.W.2d at 472 (in a nuisance case, court held that parties possessing property under a contract for deed had sufficient interest in the property to permit an action for nuisance against a third party); see also City of Austin v. Capitol Livestock Auction Co., 453 S.W.2d 461, 464 (Tex.1970) (a purchaser in possession pursuant to a contract for deed is entitled to the condemnation award in an eminent domain case)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"958 S.W.2d 472, 472","parenthetical":"in a nuisance case, court held that parties possessing property under a contract for deed had sufficient interest in the property to permit an action for nuisance against a third party","sentence":"See Graves, 958 S.W.2d at 472 (in a nuisance case, court held that parties possessing property under a contract for deed had sufficient interest in the property to permit an action for nuisance against a third party); see also City of Austin v. Capitol Livestock Auction Co., 453 S.W.2d 461, 464 (Tex.1970) (a purchaser in possession pursuant to a contract for deed is entitled to the condemnation award in an eminent domain case)."},"case_id":7301696,"label":"b"}
{"context":". Keyes does not make the argument that pretrial screening by a medical review panel violates the constitutional jury trial guarantee because it obstructs a litigant's access to a jury. We observe that' those courts faced with this claim have held that requiring a medical malpractice plaintiff to begin the process of obtaining a final determination of his claim by submitting it to the panel is a permissible interference with the jury trial right.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"404 N.E.2d 592, 592","parenthetical":"delay in commencement of trial and expense of investigating and marshalling evidence do not alter or change the substantial elements and incidents of jury trial right for either party","sentence":"See, e.g., Woods, 591 F.2d at 1179-80; Eastin, 570 P.2d at 748; St. Vincent Hosp., 404 N.E.2d at 592 (delay in commencement of trial and expense of investigating and marshalling evidence do not alter or change the substantial elements and incidents of jury trial right for either party); Linder v. Smith, 629 P.2d 1187, 1189-90 (Mont.1981) (noting other approved pre-trial procedures, such as mandatory pre-trial conferences and submission of a case to a master, which similarly burden a litigant's attempt to get into court); Strykowski, 261 N.W.2d at 450 (panel review procedure imposes no greater burden than administrative agency proceedings of which would-be litigants are generally required to avail themselves before trial under exhaustion-of-remedies rule); cf. Paro v. Longwood Hosp., 373 Mass. 645, 369 N.E.2d 985, 991 (1977) (upholding requirement that claimant post a bond as a condition for further prosecution if panel determines that no \"legitimate question of liability appropriate for judicial inquiry\u201d exists)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"upholding requirement that claimant post a bond as a condition for further prosecution if panel determines that no \"legitimate question of liability appropriate for judicial inquiry\" exists","sentence":"See, e.g., Woods, 591 F.2d at 1179-80; Eastin, 570 P.2d at 748; St. Vincent Hosp., 404 N.E.2d at 592 (delay in commencement of trial and expense of investigating and marshalling evidence do not alter or change the substantial elements and incidents of jury trial right for either party); Linder v. Smith, 629 P.2d 1187, 1189-90 (Mont.1981) (noting other approved pre-trial procedures, such as mandatory pre-trial conferences and submission of a case to a master, which similarly burden a litigant's attempt to get into court); Strykowski, 261 N.W.2d at 450 (panel review procedure imposes no greater burden than administrative agency proceedings of which would-be litigants are generally required to avail themselves before trial under exhaustion-of-remedies rule); cf. Paro v. Longwood Hosp., 373 Mass. 645, 369 N.E.2d 985, 991 (1977) (upholding requirement that claimant post a bond as a condition for further prosecution if panel determines that no \"legitimate question of liability appropriate for judicial inquiry\u201d exists)."},"case_id":11336212,"label":"a"}
{"context":". Keyes does not make the argument that pretrial screening by a medical review panel violates the constitutional jury trial guarantee because it obstructs a litigant's access to a jury. We observe that' those courts faced with this claim have held that requiring a medical malpractice plaintiff to begin the process of obtaining a final determination of his claim by submitting it to the panel is a permissible interference with the jury trial right.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"404 N.E.2d 592, 592","parenthetical":"delay in commencement of trial and expense of investigating and marshalling evidence do not alter or change the substantial elements and incidents of jury trial right for either party","sentence":"See, e.g., Woods, 591 F.2d at 1179-80; Eastin, 570 P.2d at 748; St. Vincent Hosp., 404 N.E.2d at 592 (delay in commencement of trial and expense of investigating and marshalling evidence do not alter or change the substantial elements and incidents of jury trial right for either party); Linder v. Smith, 629 P.2d 1187, 1189-90 (Mont.1981) (noting other approved pre-trial procedures, such as mandatory pre-trial conferences and submission of a case to a master, which similarly burden a litigant's attempt to get into court); Strykowski, 261 N.W.2d at 450 (panel review procedure imposes no greater burden than administrative agency proceedings of which would-be litigants are generally required to avail themselves before trial under exhaustion-of-remedies rule); cf. Paro v. Longwood Hosp., 373 Mass. 645, 369 N.E.2d 985, 991 (1977) (upholding requirement that claimant post a bond as a condition for further prosecution if panel determines that no \"legitimate question of liability appropriate for judicial inquiry\u201d exists)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"369 N.E.2d 985, 991","parenthetical":"upholding requirement that claimant post a bond as a condition for further prosecution if panel determines that no \"legitimate question of liability appropriate for judicial inquiry\" exists","sentence":"See, e.g., Woods, 591 F.2d at 1179-80; Eastin, 570 P.2d at 748; St. Vincent Hosp., 404 N.E.2d at 592 (delay in commencement of trial and expense of investigating and marshalling evidence do not alter or change the substantial elements and incidents of jury trial right for either party); Linder v. Smith, 629 P.2d 1187, 1189-90 (Mont.1981) (noting other approved pre-trial procedures, such as mandatory pre-trial conferences and submission of a case to a master, which similarly burden a litigant's attempt to get into court); Strykowski, 261 N.W.2d at 450 (panel review procedure imposes no greater burden than administrative agency proceedings of which would-be litigants are generally required to avail themselves before trial under exhaustion-of-remedies rule); cf. Paro v. Longwood Hosp., 373 Mass. 645, 369 N.E.2d 985, 991 (1977) (upholding requirement that claimant post a bond as a condition for further prosecution if panel determines that no \"legitimate question of liability appropriate for judicial inquiry\u201d exists)."},"case_id":11336212,"label":"a"}
{"context":". Keyes does not make the argument that pretrial screening by a medical review panel violates the constitutional jury trial guarantee because it obstructs a litigant's access to a jury. We observe that' those courts faced with this claim have held that requiring a medical malpractice plaintiff to begin the process of obtaining a final determination of his claim by submitting it to the panel is a permissible interference with the jury trial right.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"629 P.2d 1187, 1189-90","parenthetical":"noting other approved pre-trial procedures, such as mandatory pre-trial conferences and submission of a case to a master, which similarly burden a litigant's attempt to get into court","sentence":"See, e.g., Woods, 591 F.2d at 1179-80; Eastin, 570 P.2d at 748; St. Vincent Hosp., 404 N.E.2d at 592 (delay in commencement of trial and expense of investigating and marshalling evidence do not alter or change the substantial elements and incidents of jury trial right for either party); Linder v. Smith, 629 P.2d 1187, 1189-90 (Mont.1981) (noting other approved pre-trial procedures, such as mandatory pre-trial conferences and submission of a case to a master, which similarly burden a litigant's attempt to get into court); Strykowski, 261 N.W.2d at 450 (panel review procedure imposes no greater burden than administrative agency proceedings of which would-be litigants are generally required to avail themselves before trial under exhaustion-of-remedies rule); cf. Paro v. Longwood Hosp., 373 Mass. 645, 369 N.E.2d 985, 991 (1977) (upholding requirement that claimant post a bond as a condition for further prosecution if panel determines that no \"legitimate question of liability appropriate for judicial inquiry\u201d exists)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"upholding requirement that claimant post a bond as a condition for further prosecution if panel determines that no \"legitimate question of liability appropriate for judicial inquiry\" exists","sentence":"See, e.g., Woods, 591 F.2d at 1179-80; Eastin, 570 P.2d at 748; St. Vincent Hosp., 404 N.E.2d at 592 (delay in commencement of trial and expense of investigating and marshalling evidence do not alter or change the substantial elements and incidents of jury trial right for either party); Linder v. Smith, 629 P.2d 1187, 1189-90 (Mont.1981) (noting other approved pre-trial procedures, such as mandatory pre-trial conferences and submission of a case to a master, which similarly burden a litigant's attempt to get into court); Strykowski, 261 N.W.2d at 450 (panel review procedure imposes no greater burden than administrative agency proceedings of which would-be litigants are generally required to avail themselves before trial under exhaustion-of-remedies rule); cf. Paro v. Longwood Hosp., 373 Mass. 645, 369 N.E.2d 985, 991 (1977) (upholding requirement that claimant post a bond as a condition for further prosecution if panel determines that no \"legitimate question of liability appropriate for judicial inquiry\u201d exists)."},"case_id":11336212,"label":"a"}
{"context":". Keyes does not make the argument that pretrial screening by a medical review panel violates the constitutional jury trial guarantee because it obstructs a litigant's access to a jury. We observe that' those courts faced with this claim have held that requiring a medical malpractice plaintiff to begin the process of obtaining a final determination of his claim by submitting it to the panel is a permissible interference with the jury trial right.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"629 P.2d 1187, 1189-90","parenthetical":"noting other approved pre-trial procedures, such as mandatory pre-trial conferences and submission of a case to a master, which similarly burden a litigant's attempt to get into court","sentence":"See, e.g., Woods, 591 F.2d at 1179-80; Eastin, 570 P.2d at 748; St. Vincent Hosp., 404 N.E.2d at 592 (delay in commencement of trial and expense of investigating and marshalling evidence do not alter or change the substantial elements and incidents of jury trial right for either party); Linder v. Smith, 629 P.2d 1187, 1189-90 (Mont.1981) (noting other approved pre-trial procedures, such as mandatory pre-trial conferences and submission of a case to a master, which similarly burden a litigant's attempt to get into court); Strykowski, 261 N.W.2d at 450 (panel review procedure imposes no greater burden than administrative agency proceedings of which would-be litigants are generally required to avail themselves before trial under exhaustion-of-remedies rule); cf. Paro v. Longwood Hosp., 373 Mass. 645, 369 N.E.2d 985, 991 (1977) (upholding requirement that claimant post a bond as a condition for further prosecution if panel determines that no \"legitimate question of liability appropriate for judicial inquiry\u201d exists)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"369 N.E.2d 985, 991","parenthetical":"upholding requirement that claimant post a bond as a condition for further prosecution if panel determines that no \"legitimate question of liability appropriate for judicial inquiry\" exists","sentence":"See, e.g., Woods, 591 F.2d at 1179-80; Eastin, 570 P.2d at 748; St. Vincent Hosp., 404 N.E.2d at 592 (delay in commencement of trial and expense of investigating and marshalling evidence do not alter or change the substantial elements and incidents of jury trial right for either party); Linder v. Smith, 629 P.2d 1187, 1189-90 (Mont.1981) (noting other approved pre-trial procedures, such as mandatory pre-trial conferences and submission of a case to a master, which similarly burden a litigant's attempt to get into court); Strykowski, 261 N.W.2d at 450 (panel review procedure imposes no greater burden than administrative agency proceedings of which would-be litigants are generally required to avail themselves before trial under exhaustion-of-remedies rule); cf. Paro v. Longwood Hosp., 373 Mass. 645, 369 N.E.2d 985, 991 (1977) (upholding requirement that claimant post a bond as a condition for further prosecution if panel determines that no \"legitimate question of liability appropriate for judicial inquiry\u201d exists)."},"case_id":11336212,"label":"a"}
{"context":". Keyes does not make the argument that pretrial screening by a medical review panel violates the constitutional jury trial guarantee because it obstructs a litigant's access to a jury. We observe that' those courts faced with this claim have held that requiring a medical malpractice plaintiff to begin the process of obtaining a final determination of his claim by submitting it to the panel is a permissible interference with the jury trial right.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"upholding requirement that claimant post a bond as a condition for further prosecution if panel determines that no \"legitimate question of liability appropriate for judicial inquiry\" exists","sentence":"See, e.g., Woods, 591 F.2d at 1179-80; Eastin, 570 P.2d at 748; St. Vincent Hosp., 404 N.E.2d at 592 (delay in commencement of trial and expense of investigating and marshalling evidence do not alter or change the substantial elements and incidents of jury trial right for either party); Linder v. Smith, 629 P.2d 1187, 1189-90 (Mont.1981) (noting other approved pre-trial procedures, such as mandatory pre-trial conferences and submission of a case to a master, which similarly burden a litigant's attempt to get into court); Strykowski, 261 N.W.2d at 450 (panel review procedure imposes no greater burden than administrative agency proceedings of which would-be litigants are generally required to avail themselves before trial under exhaustion-of-remedies rule); cf. Paro v. Longwood Hosp., 373 Mass. 645, 369 N.E.2d 985, 991 (1977) (upholding requirement that claimant post a bond as a condition for further prosecution if panel determines that no \"legitimate question of liability appropriate for judicial inquiry\u201d exists)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"261 N.W.2d 450, 450","parenthetical":"panel review procedure imposes no greater burden than administrative agency proceedings of which would-be litigants are generally required to avail themselves before trial under exhaustion-of-remedies rule","sentence":"See, e.g., Woods, 591 F.2d at 1179-80; Eastin, 570 P.2d at 748; St. Vincent Hosp., 404 N.E.2d at 592 (delay in commencement of trial and expense of investigating and marshalling evidence do not alter or change the substantial elements and incidents of jury trial right for either party); Linder v. Smith, 629 P.2d 1187, 1189-90 (Mont.1981) (noting other approved pre-trial procedures, such as mandatory pre-trial conferences and submission of a case to a master, which similarly burden a litigant's attempt to get into court); Strykowski, 261 N.W.2d at 450 (panel review procedure imposes no greater burden than administrative agency proceedings of which would-be litigants are generally required to avail themselves before trial under exhaustion-of-remedies rule); cf. Paro v. Longwood Hosp., 373 Mass. 645, 369 N.E.2d 985, 991 (1977) (upholding requirement that claimant post a bond as a condition for further prosecution if panel determines that no \"legitimate question of liability appropriate for judicial inquiry\u201d exists)."},"case_id":11336212,"label":"b"}
{"context":". Keyes does not make the argument that pretrial screening by a medical review panel violates the constitutional jury trial guarantee because it obstructs a litigant's access to a jury. We observe that' those courts faced with this claim have held that requiring a medical malpractice plaintiff to begin the process of obtaining a final determination of his claim by submitting it to the panel is a permissible interference with the jury trial right.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"369 N.E.2d 985, 991","parenthetical":"upholding requirement that claimant post a bond as a condition for further prosecution if panel determines that no \"legitimate question of liability appropriate for judicial inquiry\" exists","sentence":"See, e.g., Woods, 591 F.2d at 1179-80; Eastin, 570 P.2d at 748; St. Vincent Hosp., 404 N.E.2d at 592 (delay in commencement of trial and expense of investigating and marshalling evidence do not alter or change the substantial elements and incidents of jury trial right for either party); Linder v. Smith, 629 P.2d 1187, 1189-90 (Mont.1981) (noting other approved pre-trial procedures, such as mandatory pre-trial conferences and submission of a case to a master, which similarly burden a litigant's attempt to get into court); Strykowski, 261 N.W.2d at 450 (panel review procedure imposes no greater burden than administrative agency proceedings of which would-be litigants are generally required to avail themselves before trial under exhaustion-of-remedies rule); cf. Paro v. Longwood Hosp., 373 Mass. 645, 369 N.E.2d 985, 991 (1977) (upholding requirement that claimant post a bond as a condition for further prosecution if panel determines that no \"legitimate question of liability appropriate for judicial inquiry\u201d exists)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"261 N.W.2d 450, 450","parenthetical":"panel review procedure imposes no greater burden than administrative agency proceedings of which would-be litigants are generally required to avail themselves before trial under exhaustion-of-remedies rule","sentence":"See, e.g., Woods, 591 F.2d at 1179-80; Eastin, 570 P.2d at 748; St. Vincent Hosp., 404 N.E.2d at 592 (delay in commencement of trial and expense of investigating and marshalling evidence do not alter or change the substantial elements and incidents of jury trial right for either party); Linder v. Smith, 629 P.2d 1187, 1189-90 (Mont.1981) (noting other approved pre-trial procedures, such as mandatory pre-trial conferences and submission of a case to a master, which similarly burden a litigant's attempt to get into court); Strykowski, 261 N.W.2d at 450 (panel review procedure imposes no greater burden than administrative agency proceedings of which would-be litigants are generally required to avail themselves before trial under exhaustion-of-remedies rule); cf. Paro v. Longwood Hosp., 373 Mass. 645, 369 N.E.2d 985, 991 (1977) (upholding requirement that claimant post a bond as a condition for further prosecution if panel determines that no \"legitimate question of liability appropriate for judicial inquiry\u201d exists)."},"case_id":11336212,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Moreover, the Nupath partners who have been offered the more favorable settlements by the IRS are not similarly situated to plaintiffs. As defendant correctly argues, once plaintiffs filed their refund action in court, their case was referred to DOJ, and the authority to settle their case shifted from the IRS to the Attorney General, or her delegate.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"784 F.Supp. 1132, 1139","parenthetical":"\"Once a tax matter is referred to the [DOJ] only the Attorney General ... may settle the matter.\"","sentence":"See also United States v. Forma, 784 F.Supp. 1132, 1139 (S.D.N.Y.1992) (\u201cOnce a tax matter is referred to the [DOJ] only the Attorney General ... may settle the matter.\u201d)"},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"794 F.2d 1575, 1577","parenthetical":"settlement decision is \"within the discretion of the agency conducting the litigation.\"","sentence":"See Bergh v. Department of Transp., 794 F.2d 1575, 1577 (Fed.Cir.1986) (settlement decision is \u201cwithin the discretion of the agency conducting the litigation.\u201d)."},"case_id":1270960,"label":"b"}
{"context":"While no court has apparently addressed whether there is a state administrative remedy exhaustion requirement before bringing suit under SS 1983 for violations of the Medicare Act, the Eleventh Circuit has addressed the exhaustion of state administrative remedies in the context of the Medicaid Act and SS 1983 suits. In holding against an exhaustion requirement, the Alacare court rejected the notion that the existence of a federally-mandated state administrative review process was sufficient to evidence Congress' intent that exhaustion of those remedies should be required before permitting a SS 1983 claim.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"612 F.Supp. 81, 85","parenthetical":"holding that there is an exhaustion requirement in SS 1983 suits asserting violations of the Medicaid Act","sentence":"Id. at 967 (emphasis in original). The Alacare court also reasoned that to hold that the mere existence of a state remedial scheme is sufficient to support an exhaustion requirement would eviscerate the general rule established in Patsy and would dramatically narrow the scope of relief available under \u00a7 1983. See id. at 968; see also Greenwald v. Axelrod (In re: Greenwald), 48 B.R. 263, 270-71 (S.D.N.Y.1984) (holding no exhaustion requirement in \u00a7 1983 suit alleging violations of the Medicaid Act); but see Arden House, Inc. v. Heintz, 612 F.Supp. 81, 85 (D.Conn. 1985) (holding that there is an exhaustion requirement in \u00a7 1983 suits asserting violations of the Medicaid Act); St. Joseph Hosp. v. Electronic Data Sys. Corp., 573 F.Supp. 443, 450 (S.D.Tex.1983) (same)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"48 B.R. 263, 270-71","parenthetical":"holding no exhaustion requirement in SS 1983 suit alleging violations of the Medicaid Act","sentence":"Id. at 967 (emphasis in original). The Alacare court also reasoned that to hold that the mere existence of a state remedial scheme is sufficient to support an exhaustion requirement would eviscerate the general rule established in Patsy and would dramatically narrow the scope of relief available under \u00a7 1983. See id. at 968; see also Greenwald v. Axelrod (In re: Greenwald), 48 B.R. 263, 270-71 (S.D.N.Y.1984) (holding no exhaustion requirement in \u00a7 1983 suit alleging violations of the Medicaid Act); but see Arden House, Inc. v. Heintz, 612 F.Supp. 81, 85 (D.Conn. 1985) (holding that there is an exhaustion requirement in \u00a7 1983 suits asserting violations of the Medicaid Act); St. Joseph Hosp. v. Electronic Data Sys. Corp., 573 F.Supp. 443, 450 (S.D.Tex.1983) (same)."},"case_id":509226,"label":"b"}
{"context":"When a prisoner seeks \"equitable relief that will result in immediate or more speedy release, then habeas is the exclusive federal remedy.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"411 U.S. 475, 500","parenthetical":"finding that a complaint seeking to alter the \"fact or duration\" of a prisoner's confinement can only be granted through a habeas corpus proceeding","sentence":"Monk v. Secretary of the Navy, 793 F.2d 364, 367-68 (D.C.Cir.1986) (\u201c[W]hen a prisoner challenges action other than his underlying conviction, the nature of the relief requested determines whether habeas corpus is the exclusive federal remedy.\u201d); see also Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973) (finding that a complaint seeking to alter the \u201cfact or duration\u201d of a prisoner\u2019s confinement can only be granted through a habeas corpus proceeding)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"793 F.2d 364, 367-68","parenthetical":"\"[W]hen a prisoner challenges action other than his underlying conviction, the nature of the relief requested determines whether habeas corpus is the exclusive federal remedy.\"","sentence":"Monk v. Secretary of the Navy, 793 F.2d 364, 367-68 (D.C.Cir.1986) (\u201c[W]hen a prisoner challenges action other than his underlying conviction, the nature of the relief requested determines whether habeas corpus is the exclusive federal remedy.\u201d); see also Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973) (finding that a complaint seeking to alter the \u201cfact or duration\u201d of a prisoner\u2019s confinement can only be granted through a habeas corpus proceeding)."},"case_id":11557806,"label":"b"}
{"context":"When a prisoner seeks \"equitable relief that will result in immediate or more speedy release, then habeas is the exclusive federal remedy.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding that a complaint seeking to alter the \"fact or duration\" of a prisoner's confinement can only be granted through a habeas corpus proceeding","sentence":"Monk v. Secretary of the Navy, 793 F.2d 364, 367-68 (D.C.Cir.1986) (\u201c[W]hen a prisoner challenges action other than his underlying conviction, the nature of the relief requested determines whether habeas corpus is the exclusive federal remedy.\u201d); see also Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973) (finding that a complaint seeking to alter the \u201cfact or duration\u201d of a prisoner\u2019s confinement can only be granted through a habeas corpus proceeding)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"793 F.2d 364, 367-68","parenthetical":"\"[W]hen a prisoner challenges action other than his underlying conviction, the nature of the relief requested determines whether habeas corpus is the exclusive federal remedy.\"","sentence":"Monk v. Secretary of the Navy, 793 F.2d 364, 367-68 (D.C.Cir.1986) (\u201c[W]hen a prisoner challenges action other than his underlying conviction, the nature of the relief requested determines whether habeas corpus is the exclusive federal remedy.\u201d); see also Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973) (finding that a complaint seeking to alter the \u201cfact or duration\u201d of a prisoner\u2019s confinement can only be granted through a habeas corpus proceeding)."},"case_id":11557806,"label":"b"}
{"context":"When a prisoner seeks \"equitable relief that will result in immediate or more speedy release, then habeas is the exclusive federal remedy.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"793 F.2d 364, 367-68","parenthetical":"\"[W]hen a prisoner challenges action other than his underlying conviction, the nature of the relief requested determines whether habeas corpus is the exclusive federal remedy.\"","sentence":"Monk v. Secretary of the Navy, 793 F.2d 364, 367-68 (D.C.Cir.1986) (\u201c[W]hen a prisoner challenges action other than his underlying conviction, the nature of the relief requested determines whether habeas corpus is the exclusive federal remedy.\u201d); see also Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973) (finding that a complaint seeking to alter the \u201cfact or duration\u201d of a prisoner\u2019s confinement can only be granted through a habeas corpus proceeding)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding that a complaint seeking to alter the \"fact or duration\" of a prisoner's confinement can only be granted through a habeas corpus proceeding","sentence":"Monk v. Secretary of the Navy, 793 F.2d 364, 367-68 (D.C.Cir.1986) (\u201c[W]hen a prisoner challenges action other than his underlying conviction, the nature of the relief requested determines whether habeas corpus is the exclusive federal remedy.\u201d); see also Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973) (finding that a complaint seeking to alter the \u201cfact or duration\u201d of a prisoner\u2019s confinement can only be granted through a habeas corpus proceeding)."},"case_id":11557806,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The district court properly dismissed McCulloek's action because he did not allege facts suggesting that the defendants knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to his health.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"267 F.3d 895, 915","parenthetical":"\"A supervisor may be liable under SS 1983 only if there exists either (1","sentence":"See Clement v. Gomez, 298 F.3d 898, 904 (9th Cir.2002) (describing the subjective and objective requirements for a showing of deliberate indifference); see also Jeffers v. Gomez, 267 F.3d 895, 915 (9th Cir.2001) (\u201cA supervisor may be liable under \u00a7 1983 only if there exists either (1) his or her personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation, or (2) a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor\u2019s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation.\u201d) (internal quotations omitted)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"298 F.3d 898, 904","parenthetical":"describing the subjective and objective requirements for a showing of deliberate indifference","sentence":"See Clement v. Gomez, 298 F.3d 898, 904 (9th Cir.2002) (describing the subjective and objective requirements for a showing of deliberate indifference); see also Jeffers v. Gomez, 267 F.3d 895, 915 (9th Cir.2001) (\u201cA supervisor may be liable under \u00a7 1983 only if there exists either (1) his or her personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation, or (2) a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor\u2019s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation.\u201d) (internal quotations omitted)."},"case_id":4255577,"label":"b"}
{"context":". Although no Pennsylvania precedent directly addresses the definition of \"government vehicle\" pursuant to section 4524(e)(2)(i), we note that the term has appeared in cases adjudicating disputes under the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law (\"MVFRL\"). 75 Pa.C.S. SSSS 1701-99. Both this Court and our Commonwealth Court utilize the term \"government vehicle\" in those cases to denote government ownership of a vehicle. See Nationwide Assur.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"utilizing the phrases \"government vehicles,\" \"government-owned vehicles,\" and \"Commonwealth agency vehicles\" interchangeably","sentence":"Co. v. Easley, 960 A.2d 843, 846 n. 5 (Pa.Super.2008) (referring to the \"government vehicle exception\u201d of MVFRL that exempts any motor vehicle owned by the federal government) (citing 75 Pa.C.S. \u00a7 1703); Kmonk-Sullivan v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 567 Pa. 514, 788 A.2d 955, 961-62 (2001) (utilizing the phrases \"government vehicles,\u201d \"government-owned vehicles,\u201d and \"Commonwealth agency vehicles\u201d interchangeably); see also City of Philadelphia v. Melendez, 156 Pa.Cmwlth. 271, 627 A.2d 234, 237-38 (1993) (utilizing the terms \"motor vehicle in possession or control of the local agency,\u201d \"government owned vehicle\u201d and \"government vehicle\u201d interchangeably)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"627 A.2d 234, 237-38","parenthetical":"utilizing the terms \"motor vehicle in possession or control of the local agency,\" \"government owned vehicle\" and \"government vehicle\" interchangeably","sentence":"Co. v. Easley, 960 A.2d 843, 846 n. 5 (Pa.Super.2008) (referring to the \"government vehicle exception\u201d of MVFRL that exempts any motor vehicle owned by the federal government) (citing 75 Pa.C.S. \u00a7 1703); Kmonk-Sullivan v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 567 Pa. 514, 788 A.2d 955, 961-62 (2001) (utilizing the phrases \"government vehicles,\u201d \"government-owned vehicles,\u201d and \"Commonwealth agency vehicles\u201d interchangeably); see also City of Philadelphia v. Melendez, 156 Pa.Cmwlth. 271, 627 A.2d 234, 237-38 (1993) (utilizing the terms \"motor vehicle in possession or control of the local agency,\u201d \"government owned vehicle\u201d and \"government vehicle\u201d interchangeably)."},"case_id":7301283,"label":"a"}
{"context":". Although no Pennsylvania precedent directly addresses the definition of \"government vehicle\" pursuant to section 4524(e)(2)(i), we note that the term has appeared in cases adjudicating disputes under the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law (\"MVFRL\"). 75 Pa.C.S. SSSS 1701-99. Both this Court and our Commonwealth Court utilize the term \"government vehicle\" in those cases to denote government ownership of a vehicle. See Nationwide Assur.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"627 A.2d 234, 237-38","parenthetical":"utilizing the terms \"motor vehicle in possession or control of the local agency,\" \"government owned vehicle\" and \"government vehicle\" interchangeably","sentence":"Co. v. Easley, 960 A.2d 843, 846 n. 5 (Pa.Super.2008) (referring to the \"government vehicle exception\u201d of MVFRL that exempts any motor vehicle owned by the federal government) (citing 75 Pa.C.S. \u00a7 1703); Kmonk-Sullivan v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 567 Pa. 514, 788 A.2d 955, 961-62 (2001) (utilizing the phrases \"government vehicles,\u201d \"government-owned vehicles,\u201d and \"Commonwealth agency vehicles\u201d interchangeably); see also City of Philadelphia v. Melendez, 156 Pa.Cmwlth. 271, 627 A.2d 234, 237-38 (1993) (utilizing the terms \"motor vehicle in possession or control of the local agency,\u201d \"government owned vehicle\u201d and \"government vehicle\u201d interchangeably)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"788 A.2d 955, 961-62","parenthetical":"utilizing the phrases \"government vehicles,\" \"government-owned vehicles,\" and \"Commonwealth agency vehicles\" interchangeably","sentence":"Co. v. Easley, 960 A.2d 843, 846 n. 5 (Pa.Super.2008) (referring to the \"government vehicle exception\u201d of MVFRL that exempts any motor vehicle owned by the federal government) (citing 75 Pa.C.S. \u00a7 1703); Kmonk-Sullivan v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 567 Pa. 514, 788 A.2d 955, 961-62 (2001) (utilizing the phrases \"government vehicles,\u201d \"government-owned vehicles,\u201d and \"Commonwealth agency vehicles\u201d interchangeably); see also City of Philadelphia v. Melendez, 156 Pa.Cmwlth. 271, 627 A.2d 234, 237-38 (1993) (utilizing the terms \"motor vehicle in possession or control of the local agency,\u201d \"government owned vehicle\u201d and \"government vehicle\u201d interchangeably)."},"case_id":7301283,"label":"b"}
{"context":"See Appellants' Reply Br. at 21-22. The physicians disagree and point to similar language found in both amended complaints with respect to HMOs' conspiracy. See Appellee's Br. at 19-20. The district court agreed with the physicians.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"2003 WL 22410373, *6","parenthetical":"\"[T]he 'new' allegations differ more in degree than in kind.\"","sentence":"See In Re Managed Care Litig., 2003 WL 22410373 *6 (S.D.Fla. Sept. 15, 2003) (\"[T]he 'new' allegations differ more in degree than in kind.\u201d); see also Klay v. Humana, Inc., 382 F.3d 1241, 1247 n. 1 (11th Cir.2004) (\"[T]he substance of the allegations is the same across all three of the plaintiffs\u2019 complaints.'\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[T]he substance of the allegations is the same across all three of the plaintiffs' complaints.'\"","sentence":"See In Re Managed Care Litig., 2003 WL 22410373 *6 (S.D.Fla. Sept. 15, 2003) (\"[T]he 'new' allegations differ more in degree than in kind.\u201d); see also Klay v. Humana, Inc., 382 F.3d 1241, 1247 n. 1 (11th Cir.2004) (\"[T]he substance of the allegations is the same across all three of the plaintiffs\u2019 complaints.'\u201d)."},"case_id":9151647,"label":"a"}
{"context":"(Docket Entry-No. 1). All four patents stem from a senior Canadian Priority Application, but they do not incorporate that Application into either the claim terms or specification. The contents of the Priority Application are intrinsic evidence, like claim language, the specification, or prosecution history, but cannot alone support a particular construction.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"566 F.3d 1282, 1289","parenthetical":"affirming the district court's construction of \"crystalline\" as \"Crystal A\" \"as outlined in the specification\" despite the fact that \"the Crystal B formulation actually appears in the parent ... application\" because \"Abbott knew exactly how to describe and claim Crystal B compounds\" yet \"chose to claim only the A form in the [junior] patent\"","sentence":"See Abbott Labs. v. Sandoz, 566 F.3d 1282, 1289 (Fed.Cir.2009) (affirming the district court\u2019s construction of \u201ccrystalline\u201d as \u201cCrystal A\u201d \u201cas outlined in the specification\u201d despite the fact that \u201cthe Crystal B formulation actually appears in the parent ... application\u201d because \u201cAbbott knew exactly how to describe and claim Crystal B compounds\u201d yet \u201cchose to claim only the A form in the [junior] patent\u201d); see id. at 1290 (\u201c[T]he rest of the intrinsic evidence, including the prosecution history and the priority [ ] application, evince[d] a clear intention to limit the [junior] patent to Crystal A as defined by the seven PXRD peaks in the specification and in claim 1.\u201d); see also AIA Eng\u2019g Ltd. v. Magotteaux Int\u2019l S\/A 657 F.3d 1264, 1279 (Fed.Cir.2011) (noting \u201cthat evidence proffered by [the patentee] regarding statements in the specification of one of the European priority applications is, at best, equivocal as to the meaning of\u2019 a disputed claim term and \u201cdoes not alter the clear import of the claim language, specification, and relevant extrinsic evidence in this case\u201d (citing Abbott Labs., 566 F.3d at 1290)); cf. Pfizer v. Ranbaxy Labs."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"657 F.3d 1264, 1279","parenthetical":"noting \"that evidence proffered by [the patentee] regarding statements in the specification of one of the European priority applications is, at best, equivocal as to the meaning of' a disputed claim term and \"does not alter the clear import of the claim language, specification, and relevant extrinsic evidence in this case\" (citing Abbott Labs., 566 F.3d at 1290","sentence":"See Abbott Labs. v. Sandoz, 566 F.3d 1282, 1289 (Fed.Cir.2009) (affirming the district court\u2019s construction of \u201ccrystalline\u201d as \u201cCrystal A\u201d \u201cas outlined in the specification\u201d despite the fact that \u201cthe Crystal B formulation actually appears in the parent ... application\u201d because \u201cAbbott knew exactly how to describe and claim Crystal B compounds\u201d yet \u201cchose to claim only the A form in the [junior] patent\u201d); see id. at 1290 (\u201c[T]he rest of the intrinsic evidence, including the prosecution history and the priority [ ] application, evince[d] a clear intention to limit the [junior] patent to Crystal A as defined by the seven PXRD peaks in the specification and in claim 1.\u201d); see also AIA Eng\u2019g Ltd. v. Magotteaux Int\u2019l S\/A 657 F.3d 1264, 1279 (Fed.Cir.2011) (noting \u201cthat evidence proffered by [the patentee] regarding statements in the specification of one of the European priority applications is, at best, equivocal as to the meaning of\u2019 a disputed claim term and \u201cdoes not alter the clear import of the claim language, specification, and relevant extrinsic evidence in this case\u201d (citing Abbott Labs., 566 F.3d at 1290)); cf. Pfizer v. Ranbaxy Labs."},"case_id":4335008,"label":"a"}
{"context":"(Docket Entry-No. 1). All four patents stem from a senior Canadian Priority Application, but they do not incorporate that Application into either the claim terms or specification. The contents of the Priority Application are intrinsic evidence, like claim language, the specification, or prosecution history, but cannot alone support a particular construction.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"566 F.3d 1282, 1289","parenthetical":"affirming the district court's construction of \"crystalline\" as \"Crystal A\" \"as outlined in the specification\" despite the fact that \"the Crystal B formulation actually appears in the parent ... application\" because \"Abbott knew exactly how to describe and claim Crystal B compounds\" yet \"chose to claim only the A form in the [junior] patent\"","sentence":"See Abbott Labs. v. Sandoz, 566 F.3d 1282, 1289 (Fed.Cir.2009) (affirming the district court\u2019s construction of \u201ccrystalline\u201d as \u201cCrystal A\u201d \u201cas outlined in the specification\u201d despite the fact that \u201cthe Crystal B formulation actually appears in the parent ... application\u201d because \u201cAbbott knew exactly how to describe and claim Crystal B compounds\u201d yet \u201cchose to claim only the A form in the [junior] patent\u201d); see id. at 1290 (\u201c[T]he rest of the intrinsic evidence, including the prosecution history and the priority [ ] application, evince[d] a clear intention to limit the [junior] patent to Crystal A as defined by the seven PXRD peaks in the specification and in claim 1.\u201d); see also AIA Eng\u2019g Ltd. v. Magotteaux Int\u2019l S\/A 657 F.3d 1264, 1279 (Fed.Cir.2011) (noting \u201cthat evidence proffered by [the patentee] regarding statements in the specification of one of the European priority applications is, at best, equivocal as to the meaning of\u2019 a disputed claim term and \u201cdoes not alter the clear import of the claim language, specification, and relevant extrinsic evidence in this case\u201d (citing Abbott Labs., 566 F.3d at 1290)); cf. Pfizer v. Ranbaxy Labs."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"566 F.3d 1290, 1290","parenthetical":"noting \"that evidence proffered by [the patentee] regarding statements in the specification of one of the European priority applications is, at best, equivocal as to the meaning of' a disputed claim term and \"does not alter the clear import of the claim language, specification, and relevant extrinsic evidence in this case\" (citing Abbott Labs., 566 F.3d at 1290","sentence":"See Abbott Labs. v. Sandoz, 566 F.3d 1282, 1289 (Fed.Cir.2009) (affirming the district court\u2019s construction of \u201ccrystalline\u201d as \u201cCrystal A\u201d \u201cas outlined in the specification\u201d despite the fact that \u201cthe Crystal B formulation actually appears in the parent ... application\u201d because \u201cAbbott knew exactly how to describe and claim Crystal B compounds\u201d yet \u201cchose to claim only the A form in the [junior] patent\u201d); see id. at 1290 (\u201c[T]he rest of the intrinsic evidence, including the prosecution history and the priority [ ] application, evince[d] a clear intention to limit the [junior] patent to Crystal A as defined by the seven PXRD peaks in the specification and in claim 1.\u201d); see also AIA Eng\u2019g Ltd. v. Magotteaux Int\u2019l S\/A 657 F.3d 1264, 1279 (Fed.Cir.2011) (noting \u201cthat evidence proffered by [the patentee] regarding statements in the specification of one of the European priority applications is, at best, equivocal as to the meaning of\u2019 a disputed claim term and \u201cdoes not alter the clear import of the claim language, specification, and relevant extrinsic evidence in this case\u201d (citing Abbott Labs., 566 F.3d at 1290)); cf. Pfizer v. Ranbaxy Labs."},"case_id":4335008,"label":"a"}
{"context":"There is some authority supporting the Trustee's argument with respect to the first part of the test.","citation_a":{"signal":"but cf.","identifier":"221 B.R. 56, 61","parenthetical":"option to terminate pursuant to \"adjustment clause\" was a right to terminate under UCC test","sentence":"But cf. In re Owen, 221 B.R. 56, 61 (Bankr.N.D.N.Y.1998) (option to terminate pursuant to \u201cadjustment clause\u201d was a right to terminate under UCC test)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"lease buyout provision did not constitute right to terminate obligation","sentence":"See e.g. In re Taylor, 209 B.R. 482 (Bankr.S.D.Ill.1997) (lease buyout provision did not constitute right to terminate obligation); In re Architectural Millwork of Virginia, Inc., 226 B.R. 551, 555 (Bankr.W.D.Va.1998) (lease agreement similar to the instant case did not permit debtor to terminate obligation)."},"case_id":9444443,"label":"b"}
{"context":"There is some authority supporting the Trustee's argument with respect to the first part of the test.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"226 B.R. 551, 555","parenthetical":"lease agreement similar to the instant case did not permit debtor to terminate obligation","sentence":"See e.g. In re Taylor, 209 B.R. 482 (Bankr.S.D.Ill.1997) (lease buyout provision did not constitute right to terminate obligation); In re Architectural Millwork of Virginia, Inc., 226 B.R. 551, 555 (Bankr.W.D.Va.1998) (lease agreement similar to the instant case did not permit debtor to terminate obligation)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but cf.","identifier":"221 B.R. 56, 61","parenthetical":"option to terminate pursuant to \"adjustment clause\" was a right to terminate under UCC test","sentence":"But cf. In re Owen, 221 B.R. 56, 61 (Bankr.N.D.N.Y.1998) (option to terminate pursuant to \u201cadjustment clause\u201d was a right to terminate under UCC test)."},"case_id":9444443,"label":"a"}
{"context":". The Commonwealth made this argument in the trial court and on brief on appeal. The fact that the trial court concluded appellant consented to the search and, thus, did not reach the probable cause issue does not prevent us from considering that issue on appeal where no further factual findings are necessary.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"14 Va.App. 449, 451-52","parenthetical":"holding that appellate court may affirm ruling where trial court reached right result for wrong reason, as long as alternate basis for affirmance was presented to trial court and no further factual findings are necessary","sentence":"See Driscoll v. Commonwealth, 14 Va.App. 449, 451-52, 417 S.E.2d 312, 313 (1992) (holding that appellate court may affirm ruling where trial court reached right result for wrong reason, as long as alternate basis for affirmance was presented to trial court and no further factual findings are necessary); see also Hancock v. Commonwealth, 21 Va.App. 466, 469, 465 S.E.2d 138, 140 (1995) (where trial court applied erroneous intent standard in convicting accused for possession of firearm by convicted felon, considering, without discussing authority to do so, whether evidence was sufficient to prove requisite intent and reversing based on holding, as a matter of law, that it did not prove requisite intent)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"21 Va.App. 466, 469","parenthetical":"where trial court applied erroneous intent standard in convicting accused for possession of firearm by convicted felon, considering, without discussing authority to do so, whether evidence was sufficient to prove requisite intent and reversing based on holding, as a matter of law, that it did not prove requisite intent","sentence":"See Driscoll v. Commonwealth, 14 Va.App. 449, 451-52, 417 S.E.2d 312, 313 (1992) (holding that appellate court may affirm ruling where trial court reached right result for wrong reason, as long as alternate basis for affirmance was presented to trial court and no further factual findings are necessary); see also Hancock v. Commonwealth, 21 Va.App. 466, 469, 465 S.E.2d 138, 140 (1995) (where trial court applied erroneous intent standard in convicting accused for possession of firearm by convicted felon, considering, without discussing authority to do so, whether evidence was sufficient to prove requisite intent and reversing based on holding, as a matter of law, that it did not prove requisite intent)."},"case_id":977310,"label":"a"}
{"context":". The Commonwealth made this argument in the trial court and on brief on appeal. The fact that the trial court concluded appellant consented to the search and, thus, did not reach the probable cause issue does not prevent us from considering that issue on appeal where no further factual findings are necessary.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"465 S.E.2d 138, 140","parenthetical":"where trial court applied erroneous intent standard in convicting accused for possession of firearm by convicted felon, considering, without discussing authority to do so, whether evidence was sufficient to prove requisite intent and reversing based on holding, as a matter of law, that it did not prove requisite intent","sentence":"See Driscoll v. Commonwealth, 14 Va.App. 449, 451-52, 417 S.E.2d 312, 313 (1992) (holding that appellate court may affirm ruling where trial court reached right result for wrong reason, as long as alternate basis for affirmance was presented to trial court and no further factual findings are necessary); see also Hancock v. Commonwealth, 21 Va.App. 466, 469, 465 S.E.2d 138, 140 (1995) (where trial court applied erroneous intent standard in convicting accused for possession of firearm by convicted felon, considering, without discussing authority to do so, whether evidence was sufficient to prove requisite intent and reversing based on holding, as a matter of law, that it did not prove requisite intent)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"14 Va.App. 449, 451-52","parenthetical":"holding that appellate court may affirm ruling where trial court reached right result for wrong reason, as long as alternate basis for affirmance was presented to trial court and no further factual findings are necessary","sentence":"See Driscoll v. Commonwealth, 14 Va.App. 449, 451-52, 417 S.E.2d 312, 313 (1992) (holding that appellate court may affirm ruling where trial court reached right result for wrong reason, as long as alternate basis for affirmance was presented to trial court and no further factual findings are necessary); see also Hancock v. Commonwealth, 21 Va.App. 466, 469, 465 S.E.2d 138, 140 (1995) (where trial court applied erroneous intent standard in convicting accused for possession of firearm by convicted felon, considering, without discussing authority to do so, whether evidence was sufficient to prove requisite intent and reversing based on holding, as a matter of law, that it did not prove requisite intent)."},"case_id":977310,"label":"b"}
{"context":". The Commonwealth made this argument in the trial court and on brief on appeal. The fact that the trial court concluded appellant consented to the search and, thus, did not reach the probable cause issue does not prevent us from considering that issue on appeal where no further factual findings are necessary.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"417 S.E.2d 312, 313","parenthetical":"holding that appellate court may affirm ruling where trial court reached right result for wrong reason, as long as alternate basis for affirmance was presented to trial court and no further factual findings are necessary","sentence":"See Driscoll v. Commonwealth, 14 Va.App. 449, 451-52, 417 S.E.2d 312, 313 (1992) (holding that appellate court may affirm ruling where trial court reached right result for wrong reason, as long as alternate basis for affirmance was presented to trial court and no further factual findings are necessary); see also Hancock v. Commonwealth, 21 Va.App. 466, 469, 465 S.E.2d 138, 140 (1995) (where trial court applied erroneous intent standard in convicting accused for possession of firearm by convicted felon, considering, without discussing authority to do so, whether evidence was sufficient to prove requisite intent and reversing based on holding, as a matter of law, that it did not prove requisite intent)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"21 Va.App. 466, 469","parenthetical":"where trial court applied erroneous intent standard in convicting accused for possession of firearm by convicted felon, considering, without discussing authority to do so, whether evidence was sufficient to prove requisite intent and reversing based on holding, as a matter of law, that it did not prove requisite intent","sentence":"See Driscoll v. Commonwealth, 14 Va.App. 449, 451-52, 417 S.E.2d 312, 313 (1992) (holding that appellate court may affirm ruling where trial court reached right result for wrong reason, as long as alternate basis for affirmance was presented to trial court and no further factual findings are necessary); see also Hancock v. Commonwealth, 21 Va.App. 466, 469, 465 S.E.2d 138, 140 (1995) (where trial court applied erroneous intent standard in convicting accused for possession of firearm by convicted felon, considering, without discussing authority to do so, whether evidence was sufficient to prove requisite intent and reversing based on holding, as a matter of law, that it did not prove requisite intent)."},"case_id":977310,"label":"a"}
{"context":". The Commonwealth made this argument in the trial court and on brief on appeal. The fact that the trial court concluded appellant consented to the search and, thus, did not reach the probable cause issue does not prevent us from considering that issue on appeal where no further factual findings are necessary.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"417 S.E.2d 312, 313","parenthetical":"holding that appellate court may affirm ruling where trial court reached right result for wrong reason, as long as alternate basis for affirmance was presented to trial court and no further factual findings are necessary","sentence":"See Driscoll v. Commonwealth, 14 Va.App. 449, 451-52, 417 S.E.2d 312, 313 (1992) (holding that appellate court may affirm ruling where trial court reached right result for wrong reason, as long as alternate basis for affirmance was presented to trial court and no further factual findings are necessary); see also Hancock v. Commonwealth, 21 Va.App. 466, 469, 465 S.E.2d 138, 140 (1995) (where trial court applied erroneous intent standard in convicting accused for possession of firearm by convicted felon, considering, without discussing authority to do so, whether evidence was sufficient to prove requisite intent and reversing based on holding, as a matter of law, that it did not prove requisite intent)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"465 S.E.2d 138, 140","parenthetical":"where trial court applied erroneous intent standard in convicting accused for possession of firearm by convicted felon, considering, without discussing authority to do so, whether evidence was sufficient to prove requisite intent and reversing based on holding, as a matter of law, that it did not prove requisite intent","sentence":"See Driscoll v. Commonwealth, 14 Va.App. 449, 451-52, 417 S.E.2d 312, 313 (1992) (holding that appellate court may affirm ruling where trial court reached right result for wrong reason, as long as alternate basis for affirmance was presented to trial court and no further factual findings are necessary); see also Hancock v. Commonwealth, 21 Va.App. 466, 469, 465 S.E.2d 138, 140 (1995) (where trial court applied erroneous intent standard in convicting accused for possession of firearm by convicted felon, considering, without discussing authority to do so, whether evidence was sufficient to prove requisite intent and reversing based on holding, as a matter of law, that it did not prove requisite intent)."},"case_id":977310,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Entry No. 6.) As such, Rule 4(k)(l)(C) provides an additional basis for this Court to exercise personal jurisdiction over Defendant, to the extent permitted by due process.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"349 F.Supp.2d 806, 806","parenthetical":"exercise of personal jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 4(k)(l)(C) still requires demonstration that defendant has sufficient \"minimum contacts\" to satisfy traditional due process inquiry","sentence":"See In re Terrorist Attacks, 349 F.Supp.2d at 806 (exercise of personal jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 4(k)(l)(C) still requires demonstration that defendant has sufficient \u201cminimum contacts\u201d to satisfy traditional due process inquiry); see also Wultz I, 755 F.Supp.2d at 32 (\u201cNationwide service of process does not dispense with the requirement that an exercise of personal jurisdiction comport with the Due Process Clause.\u201d)"},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"755 F.Supp.2d 32, 32","parenthetical":"\"Nationwide service of process does not dispense with the requirement that an exercise of personal jurisdiction comport with the Due Process Clause.\"","sentence":"See In re Terrorist Attacks, 349 F.Supp.2d at 806 (exercise of personal jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 4(k)(l)(C) still requires demonstration that defendant has sufficient \u201cminimum contacts\u201d to satisfy traditional due process inquiry); see also Wultz I, 755 F.Supp.2d at 32 (\u201cNationwide service of process does not dispense with the requirement that an exercise of personal jurisdiction comport with the Due Process Clause.\u201d)"},"case_id":4352776,"label":"a"}
{"context":"All of this contradictory case law points out that, regardless of whether a constitutional violation occurred when Turcotte temporarily seized and read Barstow's letter to his attorney, all Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"1994 WL 487936, at *3","parenthetical":"\"It is arguable, in light of Wolff, that a reasonable prison official could not believe that clearly marked legal mail, which could not be read by officials when it arrived at the prison, could be read during a random search of a prison cell.\"","sentence":"See Schenck v. Edwards, 921 F.Supp. 679, 690 (E.D.Wash.1996) (\"The court is not aware of any clearly established law in [the Ninth] [CJircuit which requires the inmate\u2019s presence during an inspection of the legal documents in his cell.\u201d); Proudfoot v. Williams, 803 F.Supp. 1048, 1053 (E.D.Pa.1992) (\"The question of reading a prisoner\u2019s outgoing legal mail remains unsettled \u2014 neither the Supreme Court nor the Third Circuit has addressed the matter squarely\u201d); cf. Allen v. Rainey, Civ. No. 93-1580-FR, 1994 WL 487936, at *3 (D.Or. Sept.7, 1994) (\"It is arguable, in light of Wolff, that a reasonable prison official could not believe that clearly marked legal mail, which could not be read by officials when it arrived at the prison, could be read during a random search of a prison cell.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"921 F.Supp. 679, 690","parenthetical":"\"The court is not aware of any clearly established law in [the Ninth] [CJircuit which requires the inmate's presence during an inspection of the legal documents in his cell.\"","sentence":"See Schenck v. Edwards, 921 F.Supp. 679, 690 (E.D.Wash.1996) (\"The court is not aware of any clearly established law in [the Ninth] [CJircuit which requires the inmate\u2019s presence during an inspection of the legal documents in his cell.\u201d); Proudfoot v. Williams, 803 F.Supp. 1048, 1053 (E.D.Pa.1992) (\"The question of reading a prisoner\u2019s outgoing legal mail remains unsettled \u2014 neither the Supreme Court nor the Third Circuit has addressed the matter squarely\u201d); cf. Allen v. Rainey, Civ. No. 93-1580-FR, 1994 WL 487936, at *3 (D.Or. Sept.7, 1994) (\"It is arguable, in light of Wolff, that a reasonable prison official could not believe that clearly marked legal mail, which could not be read by officials when it arrived at the prison, could be read during a random search of a prison cell.\u201d)."},"case_id":11226891,"label":"b"}
{"context":"All of this contradictory case law points out that, regardless of whether a constitutional violation occurred when Turcotte temporarily seized and read Barstow's letter to his attorney, all Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"1994 WL 487936, at *3","parenthetical":"\"It is arguable, in light of Wolff, that a reasonable prison official could not believe that clearly marked legal mail, which could not be read by officials when it arrived at the prison, could be read during a random search of a prison cell.\"","sentence":"See Schenck v. Edwards, 921 F.Supp. 679, 690 (E.D.Wash.1996) (\"The court is not aware of any clearly established law in [the Ninth] [CJircuit which requires the inmate\u2019s presence during an inspection of the legal documents in his cell.\u201d); Proudfoot v. Williams, 803 F.Supp. 1048, 1053 (E.D.Pa.1992) (\"The question of reading a prisoner\u2019s outgoing legal mail remains unsettled \u2014 neither the Supreme Court nor the Third Circuit has addressed the matter squarely\u201d); cf. Allen v. Rainey, Civ. No. 93-1580-FR, 1994 WL 487936, at *3 (D.Or. Sept.7, 1994) (\"It is arguable, in light of Wolff, that a reasonable prison official could not believe that clearly marked legal mail, which could not be read by officials when it arrived at the prison, could be read during a random search of a prison cell.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"803 F.Supp. 1048, 1053","parenthetical":"\"The question of reading a prisoner's outgoing legal mail remains unsettled -- neither the Supreme Court nor the Third Circuit has addressed the matter squarely\"","sentence":"See Schenck v. Edwards, 921 F.Supp. 679, 690 (E.D.Wash.1996) (\"The court is not aware of any clearly established law in [the Ninth] [CJircuit which requires the inmate\u2019s presence during an inspection of the legal documents in his cell.\u201d); Proudfoot v. Williams, 803 F.Supp. 1048, 1053 (E.D.Pa.1992) (\"The question of reading a prisoner\u2019s outgoing legal mail remains unsettled \u2014 neither the Supreme Court nor the Third Circuit has addressed the matter squarely\u201d); cf. Allen v. Rainey, Civ. No. 93-1580-FR, 1994 WL 487936, at *3 (D.Or. Sept.7, 1994) (\"It is arguable, in light of Wolff, that a reasonable prison official could not believe that clearly marked legal mail, which could not be read by officials when it arrived at the prison, could be read during a random search of a prison cell.\u201d)."},"case_id":11226891,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The G'i'eenwood Village court held that the trial court was correct in doing so and that it must proceed to apply the provisions contained in the revised statute.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding legislature's intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power","sentence":"See Perry v. City of Denver, 27 Colo. 93, 59 P. 747 (1899)(pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation); see also Gen. Tel. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Ill.2d 363, 83 Ill.Dec. 133, 469 N.E.2d 1067 (1984)(holding legislature\u2019s intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power); Schlenz v. Castle, 84 Ill.2d 196, 49 Ill.Dec. 322, 417 N.E.2d 1336 (1981)(rejecting separation of powers challenge where legislature\u2019s curative act did not have effect of setting aside final adjudication); Andresen v. Andresen, 317 Md. 380, 564 A.2d 399, 401 (1989)(affirming dismissal of motion to modify property distribution where final dissolution decree was entered, Congress enacted relevant law and intended retroactive effect, but motion did not allege sufficient facts to set aside final order); Atlantic City Casino Ass\u2019n v. City of Atlantic City, 217 N.J.Super. 277, 525 A.2d 1109(rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending), remanded, 102 N.J. 323, 508 A.2d 203 (1985); Bowen v. Mabry, 154 N.C.App. 734, 572 S.E.2d 809 (2002)(General Assembly has power to amend statute that it believes has been misconstrued by the courts and \u201cundo any perceived undesirable past consequences of misinterpretation of its work product\u201d unless retroactive application impairs vested rights, quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes \u00a7 411, at 568 (1999)); cf. In re Kirchner, 164 Ill.2d 468, 208 Ill.Dec. 268, 649 N.E.2d 324 (1995)(refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties\u2019 rights)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation","sentence":"See Perry v. City of Denver, 27 Colo. 93, 59 P. 747 (1899)(pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation); see also Gen. Tel. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Ill.2d 363, 83 Ill.Dec. 133, 469 N.E.2d 1067 (1984)(holding legislature\u2019s intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power); Schlenz v. Castle, 84 Ill.2d 196, 49 Ill.Dec. 322, 417 N.E.2d 1336 (1981)(rejecting separation of powers challenge where legislature\u2019s curative act did not have effect of setting aside final adjudication); Andresen v. Andresen, 317 Md. 380, 564 A.2d 399, 401 (1989)(affirming dismissal of motion to modify property distribution where final dissolution decree was entered, Congress enacted relevant law and intended retroactive effect, but motion did not allege sufficient facts to set aside final order); Atlantic City Casino Ass\u2019n v. City of Atlantic City, 217 N.J.Super. 277, 525 A.2d 1109(rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending), remanded, 102 N.J. 323, 508 A.2d 203 (1985); Bowen v. Mabry, 154 N.C.App. 734, 572 S.E.2d 809 (2002)(General Assembly has power to amend statute that it believes has been misconstrued by the courts and \u201cundo any perceived undesirable past consequences of misinterpretation of its work product\u201d unless retroactive application impairs vested rights, quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes \u00a7 411, at 568 (1999)); cf. In re Kirchner, 164 Ill.2d 468, 208 Ill.Dec. 268, 649 N.E.2d 324 (1995)(refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties\u2019 rights)."},"case_id":9025877,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The G'i'eenwood Village court held that the trial court was correct in doing so and that it must proceed to apply the provisions contained in the revised statute.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding legislature's intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power","sentence":"See Perry v. City of Denver, 27 Colo. 93, 59 P. 747 (1899)(pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation); see also Gen. Tel. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Ill.2d 363, 83 Ill.Dec. 133, 469 N.E.2d 1067 (1984)(holding legislature\u2019s intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power); Schlenz v. Castle, 84 Ill.2d 196, 49 Ill.Dec. 322, 417 N.E.2d 1336 (1981)(rejecting separation of powers challenge where legislature\u2019s curative act did not have effect of setting aside final adjudication); Andresen v. Andresen, 317 Md. 380, 564 A.2d 399, 401 (1989)(affirming dismissal of motion to modify property distribution where final dissolution decree was entered, Congress enacted relevant law and intended retroactive effect, but motion did not allege sufficient facts to set aside final order); Atlantic City Casino Ass\u2019n v. City of Atlantic City, 217 N.J.Super. 277, 525 A.2d 1109(rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending), remanded, 102 N.J. 323, 508 A.2d 203 (1985); Bowen v. Mabry, 154 N.C.App. 734, 572 S.E.2d 809 (2002)(General Assembly has power to amend statute that it believes has been misconstrued by the courts and \u201cundo any perceived undesirable past consequences of misinterpretation of its work product\u201d unless retroactive application impairs vested rights, quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes \u00a7 411, at 568 (1999)); cf. In re Kirchner, 164 Ill.2d 468, 208 Ill.Dec. 268, 649 N.E.2d 324 (1995)(refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties\u2019 rights)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation","sentence":"See Perry v. City of Denver, 27 Colo. 93, 59 P. 747 (1899)(pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation); see also Gen. Tel. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Ill.2d 363, 83 Ill.Dec. 133, 469 N.E.2d 1067 (1984)(holding legislature\u2019s intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power); Schlenz v. Castle, 84 Ill.2d 196, 49 Ill.Dec. 322, 417 N.E.2d 1336 (1981)(rejecting separation of powers challenge where legislature\u2019s curative act did not have effect of setting aside final adjudication); Andresen v. Andresen, 317 Md. 380, 564 A.2d 399, 401 (1989)(affirming dismissal of motion to modify property distribution where final dissolution decree was entered, Congress enacted relevant law and intended retroactive effect, but motion did not allege sufficient facts to set aside final order); Atlantic City Casino Ass\u2019n v. City of Atlantic City, 217 N.J.Super. 277, 525 A.2d 1109(rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending), remanded, 102 N.J. 323, 508 A.2d 203 (1985); Bowen v. Mabry, 154 N.C.App. 734, 572 S.E.2d 809 (2002)(General Assembly has power to amend statute that it believes has been misconstrued by the courts and \u201cundo any perceived undesirable past consequences of misinterpretation of its work product\u201d unless retroactive application impairs vested rights, quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes \u00a7 411, at 568 (1999)); cf. In re Kirchner, 164 Ill.2d 468, 208 Ill.Dec. 268, 649 N.E.2d 324 (1995)(refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties\u2019 rights)."},"case_id":9025877,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The G'i'eenwood Village court held that the trial court was correct in doing so and that it must proceed to apply the provisions contained in the revised statute.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation","sentence":"See Perry v. City of Denver, 27 Colo. 93, 59 P. 747 (1899)(pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation); see also Gen. Tel. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Ill.2d 363, 83 Ill.Dec. 133, 469 N.E.2d 1067 (1984)(holding legislature\u2019s intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power); Schlenz v. Castle, 84 Ill.2d 196, 49 Ill.Dec. 322, 417 N.E.2d 1336 (1981)(rejecting separation of powers challenge where legislature\u2019s curative act did not have effect of setting aside final adjudication); Andresen v. Andresen, 317 Md. 380, 564 A.2d 399, 401 (1989)(affirming dismissal of motion to modify property distribution where final dissolution decree was entered, Congress enacted relevant law and intended retroactive effect, but motion did not allege sufficient facts to set aside final order); Atlantic City Casino Ass\u2019n v. City of Atlantic City, 217 N.J.Super. 277, 525 A.2d 1109(rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending), remanded, 102 N.J. 323, 508 A.2d 203 (1985); Bowen v. Mabry, 154 N.C.App. 734, 572 S.E.2d 809 (2002)(General Assembly has power to amend statute that it believes has been misconstrued by the courts and \u201cundo any perceived undesirable past consequences of misinterpretation of its work product\u201d unless retroactive application impairs vested rights, quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes \u00a7 411, at 568 (1999)); cf. In re Kirchner, 164 Ill.2d 468, 208 Ill.Dec. 268, 649 N.E.2d 324 (1995)(refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties\u2019 rights)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding legislature's intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power","sentence":"See Perry v. City of Denver, 27 Colo. 93, 59 P. 747 (1899)(pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation); see also Gen. Tel. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Ill.2d 363, 83 Ill.Dec. 133, 469 N.E.2d 1067 (1984)(holding legislature\u2019s intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power); Schlenz v. Castle, 84 Ill.2d 196, 49 Ill.Dec. 322, 417 N.E.2d 1336 (1981)(rejecting separation of powers challenge where legislature\u2019s curative act did not have effect of setting aside final adjudication); Andresen v. Andresen, 317 Md. 380, 564 A.2d 399, 401 (1989)(affirming dismissal of motion to modify property distribution where final dissolution decree was entered, Congress enacted relevant law and intended retroactive effect, but motion did not allege sufficient facts to set aside final order); Atlantic City Casino Ass\u2019n v. City of Atlantic City, 217 N.J.Super. 277, 525 A.2d 1109(rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending), remanded, 102 N.J. 323, 508 A.2d 203 (1985); Bowen v. Mabry, 154 N.C.App. 734, 572 S.E.2d 809 (2002)(General Assembly has power to amend statute that it believes has been misconstrued by the courts and \u201cundo any perceived undesirable past consequences of misinterpretation of its work product\u201d unless retroactive application impairs vested rights, quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes \u00a7 411, at 568 (1999)); cf. In re Kirchner, 164 Ill.2d 468, 208 Ill.Dec. 268, 649 N.E.2d 324 (1995)(refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties\u2019 rights)."},"case_id":9025877,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The G'i'eenwood Village court held that the trial court was correct in doing so and that it must proceed to apply the provisions contained in the revised statute.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"rejecting separation of powers challenge where legislature's curative act did not have effect of setting aside final adjudication","sentence":"See Perry v. City of Denver, 27 Colo. 93, 59 P. 747 (1899)(pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation); see also Gen. Tel. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Ill.2d 363, 83 Ill.Dec. 133, 469 N.E.2d 1067 (1984)(holding legislature\u2019s intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power); Schlenz v. Castle, 84 Ill.2d 196, 49 Ill.Dec. 322, 417 N.E.2d 1336 (1981)(rejecting separation of powers challenge where legislature\u2019s curative act did not have effect of setting aside final adjudication); Andresen v. Andresen, 317 Md. 380, 564 A.2d 399, 401 (1989)(affirming dismissal of motion to modify property distribution where final dissolution decree was entered, Congress enacted relevant law and intended retroactive effect, but motion did not allege sufficient facts to set aside final order); Atlantic City Casino Ass\u2019n v. City of Atlantic City, 217 N.J.Super. 277, 525 A.2d 1109(rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending), remanded, 102 N.J. 323, 508 A.2d 203 (1985); Bowen v. Mabry, 154 N.C.App. 734, 572 S.E.2d 809 (2002)(General Assembly has power to amend statute that it believes has been misconstrued by the courts and \u201cundo any perceived undesirable past consequences of misinterpretation of its work product\u201d unless retroactive application impairs vested rights, quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes \u00a7 411, at 568 (1999)); cf. In re Kirchner, 164 Ill.2d 468, 208 Ill.Dec. 268, 649 N.E.2d 324 (1995)(refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties\u2019 rights)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation","sentence":"See Perry v. City of Denver, 27 Colo. 93, 59 P. 747 (1899)(pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation); see also Gen. Tel. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Ill.2d 363, 83 Ill.Dec. 133, 469 N.E.2d 1067 (1984)(holding legislature\u2019s intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power); Schlenz v. Castle, 84 Ill.2d 196, 49 Ill.Dec. 322, 417 N.E.2d 1336 (1981)(rejecting separation of powers challenge where legislature\u2019s curative act did not have effect of setting aside final adjudication); Andresen v. Andresen, 317 Md. 380, 564 A.2d 399, 401 (1989)(affirming dismissal of motion to modify property distribution where final dissolution decree was entered, Congress enacted relevant law and intended retroactive effect, but motion did not allege sufficient facts to set aside final order); Atlantic City Casino Ass\u2019n v. City of Atlantic City, 217 N.J.Super. 277, 525 A.2d 1109(rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending), remanded, 102 N.J. 323, 508 A.2d 203 (1985); Bowen v. Mabry, 154 N.C.App. 734, 572 S.E.2d 809 (2002)(General Assembly has power to amend statute that it believes has been misconstrued by the courts and \u201cundo any perceived undesirable past consequences of misinterpretation of its work product\u201d unless retroactive application impairs vested rights, quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes \u00a7 411, at 568 (1999)); cf. In re Kirchner, 164 Ill.2d 468, 208 Ill.Dec. 268, 649 N.E.2d 324 (1995)(refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties\u2019 rights)."},"case_id":9025877,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The G'i'eenwood Village court held that the trial court was correct in doing so and that it must proceed to apply the provisions contained in the revised statute.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"rejecting separation of powers challenge where legislature's curative act did not have effect of setting aside final adjudication","sentence":"See Perry v. City of Denver, 27 Colo. 93, 59 P. 747 (1899)(pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation); see also Gen. Tel. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Ill.2d 363, 83 Ill.Dec. 133, 469 N.E.2d 1067 (1984)(holding legislature\u2019s intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power); Schlenz v. Castle, 84 Ill.2d 196, 49 Ill.Dec. 322, 417 N.E.2d 1336 (1981)(rejecting separation of powers challenge where legislature\u2019s curative act did not have effect of setting aside final adjudication); Andresen v. Andresen, 317 Md. 380, 564 A.2d 399, 401 (1989)(affirming dismissal of motion to modify property distribution where final dissolution decree was entered, Congress enacted relevant law and intended retroactive effect, but motion did not allege sufficient facts to set aside final order); Atlantic City Casino Ass\u2019n v. City of Atlantic City, 217 N.J.Super. 277, 525 A.2d 1109(rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending), remanded, 102 N.J. 323, 508 A.2d 203 (1985); Bowen v. Mabry, 154 N.C.App. 734, 572 S.E.2d 809 (2002)(General Assembly has power to amend statute that it believes has been misconstrued by the courts and \u201cundo any perceived undesirable past consequences of misinterpretation of its work product\u201d unless retroactive application impairs vested rights, quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes \u00a7 411, at 568 (1999)); cf. In re Kirchner, 164 Ill.2d 468, 208 Ill.Dec. 268, 649 N.E.2d 324 (1995)(refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties\u2019 rights)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation","sentence":"See Perry v. City of Denver, 27 Colo. 93, 59 P. 747 (1899)(pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation); see also Gen. Tel. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Ill.2d 363, 83 Ill.Dec. 133, 469 N.E.2d 1067 (1984)(holding legislature\u2019s intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power); Schlenz v. Castle, 84 Ill.2d 196, 49 Ill.Dec. 322, 417 N.E.2d 1336 (1981)(rejecting separation of powers challenge where legislature\u2019s curative act did not have effect of setting aside final adjudication); Andresen v. Andresen, 317 Md. 380, 564 A.2d 399, 401 (1989)(affirming dismissal of motion to modify property distribution where final dissolution decree was entered, Congress enacted relevant law and intended retroactive effect, but motion did not allege sufficient facts to set aside final order); Atlantic City Casino Ass\u2019n v. City of Atlantic City, 217 N.J.Super. 277, 525 A.2d 1109(rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending), remanded, 102 N.J. 323, 508 A.2d 203 (1985); Bowen v. Mabry, 154 N.C.App. 734, 572 S.E.2d 809 (2002)(General Assembly has power to amend statute that it believes has been misconstrued by the courts and \u201cundo any perceived undesirable past consequences of misinterpretation of its work product\u201d unless retroactive application impairs vested rights, quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes \u00a7 411, at 568 (1999)); cf. In re Kirchner, 164 Ill.2d 468, 208 Ill.Dec. 268, 649 N.E.2d 324 (1995)(refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties\u2019 rights)."},"case_id":9025877,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The G'i'eenwood Village court held that the trial court was correct in doing so and that it must proceed to apply the provisions contained in the revised statute.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation","sentence":"See Perry v. City of Denver, 27 Colo. 93, 59 P. 747 (1899)(pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation); see also Gen. Tel. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Ill.2d 363, 83 Ill.Dec. 133, 469 N.E.2d 1067 (1984)(holding legislature\u2019s intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power); Schlenz v. Castle, 84 Ill.2d 196, 49 Ill.Dec. 322, 417 N.E.2d 1336 (1981)(rejecting separation of powers challenge where legislature\u2019s curative act did not have effect of setting aside final adjudication); Andresen v. Andresen, 317 Md. 380, 564 A.2d 399, 401 (1989)(affirming dismissal of motion to modify property distribution where final dissolution decree was entered, Congress enacted relevant law and intended retroactive effect, but motion did not allege sufficient facts to set aside final order); Atlantic City Casino Ass\u2019n v. City of Atlantic City, 217 N.J.Super. 277, 525 A.2d 1109(rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending), remanded, 102 N.J. 323, 508 A.2d 203 (1985); Bowen v. Mabry, 154 N.C.App. 734, 572 S.E.2d 809 (2002)(General Assembly has power to amend statute that it believes has been misconstrued by the courts and \u201cundo any perceived undesirable past consequences of misinterpretation of its work product\u201d unless retroactive application impairs vested rights, quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes \u00a7 411, at 568 (1999)); cf. In re Kirchner, 164 Ill.2d 468, 208 Ill.Dec. 268, 649 N.E.2d 324 (1995)(refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties\u2019 rights)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"rejecting separation of powers challenge where legislature's curative act did not have effect of setting aside final adjudication","sentence":"See Perry v. City of Denver, 27 Colo. 93, 59 P. 747 (1899)(pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation); see also Gen. Tel. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Ill.2d 363, 83 Ill.Dec. 133, 469 N.E.2d 1067 (1984)(holding legislature\u2019s intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power); Schlenz v. Castle, 84 Ill.2d 196, 49 Ill.Dec. 322, 417 N.E.2d 1336 (1981)(rejecting separation of powers challenge where legislature\u2019s curative act did not have effect of setting aside final adjudication); Andresen v. Andresen, 317 Md. 380, 564 A.2d 399, 401 (1989)(affirming dismissal of motion to modify property distribution where final dissolution decree was entered, Congress enacted relevant law and intended retroactive effect, but motion did not allege sufficient facts to set aside final order); Atlantic City Casino Ass\u2019n v. City of Atlantic City, 217 N.J.Super. 277, 525 A.2d 1109(rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending), remanded, 102 N.J. 323, 508 A.2d 203 (1985); Bowen v. Mabry, 154 N.C.App. 734, 572 S.E.2d 809 (2002)(General Assembly has power to amend statute that it believes has been misconstrued by the courts and \u201cundo any perceived undesirable past consequences of misinterpretation of its work product\u201d unless retroactive application impairs vested rights, quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes \u00a7 411, at 568 (1999)); cf. In re Kirchner, 164 Ill.2d 468, 208 Ill.Dec. 268, 649 N.E.2d 324 (1995)(refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties\u2019 rights)."},"case_id":9025877,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The G'i'eenwood Village court held that the trial court was correct in doing so and that it must proceed to apply the provisions contained in the revised statute.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation","sentence":"See Perry v. City of Denver, 27 Colo. 93, 59 P. 747 (1899)(pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation); see also Gen. Tel. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Ill.2d 363, 83 Ill.Dec. 133, 469 N.E.2d 1067 (1984)(holding legislature\u2019s intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power); Schlenz v. Castle, 84 Ill.2d 196, 49 Ill.Dec. 322, 417 N.E.2d 1336 (1981)(rejecting separation of powers challenge where legislature\u2019s curative act did not have effect of setting aside final adjudication); Andresen v. Andresen, 317 Md. 380, 564 A.2d 399, 401 (1989)(affirming dismissal of motion to modify property distribution where final dissolution decree was entered, Congress enacted relevant law and intended retroactive effect, but motion did not allege sufficient facts to set aside final order); Atlantic City Casino Ass\u2019n v. City of Atlantic City, 217 N.J.Super. 277, 525 A.2d 1109(rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending), remanded, 102 N.J. 323, 508 A.2d 203 (1985); Bowen v. Mabry, 154 N.C.App. 734, 572 S.E.2d 809 (2002)(General Assembly has power to amend statute that it believes has been misconstrued by the courts and \u201cundo any perceived undesirable past consequences of misinterpretation of its work product\u201d unless retroactive application impairs vested rights, quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes \u00a7 411, at 568 (1999)); cf. In re Kirchner, 164 Ill.2d 468, 208 Ill.Dec. 268, 649 N.E.2d 324 (1995)(refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties\u2019 rights)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"affirming dismissal of motion to modify property distribution where final dissolution decree was entered, Congress enacted relevant law and intended retroactive effect, but motion did not allege sufficient facts to set aside final order","sentence":"See Perry v. City of Denver, 27 Colo. 93, 59 P. 747 (1899)(pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation); see also Gen. Tel. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Ill.2d 363, 83 Ill.Dec. 133, 469 N.E.2d 1067 (1984)(holding legislature\u2019s intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power); Schlenz v. Castle, 84 Ill.2d 196, 49 Ill.Dec. 322, 417 N.E.2d 1336 (1981)(rejecting separation of powers challenge where legislature\u2019s curative act did not have effect of setting aside final adjudication); Andresen v. Andresen, 317 Md. 380, 564 A.2d 399, 401 (1989)(affirming dismissal of motion to modify property distribution where final dissolution decree was entered, Congress enacted relevant law and intended retroactive effect, but motion did not allege sufficient facts to set aside final order); Atlantic City Casino Ass\u2019n v. City of Atlantic City, 217 N.J.Super. 277, 525 A.2d 1109(rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending), remanded, 102 N.J. 323, 508 A.2d 203 (1985); Bowen v. Mabry, 154 N.C.App. 734, 572 S.E.2d 809 (2002)(General Assembly has power to amend statute that it believes has been misconstrued by the courts and \u201cundo any perceived undesirable past consequences of misinterpretation of its work product\u201d unless retroactive application impairs vested rights, quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes \u00a7 411, at 568 (1999)); cf. In re Kirchner, 164 Ill.2d 468, 208 Ill.Dec. 268, 649 N.E.2d 324 (1995)(refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties\u2019 rights)."},"case_id":9025877,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The G'i'eenwood Village court held that the trial court was correct in doing so and that it must proceed to apply the provisions contained in the revised statute.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation","sentence":"See Perry v. City of Denver, 27 Colo. 93, 59 P. 747 (1899)(pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation); see also Gen. Tel. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Ill.2d 363, 83 Ill.Dec. 133, 469 N.E.2d 1067 (1984)(holding legislature\u2019s intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power); Schlenz v. Castle, 84 Ill.2d 196, 49 Ill.Dec. 322, 417 N.E.2d 1336 (1981)(rejecting separation of powers challenge where legislature\u2019s curative act did not have effect of setting aside final adjudication); Andresen v. Andresen, 317 Md. 380, 564 A.2d 399, 401 (1989)(affirming dismissal of motion to modify property distribution where final dissolution decree was entered, Congress enacted relevant law and intended retroactive effect, but motion did not allege sufficient facts to set aside final order); Atlantic City Casino Ass\u2019n v. City of Atlantic City, 217 N.J.Super. 277, 525 A.2d 1109(rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending), remanded, 102 N.J. 323, 508 A.2d 203 (1985); Bowen v. Mabry, 154 N.C.App. 734, 572 S.E.2d 809 (2002)(General Assembly has power to amend statute that it believes has been misconstrued by the courts and \u201cundo any perceived undesirable past consequences of misinterpretation of its work product\u201d unless retroactive application impairs vested rights, quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes \u00a7 411, at 568 (1999)); cf. In re Kirchner, 164 Ill.2d 468, 208 Ill.Dec. 268, 649 N.E.2d 324 (1995)(refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties\u2019 rights)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"564 A.2d 399, 401","parenthetical":"affirming dismissal of motion to modify property distribution where final dissolution decree was entered, Congress enacted relevant law and intended retroactive effect, but motion did not allege sufficient facts to set aside final order","sentence":"See Perry v. City of Denver, 27 Colo. 93, 59 P. 747 (1899)(pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation); see also Gen. Tel. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Ill.2d 363, 83 Ill.Dec. 133, 469 N.E.2d 1067 (1984)(holding legislature\u2019s intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power); Schlenz v. Castle, 84 Ill.2d 196, 49 Ill.Dec. 322, 417 N.E.2d 1336 (1981)(rejecting separation of powers challenge where legislature\u2019s curative act did not have effect of setting aside final adjudication); Andresen v. Andresen, 317 Md. 380, 564 A.2d 399, 401 (1989)(affirming dismissal of motion to modify property distribution where final dissolution decree was entered, Congress enacted relevant law and intended retroactive effect, but motion did not allege sufficient facts to set aside final order); Atlantic City Casino Ass\u2019n v. City of Atlantic City, 217 N.J.Super. 277, 525 A.2d 1109(rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending), remanded, 102 N.J. 323, 508 A.2d 203 (1985); Bowen v. Mabry, 154 N.C.App. 734, 572 S.E.2d 809 (2002)(General Assembly has power to amend statute that it believes has been misconstrued by the courts and \u201cundo any perceived undesirable past consequences of misinterpretation of its work product\u201d unless retroactive application impairs vested rights, quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes \u00a7 411, at 568 (1999)); cf. In re Kirchner, 164 Ill.2d 468, 208 Ill.Dec. 268, 649 N.E.2d 324 (1995)(refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties\u2019 rights)."},"case_id":9025877,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The G'i'eenwood Village court held that the trial court was correct in doing so and that it must proceed to apply the provisions contained in the revised statute.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending","sentence":"See Perry v. City of Denver, 27 Colo. 93, 59 P. 747 (1899)(pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation); see also Gen. Tel. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Ill.2d 363, 83 Ill.Dec. 133, 469 N.E.2d 1067 (1984)(holding legislature\u2019s intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power); Schlenz v. Castle, 84 Ill.2d 196, 49 Ill.Dec. 322, 417 N.E.2d 1336 (1981)(rejecting separation of powers challenge where legislature\u2019s curative act did not have effect of setting aside final adjudication); Andresen v. Andresen, 317 Md. 380, 564 A.2d 399, 401 (1989)(affirming dismissal of motion to modify property distribution where final dissolution decree was entered, Congress enacted relevant law and intended retroactive effect, but motion did not allege sufficient facts to set aside final order); Atlantic City Casino Ass\u2019n v. City of Atlantic City, 217 N.J.Super. 277, 525 A.2d 1109(rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending), remanded, 102 N.J. 323, 508 A.2d 203 (1985); Bowen v. Mabry, 154 N.C.App. 734, 572 S.E.2d 809 (2002)(General Assembly has power to amend statute that it believes has been misconstrued by the courts and \u201cundo any perceived undesirable past consequences of misinterpretation of its work product\u201d unless retroactive application impairs vested rights, quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes \u00a7 411, at 568 (1999)); cf. In re Kirchner, 164 Ill.2d 468, 208 Ill.Dec. 268, 649 N.E.2d 324 (1995)(refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties\u2019 rights)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation","sentence":"See Perry v. City of Denver, 27 Colo. 93, 59 P. 747 (1899)(pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation); see also Gen. Tel. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Ill.2d 363, 83 Ill.Dec. 133, 469 N.E.2d 1067 (1984)(holding legislature\u2019s intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power); Schlenz v. Castle, 84 Ill.2d 196, 49 Ill.Dec. 322, 417 N.E.2d 1336 (1981)(rejecting separation of powers challenge where legislature\u2019s curative act did not have effect of setting aside final adjudication); Andresen v. Andresen, 317 Md. 380, 564 A.2d 399, 401 (1989)(affirming dismissal of motion to modify property distribution where final dissolution decree was entered, Congress enacted relevant law and intended retroactive effect, but motion did not allege sufficient facts to set aside final order); Atlantic City Casino Ass\u2019n v. City of Atlantic City, 217 N.J.Super. 277, 525 A.2d 1109(rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending), remanded, 102 N.J. 323, 508 A.2d 203 (1985); Bowen v. Mabry, 154 N.C.App. 734, 572 S.E.2d 809 (2002)(General Assembly has power to amend statute that it believes has been misconstrued by the courts and \u201cundo any perceived undesirable past consequences of misinterpretation of its work product\u201d unless retroactive application impairs vested rights, quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes \u00a7 411, at 568 (1999)); cf. In re Kirchner, 164 Ill.2d 468, 208 Ill.Dec. 268, 649 N.E.2d 324 (1995)(refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties\u2019 rights)."},"case_id":9025877,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The G'i'eenwood Village court held that the trial court was correct in doing so and that it must proceed to apply the provisions contained in the revised statute.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending","sentence":"See Perry v. City of Denver, 27 Colo. 93, 59 P. 747 (1899)(pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation); see also Gen. Tel. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Ill.2d 363, 83 Ill.Dec. 133, 469 N.E.2d 1067 (1984)(holding legislature\u2019s intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power); Schlenz v. Castle, 84 Ill.2d 196, 49 Ill.Dec. 322, 417 N.E.2d 1336 (1981)(rejecting separation of powers challenge where legislature\u2019s curative act did not have effect of setting aside final adjudication); Andresen v. Andresen, 317 Md. 380, 564 A.2d 399, 401 (1989)(affirming dismissal of motion to modify property distribution where final dissolution decree was entered, Congress enacted relevant law and intended retroactive effect, but motion did not allege sufficient facts to set aside final order); Atlantic City Casino Ass\u2019n v. City of Atlantic City, 217 N.J.Super. 277, 525 A.2d 1109(rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending), remanded, 102 N.J. 323, 508 A.2d 203 (1985); Bowen v. Mabry, 154 N.C.App. 734, 572 S.E.2d 809 (2002)(General Assembly has power to amend statute that it believes has been misconstrued by the courts and \u201cundo any perceived undesirable past consequences of misinterpretation of its work product\u201d unless retroactive application impairs vested rights, quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes \u00a7 411, at 568 (1999)); cf. In re Kirchner, 164 Ill.2d 468, 208 Ill.Dec. 268, 649 N.E.2d 324 (1995)(refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties\u2019 rights)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation","sentence":"See Perry v. City of Denver, 27 Colo. 93, 59 P. 747 (1899)(pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation); see also Gen. Tel. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Ill.2d 363, 83 Ill.Dec. 133, 469 N.E.2d 1067 (1984)(holding legislature\u2019s intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power); Schlenz v. Castle, 84 Ill.2d 196, 49 Ill.Dec. 322, 417 N.E.2d 1336 (1981)(rejecting separation of powers challenge where legislature\u2019s curative act did not have effect of setting aside final adjudication); Andresen v. Andresen, 317 Md. 380, 564 A.2d 399, 401 (1989)(affirming dismissal of motion to modify property distribution where final dissolution decree was entered, Congress enacted relevant law and intended retroactive effect, but motion did not allege sufficient facts to set aside final order); Atlantic City Casino Ass\u2019n v. City of Atlantic City, 217 N.J.Super. 277, 525 A.2d 1109(rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending), remanded, 102 N.J. 323, 508 A.2d 203 (1985); Bowen v. Mabry, 154 N.C.App. 734, 572 S.E.2d 809 (2002)(General Assembly has power to amend statute that it believes has been misconstrued by the courts and \u201cundo any perceived undesirable past consequences of misinterpretation of its work product\u201d unless retroactive application impairs vested rights, quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes \u00a7 411, at 568 (1999)); cf. In re Kirchner, 164 Ill.2d 468, 208 Ill.Dec. 268, 649 N.E.2d 324 (1995)(refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties\u2019 rights)."},"case_id":9025877,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The G'i'eenwood Village court held that the trial court was correct in doing so and that it must proceed to apply the provisions contained in the revised statute.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending","sentence":"See Perry v. City of Denver, 27 Colo. 93, 59 P. 747 (1899)(pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation); see also Gen. Tel. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Ill.2d 363, 83 Ill.Dec. 133, 469 N.E.2d 1067 (1984)(holding legislature\u2019s intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power); Schlenz v. Castle, 84 Ill.2d 196, 49 Ill.Dec. 322, 417 N.E.2d 1336 (1981)(rejecting separation of powers challenge where legislature\u2019s curative act did not have effect of setting aside final adjudication); Andresen v. Andresen, 317 Md. 380, 564 A.2d 399, 401 (1989)(affirming dismissal of motion to modify property distribution where final dissolution decree was entered, Congress enacted relevant law and intended retroactive effect, but motion did not allege sufficient facts to set aside final order); Atlantic City Casino Ass\u2019n v. City of Atlantic City, 217 N.J.Super. 277, 525 A.2d 1109(rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending), remanded, 102 N.J. 323, 508 A.2d 203 (1985); Bowen v. Mabry, 154 N.C.App. 734, 572 S.E.2d 809 (2002)(General Assembly has power to amend statute that it believes has been misconstrued by the courts and \u201cundo any perceived undesirable past consequences of misinterpretation of its work product\u201d unless retroactive application impairs vested rights, quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes \u00a7 411, at 568 (1999)); cf. In re Kirchner, 164 Ill.2d 468, 208 Ill.Dec. 268, 649 N.E.2d 324 (1995)(refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties\u2019 rights)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation","sentence":"See Perry v. City of Denver, 27 Colo. 93, 59 P. 747 (1899)(pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation); see also Gen. Tel. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Ill.2d 363, 83 Ill.Dec. 133, 469 N.E.2d 1067 (1984)(holding legislature\u2019s intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power); Schlenz v. Castle, 84 Ill.2d 196, 49 Ill.Dec. 322, 417 N.E.2d 1336 (1981)(rejecting separation of powers challenge where legislature\u2019s curative act did not have effect of setting aside final adjudication); Andresen v. Andresen, 317 Md. 380, 564 A.2d 399, 401 (1989)(affirming dismissal of motion to modify property distribution where final dissolution decree was entered, Congress enacted relevant law and intended retroactive effect, but motion did not allege sufficient facts to set aside final order); Atlantic City Casino Ass\u2019n v. City of Atlantic City, 217 N.J.Super. 277, 525 A.2d 1109(rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending), remanded, 102 N.J. 323, 508 A.2d 203 (1985); Bowen v. Mabry, 154 N.C.App. 734, 572 S.E.2d 809 (2002)(General Assembly has power to amend statute that it believes has been misconstrued by the courts and \u201cundo any perceived undesirable past consequences of misinterpretation of its work product\u201d unless retroactive application impairs vested rights, quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes \u00a7 411, at 568 (1999)); cf. In re Kirchner, 164 Ill.2d 468, 208 Ill.Dec. 268, 649 N.E.2d 324 (1995)(refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties\u2019 rights)."},"case_id":9025877,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The G'i'eenwood Village court held that the trial court was correct in doing so and that it must proceed to apply the provisions contained in the revised statute.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation","sentence":"See Perry v. City of Denver, 27 Colo. 93, 59 P. 747 (1899)(pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation); see also Gen. Tel. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Ill.2d 363, 83 Ill.Dec. 133, 469 N.E.2d 1067 (1984)(holding legislature\u2019s intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power); Schlenz v. Castle, 84 Ill.2d 196, 49 Ill.Dec. 322, 417 N.E.2d 1336 (1981)(rejecting separation of powers challenge where legislature\u2019s curative act did not have effect of setting aside final adjudication); Andresen v. Andresen, 317 Md. 380, 564 A.2d 399, 401 (1989)(affirming dismissal of motion to modify property distribution where final dissolution decree was entered, Congress enacted relevant law and intended retroactive effect, but motion did not allege sufficient facts to set aside final order); Atlantic City Casino Ass\u2019n v. City of Atlantic City, 217 N.J.Super. 277, 525 A.2d 1109(rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending), remanded, 102 N.J. 323, 508 A.2d 203 (1985); Bowen v. Mabry, 154 N.C.App. 734, 572 S.E.2d 809 (2002)(General Assembly has power to amend statute that it believes has been misconstrued by the courts and \u201cundo any perceived undesirable past consequences of misinterpretation of its work product\u201d unless retroactive application impairs vested rights, quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes \u00a7 411, at 568 (1999)); cf. In re Kirchner, 164 Ill.2d 468, 208 Ill.Dec. 268, 649 N.E.2d 324 (1995)(refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties\u2019 rights)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending","sentence":"See Perry v. City of Denver, 27 Colo. 93, 59 P. 747 (1899)(pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation); see also Gen. Tel. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Ill.2d 363, 83 Ill.Dec. 133, 469 N.E.2d 1067 (1984)(holding legislature\u2019s intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power); Schlenz v. Castle, 84 Ill.2d 196, 49 Ill.Dec. 322, 417 N.E.2d 1336 (1981)(rejecting separation of powers challenge where legislature\u2019s curative act did not have effect of setting aside final adjudication); Andresen v. Andresen, 317 Md. 380, 564 A.2d 399, 401 (1989)(affirming dismissal of motion to modify property distribution where final dissolution decree was entered, Congress enacted relevant law and intended retroactive effect, but motion did not allege sufficient facts to set aside final order); Atlantic City Casino Ass\u2019n v. City of Atlantic City, 217 N.J.Super. 277, 525 A.2d 1109(rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending), remanded, 102 N.J. 323, 508 A.2d 203 (1985); Bowen v. Mabry, 154 N.C.App. 734, 572 S.E.2d 809 (2002)(General Assembly has power to amend statute that it believes has been misconstrued by the courts and \u201cundo any perceived undesirable past consequences of misinterpretation of its work product\u201d unless retroactive application impairs vested rights, quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes \u00a7 411, at 568 (1999)); cf. In re Kirchner, 164 Ill.2d 468, 208 Ill.Dec. 268, 649 N.E.2d 324 (1995)(refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties\u2019 rights)."},"case_id":9025877,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The G'i'eenwood Village court held that the trial court was correct in doing so and that it must proceed to apply the provisions contained in the revised statute.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"General Assembly has power to amend statute that it believes has been misconstrued by the courts and \"undo any perceived undesirable past consequences of misinterpretation of its work product\" unless retroactive application impairs vested rights, quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes SS 411, at 568 (1999","sentence":"See Perry v. City of Denver, 27 Colo. 93, 59 P. 747 (1899)(pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation); see also Gen. Tel. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Ill.2d 363, 83 Ill.Dec. 133, 469 N.E.2d 1067 (1984)(holding legislature\u2019s intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power); Schlenz v. Castle, 84 Ill.2d 196, 49 Ill.Dec. 322, 417 N.E.2d 1336 (1981)(rejecting separation of powers challenge where legislature\u2019s curative act did not have effect of setting aside final adjudication); Andresen v. Andresen, 317 Md. 380, 564 A.2d 399, 401 (1989)(affirming dismissal of motion to modify property distribution where final dissolution decree was entered, Congress enacted relevant law and intended retroactive effect, but motion did not allege sufficient facts to set aside final order); Atlantic City Casino Ass\u2019n v. City of Atlantic City, 217 N.J.Super. 277, 525 A.2d 1109(rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending), remanded, 102 N.J. 323, 508 A.2d 203 (1985); Bowen v. Mabry, 154 N.C.App. 734, 572 S.E.2d 809 (2002)(General Assembly has power to amend statute that it believes has been misconstrued by the courts and \u201cundo any perceived undesirable past consequences of misinterpretation of its work product\u201d unless retroactive application impairs vested rights, quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes \u00a7 411, at 568 (1999)); cf. In re Kirchner, 164 Ill.2d 468, 208 Ill.Dec. 268, 649 N.E.2d 324 (1995)(refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties\u2019 rights)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation","sentence":"See Perry v. City of Denver, 27 Colo. 93, 59 P. 747 (1899)(pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation); see also Gen. Tel. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Ill.2d 363, 83 Ill.Dec. 133, 469 N.E.2d 1067 (1984)(holding legislature\u2019s intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power); Schlenz v. Castle, 84 Ill.2d 196, 49 Ill.Dec. 322, 417 N.E.2d 1336 (1981)(rejecting separation of powers challenge where legislature\u2019s curative act did not have effect of setting aside final adjudication); Andresen v. Andresen, 317 Md. 380, 564 A.2d 399, 401 (1989)(affirming dismissal of motion to modify property distribution where final dissolution decree was entered, Congress enacted relevant law and intended retroactive effect, but motion did not allege sufficient facts to set aside final order); Atlantic City Casino Ass\u2019n v. City of Atlantic City, 217 N.J.Super. 277, 525 A.2d 1109(rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending), remanded, 102 N.J. 323, 508 A.2d 203 (1985); Bowen v. Mabry, 154 N.C.App. 734, 572 S.E.2d 809 (2002)(General Assembly has power to amend statute that it believes has been misconstrued by the courts and \u201cundo any perceived undesirable past consequences of misinterpretation of its work product\u201d unless retroactive application impairs vested rights, quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes \u00a7 411, at 568 (1999)); cf. In re Kirchner, 164 Ill.2d 468, 208 Ill.Dec. 268, 649 N.E.2d 324 (1995)(refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties\u2019 rights)."},"case_id":9025877,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The G'i'eenwood Village court held that the trial court was correct in doing so and that it must proceed to apply the provisions contained in the revised statute.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation","sentence":"See Perry v. City of Denver, 27 Colo. 93, 59 P. 747 (1899)(pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation); see also Gen. Tel. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Ill.2d 363, 83 Ill.Dec. 133, 469 N.E.2d 1067 (1984)(holding legislature\u2019s intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power); Schlenz v. Castle, 84 Ill.2d 196, 49 Ill.Dec. 322, 417 N.E.2d 1336 (1981)(rejecting separation of powers challenge where legislature\u2019s curative act did not have effect of setting aside final adjudication); Andresen v. Andresen, 317 Md. 380, 564 A.2d 399, 401 (1989)(affirming dismissal of motion to modify property distribution where final dissolution decree was entered, Congress enacted relevant law and intended retroactive effect, but motion did not allege sufficient facts to set aside final order); Atlantic City Casino Ass\u2019n v. City of Atlantic City, 217 N.J.Super. 277, 525 A.2d 1109(rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending), remanded, 102 N.J. 323, 508 A.2d 203 (1985); Bowen v. Mabry, 154 N.C.App. 734, 572 S.E.2d 809 (2002)(General Assembly has power to amend statute that it believes has been misconstrued by the courts and \u201cundo any perceived undesirable past consequences of misinterpretation of its work product\u201d unless retroactive application impairs vested rights, quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes \u00a7 411, at 568 (1999)); cf. In re Kirchner, 164 Ill.2d 468, 208 Ill.Dec. 268, 649 N.E.2d 324 (1995)(refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties\u2019 rights)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"General Assembly has power to amend statute that it believes has been misconstrued by the courts and \"undo any perceived undesirable past consequences of misinterpretation of its work product\" unless retroactive application impairs vested rights, quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes SS 411, at 568 (1999","sentence":"See Perry v. City of Denver, 27 Colo. 93, 59 P. 747 (1899)(pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation); see also Gen. Tel. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Ill.2d 363, 83 Ill.Dec. 133, 469 N.E.2d 1067 (1984)(holding legislature\u2019s intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power); Schlenz v. Castle, 84 Ill.2d 196, 49 Ill.Dec. 322, 417 N.E.2d 1336 (1981)(rejecting separation of powers challenge where legislature\u2019s curative act did not have effect of setting aside final adjudication); Andresen v. Andresen, 317 Md. 380, 564 A.2d 399, 401 (1989)(affirming dismissal of motion to modify property distribution where final dissolution decree was entered, Congress enacted relevant law and intended retroactive effect, but motion did not allege sufficient facts to set aside final order); Atlantic City Casino Ass\u2019n v. City of Atlantic City, 217 N.J.Super. 277, 525 A.2d 1109(rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending), remanded, 102 N.J. 323, 508 A.2d 203 (1985); Bowen v. Mabry, 154 N.C.App. 734, 572 S.E.2d 809 (2002)(General Assembly has power to amend statute that it believes has been misconstrued by the courts and \u201cundo any perceived undesirable past consequences of misinterpretation of its work product\u201d unless retroactive application impairs vested rights, quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes \u00a7 411, at 568 (1999)); cf. In re Kirchner, 164 Ill.2d 468, 208 Ill.Dec. 268, 649 N.E.2d 324 (1995)(refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties\u2019 rights)."},"case_id":9025877,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The G'i'eenwood Village court held that the trial court was correct in doing so and that it must proceed to apply the provisions contained in the revised statute.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation","sentence":"See Perry v. City of Denver, 27 Colo. 93, 59 P. 747 (1899)(pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation); see also Gen. Tel. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Ill.2d 363, 83 Ill.Dec. 133, 469 N.E.2d 1067 (1984)(holding legislature\u2019s intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power); Schlenz v. Castle, 84 Ill.2d 196, 49 Ill.Dec. 322, 417 N.E.2d 1336 (1981)(rejecting separation of powers challenge where legislature\u2019s curative act did not have effect of setting aside final adjudication); Andresen v. Andresen, 317 Md. 380, 564 A.2d 399, 401 (1989)(affirming dismissal of motion to modify property distribution where final dissolution decree was entered, Congress enacted relevant law and intended retroactive effect, but motion did not allege sufficient facts to set aside final order); Atlantic City Casino Ass\u2019n v. City of Atlantic City, 217 N.J.Super. 277, 525 A.2d 1109(rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending), remanded, 102 N.J. 323, 508 A.2d 203 (1985); Bowen v. Mabry, 154 N.C.App. 734, 572 S.E.2d 809 (2002)(General Assembly has power to amend statute that it believes has been misconstrued by the courts and \u201cundo any perceived undesirable past consequences of misinterpretation of its work product\u201d unless retroactive application impairs vested rights, quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes \u00a7 411, at 568 (1999)); cf. In re Kirchner, 164 Ill.2d 468, 208 Ill.Dec. 268, 649 N.E.2d 324 (1995)(refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties\u2019 rights)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties' rights","sentence":"See Perry v. City of Denver, 27 Colo. 93, 59 P. 747 (1899)(pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation); see also Gen. Tel. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Ill.2d 363, 83 Ill.Dec. 133, 469 N.E.2d 1067 (1984)(holding legislature\u2019s intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power); Schlenz v. Castle, 84 Ill.2d 196, 49 Ill.Dec. 322, 417 N.E.2d 1336 (1981)(rejecting separation of powers challenge where legislature\u2019s curative act did not have effect of setting aside final adjudication); Andresen v. Andresen, 317 Md. 380, 564 A.2d 399, 401 (1989)(affirming dismissal of motion to modify property distribution where final dissolution decree was entered, Congress enacted relevant law and intended retroactive effect, but motion did not allege sufficient facts to set aside final order); Atlantic City Casino Ass\u2019n v. City of Atlantic City, 217 N.J.Super. 277, 525 A.2d 1109(rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending), remanded, 102 N.J. 323, 508 A.2d 203 (1985); Bowen v. Mabry, 154 N.C.App. 734, 572 S.E.2d 809 (2002)(General Assembly has power to amend statute that it believes has been misconstrued by the courts and \u201cundo any perceived undesirable past consequences of misinterpretation of its work product\u201d unless retroactive application impairs vested rights, quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes \u00a7 411, at 568 (1999)); cf. In re Kirchner, 164 Ill.2d 468, 208 Ill.Dec. 268, 649 N.E.2d 324 (1995)(refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties\u2019 rights)."},"case_id":9025877,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The G'i'eenwood Village court held that the trial court was correct in doing so and that it must proceed to apply the provisions contained in the revised statute.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties' rights","sentence":"See Perry v. City of Denver, 27 Colo. 93, 59 P. 747 (1899)(pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation); see also Gen. Tel. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Ill.2d 363, 83 Ill.Dec. 133, 469 N.E.2d 1067 (1984)(holding legislature\u2019s intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power); Schlenz v. Castle, 84 Ill.2d 196, 49 Ill.Dec. 322, 417 N.E.2d 1336 (1981)(rejecting separation of powers challenge where legislature\u2019s curative act did not have effect of setting aside final adjudication); Andresen v. Andresen, 317 Md. 380, 564 A.2d 399, 401 (1989)(affirming dismissal of motion to modify property distribution where final dissolution decree was entered, Congress enacted relevant law and intended retroactive effect, but motion did not allege sufficient facts to set aside final order); Atlantic City Casino Ass\u2019n v. City of Atlantic City, 217 N.J.Super. 277, 525 A.2d 1109(rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending), remanded, 102 N.J. 323, 508 A.2d 203 (1985); Bowen v. Mabry, 154 N.C.App. 734, 572 S.E.2d 809 (2002)(General Assembly has power to amend statute that it believes has been misconstrued by the courts and \u201cundo any perceived undesirable past consequences of misinterpretation of its work product\u201d unless retroactive application impairs vested rights, quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes \u00a7 411, at 568 (1999)); cf. In re Kirchner, 164 Ill.2d 468, 208 Ill.Dec. 268, 649 N.E.2d 324 (1995)(refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties\u2019 rights)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation","sentence":"See Perry v. City of Denver, 27 Colo. 93, 59 P. 747 (1899)(pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation); see also Gen. Tel. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Ill.2d 363, 83 Ill.Dec. 133, 469 N.E.2d 1067 (1984)(holding legislature\u2019s intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power); Schlenz v. Castle, 84 Ill.2d 196, 49 Ill.Dec. 322, 417 N.E.2d 1336 (1981)(rejecting separation of powers challenge where legislature\u2019s curative act did not have effect of setting aside final adjudication); Andresen v. Andresen, 317 Md. 380, 564 A.2d 399, 401 (1989)(affirming dismissal of motion to modify property distribution where final dissolution decree was entered, Congress enacted relevant law and intended retroactive effect, but motion did not allege sufficient facts to set aside final order); Atlantic City Casino Ass\u2019n v. City of Atlantic City, 217 N.J.Super. 277, 525 A.2d 1109(rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending), remanded, 102 N.J. 323, 508 A.2d 203 (1985); Bowen v. Mabry, 154 N.C.App. 734, 572 S.E.2d 809 (2002)(General Assembly has power to amend statute that it believes has been misconstrued by the courts and \u201cundo any perceived undesirable past consequences of misinterpretation of its work product\u201d unless retroactive application impairs vested rights, quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes \u00a7 411, at 568 (1999)); cf. In re Kirchner, 164 Ill.2d 468, 208 Ill.Dec. 268, 649 N.E.2d 324 (1995)(refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties\u2019 rights)."},"case_id":9025877,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The G'i'eenwood Village court held that the trial court was correct in doing so and that it must proceed to apply the provisions contained in the revised statute.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation","sentence":"See Perry v. City of Denver, 27 Colo. 93, 59 P. 747 (1899)(pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation); see also Gen. Tel. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Ill.2d 363, 83 Ill.Dec. 133, 469 N.E.2d 1067 (1984)(holding legislature\u2019s intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power); Schlenz v. Castle, 84 Ill.2d 196, 49 Ill.Dec. 322, 417 N.E.2d 1336 (1981)(rejecting separation of powers challenge where legislature\u2019s curative act did not have effect of setting aside final adjudication); Andresen v. Andresen, 317 Md. 380, 564 A.2d 399, 401 (1989)(affirming dismissal of motion to modify property distribution where final dissolution decree was entered, Congress enacted relevant law and intended retroactive effect, but motion did not allege sufficient facts to set aside final order); Atlantic City Casino Ass\u2019n v. City of Atlantic City, 217 N.J.Super. 277, 525 A.2d 1109(rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending), remanded, 102 N.J. 323, 508 A.2d 203 (1985); Bowen v. Mabry, 154 N.C.App. 734, 572 S.E.2d 809 (2002)(General Assembly has power to amend statute that it believes has been misconstrued by the courts and \u201cundo any perceived undesirable past consequences of misinterpretation of its work product\u201d unless retroactive application impairs vested rights, quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes \u00a7 411, at 568 (1999)); cf. In re Kirchner, 164 Ill.2d 468, 208 Ill.Dec. 268, 649 N.E.2d 324 (1995)(refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties\u2019 rights)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties' rights","sentence":"See Perry v. City of Denver, 27 Colo. 93, 59 P. 747 (1899)(pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation); see also Gen. Tel. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Ill.2d 363, 83 Ill.Dec. 133, 469 N.E.2d 1067 (1984)(holding legislature\u2019s intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power); Schlenz v. Castle, 84 Ill.2d 196, 49 Ill.Dec. 322, 417 N.E.2d 1336 (1981)(rejecting separation of powers challenge where legislature\u2019s curative act did not have effect of setting aside final adjudication); Andresen v. Andresen, 317 Md. 380, 564 A.2d 399, 401 (1989)(affirming dismissal of motion to modify property distribution where final dissolution decree was entered, Congress enacted relevant law and intended retroactive effect, but motion did not allege sufficient facts to set aside final order); Atlantic City Casino Ass\u2019n v. City of Atlantic City, 217 N.J.Super. 277, 525 A.2d 1109(rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending), remanded, 102 N.J. 323, 508 A.2d 203 (1985); Bowen v. Mabry, 154 N.C.App. 734, 572 S.E.2d 809 (2002)(General Assembly has power to amend statute that it believes has been misconstrued by the courts and \u201cundo any perceived undesirable past consequences of misinterpretation of its work product\u201d unless retroactive application impairs vested rights, quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes \u00a7 411, at 568 (1999)); cf. In re Kirchner, 164 Ill.2d 468, 208 Ill.Dec. 268, 649 N.E.2d 324 (1995)(refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties\u2019 rights)."},"case_id":9025877,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The G'i'eenwood Village court held that the trial court was correct in doing so and that it must proceed to apply the provisions contained in the revised statute.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation","sentence":"See Perry v. City of Denver, 27 Colo. 93, 59 P. 747 (1899)(pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation); see also Gen. Tel. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Ill.2d 363, 83 Ill.Dec. 133, 469 N.E.2d 1067 (1984)(holding legislature\u2019s intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power); Schlenz v. Castle, 84 Ill.2d 196, 49 Ill.Dec. 322, 417 N.E.2d 1336 (1981)(rejecting separation of powers challenge where legislature\u2019s curative act did not have effect of setting aside final adjudication); Andresen v. Andresen, 317 Md. 380, 564 A.2d 399, 401 (1989)(affirming dismissal of motion to modify property distribution where final dissolution decree was entered, Congress enacted relevant law and intended retroactive effect, but motion did not allege sufficient facts to set aside final order); Atlantic City Casino Ass\u2019n v. City of Atlantic City, 217 N.J.Super. 277, 525 A.2d 1109(rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending), remanded, 102 N.J. 323, 508 A.2d 203 (1985); Bowen v. Mabry, 154 N.C.App. 734, 572 S.E.2d 809 (2002)(General Assembly has power to amend statute that it believes has been misconstrued by the courts and \u201cundo any perceived undesirable past consequences of misinterpretation of its work product\u201d unless retroactive application impairs vested rights, quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes \u00a7 411, at 568 (1999)); cf. In re Kirchner, 164 Ill.2d 468, 208 Ill.Dec. 268, 649 N.E.2d 324 (1995)(refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties\u2019 rights)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding legislature's intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power","sentence":"See Perry v. City of Denver, 27 Colo. 93, 59 P. 747 (1899)(pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation); see also Gen. Tel. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Ill.2d 363, 83 Ill.Dec. 133, 469 N.E.2d 1067 (1984)(holding legislature\u2019s intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power); Schlenz v. Castle, 84 Ill.2d 196, 49 Ill.Dec. 322, 417 N.E.2d 1336 (1981)(rejecting separation of powers challenge where legislature\u2019s curative act did not have effect of setting aside final adjudication); Andresen v. Andresen, 317 Md. 380, 564 A.2d 399, 401 (1989)(affirming dismissal of motion to modify property distribution where final dissolution decree was entered, Congress enacted relevant law and intended retroactive effect, but motion did not allege sufficient facts to set aside final order); Atlantic City Casino Ass\u2019n v. City of Atlantic City, 217 N.J.Super. 277, 525 A.2d 1109(rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending), remanded, 102 N.J. 323, 508 A.2d 203 (1985); Bowen v. Mabry, 154 N.C.App. 734, 572 S.E.2d 809 (2002)(General Assembly has power to amend statute that it believes has been misconstrued by the courts and \u201cundo any perceived undesirable past consequences of misinterpretation of its work product\u201d unless retroactive application impairs vested rights, quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes \u00a7 411, at 568 (1999)); cf. In re Kirchner, 164 Ill.2d 468, 208 Ill.Dec. 268, 649 N.E.2d 324 (1995)(refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties\u2019 rights)."},"case_id":9025877,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The G'i'eenwood Village court held that the trial court was correct in doing so and that it must proceed to apply the provisions contained in the revised statute.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation","sentence":"See Perry v. City of Denver, 27 Colo. 93, 59 P. 747 (1899)(pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation); see also Gen. Tel. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Ill.2d 363, 83 Ill.Dec. 133, 469 N.E.2d 1067 (1984)(holding legislature\u2019s intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power); Schlenz v. Castle, 84 Ill.2d 196, 49 Ill.Dec. 322, 417 N.E.2d 1336 (1981)(rejecting separation of powers challenge where legislature\u2019s curative act did not have effect of setting aside final adjudication); Andresen v. Andresen, 317 Md. 380, 564 A.2d 399, 401 (1989)(affirming dismissal of motion to modify property distribution where final dissolution decree was entered, Congress enacted relevant law and intended retroactive effect, but motion did not allege sufficient facts to set aside final order); Atlantic City Casino Ass\u2019n v. City of Atlantic City, 217 N.J.Super. 277, 525 A.2d 1109(rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending), remanded, 102 N.J. 323, 508 A.2d 203 (1985); Bowen v. Mabry, 154 N.C.App. 734, 572 S.E.2d 809 (2002)(General Assembly has power to amend statute that it believes has been misconstrued by the courts and \u201cundo any perceived undesirable past consequences of misinterpretation of its work product\u201d unless retroactive application impairs vested rights, quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes \u00a7 411, at 568 (1999)); cf. In re Kirchner, 164 Ill.2d 468, 208 Ill.Dec. 268, 649 N.E.2d 324 (1995)(refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties\u2019 rights)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding legislature's intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power","sentence":"See Perry v. City of Denver, 27 Colo. 93, 59 P. 747 (1899)(pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation); see also Gen. Tel. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Ill.2d 363, 83 Ill.Dec. 133, 469 N.E.2d 1067 (1984)(holding legislature\u2019s intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power); Schlenz v. Castle, 84 Ill.2d 196, 49 Ill.Dec. 322, 417 N.E.2d 1336 (1981)(rejecting separation of powers challenge where legislature\u2019s curative act did not have effect of setting aside final adjudication); Andresen v. Andresen, 317 Md. 380, 564 A.2d 399, 401 (1989)(affirming dismissal of motion to modify property distribution where final dissolution decree was entered, Congress enacted relevant law and intended retroactive effect, but motion did not allege sufficient facts to set aside final order); Atlantic City Casino Ass\u2019n v. City of Atlantic City, 217 N.J.Super. 277, 525 A.2d 1109(rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending), remanded, 102 N.J. 323, 508 A.2d 203 (1985); Bowen v. Mabry, 154 N.C.App. 734, 572 S.E.2d 809 (2002)(General Assembly has power to amend statute that it believes has been misconstrued by the courts and \u201cundo any perceived undesirable past consequences of misinterpretation of its work product\u201d unless retroactive application impairs vested rights, quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes \u00a7 411, at 568 (1999)); cf. In re Kirchner, 164 Ill.2d 468, 208 Ill.Dec. 268, 649 N.E.2d 324 (1995)(refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties\u2019 rights)."},"case_id":9025877,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The G'i'eenwood Village court held that the trial court was correct in doing so and that it must proceed to apply the provisions contained in the revised statute.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation","sentence":"See Perry v. City of Denver, 27 Colo. 93, 59 P. 747 (1899)(pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation); see also Gen. Tel. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Ill.2d 363, 83 Ill.Dec. 133, 469 N.E.2d 1067 (1984)(holding legislature\u2019s intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power); Schlenz v. Castle, 84 Ill.2d 196, 49 Ill.Dec. 322, 417 N.E.2d 1336 (1981)(rejecting separation of powers challenge where legislature\u2019s curative act did not have effect of setting aside final adjudication); Andresen v. Andresen, 317 Md. 380, 564 A.2d 399, 401 (1989)(affirming dismissal of motion to modify property distribution where final dissolution decree was entered, Congress enacted relevant law and intended retroactive effect, but motion did not allege sufficient facts to set aside final order); Atlantic City Casino Ass\u2019n v. City of Atlantic City, 217 N.J.Super. 277, 525 A.2d 1109(rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending), remanded, 102 N.J. 323, 508 A.2d 203 (1985); Bowen v. Mabry, 154 N.C.App. 734, 572 S.E.2d 809 (2002)(General Assembly has power to amend statute that it believes has been misconstrued by the courts and \u201cundo any perceived undesirable past consequences of misinterpretation of its work product\u201d unless retroactive application impairs vested rights, quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes \u00a7 411, at 568 (1999)); cf. In re Kirchner, 164 Ill.2d 468, 208 Ill.Dec. 268, 649 N.E.2d 324 (1995)(refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties\u2019 rights)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding legislature's intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power","sentence":"See Perry v. City of Denver, 27 Colo. 93, 59 P. 747 (1899)(pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation); see also Gen. Tel. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Ill.2d 363, 83 Ill.Dec. 133, 469 N.E.2d 1067 (1984)(holding legislature\u2019s intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power); Schlenz v. Castle, 84 Ill.2d 196, 49 Ill.Dec. 322, 417 N.E.2d 1336 (1981)(rejecting separation of powers challenge where legislature\u2019s curative act did not have effect of setting aside final adjudication); Andresen v. Andresen, 317 Md. 380, 564 A.2d 399, 401 (1989)(affirming dismissal of motion to modify property distribution where final dissolution decree was entered, Congress enacted relevant law and intended retroactive effect, but motion did not allege sufficient facts to set aside final order); Atlantic City Casino Ass\u2019n v. City of Atlantic City, 217 N.J.Super. 277, 525 A.2d 1109(rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending), remanded, 102 N.J. 323, 508 A.2d 203 (1985); Bowen v. Mabry, 154 N.C.App. 734, 572 S.E.2d 809 (2002)(General Assembly has power to amend statute that it believes has been misconstrued by the courts and \u201cundo any perceived undesirable past consequences of misinterpretation of its work product\u201d unless retroactive application impairs vested rights, quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes \u00a7 411, at 568 (1999)); cf. In re Kirchner, 164 Ill.2d 468, 208 Ill.Dec. 268, 649 N.E.2d 324 (1995)(refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties\u2019 rights)."},"case_id":9025877,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The G'i'eenwood Village court held that the trial court was correct in doing so and that it must proceed to apply the provisions contained in the revised statute.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"rejecting separation of powers challenge where legislature's curative act did not have effect of setting aside final adjudication","sentence":"See Perry v. City of Denver, 27 Colo. 93, 59 P. 747 (1899)(pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation); see also Gen. Tel. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Ill.2d 363, 83 Ill.Dec. 133, 469 N.E.2d 1067 (1984)(holding legislature\u2019s intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power); Schlenz v. Castle, 84 Ill.2d 196, 49 Ill.Dec. 322, 417 N.E.2d 1336 (1981)(rejecting separation of powers challenge where legislature\u2019s curative act did not have effect of setting aside final adjudication); Andresen v. Andresen, 317 Md. 380, 564 A.2d 399, 401 (1989)(affirming dismissal of motion to modify property distribution where final dissolution decree was entered, Congress enacted relevant law and intended retroactive effect, but motion did not allege sufficient facts to set aside final order); Atlantic City Casino Ass\u2019n v. City of Atlantic City, 217 N.J.Super. 277, 525 A.2d 1109(rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending), remanded, 102 N.J. 323, 508 A.2d 203 (1985); Bowen v. Mabry, 154 N.C.App. 734, 572 S.E.2d 809 (2002)(General Assembly has power to amend statute that it believes has been misconstrued by the courts and \u201cundo any perceived undesirable past consequences of misinterpretation of its work product\u201d unless retroactive application impairs vested rights, quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes \u00a7 411, at 568 (1999)); cf. In re Kirchner, 164 Ill.2d 468, 208 Ill.Dec. 268, 649 N.E.2d 324 (1995)(refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties\u2019 rights)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation","sentence":"See Perry v. City of Denver, 27 Colo. 93, 59 P. 747 (1899)(pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation); see also Gen. Tel. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Ill.2d 363, 83 Ill.Dec. 133, 469 N.E.2d 1067 (1984)(holding legislature\u2019s intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power); Schlenz v. Castle, 84 Ill.2d 196, 49 Ill.Dec. 322, 417 N.E.2d 1336 (1981)(rejecting separation of powers challenge where legislature\u2019s curative act did not have effect of setting aside final adjudication); Andresen v. Andresen, 317 Md. 380, 564 A.2d 399, 401 (1989)(affirming dismissal of motion to modify property distribution where final dissolution decree was entered, Congress enacted relevant law and intended retroactive effect, but motion did not allege sufficient facts to set aside final order); Atlantic City Casino Ass\u2019n v. City of Atlantic City, 217 N.J.Super. 277, 525 A.2d 1109(rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending), remanded, 102 N.J. 323, 508 A.2d 203 (1985); Bowen v. Mabry, 154 N.C.App. 734, 572 S.E.2d 809 (2002)(General Assembly has power to amend statute that it believes has been misconstrued by the courts and \u201cundo any perceived undesirable past consequences of misinterpretation of its work product\u201d unless retroactive application impairs vested rights, quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes \u00a7 411, at 568 (1999)); cf. In re Kirchner, 164 Ill.2d 468, 208 Ill.Dec. 268, 649 N.E.2d 324 (1995)(refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties\u2019 rights)."},"case_id":9025877,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The G'i'eenwood Village court held that the trial court was correct in doing so and that it must proceed to apply the provisions contained in the revised statute.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"rejecting separation of powers challenge where legislature's curative act did not have effect of setting aside final adjudication","sentence":"See Perry v. City of Denver, 27 Colo. 93, 59 P. 747 (1899)(pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation); see also Gen. Tel. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Ill.2d 363, 83 Ill.Dec. 133, 469 N.E.2d 1067 (1984)(holding legislature\u2019s intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power); Schlenz v. Castle, 84 Ill.2d 196, 49 Ill.Dec. 322, 417 N.E.2d 1336 (1981)(rejecting separation of powers challenge where legislature\u2019s curative act did not have effect of setting aside final adjudication); Andresen v. Andresen, 317 Md. 380, 564 A.2d 399, 401 (1989)(affirming dismissal of motion to modify property distribution where final dissolution decree was entered, Congress enacted relevant law and intended retroactive effect, but motion did not allege sufficient facts to set aside final order); Atlantic City Casino Ass\u2019n v. City of Atlantic City, 217 N.J.Super. 277, 525 A.2d 1109(rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending), remanded, 102 N.J. 323, 508 A.2d 203 (1985); Bowen v. Mabry, 154 N.C.App. 734, 572 S.E.2d 809 (2002)(General Assembly has power to amend statute that it believes has been misconstrued by the courts and \u201cundo any perceived undesirable past consequences of misinterpretation of its work product\u201d unless retroactive application impairs vested rights, quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes \u00a7 411, at 568 (1999)); cf. In re Kirchner, 164 Ill.2d 468, 208 Ill.Dec. 268, 649 N.E.2d 324 (1995)(refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties\u2019 rights)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation","sentence":"See Perry v. City of Denver, 27 Colo. 93, 59 P. 747 (1899)(pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation); see also Gen. Tel. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Ill.2d 363, 83 Ill.Dec. 133, 469 N.E.2d 1067 (1984)(holding legislature\u2019s intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power); Schlenz v. Castle, 84 Ill.2d 196, 49 Ill.Dec. 322, 417 N.E.2d 1336 (1981)(rejecting separation of powers challenge where legislature\u2019s curative act did not have effect of setting aside final adjudication); Andresen v. Andresen, 317 Md. 380, 564 A.2d 399, 401 (1989)(affirming dismissal of motion to modify property distribution where final dissolution decree was entered, Congress enacted relevant law and intended retroactive effect, but motion did not allege sufficient facts to set aside final order); Atlantic City Casino Ass\u2019n v. City of Atlantic City, 217 N.J.Super. 277, 525 A.2d 1109(rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending), remanded, 102 N.J. 323, 508 A.2d 203 (1985); Bowen v. Mabry, 154 N.C.App. 734, 572 S.E.2d 809 (2002)(General Assembly has power to amend statute that it believes has been misconstrued by the courts and \u201cundo any perceived undesirable past consequences of misinterpretation of its work product\u201d unless retroactive application impairs vested rights, quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes \u00a7 411, at 568 (1999)); cf. In re Kirchner, 164 Ill.2d 468, 208 Ill.Dec. 268, 649 N.E.2d 324 (1995)(refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties\u2019 rights)."},"case_id":9025877,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The G'i'eenwood Village court held that the trial court was correct in doing so and that it must proceed to apply the provisions contained in the revised statute.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"rejecting separation of powers challenge where legislature's curative act did not have effect of setting aside final adjudication","sentence":"See Perry v. City of Denver, 27 Colo. 93, 59 P. 747 (1899)(pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation); see also Gen. Tel. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Ill.2d 363, 83 Ill.Dec. 133, 469 N.E.2d 1067 (1984)(holding legislature\u2019s intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power); Schlenz v. Castle, 84 Ill.2d 196, 49 Ill.Dec. 322, 417 N.E.2d 1336 (1981)(rejecting separation of powers challenge where legislature\u2019s curative act did not have effect of setting aside final adjudication); Andresen v. Andresen, 317 Md. 380, 564 A.2d 399, 401 (1989)(affirming dismissal of motion to modify property distribution where final dissolution decree was entered, Congress enacted relevant law and intended retroactive effect, but motion did not allege sufficient facts to set aside final order); Atlantic City Casino Ass\u2019n v. City of Atlantic City, 217 N.J.Super. 277, 525 A.2d 1109(rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending), remanded, 102 N.J. 323, 508 A.2d 203 (1985); Bowen v. Mabry, 154 N.C.App. 734, 572 S.E.2d 809 (2002)(General Assembly has power to amend statute that it believes has been misconstrued by the courts and \u201cundo any perceived undesirable past consequences of misinterpretation of its work product\u201d unless retroactive application impairs vested rights, quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes \u00a7 411, at 568 (1999)); cf. In re Kirchner, 164 Ill.2d 468, 208 Ill.Dec. 268, 649 N.E.2d 324 (1995)(refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties\u2019 rights)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation","sentence":"See Perry v. City of Denver, 27 Colo. 93, 59 P. 747 (1899)(pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation); see also Gen. Tel. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Ill.2d 363, 83 Ill.Dec. 133, 469 N.E.2d 1067 (1984)(holding legislature\u2019s intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power); Schlenz v. Castle, 84 Ill.2d 196, 49 Ill.Dec. 322, 417 N.E.2d 1336 (1981)(rejecting separation of powers challenge where legislature\u2019s curative act did not have effect of setting aside final adjudication); Andresen v. Andresen, 317 Md. 380, 564 A.2d 399, 401 (1989)(affirming dismissal of motion to modify property distribution where final dissolution decree was entered, Congress enacted relevant law and intended retroactive effect, but motion did not allege sufficient facts to set aside final order); Atlantic City Casino Ass\u2019n v. City of Atlantic City, 217 N.J.Super. 277, 525 A.2d 1109(rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending), remanded, 102 N.J. 323, 508 A.2d 203 (1985); Bowen v. Mabry, 154 N.C.App. 734, 572 S.E.2d 809 (2002)(General Assembly has power to amend statute that it believes has been misconstrued by the courts and \u201cundo any perceived undesirable past consequences of misinterpretation of its work product\u201d unless retroactive application impairs vested rights, quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes \u00a7 411, at 568 (1999)); cf. In re Kirchner, 164 Ill.2d 468, 208 Ill.Dec. 268, 649 N.E.2d 324 (1995)(refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties\u2019 rights)."},"case_id":9025877,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The G'i'eenwood Village court held that the trial court was correct in doing so and that it must proceed to apply the provisions contained in the revised statute.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation","sentence":"See Perry v. City of Denver, 27 Colo. 93, 59 P. 747 (1899)(pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation); see also Gen. Tel. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Ill.2d 363, 83 Ill.Dec. 133, 469 N.E.2d 1067 (1984)(holding legislature\u2019s intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power); Schlenz v. Castle, 84 Ill.2d 196, 49 Ill.Dec. 322, 417 N.E.2d 1336 (1981)(rejecting separation of powers challenge where legislature\u2019s curative act did not have effect of setting aside final adjudication); Andresen v. Andresen, 317 Md. 380, 564 A.2d 399, 401 (1989)(affirming dismissal of motion to modify property distribution where final dissolution decree was entered, Congress enacted relevant law and intended retroactive effect, but motion did not allege sufficient facts to set aside final order); Atlantic City Casino Ass\u2019n v. City of Atlantic City, 217 N.J.Super. 277, 525 A.2d 1109(rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending), remanded, 102 N.J. 323, 508 A.2d 203 (1985); Bowen v. Mabry, 154 N.C.App. 734, 572 S.E.2d 809 (2002)(General Assembly has power to amend statute that it believes has been misconstrued by the courts and \u201cundo any perceived undesirable past consequences of misinterpretation of its work product\u201d unless retroactive application impairs vested rights, quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes \u00a7 411, at 568 (1999)); cf. In re Kirchner, 164 Ill.2d 468, 208 Ill.Dec. 268, 649 N.E.2d 324 (1995)(refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties\u2019 rights)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"affirming dismissal of motion to modify property distribution where final dissolution decree was entered, Congress enacted relevant law and intended retroactive effect, but motion did not allege sufficient facts to set aside final order","sentence":"See Perry v. City of Denver, 27 Colo. 93, 59 P. 747 (1899)(pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation); see also Gen. Tel. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Ill.2d 363, 83 Ill.Dec. 133, 469 N.E.2d 1067 (1984)(holding legislature\u2019s intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power); Schlenz v. Castle, 84 Ill.2d 196, 49 Ill.Dec. 322, 417 N.E.2d 1336 (1981)(rejecting separation of powers challenge where legislature\u2019s curative act did not have effect of setting aside final adjudication); Andresen v. Andresen, 317 Md. 380, 564 A.2d 399, 401 (1989)(affirming dismissal of motion to modify property distribution where final dissolution decree was entered, Congress enacted relevant law and intended retroactive effect, but motion did not allege sufficient facts to set aside final order); Atlantic City Casino Ass\u2019n v. City of Atlantic City, 217 N.J.Super. 277, 525 A.2d 1109(rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending), remanded, 102 N.J. 323, 508 A.2d 203 (1985); Bowen v. Mabry, 154 N.C.App. 734, 572 S.E.2d 809 (2002)(General Assembly has power to amend statute that it believes has been misconstrued by the courts and \u201cundo any perceived undesirable past consequences of misinterpretation of its work product\u201d unless retroactive application impairs vested rights, quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes \u00a7 411, at 568 (1999)); cf. In re Kirchner, 164 Ill.2d 468, 208 Ill.Dec. 268, 649 N.E.2d 324 (1995)(refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties\u2019 rights)."},"case_id":9025877,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The G'i'eenwood Village court held that the trial court was correct in doing so and that it must proceed to apply the provisions contained in the revised statute.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"564 A.2d 399, 401","parenthetical":"affirming dismissal of motion to modify property distribution where final dissolution decree was entered, Congress enacted relevant law and intended retroactive effect, but motion did not allege sufficient facts to set aside final order","sentence":"See Perry v. City of Denver, 27 Colo. 93, 59 P. 747 (1899)(pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation); see also Gen. Tel. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Ill.2d 363, 83 Ill.Dec. 133, 469 N.E.2d 1067 (1984)(holding legislature\u2019s intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power); Schlenz v. Castle, 84 Ill.2d 196, 49 Ill.Dec. 322, 417 N.E.2d 1336 (1981)(rejecting separation of powers challenge where legislature\u2019s curative act did not have effect of setting aside final adjudication); Andresen v. Andresen, 317 Md. 380, 564 A.2d 399, 401 (1989)(affirming dismissal of motion to modify property distribution where final dissolution decree was entered, Congress enacted relevant law and intended retroactive effect, but motion did not allege sufficient facts to set aside final order); Atlantic City Casino Ass\u2019n v. City of Atlantic City, 217 N.J.Super. 277, 525 A.2d 1109(rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending), remanded, 102 N.J. 323, 508 A.2d 203 (1985); Bowen v. Mabry, 154 N.C.App. 734, 572 S.E.2d 809 (2002)(General Assembly has power to amend statute that it believes has been misconstrued by the courts and \u201cundo any perceived undesirable past consequences of misinterpretation of its work product\u201d unless retroactive application impairs vested rights, quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes \u00a7 411, at 568 (1999)); cf. In re Kirchner, 164 Ill.2d 468, 208 Ill.Dec. 268, 649 N.E.2d 324 (1995)(refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties\u2019 rights)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation","sentence":"See Perry v. City of Denver, 27 Colo. 93, 59 P. 747 (1899)(pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation); see also Gen. Tel. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Ill.2d 363, 83 Ill.Dec. 133, 469 N.E.2d 1067 (1984)(holding legislature\u2019s intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power); Schlenz v. Castle, 84 Ill.2d 196, 49 Ill.Dec. 322, 417 N.E.2d 1336 (1981)(rejecting separation of powers challenge where legislature\u2019s curative act did not have effect of setting aside final adjudication); Andresen v. Andresen, 317 Md. 380, 564 A.2d 399, 401 (1989)(affirming dismissal of motion to modify property distribution where final dissolution decree was entered, Congress enacted relevant law and intended retroactive effect, but motion did not allege sufficient facts to set aside final order); Atlantic City Casino Ass\u2019n v. City of Atlantic City, 217 N.J.Super. 277, 525 A.2d 1109(rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending), remanded, 102 N.J. 323, 508 A.2d 203 (1985); Bowen v. Mabry, 154 N.C.App. 734, 572 S.E.2d 809 (2002)(General Assembly has power to amend statute that it believes has been misconstrued by the courts and \u201cundo any perceived undesirable past consequences of misinterpretation of its work product\u201d unless retroactive application impairs vested rights, quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes \u00a7 411, at 568 (1999)); cf. In re Kirchner, 164 Ill.2d 468, 208 Ill.Dec. 268, 649 N.E.2d 324 (1995)(refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties\u2019 rights)."},"case_id":9025877,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The G'i'eenwood Village court held that the trial court was correct in doing so and that it must proceed to apply the provisions contained in the revised statute.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation","sentence":"See Perry v. City of Denver, 27 Colo. 93, 59 P. 747 (1899)(pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation); see also Gen. Tel. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Ill.2d 363, 83 Ill.Dec. 133, 469 N.E.2d 1067 (1984)(holding legislature\u2019s intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power); Schlenz v. Castle, 84 Ill.2d 196, 49 Ill.Dec. 322, 417 N.E.2d 1336 (1981)(rejecting separation of powers challenge where legislature\u2019s curative act did not have effect of setting aside final adjudication); Andresen v. Andresen, 317 Md. 380, 564 A.2d 399, 401 (1989)(affirming dismissal of motion to modify property distribution where final dissolution decree was entered, Congress enacted relevant law and intended retroactive effect, but motion did not allege sufficient facts to set aside final order); Atlantic City Casino Ass\u2019n v. City of Atlantic City, 217 N.J.Super. 277, 525 A.2d 1109(rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending), remanded, 102 N.J. 323, 508 A.2d 203 (1985); Bowen v. Mabry, 154 N.C.App. 734, 572 S.E.2d 809 (2002)(General Assembly has power to amend statute that it believes has been misconstrued by the courts and \u201cundo any perceived undesirable past consequences of misinterpretation of its work product\u201d unless retroactive application impairs vested rights, quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes \u00a7 411, at 568 (1999)); cf. In re Kirchner, 164 Ill.2d 468, 208 Ill.Dec. 268, 649 N.E.2d 324 (1995)(refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties\u2019 rights)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending","sentence":"See Perry v. City of Denver, 27 Colo. 93, 59 P. 747 (1899)(pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation); see also Gen. Tel. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Ill.2d 363, 83 Ill.Dec. 133, 469 N.E.2d 1067 (1984)(holding legislature\u2019s intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power); Schlenz v. Castle, 84 Ill.2d 196, 49 Ill.Dec. 322, 417 N.E.2d 1336 (1981)(rejecting separation of powers challenge where legislature\u2019s curative act did not have effect of setting aside final adjudication); Andresen v. Andresen, 317 Md. 380, 564 A.2d 399, 401 (1989)(affirming dismissal of motion to modify property distribution where final dissolution decree was entered, Congress enacted relevant law and intended retroactive effect, but motion did not allege sufficient facts to set aside final order); Atlantic City Casino Ass\u2019n v. City of Atlantic City, 217 N.J.Super. 277, 525 A.2d 1109(rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending), remanded, 102 N.J. 323, 508 A.2d 203 (1985); Bowen v. Mabry, 154 N.C.App. 734, 572 S.E.2d 809 (2002)(General Assembly has power to amend statute that it believes has been misconstrued by the courts and \u201cundo any perceived undesirable past consequences of misinterpretation of its work product\u201d unless retroactive application impairs vested rights, quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes \u00a7 411, at 568 (1999)); cf. In re Kirchner, 164 Ill.2d 468, 208 Ill.Dec. 268, 649 N.E.2d 324 (1995)(refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties\u2019 rights)."},"case_id":9025877,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The G'i'eenwood Village court held that the trial court was correct in doing so and that it must proceed to apply the provisions contained in the revised statute.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation","sentence":"See Perry v. City of Denver, 27 Colo. 93, 59 P. 747 (1899)(pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation); see also Gen. Tel. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Ill.2d 363, 83 Ill.Dec. 133, 469 N.E.2d 1067 (1984)(holding legislature\u2019s intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power); Schlenz v. Castle, 84 Ill.2d 196, 49 Ill.Dec. 322, 417 N.E.2d 1336 (1981)(rejecting separation of powers challenge where legislature\u2019s curative act did not have effect of setting aside final adjudication); Andresen v. Andresen, 317 Md. 380, 564 A.2d 399, 401 (1989)(affirming dismissal of motion to modify property distribution where final dissolution decree was entered, Congress enacted relevant law and intended retroactive effect, but motion did not allege sufficient facts to set aside final order); Atlantic City Casino Ass\u2019n v. City of Atlantic City, 217 N.J.Super. 277, 525 A.2d 1109(rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending), remanded, 102 N.J. 323, 508 A.2d 203 (1985); Bowen v. Mabry, 154 N.C.App. 734, 572 S.E.2d 809 (2002)(General Assembly has power to amend statute that it believes has been misconstrued by the courts and \u201cundo any perceived undesirable past consequences of misinterpretation of its work product\u201d unless retroactive application impairs vested rights, quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes \u00a7 411, at 568 (1999)); cf. In re Kirchner, 164 Ill.2d 468, 208 Ill.Dec. 268, 649 N.E.2d 324 (1995)(refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties\u2019 rights)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending","sentence":"See Perry v. City of Denver, 27 Colo. 93, 59 P. 747 (1899)(pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation); see also Gen. Tel. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Ill.2d 363, 83 Ill.Dec. 133, 469 N.E.2d 1067 (1984)(holding legislature\u2019s intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power); Schlenz v. Castle, 84 Ill.2d 196, 49 Ill.Dec. 322, 417 N.E.2d 1336 (1981)(rejecting separation of powers challenge where legislature\u2019s curative act did not have effect of setting aside final adjudication); Andresen v. Andresen, 317 Md. 380, 564 A.2d 399, 401 (1989)(affirming dismissal of motion to modify property distribution where final dissolution decree was entered, Congress enacted relevant law and intended retroactive effect, but motion did not allege sufficient facts to set aside final order); Atlantic City Casino Ass\u2019n v. City of Atlantic City, 217 N.J.Super. 277, 525 A.2d 1109(rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending), remanded, 102 N.J. 323, 508 A.2d 203 (1985); Bowen v. Mabry, 154 N.C.App. 734, 572 S.E.2d 809 (2002)(General Assembly has power to amend statute that it believes has been misconstrued by the courts and \u201cundo any perceived undesirable past consequences of misinterpretation of its work product\u201d unless retroactive application impairs vested rights, quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes \u00a7 411, at 568 (1999)); cf. In re Kirchner, 164 Ill.2d 468, 208 Ill.Dec. 268, 649 N.E.2d 324 (1995)(refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties\u2019 rights)."},"case_id":9025877,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The G'i'eenwood Village court held that the trial court was correct in doing so and that it must proceed to apply the provisions contained in the revised statute.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending","sentence":"See Perry v. City of Denver, 27 Colo. 93, 59 P. 747 (1899)(pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation); see also Gen. Tel. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Ill.2d 363, 83 Ill.Dec. 133, 469 N.E.2d 1067 (1984)(holding legislature\u2019s intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power); Schlenz v. Castle, 84 Ill.2d 196, 49 Ill.Dec. 322, 417 N.E.2d 1336 (1981)(rejecting separation of powers challenge where legislature\u2019s curative act did not have effect of setting aside final adjudication); Andresen v. Andresen, 317 Md. 380, 564 A.2d 399, 401 (1989)(affirming dismissal of motion to modify property distribution where final dissolution decree was entered, Congress enacted relevant law and intended retroactive effect, but motion did not allege sufficient facts to set aside final order); Atlantic City Casino Ass\u2019n v. City of Atlantic City, 217 N.J.Super. 277, 525 A.2d 1109(rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending), remanded, 102 N.J. 323, 508 A.2d 203 (1985); Bowen v. Mabry, 154 N.C.App. 734, 572 S.E.2d 809 (2002)(General Assembly has power to amend statute that it believes has been misconstrued by the courts and \u201cundo any perceived undesirable past consequences of misinterpretation of its work product\u201d unless retroactive application impairs vested rights, quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes \u00a7 411, at 568 (1999)); cf. In re Kirchner, 164 Ill.2d 468, 208 Ill.Dec. 268, 649 N.E.2d 324 (1995)(refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties\u2019 rights)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation","sentence":"See Perry v. City of Denver, 27 Colo. 93, 59 P. 747 (1899)(pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation); see also Gen. Tel. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Ill.2d 363, 83 Ill.Dec. 133, 469 N.E.2d 1067 (1984)(holding legislature\u2019s intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power); Schlenz v. Castle, 84 Ill.2d 196, 49 Ill.Dec. 322, 417 N.E.2d 1336 (1981)(rejecting separation of powers challenge where legislature\u2019s curative act did not have effect of setting aside final adjudication); Andresen v. Andresen, 317 Md. 380, 564 A.2d 399, 401 (1989)(affirming dismissal of motion to modify property distribution where final dissolution decree was entered, Congress enacted relevant law and intended retroactive effect, but motion did not allege sufficient facts to set aside final order); Atlantic City Casino Ass\u2019n v. City of Atlantic City, 217 N.J.Super. 277, 525 A.2d 1109(rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending), remanded, 102 N.J. 323, 508 A.2d 203 (1985); Bowen v. Mabry, 154 N.C.App. 734, 572 S.E.2d 809 (2002)(General Assembly has power to amend statute that it believes has been misconstrued by the courts and \u201cundo any perceived undesirable past consequences of misinterpretation of its work product\u201d unless retroactive application impairs vested rights, quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes \u00a7 411, at 568 (1999)); cf. In re Kirchner, 164 Ill.2d 468, 208 Ill.Dec. 268, 649 N.E.2d 324 (1995)(refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties\u2019 rights)."},"case_id":9025877,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The G'i'eenwood Village court held that the trial court was correct in doing so and that it must proceed to apply the provisions contained in the revised statute.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending","sentence":"See Perry v. City of Denver, 27 Colo. 93, 59 P. 747 (1899)(pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation); see also Gen. Tel. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Ill.2d 363, 83 Ill.Dec. 133, 469 N.E.2d 1067 (1984)(holding legislature\u2019s intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power); Schlenz v. Castle, 84 Ill.2d 196, 49 Ill.Dec. 322, 417 N.E.2d 1336 (1981)(rejecting separation of powers challenge where legislature\u2019s curative act did not have effect of setting aside final adjudication); Andresen v. Andresen, 317 Md. 380, 564 A.2d 399, 401 (1989)(affirming dismissal of motion to modify property distribution where final dissolution decree was entered, Congress enacted relevant law and intended retroactive effect, but motion did not allege sufficient facts to set aside final order); Atlantic City Casino Ass\u2019n v. City of Atlantic City, 217 N.J.Super. 277, 525 A.2d 1109(rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending), remanded, 102 N.J. 323, 508 A.2d 203 (1985); Bowen v. Mabry, 154 N.C.App. 734, 572 S.E.2d 809 (2002)(General Assembly has power to amend statute that it believes has been misconstrued by the courts and \u201cundo any perceived undesirable past consequences of misinterpretation of its work product\u201d unless retroactive application impairs vested rights, quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes \u00a7 411, at 568 (1999)); cf. In re Kirchner, 164 Ill.2d 468, 208 Ill.Dec. 268, 649 N.E.2d 324 (1995)(refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties\u2019 rights)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation","sentence":"See Perry v. City of Denver, 27 Colo. 93, 59 P. 747 (1899)(pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation); see also Gen. Tel. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Ill.2d 363, 83 Ill.Dec. 133, 469 N.E.2d 1067 (1984)(holding legislature\u2019s intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power); Schlenz v. Castle, 84 Ill.2d 196, 49 Ill.Dec. 322, 417 N.E.2d 1336 (1981)(rejecting separation of powers challenge where legislature\u2019s curative act did not have effect of setting aside final adjudication); Andresen v. Andresen, 317 Md. 380, 564 A.2d 399, 401 (1989)(affirming dismissal of motion to modify property distribution where final dissolution decree was entered, Congress enacted relevant law and intended retroactive effect, but motion did not allege sufficient facts to set aside final order); Atlantic City Casino Ass\u2019n v. City of Atlantic City, 217 N.J.Super. 277, 525 A.2d 1109(rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending), remanded, 102 N.J. 323, 508 A.2d 203 (1985); Bowen v. Mabry, 154 N.C.App. 734, 572 S.E.2d 809 (2002)(General Assembly has power to amend statute that it believes has been misconstrued by the courts and \u201cundo any perceived undesirable past consequences of misinterpretation of its work product\u201d unless retroactive application impairs vested rights, quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes \u00a7 411, at 568 (1999)); cf. In re Kirchner, 164 Ill.2d 468, 208 Ill.Dec. 268, 649 N.E.2d 324 (1995)(refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties\u2019 rights)."},"case_id":9025877,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The G'i'eenwood Village court held that the trial court was correct in doing so and that it must proceed to apply the provisions contained in the revised statute.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"General Assembly has power to amend statute that it believes has been misconstrued by the courts and \"undo any perceived undesirable past consequences of misinterpretation of its work product\" unless retroactive application impairs vested rights, quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes SS 411, at 568 (1999","sentence":"See Perry v. City of Denver, 27 Colo. 93, 59 P. 747 (1899)(pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation); see also Gen. Tel. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Ill.2d 363, 83 Ill.Dec. 133, 469 N.E.2d 1067 (1984)(holding legislature\u2019s intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power); Schlenz v. Castle, 84 Ill.2d 196, 49 Ill.Dec. 322, 417 N.E.2d 1336 (1981)(rejecting separation of powers challenge where legislature\u2019s curative act did not have effect of setting aside final adjudication); Andresen v. Andresen, 317 Md. 380, 564 A.2d 399, 401 (1989)(affirming dismissal of motion to modify property distribution where final dissolution decree was entered, Congress enacted relevant law and intended retroactive effect, but motion did not allege sufficient facts to set aside final order); Atlantic City Casino Ass\u2019n v. City of Atlantic City, 217 N.J.Super. 277, 525 A.2d 1109(rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending), remanded, 102 N.J. 323, 508 A.2d 203 (1985); Bowen v. Mabry, 154 N.C.App. 734, 572 S.E.2d 809 (2002)(General Assembly has power to amend statute that it believes has been misconstrued by the courts and \u201cundo any perceived undesirable past consequences of misinterpretation of its work product\u201d unless retroactive application impairs vested rights, quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes \u00a7 411, at 568 (1999)); cf. In re Kirchner, 164 Ill.2d 468, 208 Ill.Dec. 268, 649 N.E.2d 324 (1995)(refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties\u2019 rights)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation","sentence":"See Perry v. City of Denver, 27 Colo. 93, 59 P. 747 (1899)(pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation); see also Gen. Tel. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Ill.2d 363, 83 Ill.Dec. 133, 469 N.E.2d 1067 (1984)(holding legislature\u2019s intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power); Schlenz v. Castle, 84 Ill.2d 196, 49 Ill.Dec. 322, 417 N.E.2d 1336 (1981)(rejecting separation of powers challenge where legislature\u2019s curative act did not have effect of setting aside final adjudication); Andresen v. Andresen, 317 Md. 380, 564 A.2d 399, 401 (1989)(affirming dismissal of motion to modify property distribution where final dissolution decree was entered, Congress enacted relevant law and intended retroactive effect, but motion did not allege sufficient facts to set aside final order); Atlantic City Casino Ass\u2019n v. City of Atlantic City, 217 N.J.Super. 277, 525 A.2d 1109(rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending), remanded, 102 N.J. 323, 508 A.2d 203 (1985); Bowen v. Mabry, 154 N.C.App. 734, 572 S.E.2d 809 (2002)(General Assembly has power to amend statute that it believes has been misconstrued by the courts and \u201cundo any perceived undesirable past consequences of misinterpretation of its work product\u201d unless retroactive application impairs vested rights, quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes \u00a7 411, at 568 (1999)); cf. In re Kirchner, 164 Ill.2d 468, 208 Ill.Dec. 268, 649 N.E.2d 324 (1995)(refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties\u2019 rights)."},"case_id":9025877,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The G'i'eenwood Village court held that the trial court was correct in doing so and that it must proceed to apply the provisions contained in the revised statute.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation","sentence":"See Perry v. City of Denver, 27 Colo. 93, 59 P. 747 (1899)(pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation); see also Gen. Tel. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Ill.2d 363, 83 Ill.Dec. 133, 469 N.E.2d 1067 (1984)(holding legislature\u2019s intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power); Schlenz v. Castle, 84 Ill.2d 196, 49 Ill.Dec. 322, 417 N.E.2d 1336 (1981)(rejecting separation of powers challenge where legislature\u2019s curative act did not have effect of setting aside final adjudication); Andresen v. Andresen, 317 Md. 380, 564 A.2d 399, 401 (1989)(affirming dismissal of motion to modify property distribution where final dissolution decree was entered, Congress enacted relevant law and intended retroactive effect, but motion did not allege sufficient facts to set aside final order); Atlantic City Casino Ass\u2019n v. City of Atlantic City, 217 N.J.Super. 277, 525 A.2d 1109(rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending), remanded, 102 N.J. 323, 508 A.2d 203 (1985); Bowen v. Mabry, 154 N.C.App. 734, 572 S.E.2d 809 (2002)(General Assembly has power to amend statute that it believes has been misconstrued by the courts and \u201cundo any perceived undesirable past consequences of misinterpretation of its work product\u201d unless retroactive application impairs vested rights, quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes \u00a7 411, at 568 (1999)); cf. In re Kirchner, 164 Ill.2d 468, 208 Ill.Dec. 268, 649 N.E.2d 324 (1995)(refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties\u2019 rights)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"General Assembly has power to amend statute that it believes has been misconstrued by the courts and \"undo any perceived undesirable past consequences of misinterpretation of its work product\" unless retroactive application impairs vested rights, quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes SS 411, at 568 (1999","sentence":"See Perry v. City of Denver, 27 Colo. 93, 59 P. 747 (1899)(pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation); see also Gen. Tel. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Ill.2d 363, 83 Ill.Dec. 133, 469 N.E.2d 1067 (1984)(holding legislature\u2019s intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power); Schlenz v. Castle, 84 Ill.2d 196, 49 Ill.Dec. 322, 417 N.E.2d 1336 (1981)(rejecting separation of powers challenge where legislature\u2019s curative act did not have effect of setting aside final adjudication); Andresen v. Andresen, 317 Md. 380, 564 A.2d 399, 401 (1989)(affirming dismissal of motion to modify property distribution where final dissolution decree was entered, Congress enacted relevant law and intended retroactive effect, but motion did not allege sufficient facts to set aside final order); Atlantic City Casino Ass\u2019n v. City of Atlantic City, 217 N.J.Super. 277, 525 A.2d 1109(rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending), remanded, 102 N.J. 323, 508 A.2d 203 (1985); Bowen v. Mabry, 154 N.C.App. 734, 572 S.E.2d 809 (2002)(General Assembly has power to amend statute that it believes has been misconstrued by the courts and \u201cundo any perceived undesirable past consequences of misinterpretation of its work product\u201d unless retroactive application impairs vested rights, quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes \u00a7 411, at 568 (1999)); cf. In re Kirchner, 164 Ill.2d 468, 208 Ill.Dec. 268, 649 N.E.2d 324 (1995)(refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties\u2019 rights)."},"case_id":9025877,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The G'i'eenwood Village court held that the trial court was correct in doing so and that it must proceed to apply the provisions contained in the revised statute.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation","sentence":"See Perry v. City of Denver, 27 Colo. 93, 59 P. 747 (1899)(pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation); see also Gen. Tel. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Ill.2d 363, 83 Ill.Dec. 133, 469 N.E.2d 1067 (1984)(holding legislature\u2019s intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power); Schlenz v. Castle, 84 Ill.2d 196, 49 Ill.Dec. 322, 417 N.E.2d 1336 (1981)(rejecting separation of powers challenge where legislature\u2019s curative act did not have effect of setting aside final adjudication); Andresen v. Andresen, 317 Md. 380, 564 A.2d 399, 401 (1989)(affirming dismissal of motion to modify property distribution where final dissolution decree was entered, Congress enacted relevant law and intended retroactive effect, but motion did not allege sufficient facts to set aside final order); Atlantic City Casino Ass\u2019n v. City of Atlantic City, 217 N.J.Super. 277, 525 A.2d 1109(rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending), remanded, 102 N.J. 323, 508 A.2d 203 (1985); Bowen v. Mabry, 154 N.C.App. 734, 572 S.E.2d 809 (2002)(General Assembly has power to amend statute that it believes has been misconstrued by the courts and \u201cundo any perceived undesirable past consequences of misinterpretation of its work product\u201d unless retroactive application impairs vested rights, quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes \u00a7 411, at 568 (1999)); cf. In re Kirchner, 164 Ill.2d 468, 208 Ill.Dec. 268, 649 N.E.2d 324 (1995)(refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties\u2019 rights)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties' rights","sentence":"See Perry v. City of Denver, 27 Colo. 93, 59 P. 747 (1899)(pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation); see also Gen. Tel. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Ill.2d 363, 83 Ill.Dec. 133, 469 N.E.2d 1067 (1984)(holding legislature\u2019s intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power); Schlenz v. Castle, 84 Ill.2d 196, 49 Ill.Dec. 322, 417 N.E.2d 1336 (1981)(rejecting separation of powers challenge where legislature\u2019s curative act did not have effect of setting aside final adjudication); Andresen v. Andresen, 317 Md. 380, 564 A.2d 399, 401 (1989)(affirming dismissal of motion to modify property distribution where final dissolution decree was entered, Congress enacted relevant law and intended retroactive effect, but motion did not allege sufficient facts to set aside final order); Atlantic City Casino Ass\u2019n v. City of Atlantic City, 217 N.J.Super. 277, 525 A.2d 1109(rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending), remanded, 102 N.J. 323, 508 A.2d 203 (1985); Bowen v. Mabry, 154 N.C.App. 734, 572 S.E.2d 809 (2002)(General Assembly has power to amend statute that it believes has been misconstrued by the courts and \u201cundo any perceived undesirable past consequences of misinterpretation of its work product\u201d unless retroactive application impairs vested rights, quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes \u00a7 411, at 568 (1999)); cf. In re Kirchner, 164 Ill.2d 468, 208 Ill.Dec. 268, 649 N.E.2d 324 (1995)(refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties\u2019 rights)."},"case_id":9025877,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The G'i'eenwood Village court held that the trial court was correct in doing so and that it must proceed to apply the provisions contained in the revised statute.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation","sentence":"See Perry v. City of Denver, 27 Colo. 93, 59 P. 747 (1899)(pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation); see also Gen. Tel. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Ill.2d 363, 83 Ill.Dec. 133, 469 N.E.2d 1067 (1984)(holding legislature\u2019s intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power); Schlenz v. Castle, 84 Ill.2d 196, 49 Ill.Dec. 322, 417 N.E.2d 1336 (1981)(rejecting separation of powers challenge where legislature\u2019s curative act did not have effect of setting aside final adjudication); Andresen v. Andresen, 317 Md. 380, 564 A.2d 399, 401 (1989)(affirming dismissal of motion to modify property distribution where final dissolution decree was entered, Congress enacted relevant law and intended retroactive effect, but motion did not allege sufficient facts to set aside final order); Atlantic City Casino Ass\u2019n v. City of Atlantic City, 217 N.J.Super. 277, 525 A.2d 1109(rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending), remanded, 102 N.J. 323, 508 A.2d 203 (1985); Bowen v. Mabry, 154 N.C.App. 734, 572 S.E.2d 809 (2002)(General Assembly has power to amend statute that it believes has been misconstrued by the courts and \u201cundo any perceived undesirable past consequences of misinterpretation of its work product\u201d unless retroactive application impairs vested rights, quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes \u00a7 411, at 568 (1999)); cf. In re Kirchner, 164 Ill.2d 468, 208 Ill.Dec. 268, 649 N.E.2d 324 (1995)(refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties\u2019 rights)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties' rights","sentence":"See Perry v. City of Denver, 27 Colo. 93, 59 P. 747 (1899)(pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation); see also Gen. Tel. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Ill.2d 363, 83 Ill.Dec. 133, 469 N.E.2d 1067 (1984)(holding legislature\u2019s intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power); Schlenz v. Castle, 84 Ill.2d 196, 49 Ill.Dec. 322, 417 N.E.2d 1336 (1981)(rejecting separation of powers challenge where legislature\u2019s curative act did not have effect of setting aside final adjudication); Andresen v. Andresen, 317 Md. 380, 564 A.2d 399, 401 (1989)(affirming dismissal of motion to modify property distribution where final dissolution decree was entered, Congress enacted relevant law and intended retroactive effect, but motion did not allege sufficient facts to set aside final order); Atlantic City Casino Ass\u2019n v. City of Atlantic City, 217 N.J.Super. 277, 525 A.2d 1109(rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending), remanded, 102 N.J. 323, 508 A.2d 203 (1985); Bowen v. Mabry, 154 N.C.App. 734, 572 S.E.2d 809 (2002)(General Assembly has power to amend statute that it believes has been misconstrued by the courts and \u201cundo any perceived undesirable past consequences of misinterpretation of its work product\u201d unless retroactive application impairs vested rights, quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes \u00a7 411, at 568 (1999)); cf. In re Kirchner, 164 Ill.2d 468, 208 Ill.Dec. 268, 649 N.E.2d 324 (1995)(refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties\u2019 rights)."},"case_id":9025877,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The G'i'eenwood Village court held that the trial court was correct in doing so and that it must proceed to apply the provisions contained in the revised statute.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties' rights","sentence":"See Perry v. City of Denver, 27 Colo. 93, 59 P. 747 (1899)(pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation); see also Gen. Tel. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Ill.2d 363, 83 Ill.Dec. 133, 469 N.E.2d 1067 (1984)(holding legislature\u2019s intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power); Schlenz v. Castle, 84 Ill.2d 196, 49 Ill.Dec. 322, 417 N.E.2d 1336 (1981)(rejecting separation of powers challenge where legislature\u2019s curative act did not have effect of setting aside final adjudication); Andresen v. Andresen, 317 Md. 380, 564 A.2d 399, 401 (1989)(affirming dismissal of motion to modify property distribution where final dissolution decree was entered, Congress enacted relevant law and intended retroactive effect, but motion did not allege sufficient facts to set aside final order); Atlantic City Casino Ass\u2019n v. City of Atlantic City, 217 N.J.Super. 277, 525 A.2d 1109(rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending), remanded, 102 N.J. 323, 508 A.2d 203 (1985); Bowen v. Mabry, 154 N.C.App. 734, 572 S.E.2d 809 (2002)(General Assembly has power to amend statute that it believes has been misconstrued by the courts and \u201cundo any perceived undesirable past consequences of misinterpretation of its work product\u201d unless retroactive application impairs vested rights, quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes \u00a7 411, at 568 (1999)); cf. In re Kirchner, 164 Ill.2d 468, 208 Ill.Dec. 268, 649 N.E.2d 324 (1995)(refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties\u2019 rights)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation","sentence":"See Perry v. City of Denver, 27 Colo. 93, 59 P. 747 (1899)(pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation); see also Gen. Tel. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Ill.2d 363, 83 Ill.Dec. 133, 469 N.E.2d 1067 (1984)(holding legislature\u2019s intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power); Schlenz v. Castle, 84 Ill.2d 196, 49 Ill.Dec. 322, 417 N.E.2d 1336 (1981)(rejecting separation of powers challenge where legislature\u2019s curative act did not have effect of setting aside final adjudication); Andresen v. Andresen, 317 Md. 380, 564 A.2d 399, 401 (1989)(affirming dismissal of motion to modify property distribution where final dissolution decree was entered, Congress enacted relevant law and intended retroactive effect, but motion did not allege sufficient facts to set aside final order); Atlantic City Casino Ass\u2019n v. City of Atlantic City, 217 N.J.Super. 277, 525 A.2d 1109(rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending), remanded, 102 N.J. 323, 508 A.2d 203 (1985); Bowen v. Mabry, 154 N.C.App. 734, 572 S.E.2d 809 (2002)(General Assembly has power to amend statute that it believes has been misconstrued by the courts and \u201cundo any perceived undesirable past consequences of misinterpretation of its work product\u201d unless retroactive application impairs vested rights, quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes \u00a7 411, at 568 (1999)); cf. In re Kirchner, 164 Ill.2d 468, 208 Ill.Dec. 268, 649 N.E.2d 324 (1995)(refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties\u2019 rights)."},"case_id":9025877,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The G'i'eenwood Village court held that the trial court was correct in doing so and that it must proceed to apply the provisions contained in the revised statute.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding legislature's intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power","sentence":"See Perry v. City of Denver, 27 Colo. 93, 59 P. 747 (1899)(pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation); see also Gen. Tel. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Ill.2d 363, 83 Ill.Dec. 133, 469 N.E.2d 1067 (1984)(holding legislature\u2019s intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power); Schlenz v. Castle, 84 Ill.2d 196, 49 Ill.Dec. 322, 417 N.E.2d 1336 (1981)(rejecting separation of powers challenge where legislature\u2019s curative act did not have effect of setting aside final adjudication); Andresen v. Andresen, 317 Md. 380, 564 A.2d 399, 401 (1989)(affirming dismissal of motion to modify property distribution where final dissolution decree was entered, Congress enacted relevant law and intended retroactive effect, but motion did not allege sufficient facts to set aside final order); Atlantic City Casino Ass\u2019n v. City of Atlantic City, 217 N.J.Super. 277, 525 A.2d 1109(rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending), remanded, 102 N.J. 323, 508 A.2d 203 (1985); Bowen v. Mabry, 154 N.C.App. 734, 572 S.E.2d 809 (2002)(General Assembly has power to amend statute that it believes has been misconstrued by the courts and \u201cundo any perceived undesirable past consequences of misinterpretation of its work product\u201d unless retroactive application impairs vested rights, quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes \u00a7 411, at 568 (1999)); cf. In re Kirchner, 164 Ill.2d 468, 208 Ill.Dec. 268, 649 N.E.2d 324 (1995)(refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties\u2019 rights)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties' rights","sentence":"See Perry v. City of Denver, 27 Colo. 93, 59 P. 747 (1899)(pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation); see also Gen. Tel. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Ill.2d 363, 83 Ill.Dec. 133, 469 N.E.2d 1067 (1984)(holding legislature\u2019s intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power); Schlenz v. Castle, 84 Ill.2d 196, 49 Ill.Dec. 322, 417 N.E.2d 1336 (1981)(rejecting separation of powers challenge where legislature\u2019s curative act did not have effect of setting aside final adjudication); Andresen v. Andresen, 317 Md. 380, 564 A.2d 399, 401 (1989)(affirming dismissal of motion to modify property distribution where final dissolution decree was entered, Congress enacted relevant law and intended retroactive effect, but motion did not allege sufficient facts to set aside final order); Atlantic City Casino Ass\u2019n v. City of Atlantic City, 217 N.J.Super. 277, 525 A.2d 1109(rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending), remanded, 102 N.J. 323, 508 A.2d 203 (1985); Bowen v. Mabry, 154 N.C.App. 734, 572 S.E.2d 809 (2002)(General Assembly has power to amend statute that it believes has been misconstrued by the courts and \u201cundo any perceived undesirable past consequences of misinterpretation of its work product\u201d unless retroactive application impairs vested rights, quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes \u00a7 411, at 568 (1999)); cf. In re Kirchner, 164 Ill.2d 468, 208 Ill.Dec. 268, 649 N.E.2d 324 (1995)(refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties\u2019 rights)."},"case_id":9025877,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The G'i'eenwood Village court held that the trial court was correct in doing so and that it must proceed to apply the provisions contained in the revised statute.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding legislature's intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power","sentence":"See Perry v. City of Denver, 27 Colo. 93, 59 P. 747 (1899)(pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation); see also Gen. Tel. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Ill.2d 363, 83 Ill.Dec. 133, 469 N.E.2d 1067 (1984)(holding legislature\u2019s intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power); Schlenz v. Castle, 84 Ill.2d 196, 49 Ill.Dec. 322, 417 N.E.2d 1336 (1981)(rejecting separation of powers challenge where legislature\u2019s curative act did not have effect of setting aside final adjudication); Andresen v. Andresen, 317 Md. 380, 564 A.2d 399, 401 (1989)(affirming dismissal of motion to modify property distribution where final dissolution decree was entered, Congress enacted relevant law and intended retroactive effect, but motion did not allege sufficient facts to set aside final order); Atlantic City Casino Ass\u2019n v. City of Atlantic City, 217 N.J.Super. 277, 525 A.2d 1109(rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending), remanded, 102 N.J. 323, 508 A.2d 203 (1985); Bowen v. Mabry, 154 N.C.App. 734, 572 S.E.2d 809 (2002)(General Assembly has power to amend statute that it believes has been misconstrued by the courts and \u201cundo any perceived undesirable past consequences of misinterpretation of its work product\u201d unless retroactive application impairs vested rights, quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes \u00a7 411, at 568 (1999)); cf. In re Kirchner, 164 Ill.2d 468, 208 Ill.Dec. 268, 649 N.E.2d 324 (1995)(refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties\u2019 rights)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties' rights","sentence":"See Perry v. City of Denver, 27 Colo. 93, 59 P. 747 (1899)(pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation); see also Gen. Tel. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Ill.2d 363, 83 Ill.Dec. 133, 469 N.E.2d 1067 (1984)(holding legislature\u2019s intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power); Schlenz v. Castle, 84 Ill.2d 196, 49 Ill.Dec. 322, 417 N.E.2d 1336 (1981)(rejecting separation of powers challenge where legislature\u2019s curative act did not have effect of setting aside final adjudication); Andresen v. Andresen, 317 Md. 380, 564 A.2d 399, 401 (1989)(affirming dismissal of motion to modify property distribution where final dissolution decree was entered, Congress enacted relevant law and intended retroactive effect, but motion did not allege sufficient facts to set aside final order); Atlantic City Casino Ass\u2019n v. City of Atlantic City, 217 N.J.Super. 277, 525 A.2d 1109(rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending), remanded, 102 N.J. 323, 508 A.2d 203 (1985); Bowen v. Mabry, 154 N.C.App. 734, 572 S.E.2d 809 (2002)(General Assembly has power to amend statute that it believes has been misconstrued by the courts and \u201cundo any perceived undesirable past consequences of misinterpretation of its work product\u201d unless retroactive application impairs vested rights, quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes \u00a7 411, at 568 (1999)); cf. In re Kirchner, 164 Ill.2d 468, 208 Ill.Dec. 268, 649 N.E.2d 324 (1995)(refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties\u2019 rights)."},"case_id":9025877,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The G'i'eenwood Village court held that the trial court was correct in doing so and that it must proceed to apply the provisions contained in the revised statute.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding legislature's intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power","sentence":"See Perry v. City of Denver, 27 Colo. 93, 59 P. 747 (1899)(pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation); see also Gen. Tel. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Ill.2d 363, 83 Ill.Dec. 133, 469 N.E.2d 1067 (1984)(holding legislature\u2019s intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power); Schlenz v. Castle, 84 Ill.2d 196, 49 Ill.Dec. 322, 417 N.E.2d 1336 (1981)(rejecting separation of powers challenge where legislature\u2019s curative act did not have effect of setting aside final adjudication); Andresen v. Andresen, 317 Md. 380, 564 A.2d 399, 401 (1989)(affirming dismissal of motion to modify property distribution where final dissolution decree was entered, Congress enacted relevant law and intended retroactive effect, but motion did not allege sufficient facts to set aside final order); Atlantic City Casino Ass\u2019n v. City of Atlantic City, 217 N.J.Super. 277, 525 A.2d 1109(rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending), remanded, 102 N.J. 323, 508 A.2d 203 (1985); Bowen v. Mabry, 154 N.C.App. 734, 572 S.E.2d 809 (2002)(General Assembly has power to amend statute that it believes has been misconstrued by the courts and \u201cundo any perceived undesirable past consequences of misinterpretation of its work product\u201d unless retroactive application impairs vested rights, quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes \u00a7 411, at 568 (1999)); cf. In re Kirchner, 164 Ill.2d 468, 208 Ill.Dec. 268, 649 N.E.2d 324 (1995)(refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties\u2019 rights)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties' rights","sentence":"See Perry v. City of Denver, 27 Colo. 93, 59 P. 747 (1899)(pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation); see also Gen. Tel. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Ill.2d 363, 83 Ill.Dec. 133, 469 N.E.2d 1067 (1984)(holding legislature\u2019s intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power); Schlenz v. Castle, 84 Ill.2d 196, 49 Ill.Dec. 322, 417 N.E.2d 1336 (1981)(rejecting separation of powers challenge where legislature\u2019s curative act did not have effect of setting aside final adjudication); Andresen v. Andresen, 317 Md. 380, 564 A.2d 399, 401 (1989)(affirming dismissal of motion to modify property distribution where final dissolution decree was entered, Congress enacted relevant law and intended retroactive effect, but motion did not allege sufficient facts to set aside final order); Atlantic City Casino Ass\u2019n v. City of Atlantic City, 217 N.J.Super. 277, 525 A.2d 1109(rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending), remanded, 102 N.J. 323, 508 A.2d 203 (1985); Bowen v. Mabry, 154 N.C.App. 734, 572 S.E.2d 809 (2002)(General Assembly has power to amend statute that it believes has been misconstrued by the courts and \u201cundo any perceived undesirable past consequences of misinterpretation of its work product\u201d unless retroactive application impairs vested rights, quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes \u00a7 411, at 568 (1999)); cf. In re Kirchner, 164 Ill.2d 468, 208 Ill.Dec. 268, 649 N.E.2d 324 (1995)(refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties\u2019 rights)."},"case_id":9025877,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The G'i'eenwood Village court held that the trial court was correct in doing so and that it must proceed to apply the provisions contained in the revised statute.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties' rights","sentence":"See Perry v. City of Denver, 27 Colo. 93, 59 P. 747 (1899)(pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation); see also Gen. Tel. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Ill.2d 363, 83 Ill.Dec. 133, 469 N.E.2d 1067 (1984)(holding legislature\u2019s intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power); Schlenz v. Castle, 84 Ill.2d 196, 49 Ill.Dec. 322, 417 N.E.2d 1336 (1981)(rejecting separation of powers challenge where legislature\u2019s curative act did not have effect of setting aside final adjudication); Andresen v. Andresen, 317 Md. 380, 564 A.2d 399, 401 (1989)(affirming dismissal of motion to modify property distribution where final dissolution decree was entered, Congress enacted relevant law and intended retroactive effect, but motion did not allege sufficient facts to set aside final order); Atlantic City Casino Ass\u2019n v. City of Atlantic City, 217 N.J.Super. 277, 525 A.2d 1109(rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending), remanded, 102 N.J. 323, 508 A.2d 203 (1985); Bowen v. Mabry, 154 N.C.App. 734, 572 S.E.2d 809 (2002)(General Assembly has power to amend statute that it believes has been misconstrued by the courts and \u201cundo any perceived undesirable past consequences of misinterpretation of its work product\u201d unless retroactive application impairs vested rights, quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes \u00a7 411, at 568 (1999)); cf. In re Kirchner, 164 Ill.2d 468, 208 Ill.Dec. 268, 649 N.E.2d 324 (1995)(refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties\u2019 rights)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding legislature's intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power","sentence":"See Perry v. City of Denver, 27 Colo. 93, 59 P. 747 (1899)(pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation); see also Gen. Tel. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Ill.2d 363, 83 Ill.Dec. 133, 469 N.E.2d 1067 (1984)(holding legislature\u2019s intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power); Schlenz v. Castle, 84 Ill.2d 196, 49 Ill.Dec. 322, 417 N.E.2d 1336 (1981)(rejecting separation of powers challenge where legislature\u2019s curative act did not have effect of setting aside final adjudication); Andresen v. Andresen, 317 Md. 380, 564 A.2d 399, 401 (1989)(affirming dismissal of motion to modify property distribution where final dissolution decree was entered, Congress enacted relevant law and intended retroactive effect, but motion did not allege sufficient facts to set aside final order); Atlantic City Casino Ass\u2019n v. City of Atlantic City, 217 N.J.Super. 277, 525 A.2d 1109(rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending), remanded, 102 N.J. 323, 508 A.2d 203 (1985); Bowen v. Mabry, 154 N.C.App. 734, 572 S.E.2d 809 (2002)(General Assembly has power to amend statute that it believes has been misconstrued by the courts and \u201cundo any perceived undesirable past consequences of misinterpretation of its work product\u201d unless retroactive application impairs vested rights, quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes \u00a7 411, at 568 (1999)); cf. In re Kirchner, 164 Ill.2d 468, 208 Ill.Dec. 268, 649 N.E.2d 324 (1995)(refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties\u2019 rights)."},"case_id":9025877,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The G'i'eenwood Village court held that the trial court was correct in doing so and that it must proceed to apply the provisions contained in the revised statute.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding legislature's intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power","sentence":"See Perry v. City of Denver, 27 Colo. 93, 59 P. 747 (1899)(pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation); see also Gen. Tel. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Ill.2d 363, 83 Ill.Dec. 133, 469 N.E.2d 1067 (1984)(holding legislature\u2019s intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power); Schlenz v. Castle, 84 Ill.2d 196, 49 Ill.Dec. 322, 417 N.E.2d 1336 (1981)(rejecting separation of powers challenge where legislature\u2019s curative act did not have effect of setting aside final adjudication); Andresen v. Andresen, 317 Md. 380, 564 A.2d 399, 401 (1989)(affirming dismissal of motion to modify property distribution where final dissolution decree was entered, Congress enacted relevant law and intended retroactive effect, but motion did not allege sufficient facts to set aside final order); Atlantic City Casino Ass\u2019n v. City of Atlantic City, 217 N.J.Super. 277, 525 A.2d 1109(rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending), remanded, 102 N.J. 323, 508 A.2d 203 (1985); Bowen v. Mabry, 154 N.C.App. 734, 572 S.E.2d 809 (2002)(General Assembly has power to amend statute that it believes has been misconstrued by the courts and \u201cundo any perceived undesirable past consequences of misinterpretation of its work product\u201d unless retroactive application impairs vested rights, quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes \u00a7 411, at 568 (1999)); cf. In re Kirchner, 164 Ill.2d 468, 208 Ill.Dec. 268, 649 N.E.2d 324 (1995)(refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties\u2019 rights)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties' rights","sentence":"See Perry v. City of Denver, 27 Colo. 93, 59 P. 747 (1899)(pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation); see also Gen. Tel. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Ill.2d 363, 83 Ill.Dec. 133, 469 N.E.2d 1067 (1984)(holding legislature\u2019s intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power); Schlenz v. Castle, 84 Ill.2d 196, 49 Ill.Dec. 322, 417 N.E.2d 1336 (1981)(rejecting separation of powers challenge where legislature\u2019s curative act did not have effect of setting aside final adjudication); Andresen v. Andresen, 317 Md. 380, 564 A.2d 399, 401 (1989)(affirming dismissal of motion to modify property distribution where final dissolution decree was entered, Congress enacted relevant law and intended retroactive effect, but motion did not allege sufficient facts to set aside final order); Atlantic City Casino Ass\u2019n v. City of Atlantic City, 217 N.J.Super. 277, 525 A.2d 1109(rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending), remanded, 102 N.J. 323, 508 A.2d 203 (1985); Bowen v. Mabry, 154 N.C.App. 734, 572 S.E.2d 809 (2002)(General Assembly has power to amend statute that it believes has been misconstrued by the courts and \u201cundo any perceived undesirable past consequences of misinterpretation of its work product\u201d unless retroactive application impairs vested rights, quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes \u00a7 411, at 568 (1999)); cf. In re Kirchner, 164 Ill.2d 468, 208 Ill.Dec. 268, 649 N.E.2d 324 (1995)(refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties\u2019 rights)."},"case_id":9025877,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The G'i'eenwood Village court held that the trial court was correct in doing so and that it must proceed to apply the provisions contained in the revised statute.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding legislature's intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power","sentence":"See Perry v. City of Denver, 27 Colo. 93, 59 P. 747 (1899)(pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation); see also Gen. Tel. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Ill.2d 363, 83 Ill.Dec. 133, 469 N.E.2d 1067 (1984)(holding legislature\u2019s intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power); Schlenz v. Castle, 84 Ill.2d 196, 49 Ill.Dec. 322, 417 N.E.2d 1336 (1981)(rejecting separation of powers challenge where legislature\u2019s curative act did not have effect of setting aside final adjudication); Andresen v. Andresen, 317 Md. 380, 564 A.2d 399, 401 (1989)(affirming dismissal of motion to modify property distribution where final dissolution decree was entered, Congress enacted relevant law and intended retroactive effect, but motion did not allege sufficient facts to set aside final order); Atlantic City Casino Ass\u2019n v. City of Atlantic City, 217 N.J.Super. 277, 525 A.2d 1109(rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending), remanded, 102 N.J. 323, 508 A.2d 203 (1985); Bowen v. Mabry, 154 N.C.App. 734, 572 S.E.2d 809 (2002)(General Assembly has power to amend statute that it believes has been misconstrued by the courts and \u201cundo any perceived undesirable past consequences of misinterpretation of its work product\u201d unless retroactive application impairs vested rights, quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes \u00a7 411, at 568 (1999)); cf. In re Kirchner, 164 Ill.2d 468, 208 Ill.Dec. 268, 649 N.E.2d 324 (1995)(refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties\u2019 rights)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties' rights","sentence":"See Perry v. City of Denver, 27 Colo. 93, 59 P. 747 (1899)(pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation); see also Gen. Tel. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Ill.2d 363, 83 Ill.Dec. 133, 469 N.E.2d 1067 (1984)(holding legislature\u2019s intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power); Schlenz v. Castle, 84 Ill.2d 196, 49 Ill.Dec. 322, 417 N.E.2d 1336 (1981)(rejecting separation of powers challenge where legislature\u2019s curative act did not have effect of setting aside final adjudication); Andresen v. Andresen, 317 Md. 380, 564 A.2d 399, 401 (1989)(affirming dismissal of motion to modify property distribution where final dissolution decree was entered, Congress enacted relevant law and intended retroactive effect, but motion did not allege sufficient facts to set aside final order); Atlantic City Casino Ass\u2019n v. City of Atlantic City, 217 N.J.Super. 277, 525 A.2d 1109(rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending), remanded, 102 N.J. 323, 508 A.2d 203 (1985); Bowen v. Mabry, 154 N.C.App. 734, 572 S.E.2d 809 (2002)(General Assembly has power to amend statute that it believes has been misconstrued by the courts and \u201cundo any perceived undesirable past consequences of misinterpretation of its work product\u201d unless retroactive application impairs vested rights, quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes \u00a7 411, at 568 (1999)); cf. In re Kirchner, 164 Ill.2d 468, 208 Ill.Dec. 268, 649 N.E.2d 324 (1995)(refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties\u2019 rights)."},"case_id":9025877,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The G'i'eenwood Village court held that the trial court was correct in doing so and that it must proceed to apply the provisions contained in the revised statute.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding legislature's intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power","sentence":"See Perry v. City of Denver, 27 Colo. 93, 59 P. 747 (1899)(pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation); see also Gen. Tel. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Ill.2d 363, 83 Ill.Dec. 133, 469 N.E.2d 1067 (1984)(holding legislature\u2019s intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power); Schlenz v. Castle, 84 Ill.2d 196, 49 Ill.Dec. 322, 417 N.E.2d 1336 (1981)(rejecting separation of powers challenge where legislature\u2019s curative act did not have effect of setting aside final adjudication); Andresen v. Andresen, 317 Md. 380, 564 A.2d 399, 401 (1989)(affirming dismissal of motion to modify property distribution where final dissolution decree was entered, Congress enacted relevant law and intended retroactive effect, but motion did not allege sufficient facts to set aside final order); Atlantic City Casino Ass\u2019n v. City of Atlantic City, 217 N.J.Super. 277, 525 A.2d 1109(rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending), remanded, 102 N.J. 323, 508 A.2d 203 (1985); Bowen v. Mabry, 154 N.C.App. 734, 572 S.E.2d 809 (2002)(General Assembly has power to amend statute that it believes has been misconstrued by the courts and \u201cundo any perceived undesirable past consequences of misinterpretation of its work product\u201d unless retroactive application impairs vested rights, quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes \u00a7 411, at 568 (1999)); cf. In re Kirchner, 164 Ill.2d 468, 208 Ill.Dec. 268, 649 N.E.2d 324 (1995)(refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties\u2019 rights)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties' rights","sentence":"See Perry v. City of Denver, 27 Colo. 93, 59 P. 747 (1899)(pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation); see also Gen. Tel. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Ill.2d 363, 83 Ill.Dec. 133, 469 N.E.2d 1067 (1984)(holding legislature\u2019s intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power); Schlenz v. Castle, 84 Ill.2d 196, 49 Ill.Dec. 322, 417 N.E.2d 1336 (1981)(rejecting separation of powers challenge where legislature\u2019s curative act did not have effect of setting aside final adjudication); Andresen v. Andresen, 317 Md. 380, 564 A.2d 399, 401 (1989)(affirming dismissal of motion to modify property distribution where final dissolution decree was entered, Congress enacted relevant law and intended retroactive effect, but motion did not allege sufficient facts to set aside final order); Atlantic City Casino Ass\u2019n v. City of Atlantic City, 217 N.J.Super. 277, 525 A.2d 1109(rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending), remanded, 102 N.J. 323, 508 A.2d 203 (1985); Bowen v. Mabry, 154 N.C.App. 734, 572 S.E.2d 809 (2002)(General Assembly has power to amend statute that it believes has been misconstrued by the courts and \u201cundo any perceived undesirable past consequences of misinterpretation of its work product\u201d unless retroactive application impairs vested rights, quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes \u00a7 411, at 568 (1999)); cf. In re Kirchner, 164 Ill.2d 468, 208 Ill.Dec. 268, 649 N.E.2d 324 (1995)(refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties\u2019 rights)."},"case_id":9025877,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The G'i'eenwood Village court held that the trial court was correct in doing so and that it must proceed to apply the provisions contained in the revised statute.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties' rights","sentence":"See Perry v. City of Denver, 27 Colo. 93, 59 P. 747 (1899)(pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation); see also Gen. Tel. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Ill.2d 363, 83 Ill.Dec. 133, 469 N.E.2d 1067 (1984)(holding legislature\u2019s intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power); Schlenz v. Castle, 84 Ill.2d 196, 49 Ill.Dec. 322, 417 N.E.2d 1336 (1981)(rejecting separation of powers challenge where legislature\u2019s curative act did not have effect of setting aside final adjudication); Andresen v. Andresen, 317 Md. 380, 564 A.2d 399, 401 (1989)(affirming dismissal of motion to modify property distribution where final dissolution decree was entered, Congress enacted relevant law and intended retroactive effect, but motion did not allege sufficient facts to set aside final order); Atlantic City Casino Ass\u2019n v. City of Atlantic City, 217 N.J.Super. 277, 525 A.2d 1109(rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending), remanded, 102 N.J. 323, 508 A.2d 203 (1985); Bowen v. Mabry, 154 N.C.App. 734, 572 S.E.2d 809 (2002)(General Assembly has power to amend statute that it believes has been misconstrued by the courts and \u201cundo any perceived undesirable past consequences of misinterpretation of its work product\u201d unless retroactive application impairs vested rights, quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes \u00a7 411, at 568 (1999)); cf. In re Kirchner, 164 Ill.2d 468, 208 Ill.Dec. 268, 649 N.E.2d 324 (1995)(refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties\u2019 rights)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding legislature's intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power","sentence":"See Perry v. City of Denver, 27 Colo. 93, 59 P. 747 (1899)(pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation); see also Gen. Tel. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Ill.2d 363, 83 Ill.Dec. 133, 469 N.E.2d 1067 (1984)(holding legislature\u2019s intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power); Schlenz v. Castle, 84 Ill.2d 196, 49 Ill.Dec. 322, 417 N.E.2d 1336 (1981)(rejecting separation of powers challenge where legislature\u2019s curative act did not have effect of setting aside final adjudication); Andresen v. Andresen, 317 Md. 380, 564 A.2d 399, 401 (1989)(affirming dismissal of motion to modify property distribution where final dissolution decree was entered, Congress enacted relevant law and intended retroactive effect, but motion did not allege sufficient facts to set aside final order); Atlantic City Casino Ass\u2019n v. City of Atlantic City, 217 N.J.Super. 277, 525 A.2d 1109(rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending), remanded, 102 N.J. 323, 508 A.2d 203 (1985); Bowen v. Mabry, 154 N.C.App. 734, 572 S.E.2d 809 (2002)(General Assembly has power to amend statute that it believes has been misconstrued by the courts and \u201cundo any perceived undesirable past consequences of misinterpretation of its work product\u201d unless retroactive application impairs vested rights, quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes \u00a7 411, at 568 (1999)); cf. In re Kirchner, 164 Ill.2d 468, 208 Ill.Dec. 268, 649 N.E.2d 324 (1995)(refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties\u2019 rights)."},"case_id":9025877,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The G'i'eenwood Village court held that the trial court was correct in doing so and that it must proceed to apply the provisions contained in the revised statute.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties' rights","sentence":"See Perry v. City of Denver, 27 Colo. 93, 59 P. 747 (1899)(pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation); see also Gen. Tel. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Ill.2d 363, 83 Ill.Dec. 133, 469 N.E.2d 1067 (1984)(holding legislature\u2019s intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power); Schlenz v. Castle, 84 Ill.2d 196, 49 Ill.Dec. 322, 417 N.E.2d 1336 (1981)(rejecting separation of powers challenge where legislature\u2019s curative act did not have effect of setting aside final adjudication); Andresen v. Andresen, 317 Md. 380, 564 A.2d 399, 401 (1989)(affirming dismissal of motion to modify property distribution where final dissolution decree was entered, Congress enacted relevant law and intended retroactive effect, but motion did not allege sufficient facts to set aside final order); Atlantic City Casino Ass\u2019n v. City of Atlantic City, 217 N.J.Super. 277, 525 A.2d 1109(rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending), remanded, 102 N.J. 323, 508 A.2d 203 (1985); Bowen v. Mabry, 154 N.C.App. 734, 572 S.E.2d 809 (2002)(General Assembly has power to amend statute that it believes has been misconstrued by the courts and \u201cundo any perceived undesirable past consequences of misinterpretation of its work product\u201d unless retroactive application impairs vested rights, quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes \u00a7 411, at 568 (1999)); cf. In re Kirchner, 164 Ill.2d 468, 208 Ill.Dec. 268, 649 N.E.2d 324 (1995)(refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties\u2019 rights)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding legislature's intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power","sentence":"See Perry v. City of Denver, 27 Colo. 93, 59 P. 747 (1899)(pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation); see also Gen. Tel. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Ill.2d 363, 83 Ill.Dec. 133, 469 N.E.2d 1067 (1984)(holding legislature\u2019s intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power); Schlenz v. Castle, 84 Ill.2d 196, 49 Ill.Dec. 322, 417 N.E.2d 1336 (1981)(rejecting separation of powers challenge where legislature\u2019s curative act did not have effect of setting aside final adjudication); Andresen v. Andresen, 317 Md. 380, 564 A.2d 399, 401 (1989)(affirming dismissal of motion to modify property distribution where final dissolution decree was entered, Congress enacted relevant law and intended retroactive effect, but motion did not allege sufficient facts to set aside final order); Atlantic City Casino Ass\u2019n v. City of Atlantic City, 217 N.J.Super. 277, 525 A.2d 1109(rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending), remanded, 102 N.J. 323, 508 A.2d 203 (1985); Bowen v. Mabry, 154 N.C.App. 734, 572 S.E.2d 809 (2002)(General Assembly has power to amend statute that it believes has been misconstrued by the courts and \u201cundo any perceived undesirable past consequences of misinterpretation of its work product\u201d unless retroactive application impairs vested rights, quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes \u00a7 411, at 568 (1999)); cf. In re Kirchner, 164 Ill.2d 468, 208 Ill.Dec. 268, 649 N.E.2d 324 (1995)(refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties\u2019 rights)."},"case_id":9025877,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The G'i'eenwood Village court held that the trial court was correct in doing so and that it must proceed to apply the provisions contained in the revised statute.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties' rights","sentence":"See Perry v. City of Denver, 27 Colo. 93, 59 P. 747 (1899)(pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation); see also Gen. Tel. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Ill.2d 363, 83 Ill.Dec. 133, 469 N.E.2d 1067 (1984)(holding legislature\u2019s intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power); Schlenz v. Castle, 84 Ill.2d 196, 49 Ill.Dec. 322, 417 N.E.2d 1336 (1981)(rejecting separation of powers challenge where legislature\u2019s curative act did not have effect of setting aside final adjudication); Andresen v. Andresen, 317 Md. 380, 564 A.2d 399, 401 (1989)(affirming dismissal of motion to modify property distribution where final dissolution decree was entered, Congress enacted relevant law and intended retroactive effect, but motion did not allege sufficient facts to set aside final order); Atlantic City Casino Ass\u2019n v. City of Atlantic City, 217 N.J.Super. 277, 525 A.2d 1109(rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending), remanded, 102 N.J. 323, 508 A.2d 203 (1985); Bowen v. Mabry, 154 N.C.App. 734, 572 S.E.2d 809 (2002)(General Assembly has power to amend statute that it believes has been misconstrued by the courts and \u201cundo any perceived undesirable past consequences of misinterpretation of its work product\u201d unless retroactive application impairs vested rights, quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes \u00a7 411, at 568 (1999)); cf. In re Kirchner, 164 Ill.2d 468, 208 Ill.Dec. 268, 649 N.E.2d 324 (1995)(refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties\u2019 rights)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"rejecting separation of powers challenge where legislature's curative act did not have effect of setting aside final adjudication","sentence":"See Perry v. City of Denver, 27 Colo. 93, 59 P. 747 (1899)(pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation); see also Gen. Tel. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Ill.2d 363, 83 Ill.Dec. 133, 469 N.E.2d 1067 (1984)(holding legislature\u2019s intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power); Schlenz v. Castle, 84 Ill.2d 196, 49 Ill.Dec. 322, 417 N.E.2d 1336 (1981)(rejecting separation of powers challenge where legislature\u2019s curative act did not have effect of setting aside final adjudication); Andresen v. Andresen, 317 Md. 380, 564 A.2d 399, 401 (1989)(affirming dismissal of motion to modify property distribution where final dissolution decree was entered, Congress enacted relevant law and intended retroactive effect, but motion did not allege sufficient facts to set aside final order); Atlantic City Casino Ass\u2019n v. City of Atlantic City, 217 N.J.Super. 277, 525 A.2d 1109(rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending), remanded, 102 N.J. 323, 508 A.2d 203 (1985); Bowen v. Mabry, 154 N.C.App. 734, 572 S.E.2d 809 (2002)(General Assembly has power to amend statute that it believes has been misconstrued by the courts and \u201cundo any perceived undesirable past consequences of misinterpretation of its work product\u201d unless retroactive application impairs vested rights, quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes \u00a7 411, at 568 (1999)); cf. In re Kirchner, 164 Ill.2d 468, 208 Ill.Dec. 268, 649 N.E.2d 324 (1995)(refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties\u2019 rights)."},"case_id":9025877,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The G'i'eenwood Village court held that the trial court was correct in doing so and that it must proceed to apply the provisions contained in the revised statute.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"rejecting separation of powers challenge where legislature's curative act did not have effect of setting aside final adjudication","sentence":"See Perry v. City of Denver, 27 Colo. 93, 59 P. 747 (1899)(pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation); see also Gen. Tel. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Ill.2d 363, 83 Ill.Dec. 133, 469 N.E.2d 1067 (1984)(holding legislature\u2019s intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power); Schlenz v. Castle, 84 Ill.2d 196, 49 Ill.Dec. 322, 417 N.E.2d 1336 (1981)(rejecting separation of powers challenge where legislature\u2019s curative act did not have effect of setting aside final adjudication); Andresen v. Andresen, 317 Md. 380, 564 A.2d 399, 401 (1989)(affirming dismissal of motion to modify property distribution where final dissolution decree was entered, Congress enacted relevant law and intended retroactive effect, but motion did not allege sufficient facts to set aside final order); Atlantic City Casino Ass\u2019n v. City of Atlantic City, 217 N.J.Super. 277, 525 A.2d 1109(rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending), remanded, 102 N.J. 323, 508 A.2d 203 (1985); Bowen v. Mabry, 154 N.C.App. 734, 572 S.E.2d 809 (2002)(General Assembly has power to amend statute that it believes has been misconstrued by the courts and \u201cundo any perceived undesirable past consequences of misinterpretation of its work product\u201d unless retroactive application impairs vested rights, quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes \u00a7 411, at 568 (1999)); cf. In re Kirchner, 164 Ill.2d 468, 208 Ill.Dec. 268, 649 N.E.2d 324 (1995)(refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties\u2019 rights)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties' rights","sentence":"See Perry v. City of Denver, 27 Colo. 93, 59 P. 747 (1899)(pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation); see also Gen. Tel. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Ill.2d 363, 83 Ill.Dec. 133, 469 N.E.2d 1067 (1984)(holding legislature\u2019s intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power); Schlenz v. Castle, 84 Ill.2d 196, 49 Ill.Dec. 322, 417 N.E.2d 1336 (1981)(rejecting separation of powers challenge where legislature\u2019s curative act did not have effect of setting aside final adjudication); Andresen v. Andresen, 317 Md. 380, 564 A.2d 399, 401 (1989)(affirming dismissal of motion to modify property distribution where final dissolution decree was entered, Congress enacted relevant law and intended retroactive effect, but motion did not allege sufficient facts to set aside final order); Atlantic City Casino Ass\u2019n v. City of Atlantic City, 217 N.J.Super. 277, 525 A.2d 1109(rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending), remanded, 102 N.J. 323, 508 A.2d 203 (1985); Bowen v. Mabry, 154 N.C.App. 734, 572 S.E.2d 809 (2002)(General Assembly has power to amend statute that it believes has been misconstrued by the courts and \u201cundo any perceived undesirable past consequences of misinterpretation of its work product\u201d unless retroactive application impairs vested rights, quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes \u00a7 411, at 568 (1999)); cf. In re Kirchner, 164 Ill.2d 468, 208 Ill.Dec. 268, 649 N.E.2d 324 (1995)(refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties\u2019 rights)."},"case_id":9025877,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The G'i'eenwood Village court held that the trial court was correct in doing so and that it must proceed to apply the provisions contained in the revised statute.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"rejecting separation of powers challenge where legislature's curative act did not have effect of setting aside final adjudication","sentence":"See Perry v. City of Denver, 27 Colo. 93, 59 P. 747 (1899)(pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation); see also Gen. Tel. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Ill.2d 363, 83 Ill.Dec. 133, 469 N.E.2d 1067 (1984)(holding legislature\u2019s intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power); Schlenz v. Castle, 84 Ill.2d 196, 49 Ill.Dec. 322, 417 N.E.2d 1336 (1981)(rejecting separation of powers challenge where legislature\u2019s curative act did not have effect of setting aside final adjudication); Andresen v. Andresen, 317 Md. 380, 564 A.2d 399, 401 (1989)(affirming dismissal of motion to modify property distribution where final dissolution decree was entered, Congress enacted relevant law and intended retroactive effect, but motion did not allege sufficient facts to set aside final order); Atlantic City Casino Ass\u2019n v. City of Atlantic City, 217 N.J.Super. 277, 525 A.2d 1109(rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending), remanded, 102 N.J. 323, 508 A.2d 203 (1985); Bowen v. Mabry, 154 N.C.App. 734, 572 S.E.2d 809 (2002)(General Assembly has power to amend statute that it believes has been misconstrued by the courts and \u201cundo any perceived undesirable past consequences of misinterpretation of its work product\u201d unless retroactive application impairs vested rights, quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes \u00a7 411, at 568 (1999)); cf. In re Kirchner, 164 Ill.2d 468, 208 Ill.Dec. 268, 649 N.E.2d 324 (1995)(refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties\u2019 rights)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties' rights","sentence":"See Perry v. City of Denver, 27 Colo. 93, 59 P. 747 (1899)(pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation); see also Gen. Tel. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Ill.2d 363, 83 Ill.Dec. 133, 469 N.E.2d 1067 (1984)(holding legislature\u2019s intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power); Schlenz v. Castle, 84 Ill.2d 196, 49 Ill.Dec. 322, 417 N.E.2d 1336 (1981)(rejecting separation of powers challenge where legislature\u2019s curative act did not have effect of setting aside final adjudication); Andresen v. Andresen, 317 Md. 380, 564 A.2d 399, 401 (1989)(affirming dismissal of motion to modify property distribution where final dissolution decree was entered, Congress enacted relevant law and intended retroactive effect, but motion did not allege sufficient facts to set aside final order); Atlantic City Casino Ass\u2019n v. City of Atlantic City, 217 N.J.Super. 277, 525 A.2d 1109(rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending), remanded, 102 N.J. 323, 508 A.2d 203 (1985); Bowen v. Mabry, 154 N.C.App. 734, 572 S.E.2d 809 (2002)(General Assembly has power to amend statute that it believes has been misconstrued by the courts and \u201cundo any perceived undesirable past consequences of misinterpretation of its work product\u201d unless retroactive application impairs vested rights, quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes \u00a7 411, at 568 (1999)); cf. In re Kirchner, 164 Ill.2d 468, 208 Ill.Dec. 268, 649 N.E.2d 324 (1995)(refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties\u2019 rights)."},"case_id":9025877,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The G'i'eenwood Village court held that the trial court was correct in doing so and that it must proceed to apply the provisions contained in the revised statute.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"rejecting separation of powers challenge where legislature's curative act did not have effect of setting aside final adjudication","sentence":"See Perry v. City of Denver, 27 Colo. 93, 59 P. 747 (1899)(pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation); see also Gen. Tel. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Ill.2d 363, 83 Ill.Dec. 133, 469 N.E.2d 1067 (1984)(holding legislature\u2019s intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power); Schlenz v. Castle, 84 Ill.2d 196, 49 Ill.Dec. 322, 417 N.E.2d 1336 (1981)(rejecting separation of powers challenge where legislature\u2019s curative act did not have effect of setting aside final adjudication); Andresen v. Andresen, 317 Md. 380, 564 A.2d 399, 401 (1989)(affirming dismissal of motion to modify property distribution where final dissolution decree was entered, Congress enacted relevant law and intended retroactive effect, but motion did not allege sufficient facts to set aside final order); Atlantic City Casino Ass\u2019n v. City of Atlantic City, 217 N.J.Super. 277, 525 A.2d 1109(rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending), remanded, 102 N.J. 323, 508 A.2d 203 (1985); Bowen v. Mabry, 154 N.C.App. 734, 572 S.E.2d 809 (2002)(General Assembly has power to amend statute that it believes has been misconstrued by the courts and \u201cundo any perceived undesirable past consequences of misinterpretation of its work product\u201d unless retroactive application impairs vested rights, quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes \u00a7 411, at 568 (1999)); cf. In re Kirchner, 164 Ill.2d 468, 208 Ill.Dec. 268, 649 N.E.2d 324 (1995)(refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties\u2019 rights)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties' rights","sentence":"See Perry v. City of Denver, 27 Colo. 93, 59 P. 747 (1899)(pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation); see also Gen. Tel. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Ill.2d 363, 83 Ill.Dec. 133, 469 N.E.2d 1067 (1984)(holding legislature\u2019s intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power); Schlenz v. Castle, 84 Ill.2d 196, 49 Ill.Dec. 322, 417 N.E.2d 1336 (1981)(rejecting separation of powers challenge where legislature\u2019s curative act did not have effect of setting aside final adjudication); Andresen v. Andresen, 317 Md. 380, 564 A.2d 399, 401 (1989)(affirming dismissal of motion to modify property distribution where final dissolution decree was entered, Congress enacted relevant law and intended retroactive effect, but motion did not allege sufficient facts to set aside final order); Atlantic City Casino Ass\u2019n v. City of Atlantic City, 217 N.J.Super. 277, 525 A.2d 1109(rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending), remanded, 102 N.J. 323, 508 A.2d 203 (1985); Bowen v. Mabry, 154 N.C.App. 734, 572 S.E.2d 809 (2002)(General Assembly has power to amend statute that it believes has been misconstrued by the courts and \u201cundo any perceived undesirable past consequences of misinterpretation of its work product\u201d unless retroactive application impairs vested rights, quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes \u00a7 411, at 568 (1999)); cf. In re Kirchner, 164 Ill.2d 468, 208 Ill.Dec. 268, 649 N.E.2d 324 (1995)(refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties\u2019 rights)."},"case_id":9025877,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The G'i'eenwood Village court held that the trial court was correct in doing so and that it must proceed to apply the provisions contained in the revised statute.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties' rights","sentence":"See Perry v. City of Denver, 27 Colo. 93, 59 P. 747 (1899)(pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation); see also Gen. Tel. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Ill.2d 363, 83 Ill.Dec. 133, 469 N.E.2d 1067 (1984)(holding legislature\u2019s intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power); Schlenz v. Castle, 84 Ill.2d 196, 49 Ill.Dec. 322, 417 N.E.2d 1336 (1981)(rejecting separation of powers challenge where legislature\u2019s curative act did not have effect of setting aside final adjudication); Andresen v. Andresen, 317 Md. 380, 564 A.2d 399, 401 (1989)(affirming dismissal of motion to modify property distribution where final dissolution decree was entered, Congress enacted relevant law and intended retroactive effect, but motion did not allege sufficient facts to set aside final order); Atlantic City Casino Ass\u2019n v. City of Atlantic City, 217 N.J.Super. 277, 525 A.2d 1109(rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending), remanded, 102 N.J. 323, 508 A.2d 203 (1985); Bowen v. Mabry, 154 N.C.App. 734, 572 S.E.2d 809 (2002)(General Assembly has power to amend statute that it believes has been misconstrued by the courts and \u201cundo any perceived undesirable past consequences of misinterpretation of its work product\u201d unless retroactive application impairs vested rights, quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes \u00a7 411, at 568 (1999)); cf. In re Kirchner, 164 Ill.2d 468, 208 Ill.Dec. 268, 649 N.E.2d 324 (1995)(refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties\u2019 rights)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"rejecting separation of powers challenge where legislature's curative act did not have effect of setting aside final adjudication","sentence":"See Perry v. City of Denver, 27 Colo. 93, 59 P. 747 (1899)(pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation); see also Gen. Tel. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Ill.2d 363, 83 Ill.Dec. 133, 469 N.E.2d 1067 (1984)(holding legislature\u2019s intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power); Schlenz v. Castle, 84 Ill.2d 196, 49 Ill.Dec. 322, 417 N.E.2d 1336 (1981)(rejecting separation of powers challenge where legislature\u2019s curative act did not have effect of setting aside final adjudication); Andresen v. Andresen, 317 Md. 380, 564 A.2d 399, 401 (1989)(affirming dismissal of motion to modify property distribution where final dissolution decree was entered, Congress enacted relevant law and intended retroactive effect, but motion did not allege sufficient facts to set aside final order); Atlantic City Casino Ass\u2019n v. City of Atlantic City, 217 N.J.Super. 277, 525 A.2d 1109(rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending), remanded, 102 N.J. 323, 508 A.2d 203 (1985); Bowen v. Mabry, 154 N.C.App. 734, 572 S.E.2d 809 (2002)(General Assembly has power to amend statute that it believes has been misconstrued by the courts and \u201cundo any perceived undesirable past consequences of misinterpretation of its work product\u201d unless retroactive application impairs vested rights, quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes \u00a7 411, at 568 (1999)); cf. In re Kirchner, 164 Ill.2d 468, 208 Ill.Dec. 268, 649 N.E.2d 324 (1995)(refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties\u2019 rights)."},"case_id":9025877,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The G'i'eenwood Village court held that the trial court was correct in doing so and that it must proceed to apply the provisions contained in the revised statute.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"rejecting separation of powers challenge where legislature's curative act did not have effect of setting aside final adjudication","sentence":"See Perry v. City of Denver, 27 Colo. 93, 59 P. 747 (1899)(pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation); see also Gen. Tel. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Ill.2d 363, 83 Ill.Dec. 133, 469 N.E.2d 1067 (1984)(holding legislature\u2019s intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power); Schlenz v. Castle, 84 Ill.2d 196, 49 Ill.Dec. 322, 417 N.E.2d 1336 (1981)(rejecting separation of powers challenge where legislature\u2019s curative act did not have effect of setting aside final adjudication); Andresen v. Andresen, 317 Md. 380, 564 A.2d 399, 401 (1989)(affirming dismissal of motion to modify property distribution where final dissolution decree was entered, Congress enacted relevant law and intended retroactive effect, but motion did not allege sufficient facts to set aside final order); Atlantic City Casino Ass\u2019n v. City of Atlantic City, 217 N.J.Super. 277, 525 A.2d 1109(rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending), remanded, 102 N.J. 323, 508 A.2d 203 (1985); Bowen v. Mabry, 154 N.C.App. 734, 572 S.E.2d 809 (2002)(General Assembly has power to amend statute that it believes has been misconstrued by the courts and \u201cundo any perceived undesirable past consequences of misinterpretation of its work product\u201d unless retroactive application impairs vested rights, quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes \u00a7 411, at 568 (1999)); cf. In re Kirchner, 164 Ill.2d 468, 208 Ill.Dec. 268, 649 N.E.2d 324 (1995)(refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties\u2019 rights)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties' rights","sentence":"See Perry v. City of Denver, 27 Colo. 93, 59 P. 747 (1899)(pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation); see also Gen. Tel. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Ill.2d 363, 83 Ill.Dec. 133, 469 N.E.2d 1067 (1984)(holding legislature\u2019s intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power); Schlenz v. Castle, 84 Ill.2d 196, 49 Ill.Dec. 322, 417 N.E.2d 1336 (1981)(rejecting separation of powers challenge where legislature\u2019s curative act did not have effect of setting aside final adjudication); Andresen v. Andresen, 317 Md. 380, 564 A.2d 399, 401 (1989)(affirming dismissal of motion to modify property distribution where final dissolution decree was entered, Congress enacted relevant law and intended retroactive effect, but motion did not allege sufficient facts to set aside final order); Atlantic City Casino Ass\u2019n v. City of Atlantic City, 217 N.J.Super. 277, 525 A.2d 1109(rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending), remanded, 102 N.J. 323, 508 A.2d 203 (1985); Bowen v. Mabry, 154 N.C.App. 734, 572 S.E.2d 809 (2002)(General Assembly has power to amend statute that it believes has been misconstrued by the courts and \u201cundo any perceived undesirable past consequences of misinterpretation of its work product\u201d unless retroactive application impairs vested rights, quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes \u00a7 411, at 568 (1999)); cf. In re Kirchner, 164 Ill.2d 468, 208 Ill.Dec. 268, 649 N.E.2d 324 (1995)(refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties\u2019 rights)."},"case_id":9025877,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The G'i'eenwood Village court held that the trial court was correct in doing so and that it must proceed to apply the provisions contained in the revised statute.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"rejecting separation of powers challenge where legislature's curative act did not have effect of setting aside final adjudication","sentence":"See Perry v. City of Denver, 27 Colo. 93, 59 P. 747 (1899)(pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation); see also Gen. Tel. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Ill.2d 363, 83 Ill.Dec. 133, 469 N.E.2d 1067 (1984)(holding legislature\u2019s intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power); Schlenz v. Castle, 84 Ill.2d 196, 49 Ill.Dec. 322, 417 N.E.2d 1336 (1981)(rejecting separation of powers challenge where legislature\u2019s curative act did not have effect of setting aside final adjudication); Andresen v. Andresen, 317 Md. 380, 564 A.2d 399, 401 (1989)(affirming dismissal of motion to modify property distribution where final dissolution decree was entered, Congress enacted relevant law and intended retroactive effect, but motion did not allege sufficient facts to set aside final order); Atlantic City Casino Ass\u2019n v. City of Atlantic City, 217 N.J.Super. 277, 525 A.2d 1109(rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending), remanded, 102 N.J. 323, 508 A.2d 203 (1985); Bowen v. Mabry, 154 N.C.App. 734, 572 S.E.2d 809 (2002)(General Assembly has power to amend statute that it believes has been misconstrued by the courts and \u201cundo any perceived undesirable past consequences of misinterpretation of its work product\u201d unless retroactive application impairs vested rights, quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes \u00a7 411, at 568 (1999)); cf. In re Kirchner, 164 Ill.2d 468, 208 Ill.Dec. 268, 649 N.E.2d 324 (1995)(refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties\u2019 rights)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties' rights","sentence":"See Perry v. City of Denver, 27 Colo. 93, 59 P. 747 (1899)(pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation); see also Gen. Tel. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Ill.2d 363, 83 Ill.Dec. 133, 469 N.E.2d 1067 (1984)(holding legislature\u2019s intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power); Schlenz v. Castle, 84 Ill.2d 196, 49 Ill.Dec. 322, 417 N.E.2d 1336 (1981)(rejecting separation of powers challenge where legislature\u2019s curative act did not have effect of setting aside final adjudication); Andresen v. Andresen, 317 Md. 380, 564 A.2d 399, 401 (1989)(affirming dismissal of motion to modify property distribution where final dissolution decree was entered, Congress enacted relevant law and intended retroactive effect, but motion did not allege sufficient facts to set aside final order); Atlantic City Casino Ass\u2019n v. City of Atlantic City, 217 N.J.Super. 277, 525 A.2d 1109(rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending), remanded, 102 N.J. 323, 508 A.2d 203 (1985); Bowen v. Mabry, 154 N.C.App. 734, 572 S.E.2d 809 (2002)(General Assembly has power to amend statute that it believes has been misconstrued by the courts and \u201cundo any perceived undesirable past consequences of misinterpretation of its work product\u201d unless retroactive application impairs vested rights, quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes \u00a7 411, at 568 (1999)); cf. In re Kirchner, 164 Ill.2d 468, 208 Ill.Dec. 268, 649 N.E.2d 324 (1995)(refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties\u2019 rights)."},"case_id":9025877,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The G'i'eenwood Village court held that the trial court was correct in doing so and that it must proceed to apply the provisions contained in the revised statute.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties' rights","sentence":"See Perry v. City of Denver, 27 Colo. 93, 59 P. 747 (1899)(pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation); see also Gen. Tel. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Ill.2d 363, 83 Ill.Dec. 133, 469 N.E.2d 1067 (1984)(holding legislature\u2019s intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power); Schlenz v. Castle, 84 Ill.2d 196, 49 Ill.Dec. 322, 417 N.E.2d 1336 (1981)(rejecting separation of powers challenge where legislature\u2019s curative act did not have effect of setting aside final adjudication); Andresen v. Andresen, 317 Md. 380, 564 A.2d 399, 401 (1989)(affirming dismissal of motion to modify property distribution where final dissolution decree was entered, Congress enacted relevant law and intended retroactive effect, but motion did not allege sufficient facts to set aside final order); Atlantic City Casino Ass\u2019n v. City of Atlantic City, 217 N.J.Super. 277, 525 A.2d 1109(rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending), remanded, 102 N.J. 323, 508 A.2d 203 (1985); Bowen v. Mabry, 154 N.C.App. 734, 572 S.E.2d 809 (2002)(General Assembly has power to amend statute that it believes has been misconstrued by the courts and \u201cundo any perceived undesirable past consequences of misinterpretation of its work product\u201d unless retroactive application impairs vested rights, quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes \u00a7 411, at 568 (1999)); cf. In re Kirchner, 164 Ill.2d 468, 208 Ill.Dec. 268, 649 N.E.2d 324 (1995)(refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties\u2019 rights)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"rejecting separation of powers challenge where legislature's curative act did not have effect of setting aside final adjudication","sentence":"See Perry v. City of Denver, 27 Colo. 93, 59 P. 747 (1899)(pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation); see also Gen. Tel. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Ill.2d 363, 83 Ill.Dec. 133, 469 N.E.2d 1067 (1984)(holding legislature\u2019s intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power); Schlenz v. Castle, 84 Ill.2d 196, 49 Ill.Dec. 322, 417 N.E.2d 1336 (1981)(rejecting separation of powers challenge where legislature\u2019s curative act did not have effect of setting aside final adjudication); Andresen v. Andresen, 317 Md. 380, 564 A.2d 399, 401 (1989)(affirming dismissal of motion to modify property distribution where final dissolution decree was entered, Congress enacted relevant law and intended retroactive effect, but motion did not allege sufficient facts to set aside final order); Atlantic City Casino Ass\u2019n v. City of Atlantic City, 217 N.J.Super. 277, 525 A.2d 1109(rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending), remanded, 102 N.J. 323, 508 A.2d 203 (1985); Bowen v. Mabry, 154 N.C.App. 734, 572 S.E.2d 809 (2002)(General Assembly has power to amend statute that it believes has been misconstrued by the courts and \u201cundo any perceived undesirable past consequences of misinterpretation of its work product\u201d unless retroactive application impairs vested rights, quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes \u00a7 411, at 568 (1999)); cf. In re Kirchner, 164 Ill.2d 468, 208 Ill.Dec. 268, 649 N.E.2d 324 (1995)(refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties\u2019 rights)."},"case_id":9025877,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The G'i'eenwood Village court held that the trial court was correct in doing so and that it must proceed to apply the provisions contained in the revised statute.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"rejecting separation of powers challenge where legislature's curative act did not have effect of setting aside final adjudication","sentence":"See Perry v. City of Denver, 27 Colo. 93, 59 P. 747 (1899)(pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation); see also Gen. Tel. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Ill.2d 363, 83 Ill.Dec. 133, 469 N.E.2d 1067 (1984)(holding legislature\u2019s intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power); Schlenz v. Castle, 84 Ill.2d 196, 49 Ill.Dec. 322, 417 N.E.2d 1336 (1981)(rejecting separation of powers challenge where legislature\u2019s curative act did not have effect of setting aside final adjudication); Andresen v. Andresen, 317 Md. 380, 564 A.2d 399, 401 (1989)(affirming dismissal of motion to modify property distribution where final dissolution decree was entered, Congress enacted relevant law and intended retroactive effect, but motion did not allege sufficient facts to set aside final order); Atlantic City Casino Ass\u2019n v. City of Atlantic City, 217 N.J.Super. 277, 525 A.2d 1109(rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending), remanded, 102 N.J. 323, 508 A.2d 203 (1985); Bowen v. Mabry, 154 N.C.App. 734, 572 S.E.2d 809 (2002)(General Assembly has power to amend statute that it believes has been misconstrued by the courts and \u201cundo any perceived undesirable past consequences of misinterpretation of its work product\u201d unless retroactive application impairs vested rights, quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes \u00a7 411, at 568 (1999)); cf. In re Kirchner, 164 Ill.2d 468, 208 Ill.Dec. 268, 649 N.E.2d 324 (1995)(refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties\u2019 rights)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties' rights","sentence":"See Perry v. City of Denver, 27 Colo. 93, 59 P. 747 (1899)(pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation); see also Gen. Tel. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Ill.2d 363, 83 Ill.Dec. 133, 469 N.E.2d 1067 (1984)(holding legislature\u2019s intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power); Schlenz v. Castle, 84 Ill.2d 196, 49 Ill.Dec. 322, 417 N.E.2d 1336 (1981)(rejecting separation of powers challenge where legislature\u2019s curative act did not have effect of setting aside final adjudication); Andresen v. Andresen, 317 Md. 380, 564 A.2d 399, 401 (1989)(affirming dismissal of motion to modify property distribution where final dissolution decree was entered, Congress enacted relevant law and intended retroactive effect, but motion did not allege sufficient facts to set aside final order); Atlantic City Casino Ass\u2019n v. City of Atlantic City, 217 N.J.Super. 277, 525 A.2d 1109(rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending), remanded, 102 N.J. 323, 508 A.2d 203 (1985); Bowen v. Mabry, 154 N.C.App. 734, 572 S.E.2d 809 (2002)(General Assembly has power to amend statute that it believes has been misconstrued by the courts and \u201cundo any perceived undesirable past consequences of misinterpretation of its work product\u201d unless retroactive application impairs vested rights, quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes \u00a7 411, at 568 (1999)); cf. In re Kirchner, 164 Ill.2d 468, 208 Ill.Dec. 268, 649 N.E.2d 324 (1995)(refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties\u2019 rights)."},"case_id":9025877,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The G'i'eenwood Village court held that the trial court was correct in doing so and that it must proceed to apply the provisions contained in the revised statute.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties' rights","sentence":"See Perry v. City of Denver, 27 Colo. 93, 59 P. 747 (1899)(pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation); see also Gen. Tel. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Ill.2d 363, 83 Ill.Dec. 133, 469 N.E.2d 1067 (1984)(holding legislature\u2019s intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power); Schlenz v. Castle, 84 Ill.2d 196, 49 Ill.Dec. 322, 417 N.E.2d 1336 (1981)(rejecting separation of powers challenge where legislature\u2019s curative act did not have effect of setting aside final adjudication); Andresen v. Andresen, 317 Md. 380, 564 A.2d 399, 401 (1989)(affirming dismissal of motion to modify property distribution where final dissolution decree was entered, Congress enacted relevant law and intended retroactive effect, but motion did not allege sufficient facts to set aside final order); Atlantic City Casino Ass\u2019n v. City of Atlantic City, 217 N.J.Super. 277, 525 A.2d 1109(rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending), remanded, 102 N.J. 323, 508 A.2d 203 (1985); Bowen v. Mabry, 154 N.C.App. 734, 572 S.E.2d 809 (2002)(General Assembly has power to amend statute that it believes has been misconstrued by the courts and \u201cundo any perceived undesirable past consequences of misinterpretation of its work product\u201d unless retroactive application impairs vested rights, quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes \u00a7 411, at 568 (1999)); cf. In re Kirchner, 164 Ill.2d 468, 208 Ill.Dec. 268, 649 N.E.2d 324 (1995)(refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties\u2019 rights)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"affirming dismissal of motion to modify property distribution where final dissolution decree was entered, Congress enacted relevant law and intended retroactive effect, but motion did not allege sufficient facts to set aside final order","sentence":"See Perry v. City of Denver, 27 Colo. 93, 59 P. 747 (1899)(pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation); see also Gen. Tel. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Ill.2d 363, 83 Ill.Dec. 133, 469 N.E.2d 1067 (1984)(holding legislature\u2019s intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power); Schlenz v. Castle, 84 Ill.2d 196, 49 Ill.Dec. 322, 417 N.E.2d 1336 (1981)(rejecting separation of powers challenge where legislature\u2019s curative act did not have effect of setting aside final adjudication); Andresen v. Andresen, 317 Md. 380, 564 A.2d 399, 401 (1989)(affirming dismissal of motion to modify property distribution where final dissolution decree was entered, Congress enacted relevant law and intended retroactive effect, but motion did not allege sufficient facts to set aside final order); Atlantic City Casino Ass\u2019n v. City of Atlantic City, 217 N.J.Super. 277, 525 A.2d 1109(rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending), remanded, 102 N.J. 323, 508 A.2d 203 (1985); Bowen v. Mabry, 154 N.C.App. 734, 572 S.E.2d 809 (2002)(General Assembly has power to amend statute that it believes has been misconstrued by the courts and \u201cundo any perceived undesirable past consequences of misinterpretation of its work product\u201d unless retroactive application impairs vested rights, quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes \u00a7 411, at 568 (1999)); cf. In re Kirchner, 164 Ill.2d 468, 208 Ill.Dec. 268, 649 N.E.2d 324 (1995)(refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties\u2019 rights)."},"case_id":9025877,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The G'i'eenwood Village court held that the trial court was correct in doing so and that it must proceed to apply the provisions contained in the revised statute.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties' rights","sentence":"See Perry v. City of Denver, 27 Colo. 93, 59 P. 747 (1899)(pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation); see also Gen. Tel. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Ill.2d 363, 83 Ill.Dec. 133, 469 N.E.2d 1067 (1984)(holding legislature\u2019s intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power); Schlenz v. Castle, 84 Ill.2d 196, 49 Ill.Dec. 322, 417 N.E.2d 1336 (1981)(rejecting separation of powers challenge where legislature\u2019s curative act did not have effect of setting aside final adjudication); Andresen v. Andresen, 317 Md. 380, 564 A.2d 399, 401 (1989)(affirming dismissal of motion to modify property distribution where final dissolution decree was entered, Congress enacted relevant law and intended retroactive effect, but motion did not allege sufficient facts to set aside final order); Atlantic City Casino Ass\u2019n v. City of Atlantic City, 217 N.J.Super. 277, 525 A.2d 1109(rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending), remanded, 102 N.J. 323, 508 A.2d 203 (1985); Bowen v. Mabry, 154 N.C.App. 734, 572 S.E.2d 809 (2002)(General Assembly has power to amend statute that it believes has been misconstrued by the courts and \u201cundo any perceived undesirable past consequences of misinterpretation of its work product\u201d unless retroactive application impairs vested rights, quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes \u00a7 411, at 568 (1999)); cf. In re Kirchner, 164 Ill.2d 468, 208 Ill.Dec. 268, 649 N.E.2d 324 (1995)(refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties\u2019 rights)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"affirming dismissal of motion to modify property distribution where final dissolution decree was entered, Congress enacted relevant law and intended retroactive effect, but motion did not allege sufficient facts to set aside final order","sentence":"See Perry v. City of Denver, 27 Colo. 93, 59 P. 747 (1899)(pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation); see also Gen. Tel. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Ill.2d 363, 83 Ill.Dec. 133, 469 N.E.2d 1067 (1984)(holding legislature\u2019s intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power); Schlenz v. Castle, 84 Ill.2d 196, 49 Ill.Dec. 322, 417 N.E.2d 1336 (1981)(rejecting separation of powers challenge where legislature\u2019s curative act did not have effect of setting aside final adjudication); Andresen v. Andresen, 317 Md. 380, 564 A.2d 399, 401 (1989)(affirming dismissal of motion to modify property distribution where final dissolution decree was entered, Congress enacted relevant law and intended retroactive effect, but motion did not allege sufficient facts to set aside final order); Atlantic City Casino Ass\u2019n v. City of Atlantic City, 217 N.J.Super. 277, 525 A.2d 1109(rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending), remanded, 102 N.J. 323, 508 A.2d 203 (1985); Bowen v. Mabry, 154 N.C.App. 734, 572 S.E.2d 809 (2002)(General Assembly has power to amend statute that it believes has been misconstrued by the courts and \u201cundo any perceived undesirable past consequences of misinterpretation of its work product\u201d unless retroactive application impairs vested rights, quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes \u00a7 411, at 568 (1999)); cf. In re Kirchner, 164 Ill.2d 468, 208 Ill.Dec. 268, 649 N.E.2d 324 (1995)(refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties\u2019 rights)."},"case_id":9025877,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The G'i'eenwood Village court held that the trial court was correct in doing so and that it must proceed to apply the provisions contained in the revised statute.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties' rights","sentence":"See Perry v. City of Denver, 27 Colo. 93, 59 P. 747 (1899)(pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation); see also Gen. Tel. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Ill.2d 363, 83 Ill.Dec. 133, 469 N.E.2d 1067 (1984)(holding legislature\u2019s intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power); Schlenz v. Castle, 84 Ill.2d 196, 49 Ill.Dec. 322, 417 N.E.2d 1336 (1981)(rejecting separation of powers challenge where legislature\u2019s curative act did not have effect of setting aside final adjudication); Andresen v. Andresen, 317 Md. 380, 564 A.2d 399, 401 (1989)(affirming dismissal of motion to modify property distribution where final dissolution decree was entered, Congress enacted relevant law and intended retroactive effect, but motion did not allege sufficient facts to set aside final order); Atlantic City Casino Ass\u2019n v. City of Atlantic City, 217 N.J.Super. 277, 525 A.2d 1109(rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending), remanded, 102 N.J. 323, 508 A.2d 203 (1985); Bowen v. Mabry, 154 N.C.App. 734, 572 S.E.2d 809 (2002)(General Assembly has power to amend statute that it believes has been misconstrued by the courts and \u201cundo any perceived undesirable past consequences of misinterpretation of its work product\u201d unless retroactive application impairs vested rights, quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes \u00a7 411, at 568 (1999)); cf. In re Kirchner, 164 Ill.2d 468, 208 Ill.Dec. 268, 649 N.E.2d 324 (1995)(refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties\u2019 rights)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"affirming dismissal of motion to modify property distribution where final dissolution decree was entered, Congress enacted relevant law and intended retroactive effect, but motion did not allege sufficient facts to set aside final order","sentence":"See Perry v. City of Denver, 27 Colo. 93, 59 P. 747 (1899)(pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation); see also Gen. Tel. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Ill.2d 363, 83 Ill.Dec. 133, 469 N.E.2d 1067 (1984)(holding legislature\u2019s intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power); Schlenz v. Castle, 84 Ill.2d 196, 49 Ill.Dec. 322, 417 N.E.2d 1336 (1981)(rejecting separation of powers challenge where legislature\u2019s curative act did not have effect of setting aside final adjudication); Andresen v. Andresen, 317 Md. 380, 564 A.2d 399, 401 (1989)(affirming dismissal of motion to modify property distribution where final dissolution decree was entered, Congress enacted relevant law and intended retroactive effect, but motion did not allege sufficient facts to set aside final order); Atlantic City Casino Ass\u2019n v. City of Atlantic City, 217 N.J.Super. 277, 525 A.2d 1109(rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending), remanded, 102 N.J. 323, 508 A.2d 203 (1985); Bowen v. Mabry, 154 N.C.App. 734, 572 S.E.2d 809 (2002)(General Assembly has power to amend statute that it believes has been misconstrued by the courts and \u201cundo any perceived undesirable past consequences of misinterpretation of its work product\u201d unless retroactive application impairs vested rights, quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes \u00a7 411, at 568 (1999)); cf. In re Kirchner, 164 Ill.2d 468, 208 Ill.Dec. 268, 649 N.E.2d 324 (1995)(refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties\u2019 rights)."},"case_id":9025877,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The G'i'eenwood Village court held that the trial court was correct in doing so and that it must proceed to apply the provisions contained in the revised statute.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"564 A.2d 399, 401","parenthetical":"affirming dismissal of motion to modify property distribution where final dissolution decree was entered, Congress enacted relevant law and intended retroactive effect, but motion did not allege sufficient facts to set aside final order","sentence":"See Perry v. City of Denver, 27 Colo. 93, 59 P. 747 (1899)(pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation); see also Gen. Tel. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Ill.2d 363, 83 Ill.Dec. 133, 469 N.E.2d 1067 (1984)(holding legislature\u2019s intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power); Schlenz v. Castle, 84 Ill.2d 196, 49 Ill.Dec. 322, 417 N.E.2d 1336 (1981)(rejecting separation of powers challenge where legislature\u2019s curative act did not have effect of setting aside final adjudication); Andresen v. Andresen, 317 Md. 380, 564 A.2d 399, 401 (1989)(affirming dismissal of motion to modify property distribution where final dissolution decree was entered, Congress enacted relevant law and intended retroactive effect, but motion did not allege sufficient facts to set aside final order); Atlantic City Casino Ass\u2019n v. City of Atlantic City, 217 N.J.Super. 277, 525 A.2d 1109(rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending), remanded, 102 N.J. 323, 508 A.2d 203 (1985); Bowen v. Mabry, 154 N.C.App. 734, 572 S.E.2d 809 (2002)(General Assembly has power to amend statute that it believes has been misconstrued by the courts and \u201cundo any perceived undesirable past consequences of misinterpretation of its work product\u201d unless retroactive application impairs vested rights, quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes \u00a7 411, at 568 (1999)); cf. In re Kirchner, 164 Ill.2d 468, 208 Ill.Dec. 268, 649 N.E.2d 324 (1995)(refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties\u2019 rights)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties' rights","sentence":"See Perry v. City of Denver, 27 Colo. 93, 59 P. 747 (1899)(pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation); see also Gen. Tel. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Ill.2d 363, 83 Ill.Dec. 133, 469 N.E.2d 1067 (1984)(holding legislature\u2019s intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power); Schlenz v. Castle, 84 Ill.2d 196, 49 Ill.Dec. 322, 417 N.E.2d 1336 (1981)(rejecting separation of powers challenge where legislature\u2019s curative act did not have effect of setting aside final adjudication); Andresen v. Andresen, 317 Md. 380, 564 A.2d 399, 401 (1989)(affirming dismissal of motion to modify property distribution where final dissolution decree was entered, Congress enacted relevant law and intended retroactive effect, but motion did not allege sufficient facts to set aside final order); Atlantic City Casino Ass\u2019n v. City of Atlantic City, 217 N.J.Super. 277, 525 A.2d 1109(rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending), remanded, 102 N.J. 323, 508 A.2d 203 (1985); Bowen v. Mabry, 154 N.C.App. 734, 572 S.E.2d 809 (2002)(General Assembly has power to amend statute that it believes has been misconstrued by the courts and \u201cundo any perceived undesirable past consequences of misinterpretation of its work product\u201d unless retroactive application impairs vested rights, quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes \u00a7 411, at 568 (1999)); cf. In re Kirchner, 164 Ill.2d 468, 208 Ill.Dec. 268, 649 N.E.2d 324 (1995)(refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties\u2019 rights)."},"case_id":9025877,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The G'i'eenwood Village court held that the trial court was correct in doing so and that it must proceed to apply the provisions contained in the revised statute.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"564 A.2d 399, 401","parenthetical":"affirming dismissal of motion to modify property distribution where final dissolution decree was entered, Congress enacted relevant law and intended retroactive effect, but motion did not allege sufficient facts to set aside final order","sentence":"See Perry v. City of Denver, 27 Colo. 93, 59 P. 747 (1899)(pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation); see also Gen. Tel. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Ill.2d 363, 83 Ill.Dec. 133, 469 N.E.2d 1067 (1984)(holding legislature\u2019s intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power); Schlenz v. Castle, 84 Ill.2d 196, 49 Ill.Dec. 322, 417 N.E.2d 1336 (1981)(rejecting separation of powers challenge where legislature\u2019s curative act did not have effect of setting aside final adjudication); Andresen v. Andresen, 317 Md. 380, 564 A.2d 399, 401 (1989)(affirming dismissal of motion to modify property distribution where final dissolution decree was entered, Congress enacted relevant law and intended retroactive effect, but motion did not allege sufficient facts to set aside final order); Atlantic City Casino Ass\u2019n v. City of Atlantic City, 217 N.J.Super. 277, 525 A.2d 1109(rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending), remanded, 102 N.J. 323, 508 A.2d 203 (1985); Bowen v. Mabry, 154 N.C.App. 734, 572 S.E.2d 809 (2002)(General Assembly has power to amend statute that it believes has been misconstrued by the courts and \u201cundo any perceived undesirable past consequences of misinterpretation of its work product\u201d unless retroactive application impairs vested rights, quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes \u00a7 411, at 568 (1999)); cf. In re Kirchner, 164 Ill.2d 468, 208 Ill.Dec. 268, 649 N.E.2d 324 (1995)(refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties\u2019 rights)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties' rights","sentence":"See Perry v. City of Denver, 27 Colo. 93, 59 P. 747 (1899)(pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation); see also Gen. Tel. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Ill.2d 363, 83 Ill.Dec. 133, 469 N.E.2d 1067 (1984)(holding legislature\u2019s intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power); Schlenz v. Castle, 84 Ill.2d 196, 49 Ill.Dec. 322, 417 N.E.2d 1336 (1981)(rejecting separation of powers challenge where legislature\u2019s curative act did not have effect of setting aside final adjudication); Andresen v. Andresen, 317 Md. 380, 564 A.2d 399, 401 (1989)(affirming dismissal of motion to modify property distribution where final dissolution decree was entered, Congress enacted relevant law and intended retroactive effect, but motion did not allege sufficient facts to set aside final order); Atlantic City Casino Ass\u2019n v. City of Atlantic City, 217 N.J.Super. 277, 525 A.2d 1109(rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending), remanded, 102 N.J. 323, 508 A.2d 203 (1985); Bowen v. Mabry, 154 N.C.App. 734, 572 S.E.2d 809 (2002)(General Assembly has power to amend statute that it believes has been misconstrued by the courts and \u201cundo any perceived undesirable past consequences of misinterpretation of its work product\u201d unless retroactive application impairs vested rights, quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes \u00a7 411, at 568 (1999)); cf. In re Kirchner, 164 Ill.2d 468, 208 Ill.Dec. 268, 649 N.E.2d 324 (1995)(refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties\u2019 rights)."},"case_id":9025877,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The G'i'eenwood Village court held that the trial court was correct in doing so and that it must proceed to apply the provisions contained in the revised statute.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"564 A.2d 399, 401","parenthetical":"affirming dismissal of motion to modify property distribution where final dissolution decree was entered, Congress enacted relevant law and intended retroactive effect, but motion did not allege sufficient facts to set aside final order","sentence":"See Perry v. City of Denver, 27 Colo. 93, 59 P. 747 (1899)(pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation); see also Gen. Tel. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Ill.2d 363, 83 Ill.Dec. 133, 469 N.E.2d 1067 (1984)(holding legislature\u2019s intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power); Schlenz v. Castle, 84 Ill.2d 196, 49 Ill.Dec. 322, 417 N.E.2d 1336 (1981)(rejecting separation of powers challenge where legislature\u2019s curative act did not have effect of setting aside final adjudication); Andresen v. Andresen, 317 Md. 380, 564 A.2d 399, 401 (1989)(affirming dismissal of motion to modify property distribution where final dissolution decree was entered, Congress enacted relevant law and intended retroactive effect, but motion did not allege sufficient facts to set aside final order); Atlantic City Casino Ass\u2019n v. City of Atlantic City, 217 N.J.Super. 277, 525 A.2d 1109(rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending), remanded, 102 N.J. 323, 508 A.2d 203 (1985); Bowen v. Mabry, 154 N.C.App. 734, 572 S.E.2d 809 (2002)(General Assembly has power to amend statute that it believes has been misconstrued by the courts and \u201cundo any perceived undesirable past consequences of misinterpretation of its work product\u201d unless retroactive application impairs vested rights, quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes \u00a7 411, at 568 (1999)); cf. In re Kirchner, 164 Ill.2d 468, 208 Ill.Dec. 268, 649 N.E.2d 324 (1995)(refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties\u2019 rights)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties' rights","sentence":"See Perry v. City of Denver, 27 Colo. 93, 59 P. 747 (1899)(pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation); see also Gen. Tel. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Ill.2d 363, 83 Ill.Dec. 133, 469 N.E.2d 1067 (1984)(holding legislature\u2019s intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power); Schlenz v. Castle, 84 Ill.2d 196, 49 Ill.Dec. 322, 417 N.E.2d 1336 (1981)(rejecting separation of powers challenge where legislature\u2019s curative act did not have effect of setting aside final adjudication); Andresen v. Andresen, 317 Md. 380, 564 A.2d 399, 401 (1989)(affirming dismissal of motion to modify property distribution where final dissolution decree was entered, Congress enacted relevant law and intended retroactive effect, but motion did not allege sufficient facts to set aside final order); Atlantic City Casino Ass\u2019n v. City of Atlantic City, 217 N.J.Super. 277, 525 A.2d 1109(rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending), remanded, 102 N.J. 323, 508 A.2d 203 (1985); Bowen v. Mabry, 154 N.C.App. 734, 572 S.E.2d 809 (2002)(General Assembly has power to amend statute that it believes has been misconstrued by the courts and \u201cundo any perceived undesirable past consequences of misinterpretation of its work product\u201d unless retroactive application impairs vested rights, quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes \u00a7 411, at 568 (1999)); cf. In re Kirchner, 164 Ill.2d 468, 208 Ill.Dec. 268, 649 N.E.2d 324 (1995)(refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties\u2019 rights)."},"case_id":9025877,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The G'i'eenwood Village court held that the trial court was correct in doing so and that it must proceed to apply the provisions contained in the revised statute.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties' rights","sentence":"See Perry v. City of Denver, 27 Colo. 93, 59 P. 747 (1899)(pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation); see also Gen. Tel. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Ill.2d 363, 83 Ill.Dec. 133, 469 N.E.2d 1067 (1984)(holding legislature\u2019s intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power); Schlenz v. Castle, 84 Ill.2d 196, 49 Ill.Dec. 322, 417 N.E.2d 1336 (1981)(rejecting separation of powers challenge where legislature\u2019s curative act did not have effect of setting aside final adjudication); Andresen v. Andresen, 317 Md. 380, 564 A.2d 399, 401 (1989)(affirming dismissal of motion to modify property distribution where final dissolution decree was entered, Congress enacted relevant law and intended retroactive effect, but motion did not allege sufficient facts to set aside final order); Atlantic City Casino Ass\u2019n v. City of Atlantic City, 217 N.J.Super. 277, 525 A.2d 1109(rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending), remanded, 102 N.J. 323, 508 A.2d 203 (1985); Bowen v. Mabry, 154 N.C.App. 734, 572 S.E.2d 809 (2002)(General Assembly has power to amend statute that it believes has been misconstrued by the courts and \u201cundo any perceived undesirable past consequences of misinterpretation of its work product\u201d unless retroactive application impairs vested rights, quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes \u00a7 411, at 568 (1999)); cf. In re Kirchner, 164 Ill.2d 468, 208 Ill.Dec. 268, 649 N.E.2d 324 (1995)(refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties\u2019 rights)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending","sentence":"See Perry v. City of Denver, 27 Colo. 93, 59 P. 747 (1899)(pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation); see also Gen. Tel. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Ill.2d 363, 83 Ill.Dec. 133, 469 N.E.2d 1067 (1984)(holding legislature\u2019s intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power); Schlenz v. Castle, 84 Ill.2d 196, 49 Ill.Dec. 322, 417 N.E.2d 1336 (1981)(rejecting separation of powers challenge where legislature\u2019s curative act did not have effect of setting aside final adjudication); Andresen v. Andresen, 317 Md. 380, 564 A.2d 399, 401 (1989)(affirming dismissal of motion to modify property distribution where final dissolution decree was entered, Congress enacted relevant law and intended retroactive effect, but motion did not allege sufficient facts to set aside final order); Atlantic City Casino Ass\u2019n v. City of Atlantic City, 217 N.J.Super. 277, 525 A.2d 1109(rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending), remanded, 102 N.J. 323, 508 A.2d 203 (1985); Bowen v. Mabry, 154 N.C.App. 734, 572 S.E.2d 809 (2002)(General Assembly has power to amend statute that it believes has been misconstrued by the courts and \u201cundo any perceived undesirable past consequences of misinterpretation of its work product\u201d unless retroactive application impairs vested rights, quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes \u00a7 411, at 568 (1999)); cf. In re Kirchner, 164 Ill.2d 468, 208 Ill.Dec. 268, 649 N.E.2d 324 (1995)(refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties\u2019 rights)."},"case_id":9025877,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The G'i'eenwood Village court held that the trial court was correct in doing so and that it must proceed to apply the provisions contained in the revised statute.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending","sentence":"See Perry v. City of Denver, 27 Colo. 93, 59 P. 747 (1899)(pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation); see also Gen. Tel. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Ill.2d 363, 83 Ill.Dec. 133, 469 N.E.2d 1067 (1984)(holding legislature\u2019s intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power); Schlenz v. Castle, 84 Ill.2d 196, 49 Ill.Dec. 322, 417 N.E.2d 1336 (1981)(rejecting separation of powers challenge where legislature\u2019s curative act did not have effect of setting aside final adjudication); Andresen v. Andresen, 317 Md. 380, 564 A.2d 399, 401 (1989)(affirming dismissal of motion to modify property distribution where final dissolution decree was entered, Congress enacted relevant law and intended retroactive effect, but motion did not allege sufficient facts to set aside final order); Atlantic City Casino Ass\u2019n v. City of Atlantic City, 217 N.J.Super. 277, 525 A.2d 1109(rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending), remanded, 102 N.J. 323, 508 A.2d 203 (1985); Bowen v. Mabry, 154 N.C.App. 734, 572 S.E.2d 809 (2002)(General Assembly has power to amend statute that it believes has been misconstrued by the courts and \u201cundo any perceived undesirable past consequences of misinterpretation of its work product\u201d unless retroactive application impairs vested rights, quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes \u00a7 411, at 568 (1999)); cf. In re Kirchner, 164 Ill.2d 468, 208 Ill.Dec. 268, 649 N.E.2d 324 (1995)(refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties\u2019 rights)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties' rights","sentence":"See Perry v. City of Denver, 27 Colo. 93, 59 P. 747 (1899)(pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation); see also Gen. Tel. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Ill.2d 363, 83 Ill.Dec. 133, 469 N.E.2d 1067 (1984)(holding legislature\u2019s intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power); Schlenz v. Castle, 84 Ill.2d 196, 49 Ill.Dec. 322, 417 N.E.2d 1336 (1981)(rejecting separation of powers challenge where legislature\u2019s curative act did not have effect of setting aside final adjudication); Andresen v. Andresen, 317 Md. 380, 564 A.2d 399, 401 (1989)(affirming dismissal of motion to modify property distribution where final dissolution decree was entered, Congress enacted relevant law and intended retroactive effect, but motion did not allege sufficient facts to set aside final order); Atlantic City Casino Ass\u2019n v. City of Atlantic City, 217 N.J.Super. 277, 525 A.2d 1109(rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending), remanded, 102 N.J. 323, 508 A.2d 203 (1985); Bowen v. Mabry, 154 N.C.App. 734, 572 S.E.2d 809 (2002)(General Assembly has power to amend statute that it believes has been misconstrued by the courts and \u201cundo any perceived undesirable past consequences of misinterpretation of its work product\u201d unless retroactive application impairs vested rights, quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes \u00a7 411, at 568 (1999)); cf. In re Kirchner, 164 Ill.2d 468, 208 Ill.Dec. 268, 649 N.E.2d 324 (1995)(refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties\u2019 rights)."},"case_id":9025877,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The G'i'eenwood Village court held that the trial court was correct in doing so and that it must proceed to apply the provisions contained in the revised statute.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties' rights","sentence":"See Perry v. City of Denver, 27 Colo. 93, 59 P. 747 (1899)(pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation); see also Gen. Tel. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Ill.2d 363, 83 Ill.Dec. 133, 469 N.E.2d 1067 (1984)(holding legislature\u2019s intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power); Schlenz v. Castle, 84 Ill.2d 196, 49 Ill.Dec. 322, 417 N.E.2d 1336 (1981)(rejecting separation of powers challenge where legislature\u2019s curative act did not have effect of setting aside final adjudication); Andresen v. Andresen, 317 Md. 380, 564 A.2d 399, 401 (1989)(affirming dismissal of motion to modify property distribution where final dissolution decree was entered, Congress enacted relevant law and intended retroactive effect, but motion did not allege sufficient facts to set aside final order); Atlantic City Casino Ass\u2019n v. City of Atlantic City, 217 N.J.Super. 277, 525 A.2d 1109(rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending), remanded, 102 N.J. 323, 508 A.2d 203 (1985); Bowen v. Mabry, 154 N.C.App. 734, 572 S.E.2d 809 (2002)(General Assembly has power to amend statute that it believes has been misconstrued by the courts and \u201cundo any perceived undesirable past consequences of misinterpretation of its work product\u201d unless retroactive application impairs vested rights, quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes \u00a7 411, at 568 (1999)); cf. In re Kirchner, 164 Ill.2d 468, 208 Ill.Dec. 268, 649 N.E.2d 324 (1995)(refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties\u2019 rights)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending","sentence":"See Perry v. City of Denver, 27 Colo. 93, 59 P. 747 (1899)(pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation); see also Gen. Tel. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Ill.2d 363, 83 Ill.Dec. 133, 469 N.E.2d 1067 (1984)(holding legislature\u2019s intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power); Schlenz v. Castle, 84 Ill.2d 196, 49 Ill.Dec. 322, 417 N.E.2d 1336 (1981)(rejecting separation of powers challenge where legislature\u2019s curative act did not have effect of setting aside final adjudication); Andresen v. Andresen, 317 Md. 380, 564 A.2d 399, 401 (1989)(affirming dismissal of motion to modify property distribution where final dissolution decree was entered, Congress enacted relevant law and intended retroactive effect, but motion did not allege sufficient facts to set aside final order); Atlantic City Casino Ass\u2019n v. City of Atlantic City, 217 N.J.Super. 277, 525 A.2d 1109(rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending), remanded, 102 N.J. 323, 508 A.2d 203 (1985); Bowen v. Mabry, 154 N.C.App. 734, 572 S.E.2d 809 (2002)(General Assembly has power to amend statute that it believes has been misconstrued by the courts and \u201cundo any perceived undesirable past consequences of misinterpretation of its work product\u201d unless retroactive application impairs vested rights, quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes \u00a7 411, at 568 (1999)); cf. In re Kirchner, 164 Ill.2d 468, 208 Ill.Dec. 268, 649 N.E.2d 324 (1995)(refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties\u2019 rights)."},"case_id":9025877,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The G'i'eenwood Village court held that the trial court was correct in doing so and that it must proceed to apply the provisions contained in the revised statute.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties' rights","sentence":"See Perry v. City of Denver, 27 Colo. 93, 59 P. 747 (1899)(pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation); see also Gen. Tel. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Ill.2d 363, 83 Ill.Dec. 133, 469 N.E.2d 1067 (1984)(holding legislature\u2019s intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power); Schlenz v. Castle, 84 Ill.2d 196, 49 Ill.Dec. 322, 417 N.E.2d 1336 (1981)(rejecting separation of powers challenge where legislature\u2019s curative act did not have effect of setting aside final adjudication); Andresen v. Andresen, 317 Md. 380, 564 A.2d 399, 401 (1989)(affirming dismissal of motion to modify property distribution where final dissolution decree was entered, Congress enacted relevant law and intended retroactive effect, but motion did not allege sufficient facts to set aside final order); Atlantic City Casino Ass\u2019n v. City of Atlantic City, 217 N.J.Super. 277, 525 A.2d 1109(rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending), remanded, 102 N.J. 323, 508 A.2d 203 (1985); Bowen v. Mabry, 154 N.C.App. 734, 572 S.E.2d 809 (2002)(General Assembly has power to amend statute that it believes has been misconstrued by the courts and \u201cundo any perceived undesirable past consequences of misinterpretation of its work product\u201d unless retroactive application impairs vested rights, quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes \u00a7 411, at 568 (1999)); cf. In re Kirchner, 164 Ill.2d 468, 208 Ill.Dec. 268, 649 N.E.2d 324 (1995)(refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties\u2019 rights)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending","sentence":"See Perry v. City of Denver, 27 Colo. 93, 59 P. 747 (1899)(pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation); see also Gen. Tel. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Ill.2d 363, 83 Ill.Dec. 133, 469 N.E.2d 1067 (1984)(holding legislature\u2019s intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power); Schlenz v. Castle, 84 Ill.2d 196, 49 Ill.Dec. 322, 417 N.E.2d 1336 (1981)(rejecting separation of powers challenge where legislature\u2019s curative act did not have effect of setting aside final adjudication); Andresen v. Andresen, 317 Md. 380, 564 A.2d 399, 401 (1989)(affirming dismissal of motion to modify property distribution where final dissolution decree was entered, Congress enacted relevant law and intended retroactive effect, but motion did not allege sufficient facts to set aside final order); Atlantic City Casino Ass\u2019n v. City of Atlantic City, 217 N.J.Super. 277, 525 A.2d 1109(rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending), remanded, 102 N.J. 323, 508 A.2d 203 (1985); Bowen v. Mabry, 154 N.C.App. 734, 572 S.E.2d 809 (2002)(General Assembly has power to amend statute that it believes has been misconstrued by the courts and \u201cundo any perceived undesirable past consequences of misinterpretation of its work product\u201d unless retroactive application impairs vested rights, quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes \u00a7 411, at 568 (1999)); cf. In re Kirchner, 164 Ill.2d 468, 208 Ill.Dec. 268, 649 N.E.2d 324 (1995)(refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties\u2019 rights)."},"case_id":9025877,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The G'i'eenwood Village court held that the trial court was correct in doing so and that it must proceed to apply the provisions contained in the revised statute.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties' rights","sentence":"See Perry v. City of Denver, 27 Colo. 93, 59 P. 747 (1899)(pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation); see also Gen. Tel. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Ill.2d 363, 83 Ill.Dec. 133, 469 N.E.2d 1067 (1984)(holding legislature\u2019s intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power); Schlenz v. Castle, 84 Ill.2d 196, 49 Ill.Dec. 322, 417 N.E.2d 1336 (1981)(rejecting separation of powers challenge where legislature\u2019s curative act did not have effect of setting aside final adjudication); Andresen v. Andresen, 317 Md. 380, 564 A.2d 399, 401 (1989)(affirming dismissal of motion to modify property distribution where final dissolution decree was entered, Congress enacted relevant law and intended retroactive effect, but motion did not allege sufficient facts to set aside final order); Atlantic City Casino Ass\u2019n v. City of Atlantic City, 217 N.J.Super. 277, 525 A.2d 1109(rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending), remanded, 102 N.J. 323, 508 A.2d 203 (1985); Bowen v. Mabry, 154 N.C.App. 734, 572 S.E.2d 809 (2002)(General Assembly has power to amend statute that it believes has been misconstrued by the courts and \u201cundo any perceived undesirable past consequences of misinterpretation of its work product\u201d unless retroactive application impairs vested rights, quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes \u00a7 411, at 568 (1999)); cf. In re Kirchner, 164 Ill.2d 468, 208 Ill.Dec. 268, 649 N.E.2d 324 (1995)(refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties\u2019 rights)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending","sentence":"See Perry v. City of Denver, 27 Colo. 93, 59 P. 747 (1899)(pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation); see also Gen. Tel. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Ill.2d 363, 83 Ill.Dec. 133, 469 N.E.2d 1067 (1984)(holding legislature\u2019s intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power); Schlenz v. Castle, 84 Ill.2d 196, 49 Ill.Dec. 322, 417 N.E.2d 1336 (1981)(rejecting separation of powers challenge where legislature\u2019s curative act did not have effect of setting aside final adjudication); Andresen v. Andresen, 317 Md. 380, 564 A.2d 399, 401 (1989)(affirming dismissal of motion to modify property distribution where final dissolution decree was entered, Congress enacted relevant law and intended retroactive effect, but motion did not allege sufficient facts to set aside final order); Atlantic City Casino Ass\u2019n v. City of Atlantic City, 217 N.J.Super. 277, 525 A.2d 1109(rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending), remanded, 102 N.J. 323, 508 A.2d 203 (1985); Bowen v. Mabry, 154 N.C.App. 734, 572 S.E.2d 809 (2002)(General Assembly has power to amend statute that it believes has been misconstrued by the courts and \u201cundo any perceived undesirable past consequences of misinterpretation of its work product\u201d unless retroactive application impairs vested rights, quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes \u00a7 411, at 568 (1999)); cf. In re Kirchner, 164 Ill.2d 468, 208 Ill.Dec. 268, 649 N.E.2d 324 (1995)(refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties\u2019 rights)."},"case_id":9025877,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The G'i'eenwood Village court held that the trial court was correct in doing so and that it must proceed to apply the provisions contained in the revised statute.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties' rights","sentence":"See Perry v. City of Denver, 27 Colo. 93, 59 P. 747 (1899)(pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation); see also Gen. Tel. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Ill.2d 363, 83 Ill.Dec. 133, 469 N.E.2d 1067 (1984)(holding legislature\u2019s intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power); Schlenz v. Castle, 84 Ill.2d 196, 49 Ill.Dec. 322, 417 N.E.2d 1336 (1981)(rejecting separation of powers challenge where legislature\u2019s curative act did not have effect of setting aside final adjudication); Andresen v. Andresen, 317 Md. 380, 564 A.2d 399, 401 (1989)(affirming dismissal of motion to modify property distribution where final dissolution decree was entered, Congress enacted relevant law and intended retroactive effect, but motion did not allege sufficient facts to set aside final order); Atlantic City Casino Ass\u2019n v. City of Atlantic City, 217 N.J.Super. 277, 525 A.2d 1109(rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending), remanded, 102 N.J. 323, 508 A.2d 203 (1985); Bowen v. Mabry, 154 N.C.App. 734, 572 S.E.2d 809 (2002)(General Assembly has power to amend statute that it believes has been misconstrued by the courts and \u201cundo any perceived undesirable past consequences of misinterpretation of its work product\u201d unless retroactive application impairs vested rights, quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes \u00a7 411, at 568 (1999)); cf. In re Kirchner, 164 Ill.2d 468, 208 Ill.Dec. 268, 649 N.E.2d 324 (1995)(refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties\u2019 rights)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending","sentence":"See Perry v. City of Denver, 27 Colo. 93, 59 P. 747 (1899)(pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation); see also Gen. Tel. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Ill.2d 363, 83 Ill.Dec. 133, 469 N.E.2d 1067 (1984)(holding legislature\u2019s intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power); Schlenz v. Castle, 84 Ill.2d 196, 49 Ill.Dec. 322, 417 N.E.2d 1336 (1981)(rejecting separation of powers challenge where legislature\u2019s curative act did not have effect of setting aside final adjudication); Andresen v. Andresen, 317 Md. 380, 564 A.2d 399, 401 (1989)(affirming dismissal of motion to modify property distribution where final dissolution decree was entered, Congress enacted relevant law and intended retroactive effect, but motion did not allege sufficient facts to set aside final order); Atlantic City Casino Ass\u2019n v. City of Atlantic City, 217 N.J.Super. 277, 525 A.2d 1109(rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending), remanded, 102 N.J. 323, 508 A.2d 203 (1985); Bowen v. Mabry, 154 N.C.App. 734, 572 S.E.2d 809 (2002)(General Assembly has power to amend statute that it believes has been misconstrued by the courts and \u201cundo any perceived undesirable past consequences of misinterpretation of its work product\u201d unless retroactive application impairs vested rights, quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes \u00a7 411, at 568 (1999)); cf. In re Kirchner, 164 Ill.2d 468, 208 Ill.Dec. 268, 649 N.E.2d 324 (1995)(refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties\u2019 rights)."},"case_id":9025877,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The G'i'eenwood Village court held that the trial court was correct in doing so and that it must proceed to apply the provisions contained in the revised statute.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties' rights","sentence":"See Perry v. City of Denver, 27 Colo. 93, 59 P. 747 (1899)(pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation); see also Gen. Tel. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Ill.2d 363, 83 Ill.Dec. 133, 469 N.E.2d 1067 (1984)(holding legislature\u2019s intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power); Schlenz v. Castle, 84 Ill.2d 196, 49 Ill.Dec. 322, 417 N.E.2d 1336 (1981)(rejecting separation of powers challenge where legislature\u2019s curative act did not have effect of setting aside final adjudication); Andresen v. Andresen, 317 Md. 380, 564 A.2d 399, 401 (1989)(affirming dismissal of motion to modify property distribution where final dissolution decree was entered, Congress enacted relevant law and intended retroactive effect, but motion did not allege sufficient facts to set aside final order); Atlantic City Casino Ass\u2019n v. City of Atlantic City, 217 N.J.Super. 277, 525 A.2d 1109(rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending), remanded, 102 N.J. 323, 508 A.2d 203 (1985); Bowen v. Mabry, 154 N.C.App. 734, 572 S.E.2d 809 (2002)(General Assembly has power to amend statute that it believes has been misconstrued by the courts and \u201cundo any perceived undesirable past consequences of misinterpretation of its work product\u201d unless retroactive application impairs vested rights, quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes \u00a7 411, at 568 (1999)); cf. In re Kirchner, 164 Ill.2d 468, 208 Ill.Dec. 268, 649 N.E.2d 324 (1995)(refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties\u2019 rights)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending","sentence":"See Perry v. City of Denver, 27 Colo. 93, 59 P. 747 (1899)(pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation); see also Gen. Tel. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Ill.2d 363, 83 Ill.Dec. 133, 469 N.E.2d 1067 (1984)(holding legislature\u2019s intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power); Schlenz v. Castle, 84 Ill.2d 196, 49 Ill.Dec. 322, 417 N.E.2d 1336 (1981)(rejecting separation of powers challenge where legislature\u2019s curative act did not have effect of setting aside final adjudication); Andresen v. Andresen, 317 Md. 380, 564 A.2d 399, 401 (1989)(affirming dismissal of motion to modify property distribution where final dissolution decree was entered, Congress enacted relevant law and intended retroactive effect, but motion did not allege sufficient facts to set aside final order); Atlantic City Casino Ass\u2019n v. City of Atlantic City, 217 N.J.Super. 277, 525 A.2d 1109(rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending), remanded, 102 N.J. 323, 508 A.2d 203 (1985); Bowen v. Mabry, 154 N.C.App. 734, 572 S.E.2d 809 (2002)(General Assembly has power to amend statute that it believes has been misconstrued by the courts and \u201cundo any perceived undesirable past consequences of misinterpretation of its work product\u201d unless retroactive application impairs vested rights, quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes \u00a7 411, at 568 (1999)); cf. In re Kirchner, 164 Ill.2d 468, 208 Ill.Dec. 268, 649 N.E.2d 324 (1995)(refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties\u2019 rights)."},"case_id":9025877,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The G'i'eenwood Village court held that the trial court was correct in doing so and that it must proceed to apply the provisions contained in the revised statute.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties' rights","sentence":"See Perry v. City of Denver, 27 Colo. 93, 59 P. 747 (1899)(pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation); see also Gen. Tel. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Ill.2d 363, 83 Ill.Dec. 133, 469 N.E.2d 1067 (1984)(holding legislature\u2019s intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power); Schlenz v. Castle, 84 Ill.2d 196, 49 Ill.Dec. 322, 417 N.E.2d 1336 (1981)(rejecting separation of powers challenge where legislature\u2019s curative act did not have effect of setting aside final adjudication); Andresen v. Andresen, 317 Md. 380, 564 A.2d 399, 401 (1989)(affirming dismissal of motion to modify property distribution where final dissolution decree was entered, Congress enacted relevant law and intended retroactive effect, but motion did not allege sufficient facts to set aside final order); Atlantic City Casino Ass\u2019n v. City of Atlantic City, 217 N.J.Super. 277, 525 A.2d 1109(rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending), remanded, 102 N.J. 323, 508 A.2d 203 (1985); Bowen v. Mabry, 154 N.C.App. 734, 572 S.E.2d 809 (2002)(General Assembly has power to amend statute that it believes has been misconstrued by the courts and \u201cundo any perceived undesirable past consequences of misinterpretation of its work product\u201d unless retroactive application impairs vested rights, quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes \u00a7 411, at 568 (1999)); cf. In re Kirchner, 164 Ill.2d 468, 208 Ill.Dec. 268, 649 N.E.2d 324 (1995)(refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties\u2019 rights)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending","sentence":"See Perry v. City of Denver, 27 Colo. 93, 59 P. 747 (1899)(pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation); see also Gen. Tel. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Ill.2d 363, 83 Ill.Dec. 133, 469 N.E.2d 1067 (1984)(holding legislature\u2019s intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power); Schlenz v. Castle, 84 Ill.2d 196, 49 Ill.Dec. 322, 417 N.E.2d 1336 (1981)(rejecting separation of powers challenge where legislature\u2019s curative act did not have effect of setting aside final adjudication); Andresen v. Andresen, 317 Md. 380, 564 A.2d 399, 401 (1989)(affirming dismissal of motion to modify property distribution where final dissolution decree was entered, Congress enacted relevant law and intended retroactive effect, but motion did not allege sufficient facts to set aside final order); Atlantic City Casino Ass\u2019n v. City of Atlantic City, 217 N.J.Super. 277, 525 A.2d 1109(rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending), remanded, 102 N.J. 323, 508 A.2d 203 (1985); Bowen v. Mabry, 154 N.C.App. 734, 572 S.E.2d 809 (2002)(General Assembly has power to amend statute that it believes has been misconstrued by the courts and \u201cundo any perceived undesirable past consequences of misinterpretation of its work product\u201d unless retroactive application impairs vested rights, quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes \u00a7 411, at 568 (1999)); cf. In re Kirchner, 164 Ill.2d 468, 208 Ill.Dec. 268, 649 N.E.2d 324 (1995)(refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties\u2019 rights)."},"case_id":9025877,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The G'i'eenwood Village court held that the trial court was correct in doing so and that it must proceed to apply the provisions contained in the revised statute.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending","sentence":"See Perry v. City of Denver, 27 Colo. 93, 59 P. 747 (1899)(pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation); see also Gen. Tel. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Ill.2d 363, 83 Ill.Dec. 133, 469 N.E.2d 1067 (1984)(holding legislature\u2019s intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power); Schlenz v. Castle, 84 Ill.2d 196, 49 Ill.Dec. 322, 417 N.E.2d 1336 (1981)(rejecting separation of powers challenge where legislature\u2019s curative act did not have effect of setting aside final adjudication); Andresen v. Andresen, 317 Md. 380, 564 A.2d 399, 401 (1989)(affirming dismissal of motion to modify property distribution where final dissolution decree was entered, Congress enacted relevant law and intended retroactive effect, but motion did not allege sufficient facts to set aside final order); Atlantic City Casino Ass\u2019n v. City of Atlantic City, 217 N.J.Super. 277, 525 A.2d 1109(rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending), remanded, 102 N.J. 323, 508 A.2d 203 (1985); Bowen v. Mabry, 154 N.C.App. 734, 572 S.E.2d 809 (2002)(General Assembly has power to amend statute that it believes has been misconstrued by the courts and \u201cundo any perceived undesirable past consequences of misinterpretation of its work product\u201d unless retroactive application impairs vested rights, quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes \u00a7 411, at 568 (1999)); cf. In re Kirchner, 164 Ill.2d 468, 208 Ill.Dec. 268, 649 N.E.2d 324 (1995)(refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties\u2019 rights)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties' rights","sentence":"See Perry v. City of Denver, 27 Colo. 93, 59 P. 747 (1899)(pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation); see also Gen. Tel. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Ill.2d 363, 83 Ill.Dec. 133, 469 N.E.2d 1067 (1984)(holding legislature\u2019s intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power); Schlenz v. Castle, 84 Ill.2d 196, 49 Ill.Dec. 322, 417 N.E.2d 1336 (1981)(rejecting separation of powers challenge where legislature\u2019s curative act did not have effect of setting aside final adjudication); Andresen v. Andresen, 317 Md. 380, 564 A.2d 399, 401 (1989)(affirming dismissal of motion to modify property distribution where final dissolution decree was entered, Congress enacted relevant law and intended retroactive effect, but motion did not allege sufficient facts to set aside final order); Atlantic City Casino Ass\u2019n v. City of Atlantic City, 217 N.J.Super. 277, 525 A.2d 1109(rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending), remanded, 102 N.J. 323, 508 A.2d 203 (1985); Bowen v. Mabry, 154 N.C.App. 734, 572 S.E.2d 809 (2002)(General Assembly has power to amend statute that it believes has been misconstrued by the courts and \u201cundo any perceived undesirable past consequences of misinterpretation of its work product\u201d unless retroactive application impairs vested rights, quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes \u00a7 411, at 568 (1999)); cf. In re Kirchner, 164 Ill.2d 468, 208 Ill.Dec. 268, 649 N.E.2d 324 (1995)(refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties\u2019 rights)."},"case_id":9025877,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The G'i'eenwood Village court held that the trial court was correct in doing so and that it must proceed to apply the provisions contained in the revised statute.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties' rights","sentence":"See Perry v. City of Denver, 27 Colo. 93, 59 P. 747 (1899)(pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation); see also Gen. Tel. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Ill.2d 363, 83 Ill.Dec. 133, 469 N.E.2d 1067 (1984)(holding legislature\u2019s intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power); Schlenz v. Castle, 84 Ill.2d 196, 49 Ill.Dec. 322, 417 N.E.2d 1336 (1981)(rejecting separation of powers challenge where legislature\u2019s curative act did not have effect of setting aside final adjudication); Andresen v. Andresen, 317 Md. 380, 564 A.2d 399, 401 (1989)(affirming dismissal of motion to modify property distribution where final dissolution decree was entered, Congress enacted relevant law and intended retroactive effect, but motion did not allege sufficient facts to set aside final order); Atlantic City Casino Ass\u2019n v. City of Atlantic City, 217 N.J.Super. 277, 525 A.2d 1109(rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending), remanded, 102 N.J. 323, 508 A.2d 203 (1985); Bowen v. Mabry, 154 N.C.App. 734, 572 S.E.2d 809 (2002)(General Assembly has power to amend statute that it believes has been misconstrued by the courts and \u201cundo any perceived undesirable past consequences of misinterpretation of its work product\u201d unless retroactive application impairs vested rights, quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes \u00a7 411, at 568 (1999)); cf. In re Kirchner, 164 Ill.2d 468, 208 Ill.Dec. 268, 649 N.E.2d 324 (1995)(refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties\u2019 rights)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending","sentence":"See Perry v. City of Denver, 27 Colo. 93, 59 P. 747 (1899)(pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation); see also Gen. Tel. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Ill.2d 363, 83 Ill.Dec. 133, 469 N.E.2d 1067 (1984)(holding legislature\u2019s intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power); Schlenz v. Castle, 84 Ill.2d 196, 49 Ill.Dec. 322, 417 N.E.2d 1336 (1981)(rejecting separation of powers challenge where legislature\u2019s curative act did not have effect of setting aside final adjudication); Andresen v. Andresen, 317 Md. 380, 564 A.2d 399, 401 (1989)(affirming dismissal of motion to modify property distribution where final dissolution decree was entered, Congress enacted relevant law and intended retroactive effect, but motion did not allege sufficient facts to set aside final order); Atlantic City Casino Ass\u2019n v. City of Atlantic City, 217 N.J.Super. 277, 525 A.2d 1109(rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending), remanded, 102 N.J. 323, 508 A.2d 203 (1985); Bowen v. Mabry, 154 N.C.App. 734, 572 S.E.2d 809 (2002)(General Assembly has power to amend statute that it believes has been misconstrued by the courts and \u201cundo any perceived undesirable past consequences of misinterpretation of its work product\u201d unless retroactive application impairs vested rights, quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes \u00a7 411, at 568 (1999)); cf. In re Kirchner, 164 Ill.2d 468, 208 Ill.Dec. 268, 649 N.E.2d 324 (1995)(refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties\u2019 rights)."},"case_id":9025877,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The G'i'eenwood Village court held that the trial court was correct in doing so and that it must proceed to apply the provisions contained in the revised statute.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties' rights","sentence":"See Perry v. City of Denver, 27 Colo. 93, 59 P. 747 (1899)(pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation); see also Gen. Tel. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Ill.2d 363, 83 Ill.Dec. 133, 469 N.E.2d 1067 (1984)(holding legislature\u2019s intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power); Schlenz v. Castle, 84 Ill.2d 196, 49 Ill.Dec. 322, 417 N.E.2d 1336 (1981)(rejecting separation of powers challenge where legislature\u2019s curative act did not have effect of setting aside final adjudication); Andresen v. Andresen, 317 Md. 380, 564 A.2d 399, 401 (1989)(affirming dismissal of motion to modify property distribution where final dissolution decree was entered, Congress enacted relevant law and intended retroactive effect, but motion did not allege sufficient facts to set aside final order); Atlantic City Casino Ass\u2019n v. City of Atlantic City, 217 N.J.Super. 277, 525 A.2d 1109(rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending), remanded, 102 N.J. 323, 508 A.2d 203 (1985); Bowen v. Mabry, 154 N.C.App. 734, 572 S.E.2d 809 (2002)(General Assembly has power to amend statute that it believes has been misconstrued by the courts and \u201cundo any perceived undesirable past consequences of misinterpretation of its work product\u201d unless retroactive application impairs vested rights, quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes \u00a7 411, at 568 (1999)); cf. In re Kirchner, 164 Ill.2d 468, 208 Ill.Dec. 268, 649 N.E.2d 324 (1995)(refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties\u2019 rights)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending","sentence":"See Perry v. City of Denver, 27 Colo. 93, 59 P. 747 (1899)(pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation); see also Gen. Tel. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Ill.2d 363, 83 Ill.Dec. 133, 469 N.E.2d 1067 (1984)(holding legislature\u2019s intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power); Schlenz v. Castle, 84 Ill.2d 196, 49 Ill.Dec. 322, 417 N.E.2d 1336 (1981)(rejecting separation of powers challenge where legislature\u2019s curative act did not have effect of setting aside final adjudication); Andresen v. Andresen, 317 Md. 380, 564 A.2d 399, 401 (1989)(affirming dismissal of motion to modify property distribution where final dissolution decree was entered, Congress enacted relevant law and intended retroactive effect, but motion did not allege sufficient facts to set aside final order); Atlantic City Casino Ass\u2019n v. City of Atlantic City, 217 N.J.Super. 277, 525 A.2d 1109(rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending), remanded, 102 N.J. 323, 508 A.2d 203 (1985); Bowen v. Mabry, 154 N.C.App. 734, 572 S.E.2d 809 (2002)(General Assembly has power to amend statute that it believes has been misconstrued by the courts and \u201cundo any perceived undesirable past consequences of misinterpretation of its work product\u201d unless retroactive application impairs vested rights, quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes \u00a7 411, at 568 (1999)); cf. In re Kirchner, 164 Ill.2d 468, 208 Ill.Dec. 268, 649 N.E.2d 324 (1995)(refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties\u2019 rights)."},"case_id":9025877,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The G'i'eenwood Village court held that the trial court was correct in doing so and that it must proceed to apply the provisions contained in the revised statute.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties' rights","sentence":"See Perry v. City of Denver, 27 Colo. 93, 59 P. 747 (1899)(pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation); see also Gen. Tel. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Ill.2d 363, 83 Ill.Dec. 133, 469 N.E.2d 1067 (1984)(holding legislature\u2019s intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power); Schlenz v. Castle, 84 Ill.2d 196, 49 Ill.Dec. 322, 417 N.E.2d 1336 (1981)(rejecting separation of powers challenge where legislature\u2019s curative act did not have effect of setting aside final adjudication); Andresen v. Andresen, 317 Md. 380, 564 A.2d 399, 401 (1989)(affirming dismissal of motion to modify property distribution where final dissolution decree was entered, Congress enacted relevant law and intended retroactive effect, but motion did not allege sufficient facts to set aside final order); Atlantic City Casino Ass\u2019n v. City of Atlantic City, 217 N.J.Super. 277, 525 A.2d 1109(rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending), remanded, 102 N.J. 323, 508 A.2d 203 (1985); Bowen v. Mabry, 154 N.C.App. 734, 572 S.E.2d 809 (2002)(General Assembly has power to amend statute that it believes has been misconstrued by the courts and \u201cundo any perceived undesirable past consequences of misinterpretation of its work product\u201d unless retroactive application impairs vested rights, quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes \u00a7 411, at 568 (1999)); cf. In re Kirchner, 164 Ill.2d 468, 208 Ill.Dec. 268, 649 N.E.2d 324 (1995)(refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties\u2019 rights)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending","sentence":"See Perry v. City of Denver, 27 Colo. 93, 59 P. 747 (1899)(pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation); see also Gen. Tel. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Ill.2d 363, 83 Ill.Dec. 133, 469 N.E.2d 1067 (1984)(holding legislature\u2019s intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power); Schlenz v. Castle, 84 Ill.2d 196, 49 Ill.Dec. 322, 417 N.E.2d 1336 (1981)(rejecting separation of powers challenge where legislature\u2019s curative act did not have effect of setting aside final adjudication); Andresen v. Andresen, 317 Md. 380, 564 A.2d 399, 401 (1989)(affirming dismissal of motion to modify property distribution where final dissolution decree was entered, Congress enacted relevant law and intended retroactive effect, but motion did not allege sufficient facts to set aside final order); Atlantic City Casino Ass\u2019n v. City of Atlantic City, 217 N.J.Super. 277, 525 A.2d 1109(rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending), remanded, 102 N.J. 323, 508 A.2d 203 (1985); Bowen v. Mabry, 154 N.C.App. 734, 572 S.E.2d 809 (2002)(General Assembly has power to amend statute that it believes has been misconstrued by the courts and \u201cundo any perceived undesirable past consequences of misinterpretation of its work product\u201d unless retroactive application impairs vested rights, quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes \u00a7 411, at 568 (1999)); cf. In re Kirchner, 164 Ill.2d 468, 208 Ill.Dec. 268, 649 N.E.2d 324 (1995)(refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties\u2019 rights)."},"case_id":9025877,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The G'i'eenwood Village court held that the trial court was correct in doing so and that it must proceed to apply the provisions contained in the revised statute.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties' rights","sentence":"See Perry v. City of Denver, 27 Colo. 93, 59 P. 747 (1899)(pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation); see also Gen. Tel. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Ill.2d 363, 83 Ill.Dec. 133, 469 N.E.2d 1067 (1984)(holding legislature\u2019s intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power); Schlenz v. Castle, 84 Ill.2d 196, 49 Ill.Dec. 322, 417 N.E.2d 1336 (1981)(rejecting separation of powers challenge where legislature\u2019s curative act did not have effect of setting aside final adjudication); Andresen v. Andresen, 317 Md. 380, 564 A.2d 399, 401 (1989)(affirming dismissal of motion to modify property distribution where final dissolution decree was entered, Congress enacted relevant law and intended retroactive effect, but motion did not allege sufficient facts to set aside final order); Atlantic City Casino Ass\u2019n v. City of Atlantic City, 217 N.J.Super. 277, 525 A.2d 1109(rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending), remanded, 102 N.J. 323, 508 A.2d 203 (1985); Bowen v. Mabry, 154 N.C.App. 734, 572 S.E.2d 809 (2002)(General Assembly has power to amend statute that it believes has been misconstrued by the courts and \u201cundo any perceived undesirable past consequences of misinterpretation of its work product\u201d unless retroactive application impairs vested rights, quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes \u00a7 411, at 568 (1999)); cf. In re Kirchner, 164 Ill.2d 468, 208 Ill.Dec. 268, 649 N.E.2d 324 (1995)(refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties\u2019 rights)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"General Assembly has power to amend statute that it believes has been misconstrued by the courts and \"undo any perceived undesirable past consequences of misinterpretation of its work product\" unless retroactive application impairs vested rights, quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes SS 411, at 568 (1999","sentence":"See Perry v. City of Denver, 27 Colo. 93, 59 P. 747 (1899)(pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation); see also Gen. Tel. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Ill.2d 363, 83 Ill.Dec. 133, 469 N.E.2d 1067 (1984)(holding legislature\u2019s intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power); Schlenz v. Castle, 84 Ill.2d 196, 49 Ill.Dec. 322, 417 N.E.2d 1336 (1981)(rejecting separation of powers challenge where legislature\u2019s curative act did not have effect of setting aside final adjudication); Andresen v. Andresen, 317 Md. 380, 564 A.2d 399, 401 (1989)(affirming dismissal of motion to modify property distribution where final dissolution decree was entered, Congress enacted relevant law and intended retroactive effect, but motion did not allege sufficient facts to set aside final order); Atlantic City Casino Ass\u2019n v. City of Atlantic City, 217 N.J.Super. 277, 525 A.2d 1109(rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending), remanded, 102 N.J. 323, 508 A.2d 203 (1985); Bowen v. Mabry, 154 N.C.App. 734, 572 S.E.2d 809 (2002)(General Assembly has power to amend statute that it believes has been misconstrued by the courts and \u201cundo any perceived undesirable past consequences of misinterpretation of its work product\u201d unless retroactive application impairs vested rights, quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes \u00a7 411, at 568 (1999)); cf. In re Kirchner, 164 Ill.2d 468, 208 Ill.Dec. 268, 649 N.E.2d 324 (1995)(refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties\u2019 rights)."},"case_id":9025877,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The G'i'eenwood Village court held that the trial court was correct in doing so and that it must proceed to apply the provisions contained in the revised statute.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"General Assembly has power to amend statute that it believes has been misconstrued by the courts and \"undo any perceived undesirable past consequences of misinterpretation of its work product\" unless retroactive application impairs vested rights, quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes SS 411, at 568 (1999","sentence":"See Perry v. City of Denver, 27 Colo. 93, 59 P. 747 (1899)(pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation); see also Gen. Tel. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Ill.2d 363, 83 Ill.Dec. 133, 469 N.E.2d 1067 (1984)(holding legislature\u2019s intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power); Schlenz v. Castle, 84 Ill.2d 196, 49 Ill.Dec. 322, 417 N.E.2d 1336 (1981)(rejecting separation of powers challenge where legislature\u2019s curative act did not have effect of setting aside final adjudication); Andresen v. Andresen, 317 Md. 380, 564 A.2d 399, 401 (1989)(affirming dismissal of motion to modify property distribution where final dissolution decree was entered, Congress enacted relevant law and intended retroactive effect, but motion did not allege sufficient facts to set aside final order); Atlantic City Casino Ass\u2019n v. City of Atlantic City, 217 N.J.Super. 277, 525 A.2d 1109(rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending), remanded, 102 N.J. 323, 508 A.2d 203 (1985); Bowen v. Mabry, 154 N.C.App. 734, 572 S.E.2d 809 (2002)(General Assembly has power to amend statute that it believes has been misconstrued by the courts and \u201cundo any perceived undesirable past consequences of misinterpretation of its work product\u201d unless retroactive application impairs vested rights, quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes \u00a7 411, at 568 (1999)); cf. In re Kirchner, 164 Ill.2d 468, 208 Ill.Dec. 268, 649 N.E.2d 324 (1995)(refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties\u2019 rights)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties' rights","sentence":"See Perry v. City of Denver, 27 Colo. 93, 59 P. 747 (1899)(pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation); see also Gen. Tel. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Ill.2d 363, 83 Ill.Dec. 133, 469 N.E.2d 1067 (1984)(holding legislature\u2019s intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power); Schlenz v. Castle, 84 Ill.2d 196, 49 Ill.Dec. 322, 417 N.E.2d 1336 (1981)(rejecting separation of powers challenge where legislature\u2019s curative act did not have effect of setting aside final adjudication); Andresen v. Andresen, 317 Md. 380, 564 A.2d 399, 401 (1989)(affirming dismissal of motion to modify property distribution where final dissolution decree was entered, Congress enacted relevant law and intended retroactive effect, but motion did not allege sufficient facts to set aside final order); Atlantic City Casino Ass\u2019n v. City of Atlantic City, 217 N.J.Super. 277, 525 A.2d 1109(rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending), remanded, 102 N.J. 323, 508 A.2d 203 (1985); Bowen v. Mabry, 154 N.C.App. 734, 572 S.E.2d 809 (2002)(General Assembly has power to amend statute that it believes has been misconstrued by the courts and \u201cundo any perceived undesirable past consequences of misinterpretation of its work product\u201d unless retroactive application impairs vested rights, quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes \u00a7 411, at 568 (1999)); cf. In re Kirchner, 164 Ill.2d 468, 208 Ill.Dec. 268, 649 N.E.2d 324 (1995)(refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties\u2019 rights)."},"case_id":9025877,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The G'i'eenwood Village court held that the trial court was correct in doing so and that it must proceed to apply the provisions contained in the revised statute.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"General Assembly has power to amend statute that it believes has been misconstrued by the courts and \"undo any perceived undesirable past consequences of misinterpretation of its work product\" unless retroactive application impairs vested rights, quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes SS 411, at 568 (1999","sentence":"See Perry v. City of Denver, 27 Colo. 93, 59 P. 747 (1899)(pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation); see also Gen. Tel. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Ill.2d 363, 83 Ill.Dec. 133, 469 N.E.2d 1067 (1984)(holding legislature\u2019s intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power); Schlenz v. Castle, 84 Ill.2d 196, 49 Ill.Dec. 322, 417 N.E.2d 1336 (1981)(rejecting separation of powers challenge where legislature\u2019s curative act did not have effect of setting aside final adjudication); Andresen v. Andresen, 317 Md. 380, 564 A.2d 399, 401 (1989)(affirming dismissal of motion to modify property distribution where final dissolution decree was entered, Congress enacted relevant law and intended retroactive effect, but motion did not allege sufficient facts to set aside final order); Atlantic City Casino Ass\u2019n v. City of Atlantic City, 217 N.J.Super. 277, 525 A.2d 1109(rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending), remanded, 102 N.J. 323, 508 A.2d 203 (1985); Bowen v. Mabry, 154 N.C.App. 734, 572 S.E.2d 809 (2002)(General Assembly has power to amend statute that it believes has been misconstrued by the courts and \u201cundo any perceived undesirable past consequences of misinterpretation of its work product\u201d unless retroactive application impairs vested rights, quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes \u00a7 411, at 568 (1999)); cf. In re Kirchner, 164 Ill.2d 468, 208 Ill.Dec. 268, 649 N.E.2d 324 (1995)(refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties\u2019 rights)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties' rights","sentence":"See Perry v. City of Denver, 27 Colo. 93, 59 P. 747 (1899)(pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation); see also Gen. Tel. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Ill.2d 363, 83 Ill.Dec. 133, 469 N.E.2d 1067 (1984)(holding legislature\u2019s intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power); Schlenz v. Castle, 84 Ill.2d 196, 49 Ill.Dec. 322, 417 N.E.2d 1336 (1981)(rejecting separation of powers challenge where legislature\u2019s curative act did not have effect of setting aside final adjudication); Andresen v. Andresen, 317 Md. 380, 564 A.2d 399, 401 (1989)(affirming dismissal of motion to modify property distribution where final dissolution decree was entered, Congress enacted relevant law and intended retroactive effect, but motion did not allege sufficient facts to set aside final order); Atlantic City Casino Ass\u2019n v. City of Atlantic City, 217 N.J.Super. 277, 525 A.2d 1109(rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending), remanded, 102 N.J. 323, 508 A.2d 203 (1985); Bowen v. Mabry, 154 N.C.App. 734, 572 S.E.2d 809 (2002)(General Assembly has power to amend statute that it believes has been misconstrued by the courts and \u201cundo any perceived undesirable past consequences of misinterpretation of its work product\u201d unless retroactive application impairs vested rights, quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes \u00a7 411, at 568 (1999)); cf. In re Kirchner, 164 Ill.2d 468, 208 Ill.Dec. 268, 649 N.E.2d 324 (1995)(refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties\u2019 rights)."},"case_id":9025877,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The G'i'eenwood Village court held that the trial court was correct in doing so and that it must proceed to apply the provisions contained in the revised statute.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"General Assembly has power to amend statute that it believes has been misconstrued by the courts and \"undo any perceived undesirable past consequences of misinterpretation of its work product\" unless retroactive application impairs vested rights, quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes SS 411, at 568 (1999","sentence":"See Perry v. City of Denver, 27 Colo. 93, 59 P. 747 (1899)(pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation); see also Gen. Tel. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Ill.2d 363, 83 Ill.Dec. 133, 469 N.E.2d 1067 (1984)(holding legislature\u2019s intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power); Schlenz v. Castle, 84 Ill.2d 196, 49 Ill.Dec. 322, 417 N.E.2d 1336 (1981)(rejecting separation of powers challenge where legislature\u2019s curative act did not have effect of setting aside final adjudication); Andresen v. Andresen, 317 Md. 380, 564 A.2d 399, 401 (1989)(affirming dismissal of motion to modify property distribution where final dissolution decree was entered, Congress enacted relevant law and intended retroactive effect, but motion did not allege sufficient facts to set aside final order); Atlantic City Casino Ass\u2019n v. City of Atlantic City, 217 N.J.Super. 277, 525 A.2d 1109(rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending), remanded, 102 N.J. 323, 508 A.2d 203 (1985); Bowen v. Mabry, 154 N.C.App. 734, 572 S.E.2d 809 (2002)(General Assembly has power to amend statute that it believes has been misconstrued by the courts and \u201cundo any perceived undesirable past consequences of misinterpretation of its work product\u201d unless retroactive application impairs vested rights, quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes \u00a7 411, at 568 (1999)); cf. In re Kirchner, 164 Ill.2d 468, 208 Ill.Dec. 268, 649 N.E.2d 324 (1995)(refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties\u2019 rights)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties' rights","sentence":"See Perry v. City of Denver, 27 Colo. 93, 59 P. 747 (1899)(pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation); see also Gen. Tel. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Ill.2d 363, 83 Ill.Dec. 133, 469 N.E.2d 1067 (1984)(holding legislature\u2019s intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power); Schlenz v. Castle, 84 Ill.2d 196, 49 Ill.Dec. 322, 417 N.E.2d 1336 (1981)(rejecting separation of powers challenge where legislature\u2019s curative act did not have effect of setting aside final adjudication); Andresen v. Andresen, 317 Md. 380, 564 A.2d 399, 401 (1989)(affirming dismissal of motion to modify property distribution where final dissolution decree was entered, Congress enacted relevant law and intended retroactive effect, but motion did not allege sufficient facts to set aside final order); Atlantic City Casino Ass\u2019n v. City of Atlantic City, 217 N.J.Super. 277, 525 A.2d 1109(rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending), remanded, 102 N.J. 323, 508 A.2d 203 (1985); Bowen v. Mabry, 154 N.C.App. 734, 572 S.E.2d 809 (2002)(General Assembly has power to amend statute that it believes has been misconstrued by the courts and \u201cundo any perceived undesirable past consequences of misinterpretation of its work product\u201d unless retroactive application impairs vested rights, quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes \u00a7 411, at 568 (1999)); cf. In re Kirchner, 164 Ill.2d 468, 208 Ill.Dec. 268, 649 N.E.2d 324 (1995)(refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties\u2019 rights)."},"case_id":9025877,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The G'i'eenwood Village court held that the trial court was correct in doing so and that it must proceed to apply the provisions contained in the revised statute.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"General Assembly has power to amend statute that it believes has been misconstrued by the courts and \"undo any perceived undesirable past consequences of misinterpretation of its work product\" unless retroactive application impairs vested rights, quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes SS 411, at 568 (1999","sentence":"See Perry v. City of Denver, 27 Colo. 93, 59 P. 747 (1899)(pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation); see also Gen. Tel. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Ill.2d 363, 83 Ill.Dec. 133, 469 N.E.2d 1067 (1984)(holding legislature\u2019s intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power); Schlenz v. Castle, 84 Ill.2d 196, 49 Ill.Dec. 322, 417 N.E.2d 1336 (1981)(rejecting separation of powers challenge where legislature\u2019s curative act did not have effect of setting aside final adjudication); Andresen v. Andresen, 317 Md. 380, 564 A.2d 399, 401 (1989)(affirming dismissal of motion to modify property distribution where final dissolution decree was entered, Congress enacted relevant law and intended retroactive effect, but motion did not allege sufficient facts to set aside final order); Atlantic City Casino Ass\u2019n v. City of Atlantic City, 217 N.J.Super. 277, 525 A.2d 1109(rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending), remanded, 102 N.J. 323, 508 A.2d 203 (1985); Bowen v. Mabry, 154 N.C.App. 734, 572 S.E.2d 809 (2002)(General Assembly has power to amend statute that it believes has been misconstrued by the courts and \u201cundo any perceived undesirable past consequences of misinterpretation of its work product\u201d unless retroactive application impairs vested rights, quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes \u00a7 411, at 568 (1999)); cf. In re Kirchner, 164 Ill.2d 468, 208 Ill.Dec. 268, 649 N.E.2d 324 (1995)(refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties\u2019 rights)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties' rights","sentence":"See Perry v. City of Denver, 27 Colo. 93, 59 P. 747 (1899)(pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation); see also Gen. Tel. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Ill.2d 363, 83 Ill.Dec. 133, 469 N.E.2d 1067 (1984)(holding legislature\u2019s intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power); Schlenz v. Castle, 84 Ill.2d 196, 49 Ill.Dec. 322, 417 N.E.2d 1336 (1981)(rejecting separation of powers challenge where legislature\u2019s curative act did not have effect of setting aside final adjudication); Andresen v. Andresen, 317 Md. 380, 564 A.2d 399, 401 (1989)(affirming dismissal of motion to modify property distribution where final dissolution decree was entered, Congress enacted relevant law and intended retroactive effect, but motion did not allege sufficient facts to set aside final order); Atlantic City Casino Ass\u2019n v. City of Atlantic City, 217 N.J.Super. 277, 525 A.2d 1109(rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending), remanded, 102 N.J. 323, 508 A.2d 203 (1985); Bowen v. Mabry, 154 N.C.App. 734, 572 S.E.2d 809 (2002)(General Assembly has power to amend statute that it believes has been misconstrued by the courts and \u201cundo any perceived undesirable past consequences of misinterpretation of its work product\u201d unless retroactive application impairs vested rights, quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes \u00a7 411, at 568 (1999)); cf. In re Kirchner, 164 Ill.2d 468, 208 Ill.Dec. 268, 649 N.E.2d 324 (1995)(refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties\u2019 rights)."},"case_id":9025877,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The G'i'eenwood Village court held that the trial court was correct in doing so and that it must proceed to apply the provisions contained in the revised statute.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"General Assembly has power to amend statute that it believes has been misconstrued by the courts and \"undo any perceived undesirable past consequences of misinterpretation of its work product\" unless retroactive application impairs vested rights, quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes SS 411, at 568 (1999","sentence":"See Perry v. City of Denver, 27 Colo. 93, 59 P. 747 (1899)(pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation); see also Gen. Tel. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Ill.2d 363, 83 Ill.Dec. 133, 469 N.E.2d 1067 (1984)(holding legislature\u2019s intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power); Schlenz v. Castle, 84 Ill.2d 196, 49 Ill.Dec. 322, 417 N.E.2d 1336 (1981)(rejecting separation of powers challenge where legislature\u2019s curative act did not have effect of setting aside final adjudication); Andresen v. Andresen, 317 Md. 380, 564 A.2d 399, 401 (1989)(affirming dismissal of motion to modify property distribution where final dissolution decree was entered, Congress enacted relevant law and intended retroactive effect, but motion did not allege sufficient facts to set aside final order); Atlantic City Casino Ass\u2019n v. City of Atlantic City, 217 N.J.Super. 277, 525 A.2d 1109(rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending), remanded, 102 N.J. 323, 508 A.2d 203 (1985); Bowen v. Mabry, 154 N.C.App. 734, 572 S.E.2d 809 (2002)(General Assembly has power to amend statute that it believes has been misconstrued by the courts and \u201cundo any perceived undesirable past consequences of misinterpretation of its work product\u201d unless retroactive application impairs vested rights, quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes \u00a7 411, at 568 (1999)); cf. In re Kirchner, 164 Ill.2d 468, 208 Ill.Dec. 268, 649 N.E.2d 324 (1995)(refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties\u2019 rights)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties' rights","sentence":"See Perry v. City of Denver, 27 Colo. 93, 59 P. 747 (1899)(pending annexations are subject to additional procedures of statutes enacted by the General Assembly after initiation of the pending but as yet uncompleted annexation); see also Gen. Tel. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Ill.2d 363, 83 Ill.Dec. 133, 469 N.E.2d 1067 (1984)(holding legislature\u2019s intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power); Schlenz v. Castle, 84 Ill.2d 196, 49 Ill.Dec. 322, 417 N.E.2d 1336 (1981)(rejecting separation of powers challenge where legislature\u2019s curative act did not have effect of setting aside final adjudication); Andresen v. Andresen, 317 Md. 380, 564 A.2d 399, 401 (1989)(affirming dismissal of motion to modify property distribution where final dissolution decree was entered, Congress enacted relevant law and intended retroactive effect, but motion did not allege sufficient facts to set aside final order); Atlantic City Casino Ass\u2019n v. City of Atlantic City, 217 N.J.Super. 277, 525 A.2d 1109(rejecting separation of powers challenge where litigation upon which legislature purportedly intruded was still pending), remanded, 102 N.J. 323, 508 A.2d 203 (1985); Bowen v. Mabry, 154 N.C.App. 734, 572 S.E.2d 809 (2002)(General Assembly has power to amend statute that it believes has been misconstrued by the courts and \u201cundo any perceived undesirable past consequences of misinterpretation of its work product\u201d unless retroactive application impairs vested rights, quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes \u00a7 411, at 568 (1999)); cf. In re Kirchner, 164 Ill.2d 468, 208 Ill.Dec. 268, 649 N.E.2d 324 (1995)(refusing to apply statute that changed final judicial determination of parties\u2019 rights)."},"case_id":9025877,"label":"a"}
{"context":"As the president and CEO of the entire Industrial Systems Division, however, Defendant Trotter could potentially be hable for Plaintiffs ultimate termination from the Transmission Leader position. Individual liability under Ohio Revised Code chapter 4112 extends only to an individual's own actions, and therefore, only to direct supervisors or supervisors who played a direct role in making an employment decision.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"211 F.R.D. 320, 327","parenthetical":"finding that under Genaro, \"only the 'decision maker' of the adverse employment action is liable\"","sentence":"See Genaro, 703 N.E.2d at 787 (\u201c[IJndividual supervisors and managers are accountable for their own discriminatory conduct occurring in the workplace environment.\u201d) (emphasis added); see also Brown v. Worthington Steel, Inc., 211 F.R.D. 320, 327 (S.D.Ohio 2002) (finding that under Genaro, \u201conly the \u2018decision maker\u2019 of the adverse employment action is liable\u201d) (quoting Jones v. Kilboume Med. Labs., 162 F.Supp.2d 813, 830 (S.D.Ohio 2000))."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"703 N.E.2d 787, 787","parenthetical":"\"[IJndividual supervisors and managers are accountable for their own discriminatory conduct occurring in the workplace environment.\"","sentence":"See Genaro, 703 N.E.2d at 787 (\u201c[IJndividual supervisors and managers are accountable for their own discriminatory conduct occurring in the workplace environment.\u201d) (emphasis added); see also Brown v. Worthington Steel, Inc., 211 F.R.D. 320, 327 (S.D.Ohio 2002) (finding that under Genaro, \u201conly the \u2018decision maker\u2019 of the adverse employment action is liable\u201d) (quoting Jones v. Kilboume Med. Labs., 162 F.Supp.2d 813, 830 (S.D.Ohio 2000))."},"case_id":9104926,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The State argues that the court did not have to hear testimony to reach that conclusion because its offer of proof was a sufficient basis on which to conclude that the event actually occurred. \"Where the existence of a prior bad act is contested, the trial court should conduct a pretrial hearing so that it can hear the testimony and determine which version is more credible.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"120 Wn.2d 653, 653","parenthetical":"\"trial court's preliminary finding\" that a prior bad act was proved by a preponderance of the evidence will be upheld if supported by substantial evidence (italics ours","sentence":"State v. Stanton, 68 Wn. App. 855, 865, 845 P.2d 1365 (1993) (\"uncharged act must be proved by \u00e1 preponderance of evidence before it can be admitted under ER 404(b)\u201d); see Benn, 120 Wn.2d at 653 (\"trial court\u2019s preliminary finding\u201d that a prior bad act was proved by a preponderance of the evidence will be upheld if supported by substantial evidence (italics ours))."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"68 Wn. App. 855, 865","parenthetical":"\"uncharged act must be proved by a preponderance of evidence before it can be admitted under ER 404(b)\"","sentence":"State v. Stanton, 68 Wn. App. 855, 865, 845 P.2d 1365 (1993) (\"uncharged act must be proved by \u00e1 preponderance of evidence before it can be admitted under ER 404(b)\u201d); see Benn, 120 Wn.2d at 653 (\"trial court\u2019s preliminary finding\u201d that a prior bad act was proved by a preponderance of the evidence will be upheld if supported by substantial evidence (italics ours))."},"case_id":423532,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The State argues that the court did not have to hear testimony to reach that conclusion because its offer of proof was a sufficient basis on which to conclude that the event actually occurred. \"Where the existence of a prior bad act is contested, the trial court should conduct a pretrial hearing so that it can hear the testimony and determine which version is more credible.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"120 Wn.2d 653, 653","parenthetical":"\"trial court's preliminary finding\" that a prior bad act was proved by a preponderance of the evidence will be upheld if supported by substantial evidence (italics ours","sentence":"State v. Stanton, 68 Wn. App. 855, 865, 845 P.2d 1365 (1993) (\"uncharged act must be proved by \u00e1 preponderance of evidence before it can be admitted under ER 404(b)\u201d); see Benn, 120 Wn.2d at 653 (\"trial court\u2019s preliminary finding\u201d that a prior bad act was proved by a preponderance of the evidence will be upheld if supported by substantial evidence (italics ours))."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"uncharged act must be proved by a preponderance of evidence before it can be admitted under ER 404(b)\"","sentence":"State v. Stanton, 68 Wn. App. 855, 865, 845 P.2d 1365 (1993) (\"uncharged act must be proved by \u00e1 preponderance of evidence before it can be admitted under ER 404(b)\u201d); see Benn, 120 Wn.2d at 653 (\"trial court\u2019s preliminary finding\u201d that a prior bad act was proved by a preponderance of the evidence will be upheld if supported by substantial evidence (italics ours))."},"case_id":423532,"label":"b"}
{"context":"It is true that the general rule \"appears to assume that the insured or applicant does not have reason to know of the information's materiality apart from whether the insurer makes an inquiry. Such knowledge, combined with knowledge that the insurer is ignorant of the information, generally would impose a duty to disclose.\" 6 Russ & Segalla, supra, SS 84:2. The general rule, however, is not without exception. As at least one decision in this District has recognized, many state courts allow claims for \"[fraudulent concealment ... even without inquiry concerning the concealed material facts by the insurer.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"106 A.D.2d 892, 892-93","parenthetical":"allowing a claim for fraudulent concealment based on omitting the fact that fires had occurred in the plaintiffs' basement several months before applying for insurance, even though \"plaintiffs were asked no question with relation to prior fires\"","sentence":"Putnam Res. v. Pateman, 757 F.Supp. 157, 162 n. 1 (D.R.I.1991); see Lighton v. Madison-Onondaga Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 106 A.D.2d 892, 892-93, 483 N.Y.S.2d 515 (N.Y.App.Div.1984) (allowing a claim for fraudulent concealment based on omitting the fact that fires had occurred in the plaintiffs\u2019 basement several months before applying for insurance, even though \u201cplaintiffs were asked no question with relation to prior fires\u201d); Sun Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Hercules Sec. Unlimited, Inc., 195 A.D.2d 24, 30, 605 N.Y.S.2d 767 (N.Y.App.Div.1993) (affirming judgment on claim for fraudulent concealment even though \u201cthe insured ha[d] not been asked\u201d about the concealed fact that the insured planned to steal the insured assets); see also Harrison State Bank v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 94 Mont. 100, 22 P.2d 1061, 1064 (1933) (stating that \u201cany concealment of a material fact known to a party, increasing the ordinary risk, would be deemed ... fraudulent,\u201d and explaining that the applicant for bank insurance knew of a planned robbery that law enforcement intended to allow in an attempt to catch the criminals)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"stating that \"any concealment of a material fact known to a party, increasing the ordinary risk, would be deemed ... fraudulent,\" and explaining that the applicant for bank insurance knew of a planned robbery that law enforcement intended to allow in an attempt to catch the criminals","sentence":"Putnam Res. v. Pateman, 757 F.Supp. 157, 162 n. 1 (D.R.I.1991); see Lighton v. Madison-Onondaga Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 106 A.D.2d 892, 892-93, 483 N.Y.S.2d 515 (N.Y.App.Div.1984) (allowing a claim for fraudulent concealment based on omitting the fact that fires had occurred in the plaintiffs\u2019 basement several months before applying for insurance, even though \u201cplaintiffs were asked no question with relation to prior fires\u201d); Sun Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Hercules Sec. Unlimited, Inc., 195 A.D.2d 24, 30, 605 N.Y.S.2d 767 (N.Y.App.Div.1993) (affirming judgment on claim for fraudulent concealment even though \u201cthe insured ha[d] not been asked\u201d about the concealed fact that the insured planned to steal the insured assets); see also Harrison State Bank v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 94 Mont. 100, 22 P.2d 1061, 1064 (1933) (stating that \u201cany concealment of a material fact known to a party, increasing the ordinary risk, would be deemed ... fraudulent,\u201d and explaining that the applicant for bank insurance knew of a planned robbery that law enforcement intended to allow in an attempt to catch the criminals)."},"case_id":4032161,"label":"a"}
{"context":"It is true that the general rule \"appears to assume that the insured or applicant does not have reason to know of the information's materiality apart from whether the insurer makes an inquiry. Such knowledge, combined with knowledge that the insurer is ignorant of the information, generally would impose a duty to disclose.\" 6 Russ & Segalla, supra, SS 84:2. The general rule, however, is not without exception. As at least one decision in this District has recognized, many state courts allow claims for \"[fraudulent concealment ... even without inquiry concerning the concealed material facts by the insurer.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"22 P.2d 1061, 1064","parenthetical":"stating that \"any concealment of a material fact known to a party, increasing the ordinary risk, would be deemed ... fraudulent,\" and explaining that the applicant for bank insurance knew of a planned robbery that law enforcement intended to allow in an attempt to catch the criminals","sentence":"Putnam Res. v. Pateman, 757 F.Supp. 157, 162 n. 1 (D.R.I.1991); see Lighton v. Madison-Onondaga Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 106 A.D.2d 892, 892-93, 483 N.Y.S.2d 515 (N.Y.App.Div.1984) (allowing a claim for fraudulent concealment based on omitting the fact that fires had occurred in the plaintiffs\u2019 basement several months before applying for insurance, even though \u201cplaintiffs were asked no question with relation to prior fires\u201d); Sun Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Hercules Sec. Unlimited, Inc., 195 A.D.2d 24, 30, 605 N.Y.S.2d 767 (N.Y.App.Div.1993) (affirming judgment on claim for fraudulent concealment even though \u201cthe insured ha[d] not been asked\u201d about the concealed fact that the insured planned to steal the insured assets); see also Harrison State Bank v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 94 Mont. 100, 22 P.2d 1061, 1064 (1933) (stating that \u201cany concealment of a material fact known to a party, increasing the ordinary risk, would be deemed ... fraudulent,\u201d and explaining that the applicant for bank insurance knew of a planned robbery that law enforcement intended to allow in an attempt to catch the criminals)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"106 A.D.2d 892, 892-93","parenthetical":"allowing a claim for fraudulent concealment based on omitting the fact that fires had occurred in the plaintiffs' basement several months before applying for insurance, even though \"plaintiffs were asked no question with relation to prior fires\"","sentence":"Putnam Res. v. Pateman, 757 F.Supp. 157, 162 n. 1 (D.R.I.1991); see Lighton v. Madison-Onondaga Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 106 A.D.2d 892, 892-93, 483 N.Y.S.2d 515 (N.Y.App.Div.1984) (allowing a claim for fraudulent concealment based on omitting the fact that fires had occurred in the plaintiffs\u2019 basement several months before applying for insurance, even though \u201cplaintiffs were asked no question with relation to prior fires\u201d); Sun Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Hercules Sec. Unlimited, Inc., 195 A.D.2d 24, 30, 605 N.Y.S.2d 767 (N.Y.App.Div.1993) (affirming judgment on claim for fraudulent concealment even though \u201cthe insured ha[d] not been asked\u201d about the concealed fact that the insured planned to steal the insured assets); see also Harrison State Bank v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 94 Mont. 100, 22 P.2d 1061, 1064 (1933) (stating that \u201cany concealment of a material fact known to a party, increasing the ordinary risk, would be deemed ... fraudulent,\u201d and explaining that the applicant for bank insurance knew of a planned robbery that law enforcement intended to allow in an attempt to catch the criminals)."},"case_id":4032161,"label":"b"}
{"context":"It is true that the general rule \"appears to assume that the insured or applicant does not have reason to know of the information's materiality apart from whether the insurer makes an inquiry. Such knowledge, combined with knowledge that the insurer is ignorant of the information, generally would impose a duty to disclose.\" 6 Russ & Segalla, supra, SS 84:2. The general rule, however, is not without exception. As at least one decision in this District has recognized, many state courts allow claims for \"[fraudulent concealment ... even without inquiry concerning the concealed material facts by the insurer.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"allowing a claim for fraudulent concealment based on omitting the fact that fires had occurred in the plaintiffs' basement several months before applying for insurance, even though \"plaintiffs were asked no question with relation to prior fires\"","sentence":"Putnam Res. v. Pateman, 757 F.Supp. 157, 162 n. 1 (D.R.I.1991); see Lighton v. Madison-Onondaga Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 106 A.D.2d 892, 892-93, 483 N.Y.S.2d 515 (N.Y.App.Div.1984) (allowing a claim for fraudulent concealment based on omitting the fact that fires had occurred in the plaintiffs\u2019 basement several months before applying for insurance, even though \u201cplaintiffs were asked no question with relation to prior fires\u201d); Sun Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Hercules Sec. Unlimited, Inc., 195 A.D.2d 24, 30, 605 N.Y.S.2d 767 (N.Y.App.Div.1993) (affirming judgment on claim for fraudulent concealment even though \u201cthe insured ha[d] not been asked\u201d about the concealed fact that the insured planned to steal the insured assets); see also Harrison State Bank v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 94 Mont. 100, 22 P.2d 1061, 1064 (1933) (stating that \u201cany concealment of a material fact known to a party, increasing the ordinary risk, would be deemed ... fraudulent,\u201d and explaining that the applicant for bank insurance knew of a planned robbery that law enforcement intended to allow in an attempt to catch the criminals)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"stating that \"any concealment of a material fact known to a party, increasing the ordinary risk, would be deemed ... fraudulent,\" and explaining that the applicant for bank insurance knew of a planned robbery that law enforcement intended to allow in an attempt to catch the criminals","sentence":"Putnam Res. v. Pateman, 757 F.Supp. 157, 162 n. 1 (D.R.I.1991); see Lighton v. Madison-Onondaga Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 106 A.D.2d 892, 892-93, 483 N.Y.S.2d 515 (N.Y.App.Div.1984) (allowing a claim for fraudulent concealment based on omitting the fact that fires had occurred in the plaintiffs\u2019 basement several months before applying for insurance, even though \u201cplaintiffs were asked no question with relation to prior fires\u201d); Sun Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Hercules Sec. Unlimited, Inc., 195 A.D.2d 24, 30, 605 N.Y.S.2d 767 (N.Y.App.Div.1993) (affirming judgment on claim for fraudulent concealment even though \u201cthe insured ha[d] not been asked\u201d about the concealed fact that the insured planned to steal the insured assets); see also Harrison State Bank v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 94 Mont. 100, 22 P.2d 1061, 1064 (1933) (stating that \u201cany concealment of a material fact known to a party, increasing the ordinary risk, would be deemed ... fraudulent,\u201d and explaining that the applicant for bank insurance knew of a planned robbery that law enforcement intended to allow in an attempt to catch the criminals)."},"case_id":4032161,"label":"a"}
{"context":"It is true that the general rule \"appears to assume that the insured or applicant does not have reason to know of the information's materiality apart from whether the insurer makes an inquiry. Such knowledge, combined with knowledge that the insurer is ignorant of the information, generally would impose a duty to disclose.\" 6 Russ & Segalla, supra, SS 84:2. The general rule, however, is not without exception. As at least one decision in this District has recognized, many state courts allow claims for \"[fraudulent concealment ... even without inquiry concerning the concealed material facts by the insurer.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"22 P.2d 1061, 1064","parenthetical":"stating that \"any concealment of a material fact known to a party, increasing the ordinary risk, would be deemed ... fraudulent,\" and explaining that the applicant for bank insurance knew of a planned robbery that law enforcement intended to allow in an attempt to catch the criminals","sentence":"Putnam Res. v. Pateman, 757 F.Supp. 157, 162 n. 1 (D.R.I.1991); see Lighton v. Madison-Onondaga Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 106 A.D.2d 892, 892-93, 483 N.Y.S.2d 515 (N.Y.App.Div.1984) (allowing a claim for fraudulent concealment based on omitting the fact that fires had occurred in the plaintiffs\u2019 basement several months before applying for insurance, even though \u201cplaintiffs were asked no question with relation to prior fires\u201d); Sun Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Hercules Sec. Unlimited, Inc., 195 A.D.2d 24, 30, 605 N.Y.S.2d 767 (N.Y.App.Div.1993) (affirming judgment on claim for fraudulent concealment even though \u201cthe insured ha[d] not been asked\u201d about the concealed fact that the insured planned to steal the insured assets); see also Harrison State Bank v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 94 Mont. 100, 22 P.2d 1061, 1064 (1933) (stating that \u201cany concealment of a material fact known to a party, increasing the ordinary risk, would be deemed ... fraudulent,\u201d and explaining that the applicant for bank insurance knew of a planned robbery that law enforcement intended to allow in an attempt to catch the criminals)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"allowing a claim for fraudulent concealment based on omitting the fact that fires had occurred in the plaintiffs' basement several months before applying for insurance, even though \"plaintiffs were asked no question with relation to prior fires\"","sentence":"Putnam Res. v. Pateman, 757 F.Supp. 157, 162 n. 1 (D.R.I.1991); see Lighton v. Madison-Onondaga Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 106 A.D.2d 892, 892-93, 483 N.Y.S.2d 515 (N.Y.App.Div.1984) (allowing a claim for fraudulent concealment based on omitting the fact that fires had occurred in the plaintiffs\u2019 basement several months before applying for insurance, even though \u201cplaintiffs were asked no question with relation to prior fires\u201d); Sun Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Hercules Sec. Unlimited, Inc., 195 A.D.2d 24, 30, 605 N.Y.S.2d 767 (N.Y.App.Div.1993) (affirming judgment on claim for fraudulent concealment even though \u201cthe insured ha[d] not been asked\u201d about the concealed fact that the insured planned to steal the insured assets); see also Harrison State Bank v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 94 Mont. 100, 22 P.2d 1061, 1064 (1933) (stating that \u201cany concealment of a material fact known to a party, increasing the ordinary risk, would be deemed ... fraudulent,\u201d and explaining that the applicant for bank insurance knew of a planned robbery that law enforcement intended to allow in an attempt to catch the criminals)."},"case_id":4032161,"label":"b"}
{"context":"It is true that the general rule \"appears to assume that the insured or applicant does not have reason to know of the information's materiality apart from whether the insurer makes an inquiry. Such knowledge, combined with knowledge that the insurer is ignorant of the information, generally would impose a duty to disclose.\" 6 Russ & Segalla, supra, SS 84:2. The general rule, however, is not without exception. As at least one decision in this District has recognized, many state courts allow claims for \"[fraudulent concealment ... even without inquiry concerning the concealed material facts by the insurer.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"stating that \"any concealment of a material fact known to a party, increasing the ordinary risk, would be deemed ... fraudulent,\" and explaining that the applicant for bank insurance knew of a planned robbery that law enforcement intended to allow in an attempt to catch the criminals","sentence":"Putnam Res. v. Pateman, 757 F.Supp. 157, 162 n. 1 (D.R.I.1991); see Lighton v. Madison-Onondaga Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 106 A.D.2d 892, 892-93, 483 N.Y.S.2d 515 (N.Y.App.Div.1984) (allowing a claim for fraudulent concealment based on omitting the fact that fires had occurred in the plaintiffs\u2019 basement several months before applying for insurance, even though \u201cplaintiffs were asked no question with relation to prior fires\u201d); Sun Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Hercules Sec. Unlimited, Inc., 195 A.D.2d 24, 30, 605 N.Y.S.2d 767 (N.Y.App.Div.1993) (affirming judgment on claim for fraudulent concealment even though \u201cthe insured ha[d] not been asked\u201d about the concealed fact that the insured planned to steal the insured assets); see also Harrison State Bank v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 94 Mont. 100, 22 P.2d 1061, 1064 (1933) (stating that \u201cany concealment of a material fact known to a party, increasing the ordinary risk, would be deemed ... fraudulent,\u201d and explaining that the applicant for bank insurance knew of a planned robbery that law enforcement intended to allow in an attempt to catch the criminals)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"195 A.D.2d 24, 30","parenthetical":"affirming judgment on claim for fraudulent concealment even though \"the insured ha[d] not been asked\" about the concealed fact that the insured planned to steal the insured assets","sentence":"Putnam Res. v. Pateman, 757 F.Supp. 157, 162 n. 1 (D.R.I.1991); see Lighton v. Madison-Onondaga Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 106 A.D.2d 892, 892-93, 483 N.Y.S.2d 515 (N.Y.App.Div.1984) (allowing a claim for fraudulent concealment based on omitting the fact that fires had occurred in the plaintiffs\u2019 basement several months before applying for insurance, even though \u201cplaintiffs were asked no question with relation to prior fires\u201d); Sun Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Hercules Sec. Unlimited, Inc., 195 A.D.2d 24, 30, 605 N.Y.S.2d 767 (N.Y.App.Div.1993) (affirming judgment on claim for fraudulent concealment even though \u201cthe insured ha[d] not been asked\u201d about the concealed fact that the insured planned to steal the insured assets); see also Harrison State Bank v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 94 Mont. 100, 22 P.2d 1061, 1064 (1933) (stating that \u201cany concealment of a material fact known to a party, increasing the ordinary risk, would be deemed ... fraudulent,\u201d and explaining that the applicant for bank insurance knew of a planned robbery that law enforcement intended to allow in an attempt to catch the criminals)."},"case_id":4032161,"label":"b"}
{"context":"It is true that the general rule \"appears to assume that the insured or applicant does not have reason to know of the information's materiality apart from whether the insurer makes an inquiry. Such knowledge, combined with knowledge that the insurer is ignorant of the information, generally would impose a duty to disclose.\" 6 Russ & Segalla, supra, SS 84:2. The general rule, however, is not without exception. As at least one decision in this District has recognized, many state courts allow claims for \"[fraudulent concealment ... even without inquiry concerning the concealed material facts by the insurer.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"22 P.2d 1061, 1064","parenthetical":"stating that \"any concealment of a material fact known to a party, increasing the ordinary risk, would be deemed ... fraudulent,\" and explaining that the applicant for bank insurance knew of a planned robbery that law enforcement intended to allow in an attempt to catch the criminals","sentence":"Putnam Res. v. Pateman, 757 F.Supp. 157, 162 n. 1 (D.R.I.1991); see Lighton v. Madison-Onondaga Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 106 A.D.2d 892, 892-93, 483 N.Y.S.2d 515 (N.Y.App.Div.1984) (allowing a claim for fraudulent concealment based on omitting the fact that fires had occurred in the plaintiffs\u2019 basement several months before applying for insurance, even though \u201cplaintiffs were asked no question with relation to prior fires\u201d); Sun Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Hercules Sec. Unlimited, Inc., 195 A.D.2d 24, 30, 605 N.Y.S.2d 767 (N.Y.App.Div.1993) (affirming judgment on claim for fraudulent concealment even though \u201cthe insured ha[d] not been asked\u201d about the concealed fact that the insured planned to steal the insured assets); see also Harrison State Bank v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 94 Mont. 100, 22 P.2d 1061, 1064 (1933) (stating that \u201cany concealment of a material fact known to a party, increasing the ordinary risk, would be deemed ... fraudulent,\u201d and explaining that the applicant for bank insurance knew of a planned robbery that law enforcement intended to allow in an attempt to catch the criminals)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"195 A.D.2d 24, 30","parenthetical":"affirming judgment on claim for fraudulent concealment even though \"the insured ha[d] not been asked\" about the concealed fact that the insured planned to steal the insured assets","sentence":"Putnam Res. v. Pateman, 757 F.Supp. 157, 162 n. 1 (D.R.I.1991); see Lighton v. Madison-Onondaga Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 106 A.D.2d 892, 892-93, 483 N.Y.S.2d 515 (N.Y.App.Div.1984) (allowing a claim for fraudulent concealment based on omitting the fact that fires had occurred in the plaintiffs\u2019 basement several months before applying for insurance, even though \u201cplaintiffs were asked no question with relation to prior fires\u201d); Sun Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Hercules Sec. Unlimited, Inc., 195 A.D.2d 24, 30, 605 N.Y.S.2d 767 (N.Y.App.Div.1993) (affirming judgment on claim for fraudulent concealment even though \u201cthe insured ha[d] not been asked\u201d about the concealed fact that the insured planned to steal the insured assets); see also Harrison State Bank v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 94 Mont. 100, 22 P.2d 1061, 1064 (1933) (stating that \u201cany concealment of a material fact known to a party, increasing the ordinary risk, would be deemed ... fraudulent,\u201d and explaining that the applicant for bank insurance knew of a planned robbery that law enforcement intended to allow in an attempt to catch the criminals)."},"case_id":4032161,"label":"b"}
{"context":"It is true that the general rule \"appears to assume that the insured or applicant does not have reason to know of the information's materiality apart from whether the insurer makes an inquiry. Such knowledge, combined with knowledge that the insurer is ignorant of the information, generally would impose a duty to disclose.\" 6 Russ & Segalla, supra, SS 84:2. The general rule, however, is not without exception. As at least one decision in this District has recognized, many state courts allow claims for \"[fraudulent concealment ... even without inquiry concerning the concealed material facts by the insurer.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"stating that \"any concealment of a material fact known to a party, increasing the ordinary risk, would be deemed ... fraudulent,\" and explaining that the applicant for bank insurance knew of a planned robbery that law enforcement intended to allow in an attempt to catch the criminals","sentence":"Putnam Res. v. Pateman, 757 F.Supp. 157, 162 n. 1 (D.R.I.1991); see Lighton v. Madison-Onondaga Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 106 A.D.2d 892, 892-93, 483 N.Y.S.2d 515 (N.Y.App.Div.1984) (allowing a claim for fraudulent concealment based on omitting the fact that fires had occurred in the plaintiffs\u2019 basement several months before applying for insurance, even though \u201cplaintiffs were asked no question with relation to prior fires\u201d); Sun Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Hercules Sec. Unlimited, Inc., 195 A.D.2d 24, 30, 605 N.Y.S.2d 767 (N.Y.App.Div.1993) (affirming judgment on claim for fraudulent concealment even though \u201cthe insured ha[d] not been asked\u201d about the concealed fact that the insured planned to steal the insured assets); see also Harrison State Bank v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 94 Mont. 100, 22 P.2d 1061, 1064 (1933) (stating that \u201cany concealment of a material fact known to a party, increasing the ordinary risk, would be deemed ... fraudulent,\u201d and explaining that the applicant for bank insurance knew of a planned robbery that law enforcement intended to allow in an attempt to catch the criminals)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"affirming judgment on claim for fraudulent concealment even though \"the insured ha[d] not been asked\" about the concealed fact that the insured planned to steal the insured assets","sentence":"Putnam Res. v. Pateman, 757 F.Supp. 157, 162 n. 1 (D.R.I.1991); see Lighton v. Madison-Onondaga Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 106 A.D.2d 892, 892-93, 483 N.Y.S.2d 515 (N.Y.App.Div.1984) (allowing a claim for fraudulent concealment based on omitting the fact that fires had occurred in the plaintiffs\u2019 basement several months before applying for insurance, even though \u201cplaintiffs were asked no question with relation to prior fires\u201d); Sun Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Hercules Sec. Unlimited, Inc., 195 A.D.2d 24, 30, 605 N.Y.S.2d 767 (N.Y.App.Div.1993) (affirming judgment on claim for fraudulent concealment even though \u201cthe insured ha[d] not been asked\u201d about the concealed fact that the insured planned to steal the insured assets); see also Harrison State Bank v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 94 Mont. 100, 22 P.2d 1061, 1064 (1933) (stating that \u201cany concealment of a material fact known to a party, increasing the ordinary risk, would be deemed ... fraudulent,\u201d and explaining that the applicant for bank insurance knew of a planned robbery that law enforcement intended to allow in an attempt to catch the criminals)."},"case_id":4032161,"label":"b"}
{"context":"It is true that the general rule \"appears to assume that the insured or applicant does not have reason to know of the information's materiality apart from whether the insurer makes an inquiry. Such knowledge, combined with knowledge that the insurer is ignorant of the information, generally would impose a duty to disclose.\" 6 Russ & Segalla, supra, SS 84:2. The general rule, however, is not without exception. As at least one decision in this District has recognized, many state courts allow claims for \"[fraudulent concealment ... even without inquiry concerning the concealed material facts by the insurer.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"22 P.2d 1061, 1064","parenthetical":"stating that \"any concealment of a material fact known to a party, increasing the ordinary risk, would be deemed ... fraudulent,\" and explaining that the applicant for bank insurance knew of a planned robbery that law enforcement intended to allow in an attempt to catch the criminals","sentence":"Putnam Res. v. Pateman, 757 F.Supp. 157, 162 n. 1 (D.R.I.1991); see Lighton v. Madison-Onondaga Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 106 A.D.2d 892, 892-93, 483 N.Y.S.2d 515 (N.Y.App.Div.1984) (allowing a claim for fraudulent concealment based on omitting the fact that fires had occurred in the plaintiffs\u2019 basement several months before applying for insurance, even though \u201cplaintiffs were asked no question with relation to prior fires\u201d); Sun Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Hercules Sec. Unlimited, Inc., 195 A.D.2d 24, 30, 605 N.Y.S.2d 767 (N.Y.App.Div.1993) (affirming judgment on claim for fraudulent concealment even though \u201cthe insured ha[d] not been asked\u201d about the concealed fact that the insured planned to steal the insured assets); see also Harrison State Bank v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 94 Mont. 100, 22 P.2d 1061, 1064 (1933) (stating that \u201cany concealment of a material fact known to a party, increasing the ordinary risk, would be deemed ... fraudulent,\u201d and explaining that the applicant for bank insurance knew of a planned robbery that law enforcement intended to allow in an attempt to catch the criminals)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"affirming judgment on claim for fraudulent concealment even though \"the insured ha[d] not been asked\" about the concealed fact that the insured planned to steal the insured assets","sentence":"Putnam Res. v. Pateman, 757 F.Supp. 157, 162 n. 1 (D.R.I.1991); see Lighton v. Madison-Onondaga Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 106 A.D.2d 892, 892-93, 483 N.Y.S.2d 515 (N.Y.App.Div.1984) (allowing a claim for fraudulent concealment based on omitting the fact that fires had occurred in the plaintiffs\u2019 basement several months before applying for insurance, even though \u201cplaintiffs were asked no question with relation to prior fires\u201d); Sun Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Hercules Sec. Unlimited, Inc., 195 A.D.2d 24, 30, 605 N.Y.S.2d 767 (N.Y.App.Div.1993) (affirming judgment on claim for fraudulent concealment even though \u201cthe insured ha[d] not been asked\u201d about the concealed fact that the insured planned to steal the insured assets); see also Harrison State Bank v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 94 Mont. 100, 22 P.2d 1061, 1064 (1933) (stating that \u201cany concealment of a material fact known to a party, increasing the ordinary risk, would be deemed ... fraudulent,\u201d and explaining that the applicant for bank insurance knew of a planned robbery that law enforcement intended to allow in an attempt to catch the criminals)."},"case_id":4032161,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Additionally, it is doubtful that this Court even has the authority to grant petitioner's motion, because to do so would require that it \"review the discretionary actions of the Court of Appeals\" to determine whether the Second Circuit erred by ignoring the supposedly fraudulent behavior of the Government. The Court has not located any Second Circuit authority addressing the question of whether a district court has the authority to review a decision of the Court of Appeals. However, other courts have answered that question in the negative.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"815 F.2d 1318, 1321","parenthetical":" \"Absent Supreme Court authority contrary to our decision in a case, a district court cannot entertain, even in a manner properly before it, a petition by a party which in effect seeks to undo our court's resolution of a matter first addressed to and fully and fairly adjudicated by it.\"","sentence":"See Feldman v. Henman, 815 F.2d 1318, 1321 (9th Cir.1987) ( \u201cAbsent Supreme Court authority contrary to our decision in a case, a district court cannot entertain, even in a manner properly before it, a petition by a party which in effect seeks to undo our court\u2019s resolution of a matter first addressed to and fully and fairly adjudicated by it.\u201d); Page v. United States, 884 F.2d 300, 302 (7th Cir.1989) (\u201cIf the court of appeals has actually considered and rejected a claim ... on appeal, that decision binds the district court unless there has been an intervening change in the law.\u201d); Rivera v. United States, 477 F.2d 927, 928 (3rd Cir.1973) (\u201cThe incongruity of a district court ruling and then implementing its ruling that the Court of Appeals erred.... is self-evident.\u201d); see also United States v. Sanders, 142 F.Supp. 638, 641(D.Md.l956) (\u201c[Tjhis court cannot properly vacate a sentence imposed here and affirmed by the Court of Appeals for any alleged or suggested error of the Court of Appeals.\u201d). This Court therefore cannot, and will not, review the discretionary decision of the Second Circuit."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"142 F.Supp. 638, 641","parenthetical":"\"[Tjhis court cannot properly vacate a sentence imposed here and affirmed by the Court of Appeals for any alleged or suggested error of the Court of Appeals.\"","sentence":"See Feldman v. Henman, 815 F.2d 1318, 1321 (9th Cir.1987) ( \u201cAbsent Supreme Court authority contrary to our decision in a case, a district court cannot entertain, even in a manner properly before it, a petition by a party which in effect seeks to undo our court\u2019s resolution of a matter first addressed to and fully and fairly adjudicated by it.\u201d); Page v. United States, 884 F.2d 300, 302 (7th Cir.1989) (\u201cIf the court of appeals has actually considered and rejected a claim ... on appeal, that decision binds the district court unless there has been an intervening change in the law.\u201d); Rivera v. United States, 477 F.2d 927, 928 (3rd Cir.1973) (\u201cThe incongruity of a district court ruling and then implementing its ruling that the Court of Appeals erred.... is self-evident.\u201d); see also United States v. Sanders, 142 F.Supp. 638, 641(D.Md.l956) (\u201c[Tjhis court cannot properly vacate a sentence imposed here and affirmed by the Court of Appeals for any alleged or suggested error of the Court of Appeals.\u201d). This Court therefore cannot, and will not, review the discretionary decision of the Second Circuit."},"case_id":1761361,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Additionally, it is doubtful that this Court even has the authority to grant petitioner's motion, because to do so would require that it \"review the discretionary actions of the Court of Appeals\" to determine whether the Second Circuit erred by ignoring the supposedly fraudulent behavior of the Government. The Court has not located any Second Circuit authority addressing the question of whether a district court has the authority to review a decision of the Court of Appeals. However, other courts have answered that question in the negative.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"142 F.Supp. 638, 641","parenthetical":"\"[Tjhis court cannot properly vacate a sentence imposed here and affirmed by the Court of Appeals for any alleged or suggested error of the Court of Appeals.\"","sentence":"See Feldman v. Henman, 815 F.2d 1318, 1321 (9th Cir.1987) ( \u201cAbsent Supreme Court authority contrary to our decision in a case, a district court cannot entertain, even in a manner properly before it, a petition by a party which in effect seeks to undo our court\u2019s resolution of a matter first addressed to and fully and fairly adjudicated by it.\u201d); Page v. United States, 884 F.2d 300, 302 (7th Cir.1989) (\u201cIf the court of appeals has actually considered and rejected a claim ... on appeal, that decision binds the district court unless there has been an intervening change in the law.\u201d); Rivera v. United States, 477 F.2d 927, 928 (3rd Cir.1973) (\u201cThe incongruity of a district court ruling and then implementing its ruling that the Court of Appeals erred.... is self-evident.\u201d); see also United States v. Sanders, 142 F.Supp. 638, 641(D.Md.l956) (\u201c[Tjhis court cannot properly vacate a sentence imposed here and affirmed by the Court of Appeals for any alleged or suggested error of the Court of Appeals.\u201d). This Court therefore cannot, and will not, review the discretionary decision of the Second Circuit."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"884 F.2d 300, 302","parenthetical":"\"If the court of appeals has actually considered and rejected a claim ... on appeal, that decision binds the district court unless there has been an intervening change in the law.\"","sentence":"See Feldman v. Henman, 815 F.2d 1318, 1321 (9th Cir.1987) ( \u201cAbsent Supreme Court authority contrary to our decision in a case, a district court cannot entertain, even in a manner properly before it, a petition by a party which in effect seeks to undo our court\u2019s resolution of a matter first addressed to and fully and fairly adjudicated by it.\u201d); Page v. United States, 884 F.2d 300, 302 (7th Cir.1989) (\u201cIf the court of appeals has actually considered and rejected a claim ... on appeal, that decision binds the district court unless there has been an intervening change in the law.\u201d); Rivera v. United States, 477 F.2d 927, 928 (3rd Cir.1973) (\u201cThe incongruity of a district court ruling and then implementing its ruling that the Court of Appeals erred.... is self-evident.\u201d); see also United States v. Sanders, 142 F.Supp. 638, 641(D.Md.l956) (\u201c[Tjhis court cannot properly vacate a sentence imposed here and affirmed by the Court of Appeals for any alleged or suggested error of the Court of Appeals.\u201d). This Court therefore cannot, and will not, review the discretionary decision of the Second Circuit."},"case_id":1761361,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Additionally, it is doubtful that this Court even has the authority to grant petitioner's motion, because to do so would require that it \"review the discretionary actions of the Court of Appeals\" to determine whether the Second Circuit erred by ignoring the supposedly fraudulent behavior of the Government. The Court has not located any Second Circuit authority addressing the question of whether a district court has the authority to review a decision of the Court of Appeals. However, other courts have answered that question in the negative.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"477 F.2d 927, 928","parenthetical":"\"The incongruity of a district court ruling and then implementing its ruling that the Court of Appeals erred.... is self-evident.\"","sentence":"See Feldman v. Henman, 815 F.2d 1318, 1321 (9th Cir.1987) ( \u201cAbsent Supreme Court authority contrary to our decision in a case, a district court cannot entertain, even in a manner properly before it, a petition by a party which in effect seeks to undo our court\u2019s resolution of a matter first addressed to and fully and fairly adjudicated by it.\u201d); Page v. United States, 884 F.2d 300, 302 (7th Cir.1989) (\u201cIf the court of appeals has actually considered and rejected a claim ... on appeal, that decision binds the district court unless there has been an intervening change in the law.\u201d); Rivera v. United States, 477 F.2d 927, 928 (3rd Cir.1973) (\u201cThe incongruity of a district court ruling and then implementing its ruling that the Court of Appeals erred.... is self-evident.\u201d); see also United States v. Sanders, 142 F.Supp. 638, 641(D.Md.l956) (\u201c[Tjhis court cannot properly vacate a sentence imposed here and affirmed by the Court of Appeals for any alleged or suggested error of the Court of Appeals.\u201d). This Court therefore cannot, and will not, review the discretionary decision of the Second Circuit."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"142 F.Supp. 638, 641","parenthetical":"\"[Tjhis court cannot properly vacate a sentence imposed here and affirmed by the Court of Appeals for any alleged or suggested error of the Court of Appeals.\"","sentence":"See Feldman v. Henman, 815 F.2d 1318, 1321 (9th Cir.1987) ( \u201cAbsent Supreme Court authority contrary to our decision in a case, a district court cannot entertain, even in a manner properly before it, a petition by a party which in effect seeks to undo our court\u2019s resolution of a matter first addressed to and fully and fairly adjudicated by it.\u201d); Page v. United States, 884 F.2d 300, 302 (7th Cir.1989) (\u201cIf the court of appeals has actually considered and rejected a claim ... on appeal, that decision binds the district court unless there has been an intervening change in the law.\u201d); Rivera v. United States, 477 F.2d 927, 928 (3rd Cir.1973) (\u201cThe incongruity of a district court ruling and then implementing its ruling that the Court of Appeals erred.... is self-evident.\u201d); see also United States v. Sanders, 142 F.Supp. 638, 641(D.Md.l956) (\u201c[Tjhis court cannot properly vacate a sentence imposed here and affirmed by the Court of Appeals for any alleged or suggested error of the Court of Appeals.\u201d). This Court therefore cannot, and will not, review the discretionary decision of the Second Circuit."},"case_id":1761361,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Section 3742(a) does, however, grant us jurisdiction over an appeal of a sentence that \"(1) was imposed in violation of law; or (2) was imposed as a result of an incorrect application of the sentencing guidelines,\" even if the alleged error involved a downward departure.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"103 F.3d 912, 912","parenthetical":"\"[A]n appeal from a sentence founded on a mistake of law is within our jurisdiction even if the dispute concerns the fact or extent of departure.\"","sentence":"See Eureka Lab., 103 F.3d at 912 (\u201c[A]n appeal from a sentence founded on a mistake of law is within our jurisdiction even if the dispute concerns the fact or extent of departure.\u201d) (quoting United States v. Gomez, 24 F.3d 924, 927 (7th Cir.1994)); see also United States v. Martinez, 905 F.2d 251, 254 (9th Cir.1990) (\u201c[Defendant] does not assert the sentence imposed was in violation of law, involved an incorrect application of the guidelines, [or was based on other] grounds upon which a defendant is expressly authorized to appeal. Absent such challenges we have no basis to review the district court\u2019s downward departure.\u201d) (citation omitted)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"905 F.2d 251, 254","parenthetical":"\"[Defendant] does not assert the sentence imposed was in violation of law, involved an incorrect application of the guidelines, [or was based on other] grounds upon which a defendant is expressly authorized to appeal. Absent such challenges we have no basis to review the district court's downward departure.\"","sentence":"See Eureka Lab., 103 F.3d at 912 (\u201c[A]n appeal from a sentence founded on a mistake of law is within our jurisdiction even if the dispute concerns the fact or extent of departure.\u201d) (quoting United States v. Gomez, 24 F.3d 924, 927 (7th Cir.1994)); see also United States v. Martinez, 905 F.2d 251, 254 (9th Cir.1990) (\u201c[Defendant] does not assert the sentence imposed was in violation of law, involved an incorrect application of the guidelines, [or was based on other] grounds upon which a defendant is expressly authorized to appeal. Absent such challenges we have no basis to review the district court\u2019s downward departure.\u201d) (citation omitted)."},"case_id":1733472,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The INS argues that these activities are consistent with those of a nonimmigrant visitor for business and we agree. The evidence clearly shows a visitor who spent a sporadic amount of time in the United States until he could establish a permanent residence in this country \"at some indefinite time in the possibly distant future.\" These visits do not qualify as \"temporary\" and, by making them, Singh abandoned his legal permanent residency in the United States.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"729 F.Supp. 481, 481","parenthetical":"alien not permitted to spend a month or two annually in the U.S. with the intention of retaining permanent resident status","sentence":"See Huang, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 756 (permanent residency relinquished when family lived in Japan while waiting for husband to finish doctoral studies so they could all move to the United States); see also Angeles, 729 F.Supp. at 481 (alien not permitted to spend a month or two annually in the U.S. with the intention of retaining permanent resident status); Kane, 15 I. & N. Dec. at 258 (same)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"19 I. & N. Dec. 756, 756","parenthetical":"permanent residency relinquished when family lived in Japan while waiting for husband to finish doctoral studies so they could all move to the United States","sentence":"See Huang, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 756 (permanent residency relinquished when family lived in Japan while waiting for husband to finish doctoral studies so they could all move to the United States); see also Angeles, 729 F.Supp. at 481 (alien not permitted to spend a month or two annually in the U.S. with the intention of retaining permanent resident status); Kane, 15 I. & N. Dec. at 258 (same)."},"case_id":336529,"label":"b"}
{"context":"We have limited the application of Pisa-ni \"to the context of unrelated counts.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"787 F.2d 75, 75-76","parenthetical":"noting that campaign-fund mail fraud and tax charges were unrelated to the law-practice mail fraud charges","sentence":"United States v. Vasquez, 85 F.3d 59, 61 (2d Cir.1996) (remanding for resentencing on remaining narcotics counts after vaca-tur of firearm conviction); see also United States v. Rosario, 386 F.3d 166, 170 (2d Cir.2004) (holding that \u201cin some circumstances, a sentence on one count may be increased after the sentence on a similar or related count has been vacated on appeal\u201d). While Weingarten argues that his counts are unrelated because \u201crelated\u201d counts are only those that mandate consecutive sentences, that argument has no support in our case law or in the reasoning of Pisani. Pisani involved a diverse set of crimes based on entirely distinct behavior that were joined as \u201ca matter of trial convenience.\u201d 787 F.2d at 75-76 (noting that campaign-fund mail fraud and tax charges were unrelated to the law-practice mail fraud charges)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"85 F.3d 59, 61","parenthetical":"remanding for resentencing on remaining narcotics counts after vaca-tur of firearm conviction","sentence":"United States v. Vasquez, 85 F.3d 59, 61 (2d Cir.1996) (remanding for resentencing on remaining narcotics counts after vaca-tur of firearm conviction); see also United States v. Rosario, 386 F.3d 166, 170 (2d Cir.2004) (holding that \u201cin some circumstances, a sentence on one count may be increased after the sentence on a similar or related count has been vacated on appeal\u201d). While Weingarten argues that his counts are unrelated because \u201crelated\u201d counts are only those that mandate consecutive sentences, that argument has no support in our case law or in the reasoning of Pisani. Pisani involved a diverse set of crimes based on entirely distinct behavior that were joined as \u201ca matter of trial convenience.\u201d 787 F.2d at 75-76 (noting that campaign-fund mail fraud and tax charges were unrelated to the law-practice mail fraud charges)."},"case_id":3559653,"label":"b"}
{"context":"It is another matter to find within these jurisdictional provisions the additional requirement that the party possessing the enforceable right be named as plaintiff. Such a requirement is not obvious from the wording of the statutes, and to the extent that it simply represents broader notions of justiciability that inhere in standing doctrine, Delta's status as representative of the co-owners' interests, combined with its allegations of injury in fact to those interests, suffices to pass the minimal test required for invoking the court's jurisdiction. A plaintiff's suit may, of course, be subject to dismissal if the substantive statute on which he relies affords no right to relief to either him or those he represents. But that is properly an issue for determination on the merits.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"645 F.2d 404, 415","parenthetical":"cautioning against dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction when basis of jurisdiction is also an element of cause of action","sentence":"See Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682, 66 S.Ct. 773, 776, 90 L.Ed. 939 (1946) (\u201c[T]he failure to state a proper cause of action calls for a judgment on the merits and not for a dismissal for want of jurisdiction.\u201d); see also Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 415 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897, 102 S.Ct. 396, 70 L.Ed.2d 212 (1981) (cautioning against dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction when basis of jurisdiction is also an element of cause of action)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"327 U.S. 678, 682","parenthetical":"\"[T]he failure to state a proper cause of action calls for a judgment on the merits and not for a dismissal for want of jurisdiction.\"","sentence":"See Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682, 66 S.Ct. 773, 776, 90 L.Ed. 939 (1946) (\u201c[T]he failure to state a proper cause of action calls for a judgment on the merits and not for a dismissal for want of jurisdiction.\u201d); see also Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 415 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897, 102 S.Ct. 396, 70 L.Ed.2d 212 (1981) (cautioning against dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction when basis of jurisdiction is also an element of cause of action)."},"case_id":607608,"label":"b"}
{"context":"It is another matter to find within these jurisdictional provisions the additional requirement that the party possessing the enforceable right be named as plaintiff. Such a requirement is not obvious from the wording of the statutes, and to the extent that it simply represents broader notions of justiciability that inhere in standing doctrine, Delta's status as representative of the co-owners' interests, combined with its allegations of injury in fact to those interests, suffices to pass the minimal test required for invoking the court's jurisdiction. A plaintiff's suit may, of course, be subject to dismissal if the substantive statute on which he relies affords no right to relief to either him or those he represents. But that is properly an issue for determination on the merits.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"327 U.S. 678, 682","parenthetical":"\"[T]he failure to state a proper cause of action calls for a judgment on the merits and not for a dismissal for want of jurisdiction.\"","sentence":"See Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682, 66 S.Ct. 773, 776, 90 L.Ed. 939 (1946) (\u201c[T]he failure to state a proper cause of action calls for a judgment on the merits and not for a dismissal for want of jurisdiction.\u201d); see also Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 415 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897, 102 S.Ct. 396, 70 L.Ed.2d 212 (1981) (cautioning against dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction when basis of jurisdiction is also an element of cause of action)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"cautioning against dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction when basis of jurisdiction is also an element of cause of action","sentence":"See Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682, 66 S.Ct. 773, 776, 90 L.Ed. 939 (1946) (\u201c[T]he failure to state a proper cause of action calls for a judgment on the merits and not for a dismissal for want of jurisdiction.\u201d); see also Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 415 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897, 102 S.Ct. 396, 70 L.Ed.2d 212 (1981) (cautioning against dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction when basis of jurisdiction is also an element of cause of action)."},"case_id":607608,"label":"a"}
{"context":"It is another matter to find within these jurisdictional provisions the additional requirement that the party possessing the enforceable right be named as plaintiff. Such a requirement is not obvious from the wording of the statutes, and to the extent that it simply represents broader notions of justiciability that inhere in standing doctrine, Delta's status as representative of the co-owners' interests, combined with its allegations of injury in fact to those interests, suffices to pass the minimal test required for invoking the court's jurisdiction. A plaintiff's suit may, of course, be subject to dismissal if the substantive statute on which he relies affords no right to relief to either him or those he represents. But that is properly an issue for determination on the merits.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"327 U.S. 678, 682","parenthetical":"\"[T]he failure to state a proper cause of action calls for a judgment on the merits and not for a dismissal for want of jurisdiction.\"","sentence":"See Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682, 66 S.Ct. 773, 776, 90 L.Ed. 939 (1946) (\u201c[T]he failure to state a proper cause of action calls for a judgment on the merits and not for a dismissal for want of jurisdiction.\u201d); see also Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 415 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897, 102 S.Ct. 396, 70 L.Ed.2d 212 (1981) (cautioning against dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction when basis of jurisdiction is also an element of cause of action)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"cautioning against dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction when basis of jurisdiction is also an element of cause of action","sentence":"See Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682, 66 S.Ct. 773, 776, 90 L.Ed. 939 (1946) (\u201c[T]he failure to state a proper cause of action calls for a judgment on the merits and not for a dismissal for want of jurisdiction.\u201d); see also Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 415 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897, 102 S.Ct. 396, 70 L.Ed.2d 212 (1981) (cautioning against dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction when basis of jurisdiction is also an element of cause of action)."},"case_id":607608,"label":"a"}
{"context":"It is another matter to find within these jurisdictional provisions the additional requirement that the party possessing the enforceable right be named as plaintiff. Such a requirement is not obvious from the wording of the statutes, and to the extent that it simply represents broader notions of justiciability that inhere in standing doctrine, Delta's status as representative of the co-owners' interests, combined with its allegations of injury in fact to those interests, suffices to pass the minimal test required for invoking the court's jurisdiction. A plaintiff's suit may, of course, be subject to dismissal if the substantive statute on which he relies affords no right to relief to either him or those he represents. But that is properly an issue for determination on the merits.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"cautioning against dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction when basis of jurisdiction is also an element of cause of action","sentence":"See Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682, 66 S.Ct. 773, 776, 90 L.Ed. 939 (1946) (\u201c[T]he failure to state a proper cause of action calls for a judgment on the merits and not for a dismissal for want of jurisdiction.\u201d); see also Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 415 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897, 102 S.Ct. 396, 70 L.Ed.2d 212 (1981) (cautioning against dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction when basis of jurisdiction is also an element of cause of action)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"327 U.S. 678, 682","parenthetical":"\"[T]he failure to state a proper cause of action calls for a judgment on the merits and not for a dismissal for want of jurisdiction.\"","sentence":"See Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682, 66 S.Ct. 773, 776, 90 L.Ed. 939 (1946) (\u201c[T]he failure to state a proper cause of action calls for a judgment on the merits and not for a dismissal for want of jurisdiction.\u201d); see also Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 415 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897, 102 S.Ct. 396, 70 L.Ed.2d 212 (1981) (cautioning against dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction when basis of jurisdiction is also an element of cause of action)."},"case_id":607608,"label":"b"}
{"context":"It is another matter to find within these jurisdictional provisions the additional requirement that the party possessing the enforceable right be named as plaintiff. Such a requirement is not obvious from the wording of the statutes, and to the extent that it simply represents broader notions of justiciability that inhere in standing doctrine, Delta's status as representative of the co-owners' interests, combined with its allegations of injury in fact to those interests, suffices to pass the minimal test required for invoking the court's jurisdiction. A plaintiff's suit may, of course, be subject to dismissal if the substantive statute on which he relies affords no right to relief to either him or those he represents. But that is properly an issue for determination on the merits.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"645 F.2d 404, 415","parenthetical":"cautioning against dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction when basis of jurisdiction is also an element of cause of action","sentence":"See Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682, 66 S.Ct. 773, 776, 90 L.Ed. 939 (1946) (\u201c[T]he failure to state a proper cause of action calls for a judgment on the merits and not for a dismissal for want of jurisdiction.\u201d); see also Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 415 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897, 102 S.Ct. 396, 70 L.Ed.2d 212 (1981) (cautioning against dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction when basis of jurisdiction is also an element of cause of action)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"66 S.Ct. 773, 776","parenthetical":"\"[T]he failure to state a proper cause of action calls for a judgment on the merits and not for a dismissal for want of jurisdiction.\"","sentence":"See Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682, 66 S.Ct. 773, 776, 90 L.Ed. 939 (1946) (\u201c[T]he failure to state a proper cause of action calls for a judgment on the merits and not for a dismissal for want of jurisdiction.\u201d); see also Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 415 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897, 102 S.Ct. 396, 70 L.Ed.2d 212 (1981) (cautioning against dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction when basis of jurisdiction is also an element of cause of action)."},"case_id":607608,"label":"b"}
{"context":"It is another matter to find within these jurisdictional provisions the additional requirement that the party possessing the enforceable right be named as plaintiff. Such a requirement is not obvious from the wording of the statutes, and to the extent that it simply represents broader notions of justiciability that inhere in standing doctrine, Delta's status as representative of the co-owners' interests, combined with its allegations of injury in fact to those interests, suffices to pass the minimal test required for invoking the court's jurisdiction. A plaintiff's suit may, of course, be subject to dismissal if the substantive statute on which he relies affords no right to relief to either him or those he represents. But that is properly an issue for determination on the merits.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"cautioning against dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction when basis of jurisdiction is also an element of cause of action","sentence":"See Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682, 66 S.Ct. 773, 776, 90 L.Ed. 939 (1946) (\u201c[T]he failure to state a proper cause of action calls for a judgment on the merits and not for a dismissal for want of jurisdiction.\u201d); see also Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 415 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897, 102 S.Ct. 396, 70 L.Ed.2d 212 (1981) (cautioning against dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction when basis of jurisdiction is also an element of cause of action)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"66 S.Ct. 773, 776","parenthetical":"\"[T]he failure to state a proper cause of action calls for a judgment on the merits and not for a dismissal for want of jurisdiction.\"","sentence":"See Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682, 66 S.Ct. 773, 776, 90 L.Ed. 939 (1946) (\u201c[T]he failure to state a proper cause of action calls for a judgment on the merits and not for a dismissal for want of jurisdiction.\u201d); see also Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 415 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897, 102 S.Ct. 396, 70 L.Ed.2d 212 (1981) (cautioning against dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction when basis of jurisdiction is also an element of cause of action)."},"case_id":607608,"label":"b"}
{"context":"It is another matter to find within these jurisdictional provisions the additional requirement that the party possessing the enforceable right be named as plaintiff. Such a requirement is not obvious from the wording of the statutes, and to the extent that it simply represents broader notions of justiciability that inhere in standing doctrine, Delta's status as representative of the co-owners' interests, combined with its allegations of injury in fact to those interests, suffices to pass the minimal test required for invoking the court's jurisdiction. A plaintiff's suit may, of course, be subject to dismissal if the substantive statute on which he relies affords no right to relief to either him or those he represents. But that is properly an issue for determination on the merits.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"cautioning against dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction when basis of jurisdiction is also an element of cause of action","sentence":"See Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682, 66 S.Ct. 773, 776, 90 L.Ed. 939 (1946) (\u201c[T]he failure to state a proper cause of action calls for a judgment on the merits and not for a dismissal for want of jurisdiction.\u201d); see also Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 415 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897, 102 S.Ct. 396, 70 L.Ed.2d 212 (1981) (cautioning against dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction when basis of jurisdiction is also an element of cause of action)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"66 S.Ct. 773, 776","parenthetical":"\"[T]he failure to state a proper cause of action calls for a judgment on the merits and not for a dismissal for want of jurisdiction.\"","sentence":"See Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682, 66 S.Ct. 773, 776, 90 L.Ed. 939 (1946) (\u201c[T]he failure to state a proper cause of action calls for a judgment on the merits and not for a dismissal for want of jurisdiction.\u201d); see also Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 415 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897, 102 S.Ct. 396, 70 L.Ed.2d 212 (1981) (cautioning against dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction when basis of jurisdiction is also an element of cause of action)."},"case_id":607608,"label":"b"}
{"context":"It is another matter to find within these jurisdictional provisions the additional requirement that the party possessing the enforceable right be named as plaintiff. Such a requirement is not obvious from the wording of the statutes, and to the extent that it simply represents broader notions of justiciability that inhere in standing doctrine, Delta's status as representative of the co-owners' interests, combined with its allegations of injury in fact to those interests, suffices to pass the minimal test required for invoking the court's jurisdiction. A plaintiff's suit may, of course, be subject to dismissal if the substantive statute on which he relies affords no right to relief to either him or those he represents. But that is properly an issue for determination on the merits.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"66 S.Ct. 773, 776","parenthetical":"\"[T]he failure to state a proper cause of action calls for a judgment on the merits and not for a dismissal for want of jurisdiction.\"","sentence":"See Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682, 66 S.Ct. 773, 776, 90 L.Ed. 939 (1946) (\u201c[T]he failure to state a proper cause of action calls for a judgment on the merits and not for a dismissal for want of jurisdiction.\u201d); see also Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 415 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897, 102 S.Ct. 396, 70 L.Ed.2d 212 (1981) (cautioning against dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction when basis of jurisdiction is also an element of cause of action)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"cautioning against dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction when basis of jurisdiction is also an element of cause of action","sentence":"See Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682, 66 S.Ct. 773, 776, 90 L.Ed. 939 (1946) (\u201c[T]he failure to state a proper cause of action calls for a judgment on the merits and not for a dismissal for want of jurisdiction.\u201d); see also Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 415 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897, 102 S.Ct. 396, 70 L.Ed.2d 212 (1981) (cautioning against dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction when basis of jurisdiction is also an element of cause of action)."},"case_id":607608,"label":"a"}
{"context":"It is another matter to find within these jurisdictional provisions the additional requirement that the party possessing the enforceable right be named as plaintiff. Such a requirement is not obvious from the wording of the statutes, and to the extent that it simply represents broader notions of justiciability that inhere in standing doctrine, Delta's status as representative of the co-owners' interests, combined with its allegations of injury in fact to those interests, suffices to pass the minimal test required for invoking the court's jurisdiction. A plaintiff's suit may, of course, be subject to dismissal if the substantive statute on which he relies affords no right to relief to either him or those he represents. But that is properly an issue for determination on the merits.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"645 F.2d 404, 415","parenthetical":"cautioning against dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction when basis of jurisdiction is also an element of cause of action","sentence":"See Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682, 66 S.Ct. 773, 776, 90 L.Ed. 939 (1946) (\u201c[T]he failure to state a proper cause of action calls for a judgment on the merits and not for a dismissal for want of jurisdiction.\u201d); see also Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 415 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897, 102 S.Ct. 396, 70 L.Ed.2d 212 (1981) (cautioning against dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction when basis of jurisdiction is also an element of cause of action)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[T]he failure to state a proper cause of action calls for a judgment on the merits and not for a dismissal for want of jurisdiction.\"","sentence":"See Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682, 66 S.Ct. 773, 776, 90 L.Ed. 939 (1946) (\u201c[T]he failure to state a proper cause of action calls for a judgment on the merits and not for a dismissal for want of jurisdiction.\u201d); see also Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 415 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897, 102 S.Ct. 396, 70 L.Ed.2d 212 (1981) (cautioning against dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction when basis of jurisdiction is also an element of cause of action)."},"case_id":607608,"label":"b"}
{"context":"It is another matter to find within these jurisdictional provisions the additional requirement that the party possessing the enforceable right be named as plaintiff. Such a requirement is not obvious from the wording of the statutes, and to the extent that it simply represents broader notions of justiciability that inhere in standing doctrine, Delta's status as representative of the co-owners' interests, combined with its allegations of injury in fact to those interests, suffices to pass the minimal test required for invoking the court's jurisdiction. A plaintiff's suit may, of course, be subject to dismissal if the substantive statute on which he relies affords no right to relief to either him or those he represents. But that is properly an issue for determination on the merits.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"cautioning against dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction when basis of jurisdiction is also an element of cause of action","sentence":"See Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682, 66 S.Ct. 773, 776, 90 L.Ed. 939 (1946) (\u201c[T]he failure to state a proper cause of action calls for a judgment on the merits and not for a dismissal for want of jurisdiction.\u201d); see also Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 415 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897, 102 S.Ct. 396, 70 L.Ed.2d 212 (1981) (cautioning against dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction when basis of jurisdiction is also an element of cause of action)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[T]he failure to state a proper cause of action calls for a judgment on the merits and not for a dismissal for want of jurisdiction.\"","sentence":"See Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682, 66 S.Ct. 773, 776, 90 L.Ed. 939 (1946) (\u201c[T]he failure to state a proper cause of action calls for a judgment on the merits and not for a dismissal for want of jurisdiction.\u201d); see also Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 415 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897, 102 S.Ct. 396, 70 L.Ed.2d 212 (1981) (cautioning against dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction when basis of jurisdiction is also an element of cause of action)."},"case_id":607608,"label":"b"}
{"context":"It is another matter to find within these jurisdictional provisions the additional requirement that the party possessing the enforceable right be named as plaintiff. Such a requirement is not obvious from the wording of the statutes, and to the extent that it simply represents broader notions of justiciability that inhere in standing doctrine, Delta's status as representative of the co-owners' interests, combined with its allegations of injury in fact to those interests, suffices to pass the minimal test required for invoking the court's jurisdiction. A plaintiff's suit may, of course, be subject to dismissal if the substantive statute on which he relies affords no right to relief to either him or those he represents. But that is properly an issue for determination on the merits.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[T]he failure to state a proper cause of action calls for a judgment on the merits and not for a dismissal for want of jurisdiction.\"","sentence":"See Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682, 66 S.Ct. 773, 776, 90 L.Ed. 939 (1946) (\u201c[T]he failure to state a proper cause of action calls for a judgment on the merits and not for a dismissal for want of jurisdiction.\u201d); see also Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 415 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897, 102 S.Ct. 396, 70 L.Ed.2d 212 (1981) (cautioning against dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction when basis of jurisdiction is also an element of cause of action)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"cautioning against dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction when basis of jurisdiction is also an element of cause of action","sentence":"See Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682, 66 S.Ct. 773, 776, 90 L.Ed. 939 (1946) (\u201c[T]he failure to state a proper cause of action calls for a judgment on the merits and not for a dismissal for want of jurisdiction.\u201d); see also Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 415 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897, 102 S.Ct. 396, 70 L.Ed.2d 212 (1981) (cautioning against dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction when basis of jurisdiction is also an element of cause of action)."},"case_id":607608,"label":"a"}
{"context":"It is another matter to find within these jurisdictional provisions the additional requirement that the party possessing the enforceable right be named as plaintiff. Such a requirement is not obvious from the wording of the statutes, and to the extent that it simply represents broader notions of justiciability that inhere in standing doctrine, Delta's status as representative of the co-owners' interests, combined with its allegations of injury in fact to those interests, suffices to pass the minimal test required for invoking the court's jurisdiction. A plaintiff's suit may, of course, be subject to dismissal if the substantive statute on which he relies affords no right to relief to either him or those he represents. But that is properly an issue for determination on the merits.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"cautioning against dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction when basis of jurisdiction is also an element of cause of action","sentence":"See Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682, 66 S.Ct. 773, 776, 90 L.Ed. 939 (1946) (\u201c[T]he failure to state a proper cause of action calls for a judgment on the merits and not for a dismissal for want of jurisdiction.\u201d); see also Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 415 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897, 102 S.Ct. 396, 70 L.Ed.2d 212 (1981) (cautioning against dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction when basis of jurisdiction is also an element of cause of action)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[T]he failure to state a proper cause of action calls for a judgment on the merits and not for a dismissal for want of jurisdiction.\"","sentence":"See Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682, 66 S.Ct. 773, 776, 90 L.Ed. 939 (1946) (\u201c[T]he failure to state a proper cause of action calls for a judgment on the merits and not for a dismissal for want of jurisdiction.\u201d); see also Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 415 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897, 102 S.Ct. 396, 70 L.Ed.2d 212 (1981) (cautioning against dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction when basis of jurisdiction is also an element of cause of action)."},"case_id":607608,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Here, in determining whether to extend asylum relief to spouses, the BIA reasonably considered the general principles underlying the definition of persecution and concluded that a husband is persecuted \"when the government forces an abortion on a married couple.\" (\"When the government intervenes in the private affairs of a married couple to force an abortion or sterilization, it persecutes the married couple as an entity.\"). I see no reason why the BIA could not reasonably conclude that one has suffered harm or injury sufficiently severe to constitute persecution when one's spouse is forced to undergo an abortion or sterilization. Indeed, this determination finds support in the decisions of a number of courts that have explicitly recognized that non-physical harm may support a finding of past persecution in at least some circumstances.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"383 F.3d 1112, 1120","parenthetical":"\"Persecution may be emotional or psychological, as well as physical.\"","sentence":"See Junshao Zhang, 434 F.3d at 1001 (rejecting explicitly the \u201cnotion that [a husband] suffers no persecution independent of his wife, as the result of the forcible abortion of his child\u201d and holding that \u201c[although his wife was certainly a very direct victim of China\u2019s population control measures, Zhang was a victim as well. The forcible abortion has deprived him of his unborn child, of the ability to realize the family that his wife and he had desired, and forever deprived him of the ability to become a parent to that unborn son or daughter with his wife\u201d); see also Ouk v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 108, 111 (1st Cir.2006) (noting that \u201c[u]n-der the right set of circumstances, a finding of past persecution might rest on a showing of psychological harm\u201d (quotation marks omitted)); Mashiri v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 1112, 1120 (9th Cir.2004) (\u201cPersecution may be emotional or psychological, as well as physical.\u201d); Abay v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 634, 642 (6th Cir.2004) (holding that the applicant was entitled to asylum \u201cbased on her fear that her daughter will be forced to undergo female genital mutilation\u201d because her \u201cfear of ... being forced to witness the pain and suffering of her daughter is well-founded\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"434 F.3d 1001, 1001","parenthetical":"rejecting explicitly the \"notion that [a husband] suffers no persecution independent of his wife, as the result of the forcible abortion of his child\" and holding that \"[although his wife was certainly a very direct victim of China's population control measures, Zhang was a victim as well. The forcible abortion has deprived him of his unborn child, of the ability to realize the family that his wife and he had desired, and forever deprived him of the ability to become a parent to that unborn son or daughter with his wife\"","sentence":"See Junshao Zhang, 434 F.3d at 1001 (rejecting explicitly the \u201cnotion that [a husband] suffers no persecution independent of his wife, as the result of the forcible abortion of his child\u201d and holding that \u201c[although his wife was certainly a very direct victim of China\u2019s population control measures, Zhang was a victim as well. The forcible abortion has deprived him of his unborn child, of the ability to realize the family that his wife and he had desired, and forever deprived him of the ability to become a parent to that unborn son or daughter with his wife\u201d); see also Ouk v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 108, 111 (1st Cir.2006) (noting that \u201c[u]n-der the right set of circumstances, a finding of past persecution might rest on a showing of psychological harm\u201d (quotation marks omitted)); Mashiri v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 1112, 1120 (9th Cir.2004) (\u201cPersecution may be emotional or psychological, as well as physical.\u201d); Abay v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 634, 642 (6th Cir.2004) (holding that the applicant was entitled to asylum \u201cbased on her fear that her daughter will be forced to undergo female genital mutilation\u201d because her \u201cfear of ... being forced to witness the pain and suffering of her daughter is well-founded\u201d)."},"case_id":6046993,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Here, in determining whether to extend asylum relief to spouses, the BIA reasonably considered the general principles underlying the definition of persecution and concluded that a husband is persecuted \"when the government forces an abortion on a married couple.\" (\"When the government intervenes in the private affairs of a married couple to force an abortion or sterilization, it persecutes the married couple as an entity.\"). I see no reason why the BIA could not reasonably conclude that one has suffered harm or injury sufficiently severe to constitute persecution when one's spouse is forced to undergo an abortion or sterilization. Indeed, this determination finds support in the decisions of a number of courts that have explicitly recognized that non-physical harm may support a finding of past persecution in at least some circumstances.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"368 F.3d 634, 642","parenthetical":"holding that the applicant was entitled to asylum \"based on her fear that her daughter will be forced to undergo female genital mutilation\" because her \"fear of ... being forced to witness the pain and suffering of her daughter is well-founded\"","sentence":"See Junshao Zhang, 434 F.3d at 1001 (rejecting explicitly the \u201cnotion that [a husband] suffers no persecution independent of his wife, as the result of the forcible abortion of his child\u201d and holding that \u201c[although his wife was certainly a very direct victim of China\u2019s population control measures, Zhang was a victim as well. The forcible abortion has deprived him of his unborn child, of the ability to realize the family that his wife and he had desired, and forever deprived him of the ability to become a parent to that unborn son or daughter with his wife\u201d); see also Ouk v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 108, 111 (1st Cir.2006) (noting that \u201c[u]n-der the right set of circumstances, a finding of past persecution might rest on a showing of psychological harm\u201d (quotation marks omitted)); Mashiri v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 1112, 1120 (9th Cir.2004) (\u201cPersecution may be emotional or psychological, as well as physical.\u201d); Abay v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 634, 642 (6th Cir.2004) (holding that the applicant was entitled to asylum \u201cbased on her fear that her daughter will be forced to undergo female genital mutilation\u201d because her \u201cfear of ... being forced to witness the pain and suffering of her daughter is well-founded\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"434 F.3d 1001, 1001","parenthetical":"rejecting explicitly the \"notion that [a husband] suffers no persecution independent of his wife, as the result of the forcible abortion of his child\" and holding that \"[although his wife was certainly a very direct victim of China's population control measures, Zhang was a victim as well. The forcible abortion has deprived him of his unborn child, of the ability to realize the family that his wife and he had desired, and forever deprived him of the ability to become a parent to that unborn son or daughter with his wife\"","sentence":"See Junshao Zhang, 434 F.3d at 1001 (rejecting explicitly the \u201cnotion that [a husband] suffers no persecution independent of his wife, as the result of the forcible abortion of his child\u201d and holding that \u201c[although his wife was certainly a very direct victim of China\u2019s population control measures, Zhang was a victim as well. The forcible abortion has deprived him of his unborn child, of the ability to realize the family that his wife and he had desired, and forever deprived him of the ability to become a parent to that unborn son or daughter with his wife\u201d); see also Ouk v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 108, 111 (1st Cir.2006) (noting that \u201c[u]n-der the right set of circumstances, a finding of past persecution might rest on a showing of psychological harm\u201d (quotation marks omitted)); Mashiri v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 1112, 1120 (9th Cir.2004) (\u201cPersecution may be emotional or psychological, as well as physical.\u201d); Abay v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 634, 642 (6th Cir.2004) (holding that the applicant was entitled to asylum \u201cbased on her fear that her daughter will be forced to undergo female genital mutilation\u201d because her \u201cfear of ... being forced to witness the pain and suffering of her daughter is well-founded\u201d)."},"case_id":6046993,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Thus, Gene almost certainly would have to sell land .or cattle in order to pay Becky's attorneys' fees. Under these circumstances, we hold that Becky .is able to pay her attorneys' fees, and therefore it was an abuse of discretion to order Gene to pay them for her.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"917 So.2d 95, 104","parenthetical":"holding that a wife's net worth of approximately $62,000 demonstrated her ability to pay her own attorneys' fees, notwithstanding her objection that her assets were illiquid, in the form of home equity and a state retirement account","sentence":"See Jones v. Jones, 917 So.2d 95, 104 (\u00b680) (Miss.Ct.App.2Q05) (holding that a wife\u2019s net worth of approximately $62,000 demonstrated her ability to pay her own attorneys\u2019 fees, notwithstanding her objection that her assets were illiquid, in the form of home equity and a state retirement account); see also Seymour v. Seymour, 960 So.2d 513, 520-21 (\u00b6 18) (Miss.Ct.App.2006) (holding that a wife was able to pay her own Attorneys\u2019 fees because she' had \u201can investment account of $16,000, which could be liquidated\u201d to pay the fees)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"960 So.2d 513, 520-21","parenthetical":"holding that a wife was able to pay her own Attorneys' fees because she' had \"an investment account of $16,000, which could be liquidated\" to pay the fees","sentence":"See Jones v. Jones, 917 So.2d 95, 104 (\u00b680) (Miss.Ct.App.2Q05) (holding that a wife\u2019s net worth of approximately $62,000 demonstrated her ability to pay her own attorneys\u2019 fees, notwithstanding her objection that her assets were illiquid, in the form of home equity and a state retirement account); see also Seymour v. Seymour, 960 So.2d 513, 520-21 (\u00b6 18) (Miss.Ct.App.2006) (holding that a wife was able to pay her own Attorneys\u2019 fees because she' had \u201can investment account of $16,000, which could be liquidated\u201d to pay the fees)."},"case_id":12179457,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Abonce-Barrera also asserts that the magistrate judge erred in failing to require the production of a list of all the cases on which the informant worked. Abonce-Barrera has failed, however, to show how such a list would be material under Brady.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"806 F.2d 933, 935","parenthetical":"holding that additional detailed information about a previous unrelated investigation involving an informant could be withheld after balancing the government's interest in insuring the informant's safety","sentence":"See also United States v. Cutler, 806 F.2d 933, 935 (9th Cir.1986) (holding that additional detailed information about a previous unrelated investigation involving an informant could be withheld after balancing the government\u2019s interest in insuring the informant\u2019s safety)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"56 F.3d 1198, 1198","parenthetical":"\"Evidence is material for Brady purposes only if there is a reasonable probability that, had it been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.\"","sentence":"See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434-38, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995); Manning, 56 F.3d at 1198 (\u201cEvidence is material for Brady purposes only if there is a reasonable probability that, had it been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.\u201d)."},"case_id":11087124,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The First Amendment protects ideas and the freedom to express them.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"435 U.S. 589, 608-09","parenthetical":"no First Amendment right to physical originals of audio tapes where reporters received transcripts of tapes and could communicate contents to public if desired","sentence":"Cf. Nixon v. Warner Commc\u2019ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 608-09, 98 S.Ct. 1306, 55 L.Ed.2d 570 (1978) (no First Amendment right to physical originals of audio tapes where reporters received transcripts of tapes and could communicate contents to public if desired). Kaezynski offers instead practical, forensic considerations for why the originals are more valuable, but no explanation as to how his right to free speech or freedom of expression is impinged by their sale."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"354 U.S. 476, 484","parenthetical":"the First Amendment \"was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498 (1957) (the First Amendment \u201cwas fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas\u201d); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 537, 65 S.Ct. 315, 89 L.Ed. 430 (1945) (\u201cfree trade in ideas\u201d includes opportunity to persuade); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102, 60 S.Ct. 736, 84 L.Ed. 1093 (1940) (discussing historical importance of freedom of discussion). Kaezynski cites no authority for the proposition that the original pieces of paper on which his ideas were written are independently deserving of constitutional protection."},"case_id":5750974,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The First Amendment protects ideas and the freedom to express them.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"no First Amendment right to physical originals of audio tapes where reporters received transcripts of tapes and could communicate contents to public if desired","sentence":"Cf. Nixon v. Warner Commc\u2019ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 608-09, 98 S.Ct. 1306, 55 L.Ed.2d 570 (1978) (no First Amendment right to physical originals of audio tapes where reporters received transcripts of tapes and could communicate contents to public if desired). Kaezynski offers instead practical, forensic considerations for why the originals are more valuable, but no explanation as to how his right to free speech or freedom of expression is impinged by their sale."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"354 U.S. 476, 484","parenthetical":"the First Amendment \"was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498 (1957) (the First Amendment \u201cwas fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas\u201d); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 537, 65 S.Ct. 315, 89 L.Ed. 430 (1945) (\u201cfree trade in ideas\u201d includes opportunity to persuade); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102, 60 S.Ct. 736, 84 L.Ed. 1093 (1940) (discussing historical importance of freedom of discussion). Kaezynski cites no authority for the proposition that the original pieces of paper on which his ideas were written are independently deserving of constitutional protection."},"case_id":5750974,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The First Amendment protects ideas and the freedom to express them.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"no First Amendment right to physical originals of audio tapes where reporters received transcripts of tapes and could communicate contents to public if desired","sentence":"Cf. Nixon v. Warner Commc\u2019ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 608-09, 98 S.Ct. 1306, 55 L.Ed.2d 570 (1978) (no First Amendment right to physical originals of audio tapes where reporters received transcripts of tapes and could communicate contents to public if desired). Kaezynski offers instead practical, forensic considerations for why the originals are more valuable, but no explanation as to how his right to free speech or freedom of expression is impinged by their sale."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"354 U.S. 476, 484","parenthetical":"the First Amendment \"was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498 (1957) (the First Amendment \u201cwas fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas\u201d); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 537, 65 S.Ct. 315, 89 L.Ed. 430 (1945) (\u201cfree trade in ideas\u201d includes opportunity to persuade); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102, 60 S.Ct. 736, 84 L.Ed. 1093 (1940) (discussing historical importance of freedom of discussion). Kaezynski cites no authority for the proposition that the original pieces of paper on which his ideas were written are independently deserving of constitutional protection."},"case_id":5750974,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The First Amendment protects ideas and the freedom to express them.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"the First Amendment \"was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498 (1957) (the First Amendment \u201cwas fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas\u201d); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 537, 65 S.Ct. 315, 89 L.Ed. 430 (1945) (\u201cfree trade in ideas\u201d includes opportunity to persuade); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102, 60 S.Ct. 736, 84 L.Ed. 1093 (1940) (discussing historical importance of freedom of discussion). Kaezynski cites no authority for the proposition that the original pieces of paper on which his ideas were written are independently deserving of constitutional protection."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"435 U.S. 589, 608-09","parenthetical":"no First Amendment right to physical originals of audio tapes where reporters received transcripts of tapes and could communicate contents to public if desired","sentence":"Cf. Nixon v. Warner Commc\u2019ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 608-09, 98 S.Ct. 1306, 55 L.Ed.2d 570 (1978) (no First Amendment right to physical originals of audio tapes where reporters received transcripts of tapes and could communicate contents to public if desired). Kaezynski offers instead practical, forensic considerations for why the originals are more valuable, but no explanation as to how his right to free speech or freedom of expression is impinged by their sale."},"case_id":5750974,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The First Amendment protects ideas and the freedom to express them.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"the First Amendment \"was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498 (1957) (the First Amendment \u201cwas fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas\u201d); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 537, 65 S.Ct. 315, 89 L.Ed. 430 (1945) (\u201cfree trade in ideas\u201d includes opportunity to persuade); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102, 60 S.Ct. 736, 84 L.Ed. 1093 (1940) (discussing historical importance of freedom of discussion). Kaezynski cites no authority for the proposition that the original pieces of paper on which his ideas were written are independently deserving of constitutional protection."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"no First Amendment right to physical originals of audio tapes where reporters received transcripts of tapes and could communicate contents to public if desired","sentence":"Cf. Nixon v. Warner Commc\u2019ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 608-09, 98 S.Ct. 1306, 55 L.Ed.2d 570 (1978) (no First Amendment right to physical originals of audio tapes where reporters received transcripts of tapes and could communicate contents to public if desired). Kaezynski offers instead practical, forensic considerations for why the originals are more valuable, but no explanation as to how his right to free speech or freedom of expression is impinged by their sale."},"case_id":5750974,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The First Amendment protects ideas and the freedom to express them.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"no First Amendment right to physical originals of audio tapes where reporters received transcripts of tapes and could communicate contents to public if desired","sentence":"Cf. Nixon v. Warner Commc\u2019ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 608-09, 98 S.Ct. 1306, 55 L.Ed.2d 570 (1978) (no First Amendment right to physical originals of audio tapes where reporters received transcripts of tapes and could communicate contents to public if desired). Kaezynski offers instead practical, forensic considerations for why the originals are more valuable, but no explanation as to how his right to free speech or freedom of expression is impinged by their sale."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"the First Amendment \"was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498 (1957) (the First Amendment \u201cwas fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas\u201d); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 537, 65 S.Ct. 315, 89 L.Ed. 430 (1945) (\u201cfree trade in ideas\u201d includes opportunity to persuade); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102, 60 S.Ct. 736, 84 L.Ed. 1093 (1940) (discussing historical importance of freedom of discussion). Kaezynski cites no authority for the proposition that the original pieces of paper on which his ideas were written are independently deserving of constitutional protection."},"case_id":5750974,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The First Amendment protects ideas and the freedom to express them.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"435 U.S. 589, 608-09","parenthetical":"no First Amendment right to physical originals of audio tapes where reporters received transcripts of tapes and could communicate contents to public if desired","sentence":"Cf. Nixon v. Warner Commc\u2019ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 608-09, 98 S.Ct. 1306, 55 L.Ed.2d 570 (1978) (no First Amendment right to physical originals of audio tapes where reporters received transcripts of tapes and could communicate contents to public if desired). Kaezynski offers instead practical, forensic considerations for why the originals are more valuable, but no explanation as to how his right to free speech or freedom of expression is impinged by their sale."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"the First Amendment \"was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498 (1957) (the First Amendment \u201cwas fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas\u201d); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 537, 65 S.Ct. 315, 89 L.Ed. 430 (1945) (\u201cfree trade in ideas\u201d includes opportunity to persuade); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102, 60 S.Ct. 736, 84 L.Ed. 1093 (1940) (discussing historical importance of freedom of discussion). Kaezynski cites no authority for the proposition that the original pieces of paper on which his ideas were written are independently deserving of constitutional protection."},"case_id":5750974,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The First Amendment protects ideas and the freedom to express them.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"the First Amendment \"was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498 (1957) (the First Amendment \u201cwas fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas\u201d); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 537, 65 S.Ct. 315, 89 L.Ed. 430 (1945) (\u201cfree trade in ideas\u201d includes opportunity to persuade); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102, 60 S.Ct. 736, 84 L.Ed. 1093 (1940) (discussing historical importance of freedom of discussion). Kaezynski cites no authority for the proposition that the original pieces of paper on which his ideas were written are independently deserving of constitutional protection."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"no First Amendment right to physical originals of audio tapes where reporters received transcripts of tapes and could communicate contents to public if desired","sentence":"Cf. Nixon v. Warner Commc\u2019ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 608-09, 98 S.Ct. 1306, 55 L.Ed.2d 570 (1978) (no First Amendment right to physical originals of audio tapes where reporters received transcripts of tapes and could communicate contents to public if desired). Kaezynski offers instead practical, forensic considerations for why the originals are more valuable, but no explanation as to how his right to free speech or freedom of expression is impinged by their sale."},"case_id":5750974,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The First Amendment protects ideas and the freedom to express them.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"the First Amendment \"was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498 (1957) (the First Amendment \u201cwas fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas\u201d); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 537, 65 S.Ct. 315, 89 L.Ed. 430 (1945) (\u201cfree trade in ideas\u201d includes opportunity to persuade); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102, 60 S.Ct. 736, 84 L.Ed. 1093 (1940) (discussing historical importance of freedom of discussion). Kaezynski cites no authority for the proposition that the original pieces of paper on which his ideas were written are independently deserving of constitutional protection."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"no First Amendment right to physical originals of audio tapes where reporters received transcripts of tapes and could communicate contents to public if desired","sentence":"Cf. Nixon v. Warner Commc\u2019ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 608-09, 98 S.Ct. 1306, 55 L.Ed.2d 570 (1978) (no First Amendment right to physical originals of audio tapes where reporters received transcripts of tapes and could communicate contents to public if desired). Kaezynski offers instead practical, forensic considerations for why the originals are more valuable, but no explanation as to how his right to free speech or freedom of expression is impinged by their sale."},"case_id":5750974,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Here, Nelson challenges the court's decision to depart upward. But we need not consider whether the court properly calculated the guideline range with the upward departure because any error was harmless.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"493 F.3d 1291, 1305","parenthetical":"reasoning that the district court stated that it would have imposed the same sentence regardless of its guideline calculations, recognized the advisory nature of the guidelines, stated that the sentence complied with the 18 U.S.C. SS 3553(a","sentence":"United States v. Keene, 470 F.3d 1347, 1348-49 (11th Cir.2006) (explaining that a Guidelines calculation error is harmless, and thus does not require remand, when (1) the record includes evidence that the district court would have reached the same result even if it had decided the Guidelines issue the other way, and (2) the sentence imposed would be reasonable even if the Guidelines issue had been decided the other way); see also United States v. Tampas, 493 F.3d 1291, 1305 (11th Cir.2007) (reasoning that the district court stated that it would have imposed the same sentence regardless of its guideline calculations, recognized the advisory nature of the guidelines, stated that the sentence complied with the 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 3553(a) factors, and imposed a sentence within the statutory maximum)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"470 F.3d 1347, 1348-49","parenthetical":"explaining that a Guidelines calculation error is harmless, and thus does not require remand, when (1","sentence":"United States v. Keene, 470 F.3d 1347, 1348-49 (11th Cir.2006) (explaining that a Guidelines calculation error is harmless, and thus does not require remand, when (1) the record includes evidence that the district court would have reached the same result even if it had decided the Guidelines issue the other way, and (2) the sentence imposed would be reasonable even if the Guidelines issue had been decided the other way); see also United States v. Tampas, 493 F.3d 1291, 1305 (11th Cir.2007) (reasoning that the district court stated that it would have imposed the same sentence regardless of its guideline calculations, recognized the advisory nature of the guidelines, stated that the sentence complied with the 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 3553(a) factors, and imposed a sentence within the statutory maximum)."},"case_id":3437323,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Upon careful review, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Trice.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"687 F.3d 988, 990","parenthetical":"where defendant does not raise procedural error, court bypasses review and only reviews substantive reasonableness of sentence for abuse of discretion","sentence":"See United States v. Franik, 687 F.3d 988, 990 (8th Cir.2012) (where defendant does not raise procedural error, court bypasses review and only reviews substantive reasonableness of sentence for abuse of discretion); see also United States v. Lazarski 560 F.3d 731, 733 (8th Cir.2009) (where district court varied downward from Guidelines range, it was \u201cnearly inconceivable\u201d that court abused its discretion in not varying downward further)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"560 F.3d 731, 733","parenthetical":"where district court varied downward from Guidelines range, it was \"nearly inconceivable\" that court abused its discretion in not varying downward further","sentence":"See United States v. Franik, 687 F.3d 988, 990 (8th Cir.2012) (where defendant does not raise procedural error, court bypasses review and only reviews substantive reasonableness of sentence for abuse of discretion); see also United States v. Lazarski 560 F.3d 731, 733 (8th Cir.2009) (where district court varied downward from Guidelines range, it was \u201cnearly inconceivable\u201d that court abused its discretion in not varying downward further)."},"case_id":5756131,"label":"a"}
{"context":"We recognize that disclosure may not always be possible. For example, an unclassified summary may not be possible because, in some cases, the subject matter itself may be classified and cannot be revealed without implicating national security. Depending on the circumstances, OFAC might have a legitimate interest in shielding the materials even from someone with the appropriate security clearance.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"181 S.Ct. 1904, 1904","parenthetical":"noting that disclosure of sensitive information to a limited number of lawyers led to \"unauthorized disclosure of military secrets\"","sentence":"See Ott, 827 F.2d at 477 (holding, in a different context, that \u201cCongress has a legitimate interest in authorizing the Attorney General to invoke procedures designed to ensure that sensitive security information is not unnecessarily disseminated to anyone not involved in the surveillance operation in question, whether or not she happens for unrelated reasons to enjoy security clearance\u201d); see also Gen. Dynamics, 181 S.Ct. at 1904 (noting that disclosure of sensitive information to a limited number of lawyers led to \u201cunauthorized disclosure of military secrets\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"827 F.2d 477, 477","parenthetical":"holding, in a different context, that \"Congress has a legitimate interest in authorizing the Attorney General to invoke procedures designed to ensure that sensitive security information is not unnecessarily disseminated to anyone not involved in the surveillance operation in question, whether or not she happens for unrelated reasons to enjoy security clearance\"","sentence":"See Ott, 827 F.2d at 477 (holding, in a different context, that \u201cCongress has a legitimate interest in authorizing the Attorney General to invoke procedures designed to ensure that sensitive security information is not unnecessarily disseminated to anyone not involved in the surveillance operation in question, whether or not she happens for unrelated reasons to enjoy security clearance\u201d); see also Gen. Dynamics, 181 S.Ct. at 1904 (noting that disclosure of sensitive information to a limited number of lawyers led to \u201cunauthorized disclosure of military secrets\u201d)."},"case_id":6051328,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The survival of prior case law would not, however, make the otherwise agreed language in the statute superfluous; it would merely narrow its scope. The otherwise agreed in writing language would only apply to cases where no decree has been issued or where the decree declared that the agreement shall survive the decree.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"agreement not incorporated into a decree providing child support during the minority of a child does not terminate obligation upon payor's death","sentence":"See, e.g., Stone v. Bayley, 75 Wash. 184, 134 P. 820 (1913) (agreement not incorporated into a decree providing child support during the minority of a child does not terminate obligation upon payor's death); In re Marriage of Olsen, 24 Wn. App. 292, 297-98, 600 P.2d 690 (1979) (contract survives divorce decree because the Mexican court decided that it would); cf. Scudder v. Scudder, 55 Wn.2d 454, 460, 348 P.2d 225 (1960) (settlement incorporated in decree requiring that Dr. Scudder support his children during their minority does not survive his death)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"55 Wn.2d 454, 460","parenthetical":"settlement incorporated in decree requiring that Dr. Scudder support his children during their minority does not survive his death","sentence":"See, e.g., Stone v. Bayley, 75 Wash. 184, 134 P. 820 (1913) (agreement not incorporated into a decree providing child support during the minority of a child does not terminate obligation upon payor's death); In re Marriage of Olsen, 24 Wn. App. 292, 297-98, 600 P.2d 690 (1979) (contract survives divorce decree because the Mexican court decided that it would); cf. Scudder v. Scudder, 55 Wn.2d 454, 460, 348 P.2d 225 (1960) (settlement incorporated in decree requiring that Dr. Scudder support his children during their minority does not survive his death)."},"case_id":1379116,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The survival of prior case law would not, however, make the otherwise agreed language in the statute superfluous; it would merely narrow its scope. The otherwise agreed in writing language would only apply to cases where no decree has been issued or where the decree declared that the agreement shall survive the decree.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"settlement incorporated in decree requiring that Dr. Scudder support his children during their minority does not survive his death","sentence":"See, e.g., Stone v. Bayley, 75 Wash. 184, 134 P. 820 (1913) (agreement not incorporated into a decree providing child support during the minority of a child does not terminate obligation upon payor's death); In re Marriage of Olsen, 24 Wn. App. 292, 297-98, 600 P.2d 690 (1979) (contract survives divorce decree because the Mexican court decided that it would); cf. Scudder v. Scudder, 55 Wn.2d 454, 460, 348 P.2d 225 (1960) (settlement incorporated in decree requiring that Dr. Scudder support his children during their minority does not survive his death)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"agreement not incorporated into a decree providing child support during the minority of a child does not terminate obligation upon payor's death","sentence":"See, e.g., Stone v. Bayley, 75 Wash. 184, 134 P. 820 (1913) (agreement not incorporated into a decree providing child support during the minority of a child does not terminate obligation upon payor's death); In re Marriage of Olsen, 24 Wn. App. 292, 297-98, 600 P.2d 690 (1979) (contract survives divorce decree because the Mexican court decided that it would); cf. Scudder v. Scudder, 55 Wn.2d 454, 460, 348 P.2d 225 (1960) (settlement incorporated in decree requiring that Dr. Scudder support his children during their minority does not survive his death)."},"case_id":1379116,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The survival of prior case law would not, however, make the otherwise agreed language in the statute superfluous; it would merely narrow its scope. The otherwise agreed in writing language would only apply to cases where no decree has been issued or where the decree declared that the agreement shall survive the decree.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"agreement not incorporated into a decree providing child support during the minority of a child does not terminate obligation upon payor's death","sentence":"See, e.g., Stone v. Bayley, 75 Wash. 184, 134 P. 820 (1913) (agreement not incorporated into a decree providing child support during the minority of a child does not terminate obligation upon payor's death); In re Marriage of Olsen, 24 Wn. App. 292, 297-98, 600 P.2d 690 (1979) (contract survives divorce decree because the Mexican court decided that it would); cf. Scudder v. Scudder, 55 Wn.2d 454, 460, 348 P.2d 225 (1960) (settlement incorporated in decree requiring that Dr. Scudder support his children during their minority does not survive his death)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"55 Wn.2d 454, 460","parenthetical":"settlement incorporated in decree requiring that Dr. Scudder support his children during their minority does not survive his death","sentence":"See, e.g., Stone v. Bayley, 75 Wash. 184, 134 P. 820 (1913) (agreement not incorporated into a decree providing child support during the minority of a child does not terminate obligation upon payor's death); In re Marriage of Olsen, 24 Wn. App. 292, 297-98, 600 P.2d 690 (1979) (contract survives divorce decree because the Mexican court decided that it would); cf. Scudder v. Scudder, 55 Wn.2d 454, 460, 348 P.2d 225 (1960) (settlement incorporated in decree requiring that Dr. Scudder support his children during their minority does not survive his death)."},"case_id":1379116,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The survival of prior case law would not, however, make the otherwise agreed language in the statute superfluous; it would merely narrow its scope. The otherwise agreed in writing language would only apply to cases where no decree has been issued or where the decree declared that the agreement shall survive the decree.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"settlement incorporated in decree requiring that Dr. Scudder support his children during their minority does not survive his death","sentence":"See, e.g., Stone v. Bayley, 75 Wash. 184, 134 P. 820 (1913) (agreement not incorporated into a decree providing child support during the minority of a child does not terminate obligation upon payor's death); In re Marriage of Olsen, 24 Wn. App. 292, 297-98, 600 P.2d 690 (1979) (contract survives divorce decree because the Mexican court decided that it would); cf. Scudder v. Scudder, 55 Wn.2d 454, 460, 348 P.2d 225 (1960) (settlement incorporated in decree requiring that Dr. Scudder support his children during their minority does not survive his death)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"agreement not incorporated into a decree providing child support during the minority of a child does not terminate obligation upon payor's death","sentence":"See, e.g., Stone v. Bayley, 75 Wash. 184, 134 P. 820 (1913) (agreement not incorporated into a decree providing child support during the minority of a child does not terminate obligation upon payor's death); In re Marriage of Olsen, 24 Wn. App. 292, 297-98, 600 P.2d 690 (1979) (contract survives divorce decree because the Mexican court decided that it would); cf. Scudder v. Scudder, 55 Wn.2d 454, 460, 348 P.2d 225 (1960) (settlement incorporated in decree requiring that Dr. Scudder support his children during their minority does not survive his death)."},"case_id":1379116,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The survival of prior case law would not, however, make the otherwise agreed language in the statute superfluous; it would merely narrow its scope. The otherwise agreed in writing language would only apply to cases where no decree has been issued or where the decree declared that the agreement shall survive the decree.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"55 Wn.2d 454, 460","parenthetical":"settlement incorporated in decree requiring that Dr. Scudder support his children during their minority does not survive his death","sentence":"See, e.g., Stone v. Bayley, 75 Wash. 184, 134 P. 820 (1913) (agreement not incorporated into a decree providing child support during the minority of a child does not terminate obligation upon payor's death); In re Marriage of Olsen, 24 Wn. App. 292, 297-98, 600 P.2d 690 (1979) (contract survives divorce decree because the Mexican court decided that it would); cf. Scudder v. Scudder, 55 Wn.2d 454, 460, 348 P.2d 225 (1960) (settlement incorporated in decree requiring that Dr. Scudder support his children during their minority does not survive his death)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"24 Wn. App. 292, 297-98","parenthetical":"contract survives divorce decree because the Mexican court decided that it would","sentence":"See, e.g., Stone v. Bayley, 75 Wash. 184, 134 P. 820 (1913) (agreement not incorporated into a decree providing child support during the minority of a child does not terminate obligation upon payor's death); In re Marriage of Olsen, 24 Wn. App. 292, 297-98, 600 P.2d 690 (1979) (contract survives divorce decree because the Mexican court decided that it would); cf. Scudder v. Scudder, 55 Wn.2d 454, 460, 348 P.2d 225 (1960) (settlement incorporated in decree requiring that Dr. Scudder support his children during their minority does not survive his death)."},"case_id":1379116,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The survival of prior case law would not, however, make the otherwise agreed language in the statute superfluous; it would merely narrow its scope. The otherwise agreed in writing language would only apply to cases where no decree has been issued or where the decree declared that the agreement shall survive the decree.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"settlement incorporated in decree requiring that Dr. Scudder support his children during their minority does not survive his death","sentence":"See, e.g., Stone v. Bayley, 75 Wash. 184, 134 P. 820 (1913) (agreement not incorporated into a decree providing child support during the minority of a child does not terminate obligation upon payor's death); In re Marriage of Olsen, 24 Wn. App. 292, 297-98, 600 P.2d 690 (1979) (contract survives divorce decree because the Mexican court decided that it would); cf. Scudder v. Scudder, 55 Wn.2d 454, 460, 348 P.2d 225 (1960) (settlement incorporated in decree requiring that Dr. Scudder support his children during their minority does not survive his death)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"24 Wn. App. 292, 297-98","parenthetical":"contract survives divorce decree because the Mexican court decided that it would","sentence":"See, e.g., Stone v. Bayley, 75 Wash. 184, 134 P. 820 (1913) (agreement not incorporated into a decree providing child support during the minority of a child does not terminate obligation upon payor's death); In re Marriage of Olsen, 24 Wn. App. 292, 297-98, 600 P.2d 690 (1979) (contract survives divorce decree because the Mexican court decided that it would); cf. Scudder v. Scudder, 55 Wn.2d 454, 460, 348 P.2d 225 (1960) (settlement incorporated in decree requiring that Dr. Scudder support his children during their minority does not survive his death)."},"case_id":1379116,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The survival of prior case law would not, however, make the otherwise agreed language in the statute superfluous; it would merely narrow its scope. The otherwise agreed in writing language would only apply to cases where no decree has been issued or where the decree declared that the agreement shall survive the decree.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"55 Wn.2d 454, 460","parenthetical":"settlement incorporated in decree requiring that Dr. Scudder support his children during their minority does not survive his death","sentence":"See, e.g., Stone v. Bayley, 75 Wash. 184, 134 P. 820 (1913) (agreement not incorporated into a decree providing child support during the minority of a child does not terminate obligation upon payor's death); In re Marriage of Olsen, 24 Wn. App. 292, 297-98, 600 P.2d 690 (1979) (contract survives divorce decree because the Mexican court decided that it would); cf. Scudder v. Scudder, 55 Wn.2d 454, 460, 348 P.2d 225 (1960) (settlement incorporated in decree requiring that Dr. Scudder support his children during their minority does not survive his death)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"contract survives divorce decree because the Mexican court decided that it would","sentence":"See, e.g., Stone v. Bayley, 75 Wash. 184, 134 P. 820 (1913) (agreement not incorporated into a decree providing child support during the minority of a child does not terminate obligation upon payor's death); In re Marriage of Olsen, 24 Wn. App. 292, 297-98, 600 P.2d 690 (1979) (contract survives divorce decree because the Mexican court decided that it would); cf. Scudder v. Scudder, 55 Wn.2d 454, 460, 348 P.2d 225 (1960) (settlement incorporated in decree requiring that Dr. Scudder support his children during their minority does not survive his death)."},"case_id":1379116,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The survival of prior case law would not, however, make the otherwise agreed language in the statute superfluous; it would merely narrow its scope. The otherwise agreed in writing language would only apply to cases where no decree has been issued or where the decree declared that the agreement shall survive the decree.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"contract survives divorce decree because the Mexican court decided that it would","sentence":"See, e.g., Stone v. Bayley, 75 Wash. 184, 134 P. 820 (1913) (agreement not incorporated into a decree providing child support during the minority of a child does not terminate obligation upon payor's death); In re Marriage of Olsen, 24 Wn. App. 292, 297-98, 600 P.2d 690 (1979) (contract survives divorce decree because the Mexican court decided that it would); cf. Scudder v. Scudder, 55 Wn.2d 454, 460, 348 P.2d 225 (1960) (settlement incorporated in decree requiring that Dr. Scudder support his children during their minority does not survive his death)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"settlement incorporated in decree requiring that Dr. Scudder support his children during their minority does not survive his death","sentence":"See, e.g., Stone v. Bayley, 75 Wash. 184, 134 P. 820 (1913) (agreement not incorporated into a decree providing child support during the minority of a child does not terminate obligation upon payor's death); In re Marriage of Olsen, 24 Wn. App. 292, 297-98, 600 P.2d 690 (1979) (contract survives divorce decree because the Mexican court decided that it would); cf. Scudder v. Scudder, 55 Wn.2d 454, 460, 348 P.2d 225 (1960) (settlement incorporated in decree requiring that Dr. Scudder support his children during their minority does not survive his death)."},"case_id":1379116,"label":"a"}
{"context":"P 20. Still, on appeal, Taylor offers a fleeting argument that we could conclude, as a matter of law, that Kustelski was at least 51% negligent and, therefore, the summary judgment should be upheld on that basis. The summary judgment submissions, however, preclude such a conclusion as a matter of law. They include factual allegations of Taylor's conduct and driving, supported by witnesses and an accident reconstruction ist, that would require a jury's evaluation.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"19 Wis. 2d 373, 375","parenthetical":"\"It is a rare case when summary judgment can be granted in an action grounded on negligence.\"","sentence":"See Dottai v. Altenbach, 19 Wis. 2d 373, 375, 120 N.W2d 41 (1963) (\"It is a rare case when summary judgment can be granted in an action grounded on negligence.\"); see also Bishop v. Johnson, 36 Wis. 2d 64, 68, 152 N.W.2d 887 (1967) (\"In the great majority of cases the evidence is such that a jury question on the comparison of the causal negligence is presented.\"). Material factual issues, including the speeds of the vehicles and Taylor's alleged lane change and possible consumption of alcohol, remain."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"36 Wis. 2d 64, 68","parenthetical":"\"In the great majority of cases the evidence is such that a jury question on the comparison of the causal negligence is presented.\"","sentence":"See Dottai v. Altenbach, 19 Wis. 2d 373, 375, 120 N.W2d 41 (1963) (\"It is a rare case when summary judgment can be granted in an action grounded on negligence.\"); see also Bishop v. Johnson, 36 Wis. 2d 64, 68, 152 N.W.2d 887 (1967) (\"In the great majority of cases the evidence is such that a jury question on the comparison of the causal negligence is presented.\"). Material factual issues, including the speeds of the vehicles and Taylor's alleged lane change and possible consumption of alcohol, remain."},"case_id":9266206,"label":"a"}
{"context":"P 20. Still, on appeal, Taylor offers a fleeting argument that we could conclude, as a matter of law, that Kustelski was at least 51% negligent and, therefore, the summary judgment should be upheld on that basis. The summary judgment submissions, however, preclude such a conclusion as a matter of law. They include factual allegations of Taylor's conduct and driving, supported by witnesses and an accident reconstruction ist, that would require a jury's evaluation.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"19 Wis. 2d 373, 375","parenthetical":"\"It is a rare case when summary judgment can be granted in an action grounded on negligence.\"","sentence":"See Dottai v. Altenbach, 19 Wis. 2d 373, 375, 120 N.W2d 41 (1963) (\"It is a rare case when summary judgment can be granted in an action grounded on negligence.\"); see also Bishop v. Johnson, 36 Wis. 2d 64, 68, 152 N.W.2d 887 (1967) (\"In the great majority of cases the evidence is such that a jury question on the comparison of the causal negligence is presented.\"). Material factual issues, including the speeds of the vehicles and Taylor's alleged lane change and possible consumption of alcohol, remain."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"In the great majority of cases the evidence is such that a jury question on the comparison of the causal negligence is presented.\"","sentence":"See Dottai v. Altenbach, 19 Wis. 2d 373, 375, 120 N.W2d 41 (1963) (\"It is a rare case when summary judgment can be granted in an action grounded on negligence.\"); see also Bishop v. Johnson, 36 Wis. 2d 64, 68, 152 N.W.2d 887 (1967) (\"In the great majority of cases the evidence is such that a jury question on the comparison of the causal negligence is presented.\"). Material factual issues, including the speeds of the vehicles and Taylor's alleged lane change and possible consumption of alcohol, remain."},"case_id":9266206,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Defendant does not disclose the number of pages purchased, nor the price per page. Without these variables -- which are regularly submitted to this Court with bills of costs -- -the Court cannot conclude whether the amounts requested are reasonable.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"2011 WL 941188, at *4","parenthetical":"denying request for $173,150.00 in costs for expert witness expenses because court could not ascertain from materials provided by prevailing party whether any part of requested amount was compensable under relevant statutes","sentence":"See Rogers v. Baxter Int\u2019l, Inc., 2011 WL 941188, at *4 (N.D.Ill. Mar. 16, 2011) (denying request for $173,150.00 in costs for expert witness expenses because court could not ascertain from materials provided by prevailing party whether any part of requested amount was compensable under relevant statutes); Highway Commercial Services, Inc. v. Midwest Trailer Repair, Inc., 2011 WL 3159128, at *2 (N.D.Ill. July 26, 2011) (noting that \u201ceven as to the unchallenged costs, [the court] must still ensure that each proposed cost is allowed under \u00a7 1920, is reasonable, and is necessary to the litigation.\u201d); see also Farmer v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 379 U.S. 227, 235, 85 S.Ct. 411, 13 L.Ed.2d 248 (1964) (\u201cItems proposed by winning parties as costs should always be given careful scrutiny.\u201d); Little v. Mitsubishi Motors N. Am., Inc., 514 F.3d 699, 702 (7th Cir.2008)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"379 U.S. 227, 235","parenthetical":"\"Items proposed by winning parties as costs should always be given careful scrutiny.\"","sentence":"See Rogers v. Baxter Int\u2019l, Inc., 2011 WL 941188, at *4 (N.D.Ill. Mar. 16, 2011) (denying request for $173,150.00 in costs for expert witness expenses because court could not ascertain from materials provided by prevailing party whether any part of requested amount was compensable under relevant statutes); Highway Commercial Services, Inc. v. Midwest Trailer Repair, Inc., 2011 WL 3159128, at *2 (N.D.Ill. July 26, 2011) (noting that \u201ceven as to the unchallenged costs, [the court] must still ensure that each proposed cost is allowed under \u00a7 1920, is reasonable, and is necessary to the litigation.\u201d); see also Farmer v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 379 U.S. 227, 235, 85 S.Ct. 411, 13 L.Ed.2d 248 (1964) (\u201cItems proposed by winning parties as costs should always be given careful scrutiny.\u201d); Little v. Mitsubishi Motors N. Am., Inc., 514 F.3d 699, 702 (7th Cir.2008)."},"case_id":3806013,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Defendant does not disclose the number of pages purchased, nor the price per page. Without these variables -- which are regularly submitted to this Court with bills of costs -- -the Court cannot conclude whether the amounts requested are reasonable.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"2011 WL 941188, at *4","parenthetical":"denying request for $173,150.00 in costs for expert witness expenses because court could not ascertain from materials provided by prevailing party whether any part of requested amount was compensable under relevant statutes","sentence":"See Rogers v. Baxter Int\u2019l, Inc., 2011 WL 941188, at *4 (N.D.Ill. Mar. 16, 2011) (denying request for $173,150.00 in costs for expert witness expenses because court could not ascertain from materials provided by prevailing party whether any part of requested amount was compensable under relevant statutes); Highway Commercial Services, Inc. v. Midwest Trailer Repair, Inc., 2011 WL 3159128, at *2 (N.D.Ill. July 26, 2011) (noting that \u201ceven as to the unchallenged costs, [the court] must still ensure that each proposed cost is allowed under \u00a7 1920, is reasonable, and is necessary to the litigation.\u201d); see also Farmer v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 379 U.S. 227, 235, 85 S.Ct. 411, 13 L.Ed.2d 248 (1964) (\u201cItems proposed by winning parties as costs should always be given careful scrutiny.\u201d); Little v. Mitsubishi Motors N. Am., Inc., 514 F.3d 699, 702 (7th Cir.2008)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"Items proposed by winning parties as costs should always be given careful scrutiny.\"","sentence":"See Rogers v. Baxter Int\u2019l, Inc., 2011 WL 941188, at *4 (N.D.Ill. Mar. 16, 2011) (denying request for $173,150.00 in costs for expert witness expenses because court could not ascertain from materials provided by prevailing party whether any part of requested amount was compensable under relevant statutes); Highway Commercial Services, Inc. v. Midwest Trailer Repair, Inc., 2011 WL 3159128, at *2 (N.D.Ill. July 26, 2011) (noting that \u201ceven as to the unchallenged costs, [the court] must still ensure that each proposed cost is allowed under \u00a7 1920, is reasonable, and is necessary to the litigation.\u201d); see also Farmer v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 379 U.S. 227, 235, 85 S.Ct. 411, 13 L.Ed.2d 248 (1964) (\u201cItems proposed by winning parties as costs should always be given careful scrutiny.\u201d); Little v. Mitsubishi Motors N. Am., Inc., 514 F.3d 699, 702 (7th Cir.2008)."},"case_id":3806013,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Defendant does not disclose the number of pages purchased, nor the price per page. Without these variables -- which are regularly submitted to this Court with bills of costs -- -the Court cannot conclude whether the amounts requested are reasonable.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"2011 WL 941188, at *4","parenthetical":"denying request for $173,150.00 in costs for expert witness expenses because court could not ascertain from materials provided by prevailing party whether any part of requested amount was compensable under relevant statutes","sentence":"See Rogers v. Baxter Int\u2019l, Inc., 2011 WL 941188, at *4 (N.D.Ill. Mar. 16, 2011) (denying request for $173,150.00 in costs for expert witness expenses because court could not ascertain from materials provided by prevailing party whether any part of requested amount was compensable under relevant statutes); Highway Commercial Services, Inc. v. Midwest Trailer Repair, Inc., 2011 WL 3159128, at *2 (N.D.Ill. July 26, 2011) (noting that \u201ceven as to the unchallenged costs, [the court] must still ensure that each proposed cost is allowed under \u00a7 1920, is reasonable, and is necessary to the litigation.\u201d); see also Farmer v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 379 U.S. 227, 235, 85 S.Ct. 411, 13 L.Ed.2d 248 (1964) (\u201cItems proposed by winning parties as costs should always be given careful scrutiny.\u201d); Little v. Mitsubishi Motors N. Am., Inc., 514 F.3d 699, 702 (7th Cir.2008)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"Items proposed by winning parties as costs should always be given careful scrutiny.\"","sentence":"See Rogers v. Baxter Int\u2019l, Inc., 2011 WL 941188, at *4 (N.D.Ill. Mar. 16, 2011) (denying request for $173,150.00 in costs for expert witness expenses because court could not ascertain from materials provided by prevailing party whether any part of requested amount was compensable under relevant statutes); Highway Commercial Services, Inc. v. Midwest Trailer Repair, Inc., 2011 WL 3159128, at *2 (N.D.Ill. July 26, 2011) (noting that \u201ceven as to the unchallenged costs, [the court] must still ensure that each proposed cost is allowed under \u00a7 1920, is reasonable, and is necessary to the litigation.\u201d); see also Farmer v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 379 U.S. 227, 235, 85 S.Ct. 411, 13 L.Ed.2d 248 (1964) (\u201cItems proposed by winning parties as costs should always be given careful scrutiny.\u201d); Little v. Mitsubishi Motors N. Am., Inc., 514 F.3d 699, 702 (7th Cir.2008)."},"case_id":3806013,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Defendant does not disclose the number of pages purchased, nor the price per page. Without these variables -- which are regularly submitted to this Court with bills of costs -- -the Court cannot conclude whether the amounts requested are reasonable.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"379 U.S. 227, 235","parenthetical":"\"Items proposed by winning parties as costs should always be given careful scrutiny.\"","sentence":"See Rogers v. Baxter Int\u2019l, Inc., 2011 WL 941188, at *4 (N.D.Ill. Mar. 16, 2011) (denying request for $173,150.00 in costs for expert witness expenses because court could not ascertain from materials provided by prevailing party whether any part of requested amount was compensable under relevant statutes); Highway Commercial Services, Inc. v. Midwest Trailer Repair, Inc., 2011 WL 3159128, at *2 (N.D.Ill. July 26, 2011) (noting that \u201ceven as to the unchallenged costs, [the court] must still ensure that each proposed cost is allowed under \u00a7 1920, is reasonable, and is necessary to the litigation.\u201d); see also Farmer v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 379 U.S. 227, 235, 85 S.Ct. 411, 13 L.Ed.2d 248 (1964) (\u201cItems proposed by winning parties as costs should always be given careful scrutiny.\u201d); Little v. Mitsubishi Motors N. Am., Inc., 514 F.3d 699, 702 (7th Cir.2008)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"2011 WL 3159128, at *2","parenthetical":"noting that \"even as to the unchallenged costs, [the court] must still ensure that each proposed cost is allowed under SS 1920, is reasonable, and is necessary to the litigation.\"","sentence":"See Rogers v. Baxter Int\u2019l, Inc., 2011 WL 941188, at *4 (N.D.Ill. Mar. 16, 2011) (denying request for $173,150.00 in costs for expert witness expenses because court could not ascertain from materials provided by prevailing party whether any part of requested amount was compensable under relevant statutes); Highway Commercial Services, Inc. v. Midwest Trailer Repair, Inc., 2011 WL 3159128, at *2 (N.D.Ill. July 26, 2011) (noting that \u201ceven as to the unchallenged costs, [the court] must still ensure that each proposed cost is allowed under \u00a7 1920, is reasonable, and is necessary to the litigation.\u201d); see also Farmer v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 379 U.S. 227, 235, 85 S.Ct. 411, 13 L.Ed.2d 248 (1964) (\u201cItems proposed by winning parties as costs should always be given careful scrutiny.\u201d); Little v. Mitsubishi Motors N. Am., Inc., 514 F.3d 699, 702 (7th Cir.2008)."},"case_id":3806013,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Defendant does not disclose the number of pages purchased, nor the price per page. Without these variables -- which are regularly submitted to this Court with bills of costs -- -the Court cannot conclude whether the amounts requested are reasonable.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"2011 WL 3159128, at *2","parenthetical":"noting that \"even as to the unchallenged costs, [the court] must still ensure that each proposed cost is allowed under SS 1920, is reasonable, and is necessary to the litigation.\"","sentence":"See Rogers v. Baxter Int\u2019l, Inc., 2011 WL 941188, at *4 (N.D.Ill. Mar. 16, 2011) (denying request for $173,150.00 in costs for expert witness expenses because court could not ascertain from materials provided by prevailing party whether any part of requested amount was compensable under relevant statutes); Highway Commercial Services, Inc. v. Midwest Trailer Repair, Inc., 2011 WL 3159128, at *2 (N.D.Ill. July 26, 2011) (noting that \u201ceven as to the unchallenged costs, [the court] must still ensure that each proposed cost is allowed under \u00a7 1920, is reasonable, and is necessary to the litigation.\u201d); see also Farmer v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 379 U.S. 227, 235, 85 S.Ct. 411, 13 L.Ed.2d 248 (1964) (\u201cItems proposed by winning parties as costs should always be given careful scrutiny.\u201d); Little v. Mitsubishi Motors N. Am., Inc., 514 F.3d 699, 702 (7th Cir.2008)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"Items proposed by winning parties as costs should always be given careful scrutiny.\"","sentence":"See Rogers v. Baxter Int\u2019l, Inc., 2011 WL 941188, at *4 (N.D.Ill. Mar. 16, 2011) (denying request for $173,150.00 in costs for expert witness expenses because court could not ascertain from materials provided by prevailing party whether any part of requested amount was compensable under relevant statutes); Highway Commercial Services, Inc. v. Midwest Trailer Repair, Inc., 2011 WL 3159128, at *2 (N.D.Ill. July 26, 2011) (noting that \u201ceven as to the unchallenged costs, [the court] must still ensure that each proposed cost is allowed under \u00a7 1920, is reasonable, and is necessary to the litigation.\u201d); see also Farmer v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 379 U.S. 227, 235, 85 S.Ct. 411, 13 L.Ed.2d 248 (1964) (\u201cItems proposed by winning parties as costs should always be given careful scrutiny.\u201d); Little v. Mitsubishi Motors N. Am., Inc., 514 F.3d 699, 702 (7th Cir.2008)."},"case_id":3806013,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Defendant does not disclose the number of pages purchased, nor the price per page. Without these variables -- which are regularly submitted to this Court with bills of costs -- -the Court cannot conclude whether the amounts requested are reasonable.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"2011 WL 3159128, at *2","parenthetical":"noting that \"even as to the unchallenged costs, [the court] must still ensure that each proposed cost is allowed under SS 1920, is reasonable, and is necessary to the litigation.\"","sentence":"See Rogers v. Baxter Int\u2019l, Inc., 2011 WL 941188, at *4 (N.D.Ill. Mar. 16, 2011) (denying request for $173,150.00 in costs for expert witness expenses because court could not ascertain from materials provided by prevailing party whether any part of requested amount was compensable under relevant statutes); Highway Commercial Services, Inc. v. Midwest Trailer Repair, Inc., 2011 WL 3159128, at *2 (N.D.Ill. July 26, 2011) (noting that \u201ceven as to the unchallenged costs, [the court] must still ensure that each proposed cost is allowed under \u00a7 1920, is reasonable, and is necessary to the litigation.\u201d); see also Farmer v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 379 U.S. 227, 235, 85 S.Ct. 411, 13 L.Ed.2d 248 (1964) (\u201cItems proposed by winning parties as costs should always be given careful scrutiny.\u201d); Little v. Mitsubishi Motors N. Am., Inc., 514 F.3d 699, 702 (7th Cir.2008)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"Items proposed by winning parties as costs should always be given careful scrutiny.\"","sentence":"See Rogers v. Baxter Int\u2019l, Inc., 2011 WL 941188, at *4 (N.D.Ill. Mar. 16, 2011) (denying request for $173,150.00 in costs for expert witness expenses because court could not ascertain from materials provided by prevailing party whether any part of requested amount was compensable under relevant statutes); Highway Commercial Services, Inc. v. Midwest Trailer Repair, Inc., 2011 WL 3159128, at *2 (N.D.Ill. July 26, 2011) (noting that \u201ceven as to the unchallenged costs, [the court] must still ensure that each proposed cost is allowed under \u00a7 1920, is reasonable, and is necessary to the litigation.\u201d); see also Farmer v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 379 U.S. 227, 235, 85 S.Ct. 411, 13 L.Ed.2d 248 (1964) (\u201cItems proposed by winning parties as costs should always be given careful scrutiny.\u201d); Little v. Mitsubishi Motors N. Am., Inc., 514 F.3d 699, 702 (7th Cir.2008)."},"case_id":3806013,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Here, the officers executing the warrant correctly identified the premises to be searched as apartment number 517 (quite possibly recognizing that the incorrect identification of the apartment number as \"484\" was simply an inadvertent repetition of the building address number). But the Court need not speculate as to how the executing officers correctly chose number 517 over number 484 because the executing officers included the Affiant who submitted the warrant application, which contained the same error as the warrant itself.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"747 F.2d 460, 461","parenthetical":"upholding validity of search pursuant to warrant that specified wrong apartment number where the executing officer \"immediately went to correct apartment\" based on his personal knowledge","sentence":"See United States v. Clement, 747 F.2d 460, 461 (8th Cir.1984) (upholding validity of search pursuant to warrant that specified wrong apartment number where the executing officer \u201cimmediately went to correct apartment\u201d based on his personal knowledge)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"439 F.3d 796, 806","parenthetical":"upholding validity of search pursuant to warrant that specified wrong apartment number where the executing officers \"had conducted ex-tensive surveillance of the premises before the warrant was executed, ... had personal knowledge of the premises that they intended to search, and the premises that they intended to search were, in fact searched\"","sentence":"Cf. United States v. Gamboa, 439 F.3d 796, 806 (8th Cir.2006) (upholding validity of search pursuant to warrant that specified wrong apartment number where the executing officers \u201chad conducted ex-tensive surveillance of the premises before the warrant was executed, ... had personal knowledge of the premises that they intended to search, and the premises that they intended to search were, in fact searched\u201d)."},"case_id":3564674,"label":"a"}
{"context":"We may not, therefore, add terms not present in the easement, as Bluebonnet's and Petro-Guard's conten tion would require. See Am. Mfrs.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"154 F.Supp.2d 942, 949-50","parenthetical":"holding that language of easement did not support restrictive interpretation proposed by landowner owners of servient estate","sentence":"Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schaefer, 124 S.W.3d 154, 161-68 (Tex.2003) (stating, in context of insurance-coverage determination, \u201cwe may neither rewrite the parties\u2019 contract nor add to its language\u201d); Helmerich & Payne Int\u2019l Drilling Co. v. Swift Energy Co., 180 S.W.3d 635, 640-42 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.) (declining to \u201crewrite\u201d drilling contract or \u201cadd to it under the guise of interpretation\u201d); see also Oxford v. Williams Cos., 154 F.Supp.2d 942, 949-50 (E.D.Tex.2001) (memo op.) (holding that language of easement did not support restrictive interpretation proposed by landowner owners of servient estate)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"124 S.W.3d 154, 161-68","parenthetical":"stating, in context of insurance-coverage determination, \"we may neither rewrite the parties' contract nor add to its language\"","sentence":"Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schaefer, 124 S.W.3d 154, 161-68 (Tex.2003) (stating, in context of insurance-coverage determination, \u201cwe may neither rewrite the parties\u2019 contract nor add to its language\u201d); Helmerich & Payne Int\u2019l Drilling Co. v. Swift Energy Co., 180 S.W.3d 635, 640-42 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.) (declining to \u201crewrite\u201d drilling contract or \u201cadd to it under the guise of interpretation\u201d); see also Oxford v. Williams Cos., 154 F.Supp.2d 942, 949-50 (E.D.Tex.2001) (memo op.) (holding that language of easement did not support restrictive interpretation proposed by landowner owners of servient estate)."},"case_id":8205093,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Under our precedent, the district court was not obligated sua sponte to provide appellant with an opportunity to amend her complaint prior to dismissing it with prejudice. See Wagner v. Daewoo Heavy Inds.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"181 F.3d 1275, 1279-80","parenthetical":"requiring plaintiff to make by separate motion, setting forth the substance of proposed amendments, a request for leave to amend a complaint","sentence":"Am. Corp., 314 F.3d 541, 542 (11th Cir.2002) (en banc) (\u201cA district court is not required to grant a plaintiff leave to amend his complaint sua sponte when the plaintiff, who is represented by counsel, never filed a motion to amend nor requested leave to amend before the district court.\u201d); see also Long v. Satz, 181 F.3d 1275, 1279-80 (11th Cir.1999) (requiring plaintiff to make by separate motion, setting forth the substance of proposed amendments, a request for leave to amend a complaint); Fed.R.Civ.P. 7(b)(1)(A) (\u201cA request for a court order must be made by motion. The motion must: (A) be in writing unless made during a hearing or trial\u201d). Therefore, if we are to conclude that there was an abuse of discretion by the district court in dismissing any part of First Amended Complaint, we must find that appellant sufficiently remedied the procedural errors in the amended complaint such that it was unreasonable for the district court to dismiss that count."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"314 F.3d 541, 542","parenthetical":"\"A district court is not required to grant a plaintiff leave to amend his complaint sua sponte when the plaintiff, who is represented by counsel, never filed a motion to amend nor requested leave to amend before the district court.\"","sentence":"Am. Corp., 314 F.3d 541, 542 (11th Cir.2002) (en banc) (\u201cA district court is not required to grant a plaintiff leave to amend his complaint sua sponte when the plaintiff, who is represented by counsel, never filed a motion to amend nor requested leave to amend before the district court.\u201d); see also Long v. Satz, 181 F.3d 1275, 1279-80 (11th Cir.1999) (requiring plaintiff to make by separate motion, setting forth the substance of proposed amendments, a request for leave to amend a complaint); Fed.R.Civ.P. 7(b)(1)(A) (\u201cA request for a court order must be made by motion. The motion must: (A) be in writing unless made during a hearing or trial\u201d). Therefore, if we are to conclude that there was an abuse of discretion by the district court in dismissing any part of First Amended Complaint, we must find that appellant sufficiently remedied the procedural errors in the amended complaint such that it was unreasonable for the district court to dismiss that count."},"case_id":3818992,"label":"b"}
{"context":"R., Vol. 1 pt. 2 at 290. Nothing more was required. As we have said, \"[A]n in camera hearing is the appropriate procedural vehicle for determining whether the informant's testimony would lend significant credence to [the] defense.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"662 F.2d 1364, 1369","parenthetical":"informant had arranged drug sale between defendant and police officer and was present at the sale","sentence":"Gaines v. Hess, 662 F.2d 1364, 1369 (10th Cir.1981) (informant had arranged drug sale between defendant and police officer and was present at the sale); see United States v. Martinez, 487 F.2d 973, 977 (10th Cir.1973); United States v. Cortese, 614 F.2d 914, 922 (3d Cir.1980) (denying release to defense attorney of notes of in camera testimony because \u201cdisclosure to attorneys is likely to compromise the policy behind the informer privilege\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"614 F.2d 914, 922","parenthetical":"denying release to defense attorney of notes of in camera testimony because \"disclosure to attorneys is likely to compromise the policy behind the informer privilege\"","sentence":"Gaines v. Hess, 662 F.2d 1364, 1369 (10th Cir.1981) (informant had arranged drug sale between defendant and police officer and was present at the sale); see United States v. Martinez, 487 F.2d 973, 977 (10th Cir.1973); United States v. Cortese, 614 F.2d 914, 922 (3d Cir.1980) (denying release to defense attorney of notes of in camera testimony because \u201cdisclosure to attorneys is likely to compromise the policy behind the informer privilege\u201d)."},"case_id":4340671,"label":"a"}
{"context":"But, by the same token, an expert witness \"may in any event be required to disclose the underlying facts or data on cross-examination.\" Fed.R.Evid. 705. The need to permit a criminal defendant the means to expose the basis of expert evidence against him is particularly strong.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting the possibility that \"the introduction of expert testimony with no basis could ... be so lacking in reliability, and so prejudicial, as to deny a defendant a fair trial\"","sentence":"See Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 106 S.Ct. 292, 296, 88 L.Ed.2d 15 (1985) (noting the possibility that \u201cthe introduction of expert testimony with no basis could ... be so lacking in reliability, and so prejudicial, as to deny a defendant a fair trial\u201d); United States v. Williams, 447 F.2d 1285, 1290 (5th Cir.1971) (en banc) (stating that introduction of expert opinion without opportunity to cross-examine author as to bases of opinion would infringe confrontation clause rights of defendant), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 954, 92 S.Ct. 1168, 31 L.Ed.2d 231 (1972); 3 Weinstein\u2019s Evidence Tf 703[04]. Rational use of expert evidence in the courtroom, however, demands that defense testimory be equally open to scrutiny by the government."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"483 A.2d 317, 322-23","parenthetical":"holding that civil defendant had the right to cross-examine plaintiffs expert psychological witness about plaintiffs juvenile record, in part because examination of this record formed part of the basis for expert's testimony","sentence":"Cf. District of Columbia v. Cooper, 483 A.2d 317, 322-23 (D.C.1984) (holding that civil defendant had the right to cross-examine plaintiffs expert psychological witness about plaintiffs juvenile record, in part because examination of this record formed part of the basis for expert\u2019s testimony)."},"case_id":9053680,"label":"a"}
{"context":"But, by the same token, an expert witness \"may in any event be required to disclose the underlying facts or data on cross-examination.\" Fed.R.Evid. 705. The need to permit a criminal defendant the means to expose the basis of expert evidence against him is particularly strong.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"483 A.2d 317, 322-23","parenthetical":"holding that civil defendant had the right to cross-examine plaintiffs expert psychological witness about plaintiffs juvenile record, in part because examination of this record formed part of the basis for expert's testimony","sentence":"Cf. District of Columbia v. Cooper, 483 A.2d 317, 322-23 (D.C.1984) (holding that civil defendant had the right to cross-examine plaintiffs expert psychological witness about plaintiffs juvenile record, in part because examination of this record formed part of the basis for expert\u2019s testimony)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"106 S.Ct. 292, 296","parenthetical":"noting the possibility that \"the introduction of expert testimony with no basis could ... be so lacking in reliability, and so prejudicial, as to deny a defendant a fair trial\"","sentence":"See Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 106 S.Ct. 292, 296, 88 L.Ed.2d 15 (1985) (noting the possibility that \u201cthe introduction of expert testimony with no basis could ... be so lacking in reliability, and so prejudicial, as to deny a defendant a fair trial\u201d); United States v. Williams, 447 F.2d 1285, 1290 (5th Cir.1971) (en banc) (stating that introduction of expert opinion without opportunity to cross-examine author as to bases of opinion would infringe confrontation clause rights of defendant), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 954, 92 S.Ct. 1168, 31 L.Ed.2d 231 (1972); 3 Weinstein\u2019s Evidence Tf 703[04]. Rational use of expert evidence in the courtroom, however, demands that defense testimory be equally open to scrutiny by the government."},"case_id":9053680,"label":"b"}
{"context":"But, by the same token, an expert witness \"may in any event be required to disclose the underlying facts or data on cross-examination.\" Fed.R.Evid. 705. The need to permit a criminal defendant the means to expose the basis of expert evidence against him is particularly strong.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting the possibility that \"the introduction of expert testimony with no basis could ... be so lacking in reliability, and so prejudicial, as to deny a defendant a fair trial\"","sentence":"See Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 106 S.Ct. 292, 296, 88 L.Ed.2d 15 (1985) (noting the possibility that \u201cthe introduction of expert testimony with no basis could ... be so lacking in reliability, and so prejudicial, as to deny a defendant a fair trial\u201d); United States v. Williams, 447 F.2d 1285, 1290 (5th Cir.1971) (en banc) (stating that introduction of expert opinion without opportunity to cross-examine author as to bases of opinion would infringe confrontation clause rights of defendant), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 954, 92 S.Ct. 1168, 31 L.Ed.2d 231 (1972); 3 Weinstein\u2019s Evidence Tf 703[04]. Rational use of expert evidence in the courtroom, however, demands that defense testimory be equally open to scrutiny by the government."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"483 A.2d 317, 322-23","parenthetical":"holding that civil defendant had the right to cross-examine plaintiffs expert psychological witness about plaintiffs juvenile record, in part because examination of this record formed part of the basis for expert's testimony","sentence":"Cf. District of Columbia v. Cooper, 483 A.2d 317, 322-23 (D.C.1984) (holding that civil defendant had the right to cross-examine plaintiffs expert psychological witness about plaintiffs juvenile record, in part because examination of this record formed part of the basis for expert\u2019s testimony)."},"case_id":9053680,"label":"a"}
{"context":"But, by the same token, an expert witness \"may in any event be required to disclose the underlying facts or data on cross-examination.\" Fed.R.Evid. 705. The need to permit a criminal defendant the means to expose the basis of expert evidence against him is particularly strong.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"483 A.2d 317, 322-23","parenthetical":"holding that civil defendant had the right to cross-examine plaintiffs expert psychological witness about plaintiffs juvenile record, in part because examination of this record formed part of the basis for expert's testimony","sentence":"Cf. District of Columbia v. Cooper, 483 A.2d 317, 322-23 (D.C.1984) (holding that civil defendant had the right to cross-examine plaintiffs expert psychological witness about plaintiffs juvenile record, in part because examination of this record formed part of the basis for expert\u2019s testimony)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"447 F.2d 1285, 1290","parenthetical":"stating that introduction of expert opinion without opportunity to cross-examine author as to bases of opinion would infringe confrontation clause rights of defendant","sentence":"See Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 106 S.Ct. 292, 296, 88 L.Ed.2d 15 (1985) (noting the possibility that \u201cthe introduction of expert testimony with no basis could ... be so lacking in reliability, and so prejudicial, as to deny a defendant a fair trial\u201d); United States v. Williams, 447 F.2d 1285, 1290 (5th Cir.1971) (en banc) (stating that introduction of expert opinion without opportunity to cross-examine author as to bases of opinion would infringe confrontation clause rights of defendant), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 954, 92 S.Ct. 1168, 31 L.Ed.2d 231 (1972); 3 Weinstein\u2019s Evidence Tf 703[04]. Rational use of expert evidence in the courtroom, however, demands that defense testimory be equally open to scrutiny by the government."},"case_id":9053680,"label":"b"}
{"context":"But, by the same token, an expert witness \"may in any event be required to disclose the underlying facts or data on cross-examination.\" Fed.R.Evid. 705. The need to permit a criminal defendant the means to expose the basis of expert evidence against him is particularly strong.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"483 A.2d 317, 322-23","parenthetical":"holding that civil defendant had the right to cross-examine plaintiffs expert psychological witness about plaintiffs juvenile record, in part because examination of this record formed part of the basis for expert's testimony","sentence":"Cf. District of Columbia v. Cooper, 483 A.2d 317, 322-23 (D.C.1984) (holding that civil defendant had the right to cross-examine plaintiffs expert psychological witness about plaintiffs juvenile record, in part because examination of this record formed part of the basis for expert\u2019s testimony)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"stating that introduction of expert opinion without opportunity to cross-examine author as to bases of opinion would infringe confrontation clause rights of defendant","sentence":"See Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 106 S.Ct. 292, 296, 88 L.Ed.2d 15 (1985) (noting the possibility that \u201cthe introduction of expert testimony with no basis could ... be so lacking in reliability, and so prejudicial, as to deny a defendant a fair trial\u201d); United States v. Williams, 447 F.2d 1285, 1290 (5th Cir.1971) (en banc) (stating that introduction of expert opinion without opportunity to cross-examine author as to bases of opinion would infringe confrontation clause rights of defendant), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 954, 92 S.Ct. 1168, 31 L.Ed.2d 231 (1972); 3 Weinstein\u2019s Evidence Tf 703[04]. Rational use of expert evidence in the courtroom, however, demands that defense testimory be equally open to scrutiny by the government."},"case_id":9053680,"label":"b"}
{"context":"But, by the same token, an expert witness \"may in any event be required to disclose the underlying facts or data on cross-examination.\" Fed.R.Evid. 705. The need to permit a criminal defendant the means to expose the basis of expert evidence against him is particularly strong.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"483 A.2d 317, 322-23","parenthetical":"holding that civil defendant had the right to cross-examine plaintiffs expert psychological witness about plaintiffs juvenile record, in part because examination of this record formed part of the basis for expert's testimony","sentence":"Cf. District of Columbia v. Cooper, 483 A.2d 317, 322-23 (D.C.1984) (holding that civil defendant had the right to cross-examine plaintiffs expert psychological witness about plaintiffs juvenile record, in part because examination of this record formed part of the basis for expert\u2019s testimony)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"stating that introduction of expert opinion without opportunity to cross-examine author as to bases of opinion would infringe confrontation clause rights of defendant","sentence":"See Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 106 S.Ct. 292, 296, 88 L.Ed.2d 15 (1985) (noting the possibility that \u201cthe introduction of expert testimony with no basis could ... be so lacking in reliability, and so prejudicial, as to deny a defendant a fair trial\u201d); United States v. Williams, 447 F.2d 1285, 1290 (5th Cir.1971) (en banc) (stating that introduction of expert opinion without opportunity to cross-examine author as to bases of opinion would infringe confrontation clause rights of defendant), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 954, 92 S.Ct. 1168, 31 L.Ed.2d 231 (1972); 3 Weinstein\u2019s Evidence Tf 703[04]. Rational use of expert evidence in the courtroom, however, demands that defense testimory be equally open to scrutiny by the government."},"case_id":9053680,"label":"b"}
{"context":"But, by the same token, an expert witness \"may in any event be required to disclose the underlying facts or data on cross-examination.\" Fed.R.Evid. 705. The need to permit a criminal defendant the means to expose the basis of expert evidence against him is particularly strong.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"stating that introduction of expert opinion without opportunity to cross-examine author as to bases of opinion would infringe confrontation clause rights of defendant","sentence":"See Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 106 S.Ct. 292, 296, 88 L.Ed.2d 15 (1985) (noting the possibility that \u201cthe introduction of expert testimony with no basis could ... be so lacking in reliability, and so prejudicial, as to deny a defendant a fair trial\u201d); United States v. Williams, 447 F.2d 1285, 1290 (5th Cir.1971) (en banc) (stating that introduction of expert opinion without opportunity to cross-examine author as to bases of opinion would infringe confrontation clause rights of defendant), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 954, 92 S.Ct. 1168, 31 L.Ed.2d 231 (1972); 3 Weinstein\u2019s Evidence Tf 703[04]. Rational use of expert evidence in the courtroom, however, demands that defense testimory be equally open to scrutiny by the government."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"483 A.2d 317, 322-23","parenthetical":"holding that civil defendant had the right to cross-examine plaintiffs expert psychological witness about plaintiffs juvenile record, in part because examination of this record formed part of the basis for expert's testimony","sentence":"Cf. District of Columbia v. Cooper, 483 A.2d 317, 322-23 (D.C.1984) (holding that civil defendant had the right to cross-examine plaintiffs expert psychological witness about plaintiffs juvenile record, in part because examination of this record formed part of the basis for expert\u2019s testimony)."},"case_id":9053680,"label":"a"}
{"context":"A movant meets the \"need\" requirement of Rule 35(a) by showing that- the requested examination will produce some relevant evidence that is not available from other sources. Accordingly, several courts have refused to order physical or mental examinations where the movant could obtain the desired information from other sources.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"178 F.R.D. 582, 582","parenthetical":"denying an examination where the movant could obtain copies of relevant records","sentence":"See, e.g., Pearson, 178 F.R.D. at 582 (denying an examination where the movant could obtain copies of relevant records); Marroni v. Matey, 82 F.R.D. 371, 372 (E.D.Pa.1979) (denying an examination where the movant had not established that the information was unavailable from less intrusive methods); Hughes v. Groves, 47 F.R.D. 52, 57 (W.D.Mo.1969) (stating that the discovery of medical reports may deprive the movant of \u201cgood cause\u201d for an examination); Petition of Trinidad Corp., 238 F.Supp. 928, 935 (E.D.Va.1965) (stating that the discovery of medical records may deprive the movant of the right to thereafter seek an examination); Martin v. Tindell, 98 So.2d 473, 475 (Fla.1957) (stating that although the denial of a Rule 35 motion might be an abuse of discretion where the defendant does not have access to the reports of either the hospital or the physician, there was no abuse of discretion in denying the motion where the defendant had such access), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 959, 78 S.Ct. 545, 2 L.Ed.2d 534 (1958); cf. Lahr, 164 F.R.D. at 200-01 (ordering an examination where the defendant demonstrated that the existing medical evidence was inadequate to evaluate the employee\u2019s mental condition and the defendant\u2019s psychologist averred that a mental examination was necessary to evaluate the employee\u2019s emotional state); Eckman v. University of Rhode Island, 160 F.R.D. 431, 434 (D.R.I.1995) (ordering an examination where the movant established that the severity of the injury would play a central role and that the examination would result neither in duplication of prior examinations nor in cumulative or invasive procedures)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"164 F.R.D. 200, 200-01","parenthetical":"ordering an examination where the defendant demonstrated that the existing medical evidence was inadequate to evaluate the employee's mental condition and the defendant's psychologist averred that a mental examination was necessary to evaluate the employee's emotional state","sentence":"See, e.g., Pearson, 178 F.R.D. at 582 (denying an examination where the movant could obtain copies of relevant records); Marroni v. Matey, 82 F.R.D. 371, 372 (E.D.Pa.1979) (denying an examination where the movant had not established that the information was unavailable from less intrusive methods); Hughes v. Groves, 47 F.R.D. 52, 57 (W.D.Mo.1969) (stating that the discovery of medical reports may deprive the movant of \u201cgood cause\u201d for an examination); Petition of Trinidad Corp., 238 F.Supp. 928, 935 (E.D.Va.1965) (stating that the discovery of medical records may deprive the movant of the right to thereafter seek an examination); Martin v. Tindell, 98 So.2d 473, 475 (Fla.1957) (stating that although the denial of a Rule 35 motion might be an abuse of discretion where the defendant does not have access to the reports of either the hospital or the physician, there was no abuse of discretion in denying the motion where the defendant had such access), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 959, 78 S.Ct. 545, 2 L.Ed.2d 534 (1958); cf. Lahr, 164 F.R.D. at 200-01 (ordering an examination where the defendant demonstrated that the existing medical evidence was inadequate to evaluate the employee\u2019s mental condition and the defendant\u2019s psychologist averred that a mental examination was necessary to evaluate the employee\u2019s emotional state); Eckman v. University of Rhode Island, 160 F.R.D. 431, 434 (D.R.I.1995) (ordering an examination where the movant established that the severity of the injury would play a central role and that the examination would result neither in duplication of prior examinations nor in cumulative or invasive procedures)."},"case_id":11623245,"label":"a"}
{"context":"A movant meets the \"need\" requirement of Rule 35(a) by showing that- the requested examination will produce some relevant evidence that is not available from other sources. Accordingly, several courts have refused to order physical or mental examinations where the movant could obtain the desired information from other sources.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"178 F.R.D. 582, 582","parenthetical":"denying an examination where the movant could obtain copies of relevant records","sentence":"See, e.g., Pearson, 178 F.R.D. at 582 (denying an examination where the movant could obtain copies of relevant records); Marroni v. Matey, 82 F.R.D. 371, 372 (E.D.Pa.1979) (denying an examination where the movant had not established that the information was unavailable from less intrusive methods); Hughes v. Groves, 47 F.R.D. 52, 57 (W.D.Mo.1969) (stating that the discovery of medical reports may deprive the movant of \u201cgood cause\u201d for an examination); Petition of Trinidad Corp., 238 F.Supp. 928, 935 (E.D.Va.1965) (stating that the discovery of medical records may deprive the movant of the right to thereafter seek an examination); Martin v. Tindell, 98 So.2d 473, 475 (Fla.1957) (stating that although the denial of a Rule 35 motion might be an abuse of discretion where the defendant does not have access to the reports of either the hospital or the physician, there was no abuse of discretion in denying the motion where the defendant had such access), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 959, 78 S.Ct. 545, 2 L.Ed.2d 534 (1958); cf. Lahr, 164 F.R.D. at 200-01 (ordering an examination where the defendant demonstrated that the existing medical evidence was inadequate to evaluate the employee\u2019s mental condition and the defendant\u2019s psychologist averred that a mental examination was necessary to evaluate the employee\u2019s emotional state); Eckman v. University of Rhode Island, 160 F.R.D. 431, 434 (D.R.I.1995) (ordering an examination where the movant established that the severity of the injury would play a central role and that the examination would result neither in duplication of prior examinations nor in cumulative or invasive procedures)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"160 F.R.D. 431, 434","parenthetical":"ordering an examination where the movant established that the severity of the injury would play a central role and that the examination would result neither in duplication of prior examinations nor in cumulative or invasive procedures","sentence":"See, e.g., Pearson, 178 F.R.D. at 582 (denying an examination where the movant could obtain copies of relevant records); Marroni v. Matey, 82 F.R.D. 371, 372 (E.D.Pa.1979) (denying an examination where the movant had not established that the information was unavailable from less intrusive methods); Hughes v. Groves, 47 F.R.D. 52, 57 (W.D.Mo.1969) (stating that the discovery of medical reports may deprive the movant of \u201cgood cause\u201d for an examination); Petition of Trinidad Corp., 238 F.Supp. 928, 935 (E.D.Va.1965) (stating that the discovery of medical records may deprive the movant of the right to thereafter seek an examination); Martin v. Tindell, 98 So.2d 473, 475 (Fla.1957) (stating that although the denial of a Rule 35 motion might be an abuse of discretion where the defendant does not have access to the reports of either the hospital or the physician, there was no abuse of discretion in denying the motion where the defendant had such access), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 959, 78 S.Ct. 545, 2 L.Ed.2d 534 (1958); cf. Lahr, 164 F.R.D. at 200-01 (ordering an examination where the defendant demonstrated that the existing medical evidence was inadequate to evaluate the employee\u2019s mental condition and the defendant\u2019s psychologist averred that a mental examination was necessary to evaluate the employee\u2019s emotional state); Eckman v. University of Rhode Island, 160 F.R.D. 431, 434 (D.R.I.1995) (ordering an examination where the movant established that the severity of the injury would play a central role and that the examination would result neither in duplication of prior examinations nor in cumulative or invasive procedures)."},"case_id":11623245,"label":"a"}
{"context":"A movant meets the \"need\" requirement of Rule 35(a) by showing that- the requested examination will produce some relevant evidence that is not available from other sources. Accordingly, several courts have refused to order physical or mental examinations where the movant could obtain the desired information from other sources.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"110 F.R.D. 184, 186","parenthetical":"finding good cause for an examination even though the movant had access to the plaintiffs medical records","sentence":"But see Anson v. Fickel, 110 F.R.D. 184, 186 (N.D.Ind.1986) (finding good cause for an examination even though the movant had access to the plaintiffs medical records)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"178 F.R.D. 582, 582","parenthetical":"denying an examination where the movant could obtain copies of relevant records","sentence":"See, e.g., Pearson, 178 F.R.D. at 582 (denying an examination where the movant could obtain copies of relevant records); Marroni v. Matey, 82 F.R.D. 371, 372 (E.D.Pa.1979) (denying an examination where the movant had not established that the information was unavailable from less intrusive methods); Hughes v. Groves, 47 F.R.D. 52, 57 (W.D.Mo.1969) (stating that the discovery of medical reports may deprive the movant of \u201cgood cause\u201d for an examination); Petition of Trinidad Corp., 238 F.Supp. 928, 935 (E.D.Va.1965) (stating that the discovery of medical records may deprive the movant of the right to thereafter seek an examination); Martin v. Tindell, 98 So.2d 473, 475 (Fla.1957) (stating that although the denial of a Rule 35 motion might be an abuse of discretion where the defendant does not have access to the reports of either the hospital or the physician, there was no abuse of discretion in denying the motion where the defendant had such access), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 959, 78 S.Ct. 545, 2 L.Ed.2d 534 (1958); cf. Lahr, 164 F.R.D. at 200-01 (ordering an examination where the defendant demonstrated that the existing medical evidence was inadequate to evaluate the employee\u2019s mental condition and the defendant\u2019s psychologist averred that a mental examination was necessary to evaluate the employee\u2019s emotional state); Eckman v. University of Rhode Island, 160 F.R.D. 431, 434 (D.R.I.1995) (ordering an examination where the movant established that the severity of the injury would play a central role and that the examination would result neither in duplication of prior examinations nor in cumulative or invasive procedures)."},"case_id":11623245,"label":"b"}
{"context":"A movant meets the \"need\" requirement of Rule 35(a) by showing that- the requested examination will produce some relevant evidence that is not available from other sources. Accordingly, several courts have refused to order physical or mental examinations where the movant could obtain the desired information from other sources.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"82 F.R.D. 371, 372","parenthetical":"denying an examination where the movant had not established that the information was unavailable from less intrusive methods","sentence":"See, e.g., Pearson, 178 F.R.D. at 582 (denying an examination where the movant could obtain copies of relevant records); Marroni v. Matey, 82 F.R.D. 371, 372 (E.D.Pa.1979) (denying an examination where the movant had not established that the information was unavailable from less intrusive methods); Hughes v. Groves, 47 F.R.D. 52, 57 (W.D.Mo.1969) (stating that the discovery of medical reports may deprive the movant of \u201cgood cause\u201d for an examination); Petition of Trinidad Corp., 238 F.Supp. 928, 935 (E.D.Va.1965) (stating that the discovery of medical records may deprive the movant of the right to thereafter seek an examination); Martin v. Tindell, 98 So.2d 473, 475 (Fla.1957) (stating that although the denial of a Rule 35 motion might be an abuse of discretion where the defendant does not have access to the reports of either the hospital or the physician, there was no abuse of discretion in denying the motion where the defendant had such access), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 959, 78 S.Ct. 545, 2 L.Ed.2d 534 (1958); cf. Lahr, 164 F.R.D. at 200-01 (ordering an examination where the defendant demonstrated that the existing medical evidence was inadequate to evaluate the employee\u2019s mental condition and the defendant\u2019s psychologist averred that a mental examination was necessary to evaluate the employee\u2019s emotional state); Eckman v. University of Rhode Island, 160 F.R.D. 431, 434 (D.R.I.1995) (ordering an examination where the movant established that the severity of the injury would play a central role and that the examination would result neither in duplication of prior examinations nor in cumulative or invasive procedures)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"164 F.R.D. 200, 200-01","parenthetical":"ordering an examination where the defendant demonstrated that the existing medical evidence was inadequate to evaluate the employee's mental condition and the defendant's psychologist averred that a mental examination was necessary to evaluate the employee's emotional state","sentence":"See, e.g., Pearson, 178 F.R.D. at 582 (denying an examination where the movant could obtain copies of relevant records); Marroni v. Matey, 82 F.R.D. 371, 372 (E.D.Pa.1979) (denying an examination where the movant had not established that the information was unavailable from less intrusive methods); Hughes v. Groves, 47 F.R.D. 52, 57 (W.D.Mo.1969) (stating that the discovery of medical reports may deprive the movant of \u201cgood cause\u201d for an examination); Petition of Trinidad Corp., 238 F.Supp. 928, 935 (E.D.Va.1965) (stating that the discovery of medical records may deprive the movant of the right to thereafter seek an examination); Martin v. Tindell, 98 So.2d 473, 475 (Fla.1957) (stating that although the denial of a Rule 35 motion might be an abuse of discretion where the defendant does not have access to the reports of either the hospital or the physician, there was no abuse of discretion in denying the motion where the defendant had such access), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 959, 78 S.Ct. 545, 2 L.Ed.2d 534 (1958); cf. Lahr, 164 F.R.D. at 200-01 (ordering an examination where the defendant demonstrated that the existing medical evidence was inadequate to evaluate the employee\u2019s mental condition and the defendant\u2019s psychologist averred that a mental examination was necessary to evaluate the employee\u2019s emotional state); Eckman v. University of Rhode Island, 160 F.R.D. 431, 434 (D.R.I.1995) (ordering an examination where the movant established that the severity of the injury would play a central role and that the examination would result neither in duplication of prior examinations nor in cumulative or invasive procedures)."},"case_id":11623245,"label":"a"}
{"context":"A movant meets the \"need\" requirement of Rule 35(a) by showing that- the requested examination will produce some relevant evidence that is not available from other sources. Accordingly, several courts have refused to order physical or mental examinations where the movant could obtain the desired information from other sources.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"82 F.R.D. 371, 372","parenthetical":"denying an examination where the movant had not established that the information was unavailable from less intrusive methods","sentence":"See, e.g., Pearson, 178 F.R.D. at 582 (denying an examination where the movant could obtain copies of relevant records); Marroni v. Matey, 82 F.R.D. 371, 372 (E.D.Pa.1979) (denying an examination where the movant had not established that the information was unavailable from less intrusive methods); Hughes v. Groves, 47 F.R.D. 52, 57 (W.D.Mo.1969) (stating that the discovery of medical reports may deprive the movant of \u201cgood cause\u201d for an examination); Petition of Trinidad Corp., 238 F.Supp. 928, 935 (E.D.Va.1965) (stating that the discovery of medical records may deprive the movant of the right to thereafter seek an examination); Martin v. Tindell, 98 So.2d 473, 475 (Fla.1957) (stating that although the denial of a Rule 35 motion might be an abuse of discretion where the defendant does not have access to the reports of either the hospital or the physician, there was no abuse of discretion in denying the motion where the defendant had such access), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 959, 78 S.Ct. 545, 2 L.Ed.2d 534 (1958); cf. Lahr, 164 F.R.D. at 200-01 (ordering an examination where the defendant demonstrated that the existing medical evidence was inadequate to evaluate the employee\u2019s mental condition and the defendant\u2019s psychologist averred that a mental examination was necessary to evaluate the employee\u2019s emotional state); Eckman v. University of Rhode Island, 160 F.R.D. 431, 434 (D.R.I.1995) (ordering an examination where the movant established that the severity of the injury would play a central role and that the examination would result neither in duplication of prior examinations nor in cumulative or invasive procedures)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"160 F.R.D. 431, 434","parenthetical":"ordering an examination where the movant established that the severity of the injury would play a central role and that the examination would result neither in duplication of prior examinations nor in cumulative or invasive procedures","sentence":"See, e.g., Pearson, 178 F.R.D. at 582 (denying an examination where the movant could obtain copies of relevant records); Marroni v. Matey, 82 F.R.D. 371, 372 (E.D.Pa.1979) (denying an examination where the movant had not established that the information was unavailable from less intrusive methods); Hughes v. Groves, 47 F.R.D. 52, 57 (W.D.Mo.1969) (stating that the discovery of medical reports may deprive the movant of \u201cgood cause\u201d for an examination); Petition of Trinidad Corp., 238 F.Supp. 928, 935 (E.D.Va.1965) (stating that the discovery of medical records may deprive the movant of the right to thereafter seek an examination); Martin v. Tindell, 98 So.2d 473, 475 (Fla.1957) (stating that although the denial of a Rule 35 motion might be an abuse of discretion where the defendant does not have access to the reports of either the hospital or the physician, there was no abuse of discretion in denying the motion where the defendant had such access), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 959, 78 S.Ct. 545, 2 L.Ed.2d 534 (1958); cf. Lahr, 164 F.R.D. at 200-01 (ordering an examination where the defendant demonstrated that the existing medical evidence was inadequate to evaluate the employee\u2019s mental condition and the defendant\u2019s psychologist averred that a mental examination was necessary to evaluate the employee\u2019s emotional state); Eckman v. University of Rhode Island, 160 F.R.D. 431, 434 (D.R.I.1995) (ordering an examination where the movant established that the severity of the injury would play a central role and that the examination would result neither in duplication of prior examinations nor in cumulative or invasive procedures)."},"case_id":11623245,"label":"a"}
{"context":"A movant meets the \"need\" requirement of Rule 35(a) by showing that- the requested examination will produce some relevant evidence that is not available from other sources. Accordingly, several courts have refused to order physical or mental examinations where the movant could obtain the desired information from other sources.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"82 F.R.D. 371, 372","parenthetical":"denying an examination where the movant had not established that the information was unavailable from less intrusive methods","sentence":"See, e.g., Pearson, 178 F.R.D. at 582 (denying an examination where the movant could obtain copies of relevant records); Marroni v. Matey, 82 F.R.D. 371, 372 (E.D.Pa.1979) (denying an examination where the movant had not established that the information was unavailable from less intrusive methods); Hughes v. Groves, 47 F.R.D. 52, 57 (W.D.Mo.1969) (stating that the discovery of medical reports may deprive the movant of \u201cgood cause\u201d for an examination); Petition of Trinidad Corp., 238 F.Supp. 928, 935 (E.D.Va.1965) (stating that the discovery of medical records may deprive the movant of the right to thereafter seek an examination); Martin v. Tindell, 98 So.2d 473, 475 (Fla.1957) (stating that although the denial of a Rule 35 motion might be an abuse of discretion where the defendant does not have access to the reports of either the hospital or the physician, there was no abuse of discretion in denying the motion where the defendant had such access), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 959, 78 S.Ct. 545, 2 L.Ed.2d 534 (1958); cf. Lahr, 164 F.R.D. at 200-01 (ordering an examination where the defendant demonstrated that the existing medical evidence was inadequate to evaluate the employee\u2019s mental condition and the defendant\u2019s psychologist averred that a mental examination was necessary to evaluate the employee\u2019s emotional state); Eckman v. University of Rhode Island, 160 F.R.D. 431, 434 (D.R.I.1995) (ordering an examination where the movant established that the severity of the injury would play a central role and that the examination would result neither in duplication of prior examinations nor in cumulative or invasive procedures)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"110 F.R.D. 184, 186","parenthetical":"finding good cause for an examination even though the movant had access to the plaintiffs medical records","sentence":"But see Anson v. Fickel, 110 F.R.D. 184, 186 (N.D.Ind.1986) (finding good cause for an examination even though the movant had access to the plaintiffs medical records)."},"case_id":11623245,"label":"a"}
{"context":"A movant meets the \"need\" requirement of Rule 35(a) by showing that- the requested examination will produce some relevant evidence that is not available from other sources. Accordingly, several courts have refused to order physical or mental examinations where the movant could obtain the desired information from other sources.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"164 F.R.D. 200, 200-01","parenthetical":"ordering an examination where the defendant demonstrated that the existing medical evidence was inadequate to evaluate the employee's mental condition and the defendant's psychologist averred that a mental examination was necessary to evaluate the employee's emotional state","sentence":"See, e.g., Pearson, 178 F.R.D. at 582 (denying an examination where the movant could obtain copies of relevant records); Marroni v. Matey, 82 F.R.D. 371, 372 (E.D.Pa.1979) (denying an examination where the movant had not established that the information was unavailable from less intrusive methods); Hughes v. Groves, 47 F.R.D. 52, 57 (W.D.Mo.1969) (stating that the discovery of medical reports may deprive the movant of \u201cgood cause\u201d for an examination); Petition of Trinidad Corp., 238 F.Supp. 928, 935 (E.D.Va.1965) (stating that the discovery of medical records may deprive the movant of the right to thereafter seek an examination); Martin v. Tindell, 98 So.2d 473, 475 (Fla.1957) (stating that although the denial of a Rule 35 motion might be an abuse of discretion where the defendant does not have access to the reports of either the hospital or the physician, there was no abuse of discretion in denying the motion where the defendant had such access), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 959, 78 S.Ct. 545, 2 L.Ed.2d 534 (1958); cf. Lahr, 164 F.R.D. at 200-01 (ordering an examination where the defendant demonstrated that the existing medical evidence was inadequate to evaluate the employee\u2019s mental condition and the defendant\u2019s psychologist averred that a mental examination was necessary to evaluate the employee\u2019s emotional state); Eckman v. University of Rhode Island, 160 F.R.D. 431, 434 (D.R.I.1995) (ordering an examination where the movant established that the severity of the injury would play a central role and that the examination would result neither in duplication of prior examinations nor in cumulative or invasive procedures)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"47 F.R.D. 52, 57","parenthetical":"stating that the discovery of medical reports may deprive the movant of \"good cause\" for an examination","sentence":"See, e.g., Pearson, 178 F.R.D. at 582 (denying an examination where the movant could obtain copies of relevant records); Marroni v. Matey, 82 F.R.D. 371, 372 (E.D.Pa.1979) (denying an examination where the movant had not established that the information was unavailable from less intrusive methods); Hughes v. Groves, 47 F.R.D. 52, 57 (W.D.Mo.1969) (stating that the discovery of medical reports may deprive the movant of \u201cgood cause\u201d for an examination); Petition of Trinidad Corp., 238 F.Supp. 928, 935 (E.D.Va.1965) (stating that the discovery of medical records may deprive the movant of the right to thereafter seek an examination); Martin v. Tindell, 98 So.2d 473, 475 (Fla.1957) (stating that although the denial of a Rule 35 motion might be an abuse of discretion where the defendant does not have access to the reports of either the hospital or the physician, there was no abuse of discretion in denying the motion where the defendant had such access), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 959, 78 S.Ct. 545, 2 L.Ed.2d 534 (1958); cf. Lahr, 164 F.R.D. at 200-01 (ordering an examination where the defendant demonstrated that the existing medical evidence was inadequate to evaluate the employee\u2019s mental condition and the defendant\u2019s psychologist averred that a mental examination was necessary to evaluate the employee\u2019s emotional state); Eckman v. University of Rhode Island, 160 F.R.D. 431, 434 (D.R.I.1995) (ordering an examination where the movant established that the severity of the injury would play a central role and that the examination would result neither in duplication of prior examinations nor in cumulative or invasive procedures)."},"case_id":11623245,"label":"b"}
{"context":"A movant meets the \"need\" requirement of Rule 35(a) by showing that- the requested examination will produce some relevant evidence that is not available from other sources. Accordingly, several courts have refused to order physical or mental examinations where the movant could obtain the desired information from other sources.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"47 F.R.D. 52, 57","parenthetical":"stating that the discovery of medical reports may deprive the movant of \"good cause\" for an examination","sentence":"See, e.g., Pearson, 178 F.R.D. at 582 (denying an examination where the movant could obtain copies of relevant records); Marroni v. Matey, 82 F.R.D. 371, 372 (E.D.Pa.1979) (denying an examination where the movant had not established that the information was unavailable from less intrusive methods); Hughes v. Groves, 47 F.R.D. 52, 57 (W.D.Mo.1969) (stating that the discovery of medical reports may deprive the movant of \u201cgood cause\u201d for an examination); Petition of Trinidad Corp., 238 F.Supp. 928, 935 (E.D.Va.1965) (stating that the discovery of medical records may deprive the movant of the right to thereafter seek an examination); Martin v. Tindell, 98 So.2d 473, 475 (Fla.1957) (stating that although the denial of a Rule 35 motion might be an abuse of discretion where the defendant does not have access to the reports of either the hospital or the physician, there was no abuse of discretion in denying the motion where the defendant had such access), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 959, 78 S.Ct. 545, 2 L.Ed.2d 534 (1958); cf. Lahr, 164 F.R.D. at 200-01 (ordering an examination where the defendant demonstrated that the existing medical evidence was inadequate to evaluate the employee\u2019s mental condition and the defendant\u2019s psychologist averred that a mental examination was necessary to evaluate the employee\u2019s emotional state); Eckman v. University of Rhode Island, 160 F.R.D. 431, 434 (D.R.I.1995) (ordering an examination where the movant established that the severity of the injury would play a central role and that the examination would result neither in duplication of prior examinations nor in cumulative or invasive procedures)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"160 F.R.D. 431, 434","parenthetical":"ordering an examination where the movant established that the severity of the injury would play a central role and that the examination would result neither in duplication of prior examinations nor in cumulative or invasive procedures","sentence":"See, e.g., Pearson, 178 F.R.D. at 582 (denying an examination where the movant could obtain copies of relevant records); Marroni v. Matey, 82 F.R.D. 371, 372 (E.D.Pa.1979) (denying an examination where the movant had not established that the information was unavailable from less intrusive methods); Hughes v. Groves, 47 F.R.D. 52, 57 (W.D.Mo.1969) (stating that the discovery of medical reports may deprive the movant of \u201cgood cause\u201d for an examination); Petition of Trinidad Corp., 238 F.Supp. 928, 935 (E.D.Va.1965) (stating that the discovery of medical records may deprive the movant of the right to thereafter seek an examination); Martin v. Tindell, 98 So.2d 473, 475 (Fla.1957) (stating that although the denial of a Rule 35 motion might be an abuse of discretion where the defendant does not have access to the reports of either the hospital or the physician, there was no abuse of discretion in denying the motion where the defendant had such access), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 959, 78 S.Ct. 545, 2 L.Ed.2d 534 (1958); cf. Lahr, 164 F.R.D. at 200-01 (ordering an examination where the defendant demonstrated that the existing medical evidence was inadequate to evaluate the employee\u2019s mental condition and the defendant\u2019s psychologist averred that a mental examination was necessary to evaluate the employee\u2019s emotional state); Eckman v. University of Rhode Island, 160 F.R.D. 431, 434 (D.R.I.1995) (ordering an examination where the movant established that the severity of the injury would play a central role and that the examination would result neither in duplication of prior examinations nor in cumulative or invasive procedures)."},"case_id":11623245,"label":"a"}
{"context":"A movant meets the \"need\" requirement of Rule 35(a) by showing that- the requested examination will produce some relevant evidence that is not available from other sources. Accordingly, several courts have refused to order physical or mental examinations where the movant could obtain the desired information from other sources.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"110 F.R.D. 184, 186","parenthetical":"finding good cause for an examination even though the movant had access to the plaintiffs medical records","sentence":"But see Anson v. Fickel, 110 F.R.D. 184, 186 (N.D.Ind.1986) (finding good cause for an examination even though the movant had access to the plaintiffs medical records)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"47 F.R.D. 52, 57","parenthetical":"stating that the discovery of medical reports may deprive the movant of \"good cause\" for an examination","sentence":"See, e.g., Pearson, 178 F.R.D. at 582 (denying an examination where the movant could obtain copies of relevant records); Marroni v. Matey, 82 F.R.D. 371, 372 (E.D.Pa.1979) (denying an examination where the movant had not established that the information was unavailable from less intrusive methods); Hughes v. Groves, 47 F.R.D. 52, 57 (W.D.Mo.1969) (stating that the discovery of medical reports may deprive the movant of \u201cgood cause\u201d for an examination); Petition of Trinidad Corp., 238 F.Supp. 928, 935 (E.D.Va.1965) (stating that the discovery of medical records may deprive the movant of the right to thereafter seek an examination); Martin v. Tindell, 98 So.2d 473, 475 (Fla.1957) (stating that although the denial of a Rule 35 motion might be an abuse of discretion where the defendant does not have access to the reports of either the hospital or the physician, there was no abuse of discretion in denying the motion where the defendant had such access), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 959, 78 S.Ct. 545, 2 L.Ed.2d 534 (1958); cf. Lahr, 164 F.R.D. at 200-01 (ordering an examination where the defendant demonstrated that the existing medical evidence was inadequate to evaluate the employee\u2019s mental condition and the defendant\u2019s psychologist averred that a mental examination was necessary to evaluate the employee\u2019s emotional state); Eckman v. University of Rhode Island, 160 F.R.D. 431, 434 (D.R.I.1995) (ordering an examination where the movant established that the severity of the injury would play a central role and that the examination would result neither in duplication of prior examinations nor in cumulative or invasive procedures)."},"case_id":11623245,"label":"b"}
{"context":"A movant meets the \"need\" requirement of Rule 35(a) by showing that- the requested examination will produce some relevant evidence that is not available from other sources. Accordingly, several courts have refused to order physical or mental examinations where the movant could obtain the desired information from other sources.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"164 F.R.D. 200, 200-01","parenthetical":"ordering an examination where the defendant demonstrated that the existing medical evidence was inadequate to evaluate the employee's mental condition and the defendant's psychologist averred that a mental examination was necessary to evaluate the employee's emotional state","sentence":"See, e.g., Pearson, 178 F.R.D. at 582 (denying an examination where the movant could obtain copies of relevant records); Marroni v. Matey, 82 F.R.D. 371, 372 (E.D.Pa.1979) (denying an examination where the movant had not established that the information was unavailable from less intrusive methods); Hughes v. Groves, 47 F.R.D. 52, 57 (W.D.Mo.1969) (stating that the discovery of medical reports may deprive the movant of \u201cgood cause\u201d for an examination); Petition of Trinidad Corp., 238 F.Supp. 928, 935 (E.D.Va.1965) (stating that the discovery of medical records may deprive the movant of the right to thereafter seek an examination); Martin v. Tindell, 98 So.2d 473, 475 (Fla.1957) (stating that although the denial of a Rule 35 motion might be an abuse of discretion where the defendant does not have access to the reports of either the hospital or the physician, there was no abuse of discretion in denying the motion where the defendant had such access), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 959, 78 S.Ct. 545, 2 L.Ed.2d 534 (1958); cf. Lahr, 164 F.R.D. at 200-01 (ordering an examination where the defendant demonstrated that the existing medical evidence was inadequate to evaluate the employee\u2019s mental condition and the defendant\u2019s psychologist averred that a mental examination was necessary to evaluate the employee\u2019s emotional state); Eckman v. University of Rhode Island, 160 F.R.D. 431, 434 (D.R.I.1995) (ordering an examination where the movant established that the severity of the injury would play a central role and that the examination would result neither in duplication of prior examinations nor in cumulative or invasive procedures)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"238 F.Supp. 928, 935","parenthetical":"stating that the discovery of medical records may deprive the movant of the right to thereafter seek an examination","sentence":"See, e.g., Pearson, 178 F.R.D. at 582 (denying an examination where the movant could obtain copies of relevant records); Marroni v. Matey, 82 F.R.D. 371, 372 (E.D.Pa.1979) (denying an examination where the movant had not established that the information was unavailable from less intrusive methods); Hughes v. Groves, 47 F.R.D. 52, 57 (W.D.Mo.1969) (stating that the discovery of medical reports may deprive the movant of \u201cgood cause\u201d for an examination); Petition of Trinidad Corp., 238 F.Supp. 928, 935 (E.D.Va.1965) (stating that the discovery of medical records may deprive the movant of the right to thereafter seek an examination); Martin v. Tindell, 98 So.2d 473, 475 (Fla.1957) (stating that although the denial of a Rule 35 motion might be an abuse of discretion where the defendant does not have access to the reports of either the hospital or the physician, there was no abuse of discretion in denying the motion where the defendant had such access), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 959, 78 S.Ct. 545, 2 L.Ed.2d 534 (1958); cf. Lahr, 164 F.R.D. at 200-01 (ordering an examination where the defendant demonstrated that the existing medical evidence was inadequate to evaluate the employee\u2019s mental condition and the defendant\u2019s psychologist averred that a mental examination was necessary to evaluate the employee\u2019s emotional state); Eckman v. University of Rhode Island, 160 F.R.D. 431, 434 (D.R.I.1995) (ordering an examination where the movant established that the severity of the injury would play a central role and that the examination would result neither in duplication of prior examinations nor in cumulative or invasive procedures)."},"case_id":11623245,"label":"b"}
{"context":"A movant meets the \"need\" requirement of Rule 35(a) by showing that- the requested examination will produce some relevant evidence that is not available from other sources. Accordingly, several courts have refused to order physical or mental examinations where the movant could obtain the desired information from other sources.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"238 F.Supp. 928, 935","parenthetical":"stating that the discovery of medical records may deprive the movant of the right to thereafter seek an examination","sentence":"See, e.g., Pearson, 178 F.R.D. at 582 (denying an examination where the movant could obtain copies of relevant records); Marroni v. Matey, 82 F.R.D. 371, 372 (E.D.Pa.1979) (denying an examination where the movant had not established that the information was unavailable from less intrusive methods); Hughes v. Groves, 47 F.R.D. 52, 57 (W.D.Mo.1969) (stating that the discovery of medical reports may deprive the movant of \u201cgood cause\u201d for an examination); Petition of Trinidad Corp., 238 F.Supp. 928, 935 (E.D.Va.1965) (stating that the discovery of medical records may deprive the movant of the right to thereafter seek an examination); Martin v. Tindell, 98 So.2d 473, 475 (Fla.1957) (stating that although the denial of a Rule 35 motion might be an abuse of discretion where the defendant does not have access to the reports of either the hospital or the physician, there was no abuse of discretion in denying the motion where the defendant had such access), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 959, 78 S.Ct. 545, 2 L.Ed.2d 534 (1958); cf. Lahr, 164 F.R.D. at 200-01 (ordering an examination where the defendant demonstrated that the existing medical evidence was inadequate to evaluate the employee\u2019s mental condition and the defendant\u2019s psychologist averred that a mental examination was necessary to evaluate the employee\u2019s emotional state); Eckman v. University of Rhode Island, 160 F.R.D. 431, 434 (D.R.I.1995) (ordering an examination where the movant established that the severity of the injury would play a central role and that the examination would result neither in duplication of prior examinations nor in cumulative or invasive procedures)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"160 F.R.D. 431, 434","parenthetical":"ordering an examination where the movant established that the severity of the injury would play a central role and that the examination would result neither in duplication of prior examinations nor in cumulative or invasive procedures","sentence":"See, e.g., Pearson, 178 F.R.D. at 582 (denying an examination where the movant could obtain copies of relevant records); Marroni v. Matey, 82 F.R.D. 371, 372 (E.D.Pa.1979) (denying an examination where the movant had not established that the information was unavailable from less intrusive methods); Hughes v. Groves, 47 F.R.D. 52, 57 (W.D.Mo.1969) (stating that the discovery of medical reports may deprive the movant of \u201cgood cause\u201d for an examination); Petition of Trinidad Corp., 238 F.Supp. 928, 935 (E.D.Va.1965) (stating that the discovery of medical records may deprive the movant of the right to thereafter seek an examination); Martin v. Tindell, 98 So.2d 473, 475 (Fla.1957) (stating that although the denial of a Rule 35 motion might be an abuse of discretion where the defendant does not have access to the reports of either the hospital or the physician, there was no abuse of discretion in denying the motion where the defendant had such access), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 959, 78 S.Ct. 545, 2 L.Ed.2d 534 (1958); cf. Lahr, 164 F.R.D. at 200-01 (ordering an examination where the defendant demonstrated that the existing medical evidence was inadequate to evaluate the employee\u2019s mental condition and the defendant\u2019s psychologist averred that a mental examination was necessary to evaluate the employee\u2019s emotional state); Eckman v. University of Rhode Island, 160 F.R.D. 431, 434 (D.R.I.1995) (ordering an examination where the movant established that the severity of the injury would play a central role and that the examination would result neither in duplication of prior examinations nor in cumulative or invasive procedures)."},"case_id":11623245,"label":"a"}
{"context":"A movant meets the \"need\" requirement of Rule 35(a) by showing that- the requested examination will produce some relevant evidence that is not available from other sources. Accordingly, several courts have refused to order physical or mental examinations where the movant could obtain the desired information from other sources.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"238 F.Supp. 928, 935","parenthetical":"stating that the discovery of medical records may deprive the movant of the right to thereafter seek an examination","sentence":"See, e.g., Pearson, 178 F.R.D. at 582 (denying an examination where the movant could obtain copies of relevant records); Marroni v. Matey, 82 F.R.D. 371, 372 (E.D.Pa.1979) (denying an examination where the movant had not established that the information was unavailable from less intrusive methods); Hughes v. Groves, 47 F.R.D. 52, 57 (W.D.Mo.1969) (stating that the discovery of medical reports may deprive the movant of \u201cgood cause\u201d for an examination); Petition of Trinidad Corp., 238 F.Supp. 928, 935 (E.D.Va.1965) (stating that the discovery of medical records may deprive the movant of the right to thereafter seek an examination); Martin v. Tindell, 98 So.2d 473, 475 (Fla.1957) (stating that although the denial of a Rule 35 motion might be an abuse of discretion where the defendant does not have access to the reports of either the hospital or the physician, there was no abuse of discretion in denying the motion where the defendant had such access), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 959, 78 S.Ct. 545, 2 L.Ed.2d 534 (1958); cf. Lahr, 164 F.R.D. at 200-01 (ordering an examination where the defendant demonstrated that the existing medical evidence was inadequate to evaluate the employee\u2019s mental condition and the defendant\u2019s psychologist averred that a mental examination was necessary to evaluate the employee\u2019s emotional state); Eckman v. University of Rhode Island, 160 F.R.D. 431, 434 (D.R.I.1995) (ordering an examination where the movant established that the severity of the injury would play a central role and that the examination would result neither in duplication of prior examinations nor in cumulative or invasive procedures)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"110 F.R.D. 184, 186","parenthetical":"finding good cause for an examination even though the movant had access to the plaintiffs medical records","sentence":"But see Anson v. Fickel, 110 F.R.D. 184, 186 (N.D.Ind.1986) (finding good cause for an examination even though the movant had access to the plaintiffs medical records)."},"case_id":11623245,"label":"a"}
{"context":"A movant meets the \"need\" requirement of Rule 35(a) by showing that- the requested examination will produce some relevant evidence that is not available from other sources. Accordingly, several courts have refused to order physical or mental examinations where the movant could obtain the desired information from other sources.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"164 F.R.D. 200, 200-01","parenthetical":"ordering an examination where the defendant demonstrated that the existing medical evidence was inadequate to evaluate the employee's mental condition and the defendant's psychologist averred that a mental examination was necessary to evaluate the employee's emotional state","sentence":"See, e.g., Pearson, 178 F.R.D. at 582 (denying an examination where the movant could obtain copies of relevant records); Marroni v. Matey, 82 F.R.D. 371, 372 (E.D.Pa.1979) (denying an examination where the movant had not established that the information was unavailable from less intrusive methods); Hughes v. Groves, 47 F.R.D. 52, 57 (W.D.Mo.1969) (stating that the discovery of medical reports may deprive the movant of \u201cgood cause\u201d for an examination); Petition of Trinidad Corp., 238 F.Supp. 928, 935 (E.D.Va.1965) (stating that the discovery of medical records may deprive the movant of the right to thereafter seek an examination); Martin v. Tindell, 98 So.2d 473, 475 (Fla.1957) (stating that although the denial of a Rule 35 motion might be an abuse of discretion where the defendant does not have access to the reports of either the hospital or the physician, there was no abuse of discretion in denying the motion where the defendant had such access), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 959, 78 S.Ct. 545, 2 L.Ed.2d 534 (1958); cf. Lahr, 164 F.R.D. at 200-01 (ordering an examination where the defendant demonstrated that the existing medical evidence was inadequate to evaluate the employee\u2019s mental condition and the defendant\u2019s psychologist averred that a mental examination was necessary to evaluate the employee\u2019s emotional state); Eckman v. University of Rhode Island, 160 F.R.D. 431, 434 (D.R.I.1995) (ordering an examination where the movant established that the severity of the injury would play a central role and that the examination would result neither in duplication of prior examinations nor in cumulative or invasive procedures)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"98 So.2d 473, 475","parenthetical":"stating that although the denial of a Rule 35 motion might be an abuse of discretion where the defendant does not have access to the reports of either the hospital or the physician, there was no abuse of discretion in denying the motion where the defendant had such access","sentence":"See, e.g., Pearson, 178 F.R.D. at 582 (denying an examination where the movant could obtain copies of relevant records); Marroni v. Matey, 82 F.R.D. 371, 372 (E.D.Pa.1979) (denying an examination where the movant had not established that the information was unavailable from less intrusive methods); Hughes v. Groves, 47 F.R.D. 52, 57 (W.D.Mo.1969) (stating that the discovery of medical reports may deprive the movant of \u201cgood cause\u201d for an examination); Petition of Trinidad Corp., 238 F.Supp. 928, 935 (E.D.Va.1965) (stating that the discovery of medical records may deprive the movant of the right to thereafter seek an examination); Martin v. Tindell, 98 So.2d 473, 475 (Fla.1957) (stating that although the denial of a Rule 35 motion might be an abuse of discretion where the defendant does not have access to the reports of either the hospital or the physician, there was no abuse of discretion in denying the motion where the defendant had such access), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 959, 78 S.Ct. 545, 2 L.Ed.2d 534 (1958); cf. Lahr, 164 F.R.D. at 200-01 (ordering an examination where the defendant demonstrated that the existing medical evidence was inadequate to evaluate the employee\u2019s mental condition and the defendant\u2019s psychologist averred that a mental examination was necessary to evaluate the employee\u2019s emotional state); Eckman v. University of Rhode Island, 160 F.R.D. 431, 434 (D.R.I.1995) (ordering an examination where the movant established that the severity of the injury would play a central role and that the examination would result neither in duplication of prior examinations nor in cumulative or invasive procedures)."},"case_id":11623245,"label":"b"}
{"context":"A movant meets the \"need\" requirement of Rule 35(a) by showing that- the requested examination will produce some relevant evidence that is not available from other sources. Accordingly, several courts have refused to order physical or mental examinations where the movant could obtain the desired information from other sources.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"160 F.R.D. 431, 434","parenthetical":"ordering an examination where the movant established that the severity of the injury would play a central role and that the examination would result neither in duplication of prior examinations nor in cumulative or invasive procedures","sentence":"See, e.g., Pearson, 178 F.R.D. at 582 (denying an examination where the movant could obtain copies of relevant records); Marroni v. Matey, 82 F.R.D. 371, 372 (E.D.Pa.1979) (denying an examination where the movant had not established that the information was unavailable from less intrusive methods); Hughes v. Groves, 47 F.R.D. 52, 57 (W.D.Mo.1969) (stating that the discovery of medical reports may deprive the movant of \u201cgood cause\u201d for an examination); Petition of Trinidad Corp., 238 F.Supp. 928, 935 (E.D.Va.1965) (stating that the discovery of medical records may deprive the movant of the right to thereafter seek an examination); Martin v. Tindell, 98 So.2d 473, 475 (Fla.1957) (stating that although the denial of a Rule 35 motion might be an abuse of discretion where the defendant does not have access to the reports of either the hospital or the physician, there was no abuse of discretion in denying the motion where the defendant had such access), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 959, 78 S.Ct. 545, 2 L.Ed.2d 534 (1958); cf. Lahr, 164 F.R.D. at 200-01 (ordering an examination where the defendant demonstrated that the existing medical evidence was inadequate to evaluate the employee\u2019s mental condition and the defendant\u2019s psychologist averred that a mental examination was necessary to evaluate the employee\u2019s emotional state); Eckman v. University of Rhode Island, 160 F.R.D. 431, 434 (D.R.I.1995) (ordering an examination where the movant established that the severity of the injury would play a central role and that the examination would result neither in duplication of prior examinations nor in cumulative or invasive procedures)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"98 So.2d 473, 475","parenthetical":"stating that although the denial of a Rule 35 motion might be an abuse of discretion where the defendant does not have access to the reports of either the hospital or the physician, there was no abuse of discretion in denying the motion where the defendant had such access","sentence":"See, e.g., Pearson, 178 F.R.D. at 582 (denying an examination where the movant could obtain copies of relevant records); Marroni v. Matey, 82 F.R.D. 371, 372 (E.D.Pa.1979) (denying an examination where the movant had not established that the information was unavailable from less intrusive methods); Hughes v. Groves, 47 F.R.D. 52, 57 (W.D.Mo.1969) (stating that the discovery of medical reports may deprive the movant of \u201cgood cause\u201d for an examination); Petition of Trinidad Corp., 238 F.Supp. 928, 935 (E.D.Va.1965) (stating that the discovery of medical records may deprive the movant of the right to thereafter seek an examination); Martin v. Tindell, 98 So.2d 473, 475 (Fla.1957) (stating that although the denial of a Rule 35 motion might be an abuse of discretion where the defendant does not have access to the reports of either the hospital or the physician, there was no abuse of discretion in denying the motion where the defendant had such access), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 959, 78 S.Ct. 545, 2 L.Ed.2d 534 (1958); cf. Lahr, 164 F.R.D. at 200-01 (ordering an examination where the defendant demonstrated that the existing medical evidence was inadequate to evaluate the employee\u2019s mental condition and the defendant\u2019s psychologist averred that a mental examination was necessary to evaluate the employee\u2019s emotional state); Eckman v. University of Rhode Island, 160 F.R.D. 431, 434 (D.R.I.1995) (ordering an examination where the movant established that the severity of the injury would play a central role and that the examination would result neither in duplication of prior examinations nor in cumulative or invasive procedures)."},"case_id":11623245,"label":"b"}
{"context":"A movant meets the \"need\" requirement of Rule 35(a) by showing that- the requested examination will produce some relevant evidence that is not available from other sources. Accordingly, several courts have refused to order physical or mental examinations where the movant could obtain the desired information from other sources.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"110 F.R.D. 184, 186","parenthetical":"finding good cause for an examination even though the movant had access to the plaintiffs medical records","sentence":"But see Anson v. Fickel, 110 F.R.D. 184, 186 (N.D.Ind.1986) (finding good cause for an examination even though the movant had access to the plaintiffs medical records)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"98 So.2d 473, 475","parenthetical":"stating that although the denial of a Rule 35 motion might be an abuse of discretion where the defendant does not have access to the reports of either the hospital or the physician, there was no abuse of discretion in denying the motion where the defendant had such access","sentence":"See, e.g., Pearson, 178 F.R.D. at 582 (denying an examination where the movant could obtain copies of relevant records); Marroni v. Matey, 82 F.R.D. 371, 372 (E.D.Pa.1979) (denying an examination where the movant had not established that the information was unavailable from less intrusive methods); Hughes v. Groves, 47 F.R.D. 52, 57 (W.D.Mo.1969) (stating that the discovery of medical reports may deprive the movant of \u201cgood cause\u201d for an examination); Petition of Trinidad Corp., 238 F.Supp. 928, 935 (E.D.Va.1965) (stating that the discovery of medical records may deprive the movant of the right to thereafter seek an examination); Martin v. Tindell, 98 So.2d 473, 475 (Fla.1957) (stating that although the denial of a Rule 35 motion might be an abuse of discretion where the defendant does not have access to the reports of either the hospital or the physician, there was no abuse of discretion in denying the motion where the defendant had such access), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 959, 78 S.Ct. 545, 2 L.Ed.2d 534 (1958); cf. Lahr, 164 F.R.D. at 200-01 (ordering an examination where the defendant demonstrated that the existing medical evidence was inadequate to evaluate the employee\u2019s mental condition and the defendant\u2019s psychologist averred that a mental examination was necessary to evaluate the employee\u2019s emotional state); Eckman v. University of Rhode Island, 160 F.R.D. 431, 434 (D.R.I.1995) (ordering an examination where the movant established that the severity of the injury would play a central role and that the examination would result neither in duplication of prior examinations nor in cumulative or invasive procedures)."},"case_id":11623245,"label":"b"}
{"context":"A movant meets the \"need\" requirement of Rule 35(a) by showing that- the requested examination will produce some relevant evidence that is not available from other sources. Accordingly, several courts have refused to order physical or mental examinations where the movant could obtain the desired information from other sources.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"stating that although the denial of a Rule 35 motion might be an abuse of discretion where the defendant does not have access to the reports of either the hospital or the physician, there was no abuse of discretion in denying the motion where the defendant had such access","sentence":"See, e.g., Pearson, 178 F.R.D. at 582 (denying an examination where the movant could obtain copies of relevant records); Marroni v. Matey, 82 F.R.D. 371, 372 (E.D.Pa.1979) (denying an examination where the movant had not established that the information was unavailable from less intrusive methods); Hughes v. Groves, 47 F.R.D. 52, 57 (W.D.Mo.1969) (stating that the discovery of medical reports may deprive the movant of \u201cgood cause\u201d for an examination); Petition of Trinidad Corp., 238 F.Supp. 928, 935 (E.D.Va.1965) (stating that the discovery of medical records may deprive the movant of the right to thereafter seek an examination); Martin v. Tindell, 98 So.2d 473, 475 (Fla.1957) (stating that although the denial of a Rule 35 motion might be an abuse of discretion where the defendant does not have access to the reports of either the hospital or the physician, there was no abuse of discretion in denying the motion where the defendant had such access), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 959, 78 S.Ct. 545, 2 L.Ed.2d 534 (1958); cf. Lahr, 164 F.R.D. at 200-01 (ordering an examination where the defendant demonstrated that the existing medical evidence was inadequate to evaluate the employee\u2019s mental condition and the defendant\u2019s psychologist averred that a mental examination was necessary to evaluate the employee\u2019s emotional state); Eckman v. University of Rhode Island, 160 F.R.D. 431, 434 (D.R.I.1995) (ordering an examination where the movant established that the severity of the injury would play a central role and that the examination would result neither in duplication of prior examinations nor in cumulative or invasive procedures)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"164 F.R.D. 200, 200-01","parenthetical":"ordering an examination where the defendant demonstrated that the existing medical evidence was inadequate to evaluate the employee's mental condition and the defendant's psychologist averred that a mental examination was necessary to evaluate the employee's emotional state","sentence":"See, e.g., Pearson, 178 F.R.D. at 582 (denying an examination where the movant could obtain copies of relevant records); Marroni v. Matey, 82 F.R.D. 371, 372 (E.D.Pa.1979) (denying an examination where the movant had not established that the information was unavailable from less intrusive methods); Hughes v. Groves, 47 F.R.D. 52, 57 (W.D.Mo.1969) (stating that the discovery of medical reports may deprive the movant of \u201cgood cause\u201d for an examination); Petition of Trinidad Corp., 238 F.Supp. 928, 935 (E.D.Va.1965) (stating that the discovery of medical records may deprive the movant of the right to thereafter seek an examination); Martin v. Tindell, 98 So.2d 473, 475 (Fla.1957) (stating that although the denial of a Rule 35 motion might be an abuse of discretion where the defendant does not have access to the reports of either the hospital or the physician, there was no abuse of discretion in denying the motion where the defendant had such access), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 959, 78 S.Ct. 545, 2 L.Ed.2d 534 (1958); cf. Lahr, 164 F.R.D. at 200-01 (ordering an examination where the defendant demonstrated that the existing medical evidence was inadequate to evaluate the employee\u2019s mental condition and the defendant\u2019s psychologist averred that a mental examination was necessary to evaluate the employee\u2019s emotional state); Eckman v. University of Rhode Island, 160 F.R.D. 431, 434 (D.R.I.1995) (ordering an examination where the movant established that the severity of the injury would play a central role and that the examination would result neither in duplication of prior examinations nor in cumulative or invasive procedures)."},"case_id":11623245,"label":"a"}
{"context":"A movant meets the \"need\" requirement of Rule 35(a) by showing that- the requested examination will produce some relevant evidence that is not available from other sources. Accordingly, several courts have refused to order physical or mental examinations where the movant could obtain the desired information from other sources.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"160 F.R.D. 431, 434","parenthetical":"ordering an examination where the movant established that the severity of the injury would play a central role and that the examination would result neither in duplication of prior examinations nor in cumulative or invasive procedures","sentence":"See, e.g., Pearson, 178 F.R.D. at 582 (denying an examination where the movant could obtain copies of relevant records); Marroni v. Matey, 82 F.R.D. 371, 372 (E.D.Pa.1979) (denying an examination where the movant had not established that the information was unavailable from less intrusive methods); Hughes v. Groves, 47 F.R.D. 52, 57 (W.D.Mo.1969) (stating that the discovery of medical reports may deprive the movant of \u201cgood cause\u201d for an examination); Petition of Trinidad Corp., 238 F.Supp. 928, 935 (E.D.Va.1965) (stating that the discovery of medical records may deprive the movant of the right to thereafter seek an examination); Martin v. Tindell, 98 So.2d 473, 475 (Fla.1957) (stating that although the denial of a Rule 35 motion might be an abuse of discretion where the defendant does not have access to the reports of either the hospital or the physician, there was no abuse of discretion in denying the motion where the defendant had such access), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 959, 78 S.Ct. 545, 2 L.Ed.2d 534 (1958); cf. Lahr, 164 F.R.D. at 200-01 (ordering an examination where the defendant demonstrated that the existing medical evidence was inadequate to evaluate the employee\u2019s mental condition and the defendant\u2019s psychologist averred that a mental examination was necessary to evaluate the employee\u2019s emotional state); Eckman v. University of Rhode Island, 160 F.R.D. 431, 434 (D.R.I.1995) (ordering an examination where the movant established that the severity of the injury would play a central role and that the examination would result neither in duplication of prior examinations nor in cumulative or invasive procedures)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"stating that although the denial of a Rule 35 motion might be an abuse of discretion where the defendant does not have access to the reports of either the hospital or the physician, there was no abuse of discretion in denying the motion where the defendant had such access","sentence":"See, e.g., Pearson, 178 F.R.D. at 582 (denying an examination where the movant could obtain copies of relevant records); Marroni v. Matey, 82 F.R.D. 371, 372 (E.D.Pa.1979) (denying an examination where the movant had not established that the information was unavailable from less intrusive methods); Hughes v. Groves, 47 F.R.D. 52, 57 (W.D.Mo.1969) (stating that the discovery of medical reports may deprive the movant of \u201cgood cause\u201d for an examination); Petition of Trinidad Corp., 238 F.Supp. 928, 935 (E.D.Va.1965) (stating that the discovery of medical records may deprive the movant of the right to thereafter seek an examination); Martin v. Tindell, 98 So.2d 473, 475 (Fla.1957) (stating that although the denial of a Rule 35 motion might be an abuse of discretion where the defendant does not have access to the reports of either the hospital or the physician, there was no abuse of discretion in denying the motion where the defendant had such access), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 959, 78 S.Ct. 545, 2 L.Ed.2d 534 (1958); cf. Lahr, 164 F.R.D. at 200-01 (ordering an examination where the defendant demonstrated that the existing medical evidence was inadequate to evaluate the employee\u2019s mental condition and the defendant\u2019s psychologist averred that a mental examination was necessary to evaluate the employee\u2019s emotional state); Eckman v. University of Rhode Island, 160 F.R.D. 431, 434 (D.R.I.1995) (ordering an examination where the movant established that the severity of the injury would play a central role and that the examination would result neither in duplication of prior examinations nor in cumulative or invasive procedures)."},"case_id":11623245,"label":"b"}
{"context":"A movant meets the \"need\" requirement of Rule 35(a) by showing that- the requested examination will produce some relevant evidence that is not available from other sources. Accordingly, several courts have refused to order physical or mental examinations where the movant could obtain the desired information from other sources.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"stating that although the denial of a Rule 35 motion might be an abuse of discretion where the defendant does not have access to the reports of either the hospital or the physician, there was no abuse of discretion in denying the motion where the defendant had such access","sentence":"See, e.g., Pearson, 178 F.R.D. at 582 (denying an examination where the movant could obtain copies of relevant records); Marroni v. Matey, 82 F.R.D. 371, 372 (E.D.Pa.1979) (denying an examination where the movant had not established that the information was unavailable from less intrusive methods); Hughes v. Groves, 47 F.R.D. 52, 57 (W.D.Mo.1969) (stating that the discovery of medical reports may deprive the movant of \u201cgood cause\u201d for an examination); Petition of Trinidad Corp., 238 F.Supp. 928, 935 (E.D.Va.1965) (stating that the discovery of medical records may deprive the movant of the right to thereafter seek an examination); Martin v. Tindell, 98 So.2d 473, 475 (Fla.1957) (stating that although the denial of a Rule 35 motion might be an abuse of discretion where the defendant does not have access to the reports of either the hospital or the physician, there was no abuse of discretion in denying the motion where the defendant had such access), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 959, 78 S.Ct. 545, 2 L.Ed.2d 534 (1958); cf. Lahr, 164 F.R.D. at 200-01 (ordering an examination where the defendant demonstrated that the existing medical evidence was inadequate to evaluate the employee\u2019s mental condition and the defendant\u2019s psychologist averred that a mental examination was necessary to evaluate the employee\u2019s emotional state); Eckman v. University of Rhode Island, 160 F.R.D. 431, 434 (D.R.I.1995) (ordering an examination where the movant established that the severity of the injury would play a central role and that the examination would result neither in duplication of prior examinations nor in cumulative or invasive procedures)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"110 F.R.D. 184, 186","parenthetical":"finding good cause for an examination even though the movant had access to the plaintiffs medical records","sentence":"But see Anson v. Fickel, 110 F.R.D. 184, 186 (N.D.Ind.1986) (finding good cause for an examination even though the movant had access to the plaintiffs medical records)."},"case_id":11623245,"label":"a"}
{"context":"A movant meets the \"need\" requirement of Rule 35(a) by showing that- the requested examination will produce some relevant evidence that is not available from other sources. Accordingly, several courts have refused to order physical or mental examinations where the movant could obtain the desired information from other sources.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"stating that although the denial of a Rule 35 motion might be an abuse of discretion where the defendant does not have access to the reports of either the hospital or the physician, there was no abuse of discretion in denying the motion where the defendant had such access","sentence":"See, e.g., Pearson, 178 F.R.D. at 582 (denying an examination where the movant could obtain copies of relevant records); Marroni v. Matey, 82 F.R.D. 371, 372 (E.D.Pa.1979) (denying an examination where the movant had not established that the information was unavailable from less intrusive methods); Hughes v. Groves, 47 F.R.D. 52, 57 (W.D.Mo.1969) (stating that the discovery of medical reports may deprive the movant of \u201cgood cause\u201d for an examination); Petition of Trinidad Corp., 238 F.Supp. 928, 935 (E.D.Va.1965) (stating that the discovery of medical records may deprive the movant of the right to thereafter seek an examination); Martin v. Tindell, 98 So.2d 473, 475 (Fla.1957) (stating that although the denial of a Rule 35 motion might be an abuse of discretion where the defendant does not have access to the reports of either the hospital or the physician, there was no abuse of discretion in denying the motion where the defendant had such access), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 959, 78 S.Ct. 545, 2 L.Ed.2d 534 (1958); cf. Lahr, 164 F.R.D. at 200-01 (ordering an examination where the defendant demonstrated that the existing medical evidence was inadequate to evaluate the employee\u2019s mental condition and the defendant\u2019s psychologist averred that a mental examination was necessary to evaluate the employee\u2019s emotional state); Eckman v. University of Rhode Island, 160 F.R.D. 431, 434 (D.R.I.1995) (ordering an examination where the movant established that the severity of the injury would play a central role and that the examination would result neither in duplication of prior examinations nor in cumulative or invasive procedures)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"164 F.R.D. 200, 200-01","parenthetical":"ordering an examination where the defendant demonstrated that the existing medical evidence was inadequate to evaluate the employee's mental condition and the defendant's psychologist averred that a mental examination was necessary to evaluate the employee's emotional state","sentence":"See, e.g., Pearson, 178 F.R.D. at 582 (denying an examination where the movant could obtain copies of relevant records); Marroni v. Matey, 82 F.R.D. 371, 372 (E.D.Pa.1979) (denying an examination where the movant had not established that the information was unavailable from less intrusive methods); Hughes v. Groves, 47 F.R.D. 52, 57 (W.D.Mo.1969) (stating that the discovery of medical reports may deprive the movant of \u201cgood cause\u201d for an examination); Petition of Trinidad Corp., 238 F.Supp. 928, 935 (E.D.Va.1965) (stating that the discovery of medical records may deprive the movant of the right to thereafter seek an examination); Martin v. Tindell, 98 So.2d 473, 475 (Fla.1957) (stating that although the denial of a Rule 35 motion might be an abuse of discretion where the defendant does not have access to the reports of either the hospital or the physician, there was no abuse of discretion in denying the motion where the defendant had such access), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 959, 78 S.Ct. 545, 2 L.Ed.2d 534 (1958); cf. Lahr, 164 F.R.D. at 200-01 (ordering an examination where the defendant demonstrated that the existing medical evidence was inadequate to evaluate the employee\u2019s mental condition and the defendant\u2019s psychologist averred that a mental examination was necessary to evaluate the employee\u2019s emotional state); Eckman v. University of Rhode Island, 160 F.R.D. 431, 434 (D.R.I.1995) (ordering an examination where the movant established that the severity of the injury would play a central role and that the examination would result neither in duplication of prior examinations nor in cumulative or invasive procedures)."},"case_id":11623245,"label":"a"}
{"context":"A movant meets the \"need\" requirement of Rule 35(a) by showing that- the requested examination will produce some relevant evidence that is not available from other sources. Accordingly, several courts have refused to order physical or mental examinations where the movant could obtain the desired information from other sources.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"160 F.R.D. 431, 434","parenthetical":"ordering an examination where the movant established that the severity of the injury would play a central role and that the examination would result neither in duplication of prior examinations nor in cumulative or invasive procedures","sentence":"See, e.g., Pearson, 178 F.R.D. at 582 (denying an examination where the movant could obtain copies of relevant records); Marroni v. Matey, 82 F.R.D. 371, 372 (E.D.Pa.1979) (denying an examination where the movant had not established that the information was unavailable from less intrusive methods); Hughes v. Groves, 47 F.R.D. 52, 57 (W.D.Mo.1969) (stating that the discovery of medical reports may deprive the movant of \u201cgood cause\u201d for an examination); Petition of Trinidad Corp., 238 F.Supp. 928, 935 (E.D.Va.1965) (stating that the discovery of medical records may deprive the movant of the right to thereafter seek an examination); Martin v. Tindell, 98 So.2d 473, 475 (Fla.1957) (stating that although the denial of a Rule 35 motion might be an abuse of discretion where the defendant does not have access to the reports of either the hospital or the physician, there was no abuse of discretion in denying the motion where the defendant had such access), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 959, 78 S.Ct. 545, 2 L.Ed.2d 534 (1958); cf. Lahr, 164 F.R.D. at 200-01 (ordering an examination where the defendant demonstrated that the existing medical evidence was inadequate to evaluate the employee\u2019s mental condition and the defendant\u2019s psychologist averred that a mental examination was necessary to evaluate the employee\u2019s emotional state); Eckman v. University of Rhode Island, 160 F.R.D. 431, 434 (D.R.I.1995) (ordering an examination where the movant established that the severity of the injury would play a central role and that the examination would result neither in duplication of prior examinations nor in cumulative or invasive procedures)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"stating that although the denial of a Rule 35 motion might be an abuse of discretion where the defendant does not have access to the reports of either the hospital or the physician, there was no abuse of discretion in denying the motion where the defendant had such access","sentence":"See, e.g., Pearson, 178 F.R.D. at 582 (denying an examination where the movant could obtain copies of relevant records); Marroni v. Matey, 82 F.R.D. 371, 372 (E.D.Pa.1979) (denying an examination where the movant had not established that the information was unavailable from less intrusive methods); Hughes v. Groves, 47 F.R.D. 52, 57 (W.D.Mo.1969) (stating that the discovery of medical reports may deprive the movant of \u201cgood cause\u201d for an examination); Petition of Trinidad Corp., 238 F.Supp. 928, 935 (E.D.Va.1965) (stating that the discovery of medical records may deprive the movant of the right to thereafter seek an examination); Martin v. Tindell, 98 So.2d 473, 475 (Fla.1957) (stating that although the denial of a Rule 35 motion might be an abuse of discretion where the defendant does not have access to the reports of either the hospital or the physician, there was no abuse of discretion in denying the motion where the defendant had such access), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 959, 78 S.Ct. 545, 2 L.Ed.2d 534 (1958); cf. Lahr, 164 F.R.D. at 200-01 (ordering an examination where the defendant demonstrated that the existing medical evidence was inadequate to evaluate the employee\u2019s mental condition and the defendant\u2019s psychologist averred that a mental examination was necessary to evaluate the employee\u2019s emotional state); Eckman v. University of Rhode Island, 160 F.R.D. 431, 434 (D.R.I.1995) (ordering an examination where the movant established that the severity of the injury would play a central role and that the examination would result neither in duplication of prior examinations nor in cumulative or invasive procedures)."},"case_id":11623245,"label":"b"}
{"context":"A movant meets the \"need\" requirement of Rule 35(a) by showing that- the requested examination will produce some relevant evidence that is not available from other sources. Accordingly, several courts have refused to order physical or mental examinations where the movant could obtain the desired information from other sources.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"110 F.R.D. 184, 186","parenthetical":"finding good cause for an examination even though the movant had access to the plaintiffs medical records","sentence":"But see Anson v. Fickel, 110 F.R.D. 184, 186 (N.D.Ind.1986) (finding good cause for an examination even though the movant had access to the plaintiffs medical records)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"stating that although the denial of a Rule 35 motion might be an abuse of discretion where the defendant does not have access to the reports of either the hospital or the physician, there was no abuse of discretion in denying the motion where the defendant had such access","sentence":"See, e.g., Pearson, 178 F.R.D. at 582 (denying an examination where the movant could obtain copies of relevant records); Marroni v. Matey, 82 F.R.D. 371, 372 (E.D.Pa.1979) (denying an examination where the movant had not established that the information was unavailable from less intrusive methods); Hughes v. Groves, 47 F.R.D. 52, 57 (W.D.Mo.1969) (stating that the discovery of medical reports may deprive the movant of \u201cgood cause\u201d for an examination); Petition of Trinidad Corp., 238 F.Supp. 928, 935 (E.D.Va.1965) (stating that the discovery of medical records may deprive the movant of the right to thereafter seek an examination); Martin v. Tindell, 98 So.2d 473, 475 (Fla.1957) (stating that although the denial of a Rule 35 motion might be an abuse of discretion where the defendant does not have access to the reports of either the hospital or the physician, there was no abuse of discretion in denying the motion where the defendant had such access), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 959, 78 S.Ct. 545, 2 L.Ed.2d 534 (1958); cf. Lahr, 164 F.R.D. at 200-01 (ordering an examination where the defendant demonstrated that the existing medical evidence was inadequate to evaluate the employee\u2019s mental condition and the defendant\u2019s psychologist averred that a mental examination was necessary to evaluate the employee\u2019s emotional state); Eckman v. University of Rhode Island, 160 F.R.D. 431, 434 (D.R.I.1995) (ordering an examination where the movant established that the severity of the injury would play a central role and that the examination would result neither in duplication of prior examinations nor in cumulative or invasive procedures)."},"case_id":11623245,"label":"b"}
{"context":"A movant meets the \"need\" requirement of Rule 35(a) by showing that- the requested examination will produce some relevant evidence that is not available from other sources. Accordingly, several courts have refused to order physical or mental examinations where the movant could obtain the desired information from other sources.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"stating that although the denial of a Rule 35 motion might be an abuse of discretion where the defendant does not have access to the reports of either the hospital or the physician, there was no abuse of discretion in denying the motion where the defendant had such access","sentence":"See, e.g., Pearson, 178 F.R.D. at 582 (denying an examination where the movant could obtain copies of relevant records); Marroni v. Matey, 82 F.R.D. 371, 372 (E.D.Pa.1979) (denying an examination where the movant had not established that the information was unavailable from less intrusive methods); Hughes v. Groves, 47 F.R.D. 52, 57 (W.D.Mo.1969) (stating that the discovery of medical reports may deprive the movant of \u201cgood cause\u201d for an examination); Petition of Trinidad Corp., 238 F.Supp. 928, 935 (E.D.Va.1965) (stating that the discovery of medical records may deprive the movant of the right to thereafter seek an examination); Martin v. Tindell, 98 So.2d 473, 475 (Fla.1957) (stating that although the denial of a Rule 35 motion might be an abuse of discretion where the defendant does not have access to the reports of either the hospital or the physician, there was no abuse of discretion in denying the motion where the defendant had such access), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 959, 78 S.Ct. 545, 2 L.Ed.2d 534 (1958); cf. Lahr, 164 F.R.D. at 200-01 (ordering an examination where the defendant demonstrated that the existing medical evidence was inadequate to evaluate the employee\u2019s mental condition and the defendant\u2019s psychologist averred that a mental examination was necessary to evaluate the employee\u2019s emotional state); Eckman v. University of Rhode Island, 160 F.R.D. 431, 434 (D.R.I.1995) (ordering an examination where the movant established that the severity of the injury would play a central role and that the examination would result neither in duplication of prior examinations nor in cumulative or invasive procedures)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"164 F.R.D. 200, 200-01","parenthetical":"ordering an examination where the defendant demonstrated that the existing medical evidence was inadequate to evaluate the employee's mental condition and the defendant's psychologist averred that a mental examination was necessary to evaluate the employee's emotional state","sentence":"See, e.g., Pearson, 178 F.R.D. at 582 (denying an examination where the movant could obtain copies of relevant records); Marroni v. Matey, 82 F.R.D. 371, 372 (E.D.Pa.1979) (denying an examination where the movant had not established that the information was unavailable from less intrusive methods); Hughes v. Groves, 47 F.R.D. 52, 57 (W.D.Mo.1969) (stating that the discovery of medical reports may deprive the movant of \u201cgood cause\u201d for an examination); Petition of Trinidad Corp., 238 F.Supp. 928, 935 (E.D.Va.1965) (stating that the discovery of medical records may deprive the movant of the right to thereafter seek an examination); Martin v. Tindell, 98 So.2d 473, 475 (Fla.1957) (stating that although the denial of a Rule 35 motion might be an abuse of discretion where the defendant does not have access to the reports of either the hospital or the physician, there was no abuse of discretion in denying the motion where the defendant had such access), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 959, 78 S.Ct. 545, 2 L.Ed.2d 534 (1958); cf. Lahr, 164 F.R.D. at 200-01 (ordering an examination where the defendant demonstrated that the existing medical evidence was inadequate to evaluate the employee\u2019s mental condition and the defendant\u2019s psychologist averred that a mental examination was necessary to evaluate the employee\u2019s emotional state); Eckman v. University of Rhode Island, 160 F.R.D. 431, 434 (D.R.I.1995) (ordering an examination where the movant established that the severity of the injury would play a central role and that the examination would result neither in duplication of prior examinations nor in cumulative or invasive procedures)."},"case_id":11623245,"label":"a"}
{"context":"A movant meets the \"need\" requirement of Rule 35(a) by showing that- the requested examination will produce some relevant evidence that is not available from other sources. Accordingly, several courts have refused to order physical or mental examinations where the movant could obtain the desired information from other sources.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"160 F.R.D. 431, 434","parenthetical":"ordering an examination where the movant established that the severity of the injury would play a central role and that the examination would result neither in duplication of prior examinations nor in cumulative or invasive procedures","sentence":"See, e.g., Pearson, 178 F.R.D. at 582 (denying an examination where the movant could obtain copies of relevant records); Marroni v. Matey, 82 F.R.D. 371, 372 (E.D.Pa.1979) (denying an examination where the movant had not established that the information was unavailable from less intrusive methods); Hughes v. Groves, 47 F.R.D. 52, 57 (W.D.Mo.1969) (stating that the discovery of medical reports may deprive the movant of \u201cgood cause\u201d for an examination); Petition of Trinidad Corp., 238 F.Supp. 928, 935 (E.D.Va.1965) (stating that the discovery of medical records may deprive the movant of the right to thereafter seek an examination); Martin v. Tindell, 98 So.2d 473, 475 (Fla.1957) (stating that although the denial of a Rule 35 motion might be an abuse of discretion where the defendant does not have access to the reports of either the hospital or the physician, there was no abuse of discretion in denying the motion where the defendant had such access), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 959, 78 S.Ct. 545, 2 L.Ed.2d 534 (1958); cf. Lahr, 164 F.R.D. at 200-01 (ordering an examination where the defendant demonstrated that the existing medical evidence was inadequate to evaluate the employee\u2019s mental condition and the defendant\u2019s psychologist averred that a mental examination was necessary to evaluate the employee\u2019s emotional state); Eckman v. University of Rhode Island, 160 F.R.D. 431, 434 (D.R.I.1995) (ordering an examination where the movant established that the severity of the injury would play a central role and that the examination would result neither in duplication of prior examinations nor in cumulative or invasive procedures)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"stating that although the denial of a Rule 35 motion might be an abuse of discretion where the defendant does not have access to the reports of either the hospital or the physician, there was no abuse of discretion in denying the motion where the defendant had such access","sentence":"See, e.g., Pearson, 178 F.R.D. at 582 (denying an examination where the movant could obtain copies of relevant records); Marroni v. Matey, 82 F.R.D. 371, 372 (E.D.Pa.1979) (denying an examination where the movant had not established that the information was unavailable from less intrusive methods); Hughes v. Groves, 47 F.R.D. 52, 57 (W.D.Mo.1969) (stating that the discovery of medical reports may deprive the movant of \u201cgood cause\u201d for an examination); Petition of Trinidad Corp., 238 F.Supp. 928, 935 (E.D.Va.1965) (stating that the discovery of medical records may deprive the movant of the right to thereafter seek an examination); Martin v. Tindell, 98 So.2d 473, 475 (Fla.1957) (stating that although the denial of a Rule 35 motion might be an abuse of discretion where the defendant does not have access to the reports of either the hospital or the physician, there was no abuse of discretion in denying the motion where the defendant had such access), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 959, 78 S.Ct. 545, 2 L.Ed.2d 534 (1958); cf. Lahr, 164 F.R.D. at 200-01 (ordering an examination where the defendant demonstrated that the existing medical evidence was inadequate to evaluate the employee\u2019s mental condition and the defendant\u2019s psychologist averred that a mental examination was necessary to evaluate the employee\u2019s emotional state); Eckman v. University of Rhode Island, 160 F.R.D. 431, 434 (D.R.I.1995) (ordering an examination where the movant established that the severity of the injury would play a central role and that the examination would result neither in duplication of prior examinations nor in cumulative or invasive procedures)."},"case_id":11623245,"label":"b"}
{"context":"A movant meets the \"need\" requirement of Rule 35(a) by showing that- the requested examination will produce some relevant evidence that is not available from other sources. Accordingly, several courts have refused to order physical or mental examinations where the movant could obtain the desired information from other sources.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"110 F.R.D. 184, 186","parenthetical":"finding good cause for an examination even though the movant had access to the plaintiffs medical records","sentence":"But see Anson v. Fickel, 110 F.R.D. 184, 186 (N.D.Ind.1986) (finding good cause for an examination even though the movant had access to the plaintiffs medical records)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"stating that although the denial of a Rule 35 motion might be an abuse of discretion where the defendant does not have access to the reports of either the hospital or the physician, there was no abuse of discretion in denying the motion where the defendant had such access","sentence":"See, e.g., Pearson, 178 F.R.D. at 582 (denying an examination where the movant could obtain copies of relevant records); Marroni v. Matey, 82 F.R.D. 371, 372 (E.D.Pa.1979) (denying an examination where the movant had not established that the information was unavailable from less intrusive methods); Hughes v. Groves, 47 F.R.D. 52, 57 (W.D.Mo.1969) (stating that the discovery of medical reports may deprive the movant of \u201cgood cause\u201d for an examination); Petition of Trinidad Corp., 238 F.Supp. 928, 935 (E.D.Va.1965) (stating that the discovery of medical records may deprive the movant of the right to thereafter seek an examination); Martin v. Tindell, 98 So.2d 473, 475 (Fla.1957) (stating that although the denial of a Rule 35 motion might be an abuse of discretion where the defendant does not have access to the reports of either the hospital or the physician, there was no abuse of discretion in denying the motion where the defendant had such access), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 959, 78 S.Ct. 545, 2 L.Ed.2d 534 (1958); cf. Lahr, 164 F.R.D. at 200-01 (ordering an examination where the defendant demonstrated that the existing medical evidence was inadequate to evaluate the employee\u2019s mental condition and the defendant\u2019s psychologist averred that a mental examination was necessary to evaluate the employee\u2019s emotional state); Eckman v. University of Rhode Island, 160 F.R.D. 431, 434 (D.R.I.1995) (ordering an examination where the movant established that the severity of the injury would play a central role and that the examination would result neither in duplication of prior examinations nor in cumulative or invasive procedures)."},"case_id":11623245,"label":"b"}
{"context":"A movant meets the \"need\" requirement of Rule 35(a) by showing that- the requested examination will produce some relevant evidence that is not available from other sources. Accordingly, several courts have refused to order physical or mental examinations where the movant could obtain the desired information from other sources.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"110 F.R.D. 184, 186","parenthetical":"finding good cause for an examination even though the movant had access to the plaintiffs medical records","sentence":"But see Anson v. Fickel, 110 F.R.D. 184, 186 (N.D.Ind.1986) (finding good cause for an examination even though the movant had access to the plaintiffs medical records)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"164 F.R.D. 200, 200-01","parenthetical":"ordering an examination where the defendant demonstrated that the existing medical evidence was inadequate to evaluate the employee's mental condition and the defendant's psychologist averred that a mental examination was necessary to evaluate the employee's emotional state","sentence":"See, e.g., Pearson, 178 F.R.D. at 582 (denying an examination where the movant could obtain copies of relevant records); Marroni v. Matey, 82 F.R.D. 371, 372 (E.D.Pa.1979) (denying an examination where the movant had not established that the information was unavailable from less intrusive methods); Hughes v. Groves, 47 F.R.D. 52, 57 (W.D.Mo.1969) (stating that the discovery of medical reports may deprive the movant of \u201cgood cause\u201d for an examination); Petition of Trinidad Corp., 238 F.Supp. 928, 935 (E.D.Va.1965) (stating that the discovery of medical records may deprive the movant of the right to thereafter seek an examination); Martin v. Tindell, 98 So.2d 473, 475 (Fla.1957) (stating that although the denial of a Rule 35 motion might be an abuse of discretion where the defendant does not have access to the reports of either the hospital or the physician, there was no abuse of discretion in denying the motion where the defendant had such access), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 959, 78 S.Ct. 545, 2 L.Ed.2d 534 (1958); cf. Lahr, 164 F.R.D. at 200-01 (ordering an examination where the defendant demonstrated that the existing medical evidence was inadequate to evaluate the employee\u2019s mental condition and the defendant\u2019s psychologist averred that a mental examination was necessary to evaluate the employee\u2019s emotional state); Eckman v. University of Rhode Island, 160 F.R.D. 431, 434 (D.R.I.1995) (ordering an examination where the movant established that the severity of the injury would play a central role and that the examination would result neither in duplication of prior examinations nor in cumulative or invasive procedures)."},"case_id":11623245,"label":"b"}
{"context":"A movant meets the \"need\" requirement of Rule 35(a) by showing that- the requested examination will produce some relevant evidence that is not available from other sources. Accordingly, several courts have refused to order physical or mental examinations where the movant could obtain the desired information from other sources.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"160 F.R.D. 431, 434","parenthetical":"ordering an examination where the movant established that the severity of the injury would play a central role and that the examination would result neither in duplication of prior examinations nor in cumulative or invasive procedures","sentence":"See, e.g., Pearson, 178 F.R.D. at 582 (denying an examination where the movant could obtain copies of relevant records); Marroni v. Matey, 82 F.R.D. 371, 372 (E.D.Pa.1979) (denying an examination where the movant had not established that the information was unavailable from less intrusive methods); Hughes v. Groves, 47 F.R.D. 52, 57 (W.D.Mo.1969) (stating that the discovery of medical reports may deprive the movant of \u201cgood cause\u201d for an examination); Petition of Trinidad Corp., 238 F.Supp. 928, 935 (E.D.Va.1965) (stating that the discovery of medical records may deprive the movant of the right to thereafter seek an examination); Martin v. Tindell, 98 So.2d 473, 475 (Fla.1957) (stating that although the denial of a Rule 35 motion might be an abuse of discretion where the defendant does not have access to the reports of either the hospital or the physician, there was no abuse of discretion in denying the motion where the defendant had such access), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 959, 78 S.Ct. 545, 2 L.Ed.2d 534 (1958); cf. Lahr, 164 F.R.D. at 200-01 (ordering an examination where the defendant demonstrated that the existing medical evidence was inadequate to evaluate the employee\u2019s mental condition and the defendant\u2019s psychologist averred that a mental examination was necessary to evaluate the employee\u2019s emotional state); Eckman v. University of Rhode Island, 160 F.R.D. 431, 434 (D.R.I.1995) (ordering an examination where the movant established that the severity of the injury would play a central role and that the examination would result neither in duplication of prior examinations nor in cumulative or invasive procedures)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"110 F.R.D. 184, 186","parenthetical":"finding good cause for an examination even though the movant had access to the plaintiffs medical records","sentence":"But see Anson v. Fickel, 110 F.R.D. 184, 186 (N.D.Ind.1986) (finding good cause for an examination even though the movant had access to the plaintiffs medical records)."},"case_id":11623245,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Although the standard is rigorous, as is the case with claims of selective prosecution, this threshold showing to obtain a discovery order is less than that required to establish a prima facie claim of vindictive prosecution.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"101 P.3d 1116, 1116","parenthetical":"discovery standard for selective prosecution claim is less than prima facie case of selective enforcement","sentence":"See Valencia-Alvarez, 101 P.3d at 1116 (discovery standard for selective prosecution claim is less than prima facie case of selective enforcement); cf. United States v. Alameh, 341 F.3d 167, 174 (2d Cir.2003) (discovery for selective prosecution is lesser standard than that for the merits)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"341 F.3d 167, 174","parenthetical":"discovery for selective prosecution is lesser standard than that for the merits","sentence":"See Valencia-Alvarez, 101 P.3d at 1116 (discovery standard for selective prosecution claim is less than prima facie case of selective enforcement); cf. United States v. Alameh, 341 F.3d 167, 174 (2d Cir.2003) (discovery for selective prosecution is lesser standard than that for the merits)."},"case_id":6994225,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Not every violation of a statute or regulation, nor the failure to comply with a congressional request for reports and internal approvals, renders a contract void or invalid -- particularly after it has been fully performed. Indeed, contracts between the government and a private party have been sustained even when statutes and regulations relating to the procurement or award process have been violated.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"429 U.S. 401, 408","parenthetical":"requiring preservation of the validity of contracts' that are not plainly illegal","sentence":"E. Walters, 576 F.2d at 367 (\u201cthe fact that a procurement practice is prohibited does not necessarily mean that it is therefore actionable\u201d); see Walsh v. Schlecht, 429 U.S. 401, 408, 97 S.Ct. 679, 685, 50 L.Ed.2d 641 (1977) (requiring preservation of the validity of contracts' that are not plainly illegal); United States v. New York & Porto Rico S.S. Co., 239 U.S. 88, 92, 36 S.Ct. 41, 42, 60 L.Ed. 161 (1915) (when government did not comply with formal requirements, contract not illegal and recovery permitted upon quantum vale- bat when performed) (citing United States v. R.P. Andrews & Co., 207 U.S. 229, 243, 28 S.Ct. 100, 105, 52 L.Ed. 185 (1907)); Triton Educational Corp. v. United States, 217 Ct. Cl. 266, 578 F.2d 1356, 1361 (1978) (the fact that the contracting officer may have disregarded a directive of the ASPR does not ordinarily render the contract a nullity); Ocean Tech., Inc. v. United States, 19 Cl.Ct. 288, 294 (1990) (\u201cPerformance having been fully completed, holding the obligation to pay unenforceable is not a position favored in this circuit.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"576 F.2d 367, 367","parenthetical":"\"the fact that a procurement practice is prohibited does not necessarily mean that it is therefore actionable\"","sentence":"E. Walters, 576 F.2d at 367 (\u201cthe fact that a procurement practice is prohibited does not necessarily mean that it is therefore actionable\u201d); see Walsh v. Schlecht, 429 U.S. 401, 408, 97 S.Ct. 679, 685, 50 L.Ed.2d 641 (1977) (requiring preservation of the validity of contracts' that are not plainly illegal); United States v. New York & Porto Rico S.S. Co., 239 U.S. 88, 92, 36 S.Ct. 41, 42, 60 L.Ed. 161 (1915) (when government did not comply with formal requirements, contract not illegal and recovery permitted upon quantum vale- bat when performed) (citing United States v. R.P. Andrews & Co., 207 U.S. 229, 243, 28 S.Ct. 100, 105, 52 L.Ed. 185 (1907)); Triton Educational Corp. v. United States, 217 Ct. Cl. 266, 578 F.2d 1356, 1361 (1978) (the fact that the contracting officer may have disregarded a directive of the ASPR does not ordinarily render the contract a nullity); Ocean Tech., Inc. v. United States, 19 Cl.Ct. 288, 294 (1990) (\u201cPerformance having been fully completed, holding the obligation to pay unenforceable is not a position favored in this circuit.\u201d)."},"case_id":11911620,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Not every violation of a statute or regulation, nor the failure to comply with a congressional request for reports and internal approvals, renders a contract void or invalid -- particularly after it has been fully performed. Indeed, contracts between the government and a private party have been sustained even when statutes and regulations relating to the procurement or award process have been violated.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"97 S.Ct. 679, 685","parenthetical":"requiring preservation of the validity of contracts' that are not plainly illegal","sentence":"E. Walters, 576 F.2d at 367 (\u201cthe fact that a procurement practice is prohibited does not necessarily mean that it is therefore actionable\u201d); see Walsh v. Schlecht, 429 U.S. 401, 408, 97 S.Ct. 679, 685, 50 L.Ed.2d 641 (1977) (requiring preservation of the validity of contracts' that are not plainly illegal); United States v. New York & Porto Rico S.S. Co., 239 U.S. 88, 92, 36 S.Ct. 41, 42, 60 L.Ed. 161 (1915) (when government did not comply with formal requirements, contract not illegal and recovery permitted upon quantum vale- bat when performed) (citing United States v. R.P. Andrews & Co., 207 U.S. 229, 243, 28 S.Ct. 100, 105, 52 L.Ed. 185 (1907)); Triton Educational Corp. v. United States, 217 Ct. Cl. 266, 578 F.2d 1356, 1361 (1978) (the fact that the contracting officer may have disregarded a directive of the ASPR does not ordinarily render the contract a nullity); Ocean Tech., Inc. v. United States, 19 Cl.Ct. 288, 294 (1990) (\u201cPerformance having been fully completed, holding the obligation to pay unenforceable is not a position favored in this circuit.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"576 F.2d 367, 367","parenthetical":"\"the fact that a procurement practice is prohibited does not necessarily mean that it is therefore actionable\"","sentence":"E. Walters, 576 F.2d at 367 (\u201cthe fact that a procurement practice is prohibited does not necessarily mean that it is therefore actionable\u201d); see Walsh v. Schlecht, 429 U.S. 401, 408, 97 S.Ct. 679, 685, 50 L.Ed.2d 641 (1977) (requiring preservation of the validity of contracts' that are not plainly illegal); United States v. New York & Porto Rico S.S. Co., 239 U.S. 88, 92, 36 S.Ct. 41, 42, 60 L.Ed. 161 (1915) (when government did not comply with formal requirements, contract not illegal and recovery permitted upon quantum vale- bat when performed) (citing United States v. R.P. Andrews & Co., 207 U.S. 229, 243, 28 S.Ct. 100, 105, 52 L.Ed. 185 (1907)); Triton Educational Corp. v. United States, 217 Ct. Cl. 266, 578 F.2d 1356, 1361 (1978) (the fact that the contracting officer may have disregarded a directive of the ASPR does not ordinarily render the contract a nullity); Ocean Tech., Inc. v. United States, 19 Cl.Ct. 288, 294 (1990) (\u201cPerformance having been fully completed, holding the obligation to pay unenforceable is not a position favored in this circuit.\u201d)."},"case_id":11911620,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Not every violation of a statute or regulation, nor the failure to comply with a congressional request for reports and internal approvals, renders a contract void or invalid -- particularly after it has been fully performed. Indeed, contracts between the government and a private party have been sustained even when statutes and regulations relating to the procurement or award process have been violated.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"576 F.2d 367, 367","parenthetical":"\"the fact that a procurement practice is prohibited does not necessarily mean that it is therefore actionable\"","sentence":"E. Walters, 576 F.2d at 367 (\u201cthe fact that a procurement practice is prohibited does not necessarily mean that it is therefore actionable\u201d); see Walsh v. Schlecht, 429 U.S. 401, 408, 97 S.Ct. 679, 685, 50 L.Ed.2d 641 (1977) (requiring preservation of the validity of contracts' that are not plainly illegal); United States v. New York & Porto Rico S.S. Co., 239 U.S. 88, 92, 36 S.Ct. 41, 42, 60 L.Ed. 161 (1915) (when government did not comply with formal requirements, contract not illegal and recovery permitted upon quantum vale- bat when performed) (citing United States v. R.P. Andrews & Co., 207 U.S. 229, 243, 28 S.Ct. 100, 105, 52 L.Ed. 185 (1907)); Triton Educational Corp. v. United States, 217 Ct. Cl. 266, 578 F.2d 1356, 1361 (1978) (the fact that the contracting officer may have disregarded a directive of the ASPR does not ordinarily render the contract a nullity); Ocean Tech., Inc. v. United States, 19 Cl.Ct. 288, 294 (1990) (\u201cPerformance having been fully completed, holding the obligation to pay unenforceable is not a position favored in this circuit.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"requiring preservation of the validity of contracts' that are not plainly illegal","sentence":"E. Walters, 576 F.2d at 367 (\u201cthe fact that a procurement practice is prohibited does not necessarily mean that it is therefore actionable\u201d); see Walsh v. Schlecht, 429 U.S. 401, 408, 97 S.Ct. 679, 685, 50 L.Ed.2d 641 (1977) (requiring preservation of the validity of contracts' that are not plainly illegal); United States v. New York & Porto Rico S.S. Co., 239 U.S. 88, 92, 36 S.Ct. 41, 42, 60 L.Ed. 161 (1915) (when government did not comply with formal requirements, contract not illegal and recovery permitted upon quantum vale- bat when performed) (citing United States v. R.P. Andrews & Co., 207 U.S. 229, 243, 28 S.Ct. 100, 105, 52 L.Ed. 185 (1907)); Triton Educational Corp. v. United States, 217 Ct. Cl. 266, 578 F.2d 1356, 1361 (1978) (the fact that the contracting officer may have disregarded a directive of the ASPR does not ordinarily render the contract a nullity); Ocean Tech., Inc. v. United States, 19 Cl.Ct. 288, 294 (1990) (\u201cPerformance having been fully completed, holding the obligation to pay unenforceable is not a position favored in this circuit.\u201d)."},"case_id":11911620,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Not every violation of a statute or regulation, nor the failure to comply with a congressional request for reports and internal approvals, renders a contract void or invalid -- particularly after it has been fully performed. Indeed, contracts between the government and a private party have been sustained even when statutes and regulations relating to the procurement or award process have been violated.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"239 U.S. 88, 92","parenthetical":"when government did not comply with formal requirements, contract not illegal and recovery permitted upon quantum vale- bat when performed","sentence":"E. Walters, 576 F.2d at 367 (\u201cthe fact that a procurement practice is prohibited does not necessarily mean that it is therefore actionable\u201d); see Walsh v. Schlecht, 429 U.S. 401, 408, 97 S.Ct. 679, 685, 50 L.Ed.2d 641 (1977) (requiring preservation of the validity of contracts' that are not plainly illegal); United States v. New York & Porto Rico S.S. Co., 239 U.S. 88, 92, 36 S.Ct. 41, 42, 60 L.Ed. 161 (1915) (when government did not comply with formal requirements, contract not illegal and recovery permitted upon quantum vale- bat when performed) (citing United States v. R.P. Andrews & Co., 207 U.S. 229, 243, 28 S.Ct. 100, 105, 52 L.Ed. 185 (1907)); Triton Educational Corp. v. United States, 217 Ct. Cl. 266, 578 F.2d 1356, 1361 (1978) (the fact that the contracting officer may have disregarded a directive of the ASPR does not ordinarily render the contract a nullity); Ocean Tech., Inc. v. United States, 19 Cl.Ct. 288, 294 (1990) (\u201cPerformance having been fully completed, holding the obligation to pay unenforceable is not a position favored in this circuit.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"576 F.2d 367, 367","parenthetical":"\"the fact that a procurement practice is prohibited does not necessarily mean that it is therefore actionable\"","sentence":"E. Walters, 576 F.2d at 367 (\u201cthe fact that a procurement practice is prohibited does not necessarily mean that it is therefore actionable\u201d); see Walsh v. Schlecht, 429 U.S. 401, 408, 97 S.Ct. 679, 685, 50 L.Ed.2d 641 (1977) (requiring preservation of the validity of contracts' that are not plainly illegal); United States v. New York & Porto Rico S.S. Co., 239 U.S. 88, 92, 36 S.Ct. 41, 42, 60 L.Ed. 161 (1915) (when government did not comply with formal requirements, contract not illegal and recovery permitted upon quantum vale- bat when performed) (citing United States v. R.P. Andrews & Co., 207 U.S. 229, 243, 28 S.Ct. 100, 105, 52 L.Ed. 185 (1907)); Triton Educational Corp. v. United States, 217 Ct. Cl. 266, 578 F.2d 1356, 1361 (1978) (the fact that the contracting officer may have disregarded a directive of the ASPR does not ordinarily render the contract a nullity); Ocean Tech., Inc. v. United States, 19 Cl.Ct. 288, 294 (1990) (\u201cPerformance having been fully completed, holding the obligation to pay unenforceable is not a position favored in this circuit.\u201d)."},"case_id":11911620,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Not every violation of a statute or regulation, nor the failure to comply with a congressional request for reports and internal approvals, renders a contract void or invalid -- particularly after it has been fully performed. Indeed, contracts between the government and a private party have been sustained even when statutes and regulations relating to the procurement or award process have been violated.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"576 F.2d 367, 367","parenthetical":"\"the fact that a procurement practice is prohibited does not necessarily mean that it is therefore actionable\"","sentence":"E. Walters, 576 F.2d at 367 (\u201cthe fact that a procurement practice is prohibited does not necessarily mean that it is therefore actionable\u201d); see Walsh v. Schlecht, 429 U.S. 401, 408, 97 S.Ct. 679, 685, 50 L.Ed.2d 641 (1977) (requiring preservation of the validity of contracts' that are not plainly illegal); United States v. New York & Porto Rico S.S. Co., 239 U.S. 88, 92, 36 S.Ct. 41, 42, 60 L.Ed. 161 (1915) (when government did not comply with formal requirements, contract not illegal and recovery permitted upon quantum vale- bat when performed) (citing United States v. R.P. Andrews & Co., 207 U.S. 229, 243, 28 S.Ct. 100, 105, 52 L.Ed. 185 (1907)); Triton Educational Corp. v. United States, 217 Ct. Cl. 266, 578 F.2d 1356, 1361 (1978) (the fact that the contracting officer may have disregarded a directive of the ASPR does not ordinarily render the contract a nullity); Ocean Tech., Inc. v. United States, 19 Cl.Ct. 288, 294 (1990) (\u201cPerformance having been fully completed, holding the obligation to pay unenforceable is not a position favored in this circuit.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"36 S.Ct. 41, 42","parenthetical":"when government did not comply with formal requirements, contract not illegal and recovery permitted upon quantum vale- bat when performed","sentence":"E. Walters, 576 F.2d at 367 (\u201cthe fact that a procurement practice is prohibited does not necessarily mean that it is therefore actionable\u201d); see Walsh v. Schlecht, 429 U.S. 401, 408, 97 S.Ct. 679, 685, 50 L.Ed.2d 641 (1977) (requiring preservation of the validity of contracts' that are not plainly illegal); United States v. New York & Porto Rico S.S. Co., 239 U.S. 88, 92, 36 S.Ct. 41, 42, 60 L.Ed. 161 (1915) (when government did not comply with formal requirements, contract not illegal and recovery permitted upon quantum vale- bat when performed) (citing United States v. R.P. Andrews & Co., 207 U.S. 229, 243, 28 S.Ct. 100, 105, 52 L.Ed. 185 (1907)); Triton Educational Corp. v. United States, 217 Ct. Cl. 266, 578 F.2d 1356, 1361 (1978) (the fact that the contracting officer may have disregarded a directive of the ASPR does not ordinarily render the contract a nullity); Ocean Tech., Inc. v. United States, 19 Cl.Ct. 288, 294 (1990) (\u201cPerformance having been fully completed, holding the obligation to pay unenforceable is not a position favored in this circuit.\u201d)."},"case_id":11911620,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Not every violation of a statute or regulation, nor the failure to comply with a congressional request for reports and internal approvals, renders a contract void or invalid -- particularly after it has been fully performed. Indeed, contracts between the government and a private party have been sustained even when statutes and regulations relating to the procurement or award process have been violated.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"when government did not comply with formal requirements, contract not illegal and recovery permitted upon quantum vale- bat when performed","sentence":"E. Walters, 576 F.2d at 367 (\u201cthe fact that a procurement practice is prohibited does not necessarily mean that it is therefore actionable\u201d); see Walsh v. Schlecht, 429 U.S. 401, 408, 97 S.Ct. 679, 685, 50 L.Ed.2d 641 (1977) (requiring preservation of the validity of contracts' that are not plainly illegal); United States v. New York & Porto Rico S.S. Co., 239 U.S. 88, 92, 36 S.Ct. 41, 42, 60 L.Ed. 161 (1915) (when government did not comply with formal requirements, contract not illegal and recovery permitted upon quantum vale- bat when performed) (citing United States v. R.P. Andrews & Co., 207 U.S. 229, 243, 28 S.Ct. 100, 105, 52 L.Ed. 185 (1907)); Triton Educational Corp. v. United States, 217 Ct. Cl. 266, 578 F.2d 1356, 1361 (1978) (the fact that the contracting officer may have disregarded a directive of the ASPR does not ordinarily render the contract a nullity); Ocean Tech., Inc. v. United States, 19 Cl.Ct. 288, 294 (1990) (\u201cPerformance having been fully completed, holding the obligation to pay unenforceable is not a position favored in this circuit.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"576 F.2d 367, 367","parenthetical":"\"the fact that a procurement practice is prohibited does not necessarily mean that it is therefore actionable\"","sentence":"E. Walters, 576 F.2d at 367 (\u201cthe fact that a procurement practice is prohibited does not necessarily mean that it is therefore actionable\u201d); see Walsh v. Schlecht, 429 U.S. 401, 408, 97 S.Ct. 679, 685, 50 L.Ed.2d 641 (1977) (requiring preservation of the validity of contracts' that are not plainly illegal); United States v. New York & Porto Rico S.S. Co., 239 U.S. 88, 92, 36 S.Ct. 41, 42, 60 L.Ed. 161 (1915) (when government did not comply with formal requirements, contract not illegal and recovery permitted upon quantum vale- bat when performed) (citing United States v. R.P. Andrews & Co., 207 U.S. 229, 243, 28 S.Ct. 100, 105, 52 L.Ed. 185 (1907)); Triton Educational Corp. v. United States, 217 Ct. Cl. 266, 578 F.2d 1356, 1361 (1978) (the fact that the contracting officer may have disregarded a directive of the ASPR does not ordinarily render the contract a nullity); Ocean Tech., Inc. v. United States, 19 Cl.Ct. 288, 294 (1990) (\u201cPerformance having been fully completed, holding the obligation to pay unenforceable is not a position favored in this circuit.\u201d)."},"case_id":11911620,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Not every violation of a statute or regulation, nor the failure to comply with a congressional request for reports and internal approvals, renders a contract void or invalid -- particularly after it has been fully performed. Indeed, contracts between the government and a private party have been sustained even when statutes and regulations relating to the procurement or award process have been violated.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"the fact that the contracting officer may have disregarded a directive of the ASPR does not ordinarily render the contract a nullity","sentence":"E. Walters, 576 F.2d at 367 (\u201cthe fact that a procurement practice is prohibited does not necessarily mean that it is therefore actionable\u201d); see Walsh v. Schlecht, 429 U.S. 401, 408, 97 S.Ct. 679, 685, 50 L.Ed.2d 641 (1977) (requiring preservation of the validity of contracts' that are not plainly illegal); United States v. New York & Porto Rico S.S. Co., 239 U.S. 88, 92, 36 S.Ct. 41, 42, 60 L.Ed. 161 (1915) (when government did not comply with formal requirements, contract not illegal and recovery permitted upon quantum vale- bat when performed) (citing United States v. R.P. Andrews & Co., 207 U.S. 229, 243, 28 S.Ct. 100, 105, 52 L.Ed. 185 (1907)); Triton Educational Corp. v. United States, 217 Ct. Cl. 266, 578 F.2d 1356, 1361 (1978) (the fact that the contracting officer may have disregarded a directive of the ASPR does not ordinarily render the contract a nullity); Ocean Tech., Inc. v. United States, 19 Cl.Ct. 288, 294 (1990) (\u201cPerformance having been fully completed, holding the obligation to pay unenforceable is not a position favored in this circuit.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"576 F.2d 367, 367","parenthetical":"\"the fact that a procurement practice is prohibited does not necessarily mean that it is therefore actionable\"","sentence":"E. Walters, 576 F.2d at 367 (\u201cthe fact that a procurement practice is prohibited does not necessarily mean that it is therefore actionable\u201d); see Walsh v. Schlecht, 429 U.S. 401, 408, 97 S.Ct. 679, 685, 50 L.Ed.2d 641 (1977) (requiring preservation of the validity of contracts' that are not plainly illegal); United States v. New York & Porto Rico S.S. Co., 239 U.S. 88, 92, 36 S.Ct. 41, 42, 60 L.Ed. 161 (1915) (when government did not comply with formal requirements, contract not illegal and recovery permitted upon quantum vale- bat when performed) (citing United States v. R.P. Andrews & Co., 207 U.S. 229, 243, 28 S.Ct. 100, 105, 52 L.Ed. 185 (1907)); Triton Educational Corp. v. United States, 217 Ct. Cl. 266, 578 F.2d 1356, 1361 (1978) (the fact that the contracting officer may have disregarded a directive of the ASPR does not ordinarily render the contract a nullity); Ocean Tech., Inc. v. United States, 19 Cl.Ct. 288, 294 (1990) (\u201cPerformance having been fully completed, holding the obligation to pay unenforceable is not a position favored in this circuit.\u201d)."},"case_id":11911620,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Not every violation of a statute or regulation, nor the failure to comply with a congressional request for reports and internal approvals, renders a contract void or invalid -- particularly after it has been fully performed. Indeed, contracts between the government and a private party have been sustained even when statutes and regulations relating to the procurement or award process have been violated.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"578 F.2d 1356, 1361","parenthetical":"the fact that the contracting officer may have disregarded a directive of the ASPR does not ordinarily render the contract a nullity","sentence":"E. Walters, 576 F.2d at 367 (\u201cthe fact that a procurement practice is prohibited does not necessarily mean that it is therefore actionable\u201d); see Walsh v. Schlecht, 429 U.S. 401, 408, 97 S.Ct. 679, 685, 50 L.Ed.2d 641 (1977) (requiring preservation of the validity of contracts' that are not plainly illegal); United States v. New York & Porto Rico S.S. Co., 239 U.S. 88, 92, 36 S.Ct. 41, 42, 60 L.Ed. 161 (1915) (when government did not comply with formal requirements, contract not illegal and recovery permitted upon quantum vale- bat when performed) (citing United States v. R.P. Andrews & Co., 207 U.S. 229, 243, 28 S.Ct. 100, 105, 52 L.Ed. 185 (1907)); Triton Educational Corp. v. United States, 217 Ct. Cl. 266, 578 F.2d 1356, 1361 (1978) (the fact that the contracting officer may have disregarded a directive of the ASPR does not ordinarily render the contract a nullity); Ocean Tech., Inc. v. United States, 19 Cl.Ct. 288, 294 (1990) (\u201cPerformance having been fully completed, holding the obligation to pay unenforceable is not a position favored in this circuit.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"576 F.2d 367, 367","parenthetical":"\"the fact that a procurement practice is prohibited does not necessarily mean that it is therefore actionable\"","sentence":"E. Walters, 576 F.2d at 367 (\u201cthe fact that a procurement practice is prohibited does not necessarily mean that it is therefore actionable\u201d); see Walsh v. Schlecht, 429 U.S. 401, 408, 97 S.Ct. 679, 685, 50 L.Ed.2d 641 (1977) (requiring preservation of the validity of contracts' that are not plainly illegal); United States v. New York & Porto Rico S.S. Co., 239 U.S. 88, 92, 36 S.Ct. 41, 42, 60 L.Ed. 161 (1915) (when government did not comply with formal requirements, contract not illegal and recovery permitted upon quantum vale- bat when performed) (citing United States v. R.P. Andrews & Co., 207 U.S. 229, 243, 28 S.Ct. 100, 105, 52 L.Ed. 185 (1907)); Triton Educational Corp. v. United States, 217 Ct. Cl. 266, 578 F.2d 1356, 1361 (1978) (the fact that the contracting officer may have disregarded a directive of the ASPR does not ordinarily render the contract a nullity); Ocean Tech., Inc. v. United States, 19 Cl.Ct. 288, 294 (1990) (\u201cPerformance having been fully completed, holding the obligation to pay unenforceable is not a position favored in this circuit.\u201d)."},"case_id":11911620,"label":"b"}
{"context":"We therefore conclude that the warrant failed to describe with particularity the evidence sought and, more specifically, to link that evidence to the criminal activity supported by probable cause. As a result, the warrant violated the Fourth Amendment's proscription against general searches.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"998 F.2d 1116, 1116","parenthetical":"noting that the subject warrant, when viewed by itself, was impermissibly broad because it described \"neither the precise items to be seized nor the possible crimes involved\"","sentence":"See Bianco, 998 F.2d at 1116 (noting that the subject warrant, when viewed by itself, was impermissibly broad because it described \u201cneither the precise items to be seized nor the possible crimes involved\u201d); see also United States v. Burgess, 576 F.3d 1078, 1091 (10th Cir.2009) (\u201cIf the warrant is read to allow a search of all computer records without description or limitation it would not meet the Fourth Amendment\u2019s particularity requirement.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"576 F.3d 1078, 1091","parenthetical":"\"If the warrant is read to allow a search of all computer records without description or limitation it would not meet the Fourth Amendment's particularity requirement.\"","sentence":"See Bianco, 998 F.2d at 1116 (noting that the subject warrant, when viewed by itself, was impermissibly broad because it described \u201cneither the precise items to be seized nor the possible crimes involved\u201d); see also United States v. Burgess, 576 F.3d 1078, 1091 (10th Cir.2009) (\u201cIf the warrant is read to allow a search of all computer records without description or limitation it would not meet the Fourth Amendment\u2019s particularity requirement.\u201d)."},"case_id":6052478,"label":"a"}
{"context":"This conclusion is supported by several cases in which it has been held that when, as here, there is an evidentiary basis to separate the two, a determination that the defendant was insane during a later crime does not foreclose a contrary finding as to a previous one -- even one which occurred a very short time before.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"insanity finding in second robbery no collateral estoppel as to robbery three hours earlier \"although it is highly improbable that defendant was not suffering from the same incapacity.\"","sentence":"See State v. Sanders, 229 So.2d 288 (Fla. 1st DCA 1969) (collateral estoppel inapplicable because of indication that defendant\u2019s \u201cmind snapped\u201d during hour between two murders; compare Rawls, J., dissenting on ground that medical testimony as to two homicides \u201cnot capable of being separated,\u201d 229 So.2d at 299); People v. Kernanen, 178 Colo. 234, 497 P.2d 8 (1972) (insanity finding in second robbery no collateral estoppel as to robbery three hours earlier \u201calthough it is highly improbable that defendant was not suffering from the same incapacity.\u201d); see also Gray v. State, 23 Md.App. 700, 329 A.2d 751 (1974) (insanity as to November 20th murder not conclusive as to homicides on October 16th or December 11th)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"insanity as to November 20th murder not conclusive as to homicides on October 16th or December 11th","sentence":"See State v. Sanders, 229 So.2d 288 (Fla. 1st DCA 1969) (collateral estoppel inapplicable because of indication that defendant\u2019s \u201cmind snapped\u201d during hour between two murders; compare Rawls, J., dissenting on ground that medical testimony as to two homicides \u201cnot capable of being separated,\u201d 229 So.2d at 299); People v. Kernanen, 178 Colo. 234, 497 P.2d 8 (1972) (insanity finding in second robbery no collateral estoppel as to robbery three hours earlier \u201calthough it is highly improbable that defendant was not suffering from the same incapacity.\u201d); see also Gray v. State, 23 Md.App. 700, 329 A.2d 751 (1974) (insanity as to November 20th murder not conclusive as to homicides on October 16th or December 11th)."},"case_id":7620177,"label":"a"}
{"context":"This conclusion is supported by several cases in which it has been held that when, as here, there is an evidentiary basis to separate the two, a determination that the defendant was insane during a later crime does not foreclose a contrary finding as to a previous one -- even one which occurred a very short time before.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"insanity finding in second robbery no collateral estoppel as to robbery three hours earlier \"although it is highly improbable that defendant was not suffering from the same incapacity.\"","sentence":"See State v. Sanders, 229 So.2d 288 (Fla. 1st DCA 1969) (collateral estoppel inapplicable because of indication that defendant\u2019s \u201cmind snapped\u201d during hour between two murders; compare Rawls, J., dissenting on ground that medical testimony as to two homicides \u201cnot capable of being separated,\u201d 229 So.2d at 299); People v. Kernanen, 178 Colo. 234, 497 P.2d 8 (1972) (insanity finding in second robbery no collateral estoppel as to robbery three hours earlier \u201calthough it is highly improbable that defendant was not suffering from the same incapacity.\u201d); see also Gray v. State, 23 Md.App. 700, 329 A.2d 751 (1974) (insanity as to November 20th murder not conclusive as to homicides on October 16th or December 11th)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"insanity as to November 20th murder not conclusive as to homicides on October 16th or December 11th","sentence":"See State v. Sanders, 229 So.2d 288 (Fla. 1st DCA 1969) (collateral estoppel inapplicable because of indication that defendant\u2019s \u201cmind snapped\u201d during hour between two murders; compare Rawls, J., dissenting on ground that medical testimony as to two homicides \u201cnot capable of being separated,\u201d 229 So.2d at 299); People v. Kernanen, 178 Colo. 234, 497 P.2d 8 (1972) (insanity finding in second robbery no collateral estoppel as to robbery three hours earlier \u201calthough it is highly improbable that defendant was not suffering from the same incapacity.\u201d); see also Gray v. State, 23 Md.App. 700, 329 A.2d 751 (1974) (insanity as to November 20th murder not conclusive as to homicides on October 16th or December 11th)."},"case_id":7620177,"label":"a"}
{"context":"This conclusion is supported by several cases in which it has been held that when, as here, there is an evidentiary basis to separate the two, a determination that the defendant was insane during a later crime does not foreclose a contrary finding as to a previous one -- even one which occurred a very short time before.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"insanity as to November 20th murder not conclusive as to homicides on October 16th or December 11th","sentence":"See State v. Sanders, 229 So.2d 288 (Fla. 1st DCA 1969) (collateral estoppel inapplicable because of indication that defendant\u2019s \u201cmind snapped\u201d during hour between two murders; compare Rawls, J., dissenting on ground that medical testimony as to two homicides \u201cnot capable of being separated,\u201d 229 So.2d at 299); People v. Kernanen, 178 Colo. 234, 497 P.2d 8 (1972) (insanity finding in second robbery no collateral estoppel as to robbery three hours earlier \u201calthough it is highly improbable that defendant was not suffering from the same incapacity.\u201d); see also Gray v. State, 23 Md.App. 700, 329 A.2d 751 (1974) (insanity as to November 20th murder not conclusive as to homicides on October 16th or December 11th)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"insanity finding in second robbery no collateral estoppel as to robbery three hours earlier \"although it is highly improbable that defendant was not suffering from the same incapacity.\"","sentence":"See State v. Sanders, 229 So.2d 288 (Fla. 1st DCA 1969) (collateral estoppel inapplicable because of indication that defendant\u2019s \u201cmind snapped\u201d during hour between two murders; compare Rawls, J., dissenting on ground that medical testimony as to two homicides \u201cnot capable of being separated,\u201d 229 So.2d at 299); People v. Kernanen, 178 Colo. 234, 497 P.2d 8 (1972) (insanity finding in second robbery no collateral estoppel as to robbery three hours earlier \u201calthough it is highly improbable that defendant was not suffering from the same incapacity.\u201d); see also Gray v. State, 23 Md.App. 700, 329 A.2d 751 (1974) (insanity as to November 20th murder not conclusive as to homicides on October 16th or December 11th)."},"case_id":7620177,"label":"b"}
{"context":"This conclusion is supported by several cases in which it has been held that when, as here, there is an evidentiary basis to separate the two, a determination that the defendant was insane during a later crime does not foreclose a contrary finding as to a previous one -- even one which occurred a very short time before.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"insanity finding in second robbery no collateral estoppel as to robbery three hours earlier \"although it is highly improbable that defendant was not suffering from the same incapacity.\"","sentence":"See State v. Sanders, 229 So.2d 288 (Fla. 1st DCA 1969) (collateral estoppel inapplicable because of indication that defendant\u2019s \u201cmind snapped\u201d during hour between two murders; compare Rawls, J., dissenting on ground that medical testimony as to two homicides \u201cnot capable of being separated,\u201d 229 So.2d at 299); People v. Kernanen, 178 Colo. 234, 497 P.2d 8 (1972) (insanity finding in second robbery no collateral estoppel as to robbery three hours earlier \u201calthough it is highly improbable that defendant was not suffering from the same incapacity.\u201d); see also Gray v. State, 23 Md.App. 700, 329 A.2d 751 (1974) (insanity as to November 20th murder not conclusive as to homicides on October 16th or December 11th)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"insanity as to November 20th murder not conclusive as to homicides on October 16th or December 11th","sentence":"See State v. Sanders, 229 So.2d 288 (Fla. 1st DCA 1969) (collateral estoppel inapplicable because of indication that defendant\u2019s \u201cmind snapped\u201d during hour between two murders; compare Rawls, J., dissenting on ground that medical testimony as to two homicides \u201cnot capable of being separated,\u201d 229 So.2d at 299); People v. Kernanen, 178 Colo. 234, 497 P.2d 8 (1972) (insanity finding in second robbery no collateral estoppel as to robbery three hours earlier \u201calthough it is highly improbable that defendant was not suffering from the same incapacity.\u201d); see also Gray v. State, 23 Md.App. 700, 329 A.2d 751 (1974) (insanity as to November 20th murder not conclusive as to homicides on October 16th or December 11th)."},"case_id":7620177,"label":"a"}
{"context":". Although the MCCA provides for a hearing by parties challenging an eligibility determination, the Sellers did not ask for a hearing. This fact, however, is not fatal to their SS 1983 claim.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"534 U.S. 516, 523","parenthetical":"\"plaintiffs pursuing civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. SS 1983 need not exhaust administrative remedies before filing suit in court\"","sentence":"See Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 523, 122 S.Ct. 983, 152 L.Ed.2d 12 (2002) (\"plaintiffs pursuing civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 need not exhaust administrative remedies before filing suit in court\u201d); see also Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass\u2019n, 496 U.S. 498, 521-22, 110 S.Ct. 2510, 110 L.Ed.2d 455 (1990)(holding the Medicaid Act permits enforcement under \u00a7 1983 notwithstanding inclusion of alternative state administrative procedures)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"496 U.S. 498, 521-22","parenthetical":"holding the Medicaid Act permits enforcement under SS 1983 notwithstanding inclusion of alternative state administrative procedures","sentence":"See Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 523, 122 S.Ct. 983, 152 L.Ed.2d 12 (2002) (\"plaintiffs pursuing civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 need not exhaust administrative remedies before filing suit in court\u201d); see also Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass\u2019n, 496 U.S. 498, 521-22, 110 S.Ct. 2510, 110 L.Ed.2d 455 (1990)(holding the Medicaid Act permits enforcement under \u00a7 1983 notwithstanding inclusion of alternative state administrative procedures)."},"case_id":2190370,"label":"a"}
{"context":". Although the MCCA provides for a hearing by parties challenging an eligibility determination, the Sellers did not ask for a hearing. This fact, however, is not fatal to their SS 1983 claim.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"534 U.S. 516, 523","parenthetical":"\"plaintiffs pursuing civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. SS 1983 need not exhaust administrative remedies before filing suit in court\"","sentence":"See Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 523, 122 S.Ct. 983, 152 L.Ed.2d 12 (2002) (\"plaintiffs pursuing civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 need not exhaust administrative remedies before filing suit in court\u201d); see also Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass\u2019n, 496 U.S. 498, 521-22, 110 S.Ct. 2510, 110 L.Ed.2d 455 (1990)(holding the Medicaid Act permits enforcement under \u00a7 1983 notwithstanding inclusion of alternative state administrative procedures)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding the Medicaid Act permits enforcement under SS 1983 notwithstanding inclusion of alternative state administrative procedures","sentence":"See Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 523, 122 S.Ct. 983, 152 L.Ed.2d 12 (2002) (\"plaintiffs pursuing civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 need not exhaust administrative remedies before filing suit in court\u201d); see also Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass\u2019n, 496 U.S. 498, 521-22, 110 S.Ct. 2510, 110 L.Ed.2d 455 (1990)(holding the Medicaid Act permits enforcement under \u00a7 1983 notwithstanding inclusion of alternative state administrative procedures)."},"case_id":2190370,"label":"a"}
{"context":". Although the MCCA provides for a hearing by parties challenging an eligibility determination, the Sellers did not ask for a hearing. This fact, however, is not fatal to their SS 1983 claim.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"534 U.S. 516, 523","parenthetical":"\"plaintiffs pursuing civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. SS 1983 need not exhaust administrative remedies before filing suit in court\"","sentence":"See Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 523, 122 S.Ct. 983, 152 L.Ed.2d 12 (2002) (\"plaintiffs pursuing civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 need not exhaust administrative remedies before filing suit in court\u201d); see also Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass\u2019n, 496 U.S. 498, 521-22, 110 S.Ct. 2510, 110 L.Ed.2d 455 (1990)(holding the Medicaid Act permits enforcement under \u00a7 1983 notwithstanding inclusion of alternative state administrative procedures)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding the Medicaid Act permits enforcement under SS 1983 notwithstanding inclusion of alternative state administrative procedures","sentence":"See Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 523, 122 S.Ct. 983, 152 L.Ed.2d 12 (2002) (\"plaintiffs pursuing civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 need not exhaust administrative remedies before filing suit in court\u201d); see also Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass\u2019n, 496 U.S. 498, 521-22, 110 S.Ct. 2510, 110 L.Ed.2d 455 (1990)(holding the Medicaid Act permits enforcement under \u00a7 1983 notwithstanding inclusion of alternative state administrative procedures)."},"case_id":2190370,"label":"a"}
{"context":". Although the MCCA provides for a hearing by parties challenging an eligibility determination, the Sellers did not ask for a hearing. This fact, however, is not fatal to their SS 1983 claim.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"496 U.S. 498, 521-22","parenthetical":"holding the Medicaid Act permits enforcement under SS 1983 notwithstanding inclusion of alternative state administrative procedures","sentence":"See Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 523, 122 S.Ct. 983, 152 L.Ed.2d 12 (2002) (\"plaintiffs pursuing civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 need not exhaust administrative remedies before filing suit in court\u201d); see also Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass\u2019n, 496 U.S. 498, 521-22, 110 S.Ct. 2510, 110 L.Ed.2d 455 (1990)(holding the Medicaid Act permits enforcement under \u00a7 1983 notwithstanding inclusion of alternative state administrative procedures)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"plaintiffs pursuing civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. SS 1983 need not exhaust administrative remedies before filing suit in court\"","sentence":"See Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 523, 122 S.Ct. 983, 152 L.Ed.2d 12 (2002) (\"plaintiffs pursuing civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 need not exhaust administrative remedies before filing suit in court\u201d); see also Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass\u2019n, 496 U.S. 498, 521-22, 110 S.Ct. 2510, 110 L.Ed.2d 455 (1990)(holding the Medicaid Act permits enforcement under \u00a7 1983 notwithstanding inclusion of alternative state administrative procedures)."},"case_id":2190370,"label":"b"}
{"context":". Although the MCCA provides for a hearing by parties challenging an eligibility determination, the Sellers did not ask for a hearing. This fact, however, is not fatal to their SS 1983 claim.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding the Medicaid Act permits enforcement under SS 1983 notwithstanding inclusion of alternative state administrative procedures","sentence":"See Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 523, 122 S.Ct. 983, 152 L.Ed.2d 12 (2002) (\"plaintiffs pursuing civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 need not exhaust administrative remedies before filing suit in court\u201d); see also Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass\u2019n, 496 U.S. 498, 521-22, 110 S.Ct. 2510, 110 L.Ed.2d 455 (1990)(holding the Medicaid Act permits enforcement under \u00a7 1983 notwithstanding inclusion of alternative state administrative procedures)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"plaintiffs pursuing civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. SS 1983 need not exhaust administrative remedies before filing suit in court\"","sentence":"See Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 523, 122 S.Ct. 983, 152 L.Ed.2d 12 (2002) (\"plaintiffs pursuing civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 need not exhaust administrative remedies before filing suit in court\u201d); see also Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass\u2019n, 496 U.S. 498, 521-22, 110 S.Ct. 2510, 110 L.Ed.2d 455 (1990)(holding the Medicaid Act permits enforcement under \u00a7 1983 notwithstanding inclusion of alternative state administrative procedures)."},"case_id":2190370,"label":"b"}
{"context":". Although the MCCA provides for a hearing by parties challenging an eligibility determination, the Sellers did not ask for a hearing. This fact, however, is not fatal to their SS 1983 claim.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"plaintiffs pursuing civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. SS 1983 need not exhaust administrative remedies before filing suit in court\"","sentence":"See Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 523, 122 S.Ct. 983, 152 L.Ed.2d 12 (2002) (\"plaintiffs pursuing civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 need not exhaust administrative remedies before filing suit in court\u201d); see also Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass\u2019n, 496 U.S. 498, 521-22, 110 S.Ct. 2510, 110 L.Ed.2d 455 (1990)(holding the Medicaid Act permits enforcement under \u00a7 1983 notwithstanding inclusion of alternative state administrative procedures)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding the Medicaid Act permits enforcement under SS 1983 notwithstanding inclusion of alternative state administrative procedures","sentence":"See Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 523, 122 S.Ct. 983, 152 L.Ed.2d 12 (2002) (\"plaintiffs pursuing civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 need not exhaust administrative remedies before filing suit in court\u201d); see also Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass\u2019n, 496 U.S. 498, 521-22, 110 S.Ct. 2510, 110 L.Ed.2d 455 (1990)(holding the Medicaid Act permits enforcement under \u00a7 1983 notwithstanding inclusion of alternative state administrative procedures)."},"case_id":2190370,"label":"a"}
{"context":". Although the MCCA provides for a hearing by parties challenging an eligibility determination, the Sellers did not ask for a hearing. This fact, however, is not fatal to their SS 1983 claim.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"plaintiffs pursuing civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. SS 1983 need not exhaust administrative remedies before filing suit in court\"","sentence":"See Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 523, 122 S.Ct. 983, 152 L.Ed.2d 12 (2002) (\"plaintiffs pursuing civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 need not exhaust administrative remedies before filing suit in court\u201d); see also Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass\u2019n, 496 U.S. 498, 521-22, 110 S.Ct. 2510, 110 L.Ed.2d 455 (1990)(holding the Medicaid Act permits enforcement under \u00a7 1983 notwithstanding inclusion of alternative state administrative procedures)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"496 U.S. 498, 521-22","parenthetical":"holding the Medicaid Act permits enforcement under SS 1983 notwithstanding inclusion of alternative state administrative procedures","sentence":"See Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 523, 122 S.Ct. 983, 152 L.Ed.2d 12 (2002) (\"plaintiffs pursuing civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 need not exhaust administrative remedies before filing suit in court\u201d); see also Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass\u2019n, 496 U.S. 498, 521-22, 110 S.Ct. 2510, 110 L.Ed.2d 455 (1990)(holding the Medicaid Act permits enforcement under \u00a7 1983 notwithstanding inclusion of alternative state administrative procedures)."},"case_id":2190370,"label":"a"}
{"context":". Although the MCCA provides for a hearing by parties challenging an eligibility determination, the Sellers did not ask for a hearing. This fact, however, is not fatal to their SS 1983 claim.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding the Medicaid Act permits enforcement under SS 1983 notwithstanding inclusion of alternative state administrative procedures","sentence":"See Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 523, 122 S.Ct. 983, 152 L.Ed.2d 12 (2002) (\"plaintiffs pursuing civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 need not exhaust administrative remedies before filing suit in court\u201d); see also Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass\u2019n, 496 U.S. 498, 521-22, 110 S.Ct. 2510, 110 L.Ed.2d 455 (1990)(holding the Medicaid Act permits enforcement under \u00a7 1983 notwithstanding inclusion of alternative state administrative procedures)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"plaintiffs pursuing civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. SS 1983 need not exhaust administrative remedies before filing suit in court\"","sentence":"See Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 523, 122 S.Ct. 983, 152 L.Ed.2d 12 (2002) (\"plaintiffs pursuing civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 need not exhaust administrative remedies before filing suit in court\u201d); see also Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass\u2019n, 496 U.S. 498, 521-22, 110 S.Ct. 2510, 110 L.Ed.2d 455 (1990)(holding the Medicaid Act permits enforcement under \u00a7 1983 notwithstanding inclusion of alternative state administrative procedures)."},"case_id":2190370,"label":"b"}
{"context":". Although the MCCA provides for a hearing by parties challenging an eligibility determination, the Sellers did not ask for a hearing. This fact, however, is not fatal to their SS 1983 claim.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding the Medicaid Act permits enforcement under SS 1983 notwithstanding inclusion of alternative state administrative procedures","sentence":"See Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 523, 122 S.Ct. 983, 152 L.Ed.2d 12 (2002) (\"plaintiffs pursuing civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 need not exhaust administrative remedies before filing suit in court\u201d); see also Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass\u2019n, 496 U.S. 498, 521-22, 110 S.Ct. 2510, 110 L.Ed.2d 455 (1990)(holding the Medicaid Act permits enforcement under \u00a7 1983 notwithstanding inclusion of alternative state administrative procedures)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"plaintiffs pursuing civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. SS 1983 need not exhaust administrative remedies before filing suit in court\"","sentence":"See Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 523, 122 S.Ct. 983, 152 L.Ed.2d 12 (2002) (\"plaintiffs pursuing civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 need not exhaust administrative remedies before filing suit in court\u201d); see also Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass\u2019n, 496 U.S. 498, 521-22, 110 S.Ct. 2510, 110 L.Ed.2d 455 (1990)(holding the Medicaid Act permits enforcement under \u00a7 1983 notwithstanding inclusion of alternative state administrative procedures)."},"case_id":2190370,"label":"b"}
{"context":"I am aware that a number of district courts have dismissed SS 1132(a)(3) claims as duplicative of SS 1132(a)(1)(B) claims on Rule 12(b)(6) motions. However, for the reasons stated above, I believe that courts are better advised to permit the parties to develop the record before addressing the issue of whether either or both claims are viable.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"213 F.Supp.2d 818, 818","parenthetical":"stating that plaintiffs had alleged facts supporting claims under both sections and that question of which claim should proceed could not be resolved solely by reference to the face of the complaint","sentence":"See, e.g. Gieger, 213 F.Supp.2d at 818 (stating that plaintiffs had alleged facts supporting claims under both sections and that question of which claim should proceed could not be resolved solely by reference to the face of the complaint); Schultz, 127 F.Supp.2d at 451 (stating that where plaintiff alleged facts supporting both \u00a7 1132(a)(1)(B) and \u00a7 1132(a)(3) claims, court should wait until record was developed before determining which claims were viable); see also Edmond v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., No. 1:03-CV-1316-CC, 2004 WL 1406098, at *3, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11861, at *8 (N.D.Ga. Jan. 16, 2004) (stating that at the pleading stage, plaintiff may simultaneously assert alternate claims for recovery of benefits under \u00a7 1132(a)(1)(B) and for breach of fiduciary duty under \u00a7 1132(a)(3)). In addition, the cases cited previously in which circuit courts rejected \u00a7 1132(a)(3) claims as du-plicative, Tolson, Wilkins, Wald and For-syth, all involved decisions on summary judgment motions rather than motions to dismiss. Thus, I will deny Standard\u2019s motion to dismiss plaintiffs \u00a7 1132(a)(3) claim."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"2004 WL 1406098, at *3","parenthetical":"stating that at the pleading stage, plaintiff may simultaneously assert alternate claims for recovery of benefits under SS 1132(a)(1)(B) and for breach of fiduciary duty under SS 1132(a)(3","sentence":"See, e.g. Gieger, 213 F.Supp.2d at 818 (stating that plaintiffs had alleged facts supporting claims under both sections and that question of which claim should proceed could not be resolved solely by reference to the face of the complaint); Schultz, 127 F.Supp.2d at 451 (stating that where plaintiff alleged facts supporting both \u00a7 1132(a)(1)(B) and \u00a7 1132(a)(3) claims, court should wait until record was developed before determining which claims were viable); see also Edmond v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., No. 1:03-CV-1316-CC, 2004 WL 1406098, at *3, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11861, at *8 (N.D.Ga. Jan. 16, 2004) (stating that at the pleading stage, plaintiff may simultaneously assert alternate claims for recovery of benefits under \u00a7 1132(a)(1)(B) and for breach of fiduciary duty under \u00a7 1132(a)(3)). In addition, the cases cited previously in which circuit courts rejected \u00a7 1132(a)(3) claims as du-plicative, Tolson, Wilkins, Wald and For-syth, all involved decisions on summary judgment motions rather than motions to dismiss. Thus, I will deny Standard\u2019s motion to dismiss plaintiffs \u00a7 1132(a)(3) claim."},"case_id":8954088,"label":"a"}
{"context":"I am aware that a number of district courts have dismissed SS 1132(a)(3) claims as duplicative of SS 1132(a)(1)(B) claims on Rule 12(b)(6) motions. However, for the reasons stated above, I believe that courts are better advised to permit the parties to develop the record before addressing the issue of whether either or both claims are viable.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"213 F.Supp.2d 818, 818","parenthetical":"stating that plaintiffs had alleged facts supporting claims under both sections and that question of which claim should proceed could not be resolved solely by reference to the face of the complaint","sentence":"See, e.g. Gieger, 213 F.Supp.2d at 818 (stating that plaintiffs had alleged facts supporting claims under both sections and that question of which claim should proceed could not be resolved solely by reference to the face of the complaint); Schultz, 127 F.Supp.2d at 451 (stating that where plaintiff alleged facts supporting both \u00a7 1132(a)(1)(B) and \u00a7 1132(a)(3) claims, court should wait until record was developed before determining which claims were viable); see also Edmond v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., No. 1:03-CV-1316-CC, 2004 WL 1406098, at *3, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11861, at *8 (N.D.Ga. Jan. 16, 2004) (stating that at the pleading stage, plaintiff may simultaneously assert alternate claims for recovery of benefits under \u00a7 1132(a)(1)(B) and for breach of fiduciary duty under \u00a7 1132(a)(3)). In addition, the cases cited previously in which circuit courts rejected \u00a7 1132(a)(3) claims as du-plicative, Tolson, Wilkins, Wald and For-syth, all involved decisions on summary judgment motions rather than motions to dismiss. Thus, I will deny Standard\u2019s motion to dismiss plaintiffs \u00a7 1132(a)(3) claim."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11861, at *8","parenthetical":"stating that at the pleading stage, plaintiff may simultaneously assert alternate claims for recovery of benefits under SS 1132(a)(1)(B) and for breach of fiduciary duty under SS 1132(a)(3","sentence":"See, e.g. Gieger, 213 F.Supp.2d at 818 (stating that plaintiffs had alleged facts supporting claims under both sections and that question of which claim should proceed could not be resolved solely by reference to the face of the complaint); Schultz, 127 F.Supp.2d at 451 (stating that where plaintiff alleged facts supporting both \u00a7 1132(a)(1)(B) and \u00a7 1132(a)(3) claims, court should wait until record was developed before determining which claims were viable); see also Edmond v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., No. 1:03-CV-1316-CC, 2004 WL 1406098, at *3, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11861, at *8 (N.D.Ga. Jan. 16, 2004) (stating that at the pleading stage, plaintiff may simultaneously assert alternate claims for recovery of benefits under \u00a7 1132(a)(1)(B) and for breach of fiduciary duty under \u00a7 1132(a)(3)). In addition, the cases cited previously in which circuit courts rejected \u00a7 1132(a)(3) claims as du-plicative, Tolson, Wilkins, Wald and For-syth, all involved decisions on summary judgment motions rather than motions to dismiss. Thus, I will deny Standard\u2019s motion to dismiss plaintiffs \u00a7 1132(a)(3) claim."},"case_id":8954088,"label":"a"}
{"context":"I am aware that a number of district courts have dismissed SS 1132(a)(3) claims as duplicative of SS 1132(a)(1)(B) claims on Rule 12(b)(6) motions. However, for the reasons stated above, I believe that courts are better advised to permit the parties to develop the record before addressing the issue of whether either or both claims are viable.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"2004 WL 1406098, at *3","parenthetical":"stating that at the pleading stage, plaintiff may simultaneously assert alternate claims for recovery of benefits under SS 1132(a)(1)(B) and for breach of fiduciary duty under SS 1132(a)(3","sentence":"See, e.g. Gieger, 213 F.Supp.2d at 818 (stating that plaintiffs had alleged facts supporting claims under both sections and that question of which claim should proceed could not be resolved solely by reference to the face of the complaint); Schultz, 127 F.Supp.2d at 451 (stating that where plaintiff alleged facts supporting both \u00a7 1132(a)(1)(B) and \u00a7 1132(a)(3) claims, court should wait until record was developed before determining which claims were viable); see also Edmond v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., No. 1:03-CV-1316-CC, 2004 WL 1406098, at *3, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11861, at *8 (N.D.Ga. Jan. 16, 2004) (stating that at the pleading stage, plaintiff may simultaneously assert alternate claims for recovery of benefits under \u00a7 1132(a)(1)(B) and for breach of fiduciary duty under \u00a7 1132(a)(3)). In addition, the cases cited previously in which circuit courts rejected \u00a7 1132(a)(3) claims as du-plicative, Tolson, Wilkins, Wald and For-syth, all involved decisions on summary judgment motions rather than motions to dismiss. Thus, I will deny Standard\u2019s motion to dismiss plaintiffs \u00a7 1132(a)(3) claim."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"127 F.Supp.2d 451, 451","parenthetical":"stating that where plaintiff alleged facts supporting both SS 1132(a","sentence":"See, e.g. Gieger, 213 F.Supp.2d at 818 (stating that plaintiffs had alleged facts supporting claims under both sections and that question of which claim should proceed could not be resolved solely by reference to the face of the complaint); Schultz, 127 F.Supp.2d at 451 (stating that where plaintiff alleged facts supporting both \u00a7 1132(a)(1)(B) and \u00a7 1132(a)(3) claims, court should wait until record was developed before determining which claims were viable); see also Edmond v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., No. 1:03-CV-1316-CC, 2004 WL 1406098, at *3, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11861, at *8 (N.D.Ga. Jan. 16, 2004) (stating that at the pleading stage, plaintiff may simultaneously assert alternate claims for recovery of benefits under \u00a7 1132(a)(1)(B) and for breach of fiduciary duty under \u00a7 1132(a)(3)). In addition, the cases cited previously in which circuit courts rejected \u00a7 1132(a)(3) claims as du-plicative, Tolson, Wilkins, Wald and For-syth, all involved decisions on summary judgment motions rather than motions to dismiss. Thus, I will deny Standard\u2019s motion to dismiss plaintiffs \u00a7 1132(a)(3) claim."},"case_id":8954088,"label":"b"}
{"context":"I am aware that a number of district courts have dismissed SS 1132(a)(3) claims as duplicative of SS 1132(a)(1)(B) claims on Rule 12(b)(6) motions. However, for the reasons stated above, I believe that courts are better advised to permit the parties to develop the record before addressing the issue of whether either or both claims are viable.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11861, at *8","parenthetical":"stating that at the pleading stage, plaintiff may simultaneously assert alternate claims for recovery of benefits under SS 1132(a)(1)(B) and for breach of fiduciary duty under SS 1132(a)(3","sentence":"See, e.g. Gieger, 213 F.Supp.2d at 818 (stating that plaintiffs had alleged facts supporting claims under both sections and that question of which claim should proceed could not be resolved solely by reference to the face of the complaint); Schultz, 127 F.Supp.2d at 451 (stating that where plaintiff alleged facts supporting both \u00a7 1132(a)(1)(B) and \u00a7 1132(a)(3) claims, court should wait until record was developed before determining which claims were viable); see also Edmond v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., No. 1:03-CV-1316-CC, 2004 WL 1406098, at *3, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11861, at *8 (N.D.Ga. Jan. 16, 2004) (stating that at the pleading stage, plaintiff may simultaneously assert alternate claims for recovery of benefits under \u00a7 1132(a)(1)(B) and for breach of fiduciary duty under \u00a7 1132(a)(3)). In addition, the cases cited previously in which circuit courts rejected \u00a7 1132(a)(3) claims as du-plicative, Tolson, Wilkins, Wald and For-syth, all involved decisions on summary judgment motions rather than motions to dismiss. Thus, I will deny Standard\u2019s motion to dismiss plaintiffs \u00a7 1132(a)(3) claim."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"127 F.Supp.2d 451, 451","parenthetical":"stating that where plaintiff alleged facts supporting both SS 1132(a","sentence":"See, e.g. Gieger, 213 F.Supp.2d at 818 (stating that plaintiffs had alleged facts supporting claims under both sections and that question of which claim should proceed could not be resolved solely by reference to the face of the complaint); Schultz, 127 F.Supp.2d at 451 (stating that where plaintiff alleged facts supporting both \u00a7 1132(a)(1)(B) and \u00a7 1132(a)(3) claims, court should wait until record was developed before determining which claims were viable); see also Edmond v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., No. 1:03-CV-1316-CC, 2004 WL 1406098, at *3, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11861, at *8 (N.D.Ga. Jan. 16, 2004) (stating that at the pleading stage, plaintiff may simultaneously assert alternate claims for recovery of benefits under \u00a7 1132(a)(1)(B) and for breach of fiduciary duty under \u00a7 1132(a)(3)). In addition, the cases cited previously in which circuit courts rejected \u00a7 1132(a)(3) claims as du-plicative, Tolson, Wilkins, Wald and For-syth, all involved decisions on summary judgment motions rather than motions to dismiss. Thus, I will deny Standard\u2019s motion to dismiss plaintiffs \u00a7 1132(a)(3) claim."},"case_id":8954088,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Courts of appeals have followed the Supreme Court's lead in assuming jurisdiction and ruling on the merits against the party invoking jurisdiction.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"872 F.2d 512, 514","parenthetical":"court assumes jurisdiction arguendo and holds that plaintiff's damages claim is time barred","sentence":"See, e.g., Edwards v. Carter, 580 F.2d 1055, 1056-57 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 907, 98 S.Ct. 2240, 56 L.Ed.2d 406 (1978), discussed infra; Adams v. Vance, 570 F.2d 950 (D.C.Cir. 1978) (per curiam), discussed infra; Ripon Society v. National Republican Party, 525 F.2d 567, 576 n. 26 & 578 n. 28 (D.C. Cir.1975) (assuming, without deciding, jurisdiction), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 933, 96 S.Ct. 1147, 47 L.Ed.2d 341 (1976); Kaiser v. Armstrong World Industries, Inc., 872 F.2d 512, 514 (1st Cir.1989) (court assumes jurisdiction arguendo and holds that plaintiff\u2019s damages claim is time barred); Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Caledonia Investment Corp., 862 F.2d 378, 381 (1st Cir.1988) (\u201c[s]ince we affirm on the merits, however, we need not decide the jurisdictional issue because the result is the same\u201d); Switlik v. Hardwicke Co., 651 F.2d 852 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1064, 102 S.Ct. 614, 70 L.Ed.2d 601 (1981), discussed infra; Mitchell v. West Feliciana Parish School Board, 507 F.2d 662, 666-67 (5th Cir.1975), discussed infra; Southern Pacific Transportation Co. v. Usery, 539 F.2d 386, 389 n. 1 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 874, 98 S.Ct. 222, 54 L.Ed.2d 154 (1977) (consolidated cases in which court avoided challenge to jurisdiction as to one case because other cases were clearly within court\u2019s jurisdiction); Forster v. County of Santa Barbara, 896 F.2d 1146 (9th Cir.1990) (ignoring jurisdictional question because of factual dispute, unresolved at district court level, over whether appellant filed timely notice of appeal); Wolder v. United States, 807 F.2d 1506, 1507 (9th Cir.1987) (per curiam) (\u201cwhere the jurisdictional question is complex and the appeal is clearly without merit,\u201d court will avoid jurisdictional question and rule on merits); Lehner v. United States, 685 F.2d 1187 (9th Cir.1982) (court avoids question of whether jurisdiction exists over claims for money damages, because jurisdiction over equitable claims was clear, and merits would not be affected), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1039, 103 S.Ct. 1431, 75 L.Ed.2d 790 (1983)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"551 F.2d 521, 528","parenthetical":"characterizing as \"jurisdictional\" the question of whether a note in issue was a security under section 10(b","sentence":"Cf. Friedman v. Beame, 558 F.2d 1107, 1110 n. 3 (2d Cir. 1977) (assuming standing in order to reach the merits); Franklin Savings Bank of New York v. Levy, 551 F.2d 521, 528 (2d Cir.1977) (characterizing as \u201cjurisdictional\u201d the question of whether a note in issue was a security under section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, and avoiding the question to reach the \u201cmerits\u201d)."},"case_id":10527240,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Courts of appeals have followed the Supreme Court's lead in assuming jurisdiction and ruling on the merits against the party invoking jurisdiction.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"551 F.2d 521, 528","parenthetical":"characterizing as \"jurisdictional\" the question of whether a note in issue was a security under section 10(b","sentence":"Cf. Friedman v. Beame, 558 F.2d 1107, 1110 n. 3 (2d Cir. 1977) (assuming standing in order to reach the merits); Franklin Savings Bank of New York v. Levy, 551 F.2d 521, 528 (2d Cir.1977) (characterizing as \u201cjurisdictional\u201d the question of whether a note in issue was a security under section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, and avoiding the question to reach the \u201cmerits\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"862 F.2d 378, 381","parenthetical":"\"[s]ince we affirm on the merits, however, we need not decide the jurisdictional issue because the result is the same\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Edwards v. Carter, 580 F.2d 1055, 1056-57 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 907, 98 S.Ct. 2240, 56 L.Ed.2d 406 (1978), discussed infra; Adams v. Vance, 570 F.2d 950 (D.C.Cir. 1978) (per curiam), discussed infra; Ripon Society v. National Republican Party, 525 F.2d 567, 576 n. 26 & 578 n. 28 (D.C. Cir.1975) (assuming, without deciding, jurisdiction), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 933, 96 S.Ct. 1147, 47 L.Ed.2d 341 (1976); Kaiser v. Armstrong World Industries, Inc., 872 F.2d 512, 514 (1st Cir.1989) (court assumes jurisdiction arguendo and holds that plaintiff\u2019s damages claim is time barred); Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Caledonia Investment Corp., 862 F.2d 378, 381 (1st Cir.1988) (\u201c[s]ince we affirm on the merits, however, we need not decide the jurisdictional issue because the result is the same\u201d); Switlik v. Hardwicke Co., 651 F.2d 852 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1064, 102 S.Ct. 614, 70 L.Ed.2d 601 (1981), discussed infra; Mitchell v. West Feliciana Parish School Board, 507 F.2d 662, 666-67 (5th Cir.1975), discussed infra; Southern Pacific Transportation Co. v. Usery, 539 F.2d 386, 389 n. 1 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 874, 98 S.Ct. 222, 54 L.Ed.2d 154 (1977) (consolidated cases in which court avoided challenge to jurisdiction as to one case because other cases were clearly within court\u2019s jurisdiction); Forster v. County of Santa Barbara, 896 F.2d 1146 (9th Cir.1990) (ignoring jurisdictional question because of factual dispute, unresolved at district court level, over whether appellant filed timely notice of appeal); Wolder v. United States, 807 F.2d 1506, 1507 (9th Cir.1987) (per curiam) (\u201cwhere the jurisdictional question is complex and the appeal is clearly without merit,\u201d court will avoid jurisdictional question and rule on merits); Lehner v. United States, 685 F.2d 1187 (9th Cir.1982) (court avoids question of whether jurisdiction exists over claims for money damages, because jurisdiction over equitable claims was clear, and merits would not be affected), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1039, 103 S.Ct. 1431, 75 L.Ed.2d 790 (1983)."},"case_id":10527240,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Courts of appeals have followed the Supreme Court's lead in assuming jurisdiction and ruling on the merits against the party invoking jurisdiction.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"551 F.2d 521, 528","parenthetical":"characterizing as \"jurisdictional\" the question of whether a note in issue was a security under section 10(b","sentence":"Cf. Friedman v. Beame, 558 F.2d 1107, 1110 n. 3 (2d Cir. 1977) (assuming standing in order to reach the merits); Franklin Savings Bank of New York v. Levy, 551 F.2d 521, 528 (2d Cir.1977) (characterizing as \u201cjurisdictional\u201d the question of whether a note in issue was a security under section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, and avoiding the question to reach the \u201cmerits\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"consolidated cases in which court avoided challenge to jurisdiction as to one case because other cases were clearly within court's jurisdiction","sentence":"See, e.g., Edwards v. Carter, 580 F.2d 1055, 1056-57 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 907, 98 S.Ct. 2240, 56 L.Ed.2d 406 (1978), discussed infra; Adams v. Vance, 570 F.2d 950 (D.C.Cir. 1978) (per curiam), discussed infra; Ripon Society v. National Republican Party, 525 F.2d 567, 576 n. 26 & 578 n. 28 (D.C. Cir.1975) (assuming, without deciding, jurisdiction), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 933, 96 S.Ct. 1147, 47 L.Ed.2d 341 (1976); Kaiser v. Armstrong World Industries, Inc., 872 F.2d 512, 514 (1st Cir.1989) (court assumes jurisdiction arguendo and holds that plaintiff\u2019s damages claim is time barred); Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Caledonia Investment Corp., 862 F.2d 378, 381 (1st Cir.1988) (\u201c[s]ince we affirm on the merits, however, we need not decide the jurisdictional issue because the result is the same\u201d); Switlik v. Hardwicke Co., 651 F.2d 852 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1064, 102 S.Ct. 614, 70 L.Ed.2d 601 (1981), discussed infra; Mitchell v. West Feliciana Parish School Board, 507 F.2d 662, 666-67 (5th Cir.1975), discussed infra; Southern Pacific Transportation Co. v. Usery, 539 F.2d 386, 389 n. 1 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 874, 98 S.Ct. 222, 54 L.Ed.2d 154 (1977) (consolidated cases in which court avoided challenge to jurisdiction as to one case because other cases were clearly within court\u2019s jurisdiction); Forster v. County of Santa Barbara, 896 F.2d 1146 (9th Cir.1990) (ignoring jurisdictional question because of factual dispute, unresolved at district court level, over whether appellant filed timely notice of appeal); Wolder v. United States, 807 F.2d 1506, 1507 (9th Cir.1987) (per curiam) (\u201cwhere the jurisdictional question is complex and the appeal is clearly without merit,\u201d court will avoid jurisdictional question and rule on merits); Lehner v. United States, 685 F.2d 1187 (9th Cir.1982) (court avoids question of whether jurisdiction exists over claims for money damages, because jurisdiction over equitable claims was clear, and merits would not be affected), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1039, 103 S.Ct. 1431, 75 L.Ed.2d 790 (1983)."},"case_id":10527240,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Courts of appeals have followed the Supreme Court's lead in assuming jurisdiction and ruling on the merits against the party invoking jurisdiction.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"consolidated cases in which court avoided challenge to jurisdiction as to one case because other cases were clearly within court's jurisdiction","sentence":"See, e.g., Edwards v. Carter, 580 F.2d 1055, 1056-57 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 907, 98 S.Ct. 2240, 56 L.Ed.2d 406 (1978), discussed infra; Adams v. Vance, 570 F.2d 950 (D.C.Cir. 1978) (per curiam), discussed infra; Ripon Society v. National Republican Party, 525 F.2d 567, 576 n. 26 & 578 n. 28 (D.C. Cir.1975) (assuming, without deciding, jurisdiction), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 933, 96 S.Ct. 1147, 47 L.Ed.2d 341 (1976); Kaiser v. Armstrong World Industries, Inc., 872 F.2d 512, 514 (1st Cir.1989) (court assumes jurisdiction arguendo and holds that plaintiff\u2019s damages claim is time barred); Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Caledonia Investment Corp., 862 F.2d 378, 381 (1st Cir.1988) (\u201c[s]ince we affirm on the merits, however, we need not decide the jurisdictional issue because the result is the same\u201d); Switlik v. Hardwicke Co., 651 F.2d 852 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1064, 102 S.Ct. 614, 70 L.Ed.2d 601 (1981), discussed infra; Mitchell v. West Feliciana Parish School Board, 507 F.2d 662, 666-67 (5th Cir.1975), discussed infra; Southern Pacific Transportation Co. v. Usery, 539 F.2d 386, 389 n. 1 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 874, 98 S.Ct. 222, 54 L.Ed.2d 154 (1977) (consolidated cases in which court avoided challenge to jurisdiction as to one case because other cases were clearly within court\u2019s jurisdiction); Forster v. County of Santa Barbara, 896 F.2d 1146 (9th Cir.1990) (ignoring jurisdictional question because of factual dispute, unresolved at district court level, over whether appellant filed timely notice of appeal); Wolder v. United States, 807 F.2d 1506, 1507 (9th Cir.1987) (per curiam) (\u201cwhere the jurisdictional question is complex and the appeal is clearly without merit,\u201d court will avoid jurisdictional question and rule on merits); Lehner v. United States, 685 F.2d 1187 (9th Cir.1982) (court avoids question of whether jurisdiction exists over claims for money damages, because jurisdiction over equitable claims was clear, and merits would not be affected), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1039, 103 S.Ct. 1431, 75 L.Ed.2d 790 (1983)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"551 F.2d 521, 528","parenthetical":"characterizing as \"jurisdictional\" the question of whether a note in issue was a security under section 10(b","sentence":"Cf. Friedman v. Beame, 558 F.2d 1107, 1110 n. 3 (2d Cir. 1977) (assuming standing in order to reach the merits); Franklin Savings Bank of New York v. Levy, 551 F.2d 521, 528 (2d Cir.1977) (characterizing as \u201cjurisdictional\u201d the question of whether a note in issue was a security under section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, and avoiding the question to reach the \u201cmerits\u201d)."},"case_id":10527240,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Courts of appeals have followed the Supreme Court's lead in assuming jurisdiction and ruling on the merits against the party invoking jurisdiction.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"551 F.2d 521, 528","parenthetical":"characterizing as \"jurisdictional\" the question of whether a note in issue was a security under section 10(b","sentence":"Cf. Friedman v. Beame, 558 F.2d 1107, 1110 n. 3 (2d Cir. 1977) (assuming standing in order to reach the merits); Franklin Savings Bank of New York v. Levy, 551 F.2d 521, 528 (2d Cir.1977) (characterizing as \u201cjurisdictional\u201d the question of whether a note in issue was a security under section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, and avoiding the question to reach the \u201cmerits\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"consolidated cases in which court avoided challenge to jurisdiction as to one case because other cases were clearly within court's jurisdiction","sentence":"See, e.g., Edwards v. Carter, 580 F.2d 1055, 1056-57 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 907, 98 S.Ct. 2240, 56 L.Ed.2d 406 (1978), discussed infra; Adams v. Vance, 570 F.2d 950 (D.C.Cir. 1978) (per curiam), discussed infra; Ripon Society v. National Republican Party, 525 F.2d 567, 576 n. 26 & 578 n. 28 (D.C. Cir.1975) (assuming, without deciding, jurisdiction), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 933, 96 S.Ct. 1147, 47 L.Ed.2d 341 (1976); Kaiser v. Armstrong World Industries, Inc., 872 F.2d 512, 514 (1st Cir.1989) (court assumes jurisdiction arguendo and holds that plaintiff\u2019s damages claim is time barred); Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Caledonia Investment Corp., 862 F.2d 378, 381 (1st Cir.1988) (\u201c[s]ince we affirm on the merits, however, we need not decide the jurisdictional issue because the result is the same\u201d); Switlik v. Hardwicke Co., 651 F.2d 852 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1064, 102 S.Ct. 614, 70 L.Ed.2d 601 (1981), discussed infra; Mitchell v. West Feliciana Parish School Board, 507 F.2d 662, 666-67 (5th Cir.1975), discussed infra; Southern Pacific Transportation Co. v. Usery, 539 F.2d 386, 389 n. 1 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 874, 98 S.Ct. 222, 54 L.Ed.2d 154 (1977) (consolidated cases in which court avoided challenge to jurisdiction as to one case because other cases were clearly within court\u2019s jurisdiction); Forster v. County of Santa Barbara, 896 F.2d 1146 (9th Cir.1990) (ignoring jurisdictional question because of factual dispute, unresolved at district court level, over whether appellant filed timely notice of appeal); Wolder v. United States, 807 F.2d 1506, 1507 (9th Cir.1987) (per curiam) (\u201cwhere the jurisdictional question is complex and the appeal is clearly without merit,\u201d court will avoid jurisdictional question and rule on merits); Lehner v. United States, 685 F.2d 1187 (9th Cir.1982) (court avoids question of whether jurisdiction exists over claims for money damages, because jurisdiction over equitable claims was clear, and merits would not be affected), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1039, 103 S.Ct. 1431, 75 L.Ed.2d 790 (1983)."},"case_id":10527240,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Courts of appeals have followed the Supreme Court's lead in assuming jurisdiction and ruling on the merits against the party invoking jurisdiction.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"551 F.2d 521, 528","parenthetical":"characterizing as \"jurisdictional\" the question of whether a note in issue was a security under section 10(b","sentence":"Cf. Friedman v. Beame, 558 F.2d 1107, 1110 n. 3 (2d Cir. 1977) (assuming standing in order to reach the merits); Franklin Savings Bank of New York v. Levy, 551 F.2d 521, 528 (2d Cir.1977) (characterizing as \u201cjurisdictional\u201d the question of whether a note in issue was a security under section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, and avoiding the question to reach the \u201cmerits\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"consolidated cases in which court avoided challenge to jurisdiction as to one case because other cases were clearly within court's jurisdiction","sentence":"See, e.g., Edwards v. Carter, 580 F.2d 1055, 1056-57 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 907, 98 S.Ct. 2240, 56 L.Ed.2d 406 (1978), discussed infra; Adams v. Vance, 570 F.2d 950 (D.C.Cir. 1978) (per curiam), discussed infra; Ripon Society v. National Republican Party, 525 F.2d 567, 576 n. 26 & 578 n. 28 (D.C. Cir.1975) (assuming, without deciding, jurisdiction), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 933, 96 S.Ct. 1147, 47 L.Ed.2d 341 (1976); Kaiser v. Armstrong World Industries, Inc., 872 F.2d 512, 514 (1st Cir.1989) (court assumes jurisdiction arguendo and holds that plaintiff\u2019s damages claim is time barred); Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Caledonia Investment Corp., 862 F.2d 378, 381 (1st Cir.1988) (\u201c[s]ince we affirm on the merits, however, we need not decide the jurisdictional issue because the result is the same\u201d); Switlik v. Hardwicke Co., 651 F.2d 852 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1064, 102 S.Ct. 614, 70 L.Ed.2d 601 (1981), discussed infra; Mitchell v. West Feliciana Parish School Board, 507 F.2d 662, 666-67 (5th Cir.1975), discussed infra; Southern Pacific Transportation Co. v. Usery, 539 F.2d 386, 389 n. 1 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 874, 98 S.Ct. 222, 54 L.Ed.2d 154 (1977) (consolidated cases in which court avoided challenge to jurisdiction as to one case because other cases were clearly within court\u2019s jurisdiction); Forster v. County of Santa Barbara, 896 F.2d 1146 (9th Cir.1990) (ignoring jurisdictional question because of factual dispute, unresolved at district court level, over whether appellant filed timely notice of appeal); Wolder v. United States, 807 F.2d 1506, 1507 (9th Cir.1987) (per curiam) (\u201cwhere the jurisdictional question is complex and the appeal is clearly without merit,\u201d court will avoid jurisdictional question and rule on merits); Lehner v. United States, 685 F.2d 1187 (9th Cir.1982) (court avoids question of whether jurisdiction exists over claims for money damages, because jurisdiction over equitable claims was clear, and merits would not be affected), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1039, 103 S.Ct. 1431, 75 L.Ed.2d 790 (1983)."},"case_id":10527240,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Courts of appeals have followed the Supreme Court's lead in assuming jurisdiction and ruling on the merits against the party invoking jurisdiction.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"551 F.2d 521, 528","parenthetical":"characterizing as \"jurisdictional\" the question of whether a note in issue was a security under section 10(b","sentence":"Cf. Friedman v. Beame, 558 F.2d 1107, 1110 n. 3 (2d Cir. 1977) (assuming standing in order to reach the merits); Franklin Savings Bank of New York v. Levy, 551 F.2d 521, 528 (2d Cir.1977) (characterizing as \u201cjurisdictional\u201d the question of whether a note in issue was a security under section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, and avoiding the question to reach the \u201cmerits\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"ignoring jurisdictional question because of factual dispute, unresolved at district court level, over whether appellant filed timely notice of appeal","sentence":"See, e.g., Edwards v. Carter, 580 F.2d 1055, 1056-57 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 907, 98 S.Ct. 2240, 56 L.Ed.2d 406 (1978), discussed infra; Adams v. Vance, 570 F.2d 950 (D.C.Cir. 1978) (per curiam), discussed infra; Ripon Society v. National Republican Party, 525 F.2d 567, 576 n. 26 & 578 n. 28 (D.C. Cir.1975) (assuming, without deciding, jurisdiction), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 933, 96 S.Ct. 1147, 47 L.Ed.2d 341 (1976); Kaiser v. Armstrong World Industries, Inc., 872 F.2d 512, 514 (1st Cir.1989) (court assumes jurisdiction arguendo and holds that plaintiff\u2019s damages claim is time barred); Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Caledonia Investment Corp., 862 F.2d 378, 381 (1st Cir.1988) (\u201c[s]ince we affirm on the merits, however, we need not decide the jurisdictional issue because the result is the same\u201d); Switlik v. Hardwicke Co., 651 F.2d 852 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1064, 102 S.Ct. 614, 70 L.Ed.2d 601 (1981), discussed infra; Mitchell v. West Feliciana Parish School Board, 507 F.2d 662, 666-67 (5th Cir.1975), discussed infra; Southern Pacific Transportation Co. v. Usery, 539 F.2d 386, 389 n. 1 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 874, 98 S.Ct. 222, 54 L.Ed.2d 154 (1977) (consolidated cases in which court avoided challenge to jurisdiction as to one case because other cases were clearly within court\u2019s jurisdiction); Forster v. County of Santa Barbara, 896 F.2d 1146 (9th Cir.1990) (ignoring jurisdictional question because of factual dispute, unresolved at district court level, over whether appellant filed timely notice of appeal); Wolder v. United States, 807 F.2d 1506, 1507 (9th Cir.1987) (per curiam) (\u201cwhere the jurisdictional question is complex and the appeal is clearly without merit,\u201d court will avoid jurisdictional question and rule on merits); Lehner v. United States, 685 F.2d 1187 (9th Cir.1982) (court avoids question of whether jurisdiction exists over claims for money damages, because jurisdiction over equitable claims was clear, and merits would not be affected), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1039, 103 S.Ct. 1431, 75 L.Ed.2d 790 (1983)."},"case_id":10527240,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Courts of appeals have followed the Supreme Court's lead in assuming jurisdiction and ruling on the merits against the party invoking jurisdiction.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"551 F.2d 521, 528","parenthetical":"characterizing as \"jurisdictional\" the question of whether a note in issue was a security under section 10(b","sentence":"Cf. Friedman v. Beame, 558 F.2d 1107, 1110 n. 3 (2d Cir. 1977) (assuming standing in order to reach the merits); Franklin Savings Bank of New York v. Levy, 551 F.2d 521, 528 (2d Cir.1977) (characterizing as \u201cjurisdictional\u201d the question of whether a note in issue was a security under section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, and avoiding the question to reach the \u201cmerits\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"807 F.2d 1506, 1507","parenthetical":"\"where the jurisdictional question is complex and the appeal is clearly without merit,\" court will avoid jurisdictional question and rule on merits","sentence":"See, e.g., Edwards v. Carter, 580 F.2d 1055, 1056-57 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 907, 98 S.Ct. 2240, 56 L.Ed.2d 406 (1978), discussed infra; Adams v. Vance, 570 F.2d 950 (D.C.Cir. 1978) (per curiam), discussed infra; Ripon Society v. National Republican Party, 525 F.2d 567, 576 n. 26 & 578 n. 28 (D.C. Cir.1975) (assuming, without deciding, jurisdiction), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 933, 96 S.Ct. 1147, 47 L.Ed.2d 341 (1976); Kaiser v. Armstrong World Industries, Inc., 872 F.2d 512, 514 (1st Cir.1989) (court assumes jurisdiction arguendo and holds that plaintiff\u2019s damages claim is time barred); Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Caledonia Investment Corp., 862 F.2d 378, 381 (1st Cir.1988) (\u201c[s]ince we affirm on the merits, however, we need not decide the jurisdictional issue because the result is the same\u201d); Switlik v. Hardwicke Co., 651 F.2d 852 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1064, 102 S.Ct. 614, 70 L.Ed.2d 601 (1981), discussed infra; Mitchell v. West Feliciana Parish School Board, 507 F.2d 662, 666-67 (5th Cir.1975), discussed infra; Southern Pacific Transportation Co. v. Usery, 539 F.2d 386, 389 n. 1 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 874, 98 S.Ct. 222, 54 L.Ed.2d 154 (1977) (consolidated cases in which court avoided challenge to jurisdiction as to one case because other cases were clearly within court\u2019s jurisdiction); Forster v. County of Santa Barbara, 896 F.2d 1146 (9th Cir.1990) (ignoring jurisdictional question because of factual dispute, unresolved at district court level, over whether appellant filed timely notice of appeal); Wolder v. United States, 807 F.2d 1506, 1507 (9th Cir.1987) (per curiam) (\u201cwhere the jurisdictional question is complex and the appeal is clearly without merit,\u201d court will avoid jurisdictional question and rule on merits); Lehner v. United States, 685 F.2d 1187 (9th Cir.1982) (court avoids question of whether jurisdiction exists over claims for money damages, because jurisdiction over equitable claims was clear, and merits would not be affected), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1039, 103 S.Ct. 1431, 75 L.Ed.2d 790 (1983)."},"case_id":10527240,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Courts of appeals have followed the Supreme Court's lead in assuming jurisdiction and ruling on the merits against the party invoking jurisdiction.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"court avoids question of whether jurisdiction exists over claims for money damages, because jurisdiction over equitable claims was clear, and merits would not be affected","sentence":"See, e.g., Edwards v. Carter, 580 F.2d 1055, 1056-57 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 907, 98 S.Ct. 2240, 56 L.Ed.2d 406 (1978), discussed infra; Adams v. Vance, 570 F.2d 950 (D.C.Cir. 1978) (per curiam), discussed infra; Ripon Society v. National Republican Party, 525 F.2d 567, 576 n. 26 & 578 n. 28 (D.C. Cir.1975) (assuming, without deciding, jurisdiction), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 933, 96 S.Ct. 1147, 47 L.Ed.2d 341 (1976); Kaiser v. Armstrong World Industries, Inc., 872 F.2d 512, 514 (1st Cir.1989) (court assumes jurisdiction arguendo and holds that plaintiff\u2019s damages claim is time barred); Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Caledonia Investment Corp., 862 F.2d 378, 381 (1st Cir.1988) (\u201c[s]ince we affirm on the merits, however, we need not decide the jurisdictional issue because the result is the same\u201d); Switlik v. Hardwicke Co., 651 F.2d 852 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1064, 102 S.Ct. 614, 70 L.Ed.2d 601 (1981), discussed infra; Mitchell v. West Feliciana Parish School Board, 507 F.2d 662, 666-67 (5th Cir.1975), discussed infra; Southern Pacific Transportation Co. v. Usery, 539 F.2d 386, 389 n. 1 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 874, 98 S.Ct. 222, 54 L.Ed.2d 154 (1977) (consolidated cases in which court avoided challenge to jurisdiction as to one case because other cases were clearly within court\u2019s jurisdiction); Forster v. County of Santa Barbara, 896 F.2d 1146 (9th Cir.1990) (ignoring jurisdictional question because of factual dispute, unresolved at district court level, over whether appellant filed timely notice of appeal); Wolder v. United States, 807 F.2d 1506, 1507 (9th Cir.1987) (per curiam) (\u201cwhere the jurisdictional question is complex and the appeal is clearly without merit,\u201d court will avoid jurisdictional question and rule on merits); Lehner v. United States, 685 F.2d 1187 (9th Cir.1982) (court avoids question of whether jurisdiction exists over claims for money damages, because jurisdiction over equitable claims was clear, and merits would not be affected), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1039, 103 S.Ct. 1431, 75 L.Ed.2d 790 (1983)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"551 F.2d 521, 528","parenthetical":"characterizing as \"jurisdictional\" the question of whether a note in issue was a security under section 10(b","sentence":"Cf. Friedman v. Beame, 558 F.2d 1107, 1110 n. 3 (2d Cir. 1977) (assuming standing in order to reach the merits); Franklin Savings Bank of New York v. Levy, 551 F.2d 521, 528 (2d Cir.1977) (characterizing as \u201cjurisdictional\u201d the question of whether a note in issue was a security under section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, and avoiding the question to reach the \u201cmerits\u201d)."},"case_id":10527240,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Courts of appeals have followed the Supreme Court's lead in assuming jurisdiction and ruling on the merits against the party invoking jurisdiction.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"551 F.2d 521, 528","parenthetical":"characterizing as \"jurisdictional\" the question of whether a note in issue was a security under section 10(b","sentence":"Cf. Friedman v. Beame, 558 F.2d 1107, 1110 n. 3 (2d Cir. 1977) (assuming standing in order to reach the merits); Franklin Savings Bank of New York v. Levy, 551 F.2d 521, 528 (2d Cir.1977) (characterizing as \u201cjurisdictional\u201d the question of whether a note in issue was a security under section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, and avoiding the question to reach the \u201cmerits\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"court avoids question of whether jurisdiction exists over claims for money damages, because jurisdiction over equitable claims was clear, and merits would not be affected","sentence":"See, e.g., Edwards v. Carter, 580 F.2d 1055, 1056-57 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 907, 98 S.Ct. 2240, 56 L.Ed.2d 406 (1978), discussed infra; Adams v. Vance, 570 F.2d 950 (D.C.Cir. 1978) (per curiam), discussed infra; Ripon Society v. National Republican Party, 525 F.2d 567, 576 n. 26 & 578 n. 28 (D.C. Cir.1975) (assuming, without deciding, jurisdiction), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 933, 96 S.Ct. 1147, 47 L.Ed.2d 341 (1976); Kaiser v. Armstrong World Industries, Inc., 872 F.2d 512, 514 (1st Cir.1989) (court assumes jurisdiction arguendo and holds that plaintiff\u2019s damages claim is time barred); Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Caledonia Investment Corp., 862 F.2d 378, 381 (1st Cir.1988) (\u201c[s]ince we affirm on the merits, however, we need not decide the jurisdictional issue because the result is the same\u201d); Switlik v. Hardwicke Co., 651 F.2d 852 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1064, 102 S.Ct. 614, 70 L.Ed.2d 601 (1981), discussed infra; Mitchell v. West Feliciana Parish School Board, 507 F.2d 662, 666-67 (5th Cir.1975), discussed infra; Southern Pacific Transportation Co. v. Usery, 539 F.2d 386, 389 n. 1 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 874, 98 S.Ct. 222, 54 L.Ed.2d 154 (1977) (consolidated cases in which court avoided challenge to jurisdiction as to one case because other cases were clearly within court\u2019s jurisdiction); Forster v. County of Santa Barbara, 896 F.2d 1146 (9th Cir.1990) (ignoring jurisdictional question because of factual dispute, unresolved at district court level, over whether appellant filed timely notice of appeal); Wolder v. United States, 807 F.2d 1506, 1507 (9th Cir.1987) (per curiam) (\u201cwhere the jurisdictional question is complex and the appeal is clearly without merit,\u201d court will avoid jurisdictional question and rule on merits); Lehner v. United States, 685 F.2d 1187 (9th Cir.1982) (court avoids question of whether jurisdiction exists over claims for money damages, because jurisdiction over equitable claims was clear, and merits would not be affected), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1039, 103 S.Ct. 1431, 75 L.Ed.2d 790 (1983)."},"case_id":10527240,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Courts of appeals have followed the Supreme Court's lead in assuming jurisdiction and ruling on the merits against the party invoking jurisdiction.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"551 F.2d 521, 528","parenthetical":"characterizing as \"jurisdictional\" the question of whether a note in issue was a security under section 10(b","sentence":"Cf. Friedman v. Beame, 558 F.2d 1107, 1110 n. 3 (2d Cir. 1977) (assuming standing in order to reach the merits); Franklin Savings Bank of New York v. Levy, 551 F.2d 521, 528 (2d Cir.1977) (characterizing as \u201cjurisdictional\u201d the question of whether a note in issue was a security under section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, and avoiding the question to reach the \u201cmerits\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"court avoids question of whether jurisdiction exists over claims for money damages, because jurisdiction over equitable claims was clear, and merits would not be affected","sentence":"See, e.g., Edwards v. Carter, 580 F.2d 1055, 1056-57 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 907, 98 S.Ct. 2240, 56 L.Ed.2d 406 (1978), discussed infra; Adams v. Vance, 570 F.2d 950 (D.C.Cir. 1978) (per curiam), discussed infra; Ripon Society v. National Republican Party, 525 F.2d 567, 576 n. 26 & 578 n. 28 (D.C. Cir.1975) (assuming, without deciding, jurisdiction), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 933, 96 S.Ct. 1147, 47 L.Ed.2d 341 (1976); Kaiser v. Armstrong World Industries, Inc., 872 F.2d 512, 514 (1st Cir.1989) (court assumes jurisdiction arguendo and holds that plaintiff\u2019s damages claim is time barred); Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Caledonia Investment Corp., 862 F.2d 378, 381 (1st Cir.1988) (\u201c[s]ince we affirm on the merits, however, we need not decide the jurisdictional issue because the result is the same\u201d); Switlik v. Hardwicke Co., 651 F.2d 852 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1064, 102 S.Ct. 614, 70 L.Ed.2d 601 (1981), discussed infra; Mitchell v. West Feliciana Parish School Board, 507 F.2d 662, 666-67 (5th Cir.1975), discussed infra; Southern Pacific Transportation Co. v. Usery, 539 F.2d 386, 389 n. 1 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 874, 98 S.Ct. 222, 54 L.Ed.2d 154 (1977) (consolidated cases in which court avoided challenge to jurisdiction as to one case because other cases were clearly within court\u2019s jurisdiction); Forster v. County of Santa Barbara, 896 F.2d 1146 (9th Cir.1990) (ignoring jurisdictional question because of factual dispute, unresolved at district court level, over whether appellant filed timely notice of appeal); Wolder v. United States, 807 F.2d 1506, 1507 (9th Cir.1987) (per curiam) (\u201cwhere the jurisdictional question is complex and the appeal is clearly without merit,\u201d court will avoid jurisdictional question and rule on merits); Lehner v. United States, 685 F.2d 1187 (9th Cir.1982) (court avoids question of whether jurisdiction exists over claims for money damages, because jurisdiction over equitable claims was clear, and merits would not be affected), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1039, 103 S.Ct. 1431, 75 L.Ed.2d 790 (1983)."},"case_id":10527240,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Courts of appeals have followed the Supreme Court's lead in assuming jurisdiction and ruling on the merits against the party invoking jurisdiction.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"court avoids question of whether jurisdiction exists over claims for money damages, because jurisdiction over equitable claims was clear, and merits would not be affected","sentence":"See, e.g., Edwards v. Carter, 580 F.2d 1055, 1056-57 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 907, 98 S.Ct. 2240, 56 L.Ed.2d 406 (1978), discussed infra; Adams v. Vance, 570 F.2d 950 (D.C.Cir. 1978) (per curiam), discussed infra; Ripon Society v. National Republican Party, 525 F.2d 567, 576 n. 26 & 578 n. 28 (D.C. Cir.1975) (assuming, without deciding, jurisdiction), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 933, 96 S.Ct. 1147, 47 L.Ed.2d 341 (1976); Kaiser v. Armstrong World Industries, Inc., 872 F.2d 512, 514 (1st Cir.1989) (court assumes jurisdiction arguendo and holds that plaintiff\u2019s damages claim is time barred); Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Caledonia Investment Corp., 862 F.2d 378, 381 (1st Cir.1988) (\u201c[s]ince we affirm on the merits, however, we need not decide the jurisdictional issue because the result is the same\u201d); Switlik v. Hardwicke Co., 651 F.2d 852 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1064, 102 S.Ct. 614, 70 L.Ed.2d 601 (1981), discussed infra; Mitchell v. West Feliciana Parish School Board, 507 F.2d 662, 666-67 (5th Cir.1975), discussed infra; Southern Pacific Transportation Co. v. Usery, 539 F.2d 386, 389 n. 1 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 874, 98 S.Ct. 222, 54 L.Ed.2d 154 (1977) (consolidated cases in which court avoided challenge to jurisdiction as to one case because other cases were clearly within court\u2019s jurisdiction); Forster v. County of Santa Barbara, 896 F.2d 1146 (9th Cir.1990) (ignoring jurisdictional question because of factual dispute, unresolved at district court level, over whether appellant filed timely notice of appeal); Wolder v. United States, 807 F.2d 1506, 1507 (9th Cir.1987) (per curiam) (\u201cwhere the jurisdictional question is complex and the appeal is clearly without merit,\u201d court will avoid jurisdictional question and rule on merits); Lehner v. United States, 685 F.2d 1187 (9th Cir.1982) (court avoids question of whether jurisdiction exists over claims for money damages, because jurisdiction over equitable claims was clear, and merits would not be affected), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1039, 103 S.Ct. 1431, 75 L.Ed.2d 790 (1983)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"551 F.2d 521, 528","parenthetical":"characterizing as \"jurisdictional\" the question of whether a note in issue was a security under section 10(b","sentence":"Cf. Friedman v. Beame, 558 F.2d 1107, 1110 n. 3 (2d Cir. 1977) (assuming standing in order to reach the merits); Franklin Savings Bank of New York v. Levy, 551 F.2d 521, 528 (2d Cir.1977) (characterizing as \u201cjurisdictional\u201d the question of whether a note in issue was a security under section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, and avoiding the question to reach the \u201cmerits\u201d)."},"case_id":10527240,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The District Court considered the facts before it through the lens of the injunction's original purpose. And it concluded that the land transfer would frustrate that purpose.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"364 F. Supp. 2d 1182, 1182","parenthetical":"the transfer would \"keep the Latin cross atop Sunrise Rock without actually curing the continuing Establishment Clause violation\"","sentence":"See 364 F. Supp. 2d, at 1182 (the transfer would \u201ckeep the Latin cross atop Sunrise Rock without actually curing the continuing Establishment Clause violation\u201d); see also 527 F. 3d, at 783 (finding that \u201c[n]othing in the present posture of the case alters . . . earlier conclusions\u201d regarding what a reasonable observer would perceive)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"527 F. 3d 783, 783","parenthetical":"finding that \"[n]othing in the present posture of the case alters . . . earlier conclusions\" regarding what a reasonable observer would perceive","sentence":"See 364 F. Supp. 2d, at 1182 (the transfer would \u201ckeep the Latin cross atop Sunrise Rock without actually curing the continuing Establishment Clause violation\u201d); see also 527 F. 3d, at 783 (finding that \u201c[n]othing in the present posture of the case alters . . . earlier conclusions\u201d regarding what a reasonable observer would perceive)."},"case_id":3582133,"label":"a"}
{"context":"He too cites to numerous cases -- but also none by the Third Circuit -- that have confronted this exact issue and have concluded that state failure-to-warn claims are not preempted by the FDCA and its attendant regulations. See, e.g., Hurley v. Lederle Labs.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting \"the great majority of United States district courts which have addressed this issue have ruled against preemption\" and Citing seventeen previous decisions to that effect","sentence":"Div. of Am. Cyanamid Co., 863 F.2d 1173 (5th Cir.1988) (noting \u201cthe great majority of United States district courts which have addressed this issue have ruled against preemption\u201d and Citing seventeen previous decisions to that effect); Laisure-Radke, 2006 WL 901657 at *3 (involving the anti-depressant Prozac); McNellis, Civ. No. 05-1286, 14 (involving the antidepressant Zoloft); Witczak, 377 F.Supp.2d at 729 (involving Zoloft); Zikis, Civ. No. 04-8104, 8 (involving Zoloft); Cartwright, 369 F.Supp.2d at 887 (involving Zoloft); In re Paxil Litig., [docket # ], 2002 WL 31375497, *1 (C.D.Cal,2002) (involving the anti-depressant Paxil)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"825 F.2d 908, 912-13","parenthetical":"involving FDA regulations for veterinary drugs, which are very similar, if not virtually identical to the regulations regarding drugs for humans","sentence":"See also Osburn v. Anchor Labs., Inc., 825 F.2d 908, 912-13 (5th Cir.1987) (involving FDA regulations for veterinary drugs, which are very similar, if not virtually identical to the regulations regarding drugs for humans); Caraker v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 172 F.Supp.2d 1018, 1032-36 (S.D.Ill.2001) (manufacturer\u2019s common law duty under Illinois law to warn individuals of postpartum lactation-control drug\u2019s dangers was not preempted by federal law)."},"case_id":3154185,"label":"a"}
{"context":"He too cites to numerous cases -- but also none by the Third Circuit -- that have confronted this exact issue and have concluded that state failure-to-warn claims are not preempted by the FDCA and its attendant regulations. See, e.g., Hurley v. Lederle Labs.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"172 F.Supp.2d 1018, 1032-36","parenthetical":"manufacturer's common law duty under Illinois law to warn individuals of postpartum lactation-control drug's dangers was not preempted by federal law","sentence":"See also Osburn v. Anchor Labs., Inc., 825 F.2d 908, 912-13 (5th Cir.1987) (involving FDA regulations for veterinary drugs, which are very similar, if not virtually identical to the regulations regarding drugs for humans); Caraker v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 172 F.Supp.2d 1018, 1032-36 (S.D.Ill.2001) (manufacturer\u2019s common law duty under Illinois law to warn individuals of postpartum lactation-control drug\u2019s dangers was not preempted by federal law)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting \"the great majority of United States district courts which have addressed this issue have ruled against preemption\" and Citing seventeen previous decisions to that effect","sentence":"Div. of Am. Cyanamid Co., 863 F.2d 1173 (5th Cir.1988) (noting \u201cthe great majority of United States district courts which have addressed this issue have ruled against preemption\u201d and Citing seventeen previous decisions to that effect); Laisure-Radke, 2006 WL 901657 at *3 (involving the anti-depressant Prozac); McNellis, Civ. No. 05-1286, 14 (involving the antidepressant Zoloft); Witczak, 377 F.Supp.2d at 729 (involving Zoloft); Zikis, Civ. No. 04-8104, 8 (involving Zoloft); Cartwright, 369 F.Supp.2d at 887 (involving Zoloft); In re Paxil Litig., [docket # ], 2002 WL 31375497, *1 (C.D.Cal,2002) (involving the anti-depressant Paxil)."},"case_id":3154185,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The government responds, inter alia, that the defense of laches may not be invoked against it in this context.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"292 F.3d 333, 338","parenthetical":"\"[LJaches is not available against the federal government when it undertakes to enforce a public right or protect the public interest.\"","sentence":"See United States v. Angell, 292 F.3d 333, 338 (2d Cir.2002) (\u201c[LJaches is not available against the federal government when it undertakes to enforce a public right or protect the public interest.\u201d); see also Costello v. United States., 365 U.S. 265, 281-82, 81 S.Ct. 534, 5 L.Ed.2d 551 (1961) (noting that \u201c[i]t has consistently been held in the lower courts that delay which might support a defense of laches in ordinary equitable proceedings between private litigants will not bar a denaturalization proceeding brought by the Government,\u201d but reserving the question)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"365 U.S. 265, 281-82","parenthetical":"noting that \"[i]t has consistently been held in the lower courts that delay which might support a defense of laches in ordinary equitable proceedings between private litigants will not bar a denaturalization proceeding brought by the Government,\" but reserving the question","sentence":"See United States v. Angell, 292 F.3d 333, 338 (2d Cir.2002) (\u201c[LJaches is not available against the federal government when it undertakes to enforce a public right or protect the public interest.\u201d); see also Costello v. United States., 365 U.S. 265, 281-82, 81 S.Ct. 534, 5 L.Ed.2d 551 (1961) (noting that \u201c[i]t has consistently been held in the lower courts that delay which might support a defense of laches in ordinary equitable proceedings between private litigants will not bar a denaturalization proceeding brought by the Government,\u201d but reserving the question)."},"case_id":9244928,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The government responds, inter alia, that the defense of laches may not be invoked against it in this context.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting that \"[i]t has consistently been held in the lower courts that delay which might support a defense of laches in ordinary equitable proceedings between private litigants will not bar a denaturalization proceeding brought by the Government,\" but reserving the question","sentence":"See United States v. Angell, 292 F.3d 333, 338 (2d Cir.2002) (\u201c[LJaches is not available against the federal government when it undertakes to enforce a public right or protect the public interest.\u201d); see also Costello v. United States., 365 U.S. 265, 281-82, 81 S.Ct. 534, 5 L.Ed.2d 551 (1961) (noting that \u201c[i]t has consistently been held in the lower courts that delay which might support a defense of laches in ordinary equitable proceedings between private litigants will not bar a denaturalization proceeding brought by the Government,\u201d but reserving the question)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"292 F.3d 333, 338","parenthetical":"\"[LJaches is not available against the federal government when it undertakes to enforce a public right or protect the public interest.\"","sentence":"See United States v. Angell, 292 F.3d 333, 338 (2d Cir.2002) (\u201c[LJaches is not available against the federal government when it undertakes to enforce a public right or protect the public interest.\u201d); see also Costello v. United States., 365 U.S. 265, 281-82, 81 S.Ct. 534, 5 L.Ed.2d 551 (1961) (noting that \u201c[i]t has consistently been held in the lower courts that delay which might support a defense of laches in ordinary equitable proceedings between private litigants will not bar a denaturalization proceeding brought by the Government,\u201d but reserving the question)."},"case_id":9244928,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The government responds, inter alia, that the defense of laches may not be invoked against it in this context.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"292 F.3d 333, 338","parenthetical":"\"[LJaches is not available against the federal government when it undertakes to enforce a public right or protect the public interest.\"","sentence":"See United States v. Angell, 292 F.3d 333, 338 (2d Cir.2002) (\u201c[LJaches is not available against the federal government when it undertakes to enforce a public right or protect the public interest.\u201d); see also Costello v. United States., 365 U.S. 265, 281-82, 81 S.Ct. 534, 5 L.Ed.2d 551 (1961) (noting that \u201c[i]t has consistently been held in the lower courts that delay which might support a defense of laches in ordinary equitable proceedings between private litigants will not bar a denaturalization proceeding brought by the Government,\u201d but reserving the question)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting that \"[i]t has consistently been held in the lower courts that delay which might support a defense of laches in ordinary equitable proceedings between private litigants will not bar a denaturalization proceeding brought by the Government,\" but reserving the question","sentence":"See United States v. Angell, 292 F.3d 333, 338 (2d Cir.2002) (\u201c[LJaches is not available against the federal government when it undertakes to enforce a public right or protect the public interest.\u201d); see also Costello v. United States., 365 U.S. 265, 281-82, 81 S.Ct. 534, 5 L.Ed.2d 551 (1961) (noting that \u201c[i]t has consistently been held in the lower courts that delay which might support a defense of laches in ordinary equitable proceedings between private litigants will not bar a denaturalization proceeding brought by the Government,\u201d but reserving the question)."},"case_id":9244928,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In contrast, we have permitted recovery of prejudgment interest in cases where the element of uncertainty was greatly reduced.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"construction cost of townhouse with an agreed price plus undisputed costs of extras","sentence":"See Amert, supra, citing Barton Masonry, Inc. v. Varilek, 375 N.W.2d 200 (S.D.1985) (home improvements calculated from invoices); Dougherty v. Beckman, 347 N.W.2d 587 (S.D.1984) (construction cost of townhouse with an agreed price plus undisputed costs of extras); Beka, supra (contract specified amount of and price of ore to be delivered, less undisputed evidence of delivery cost); see also Northwestern Engineering Co. v. Thunderbolt Enterprises, 301 N.W.2d 421 (S.D.1981) (receivables for construction work performed pursuant to contract, including addition of amount retained, deduction for payments made, and offset for other work)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"receivables for construction work performed pursuant to contract, including addition of amount retained, deduction for payments made, and offset for other work","sentence":"See Amert, supra, citing Barton Masonry, Inc. v. Varilek, 375 N.W.2d 200 (S.D.1985) (home improvements calculated from invoices); Dougherty v. Beckman, 347 N.W.2d 587 (S.D.1984) (construction cost of townhouse with an agreed price plus undisputed costs of extras); Beka, supra (contract specified amount of and price of ore to be delivered, less undisputed evidence of delivery cost); see also Northwestern Engineering Co. v. Thunderbolt Enterprises, 301 N.W.2d 421 (S.D.1981) (receivables for construction work performed pursuant to contract, including addition of amount retained, deduction for payments made, and offset for other work)."},"case_id":10658558,"label":"a"}
{"context":"An examination of the case law on issues of juror misconduct demonstrates that the court has a duty to fully investigate allegations of juror misconduct before ruling on a motion for a mistrial, and that failure to conduct a voir dire examination of the jurors before resolving the issue of prejudice is an abuse of the trial judge's discretion. Generally, in cases where the trial judge or the parties conducted a voir dire examination of the juror or jurors in question, the appellate courts have upheld the trial court's decision on the issue of prejudice to the defendant.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"131 Md.App. 271, 271","parenthetical":"overruling the trial judge's determination about prejudice, despite a voir dire of the jurors, because \"[ajlthough the jurors may have honestly thought that they could disregard the information in the articles, in our judgment, any doubts the jurors may have had, reasonable or otherwise, would have been resolved against appellant,--even if only subconsciously--as a result of the information contained in the articles\"","sentence":"E.g., Grandison, 305 Md. at 726-27, 506 A.2d at 618-19; Eades v. State, 75 Md.App. 411, 423-24, 541 A.2d 1001, 1008 (1988); Summers, 152 Md.App. at 377, 831 A.2d at 1142; Ezenwa v. State, 82 Md.App. 489, 518, 572 A.2d 1101, 1114-15 (1990); Allen, 89 Md.App. at 47-48, 597 A.2d at 500; Tejeda, 481 F.3d at 52; United States v. Peterson, 385 F.3d 127 (2d Cir.2004); United States v. Ramos, 71 F.3d 1150 (5th Cir.1995); Sears, 663 F.2d at 899-900; United States v. Puckett, 692 F.2d 663, 669-70 (10th Cir.1982); see also Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 217, 102 S.Ct. 940, 946, 71 L.Ed.2d 78, 86 (1982) (noting that voir dire and protective instructions are \u201cthe safeguards of juror impartiality\u201d when a juror is placed in a \u201cpotentially compromising situation\u201d); but see Wright, 131 Md.App. at 271, 748 A.2d at 1065 (overruling the trial judge\u2019s determination about prejudice, despite a voir dire of the jurors, because \u201c[ajlthough the jurors may have honestly thought that they could disregard the information in the articles, in our judgment, any doubts the jurors may have had, reasonable or otherwise, would have been resolved against appellant,\u2014even if only subconsciously\u2014as a result of the information contained in the articles\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"455 U.S. 209, 217","parenthetical":"noting that voir dire and protective instructions are \"the safeguards of juror impartiality\" when a juror is placed in a \"potentially compromising situation\"","sentence":"E.g., Grandison, 305 Md. at 726-27, 506 A.2d at 618-19; Eades v. State, 75 Md.App. 411, 423-24, 541 A.2d 1001, 1008 (1988); Summers, 152 Md.App. at 377, 831 A.2d at 1142; Ezenwa v. State, 82 Md.App. 489, 518, 572 A.2d 1101, 1114-15 (1990); Allen, 89 Md.App. at 47-48, 597 A.2d at 500; Tejeda, 481 F.3d at 52; United States v. Peterson, 385 F.3d 127 (2d Cir.2004); United States v. Ramos, 71 F.3d 1150 (5th Cir.1995); Sears, 663 F.2d at 899-900; United States v. Puckett, 692 F.2d 663, 669-70 (10th Cir.1982); see also Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 217, 102 S.Ct. 940, 946, 71 L.Ed.2d 78, 86 (1982) (noting that voir dire and protective instructions are \u201cthe safeguards of juror impartiality\u201d when a juror is placed in a \u201cpotentially compromising situation\u201d); but see Wright, 131 Md.App. at 271, 748 A.2d at 1065 (overruling the trial judge\u2019s determination about prejudice, despite a voir dire of the jurors, because \u201c[ajlthough the jurors may have honestly thought that they could disregard the information in the articles, in our judgment, any doubts the jurors may have had, reasonable or otherwise, would have been resolved against appellant,\u2014even if only subconsciously\u2014as a result of the information contained in the articles\u201d)."},"case_id":3694003,"label":"b"}
{"context":"An examination of the case law on issues of juror misconduct demonstrates that the court has a duty to fully investigate allegations of juror misconduct before ruling on a motion for a mistrial, and that failure to conduct a voir dire examination of the jurors before resolving the issue of prejudice is an abuse of the trial judge's discretion. Generally, in cases where the trial judge or the parties conducted a voir dire examination of the juror or jurors in question, the appellate courts have upheld the trial court's decision on the issue of prejudice to the defendant.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"748 A.2d 1065, 1065","parenthetical":"overruling the trial judge's determination about prejudice, despite a voir dire of the jurors, because \"[ajlthough the jurors may have honestly thought that they could disregard the information in the articles, in our judgment, any doubts the jurors may have had, reasonable or otherwise, would have been resolved against appellant,--even if only subconsciously--as a result of the information contained in the articles\"","sentence":"E.g., Grandison, 305 Md. at 726-27, 506 A.2d at 618-19; Eades v. State, 75 Md.App. 411, 423-24, 541 A.2d 1001, 1008 (1988); Summers, 152 Md.App. at 377, 831 A.2d at 1142; Ezenwa v. State, 82 Md.App. 489, 518, 572 A.2d 1101, 1114-15 (1990); Allen, 89 Md.App. at 47-48, 597 A.2d at 500; Tejeda, 481 F.3d at 52; United States v. Peterson, 385 F.3d 127 (2d Cir.2004); United States v. Ramos, 71 F.3d 1150 (5th Cir.1995); Sears, 663 F.2d at 899-900; United States v. Puckett, 692 F.2d 663, 669-70 (10th Cir.1982); see also Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 217, 102 S.Ct. 940, 946, 71 L.Ed.2d 78, 86 (1982) (noting that voir dire and protective instructions are \u201cthe safeguards of juror impartiality\u201d when a juror is placed in a \u201cpotentially compromising situation\u201d); but see Wright, 131 Md.App. at 271, 748 A.2d at 1065 (overruling the trial judge\u2019s determination about prejudice, despite a voir dire of the jurors, because \u201c[ajlthough the jurors may have honestly thought that they could disregard the information in the articles, in our judgment, any doubts the jurors may have had, reasonable or otherwise, would have been resolved against appellant,\u2014even if only subconsciously\u2014as a result of the information contained in the articles\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"455 U.S. 209, 217","parenthetical":"noting that voir dire and protective instructions are \"the safeguards of juror impartiality\" when a juror is placed in a \"potentially compromising situation\"","sentence":"E.g., Grandison, 305 Md. at 726-27, 506 A.2d at 618-19; Eades v. State, 75 Md.App. 411, 423-24, 541 A.2d 1001, 1008 (1988); Summers, 152 Md.App. at 377, 831 A.2d at 1142; Ezenwa v. State, 82 Md.App. 489, 518, 572 A.2d 1101, 1114-15 (1990); Allen, 89 Md.App. at 47-48, 597 A.2d at 500; Tejeda, 481 F.3d at 52; United States v. Peterson, 385 F.3d 127 (2d Cir.2004); United States v. Ramos, 71 F.3d 1150 (5th Cir.1995); Sears, 663 F.2d at 899-900; United States v. Puckett, 692 F.2d 663, 669-70 (10th Cir.1982); see also Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 217, 102 S.Ct. 940, 946, 71 L.Ed.2d 78, 86 (1982) (noting that voir dire and protective instructions are \u201cthe safeguards of juror impartiality\u201d when a juror is placed in a \u201cpotentially compromising situation\u201d); but see Wright, 131 Md.App. at 271, 748 A.2d at 1065 (overruling the trial judge\u2019s determination about prejudice, despite a voir dire of the jurors, because \u201c[ajlthough the jurors may have honestly thought that they could disregard the information in the articles, in our judgment, any doubts the jurors may have had, reasonable or otherwise, would have been resolved against appellant,\u2014even if only subconsciously\u2014as a result of the information contained in the articles\u201d)."},"case_id":3694003,"label":"b"}
{"context":"An examination of the case law on issues of juror misconduct demonstrates that the court has a duty to fully investigate allegations of juror misconduct before ruling on a motion for a mistrial, and that failure to conduct a voir dire examination of the jurors before resolving the issue of prejudice is an abuse of the trial judge's discretion. Generally, in cases where the trial judge or the parties conducted a voir dire examination of the juror or jurors in question, the appellate courts have upheld the trial court's decision on the issue of prejudice to the defendant.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"131 Md.App. 271, 271","parenthetical":"overruling the trial judge's determination about prejudice, despite a voir dire of the jurors, because \"[ajlthough the jurors may have honestly thought that they could disregard the information in the articles, in our judgment, any doubts the jurors may have had, reasonable or otherwise, would have been resolved against appellant,--even if only subconsciously--as a result of the information contained in the articles\"","sentence":"E.g., Grandison, 305 Md. at 726-27, 506 A.2d at 618-19; Eades v. State, 75 Md.App. 411, 423-24, 541 A.2d 1001, 1008 (1988); Summers, 152 Md.App. at 377, 831 A.2d at 1142; Ezenwa v. State, 82 Md.App. 489, 518, 572 A.2d 1101, 1114-15 (1990); Allen, 89 Md.App. at 47-48, 597 A.2d at 500; Tejeda, 481 F.3d at 52; United States v. Peterson, 385 F.3d 127 (2d Cir.2004); United States v. Ramos, 71 F.3d 1150 (5th Cir.1995); Sears, 663 F.2d at 899-900; United States v. Puckett, 692 F.2d 663, 669-70 (10th Cir.1982); see also Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 217, 102 S.Ct. 940, 946, 71 L.Ed.2d 78, 86 (1982) (noting that voir dire and protective instructions are \u201cthe safeguards of juror impartiality\u201d when a juror is placed in a \u201cpotentially compromising situation\u201d); but see Wright, 131 Md.App. at 271, 748 A.2d at 1065 (overruling the trial judge\u2019s determination about prejudice, despite a voir dire of the jurors, because \u201c[ajlthough the jurors may have honestly thought that they could disregard the information in the articles, in our judgment, any doubts the jurors may have had, reasonable or otherwise, would have been resolved against appellant,\u2014even if only subconsciously\u2014as a result of the information contained in the articles\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"102 S.Ct. 940, 946","parenthetical":"noting that voir dire and protective instructions are \"the safeguards of juror impartiality\" when a juror is placed in a \"potentially compromising situation\"","sentence":"E.g., Grandison, 305 Md. at 726-27, 506 A.2d at 618-19; Eades v. State, 75 Md.App. 411, 423-24, 541 A.2d 1001, 1008 (1988); Summers, 152 Md.App. at 377, 831 A.2d at 1142; Ezenwa v. State, 82 Md.App. 489, 518, 572 A.2d 1101, 1114-15 (1990); Allen, 89 Md.App. at 47-48, 597 A.2d at 500; Tejeda, 481 F.3d at 52; United States v. Peterson, 385 F.3d 127 (2d Cir.2004); United States v. Ramos, 71 F.3d 1150 (5th Cir.1995); Sears, 663 F.2d at 899-900; United States v. Puckett, 692 F.2d 663, 669-70 (10th Cir.1982); see also Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 217, 102 S.Ct. 940, 946, 71 L.Ed.2d 78, 86 (1982) (noting that voir dire and protective instructions are \u201cthe safeguards of juror impartiality\u201d when a juror is placed in a \u201cpotentially compromising situation\u201d); but see Wright, 131 Md.App. at 271, 748 A.2d at 1065 (overruling the trial judge\u2019s determination about prejudice, despite a voir dire of the jurors, because \u201c[ajlthough the jurors may have honestly thought that they could disregard the information in the articles, in our judgment, any doubts the jurors may have had, reasonable or otherwise, would have been resolved against appellant,\u2014even if only subconsciously\u2014as a result of the information contained in the articles\u201d)."},"case_id":3694003,"label":"b"}
{"context":"An examination of the case law on issues of juror misconduct demonstrates that the court has a duty to fully investigate allegations of juror misconduct before ruling on a motion for a mistrial, and that failure to conduct a voir dire examination of the jurors before resolving the issue of prejudice is an abuse of the trial judge's discretion. Generally, in cases where the trial judge or the parties conducted a voir dire examination of the juror or jurors in question, the appellate courts have upheld the trial court's decision on the issue of prejudice to the defendant.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"102 S.Ct. 940, 946","parenthetical":"noting that voir dire and protective instructions are \"the safeguards of juror impartiality\" when a juror is placed in a \"potentially compromising situation\"","sentence":"E.g., Grandison, 305 Md. at 726-27, 506 A.2d at 618-19; Eades v. State, 75 Md.App. 411, 423-24, 541 A.2d 1001, 1008 (1988); Summers, 152 Md.App. at 377, 831 A.2d at 1142; Ezenwa v. State, 82 Md.App. 489, 518, 572 A.2d 1101, 1114-15 (1990); Allen, 89 Md.App. at 47-48, 597 A.2d at 500; Tejeda, 481 F.3d at 52; United States v. Peterson, 385 F.3d 127 (2d Cir.2004); United States v. Ramos, 71 F.3d 1150 (5th Cir.1995); Sears, 663 F.2d at 899-900; United States v. Puckett, 692 F.2d 663, 669-70 (10th Cir.1982); see also Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 217, 102 S.Ct. 940, 946, 71 L.Ed.2d 78, 86 (1982) (noting that voir dire and protective instructions are \u201cthe safeguards of juror impartiality\u201d when a juror is placed in a \u201cpotentially compromising situation\u201d); but see Wright, 131 Md.App. at 271, 748 A.2d at 1065 (overruling the trial judge\u2019s determination about prejudice, despite a voir dire of the jurors, because \u201c[ajlthough the jurors may have honestly thought that they could disregard the information in the articles, in our judgment, any doubts the jurors may have had, reasonable or otherwise, would have been resolved against appellant,\u2014even if only subconsciously\u2014as a result of the information contained in the articles\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"748 A.2d 1065, 1065","parenthetical":"overruling the trial judge's determination about prejudice, despite a voir dire of the jurors, because \"[ajlthough the jurors may have honestly thought that they could disregard the information in the articles, in our judgment, any doubts the jurors may have had, reasonable or otherwise, would have been resolved against appellant,--even if only subconsciously--as a result of the information contained in the articles\"","sentence":"E.g., Grandison, 305 Md. at 726-27, 506 A.2d at 618-19; Eades v. State, 75 Md.App. 411, 423-24, 541 A.2d 1001, 1008 (1988); Summers, 152 Md.App. at 377, 831 A.2d at 1142; Ezenwa v. State, 82 Md.App. 489, 518, 572 A.2d 1101, 1114-15 (1990); Allen, 89 Md.App. at 47-48, 597 A.2d at 500; Tejeda, 481 F.3d at 52; United States v. Peterson, 385 F.3d 127 (2d Cir.2004); United States v. Ramos, 71 F.3d 1150 (5th Cir.1995); Sears, 663 F.2d at 899-900; United States v. Puckett, 692 F.2d 663, 669-70 (10th Cir.1982); see also Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 217, 102 S.Ct. 940, 946, 71 L.Ed.2d 78, 86 (1982) (noting that voir dire and protective instructions are \u201cthe safeguards of juror impartiality\u201d when a juror is placed in a \u201cpotentially compromising situation\u201d); but see Wright, 131 Md.App. at 271, 748 A.2d at 1065 (overruling the trial judge\u2019s determination about prejudice, despite a voir dire of the jurors, because \u201c[ajlthough the jurors may have honestly thought that they could disregard the information in the articles, in our judgment, any doubts the jurors may have had, reasonable or otherwise, would have been resolved against appellant,\u2014even if only subconsciously\u2014as a result of the information contained in the articles\u201d)."},"case_id":3694003,"label":"a"}
{"context":"An examination of the case law on issues of juror misconduct demonstrates that the court has a duty to fully investigate allegations of juror misconduct before ruling on a motion for a mistrial, and that failure to conduct a voir dire examination of the jurors before resolving the issue of prejudice is an abuse of the trial judge's discretion. Generally, in cases where the trial judge or the parties conducted a voir dire examination of the juror or jurors in question, the appellate courts have upheld the trial court's decision on the issue of prejudice to the defendant.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"71 L.Ed.2d 78, 86","parenthetical":"noting that voir dire and protective instructions are \"the safeguards of juror impartiality\" when a juror is placed in a \"potentially compromising situation\"","sentence":"E.g., Grandison, 305 Md. at 726-27, 506 A.2d at 618-19; Eades v. State, 75 Md.App. 411, 423-24, 541 A.2d 1001, 1008 (1988); Summers, 152 Md.App. at 377, 831 A.2d at 1142; Ezenwa v. State, 82 Md.App. 489, 518, 572 A.2d 1101, 1114-15 (1990); Allen, 89 Md.App. at 47-48, 597 A.2d at 500; Tejeda, 481 F.3d at 52; United States v. Peterson, 385 F.3d 127 (2d Cir.2004); United States v. Ramos, 71 F.3d 1150 (5th Cir.1995); Sears, 663 F.2d at 899-900; United States v. Puckett, 692 F.2d 663, 669-70 (10th Cir.1982); see also Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 217, 102 S.Ct. 940, 946, 71 L.Ed.2d 78, 86 (1982) (noting that voir dire and protective instructions are \u201cthe safeguards of juror impartiality\u201d when a juror is placed in a \u201cpotentially compromising situation\u201d); but see Wright, 131 Md.App. at 271, 748 A.2d at 1065 (overruling the trial judge\u2019s determination about prejudice, despite a voir dire of the jurors, because \u201c[ajlthough the jurors may have honestly thought that they could disregard the information in the articles, in our judgment, any doubts the jurors may have had, reasonable or otherwise, would have been resolved against appellant,\u2014even if only subconsciously\u2014as a result of the information contained in the articles\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"131 Md.App. 271, 271","parenthetical":"overruling the trial judge's determination about prejudice, despite a voir dire of the jurors, because \"[ajlthough the jurors may have honestly thought that they could disregard the information in the articles, in our judgment, any doubts the jurors may have had, reasonable or otherwise, would have been resolved against appellant,--even if only subconsciously--as a result of the information contained in the articles\"","sentence":"E.g., Grandison, 305 Md. at 726-27, 506 A.2d at 618-19; Eades v. State, 75 Md.App. 411, 423-24, 541 A.2d 1001, 1008 (1988); Summers, 152 Md.App. at 377, 831 A.2d at 1142; Ezenwa v. State, 82 Md.App. 489, 518, 572 A.2d 1101, 1114-15 (1990); Allen, 89 Md.App. at 47-48, 597 A.2d at 500; Tejeda, 481 F.3d at 52; United States v. Peterson, 385 F.3d 127 (2d Cir.2004); United States v. Ramos, 71 F.3d 1150 (5th Cir.1995); Sears, 663 F.2d at 899-900; United States v. Puckett, 692 F.2d 663, 669-70 (10th Cir.1982); see also Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 217, 102 S.Ct. 940, 946, 71 L.Ed.2d 78, 86 (1982) (noting that voir dire and protective instructions are \u201cthe safeguards of juror impartiality\u201d when a juror is placed in a \u201cpotentially compromising situation\u201d); but see Wright, 131 Md.App. at 271, 748 A.2d at 1065 (overruling the trial judge\u2019s determination about prejudice, despite a voir dire of the jurors, because \u201c[ajlthough the jurors may have honestly thought that they could disregard the information in the articles, in our judgment, any doubts the jurors may have had, reasonable or otherwise, would have been resolved against appellant,\u2014even if only subconsciously\u2014as a result of the information contained in the articles\u201d)."},"case_id":3694003,"label":"a"}
{"context":"An examination of the case law on issues of juror misconduct demonstrates that the court has a duty to fully investigate allegations of juror misconduct before ruling on a motion for a mistrial, and that failure to conduct a voir dire examination of the jurors before resolving the issue of prejudice is an abuse of the trial judge's discretion. Generally, in cases where the trial judge or the parties conducted a voir dire examination of the juror or jurors in question, the appellate courts have upheld the trial court's decision on the issue of prejudice to the defendant.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"748 A.2d 1065, 1065","parenthetical":"overruling the trial judge's determination about prejudice, despite a voir dire of the jurors, because \"[ajlthough the jurors may have honestly thought that they could disregard the information in the articles, in our judgment, any doubts the jurors may have had, reasonable or otherwise, would have been resolved against appellant,--even if only subconsciously--as a result of the information contained in the articles\"","sentence":"E.g., Grandison, 305 Md. at 726-27, 506 A.2d at 618-19; Eades v. State, 75 Md.App. 411, 423-24, 541 A.2d 1001, 1008 (1988); Summers, 152 Md.App. at 377, 831 A.2d at 1142; Ezenwa v. State, 82 Md.App. 489, 518, 572 A.2d 1101, 1114-15 (1990); Allen, 89 Md.App. at 47-48, 597 A.2d at 500; Tejeda, 481 F.3d at 52; United States v. Peterson, 385 F.3d 127 (2d Cir.2004); United States v. Ramos, 71 F.3d 1150 (5th Cir.1995); Sears, 663 F.2d at 899-900; United States v. Puckett, 692 F.2d 663, 669-70 (10th Cir.1982); see also Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 217, 102 S.Ct. 940, 946, 71 L.Ed.2d 78, 86 (1982) (noting that voir dire and protective instructions are \u201cthe safeguards of juror impartiality\u201d when a juror is placed in a \u201cpotentially compromising situation\u201d); but see Wright, 131 Md.App. at 271, 748 A.2d at 1065 (overruling the trial judge\u2019s determination about prejudice, despite a voir dire of the jurors, because \u201c[ajlthough the jurors may have honestly thought that they could disregard the information in the articles, in our judgment, any doubts the jurors may have had, reasonable or otherwise, would have been resolved against appellant,\u2014even if only subconsciously\u2014as a result of the information contained in the articles\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"71 L.Ed.2d 78, 86","parenthetical":"noting that voir dire and protective instructions are \"the safeguards of juror impartiality\" when a juror is placed in a \"potentially compromising situation\"","sentence":"E.g., Grandison, 305 Md. at 726-27, 506 A.2d at 618-19; Eades v. State, 75 Md.App. 411, 423-24, 541 A.2d 1001, 1008 (1988); Summers, 152 Md.App. at 377, 831 A.2d at 1142; Ezenwa v. State, 82 Md.App. 489, 518, 572 A.2d 1101, 1114-15 (1990); Allen, 89 Md.App. at 47-48, 597 A.2d at 500; Tejeda, 481 F.3d at 52; United States v. Peterson, 385 F.3d 127 (2d Cir.2004); United States v. Ramos, 71 F.3d 1150 (5th Cir.1995); Sears, 663 F.2d at 899-900; United States v. Puckett, 692 F.2d 663, 669-70 (10th Cir.1982); see also Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 217, 102 S.Ct. 940, 946, 71 L.Ed.2d 78, 86 (1982) (noting that voir dire and protective instructions are \u201cthe safeguards of juror impartiality\u201d when a juror is placed in a \u201cpotentially compromising situation\u201d); but see Wright, 131 Md.App. at 271, 748 A.2d at 1065 (overruling the trial judge\u2019s determination about prejudice, despite a voir dire of the jurors, because \u201c[ajlthough the jurors may have honestly thought that they could disregard the information in the articles, in our judgment, any doubts the jurors may have had, reasonable or otherwise, would have been resolved against appellant,\u2014even if only subconsciously\u2014as a result of the information contained in the articles\u201d)."},"case_id":3694003,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The question was whether, in reviewing a COA application to see if an appealable issue exists, we should consider issues that were raised in the district court, but omitted from the COA application. We concluded in Beatty \"that the other grounds for relief alleged in [petitioner's] section 2255 motion have been abandoned for lack of inclusion in the pa pers filed in this Court.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"377 F.3d 182, 183","parenthetical":"observing that this Court can \"expand a petitioner's COA when appropriate\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Dellinger v. Bowen, 301 F.3d 758, 765 (7th Cir.2002) (holding that petitioner\u2019s claim, asserted in a subsequent brief, was not waived due to omission from the COA application); cf. Green v. Mazzucca, 377 F.3d 182, 183 (2d Cir.2004) (per curiam) (observing that this Court can \u201cexpand a petitioner\u2019s COA when appropriate\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"301 F.3d 758, 765","parenthetical":"holding that petitioner's claim, asserted in a subsequent brief, was not waived due to omission from the COA application","sentence":"See, e.g., Dellinger v. Bowen, 301 F.3d 758, 765 (7th Cir.2002) (holding that petitioner\u2019s claim, asserted in a subsequent brief, was not waived due to omission from the COA application); cf. Green v. Mazzucca, 377 F.3d 182, 183 (2d Cir.2004) (per curiam) (observing that this Court can \u201cexpand a petitioner\u2019s COA when appropriate\u201d)."},"case_id":8968257,"label":"b"}
{"context":"E.g. And, we take note that admissibility of all evidence, particularly scientific evidence being used in a criminal proceeding, must be \"clearly established.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"contra","identifier":"299 N.J.Super. 1, 19-20","parenthetical":"on cross-examination of defendant's diminished capacity expert witness, prosecutor's questions incorporating rapist profile traits, not disagreed with by the expert, was proper cross-examination and not substantive proffer of rapist profile methodology","sentence":"Contrast State v. Clowney, 299 N.J.Super. 1, 19-20, 690 A.2d 612 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 151 N.J. 77, 697 A.2d 549 (1997) (on cross-examination of defendant\u2019s diminished capacity expert witness, prosecutor\u2019s questions incorporating rapist profile traits, not disagreed with by the expert, was proper cross-examination and not substantive proffer of rapist profile methodology)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[t]he need for a high degree of scientific acceptance, and particularly reliability, is vital when a criminal case is involved where the individual's freedom or, in fact, his life may be at stake.\"","sentence":"State v. Haskins, 131 N.J. 643, 649, 622 A.2d 867 (1993); State v. Cary, 99 N.J.Super. 323, 333, 239 A.2d 680 (Law Div.1968), aff'd, 56 N.J. 16, 264 A.2d 209 (3970) (\u201c[t]he need for a high degree of scientific acceptance, and particularly reliability, is vital when a criminal case is involved where the individual\u2019s freedom or, in fact, his life may be at stake.\u201d). See State v. Fortin, 318 N.J.Super. 577, 609, 724 A.2d 818 (App.Div.1999) (in murder trial, linkage-analysis methodology of identifying defendant as the murderer based upon a comparison of one other crime committed by him not scientifically reliable)."},"case_id":745919,"label":"b"}
{"context":"E.g. And, we take note that admissibility of all evidence, particularly scientific evidence being used in a criminal proceeding, must be \"clearly established.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[t]he need for a high degree of scientific acceptance, and particularly reliability, is vital when a criminal case is involved where the individual's freedom or, in fact, his life may be at stake.\"","sentence":"State v. Haskins, 131 N.J. 643, 649, 622 A.2d 867 (1993); State v. Cary, 99 N.J.Super. 323, 333, 239 A.2d 680 (Law Div.1968), aff'd, 56 N.J. 16, 264 A.2d 209 (3970) (\u201c[t]he need for a high degree of scientific acceptance, and particularly reliability, is vital when a criminal case is involved where the individual\u2019s freedom or, in fact, his life may be at stake.\u201d). See State v. Fortin, 318 N.J.Super. 577, 609, 724 A.2d 818 (App.Div.1999) (in murder trial, linkage-analysis methodology of identifying defendant as the murderer based upon a comparison of one other crime committed by him not scientifically reliable)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"contra","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"on cross-examination of defendant's diminished capacity expert witness, prosecutor's questions incorporating rapist profile traits, not disagreed with by the expert, was proper cross-examination and not substantive proffer of rapist profile methodology","sentence":"Contrast State v. Clowney, 299 N.J.Super. 1, 19-20, 690 A.2d 612 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 151 N.J. 77, 697 A.2d 549 (1997) (on cross-examination of defendant\u2019s diminished capacity expert witness, prosecutor\u2019s questions incorporating rapist profile traits, not disagreed with by the expert, was proper cross-examination and not substantive proffer of rapist profile methodology)."},"case_id":745919,"label":"a"}
{"context":"E.g. And, we take note that admissibility of all evidence, particularly scientific evidence being used in a criminal proceeding, must be \"clearly established.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[t]he need for a high degree of scientific acceptance, and particularly reliability, is vital when a criminal case is involved where the individual's freedom or, in fact, his life may be at stake.\"","sentence":"State v. Haskins, 131 N.J. 643, 649, 622 A.2d 867 (1993); State v. Cary, 99 N.J.Super. 323, 333, 239 A.2d 680 (Law Div.1968), aff'd, 56 N.J. 16, 264 A.2d 209 (3970) (\u201c[t]he need for a high degree of scientific acceptance, and particularly reliability, is vital when a criminal case is involved where the individual\u2019s freedom or, in fact, his life may be at stake.\u201d). See State v. Fortin, 318 N.J.Super. 577, 609, 724 A.2d 818 (App.Div.1999) (in murder trial, linkage-analysis methodology of identifying defendant as the murderer based upon a comparison of one other crime committed by him not scientifically reliable)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"contra","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"on cross-examination of defendant's diminished capacity expert witness, prosecutor's questions incorporating rapist profile traits, not disagreed with by the expert, was proper cross-examination and not substantive proffer of rapist profile methodology","sentence":"Contrast State v. Clowney, 299 N.J.Super. 1, 19-20, 690 A.2d 612 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 151 N.J. 77, 697 A.2d 549 (1997) (on cross-examination of defendant\u2019s diminished capacity expert witness, prosecutor\u2019s questions incorporating rapist profile traits, not disagreed with by the expert, was proper cross-examination and not substantive proffer of rapist profile methodology)."},"case_id":745919,"label":"a"}
{"context":"E.g. And, we take note that admissibility of all evidence, particularly scientific evidence being used in a criminal proceeding, must be \"clearly established.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"contra","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"on cross-examination of defendant's diminished capacity expert witness, prosecutor's questions incorporating rapist profile traits, not disagreed with by the expert, was proper cross-examination and not substantive proffer of rapist profile methodology","sentence":"Contrast State v. Clowney, 299 N.J.Super. 1, 19-20, 690 A.2d 612 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 151 N.J. 77, 697 A.2d 549 (1997) (on cross-examination of defendant\u2019s diminished capacity expert witness, prosecutor\u2019s questions incorporating rapist profile traits, not disagreed with by the expert, was proper cross-examination and not substantive proffer of rapist profile methodology)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[t]he need for a high degree of scientific acceptance, and particularly reliability, is vital when a criminal case is involved where the individual's freedom or, in fact, his life may be at stake.\"","sentence":"State v. Haskins, 131 N.J. 643, 649, 622 A.2d 867 (1993); State v. Cary, 99 N.J.Super. 323, 333, 239 A.2d 680 (Law Div.1968), aff'd, 56 N.J. 16, 264 A.2d 209 (3970) (\u201c[t]he need for a high degree of scientific acceptance, and particularly reliability, is vital when a criminal case is involved where the individual\u2019s freedom or, in fact, his life may be at stake.\u201d). See State v. Fortin, 318 N.J.Super. 577, 609, 724 A.2d 818 (App.Div.1999) (in murder trial, linkage-analysis methodology of identifying defendant as the murderer based upon a comparison of one other crime committed by him not scientifically reliable)."},"case_id":745919,"label":"b"}
{"context":"E.g. And, we take note that admissibility of all evidence, particularly scientific evidence being used in a criminal proceeding, must be \"clearly established.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"contra","identifier":"299 N.J.Super. 1, 19-20","parenthetical":"on cross-examination of defendant's diminished capacity expert witness, prosecutor's questions incorporating rapist profile traits, not disagreed with by the expert, was proper cross-examination and not substantive proffer of rapist profile methodology","sentence":"Contrast State v. Clowney, 299 N.J.Super. 1, 19-20, 690 A.2d 612 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 151 N.J. 77, 697 A.2d 549 (1997) (on cross-examination of defendant\u2019s diminished capacity expert witness, prosecutor\u2019s questions incorporating rapist profile traits, not disagreed with by the expert, was proper cross-examination and not substantive proffer of rapist profile methodology)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[t]he need for a high degree of scientific acceptance, and particularly reliability, is vital when a criminal case is involved where the individual's freedom or, in fact, his life may be at stake.\"","sentence":"State v. Haskins, 131 N.J. 643, 649, 622 A.2d 867 (1993); State v. Cary, 99 N.J.Super. 323, 333, 239 A.2d 680 (Law Div.1968), aff'd, 56 N.J. 16, 264 A.2d 209 (3970) (\u201c[t]he need for a high degree of scientific acceptance, and particularly reliability, is vital when a criminal case is involved where the individual\u2019s freedom or, in fact, his life may be at stake.\u201d). See State v. Fortin, 318 N.J.Super. 577, 609, 724 A.2d 818 (App.Div.1999) (in murder trial, linkage-analysis methodology of identifying defendant as the murderer based upon a comparison of one other crime committed by him not scientifically reliable)."},"case_id":745919,"label":"b"}
{"context":"E.g. And, we take note that admissibility of all evidence, particularly scientific evidence being used in a criminal proceeding, must be \"clearly established.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"contra","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"on cross-examination of defendant's diminished capacity expert witness, prosecutor's questions incorporating rapist profile traits, not disagreed with by the expert, was proper cross-examination and not substantive proffer of rapist profile methodology","sentence":"Contrast State v. Clowney, 299 N.J.Super. 1, 19-20, 690 A.2d 612 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 151 N.J. 77, 697 A.2d 549 (1997) (on cross-examination of defendant\u2019s diminished capacity expert witness, prosecutor\u2019s questions incorporating rapist profile traits, not disagreed with by the expert, was proper cross-examination and not substantive proffer of rapist profile methodology)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[t]he need for a high degree of scientific acceptance, and particularly reliability, is vital when a criminal case is involved where the individual's freedom or, in fact, his life may be at stake.\"","sentence":"State v. Haskins, 131 N.J. 643, 649, 622 A.2d 867 (1993); State v. Cary, 99 N.J.Super. 323, 333, 239 A.2d 680 (Law Div.1968), aff'd, 56 N.J. 16, 264 A.2d 209 (3970) (\u201c[t]he need for a high degree of scientific acceptance, and particularly reliability, is vital when a criminal case is involved where the individual\u2019s freedom or, in fact, his life may be at stake.\u201d). See State v. Fortin, 318 N.J.Super. 577, 609, 724 A.2d 818 (App.Div.1999) (in murder trial, linkage-analysis methodology of identifying defendant as the murderer based upon a comparison of one other crime committed by him not scientifically reliable)."},"case_id":745919,"label":"b"}
{"context":"E.g. And, we take note that admissibility of all evidence, particularly scientific evidence being used in a criminal proceeding, must be \"clearly established.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"contra","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"on cross-examination of defendant's diminished capacity expert witness, prosecutor's questions incorporating rapist profile traits, not disagreed with by the expert, was proper cross-examination and not substantive proffer of rapist profile methodology","sentence":"Contrast State v. Clowney, 299 N.J.Super. 1, 19-20, 690 A.2d 612 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 151 N.J. 77, 697 A.2d 549 (1997) (on cross-examination of defendant\u2019s diminished capacity expert witness, prosecutor\u2019s questions incorporating rapist profile traits, not disagreed with by the expert, was proper cross-examination and not substantive proffer of rapist profile methodology)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[t]he need for a high degree of scientific acceptance, and particularly reliability, is vital when a criminal case is involved where the individual's freedom or, in fact, his life may be at stake.\"","sentence":"State v. Haskins, 131 N.J. 643, 649, 622 A.2d 867 (1993); State v. Cary, 99 N.J.Super. 323, 333, 239 A.2d 680 (Law Div.1968), aff'd, 56 N.J. 16, 264 A.2d 209 (3970) (\u201c[t]he need for a high degree of scientific acceptance, and particularly reliability, is vital when a criminal case is involved where the individual\u2019s freedom or, in fact, his life may be at stake.\u201d). See State v. Fortin, 318 N.J.Super. 577, 609, 724 A.2d 818 (App.Div.1999) (in murder trial, linkage-analysis methodology of identifying defendant as the murderer based upon a comparison of one other crime committed by him not scientifically reliable)."},"case_id":745919,"label":"b"}
{"context":"E.g. And, we take note that admissibility of all evidence, particularly scientific evidence being used in a criminal proceeding, must be \"clearly established.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"contra","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"on cross-examination of defendant's diminished capacity expert witness, prosecutor's questions incorporating rapist profile traits, not disagreed with by the expert, was proper cross-examination and not substantive proffer of rapist profile methodology","sentence":"Contrast State v. Clowney, 299 N.J.Super. 1, 19-20, 690 A.2d 612 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 151 N.J. 77, 697 A.2d 549 (1997) (on cross-examination of defendant\u2019s diminished capacity expert witness, prosecutor\u2019s questions incorporating rapist profile traits, not disagreed with by the expert, was proper cross-examination and not substantive proffer of rapist profile methodology)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[t]he need for a high degree of scientific acceptance, and particularly reliability, is vital when a criminal case is involved where the individual's freedom or, in fact, his life may be at stake.\"","sentence":"State v. Haskins, 131 N.J. 643, 649, 622 A.2d 867 (1993); State v. Cary, 99 N.J.Super. 323, 333, 239 A.2d 680 (Law Div.1968), aff'd, 56 N.J. 16, 264 A.2d 209 (3970) (\u201c[t]he need for a high degree of scientific acceptance, and particularly reliability, is vital when a criminal case is involved where the individual\u2019s freedom or, in fact, his life may be at stake.\u201d). See State v. Fortin, 318 N.J.Super. 577, 609, 724 A.2d 818 (App.Div.1999) (in murder trial, linkage-analysis methodology of identifying defendant as the murderer based upon a comparison of one other crime committed by him not scientifically reliable)."},"case_id":745919,"label":"b"}
{"context":"16. Instead, when an employee who is eligible for FMLA leave notifies his or her employer of the need to take leave for a qualifying reason, the FMLA places the risk of ignorance on the employer.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"141 F.3d 309, 312","parenthetical":"employee need not mention, and may be ignorant of, the FMLA, yet be protected as long as enough information is given to put employer on notice that FMLA-qualifying leave is needed","sentence":"See Stoops v. One Call Comm., Inc., 141 F.3d 309, 312 (7th Cir.1998) (employee need not mention, and may be ignorant of, the FMLA, yet be protected as long as enough information is given to put employer on notice that FMLA-qualifying leave is needed); Price, 117 F.3d at 1025-26 (employee\u2019s request for paid sick leave put employer on notice that leave was possibly FMLA-protected); see also Viereck v. City of Gloucester, 961 F.Supp. 703, 707 (D.N.J. 1997) (employee who told employer she was hospitalized and would be off work for some time put employer on notice of a serious health condition)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"961 F.Supp. 703, 707","parenthetical":"employee who told employer she was hospitalized and would be off work for some time put employer on notice of a serious health condition","sentence":"See Stoops v. One Call Comm., Inc., 141 F.3d 309, 312 (7th Cir.1998) (employee need not mention, and may be ignorant of, the FMLA, yet be protected as long as enough information is given to put employer on notice that FMLA-qualifying leave is needed); Price, 117 F.3d at 1025-26 (employee\u2019s request for paid sick leave put employer on notice that leave was possibly FMLA-protected); see also Viereck v. City of Gloucester, 961 F.Supp. 703, 707 (D.N.J. 1997) (employee who told employer she was hospitalized and would be off work for some time put employer on notice of a serious health condition)."},"case_id":11585209,"label":"a"}
{"context":"16. Instead, when an employee who is eligible for FMLA leave notifies his or her employer of the need to take leave for a qualifying reason, the FMLA places the risk of ignorance on the employer.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"117 F.3d 1025, 1025-26","parenthetical":"employee's request for paid sick leave put employer on notice that leave was possibly FMLA-protected","sentence":"See Stoops v. One Call Comm., Inc., 141 F.3d 309, 312 (7th Cir.1998) (employee need not mention, and may be ignorant of, the FMLA, yet be protected as long as enough information is given to put employer on notice that FMLA-qualifying leave is needed); Price, 117 F.3d at 1025-26 (employee\u2019s request for paid sick leave put employer on notice that leave was possibly FMLA-protected); see also Viereck v. City of Gloucester, 961 F.Supp. 703, 707 (D.N.J. 1997) (employee who told employer she was hospitalized and would be off work for some time put employer on notice of a serious health condition)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"961 F.Supp. 703, 707","parenthetical":"employee who told employer she was hospitalized and would be off work for some time put employer on notice of a serious health condition","sentence":"See Stoops v. One Call Comm., Inc., 141 F.3d 309, 312 (7th Cir.1998) (employee need not mention, and may be ignorant of, the FMLA, yet be protected as long as enough information is given to put employer on notice that FMLA-qualifying leave is needed); Price, 117 F.3d at 1025-26 (employee\u2019s request for paid sick leave put employer on notice that leave was possibly FMLA-protected); see also Viereck v. City of Gloucester, 961 F.Supp. 703, 707 (D.N.J. 1997) (employee who told employer she was hospitalized and would be off work for some time put employer on notice of a serious health condition)."},"case_id":11585209,"label":"a"}
{"context":"A habeas petition is considered pending during one full round of state review, which in California includes petitions filed in Superior Court, the Court of Appeal, and the Supreme Court.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"134 F.3d 146, 148","parenthetical":"\"[I]f a state allows petitioners to file second or subsequent petitions for post-conviction relief, federal courts should not undermine the state's decision by refusing to toll the one-year period of limitation of SS 2244(d","sentence":"See King v. Roe, 340 F.3d 821, 823 (9th Cir.2003) (per curiam) (recognizing that a habeas petitioner may be entitled to tolling during a second round of petitions, but holding that the statute is not tolled between rounds); Dils v. Small, 260 F.3d 984, 985-86 (9th Cir.2001) (noting that petitioner was entitled to tolling during first, second, and third rounds of state habeas petitions but not between rounds); see also Lovasz v. Vaughn, 134 F.3d 146, 148 (3d Cir.1998) (\u201c[I]f a state allows petitioners to file second or subsequent petitions for post-conviction relief, federal courts should not undermine the state\u2019s decision by refusing to toll the one-year period of limitation of \u00a7 2244(d)(1) where a second or subsequent petition is pending in the state court system.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"340 F.3d 821, 823","parenthetical":"recognizing that a habeas petitioner may be entitled to tolling during a second round of petitions, but holding that the statute is not tolled between rounds","sentence":"See King v. Roe, 340 F.3d 821, 823 (9th Cir.2003) (per curiam) (recognizing that a habeas petitioner may be entitled to tolling during a second round of petitions, but holding that the statute is not tolled between rounds); Dils v. Small, 260 F.3d 984, 985-86 (9th Cir.2001) (noting that petitioner was entitled to tolling during first, second, and third rounds of state habeas petitions but not between rounds); see also Lovasz v. Vaughn, 134 F.3d 146, 148 (3d Cir.1998) (\u201c[I]f a state allows petitioners to file second or subsequent petitions for post-conviction relief, federal courts should not undermine the state\u2019s decision by refusing to toll the one-year period of limitation of \u00a7 2244(d)(1) where a second or subsequent petition is pending in the state court system.\u201d)."},"case_id":2190353,"label":"b"}
{"context":"A habeas petition is considered pending during one full round of state review, which in California includes petitions filed in Superior Court, the Court of Appeal, and the Supreme Court.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"260 F.3d 984, 985-86","parenthetical":"noting that petitioner was entitled to tolling during first, second, and third rounds of state habeas petitions but not between rounds","sentence":"See King v. Roe, 340 F.3d 821, 823 (9th Cir.2003) (per curiam) (recognizing that a habeas petitioner may be entitled to tolling during a second round of petitions, but holding that the statute is not tolled between rounds); Dils v. Small, 260 F.3d 984, 985-86 (9th Cir.2001) (noting that petitioner was entitled to tolling during first, second, and third rounds of state habeas petitions but not between rounds); see also Lovasz v. Vaughn, 134 F.3d 146, 148 (3d Cir.1998) (\u201c[I]f a state allows petitioners to file second or subsequent petitions for post-conviction relief, federal courts should not undermine the state\u2019s decision by refusing to toll the one-year period of limitation of \u00a7 2244(d)(1) where a second or subsequent petition is pending in the state court system.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"134 F.3d 146, 148","parenthetical":"\"[I]f a state allows petitioners to file second or subsequent petitions for post-conviction relief, federal courts should not undermine the state's decision by refusing to toll the one-year period of limitation of SS 2244(d","sentence":"See King v. Roe, 340 F.3d 821, 823 (9th Cir.2003) (per curiam) (recognizing that a habeas petitioner may be entitled to tolling during a second round of petitions, but holding that the statute is not tolled between rounds); Dils v. Small, 260 F.3d 984, 985-86 (9th Cir.2001) (noting that petitioner was entitled to tolling during first, second, and third rounds of state habeas petitions but not between rounds); see also Lovasz v. Vaughn, 134 F.3d 146, 148 (3d Cir.1998) (\u201c[I]f a state allows petitioners to file second or subsequent petitions for post-conviction relief, federal courts should not undermine the state\u2019s decision by refusing to toll the one-year period of limitation of \u00a7 2244(d)(1) where a second or subsequent petition is pending in the state court system.\u201d)."},"case_id":2190353,"label":"a"}
{"context":"However, the New York custody order under which Dorchester County DSS assumed custody is not in the record on appeal and, thus, we are not apprised of its terms. In any event, while Judge Biggs's order is the law of the case, the mother was required to argue that fact before the trial court as an issue of res judicata, which she has not done.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"317 S.C. 291, 291","parenthetical":"a successor judge has no \"discretion\" to \"reweigh the evidence where the trial judge has made findings of fact supported by evidence in the record\"","sentence":"Carolina Baking Co. v. Geilfuss, 169 S.C. 348, 168 S.E. 849 (1933) (while circuit court judge had no authority to change or modify another circuit court judge\u2019s order, the second order is res judicata as to those who sought, consented to or acquiesced in it); see also, Charleston County DSS, 317 S.C. at 291, 454 S.E.2d at 312 (a successor judge has no \u201cdiscretion\u201d to \u201creweigh the evidence where the trial judge has made findings of fact supported by evidence in the record\u201d)!"},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"while circuit court judge had no authority to change or modify another circuit court judge's order, the second order is res judicata as to those who sought, consented to or acquiesced in it","sentence":"Carolina Baking Co. v. Geilfuss, 169 S.C. 348, 168 S.E. 849 (1933) (while circuit court judge had no authority to change or modify another circuit court judge\u2019s order, the second order is res judicata as to those who sought, consented to or acquiesced in it); see also, Charleston County DSS, 317 S.C. at 291, 454 S.E.2d at 312 (a successor judge has no \u201cdiscretion\u201d to \u201creweigh the evidence where the trial judge has made findings of fact supported by evidence in the record\u201d)!"},"case_id":514453,"label":"b"}
{"context":"However, the New York custody order under which Dorchester County DSS assumed custody is not in the record on appeal and, thus, we are not apprised of its terms. In any event, while Judge Biggs's order is the law of the case, the mother was required to argue that fact before the trial court as an issue of res judicata, which she has not done.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"454 S.E.2d 312, 312","parenthetical":"a successor judge has no \"discretion\" to \"reweigh the evidence where the trial judge has made findings of fact supported by evidence in the record\"","sentence":"Carolina Baking Co. v. Geilfuss, 169 S.C. 348, 168 S.E. 849 (1933) (while circuit court judge had no authority to change or modify another circuit court judge\u2019s order, the second order is res judicata as to those who sought, consented to or acquiesced in it); see also, Charleston County DSS, 317 S.C. at 291, 454 S.E.2d at 312 (a successor judge has no \u201cdiscretion\u201d to \u201creweigh the evidence where the trial judge has made findings of fact supported by evidence in the record\u201d)!"},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"while circuit court judge had no authority to change or modify another circuit court judge's order, the second order is res judicata as to those who sought, consented to or acquiesced in it","sentence":"Carolina Baking Co. v. Geilfuss, 169 S.C. 348, 168 S.E. 849 (1933) (while circuit court judge had no authority to change or modify another circuit court judge\u2019s order, the second order is res judicata as to those who sought, consented to or acquiesced in it); see also, Charleston County DSS, 317 S.C. at 291, 454 S.E.2d at 312 (a successor judge has no \u201cdiscretion\u201d to \u201creweigh the evidence where the trial judge has made findings of fact supported by evidence in the record\u201d)!"},"case_id":514453,"label":"b"}
{"context":"However, the New York custody order under which Dorchester County DSS assumed custody is not in the record on appeal and, thus, we are not apprised of its terms. In any event, while Judge Biggs's order is the law of the case, the mother was required to argue that fact before the trial court as an issue of res judicata, which she has not done.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"317 S.C. 291, 291","parenthetical":"a successor judge has no \"discretion\" to \"reweigh the evidence where the trial judge has made findings of fact supported by evidence in the record\"","sentence":"Carolina Baking Co. v. Geilfuss, 169 S.C. 348, 168 S.E. 849 (1933) (while circuit court judge had no authority to change or modify another circuit court judge\u2019s order, the second order is res judicata as to those who sought, consented to or acquiesced in it); see also, Charleston County DSS, 317 S.C. at 291, 454 S.E.2d at 312 (a successor judge has no \u201cdiscretion\u201d to \u201creweigh the evidence where the trial judge has made findings of fact supported by evidence in the record\u201d)!"},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"while circuit court judge had no authority to change or modify another circuit court judge's order, the second order is res judicata as to those who sought, consented to or acquiesced in it","sentence":"Carolina Baking Co. v. Geilfuss, 169 S.C. 348, 168 S.E. 849 (1933) (while circuit court judge had no authority to change or modify another circuit court judge\u2019s order, the second order is res judicata as to those who sought, consented to or acquiesced in it); see also, Charleston County DSS, 317 S.C. at 291, 454 S.E.2d at 312 (a successor judge has no \u201cdiscretion\u201d to \u201creweigh the evidence where the trial judge has made findings of fact supported by evidence in the record\u201d)!"},"case_id":514453,"label":"b"}
{"context":"However, the New York custody order under which Dorchester County DSS assumed custody is not in the record on appeal and, thus, we are not apprised of its terms. In any event, while Judge Biggs's order is the law of the case, the mother was required to argue that fact before the trial court as an issue of res judicata, which she has not done.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"while circuit court judge had no authority to change or modify another circuit court judge's order, the second order is res judicata as to those who sought, consented to or acquiesced in it","sentence":"Carolina Baking Co. v. Geilfuss, 169 S.C. 348, 168 S.E. 849 (1933) (while circuit court judge had no authority to change or modify another circuit court judge\u2019s order, the second order is res judicata as to those who sought, consented to or acquiesced in it); see also, Charleston County DSS, 317 S.C. at 291, 454 S.E.2d at 312 (a successor judge has no \u201cdiscretion\u201d to \u201creweigh the evidence where the trial judge has made findings of fact supported by evidence in the record\u201d)!"},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"454 S.E.2d 312, 312","parenthetical":"a successor judge has no \"discretion\" to \"reweigh the evidence where the trial judge has made findings of fact supported by evidence in the record\"","sentence":"Carolina Baking Co. v. Geilfuss, 169 S.C. 348, 168 S.E. 849 (1933) (while circuit court judge had no authority to change or modify another circuit court judge\u2019s order, the second order is res judicata as to those who sought, consented to or acquiesced in it); see also, Charleston County DSS, 317 S.C. at 291, 454 S.E.2d at 312 (a successor judge has no \u201cdiscretion\u201d to \u201creweigh the evidence where the trial judge has made findings of fact supported by evidence in the record\u201d)!"},"case_id":514453,"label":"a"}
{"context":"We have not directly addressed this issue before. But, to date, four other circuits -- the First, Seventh, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits -- have extended Engquist beyond the context of government employment.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"626 F.3d 135, 142-43","parenthetical":"refusing to extend Engquist to a claim challenging the state's exercise of \"its regulatory and licensing power\"","sentence":"See Caesars Mass. Mgmt. Co. v. Crosby, 778 F.3d 327, 336-37 (1st Cir.2015) (applying Engquist to preclude four corporate plaintiffs from asserting an equal protection claim arising out of a decision by the Massachusetts Gaming Commission finding them unsuitable as proposed operators of a casino); Srail v. Village of Lisle, 588 F.3d 940, 944-45 (7th Cir.2009) (extending Engquist to preclude equal protection claim filed by residents of an incorporated subdivision claiming that the village in which they resided violated the Equal Protection Clause by refusing to supply water to subdivisions and schools attended by their children at adequate firefighting pressure and volume); Flowers v. City of Minneapolis, 558 F.3d 794, 799-800 (8th Cir.2009) (\u201cIn light of Engquist, ... we conclude that while a police officer\u2019s investigative decisions remain subject to traditional class-based equal protection analysis, they may not be attacked in a class-of-one equal protection claim.\u201d); United States v. Moore, 543 F.3d 891, 901 (7th Cir.2008) (extending Engquist to preclude class-of-one claims challenging prosecutorial decisions); Douglas Asphalt Co. v. Qore, Inc., 541 F.3d 1269, 1274 (11th Cir.2008) (\u201cWe have little trouble applying the reasoning in Engquist ... to the circumstances in this case involving a government-contractor relationship.\u201d); but see Analytical Diagnostic Labs, Inc. v. Kusel, 626 F.3d 135, 142-43 (2d Cir.2010) (refusing to extend Engquist to a claim challenging the state\u2019s exercise of \u201cits regulatory and licensing power\u201d); Hanes v. Zurick, 578 F.3d 491, 495-96 (7th Cir.2009) (refusing to extend Engquist to bar class-of-one claim alleging that defendant police officers repeatedly arrested plaintiff without cause)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"778 F.3d 327, 336-37","parenthetical":"applying Engquist to preclude four corporate plaintiffs from asserting an equal protection claim arising out of a decision by the Massachusetts Gaming Commission finding them unsuitable as proposed operators of a casino","sentence":"See Caesars Mass. Mgmt. Co. v. Crosby, 778 F.3d 327, 336-37 (1st Cir.2015) (applying Engquist to preclude four corporate plaintiffs from asserting an equal protection claim arising out of a decision by the Massachusetts Gaming Commission finding them unsuitable as proposed operators of a casino); Srail v. Village of Lisle, 588 F.3d 940, 944-45 (7th Cir.2009) (extending Engquist to preclude equal protection claim filed by residents of an incorporated subdivision claiming that the village in which they resided violated the Equal Protection Clause by refusing to supply water to subdivisions and schools attended by their children at adequate firefighting pressure and volume); Flowers v. City of Minneapolis, 558 F.3d 794, 799-800 (8th Cir.2009) (\u201cIn light of Engquist, ... we conclude that while a police officer\u2019s investigative decisions remain subject to traditional class-based equal protection analysis, they may not be attacked in a class-of-one equal protection claim.\u201d); United States v. Moore, 543 F.3d 891, 901 (7th Cir.2008) (extending Engquist to preclude class-of-one claims challenging prosecutorial decisions); Douglas Asphalt Co. v. Qore, Inc., 541 F.3d 1269, 1274 (11th Cir.2008) (\u201cWe have little trouble applying the reasoning in Engquist ... to the circumstances in this case involving a government-contractor relationship.\u201d); but see Analytical Diagnostic Labs, Inc. v. Kusel, 626 F.3d 135, 142-43 (2d Cir.2010) (refusing to extend Engquist to a claim challenging the state\u2019s exercise of \u201cits regulatory and licensing power\u201d); Hanes v. Zurick, 578 F.3d 491, 495-96 (7th Cir.2009) (refusing to extend Engquist to bar class-of-one claim alleging that defendant police officers repeatedly arrested plaintiff without cause)."},"case_id":4336089,"label":"b"}
{"context":"We have not directly addressed this issue before. But, to date, four other circuits -- the First, Seventh, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits -- have extended Engquist beyond the context of government employment.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"578 F.3d 491, 495-96","parenthetical":"refusing to extend Engquist to bar class-of-one claim alleging that defendant police officers repeatedly arrested plaintiff without cause","sentence":"See Caesars Mass. Mgmt. Co. v. Crosby, 778 F.3d 327, 336-37 (1st Cir.2015) (applying Engquist to preclude four corporate plaintiffs from asserting an equal protection claim arising out of a decision by the Massachusetts Gaming Commission finding them unsuitable as proposed operators of a casino); Srail v. Village of Lisle, 588 F.3d 940, 944-45 (7th Cir.2009) (extending Engquist to preclude equal protection claim filed by residents of an incorporated subdivision claiming that the village in which they resided violated the Equal Protection Clause by refusing to supply water to subdivisions and schools attended by their children at adequate firefighting pressure and volume); Flowers v. City of Minneapolis, 558 F.3d 794, 799-800 (8th Cir.2009) (\u201cIn light of Engquist, ... we conclude that while a police officer\u2019s investigative decisions remain subject to traditional class-based equal protection analysis, they may not be attacked in a class-of-one equal protection claim.\u201d); United States v. Moore, 543 F.3d 891, 901 (7th Cir.2008) (extending Engquist to preclude class-of-one claims challenging prosecutorial decisions); Douglas Asphalt Co. v. Qore, Inc., 541 F.3d 1269, 1274 (11th Cir.2008) (\u201cWe have little trouble applying the reasoning in Engquist ... to the circumstances in this case involving a government-contractor relationship.\u201d); but see Analytical Diagnostic Labs, Inc. v. Kusel, 626 F.3d 135, 142-43 (2d Cir.2010) (refusing to extend Engquist to a claim challenging the state\u2019s exercise of \u201cits regulatory and licensing power\u201d); Hanes v. Zurick, 578 F.3d 491, 495-96 (7th Cir.2009) (refusing to extend Engquist to bar class-of-one claim alleging that defendant police officers repeatedly arrested plaintiff without cause)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"778 F.3d 327, 336-37","parenthetical":"applying Engquist to preclude four corporate plaintiffs from asserting an equal protection claim arising out of a decision by the Massachusetts Gaming Commission finding them unsuitable as proposed operators of a casino","sentence":"See Caesars Mass. Mgmt. Co. v. Crosby, 778 F.3d 327, 336-37 (1st Cir.2015) (applying Engquist to preclude four corporate plaintiffs from asserting an equal protection claim arising out of a decision by the Massachusetts Gaming Commission finding them unsuitable as proposed operators of a casino); Srail v. Village of Lisle, 588 F.3d 940, 944-45 (7th Cir.2009) (extending Engquist to preclude equal protection claim filed by residents of an incorporated subdivision claiming that the village in which they resided violated the Equal Protection Clause by refusing to supply water to subdivisions and schools attended by their children at adequate firefighting pressure and volume); Flowers v. City of Minneapolis, 558 F.3d 794, 799-800 (8th Cir.2009) (\u201cIn light of Engquist, ... we conclude that while a police officer\u2019s investigative decisions remain subject to traditional class-based equal protection analysis, they may not be attacked in a class-of-one equal protection claim.\u201d); United States v. Moore, 543 F.3d 891, 901 (7th Cir.2008) (extending Engquist to preclude class-of-one claims challenging prosecutorial decisions); Douglas Asphalt Co. v. Qore, Inc., 541 F.3d 1269, 1274 (11th Cir.2008) (\u201cWe have little trouble applying the reasoning in Engquist ... to the circumstances in this case involving a government-contractor relationship.\u201d); but see Analytical Diagnostic Labs, Inc. v. Kusel, 626 F.3d 135, 142-43 (2d Cir.2010) (refusing to extend Engquist to a claim challenging the state\u2019s exercise of \u201cits regulatory and licensing power\u201d); Hanes v. Zurick, 578 F.3d 491, 495-96 (7th Cir.2009) (refusing to extend Engquist to bar class-of-one claim alleging that defendant police officers repeatedly arrested plaintiff without cause)."},"case_id":4336089,"label":"b"}
{"context":"We have not directly addressed this issue before. But, to date, four other circuits -- the First, Seventh, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits -- have extended Engquist beyond the context of government employment.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"626 F.3d 135, 142-43","parenthetical":"refusing to extend Engquist to a claim challenging the state's exercise of \"its regulatory and licensing power\"","sentence":"See Caesars Mass. Mgmt. Co. v. Crosby, 778 F.3d 327, 336-37 (1st Cir.2015) (applying Engquist to preclude four corporate plaintiffs from asserting an equal protection claim arising out of a decision by the Massachusetts Gaming Commission finding them unsuitable as proposed operators of a casino); Srail v. Village of Lisle, 588 F.3d 940, 944-45 (7th Cir.2009) (extending Engquist to preclude equal protection claim filed by residents of an incorporated subdivision claiming that the village in which they resided violated the Equal Protection Clause by refusing to supply water to subdivisions and schools attended by their children at adequate firefighting pressure and volume); Flowers v. City of Minneapolis, 558 F.3d 794, 799-800 (8th Cir.2009) (\u201cIn light of Engquist, ... we conclude that while a police officer\u2019s investigative decisions remain subject to traditional class-based equal protection analysis, they may not be attacked in a class-of-one equal protection claim.\u201d); United States v. Moore, 543 F.3d 891, 901 (7th Cir.2008) (extending Engquist to preclude class-of-one claims challenging prosecutorial decisions); Douglas Asphalt Co. v. Qore, Inc., 541 F.3d 1269, 1274 (11th Cir.2008) (\u201cWe have little trouble applying the reasoning in Engquist ... to the circumstances in this case involving a government-contractor relationship.\u201d); but see Analytical Diagnostic Labs, Inc. v. Kusel, 626 F.3d 135, 142-43 (2d Cir.2010) (refusing to extend Engquist to a claim challenging the state\u2019s exercise of \u201cits regulatory and licensing power\u201d); Hanes v. Zurick, 578 F.3d 491, 495-96 (7th Cir.2009) (refusing to extend Engquist to bar class-of-one claim alleging that defendant police officers repeatedly arrested plaintiff without cause)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"588 F.3d 940, 944-45","parenthetical":"extending Engquist to preclude equal protection claim filed by residents of an incorporated subdivision claiming that the village in which they resided violated the Equal Protection Clause by refusing to supply water to subdivisions and schools attended by their children at adequate firefighting pressure and volume","sentence":"See Caesars Mass. Mgmt. Co. v. Crosby, 778 F.3d 327, 336-37 (1st Cir.2015) (applying Engquist to preclude four corporate plaintiffs from asserting an equal protection claim arising out of a decision by the Massachusetts Gaming Commission finding them unsuitable as proposed operators of a casino); Srail v. Village of Lisle, 588 F.3d 940, 944-45 (7th Cir.2009) (extending Engquist to preclude equal protection claim filed by residents of an incorporated subdivision claiming that the village in which they resided violated the Equal Protection Clause by refusing to supply water to subdivisions and schools attended by their children at adequate firefighting pressure and volume); Flowers v. City of Minneapolis, 558 F.3d 794, 799-800 (8th Cir.2009) (\u201cIn light of Engquist, ... we conclude that while a police officer\u2019s investigative decisions remain subject to traditional class-based equal protection analysis, they may not be attacked in a class-of-one equal protection claim.\u201d); United States v. Moore, 543 F.3d 891, 901 (7th Cir.2008) (extending Engquist to preclude class-of-one claims challenging prosecutorial decisions); Douglas Asphalt Co. v. Qore, Inc., 541 F.3d 1269, 1274 (11th Cir.2008) (\u201cWe have little trouble applying the reasoning in Engquist ... to the circumstances in this case involving a government-contractor relationship.\u201d); but see Analytical Diagnostic Labs, Inc. v. Kusel, 626 F.3d 135, 142-43 (2d Cir.2010) (refusing to extend Engquist to a claim challenging the state\u2019s exercise of \u201cits regulatory and licensing power\u201d); Hanes v. Zurick, 578 F.3d 491, 495-96 (7th Cir.2009) (refusing to extend Engquist to bar class-of-one claim alleging that defendant police officers repeatedly arrested plaintiff without cause)."},"case_id":4336089,"label":"b"}
{"context":"We have not directly addressed this issue before. But, to date, four other circuits -- the First, Seventh, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits -- have extended Engquist beyond the context of government employment.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"588 F.3d 940, 944-45","parenthetical":"extending Engquist to preclude equal protection claim filed by residents of an incorporated subdivision claiming that the village in which they resided violated the Equal Protection Clause by refusing to supply water to subdivisions and schools attended by their children at adequate firefighting pressure and volume","sentence":"See Caesars Mass. Mgmt. Co. v. Crosby, 778 F.3d 327, 336-37 (1st Cir.2015) (applying Engquist to preclude four corporate plaintiffs from asserting an equal protection claim arising out of a decision by the Massachusetts Gaming Commission finding them unsuitable as proposed operators of a casino); Srail v. Village of Lisle, 588 F.3d 940, 944-45 (7th Cir.2009) (extending Engquist to preclude equal protection claim filed by residents of an incorporated subdivision claiming that the village in which they resided violated the Equal Protection Clause by refusing to supply water to subdivisions and schools attended by their children at adequate firefighting pressure and volume); Flowers v. City of Minneapolis, 558 F.3d 794, 799-800 (8th Cir.2009) (\u201cIn light of Engquist, ... we conclude that while a police officer\u2019s investigative decisions remain subject to traditional class-based equal protection analysis, they may not be attacked in a class-of-one equal protection claim.\u201d); United States v. Moore, 543 F.3d 891, 901 (7th Cir.2008) (extending Engquist to preclude class-of-one claims challenging prosecutorial decisions); Douglas Asphalt Co. v. Qore, Inc., 541 F.3d 1269, 1274 (11th Cir.2008) (\u201cWe have little trouble applying the reasoning in Engquist ... to the circumstances in this case involving a government-contractor relationship.\u201d); but see Analytical Diagnostic Labs, Inc. v. Kusel, 626 F.3d 135, 142-43 (2d Cir.2010) (refusing to extend Engquist to a claim challenging the state\u2019s exercise of \u201cits regulatory and licensing power\u201d); Hanes v. Zurick, 578 F.3d 491, 495-96 (7th Cir.2009) (refusing to extend Engquist to bar class-of-one claim alleging that defendant police officers repeatedly arrested plaintiff without cause)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"578 F.3d 491, 495-96","parenthetical":"refusing to extend Engquist to bar class-of-one claim alleging that defendant police officers repeatedly arrested plaintiff without cause","sentence":"See Caesars Mass. Mgmt. Co. v. Crosby, 778 F.3d 327, 336-37 (1st Cir.2015) (applying Engquist to preclude four corporate plaintiffs from asserting an equal protection claim arising out of a decision by the Massachusetts Gaming Commission finding them unsuitable as proposed operators of a casino); Srail v. Village of Lisle, 588 F.3d 940, 944-45 (7th Cir.2009) (extending Engquist to preclude equal protection claim filed by residents of an incorporated subdivision claiming that the village in which they resided violated the Equal Protection Clause by refusing to supply water to subdivisions and schools attended by their children at adequate firefighting pressure and volume); Flowers v. City of Minneapolis, 558 F.3d 794, 799-800 (8th Cir.2009) (\u201cIn light of Engquist, ... we conclude that while a police officer\u2019s investigative decisions remain subject to traditional class-based equal protection analysis, they may not be attacked in a class-of-one equal protection claim.\u201d); United States v. Moore, 543 F.3d 891, 901 (7th Cir.2008) (extending Engquist to preclude class-of-one claims challenging prosecutorial decisions); Douglas Asphalt Co. v. Qore, Inc., 541 F.3d 1269, 1274 (11th Cir.2008) (\u201cWe have little trouble applying the reasoning in Engquist ... to the circumstances in this case involving a government-contractor relationship.\u201d); but see Analytical Diagnostic Labs, Inc. v. Kusel, 626 F.3d 135, 142-43 (2d Cir.2010) (refusing to extend Engquist to a claim challenging the state\u2019s exercise of \u201cits regulatory and licensing power\u201d); Hanes v. Zurick, 578 F.3d 491, 495-96 (7th Cir.2009) (refusing to extend Engquist to bar class-of-one claim alleging that defendant police officers repeatedly arrested plaintiff without cause)."},"case_id":4336089,"label":"a"}
{"context":"We have not directly addressed this issue before. But, to date, four other circuits -- the First, Seventh, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits -- have extended Engquist beyond the context of government employment.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"558 F.3d 794, 799-800","parenthetical":"\"In light of Engquist, ... we conclude that while a police officer's investigative decisions remain subject to traditional class-based equal protection analysis, they may not be attacked in a class-of-one equal protection claim.\"","sentence":"See Caesars Mass. Mgmt. Co. v. Crosby, 778 F.3d 327, 336-37 (1st Cir.2015) (applying Engquist to preclude four corporate plaintiffs from asserting an equal protection claim arising out of a decision by the Massachusetts Gaming Commission finding them unsuitable as proposed operators of a casino); Srail v. Village of Lisle, 588 F.3d 940, 944-45 (7th Cir.2009) (extending Engquist to preclude equal protection claim filed by residents of an incorporated subdivision claiming that the village in which they resided violated the Equal Protection Clause by refusing to supply water to subdivisions and schools attended by their children at adequate firefighting pressure and volume); Flowers v. City of Minneapolis, 558 F.3d 794, 799-800 (8th Cir.2009) (\u201cIn light of Engquist, ... we conclude that while a police officer\u2019s investigative decisions remain subject to traditional class-based equal protection analysis, they may not be attacked in a class-of-one equal protection claim.\u201d); United States v. Moore, 543 F.3d 891, 901 (7th Cir.2008) (extending Engquist to preclude class-of-one claims challenging prosecutorial decisions); Douglas Asphalt Co. v. Qore, Inc., 541 F.3d 1269, 1274 (11th Cir.2008) (\u201cWe have little trouble applying the reasoning in Engquist ... to the circumstances in this case involving a government-contractor relationship.\u201d); but see Analytical Diagnostic Labs, Inc. v. Kusel, 626 F.3d 135, 142-43 (2d Cir.2010) (refusing to extend Engquist to a claim challenging the state\u2019s exercise of \u201cits regulatory and licensing power\u201d); Hanes v. Zurick, 578 F.3d 491, 495-96 (7th Cir.2009) (refusing to extend Engquist to bar class-of-one claim alleging that defendant police officers repeatedly arrested plaintiff without cause)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"626 F.3d 135, 142-43","parenthetical":"refusing to extend Engquist to a claim challenging the state's exercise of \"its regulatory and licensing power\"","sentence":"See Caesars Mass. Mgmt. Co. v. Crosby, 778 F.3d 327, 336-37 (1st Cir.2015) (applying Engquist to preclude four corporate plaintiffs from asserting an equal protection claim arising out of a decision by the Massachusetts Gaming Commission finding them unsuitable as proposed operators of a casino); Srail v. Village of Lisle, 588 F.3d 940, 944-45 (7th Cir.2009) (extending Engquist to preclude equal protection claim filed by residents of an incorporated subdivision claiming that the village in which they resided violated the Equal Protection Clause by refusing to supply water to subdivisions and schools attended by their children at adequate firefighting pressure and volume); Flowers v. City of Minneapolis, 558 F.3d 794, 799-800 (8th Cir.2009) (\u201cIn light of Engquist, ... we conclude that while a police officer\u2019s investigative decisions remain subject to traditional class-based equal protection analysis, they may not be attacked in a class-of-one equal protection claim.\u201d); United States v. Moore, 543 F.3d 891, 901 (7th Cir.2008) (extending Engquist to preclude class-of-one claims challenging prosecutorial decisions); Douglas Asphalt Co. v. Qore, Inc., 541 F.3d 1269, 1274 (11th Cir.2008) (\u201cWe have little trouble applying the reasoning in Engquist ... to the circumstances in this case involving a government-contractor relationship.\u201d); but see Analytical Diagnostic Labs, Inc. v. Kusel, 626 F.3d 135, 142-43 (2d Cir.2010) (refusing to extend Engquist to a claim challenging the state\u2019s exercise of \u201cits regulatory and licensing power\u201d); Hanes v. Zurick, 578 F.3d 491, 495-96 (7th Cir.2009) (refusing to extend Engquist to bar class-of-one claim alleging that defendant police officers repeatedly arrested plaintiff without cause)."},"case_id":4336089,"label":"a"}
{"context":"We have not directly addressed this issue before. But, to date, four other circuits -- the First, Seventh, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits -- have extended Engquist beyond the context of government employment.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"558 F.3d 794, 799-800","parenthetical":"\"In light of Engquist, ... we conclude that while a police officer's investigative decisions remain subject to traditional class-based equal protection analysis, they may not be attacked in a class-of-one equal protection claim.\"","sentence":"See Caesars Mass. Mgmt. Co. v. Crosby, 778 F.3d 327, 336-37 (1st Cir.2015) (applying Engquist to preclude four corporate plaintiffs from asserting an equal protection claim arising out of a decision by the Massachusetts Gaming Commission finding them unsuitable as proposed operators of a casino); Srail v. Village of Lisle, 588 F.3d 940, 944-45 (7th Cir.2009) (extending Engquist to preclude equal protection claim filed by residents of an incorporated subdivision claiming that the village in which they resided violated the Equal Protection Clause by refusing to supply water to subdivisions and schools attended by their children at adequate firefighting pressure and volume); Flowers v. City of Minneapolis, 558 F.3d 794, 799-800 (8th Cir.2009) (\u201cIn light of Engquist, ... we conclude that while a police officer\u2019s investigative decisions remain subject to traditional class-based equal protection analysis, they may not be attacked in a class-of-one equal protection claim.\u201d); United States v. Moore, 543 F.3d 891, 901 (7th Cir.2008) (extending Engquist to preclude class-of-one claims challenging prosecutorial decisions); Douglas Asphalt Co. v. Qore, Inc., 541 F.3d 1269, 1274 (11th Cir.2008) (\u201cWe have little trouble applying the reasoning in Engquist ... to the circumstances in this case involving a government-contractor relationship.\u201d); but see Analytical Diagnostic Labs, Inc. v. Kusel, 626 F.3d 135, 142-43 (2d Cir.2010) (refusing to extend Engquist to a claim challenging the state\u2019s exercise of \u201cits regulatory and licensing power\u201d); Hanes v. Zurick, 578 F.3d 491, 495-96 (7th Cir.2009) (refusing to extend Engquist to bar class-of-one claim alleging that defendant police officers repeatedly arrested plaintiff without cause)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"578 F.3d 491, 495-96","parenthetical":"refusing to extend Engquist to bar class-of-one claim alleging that defendant police officers repeatedly arrested plaintiff without cause","sentence":"See Caesars Mass. Mgmt. Co. v. Crosby, 778 F.3d 327, 336-37 (1st Cir.2015) (applying Engquist to preclude four corporate plaintiffs from asserting an equal protection claim arising out of a decision by the Massachusetts Gaming Commission finding them unsuitable as proposed operators of a casino); Srail v. Village of Lisle, 588 F.3d 940, 944-45 (7th Cir.2009) (extending Engquist to preclude equal protection claim filed by residents of an incorporated subdivision claiming that the village in which they resided violated the Equal Protection Clause by refusing to supply water to subdivisions and schools attended by their children at adequate firefighting pressure and volume); Flowers v. City of Minneapolis, 558 F.3d 794, 799-800 (8th Cir.2009) (\u201cIn light of Engquist, ... we conclude that while a police officer\u2019s investigative decisions remain subject to traditional class-based equal protection analysis, they may not be attacked in a class-of-one equal protection claim.\u201d); United States v. Moore, 543 F.3d 891, 901 (7th Cir.2008) (extending Engquist to preclude class-of-one claims challenging prosecutorial decisions); Douglas Asphalt Co. v. Qore, Inc., 541 F.3d 1269, 1274 (11th Cir.2008) (\u201cWe have little trouble applying the reasoning in Engquist ... to the circumstances in this case involving a government-contractor relationship.\u201d); but see Analytical Diagnostic Labs, Inc. v. Kusel, 626 F.3d 135, 142-43 (2d Cir.2010) (refusing to extend Engquist to a claim challenging the state\u2019s exercise of \u201cits regulatory and licensing power\u201d); Hanes v. Zurick, 578 F.3d 491, 495-96 (7th Cir.2009) (refusing to extend Engquist to bar class-of-one claim alleging that defendant police officers repeatedly arrested plaintiff without cause)."},"case_id":4336089,"label":"a"}
{"context":"We have not directly addressed this issue before. But, to date, four other circuits -- the First, Seventh, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits -- have extended Engquist beyond the context of government employment.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"541 F.3d 1269, 1274","parenthetical":"\"We have little trouble applying the reasoning in Engquist ... to the circumstances in this case involving a government-contractor relationship.\"","sentence":"See Caesars Mass. Mgmt. Co. v. Crosby, 778 F.3d 327, 336-37 (1st Cir.2015) (applying Engquist to preclude four corporate plaintiffs from asserting an equal protection claim arising out of a decision by the Massachusetts Gaming Commission finding them unsuitable as proposed operators of a casino); Srail v. Village of Lisle, 588 F.3d 940, 944-45 (7th Cir.2009) (extending Engquist to preclude equal protection claim filed by residents of an incorporated subdivision claiming that the village in which they resided violated the Equal Protection Clause by refusing to supply water to subdivisions and schools attended by their children at adequate firefighting pressure and volume); Flowers v. City of Minneapolis, 558 F.3d 794, 799-800 (8th Cir.2009) (\u201cIn light of Engquist, ... we conclude that while a police officer\u2019s investigative decisions remain subject to traditional class-based equal protection analysis, they may not be attacked in a class-of-one equal protection claim.\u201d); United States v. Moore, 543 F.3d 891, 901 (7th Cir.2008) (extending Engquist to preclude class-of-one claims challenging prosecutorial decisions); Douglas Asphalt Co. v. Qore, Inc., 541 F.3d 1269, 1274 (11th Cir.2008) (\u201cWe have little trouble applying the reasoning in Engquist ... to the circumstances in this case involving a government-contractor relationship.\u201d); but see Analytical Diagnostic Labs, Inc. v. Kusel, 626 F.3d 135, 142-43 (2d Cir.2010) (refusing to extend Engquist to a claim challenging the state\u2019s exercise of \u201cits regulatory and licensing power\u201d); Hanes v. Zurick, 578 F.3d 491, 495-96 (7th Cir.2009) (refusing to extend Engquist to bar class-of-one claim alleging that defendant police officers repeatedly arrested plaintiff without cause)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"626 F.3d 135, 142-43","parenthetical":"refusing to extend Engquist to a claim challenging the state's exercise of \"its regulatory and licensing power\"","sentence":"See Caesars Mass. Mgmt. Co. v. Crosby, 778 F.3d 327, 336-37 (1st Cir.2015) (applying Engquist to preclude four corporate plaintiffs from asserting an equal protection claim arising out of a decision by the Massachusetts Gaming Commission finding them unsuitable as proposed operators of a casino); Srail v. Village of Lisle, 588 F.3d 940, 944-45 (7th Cir.2009) (extending Engquist to preclude equal protection claim filed by residents of an incorporated subdivision claiming that the village in which they resided violated the Equal Protection Clause by refusing to supply water to subdivisions and schools attended by their children at adequate firefighting pressure and volume); Flowers v. City of Minneapolis, 558 F.3d 794, 799-800 (8th Cir.2009) (\u201cIn light of Engquist, ... we conclude that while a police officer\u2019s investigative decisions remain subject to traditional class-based equal protection analysis, they may not be attacked in a class-of-one equal protection claim.\u201d); United States v. Moore, 543 F.3d 891, 901 (7th Cir.2008) (extending Engquist to preclude class-of-one claims challenging prosecutorial decisions); Douglas Asphalt Co. v. Qore, Inc., 541 F.3d 1269, 1274 (11th Cir.2008) (\u201cWe have little trouble applying the reasoning in Engquist ... to the circumstances in this case involving a government-contractor relationship.\u201d); but see Analytical Diagnostic Labs, Inc. v. Kusel, 626 F.3d 135, 142-43 (2d Cir.2010) (refusing to extend Engquist to a claim challenging the state\u2019s exercise of \u201cits regulatory and licensing power\u201d); Hanes v. Zurick, 578 F.3d 491, 495-96 (7th Cir.2009) (refusing to extend Engquist to bar class-of-one claim alleging that defendant police officers repeatedly arrested plaintiff without cause)."},"case_id":4336089,"label":"a"}
{"context":"We have not directly addressed this issue before. But, to date, four other circuits -- the First, Seventh, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits -- have extended Engquist beyond the context of government employment.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"541 F.3d 1269, 1274","parenthetical":"\"We have little trouble applying the reasoning in Engquist ... to the circumstances in this case involving a government-contractor relationship.\"","sentence":"See Caesars Mass. Mgmt. Co. v. Crosby, 778 F.3d 327, 336-37 (1st Cir.2015) (applying Engquist to preclude four corporate plaintiffs from asserting an equal protection claim arising out of a decision by the Massachusetts Gaming Commission finding them unsuitable as proposed operators of a casino); Srail v. Village of Lisle, 588 F.3d 940, 944-45 (7th Cir.2009) (extending Engquist to preclude equal protection claim filed by residents of an incorporated subdivision claiming that the village in which they resided violated the Equal Protection Clause by refusing to supply water to subdivisions and schools attended by their children at adequate firefighting pressure and volume); Flowers v. City of Minneapolis, 558 F.3d 794, 799-800 (8th Cir.2009) (\u201cIn light of Engquist, ... we conclude that while a police officer\u2019s investigative decisions remain subject to traditional class-based equal protection analysis, they may not be attacked in a class-of-one equal protection claim.\u201d); United States v. Moore, 543 F.3d 891, 901 (7th Cir.2008) (extending Engquist to preclude class-of-one claims challenging prosecutorial decisions); Douglas Asphalt Co. v. Qore, Inc., 541 F.3d 1269, 1274 (11th Cir.2008) (\u201cWe have little trouble applying the reasoning in Engquist ... to the circumstances in this case involving a government-contractor relationship.\u201d); but see Analytical Diagnostic Labs, Inc. v. Kusel, 626 F.3d 135, 142-43 (2d Cir.2010) (refusing to extend Engquist to a claim challenging the state\u2019s exercise of \u201cits regulatory and licensing power\u201d); Hanes v. Zurick, 578 F.3d 491, 495-96 (7th Cir.2009) (refusing to extend Engquist to bar class-of-one claim alleging that defendant police officers repeatedly arrested plaintiff without cause)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"578 F.3d 491, 495-96","parenthetical":"refusing to extend Engquist to bar class-of-one claim alleging that defendant police officers repeatedly arrested plaintiff without cause","sentence":"See Caesars Mass. Mgmt. Co. v. Crosby, 778 F.3d 327, 336-37 (1st Cir.2015) (applying Engquist to preclude four corporate plaintiffs from asserting an equal protection claim arising out of a decision by the Massachusetts Gaming Commission finding them unsuitable as proposed operators of a casino); Srail v. Village of Lisle, 588 F.3d 940, 944-45 (7th Cir.2009) (extending Engquist to preclude equal protection claim filed by residents of an incorporated subdivision claiming that the village in which they resided violated the Equal Protection Clause by refusing to supply water to subdivisions and schools attended by their children at adequate firefighting pressure and volume); Flowers v. City of Minneapolis, 558 F.3d 794, 799-800 (8th Cir.2009) (\u201cIn light of Engquist, ... we conclude that while a police officer\u2019s investigative decisions remain subject to traditional class-based equal protection analysis, they may not be attacked in a class-of-one equal protection claim.\u201d); United States v. Moore, 543 F.3d 891, 901 (7th Cir.2008) (extending Engquist to preclude class-of-one claims challenging prosecutorial decisions); Douglas Asphalt Co. v. Qore, Inc., 541 F.3d 1269, 1274 (11th Cir.2008) (\u201cWe have little trouble applying the reasoning in Engquist ... to the circumstances in this case involving a government-contractor relationship.\u201d); but see Analytical Diagnostic Labs, Inc. v. Kusel, 626 F.3d 135, 142-43 (2d Cir.2010) (refusing to extend Engquist to a claim challenging the state\u2019s exercise of \u201cits regulatory and licensing power\u201d); Hanes v. Zurick, 578 F.3d 491, 495-96 (7th Cir.2009) (refusing to extend Engquist to bar class-of-one claim alleging that defendant police officers repeatedly arrested plaintiff without cause)."},"case_id":4336089,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Turning more specifically to the issue before the Court, on a motion for judg ment on the pleadings, as with motions to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b), the Court is not strictly limited to the facts addressed in the pleadings; the Court may take judicial notice of additional facts where appropriate.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"803 F.2d 500, 504","parenthetical":"\"On a motion to dismiss, we may take judicial notice of matters of public record outside the pleadings.\"","sentence":"MGIC Indemnity Corp. v. Weisman, 803 F.2d 500, 504 (9th Cir.1986) (\u201cOn a motion to dismiss, we may take judicial notice of matters of public record outside the pleadings.\u201d) (citations omitted); Phillips v. Bureau of Prisons, 591 F.2d 966, 969 (D.C.Cir.1979) (on defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss, the Court will consider factual allegations of complaint and matters of general public record); see, e.g., Huntt v. Government of the Virgin Islands, 339 F.2d 309, 310 (3d Cir.1964) (taking judicial notice of certain facts on a Rule 12(c) motion)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"339 F.2d 309, 310","parenthetical":"taking judicial notice of certain facts on a Rule 12(c","sentence":"MGIC Indemnity Corp. v. Weisman, 803 F.2d 500, 504 (9th Cir.1986) (\u201cOn a motion to dismiss, we may take judicial notice of matters of public record outside the pleadings.\u201d) (citations omitted); Phillips v. Bureau of Prisons, 591 F.2d 966, 969 (D.C.Cir.1979) (on defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss, the Court will consider factual allegations of complaint and matters of general public record); see, e.g., Huntt v. Government of the Virgin Islands, 339 F.2d 309, 310 (3d Cir.1964) (taking judicial notice of certain facts on a Rule 12(c) motion)."},"case_id":11315131,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Turning more specifically to the issue before the Court, on a motion for judg ment on the pleadings, as with motions to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b), the Court is not strictly limited to the facts addressed in the pleadings; the Court may take judicial notice of additional facts where appropriate.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"339 F.2d 309, 310","parenthetical":"taking judicial notice of certain facts on a Rule 12(c","sentence":"MGIC Indemnity Corp. v. Weisman, 803 F.2d 500, 504 (9th Cir.1986) (\u201cOn a motion to dismiss, we may take judicial notice of matters of public record outside the pleadings.\u201d) (citations omitted); Phillips v. Bureau of Prisons, 591 F.2d 966, 969 (D.C.Cir.1979) (on defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss, the Court will consider factual allegations of complaint and matters of general public record); see, e.g., Huntt v. Government of the Virgin Islands, 339 F.2d 309, 310 (3d Cir.1964) (taking judicial notice of certain facts on a Rule 12(c) motion)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"591 F.2d 966, 969","parenthetical":"on defendant's motion to dismiss, the Court will consider factual allegations of complaint and matters of general public record","sentence":"MGIC Indemnity Corp. v. Weisman, 803 F.2d 500, 504 (9th Cir.1986) (\u201cOn a motion to dismiss, we may take judicial notice of matters of public record outside the pleadings.\u201d) (citations omitted); Phillips v. Bureau of Prisons, 591 F.2d 966, 969 (D.C.Cir.1979) (on defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss, the Court will consider factual allegations of complaint and matters of general public record); see, e.g., Huntt v. Government of the Virgin Islands, 339 F.2d 309, 310 (3d Cir.1964) (taking judicial notice of certain facts on a Rule 12(c) motion)."},"case_id":11315131,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Furthermore, we find that the topic of workplace tobacco usage is unlike those significant core entrepreneurial topics that are more naturally considered to be inherently managerial in nature such as decisions regarding the programs of the employer, standards of service, overall budget, use of technologies, organizational structure, and selection and direction of employees. See 43 P.S. SS 1101.702. Thus, we conclude that collective bargaining over the policy regarding tobacco usage does not unduly infringe upon the employer's inherent managerial decision making. Therefore, in these circumstances, the Borough's ban on tobacco products was not a managerial prerogative, and, thus, was subject to mandatory collective bargaining.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"920 F.2d 45, 47-8","parenthetical":"concluding mission to educate public about dangers of smoking was not compelling need that rendered ban on smoking in workplace non-bargainable under Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Act, 5 U.S.C. SS 7101 et seq.","sentence":"See Crawford County, 659 A.2d at 1081-82 (finding ban on smoking in jail to be a mandatory subject of bargaining and rejecting the argument that policy concerns relating to health and second hand smoke and possible fire hazard rendered the topic a managerial prerogative); Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 459 A.2d at 455 (determining workplace smoking was \u201cat the center of those subjects properly described as \u2018conditions of employment\u2019 and to be entirely unrelated to those entrepreneurial or managerial judgments fundamental to the basic direction of the enterprise\u201d); see also Dep\u2019t of Health and Human Serv. v. FLRA, 920 F.2d 45, 47-8 (D.C.Cir.1990) (concluding mission to educate public about dangers of smoking was not compelling need that rendered ban on smoking in workplace non-bargainable under Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Act, 5 U.S.C. \u00a7 7101 et seq.)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"659 A.2d 1081, 1081-82","parenthetical":"finding ban on smoking in jail to be a mandatory subject of bargaining and rejecting the argument that policy concerns relating to health and second hand smoke and possible fire hazard rendered the topic a managerial prerogative","sentence":"See Crawford County, 659 A.2d at 1081-82 (finding ban on smoking in jail to be a mandatory subject of bargaining and rejecting the argument that policy concerns relating to health and second hand smoke and possible fire hazard rendered the topic a managerial prerogative); Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 459 A.2d at 455 (determining workplace smoking was \u201cat the center of those subjects properly described as \u2018conditions of employment\u2019 and to be entirely unrelated to those entrepreneurial or managerial judgments fundamental to the basic direction of the enterprise\u201d); see also Dep\u2019t of Health and Human Serv. v. FLRA, 920 F.2d 45, 47-8 (D.C.Cir.1990) (concluding mission to educate public about dangers of smoking was not compelling need that rendered ban on smoking in workplace non-bargainable under Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Act, 5 U.S.C. \u00a7 7101 et seq.)."},"case_id":7288063,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Furthermore, we find that the topic of workplace tobacco usage is unlike those significant core entrepreneurial topics that are more naturally considered to be inherently managerial in nature such as decisions regarding the programs of the employer, standards of service, overall budget, use of technologies, organizational structure, and selection and direction of employees. See 43 P.S. SS 1101.702. Thus, we conclude that collective bargaining over the policy regarding tobacco usage does not unduly infringe upon the employer's inherent managerial decision making. Therefore, in these circumstances, the Borough's ban on tobacco products was not a managerial prerogative, and, thus, was subject to mandatory collective bargaining.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"920 F.2d 45, 47-8","parenthetical":"concluding mission to educate public about dangers of smoking was not compelling need that rendered ban on smoking in workplace non-bargainable under Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Act, 5 U.S.C. SS 7101 et seq.","sentence":"See Crawford County, 659 A.2d at 1081-82 (finding ban on smoking in jail to be a mandatory subject of bargaining and rejecting the argument that policy concerns relating to health and second hand smoke and possible fire hazard rendered the topic a managerial prerogative); Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 459 A.2d at 455 (determining workplace smoking was \u201cat the center of those subjects properly described as \u2018conditions of employment\u2019 and to be entirely unrelated to those entrepreneurial or managerial judgments fundamental to the basic direction of the enterprise\u201d); see also Dep\u2019t of Health and Human Serv. v. FLRA, 920 F.2d 45, 47-8 (D.C.Cir.1990) (concluding mission to educate public about dangers of smoking was not compelling need that rendered ban on smoking in workplace non-bargainable under Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Act, 5 U.S.C. \u00a7 7101 et seq.)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"459 A.2d 455, 455","parenthetical":"determining workplace smoking was \"at the center of those subjects properly described as 'conditions of employment' and to be entirely unrelated to those entrepreneurial or managerial judgments fundamental to the basic direction of the enterprise\"","sentence":"See Crawford County, 659 A.2d at 1081-82 (finding ban on smoking in jail to be a mandatory subject of bargaining and rejecting the argument that policy concerns relating to health and second hand smoke and possible fire hazard rendered the topic a managerial prerogative); Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 459 A.2d at 455 (determining workplace smoking was \u201cat the center of those subjects properly described as \u2018conditions of employment\u2019 and to be entirely unrelated to those entrepreneurial or managerial judgments fundamental to the basic direction of the enterprise\u201d); see also Dep\u2019t of Health and Human Serv. v. FLRA, 920 F.2d 45, 47-8 (D.C.Cir.1990) (concluding mission to educate public about dangers of smoking was not compelling need that rendered ban on smoking in workplace non-bargainable under Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Act, 5 U.S.C. \u00a7 7101 et seq.)."},"case_id":7288063,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Fourth, and finally, if the order of payment is not forthcoming, the equity court may find a non-paying party in contempt, upon proper petition thereof. Such a continuing review of a divorced couple's relative rights and duties under the divorce decree is consistent with the powers and jurisdiction of an equity court.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"290 Md. 641, 648-53","parenthetical":"\"The General Assembly was unambiguously endowing the equity court sitting in divorce ... with the general powers normally exercised by that court in other matters.\"","sentence":"See FL \u00a7 1-201 and \u00a7 1-203 (formerly CJ \u00a7 3-603); Winston v. Winston, 290 Md. 641, 648-53, 431 A.2d 1330 (1981) (\u201cThe General Assembly was unambiguously endowing the equity court sitting in divorce ... with the general powers normally exercised by that court in other matters.\u201d); see also Brewster v. Brewster, 207 Md. 193, 199, 114 A.2d 53 (1955) (\u201cAnd it is well settled that the jurisdiction of an equity court, once acquired, continues until all matters in litigation are finally disposed of.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"207 Md. 193, 199","parenthetical":"\"And it is well settled that the jurisdiction of an equity court, once acquired, continues until all matters in litigation are finally disposed of.\"","sentence":"See FL \u00a7 1-201 and \u00a7 1-203 (formerly CJ \u00a7 3-603); Winston v. Winston, 290 Md. 641, 648-53, 431 A.2d 1330 (1981) (\u201cThe General Assembly was unambiguously endowing the equity court sitting in divorce ... with the general powers normally exercised by that court in other matters.\u201d); see also Brewster v. Brewster, 207 Md. 193, 199, 114 A.2d 53 (1955) (\u201cAnd it is well settled that the jurisdiction of an equity court, once acquired, continues until all matters in litigation are finally disposed of.\u201d)."},"case_id":2262447,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Fourth, and finally, if the order of payment is not forthcoming, the equity court may find a non-paying party in contempt, upon proper petition thereof. Such a continuing review of a divorced couple's relative rights and duties under the divorce decree is consistent with the powers and jurisdiction of an equity court.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"And it is well settled that the jurisdiction of an equity court, once acquired, continues until all matters in litigation are finally disposed of.\"","sentence":"See FL \u00a7 1-201 and \u00a7 1-203 (formerly CJ \u00a7 3-603); Winston v. Winston, 290 Md. 641, 648-53, 431 A.2d 1330 (1981) (\u201cThe General Assembly was unambiguously endowing the equity court sitting in divorce ... with the general powers normally exercised by that court in other matters.\u201d); see also Brewster v. Brewster, 207 Md. 193, 199, 114 A.2d 53 (1955) (\u201cAnd it is well settled that the jurisdiction of an equity court, once acquired, continues until all matters in litigation are finally disposed of.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"290 Md. 641, 648-53","parenthetical":"\"The General Assembly was unambiguously endowing the equity court sitting in divorce ... with the general powers normally exercised by that court in other matters.\"","sentence":"See FL \u00a7 1-201 and \u00a7 1-203 (formerly CJ \u00a7 3-603); Winston v. Winston, 290 Md. 641, 648-53, 431 A.2d 1330 (1981) (\u201cThe General Assembly was unambiguously endowing the equity court sitting in divorce ... with the general powers normally exercised by that court in other matters.\u201d); see also Brewster v. Brewster, 207 Md. 193, 199, 114 A.2d 53 (1955) (\u201cAnd it is well settled that the jurisdiction of an equity court, once acquired, continues until all matters in litigation are finally disposed of.\u201d)."},"case_id":2262447,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Fourth, and finally, if the order of payment is not forthcoming, the equity court may find a non-paying party in contempt, upon proper petition thereof. Such a continuing review of a divorced couple's relative rights and duties under the divorce decree is consistent with the powers and jurisdiction of an equity court.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"The General Assembly was unambiguously endowing the equity court sitting in divorce ... with the general powers normally exercised by that court in other matters.\"","sentence":"See FL \u00a7 1-201 and \u00a7 1-203 (formerly CJ \u00a7 3-603); Winston v. Winston, 290 Md. 641, 648-53, 431 A.2d 1330 (1981) (\u201cThe General Assembly was unambiguously endowing the equity court sitting in divorce ... with the general powers normally exercised by that court in other matters.\u201d); see also Brewster v. Brewster, 207 Md. 193, 199, 114 A.2d 53 (1955) (\u201cAnd it is well settled that the jurisdiction of an equity court, once acquired, continues until all matters in litigation are finally disposed of.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"207 Md. 193, 199","parenthetical":"\"And it is well settled that the jurisdiction of an equity court, once acquired, continues until all matters in litigation are finally disposed of.\"","sentence":"See FL \u00a7 1-201 and \u00a7 1-203 (formerly CJ \u00a7 3-603); Winston v. Winston, 290 Md. 641, 648-53, 431 A.2d 1330 (1981) (\u201cThe General Assembly was unambiguously endowing the equity court sitting in divorce ... with the general powers normally exercised by that court in other matters.\u201d); see also Brewster v. Brewster, 207 Md. 193, 199, 114 A.2d 53 (1955) (\u201cAnd it is well settled that the jurisdiction of an equity court, once acquired, continues until all matters in litigation are finally disposed of.\u201d)."},"case_id":2262447,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Fourth, and finally, if the order of payment is not forthcoming, the equity court may find a non-paying party in contempt, upon proper petition thereof. Such a continuing review of a divorced couple's relative rights and duties under the divorce decree is consistent with the powers and jurisdiction of an equity court.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"The General Assembly was unambiguously endowing the equity court sitting in divorce ... with the general powers normally exercised by that court in other matters.\"","sentence":"See FL \u00a7 1-201 and \u00a7 1-203 (formerly CJ \u00a7 3-603); Winston v. Winston, 290 Md. 641, 648-53, 431 A.2d 1330 (1981) (\u201cThe General Assembly was unambiguously endowing the equity court sitting in divorce ... with the general powers normally exercised by that court in other matters.\u201d); see also Brewster v. Brewster, 207 Md. 193, 199, 114 A.2d 53 (1955) (\u201cAnd it is well settled that the jurisdiction of an equity court, once acquired, continues until all matters in litigation are finally disposed of.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"And it is well settled that the jurisdiction of an equity court, once acquired, continues until all matters in litigation are finally disposed of.\"","sentence":"See FL \u00a7 1-201 and \u00a7 1-203 (formerly CJ \u00a7 3-603); Winston v. Winston, 290 Md. 641, 648-53, 431 A.2d 1330 (1981) (\u201cThe General Assembly was unambiguously endowing the equity court sitting in divorce ... with the general powers normally exercised by that court in other matters.\u201d); see also Brewster v. Brewster, 207 Md. 193, 199, 114 A.2d 53 (1955) (\u201cAnd it is well settled that the jurisdiction of an equity court, once acquired, continues until all matters in litigation are finally disposed of.\u201d)."},"case_id":2262447,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Respondents contend that under Rhude parties can never contractually agree to be personally liable for ad valorem taxes. We disagree. First, we note that by undertaking an analysis of the parties' lease agreement, the Rhude court implicitly recognized that a contract can create personal liability to pay ad valorem taxes.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"123 N.W.2d 199, 199","parenthetical":"acknowledging that the state's argument would be tenable if the court ignored certain contractual language","sentence":"See id. at 20, 123 N.W.2d at 199 (acknowledging that the state\u2019s argument would be tenable if the court ignored certain contractual language); see also State v. Barrett & Zimmerman, 228 Minn. 96, 99, 36 N.W.2d 590, 593 (1949) (recognizing that an owner of property could be personally liable to one who voluntarily pays ad valorem taxes if the parties executed a valid contract or agreement). If a contract could never create personal liability, the Rhude court\u2019s analysis of the lease agreement would be superfluous."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"228 Minn. 96, 99","parenthetical":"recognizing that an owner of property could be personally liable to one who voluntarily pays ad valorem taxes if the parties executed a valid contract or agreement","sentence":"See id. at 20, 123 N.W.2d at 199 (acknowledging that the state\u2019s argument would be tenable if the court ignored certain contractual language); see also State v. Barrett & Zimmerman, 228 Minn. 96, 99, 36 N.W.2d 590, 593 (1949) (recognizing that an owner of property could be personally liable to one who voluntarily pays ad valorem taxes if the parties executed a valid contract or agreement). If a contract could never create personal liability, the Rhude court\u2019s analysis of the lease agreement would be superfluous."},"case_id":11978275,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Respondents contend that under Rhude parties can never contractually agree to be personally liable for ad valorem taxes. We disagree. First, we note that by undertaking an analysis of the parties' lease agreement, the Rhude court implicitly recognized that a contract can create personal liability to pay ad valorem taxes.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"123 N.W.2d 199, 199","parenthetical":"acknowledging that the state's argument would be tenable if the court ignored certain contractual language","sentence":"See id. at 20, 123 N.W.2d at 199 (acknowledging that the state\u2019s argument would be tenable if the court ignored certain contractual language); see also State v. Barrett & Zimmerman, 228 Minn. 96, 99, 36 N.W.2d 590, 593 (1949) (recognizing that an owner of property could be personally liable to one who voluntarily pays ad valorem taxes if the parties executed a valid contract or agreement). If a contract could never create personal liability, the Rhude court\u2019s analysis of the lease agreement would be superfluous."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"36 N.W.2d 590, 593","parenthetical":"recognizing that an owner of property could be personally liable to one who voluntarily pays ad valorem taxes if the parties executed a valid contract or agreement","sentence":"See id. at 20, 123 N.W.2d at 199 (acknowledging that the state\u2019s argument would be tenable if the court ignored certain contractual language); see also State v. Barrett & Zimmerman, 228 Minn. 96, 99, 36 N.W.2d 590, 593 (1949) (recognizing that an owner of property could be personally liable to one who voluntarily pays ad valorem taxes if the parties executed a valid contract or agreement). If a contract could never create personal liability, the Rhude court\u2019s analysis of the lease agreement would be superfluous."},"case_id":11978275,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The appellant raises a related error that the Court must address so that it will not be repeated by the Board on remand. It is well settled that the Court will not ordinarily consider additional allegations of error that have been rendered moot by the Court's opinion or that would require the Court to issue an advisory opinion. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Federal Circuit), however, has recognized the need to address additional arguments, after the court determines that remand is necessary, in order to provide guidance to the lower tribunal.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"stating that courts of appeal have wide latitude in deciding how to write an opinion","sentence":"See Xerox Corp. v. 3Com Corp., 458 F.3d 1310, 1314-1315 (Fed.Cir.2006) (discussing a prior decision in which the court addressed additional arguments for the express purpose of providing guidance to the district court on remand); see also Taylor v. McKeithen, 407 U.S. 191, 194 n. 4, 92 S.Ct. 1980, 32 L.Ed.2d 648 (1972) (stating that courts of appeal have wide latitude in deciding how to write an opinion); accord Bernklau v. Principi, 291 F.3d 795, 801 (Fed.Cir.2002)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"458 F.3d 1310, 1314-1315","parenthetical":"discussing a prior decision in which the court addressed additional arguments for the express purpose of providing guidance to the district court on remand","sentence":"See Xerox Corp. v. 3Com Corp., 458 F.3d 1310, 1314-1315 (Fed.Cir.2006) (discussing a prior decision in which the court addressed additional arguments for the express purpose of providing guidance to the district court on remand); see also Taylor v. McKeithen, 407 U.S. 191, 194 n. 4, 92 S.Ct. 1980, 32 L.Ed.2d 648 (1972) (stating that courts of appeal have wide latitude in deciding how to write an opinion); accord Bernklau v. Principi, 291 F.3d 795, 801 (Fed.Cir.2002)."},"case_id":5633249,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The appellant raises a related error that the Court must address so that it will not be repeated by the Board on remand. It is well settled that the Court will not ordinarily consider additional allegations of error that have been rendered moot by the Court's opinion or that would require the Court to issue an advisory opinion. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Federal Circuit), however, has recognized the need to address additional arguments, after the court determines that remand is necessary, in order to provide guidance to the lower tribunal.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"stating that courts of appeal have wide latitude in deciding how to write an opinion","sentence":"See Xerox Corp. v. 3Com Corp., 458 F.3d 1310, 1314-1315 (Fed.Cir.2006) (discussing a prior decision in which the court addressed additional arguments for the express purpose of providing guidance to the district court on remand); see also Taylor v. McKeithen, 407 U.S. 191, 194 n. 4, 92 S.Ct. 1980, 32 L.Ed.2d 648 (1972) (stating that courts of appeal have wide latitude in deciding how to write an opinion); accord Bernklau v. Principi, 291 F.3d 795, 801 (Fed.Cir.2002)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"458 F.3d 1310, 1314-1315","parenthetical":"discussing a prior decision in which the court addressed additional arguments for the express purpose of providing guidance to the district court on remand","sentence":"See Xerox Corp. v. 3Com Corp., 458 F.3d 1310, 1314-1315 (Fed.Cir.2006) (discussing a prior decision in which the court addressed additional arguments for the express purpose of providing guidance to the district court on remand); see also Taylor v. McKeithen, 407 U.S. 191, 194 n. 4, 92 S.Ct. 1980, 32 L.Ed.2d 648 (1972) (stating that courts of appeal have wide latitude in deciding how to write an opinion); accord Bernklau v. Principi, 291 F.3d 795, 801 (Fed.Cir.2002)."},"case_id":5633249,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The appellant raises a related error that the Court must address so that it will not be repeated by the Board on remand. It is well settled that the Court will not ordinarily consider additional allegations of error that have been rendered moot by the Court's opinion or that would require the Court to issue an advisory opinion. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Federal Circuit), however, has recognized the need to address additional arguments, after the court determines that remand is necessary, in order to provide guidance to the lower tribunal.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"458 F.3d 1310, 1314-1315","parenthetical":"discussing a prior decision in which the court addressed additional arguments for the express purpose of providing guidance to the district court on remand","sentence":"See Xerox Corp. v. 3Com Corp., 458 F.3d 1310, 1314-1315 (Fed.Cir.2006) (discussing a prior decision in which the court addressed additional arguments for the express purpose of providing guidance to the district court on remand); see also Taylor v. McKeithen, 407 U.S. 191, 194 n. 4, 92 S.Ct. 1980, 32 L.Ed.2d 648 (1972) (stating that courts of appeal have wide latitude in deciding how to write an opinion); accord Bernklau v. Principi, 291 F.3d 795, 801 (Fed.Cir.2002)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"stating that courts of appeal have wide latitude in deciding how to write an opinion","sentence":"See Xerox Corp. v. 3Com Corp., 458 F.3d 1310, 1314-1315 (Fed.Cir.2006) (discussing a prior decision in which the court addressed additional arguments for the express purpose of providing guidance to the district court on remand); see also Taylor v. McKeithen, 407 U.S. 191, 194 n. 4, 92 S.Ct. 1980, 32 L.Ed.2d 648 (1972) (stating that courts of appeal have wide latitude in deciding how to write an opinion); accord Bernklau v. Principi, 291 F.3d 795, 801 (Fed.Cir.2002)."},"case_id":5633249,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The relevant facts regarding the basis for and means to challenge the HomeWorks charge were neither obscured, nor inaccessible.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"rejecting plaintiffs claim that the voluntary payment doctrine was inapplicable because \"the facts were not obscured nor were they inaccessible as plaintiff claims\" and in fact the relevant information was available \"from [plaintiffs] own client\"","sentence":"Goldstein Oil Co. v. Cook Cty., 156 Ill.App.3d 180, 108 Ill.Dec. 842, 509 N.E.2d 538, 542 (1987) (rejecting plaintiffs claim that the voluntary payment doctrine was inapplicable because \u201cthe facts were not obscured nor were they inaccessible as plaintiff claims\u201d and in fact the relevant information was available \u201cfrom [plaintiffs] own client\u201d); see also Randazzo, 262 F.3d at 667 (explaining that the voluntary payment doctrine \u201cholds that a person who voluntarily pays another with full 'knowledge of the facts will not be entitled to restitution\u201d). As the district court noted, the charge by Adaptive provided the name of the charge as Home-Works Plus \u2014 the name of the product discussed in the telemarketing phone call\u2014 and provided a telephone number next to the charge for customers to call. Spivey, 660 F.Supp.2d at 951."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"262 F.3d 667, 667","parenthetical":"explaining that the voluntary payment doctrine \"holds that a person who voluntarily pays another with full 'knowledge of the facts will not be entitled to restitution\"","sentence":"Goldstein Oil Co. v. Cook Cty., 156 Ill.App.3d 180, 108 Ill.Dec. 842, 509 N.E.2d 538, 542 (1987) (rejecting plaintiffs claim that the voluntary payment doctrine was inapplicable because \u201cthe facts were not obscured nor were they inaccessible as plaintiff claims\u201d and in fact the relevant information was available \u201cfrom [plaintiffs] own client\u201d); see also Randazzo, 262 F.3d at 667 (explaining that the voluntary payment doctrine \u201cholds that a person who voluntarily pays another with full 'knowledge of the facts will not be entitled to restitution\u201d). As the district court noted, the charge by Adaptive provided the name of the charge as Home-Works Plus \u2014 the name of the product discussed in the telemarketing phone call\u2014 and provided a telephone number next to the charge for customers to call. Spivey, 660 F.Supp.2d at 951."},"case_id":3787429,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The relevant facts regarding the basis for and means to challenge the HomeWorks charge were neither obscured, nor inaccessible.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"660 F.Supp.2d 951, 951","parenthetical":"explaining that the voluntary payment doctrine \"holds that a person who voluntarily pays another with full 'knowledge of the facts will not be entitled to restitution\"","sentence":"Goldstein Oil Co. v. Cook Cty., 156 Ill.App.3d 180, 108 Ill.Dec. 842, 509 N.E.2d 538, 542 (1987) (rejecting plaintiffs claim that the voluntary payment doctrine was inapplicable because \u201cthe facts were not obscured nor were they inaccessible as plaintiff claims\u201d and in fact the relevant information was available \u201cfrom [plaintiffs] own client\u201d); see also Randazzo, 262 F.3d at 667 (explaining that the voluntary payment doctrine \u201cholds that a person who voluntarily pays another with full 'knowledge of the facts will not be entitled to restitution\u201d). As the district court noted, the charge by Adaptive provided the name of the charge as Home-Works Plus \u2014 the name of the product discussed in the telemarketing phone call\u2014 and provided a telephone number next to the charge for customers to call. Spivey, 660 F.Supp.2d at 951."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"rejecting plaintiffs claim that the voluntary payment doctrine was inapplicable because \"the facts were not obscured nor were they inaccessible as plaintiff claims\" and in fact the relevant information was available \"from [plaintiffs] own client\"","sentence":"Goldstein Oil Co. v. Cook Cty., 156 Ill.App.3d 180, 108 Ill.Dec. 842, 509 N.E.2d 538, 542 (1987) (rejecting plaintiffs claim that the voluntary payment doctrine was inapplicable because \u201cthe facts were not obscured nor were they inaccessible as plaintiff claims\u201d and in fact the relevant information was available \u201cfrom [plaintiffs] own client\u201d); see also Randazzo, 262 F.3d at 667 (explaining that the voluntary payment doctrine \u201cholds that a person who voluntarily pays another with full 'knowledge of the facts will not be entitled to restitution\u201d). As the district court noted, the charge by Adaptive provided the name of the charge as Home-Works Plus \u2014 the name of the product discussed in the telemarketing phone call\u2014 and provided a telephone number next to the charge for customers to call. Spivey, 660 F.Supp.2d at 951."},"case_id":3787429,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The relevant facts regarding the basis for and means to challenge the HomeWorks charge were neither obscured, nor inaccessible.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"262 F.3d 667, 667","parenthetical":"explaining that the voluntary payment doctrine \"holds that a person who voluntarily pays another with full 'knowledge of the facts will not be entitled to restitution\"","sentence":"Goldstein Oil Co. v. Cook Cty., 156 Ill.App.3d 180, 108 Ill.Dec. 842, 509 N.E.2d 538, 542 (1987) (rejecting plaintiffs claim that the voluntary payment doctrine was inapplicable because \u201cthe facts were not obscured nor were they inaccessible as plaintiff claims\u201d and in fact the relevant information was available \u201cfrom [plaintiffs] own client\u201d); see also Randazzo, 262 F.3d at 667 (explaining that the voluntary payment doctrine \u201cholds that a person who voluntarily pays another with full 'knowledge of the facts will not be entitled to restitution\u201d). As the district court noted, the charge by Adaptive provided the name of the charge as Home-Works Plus \u2014 the name of the product discussed in the telemarketing phone call\u2014 and provided a telephone number next to the charge for customers to call. Spivey, 660 F.Supp.2d at 951."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"rejecting plaintiffs claim that the voluntary payment doctrine was inapplicable because \"the facts were not obscured nor were they inaccessible as plaintiff claims\" and in fact the relevant information was available \"from [plaintiffs] own client\"","sentence":"Goldstein Oil Co. v. Cook Cty., 156 Ill.App.3d 180, 108 Ill.Dec. 842, 509 N.E.2d 538, 542 (1987) (rejecting plaintiffs claim that the voluntary payment doctrine was inapplicable because \u201cthe facts were not obscured nor were they inaccessible as plaintiff claims\u201d and in fact the relevant information was available \u201cfrom [plaintiffs] own client\u201d); see also Randazzo, 262 F.3d at 667 (explaining that the voluntary payment doctrine \u201cholds that a person who voluntarily pays another with full 'knowledge of the facts will not be entitled to restitution\u201d). As the district court noted, the charge by Adaptive provided the name of the charge as Home-Works Plus \u2014 the name of the product discussed in the telemarketing phone call\u2014 and provided a telephone number next to the charge for customers to call. Spivey, 660 F.Supp.2d at 951."},"case_id":3787429,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The relevant facts regarding the basis for and means to challenge the HomeWorks charge were neither obscured, nor inaccessible.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"660 F.Supp.2d 951, 951","parenthetical":"explaining that the voluntary payment doctrine \"holds that a person who voluntarily pays another with full 'knowledge of the facts will not be entitled to restitution\"","sentence":"Goldstein Oil Co. v. Cook Cty., 156 Ill.App.3d 180, 108 Ill.Dec. 842, 509 N.E.2d 538, 542 (1987) (rejecting plaintiffs claim that the voluntary payment doctrine was inapplicable because \u201cthe facts were not obscured nor were they inaccessible as plaintiff claims\u201d and in fact the relevant information was available \u201cfrom [plaintiffs] own client\u201d); see also Randazzo, 262 F.3d at 667 (explaining that the voluntary payment doctrine \u201cholds that a person who voluntarily pays another with full 'knowledge of the facts will not be entitled to restitution\u201d). As the district court noted, the charge by Adaptive provided the name of the charge as Home-Works Plus \u2014 the name of the product discussed in the telemarketing phone call\u2014 and provided a telephone number next to the charge for customers to call. Spivey, 660 F.Supp.2d at 951."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"rejecting plaintiffs claim that the voluntary payment doctrine was inapplicable because \"the facts were not obscured nor were they inaccessible as plaintiff claims\" and in fact the relevant information was available \"from [plaintiffs] own client\"","sentence":"Goldstein Oil Co. v. Cook Cty., 156 Ill.App.3d 180, 108 Ill.Dec. 842, 509 N.E.2d 538, 542 (1987) (rejecting plaintiffs claim that the voluntary payment doctrine was inapplicable because \u201cthe facts were not obscured nor were they inaccessible as plaintiff claims\u201d and in fact the relevant information was available \u201cfrom [plaintiffs] own client\u201d); see also Randazzo, 262 F.3d at 667 (explaining that the voluntary payment doctrine \u201cholds that a person who voluntarily pays another with full 'knowledge of the facts will not be entitled to restitution\u201d). As the district court noted, the charge by Adaptive provided the name of the charge as Home-Works Plus \u2014 the name of the product discussed in the telemarketing phone call\u2014 and provided a telephone number next to the charge for customers to call. Spivey, 660 F.Supp.2d at 951."},"case_id":3787429,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The relevant facts regarding the basis for and means to challenge the HomeWorks charge were neither obscured, nor inaccessible.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"262 F.3d 667, 667","parenthetical":"explaining that the voluntary payment doctrine \"holds that a person who voluntarily pays another with full 'knowledge of the facts will not be entitled to restitution\"","sentence":"Goldstein Oil Co. v. Cook Cty., 156 Ill.App.3d 180, 108 Ill.Dec. 842, 509 N.E.2d 538, 542 (1987) (rejecting plaintiffs claim that the voluntary payment doctrine was inapplicable because \u201cthe facts were not obscured nor were they inaccessible as plaintiff claims\u201d and in fact the relevant information was available \u201cfrom [plaintiffs] own client\u201d); see also Randazzo, 262 F.3d at 667 (explaining that the voluntary payment doctrine \u201cholds that a person who voluntarily pays another with full 'knowledge of the facts will not be entitled to restitution\u201d). As the district court noted, the charge by Adaptive provided the name of the charge as Home-Works Plus \u2014 the name of the product discussed in the telemarketing phone call\u2014 and provided a telephone number next to the charge for customers to call. Spivey, 660 F.Supp.2d at 951."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"509 N.E.2d 538, 542","parenthetical":"rejecting plaintiffs claim that the voluntary payment doctrine was inapplicable because \"the facts were not obscured nor were they inaccessible as plaintiff claims\" and in fact the relevant information was available \"from [plaintiffs] own client\"","sentence":"Goldstein Oil Co. v. Cook Cty., 156 Ill.App.3d 180, 108 Ill.Dec. 842, 509 N.E.2d 538, 542 (1987) (rejecting plaintiffs claim that the voluntary payment doctrine was inapplicable because \u201cthe facts were not obscured nor were they inaccessible as plaintiff claims\u201d and in fact the relevant information was available \u201cfrom [plaintiffs] own client\u201d); see also Randazzo, 262 F.3d at 667 (explaining that the voluntary payment doctrine \u201cholds that a person who voluntarily pays another with full 'knowledge of the facts will not be entitled to restitution\u201d). As the district court noted, the charge by Adaptive provided the name of the charge as Home-Works Plus \u2014 the name of the product discussed in the telemarketing phone call\u2014 and provided a telephone number next to the charge for customers to call. Spivey, 660 F.Supp.2d at 951."},"case_id":3787429,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The relevant facts regarding the basis for and means to challenge the HomeWorks charge were neither obscured, nor inaccessible.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"509 N.E.2d 538, 542","parenthetical":"rejecting plaintiffs claim that the voluntary payment doctrine was inapplicable because \"the facts were not obscured nor were they inaccessible as plaintiff claims\" and in fact the relevant information was available \"from [plaintiffs] own client\"","sentence":"Goldstein Oil Co. v. Cook Cty., 156 Ill.App.3d 180, 108 Ill.Dec. 842, 509 N.E.2d 538, 542 (1987) (rejecting plaintiffs claim that the voluntary payment doctrine was inapplicable because \u201cthe facts were not obscured nor were they inaccessible as plaintiff claims\u201d and in fact the relevant information was available \u201cfrom [plaintiffs] own client\u201d); see also Randazzo, 262 F.3d at 667 (explaining that the voluntary payment doctrine \u201cholds that a person who voluntarily pays another with full 'knowledge of the facts will not be entitled to restitution\u201d). As the district court noted, the charge by Adaptive provided the name of the charge as Home-Works Plus \u2014 the name of the product discussed in the telemarketing phone call\u2014 and provided a telephone number next to the charge for customers to call. Spivey, 660 F.Supp.2d at 951."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"660 F.Supp.2d 951, 951","parenthetical":"explaining that the voluntary payment doctrine \"holds that a person who voluntarily pays another with full 'knowledge of the facts will not be entitled to restitution\"","sentence":"Goldstein Oil Co. v. Cook Cty., 156 Ill.App.3d 180, 108 Ill.Dec. 842, 509 N.E.2d 538, 542 (1987) (rejecting plaintiffs claim that the voluntary payment doctrine was inapplicable because \u201cthe facts were not obscured nor were they inaccessible as plaintiff claims\u201d and in fact the relevant information was available \u201cfrom [plaintiffs] own client\u201d); see also Randazzo, 262 F.3d at 667 (explaining that the voluntary payment doctrine \u201cholds that a person who voluntarily pays another with full 'knowledge of the facts will not be entitled to restitution\u201d). As the district court noted, the charge by Adaptive provided the name of the charge as Home-Works Plus \u2014 the name of the product discussed in the telemarketing phone call\u2014 and provided a telephone number next to the charge for customers to call. Spivey, 660 F.Supp.2d at 951."},"case_id":3787429,"label":"a"}
{"context":"This claim is barred from federal habeas review due to the imposition of an independent and adequate state procedural bar.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"297 F.3d 349, 357","parenthetical":"attorney error in filing state habeas appeal late \"cannot be constitutionally ineffective\"","sentence":"See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 752-53, 111 S.Ct. 2546 (Court holding that there is no constitutional right to counsel in state post-conviction proceedings); see also Ogan, 297 F.3d 349, 357 (5th Cir.2002) (attorney error in filing state habeas appeal late \u201ccannot be constitutionally ineffective\u201d); see also Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 377, 116 S.Ct. 2174, 135 L.Ed.2d 606 (1996) (economic parity not required by Fourteenth Amendment and no right to counsel in state post-conviction proceedings)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"501 U.S. 752, 752-53","parenthetical":"Court holding that there is no constitutional right to counsel in state post-conviction proceedings","sentence":"See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 752-53, 111 S.Ct. 2546 (Court holding that there is no constitutional right to counsel in state post-conviction proceedings); see also Ogan, 297 F.3d 349, 357 (5th Cir.2002) (attorney error in filing state habeas appeal late \u201ccannot be constitutionally ineffective\u201d); see also Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 377, 116 S.Ct. 2174, 135 L.Ed.2d 606 (1996) (economic parity not required by Fourteenth Amendment and no right to counsel in state post-conviction proceedings)."},"case_id":3808499,"label":"b"}
{"context":"This claim is barred from federal habeas review due to the imposition of an independent and adequate state procedural bar.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"518 U.S. 343, 377","parenthetical":"economic parity not required by Fourteenth Amendment and no right to counsel in state post-conviction proceedings","sentence":"See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 752-53, 111 S.Ct. 2546 (Court holding that there is no constitutional right to counsel in state post-conviction proceedings); see also Ogan, 297 F.3d 349, 357 (5th Cir.2002) (attorney error in filing state habeas appeal late \u201ccannot be constitutionally ineffective\u201d); see also Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 377, 116 S.Ct. 2174, 135 L.Ed.2d 606 (1996) (economic parity not required by Fourteenth Amendment and no right to counsel in state post-conviction proceedings)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"501 U.S. 752, 752-53","parenthetical":"Court holding that there is no constitutional right to counsel in state post-conviction proceedings","sentence":"See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 752-53, 111 S.Ct. 2546 (Court holding that there is no constitutional right to counsel in state post-conviction proceedings); see also Ogan, 297 F.3d 349, 357 (5th Cir.2002) (attorney error in filing state habeas appeal late \u201ccannot be constitutionally ineffective\u201d); see also Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 377, 116 S.Ct. 2174, 135 L.Ed.2d 606 (1996) (economic parity not required by Fourteenth Amendment and no right to counsel in state post-conviction proceedings)."},"case_id":3808499,"label":"b"}
{"context":"This claim is barred from federal habeas review due to the imposition of an independent and adequate state procedural bar.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"economic parity not required by Fourteenth Amendment and no right to counsel in state post-conviction proceedings","sentence":"See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 752-53, 111 S.Ct. 2546 (Court holding that there is no constitutional right to counsel in state post-conviction proceedings); see also Ogan, 297 F.3d 349, 357 (5th Cir.2002) (attorney error in filing state habeas appeal late \u201ccannot be constitutionally ineffective\u201d); see also Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 377, 116 S.Ct. 2174, 135 L.Ed.2d 606 (1996) (economic parity not required by Fourteenth Amendment and no right to counsel in state post-conviction proceedings)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"501 U.S. 752, 752-53","parenthetical":"Court holding that there is no constitutional right to counsel in state post-conviction proceedings","sentence":"See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 752-53, 111 S.Ct. 2546 (Court holding that there is no constitutional right to counsel in state post-conviction proceedings); see also Ogan, 297 F.3d 349, 357 (5th Cir.2002) (attorney error in filing state habeas appeal late \u201ccannot be constitutionally ineffective\u201d); see also Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 377, 116 S.Ct. 2174, 135 L.Ed.2d 606 (1996) (economic parity not required by Fourteenth Amendment and no right to counsel in state post-conviction proceedings)."},"case_id":3808499,"label":"b"}
{"context":"This claim is barred from federal habeas review due to the imposition of an independent and adequate state procedural bar.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"economic parity not required by Fourteenth Amendment and no right to counsel in state post-conviction proceedings","sentence":"See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 752-53, 111 S.Ct. 2546 (Court holding that there is no constitutional right to counsel in state post-conviction proceedings); see also Ogan, 297 F.3d 349, 357 (5th Cir.2002) (attorney error in filing state habeas appeal late \u201ccannot be constitutionally ineffective\u201d); see also Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 377, 116 S.Ct. 2174, 135 L.Ed.2d 606 (1996) (economic parity not required by Fourteenth Amendment and no right to counsel in state post-conviction proceedings)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"501 U.S. 752, 752-53","parenthetical":"Court holding that there is no constitutional right to counsel in state post-conviction proceedings","sentence":"See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 752-53, 111 S.Ct. 2546 (Court holding that there is no constitutional right to counsel in state post-conviction proceedings); see also Ogan, 297 F.3d 349, 357 (5th Cir.2002) (attorney error in filing state habeas appeal late \u201ccannot be constitutionally ineffective\u201d); see also Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 377, 116 S.Ct. 2174, 135 L.Ed.2d 606 (1996) (economic parity not required by Fourteenth Amendment and no right to counsel in state post-conviction proceedings)."},"case_id":3808499,"label":"b"}
{"context":"This claim is barred from federal habeas review due to the imposition of an independent and adequate state procedural bar.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"Court holding that there is no constitutional right to counsel in state post-conviction proceedings","sentence":"See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 752-53, 111 S.Ct. 2546 (Court holding that there is no constitutional right to counsel in state post-conviction proceedings); see also Ogan, 297 F.3d 349, 357 (5th Cir.2002) (attorney error in filing state habeas appeal late \u201ccannot be constitutionally ineffective\u201d); see also Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 377, 116 S.Ct. 2174, 135 L.Ed.2d 606 (1996) (economic parity not required by Fourteenth Amendment and no right to counsel in state post-conviction proceedings)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"297 F.3d 349, 357","parenthetical":"attorney error in filing state habeas appeal late \"cannot be constitutionally ineffective\"","sentence":"See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 752-53, 111 S.Ct. 2546 (Court holding that there is no constitutional right to counsel in state post-conviction proceedings); see also Ogan, 297 F.3d 349, 357 (5th Cir.2002) (attorney error in filing state habeas appeal late \u201ccannot be constitutionally ineffective\u201d); see also Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 377, 116 S.Ct. 2174, 135 L.Ed.2d 606 (1996) (economic parity not required by Fourteenth Amendment and no right to counsel in state post-conviction proceedings)."},"case_id":3808499,"label":"a"}
{"context":"This claim is barred from federal habeas review due to the imposition of an independent and adequate state procedural bar.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"Court holding that there is no constitutional right to counsel in state post-conviction proceedings","sentence":"See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 752-53, 111 S.Ct. 2546 (Court holding that there is no constitutional right to counsel in state post-conviction proceedings); see also Ogan, 297 F.3d 349, 357 (5th Cir.2002) (attorney error in filing state habeas appeal late \u201ccannot be constitutionally ineffective\u201d); see also Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 377, 116 S.Ct. 2174, 135 L.Ed.2d 606 (1996) (economic parity not required by Fourteenth Amendment and no right to counsel in state post-conviction proceedings)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"518 U.S. 343, 377","parenthetical":"economic parity not required by Fourteenth Amendment and no right to counsel in state post-conviction proceedings","sentence":"See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 752-53, 111 S.Ct. 2546 (Court holding that there is no constitutional right to counsel in state post-conviction proceedings); see also Ogan, 297 F.3d 349, 357 (5th Cir.2002) (attorney error in filing state habeas appeal late \u201ccannot be constitutionally ineffective\u201d); see also Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 377, 116 S.Ct. 2174, 135 L.Ed.2d 606 (1996) (economic parity not required by Fourteenth Amendment and no right to counsel in state post-conviction proceedings)."},"case_id":3808499,"label":"a"}
{"context":"This claim is barred from federal habeas review due to the imposition of an independent and adequate state procedural bar.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"Court holding that there is no constitutional right to counsel in state post-conviction proceedings","sentence":"See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 752-53, 111 S.Ct. 2546 (Court holding that there is no constitutional right to counsel in state post-conviction proceedings); see also Ogan, 297 F.3d 349, 357 (5th Cir.2002) (attorney error in filing state habeas appeal late \u201ccannot be constitutionally ineffective\u201d); see also Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 377, 116 S.Ct. 2174, 135 L.Ed.2d 606 (1996) (economic parity not required by Fourteenth Amendment and no right to counsel in state post-conviction proceedings)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"economic parity not required by Fourteenth Amendment and no right to counsel in state post-conviction proceedings","sentence":"See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 752-53, 111 S.Ct. 2546 (Court holding that there is no constitutional right to counsel in state post-conviction proceedings); see also Ogan, 297 F.3d 349, 357 (5th Cir.2002) (attorney error in filing state habeas appeal late \u201ccannot be constitutionally ineffective\u201d); see also Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 377, 116 S.Ct. 2174, 135 L.Ed.2d 606 (1996) (economic parity not required by Fourteenth Amendment and no right to counsel in state post-conviction proceedings)."},"case_id":3808499,"label":"a"}
{"context":"This claim is barred from federal habeas review due to the imposition of an independent and adequate state procedural bar.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"Court holding that there is no constitutional right to counsel in state post-conviction proceedings","sentence":"See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 752-53, 111 S.Ct. 2546 (Court holding that there is no constitutional right to counsel in state post-conviction proceedings); see also Ogan, 297 F.3d 349, 357 (5th Cir.2002) (attorney error in filing state habeas appeal late \u201ccannot be constitutionally ineffective\u201d); see also Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 377, 116 S.Ct. 2174, 135 L.Ed.2d 606 (1996) (economic parity not required by Fourteenth Amendment and no right to counsel in state post-conviction proceedings)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"economic parity not required by Fourteenth Amendment and no right to counsel in state post-conviction proceedings","sentence":"See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 752-53, 111 S.Ct. 2546 (Court holding that there is no constitutional right to counsel in state post-conviction proceedings); see also Ogan, 297 F.3d 349, 357 (5th Cir.2002) (attorney error in filing state habeas appeal late \u201ccannot be constitutionally ineffective\u201d); see also Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 377, 116 S.Ct. 2174, 135 L.Ed.2d 606 (1996) (economic parity not required by Fourteenth Amendment and no right to counsel in state post-conviction proceedings)."},"case_id":3808499,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The district court followed this Court's three-step sentencing process by (1) calculating the applicable Guidelines range; (2) ruling on all departure motions; and (3) exercising the court's discretion by considering all relevant 18 U.S.C. SS 3553(a) factors. The District Court then imposed a substantively reasonable sentence well below the Guidelines range.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"498 F.3d 204, 204","parenthetical":"\"A sentence that falls within the recommended Guidelines range, while not presumptively reasonable, is less likely to be unreasonable than a sentence outside the range.\"","sentence":"See United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 568 (3d Cir.2009) (en banc) (explaining that a procedurally sound sentence will be affirmed \u201cunless no reasonable sentencing court would have imposed the same sentence on that particular defendant for the reasons the district court provided\u201d); see also Lessner, 498 F.3d at 204 (\u201cA sentence that falls within the recommended Guidelines range, while not presumptively reasonable, is less likely to be unreasonable than a sentence outside the range.\u201d)- Any appeal of the District Court\u2019s sentence would be frivolous for an additional reason: Pursuant to the Plea Agreement, Tucker agreed not to appeal his sentence if it \u201cf[ell] within or below the Guidelines range that resultfed] from the agreed total Guidelines offense level of 42.\u201d Because Tucker\u2019s sentence of 264 months is well below the relevant Guidelines range, Tucker\u2019s Plea Agreement bars him from challenging the sentence."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"562 F.3d 558, 568","parenthetical":"explaining that a procedurally sound sentence will be affirmed \"unless no reasonable sentencing court would have imposed the same sentence on that particular defendant for the reasons the district court provided\"","sentence":"See United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 568 (3d Cir.2009) (en banc) (explaining that a procedurally sound sentence will be affirmed \u201cunless no reasonable sentencing court would have imposed the same sentence on that particular defendant for the reasons the district court provided\u201d); see also Lessner, 498 F.3d at 204 (\u201cA sentence that falls within the recommended Guidelines range, while not presumptively reasonable, is less likely to be unreasonable than a sentence outside the range.\u201d)- Any appeal of the District Court\u2019s sentence would be frivolous for an additional reason: Pursuant to the Plea Agreement, Tucker agreed not to appeal his sentence if it \u201cf[ell] within or below the Guidelines range that resultfed] from the agreed total Guidelines offense level of 42.\u201d Because Tucker\u2019s sentence of 264 months is well below the relevant Guidelines range, Tucker\u2019s Plea Agreement bars him from challenging the sentence."},"case_id":3814878,"label":"b"}
{"context":"There is no indication the plaintiffs seek disqualification as a litigation tactic or to harass the Cotters.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"73 Mass.App.Ct. 288, 288","parenthetical":"\"Where, as here, it is opposing counsel who seeks disqualification, we must 'be alert that the Canons of Ethics are not brandished for tactical advantage' \"","sentence":"See Steinert, 73 Mass.App.Ct. at 288, quoting Serody, 19 Mass.App.Ct. at 414 (\u201cWhere, as here, it is opposing counsel who seeks disqualification, we must \u2018be alert that the Canons of Ethics are not brandished for tactical advantage\u2019 \u201d); see also Gorovitz v. Planning Bd. of Nantucket 394 Mass. 246, 250 n.7 (1985) (\u201cCourt resources are sorely taxed by the increasing use of disqualification motions as harassment and dilatory tactics\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"Court resources are sorely taxed by the increasing use of disqualification motions as harassment and dilatory tactics\"","sentence":"See Steinert, 73 Mass.App.Ct. at 288, quoting Serody, 19 Mass.App.Ct. at 414 (\u201cWhere, as here, it is opposing counsel who seeks disqualification, we must \u2018be alert that the Canons of Ethics are not brandished for tactical advantage\u2019 \u201d); see also Gorovitz v. Planning Bd. of Nantucket 394 Mass. 246, 250 n.7 (1985) (\u201cCourt resources are sorely taxed by the increasing use of disqualification motions as harassment and dilatory tactics\u201d)."},"case_id":7344463,"label":"a"}
{"context":"There is no indication the plaintiffs seek disqualification as a litigation tactic or to harass the Cotters.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"Court resources are sorely taxed by the increasing use of disqualification motions as harassment and dilatory tactics\"","sentence":"See Steinert, 73 Mass.App.Ct. at 288, quoting Serody, 19 Mass.App.Ct. at 414 (\u201cWhere, as here, it is opposing counsel who seeks disqualification, we must \u2018be alert that the Canons of Ethics are not brandished for tactical advantage\u2019 \u201d); see also Gorovitz v. Planning Bd. of Nantucket 394 Mass. 246, 250 n.7 (1985) (\u201cCourt resources are sorely taxed by the increasing use of disqualification motions as harassment and dilatory tactics\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"19 Mass.App.Ct. 414, 414","parenthetical":"\"Where, as here, it is opposing counsel who seeks disqualification, we must 'be alert that the Canons of Ethics are not brandished for tactical advantage' \"","sentence":"See Steinert, 73 Mass.App.Ct. at 288, quoting Serody, 19 Mass.App.Ct. at 414 (\u201cWhere, as here, it is opposing counsel who seeks disqualification, we must \u2018be alert that the Canons of Ethics are not brandished for tactical advantage\u2019 \u201d); see also Gorovitz v. Planning Bd. of Nantucket 394 Mass. 246, 250 n.7 (1985) (\u201cCourt resources are sorely taxed by the increasing use of disqualification motions as harassment and dilatory tactics\u201d)."},"case_id":7344463,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Substantial evidence also supports the Board's finding that the Union's information request did not seek confidential information, did not constitute harassment, and was not overbroad, unduly burdensome, or sought in bad faith. Moreover, because an employer's statutory duty to provide requested relevant information is not limited to \"information relevant to grievable disputes,\" Endo's objections to the underlying grievance's merits do not excuse its noncompliance.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"622 F.2d 425, 430","parenthetical":"declining to add a grievability requirement to federal labor law","sentence":"See N.L.R.B. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 622 F.2d 425, 430 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 913, 101 S.Ct. 1353, 67 L.Ed.2d 337 (1981) (declining to add a grievability requirement to federal labor law); see also N.L.R.B. v. Acme Indus. Co., 385 U.S. 432, 436-38, 87 S.Ct. 565, 17 L.Ed.2d 495 (1967) (rejecting the argument that a grievance\u2019s merits limit an employer\u2019s statutory duty to disclose requested relevant information)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"385 U.S. 432, 436-38","parenthetical":"rejecting the argument that a grievance's merits limit an employer's statutory duty to disclose requested relevant information","sentence":"See N.L.R.B. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 622 F.2d 425, 430 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 913, 101 S.Ct. 1353, 67 L.Ed.2d 337 (1981) (declining to add a grievability requirement to federal labor law); see also N.L.R.B. v. Acme Indus. Co., 385 U.S. 432, 436-38, 87 S.Ct. 565, 17 L.Ed.2d 495 (1967) (rejecting the argument that a grievance\u2019s merits limit an employer\u2019s statutory duty to disclose requested relevant information)."},"case_id":12396503,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Substantial evidence also supports the Board's finding that the Union's information request did not seek confidential information, did not constitute harassment, and was not overbroad, unduly burdensome, or sought in bad faith. Moreover, because an employer's statutory duty to provide requested relevant information is not limited to \"information relevant to grievable disputes,\" Endo's objections to the underlying grievance's merits do not excuse its noncompliance.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"622 F.2d 425, 430","parenthetical":"declining to add a grievability requirement to federal labor law","sentence":"See N.L.R.B. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 622 F.2d 425, 430 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 913, 101 S.Ct. 1353, 67 L.Ed.2d 337 (1981) (declining to add a grievability requirement to federal labor law); see also N.L.R.B. v. Acme Indus. Co., 385 U.S. 432, 436-38, 87 S.Ct. 565, 17 L.Ed.2d 495 (1967) (rejecting the argument that a grievance\u2019s merits limit an employer\u2019s statutory duty to disclose requested relevant information)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"rejecting the argument that a grievance's merits limit an employer's statutory duty to disclose requested relevant information","sentence":"See N.L.R.B. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 622 F.2d 425, 430 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 913, 101 S.Ct. 1353, 67 L.Ed.2d 337 (1981) (declining to add a grievability requirement to federal labor law); see also N.L.R.B. v. Acme Indus. Co., 385 U.S. 432, 436-38, 87 S.Ct. 565, 17 L.Ed.2d 495 (1967) (rejecting the argument that a grievance\u2019s merits limit an employer\u2019s statutory duty to disclose requested relevant information)."},"case_id":12396503,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Substantial evidence also supports the Board's finding that the Union's information request did not seek confidential information, did not constitute harassment, and was not overbroad, unduly burdensome, or sought in bad faith. Moreover, because an employer's statutory duty to provide requested relevant information is not limited to \"information relevant to grievable disputes,\" Endo's objections to the underlying grievance's merits do not excuse its noncompliance.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"rejecting the argument that a grievance's merits limit an employer's statutory duty to disclose requested relevant information","sentence":"See N.L.R.B. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 622 F.2d 425, 430 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 913, 101 S.Ct. 1353, 67 L.Ed.2d 337 (1981) (declining to add a grievability requirement to federal labor law); see also N.L.R.B. v. Acme Indus. Co., 385 U.S. 432, 436-38, 87 S.Ct. 565, 17 L.Ed.2d 495 (1967) (rejecting the argument that a grievance\u2019s merits limit an employer\u2019s statutory duty to disclose requested relevant information)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"622 F.2d 425, 430","parenthetical":"declining to add a grievability requirement to federal labor law","sentence":"See N.L.R.B. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 622 F.2d 425, 430 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 913, 101 S.Ct. 1353, 67 L.Ed.2d 337 (1981) (declining to add a grievability requirement to federal labor law); see also N.L.R.B. v. Acme Indus. Co., 385 U.S. 432, 436-38, 87 S.Ct. 565, 17 L.Ed.2d 495 (1967) (rejecting the argument that a grievance\u2019s merits limit an employer\u2019s statutory duty to disclose requested relevant information)."},"case_id":12396503,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Substantial evidence also supports the Board's finding that the Union's information request did not seek confidential information, did not constitute harassment, and was not overbroad, unduly burdensome, or sought in bad faith. Moreover, because an employer's statutory duty to provide requested relevant information is not limited to \"information relevant to grievable disputes,\" Endo's objections to the underlying grievance's merits do not excuse its noncompliance.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"385 U.S. 432, 436-38","parenthetical":"rejecting the argument that a grievance's merits limit an employer's statutory duty to disclose requested relevant information","sentence":"See N.L.R.B. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 622 F.2d 425, 430 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 913, 101 S.Ct. 1353, 67 L.Ed.2d 337 (1981) (declining to add a grievability requirement to federal labor law); see also N.L.R.B. v. Acme Indus. Co., 385 U.S. 432, 436-38, 87 S.Ct. 565, 17 L.Ed.2d 495 (1967) (rejecting the argument that a grievance\u2019s merits limit an employer\u2019s statutory duty to disclose requested relevant information)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"declining to add a grievability requirement to federal labor law","sentence":"See N.L.R.B. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 622 F.2d 425, 430 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 913, 101 S.Ct. 1353, 67 L.Ed.2d 337 (1981) (declining to add a grievability requirement to federal labor law); see also N.L.R.B. v. Acme Indus. Co., 385 U.S. 432, 436-38, 87 S.Ct. 565, 17 L.Ed.2d 495 (1967) (rejecting the argument that a grievance\u2019s merits limit an employer\u2019s statutory duty to disclose requested relevant information)."},"case_id":12396503,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Substantial evidence also supports the Board's finding that the Union's information request did not seek confidential information, did not constitute harassment, and was not overbroad, unduly burdensome, or sought in bad faith. Moreover, because an employer's statutory duty to provide requested relevant information is not limited to \"information relevant to grievable disputes,\" Endo's objections to the underlying grievance's merits do not excuse its noncompliance.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"rejecting the argument that a grievance's merits limit an employer's statutory duty to disclose requested relevant information","sentence":"See N.L.R.B. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 622 F.2d 425, 430 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 913, 101 S.Ct. 1353, 67 L.Ed.2d 337 (1981) (declining to add a grievability requirement to federal labor law); see also N.L.R.B. v. Acme Indus. Co., 385 U.S. 432, 436-38, 87 S.Ct. 565, 17 L.Ed.2d 495 (1967) (rejecting the argument that a grievance\u2019s merits limit an employer\u2019s statutory duty to disclose requested relevant information)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"declining to add a grievability requirement to federal labor law","sentence":"See N.L.R.B. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 622 F.2d 425, 430 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 913, 101 S.Ct. 1353, 67 L.Ed.2d 337 (1981) (declining to add a grievability requirement to federal labor law); see also N.L.R.B. v. Acme Indus. Co., 385 U.S. 432, 436-38, 87 S.Ct. 565, 17 L.Ed.2d 495 (1967) (rejecting the argument that a grievance\u2019s merits limit an employer\u2019s statutory duty to disclose requested relevant information)."},"case_id":12396503,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Substantial evidence also supports the Board's finding that the Union's information request did not seek confidential information, did not constitute harassment, and was not overbroad, unduly burdensome, or sought in bad faith. Moreover, because an employer's statutory duty to provide requested relevant information is not limited to \"information relevant to grievable disputes,\" Endo's objections to the underlying grievance's merits do not excuse its noncompliance.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"declining to add a grievability requirement to federal labor law","sentence":"See N.L.R.B. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 622 F.2d 425, 430 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 913, 101 S.Ct. 1353, 67 L.Ed.2d 337 (1981) (declining to add a grievability requirement to federal labor law); see also N.L.R.B. v. Acme Indus. Co., 385 U.S. 432, 436-38, 87 S.Ct. 565, 17 L.Ed.2d 495 (1967) (rejecting the argument that a grievance\u2019s merits limit an employer\u2019s statutory duty to disclose requested relevant information)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"rejecting the argument that a grievance's merits limit an employer's statutory duty to disclose requested relevant information","sentence":"See N.L.R.B. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 622 F.2d 425, 430 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 913, 101 S.Ct. 1353, 67 L.Ed.2d 337 (1981) (declining to add a grievability requirement to federal labor law); see also N.L.R.B. v. Acme Indus. Co., 385 U.S. 432, 436-38, 87 S.Ct. 565, 17 L.Ed.2d 495 (1967) (rejecting the argument that a grievance\u2019s merits limit an employer\u2019s statutory duty to disclose requested relevant information)."},"case_id":12396503,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Substantial evidence also supports the Board's finding that the Union's information request did not seek confidential information, did not constitute harassment, and was not overbroad, unduly burdensome, or sought in bad faith. Moreover, because an employer's statutory duty to provide requested relevant information is not limited to \"information relevant to grievable disputes,\" Endo's objections to the underlying grievance's merits do not excuse its noncompliance.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"declining to add a grievability requirement to federal labor law","sentence":"See N.L.R.B. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 622 F.2d 425, 430 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 913, 101 S.Ct. 1353, 67 L.Ed.2d 337 (1981) (declining to add a grievability requirement to federal labor law); see also N.L.R.B. v. Acme Indus. Co., 385 U.S. 432, 436-38, 87 S.Ct. 565, 17 L.Ed.2d 495 (1967) (rejecting the argument that a grievance\u2019s merits limit an employer\u2019s statutory duty to disclose requested relevant information)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"385 U.S. 432, 436-38","parenthetical":"rejecting the argument that a grievance's merits limit an employer's statutory duty to disclose requested relevant information","sentence":"See N.L.R.B. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 622 F.2d 425, 430 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 913, 101 S.Ct. 1353, 67 L.Ed.2d 337 (1981) (declining to add a grievability requirement to federal labor law); see also N.L.R.B. v. Acme Indus. Co., 385 U.S. 432, 436-38, 87 S.Ct. 565, 17 L.Ed.2d 495 (1967) (rejecting the argument that a grievance\u2019s merits limit an employer\u2019s statutory duty to disclose requested relevant information)."},"case_id":12396503,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Substantial evidence also supports the Board's finding that the Union's information request did not seek confidential information, did not constitute harassment, and was not overbroad, unduly burdensome, or sought in bad faith. Moreover, because an employer's statutory duty to provide requested relevant information is not limited to \"information relevant to grievable disputes,\" Endo's objections to the underlying grievance's merits do not excuse its noncompliance.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"rejecting the argument that a grievance's merits limit an employer's statutory duty to disclose requested relevant information","sentence":"See N.L.R.B. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 622 F.2d 425, 430 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 913, 101 S.Ct. 1353, 67 L.Ed.2d 337 (1981) (declining to add a grievability requirement to federal labor law); see also N.L.R.B. v. Acme Indus. Co., 385 U.S. 432, 436-38, 87 S.Ct. 565, 17 L.Ed.2d 495 (1967) (rejecting the argument that a grievance\u2019s merits limit an employer\u2019s statutory duty to disclose requested relevant information)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"declining to add a grievability requirement to federal labor law","sentence":"See N.L.R.B. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 622 F.2d 425, 430 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 913, 101 S.Ct. 1353, 67 L.Ed.2d 337 (1981) (declining to add a grievability requirement to federal labor law); see also N.L.R.B. v. Acme Indus. Co., 385 U.S. 432, 436-38, 87 S.Ct. 565, 17 L.Ed.2d 495 (1967) (rejecting the argument that a grievance\u2019s merits limit an employer\u2019s statutory duty to disclose requested relevant information)."},"case_id":12396503,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Substantial evidence also supports the Board's finding that the Union's information request did not seek confidential information, did not constitute harassment, and was not overbroad, unduly burdensome, or sought in bad faith. Moreover, because an employer's statutory duty to provide requested relevant information is not limited to \"information relevant to grievable disputes,\" Endo's objections to the underlying grievance's merits do not excuse its noncompliance.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"declining to add a grievability requirement to federal labor law","sentence":"See N.L.R.B. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 622 F.2d 425, 430 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 913, 101 S.Ct. 1353, 67 L.Ed.2d 337 (1981) (declining to add a grievability requirement to federal labor law); see also N.L.R.B. v. Acme Indus. Co., 385 U.S. 432, 436-38, 87 S.Ct. 565, 17 L.Ed.2d 495 (1967) (rejecting the argument that a grievance\u2019s merits limit an employer\u2019s statutory duty to disclose requested relevant information)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"rejecting the argument that a grievance's merits limit an employer's statutory duty to disclose requested relevant information","sentence":"See N.L.R.B. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 622 F.2d 425, 430 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 913, 101 S.Ct. 1353, 67 L.Ed.2d 337 (1981) (declining to add a grievability requirement to federal labor law); see also N.L.R.B. v. Acme Indus. Co., 385 U.S. 432, 436-38, 87 S.Ct. 565, 17 L.Ed.2d 495 (1967) (rejecting the argument that a grievance\u2019s merits limit an employer\u2019s statutory duty to disclose requested relevant information)."},"case_id":12396503,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Substantial evidence also supports the Board's finding that the Union's information request did not seek confidential information, did not constitute harassment, and was not overbroad, unduly burdensome, or sought in bad faith. Moreover, because an employer's statutory duty to provide requested relevant information is not limited to \"information relevant to grievable disputes,\" Endo's objections to the underlying grievance's merits do not excuse its noncompliance.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"385 U.S. 432, 436-38","parenthetical":"rejecting the argument that a grievance's merits limit an employer's statutory duty to disclose requested relevant information","sentence":"See N.L.R.B. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 622 F.2d 425, 430 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 913, 101 S.Ct. 1353, 67 L.Ed.2d 337 (1981) (declining to add a grievability requirement to federal labor law); see also N.L.R.B. v. Acme Indus. Co., 385 U.S. 432, 436-38, 87 S.Ct. 565, 17 L.Ed.2d 495 (1967) (rejecting the argument that a grievance\u2019s merits limit an employer\u2019s statutory duty to disclose requested relevant information)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"declining to add a grievability requirement to federal labor law","sentence":"See N.L.R.B. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 622 F.2d 425, 430 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 913, 101 S.Ct. 1353, 67 L.Ed.2d 337 (1981) (declining to add a grievability requirement to federal labor law); see also N.L.R.B. v. Acme Indus. Co., 385 U.S. 432, 436-38, 87 S.Ct. 565, 17 L.Ed.2d 495 (1967) (rejecting the argument that a grievance\u2019s merits limit an employer\u2019s statutory duty to disclose requested relevant information)."},"case_id":12396503,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Substantial evidence also supports the Board's finding that the Union's information request did not seek confidential information, did not constitute harassment, and was not overbroad, unduly burdensome, or sought in bad faith. Moreover, because an employer's statutory duty to provide requested relevant information is not limited to \"information relevant to grievable disputes,\" Endo's objections to the underlying grievance's merits do not excuse its noncompliance.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"declining to add a grievability requirement to federal labor law","sentence":"See N.L.R.B. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 622 F.2d 425, 430 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 913, 101 S.Ct. 1353, 67 L.Ed.2d 337 (1981) (declining to add a grievability requirement to federal labor law); see also N.L.R.B. v. Acme Indus. Co., 385 U.S. 432, 436-38, 87 S.Ct. 565, 17 L.Ed.2d 495 (1967) (rejecting the argument that a grievance\u2019s merits limit an employer\u2019s statutory duty to disclose requested relevant information)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"rejecting the argument that a grievance's merits limit an employer's statutory duty to disclose requested relevant information","sentence":"See N.L.R.B. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 622 F.2d 425, 430 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 913, 101 S.Ct. 1353, 67 L.Ed.2d 337 (1981) (declining to add a grievability requirement to federal labor law); see also N.L.R.B. v. Acme Indus. Co., 385 U.S. 432, 436-38, 87 S.Ct. 565, 17 L.Ed.2d 495 (1967) (rejecting the argument that a grievance\u2019s merits limit an employer\u2019s statutory duty to disclose requested relevant information)."},"case_id":12396503,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Substantial evidence also supports the Board's finding that the Union's information request did not seek confidential information, did not constitute harassment, and was not overbroad, unduly burdensome, or sought in bad faith. Moreover, because an employer's statutory duty to provide requested relevant information is not limited to \"information relevant to grievable disputes,\" Endo's objections to the underlying grievance's merits do not excuse its noncompliance.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"rejecting the argument that a grievance's merits limit an employer's statutory duty to disclose requested relevant information","sentence":"See N.L.R.B. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 622 F.2d 425, 430 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 913, 101 S.Ct. 1353, 67 L.Ed.2d 337 (1981) (declining to add a grievability requirement to federal labor law); see also N.L.R.B. v. Acme Indus. Co., 385 U.S. 432, 436-38, 87 S.Ct. 565, 17 L.Ed.2d 495 (1967) (rejecting the argument that a grievance\u2019s merits limit an employer\u2019s statutory duty to disclose requested relevant information)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"declining to add a grievability requirement to federal labor law","sentence":"See N.L.R.B. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 622 F.2d 425, 430 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 913, 101 S.Ct. 1353, 67 L.Ed.2d 337 (1981) (declining to add a grievability requirement to federal labor law); see also N.L.R.B. v. Acme Indus. Co., 385 U.S. 432, 436-38, 87 S.Ct. 565, 17 L.Ed.2d 495 (1967) (rejecting the argument that a grievance\u2019s merits limit an employer\u2019s statutory duty to disclose requested relevant information)."},"case_id":12396503,"label":"b"}
{"context":"See PROLACTO's Mem. Supp. Mot. Reconsid., ECF No. 144-1, at 15. But PROLACTO fails to demonstrate where in the summary judgment briefing it specifically argued that this should be the relevant market under the famous mark doctrine. Instead, the Court finds that PROLACTO is attempting to take a second bite at the apple by proposing, for the first time, a new test for determining the relevant consumer market under the famous mark doctrine.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"466 F.Supp.2d 123, 123","parenthetical":"discouraging reconsideration when a party merely seeks a second bite at the apple","sentence":"See Judicial Watch, 466 F.Supp.2d at 123 (discouraging reconsideration when a party merely seeks a second bite at the apple); see also Estate of Gaither ex rel. Gaither v. District of Columbia, 771 F.Supp.2d 5, 10 n. 4 (D.D.C.2011) (motion for reconsideration is not \u201ca vehicle for presenting theories or arguments that could have been advanced earlier\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"motion for reconsideration is not \"a vehicle for presenting theories or arguments that could have been advanced earlier\"","sentence":"See Judicial Watch, 466 F.Supp.2d at 123 (discouraging reconsideration when a party merely seeks a second bite at the apple); see also Estate of Gaither ex rel. Gaither v. District of Columbia, 771 F.Supp.2d 5, 10 n. 4 (D.D.C.2011) (motion for reconsideration is not \u201ca vehicle for presenting theories or arguments that could have been advanced earlier\u201d)."},"case_id":4266343,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Therefore, \"the mere fact that [the debtor] can claim an exemption does not necessarily mean that [the debtor] is entitled to it.\" Id. This conclusion is supported by other cases where bankruptcy courts have allowed a motion to amend the debtor's schedules to include an asset, but subsequently denied the debtor's claimed exemption.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"189 B.R. 28, 28","parenthetical":"after allowing motion to amend schedules to claim exemption in personal injury settlement, court sustained trustee's objection to debtor's claim of exemption, finding debtor had acted in bad faith when he failed to disclose personal injury claim as an asset","sentence":"See, e.g., Yonikus, 996 F.2d at 866; see also St. Angelo, 189 B.R. at 28 (after allowing motion to amend schedules to claim exemption in personal injury settlement, court sustained trustee\u2019s objection to debtor\u2019s claim of exemption, finding debtor had acted in bad faith when he failed to disclose personal injury claim as an asset); cf. Snyder, 279 B.R. at 6 (although court found that creditor\u2019s objection to debtor\u2019s motion to amend schedules on prejudice grounds was properly raised, the court allowed the motion to amend but preserved the prejudice defense as one the creditor could assert in opposition to the motion to avoid lien)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"279 B.R. 6, 6","parenthetical":"although court found that creditor's objection to debtor's motion to amend schedules on prejudice grounds was properly raised, the court allowed the motion to amend but preserved the prejudice defense as one the creditor could assert in opposition to the motion to avoid lien","sentence":"See, e.g., Yonikus, 996 F.2d at 866; see also St. Angelo, 189 B.R. at 28 (after allowing motion to amend schedules to claim exemption in personal injury settlement, court sustained trustee\u2019s objection to debtor\u2019s claim of exemption, finding debtor had acted in bad faith when he failed to disclose personal injury claim as an asset); cf. Snyder, 279 B.R. at 6 (although court found that creditor\u2019s objection to debtor\u2019s motion to amend schedules on prejudice grounds was properly raised, the court allowed the motion to amend but preserved the prejudice defense as one the creditor could assert in opposition to the motion to avoid lien)."},"case_id":2158686,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Many of the cases Defendants cite for support acknowledge the concept of secondary meaning.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"stating that the dogwood floral design at issue constituted an aesthetic benefit to consumers rather than indicator of source","sentence":"See Damn I\u2019m Good, 514 F.Supp. at 1360 (\u201cstating that the doctrine of aesthetic functionality has no applicability in situations where a potential buyer is motivated by the aesthetic features of the design rather than the source of the product\u201d); see also Meadowcraft, Inc. v. B.I. Indus., Inc., 226 U.S.P.Q. 244 (N.D.Ala.1985) (stating that the dogwood floral design at issue constituted an aesthetic benefit to consumers rather than indicator of source); Deere & Co. v. Farmhand, Inc., 560 F.Supp. 85 (S.D.Iowa 1982) (\u201cSome designs adopted for the purpose of identification are not wholly useless, but perform some utilitarian function."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"514 F.Supp. 1360, 1360","parenthetical":"\"stating that the doctrine of aesthetic functionality has no applicability in situations where a potential buyer is motivated by the aesthetic features of the design rather than the source of the product\"","sentence":"See Damn I\u2019m Good, 514 F.Supp. at 1360 (\u201cstating that the doctrine of aesthetic functionality has no applicability in situations where a potential buyer is motivated by the aesthetic features of the design rather than the source of the product\u201d); see also Meadowcraft, Inc. v. B.I. Indus., Inc., 226 U.S.P.Q. 244 (N.D.Ala.1985) (stating that the dogwood floral design at issue constituted an aesthetic benefit to consumers rather than indicator of source); Deere & Co. v. Farmhand, Inc., 560 F.Supp. 85 (S.D.Iowa 1982) (\u201cSome designs adopted for the purpose of identification are not wholly useless, but perform some utilitarian function."},"case_id":9323158,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Moreover, courts have applied the requirement where the debtor has either vacated or was not using all of the leasehold premises during the post-petition, pre-rejection period.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"166 B.R. 862, 866","parenthetical":"\"Even though the Debtor-in-possession was never in physical possession of any of its 100 plus shopping center locations, those landlords who filed motions compelling payment of rent and other charges under SS 365(d","sentence":"See In re Compuadd Corp., 166 B.R. 862, 866 (Bankr.W.D.Tex.1994) (\u201cEven though the Debtor-in-possession was never in physical possession of any of its 100 plus shopping center locations, those landlords who filed motions compelling payment of rent and other charges under \u00a7 365(d)(3) are entitled an order requiring it to pay the rent and other charges under the lease which came due and owing during the sixty-day period following the petition date, save and except those few situations in which the landlord sought a lesser period of time of rent\u201d); In re Coastal Dry Dock, supra (debtor was using only ten percent of the leased space); In re Klein Sleep Products, Inc., 78 F.3d 18, 30, ftn. 7 (2d Cir.1996) (\u201cIn either event, of course, the landlord is entitled to recover as an administrative expense the rent due while the debtor and the bankruptcy court debate whether to assume the lease. 11 U.S.C. 365(d)(3)\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"142 B.R. 528, 533","parenthetical":"adopted majority view that \"the plain meaning of the provision 'notwithstanding section 503(b","sentence":"See also In re Child World, Inc., 161 B.R. 571, 576 (S.D.N.Y.1993); In re Pacific-Atlantic Trading Co., 27 F.3d 401, 405 (9th Cir.1994) (\u201cWe observe, however, that section 365(d)(3) expresses the intent of Congress to secure for lessors the full amount of rent due during the 60-day period while the trustee determines to accept or reject the lease, regardless of any benefit to the estate\u201d); Paul Harris Stores, Inc. v. Mabel L. Salter Realty Trust (In re Paul Harris Stores), 148 B.R. 307, 314 (S.D.Ind.1992) (lessor need not show postpetition rent is actual and necessary for preserving estate); In re Telesphere Communications, Inc., 148 B.R. 525, 531 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.1992) (\u201cPursuant to the plain language of Section 365(d)(3), the trustee or debtor in possession has a duty, prior to assumption or rejection of a lease of nonresidential real property, to make timely payment of the full rent due, from any available funds\u201d); In re Tobago Bay Trading Co., 142 B.R. 528, 533 (Bankr.N.D.Ga.1991) (adopted majority view that \u201cthe plain meaning of the provision \u2018notwithstanding section 503(b)(1) of this title\u2019 obviates the requirement that administrative expense status be proven\u201d) (citations omitted)."},"case_id":6455588,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Moreover, courts have applied the requirement where the debtor has either vacated or was not using all of the leasehold premises during the post-petition, pre-rejection period.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"142 B.R. 528, 533","parenthetical":"adopted majority view that \"the plain meaning of the provision 'notwithstanding section 503(b","sentence":"See also In re Child World, Inc., 161 B.R. 571, 576 (S.D.N.Y.1993); In re Pacific-Atlantic Trading Co., 27 F.3d 401, 405 (9th Cir.1994) (\u201cWe observe, however, that section 365(d)(3) expresses the intent of Congress to secure for lessors the full amount of rent due during the 60-day period while the trustee determines to accept or reject the lease, regardless of any benefit to the estate\u201d); Paul Harris Stores, Inc. v. Mabel L. Salter Realty Trust (In re Paul Harris Stores), 148 B.R. 307, 314 (S.D.Ind.1992) (lessor need not show postpetition rent is actual and necessary for preserving estate); In re Telesphere Communications, Inc., 148 B.R. 525, 531 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.1992) (\u201cPursuant to the plain language of Section 365(d)(3), the trustee or debtor in possession has a duty, prior to assumption or rejection of a lease of nonresidential real property, to make timely payment of the full rent due, from any available funds\u201d); In re Tobago Bay Trading Co., 142 B.R. 528, 533 (Bankr.N.D.Ga.1991) (adopted majority view that \u201cthe plain meaning of the provision \u2018notwithstanding section 503(b)(1) of this title\u2019 obviates the requirement that administrative expense status be proven\u201d) (citations omitted)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"78 F.3d 18, 30","parenthetical":"\"In either event, of course, the landlord is entitled to recover as an administrative expense the rent due while the debtor and the bankruptcy court debate whether to assume the lease. 11 U.S.C. 365(d","sentence":"See In re Compuadd Corp., 166 B.R. 862, 866 (Bankr.W.D.Tex.1994) (\u201cEven though the Debtor-in-possession was never in physical possession of any of its 100 plus shopping center locations, those landlords who filed motions compelling payment of rent and other charges under \u00a7 365(d)(3) are entitled an order requiring it to pay the rent and other charges under the lease which came due and owing during the sixty-day period following the petition date, save and except those few situations in which the landlord sought a lesser period of time of rent\u201d); In re Coastal Dry Dock, supra (debtor was using only ten percent of the leased space); In re Klein Sleep Products, Inc., 78 F.3d 18, 30, ftn. 7 (2d Cir.1996) (\u201cIn either event, of course, the landlord is entitled to recover as an administrative expense the rent due while the debtor and the bankruptcy court debate whether to assume the lease. 11 U.S.C. 365(d)(3)\u201d)."},"case_id":6455588,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Our holding encourages an inefficient system as the Butchers may also be able to re-urge this issue on final appeal.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"228 S.W.3d 301, 305","parenthetical":"concluding that challenge to order denying special appearance, raised for the first time on appeal from final judgment, was untimely because parties failed to bring an interlocutory appeal","sentence":"See GJP, Inc. v. Ghosh, 251 S.W.3d 854, 866-67 (Tex.App.-Austin 2008, no pet.) (holding that appellate jurisdiction to review special appearance rulings was not limited solely to interlocutory appeal authorized by section 51.014(a)(7) of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code); Canyon (Australia) Pty., Ltd. v. Maersk Contractors, Pty., Ltd., No. 08-00-00248-CV, 2002 WL 997738, at *4 (Tex.App.-El Paso May 16, 2002, pet. denied) (not designated for publication) (concluding that interlocutory appeal was not \u201cmandatory\u201d and trial court\u2019s special appearance grant could be reviewed on appeal from final judgment); but see Matis v. Golden, 228 S.W.3d 301, 305 (Tex.App.-Waco 2007, no pet.) (concluding that challenge to order denying special appearance, raised for the first time on appeal from final judgment, was untimely because parties failed to bring an interlocutory appeal)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"251 S.W.3d 854, 866-67","parenthetical":"holding that appellate jurisdiction to review special appearance rulings was not limited solely to interlocutory appeal authorized by section 51.014(a","sentence":"See GJP, Inc. v. Ghosh, 251 S.W.3d 854, 866-67 (Tex.App.-Austin 2008, no pet.) (holding that appellate jurisdiction to review special appearance rulings was not limited solely to interlocutory appeal authorized by section 51.014(a)(7) of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code); Canyon (Australia) Pty., Ltd. v. Maersk Contractors, Pty., Ltd., No. 08-00-00248-CV, 2002 WL 997738, at *4 (Tex.App.-El Paso May 16, 2002, pet. denied) (not designated for publication) (concluding that interlocutory appeal was not \u201cmandatory\u201d and trial court\u2019s special appearance grant could be reviewed on appeal from final judgment); but see Matis v. Golden, 228 S.W.3d 301, 305 (Tex.App.-Waco 2007, no pet.) (concluding that challenge to order denying special appearance, raised for the first time on appeal from final judgment, was untimely because parties failed to bring an interlocutory appeal)."},"case_id":7093044,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In construing a Florida statute providing for the disqualification of a trial judge based on, among other grounds, the fact that the judge is a material witness, the Florida Supreme Court held that a \"material witness\" is \"a witness who gives testimony going to some fact affecting the merits of the cause and about which no other witness might testify.\" From Wingate, it follows that where the trial judge is not a material witness under this definition, there is no error in the trial court's failure to recuse. Courts in other jurisdictions have adopted this view.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"where trial judge transported juror to hospital, the juror was available to testify as to the incident and the trial judge was not a necessary witness","sentence":"See also Mosley v. State, 145 Ga.App. 651, 244 S.E.2d 610 (1978) (where trial judge transported juror to hospital, the juror was available to testify as to the incident and the trial judge was not a necessary witness); State v. O\u2019Neal, 501 So.2d 920 (La.App.), cert. denied, 505 So.2d 1139 (La.1987) (where trial judge received a letter from a co-defendant which the co-defendant, while testifying as a defense witness, admitted writing, the trial judge did not become a material witness)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"Where the evidence concerning the transactions in issue may be obtained from witnesses other than the trial judge, then the trial judge is not such a material witness as to require a disqualification.\"","sentence":"Bresnahan v. Luby, 160 Colo. 455, 418 P.2d 171, 173 (1966) (\u201cWhere the evidence concerning the transactions in issue may be obtained from witnesses other than the trial judge, then the trial judge is not such a material witness as to require a disqualification.\u201d) (citing Wingate v. Mach, supra); Brown v. Bahl, 111 Pa.Super. 598, 170 A. 346, 348 (1934) (\u201c[Wjhere other witnesses were available [to testify] as to the facts that [the trial judge] observed, there is no ethical or legal reason to disqualify [the judge] simply because of his knowledge.\u201d)."},"case_id":7535661,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In construing a Florida statute providing for the disqualification of a trial judge based on, among other grounds, the fact that the judge is a material witness, the Florida Supreme Court held that a \"material witness\" is \"a witness who gives testimony going to some fact affecting the merits of the cause and about which no other witness might testify.\" From Wingate, it follows that where the trial judge is not a material witness under this definition, there is no error in the trial court's failure to recuse. Courts in other jurisdictions have adopted this view.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"where trial judge transported juror to hospital, the juror was available to testify as to the incident and the trial judge was not a necessary witness","sentence":"See also Mosley v. State, 145 Ga.App. 651, 244 S.E.2d 610 (1978) (where trial judge transported juror to hospital, the juror was available to testify as to the incident and the trial judge was not a necessary witness); State v. O\u2019Neal, 501 So.2d 920 (La.App.), cert. denied, 505 So.2d 1139 (La.1987) (where trial judge received a letter from a co-defendant which the co-defendant, while testifying as a defense witness, admitted writing, the trial judge did not become a material witness)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"Where the evidence concerning the transactions in issue may be obtained from witnesses other than the trial judge, then the trial judge is not such a material witness as to require a disqualification.\"","sentence":"Bresnahan v. Luby, 160 Colo. 455, 418 P.2d 171, 173 (1966) (\u201cWhere the evidence concerning the transactions in issue may be obtained from witnesses other than the trial judge, then the trial judge is not such a material witness as to require a disqualification.\u201d) (citing Wingate v. Mach, supra); Brown v. Bahl, 111 Pa.Super. 598, 170 A. 346, 348 (1934) (\u201c[Wjhere other witnesses were available [to testify] as to the facts that [the trial judge] observed, there is no ethical or legal reason to disqualify [the judge] simply because of his knowledge.\u201d)."},"case_id":7535661,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In construing a Florida statute providing for the disqualification of a trial judge based on, among other grounds, the fact that the judge is a material witness, the Florida Supreme Court held that a \"material witness\" is \"a witness who gives testimony going to some fact affecting the merits of the cause and about which no other witness might testify.\" From Wingate, it follows that where the trial judge is not a material witness under this definition, there is no error in the trial court's failure to recuse. Courts in other jurisdictions have adopted this view.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"Where the evidence concerning the transactions in issue may be obtained from witnesses other than the trial judge, then the trial judge is not such a material witness as to require a disqualification.\"","sentence":"Bresnahan v. Luby, 160 Colo. 455, 418 P.2d 171, 173 (1966) (\u201cWhere the evidence concerning the transactions in issue may be obtained from witnesses other than the trial judge, then the trial judge is not such a material witness as to require a disqualification.\u201d) (citing Wingate v. Mach, supra); Brown v. Bahl, 111 Pa.Super. 598, 170 A. 346, 348 (1934) (\u201c[Wjhere other witnesses were available [to testify] as to the facts that [the trial judge] observed, there is no ethical or legal reason to disqualify [the judge] simply because of his knowledge.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"where trial judge received a letter from a co-defendant which the co-defendant, while testifying as a defense witness, admitted writing, the trial judge did not become a material witness","sentence":"See also Mosley v. State, 145 Ga.App. 651, 244 S.E.2d 610 (1978) (where trial judge transported juror to hospital, the juror was available to testify as to the incident and the trial judge was not a necessary witness); State v. O\u2019Neal, 501 So.2d 920 (La.App.), cert. denied, 505 So.2d 1139 (La.1987) (where trial judge received a letter from a co-defendant which the co-defendant, while testifying as a defense witness, admitted writing, the trial judge did not become a material witness)."},"case_id":7535661,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In construing a Florida statute providing for the disqualification of a trial judge based on, among other grounds, the fact that the judge is a material witness, the Florida Supreme Court held that a \"material witness\" is \"a witness who gives testimony going to some fact affecting the merits of the cause and about which no other witness might testify.\" From Wingate, it follows that where the trial judge is not a material witness under this definition, there is no error in the trial court's failure to recuse. Courts in other jurisdictions have adopted this view.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"where trial judge received a letter from a co-defendant which the co-defendant, while testifying as a defense witness, admitted writing, the trial judge did not become a material witness","sentence":"See also Mosley v. State, 145 Ga.App. 651, 244 S.E.2d 610 (1978) (where trial judge transported juror to hospital, the juror was available to testify as to the incident and the trial judge was not a necessary witness); State v. O\u2019Neal, 501 So.2d 920 (La.App.), cert. denied, 505 So.2d 1139 (La.1987) (where trial judge received a letter from a co-defendant which the co-defendant, while testifying as a defense witness, admitted writing, the trial judge did not become a material witness)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"Where the evidence concerning the transactions in issue may be obtained from witnesses other than the trial judge, then the trial judge is not such a material witness as to require a disqualification.\"","sentence":"Bresnahan v. Luby, 160 Colo. 455, 418 P.2d 171, 173 (1966) (\u201cWhere the evidence concerning the transactions in issue may be obtained from witnesses other than the trial judge, then the trial judge is not such a material witness as to require a disqualification.\u201d) (citing Wingate v. Mach, supra); Brown v. Bahl, 111 Pa.Super. 598, 170 A. 346, 348 (1934) (\u201c[Wjhere other witnesses were available [to testify] as to the facts that [the trial judge] observed, there is no ethical or legal reason to disqualify [the judge] simply because of his knowledge.\u201d)."},"case_id":7535661,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In construing a Florida statute providing for the disqualification of a trial judge based on, among other grounds, the fact that the judge is a material witness, the Florida Supreme Court held that a \"material witness\" is \"a witness who gives testimony going to some fact affecting the merits of the cause and about which no other witness might testify.\" From Wingate, it follows that where the trial judge is not a material witness under this definition, there is no error in the trial court's failure to recuse. Courts in other jurisdictions have adopted this view.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"Where the evidence concerning the transactions in issue may be obtained from witnesses other than the trial judge, then the trial judge is not such a material witness as to require a disqualification.\"","sentence":"Bresnahan v. Luby, 160 Colo. 455, 418 P.2d 171, 173 (1966) (\u201cWhere the evidence concerning the transactions in issue may be obtained from witnesses other than the trial judge, then the trial judge is not such a material witness as to require a disqualification.\u201d) (citing Wingate v. Mach, supra); Brown v. Bahl, 111 Pa.Super. 598, 170 A. 346, 348 (1934) (\u201c[Wjhere other witnesses were available [to testify] as to the facts that [the trial judge] observed, there is no ethical or legal reason to disqualify [the judge] simply because of his knowledge.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"where the defendant in a post-conviction proceeding failed to demonstrate that the trial judge was the source of evidence otherwise unobtainable, the judge was not required to recuse himself","sentence":"Cf. Coleman v. State, \u2014 Mont. -, 633 P.2d 624 (1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 983, 102 S.Ct. 1492, 71 L.Ed.2d 693 (1982) (where the defendant in a post-conviction proceeding failed to demonstrate that the trial judge was the source of evidence otherwise unobtainable, the judge was not required to recuse himself)."},"case_id":7535661,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In construing a Florida statute providing for the disqualification of a trial judge based on, among other grounds, the fact that the judge is a material witness, the Florida Supreme Court held that a \"material witness\" is \"a witness who gives testimony going to some fact affecting the merits of the cause and about which no other witness might testify.\" From Wingate, it follows that where the trial judge is not a material witness under this definition, there is no error in the trial court's failure to recuse. Courts in other jurisdictions have adopted this view.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"where the defendant in a post-conviction proceeding failed to demonstrate that the trial judge was the source of evidence otherwise unobtainable, the judge was not required to recuse himself","sentence":"Cf. Coleman v. State, \u2014 Mont. -, 633 P.2d 624 (1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 983, 102 S.Ct. 1492, 71 L.Ed.2d 693 (1982) (where the defendant in a post-conviction proceeding failed to demonstrate that the trial judge was the source of evidence otherwise unobtainable, the judge was not required to recuse himself)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"Where the evidence concerning the transactions in issue may be obtained from witnesses other than the trial judge, then the trial judge is not such a material witness as to require a disqualification.\"","sentence":"Bresnahan v. Luby, 160 Colo. 455, 418 P.2d 171, 173 (1966) (\u201cWhere the evidence concerning the transactions in issue may be obtained from witnesses other than the trial judge, then the trial judge is not such a material witness as to require a disqualification.\u201d) (citing Wingate v. Mach, supra); Brown v. Bahl, 111 Pa.Super. 598, 170 A. 346, 348 (1934) (\u201c[Wjhere other witnesses were available [to testify] as to the facts that [the trial judge] observed, there is no ethical or legal reason to disqualify [the judge] simply because of his knowledge.\u201d)."},"case_id":7535661,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In construing a Florida statute providing for the disqualification of a trial judge based on, among other grounds, the fact that the judge is a material witness, the Florida Supreme Court held that a \"material witness\" is \"a witness who gives testimony going to some fact affecting the merits of the cause and about which no other witness might testify.\" From Wingate, it follows that where the trial judge is not a material witness under this definition, there is no error in the trial court's failure to recuse. Courts in other jurisdictions have adopted this view.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"where the defendant in a post-conviction proceeding failed to demonstrate that the trial judge was the source of evidence otherwise unobtainable, the judge was not required to recuse himself","sentence":"Cf. Coleman v. State, \u2014 Mont. -, 633 P.2d 624 (1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 983, 102 S.Ct. 1492, 71 L.Ed.2d 693 (1982) (where the defendant in a post-conviction proceeding failed to demonstrate that the trial judge was the source of evidence otherwise unobtainable, the judge was not required to recuse himself)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"Where the evidence concerning the transactions in issue may be obtained from witnesses other than the trial judge, then the trial judge is not such a material witness as to require a disqualification.\"","sentence":"Bresnahan v. Luby, 160 Colo. 455, 418 P.2d 171, 173 (1966) (\u201cWhere the evidence concerning the transactions in issue may be obtained from witnesses other than the trial judge, then the trial judge is not such a material witness as to require a disqualification.\u201d) (citing Wingate v. Mach, supra); Brown v. Bahl, 111 Pa.Super. 598, 170 A. 346, 348 (1934) (\u201c[Wjhere other witnesses were available [to testify] as to the facts that [the trial judge] observed, there is no ethical or legal reason to disqualify [the judge] simply because of his knowledge.\u201d)."},"case_id":7535661,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In construing a Florida statute providing for the disqualification of a trial judge based on, among other grounds, the fact that the judge is a material witness, the Florida Supreme Court held that a \"material witness\" is \"a witness who gives testimony going to some fact affecting the merits of the cause and about which no other witness might testify.\" From Wingate, it follows that where the trial judge is not a material witness under this definition, there is no error in the trial court's failure to recuse. Courts in other jurisdictions have adopted this view.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"Where the evidence concerning the transactions in issue may be obtained from witnesses other than the trial judge, then the trial judge is not such a material witness as to require a disqualification.\"","sentence":"Bresnahan v. Luby, 160 Colo. 455, 418 P.2d 171, 173 (1966) (\u201cWhere the evidence concerning the transactions in issue may be obtained from witnesses other than the trial judge, then the trial judge is not such a material witness as to require a disqualification.\u201d) (citing Wingate v. Mach, supra); Brown v. Bahl, 111 Pa.Super. 598, 170 A. 346, 348 (1934) (\u201c[Wjhere other witnesses were available [to testify] as to the facts that [the trial judge] observed, there is no ethical or legal reason to disqualify [the judge] simply because of his knowledge.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"where the defendant in a post-conviction proceeding failed to demonstrate that the trial judge was the source of evidence otherwise unobtainable, the judge was not required to recuse himself","sentence":"Cf. Coleman v. State, \u2014 Mont. -, 633 P.2d 624 (1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 983, 102 S.Ct. 1492, 71 L.Ed.2d 693 (1982) (where the defendant in a post-conviction proceeding failed to demonstrate that the trial judge was the source of evidence otherwise unobtainable, the judge was not required to recuse himself)."},"case_id":7535661,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In construing a Florida statute providing for the disqualification of a trial judge based on, among other grounds, the fact that the judge is a material witness, the Florida Supreme Court held that a \"material witness\" is \"a witness who gives testimony going to some fact affecting the merits of the cause and about which no other witness might testify.\" From Wingate, it follows that where the trial judge is not a material witness under this definition, there is no error in the trial court's failure to recuse. Courts in other jurisdictions have adopted this view.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"418 P.2d 171, 173","parenthetical":"\"Where the evidence concerning the transactions in issue may be obtained from witnesses other than the trial judge, then the trial judge is not such a material witness as to require a disqualification.\"","sentence":"Bresnahan v. Luby, 160 Colo. 455, 418 P.2d 171, 173 (1966) (\u201cWhere the evidence concerning the transactions in issue may be obtained from witnesses other than the trial judge, then the trial judge is not such a material witness as to require a disqualification.\u201d) (citing Wingate v. Mach, supra); Brown v. Bahl, 111 Pa.Super. 598, 170 A. 346, 348 (1934) (\u201c[Wjhere other witnesses were available [to testify] as to the facts that [the trial judge] observed, there is no ethical or legal reason to disqualify [the judge] simply because of his knowledge.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"where trial judge transported juror to hospital, the juror was available to testify as to the incident and the trial judge was not a necessary witness","sentence":"See also Mosley v. State, 145 Ga.App. 651, 244 S.E.2d 610 (1978) (where trial judge transported juror to hospital, the juror was available to testify as to the incident and the trial judge was not a necessary witness); State v. O\u2019Neal, 501 So.2d 920 (La.App.), cert. denied, 505 So.2d 1139 (La.1987) (where trial judge received a letter from a co-defendant which the co-defendant, while testifying as a defense witness, admitted writing, the trial judge did not become a material witness)."},"case_id":7535661,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In construing a Florida statute providing for the disqualification of a trial judge based on, among other grounds, the fact that the judge is a material witness, the Florida Supreme Court held that a \"material witness\" is \"a witness who gives testimony going to some fact affecting the merits of the cause and about which no other witness might testify.\" From Wingate, it follows that where the trial judge is not a material witness under this definition, there is no error in the trial court's failure to recuse. Courts in other jurisdictions have adopted this view.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"418 P.2d 171, 173","parenthetical":"\"Where the evidence concerning the transactions in issue may be obtained from witnesses other than the trial judge, then the trial judge is not such a material witness as to require a disqualification.\"","sentence":"Bresnahan v. Luby, 160 Colo. 455, 418 P.2d 171, 173 (1966) (\u201cWhere the evidence concerning the transactions in issue may be obtained from witnesses other than the trial judge, then the trial judge is not such a material witness as to require a disqualification.\u201d) (citing Wingate v. Mach, supra); Brown v. Bahl, 111 Pa.Super. 598, 170 A. 346, 348 (1934) (\u201c[Wjhere other witnesses were available [to testify] as to the facts that [the trial judge] observed, there is no ethical or legal reason to disqualify [the judge] simply because of his knowledge.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"where trial judge transported juror to hospital, the juror was available to testify as to the incident and the trial judge was not a necessary witness","sentence":"See also Mosley v. State, 145 Ga.App. 651, 244 S.E.2d 610 (1978) (where trial judge transported juror to hospital, the juror was available to testify as to the incident and the trial judge was not a necessary witness); State v. O\u2019Neal, 501 So.2d 920 (La.App.), cert. denied, 505 So.2d 1139 (La.1987) (where trial judge received a letter from a co-defendant which the co-defendant, while testifying as a defense witness, admitted writing, the trial judge did not become a material witness)."},"case_id":7535661,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In construing a Florida statute providing for the disqualification of a trial judge based on, among other grounds, the fact that the judge is a material witness, the Florida Supreme Court held that a \"material witness\" is \"a witness who gives testimony going to some fact affecting the merits of the cause and about which no other witness might testify.\" From Wingate, it follows that where the trial judge is not a material witness under this definition, there is no error in the trial court's failure to recuse. Courts in other jurisdictions have adopted this view.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"418 P.2d 171, 173","parenthetical":"\"Where the evidence concerning the transactions in issue may be obtained from witnesses other than the trial judge, then the trial judge is not such a material witness as to require a disqualification.\"","sentence":"Bresnahan v. Luby, 160 Colo. 455, 418 P.2d 171, 173 (1966) (\u201cWhere the evidence concerning the transactions in issue may be obtained from witnesses other than the trial judge, then the trial judge is not such a material witness as to require a disqualification.\u201d) (citing Wingate v. Mach, supra); Brown v. Bahl, 111 Pa.Super. 598, 170 A. 346, 348 (1934) (\u201c[Wjhere other witnesses were available [to testify] as to the facts that [the trial judge] observed, there is no ethical or legal reason to disqualify [the judge] simply because of his knowledge.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"where trial judge received a letter from a co-defendant which the co-defendant, while testifying as a defense witness, admitted writing, the trial judge did not become a material witness","sentence":"See also Mosley v. State, 145 Ga.App. 651, 244 S.E.2d 610 (1978) (where trial judge transported juror to hospital, the juror was available to testify as to the incident and the trial judge was not a necessary witness); State v. O\u2019Neal, 501 So.2d 920 (La.App.), cert. denied, 505 So.2d 1139 (La.1987) (where trial judge received a letter from a co-defendant which the co-defendant, while testifying as a defense witness, admitted writing, the trial judge did not become a material witness)."},"case_id":7535661,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In construing a Florida statute providing for the disqualification of a trial judge based on, among other grounds, the fact that the judge is a material witness, the Florida Supreme Court held that a \"material witness\" is \"a witness who gives testimony going to some fact affecting the merits of the cause and about which no other witness might testify.\" From Wingate, it follows that where the trial judge is not a material witness under this definition, there is no error in the trial court's failure to recuse. Courts in other jurisdictions have adopted this view.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"where trial judge received a letter from a co-defendant which the co-defendant, while testifying as a defense witness, admitted writing, the trial judge did not become a material witness","sentence":"See also Mosley v. State, 145 Ga.App. 651, 244 S.E.2d 610 (1978) (where trial judge transported juror to hospital, the juror was available to testify as to the incident and the trial judge was not a necessary witness); State v. O\u2019Neal, 501 So.2d 920 (La.App.), cert. denied, 505 So.2d 1139 (La.1987) (where trial judge received a letter from a co-defendant which the co-defendant, while testifying as a defense witness, admitted writing, the trial judge did not become a material witness)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"418 P.2d 171, 173","parenthetical":"\"Where the evidence concerning the transactions in issue may be obtained from witnesses other than the trial judge, then the trial judge is not such a material witness as to require a disqualification.\"","sentence":"Bresnahan v. Luby, 160 Colo. 455, 418 P.2d 171, 173 (1966) (\u201cWhere the evidence concerning the transactions in issue may be obtained from witnesses other than the trial judge, then the trial judge is not such a material witness as to require a disqualification.\u201d) (citing Wingate v. Mach, supra); Brown v. Bahl, 111 Pa.Super. 598, 170 A. 346, 348 (1934) (\u201c[Wjhere other witnesses were available [to testify] as to the facts that [the trial judge] observed, there is no ethical or legal reason to disqualify [the judge] simply because of his knowledge.\u201d)."},"case_id":7535661,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In construing a Florida statute providing for the disqualification of a trial judge based on, among other grounds, the fact that the judge is a material witness, the Florida Supreme Court held that a \"material witness\" is \"a witness who gives testimony going to some fact affecting the merits of the cause and about which no other witness might testify.\" From Wingate, it follows that where the trial judge is not a material witness under this definition, there is no error in the trial court's failure to recuse. Courts in other jurisdictions have adopted this view.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"418 P.2d 171, 173","parenthetical":"\"Where the evidence concerning the transactions in issue may be obtained from witnesses other than the trial judge, then the trial judge is not such a material witness as to require a disqualification.\"","sentence":"Bresnahan v. Luby, 160 Colo. 455, 418 P.2d 171, 173 (1966) (\u201cWhere the evidence concerning the transactions in issue may be obtained from witnesses other than the trial judge, then the trial judge is not such a material witness as to require a disqualification.\u201d) (citing Wingate v. Mach, supra); Brown v. Bahl, 111 Pa.Super. 598, 170 A. 346, 348 (1934) (\u201c[Wjhere other witnesses were available [to testify] as to the facts that [the trial judge] observed, there is no ethical or legal reason to disqualify [the judge] simply because of his knowledge.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"where the defendant in a post-conviction proceeding failed to demonstrate that the trial judge was the source of evidence otherwise unobtainable, the judge was not required to recuse himself","sentence":"Cf. Coleman v. State, \u2014 Mont. -, 633 P.2d 624 (1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 983, 102 S.Ct. 1492, 71 L.Ed.2d 693 (1982) (where the defendant in a post-conviction proceeding failed to demonstrate that the trial judge was the source of evidence otherwise unobtainable, the judge was not required to recuse himself)."},"case_id":7535661,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In construing a Florida statute providing for the disqualification of a trial judge based on, among other grounds, the fact that the judge is a material witness, the Florida Supreme Court held that a \"material witness\" is \"a witness who gives testimony going to some fact affecting the merits of the cause and about which no other witness might testify.\" From Wingate, it follows that where the trial judge is not a material witness under this definition, there is no error in the trial court's failure to recuse. Courts in other jurisdictions have adopted this view.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"where the defendant in a post-conviction proceeding failed to demonstrate that the trial judge was the source of evidence otherwise unobtainable, the judge was not required to recuse himself","sentence":"Cf. Coleman v. State, \u2014 Mont. -, 633 P.2d 624 (1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 983, 102 S.Ct. 1492, 71 L.Ed.2d 693 (1982) (where the defendant in a post-conviction proceeding failed to demonstrate that the trial judge was the source of evidence otherwise unobtainable, the judge was not required to recuse himself)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"418 P.2d 171, 173","parenthetical":"\"Where the evidence concerning the transactions in issue may be obtained from witnesses other than the trial judge, then the trial judge is not such a material witness as to require a disqualification.\"","sentence":"Bresnahan v. Luby, 160 Colo. 455, 418 P.2d 171, 173 (1966) (\u201cWhere the evidence concerning the transactions in issue may be obtained from witnesses other than the trial judge, then the trial judge is not such a material witness as to require a disqualification.\u201d) (citing Wingate v. Mach, supra); Brown v. Bahl, 111 Pa.Super. 598, 170 A. 346, 348 (1934) (\u201c[Wjhere other witnesses were available [to testify] as to the facts that [the trial judge] observed, there is no ethical or legal reason to disqualify [the judge] simply because of his knowledge.\u201d)."},"case_id":7535661,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In construing a Florida statute providing for the disqualification of a trial judge based on, among other grounds, the fact that the judge is a material witness, the Florida Supreme Court held that a \"material witness\" is \"a witness who gives testimony going to some fact affecting the merits of the cause and about which no other witness might testify.\" From Wingate, it follows that where the trial judge is not a material witness under this definition, there is no error in the trial court's failure to recuse. Courts in other jurisdictions have adopted this view.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"418 P.2d 171, 173","parenthetical":"\"Where the evidence concerning the transactions in issue may be obtained from witnesses other than the trial judge, then the trial judge is not such a material witness as to require a disqualification.\"","sentence":"Bresnahan v. Luby, 160 Colo. 455, 418 P.2d 171, 173 (1966) (\u201cWhere the evidence concerning the transactions in issue may be obtained from witnesses other than the trial judge, then the trial judge is not such a material witness as to require a disqualification.\u201d) (citing Wingate v. Mach, supra); Brown v. Bahl, 111 Pa.Super. 598, 170 A. 346, 348 (1934) (\u201c[Wjhere other witnesses were available [to testify] as to the facts that [the trial judge] observed, there is no ethical or legal reason to disqualify [the judge] simply because of his knowledge.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"where the defendant in a post-conviction proceeding failed to demonstrate that the trial judge was the source of evidence otherwise unobtainable, the judge was not required to recuse himself","sentence":"Cf. Coleman v. State, \u2014 Mont. -, 633 P.2d 624 (1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 983, 102 S.Ct. 1492, 71 L.Ed.2d 693 (1982) (where the defendant in a post-conviction proceeding failed to demonstrate that the trial judge was the source of evidence otherwise unobtainable, the judge was not required to recuse himself)."},"case_id":7535661,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In construing a Florida statute providing for the disqualification of a trial judge based on, among other grounds, the fact that the judge is a material witness, the Florida Supreme Court held that a \"material witness\" is \"a witness who gives testimony going to some fact affecting the merits of the cause and about which no other witness might testify.\" From Wingate, it follows that where the trial judge is not a material witness under this definition, there is no error in the trial court's failure to recuse. Courts in other jurisdictions have adopted this view.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"418 P.2d 171, 173","parenthetical":"\"Where the evidence concerning the transactions in issue may be obtained from witnesses other than the trial judge, then the trial judge is not such a material witness as to require a disqualification.\"","sentence":"Bresnahan v. Luby, 160 Colo. 455, 418 P.2d 171, 173 (1966) (\u201cWhere the evidence concerning the transactions in issue may be obtained from witnesses other than the trial judge, then the trial judge is not such a material witness as to require a disqualification.\u201d) (citing Wingate v. Mach, supra); Brown v. Bahl, 111 Pa.Super. 598, 170 A. 346, 348 (1934) (\u201c[Wjhere other witnesses were available [to testify] as to the facts that [the trial judge] observed, there is no ethical or legal reason to disqualify [the judge] simply because of his knowledge.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"where the defendant in a post-conviction proceeding failed to demonstrate that the trial judge was the source of evidence otherwise unobtainable, the judge was not required to recuse himself","sentence":"Cf. Coleman v. State, \u2014 Mont. -, 633 P.2d 624 (1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 983, 102 S.Ct. 1492, 71 L.Ed.2d 693 (1982) (where the defendant in a post-conviction proceeding failed to demonstrate that the trial judge was the source of evidence otherwise unobtainable, the judge was not required to recuse himself)."},"case_id":7535661,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In construing a Florida statute providing for the disqualification of a trial judge based on, among other grounds, the fact that the judge is a material witness, the Florida Supreme Court held that a \"material witness\" is \"a witness who gives testimony going to some fact affecting the merits of the cause and about which no other witness might testify.\" From Wingate, it follows that where the trial judge is not a material witness under this definition, there is no error in the trial court's failure to recuse. Courts in other jurisdictions have adopted this view.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"where trial judge transported juror to hospital, the juror was available to testify as to the incident and the trial judge was not a necessary witness","sentence":"See also Mosley v. State, 145 Ga.App. 651, 244 S.E.2d 610 (1978) (where trial judge transported juror to hospital, the juror was available to testify as to the incident and the trial judge was not a necessary witness); State v. O\u2019Neal, 501 So.2d 920 (La.App.), cert. denied, 505 So.2d 1139 (La.1987) (where trial judge received a letter from a co-defendant which the co-defendant, while testifying as a defense witness, admitted writing, the trial judge did not become a material witness)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[Wjhere other witnesses were available [to testify] as to the facts that [the trial judge] observed, there is no ethical or legal reason to disqualify [the judge] simply because of his knowledge.\"","sentence":"Bresnahan v. Luby, 160 Colo. 455, 418 P.2d 171, 173 (1966) (\u201cWhere the evidence concerning the transactions in issue may be obtained from witnesses other than the trial judge, then the trial judge is not such a material witness as to require a disqualification.\u201d) (citing Wingate v. Mach, supra); Brown v. Bahl, 111 Pa.Super. 598, 170 A. 346, 348 (1934) (\u201c[Wjhere other witnesses were available [to testify] as to the facts that [the trial judge] observed, there is no ethical or legal reason to disqualify [the judge] simply because of his knowledge.\u201d)."},"case_id":7535661,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In construing a Florida statute providing for the disqualification of a trial judge based on, among other grounds, the fact that the judge is a material witness, the Florida Supreme Court held that a \"material witness\" is \"a witness who gives testimony going to some fact affecting the merits of the cause and about which no other witness might testify.\" From Wingate, it follows that where the trial judge is not a material witness under this definition, there is no error in the trial court's failure to recuse. Courts in other jurisdictions have adopted this view.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"where trial judge transported juror to hospital, the juror was available to testify as to the incident and the trial judge was not a necessary witness","sentence":"See also Mosley v. State, 145 Ga.App. 651, 244 S.E.2d 610 (1978) (where trial judge transported juror to hospital, the juror was available to testify as to the incident and the trial judge was not a necessary witness); State v. O\u2019Neal, 501 So.2d 920 (La.App.), cert. denied, 505 So.2d 1139 (La.1987) (where trial judge received a letter from a co-defendant which the co-defendant, while testifying as a defense witness, admitted writing, the trial judge did not become a material witness)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[Wjhere other witnesses were available [to testify] as to the facts that [the trial judge] observed, there is no ethical or legal reason to disqualify [the judge] simply because of his knowledge.\"","sentence":"Bresnahan v. Luby, 160 Colo. 455, 418 P.2d 171, 173 (1966) (\u201cWhere the evidence concerning the transactions in issue may be obtained from witnesses other than the trial judge, then the trial judge is not such a material witness as to require a disqualification.\u201d) (citing Wingate v. Mach, supra); Brown v. Bahl, 111 Pa.Super. 598, 170 A. 346, 348 (1934) (\u201c[Wjhere other witnesses were available [to testify] as to the facts that [the trial judge] observed, there is no ethical or legal reason to disqualify [the judge] simply because of his knowledge.\u201d)."},"case_id":7535661,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In construing a Florida statute providing for the disqualification of a trial judge based on, among other grounds, the fact that the judge is a material witness, the Florida Supreme Court held that a \"material witness\" is \"a witness who gives testimony going to some fact affecting the merits of the cause and about which no other witness might testify.\" From Wingate, it follows that where the trial judge is not a material witness under this definition, there is no error in the trial court's failure to recuse. Courts in other jurisdictions have adopted this view.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"where trial judge received a letter from a co-defendant which the co-defendant, while testifying as a defense witness, admitted writing, the trial judge did not become a material witness","sentence":"See also Mosley v. State, 145 Ga.App. 651, 244 S.E.2d 610 (1978) (where trial judge transported juror to hospital, the juror was available to testify as to the incident and the trial judge was not a necessary witness); State v. O\u2019Neal, 501 So.2d 920 (La.App.), cert. denied, 505 So.2d 1139 (La.1987) (where trial judge received a letter from a co-defendant which the co-defendant, while testifying as a defense witness, admitted writing, the trial judge did not become a material witness)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[Wjhere other witnesses were available [to testify] as to the facts that [the trial judge] observed, there is no ethical or legal reason to disqualify [the judge] simply because of his knowledge.\"","sentence":"Bresnahan v. Luby, 160 Colo. 455, 418 P.2d 171, 173 (1966) (\u201cWhere the evidence concerning the transactions in issue may be obtained from witnesses other than the trial judge, then the trial judge is not such a material witness as to require a disqualification.\u201d) (citing Wingate v. Mach, supra); Brown v. Bahl, 111 Pa.Super. 598, 170 A. 346, 348 (1934) (\u201c[Wjhere other witnesses were available [to testify] as to the facts that [the trial judge] observed, there is no ethical or legal reason to disqualify [the judge] simply because of his knowledge.\u201d)."},"case_id":7535661,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In construing a Florida statute providing for the disqualification of a trial judge based on, among other grounds, the fact that the judge is a material witness, the Florida Supreme Court held that a \"material witness\" is \"a witness who gives testimony going to some fact affecting the merits of the cause and about which no other witness might testify.\" From Wingate, it follows that where the trial judge is not a material witness under this definition, there is no error in the trial court's failure to recuse. Courts in other jurisdictions have adopted this view.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"where trial judge received a letter from a co-defendant which the co-defendant, while testifying as a defense witness, admitted writing, the trial judge did not become a material witness","sentence":"See also Mosley v. State, 145 Ga.App. 651, 244 S.E.2d 610 (1978) (where trial judge transported juror to hospital, the juror was available to testify as to the incident and the trial judge was not a necessary witness); State v. O\u2019Neal, 501 So.2d 920 (La.App.), cert. denied, 505 So.2d 1139 (La.1987) (where trial judge received a letter from a co-defendant which the co-defendant, while testifying as a defense witness, admitted writing, the trial judge did not become a material witness)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[Wjhere other witnesses were available [to testify] as to the facts that [the trial judge] observed, there is no ethical or legal reason to disqualify [the judge] simply because of his knowledge.\"","sentence":"Bresnahan v. Luby, 160 Colo. 455, 418 P.2d 171, 173 (1966) (\u201cWhere the evidence concerning the transactions in issue may be obtained from witnesses other than the trial judge, then the trial judge is not such a material witness as to require a disqualification.\u201d) (citing Wingate v. Mach, supra); Brown v. Bahl, 111 Pa.Super. 598, 170 A. 346, 348 (1934) (\u201c[Wjhere other witnesses were available [to testify] as to the facts that [the trial judge] observed, there is no ethical or legal reason to disqualify [the judge] simply because of his knowledge.\u201d)."},"case_id":7535661,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In construing a Florida statute providing for the disqualification of a trial judge based on, among other grounds, the fact that the judge is a material witness, the Florida Supreme Court held that a \"material witness\" is \"a witness who gives testimony going to some fact affecting the merits of the cause and about which no other witness might testify.\" From Wingate, it follows that where the trial judge is not a material witness under this definition, there is no error in the trial court's failure to recuse. Courts in other jurisdictions have adopted this view.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"where the defendant in a post-conviction proceeding failed to demonstrate that the trial judge was the source of evidence otherwise unobtainable, the judge was not required to recuse himself","sentence":"Cf. Coleman v. State, \u2014 Mont. -, 633 P.2d 624 (1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 983, 102 S.Ct. 1492, 71 L.Ed.2d 693 (1982) (where the defendant in a post-conviction proceeding failed to demonstrate that the trial judge was the source of evidence otherwise unobtainable, the judge was not required to recuse himself)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[Wjhere other witnesses were available [to testify] as to the facts that [the trial judge] observed, there is no ethical or legal reason to disqualify [the judge] simply because of his knowledge.\"","sentence":"Bresnahan v. Luby, 160 Colo. 455, 418 P.2d 171, 173 (1966) (\u201cWhere the evidence concerning the transactions in issue may be obtained from witnesses other than the trial judge, then the trial judge is not such a material witness as to require a disqualification.\u201d) (citing Wingate v. Mach, supra); Brown v. Bahl, 111 Pa.Super. 598, 170 A. 346, 348 (1934) (\u201c[Wjhere other witnesses were available [to testify] as to the facts that [the trial judge] observed, there is no ethical or legal reason to disqualify [the judge] simply because of his knowledge.\u201d)."},"case_id":7535661,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In construing a Florida statute providing for the disqualification of a trial judge based on, among other grounds, the fact that the judge is a material witness, the Florida Supreme Court held that a \"material witness\" is \"a witness who gives testimony going to some fact affecting the merits of the cause and about which no other witness might testify.\" From Wingate, it follows that where the trial judge is not a material witness under this definition, there is no error in the trial court's failure to recuse. Courts in other jurisdictions have adopted this view.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"where the defendant in a post-conviction proceeding failed to demonstrate that the trial judge was the source of evidence otherwise unobtainable, the judge was not required to recuse himself","sentence":"Cf. Coleman v. State, \u2014 Mont. -, 633 P.2d 624 (1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 983, 102 S.Ct. 1492, 71 L.Ed.2d 693 (1982) (where the defendant in a post-conviction proceeding failed to demonstrate that the trial judge was the source of evidence otherwise unobtainable, the judge was not required to recuse himself)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[Wjhere other witnesses were available [to testify] as to the facts that [the trial judge] observed, there is no ethical or legal reason to disqualify [the judge] simply because of his knowledge.\"","sentence":"Bresnahan v. Luby, 160 Colo. 455, 418 P.2d 171, 173 (1966) (\u201cWhere the evidence concerning the transactions in issue may be obtained from witnesses other than the trial judge, then the trial judge is not such a material witness as to require a disqualification.\u201d) (citing Wingate v. Mach, supra); Brown v. Bahl, 111 Pa.Super. 598, 170 A. 346, 348 (1934) (\u201c[Wjhere other witnesses were available [to testify] as to the facts that [the trial judge] observed, there is no ethical or legal reason to disqualify [the judge] simply because of his knowledge.\u201d)."},"case_id":7535661,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In construing a Florida statute providing for the disqualification of a trial judge based on, among other grounds, the fact that the judge is a material witness, the Florida Supreme Court held that a \"material witness\" is \"a witness who gives testimony going to some fact affecting the merits of the cause and about which no other witness might testify.\" From Wingate, it follows that where the trial judge is not a material witness under this definition, there is no error in the trial court's failure to recuse. Courts in other jurisdictions have adopted this view.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"where the defendant in a post-conviction proceeding failed to demonstrate that the trial judge was the source of evidence otherwise unobtainable, the judge was not required to recuse himself","sentence":"Cf. Coleman v. State, \u2014 Mont. -, 633 P.2d 624 (1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 983, 102 S.Ct. 1492, 71 L.Ed.2d 693 (1982) (where the defendant in a post-conviction proceeding failed to demonstrate that the trial judge was the source of evidence otherwise unobtainable, the judge was not required to recuse himself)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[Wjhere other witnesses were available [to testify] as to the facts that [the trial judge] observed, there is no ethical or legal reason to disqualify [the judge] simply because of his knowledge.\"","sentence":"Bresnahan v. Luby, 160 Colo. 455, 418 P.2d 171, 173 (1966) (\u201cWhere the evidence concerning the transactions in issue may be obtained from witnesses other than the trial judge, then the trial judge is not such a material witness as to require a disqualification.\u201d) (citing Wingate v. Mach, supra); Brown v. Bahl, 111 Pa.Super. 598, 170 A. 346, 348 (1934) (\u201c[Wjhere other witnesses were available [to testify] as to the facts that [the trial judge] observed, there is no ethical or legal reason to disqualify [the judge] simply because of his knowledge.\u201d)."},"case_id":7535661,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In construing a Florida statute providing for the disqualification of a trial judge based on, among other grounds, the fact that the judge is a material witness, the Florida Supreme Court held that a \"material witness\" is \"a witness who gives testimony going to some fact affecting the merits of the cause and about which no other witness might testify.\" From Wingate, it follows that where the trial judge is not a material witness under this definition, there is no error in the trial court's failure to recuse. Courts in other jurisdictions have adopted this view.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"where the defendant in a post-conviction proceeding failed to demonstrate that the trial judge was the source of evidence otherwise unobtainable, the judge was not required to recuse himself","sentence":"Cf. Coleman v. State, \u2014 Mont. -, 633 P.2d 624 (1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 983, 102 S.Ct. 1492, 71 L.Ed.2d 693 (1982) (where the defendant in a post-conviction proceeding failed to demonstrate that the trial judge was the source of evidence otherwise unobtainable, the judge was not required to recuse himself)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[Wjhere other witnesses were available [to testify] as to the facts that [the trial judge] observed, there is no ethical or legal reason to disqualify [the judge] simply because of his knowledge.\"","sentence":"Bresnahan v. Luby, 160 Colo. 455, 418 P.2d 171, 173 (1966) (\u201cWhere the evidence concerning the transactions in issue may be obtained from witnesses other than the trial judge, then the trial judge is not such a material witness as to require a disqualification.\u201d) (citing Wingate v. Mach, supra); Brown v. Bahl, 111 Pa.Super. 598, 170 A. 346, 348 (1934) (\u201c[Wjhere other witnesses were available [to testify] as to the facts that [the trial judge] observed, there is no ethical or legal reason to disqualify [the judge] simply because of his knowledge.\u201d)."},"case_id":7535661,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In construing a Florida statute providing for the disqualification of a trial judge based on, among other grounds, the fact that the judge is a material witness, the Florida Supreme Court held that a \"material witness\" is \"a witness who gives testimony going to some fact affecting the merits of the cause and about which no other witness might testify.\" From Wingate, it follows that where the trial judge is not a material witness under this definition, there is no error in the trial court's failure to recuse. Courts in other jurisdictions have adopted this view.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"where trial judge transported juror to hospital, the juror was available to testify as to the incident and the trial judge was not a necessary witness","sentence":"See also Mosley v. State, 145 Ga.App. 651, 244 S.E.2d 610 (1978) (where trial judge transported juror to hospital, the juror was available to testify as to the incident and the trial judge was not a necessary witness); State v. O\u2019Neal, 501 So.2d 920 (La.App.), cert. denied, 505 So.2d 1139 (La.1987) (where trial judge received a letter from a co-defendant which the co-defendant, while testifying as a defense witness, admitted writing, the trial judge did not become a material witness)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"170 A. 346, 348","parenthetical":"\"[Wjhere other witnesses were available [to testify] as to the facts that [the trial judge] observed, there is no ethical or legal reason to disqualify [the judge] simply because of his knowledge.\"","sentence":"Bresnahan v. Luby, 160 Colo. 455, 418 P.2d 171, 173 (1966) (\u201cWhere the evidence concerning the transactions in issue may be obtained from witnesses other than the trial judge, then the trial judge is not such a material witness as to require a disqualification.\u201d) (citing Wingate v. Mach, supra); Brown v. Bahl, 111 Pa.Super. 598, 170 A. 346, 348 (1934) (\u201c[Wjhere other witnesses were available [to testify] as to the facts that [the trial judge] observed, there is no ethical or legal reason to disqualify [the judge] simply because of his knowledge.\u201d)."},"case_id":7535661,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In construing a Florida statute providing for the disqualification of a trial judge based on, among other grounds, the fact that the judge is a material witness, the Florida Supreme Court held that a \"material witness\" is \"a witness who gives testimony going to some fact affecting the merits of the cause and about which no other witness might testify.\" From Wingate, it follows that where the trial judge is not a material witness under this definition, there is no error in the trial court's failure to recuse. Courts in other jurisdictions have adopted this view.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"where trial judge transported juror to hospital, the juror was available to testify as to the incident and the trial judge was not a necessary witness","sentence":"See also Mosley v. State, 145 Ga.App. 651, 244 S.E.2d 610 (1978) (where trial judge transported juror to hospital, the juror was available to testify as to the incident and the trial judge was not a necessary witness); State v. O\u2019Neal, 501 So.2d 920 (La.App.), cert. denied, 505 So.2d 1139 (La.1987) (where trial judge received a letter from a co-defendant which the co-defendant, while testifying as a defense witness, admitted writing, the trial judge did not become a material witness)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"170 A. 346, 348","parenthetical":"\"[Wjhere other witnesses were available [to testify] as to the facts that [the trial judge] observed, there is no ethical or legal reason to disqualify [the judge] simply because of his knowledge.\"","sentence":"Bresnahan v. Luby, 160 Colo. 455, 418 P.2d 171, 173 (1966) (\u201cWhere the evidence concerning the transactions in issue may be obtained from witnesses other than the trial judge, then the trial judge is not such a material witness as to require a disqualification.\u201d) (citing Wingate v. Mach, supra); Brown v. Bahl, 111 Pa.Super. 598, 170 A. 346, 348 (1934) (\u201c[Wjhere other witnesses were available [to testify] as to the facts that [the trial judge] observed, there is no ethical or legal reason to disqualify [the judge] simply because of his knowledge.\u201d)."},"case_id":7535661,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In construing a Florida statute providing for the disqualification of a trial judge based on, among other grounds, the fact that the judge is a material witness, the Florida Supreme Court held that a \"material witness\" is \"a witness who gives testimony going to some fact affecting the merits of the cause and about which no other witness might testify.\" From Wingate, it follows that where the trial judge is not a material witness under this definition, there is no error in the trial court's failure to recuse. Courts in other jurisdictions have adopted this view.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"170 A. 346, 348","parenthetical":"\"[Wjhere other witnesses were available [to testify] as to the facts that [the trial judge] observed, there is no ethical or legal reason to disqualify [the judge] simply because of his knowledge.\"","sentence":"Bresnahan v. Luby, 160 Colo. 455, 418 P.2d 171, 173 (1966) (\u201cWhere the evidence concerning the transactions in issue may be obtained from witnesses other than the trial judge, then the trial judge is not such a material witness as to require a disqualification.\u201d) (citing Wingate v. Mach, supra); Brown v. Bahl, 111 Pa.Super. 598, 170 A. 346, 348 (1934) (\u201c[Wjhere other witnesses were available [to testify] as to the facts that [the trial judge] observed, there is no ethical or legal reason to disqualify [the judge] simply because of his knowledge.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"where trial judge received a letter from a co-defendant which the co-defendant, while testifying as a defense witness, admitted writing, the trial judge did not become a material witness","sentence":"See also Mosley v. State, 145 Ga.App. 651, 244 S.E.2d 610 (1978) (where trial judge transported juror to hospital, the juror was available to testify as to the incident and the trial judge was not a necessary witness); State v. O\u2019Neal, 501 So.2d 920 (La.App.), cert. denied, 505 So.2d 1139 (La.1987) (where trial judge received a letter from a co-defendant which the co-defendant, while testifying as a defense witness, admitted writing, the trial judge did not become a material witness)."},"case_id":7535661,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In construing a Florida statute providing for the disqualification of a trial judge based on, among other grounds, the fact that the judge is a material witness, the Florida Supreme Court held that a \"material witness\" is \"a witness who gives testimony going to some fact affecting the merits of the cause and about which no other witness might testify.\" From Wingate, it follows that where the trial judge is not a material witness under this definition, there is no error in the trial court's failure to recuse. Courts in other jurisdictions have adopted this view.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"where trial judge received a letter from a co-defendant which the co-defendant, while testifying as a defense witness, admitted writing, the trial judge did not become a material witness","sentence":"See also Mosley v. State, 145 Ga.App. 651, 244 S.E.2d 610 (1978) (where trial judge transported juror to hospital, the juror was available to testify as to the incident and the trial judge was not a necessary witness); State v. O\u2019Neal, 501 So.2d 920 (La.App.), cert. denied, 505 So.2d 1139 (La.1987) (where trial judge received a letter from a co-defendant which the co-defendant, while testifying as a defense witness, admitted writing, the trial judge did not become a material witness)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"170 A. 346, 348","parenthetical":"\"[Wjhere other witnesses were available [to testify] as to the facts that [the trial judge] observed, there is no ethical or legal reason to disqualify [the judge] simply because of his knowledge.\"","sentence":"Bresnahan v. Luby, 160 Colo. 455, 418 P.2d 171, 173 (1966) (\u201cWhere the evidence concerning the transactions in issue may be obtained from witnesses other than the trial judge, then the trial judge is not such a material witness as to require a disqualification.\u201d) (citing Wingate v. Mach, supra); Brown v. Bahl, 111 Pa.Super. 598, 170 A. 346, 348 (1934) (\u201c[Wjhere other witnesses were available [to testify] as to the facts that [the trial judge] observed, there is no ethical or legal reason to disqualify [the judge] simply because of his knowledge.\u201d)."},"case_id":7535661,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In construing a Florida statute providing for the disqualification of a trial judge based on, among other grounds, the fact that the judge is a material witness, the Florida Supreme Court held that a \"material witness\" is \"a witness who gives testimony going to some fact affecting the merits of the cause and about which no other witness might testify.\" From Wingate, it follows that where the trial judge is not a material witness under this definition, there is no error in the trial court's failure to recuse. Courts in other jurisdictions have adopted this view.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"170 A. 346, 348","parenthetical":"\"[Wjhere other witnesses were available [to testify] as to the facts that [the trial judge] observed, there is no ethical or legal reason to disqualify [the judge] simply because of his knowledge.\"","sentence":"Bresnahan v. Luby, 160 Colo. 455, 418 P.2d 171, 173 (1966) (\u201cWhere the evidence concerning the transactions in issue may be obtained from witnesses other than the trial judge, then the trial judge is not such a material witness as to require a disqualification.\u201d) (citing Wingate v. Mach, supra); Brown v. Bahl, 111 Pa.Super. 598, 170 A. 346, 348 (1934) (\u201c[Wjhere other witnesses were available [to testify] as to the facts that [the trial judge] observed, there is no ethical or legal reason to disqualify [the judge] simply because of his knowledge.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"where the defendant in a post-conviction proceeding failed to demonstrate that the trial judge was the source of evidence otherwise unobtainable, the judge was not required to recuse himself","sentence":"Cf. Coleman v. State, \u2014 Mont. -, 633 P.2d 624 (1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 983, 102 S.Ct. 1492, 71 L.Ed.2d 693 (1982) (where the defendant in a post-conviction proceeding failed to demonstrate that the trial judge was the source of evidence otherwise unobtainable, the judge was not required to recuse himself)."},"case_id":7535661,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In construing a Florida statute providing for the disqualification of a trial judge based on, among other grounds, the fact that the judge is a material witness, the Florida Supreme Court held that a \"material witness\" is \"a witness who gives testimony going to some fact affecting the merits of the cause and about which no other witness might testify.\" From Wingate, it follows that where the trial judge is not a material witness under this definition, there is no error in the trial court's failure to recuse. Courts in other jurisdictions have adopted this view.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"170 A. 346, 348","parenthetical":"\"[Wjhere other witnesses were available [to testify] as to the facts that [the trial judge] observed, there is no ethical or legal reason to disqualify [the judge] simply because of his knowledge.\"","sentence":"Bresnahan v. Luby, 160 Colo. 455, 418 P.2d 171, 173 (1966) (\u201cWhere the evidence concerning the transactions in issue may be obtained from witnesses other than the trial judge, then the trial judge is not such a material witness as to require a disqualification.\u201d) (citing Wingate v. Mach, supra); Brown v. Bahl, 111 Pa.Super. 598, 170 A. 346, 348 (1934) (\u201c[Wjhere other witnesses were available [to testify] as to the facts that [the trial judge] observed, there is no ethical or legal reason to disqualify [the judge] simply because of his knowledge.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"where the defendant in a post-conviction proceeding failed to demonstrate that the trial judge was the source of evidence otherwise unobtainable, the judge was not required to recuse himself","sentence":"Cf. Coleman v. State, \u2014 Mont. -, 633 P.2d 624 (1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 983, 102 S.Ct. 1492, 71 L.Ed.2d 693 (1982) (where the defendant in a post-conviction proceeding failed to demonstrate that the trial judge was the source of evidence otherwise unobtainable, the judge was not required to recuse himself)."},"case_id":7535661,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In construing a Florida statute providing for the disqualification of a trial judge based on, among other grounds, the fact that the judge is a material witness, the Florida Supreme Court held that a \"material witness\" is \"a witness who gives testimony going to some fact affecting the merits of the cause and about which no other witness might testify.\" From Wingate, it follows that where the trial judge is not a material witness under this definition, there is no error in the trial court's failure to recuse. Courts in other jurisdictions have adopted this view.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"170 A. 346, 348","parenthetical":"\"[Wjhere other witnesses were available [to testify] as to the facts that [the trial judge] observed, there is no ethical or legal reason to disqualify [the judge] simply because of his knowledge.\"","sentence":"Bresnahan v. Luby, 160 Colo. 455, 418 P.2d 171, 173 (1966) (\u201cWhere the evidence concerning the transactions in issue may be obtained from witnesses other than the trial judge, then the trial judge is not such a material witness as to require a disqualification.\u201d) (citing Wingate v. Mach, supra); Brown v. Bahl, 111 Pa.Super. 598, 170 A. 346, 348 (1934) (\u201c[Wjhere other witnesses were available [to testify] as to the facts that [the trial judge] observed, there is no ethical or legal reason to disqualify [the judge] simply because of his knowledge.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"where the defendant in a post-conviction proceeding failed to demonstrate that the trial judge was the source of evidence otherwise unobtainable, the judge was not required to recuse himself","sentence":"Cf. Coleman v. State, \u2014 Mont. -, 633 P.2d 624 (1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 983, 102 S.Ct. 1492, 71 L.Ed.2d 693 (1982) (where the defendant in a post-conviction proceeding failed to demonstrate that the trial judge was the source of evidence otherwise unobtainable, the judge was not required to recuse himself)."},"case_id":7535661,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In construing a Florida statute providing for the disqualification of a trial judge based on, among other grounds, the fact that the judge is a material witness, the Florida Supreme Court held that a \"material witness\" is \"a witness who gives testimony going to some fact affecting the merits of the cause and about which no other witness might testify.\" From Wingate, it follows that where the trial judge is not a material witness under this definition, there is no error in the trial court's failure to recuse. Courts in other jurisdictions have adopted this view.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"170 A. 346, 348","parenthetical":"\"[Wjhere other witnesses were available [to testify] as to the facts that [the trial judge] observed, there is no ethical or legal reason to disqualify [the judge] simply because of his knowledge.\"","sentence":"Bresnahan v. Luby, 160 Colo. 455, 418 P.2d 171, 173 (1966) (\u201cWhere the evidence concerning the transactions in issue may be obtained from witnesses other than the trial judge, then the trial judge is not such a material witness as to require a disqualification.\u201d) (citing Wingate v. Mach, supra); Brown v. Bahl, 111 Pa.Super. 598, 170 A. 346, 348 (1934) (\u201c[Wjhere other witnesses were available [to testify] as to the facts that [the trial judge] observed, there is no ethical or legal reason to disqualify [the judge] simply because of his knowledge.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"where the defendant in a post-conviction proceeding failed to demonstrate that the trial judge was the source of evidence otherwise unobtainable, the judge was not required to recuse himself","sentence":"Cf. Coleman v. State, \u2014 Mont. -, 633 P.2d 624 (1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 983, 102 S.Ct. 1492, 71 L.Ed.2d 693 (1982) (where the defendant in a post-conviction proceeding failed to demonstrate that the trial judge was the source of evidence otherwise unobtainable, the judge was not required to recuse himself)."},"case_id":7535661,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In construing a Florida statute providing for the disqualification of a trial judge based on, among other grounds, the fact that the judge is a material witness, the Florida Supreme Court held that a \"material witness\" is \"a witness who gives testimony going to some fact affecting the merits of the cause and about which no other witness might testify.\" From Wingate, it follows that where the trial judge is not a material witness under this definition, there is no error in the trial court's failure to recuse. Courts in other jurisdictions have adopted this view.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"where the defendant in a post-conviction proceeding failed to demonstrate that the trial judge was the source of evidence otherwise unobtainable, the judge was not required to recuse himself","sentence":"Cf. Coleman v. State, \u2014 Mont. -, 633 P.2d 624 (1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 983, 102 S.Ct. 1492, 71 L.Ed.2d 693 (1982) (where the defendant in a post-conviction proceeding failed to demonstrate that the trial judge was the source of evidence otherwise unobtainable, the judge was not required to recuse himself)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"where trial judge transported juror to hospital, the juror was available to testify as to the incident and the trial judge was not a necessary witness","sentence":"See also Mosley v. State, 145 Ga.App. 651, 244 S.E.2d 610 (1978) (where trial judge transported juror to hospital, the juror was available to testify as to the incident and the trial judge was not a necessary witness); State v. O\u2019Neal, 501 So.2d 920 (La.App.), cert. denied, 505 So.2d 1139 (La.1987) (where trial judge received a letter from a co-defendant which the co-defendant, while testifying as a defense witness, admitted writing, the trial judge did not become a material witness)."},"case_id":7535661,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In construing a Florida statute providing for the disqualification of a trial judge based on, among other grounds, the fact that the judge is a material witness, the Florida Supreme Court held that a \"material witness\" is \"a witness who gives testimony going to some fact affecting the merits of the cause and about which no other witness might testify.\" From Wingate, it follows that where the trial judge is not a material witness under this definition, there is no error in the trial court's failure to recuse. Courts in other jurisdictions have adopted this view.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"where the defendant in a post-conviction proceeding failed to demonstrate that the trial judge was the source of evidence otherwise unobtainable, the judge was not required to recuse himself","sentence":"Cf. Coleman v. State, \u2014 Mont. -, 633 P.2d 624 (1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 983, 102 S.Ct. 1492, 71 L.Ed.2d 693 (1982) (where the defendant in a post-conviction proceeding failed to demonstrate that the trial judge was the source of evidence otherwise unobtainable, the judge was not required to recuse himself)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"where trial judge transported juror to hospital, the juror was available to testify as to the incident and the trial judge was not a necessary witness","sentence":"See also Mosley v. State, 145 Ga.App. 651, 244 S.E.2d 610 (1978) (where trial judge transported juror to hospital, the juror was available to testify as to the incident and the trial judge was not a necessary witness); State v. O\u2019Neal, 501 So.2d 920 (La.App.), cert. denied, 505 So.2d 1139 (La.1987) (where trial judge received a letter from a co-defendant which the co-defendant, while testifying as a defense witness, admitted writing, the trial judge did not become a material witness)."},"case_id":7535661,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In construing a Florida statute providing for the disqualification of a trial judge based on, among other grounds, the fact that the judge is a material witness, the Florida Supreme Court held that a \"material witness\" is \"a witness who gives testimony going to some fact affecting the merits of the cause and about which no other witness might testify.\" From Wingate, it follows that where the trial judge is not a material witness under this definition, there is no error in the trial court's failure to recuse. Courts in other jurisdictions have adopted this view.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"where the defendant in a post-conviction proceeding failed to demonstrate that the trial judge was the source of evidence otherwise unobtainable, the judge was not required to recuse himself","sentence":"Cf. Coleman v. State, \u2014 Mont. -, 633 P.2d 624 (1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 983, 102 S.Ct. 1492, 71 L.Ed.2d 693 (1982) (where the defendant in a post-conviction proceeding failed to demonstrate that the trial judge was the source of evidence otherwise unobtainable, the judge was not required to recuse himself)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"where trial judge transported juror to hospital, the juror was available to testify as to the incident and the trial judge was not a necessary witness","sentence":"See also Mosley v. State, 145 Ga.App. 651, 244 S.E.2d 610 (1978) (where trial judge transported juror to hospital, the juror was available to testify as to the incident and the trial judge was not a necessary witness); State v. O\u2019Neal, 501 So.2d 920 (La.App.), cert. denied, 505 So.2d 1139 (La.1987) (where trial judge received a letter from a co-defendant which the co-defendant, while testifying as a defense witness, admitted writing, the trial judge did not become a material witness)."},"case_id":7535661,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In construing a Florida statute providing for the disqualification of a trial judge based on, among other grounds, the fact that the judge is a material witness, the Florida Supreme Court held that a \"material witness\" is \"a witness who gives testimony going to some fact affecting the merits of the cause and about which no other witness might testify.\" From Wingate, it follows that where the trial judge is not a material witness under this definition, there is no error in the trial court's failure to recuse. Courts in other jurisdictions have adopted this view.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"where the defendant in a post-conviction proceeding failed to demonstrate that the trial judge was the source of evidence otherwise unobtainable, the judge was not required to recuse himself","sentence":"Cf. Coleman v. State, \u2014 Mont. -, 633 P.2d 624 (1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 983, 102 S.Ct. 1492, 71 L.Ed.2d 693 (1982) (where the defendant in a post-conviction proceeding failed to demonstrate that the trial judge was the source of evidence otherwise unobtainable, the judge was not required to recuse himself)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"where trial judge transported juror to hospital, the juror was available to testify as to the incident and the trial judge was not a necessary witness","sentence":"See also Mosley v. State, 145 Ga.App. 651, 244 S.E.2d 610 (1978) (where trial judge transported juror to hospital, the juror was available to testify as to the incident and the trial judge was not a necessary witness); State v. O\u2019Neal, 501 So.2d 920 (La.App.), cert. denied, 505 So.2d 1139 (La.1987) (where trial judge received a letter from a co-defendant which the co-defendant, while testifying as a defense witness, admitted writing, the trial judge did not become a material witness)."},"case_id":7535661,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In construing a Florida statute providing for the disqualification of a trial judge based on, among other grounds, the fact that the judge is a material witness, the Florida Supreme Court held that a \"material witness\" is \"a witness who gives testimony going to some fact affecting the merits of the cause and about which no other witness might testify.\" From Wingate, it follows that where the trial judge is not a material witness under this definition, there is no error in the trial court's failure to recuse. Courts in other jurisdictions have adopted this view.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"where the defendant in a post-conviction proceeding failed to demonstrate that the trial judge was the source of evidence otherwise unobtainable, the judge was not required to recuse himself","sentence":"Cf. Coleman v. State, \u2014 Mont. -, 633 P.2d 624 (1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 983, 102 S.Ct. 1492, 71 L.Ed.2d 693 (1982) (where the defendant in a post-conviction proceeding failed to demonstrate that the trial judge was the source of evidence otherwise unobtainable, the judge was not required to recuse himself)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"where trial judge transported juror to hospital, the juror was available to testify as to the incident and the trial judge was not a necessary witness","sentence":"See also Mosley v. State, 145 Ga.App. 651, 244 S.E.2d 610 (1978) (where trial judge transported juror to hospital, the juror was available to testify as to the incident and the trial judge was not a necessary witness); State v. O\u2019Neal, 501 So.2d 920 (La.App.), cert. denied, 505 So.2d 1139 (La.1987) (where trial judge received a letter from a co-defendant which the co-defendant, while testifying as a defense witness, admitted writing, the trial judge did not become a material witness)."},"case_id":7535661,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In construing a Florida statute providing for the disqualification of a trial judge based on, among other grounds, the fact that the judge is a material witness, the Florida Supreme Court held that a \"material witness\" is \"a witness who gives testimony going to some fact affecting the merits of the cause and about which no other witness might testify.\" From Wingate, it follows that where the trial judge is not a material witness under this definition, there is no error in the trial court's failure to recuse. Courts in other jurisdictions have adopted this view.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"where trial judge transported juror to hospital, the juror was available to testify as to the incident and the trial judge was not a necessary witness","sentence":"See also Mosley v. State, 145 Ga.App. 651, 244 S.E.2d 610 (1978) (where trial judge transported juror to hospital, the juror was available to testify as to the incident and the trial judge was not a necessary witness); State v. O\u2019Neal, 501 So.2d 920 (La.App.), cert. denied, 505 So.2d 1139 (La.1987) (where trial judge received a letter from a co-defendant which the co-defendant, while testifying as a defense witness, admitted writing, the trial judge did not become a material witness)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"where the defendant in a post-conviction proceeding failed to demonstrate that the trial judge was the source of evidence otherwise unobtainable, the judge was not required to recuse himself","sentence":"Cf. Coleman v. State, \u2014 Mont. -, 633 P.2d 624 (1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 983, 102 S.Ct. 1492, 71 L.Ed.2d 693 (1982) (where the defendant in a post-conviction proceeding failed to demonstrate that the trial judge was the source of evidence otherwise unobtainable, the judge was not required to recuse himself)."},"case_id":7535661,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In construing a Florida statute providing for the disqualification of a trial judge based on, among other grounds, the fact that the judge is a material witness, the Florida Supreme Court held that a \"material witness\" is \"a witness who gives testimony going to some fact affecting the merits of the cause and about which no other witness might testify.\" From Wingate, it follows that where the trial judge is not a material witness under this definition, there is no error in the trial court's failure to recuse. Courts in other jurisdictions have adopted this view.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"where trial judge transported juror to hospital, the juror was available to testify as to the incident and the trial judge was not a necessary witness","sentence":"See also Mosley v. State, 145 Ga.App. 651, 244 S.E.2d 610 (1978) (where trial judge transported juror to hospital, the juror was available to testify as to the incident and the trial judge was not a necessary witness); State v. O\u2019Neal, 501 So.2d 920 (La.App.), cert. denied, 505 So.2d 1139 (La.1987) (where trial judge received a letter from a co-defendant which the co-defendant, while testifying as a defense witness, admitted writing, the trial judge did not become a material witness)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"where the defendant in a post-conviction proceeding failed to demonstrate that the trial judge was the source of evidence otherwise unobtainable, the judge was not required to recuse himself","sentence":"Cf. Coleman v. State, \u2014 Mont. -, 633 P.2d 624 (1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 983, 102 S.Ct. 1492, 71 L.Ed.2d 693 (1982) (where the defendant in a post-conviction proceeding failed to demonstrate that the trial judge was the source of evidence otherwise unobtainable, the judge was not required to recuse himself)."},"case_id":7535661,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In construing a Florida statute providing for the disqualification of a trial judge based on, among other grounds, the fact that the judge is a material witness, the Florida Supreme Court held that a \"material witness\" is \"a witness who gives testimony going to some fact affecting the merits of the cause and about which no other witness might testify.\" From Wingate, it follows that where the trial judge is not a material witness under this definition, there is no error in the trial court's failure to recuse. Courts in other jurisdictions have adopted this view.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"where the defendant in a post-conviction proceeding failed to demonstrate that the trial judge was the source of evidence otherwise unobtainable, the judge was not required to recuse himself","sentence":"Cf. Coleman v. State, \u2014 Mont. -, 633 P.2d 624 (1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 983, 102 S.Ct. 1492, 71 L.Ed.2d 693 (1982) (where the defendant in a post-conviction proceeding failed to demonstrate that the trial judge was the source of evidence otherwise unobtainable, the judge was not required to recuse himself)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"where trial judge transported juror to hospital, the juror was available to testify as to the incident and the trial judge was not a necessary witness","sentence":"See also Mosley v. State, 145 Ga.App. 651, 244 S.E.2d 610 (1978) (where trial judge transported juror to hospital, the juror was available to testify as to the incident and the trial judge was not a necessary witness); State v. O\u2019Neal, 501 So.2d 920 (La.App.), cert. denied, 505 So.2d 1139 (La.1987) (where trial judge received a letter from a co-defendant which the co-defendant, while testifying as a defense witness, admitted writing, the trial judge did not become a material witness)."},"case_id":7535661,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In construing a Florida statute providing for the disqualification of a trial judge based on, among other grounds, the fact that the judge is a material witness, the Florida Supreme Court held that a \"material witness\" is \"a witness who gives testimony going to some fact affecting the merits of the cause and about which no other witness might testify.\" From Wingate, it follows that where the trial judge is not a material witness under this definition, there is no error in the trial court's failure to recuse. Courts in other jurisdictions have adopted this view.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"where trial judge received a letter from a co-defendant which the co-defendant, while testifying as a defense witness, admitted writing, the trial judge did not become a material witness","sentence":"See also Mosley v. State, 145 Ga.App. 651, 244 S.E.2d 610 (1978) (where trial judge transported juror to hospital, the juror was available to testify as to the incident and the trial judge was not a necessary witness); State v. O\u2019Neal, 501 So.2d 920 (La.App.), cert. denied, 505 So.2d 1139 (La.1987) (where trial judge received a letter from a co-defendant which the co-defendant, while testifying as a defense witness, admitted writing, the trial judge did not become a material witness)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"where the defendant in a post-conviction proceeding failed to demonstrate that the trial judge was the source of evidence otherwise unobtainable, the judge was not required to recuse himself","sentence":"Cf. Coleman v. State, \u2014 Mont. -, 633 P.2d 624 (1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 983, 102 S.Ct. 1492, 71 L.Ed.2d 693 (1982) (where the defendant in a post-conviction proceeding failed to demonstrate that the trial judge was the source of evidence otherwise unobtainable, the judge was not required to recuse himself)."},"case_id":7535661,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In construing a Florida statute providing for the disqualification of a trial judge based on, among other grounds, the fact that the judge is a material witness, the Florida Supreme Court held that a \"material witness\" is \"a witness who gives testimony going to some fact affecting the merits of the cause and about which no other witness might testify.\" From Wingate, it follows that where the trial judge is not a material witness under this definition, there is no error in the trial court's failure to recuse. Courts in other jurisdictions have adopted this view.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"where the defendant in a post-conviction proceeding failed to demonstrate that the trial judge was the source of evidence otherwise unobtainable, the judge was not required to recuse himself","sentence":"Cf. Coleman v. State, \u2014 Mont. -, 633 P.2d 624 (1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 983, 102 S.Ct. 1492, 71 L.Ed.2d 693 (1982) (where the defendant in a post-conviction proceeding failed to demonstrate that the trial judge was the source of evidence otherwise unobtainable, the judge was not required to recuse himself)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"where trial judge received a letter from a co-defendant which the co-defendant, while testifying as a defense witness, admitted writing, the trial judge did not become a material witness","sentence":"See also Mosley v. State, 145 Ga.App. 651, 244 S.E.2d 610 (1978) (where trial judge transported juror to hospital, the juror was available to testify as to the incident and the trial judge was not a necessary witness); State v. O\u2019Neal, 501 So.2d 920 (La.App.), cert. denied, 505 So.2d 1139 (La.1987) (where trial judge received a letter from a co-defendant which the co-defendant, while testifying as a defense witness, admitted writing, the trial judge did not become a material witness)."},"case_id":7535661,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In construing a Florida statute providing for the disqualification of a trial judge based on, among other grounds, the fact that the judge is a material witness, the Florida Supreme Court held that a \"material witness\" is \"a witness who gives testimony going to some fact affecting the merits of the cause and about which no other witness might testify.\" From Wingate, it follows that where the trial judge is not a material witness under this definition, there is no error in the trial court's failure to recuse. Courts in other jurisdictions have adopted this view.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"where trial judge received a letter from a co-defendant which the co-defendant, while testifying as a defense witness, admitted writing, the trial judge did not become a material witness","sentence":"See also Mosley v. State, 145 Ga.App. 651, 244 S.E.2d 610 (1978) (where trial judge transported juror to hospital, the juror was available to testify as to the incident and the trial judge was not a necessary witness); State v. O\u2019Neal, 501 So.2d 920 (La.App.), cert. denied, 505 So.2d 1139 (La.1987) (where trial judge received a letter from a co-defendant which the co-defendant, while testifying as a defense witness, admitted writing, the trial judge did not become a material witness)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"where the defendant in a post-conviction proceeding failed to demonstrate that the trial judge was the source of evidence otherwise unobtainable, the judge was not required to recuse himself","sentence":"Cf. Coleman v. State, \u2014 Mont. -, 633 P.2d 624 (1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 983, 102 S.Ct. 1492, 71 L.Ed.2d 693 (1982) (where the defendant in a post-conviction proceeding failed to demonstrate that the trial judge was the source of evidence otherwise unobtainable, the judge was not required to recuse himself)."},"case_id":7535661,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In construing a Florida statute providing for the disqualification of a trial judge based on, among other grounds, the fact that the judge is a material witness, the Florida Supreme Court held that a \"material witness\" is \"a witness who gives testimony going to some fact affecting the merits of the cause and about which no other witness might testify.\" From Wingate, it follows that where the trial judge is not a material witness under this definition, there is no error in the trial court's failure to recuse. Courts in other jurisdictions have adopted this view.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"where trial judge received a letter from a co-defendant which the co-defendant, while testifying as a defense witness, admitted writing, the trial judge did not become a material witness","sentence":"See also Mosley v. State, 145 Ga.App. 651, 244 S.E.2d 610 (1978) (where trial judge transported juror to hospital, the juror was available to testify as to the incident and the trial judge was not a necessary witness); State v. O\u2019Neal, 501 So.2d 920 (La.App.), cert. denied, 505 So.2d 1139 (La.1987) (where trial judge received a letter from a co-defendant which the co-defendant, while testifying as a defense witness, admitted writing, the trial judge did not become a material witness)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"where the defendant in a post-conviction proceeding failed to demonstrate that the trial judge was the source of evidence otherwise unobtainable, the judge was not required to recuse himself","sentence":"Cf. Coleman v. State, \u2014 Mont. -, 633 P.2d 624 (1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 983, 102 S.Ct. 1492, 71 L.Ed.2d 693 (1982) (where the defendant in a post-conviction proceeding failed to demonstrate that the trial judge was the source of evidence otherwise unobtainable, the judge was not required to recuse himself)."},"case_id":7535661,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In construing a Florida statute providing for the disqualification of a trial judge based on, among other grounds, the fact that the judge is a material witness, the Florida Supreme Court held that a \"material witness\" is \"a witness who gives testimony going to some fact affecting the merits of the cause and about which no other witness might testify.\" From Wingate, it follows that where the trial judge is not a material witness under this definition, there is no error in the trial court's failure to recuse. Courts in other jurisdictions have adopted this view.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"where the defendant in a post-conviction proceeding failed to demonstrate that the trial judge was the source of evidence otherwise unobtainable, the judge was not required to recuse himself","sentence":"Cf. Coleman v. State, \u2014 Mont. -, 633 P.2d 624 (1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 983, 102 S.Ct. 1492, 71 L.Ed.2d 693 (1982) (where the defendant in a post-conviction proceeding failed to demonstrate that the trial judge was the source of evidence otherwise unobtainable, the judge was not required to recuse himself)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"where trial judge received a letter from a co-defendant which the co-defendant, while testifying as a defense witness, admitted writing, the trial judge did not become a material witness","sentence":"See also Mosley v. State, 145 Ga.App. 651, 244 S.E.2d 610 (1978) (where trial judge transported juror to hospital, the juror was available to testify as to the incident and the trial judge was not a necessary witness); State v. O\u2019Neal, 501 So.2d 920 (La.App.), cert. denied, 505 So.2d 1139 (La.1987) (where trial judge received a letter from a co-defendant which the co-defendant, while testifying as a defense witness, admitted writing, the trial judge did not become a material witness)."},"case_id":7535661,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In construing a Florida statute providing for the disqualification of a trial judge based on, among other grounds, the fact that the judge is a material witness, the Florida Supreme Court held that a \"material witness\" is \"a witness who gives testimony going to some fact affecting the merits of the cause and about which no other witness might testify.\" From Wingate, it follows that where the trial judge is not a material witness under this definition, there is no error in the trial court's failure to recuse. Courts in other jurisdictions have adopted this view.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"where trial judge received a letter from a co-defendant which the co-defendant, while testifying as a defense witness, admitted writing, the trial judge did not become a material witness","sentence":"See also Mosley v. State, 145 Ga.App. 651, 244 S.E.2d 610 (1978) (where trial judge transported juror to hospital, the juror was available to testify as to the incident and the trial judge was not a necessary witness); State v. O\u2019Neal, 501 So.2d 920 (La.App.), cert. denied, 505 So.2d 1139 (La.1987) (where trial judge received a letter from a co-defendant which the co-defendant, while testifying as a defense witness, admitted writing, the trial judge did not become a material witness)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"where the defendant in a post-conviction proceeding failed to demonstrate that the trial judge was the source of evidence otherwise unobtainable, the judge was not required to recuse himself","sentence":"Cf. Coleman v. State, \u2014 Mont. -, 633 P.2d 624 (1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 983, 102 S.Ct. 1492, 71 L.Ed.2d 693 (1982) (where the defendant in a post-conviction proceeding failed to demonstrate that the trial judge was the source of evidence otherwise unobtainable, the judge was not required to recuse himself)."},"case_id":7535661,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In construing a Florida statute providing for the disqualification of a trial judge based on, among other grounds, the fact that the judge is a material witness, the Florida Supreme Court held that a \"material witness\" is \"a witness who gives testimony going to some fact affecting the merits of the cause and about which no other witness might testify.\" From Wingate, it follows that where the trial judge is not a material witness under this definition, there is no error in the trial court's failure to recuse. Courts in other jurisdictions have adopted this view.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"where trial judge received a letter from a co-defendant which the co-defendant, while testifying as a defense witness, admitted writing, the trial judge did not become a material witness","sentence":"See also Mosley v. State, 145 Ga.App. 651, 244 S.E.2d 610 (1978) (where trial judge transported juror to hospital, the juror was available to testify as to the incident and the trial judge was not a necessary witness); State v. O\u2019Neal, 501 So.2d 920 (La.App.), cert. denied, 505 So.2d 1139 (La.1987) (where trial judge received a letter from a co-defendant which the co-defendant, while testifying as a defense witness, admitted writing, the trial judge did not become a material witness)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"where the defendant in a post-conviction proceeding failed to demonstrate that the trial judge was the source of evidence otherwise unobtainable, the judge was not required to recuse himself","sentence":"Cf. Coleman v. State, \u2014 Mont. -, 633 P.2d 624 (1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 983, 102 S.Ct. 1492, 71 L.Ed.2d 693 (1982) (where the defendant in a post-conviction proceeding failed to demonstrate that the trial judge was the source of evidence otherwise unobtainable, the judge was not required to recuse himself)."},"case_id":7535661,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In construing a Florida statute providing for the disqualification of a trial judge based on, among other grounds, the fact that the judge is a material witness, the Florida Supreme Court held that a \"material witness\" is \"a witness who gives testimony going to some fact affecting the merits of the cause and about which no other witness might testify.\" From Wingate, it follows that where the trial judge is not a material witness under this definition, there is no error in the trial court's failure to recuse. Courts in other jurisdictions have adopted this view.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"where trial judge received a letter from a co-defendant which the co-defendant, while testifying as a defense witness, admitted writing, the trial judge did not become a material witness","sentence":"See also Mosley v. State, 145 Ga.App. 651, 244 S.E.2d 610 (1978) (where trial judge transported juror to hospital, the juror was available to testify as to the incident and the trial judge was not a necessary witness); State v. O\u2019Neal, 501 So.2d 920 (La.App.), cert. denied, 505 So.2d 1139 (La.1987) (where trial judge received a letter from a co-defendant which the co-defendant, while testifying as a defense witness, admitted writing, the trial judge did not become a material witness)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"where the defendant in a post-conviction proceeding failed to demonstrate that the trial judge was the source of evidence otherwise unobtainable, the judge was not required to recuse himself","sentence":"Cf. Coleman v. State, \u2014 Mont. -, 633 P.2d 624 (1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 983, 102 S.Ct. 1492, 71 L.Ed.2d 693 (1982) (where the defendant in a post-conviction proceeding failed to demonstrate that the trial judge was the source of evidence otherwise unobtainable, the judge was not required to recuse himself)."},"case_id":7535661,"label":"a"}
{"context":"She further testified that Clay only conducted drug sales from the cocaine stored in the closet and that Clay left the closet \"[u]nloeked most [of] the time[]\" when Clay and she were in the apartment. R. 85 at 123. The firearm was situated next to the cocaine and was strategically located on the same shelf so it was quickly and easily accessible.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"732 F.3d 576, 576-77","parenthetical":"\"[T]he gun's location under the mattress in the bedroom consti tuted a strategic location: despite the bedroom's second-floor location, ... the house was small enough so that someone on the first floor could retrieve the gun within ten to fifteen seconds.\"","sentence":"See United States v. Ham, 628 F.3d 801, 804, 809 (6th Cir.2011) (finding that since the loaded gun was on top of an armoire situated just outside the closet where the drugs were found, it was strategically located so that it was quickly and easily available for use); United States v. Swafford, 385 F.3d 1026, 1027-29 (6th Cir.2004) (finding a nexus between the contraband and a loaded pistol within arm\u2019s reach of the defendant when he was arrested in the house even though the drugs for sale were located in makeshift garage behind the house); see also Brown, 732 F.3d at 576-77 (\u201c[T]he gun\u2019s location under the mattress in the bedroom consti tuted a strategic location: despite the bedroom\u2019s second-floor location, ... the house was small enough so that someone on the first floor could retrieve the gun within ten to fifteen seconds.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"628 F.3d 801, 804, 809","parenthetical":"finding that since the loaded gun was on top of an armoire situated just outside the closet where the drugs were found, it was strategically located so that it was quickly and easily available for use","sentence":"See United States v. Ham, 628 F.3d 801, 804, 809 (6th Cir.2011) (finding that since the loaded gun was on top of an armoire situated just outside the closet where the drugs were found, it was strategically located so that it was quickly and easily available for use); United States v. Swafford, 385 F.3d 1026, 1027-29 (6th Cir.2004) (finding a nexus between the contraband and a loaded pistol within arm\u2019s reach of the defendant when he was arrested in the house even though the drugs for sale were located in makeshift garage behind the house); see also Brown, 732 F.3d at 576-77 (\u201c[T]he gun\u2019s location under the mattress in the bedroom consti tuted a strategic location: despite the bedroom\u2019s second-floor location, ... the house was small enough so that someone on the first floor could retrieve the gun within ten to fifteen seconds.\u201d)."},"case_id":4079326,"label":"b"}
{"context":"She further testified that Clay only conducted drug sales from the cocaine stored in the closet and that Clay left the closet \"[u]nloeked most [of] the time[]\" when Clay and she were in the apartment. R. 85 at 123. The firearm was situated next to the cocaine and was strategically located on the same shelf so it was quickly and easily accessible.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"732 F.3d 576, 576-77","parenthetical":"\"[T]he gun's location under the mattress in the bedroom consti tuted a strategic location: despite the bedroom's second-floor location, ... the house was small enough so that someone on the first floor could retrieve the gun within ten to fifteen seconds.\"","sentence":"See United States v. Ham, 628 F.3d 801, 804, 809 (6th Cir.2011) (finding that since the loaded gun was on top of an armoire situated just outside the closet where the drugs were found, it was strategically located so that it was quickly and easily available for use); United States v. Swafford, 385 F.3d 1026, 1027-29 (6th Cir.2004) (finding a nexus between the contraband and a loaded pistol within arm\u2019s reach of the defendant when he was arrested in the house even though the drugs for sale were located in makeshift garage behind the house); see also Brown, 732 F.3d at 576-77 (\u201c[T]he gun\u2019s location under the mattress in the bedroom consti tuted a strategic location: despite the bedroom\u2019s second-floor location, ... the house was small enough so that someone on the first floor could retrieve the gun within ten to fifteen seconds.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"385 F.3d 1026, 1027-29","parenthetical":"finding a nexus between the contraband and a loaded pistol within arm's reach of the defendant when he was arrested in the house even though the drugs for sale were located in makeshift garage behind the house","sentence":"See United States v. Ham, 628 F.3d 801, 804, 809 (6th Cir.2011) (finding that since the loaded gun was on top of an armoire situated just outside the closet where the drugs were found, it was strategically located so that it was quickly and easily available for use); United States v. Swafford, 385 F.3d 1026, 1027-29 (6th Cir.2004) (finding a nexus between the contraband and a loaded pistol within arm\u2019s reach of the defendant when he was arrested in the house even though the drugs for sale were located in makeshift garage behind the house); see also Brown, 732 F.3d at 576-77 (\u201c[T]he gun\u2019s location under the mattress in the bedroom consti tuted a strategic location: despite the bedroom\u2019s second-floor location, ... the house was small enough so that someone on the first floor could retrieve the gun within ten to fifteen seconds.\u201d)."},"case_id":4079326,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Combined with its detailed instructions on the law governing conspiracies, and on substantive RICO violations, the district court's explanatory and limiting instructions to the jury are more than sufficient to guard against the possibility of prejudice to the defendants.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"190 F.3d 1027, 1027-28","parenthetical":"assessing similar instructions as adequate to cure any risk of prejudice","sentence":"See Hanley, 190 F.3d at 1027-28 (assessing similar instructions as adequate to cure any risk of prejudice); cf. Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 769, 66 S.Ct. 1239, 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1943) (noting that an appropriate instruction to avert spillover prejudice \u201cin cases where related but separate conspiracies are tried together\u201d would be \u201cthat the jury should take care to consider the evidence relating to each conspiracy separately from that relating to each other conspiracy charged\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"328 U.S. 750, 769","parenthetical":"noting that an appropriate instruction to avert spillover prejudice \"in cases where related but separate conspiracies are tried together\" would be \"that the jury should take care to consider the evidence relating to each conspiracy separately from that relating to each other conspiracy charged\"","sentence":"See Hanley, 190 F.3d at 1027-28 (assessing similar instructions as adequate to cure any risk of prejudice); cf. Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 769, 66 S.Ct. 1239, 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1943) (noting that an appropriate instruction to avert spillover prejudice \u201cin cases where related but separate conspiracies are tried together\u201d would be \u201cthat the jury should take care to consider the evidence relating to each conspiracy separately from that relating to each other conspiracy charged\u201d)."},"case_id":9152797,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Combined with its detailed instructions on the law governing conspiracies, and on substantive RICO violations, the district court's explanatory and limiting instructions to the jury are more than sufficient to guard against the possibility of prejudice to the defendants.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"190 F.3d 1027, 1027-28","parenthetical":"assessing similar instructions as adequate to cure any risk of prejudice","sentence":"See Hanley, 190 F.3d at 1027-28 (assessing similar instructions as adequate to cure any risk of prejudice); cf. Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 769, 66 S.Ct. 1239, 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1943) (noting that an appropriate instruction to avert spillover prejudice \u201cin cases where related but separate conspiracies are tried together\u201d would be \u201cthat the jury should take care to consider the evidence relating to each conspiracy separately from that relating to each other conspiracy charged\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting that an appropriate instruction to avert spillover prejudice \"in cases where related but separate conspiracies are tried together\" would be \"that the jury should take care to consider the evidence relating to each conspiracy separately from that relating to each other conspiracy charged\"","sentence":"See Hanley, 190 F.3d at 1027-28 (assessing similar instructions as adequate to cure any risk of prejudice); cf. Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 769, 66 S.Ct. 1239, 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1943) (noting that an appropriate instruction to avert spillover prejudice \u201cin cases where related but separate conspiracies are tried together\u201d would be \u201cthat the jury should take care to consider the evidence relating to each conspiracy separately from that relating to each other conspiracy charged\u201d)."},"case_id":9152797,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Combined with its detailed instructions on the law governing conspiracies, and on substantive RICO violations, the district court's explanatory and limiting instructions to the jury are more than sufficient to guard against the possibility of prejudice to the defendants.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"190 F.3d 1027, 1027-28","parenthetical":"assessing similar instructions as adequate to cure any risk of prejudice","sentence":"See Hanley, 190 F.3d at 1027-28 (assessing similar instructions as adequate to cure any risk of prejudice); cf. Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 769, 66 S.Ct. 1239, 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1943) (noting that an appropriate instruction to avert spillover prejudice \u201cin cases where related but separate conspiracies are tried together\u201d would be \u201cthat the jury should take care to consider the evidence relating to each conspiracy separately from that relating to each other conspiracy charged\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting that an appropriate instruction to avert spillover prejudice \"in cases where related but separate conspiracies are tried together\" would be \"that the jury should take care to consider the evidence relating to each conspiracy separately from that relating to each other conspiracy charged\"","sentence":"See Hanley, 190 F.3d at 1027-28 (assessing similar instructions as adequate to cure any risk of prejudice); cf. Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 769, 66 S.Ct. 1239, 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1943) (noting that an appropriate instruction to avert spillover prejudice \u201cin cases where related but separate conspiracies are tried together\u201d would be \u201cthat the jury should take care to consider the evidence relating to each conspiracy separately from that relating to each other conspiracy charged\u201d)."},"case_id":9152797,"label":"a"}
{"context":"A bankruptcy court's determination of foreign law is a conclusion of law and is therefore subject to de novo review.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"stating that foreign law determinations by bankruptcy courts are treated as questions of law requiring de novo review","sentence":"See In re Qimonda AG Bankr. Litig., 433 B.R. 547, 565 n. 28 (E.D.Va.2010) (stating that foreign law determinations by bankruptcy courts are treated as questions of law requiring de novo review); see also Fed. R. Bankr.P. 9017 (stating that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 44.1 applies in bankruptcy proceedings); Fed.R.Civ.P. 44.1 (stating that a court\u2019s determination of foreign law \u201cmust be treated as a ruling on a question of law\u201d). When determining foreign law, a court \u201cmay consider any relevant material or source, including testimony, whether or not submitted by a party or admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence.\u201d Fed.R.Civ.P. 44.1; see also Faggionato v. Lerner, 500 F.Supp.2d 237, 244 (S.D.N.Y.2007) (\u201cIn acting under Rule 44.1, a court may reject even uncontradict-ed expert testimony and reach its own decisions on the basis of independent examination of foreign legal authorities.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"500 F.Supp.2d 237, 244","parenthetical":"\"In acting under Rule 44.1, a court may reject even uncontradict-ed expert testimony and reach its own decisions on the basis of independent examination of foreign legal authorities.\"","sentence":"See In re Qimonda AG Bankr. Litig., 433 B.R. 547, 565 n. 28 (E.D.Va.2010) (stating that foreign law determinations by bankruptcy courts are treated as questions of law requiring de novo review); see also Fed. R. Bankr.P. 9017 (stating that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 44.1 applies in bankruptcy proceedings); Fed.R.Civ.P. 44.1 (stating that a court\u2019s determination of foreign law \u201cmust be treated as a ruling on a question of law\u201d). When determining foreign law, a court \u201cmay consider any relevant material or source, including testimony, whether or not submitted by a party or admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence.\u201d Fed.R.Civ.P. 44.1; see also Faggionato v. Lerner, 500 F.Supp.2d 237, 244 (S.D.N.Y.2007) (\u201cIn acting under Rule 44.1, a court may reject even uncontradict-ed expert testimony and reach its own decisions on the basis of independent examination of foreign legal authorities.\u201d)."},"case_id":4190230,"label":"a"}
{"context":"First, Fenton's statement to Detective Salsedo does not mention Mason at all. In fact, because its content never came into evidence, as far as the jury was concerned, it mentioned no one at all. For all the jury knew, Fenton confessed to his own involvement in the shootings and was arrested. Second, as Gray itself notes, the facts that would have allowed the jury to infer that Fenton's statement implicated Mason came through other, properly admitted evidence, particularly through Cole's testimony of what Mason told her.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"962 F.2d 1349, 1360-61","parenthetical":"codefendant's statement redacted to exclude defendant's name and incriminating only in light of other evidence","sentence":"Gray, 523 U.S. at 195, 118 S.Ct. 1151 (\u201cRichardson placed outside the scope of Bruton\u2019s rule those statements that incriminate inferentially.\u201d); see also United States v. Sherlock, 962 F.2d 1349, 1360-61 (9th Cir.1992) (as amended) (codefendant\u2019s statement redacted to exclude defendant\u2019s name and incriminating only in light of other evidence)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"523 U.S. 195, 195","parenthetical":"\"Richardson placed outside the scope of Bruton's rule those statements that incriminate inferentially.\"","sentence":"Gray, 523 U.S. at 195, 118 S.Ct. 1151 (\u201cRichardson placed outside the scope of Bruton\u2019s rule those statements that incriminate inferentially.\u201d); see also United States v. Sherlock, 962 F.2d 1349, 1360-61 (9th Cir.1992) (as amended) (codefendant\u2019s statement redacted to exclude defendant\u2019s name and incriminating only in light of other evidence)."},"case_id":5858721,"label":"b"}
{"context":"First, Fenton's statement to Detective Salsedo does not mention Mason at all. In fact, because its content never came into evidence, as far as the jury was concerned, it mentioned no one at all. For all the jury knew, Fenton confessed to his own involvement in the shootings and was arrested. Second, as Gray itself notes, the facts that would have allowed the jury to infer that Fenton's statement implicated Mason came through other, properly admitted evidence, particularly through Cole's testimony of what Mason told her.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"Richardson placed outside the scope of Bruton's rule those statements that incriminate inferentially.\"","sentence":"Gray, 523 U.S. at 195, 118 S.Ct. 1151 (\u201cRichardson placed outside the scope of Bruton\u2019s rule those statements that incriminate inferentially.\u201d); see also United States v. Sherlock, 962 F.2d 1349, 1360-61 (9th Cir.1992) (as amended) (codefendant\u2019s statement redacted to exclude defendant\u2019s name and incriminating only in light of other evidence)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"962 F.2d 1349, 1360-61","parenthetical":"codefendant's statement redacted to exclude defendant's name and incriminating only in light of other evidence","sentence":"Gray, 523 U.S. at 195, 118 S.Ct. 1151 (\u201cRichardson placed outside the scope of Bruton\u2019s rule those statements that incriminate inferentially.\u201d); see also United States v. Sherlock, 962 F.2d 1349, 1360-61 (9th Cir.1992) (as amended) (codefendant\u2019s statement redacted to exclude defendant\u2019s name and incriminating only in light of other evidence)."},"case_id":5858721,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Relation back is not allowed here: TUFTA's SS 24.010 is a statute of repose and is immune to procedural tolling. In re Morgan Stanley Mortg.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"2004 WI 103, \u00b6 57","parenthetical":"\"Because of the substantive nature of statutes of repose, courts have treated the effect of the period expiring to be jurisdictional.\"","sentence":"Pass-Through Certificates Litig., 23 F.Supp.3d 203, 208 (S.D.N.Y.2014) (\u201c[T]he Federal Rules[ ] could not alter the limited nature of the substantive right created by a statute of repose becarise the statute authorizing the procedural rules'subordinates them to substantive rights.\u201d); see also Meyer v. Argent Mortgage Co., LLC (In re Meyer), 379 B.R. 529, 540-41 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.2007) (\u201cHere, the application of Rule 15(c)\u2019s relation back provision to add a defendant would resurrect jurisdiction over an extinguished claim____ Just so, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction ... now that the three year rescission period has expired.\u201d); Wenke v. Gehl Co., 2004 WI 103, \u00b6 57, 274 Wis.2d 220, 261, 682 N.W.2d 405, 425 (\u201cBecause of the substantive nature of statutes of repose, courts have treated the effect of the period expiring to be jurisdictional.\u201d); Litzler v. Cooper (In re Margaux Tex. Ventures, Inc.), No. 13-03221, 2014 Bankr.LEXIS 2542, at *53 (Bankr.N.D.Tex."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"23 F.Supp.3d 203, 208","parenthetical":"\"[T]he Federal Rules[ ] could not alter the limited nature of the substantive right created by a statute of repose becarise the statute authorizing the procedural rules'subordinates them to substantive rights.\"","sentence":"Pass-Through Certificates Litig., 23 F.Supp.3d 203, 208 (S.D.N.Y.2014) (\u201c[T]he Federal Rules[ ] could not alter the limited nature of the substantive right created by a statute of repose becarise the statute authorizing the procedural rules'subordinates them to substantive rights.\u201d); see also Meyer v. Argent Mortgage Co., LLC (In re Meyer), 379 B.R. 529, 540-41 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.2007) (\u201cHere, the application of Rule 15(c)\u2019s relation back provision to add a defendant would resurrect jurisdiction over an extinguished claim____ Just so, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction ... now that the three year rescission period has expired.\u201d); Wenke v. Gehl Co., 2004 WI 103, \u00b6 57, 274 Wis.2d 220, 261, 682 N.W.2d 405, 425 (\u201cBecause of the substantive nature of statutes of repose, courts have treated the effect of the period expiring to be jurisdictional.\u201d); Litzler v. Cooper (In re Margaux Tex. Ventures, Inc.), No. 13-03221, 2014 Bankr.LEXIS 2542, at *53 (Bankr.N.D.Tex."},"case_id":4363205,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Relation back is not allowed here: TUFTA's SS 24.010 is a statute of repose and is immune to procedural tolling. In re Morgan Stanley Mortg.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"274 Wis.2d 220, 261","parenthetical":"\"Because of the substantive nature of statutes of repose, courts have treated the effect of the period expiring to be jurisdictional.\"","sentence":"Pass-Through Certificates Litig., 23 F.Supp.3d 203, 208 (S.D.N.Y.2014) (\u201c[T]he Federal Rules[ ] could not alter the limited nature of the substantive right created by a statute of repose becarise the statute authorizing the procedural rules'subordinates them to substantive rights.\u201d); see also Meyer v. Argent Mortgage Co., LLC (In re Meyer), 379 B.R. 529, 540-41 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.2007) (\u201cHere, the application of Rule 15(c)\u2019s relation back provision to add a defendant would resurrect jurisdiction over an extinguished claim____ Just so, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction ... now that the three year rescission period has expired.\u201d); Wenke v. Gehl Co., 2004 WI 103, \u00b6 57, 274 Wis.2d 220, 261, 682 N.W.2d 405, 425 (\u201cBecause of the substantive nature of statutes of repose, courts have treated the effect of the period expiring to be jurisdictional.\u201d); Litzler v. Cooper (In re Margaux Tex. Ventures, Inc.), No. 13-03221, 2014 Bankr.LEXIS 2542, at *53 (Bankr.N.D.Tex."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"23 F.Supp.3d 203, 208","parenthetical":"\"[T]he Federal Rules[ ] could not alter the limited nature of the substantive right created by a statute of repose becarise the statute authorizing the procedural rules'subordinates them to substantive rights.\"","sentence":"Pass-Through Certificates Litig., 23 F.Supp.3d 203, 208 (S.D.N.Y.2014) (\u201c[T]he Federal Rules[ ] could not alter the limited nature of the substantive right created by a statute of repose becarise the statute authorizing the procedural rules'subordinates them to substantive rights.\u201d); see also Meyer v. Argent Mortgage Co., LLC (In re Meyer), 379 B.R. 529, 540-41 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.2007) (\u201cHere, the application of Rule 15(c)\u2019s relation back provision to add a defendant would resurrect jurisdiction over an extinguished claim____ Just so, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction ... now that the three year rescission period has expired.\u201d); Wenke v. Gehl Co., 2004 WI 103, \u00b6 57, 274 Wis.2d 220, 261, 682 N.W.2d 405, 425 (\u201cBecause of the substantive nature of statutes of repose, courts have treated the effect of the period expiring to be jurisdictional.\u201d); Litzler v. Cooper (In re Margaux Tex. Ventures, Inc.), No. 13-03221, 2014 Bankr.LEXIS 2542, at *53 (Bankr.N.D.Tex."},"case_id":4363205,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Relation back is not allowed here: TUFTA's SS 24.010 is a statute of repose and is immune to procedural tolling. In re Morgan Stanley Mortg.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"682 N.W.2d 405, 425","parenthetical":"\"Because of the substantive nature of statutes of repose, courts have treated the effect of the period expiring to be jurisdictional.\"","sentence":"Pass-Through Certificates Litig., 23 F.Supp.3d 203, 208 (S.D.N.Y.2014) (\u201c[T]he Federal Rules[ ] could not alter the limited nature of the substantive right created by a statute of repose becarise the statute authorizing the procedural rules'subordinates them to substantive rights.\u201d); see also Meyer v. Argent Mortgage Co., LLC (In re Meyer), 379 B.R. 529, 540-41 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.2007) (\u201cHere, the application of Rule 15(c)\u2019s relation back provision to add a defendant would resurrect jurisdiction over an extinguished claim____ Just so, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction ... now that the three year rescission period has expired.\u201d); Wenke v. Gehl Co., 2004 WI 103, \u00b6 57, 274 Wis.2d 220, 261, 682 N.W.2d 405, 425 (\u201cBecause of the substantive nature of statutes of repose, courts have treated the effect of the period expiring to be jurisdictional.\u201d); Litzler v. Cooper (In re Margaux Tex. Ventures, Inc.), No. 13-03221, 2014 Bankr.LEXIS 2542, at *53 (Bankr.N.D.Tex."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"23 F.Supp.3d 203, 208","parenthetical":"\"[T]he Federal Rules[ ] could not alter the limited nature of the substantive right created by a statute of repose becarise the statute authorizing the procedural rules'subordinates them to substantive rights.\"","sentence":"Pass-Through Certificates Litig., 23 F.Supp.3d 203, 208 (S.D.N.Y.2014) (\u201c[T]he Federal Rules[ ] could not alter the limited nature of the substantive right created by a statute of repose becarise the statute authorizing the procedural rules'subordinates them to substantive rights.\u201d); see also Meyer v. Argent Mortgage Co., LLC (In re Meyer), 379 B.R. 529, 540-41 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.2007) (\u201cHere, the application of Rule 15(c)\u2019s relation back provision to add a defendant would resurrect jurisdiction over an extinguished claim____ Just so, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction ... now that the three year rescission period has expired.\u201d); Wenke v. Gehl Co., 2004 WI 103, \u00b6 57, 274 Wis.2d 220, 261, 682 N.W.2d 405, 425 (\u201cBecause of the substantive nature of statutes of repose, courts have treated the effect of the period expiring to be jurisdictional.\u201d); Litzler v. Cooper (In re Margaux Tex. Ventures, Inc.), No. 13-03221, 2014 Bankr.LEXIS 2542, at *53 (Bankr.N.D.Tex."},"case_id":4363205,"label":"b"}
{"context":"See G. Unlike drug certificates, docket sheets are not prepared for an upcoming case and are not testimonial since the authors are not witnesses against the criminal defendant.","citation_a":{"signal":"contra","identifier":"452 Mass. 379, 393","parenthetical":"autopsy reports prepared by \"public officers concerning causes and effects involving the exercise of judgment and discretion, expressions of opinion, and making conclusions\" are inadmissible testimonial hearsay","sentence":"Contrast Commonwealth v. Nardi, 452 Mass. 379, 393 (2008), quoting from Commonwealth v. Slavski, 245 Mass. 405, 417 (1923) (autopsy reports prepared by \u201cpublic officers concerning causes and effects involving the exercise of judgment and discretion, expressions of opinion, and making conclusions\u201d are inadmissible testimonial hearsay)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"76 Mass. App. Ct. 904, 904-905","parenthetical":"admission of court records and record of Registry of Motor Vehicles records did not violate the defendant' s Sixth Amendment right of confrontation","sentence":"L. c. 233, \u00a7 78, as well as pursuant to G. L. c. 233, \u00a7 76\u201d); Commonwealth v. McMullin, 76 Mass. App. Ct. 904, 904-905 (2010) (admission of court records and record of Registry of Motor Vehicles records did not violate the defendant\u2019 s Sixth Amendment right of confrontation). See also Commonwealth v. Bowden, 447 Mass. 593, 599 (2006) (no difference between Registry of Motor Vehicles records and court records)."},"case_id":3838359,"label":"b"}
{"context":"See G. Unlike drug certificates, docket sheets are not prepared for an upcoming case and are not testimonial since the authors are not witnesses against the criminal defendant.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"76 Mass. App. Ct. 904, 904-905","parenthetical":"admission of court records and record of Registry of Motor Vehicles records did not violate the defendant' s Sixth Amendment right of confrontation","sentence":"L. c. 233, \u00a7 78, as well as pursuant to G. L. c. 233, \u00a7 76\u201d); Commonwealth v. McMullin, 76 Mass. App. Ct. 904, 904-905 (2010) (admission of court records and record of Registry of Motor Vehicles records did not violate the defendant\u2019 s Sixth Amendment right of confrontation). See also Commonwealth v. Bowden, 447 Mass. 593, 599 (2006) (no difference between Registry of Motor Vehicles records and court records)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"contra","identifier":"245 Mass. 405, 417","parenthetical":"autopsy reports prepared by \"public officers concerning causes and effects involving the exercise of judgment and discretion, expressions of opinion, and making conclusions\" are inadmissible testimonial hearsay","sentence":"Contrast Commonwealth v. Nardi, 452 Mass. 379, 393 (2008), quoting from Commonwealth v. Slavski, 245 Mass. 405, 417 (1923) (autopsy reports prepared by \u201cpublic officers concerning causes and effects involving the exercise of judgment and discretion, expressions of opinion, and making conclusions\u201d are inadmissible testimonial hearsay)."},"case_id":3838359,"label":"a"}
{"context":"See G. Unlike drug certificates, docket sheets are not prepared for an upcoming case and are not testimonial since the authors are not witnesses against the criminal defendant.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"447 Mass. 593, 599","parenthetical":"no difference between Registry of Motor Vehicles records and court records","sentence":"L. c. 233, \u00a7 78, as well as pursuant to G. L. c. 233, \u00a7 76\u201d); Commonwealth v. McMullin, 76 Mass. App. Ct. 904, 904-905 (2010) (admission of court records and record of Registry of Motor Vehicles records did not violate the defendant\u2019 s Sixth Amendment right of confrontation). See also Commonwealth v. Bowden, 447 Mass. 593, 599 (2006) (no difference between Registry of Motor Vehicles records and court records)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"contra","identifier":"452 Mass. 379, 393","parenthetical":"autopsy reports prepared by \"public officers concerning causes and effects involving the exercise of judgment and discretion, expressions of opinion, and making conclusions\" are inadmissible testimonial hearsay","sentence":"Contrast Commonwealth v. Nardi, 452 Mass. 379, 393 (2008), quoting from Commonwealth v. Slavski, 245 Mass. 405, 417 (1923) (autopsy reports prepared by \u201cpublic officers concerning causes and effects involving the exercise of judgment and discretion, expressions of opinion, and making conclusions\u201d are inadmissible testimonial hearsay)."},"case_id":3838359,"label":"a"}
{"context":"See G. Unlike drug certificates, docket sheets are not prepared for an upcoming case and are not testimonial since the authors are not witnesses against the criminal defendant.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"447 Mass. 593, 599","parenthetical":"no difference between Registry of Motor Vehicles records and court records","sentence":"L. c. 233, \u00a7 78, as well as pursuant to G. L. c. 233, \u00a7 76\u201d); Commonwealth v. McMullin, 76 Mass. App. Ct. 904, 904-905 (2010) (admission of court records and record of Registry of Motor Vehicles records did not violate the defendant\u2019 s Sixth Amendment right of confrontation). See also Commonwealth v. Bowden, 447 Mass. 593, 599 (2006) (no difference between Registry of Motor Vehicles records and court records)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"contra","identifier":"245 Mass. 405, 417","parenthetical":"autopsy reports prepared by \"public officers concerning causes and effects involving the exercise of judgment and discretion, expressions of opinion, and making conclusions\" are inadmissible testimonial hearsay","sentence":"Contrast Commonwealth v. Nardi, 452 Mass. 379, 393 (2008), quoting from Commonwealth v. Slavski, 245 Mass. 405, 417 (1923) (autopsy reports prepared by \u201cpublic officers concerning causes and effects involving the exercise of judgment and discretion, expressions of opinion, and making conclusions\u201d are inadmissible testimonial hearsay)."},"case_id":3838359,"label":"a"}
{"context":"We reject the plaintiffs' argument that section 95.11(7) tolls the statute of limitations under these facts. Further, because we find the Title IX claims relate back to the original Complaint, the pre-suit notice gave the school board sufficient notice of the newly-alleged claim.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"87 So.2d 589, 591-92","parenthetical":"explaining that pre-suit notice is designed to make the government entity aware of the claims alleged","sentence":"See Magee v. City of Jacksonville, 87 So.2d 589, 591-92 (Fla.1956) (explaining that pre-suit notice is designed to make the government entity aware of the claims alleged); see also City of Miami v. Cisneros, 662 So.2d 1272, 1274 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995) (using the relation back analysis to determine if the plaintiff complied with the pre-suit notice requirements)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"662 So.2d 1272, 1274","parenthetical":"using the relation back analysis to determine if the plaintiff complied with the pre-suit notice requirements","sentence":"See Magee v. City of Jacksonville, 87 So.2d 589, 591-92 (Fla.1956) (explaining that pre-suit notice is designed to make the government entity aware of the claims alleged); see also City of Miami v. Cisneros, 662 So.2d 1272, 1274 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995) (using the relation back analysis to determine if the plaintiff complied with the pre-suit notice requirements)."},"case_id":7005066,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The cited cases may be in error if they intend to conclude from the quoted language of SS 3-118(a) that a draft drawn on a drawer may be treated only as a note. Section 3-118(a) arose from SS 17(5) of the Negotiable Instruments Law. Section 17(5) provided that \"[wjhere the instrument is so ambiguous that there is doubt whether it is a bill or a note, the holder may treat it as either at his election.\" The provision was enacted for the benefit of the holder to permit the holder to resort to those provisions of the Negotiable Instruments Law most advantageous to his position.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"269 Md. 149, 156","parenthetical":"treating cashier's check as note for purposes of that case","sentence":"See Taylor v. Equitable Trust Co., 269 Md. 149, 156, 304 A.2d 838 (1973) (treating cashier\u2019s check as note for purposes of that case); see also Santos v. First Nat\u2019l Bk. of N.J., 186 N.J.Super. 52, 451 A.2d 401, 409-410 & n. 22 (1982) (stating that \"[o]ne solution [to the problem of \u00a7 3-118] is to treat cashier\u2019s checks as notes for some purposes and as other instruments, such as checks, for other purposes\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"stating that \"[o]ne solution [to the problem of SS 3-118] is to treat cashier's checks as notes for some purposes and as other instruments, such as checks, for other purposes\"","sentence":"See Taylor v. Equitable Trust Co., 269 Md. 149, 156, 304 A.2d 838 (1973) (treating cashier\u2019s check as note for purposes of that case); see also Santos v. First Nat\u2019l Bk. of N.J., 186 N.J.Super. 52, 451 A.2d 401, 409-410 & n. 22 (1982) (stating that \"[o]ne solution [to the problem of \u00a7 3-118] is to treat cashier\u2019s checks as notes for some purposes and as other instruments, such as checks, for other purposes\u201d)."},"case_id":1987834,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The cited cases may be in error if they intend to conclude from the quoted language of SS 3-118(a) that a draft drawn on a drawer may be treated only as a note. Section 3-118(a) arose from SS 17(5) of the Negotiable Instruments Law. Section 17(5) provided that \"[wjhere the instrument is so ambiguous that there is doubt whether it is a bill or a note, the holder may treat it as either at his election.\" The provision was enacted for the benefit of the holder to permit the holder to resort to those provisions of the Negotiable Instruments Law most advantageous to his position.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"269 Md. 149, 156","parenthetical":"treating cashier's check as note for purposes of that case","sentence":"See Taylor v. Equitable Trust Co., 269 Md. 149, 156, 304 A.2d 838 (1973) (treating cashier\u2019s check as note for purposes of that case); see also Santos v. First Nat\u2019l Bk. of N.J., 186 N.J.Super. 52, 451 A.2d 401, 409-410 & n. 22 (1982) (stating that \"[o]ne solution [to the problem of \u00a7 3-118] is to treat cashier\u2019s checks as notes for some purposes and as other instruments, such as checks, for other purposes\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"stating that \"[o]ne solution [to the problem of SS 3-118] is to treat cashier's checks as notes for some purposes and as other instruments, such as checks, for other purposes\"","sentence":"See Taylor v. Equitable Trust Co., 269 Md. 149, 156, 304 A.2d 838 (1973) (treating cashier\u2019s check as note for purposes of that case); see also Santos v. First Nat\u2019l Bk. of N.J., 186 N.J.Super. 52, 451 A.2d 401, 409-410 & n. 22 (1982) (stating that \"[o]ne solution [to the problem of \u00a7 3-118] is to treat cashier\u2019s checks as notes for some purposes and as other instruments, such as checks, for other purposes\u201d)."},"case_id":1987834,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The cited cases may be in error if they intend to conclude from the quoted language of SS 3-118(a) that a draft drawn on a drawer may be treated only as a note. Section 3-118(a) arose from SS 17(5) of the Negotiable Instruments Law. Section 17(5) provided that \"[wjhere the instrument is so ambiguous that there is doubt whether it is a bill or a note, the holder may treat it as either at his election.\" The provision was enacted for the benefit of the holder to permit the holder to resort to those provisions of the Negotiable Instruments Law most advantageous to his position.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"treating cashier's check as note for purposes of that case","sentence":"See Taylor v. Equitable Trust Co., 269 Md. 149, 156, 304 A.2d 838 (1973) (treating cashier\u2019s check as note for purposes of that case); see also Santos v. First Nat\u2019l Bk. of N.J., 186 N.J.Super. 52, 451 A.2d 401, 409-410 & n. 22 (1982) (stating that \"[o]ne solution [to the problem of \u00a7 3-118] is to treat cashier\u2019s checks as notes for some purposes and as other instruments, such as checks, for other purposes\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"stating that \"[o]ne solution [to the problem of SS 3-118] is to treat cashier's checks as notes for some purposes and as other instruments, such as checks, for other purposes\"","sentence":"See Taylor v. Equitable Trust Co., 269 Md. 149, 156, 304 A.2d 838 (1973) (treating cashier\u2019s check as note for purposes of that case); see also Santos v. First Nat\u2019l Bk. of N.J., 186 N.J.Super. 52, 451 A.2d 401, 409-410 & n. 22 (1982) (stating that \"[o]ne solution [to the problem of \u00a7 3-118] is to treat cashier\u2019s checks as notes for some purposes and as other instruments, such as checks, for other purposes\u201d)."},"case_id":1987834,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The cited cases may be in error if they intend to conclude from the quoted language of SS 3-118(a) that a draft drawn on a drawer may be treated only as a note. Section 3-118(a) arose from SS 17(5) of the Negotiable Instruments Law. Section 17(5) provided that \"[wjhere the instrument is so ambiguous that there is doubt whether it is a bill or a note, the holder may treat it as either at his election.\" The provision was enacted for the benefit of the holder to permit the holder to resort to those provisions of the Negotiable Instruments Law most advantageous to his position.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"stating that \"[o]ne solution [to the problem of SS 3-118] is to treat cashier's checks as notes for some purposes and as other instruments, such as checks, for other purposes\"","sentence":"See Taylor v. Equitable Trust Co., 269 Md. 149, 156, 304 A.2d 838 (1973) (treating cashier\u2019s check as note for purposes of that case); see also Santos v. First Nat\u2019l Bk. of N.J., 186 N.J.Super. 52, 451 A.2d 401, 409-410 & n. 22 (1982) (stating that \"[o]ne solution [to the problem of \u00a7 3-118] is to treat cashier\u2019s checks as notes for some purposes and as other instruments, such as checks, for other purposes\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"treating cashier's check as note for purposes of that case","sentence":"See Taylor v. Equitable Trust Co., 269 Md. 149, 156, 304 A.2d 838 (1973) (treating cashier\u2019s check as note for purposes of that case); see also Santos v. First Nat\u2019l Bk. of N.J., 186 N.J.Super. 52, 451 A.2d 401, 409-410 & n. 22 (1982) (stating that \"[o]ne solution [to the problem of \u00a7 3-118] is to treat cashier\u2019s checks as notes for some purposes and as other instruments, such as checks, for other purposes\u201d)."},"case_id":1987834,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The question of when a debt arises under the bankruptcy code is governed by federal law.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"686 F.2d 799, 803-04","parenthetical":"applying federal law to determine when parties had obligations under indemnification agreement","sentence":"See In re Jensen, 995 F.2d at 930 n. 5 (\u201c \u2018The determination of when a claim arises for purposes of bankruptcy law should be a matter of federal bankruptcy law____\u2019 \u201d); Corman v. Morgan (In re Morgan), 197 B.R. 892, 896 (N.D.Cal.1996) (finding that determination of when a claim arises under the bankruptcy code should be governed by federal law), aff'd, 131 F.3d 147 (9th Cir.1997); Cohen v. North Park Parkside Community Ass\u2019n (In re Cohen), 122 B.R. 755, 757 (Bankr.S.D.Cal.1991) (\u201cHowever, federal bankruptcy law, rather than California state law, governs when a debt arises for purposes of determining dischargeability.\u201d); see also Employees\u2019 Retirement Sys. v. Osborne (In re THC), 686 F.2d 799, 803-04 (9th Cir.1982) (applying federal law to determine when parties had obligations under indemnification agreement)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\" 'The determination of when a claim arises for purposes of bankruptcy law should be a matter of federal bankruptcy law____' \"","sentence":"See In re Jensen, 995 F.2d at 930 n. 5 (\u201c \u2018The determination of when a claim arises for purposes of bankruptcy law should be a matter of federal bankruptcy law____\u2019 \u201d); Corman v. Morgan (In re Morgan), 197 B.R. 892, 896 (N.D.Cal.1996) (finding that determination of when a claim arises under the bankruptcy code should be governed by federal law), aff'd, 131 F.3d 147 (9th Cir.1997); Cohen v. North Park Parkside Community Ass\u2019n (In re Cohen), 122 B.R. 755, 757 (Bankr.S.D.Cal.1991) (\u201cHowever, federal bankruptcy law, rather than California state law, governs when a debt arises for purposes of determining dischargeability.\u201d); see also Employees\u2019 Retirement Sys. v. Osborne (In re THC), 686 F.2d 799, 803-04 (9th Cir.1982) (applying federal law to determine when parties had obligations under indemnification agreement)."},"case_id":1299594,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The question of when a debt arises under the bankruptcy code is governed by federal law.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"197 B.R. 892, 896","parenthetical":"finding that determination of when a claim arises under the bankruptcy code should be governed by federal law","sentence":"See In re Jensen, 995 F.2d at 930 n. 5 (\u201c \u2018The determination of when a claim arises for purposes of bankruptcy law should be a matter of federal bankruptcy law____\u2019 \u201d); Corman v. Morgan (In re Morgan), 197 B.R. 892, 896 (N.D.Cal.1996) (finding that determination of when a claim arises under the bankruptcy code should be governed by federal law), aff'd, 131 F.3d 147 (9th Cir.1997); Cohen v. North Park Parkside Community Ass\u2019n (In re Cohen), 122 B.R. 755, 757 (Bankr.S.D.Cal.1991) (\u201cHowever, federal bankruptcy law, rather than California state law, governs when a debt arises for purposes of determining dischargeability.\u201d); see also Employees\u2019 Retirement Sys. v. Osborne (In re THC), 686 F.2d 799, 803-04 (9th Cir.1982) (applying federal law to determine when parties had obligations under indemnification agreement)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"686 F.2d 799, 803-04","parenthetical":"applying federal law to determine when parties had obligations under indemnification agreement","sentence":"See In re Jensen, 995 F.2d at 930 n. 5 (\u201c \u2018The determination of when a claim arises for purposes of bankruptcy law should be a matter of federal bankruptcy law____\u2019 \u201d); Corman v. Morgan (In re Morgan), 197 B.R. 892, 896 (N.D.Cal.1996) (finding that determination of when a claim arises under the bankruptcy code should be governed by federal law), aff'd, 131 F.3d 147 (9th Cir.1997); Cohen v. North Park Parkside Community Ass\u2019n (In re Cohen), 122 B.R. 755, 757 (Bankr.S.D.Cal.1991) (\u201cHowever, federal bankruptcy law, rather than California state law, governs when a debt arises for purposes of determining dischargeability.\u201d); see also Employees\u2019 Retirement Sys. v. Osborne (In re THC), 686 F.2d 799, 803-04 (9th Cir.1982) (applying federal law to determine when parties had obligations under indemnification agreement)."},"case_id":1299594,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The question of when a debt arises under the bankruptcy code is governed by federal law.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"686 F.2d 799, 803-04","parenthetical":"applying federal law to determine when parties had obligations under indemnification agreement","sentence":"See In re Jensen, 995 F.2d at 930 n. 5 (\u201c \u2018The determination of when a claim arises for purposes of bankruptcy law should be a matter of federal bankruptcy law____\u2019 \u201d); Corman v. Morgan (In re Morgan), 197 B.R. 892, 896 (N.D.Cal.1996) (finding that determination of when a claim arises under the bankruptcy code should be governed by federal law), aff'd, 131 F.3d 147 (9th Cir.1997); Cohen v. North Park Parkside Community Ass\u2019n (In re Cohen), 122 B.R. 755, 757 (Bankr.S.D.Cal.1991) (\u201cHowever, federal bankruptcy law, rather than California state law, governs when a debt arises for purposes of determining dischargeability.\u201d); see also Employees\u2019 Retirement Sys. v. Osborne (In re THC), 686 F.2d 799, 803-04 (9th Cir.1982) (applying federal law to determine when parties had obligations under indemnification agreement)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding that determination of when a claim arises under the bankruptcy code should be governed by federal law","sentence":"See In re Jensen, 995 F.2d at 930 n. 5 (\u201c \u2018The determination of when a claim arises for purposes of bankruptcy law should be a matter of federal bankruptcy law____\u2019 \u201d); Corman v. Morgan (In re Morgan), 197 B.R. 892, 896 (N.D.Cal.1996) (finding that determination of when a claim arises under the bankruptcy code should be governed by federal law), aff'd, 131 F.3d 147 (9th Cir.1997); Cohen v. North Park Parkside Community Ass\u2019n (In re Cohen), 122 B.R. 755, 757 (Bankr.S.D.Cal.1991) (\u201cHowever, federal bankruptcy law, rather than California state law, governs when a debt arises for purposes of determining dischargeability.\u201d); see also Employees\u2019 Retirement Sys. v. Osborne (In re THC), 686 F.2d 799, 803-04 (9th Cir.1982) (applying federal law to determine when parties had obligations under indemnification agreement)."},"case_id":1299594,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The question of when a debt arises under the bankruptcy code is governed by federal law.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"686 F.2d 799, 803-04","parenthetical":"applying federal law to determine when parties had obligations under indemnification agreement","sentence":"See In re Jensen, 995 F.2d at 930 n. 5 (\u201c \u2018The determination of when a claim arises for purposes of bankruptcy law should be a matter of federal bankruptcy law____\u2019 \u201d); Corman v. Morgan (In re Morgan), 197 B.R. 892, 896 (N.D.Cal.1996) (finding that determination of when a claim arises under the bankruptcy code should be governed by federal law), aff'd, 131 F.3d 147 (9th Cir.1997); Cohen v. North Park Parkside Community Ass\u2019n (In re Cohen), 122 B.R. 755, 757 (Bankr.S.D.Cal.1991) (\u201cHowever, federal bankruptcy law, rather than California state law, governs when a debt arises for purposes of determining dischargeability.\u201d); see also Employees\u2019 Retirement Sys. v. Osborne (In re THC), 686 F.2d 799, 803-04 (9th Cir.1982) (applying federal law to determine when parties had obligations under indemnification agreement)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"122 B.R. 755, 757","parenthetical":"\"However, federal bankruptcy law, rather than California state law, governs when a debt arises for purposes of determining dischargeability.\"","sentence":"See In re Jensen, 995 F.2d at 930 n. 5 (\u201c \u2018The determination of when a claim arises for purposes of bankruptcy law should be a matter of federal bankruptcy law____\u2019 \u201d); Corman v. Morgan (In re Morgan), 197 B.R. 892, 896 (N.D.Cal.1996) (finding that determination of when a claim arises under the bankruptcy code should be governed by federal law), aff'd, 131 F.3d 147 (9th Cir.1997); Cohen v. North Park Parkside Community Ass\u2019n (In re Cohen), 122 B.R. 755, 757 (Bankr.S.D.Cal.1991) (\u201cHowever, federal bankruptcy law, rather than California state law, governs when a debt arises for purposes of determining dischargeability.\u201d); see also Employees\u2019 Retirement Sys. v. Osborne (In re THC), 686 F.2d 799, 803-04 (9th Cir.1982) (applying federal law to determine when parties had obligations under indemnification agreement)."},"case_id":1299594,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The question of when a debt arises under the bankruptcy code is governed by federal law.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"686 F.2d 799, 803-04","parenthetical":"applying federal law to determine when parties had obligations under indemnification agreement","sentence":"See In re Jensen, 995 F.2d at 930 n. 5 (\u201c \u2018The determination of when a claim arises for purposes of bankruptcy law should be a matter of federal bankruptcy law.... \u201d); Corman v. Morgan (In re Morgan), 197 B.R. 892, 896 (N.D.Cal.1996) (finding that determination of when a claim arises under the bankruptcy code should be governed by federal law), aff'd, 131 F.3d 147 (9th Cir.1997); Cohen, v. North Park Parkside Community Ass\u2019n (In re Cohen), 122 B.R. 755, 757 (Bankr.S.D.Cal.1991) (\u201cHowever, federal bankruptcy law, rather than California state law, governs when a debt arises for purposes of determining dischargeability.\u201d); see also Employees\u2019 Retirement Sys. v. Osborne (In re THC), 686 F.2d 799, 803-04 (9th Cir.1982) (applying federal law to determine when parties had obligations under indemnification agreement)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\" 'The determination of when a claim arises for purposes of bankruptcy law should be a matter of federal bankruptcy law.... \"","sentence":"See In re Jensen, 995 F.2d at 930 n. 5 (\u201c \u2018The determination of when a claim arises for purposes of bankruptcy law should be a matter of federal bankruptcy law.... \u201d); Corman v. Morgan (In re Morgan), 197 B.R. 892, 896 (N.D.Cal.1996) (finding that determination of when a claim arises under the bankruptcy code should be governed by federal law), aff'd, 131 F.3d 147 (9th Cir.1997); Cohen, v. North Park Parkside Community Ass\u2019n (In re Cohen), 122 B.R. 755, 757 (Bankr.S.D.Cal.1991) (\u201cHowever, federal bankruptcy law, rather than California state law, governs when a debt arises for purposes of determining dischargeability.\u201d); see also Employees\u2019 Retirement Sys. v. Osborne (In re THC), 686 F.2d 799, 803-04 (9th Cir.1982) (applying federal law to determine when parties had obligations under indemnification agreement)."},"case_id":268837,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The question of when a debt arises under the bankruptcy code is governed by federal law.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"197 B.R. 892, 896","parenthetical":"finding that determination of when a claim arises under the bankruptcy code should be governed by federal law","sentence":"See In re Jensen, 995 F.2d at 930 n. 5 (\u201c \u2018The determination of when a claim arises for purposes of bankruptcy law should be a matter of federal bankruptcy law.... \u201d); Corman v. Morgan (In re Morgan), 197 B.R. 892, 896 (N.D.Cal.1996) (finding that determination of when a claim arises under the bankruptcy code should be governed by federal law), aff'd, 131 F.3d 147 (9th Cir.1997); Cohen, v. North Park Parkside Community Ass\u2019n (In re Cohen), 122 B.R. 755, 757 (Bankr.S.D.Cal.1991) (\u201cHowever, federal bankruptcy law, rather than California state law, governs when a debt arises for purposes of determining dischargeability.\u201d); see also Employees\u2019 Retirement Sys. v. Osborne (In re THC), 686 F.2d 799, 803-04 (9th Cir.1982) (applying federal law to determine when parties had obligations under indemnification agreement)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"686 F.2d 799, 803-04","parenthetical":"applying federal law to determine when parties had obligations under indemnification agreement","sentence":"See In re Jensen, 995 F.2d at 930 n. 5 (\u201c \u2018The determination of when a claim arises for purposes of bankruptcy law should be a matter of federal bankruptcy law.... \u201d); Corman v. Morgan (In re Morgan), 197 B.R. 892, 896 (N.D.Cal.1996) (finding that determination of when a claim arises under the bankruptcy code should be governed by federal law), aff'd, 131 F.3d 147 (9th Cir.1997); Cohen, v. North Park Parkside Community Ass\u2019n (In re Cohen), 122 B.R. 755, 757 (Bankr.S.D.Cal.1991) (\u201cHowever, federal bankruptcy law, rather than California state law, governs when a debt arises for purposes of determining dischargeability.\u201d); see also Employees\u2019 Retirement Sys. v. Osborne (In re THC), 686 F.2d 799, 803-04 (9th Cir.1982) (applying federal law to determine when parties had obligations under indemnification agreement)."},"case_id":268837,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The question of when a debt arises under the bankruptcy code is governed by federal law.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding that determination of when a claim arises under the bankruptcy code should be governed by federal law","sentence":"See In re Jensen, 995 F.2d at 930 n. 5 (\u201c \u2018The determination of when a claim arises for purposes of bankruptcy law should be a matter of federal bankruptcy law.... \u201d); Corman v. Morgan (In re Morgan), 197 B.R. 892, 896 (N.D.Cal.1996) (finding that determination of when a claim arises under the bankruptcy code should be governed by federal law), aff'd, 131 F.3d 147 (9th Cir.1997); Cohen, v. North Park Parkside Community Ass\u2019n (In re Cohen), 122 B.R. 755, 757 (Bankr.S.D.Cal.1991) (\u201cHowever, federal bankruptcy law, rather than California state law, governs when a debt arises for purposes of determining dischargeability.\u201d); see also Employees\u2019 Retirement Sys. v. Osborne (In re THC), 686 F.2d 799, 803-04 (9th Cir.1982) (applying federal law to determine when parties had obligations under indemnification agreement)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"686 F.2d 799, 803-04","parenthetical":"applying federal law to determine when parties had obligations under indemnification agreement","sentence":"See In re Jensen, 995 F.2d at 930 n. 5 (\u201c \u2018The determination of when a claim arises for purposes of bankruptcy law should be a matter of federal bankruptcy law.... \u201d); Corman v. Morgan (In re Morgan), 197 B.R. 892, 896 (N.D.Cal.1996) (finding that determination of when a claim arises under the bankruptcy code should be governed by federal law), aff'd, 131 F.3d 147 (9th Cir.1997); Cohen, v. North Park Parkside Community Ass\u2019n (In re Cohen), 122 B.R. 755, 757 (Bankr.S.D.Cal.1991) (\u201cHowever, federal bankruptcy law, rather than California state law, governs when a debt arises for purposes of determining dischargeability.\u201d); see also Employees\u2019 Retirement Sys. v. Osborne (In re THC), 686 F.2d 799, 803-04 (9th Cir.1982) (applying federal law to determine when parties had obligations under indemnification agreement)."},"case_id":268837,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The question of when a debt arises under the bankruptcy code is governed by federal law.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"686 F.2d 799, 803-04","parenthetical":"applying federal law to determine when parties had obligations under indemnification agreement","sentence":"See In re Jensen, 995 F.2d at 930 n. 5 (\u201c \u2018The determination of when a claim arises for purposes of bankruptcy law should be a matter of federal bankruptcy law.... \u201d); Corman v. Morgan (In re Morgan), 197 B.R. 892, 896 (N.D.Cal.1996) (finding that determination of when a claim arises under the bankruptcy code should be governed by federal law), aff'd, 131 F.3d 147 (9th Cir.1997); Cohen, v. North Park Parkside Community Ass\u2019n (In re Cohen), 122 B.R. 755, 757 (Bankr.S.D.Cal.1991) (\u201cHowever, federal bankruptcy law, rather than California state law, governs when a debt arises for purposes of determining dischargeability.\u201d); see also Employees\u2019 Retirement Sys. v. Osborne (In re THC), 686 F.2d 799, 803-04 (9th Cir.1982) (applying federal law to determine when parties had obligations under indemnification agreement)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"122 B.R. 755, 757","parenthetical":"\"However, federal bankruptcy law, rather than California state law, governs when a debt arises for purposes of determining dischargeability.\"","sentence":"See In re Jensen, 995 F.2d at 930 n. 5 (\u201c \u2018The determination of when a claim arises for purposes of bankruptcy law should be a matter of federal bankruptcy law.... \u201d); Corman v. Morgan (In re Morgan), 197 B.R. 892, 896 (N.D.Cal.1996) (finding that determination of when a claim arises under the bankruptcy code should be governed by federal law), aff'd, 131 F.3d 147 (9th Cir.1997); Cohen, v. North Park Parkside Community Ass\u2019n (In re Cohen), 122 B.R. 755, 757 (Bankr.S.D.Cal.1991) (\u201cHowever, federal bankruptcy law, rather than California state law, governs when a debt arises for purposes of determining dischargeability.\u201d); see also Employees\u2019 Retirement Sys. v. Osborne (In re THC), 686 F.2d 799, 803-04 (9th Cir.1982) (applying federal law to determine when parties had obligations under indemnification agreement)."},"case_id":268837,"label":"b"}
{"context":"However, the only courts to specifically address who bears the burden of proof on the applicability of the section 1322(b)(2) exception, including the only circuit court to address the issue, have each held the burden of proof lies with the creditor.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"Creditor had burden of proof on issue of whether the creditor was entitled to the protections of the \"hanging paragraph\".","sentence":"Cf. In re Cross, 376 B.R. 641 (Bankr.S.D.Ohio 2007) (Creditor had burden of proof on issue of whether the creditor was entitled to the protections of the \u201changing paragraph\u201d.); In re Finnegan, 358 B.R. 644."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"Debtor seeking to confirm a chapter 13 plan has the burden of proof in valuing a vehicle under 11 U.S.C. SS 506(a","sentence":"But cf. In re Fletcher, 2007 WL 1804931 (Bankr.S.D.Fla.2007) (Debtor seeking to confirm a chapter 13 plan has the burden of proof in valuing a vehicle under 11 U.S.C. \u00a7 506(a), including the burden of proving section 506(a) is applicable notwithstanding the \u201changing paragraph\u201d)."},"case_id":4084637,"label":"a"}
{"context":"First, the defendant used the evidence relating to the autopsy findings and Nields's testimony in particular to help build his defense. Specifically, on cross-examination, the defendant elicited testimony from Nields about his observations that there were no visible injuries to the victim's genitals or anus. The defendant then used this testimony to support his claim that the evidence was insufficient to prove the intercourse between the victim and defendant was nonconsensual, and defense counsel reiterated the point in his closing argument.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"458 Mass. 461, 482","parenthetical":"\"There can be no substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice where the defendant fails to object to the admission of testimonial hearsay and then relies on that erroneously admitted hearsay to challenge the prosecution's theory of the case\"","sentence":"See Commonwealth v. McCowen, 458 Mass. 461, 482 (2010) (\u201cThere can be no substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice where the defendant fails to object to the admission of testimonial hearsay and then relies on that erroneously admitted hearsay to challenge the prosecution\u2019s theory of the case\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"452 Mass. 379, 395-396","parenthetical":"no substantial likelihood of miscarriage of justice where autopsy findings were admitted without objection and defense expert \"made use of and referenced those findings in his testimony\"","sentence":"See also Commonwealth v. Nardi, 452 Mass. 379, 395-396 (2008) (no substantial likelihood of miscarriage of justice where autopsy findings were admitted without objection and defense expert \u201cmade use of and referenced those findings in his testimony\u201d)."},"case_id":4362454,"label":"a"}
{"context":"f 48. That should have been the end of our opinion. Traditionally, when the presenting questions resolve the matter, we declare our treatment of the case complete at that point.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"As a general rule, when our resolution of one issue disposes of a case, we will not address additional issues.\"","sentence":"See Black v. City of Milwaukee, 2016 WI 47, \u00b6 39 n.24, 369 Wis. 2d 272, 882 N.W.2d 333, cert. denied sub nom. Milwaukee Police Ass'n v. City of Milwaukee, 137 S. Ct. 538 (2016) (\"We do not address these issues because they are not necessary to resolve this case\"); see also State v. Cain, 2012 WI 68, \u00b6 37 n.11, 342 Wis. 2d 1, 816 N.W.2d 177 (\"[A]n appellate court should decide cases on the narrowest possible grounds.\" (quoting Md. Arms Ltd. P'ship v. Connell, 2010 WI 64, \u00b6 48, 326 Wis. 2d 300, 786 N.W.2d 15)); Hull v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 222 Wis. 2d 627, 640 n.7, 586 N.W.2d 863 (1998) (\"As a general rule, when our resolution of one issue disposes of a case, we will not address additional issues.\")."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"We do not address these issues because they are not necessary to resolve this case\"","sentence":"See Black v. City of Milwaukee, 2016 WI 47, \u00b6 39 n.24, 369 Wis. 2d 272, 882 N.W.2d 333, cert. denied sub nom. Milwaukee Police Ass'n v. City of Milwaukee, 137 S. Ct. 538 (2016) (\"We do not address these issues because they are not necessary to resolve this case\"); see also State v. Cain, 2012 WI 68, \u00b6 37 n.11, 342 Wis. 2d 1, 816 N.W.2d 177 (\"[A]n appellate court should decide cases on the narrowest possible grounds.\" (quoting Md. Arms Ltd. P'ship v. Connell, 2010 WI 64, \u00b6 48, 326 Wis. 2d 300, 786 N.W.2d 15)); Hull v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 222 Wis. 2d 627, 640 n.7, 586 N.W.2d 863 (1998) (\"As a general rule, when our resolution of one issue disposes of a case, we will not address additional issues.\")."},"case_id":12279635,"label":"b"}
{"context":"f 48. That should have been the end of our opinion. Traditionally, when the presenting questions resolve the matter, we declare our treatment of the case complete at that point.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"As a general rule, when our resolution of one issue disposes of a case, we will not address additional issues.\"","sentence":"See Black v. City of Milwaukee, 2016 WI 47, \u00b6 39 n.24, 369 Wis. 2d 272, 882 N.W.2d 333, cert. denied sub nom. Milwaukee Police Ass'n v. City of Milwaukee, 137 S. Ct. 538 (2016) (\"We do not address these issues because they are not necessary to resolve this case\"); see also State v. Cain, 2012 WI 68, \u00b6 37 n.11, 342 Wis. 2d 1, 816 N.W.2d 177 (\"[A]n appellate court should decide cases on the narrowest possible grounds.\" (quoting Md. Arms Ltd. P'ship v. Connell, 2010 WI 64, \u00b6 48, 326 Wis. 2d 300, 786 N.W.2d 15)); Hull v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 222 Wis. 2d 627, 640 n.7, 586 N.W.2d 863 (1998) (\"As a general rule, when our resolution of one issue disposes of a case, we will not address additional issues.\")."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"We do not address these issues because they are not necessary to resolve this case\"","sentence":"See Black v. City of Milwaukee, 2016 WI 47, \u00b6 39 n.24, 369 Wis. 2d 272, 882 N.W.2d 333, cert. denied sub nom. Milwaukee Police Ass'n v. City of Milwaukee, 137 S. Ct. 538 (2016) (\"We do not address these issues because they are not necessary to resolve this case\"); see also State v. Cain, 2012 WI 68, \u00b6 37 n.11, 342 Wis. 2d 1, 816 N.W.2d 177 (\"[A]n appellate court should decide cases on the narrowest possible grounds.\" (quoting Md. Arms Ltd. P'ship v. Connell, 2010 WI 64, \u00b6 48, 326 Wis. 2d 300, 786 N.W.2d 15)); Hull v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 222 Wis. 2d 627, 640 n.7, 586 N.W.2d 863 (1998) (\"As a general rule, when our resolution of one issue disposes of a case, we will not address additional issues.\")."},"case_id":12279635,"label":"b"}
{"context":"f 48. That should have been the end of our opinion. Traditionally, when the presenting questions resolve the matter, we declare our treatment of the case complete at that point.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"We do not address these issues because they are not necessary to resolve this case\"","sentence":"See Black v. City of Milwaukee, 2016 WI 47, \u00b6 39 n.24, 369 Wis. 2d 272, 882 N.W.2d 333, cert. denied sub nom. Milwaukee Police Ass'n v. City of Milwaukee, 137 S. Ct. 538 (2016) (\"We do not address these issues because they are not necessary to resolve this case\"); see also State v. Cain, 2012 WI 68, \u00b6 37 n.11, 342 Wis. 2d 1, 816 N.W.2d 177 (\"[A]n appellate court should decide cases on the narrowest possible grounds.\" (quoting Md. Arms Ltd. P'ship v. Connell, 2010 WI 64, \u00b6 48, 326 Wis. 2d 300, 786 N.W.2d 15)); Hull v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 222 Wis. 2d 627, 640 n.7, 586 N.W.2d 863 (1998) (\"As a general rule, when our resolution of one issue disposes of a case, we will not address additional issues.\")."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"As a general rule, when our resolution of one issue disposes of a case, we will not address additional issues.\"","sentence":"See Black v. City of Milwaukee, 2016 WI 47, \u00b6 39 n.24, 369 Wis. 2d 272, 882 N.W.2d 333, cert. denied sub nom. Milwaukee Police Ass'n v. City of Milwaukee, 137 S. Ct. 538 (2016) (\"We do not address these issues because they are not necessary to resolve this case\"); see also State v. Cain, 2012 WI 68, \u00b6 37 n.11, 342 Wis. 2d 1, 816 N.W.2d 177 (\"[A]n appellate court should decide cases on the narrowest possible grounds.\" (quoting Md. Arms Ltd. P'ship v. Connell, 2010 WI 64, \u00b6 48, 326 Wis. 2d 300, 786 N.W.2d 15)); Hull v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 222 Wis. 2d 627, 640 n.7, 586 N.W.2d 863 (1998) (\"As a general rule, when our resolution of one issue disposes of a case, we will not address additional issues.\")."},"case_id":12279635,"label":"a"}
{"context":"f 48. That should have been the end of our opinion. Traditionally, when the presenting questions resolve the matter, we declare our treatment of the case complete at that point.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"We do not address these issues because they are not necessary to resolve this case\"","sentence":"See Black v. City of Milwaukee, 2016 WI 47, \u00b6 39 n.24, 369 Wis. 2d 272, 882 N.W.2d 333, cert. denied sub nom. Milwaukee Police Ass'n v. City of Milwaukee, 137 S. Ct. 538 (2016) (\"We do not address these issues because they are not necessary to resolve this case\"); see also State v. Cain, 2012 WI 68, \u00b6 37 n.11, 342 Wis. 2d 1, 816 N.W.2d 177 (\"[A]n appellate court should decide cases on the narrowest possible grounds.\" (quoting Md. Arms Ltd. P'ship v. Connell, 2010 WI 64, \u00b6 48, 326 Wis. 2d 300, 786 N.W.2d 15)); Hull v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 222 Wis. 2d 627, 640 n.7, 586 N.W.2d 863 (1998) (\"As a general rule, when our resolution of one issue disposes of a case, we will not address additional issues.\")."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"As a general rule, when our resolution of one issue disposes of a case, we will not address additional issues.\"","sentence":"See Black v. City of Milwaukee, 2016 WI 47, \u00b6 39 n.24, 369 Wis. 2d 272, 882 N.W.2d 333, cert. denied sub nom. Milwaukee Police Ass'n v. City of Milwaukee, 137 S. Ct. 538 (2016) (\"We do not address these issues because they are not necessary to resolve this case\"); see also State v. Cain, 2012 WI 68, \u00b6 37 n.11, 342 Wis. 2d 1, 816 N.W.2d 177 (\"[A]n appellate court should decide cases on the narrowest possible grounds.\" (quoting Md. Arms Ltd. P'ship v. Connell, 2010 WI 64, \u00b6 48, 326 Wis. 2d 300, 786 N.W.2d 15)); Hull v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 222 Wis. 2d 627, 640 n.7, 586 N.W.2d 863 (1998) (\"As a general rule, when our resolution of one issue disposes of a case, we will not address additional issues.\")."},"case_id":12279635,"label":"a"}
{"context":"f 48. That should have been the end of our opinion. Traditionally, when the presenting questions resolve the matter, we declare our treatment of the case complete at that point.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"We do not address these issues because they are not necessary to resolve this case\"","sentence":"See Black v. City of Milwaukee, 2016 WI 47, \u00b6 39 n.24, 369 Wis. 2d 272, 882 N.W.2d 333, cert. denied sub nom. Milwaukee Police Ass'n v. City of Milwaukee, 137 S. Ct. 538 (2016) (\"We do not address these issues because they are not necessary to resolve this case\"); see also State v. Cain, 2012 WI 68, \u00b6 37 n.11, 342 Wis. 2d 1, 816 N.W.2d 177 (\"[A]n appellate court should decide cases on the narrowest possible grounds.\" (quoting Md. Arms Ltd. P'ship v. Connell, 2010 WI 64, \u00b6 48, 326 Wis. 2d 300, 786 N.W.2d 15)); Hull v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 222 Wis. 2d 627, 640 n.7, 586 N.W.2d 863 (1998) (\"As a general rule, when our resolution of one issue disposes of a case, we will not address additional issues.\")."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"As a general rule, when our resolution of one issue disposes of a case, we will not address additional issues.\"","sentence":"See Black v. City of Milwaukee, 2016 WI 47, \u00b6 39 n.24, 369 Wis. 2d 272, 882 N.W.2d 333, cert. denied sub nom. Milwaukee Police Ass'n v. City of Milwaukee, 137 S. Ct. 538 (2016) (\"We do not address these issues because they are not necessary to resolve this case\"); see also State v. Cain, 2012 WI 68, \u00b6 37 n.11, 342 Wis. 2d 1, 816 N.W.2d 177 (\"[A]n appellate court should decide cases on the narrowest possible grounds.\" (quoting Md. Arms Ltd. P'ship v. Connell, 2010 WI 64, \u00b6 48, 326 Wis. 2d 300, 786 N.W.2d 15)); Hull v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 222 Wis. 2d 627, 640 n.7, 586 N.W.2d 863 (1998) (\"As a general rule, when our resolution of one issue disposes of a case, we will not address additional issues.\")."},"case_id":12279635,"label":"a"}
{"context":"f 48. That should have been the end of our opinion. Traditionally, when the presenting questions resolve the matter, we declare our treatment of the case complete at that point.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"We do not address these issues because they are not necessary to resolve this case\"","sentence":"See Black v. City of Milwaukee, 2016 WI 47, \u00b6 39 n.24, 369 Wis. 2d 272, 882 N.W.2d 333, cert. denied sub nom. Milwaukee Police Ass'n v. City of Milwaukee, 137 S. Ct. 538 (2016) (\"We do not address these issues because they are not necessary to resolve this case\"); see also State v. Cain, 2012 WI 68, \u00b6 37 n.11, 342 Wis. 2d 1, 816 N.W.2d 177 (\"[A]n appellate court should decide cases on the narrowest possible grounds.\" (quoting Md. Arms Ltd. P'ship v. Connell, 2010 WI 64, \u00b6 48, 326 Wis. 2d 300, 786 N.W.2d 15)); Hull v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 222 Wis. 2d 627, 640 n.7, 586 N.W.2d 863 (1998) (\"As a general rule, when our resolution of one issue disposes of a case, we will not address additional issues.\")."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"As a general rule, when our resolution of one issue disposes of a case, we will not address additional issues.\"","sentence":"See Black v. City of Milwaukee, 2016 WI 47, \u00b6 39 n.24, 369 Wis. 2d 272, 882 N.W.2d 333, cert. denied sub nom. Milwaukee Police Ass'n v. City of Milwaukee, 137 S. Ct. 538 (2016) (\"We do not address these issues because they are not necessary to resolve this case\"); see also State v. Cain, 2012 WI 68, \u00b6 37 n.11, 342 Wis. 2d 1, 816 N.W.2d 177 (\"[A]n appellate court should decide cases on the narrowest possible grounds.\" (quoting Md. Arms Ltd. P'ship v. Connell, 2010 WI 64, \u00b6 48, 326 Wis. 2d 300, 786 N.W.2d 15)); Hull v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 222 Wis. 2d 627, 640 n.7, 586 N.W.2d 863 (1998) (\"As a general rule, when our resolution of one issue disposes of a case, we will not address additional issues.\")."},"case_id":12279635,"label":"a"}
{"context":"f 48. That should have been the end of our opinion. Traditionally, when the presenting questions resolve the matter, we declare our treatment of the case complete at that point.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"We do not address these issues because they are not necessary to resolve this case\"","sentence":"See Black v. City of Milwaukee, 2016 WI 47, \u00b6 39 n.24, 369 Wis. 2d 272, 882 N.W.2d 333, cert. denied sub nom. Milwaukee Police Ass'n v. City of Milwaukee, 137 S. Ct. 538 (2016) (\"We do not address these issues because they are not necessary to resolve this case\"); see also State v. Cain, 2012 WI 68, \u00b6 37 n.11, 342 Wis. 2d 1, 816 N.W.2d 177 (\"[A]n appellate court should decide cases on the narrowest possible grounds.\" (quoting Md. Arms Ltd. P'ship v. Connell, 2010 WI 64, \u00b6 48, 326 Wis. 2d 300, 786 N.W.2d 15)); Hull v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 222 Wis. 2d 627, 640 n.7, 586 N.W.2d 863 (1998) (\"As a general rule, when our resolution of one issue disposes of a case, we will not address additional issues.\")."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"As a general rule, when our resolution of one issue disposes of a case, we will not address additional issues.\"","sentence":"See Black v. City of Milwaukee, 2016 WI 47, \u00b6 39 n.24, 369 Wis. 2d 272, 882 N.W.2d 333, cert. denied sub nom. Milwaukee Police Ass'n v. City of Milwaukee, 137 S. Ct. 538 (2016) (\"We do not address these issues because they are not necessary to resolve this case\"); see also State v. Cain, 2012 WI 68, \u00b6 37 n.11, 342 Wis. 2d 1, 816 N.W.2d 177 (\"[A]n appellate court should decide cases on the narrowest possible grounds.\" (quoting Md. Arms Ltd. P'ship v. Connell, 2010 WI 64, \u00b6 48, 326 Wis. 2d 300, 786 N.W.2d 15)); Hull v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 222 Wis. 2d 627, 640 n.7, 586 N.W.2d 863 (1998) (\"As a general rule, when our resolution of one issue disposes of a case, we will not address additional issues.\")."},"case_id":12279635,"label":"a"}
{"context":"f 48. That should have been the end of our opinion. Traditionally, when the presenting questions resolve the matter, we declare our treatment of the case complete at that point.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"We do not address these issues because they are not necessary to resolve this case\"","sentence":"See Black v. City of Milwaukee, 2016 WI 47, \u00b6 39 n.24, 369 Wis. 2d 272, 882 N.W.2d 333, cert. denied sub nom. Milwaukee Police Ass'n v. City of Milwaukee, 137 S. Ct. 538 (2016) (\"We do not address these issues because they are not necessary to resolve this case\"); see also State v. Cain, 2012 WI 68, \u00b6 37 n.11, 342 Wis. 2d 1, 816 N.W.2d 177 (\"[A]n appellate court should decide cases on the narrowest possible grounds.\" (quoting Md. Arms Ltd. P'ship v. Connell, 2010 WI 64, \u00b6 48, 326 Wis. 2d 300, 786 N.W.2d 15)); Hull v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 222 Wis. 2d 627, 640 n.7, 586 N.W.2d 863 (1998) (\"As a general rule, when our resolution of one issue disposes of a case, we will not address additional issues.\")."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"As a general rule, when our resolution of one issue disposes of a case, we will not address additional issues.\"","sentence":"See Black v. City of Milwaukee, 2016 WI 47, \u00b6 39 n.24, 369 Wis. 2d 272, 882 N.W.2d 333, cert. denied sub nom. Milwaukee Police Ass'n v. City of Milwaukee, 137 S. Ct. 538 (2016) (\"We do not address these issues because they are not necessary to resolve this case\"); see also State v. Cain, 2012 WI 68, \u00b6 37 n.11, 342 Wis. 2d 1, 816 N.W.2d 177 (\"[A]n appellate court should decide cases on the narrowest possible grounds.\" (quoting Md. Arms Ltd. P'ship v. Connell, 2010 WI 64, \u00b6 48, 326 Wis. 2d 300, 786 N.W.2d 15)); Hull v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 222 Wis. 2d 627, 640 n.7, 586 N.W.2d 863 (1998) (\"As a general rule, when our resolution of one issue disposes of a case, we will not address additional issues.\")."},"case_id":12279635,"label":"a"}
{"context":"It makes no difference that the IRS submitted a proof of claim in which it asserted a $10,000 secured claim, relying on the valuations in Debtor's schedules.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"159 B.R. 549, 549","parenthetical":"IRS could rely on federal tax lien for satisfaction of underlying tax debt despite the fact that the IRS had filed an unsecured proof of claim","sentence":"See also Bisch, 159 B.R. at 549 (IRS could rely on federal tax lien for satisfaction of underlying tax debt despite the fact that the IRS had filed an unsecured proof of claim)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"503 F.3d 867, 867-68","parenthetical":"liens pass through bankruptcy unaffected even if a secured creditor incorrectly files an unsecured claim that should have been secured","sentence":"See Brawders, 503 F.3d at 867-68 (liens pass through bankruptcy unaffected even if a secured creditor incorrectly files an unsecured claim that should have been secured)."},"case_id":4282626,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Kleiner's first opinion -- that defendants could have accommodated plaintiffs disability without significant impact, but instead retaliated against plaintiff by moving her to a less desirable position (see Kleiner Report at 10) -- includes two legal conclusions based on certain facts in the record and therefore impermissibly invades the jury's province to apply the applicable law to the facts of the case and reach ultimate legal conclusions. Rather, because Kleiner's opinion does not proffer any specialized knowledge, and invokes legal standards (#ie., that defendants could have accommodated plaintiffs disability without significant impact, and that defendants retaliated against plaintiff), his opinion would \"not aid the jury in making a decision, but rather attempts to substitute [his] judgment for the jury's.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"961 F.2d 359, 363-64","parenthetical":"holding that the district court should have excluded expert testimony in an excessive force case where the expert testified that defendant's conduct was \"not justified [or warranted] under the circumstances\" and \"totally improper,\" noting that the expert's opinions \"merely [told] the jury what result to reach\"","sentence":"See United States v. Duncan, 42 F.3d 97, 102 (2d Cir.1994) (\u201cWhen this occurs, the expert acts outside of his limited role of providing the groundwork in the form of an opinion to enable the jury to make its own informed determination.\u201d); see also Hygh v. Jacobs, 961 F.2d 359, 363-64 (2d Cir.1992) (holding that the district court should have excluded expert testimony in an excessive force case where the expert testified that defendant\u2019s conduct was \u201cnot justified [or warranted] under the circumstances\u201d and \u201ctotally improper,\u201d noting that the expert\u2019s opinions \u201cmerely [told] the jury what result to reach\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"42 F.3d 97, 102","parenthetical":"\"When this occurs, the expert acts outside of his limited role of providing the groundwork in the form of an opinion to enable the jury to make its own informed determination.\"","sentence":"See United States v. Duncan, 42 F.3d 97, 102 (2d Cir.1994) (\u201cWhen this occurs, the expert acts outside of his limited role of providing the groundwork in the form of an opinion to enable the jury to make its own informed determination.\u201d); see also Hygh v. Jacobs, 961 F.2d 359, 363-64 (2d Cir.1992) (holding that the district court should have excluded expert testimony in an excessive force case where the expert testified that defendant\u2019s conduct was \u201cnot justified [or warranted] under the circumstances\u201d and \u201ctotally improper,\u201d noting that the expert\u2019s opinions \u201cmerely [told] the jury what result to reach\u201d)."},"case_id":3102817,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Accordingly, during that time, Brooks was unable to complete and file his complaint. Once he was returned to his original facility on January 8, 2007, he acted diligently by filing his complaint just nine days later on January 17, 2007.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"70 F.3d 377, 379","parenthetical":"prisoner's pro se civil rights complaint is filed when delivered to prison officials for mailing","sentence":"See Phillips v. Donnelly, 216 F.3d 508, 511 (5th Cir.) (petitioner diligent where he filed for out of time appeal within three days of learning state habeas petition had been denied and filed federal habeas petition within one month of denial of out of time appeal), reh\u2019g granted in part on other grounds, 223 F.3d 797 (5th Cir.2000); see also Cooper v. Brookshire, 70 F.3d 377, 379 (5th Cir.1995) (prisoner\u2019s pro se civil rights complaint is filed when delivered to prison officials for mailing)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"216 F.3d 508, 511","parenthetical":"petitioner diligent where he filed for out of time appeal within three days of learning state habeas petition had been denied and filed federal habeas petition within one month of denial of out of time appeal","sentence":"See Phillips v. Donnelly, 216 F.3d 508, 511 (5th Cir.) (petitioner diligent where he filed for out of time appeal within three days of learning state habeas petition had been denied and filed federal habeas petition within one month of denial of out of time appeal), reh\u2019g granted in part on other grounds, 223 F.3d 797 (5th Cir.2000); see also Cooper v. Brookshire, 70 F.3d 377, 379 (5th Cir.1995) (prisoner\u2019s pro se civil rights complaint is filed when delivered to prison officials for mailing)."},"case_id":3565876,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Accordingly, during that time, Brooks was unable to complete and file his complaint. Once he was returned to his original facility on January 8, 2007, he acted diligently by filing his complaint just nine days later on January 17, 2007.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"70 F.3d 377, 379","parenthetical":"prisoner's pro se civil rights complaint is filed when delivered to prison officials for mailing","sentence":"See Phillips v. Donnelly, 216 F.3d 508, 511 (5th Cir.) (petitioner diligent where he filed for out of time appeal within three days of learning state habeas petition had been denied and filed federal habeas petition within one month of denial of out of time appeal), reh\u2019g granted in part on other grounds, 223 F.3d 797 (5th Cir.2000); see also Cooper v. Brookshire, 70 F.3d 377, 379 (5th Cir.1995) (prisoner\u2019s pro se civil rights complaint is filed when delivered to prison officials for mailing)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"petitioner diligent where he filed for out of time appeal within three days of learning state habeas petition had been denied and filed federal habeas petition within one month of denial of out of time appeal","sentence":"See Phillips v. Donnelly, 216 F.3d 508, 511 (5th Cir.) (petitioner diligent where he filed for out of time appeal within three days of learning state habeas petition had been denied and filed federal habeas petition within one month of denial of out of time appeal), reh\u2019g granted in part on other grounds, 223 F.3d 797 (5th Cir.2000); see also Cooper v. Brookshire, 70 F.3d 377, 379 (5th Cir.1995) (prisoner\u2019s pro se civil rights complaint is filed when delivered to prison officials for mailing)."},"case_id":3565876,"label":"b"}
{"context":"However, this tort should not be used to circumvent the established and carefully balanced framework of constitutional and state libel law. In the context of public figures and defamation claims, the Supreme Court has held that a public figure cannot recover for intentional infliction of emotional distress by reason of an offending publication without first proving the elements of a defamation claim.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"public figure must demonstrate that the offending publication contains a false statement of fact which was made with \"actual malice\" before recovering for intentional infliction of emotional distress based on the publication","sentence":"See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 108 S.Ct. 876, 99 L.Ed.2d 41 (1988) (public figure must demonstrate that the offending publication contains a false statement of fact which was made with \u201cactual malice\u201d before recovering for intentional infliction of emotional distress based on the publication); see also Howell v. New York Post Co., 81 N.Y.2d 115, 121, 596 N.Y.S.2d 350, 612 N.E.2d 699 (1993) (intentional infliction of emotional distress claim stemming from publication of photograph dismissed after invasion of privacy claim based on same publication dismissed)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"81 N.Y.2d 115, 121","parenthetical":"intentional infliction of emotional distress claim stemming from publication of photograph dismissed after invasion of privacy claim based on same publication dismissed","sentence":"See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 108 S.Ct. 876, 99 L.Ed.2d 41 (1988) (public figure must demonstrate that the offending publication contains a false statement of fact which was made with \u201cactual malice\u201d before recovering for intentional infliction of emotional distress based on the publication); see also Howell v. New York Post Co., 81 N.Y.2d 115, 121, 596 N.Y.S.2d 350, 612 N.E.2d 699 (1993) (intentional infliction of emotional distress claim stemming from publication of photograph dismissed after invasion of privacy claim based on same publication dismissed)."},"case_id":7823658,"label":"a"}
{"context":"However, this tort should not be used to circumvent the established and carefully balanced framework of constitutional and state libel law. In the context of public figures and defamation claims, the Supreme Court has held that a public figure cannot recover for intentional infliction of emotional distress by reason of an offending publication without first proving the elements of a defamation claim.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"public figure must demonstrate that the offending publication contains a false statement of fact which was made with \"actual malice\" before recovering for intentional infliction of emotional distress based on the publication","sentence":"See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 108 S.Ct. 876, 99 L.Ed.2d 41 (1988) (public figure must demonstrate that the offending publication contains a false statement of fact which was made with \u201cactual malice\u201d before recovering for intentional infliction of emotional distress based on the publication); see also Howell v. New York Post Co., 81 N.Y.2d 115, 121, 596 N.Y.S.2d 350, 612 N.E.2d 699 (1993) (intentional infliction of emotional distress claim stemming from publication of photograph dismissed after invasion of privacy claim based on same publication dismissed)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"intentional infliction of emotional distress claim stemming from publication of photograph dismissed after invasion of privacy claim based on same publication dismissed","sentence":"See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 108 S.Ct. 876, 99 L.Ed.2d 41 (1988) (public figure must demonstrate that the offending publication contains a false statement of fact which was made with \u201cactual malice\u201d before recovering for intentional infliction of emotional distress based on the publication); see also Howell v. New York Post Co., 81 N.Y.2d 115, 121, 596 N.Y.S.2d 350, 612 N.E.2d 699 (1993) (intentional infliction of emotional distress claim stemming from publication of photograph dismissed after invasion of privacy claim based on same publication dismissed)."},"case_id":7823658,"label":"a"}
{"context":"However, this tort should not be used to circumvent the established and carefully balanced framework of constitutional and state libel law. In the context of public figures and defamation claims, the Supreme Court has held that a public figure cannot recover for intentional infliction of emotional distress by reason of an offending publication without first proving the elements of a defamation claim.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"intentional infliction of emotional distress claim stemming from publication of photograph dismissed after invasion of privacy claim based on same publication dismissed","sentence":"See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 108 S.Ct. 876, 99 L.Ed.2d 41 (1988) (public figure must demonstrate that the offending publication contains a false statement of fact which was made with \u201cactual malice\u201d before recovering for intentional infliction of emotional distress based on the publication); see also Howell v. New York Post Co., 81 N.Y.2d 115, 121, 596 N.Y.S.2d 350, 612 N.E.2d 699 (1993) (intentional infliction of emotional distress claim stemming from publication of photograph dismissed after invasion of privacy claim based on same publication dismissed)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"public figure must demonstrate that the offending publication contains a false statement of fact which was made with \"actual malice\" before recovering for intentional infliction of emotional distress based on the publication","sentence":"See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 108 S.Ct. 876, 99 L.Ed.2d 41 (1988) (public figure must demonstrate that the offending publication contains a false statement of fact which was made with \u201cactual malice\u201d before recovering for intentional infliction of emotional distress based on the publication); see also Howell v. New York Post Co., 81 N.Y.2d 115, 121, 596 N.Y.S.2d 350, 612 N.E.2d 699 (1993) (intentional infliction of emotional distress claim stemming from publication of photograph dismissed after invasion of privacy claim based on same publication dismissed)."},"case_id":7823658,"label":"b"}
{"context":"However, this tort should not be used to circumvent the established and carefully balanced framework of constitutional and state libel law. In the context of public figures and defamation claims, the Supreme Court has held that a public figure cannot recover for intentional infliction of emotional distress by reason of an offending publication without first proving the elements of a defamation claim.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"public figure must demonstrate that the offending publication contains a false statement of fact which was made with \"actual malice\" before recovering for intentional infliction of emotional distress based on the publication","sentence":"See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 108 S.Ct. 876, 99 L.Ed.2d 41 (1988) (public figure must demonstrate that the offending publication contains a false statement of fact which was made with \u201cactual malice\u201d before recovering for intentional infliction of emotional distress based on the publication); see also Howell v. New York Post Co., 81 N.Y.2d 115, 121, 596 N.Y.S.2d 350, 612 N.E.2d 699 (1993) (intentional infliction of emotional distress claim stemming from publication of photograph dismissed after invasion of privacy claim based on same publication dismissed)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"81 N.Y.2d 115, 121","parenthetical":"intentional infliction of emotional distress claim stemming from publication of photograph dismissed after invasion of privacy claim based on same publication dismissed","sentence":"See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 108 S.Ct. 876, 99 L.Ed.2d 41 (1988) (public figure must demonstrate that the offending publication contains a false statement of fact which was made with \u201cactual malice\u201d before recovering for intentional infliction of emotional distress based on the publication); see also Howell v. New York Post Co., 81 N.Y.2d 115, 121, 596 N.Y.S.2d 350, 612 N.E.2d 699 (1993) (intentional infliction of emotional distress claim stemming from publication of photograph dismissed after invasion of privacy claim based on same publication dismissed)."},"case_id":7823658,"label":"a"}
{"context":"However, this tort should not be used to circumvent the established and carefully balanced framework of constitutional and state libel law. In the context of public figures and defamation claims, the Supreme Court has held that a public figure cannot recover for intentional infliction of emotional distress by reason of an offending publication without first proving the elements of a defamation claim.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"public figure must demonstrate that the offending publication contains a false statement of fact which was made with \"actual malice\" before recovering for intentional infliction of emotional distress based on the publication","sentence":"See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 108 S.Ct. 876, 99 L.Ed.2d 41 (1988) (public figure must demonstrate that the offending publication contains a false statement of fact which was made with \u201cactual malice\u201d before recovering for intentional infliction of emotional distress based on the publication); see also Howell v. New York Post Co., 81 N.Y.2d 115, 121, 596 N.Y.S.2d 350, 612 N.E.2d 699 (1993) (intentional infliction of emotional distress claim stemming from publication of photograph dismissed after invasion of privacy claim based on same publication dismissed)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"intentional infliction of emotional distress claim stemming from publication of photograph dismissed after invasion of privacy claim based on same publication dismissed","sentence":"See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 108 S.Ct. 876, 99 L.Ed.2d 41 (1988) (public figure must demonstrate that the offending publication contains a false statement of fact which was made with \u201cactual malice\u201d before recovering for intentional infliction of emotional distress based on the publication); see also Howell v. New York Post Co., 81 N.Y.2d 115, 121, 596 N.Y.S.2d 350, 612 N.E.2d 699 (1993) (intentional infliction of emotional distress claim stemming from publication of photograph dismissed after invasion of privacy claim based on same publication dismissed)."},"case_id":7823658,"label":"a"}
{"context":"However, this tort should not be used to circumvent the established and carefully balanced framework of constitutional and state libel law. In the context of public figures and defamation claims, the Supreme Court has held that a public figure cannot recover for intentional infliction of emotional distress by reason of an offending publication without first proving the elements of a defamation claim.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"intentional infliction of emotional distress claim stemming from publication of photograph dismissed after invasion of privacy claim based on same publication dismissed","sentence":"See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 108 S.Ct. 876, 99 L.Ed.2d 41 (1988) (public figure must demonstrate that the offending publication contains a false statement of fact which was made with \u201cactual malice\u201d before recovering for intentional infliction of emotional distress based on the publication); see also Howell v. New York Post Co., 81 N.Y.2d 115, 121, 596 N.Y.S.2d 350, 612 N.E.2d 699 (1993) (intentional infliction of emotional distress claim stemming from publication of photograph dismissed after invasion of privacy claim based on same publication dismissed)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"public figure must demonstrate that the offending publication contains a false statement of fact which was made with \"actual malice\" before recovering for intentional infliction of emotional distress based on the publication","sentence":"See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 108 S.Ct. 876, 99 L.Ed.2d 41 (1988) (public figure must demonstrate that the offending publication contains a false statement of fact which was made with \u201cactual malice\u201d before recovering for intentional infliction of emotional distress based on the publication); see also Howell v. New York Post Co., 81 N.Y.2d 115, 121, 596 N.Y.S.2d 350, 612 N.E.2d 699 (1993) (intentional infliction of emotional distress claim stemming from publication of photograph dismissed after invasion of privacy claim based on same publication dismissed)."},"case_id":7823658,"label":"b"}
{"context":"However, this tort should not be used to circumvent the established and carefully balanced framework of constitutional and state libel law. In the context of public figures and defamation claims, the Supreme Court has held that a public figure cannot recover for intentional infliction of emotional distress by reason of an offending publication without first proving the elements of a defamation claim.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"public figure must demonstrate that the offending publication contains a false statement of fact which was made with \"actual malice\" before recovering for intentional infliction of emotional distress based on the publication","sentence":"See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 108 S.Ct. 876, 99 L.Ed.2d 41 (1988) (public figure must demonstrate that the offending publication contains a false statement of fact which was made with \u201cactual malice\u201d before recovering for intentional infliction of emotional distress based on the publication); see also Howell v. New York Post Co., 81 N.Y.2d 115, 121, 596 N.Y.S.2d 350, 612 N.E.2d 699 (1993) (intentional infliction of emotional distress claim stemming from publication of photograph dismissed after invasion of privacy claim based on same publication dismissed)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"81 N.Y.2d 115, 121","parenthetical":"intentional infliction of emotional distress claim stemming from publication of photograph dismissed after invasion of privacy claim based on same publication dismissed","sentence":"See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 108 S.Ct. 876, 99 L.Ed.2d 41 (1988) (public figure must demonstrate that the offending publication contains a false statement of fact which was made with \u201cactual malice\u201d before recovering for intentional infliction of emotional distress based on the publication); see also Howell v. New York Post Co., 81 N.Y.2d 115, 121, 596 N.Y.S.2d 350, 612 N.E.2d 699 (1993) (intentional infliction of emotional distress claim stemming from publication of photograph dismissed after invasion of privacy claim based on same publication dismissed)."},"case_id":7823658,"label":"a"}
{"context":"However, this tort should not be used to circumvent the established and carefully balanced framework of constitutional and state libel law. In the context of public figures and defamation claims, the Supreme Court has held that a public figure cannot recover for intentional infliction of emotional distress by reason of an offending publication without first proving the elements of a defamation claim.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"intentional infliction of emotional distress claim stemming from publication of photograph dismissed after invasion of privacy claim based on same publication dismissed","sentence":"See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 108 S.Ct. 876, 99 L.Ed.2d 41 (1988) (public figure must demonstrate that the offending publication contains a false statement of fact which was made with \u201cactual malice\u201d before recovering for intentional infliction of emotional distress based on the publication); see also Howell v. New York Post Co., 81 N.Y.2d 115, 121, 596 N.Y.S.2d 350, 612 N.E.2d 699 (1993) (intentional infliction of emotional distress claim stemming from publication of photograph dismissed after invasion of privacy claim based on same publication dismissed)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"public figure must demonstrate that the offending publication contains a false statement of fact which was made with \"actual malice\" before recovering for intentional infliction of emotional distress based on the publication","sentence":"See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 108 S.Ct. 876, 99 L.Ed.2d 41 (1988) (public figure must demonstrate that the offending publication contains a false statement of fact which was made with \u201cactual malice\u201d before recovering for intentional infliction of emotional distress based on the publication); see also Howell v. New York Post Co., 81 N.Y.2d 115, 121, 596 N.Y.S.2d 350, 612 N.E.2d 699 (1993) (intentional infliction of emotional distress claim stemming from publication of photograph dismissed after invasion of privacy claim based on same publication dismissed)."},"case_id":7823658,"label":"b"}
{"context":"However, this tort should not be used to circumvent the established and carefully balanced framework of constitutional and state libel law. In the context of public figures and defamation claims, the Supreme Court has held that a public figure cannot recover for intentional infliction of emotional distress by reason of an offending publication without first proving the elements of a defamation claim.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"public figure must demonstrate that the offending publication contains a false statement of fact which was made with \"actual malice\" before recovering for intentional infliction of emotional distress based on the publication","sentence":"See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 108 S.Ct. 876, 99 L.Ed.2d 41 (1988) (public figure must demonstrate that the offending publication contains a false statement of fact which was made with \u201cactual malice\u201d before recovering for intentional infliction of emotional distress based on the publication); see also Howell v. New York Post Co., 81 N.Y.2d 115, 121, 596 N.Y.S.2d 350, 612 N.E.2d 699 (1993) (intentional infliction of emotional distress claim stemming from publication of photograph dismissed after invasion of privacy claim based on same publication dismissed)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"intentional infliction of emotional distress claim stemming from publication of photograph dismissed after invasion of privacy claim based on same publication dismissed","sentence":"See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 108 S.Ct. 876, 99 L.Ed.2d 41 (1988) (public figure must demonstrate that the offending publication contains a false statement of fact which was made with \u201cactual malice\u201d before recovering for intentional infliction of emotional distress based on the publication); see also Howell v. New York Post Co., 81 N.Y.2d 115, 121, 596 N.Y.S.2d 350, 612 N.E.2d 699 (1993) (intentional infliction of emotional distress claim stemming from publication of photograph dismissed after invasion of privacy claim based on same publication dismissed)."},"case_id":7823658,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Yet, case law has recognized an indigency exception from financial responsibility provisions in applications to use public fora. In Collin v. Smith and Eastern Conn. Citizens Action Group, the would-be permittees showed that either they could not afford or could not obtain the liability insurance required as a condition of use. Upon such a showing, the courts concluded that the requirement was unconstitutional as applied, while declining to rule that insurance requirements were unconstitutional per se.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"578 F.2d 1208, 1208","parenthetical":"\"we do not need to determine now that no insurance require ment could be imposed in any circumstances, which would be a close question, in our view\"","sentence":"Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d at 1208 (\u201cwe do not need to determine now that no insurance require ment could be imposed in any circumstances, which would be a close question, in our view\u201d); Eastern Conn. Citizens Action Group, 723 F.2d at 1057 (\u201cNor do we suggest that DOT\u2019s fee and insurance requirements would not be valid when reasonably applied.\u201d); see also Invisible Empire Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. City of West Haven, 600 F.Supp. at 1435 (finding bond requirement unconstitutional as it applies to those unable to obtain a bond); Collin v. O\u2019Malley, 452 F.Supp. 577, 579 (N.D.Ill.1978) (noting that plaintiff, as well as other \u201cpersons, groups or organizations espousing controversial political or social views and ideas,\u201d cannot obtain this level of coverage in the insurance marketplace)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"600 F.Supp. 1435, 1435","parenthetical":"finding bond requirement unconstitutional as it applies to those unable to obtain a bond","sentence":"Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d at 1208 (\u201cwe do not need to determine now that no insurance require ment could be imposed in any circumstances, which would be a close question, in our view\u201d); Eastern Conn. Citizens Action Group, 723 F.2d at 1057 (\u201cNor do we suggest that DOT\u2019s fee and insurance requirements would not be valid when reasonably applied.\u201d); see also Invisible Empire Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. City of West Haven, 600 F.Supp. at 1435 (finding bond requirement unconstitutional as it applies to those unable to obtain a bond); Collin v. O\u2019Malley, 452 F.Supp. 577, 579 (N.D.Ill.1978) (noting that plaintiff, as well as other \u201cpersons, groups or organizations espousing controversial political or social views and ideas,\u201d cannot obtain this level of coverage in the insurance marketplace)."},"case_id":9460984,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Yet, case law has recognized an indigency exception from financial responsibility provisions in applications to use public fora. In Collin v. Smith and Eastern Conn. Citizens Action Group, the would-be permittees showed that either they could not afford or could not obtain the liability insurance required as a condition of use. Upon such a showing, the courts concluded that the requirement was unconstitutional as applied, while declining to rule that insurance requirements were unconstitutional per se.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"578 F.2d 1208, 1208","parenthetical":"\"we do not need to determine now that no insurance require ment could be imposed in any circumstances, which would be a close question, in our view\"","sentence":"Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d at 1208 (\u201cwe do not need to determine now that no insurance require ment could be imposed in any circumstances, which would be a close question, in our view\u201d); Eastern Conn. Citizens Action Group, 723 F.2d at 1057 (\u201cNor do we suggest that DOT\u2019s fee and insurance requirements would not be valid when reasonably applied.\u201d); see also Invisible Empire Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. City of West Haven, 600 F.Supp. at 1435 (finding bond requirement unconstitutional as it applies to those unable to obtain a bond); Collin v. O\u2019Malley, 452 F.Supp. 577, 579 (N.D.Ill.1978) (noting that plaintiff, as well as other \u201cpersons, groups or organizations espousing controversial political or social views and ideas,\u201d cannot obtain this level of coverage in the insurance marketplace)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"452 F.Supp. 577, 579","parenthetical":"noting that plaintiff, as well as other \"persons, groups or organizations espousing controversial political or social views and ideas,\" cannot obtain this level of coverage in the insurance marketplace","sentence":"Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d at 1208 (\u201cwe do not need to determine now that no insurance require ment could be imposed in any circumstances, which would be a close question, in our view\u201d); Eastern Conn. Citizens Action Group, 723 F.2d at 1057 (\u201cNor do we suggest that DOT\u2019s fee and insurance requirements would not be valid when reasonably applied.\u201d); see also Invisible Empire Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. City of West Haven, 600 F.Supp. at 1435 (finding bond requirement unconstitutional as it applies to those unable to obtain a bond); Collin v. O\u2019Malley, 452 F.Supp. 577, 579 (N.D.Ill.1978) (noting that plaintiff, as well as other \u201cpersons, groups or organizations espousing controversial political or social views and ideas,\u201d cannot obtain this level of coverage in the insurance marketplace)."},"case_id":9460984,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Yet, case law has recognized an indigency exception from financial responsibility provisions in applications to use public fora. In Collin v. Smith and Eastern Conn. Citizens Action Group, the would-be permittees showed that either they could not afford or could not obtain the liability insurance required as a condition of use. Upon such a showing, the courts concluded that the requirement was unconstitutional as applied, while declining to rule that insurance requirements were unconstitutional per se.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"600 F.Supp. 1435, 1435","parenthetical":"finding bond requirement unconstitutional as it applies to those unable to obtain a bond","sentence":"Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d at 1208 (\u201cwe do not need to determine now that no insurance require ment could be imposed in any circumstances, which would be a close question, in our view\u201d); Eastern Conn. Citizens Action Group, 723 F.2d at 1057 (\u201cNor do we suggest that DOT\u2019s fee and insurance requirements would not be valid when reasonably applied.\u201d); see also Invisible Empire Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. City of West Haven, 600 F.Supp. at 1435 (finding bond requirement unconstitutional as it applies to those unable to obtain a bond); Collin v. O\u2019Malley, 452 F.Supp. 577, 579 (N.D.Ill.1978) (noting that plaintiff, as well as other \u201cpersons, groups or organizations espousing controversial political or social views and ideas,\u201d cannot obtain this level of coverage in the insurance marketplace)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"723 F.2d 1057, 1057","parenthetical":"\"Nor do we suggest that DOT's fee and insurance requirements would not be valid when reasonably applied.\"","sentence":"Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d at 1208 (\u201cwe do not need to determine now that no insurance require ment could be imposed in any circumstances, which would be a close question, in our view\u201d); Eastern Conn. Citizens Action Group, 723 F.2d at 1057 (\u201cNor do we suggest that DOT\u2019s fee and insurance requirements would not be valid when reasonably applied.\u201d); see also Invisible Empire Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. City of West Haven, 600 F.Supp. at 1435 (finding bond requirement unconstitutional as it applies to those unable to obtain a bond); Collin v. O\u2019Malley, 452 F.Supp. 577, 579 (N.D.Ill.1978) (noting that plaintiff, as well as other \u201cpersons, groups or organizations espousing controversial political or social views and ideas,\u201d cannot obtain this level of coverage in the insurance marketplace)."},"case_id":9460984,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Yet, case law has recognized an indigency exception from financial responsibility provisions in applications to use public fora. In Collin v. Smith and Eastern Conn. Citizens Action Group, the would-be permittees showed that either they could not afford or could not obtain the liability insurance required as a condition of use. Upon such a showing, the courts concluded that the requirement was unconstitutional as applied, while declining to rule that insurance requirements were unconstitutional per se.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"723 F.2d 1057, 1057","parenthetical":"\"Nor do we suggest that DOT's fee and insurance requirements would not be valid when reasonably applied.\"","sentence":"Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d at 1208 (\u201cwe do not need to determine now that no insurance require ment could be imposed in any circumstances, which would be a close question, in our view\u201d); Eastern Conn. Citizens Action Group, 723 F.2d at 1057 (\u201cNor do we suggest that DOT\u2019s fee and insurance requirements would not be valid when reasonably applied.\u201d); see also Invisible Empire Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. City of West Haven, 600 F.Supp. at 1435 (finding bond requirement unconstitutional as it applies to those unable to obtain a bond); Collin v. O\u2019Malley, 452 F.Supp. 577, 579 (N.D.Ill.1978) (noting that plaintiff, as well as other \u201cpersons, groups or organizations espousing controversial political or social views and ideas,\u201d cannot obtain this level of coverage in the insurance marketplace)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"452 F.Supp. 577, 579","parenthetical":"noting that plaintiff, as well as other \"persons, groups or organizations espousing controversial political or social views and ideas,\" cannot obtain this level of coverage in the insurance marketplace","sentence":"Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d at 1208 (\u201cwe do not need to determine now that no insurance require ment could be imposed in any circumstances, which would be a close question, in our view\u201d); Eastern Conn. Citizens Action Group, 723 F.2d at 1057 (\u201cNor do we suggest that DOT\u2019s fee and insurance requirements would not be valid when reasonably applied.\u201d); see also Invisible Empire Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. City of West Haven, 600 F.Supp. at 1435 (finding bond requirement unconstitutional as it applies to those unable to obtain a bond); Collin v. O\u2019Malley, 452 F.Supp. 577, 579 (N.D.Ill.1978) (noting that plaintiff, as well as other \u201cpersons, groups or organizations espousing controversial political or social views and ideas,\u201d cannot obtain this level of coverage in the insurance marketplace)."},"case_id":9460984,"label":"a"}
{"context":"25. Nor is the upgrade claim false by necessary implication. Reasonable consumers could read the upgrade claim to be making comparative statements about Gatorade, but they could also read the upgrade claim to be comparing Powerade ION4 to the old Powerade.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"497 F.3d 158, 158","parenthetical":"\"if the language ... is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation, the advertisement cannot be literally false\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Time Warner Cable, Inc., 497 F.3d at 158 (\u201cif the language ... is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation, the advertisement cannot be literally false\u201d); see also Scotts Co. v. United Indus. Corp, 315 F.3d 264, 275 (4th Cir.2002) (rejecting literal falsity argument because the advertisement \u201ccan reasonably be understood as conveying different messages\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"315 F.3d 264, 275","parenthetical":"rejecting literal falsity argument because the advertisement \"can reasonably be understood as conveying different messages\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Time Warner Cable, Inc., 497 F.3d at 158 (\u201cif the language ... is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation, the advertisement cannot be literally false\u201d); see also Scotts Co. v. United Indus. Corp, 315 F.3d 264, 275 (4th Cir.2002) (rejecting literal falsity argument because the advertisement \u201ccan reasonably be understood as conveying different messages\u201d)."},"case_id":5713147,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Street is one application of the general, long-standing principle that the potential for jury misuse of evidence can often be curbed by a limiting instruction. Indeed, whenever the Supreme Court has permitted a jury to consider evidence that has the potential to be misused, e.g., to be considered in a way that would violate the defendant's constitutional rights, it has required that a proper jury instruction be given to avoid the misuse.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"449 U.S. 341, 347","parenthetical":"condoning the admission of erroneously admitted eyewitness identification evidence when the jury was instructed not to consider it, regardless of the dissent's observation that such evidence \"has a powerful impact on juries\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971) (holding that statements elicited from a defendant in violation of his Miranda rights could be introduced to impeach that defendant\u2019s credibility when the jury was instructed that the statements were not to be considered as evidence of his guilt); Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 559-61, 87 S.Ct. 648, 17 L.Ed.2d 606 (1967) (holding that evidence of a defendant\u2019s prior criminal convictions could be introduced for the purpose of sentence enhancement if the jury was instructed that the evidence could not be used for the purposes of determining guilt); Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 64, 74 S.Ct. 354, 98 L.Ed. 503 (1954) (holding that the admission of unlawfully seized evidence of a crime was admissible if the jury was instructed that the evidence could be considered only in assessing a defendant\u2019s credibility and not for determining guilt); cf. Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341, 347, 101 S.Ct. 654, 66 L.Ed.2d 549 (1981) (condoning the admission of erroneously admitted eyewitness identification evidence when the jury was instructed not to consider it, regardless of the dissent\u2019s observation that such evidence \u201chas a powerful impact on juries\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"401 U.S. 222, 226","parenthetical":"holding that statements elicited from a defendant in violation of his Miranda rights could be introduced to impeach that defendant's credibility when the jury was instructed that the statements were not to be considered as evidence of his guilt","sentence":"See, e.g., Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971) (holding that statements elicited from a defendant in violation of his Miranda rights could be introduced to impeach that defendant\u2019s credibility when the jury was instructed that the statements were not to be considered as evidence of his guilt); Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 559-61, 87 S.Ct. 648, 17 L.Ed.2d 606 (1967) (holding that evidence of a defendant\u2019s prior criminal convictions could be introduced for the purpose of sentence enhancement if the jury was instructed that the evidence could not be used for the purposes of determining guilt); Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 64, 74 S.Ct. 354, 98 L.Ed. 503 (1954) (holding that the admission of unlawfully seized evidence of a crime was admissible if the jury was instructed that the evidence could be considered only in assessing a defendant\u2019s credibility and not for determining guilt); cf. Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341, 347, 101 S.Ct. 654, 66 L.Ed.2d 549 (1981) (condoning the admission of erroneously admitted eyewitness identification evidence when the jury was instructed not to consider it, regardless of the dissent\u2019s observation that such evidence \u201chas a powerful impact on juries\u201d)."},"case_id":4091740,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Street is one application of the general, long-standing principle that the potential for jury misuse of evidence can often be curbed by a limiting instruction. Indeed, whenever the Supreme Court has permitted a jury to consider evidence that has the potential to be misused, e.g., to be considered in a way that would violate the defendant's constitutional rights, it has required that a proper jury instruction be given to avoid the misuse.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"condoning the admission of erroneously admitted eyewitness identification evidence when the jury was instructed not to consider it, regardless of the dissent's observation that such evidence \"has a powerful impact on juries\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971) (holding that statements elicited from a defendant in violation of his Miranda rights could be introduced to impeach that defendant\u2019s credibility when the jury was instructed that the statements were not to be considered as evidence of his guilt); Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 559-61, 87 S.Ct. 648, 17 L.Ed.2d 606 (1967) (holding that evidence of a defendant\u2019s prior criminal convictions could be introduced for the purpose of sentence enhancement if the jury was instructed that the evidence could not be used for the purposes of determining guilt); Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 64, 74 S.Ct. 354, 98 L.Ed. 503 (1954) (holding that the admission of unlawfully seized evidence of a crime was admissible if the jury was instructed that the evidence could be considered only in assessing a defendant\u2019s credibility and not for determining guilt); cf. Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341, 347, 101 S.Ct. 654, 66 L.Ed.2d 549 (1981) (condoning the admission of erroneously admitted eyewitness identification evidence when the jury was instructed not to consider it, regardless of the dissent\u2019s observation that such evidence \u201chas a powerful impact on juries\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"401 U.S. 222, 226","parenthetical":"holding that statements elicited from a defendant in violation of his Miranda rights could be introduced to impeach that defendant's credibility when the jury was instructed that the statements were not to be considered as evidence of his guilt","sentence":"See, e.g., Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971) (holding that statements elicited from a defendant in violation of his Miranda rights could be introduced to impeach that defendant\u2019s credibility when the jury was instructed that the statements were not to be considered as evidence of his guilt); Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 559-61, 87 S.Ct. 648, 17 L.Ed.2d 606 (1967) (holding that evidence of a defendant\u2019s prior criminal convictions could be introduced for the purpose of sentence enhancement if the jury was instructed that the evidence could not be used for the purposes of determining guilt); Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 64, 74 S.Ct. 354, 98 L.Ed. 503 (1954) (holding that the admission of unlawfully seized evidence of a crime was admissible if the jury was instructed that the evidence could be considered only in assessing a defendant\u2019s credibility and not for determining guilt); cf. Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341, 347, 101 S.Ct. 654, 66 L.Ed.2d 549 (1981) (condoning the admission of erroneously admitted eyewitness identification evidence when the jury was instructed not to consider it, regardless of the dissent\u2019s observation that such evidence \u201chas a powerful impact on juries\u201d)."},"case_id":4091740,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Street is one application of the general, long-standing principle that the potential for jury misuse of evidence can often be curbed by a limiting instruction. Indeed, whenever the Supreme Court has permitted a jury to consider evidence that has the potential to be misused, e.g., to be considered in a way that would violate the defendant's constitutional rights, it has required that a proper jury instruction be given to avoid the misuse.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"condoning the admission of erroneously admitted eyewitness identification evidence when the jury was instructed not to consider it, regardless of the dissent's observation that such evidence \"has a powerful impact on juries\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971) (holding that statements elicited from a defendant in violation of his Miranda rights could be introduced to impeach that defendant\u2019s credibility when the jury was instructed that the statements were not to be considered as evidence of his guilt); Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 559-61, 87 S.Ct. 648, 17 L.Ed.2d 606 (1967) (holding that evidence of a defendant\u2019s prior criminal convictions could be introduced for the purpose of sentence enhancement if the jury was instructed that the evidence could not be used for the purposes of determining guilt); Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 64, 74 S.Ct. 354, 98 L.Ed. 503 (1954) (holding that the admission of unlawfully seized evidence of a crime was admissible if the jury was instructed that the evidence could be considered only in assessing a defendant\u2019s credibility and not for determining guilt); cf. Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341, 347, 101 S.Ct. 654, 66 L.Ed.2d 549 (1981) (condoning the admission of erroneously admitted eyewitness identification evidence when the jury was instructed not to consider it, regardless of the dissent\u2019s observation that such evidence \u201chas a powerful impact on juries\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"401 U.S. 222, 226","parenthetical":"holding that statements elicited from a defendant in violation of his Miranda rights could be introduced to impeach that defendant's credibility when the jury was instructed that the statements were not to be considered as evidence of his guilt","sentence":"See, e.g., Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971) (holding that statements elicited from a defendant in violation of his Miranda rights could be introduced to impeach that defendant\u2019s credibility when the jury was instructed that the statements were not to be considered as evidence of his guilt); Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 559-61, 87 S.Ct. 648, 17 L.Ed.2d 606 (1967) (holding that evidence of a defendant\u2019s prior criminal convictions could be introduced for the purpose of sentence enhancement if the jury was instructed that the evidence could not be used for the purposes of determining guilt); Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 64, 74 S.Ct. 354, 98 L.Ed. 503 (1954) (holding that the admission of unlawfully seized evidence of a crime was admissible if the jury was instructed that the evidence could be considered only in assessing a defendant\u2019s credibility and not for determining guilt); cf. Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341, 347, 101 S.Ct. 654, 66 L.Ed.2d 549 (1981) (condoning the admission of erroneously admitted eyewitness identification evidence when the jury was instructed not to consider it, regardless of the dissent\u2019s observation that such evidence \u201chas a powerful impact on juries\u201d)."},"case_id":4091740,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Street is one application of the general, long-standing principle that the potential for jury misuse of evidence can often be curbed by a limiting instruction. Indeed, whenever the Supreme Court has permitted a jury to consider evidence that has the potential to be misused, e.g., to be considered in a way that would violate the defendant's constitutional rights, it has required that a proper jury instruction be given to avoid the misuse.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that statements elicited from a defendant in violation of his Miranda rights could be introduced to impeach that defendant's credibility when the jury was instructed that the statements were not to be considered as evidence of his guilt","sentence":"See, e.g., Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971) (holding that statements elicited from a defendant in violation of his Miranda rights could be introduced to impeach that defendant\u2019s credibility when the jury was instructed that the statements were not to be considered as evidence of his guilt); Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 559-61, 87 S.Ct. 648, 17 L.Ed.2d 606 (1967) (holding that evidence of a defendant\u2019s prior criminal convictions could be introduced for the purpose of sentence enhancement if the jury was instructed that the evidence could not be used for the purposes of determining guilt); Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 64, 74 S.Ct. 354, 98 L.Ed. 503 (1954) (holding that the admission of unlawfully seized evidence of a crime was admissible if the jury was instructed that the evidence could be considered only in assessing a defendant\u2019s credibility and not for determining guilt); cf. Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341, 347, 101 S.Ct. 654, 66 L.Ed.2d 549 (1981) (condoning the admission of erroneously admitted eyewitness identification evidence when the jury was instructed not to consider it, regardless of the dissent\u2019s observation that such evidence \u201chas a powerful impact on juries\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"449 U.S. 341, 347","parenthetical":"condoning the admission of erroneously admitted eyewitness identification evidence when the jury was instructed not to consider it, regardless of the dissent's observation that such evidence \"has a powerful impact on juries\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971) (holding that statements elicited from a defendant in violation of his Miranda rights could be introduced to impeach that defendant\u2019s credibility when the jury was instructed that the statements were not to be considered as evidence of his guilt); Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 559-61, 87 S.Ct. 648, 17 L.Ed.2d 606 (1967) (holding that evidence of a defendant\u2019s prior criminal convictions could be introduced for the purpose of sentence enhancement if the jury was instructed that the evidence could not be used for the purposes of determining guilt); Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 64, 74 S.Ct. 354, 98 L.Ed. 503 (1954) (holding that the admission of unlawfully seized evidence of a crime was admissible if the jury was instructed that the evidence could be considered only in assessing a defendant\u2019s credibility and not for determining guilt); cf. Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341, 347, 101 S.Ct. 654, 66 L.Ed.2d 549 (1981) (condoning the admission of erroneously admitted eyewitness identification evidence when the jury was instructed not to consider it, regardless of the dissent\u2019s observation that such evidence \u201chas a powerful impact on juries\u201d)."},"case_id":4091740,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Street is one application of the general, long-standing principle that the potential for jury misuse of evidence can often be curbed by a limiting instruction. Indeed, whenever the Supreme Court has permitted a jury to consider evidence that has the potential to be misused, e.g., to be considered in a way that would violate the defendant's constitutional rights, it has required that a proper jury instruction be given to avoid the misuse.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"condoning the admission of erroneously admitted eyewitness identification evidence when the jury was instructed not to consider it, regardless of the dissent's observation that such evidence \"has a powerful impact on juries\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971) (holding that statements elicited from a defendant in violation of his Miranda rights could be introduced to impeach that defendant\u2019s credibility when the jury was instructed that the statements were not to be considered as evidence of his guilt); Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 559-61, 87 S.Ct. 648, 17 L.Ed.2d 606 (1967) (holding that evidence of a defendant\u2019s prior criminal convictions could be introduced for the purpose of sentence enhancement if the jury was instructed that the evidence could not be used for the purposes of determining guilt); Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 64, 74 S.Ct. 354, 98 L.Ed. 503 (1954) (holding that the admission of unlawfully seized evidence of a crime was admissible if the jury was instructed that the evidence could be considered only in assessing a defendant\u2019s credibility and not for determining guilt); cf. Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341, 347, 101 S.Ct. 654, 66 L.Ed.2d 549 (1981) (condoning the admission of erroneously admitted eyewitness identification evidence when the jury was instructed not to consider it, regardless of the dissent\u2019s observation that such evidence \u201chas a powerful impact on juries\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that statements elicited from a defendant in violation of his Miranda rights could be introduced to impeach that defendant's credibility when the jury was instructed that the statements were not to be considered as evidence of his guilt","sentence":"See, e.g., Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971) (holding that statements elicited from a defendant in violation of his Miranda rights could be introduced to impeach that defendant\u2019s credibility when the jury was instructed that the statements were not to be considered as evidence of his guilt); Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 559-61, 87 S.Ct. 648, 17 L.Ed.2d 606 (1967) (holding that evidence of a defendant\u2019s prior criminal convictions could be introduced for the purpose of sentence enhancement if the jury was instructed that the evidence could not be used for the purposes of determining guilt); Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 64, 74 S.Ct. 354, 98 L.Ed. 503 (1954) (holding that the admission of unlawfully seized evidence of a crime was admissible if the jury was instructed that the evidence could be considered only in assessing a defendant\u2019s credibility and not for determining guilt); cf. Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341, 347, 101 S.Ct. 654, 66 L.Ed.2d 549 (1981) (condoning the admission of erroneously admitted eyewitness identification evidence when the jury was instructed not to consider it, regardless of the dissent\u2019s observation that such evidence \u201chas a powerful impact on juries\u201d)."},"case_id":4091740,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Street is one application of the general, long-standing principle that the potential for jury misuse of evidence can often be curbed by a limiting instruction. Indeed, whenever the Supreme Court has permitted a jury to consider evidence that has the potential to be misused, e.g., to be considered in a way that would violate the defendant's constitutional rights, it has required that a proper jury instruction be given to avoid the misuse.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that statements elicited from a defendant in violation of his Miranda rights could be introduced to impeach that defendant's credibility when the jury was instructed that the statements were not to be considered as evidence of his guilt","sentence":"See, e.g., Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971) (holding that statements elicited from a defendant in violation of his Miranda rights could be introduced to impeach that defendant\u2019s credibility when the jury was instructed that the statements were not to be considered as evidence of his guilt); Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 559-61, 87 S.Ct. 648, 17 L.Ed.2d 606 (1967) (holding that evidence of a defendant\u2019s prior criminal convictions could be introduced for the purpose of sentence enhancement if the jury was instructed that the evidence could not be used for the purposes of determining guilt); Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 64, 74 S.Ct. 354, 98 L.Ed. 503 (1954) (holding that the admission of unlawfully seized evidence of a crime was admissible if the jury was instructed that the evidence could be considered only in assessing a defendant\u2019s credibility and not for determining guilt); cf. Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341, 347, 101 S.Ct. 654, 66 L.Ed.2d 549 (1981) (condoning the admission of erroneously admitted eyewitness identification evidence when the jury was instructed not to consider it, regardless of the dissent\u2019s observation that such evidence \u201chas a powerful impact on juries\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"condoning the admission of erroneously admitted eyewitness identification evidence when the jury was instructed not to consider it, regardless of the dissent's observation that such evidence \"has a powerful impact on juries\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971) (holding that statements elicited from a defendant in violation of his Miranda rights could be introduced to impeach that defendant\u2019s credibility when the jury was instructed that the statements were not to be considered as evidence of his guilt); Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 559-61, 87 S.Ct. 648, 17 L.Ed.2d 606 (1967) (holding that evidence of a defendant\u2019s prior criminal convictions could be introduced for the purpose of sentence enhancement if the jury was instructed that the evidence could not be used for the purposes of determining guilt); Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 64, 74 S.Ct. 354, 98 L.Ed. 503 (1954) (holding that the admission of unlawfully seized evidence of a crime was admissible if the jury was instructed that the evidence could be considered only in assessing a defendant\u2019s credibility and not for determining guilt); cf. Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341, 347, 101 S.Ct. 654, 66 L.Ed.2d 549 (1981) (condoning the admission of erroneously admitted eyewitness identification evidence when the jury was instructed not to consider it, regardless of the dissent\u2019s observation that such evidence \u201chas a powerful impact on juries\u201d)."},"case_id":4091740,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Street is one application of the general, long-standing principle that the potential for jury misuse of evidence can often be curbed by a limiting instruction. Indeed, whenever the Supreme Court has permitted a jury to consider evidence that has the potential to be misused, e.g., to be considered in a way that would violate the defendant's constitutional rights, it has required that a proper jury instruction be given to avoid the misuse.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that statements elicited from a defendant in violation of his Miranda rights could be introduced to impeach that defendant's credibility when the jury was instructed that the statements were not to be considered as evidence of his guilt","sentence":"See, e.g., Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971) (holding that statements elicited from a defendant in violation of his Miranda rights could be introduced to impeach that defendant\u2019s credibility when the jury was instructed that the statements were not to be considered as evidence of his guilt); Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 559-61, 87 S.Ct. 648, 17 L.Ed.2d 606 (1967) (holding that evidence of a defendant\u2019s prior criminal convictions could be introduced for the purpose of sentence enhancement if the jury was instructed that the evidence could not be used for the purposes of determining guilt); Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 64, 74 S.Ct. 354, 98 L.Ed. 503 (1954) (holding that the admission of unlawfully seized evidence of a crime was admissible if the jury was instructed that the evidence could be considered only in assessing a defendant\u2019s credibility and not for determining guilt); cf. Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341, 347, 101 S.Ct. 654, 66 L.Ed.2d 549 (1981) (condoning the admission of erroneously admitted eyewitness identification evidence when the jury was instructed not to consider it, regardless of the dissent\u2019s observation that such evidence \u201chas a powerful impact on juries\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"449 U.S. 341, 347","parenthetical":"condoning the admission of erroneously admitted eyewitness identification evidence when the jury was instructed not to consider it, regardless of the dissent's observation that such evidence \"has a powerful impact on juries\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971) (holding that statements elicited from a defendant in violation of his Miranda rights could be introduced to impeach that defendant\u2019s credibility when the jury was instructed that the statements were not to be considered as evidence of his guilt); Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 559-61, 87 S.Ct. 648, 17 L.Ed.2d 606 (1967) (holding that evidence of a defendant\u2019s prior criminal convictions could be introduced for the purpose of sentence enhancement if the jury was instructed that the evidence could not be used for the purposes of determining guilt); Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 64, 74 S.Ct. 354, 98 L.Ed. 503 (1954) (holding that the admission of unlawfully seized evidence of a crime was admissible if the jury was instructed that the evidence could be considered only in assessing a defendant\u2019s credibility and not for determining guilt); cf. Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341, 347, 101 S.Ct. 654, 66 L.Ed.2d 549 (1981) (condoning the admission of erroneously admitted eyewitness identification evidence when the jury was instructed not to consider it, regardless of the dissent\u2019s observation that such evidence \u201chas a powerful impact on juries\u201d)."},"case_id":4091740,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Street is one application of the general, long-standing principle that the potential for jury misuse of evidence can often be curbed by a limiting instruction. Indeed, whenever the Supreme Court has permitted a jury to consider evidence that has the potential to be misused, e.g., to be considered in a way that would violate the defendant's constitutional rights, it has required that a proper jury instruction be given to avoid the misuse.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that statements elicited from a defendant in violation of his Miranda rights could be introduced to impeach that defendant's credibility when the jury was instructed that the statements were not to be considered as evidence of his guilt","sentence":"See, e.g., Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971) (holding that statements elicited from a defendant in violation of his Miranda rights could be introduced to impeach that defendant\u2019s credibility when the jury was instructed that the statements were not to be considered as evidence of his guilt); Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 559-61, 87 S.Ct. 648, 17 L.Ed.2d 606 (1967) (holding that evidence of a defendant\u2019s prior criminal convictions could be introduced for the purpose of sentence enhancement if the jury was instructed that the evidence could not be used for the purposes of determining guilt); Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 64, 74 S.Ct. 354, 98 L.Ed. 503 (1954) (holding that the admission of unlawfully seized evidence of a crime was admissible if the jury was instructed that the evidence could be considered only in assessing a defendant\u2019s credibility and not for determining guilt); cf. Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341, 347, 101 S.Ct. 654, 66 L.Ed.2d 549 (1981) (condoning the admission of erroneously admitted eyewitness identification evidence when the jury was instructed not to consider it, regardless of the dissent\u2019s observation that such evidence \u201chas a powerful impact on juries\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"condoning the admission of erroneously admitted eyewitness identification evidence when the jury was instructed not to consider it, regardless of the dissent's observation that such evidence \"has a powerful impact on juries\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971) (holding that statements elicited from a defendant in violation of his Miranda rights could be introduced to impeach that defendant\u2019s credibility when the jury was instructed that the statements were not to be considered as evidence of his guilt); Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 559-61, 87 S.Ct. 648, 17 L.Ed.2d 606 (1967) (holding that evidence of a defendant\u2019s prior criminal convictions could be introduced for the purpose of sentence enhancement if the jury was instructed that the evidence could not be used for the purposes of determining guilt); Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 64, 74 S.Ct. 354, 98 L.Ed. 503 (1954) (holding that the admission of unlawfully seized evidence of a crime was admissible if the jury was instructed that the evidence could be considered only in assessing a defendant\u2019s credibility and not for determining guilt); cf. Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341, 347, 101 S.Ct. 654, 66 L.Ed.2d 549 (1981) (condoning the admission of erroneously admitted eyewitness identification evidence when the jury was instructed not to consider it, regardless of the dissent\u2019s observation that such evidence \u201chas a powerful impact on juries\u201d)."},"case_id":4091740,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Street is one application of the general, long-standing principle that the potential for jury misuse of evidence can often be curbed by a limiting instruction. Indeed, whenever the Supreme Court has permitted a jury to consider evidence that has the potential to be misused, e.g., to be considered in a way that would violate the defendant's constitutional rights, it has required that a proper jury instruction be given to avoid the misuse.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"condoning the admission of erroneously admitted eyewitness identification evidence when the jury was instructed not to consider it, regardless of the dissent's observation that such evidence \"has a powerful impact on juries\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971) (holding that statements elicited from a defendant in violation of his Miranda rights could be introduced to impeach that defendant\u2019s credibility when the jury was instructed that the statements were not to be considered as evidence of his guilt); Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 559-61, 87 S.Ct. 648, 17 L.Ed.2d 606 (1967) (holding that evidence of a defendant\u2019s prior criminal convictions could be introduced for the purpose of sentence enhancement if the jury was instructed that the evidence could not be used for the purposes of determining guilt); Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 64, 74 S.Ct. 354, 98 L.Ed. 503 (1954) (holding that the admission of unlawfully seized evidence of a crime was admissible if the jury was instructed that the evidence could be considered only in assessing a defendant\u2019s credibility and not for determining guilt); cf. Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341, 347, 101 S.Ct. 654, 66 L.Ed.2d 549 (1981) (condoning the admission of erroneously admitted eyewitness identification evidence when the jury was instructed not to consider it, regardless of the dissent\u2019s observation that such evidence \u201chas a powerful impact on juries\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that statements elicited from a defendant in violation of his Miranda rights could be introduced to impeach that defendant's credibility when the jury was instructed that the statements were not to be considered as evidence of his guilt","sentence":"See, e.g., Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971) (holding that statements elicited from a defendant in violation of his Miranda rights could be introduced to impeach that defendant\u2019s credibility when the jury was instructed that the statements were not to be considered as evidence of his guilt); Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 559-61, 87 S.Ct. 648, 17 L.Ed.2d 606 (1967) (holding that evidence of a defendant\u2019s prior criminal convictions could be introduced for the purpose of sentence enhancement if the jury was instructed that the evidence could not be used for the purposes of determining guilt); Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 64, 74 S.Ct. 354, 98 L.Ed. 503 (1954) (holding that the admission of unlawfully seized evidence of a crime was admissible if the jury was instructed that the evidence could be considered only in assessing a defendant\u2019s credibility and not for determining guilt); cf. Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341, 347, 101 S.Ct. 654, 66 L.Ed.2d 549 (1981) (condoning the admission of erroneously admitted eyewitness identification evidence when the jury was instructed not to consider it, regardless of the dissent\u2019s observation that such evidence \u201chas a powerful impact on juries\u201d)."},"case_id":4091740,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Street is one application of the general, long-standing principle that the potential for jury misuse of evidence can often be curbed by a limiting instruction. Indeed, whenever the Supreme Court has permitted a jury to consider evidence that has the potential to be misused, e.g., to be considered in a way that would violate the defendant's constitutional rights, it has required that a proper jury instruction be given to avoid the misuse.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"449 U.S. 341, 347","parenthetical":"condoning the admission of erroneously admitted eyewitness identification evidence when the jury was instructed not to consider it, regardless of the dissent's observation that such evidence \"has a powerful impact on juries\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971) (holding that statements elicited from a defendant in violation of his Miranda rights could be introduced to impeach that defendant\u2019s credibility when the jury was instructed that the statements were not to be considered as evidence of his guilt); Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 559-61, 87 S.Ct. 648, 17 L.Ed.2d 606 (1967) (holding that evidence of a defendant\u2019s prior criminal convictions could be introduced for the purpose of sentence enhancement if the jury was instructed that the evidence could not be used for the purposes of determining guilt); Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 64, 74 S.Ct. 354, 98 L.Ed. 503 (1954) (holding that the admission of unlawfully seized evidence of a crime was admissible if the jury was instructed that the evidence could be considered only in assessing a defendant\u2019s credibility and not for determining guilt); cf. Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341, 347, 101 S.Ct. 654, 66 L.Ed.2d 549 (1981) (condoning the admission of erroneously admitted eyewitness identification evidence when the jury was instructed not to consider it, regardless of the dissent\u2019s observation that such evidence \u201chas a powerful impact on juries\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"385 U.S. 554, 559-61","parenthetical":"holding that evidence of a defendant's prior criminal convictions could be introduced for the purpose of sentence enhancement if the jury was instructed that the evidence could not be used for the purposes of determining guilt","sentence":"See, e.g., Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971) (holding that statements elicited from a defendant in violation of his Miranda rights could be introduced to impeach that defendant\u2019s credibility when the jury was instructed that the statements were not to be considered as evidence of his guilt); Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 559-61, 87 S.Ct. 648, 17 L.Ed.2d 606 (1967) (holding that evidence of a defendant\u2019s prior criminal convictions could be introduced for the purpose of sentence enhancement if the jury was instructed that the evidence could not be used for the purposes of determining guilt); Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 64, 74 S.Ct. 354, 98 L.Ed. 503 (1954) (holding that the admission of unlawfully seized evidence of a crime was admissible if the jury was instructed that the evidence could be considered only in assessing a defendant\u2019s credibility and not for determining guilt); cf. Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341, 347, 101 S.Ct. 654, 66 L.Ed.2d 549 (1981) (condoning the admission of erroneously admitted eyewitness identification evidence when the jury was instructed not to consider it, regardless of the dissent\u2019s observation that such evidence \u201chas a powerful impact on juries\u201d)."},"case_id":4091740,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Street is one application of the general, long-standing principle that the potential for jury misuse of evidence can often be curbed by a limiting instruction. Indeed, whenever the Supreme Court has permitted a jury to consider evidence that has the potential to be misused, e.g., to be considered in a way that would violate the defendant's constitutional rights, it has required that a proper jury instruction be given to avoid the misuse.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"385 U.S. 554, 559-61","parenthetical":"holding that evidence of a defendant's prior criminal convictions could be introduced for the purpose of sentence enhancement if the jury was instructed that the evidence could not be used for the purposes of determining guilt","sentence":"See, e.g., Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971) (holding that statements elicited from a defendant in violation of his Miranda rights could be introduced to impeach that defendant\u2019s credibility when the jury was instructed that the statements were not to be considered as evidence of his guilt); Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 559-61, 87 S.Ct. 648, 17 L.Ed.2d 606 (1967) (holding that evidence of a defendant\u2019s prior criminal convictions could be introduced for the purpose of sentence enhancement if the jury was instructed that the evidence could not be used for the purposes of determining guilt); Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 64, 74 S.Ct. 354, 98 L.Ed. 503 (1954) (holding that the admission of unlawfully seized evidence of a crime was admissible if the jury was instructed that the evidence could be considered only in assessing a defendant\u2019s credibility and not for determining guilt); cf. Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341, 347, 101 S.Ct. 654, 66 L.Ed.2d 549 (1981) (condoning the admission of erroneously admitted eyewitness identification evidence when the jury was instructed not to consider it, regardless of the dissent\u2019s observation that such evidence \u201chas a powerful impact on juries\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"condoning the admission of erroneously admitted eyewitness identification evidence when the jury was instructed not to consider it, regardless of the dissent's observation that such evidence \"has a powerful impact on juries\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971) (holding that statements elicited from a defendant in violation of his Miranda rights could be introduced to impeach that defendant\u2019s credibility when the jury was instructed that the statements were not to be considered as evidence of his guilt); Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 559-61, 87 S.Ct. 648, 17 L.Ed.2d 606 (1967) (holding that evidence of a defendant\u2019s prior criminal convictions could be introduced for the purpose of sentence enhancement if the jury was instructed that the evidence could not be used for the purposes of determining guilt); Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 64, 74 S.Ct. 354, 98 L.Ed. 503 (1954) (holding that the admission of unlawfully seized evidence of a crime was admissible if the jury was instructed that the evidence could be considered only in assessing a defendant\u2019s credibility and not for determining guilt); cf. Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341, 347, 101 S.Ct. 654, 66 L.Ed.2d 549 (1981) (condoning the admission of erroneously admitted eyewitness identification evidence when the jury was instructed not to consider it, regardless of the dissent\u2019s observation that such evidence \u201chas a powerful impact on juries\u201d)."},"case_id":4091740,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Street is one application of the general, long-standing principle that the potential for jury misuse of evidence can often be curbed by a limiting instruction. Indeed, whenever the Supreme Court has permitted a jury to consider evidence that has the potential to be misused, e.g., to be considered in a way that would violate the defendant's constitutional rights, it has required that a proper jury instruction be given to avoid the misuse.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"385 U.S. 554, 559-61","parenthetical":"holding that evidence of a defendant's prior criminal convictions could be introduced for the purpose of sentence enhancement if the jury was instructed that the evidence could not be used for the purposes of determining guilt","sentence":"See, e.g., Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971) (holding that statements elicited from a defendant in violation of his Miranda rights could be introduced to impeach that defendant\u2019s credibility when the jury was instructed that the statements were not to be considered as evidence of his guilt); Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 559-61, 87 S.Ct. 648, 17 L.Ed.2d 606 (1967) (holding that evidence of a defendant\u2019s prior criminal convictions could be introduced for the purpose of sentence enhancement if the jury was instructed that the evidence could not be used for the purposes of determining guilt); Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 64, 74 S.Ct. 354, 98 L.Ed. 503 (1954) (holding that the admission of unlawfully seized evidence of a crime was admissible if the jury was instructed that the evidence could be considered only in assessing a defendant\u2019s credibility and not for determining guilt); cf. Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341, 347, 101 S.Ct. 654, 66 L.Ed.2d 549 (1981) (condoning the admission of erroneously admitted eyewitness identification evidence when the jury was instructed not to consider it, regardless of the dissent\u2019s observation that such evidence \u201chas a powerful impact on juries\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"condoning the admission of erroneously admitted eyewitness identification evidence when the jury was instructed not to consider it, regardless of the dissent's observation that such evidence \"has a powerful impact on juries\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971) (holding that statements elicited from a defendant in violation of his Miranda rights could be introduced to impeach that defendant\u2019s credibility when the jury was instructed that the statements were not to be considered as evidence of his guilt); Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 559-61, 87 S.Ct. 648, 17 L.Ed.2d 606 (1967) (holding that evidence of a defendant\u2019s prior criminal convictions could be introduced for the purpose of sentence enhancement if the jury was instructed that the evidence could not be used for the purposes of determining guilt); Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 64, 74 S.Ct. 354, 98 L.Ed. 503 (1954) (holding that the admission of unlawfully seized evidence of a crime was admissible if the jury was instructed that the evidence could be considered only in assessing a defendant\u2019s credibility and not for determining guilt); cf. Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341, 347, 101 S.Ct. 654, 66 L.Ed.2d 549 (1981) (condoning the admission of erroneously admitted eyewitness identification evidence when the jury was instructed not to consider it, regardless of the dissent\u2019s observation that such evidence \u201chas a powerful impact on juries\u201d)."},"case_id":4091740,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Street is one application of the general, long-standing principle that the potential for jury misuse of evidence can often be curbed by a limiting instruction. Indeed, whenever the Supreme Court has permitted a jury to consider evidence that has the potential to be misused, e.g., to be considered in a way that would violate the defendant's constitutional rights, it has required that a proper jury instruction be given to avoid the misuse.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that evidence of a defendant's prior criminal convictions could be introduced for the purpose of sentence enhancement if the jury was instructed that the evidence could not be used for the purposes of determining guilt","sentence":"See, e.g., Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971) (holding that statements elicited from a defendant in violation of his Miranda rights could be introduced to impeach that defendant\u2019s credibility when the jury was instructed that the statements were not to be considered as evidence of his guilt); Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 559-61, 87 S.Ct. 648, 17 L.Ed.2d 606 (1967) (holding that evidence of a defendant\u2019s prior criminal convictions could be introduced for the purpose of sentence enhancement if the jury was instructed that the evidence could not be used for the purposes of determining guilt); Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 64, 74 S.Ct. 354, 98 L.Ed. 503 (1954) (holding that the admission of unlawfully seized evidence of a crime was admissible if the jury was instructed that the evidence could be considered only in assessing a defendant\u2019s credibility and not for determining guilt); cf. Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341, 347, 101 S.Ct. 654, 66 L.Ed.2d 549 (1981) (condoning the admission of erroneously admitted eyewitness identification evidence when the jury was instructed not to consider it, regardless of the dissent\u2019s observation that such evidence \u201chas a powerful impact on juries\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"449 U.S. 341, 347","parenthetical":"condoning the admission of erroneously admitted eyewitness identification evidence when the jury was instructed not to consider it, regardless of the dissent's observation that such evidence \"has a powerful impact on juries\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971) (holding that statements elicited from a defendant in violation of his Miranda rights could be introduced to impeach that defendant\u2019s credibility when the jury was instructed that the statements were not to be considered as evidence of his guilt); Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 559-61, 87 S.Ct. 648, 17 L.Ed.2d 606 (1967) (holding that evidence of a defendant\u2019s prior criminal convictions could be introduced for the purpose of sentence enhancement if the jury was instructed that the evidence could not be used for the purposes of determining guilt); Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 64, 74 S.Ct. 354, 98 L.Ed. 503 (1954) (holding that the admission of unlawfully seized evidence of a crime was admissible if the jury was instructed that the evidence could be considered only in assessing a defendant\u2019s credibility and not for determining guilt); cf. Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341, 347, 101 S.Ct. 654, 66 L.Ed.2d 549 (1981) (condoning the admission of erroneously admitted eyewitness identification evidence when the jury was instructed not to consider it, regardless of the dissent\u2019s observation that such evidence \u201chas a powerful impact on juries\u201d)."},"case_id":4091740,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Street is one application of the general, long-standing principle that the potential for jury misuse of evidence can often be curbed by a limiting instruction. Indeed, whenever the Supreme Court has permitted a jury to consider evidence that has the potential to be misused, e.g., to be considered in a way that would violate the defendant's constitutional rights, it has required that a proper jury instruction be given to avoid the misuse.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that evidence of a defendant's prior criminal convictions could be introduced for the purpose of sentence enhancement if the jury was instructed that the evidence could not be used for the purposes of determining guilt","sentence":"See, e.g., Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971) (holding that statements elicited from a defendant in violation of his Miranda rights could be introduced to impeach that defendant\u2019s credibility when the jury was instructed that the statements were not to be considered as evidence of his guilt); Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 559-61, 87 S.Ct. 648, 17 L.Ed.2d 606 (1967) (holding that evidence of a defendant\u2019s prior criminal convictions could be introduced for the purpose of sentence enhancement if the jury was instructed that the evidence could not be used for the purposes of determining guilt); Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 64, 74 S.Ct. 354, 98 L.Ed. 503 (1954) (holding that the admission of unlawfully seized evidence of a crime was admissible if the jury was instructed that the evidence could be considered only in assessing a defendant\u2019s credibility and not for determining guilt); cf. Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341, 347, 101 S.Ct. 654, 66 L.Ed.2d 549 (1981) (condoning the admission of erroneously admitted eyewitness identification evidence when the jury was instructed not to consider it, regardless of the dissent\u2019s observation that such evidence \u201chas a powerful impact on juries\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"condoning the admission of erroneously admitted eyewitness identification evidence when the jury was instructed not to consider it, regardless of the dissent's observation that such evidence \"has a powerful impact on juries\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971) (holding that statements elicited from a defendant in violation of his Miranda rights could be introduced to impeach that defendant\u2019s credibility when the jury was instructed that the statements were not to be considered as evidence of his guilt); Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 559-61, 87 S.Ct. 648, 17 L.Ed.2d 606 (1967) (holding that evidence of a defendant\u2019s prior criminal convictions could be introduced for the purpose of sentence enhancement if the jury was instructed that the evidence could not be used for the purposes of determining guilt); Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 64, 74 S.Ct. 354, 98 L.Ed. 503 (1954) (holding that the admission of unlawfully seized evidence of a crime was admissible if the jury was instructed that the evidence could be considered only in assessing a defendant\u2019s credibility and not for determining guilt); cf. Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341, 347, 101 S.Ct. 654, 66 L.Ed.2d 549 (1981) (condoning the admission of erroneously admitted eyewitness identification evidence when the jury was instructed not to consider it, regardless of the dissent\u2019s observation that such evidence \u201chas a powerful impact on juries\u201d)."},"case_id":4091740,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Street is one application of the general, long-standing principle that the potential for jury misuse of evidence can often be curbed by a limiting instruction. Indeed, whenever the Supreme Court has permitted a jury to consider evidence that has the potential to be misused, e.g., to be considered in a way that would violate the defendant's constitutional rights, it has required that a proper jury instruction be given to avoid the misuse.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that evidence of a defendant's prior criminal convictions could be introduced for the purpose of sentence enhancement if the jury was instructed that the evidence could not be used for the purposes of determining guilt","sentence":"See, e.g., Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971) (holding that statements elicited from a defendant in violation of his Miranda rights could be introduced to impeach that defendant\u2019s credibility when the jury was instructed that the statements were not to be considered as evidence of his guilt); Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 559-61, 87 S.Ct. 648, 17 L.Ed.2d 606 (1967) (holding that evidence of a defendant\u2019s prior criminal convictions could be introduced for the purpose of sentence enhancement if the jury was instructed that the evidence could not be used for the purposes of determining guilt); Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 64, 74 S.Ct. 354, 98 L.Ed. 503 (1954) (holding that the admission of unlawfully seized evidence of a crime was admissible if the jury was instructed that the evidence could be considered only in assessing a defendant\u2019s credibility and not for determining guilt); cf. Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341, 347, 101 S.Ct. 654, 66 L.Ed.2d 549 (1981) (condoning the admission of erroneously admitted eyewitness identification evidence when the jury was instructed not to consider it, regardless of the dissent\u2019s observation that such evidence \u201chas a powerful impact on juries\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"condoning the admission of erroneously admitted eyewitness identification evidence when the jury was instructed not to consider it, regardless of the dissent's observation that such evidence \"has a powerful impact on juries\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971) (holding that statements elicited from a defendant in violation of his Miranda rights could be introduced to impeach that defendant\u2019s credibility when the jury was instructed that the statements were not to be considered as evidence of his guilt); Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 559-61, 87 S.Ct. 648, 17 L.Ed.2d 606 (1967) (holding that evidence of a defendant\u2019s prior criminal convictions could be introduced for the purpose of sentence enhancement if the jury was instructed that the evidence could not be used for the purposes of determining guilt); Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 64, 74 S.Ct. 354, 98 L.Ed. 503 (1954) (holding that the admission of unlawfully seized evidence of a crime was admissible if the jury was instructed that the evidence could be considered only in assessing a defendant\u2019s credibility and not for determining guilt); cf. Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341, 347, 101 S.Ct. 654, 66 L.Ed.2d 549 (1981) (condoning the admission of erroneously admitted eyewitness identification evidence when the jury was instructed not to consider it, regardless of the dissent\u2019s observation that such evidence \u201chas a powerful impact on juries\u201d)."},"case_id":4091740,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Street is one application of the general, long-standing principle that the potential for jury misuse of evidence can often be curbed by a limiting instruction. Indeed, whenever the Supreme Court has permitted a jury to consider evidence that has the potential to be misused, e.g., to be considered in a way that would violate the defendant's constitutional rights, it has required that a proper jury instruction be given to avoid the misuse.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that evidence of a defendant's prior criminal convictions could be introduced for the purpose of sentence enhancement if the jury was instructed that the evidence could not be used for the purposes of determining guilt","sentence":"See, e.g., Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971) (holding that statements elicited from a defendant in violation of his Miranda rights could be introduced to impeach that defendant\u2019s credibility when the jury was instructed that the statements were not to be considered as evidence of his guilt); Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 559-61, 87 S.Ct. 648, 17 L.Ed.2d 606 (1967) (holding that evidence of a defendant\u2019s prior criminal convictions could be introduced for the purpose of sentence enhancement if the jury was instructed that the evidence could not be used for the purposes of determining guilt); Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 64, 74 S.Ct. 354, 98 L.Ed. 503 (1954) (holding that the admission of unlawfully seized evidence of a crime was admissible if the jury was instructed that the evidence could be considered only in assessing a defendant\u2019s credibility and not for determining guilt); cf. Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341, 347, 101 S.Ct. 654, 66 L.Ed.2d 549 (1981) (condoning the admission of erroneously admitted eyewitness identification evidence when the jury was instructed not to consider it, regardless of the dissent\u2019s observation that such evidence \u201chas a powerful impact on juries\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"449 U.S. 341, 347","parenthetical":"condoning the admission of erroneously admitted eyewitness identification evidence when the jury was instructed not to consider it, regardless of the dissent's observation that such evidence \"has a powerful impact on juries\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971) (holding that statements elicited from a defendant in violation of his Miranda rights could be introduced to impeach that defendant\u2019s credibility when the jury was instructed that the statements were not to be considered as evidence of his guilt); Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 559-61, 87 S.Ct. 648, 17 L.Ed.2d 606 (1967) (holding that evidence of a defendant\u2019s prior criminal convictions could be introduced for the purpose of sentence enhancement if the jury was instructed that the evidence could not be used for the purposes of determining guilt); Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 64, 74 S.Ct. 354, 98 L.Ed. 503 (1954) (holding that the admission of unlawfully seized evidence of a crime was admissible if the jury was instructed that the evidence could be considered only in assessing a defendant\u2019s credibility and not for determining guilt); cf. Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341, 347, 101 S.Ct. 654, 66 L.Ed.2d 549 (1981) (condoning the admission of erroneously admitted eyewitness identification evidence when the jury was instructed not to consider it, regardless of the dissent\u2019s observation that such evidence \u201chas a powerful impact on juries\u201d)."},"case_id":4091740,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Street is one application of the general, long-standing principle that the potential for jury misuse of evidence can often be curbed by a limiting instruction. Indeed, whenever the Supreme Court has permitted a jury to consider evidence that has the potential to be misused, e.g., to be considered in a way that would violate the defendant's constitutional rights, it has required that a proper jury instruction be given to avoid the misuse.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that evidence of a defendant's prior criminal convictions could be introduced for the purpose of sentence enhancement if the jury was instructed that the evidence could not be used for the purposes of determining guilt","sentence":"See, e.g., Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971) (holding that statements elicited from a defendant in violation of his Miranda rights could be introduced to impeach that defendant\u2019s credibility when the jury was instructed that the statements were not to be considered as evidence of his guilt); Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 559-61, 87 S.Ct. 648, 17 L.Ed.2d 606 (1967) (holding that evidence of a defendant\u2019s prior criminal convictions could be introduced for the purpose of sentence enhancement if the jury was instructed that the evidence could not be used for the purposes of determining guilt); Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 64, 74 S.Ct. 354, 98 L.Ed. 503 (1954) (holding that the admission of unlawfully seized evidence of a crime was admissible if the jury was instructed that the evidence could be considered only in assessing a defendant\u2019s credibility and not for determining guilt); cf. Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341, 347, 101 S.Ct. 654, 66 L.Ed.2d 549 (1981) (condoning the admission of erroneously admitted eyewitness identification evidence when the jury was instructed not to consider it, regardless of the dissent\u2019s observation that such evidence \u201chas a powerful impact on juries\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"condoning the admission of erroneously admitted eyewitness identification evidence when the jury was instructed not to consider it, regardless of the dissent's observation that such evidence \"has a powerful impact on juries\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971) (holding that statements elicited from a defendant in violation of his Miranda rights could be introduced to impeach that defendant\u2019s credibility when the jury was instructed that the statements were not to be considered as evidence of his guilt); Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 559-61, 87 S.Ct. 648, 17 L.Ed.2d 606 (1967) (holding that evidence of a defendant\u2019s prior criminal convictions could be introduced for the purpose of sentence enhancement if the jury was instructed that the evidence could not be used for the purposes of determining guilt); Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 64, 74 S.Ct. 354, 98 L.Ed. 503 (1954) (holding that the admission of unlawfully seized evidence of a crime was admissible if the jury was instructed that the evidence could be considered only in assessing a defendant\u2019s credibility and not for determining guilt); cf. Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341, 347, 101 S.Ct. 654, 66 L.Ed.2d 549 (1981) (condoning the admission of erroneously admitted eyewitness identification evidence when the jury was instructed not to consider it, regardless of the dissent\u2019s observation that such evidence \u201chas a powerful impact on juries\u201d)."},"case_id":4091740,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Street is one application of the general, long-standing principle that the potential for jury misuse of evidence can often be curbed by a limiting instruction. Indeed, whenever the Supreme Court has permitted a jury to consider evidence that has the potential to be misused, e.g., to be considered in a way that would violate the defendant's constitutional rights, it has required that a proper jury instruction be given to avoid the misuse.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that evidence of a defendant's prior criminal convictions could be introduced for the purpose of sentence enhancement if the jury was instructed that the evidence could not be used for the purposes of determining guilt","sentence":"See, e.g., Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971) (holding that statements elicited from a defendant in violation of his Miranda rights could be introduced to impeach that defendant\u2019s credibility when the jury was instructed that the statements were not to be considered as evidence of his guilt); Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 559-61, 87 S.Ct. 648, 17 L.Ed.2d 606 (1967) (holding that evidence of a defendant\u2019s prior criminal convictions could be introduced for the purpose of sentence enhancement if the jury was instructed that the evidence could not be used for the purposes of determining guilt); Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 64, 74 S.Ct. 354, 98 L.Ed. 503 (1954) (holding that the admission of unlawfully seized evidence of a crime was admissible if the jury was instructed that the evidence could be considered only in assessing a defendant\u2019s credibility and not for determining guilt); cf. Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341, 347, 101 S.Ct. 654, 66 L.Ed.2d 549 (1981) (condoning the admission of erroneously admitted eyewitness identification evidence when the jury was instructed not to consider it, regardless of the dissent\u2019s observation that such evidence \u201chas a powerful impact on juries\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"condoning the admission of erroneously admitted eyewitness identification evidence when the jury was instructed not to consider it, regardless of the dissent's observation that such evidence \"has a powerful impact on juries\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971) (holding that statements elicited from a defendant in violation of his Miranda rights could be introduced to impeach that defendant\u2019s credibility when the jury was instructed that the statements were not to be considered as evidence of his guilt); Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 559-61, 87 S.Ct. 648, 17 L.Ed.2d 606 (1967) (holding that evidence of a defendant\u2019s prior criminal convictions could be introduced for the purpose of sentence enhancement if the jury was instructed that the evidence could not be used for the purposes of determining guilt); Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 64, 74 S.Ct. 354, 98 L.Ed. 503 (1954) (holding that the admission of unlawfully seized evidence of a crime was admissible if the jury was instructed that the evidence could be considered only in assessing a defendant\u2019s credibility and not for determining guilt); cf. Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341, 347, 101 S.Ct. 654, 66 L.Ed.2d 549 (1981) (condoning the admission of erroneously admitted eyewitness identification evidence when the jury was instructed not to consider it, regardless of the dissent\u2019s observation that such evidence \u201chas a powerful impact on juries\u201d)."},"case_id":4091740,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Street is one application of the general, long-standing principle that the potential for jury misuse of evidence can often be curbed by a limiting instruction. Indeed, whenever the Supreme Court has permitted a jury to consider evidence that has the potential to be misused, e.g., to be considered in a way that would violate the defendant's constitutional rights, it has required that a proper jury instruction be given to avoid the misuse.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"449 U.S. 341, 347","parenthetical":"condoning the admission of erroneously admitted eyewitness identification evidence when the jury was instructed not to consider it, regardless of the dissent's observation that such evidence \"has a powerful impact on juries\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971) (holding that statements elicited from a defendant in violation of his Miranda rights could be introduced to impeach that defendant\u2019s credibility when the jury was instructed that the statements were not to be considered as evidence of his guilt); Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 559-61, 87 S.Ct. 648, 17 L.Ed.2d 606 (1967) (holding that evidence of a defendant\u2019s prior criminal convictions could be introduced for the purpose of sentence enhancement if the jury was instructed that the evidence could not be used for the purposes of determining guilt); Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 64, 74 S.Ct. 354, 98 L.Ed. 503 (1954) (holding that the admission of unlawfully seized evidence of a crime was admissible if the jury was instructed that the evidence could be considered only in assessing a defendant\u2019s credibility and not for determining guilt); cf. Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341, 347, 101 S.Ct. 654, 66 L.Ed.2d 549 (1981) (condoning the admission of erroneously admitted eyewitness identification evidence when the jury was instructed not to consider it, regardless of the dissent\u2019s observation that such evidence \u201chas a powerful impact on juries\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"347 U.S. 62, 64","parenthetical":"holding that the admission of unlawfully seized evidence of a crime was admissible if the jury was instructed that the evidence could be considered only in assessing a defendant's credibility and not for determining guilt","sentence":"See, e.g., Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971) (holding that statements elicited from a defendant in violation of his Miranda rights could be introduced to impeach that defendant\u2019s credibility when the jury was instructed that the statements were not to be considered as evidence of his guilt); Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 559-61, 87 S.Ct. 648, 17 L.Ed.2d 606 (1967) (holding that evidence of a defendant\u2019s prior criminal convictions could be introduced for the purpose of sentence enhancement if the jury was instructed that the evidence could not be used for the purposes of determining guilt); Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 64, 74 S.Ct. 354, 98 L.Ed. 503 (1954) (holding that the admission of unlawfully seized evidence of a crime was admissible if the jury was instructed that the evidence could be considered only in assessing a defendant\u2019s credibility and not for determining guilt); cf. Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341, 347, 101 S.Ct. 654, 66 L.Ed.2d 549 (1981) (condoning the admission of erroneously admitted eyewitness identification evidence when the jury was instructed not to consider it, regardless of the dissent\u2019s observation that such evidence \u201chas a powerful impact on juries\u201d)."},"case_id":4091740,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Street is one application of the general, long-standing principle that the potential for jury misuse of evidence can often be curbed by a limiting instruction. Indeed, whenever the Supreme Court has permitted a jury to consider evidence that has the potential to be misused, e.g., to be considered in a way that would violate the defendant's constitutional rights, it has required that a proper jury instruction be given to avoid the misuse.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"condoning the admission of erroneously admitted eyewitness identification evidence when the jury was instructed not to consider it, regardless of the dissent's observation that such evidence \"has a powerful impact on juries\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971) (holding that statements elicited from a defendant in violation of his Miranda rights could be introduced to impeach that defendant\u2019s credibility when the jury was instructed that the statements were not to be considered as evidence of his guilt); Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 559-61, 87 S.Ct. 648, 17 L.Ed.2d 606 (1967) (holding that evidence of a defendant\u2019s prior criminal convictions could be introduced for the purpose of sentence enhancement if the jury was instructed that the evidence could not be used for the purposes of determining guilt); Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 64, 74 S.Ct. 354, 98 L.Ed. 503 (1954) (holding that the admission of unlawfully seized evidence of a crime was admissible if the jury was instructed that the evidence could be considered only in assessing a defendant\u2019s credibility and not for determining guilt); cf. Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341, 347, 101 S.Ct. 654, 66 L.Ed.2d 549 (1981) (condoning the admission of erroneously admitted eyewitness identification evidence when the jury was instructed not to consider it, regardless of the dissent\u2019s observation that such evidence \u201chas a powerful impact on juries\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"347 U.S. 62, 64","parenthetical":"holding that the admission of unlawfully seized evidence of a crime was admissible if the jury was instructed that the evidence could be considered only in assessing a defendant's credibility and not for determining guilt","sentence":"See, e.g., Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971) (holding that statements elicited from a defendant in violation of his Miranda rights could be introduced to impeach that defendant\u2019s credibility when the jury was instructed that the statements were not to be considered as evidence of his guilt); Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 559-61, 87 S.Ct. 648, 17 L.Ed.2d 606 (1967) (holding that evidence of a defendant\u2019s prior criminal convictions could be introduced for the purpose of sentence enhancement if the jury was instructed that the evidence could not be used for the purposes of determining guilt); Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 64, 74 S.Ct. 354, 98 L.Ed. 503 (1954) (holding that the admission of unlawfully seized evidence of a crime was admissible if the jury was instructed that the evidence could be considered only in assessing a defendant\u2019s credibility and not for determining guilt); cf. Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341, 347, 101 S.Ct. 654, 66 L.Ed.2d 549 (1981) (condoning the admission of erroneously admitted eyewitness identification evidence when the jury was instructed not to consider it, regardless of the dissent\u2019s observation that such evidence \u201chas a powerful impact on juries\u201d)."},"case_id":4091740,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Street is one application of the general, long-standing principle that the potential for jury misuse of evidence can often be curbed by a limiting instruction. Indeed, whenever the Supreme Court has permitted a jury to consider evidence that has the potential to be misused, e.g., to be considered in a way that would violate the defendant's constitutional rights, it has required that a proper jury instruction be given to avoid the misuse.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"condoning the admission of erroneously admitted eyewitness identification evidence when the jury was instructed not to consider it, regardless of the dissent's observation that such evidence \"has a powerful impact on juries\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971) (holding that statements elicited from a defendant in violation of his Miranda rights could be introduced to impeach that defendant\u2019s credibility when the jury was instructed that the statements were not to be considered as evidence of his guilt); Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 559-61, 87 S.Ct. 648, 17 L.Ed.2d 606 (1967) (holding that evidence of a defendant\u2019s prior criminal convictions could be introduced for the purpose of sentence enhancement if the jury was instructed that the evidence could not be used for the purposes of determining guilt); Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 64, 74 S.Ct. 354, 98 L.Ed. 503 (1954) (holding that the admission of unlawfully seized evidence of a crime was admissible if the jury was instructed that the evidence could be considered only in assessing a defendant\u2019s credibility and not for determining guilt); cf. Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341, 347, 101 S.Ct. 654, 66 L.Ed.2d 549 (1981) (condoning the admission of erroneously admitted eyewitness identification evidence when the jury was instructed not to consider it, regardless of the dissent\u2019s observation that such evidence \u201chas a powerful impact on juries\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"347 U.S. 62, 64","parenthetical":"holding that the admission of unlawfully seized evidence of a crime was admissible if the jury was instructed that the evidence could be considered only in assessing a defendant's credibility and not for determining guilt","sentence":"See, e.g., Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971) (holding that statements elicited from a defendant in violation of his Miranda rights could be introduced to impeach that defendant\u2019s credibility when the jury was instructed that the statements were not to be considered as evidence of his guilt); Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 559-61, 87 S.Ct. 648, 17 L.Ed.2d 606 (1967) (holding that evidence of a defendant\u2019s prior criminal convictions could be introduced for the purpose of sentence enhancement if the jury was instructed that the evidence could not be used for the purposes of determining guilt); Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 64, 74 S.Ct. 354, 98 L.Ed. 503 (1954) (holding that the admission of unlawfully seized evidence of a crime was admissible if the jury was instructed that the evidence could be considered only in assessing a defendant\u2019s credibility and not for determining guilt); cf. Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341, 347, 101 S.Ct. 654, 66 L.Ed.2d 549 (1981) (condoning the admission of erroneously admitted eyewitness identification evidence when the jury was instructed not to consider it, regardless of the dissent\u2019s observation that such evidence \u201chas a powerful impact on juries\u201d)."},"case_id":4091740,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Street is one application of the general, long-standing principle that the potential for jury misuse of evidence can often be curbed by a limiting instruction. Indeed, whenever the Supreme Court has permitted a jury to consider evidence that has the potential to be misused, e.g., to be considered in a way that would violate the defendant's constitutional rights, it has required that a proper jury instruction be given to avoid the misuse.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"449 U.S. 341, 347","parenthetical":"condoning the admission of erroneously admitted eyewitness identification evidence when the jury was instructed not to consider it, regardless of the dissent's observation that such evidence \"has a powerful impact on juries\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971) (holding that statements elicited from a defendant in violation of his Miranda rights could be introduced to impeach that defendant\u2019s credibility when the jury was instructed that the statements were not to be considered as evidence of his guilt); Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 559-61, 87 S.Ct. 648, 17 L.Ed.2d 606 (1967) (holding that evidence of a defendant\u2019s prior criminal convictions could be introduced for the purpose of sentence enhancement if the jury was instructed that the evidence could not be used for the purposes of determining guilt); Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 64, 74 S.Ct. 354, 98 L.Ed. 503 (1954) (holding that the admission of unlawfully seized evidence of a crime was admissible if the jury was instructed that the evidence could be considered only in assessing a defendant\u2019s credibility and not for determining guilt); cf. Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341, 347, 101 S.Ct. 654, 66 L.Ed.2d 549 (1981) (condoning the admission of erroneously admitted eyewitness identification evidence when the jury was instructed not to consider it, regardless of the dissent\u2019s observation that such evidence \u201chas a powerful impact on juries\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that the admission of unlawfully seized evidence of a crime was admissible if the jury was instructed that the evidence could be considered only in assessing a defendant's credibility and not for determining guilt","sentence":"See, e.g., Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971) (holding that statements elicited from a defendant in violation of his Miranda rights could be introduced to impeach that defendant\u2019s credibility when the jury was instructed that the statements were not to be considered as evidence of his guilt); Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 559-61, 87 S.Ct. 648, 17 L.Ed.2d 606 (1967) (holding that evidence of a defendant\u2019s prior criminal convictions could be introduced for the purpose of sentence enhancement if the jury was instructed that the evidence could not be used for the purposes of determining guilt); Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 64, 74 S.Ct. 354, 98 L.Ed. 503 (1954) (holding that the admission of unlawfully seized evidence of a crime was admissible if the jury was instructed that the evidence could be considered only in assessing a defendant\u2019s credibility and not for determining guilt); cf. Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341, 347, 101 S.Ct. 654, 66 L.Ed.2d 549 (1981) (condoning the admission of erroneously admitted eyewitness identification evidence when the jury was instructed not to consider it, regardless of the dissent\u2019s observation that such evidence \u201chas a powerful impact on juries\u201d)."},"case_id":4091740,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Street is one application of the general, long-standing principle that the potential for jury misuse of evidence can often be curbed by a limiting instruction. Indeed, whenever the Supreme Court has permitted a jury to consider evidence that has the potential to be misused, e.g., to be considered in a way that would violate the defendant's constitutional rights, it has required that a proper jury instruction be given to avoid the misuse.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"condoning the admission of erroneously admitted eyewitness identification evidence when the jury was instructed not to consider it, regardless of the dissent's observation that such evidence \"has a powerful impact on juries\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971) (holding that statements elicited from a defendant in violation of his Miranda rights could be introduced to impeach that defendant\u2019s credibility when the jury was instructed that the statements were not to be considered as evidence of his guilt); Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 559-61, 87 S.Ct. 648, 17 L.Ed.2d 606 (1967) (holding that evidence of a defendant\u2019s prior criminal convictions could be introduced for the purpose of sentence enhancement if the jury was instructed that the evidence could not be used for the purposes of determining guilt); Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 64, 74 S.Ct. 354, 98 L.Ed. 503 (1954) (holding that the admission of unlawfully seized evidence of a crime was admissible if the jury was instructed that the evidence could be considered only in assessing a defendant\u2019s credibility and not for determining guilt); cf. Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341, 347, 101 S.Ct. 654, 66 L.Ed.2d 549 (1981) (condoning the admission of erroneously admitted eyewitness identification evidence when the jury was instructed not to consider it, regardless of the dissent\u2019s observation that such evidence \u201chas a powerful impact on juries\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that the admission of unlawfully seized evidence of a crime was admissible if the jury was instructed that the evidence could be considered only in assessing a defendant's credibility and not for determining guilt","sentence":"See, e.g., Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971) (holding that statements elicited from a defendant in violation of his Miranda rights could be introduced to impeach that defendant\u2019s credibility when the jury was instructed that the statements were not to be considered as evidence of his guilt); Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 559-61, 87 S.Ct. 648, 17 L.Ed.2d 606 (1967) (holding that evidence of a defendant\u2019s prior criminal convictions could be introduced for the purpose of sentence enhancement if the jury was instructed that the evidence could not be used for the purposes of determining guilt); Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 64, 74 S.Ct. 354, 98 L.Ed. 503 (1954) (holding that the admission of unlawfully seized evidence of a crime was admissible if the jury was instructed that the evidence could be considered only in assessing a defendant\u2019s credibility and not for determining guilt); cf. Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341, 347, 101 S.Ct. 654, 66 L.Ed.2d 549 (1981) (condoning the admission of erroneously admitted eyewitness identification evidence when the jury was instructed not to consider it, regardless of the dissent\u2019s observation that such evidence \u201chas a powerful impact on juries\u201d)."},"case_id":4091740,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Street is one application of the general, long-standing principle that the potential for jury misuse of evidence can often be curbed by a limiting instruction. Indeed, whenever the Supreme Court has permitted a jury to consider evidence that has the potential to be misused, e.g., to be considered in a way that would violate the defendant's constitutional rights, it has required that a proper jury instruction be given to avoid the misuse.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"condoning the admission of erroneously admitted eyewitness identification evidence when the jury was instructed not to consider it, regardless of the dissent's observation that such evidence \"has a powerful impact on juries\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971) (holding that statements elicited from a defendant in violation of his Miranda rights could be introduced to impeach that defendant\u2019s credibility when the jury was instructed that the statements were not to be considered as evidence of his guilt); Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 559-61, 87 S.Ct. 648, 17 L.Ed.2d 606 (1967) (holding that evidence of a defendant\u2019s prior criminal convictions could be introduced for the purpose of sentence enhancement if the jury was instructed that the evidence could not be used for the purposes of determining guilt); Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 64, 74 S.Ct. 354, 98 L.Ed. 503 (1954) (holding that the admission of unlawfully seized evidence of a crime was admissible if the jury was instructed that the evidence could be considered only in assessing a defendant\u2019s credibility and not for determining guilt); cf. Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341, 347, 101 S.Ct. 654, 66 L.Ed.2d 549 (1981) (condoning the admission of erroneously admitted eyewitness identification evidence when the jury was instructed not to consider it, regardless of the dissent\u2019s observation that such evidence \u201chas a powerful impact on juries\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that the admission of unlawfully seized evidence of a crime was admissible if the jury was instructed that the evidence could be considered only in assessing a defendant's credibility and not for determining guilt","sentence":"See, e.g., Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971) (holding that statements elicited from a defendant in violation of his Miranda rights could be introduced to impeach that defendant\u2019s credibility when the jury was instructed that the statements were not to be considered as evidence of his guilt); Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 559-61, 87 S.Ct. 648, 17 L.Ed.2d 606 (1967) (holding that evidence of a defendant\u2019s prior criminal convictions could be introduced for the purpose of sentence enhancement if the jury was instructed that the evidence could not be used for the purposes of determining guilt); Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 64, 74 S.Ct. 354, 98 L.Ed. 503 (1954) (holding that the admission of unlawfully seized evidence of a crime was admissible if the jury was instructed that the evidence could be considered only in assessing a defendant\u2019s credibility and not for determining guilt); cf. Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341, 347, 101 S.Ct. 654, 66 L.Ed.2d 549 (1981) (condoning the admission of erroneously admitted eyewitness identification evidence when the jury was instructed not to consider it, regardless of the dissent\u2019s observation that such evidence \u201chas a powerful impact on juries\u201d)."},"case_id":4091740,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Street is one application of the general, long-standing principle that the potential for jury misuse of evidence can often be curbed by a limiting instruction. Indeed, whenever the Supreme Court has permitted a jury to consider evidence that has the potential to be misused, e.g., to be considered in a way that would violate the defendant's constitutional rights, it has required that a proper jury instruction be given to avoid the misuse.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"449 U.S. 341, 347","parenthetical":"condoning the admission of erroneously admitted eyewitness identification evidence when the jury was instructed not to consider it, regardless of the dissent's observation that such evidence \"has a powerful impact on juries\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971) (holding that statements elicited from a defendant in violation of his Miranda rights could be introduced to impeach that defendant\u2019s credibility when the jury was instructed that the statements were not to be considered as evidence of his guilt); Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 559-61, 87 S.Ct. 648, 17 L.Ed.2d 606 (1967) (holding that evidence of a defendant\u2019s prior criminal convictions could be introduced for the purpose of sentence enhancement if the jury was instructed that the evidence could not be used for the purposes of determining guilt); Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 64, 74 S.Ct. 354, 98 L.Ed. 503 (1954) (holding that the admission of unlawfully seized evidence of a crime was admissible if the jury was instructed that the evidence could be considered only in assessing a defendant\u2019s credibility and not for determining guilt); cf. Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341, 347, 101 S.Ct. 654, 66 L.Ed.2d 549 (1981) (condoning the admission of erroneously admitted eyewitness identification evidence when the jury was instructed not to consider it, regardless of the dissent\u2019s observation that such evidence \u201chas a powerful impact on juries\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that the admission of unlawfully seized evidence of a crime was admissible if the jury was instructed that the evidence could be considered only in assessing a defendant's credibility and not for determining guilt","sentence":"See, e.g., Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971) (holding that statements elicited from a defendant in violation of his Miranda rights could be introduced to impeach that defendant\u2019s credibility when the jury was instructed that the statements were not to be considered as evidence of his guilt); Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 559-61, 87 S.Ct. 648, 17 L.Ed.2d 606 (1967) (holding that evidence of a defendant\u2019s prior criminal convictions could be introduced for the purpose of sentence enhancement if the jury was instructed that the evidence could not be used for the purposes of determining guilt); Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 64, 74 S.Ct. 354, 98 L.Ed. 503 (1954) (holding that the admission of unlawfully seized evidence of a crime was admissible if the jury was instructed that the evidence could be considered only in assessing a defendant\u2019s credibility and not for determining guilt); cf. Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341, 347, 101 S.Ct. 654, 66 L.Ed.2d 549 (1981) (condoning the admission of erroneously admitted eyewitness identification evidence when the jury was instructed not to consider it, regardless of the dissent\u2019s observation that such evidence \u201chas a powerful impact on juries\u201d)."},"case_id":4091740,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Street is one application of the general, long-standing principle that the potential for jury misuse of evidence can often be curbed by a limiting instruction. Indeed, whenever the Supreme Court has permitted a jury to consider evidence that has the potential to be misused, e.g., to be considered in a way that would violate the defendant's constitutional rights, it has required that a proper jury instruction be given to avoid the misuse.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"condoning the admission of erroneously admitted eyewitness identification evidence when the jury was instructed not to consider it, regardless of the dissent's observation that such evidence \"has a powerful impact on juries\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971) (holding that statements elicited from a defendant in violation of his Miranda rights could be introduced to impeach that defendant\u2019s credibility when the jury was instructed that the statements were not to be considered as evidence of his guilt); Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 559-61, 87 S.Ct. 648, 17 L.Ed.2d 606 (1967) (holding that evidence of a defendant\u2019s prior criminal convictions could be introduced for the purpose of sentence enhancement if the jury was instructed that the evidence could not be used for the purposes of determining guilt); Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 64, 74 S.Ct. 354, 98 L.Ed. 503 (1954) (holding that the admission of unlawfully seized evidence of a crime was admissible if the jury was instructed that the evidence could be considered only in assessing a defendant\u2019s credibility and not for determining guilt); cf. Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341, 347, 101 S.Ct. 654, 66 L.Ed.2d 549 (1981) (condoning the admission of erroneously admitted eyewitness identification evidence when the jury was instructed not to consider it, regardless of the dissent\u2019s observation that such evidence \u201chas a powerful impact on juries\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that the admission of unlawfully seized evidence of a crime was admissible if the jury was instructed that the evidence could be considered only in assessing a defendant's credibility and not for determining guilt","sentence":"See, e.g., Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971) (holding that statements elicited from a defendant in violation of his Miranda rights could be introduced to impeach that defendant\u2019s credibility when the jury was instructed that the statements were not to be considered as evidence of his guilt); Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 559-61, 87 S.Ct. 648, 17 L.Ed.2d 606 (1967) (holding that evidence of a defendant\u2019s prior criminal convictions could be introduced for the purpose of sentence enhancement if the jury was instructed that the evidence could not be used for the purposes of determining guilt); Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 64, 74 S.Ct. 354, 98 L.Ed. 503 (1954) (holding that the admission of unlawfully seized evidence of a crime was admissible if the jury was instructed that the evidence could be considered only in assessing a defendant\u2019s credibility and not for determining guilt); cf. Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341, 347, 101 S.Ct. 654, 66 L.Ed.2d 549 (1981) (condoning the admission of erroneously admitted eyewitness identification evidence when the jury was instructed not to consider it, regardless of the dissent\u2019s observation that such evidence \u201chas a powerful impact on juries\u201d)."},"case_id":4091740,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Street is one application of the general, long-standing principle that the potential for jury misuse of evidence can often be curbed by a limiting instruction. Indeed, whenever the Supreme Court has permitted a jury to consider evidence that has the potential to be misused, e.g., to be considered in a way that would violate the defendant's constitutional rights, it has required that a proper jury instruction be given to avoid the misuse.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"condoning the admission of erroneously admitted eyewitness identification evidence when the jury was instructed not to consider it, regardless of the dissent's observation that such evidence \"has a powerful impact on juries\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971) (holding that statements elicited from a defendant in violation of his Miranda rights could be introduced to impeach that defendant\u2019s credibility when the jury was instructed that the statements were not to be considered as evidence of his guilt); Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 559-61, 87 S.Ct. 648, 17 L.Ed.2d 606 (1967) (holding that evidence of a defendant\u2019s prior criminal convictions could be introduced for the purpose of sentence enhancement if the jury was instructed that the evidence could not be used for the purposes of determining guilt); Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 64, 74 S.Ct. 354, 98 L.Ed. 503 (1954) (holding that the admission of unlawfully seized evidence of a crime was admissible if the jury was instructed that the evidence could be considered only in assessing a defendant\u2019s credibility and not for determining guilt); cf. Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341, 347, 101 S.Ct. 654, 66 L.Ed.2d 549 (1981) (condoning the admission of erroneously admitted eyewitness identification evidence when the jury was instructed not to consider it, regardless of the dissent\u2019s observation that such evidence \u201chas a powerful impact on juries\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that the admission of unlawfully seized evidence of a crime was admissible if the jury was instructed that the evidence could be considered only in assessing a defendant's credibility and not for determining guilt","sentence":"See, e.g., Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971) (holding that statements elicited from a defendant in violation of his Miranda rights could be introduced to impeach that defendant\u2019s credibility when the jury was instructed that the statements were not to be considered as evidence of his guilt); Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 559-61, 87 S.Ct. 648, 17 L.Ed.2d 606 (1967) (holding that evidence of a defendant\u2019s prior criminal convictions could be introduced for the purpose of sentence enhancement if the jury was instructed that the evidence could not be used for the purposes of determining guilt); Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 64, 74 S.Ct. 354, 98 L.Ed. 503 (1954) (holding that the admission of unlawfully seized evidence of a crime was admissible if the jury was instructed that the evidence could be considered only in assessing a defendant\u2019s credibility and not for determining guilt); cf. Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341, 347, 101 S.Ct. 654, 66 L.Ed.2d 549 (1981) (condoning the admission of erroneously admitted eyewitness identification evidence when the jury was instructed not to consider it, regardless of the dissent\u2019s observation that such evidence \u201chas a powerful impact on juries\u201d)."},"case_id":4091740,"label":"b"}
{"context":"We generally only accept a noncompliant brief if it does not prejudice the opposing party. Prejudice does not exist, however, when the disputed issues are obvious and the opposing party has the opportunity to address all relevant issues in the case.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"allowing a pro se appellant to proceed where the opponent could not claim that \"it was not aware of the issues in this appeal or that it was hampered in its ability to respond\"","sentence":"Price v. Digital Equip. Corp., 846 F.2d 1026, 1028 (5th Cir.1988) (allowing a technically noncompliant pro se appeal to go forward when there was only one issue on appeal); see also Fed. Sav. & Loan Ins. Co. v. Haralson, 813 F.2d 370, 373 n. 3 (11th Cir.1987) (allowing a pro se appellant to proceed where the opponent could not claim that \u201cit was not aware of the issues in this appeal or that it was hampered in its ability to respond\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"846 F.2d 1026, 1028","parenthetical":"allowing a technically noncompliant pro se appeal to go forward when there was only one issue on appeal","sentence":"Price v. Digital Equip. Corp., 846 F.2d 1026, 1028 (5th Cir.1988) (allowing a technically noncompliant pro se appeal to go forward when there was only one issue on appeal); see also Fed. Sav. & Loan Ins. Co. v. Haralson, 813 F.2d 370, 373 n. 3 (11th Cir.1987) (allowing a pro se appellant to proceed where the opponent could not claim that \u201cit was not aware of the issues in this appeal or that it was hampered in its ability to respond\u201d)."},"case_id":3166896,"label":"b"}
{"context":"After considering the three approaches as to what constitutes a \"personal injury tort claim,\" this Court concludes that the middle ground is the correct approach. Using this approach, the Court finds that the Plaintiffs' defamation claims constitute personal injury tort claims within the meaning of Section 157(b)(5).","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"288 B.R. 269, 279, 286","parenthetical":"holding that a defamation claim is a personal injury tort claim","sentence":"See Control Center, L.L.C. v. Lauer, 288 B.R. 269, 279, 286 (M.D.Fla.2002) (holding that a defamation claim is a personal injury tort claim); Hansen, 164 B.R. at 486 (holding that a defamation claim is a personal injury tort claim); Smith, 389 B.R. at 908 (holding that a libel claim is a personal injury tort claim); Passialis, 292 B.R. at 352 (holding that a slander claim is a personal injury tort claim)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that a libel claim is not a personal injury tort claim","sentence":"But see Mitan v. Davis (In re Davis), 334 B.R. 874, 878 n. 2 (Bankr.W.D.Ky.2005) (holding that a libel claim is not a personal injury tort claim)."},"case_id":5897449,"label":"a"}
{"context":"After considering the three approaches as to what constitutes a \"personal injury tort claim,\" this Court concludes that the middle ground is the correct approach. Using this approach, the Court finds that the Plaintiffs' defamation claims constitute personal injury tort claims within the meaning of Section 157(b)(5).","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that a libel claim is not a personal injury tort claim","sentence":"But see Mitan v. Davis (In re Davis), 334 B.R. 874, 878 n. 2 (Bankr.W.D.Ky.2005) (holding that a libel claim is not a personal injury tort claim)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"164 B.R. 486, 486","parenthetical":"holding that a defamation claim is a personal injury tort claim","sentence":"See Control Center, L.L.C. v. Lauer, 288 B.R. 269, 279, 286 (M.D.Fla.2002) (holding that a defamation claim is a personal injury tort claim); Hansen, 164 B.R. at 486 (holding that a defamation claim is a personal injury tort claim); Smith, 389 B.R. at 908 (holding that a libel claim is a personal injury tort claim); Passialis, 292 B.R. at 352 (holding that a slander claim is a personal injury tort claim)."},"case_id":5897449,"label":"b"}
{"context":"After considering the three approaches as to what constitutes a \"personal injury tort claim,\" this Court concludes that the middle ground is the correct approach. Using this approach, the Court finds that the Plaintiffs' defamation claims constitute personal injury tort claims within the meaning of Section 157(b)(5).","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that a libel claim is not a personal injury tort claim","sentence":"But see Mitan v. Davis (In re Davis), 334 B.R. 874, 878 n. 2 (Bankr.W.D.Ky.2005) (holding that a libel claim is not a personal injury tort claim)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"389 B.R. 908, 908","parenthetical":"holding that a libel claim is a personal injury tort claim","sentence":"See Control Center, L.L.C. v. Lauer, 288 B.R. 269, 279, 286 (M.D.Fla.2002) (holding that a defamation claim is a personal injury tort claim); Hansen, 164 B.R. at 486 (holding that a defamation claim is a personal injury tort claim); Smith, 389 B.R. at 908 (holding that a libel claim is a personal injury tort claim); Passialis, 292 B.R. at 352 (holding that a slander claim is a personal injury tort claim)."},"case_id":5897449,"label":"b"}
{"context":"After considering the three approaches as to what constitutes a \"personal injury tort claim,\" this Court concludes that the middle ground is the correct approach. Using this approach, the Court finds that the Plaintiffs' defamation claims constitute personal injury tort claims within the meaning of Section 157(b)(5).","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that a libel claim is not a personal injury tort claim","sentence":"But see Mitan v. Davis (In re Davis), 334 B.R. 874, 878 n. 2 (Bankr.W.D.Ky.2005) (holding that a libel claim is not a personal injury tort claim)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"292 B.R. 352, 352","parenthetical":"holding that a slander claim is a personal injury tort claim","sentence":"See Control Center, L.L.C. v. Lauer, 288 B.R. 269, 279, 286 (M.D.Fla.2002) (holding that a defamation claim is a personal injury tort claim); Hansen, 164 B.R. at 486 (holding that a defamation claim is a personal injury tort claim); Smith, 389 B.R. at 908 (holding that a libel claim is a personal injury tort claim); Passialis, 292 B.R. at 352 (holding that a slander claim is a personal injury tort claim)."},"case_id":5897449,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In particular, the court has subjected jury instructions plagued by constitutional error to harmless-error analysis.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"erroneous burden of proof instruction not subject to harmless-error analysis","sentence":"Clark ] supra, 478 U.S. [570] at 581-582, 106 S.Ct. [3101] at 3107-3108 [92 L.Ed.2d 460 (1986)] (jury instruction containing an erroneous rebuttable presumption subject to harmless-error analysis); but see Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, -, 113 S.Ct. 2078, 2082, 124 L.Ed.2d 182 (1993) (erroneous burden of proof instruction not subject to harmless-error analysis)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"500 U.S. 391, 402","parenthetical":"taint of an unconstitutional burden-shifting jury instruction subject to harmless-error analysis","sentence":"See, e.g., Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391, 402, 111 S.Ct. 1884, 1892, 114 L.Ed.2d 432 (1991) (taint of an unconstitutional burden-shifting jury instruction subject to harmless-error analysis); Carella v. California, 491 U.S. 263, 266, 109 S.Ct. 2419, 2421, 105 L.Ed.2d 218 (1989) (per curiam) (jury instruction containing an erroneous mandatory presumption subject to harmless-error analysis); Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 502-04, 107 S.Ct. 1918, 1921-23, 95 L.Ed.2d 439 (1987) (jury instruction misstating an element of an offense subject to harmless-error analysis); Rose [v."},"case_id":7825715,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In particular, the court has subjected jury instructions plagued by constitutional error to harmless-error analysis.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"113 S.Ct. 2078, 2082","parenthetical":"erroneous burden of proof instruction not subject to harmless-error analysis","sentence":"Clark ] supra, 478 U.S. [570] at 581-582, 106 S.Ct. [3101] at 3107-3108 [92 L.Ed.2d 460 (1986)] (jury instruction containing an erroneous rebuttable presumption subject to harmless-error analysis); but see Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, -, 113 S.Ct. 2078, 2082, 124 L.Ed.2d 182 (1993) (erroneous burden of proof instruction not subject to harmless-error analysis)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"500 U.S. 391, 402","parenthetical":"taint of an unconstitutional burden-shifting jury instruction subject to harmless-error analysis","sentence":"See, e.g., Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391, 402, 111 S.Ct. 1884, 1892, 114 L.Ed.2d 432 (1991) (taint of an unconstitutional burden-shifting jury instruction subject to harmless-error analysis); Carella v. California, 491 U.S. 263, 266, 109 S.Ct. 2419, 2421, 105 L.Ed.2d 218 (1989) (per curiam) (jury instruction containing an erroneous mandatory presumption subject to harmless-error analysis); Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 502-04, 107 S.Ct. 1918, 1921-23, 95 L.Ed.2d 439 (1987) (jury instruction misstating an element of an offense subject to harmless-error analysis); Rose [v."},"case_id":7825715,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In particular, the court has subjected jury instructions plagued by constitutional error to harmless-error analysis.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"erroneous burden of proof instruction not subject to harmless-error analysis","sentence":"Clark ] supra, 478 U.S. [570] at 581-582, 106 S.Ct. [3101] at 3107-3108 [92 L.Ed.2d 460 (1986)] (jury instruction containing an erroneous rebuttable presumption subject to harmless-error analysis); but see Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, -, 113 S.Ct. 2078, 2082, 124 L.Ed.2d 182 (1993) (erroneous burden of proof instruction not subject to harmless-error analysis)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"500 U.S. 391, 402","parenthetical":"taint of an unconstitutional burden-shifting jury instruction subject to harmless-error analysis","sentence":"See, e.g., Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391, 402, 111 S.Ct. 1884, 1892, 114 L.Ed.2d 432 (1991) (taint of an unconstitutional burden-shifting jury instruction subject to harmless-error analysis); Carella v. California, 491 U.S. 263, 266, 109 S.Ct. 2419, 2421, 105 L.Ed.2d 218 (1989) (per curiam) (jury instruction containing an erroneous mandatory presumption subject to harmless-error analysis); Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 502-04, 107 S.Ct. 1918, 1921-23, 95 L.Ed.2d 439 (1987) (jury instruction misstating an element of an offense subject to harmless-error analysis); Rose [v."},"case_id":7825715,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In particular, the court has subjected jury instructions plagued by constitutional error to harmless-error analysis.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"erroneous burden of proof instruction not subject to harmless-error analysis","sentence":"Clark ] supra, 478 U.S. [570] at 581-582, 106 S.Ct. [3101] at 3107-3108 [92 L.Ed.2d 460 (1986)] (jury instruction containing an erroneous rebuttable presumption subject to harmless-error analysis); but see Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, -, 113 S.Ct. 2078, 2082, 124 L.Ed.2d 182 (1993) (erroneous burden of proof instruction not subject to harmless-error analysis)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"111 S.Ct. 1884, 1892","parenthetical":"taint of an unconstitutional burden-shifting jury instruction subject to harmless-error analysis","sentence":"See, e.g., Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391, 402, 111 S.Ct. 1884, 1892, 114 L.Ed.2d 432 (1991) (taint of an unconstitutional burden-shifting jury instruction subject to harmless-error analysis); Carella v. California, 491 U.S. 263, 266, 109 S.Ct. 2419, 2421, 105 L.Ed.2d 218 (1989) (per curiam) (jury instruction containing an erroneous mandatory presumption subject to harmless-error analysis); Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 502-04, 107 S.Ct. 1918, 1921-23, 95 L.Ed.2d 439 (1987) (jury instruction misstating an element of an offense subject to harmless-error analysis); Rose [v."},"case_id":7825715,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In particular, the court has subjected jury instructions plagued by constitutional error to harmless-error analysis.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"113 S.Ct. 2078, 2082","parenthetical":"erroneous burden of proof instruction not subject to harmless-error analysis","sentence":"Clark ] supra, 478 U.S. [570] at 581-582, 106 S.Ct. [3101] at 3107-3108 [92 L.Ed.2d 460 (1986)] (jury instruction containing an erroneous rebuttable presumption subject to harmless-error analysis); but see Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, -, 113 S.Ct. 2078, 2082, 124 L.Ed.2d 182 (1993) (erroneous burden of proof instruction not subject to harmless-error analysis)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"111 S.Ct. 1884, 1892","parenthetical":"taint of an unconstitutional burden-shifting jury instruction subject to harmless-error analysis","sentence":"See, e.g., Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391, 402, 111 S.Ct. 1884, 1892, 114 L.Ed.2d 432 (1991) (taint of an unconstitutional burden-shifting jury instruction subject to harmless-error analysis); Carella v. California, 491 U.S. 263, 266, 109 S.Ct. 2419, 2421, 105 L.Ed.2d 218 (1989) (per curiam) (jury instruction containing an erroneous mandatory presumption subject to harmless-error analysis); Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 502-04, 107 S.Ct. 1918, 1921-23, 95 L.Ed.2d 439 (1987) (jury instruction misstating an element of an offense subject to harmless-error analysis); Rose [v."},"case_id":7825715,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In particular, the court has subjected jury instructions plagued by constitutional error to harmless-error analysis.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"erroneous burden of proof instruction not subject to harmless-error analysis","sentence":"Clark ] supra, 478 U.S. [570] at 581-582, 106 S.Ct. [3101] at 3107-3108 [92 L.Ed.2d 460 (1986)] (jury instruction containing an erroneous rebuttable presumption subject to harmless-error analysis); but see Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, -, 113 S.Ct. 2078, 2082, 124 L.Ed.2d 182 (1993) (erroneous burden of proof instruction not subject to harmless-error analysis)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"111 S.Ct. 1884, 1892","parenthetical":"taint of an unconstitutional burden-shifting jury instruction subject to harmless-error analysis","sentence":"See, e.g., Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391, 402, 111 S.Ct. 1884, 1892, 114 L.Ed.2d 432 (1991) (taint of an unconstitutional burden-shifting jury instruction subject to harmless-error analysis); Carella v. California, 491 U.S. 263, 266, 109 S.Ct. 2419, 2421, 105 L.Ed.2d 218 (1989) (per curiam) (jury instruction containing an erroneous mandatory presumption subject to harmless-error analysis); Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 502-04, 107 S.Ct. 1918, 1921-23, 95 L.Ed.2d 439 (1987) (jury instruction misstating an element of an offense subject to harmless-error analysis); Rose [v."},"case_id":7825715,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In particular, the court has subjected jury instructions plagued by constitutional error to harmless-error analysis.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"taint of an unconstitutional burden-shifting jury instruction subject to harmless-error analysis","sentence":"See, e.g., Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391, 402, 111 S.Ct. 1884, 1892, 114 L.Ed.2d 432 (1991) (taint of an unconstitutional burden-shifting jury instruction subject to harmless-error analysis); Carella v. California, 491 U.S. 263, 266, 109 S.Ct. 2419, 2421, 105 L.Ed.2d 218 (1989) (per curiam) (jury instruction containing an erroneous mandatory presumption subject to harmless-error analysis); Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 502-04, 107 S.Ct. 1918, 1921-23, 95 L.Ed.2d 439 (1987) (jury instruction misstating an element of an offense subject to harmless-error analysis); Rose [v."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"erroneous burden of proof instruction not subject to harmless-error analysis","sentence":"Clark ] supra, 478 U.S. [570] at 581-582, 106 S.Ct. [3101] at 3107-3108 [92 L.Ed.2d 460 (1986)] (jury instruction containing an erroneous rebuttable presumption subject to harmless-error analysis); but see Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, -, 113 S.Ct. 2078, 2082, 124 L.Ed.2d 182 (1993) (erroneous burden of proof instruction not subject to harmless-error analysis)."},"case_id":7825715,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In particular, the court has subjected jury instructions plagued by constitutional error to harmless-error analysis.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"113 S.Ct. 2078, 2082","parenthetical":"erroneous burden of proof instruction not subject to harmless-error analysis","sentence":"Clark ] supra, 478 U.S. [570] at 581-582, 106 S.Ct. [3101] at 3107-3108 [92 L.Ed.2d 460 (1986)] (jury instruction containing an erroneous rebuttable presumption subject to harmless-error analysis); but see Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, -, 113 S.Ct. 2078, 2082, 124 L.Ed.2d 182 (1993) (erroneous burden of proof instruction not subject to harmless-error analysis)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"taint of an unconstitutional burden-shifting jury instruction subject to harmless-error analysis","sentence":"See, e.g., Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391, 402, 111 S.Ct. 1884, 1892, 114 L.Ed.2d 432 (1991) (taint of an unconstitutional burden-shifting jury instruction subject to harmless-error analysis); Carella v. California, 491 U.S. 263, 266, 109 S.Ct. 2419, 2421, 105 L.Ed.2d 218 (1989) (per curiam) (jury instruction containing an erroneous mandatory presumption subject to harmless-error analysis); Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 502-04, 107 S.Ct. 1918, 1921-23, 95 L.Ed.2d 439 (1987) (jury instruction misstating an element of an offense subject to harmless-error analysis); Rose [v."},"case_id":7825715,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In particular, the court has subjected jury instructions plagued by constitutional error to harmless-error analysis.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"taint of an unconstitutional burden-shifting jury instruction subject to harmless-error analysis","sentence":"See, e.g., Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391, 402, 111 S.Ct. 1884, 1892, 114 L.Ed.2d 432 (1991) (taint of an unconstitutional burden-shifting jury instruction subject to harmless-error analysis); Carella v. California, 491 U.S. 263, 266, 109 S.Ct. 2419, 2421, 105 L.Ed.2d 218 (1989) (per curiam) (jury instruction containing an erroneous mandatory presumption subject to harmless-error analysis); Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 502-04, 107 S.Ct. 1918, 1921-23, 95 L.Ed.2d 439 (1987) (jury instruction misstating an element of an offense subject to harmless-error analysis); Rose [v."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"erroneous burden of proof instruction not subject to harmless-error analysis","sentence":"Clark ] supra, 478 U.S. [570] at 581-582, 106 S.Ct. [3101] at 3107-3108 [92 L.Ed.2d 460 (1986)] (jury instruction containing an erroneous rebuttable presumption subject to harmless-error analysis); but see Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, -, 113 S.Ct. 2078, 2082, 124 L.Ed.2d 182 (1993) (erroneous burden of proof instruction not subject to harmless-error analysis)."},"case_id":7825715,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In particular, the court has subjected jury instructions plagued by constitutional error to harmless-error analysis.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"481 U.S. 497, 502-04","parenthetical":"jury instruction misstating an element of an offense subject to harmless-error analysis","sentence":"See, e.g., Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391, 402, 111 S.Ct. 1884, 1892, 114 L.Ed.2d 432 (1991) (taint of an unconstitutional burden-shifting jury instruction subject to harmless-error analysis); Carella v. California, 491 U.S. 263, 266, 109 S.Ct. 2419, 2421, 105 L.Ed.2d 218 (1989) (per curiam) (jury instruction containing an erroneous mandatory presumption subject to harmless-error analysis); Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 502-04, 107 S.Ct. 1918, 1921-23, 95 L.Ed.2d 439 (1987) (jury instruction misstating an element of an offense subject to harmless-error analysis); Rose [v."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"erroneous burden of proof instruction not subject to harmless-error analysis","sentence":"Clark ] supra, 478 U.S. [570] at 581-582, 106 S.Ct. [3101] at 3107-3108 [92 L.Ed.2d 460 (1986)] (jury instruction containing an erroneous rebuttable presumption subject to harmless-error analysis); but see Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, -, 113 S.Ct. 2078, 2082, 124 L.Ed.2d 182 (1993) (erroneous burden of proof instruction not subject to harmless-error analysis)."},"case_id":7825715,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In particular, the court has subjected jury instructions plagued by constitutional error to harmless-error analysis.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"481 U.S. 497, 502-04","parenthetical":"jury instruction misstating an element of an offense subject to harmless-error analysis","sentence":"See, e.g., Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391, 402, 111 S.Ct. 1884, 1892, 114 L.Ed.2d 432 (1991) (taint of an unconstitutional burden-shifting jury instruction subject to harmless-error analysis); Carella v. California, 491 U.S. 263, 266, 109 S.Ct. 2419, 2421, 105 L.Ed.2d 218 (1989) (per curiam) (jury instruction containing an erroneous mandatory presumption subject to harmless-error analysis); Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 502-04, 107 S.Ct. 1918, 1921-23, 95 L.Ed.2d 439 (1987) (jury instruction misstating an element of an offense subject to harmless-error analysis); Rose [v."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"113 S.Ct. 2078, 2082","parenthetical":"erroneous burden of proof instruction not subject to harmless-error analysis","sentence":"Clark ] supra, 478 U.S. [570] at 581-582, 106 S.Ct. [3101] at 3107-3108 [92 L.Ed.2d 460 (1986)] (jury instruction containing an erroneous rebuttable presumption subject to harmless-error analysis); but see Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, -, 113 S.Ct. 2078, 2082, 124 L.Ed.2d 182 (1993) (erroneous burden of proof instruction not subject to harmless-error analysis)."},"case_id":7825715,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In particular, the court has subjected jury instructions plagued by constitutional error to harmless-error analysis.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"erroneous burden of proof instruction not subject to harmless-error analysis","sentence":"Clark ] supra, 478 U.S. [570] at 581-582, 106 S.Ct. [3101] at 3107-3108 [92 L.Ed.2d 460 (1986)] (jury instruction containing an erroneous rebuttable presumption subject to harmless-error analysis); but see Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, -, 113 S.Ct. 2078, 2082, 124 L.Ed.2d 182 (1993) (erroneous burden of proof instruction not subject to harmless-error analysis)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"481 U.S. 497, 502-04","parenthetical":"jury instruction misstating an element of an offense subject to harmless-error analysis","sentence":"See, e.g., Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391, 402, 111 S.Ct. 1884, 1892, 114 L.Ed.2d 432 (1991) (taint of an unconstitutional burden-shifting jury instruction subject to harmless-error analysis); Carella v. California, 491 U.S. 263, 266, 109 S.Ct. 2419, 2421, 105 L.Ed.2d 218 (1989) (per curiam) (jury instruction containing an erroneous mandatory presumption subject to harmless-error analysis); Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 502-04, 107 S.Ct. 1918, 1921-23, 95 L.Ed.2d 439 (1987) (jury instruction misstating an element of an offense subject to harmless-error analysis); Rose [v."},"case_id":7825715,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In particular, the court has subjected jury instructions plagued by constitutional error to harmless-error analysis.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"107 S.Ct. 1918, 1921-23","parenthetical":"jury instruction misstating an element of an offense subject to harmless-error analysis","sentence":"See, e.g., Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391, 402, 111 S.Ct. 1884, 1892, 114 L.Ed.2d 432 (1991) (taint of an unconstitutional burden-shifting jury instruction subject to harmless-error analysis); Carella v. California, 491 U.S. 263, 266, 109 S.Ct. 2419, 2421, 105 L.Ed.2d 218 (1989) (per curiam) (jury instruction containing an erroneous mandatory presumption subject to harmless-error analysis); Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 502-04, 107 S.Ct. 1918, 1921-23, 95 L.Ed.2d 439 (1987) (jury instruction misstating an element of an offense subject to harmless-error analysis); Rose [v."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"erroneous burden of proof instruction not subject to harmless-error analysis","sentence":"Clark ] supra, 478 U.S. [570] at 581-582, 106 S.Ct. [3101] at 3107-3108 [92 L.Ed.2d 460 (1986)] (jury instruction containing an erroneous rebuttable presumption subject to harmless-error analysis); but see Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, -, 113 S.Ct. 2078, 2082, 124 L.Ed.2d 182 (1993) (erroneous burden of proof instruction not subject to harmless-error analysis)."},"case_id":7825715,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In particular, the court has subjected jury instructions plagued by constitutional error to harmless-error analysis.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"113 S.Ct. 2078, 2082","parenthetical":"erroneous burden of proof instruction not subject to harmless-error analysis","sentence":"Clark ] supra, 478 U.S. [570] at 581-582, 106 S.Ct. [3101] at 3107-3108 [92 L.Ed.2d 460 (1986)] (jury instruction containing an erroneous rebuttable presumption subject to harmless-error analysis); but see Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, -, 113 S.Ct. 2078, 2082, 124 L.Ed.2d 182 (1993) (erroneous burden of proof instruction not subject to harmless-error analysis)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"107 S.Ct. 1918, 1921-23","parenthetical":"jury instruction misstating an element of an offense subject to harmless-error analysis","sentence":"See, e.g., Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391, 402, 111 S.Ct. 1884, 1892, 114 L.Ed.2d 432 (1991) (taint of an unconstitutional burden-shifting jury instruction subject to harmless-error analysis); Carella v. California, 491 U.S. 263, 266, 109 S.Ct. 2419, 2421, 105 L.Ed.2d 218 (1989) (per curiam) (jury instruction containing an erroneous mandatory presumption subject to harmless-error analysis); Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 502-04, 107 S.Ct. 1918, 1921-23, 95 L.Ed.2d 439 (1987) (jury instruction misstating an element of an offense subject to harmless-error analysis); Rose [v."},"case_id":7825715,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In particular, the court has subjected jury instructions plagued by constitutional error to harmless-error analysis.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"107 S.Ct. 1918, 1921-23","parenthetical":"jury instruction misstating an element of an offense subject to harmless-error analysis","sentence":"See, e.g., Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391, 402, 111 S.Ct. 1884, 1892, 114 L.Ed.2d 432 (1991) (taint of an unconstitutional burden-shifting jury instruction subject to harmless-error analysis); Carella v. California, 491 U.S. 263, 266, 109 S.Ct. 2419, 2421, 105 L.Ed.2d 218 (1989) (per curiam) (jury instruction containing an erroneous mandatory presumption subject to harmless-error analysis); Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 502-04, 107 S.Ct. 1918, 1921-23, 95 L.Ed.2d 439 (1987) (jury instruction misstating an element of an offense subject to harmless-error analysis); Rose [v."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"erroneous burden of proof instruction not subject to harmless-error analysis","sentence":"Clark ] supra, 478 U.S. [570] at 581-582, 106 S.Ct. [3101] at 3107-3108 [92 L.Ed.2d 460 (1986)] (jury instruction containing an erroneous rebuttable presumption subject to harmless-error analysis); but see Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, -, 113 S.Ct. 2078, 2082, 124 L.Ed.2d 182 (1993) (erroneous burden of proof instruction not subject to harmless-error analysis)."},"case_id":7825715,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In particular, the court has subjected jury instructions plagued by constitutional error to harmless-error analysis.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"erroneous burden of proof instruction not subject to harmless-error analysis","sentence":"Clark ] supra, 478 U.S. [570] at 581-582, 106 S.Ct. [3101] at 3107-3108 [92 L.Ed.2d 460 (1986)] (jury instruction containing an erroneous rebuttable presumption subject to harmless-error analysis); but see Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, -, 113 S.Ct. 2078, 2082, 124 L.Ed.2d 182 (1993) (erroneous burden of proof instruction not subject to harmless-error analysis)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"jury instruction misstating an element of an offense subject to harmless-error analysis","sentence":"See, e.g., Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391, 402, 111 S.Ct. 1884, 1892, 114 L.Ed.2d 432 (1991) (taint of an unconstitutional burden-shifting jury instruction subject to harmless-error analysis); Carella v. California, 491 U.S. 263, 266, 109 S.Ct. 2419, 2421, 105 L.Ed.2d 218 (1989) (per curiam) (jury instruction containing an erroneous mandatory presumption subject to harmless-error analysis); Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 502-04, 107 S.Ct. 1918, 1921-23, 95 L.Ed.2d 439 (1987) (jury instruction misstating an element of an offense subject to harmless-error analysis); Rose [v."},"case_id":7825715,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In particular, the court has subjected jury instructions plagued by constitutional error to harmless-error analysis.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"113 S.Ct. 2078, 2082","parenthetical":"erroneous burden of proof instruction not subject to harmless-error analysis","sentence":"Clark ] supra, 478 U.S. [570] at 581-582, 106 S.Ct. [3101] at 3107-3108 [92 L.Ed.2d 460 (1986)] (jury instruction containing an erroneous rebuttable presumption subject to harmless-error analysis); but see Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, -, 113 S.Ct. 2078, 2082, 124 L.Ed.2d 182 (1993) (erroneous burden of proof instruction not subject to harmless-error analysis)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"jury instruction misstating an element of an offense subject to harmless-error analysis","sentence":"See, e.g., Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391, 402, 111 S.Ct. 1884, 1892, 114 L.Ed.2d 432 (1991) (taint of an unconstitutional burden-shifting jury instruction subject to harmless-error analysis); Carella v. California, 491 U.S. 263, 266, 109 S.Ct. 2419, 2421, 105 L.Ed.2d 218 (1989) (per curiam) (jury instruction containing an erroneous mandatory presumption subject to harmless-error analysis); Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 502-04, 107 S.Ct. 1918, 1921-23, 95 L.Ed.2d 439 (1987) (jury instruction misstating an element of an offense subject to harmless-error analysis); Rose [v."},"case_id":7825715,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In particular, the court has subjected jury instructions plagued by constitutional error to harmless-error analysis.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"erroneous burden of proof instruction not subject to harmless-error analysis","sentence":"Clark ] supra, 478 U.S. [570] at 581-582, 106 S.Ct. [3101] at 3107-3108 [92 L.Ed.2d 460 (1986)] (jury instruction containing an erroneous rebuttable presumption subject to harmless-error analysis); but see Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, -, 113 S.Ct. 2078, 2082, 124 L.Ed.2d 182 (1993) (erroneous burden of proof instruction not subject to harmless-error analysis)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"jury instruction misstating an element of an offense subject to harmless-error analysis","sentence":"See, e.g., Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391, 402, 111 S.Ct. 1884, 1892, 114 L.Ed.2d 432 (1991) (taint of an unconstitutional burden-shifting jury instruction subject to harmless-error analysis); Carella v. California, 491 U.S. 263, 266, 109 S.Ct. 2419, 2421, 105 L.Ed.2d 218 (1989) (per curiam) (jury instruction containing an erroneous mandatory presumption subject to harmless-error analysis); Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 502-04, 107 S.Ct. 1918, 1921-23, 95 L.Ed.2d 439 (1987) (jury instruction misstating an element of an offense subject to harmless-error analysis); Rose [v."},"case_id":7825715,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In particular, the court has subjected jury instructions plagued by constitutional error to harmless-error analysis.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"jury instruction containing an erroneous rebuttable presumption subject to harmless-error analysis","sentence":"Clark ] supra, 478 U.S. [570] at 581-582, 106 S.Ct. [3101] at 3107-3108 [92 L.Ed.2d 460 (1986)] (jury instruction containing an erroneous rebuttable presumption subject to harmless-error analysis); but see Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, -, 113 S.Ct. 2078, 2082, 124 L.Ed.2d 182 (1993) (erroneous burden of proof instruction not subject to harmless-error analysis)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"erroneous burden of proof instruction not subject to harmless-error analysis","sentence":"Clark ] supra, 478 U.S. [570] at 581-582, 106 S.Ct. [3101] at 3107-3108 [92 L.Ed.2d 460 (1986)] (jury instruction containing an erroneous rebuttable presumption subject to harmless-error analysis); but see Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, -, 113 S.Ct. 2078, 2082, 124 L.Ed.2d 182 (1993) (erroneous burden of proof instruction not subject to harmless-error analysis)."},"case_id":7825715,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In particular, the court has subjected jury instructions plagued by constitutional error to harmless-error analysis.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"jury instruction containing an erroneous rebuttable presumption subject to harmless-error analysis","sentence":"Clark ] supra, 478 U.S. [570] at 581-582, 106 S.Ct. [3101] at 3107-3108 [92 L.Ed.2d 460 (1986)] (jury instruction containing an erroneous rebuttable presumption subject to harmless-error analysis); but see Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, -, 113 S.Ct. 2078, 2082, 124 L.Ed.2d 182 (1993) (erroneous burden of proof instruction not subject to harmless-error analysis)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"113 S.Ct. 2078, 2082","parenthetical":"erroneous burden of proof instruction not subject to harmless-error analysis","sentence":"Clark ] supra, 478 U.S. [570] at 581-582, 106 S.Ct. [3101] at 3107-3108 [92 L.Ed.2d 460 (1986)] (jury instruction containing an erroneous rebuttable presumption subject to harmless-error analysis); but see Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, -, 113 S.Ct. 2078, 2082, 124 L.Ed.2d 182 (1993) (erroneous burden of proof instruction not subject to harmless-error analysis)."},"case_id":7825715,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In particular, the court has subjected jury instructions plagued by constitutional error to harmless-error analysis.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"erroneous burden of proof instruction not subject to harmless-error analysis","sentence":"Clark ] supra, 478 U.S. [570] at 581-582, 106 S.Ct. [3101] at 3107-3108 [92 L.Ed.2d 460 (1986)] (jury instruction containing an erroneous rebuttable presumption subject to harmless-error analysis); but see Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, -, 113 S.Ct. 2078, 2082, 124 L.Ed.2d 182 (1993) (erroneous burden of proof instruction not subject to harmless-error analysis)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"jury instruction containing an erroneous rebuttable presumption subject to harmless-error analysis","sentence":"Clark ] supra, 478 U.S. [570] at 581-582, 106 S.Ct. [3101] at 3107-3108 [92 L.Ed.2d 460 (1986)] (jury instruction containing an erroneous rebuttable presumption subject to harmless-error analysis); but see Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, -, 113 S.Ct. 2078, 2082, 124 L.Ed.2d 182 (1993) (erroneous burden of proof instruction not subject to harmless-error analysis)."},"case_id":7825715,"label":"b"}
{"context":"A reasonable jury could infer from this evidence that the defendant was aware that by igniting the gasoline he would light not only himself on fire, but other people and things. Further, by his failure to take action to put out the fire, or to sound an alarm, the jury reasonably could have inferred that the defendant intended that the fire bum the apartment.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"23 Mass. App. Ct. 440, 444","parenthetical":"error where instruction failed to make clear that either setting of fire or \"failure to extinguish or report it had to be intentional and not merely negligent\"","sentence":"Cf. Commonwealth v. Glenn, 23 Mass. App. Ct. 440, 444 (1987) (error where instruction failed to make clear that either setting of fire or \u201cfailure to extinguish or report it had to be intentional and not merely negligent\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"284 Mass. 443, 445","parenthetical":"defendant, with knowledge that there had been fire in house, left without notifying authorities","sentence":"See Commonwealth v. Cavedon, 301 Mass. 307, 314-315 (1938) (no evidence that defendants made any effort to extinguish fire; this and fact that they failed to give any alarm might have been found by jury to be indicative of guilt); Commonwealth v. Vellucci, 284 Mass. 443, 445 (1933) (defendant, with knowledge that there had been fire in house, left without notifying authorities); Commonwealth v. Cali, 247 Mass. 20, 24 (1923) (notwithstanding defendant\u2019s claim that fire\u2019s origin was accidental, jury could find after reviewing all circumstances either that he set it or that after fire was under way he purposely refrained from any attempt to extinguish it)."},"case_id":3685501,"label":"b"}
{"context":"A reasonable jury could infer from this evidence that the defendant was aware that by igniting the gasoline he would light not only himself on fire, but other people and things. Further, by his failure to take action to put out the fire, or to sound an alarm, the jury reasonably could have inferred that the defendant intended that the fire bum the apartment.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"247 Mass. 20, 24","parenthetical":"notwithstanding defendant's claim that fire's origin was accidental, jury could find after reviewing all circumstances either that he set it or that after fire was under way he purposely refrained from any attempt to extinguish it","sentence":"See Commonwealth v. Cavedon, 301 Mass. 307, 314-315 (1938) (no evidence that defendants made any effort to extinguish fire; this and fact that they failed to give any alarm might have been found by jury to be indicative of guilt); Commonwealth v. Vellucci, 284 Mass. 443, 445 (1933) (defendant, with knowledge that there had been fire in house, left without notifying authorities); Commonwealth v. Cali, 247 Mass. 20, 24 (1923) (notwithstanding defendant\u2019s claim that fire\u2019s origin was accidental, jury could find after reviewing all circumstances either that he set it or that after fire was under way he purposely refrained from any attempt to extinguish it)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"23 Mass. App. Ct. 440, 444","parenthetical":"error where instruction failed to make clear that either setting of fire or \"failure to extinguish or report it had to be intentional and not merely negligent\"","sentence":"Cf. Commonwealth v. Glenn, 23 Mass. App. Ct. 440, 444 (1987) (error where instruction failed to make clear that either setting of fire or \u201cfailure to extinguish or report it had to be intentional and not merely negligent\u201d)."},"case_id":3685501,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The record is devoid of any evidence of the amount of benefits Wife might expect to receive at age sixty-five. Because the family court must have sufficient evidence upon which to base a determination of a person's earning potential for purposes of awarding alimony, the family court was not presented with sufficient evidence to prospectively consider the amount of benefits Wife reasonably anticipates receiving at age sixty-five in awarding alimony and, thus, did not err in refusing to engage in such speculation.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"308 S.C. 37, 42","parenthetical":"reversing the family court's alimony award because it was based on an unsupported finding of the husband's earning capacity","sentence":"See Sexton v. Sexton, 308 S.C. 37, 42, 416 S.E.2d 649, 653 (Ct.App.1992) (reversing the family court\u2019s alimony award because it was based on an unsupported finding of the husband\u2019s earning capacity), rev\u2019d on other grounds, 310 S.C. 501, 427 S.E.2d 665 (1993); see also Nelson v. Nelson, 651 So.2d 1252 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1995) (\u201cAs a general rule, trial courts may not consider future or anticipated events in setting current alimony and child support amounts due to the lack of evidentiary basis or the uncertainty surrounding such future events.\u201d); cf. Cox v. Cox, 882 P.2d 909 (Alaska 1994) (affirming the trial court\u2019s refusal to consider future social security benefits due to their \u201cspeculative nature\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"As a general rule, trial courts may not consider future or anticipated events in setting current alimony and child support amounts due to the lack of evidentiary basis or the uncertainty surrounding such future events.\"","sentence":"See Sexton v. Sexton, 308 S.C. 37, 42, 416 S.E.2d 649, 653 (Ct.App.1992) (reversing the family court\u2019s alimony award because it was based on an unsupported finding of the husband\u2019s earning capacity), rev\u2019d on other grounds, 310 S.C. 501, 427 S.E.2d 665 (1993); see also Nelson v. Nelson, 651 So.2d 1252 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1995) (\u201cAs a general rule, trial courts may not consider future or anticipated events in setting current alimony and child support amounts due to the lack of evidentiary basis or the uncertainty surrounding such future events.\u201d); cf. Cox v. Cox, 882 P.2d 909 (Alaska 1994) (affirming the trial court\u2019s refusal to consider future social security benefits due to their \u201cspeculative nature\u201d)."},"case_id":4078800,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The record is devoid of any evidence of the amount of benefits Wife might expect to receive at age sixty-five. Because the family court must have sufficient evidence upon which to base a determination of a person's earning potential for purposes of awarding alimony, the family court was not presented with sufficient evidence to prospectively consider the amount of benefits Wife reasonably anticipates receiving at age sixty-five in awarding alimony and, thus, did not err in refusing to engage in such speculation.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"308 S.C. 37, 42","parenthetical":"reversing the family court's alimony award because it was based on an unsupported finding of the husband's earning capacity","sentence":"See Sexton v. Sexton, 308 S.C. 37, 42, 416 S.E.2d 649, 653 (Ct.App.1992) (reversing the family court\u2019s alimony award because it was based on an unsupported finding of the husband\u2019s earning capacity), rev\u2019d on other grounds, 310 S.C. 501, 427 S.E.2d 665 (1993); see also Nelson v. Nelson, 651 So.2d 1252 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1995) (\u201cAs a general rule, trial courts may not consider future or anticipated events in setting current alimony and child support amounts due to the lack of evidentiary basis or the uncertainty surrounding such future events.\u201d); cf. Cox v. Cox, 882 P.2d 909 (Alaska 1994) (affirming the trial court\u2019s refusal to consider future social security benefits due to their \u201cspeculative nature\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"affirming the trial court's refusal to consider future social security benefits due to their \"speculative nature\"","sentence":"See Sexton v. Sexton, 308 S.C. 37, 42, 416 S.E.2d 649, 653 (Ct.App.1992) (reversing the family court\u2019s alimony award because it was based on an unsupported finding of the husband\u2019s earning capacity), rev\u2019d on other grounds, 310 S.C. 501, 427 S.E.2d 665 (1993); see also Nelson v. Nelson, 651 So.2d 1252 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1995) (\u201cAs a general rule, trial courts may not consider future or anticipated events in setting current alimony and child support amounts due to the lack of evidentiary basis or the uncertainty surrounding such future events.\u201d); cf. Cox v. Cox, 882 P.2d 909 (Alaska 1994) (affirming the trial court\u2019s refusal to consider future social security benefits due to their \u201cspeculative nature\u201d)."},"case_id":4078800,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The record is devoid of any evidence of the amount of benefits Wife might expect to receive at age sixty-five. Because the family court must have sufficient evidence upon which to base a determination of a person's earning potential for purposes of awarding alimony, the family court was not presented with sufficient evidence to prospectively consider the amount of benefits Wife reasonably anticipates receiving at age sixty-five in awarding alimony and, thus, did not err in refusing to engage in such speculation.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"416 S.E.2d 649, 653","parenthetical":"reversing the family court's alimony award because it was based on an unsupported finding of the husband's earning capacity","sentence":"See Sexton v. Sexton, 308 S.C. 37, 42, 416 S.E.2d 649, 653 (Ct.App.1992) (reversing the family court\u2019s alimony award because it was based on an unsupported finding of the husband\u2019s earning capacity), rev\u2019d on other grounds, 310 S.C. 501, 427 S.E.2d 665 (1993); see also Nelson v. Nelson, 651 So.2d 1252 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1995) (\u201cAs a general rule, trial courts may not consider future or anticipated events in setting current alimony and child support amounts due to the lack of evidentiary basis or the uncertainty surrounding such future events.\u201d); cf. Cox v. Cox, 882 P.2d 909 (Alaska 1994) (affirming the trial court\u2019s refusal to consider future social security benefits due to their \u201cspeculative nature\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"As a general rule, trial courts may not consider future or anticipated events in setting current alimony and child support amounts due to the lack of evidentiary basis or the uncertainty surrounding such future events.\"","sentence":"See Sexton v. Sexton, 308 S.C. 37, 42, 416 S.E.2d 649, 653 (Ct.App.1992) (reversing the family court\u2019s alimony award because it was based on an unsupported finding of the husband\u2019s earning capacity), rev\u2019d on other grounds, 310 S.C. 501, 427 S.E.2d 665 (1993); see also Nelson v. Nelson, 651 So.2d 1252 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1995) (\u201cAs a general rule, trial courts may not consider future or anticipated events in setting current alimony and child support amounts due to the lack of evidentiary basis or the uncertainty surrounding such future events.\u201d); cf. Cox v. Cox, 882 P.2d 909 (Alaska 1994) (affirming the trial court\u2019s refusal to consider future social security benefits due to their \u201cspeculative nature\u201d)."},"case_id":4078800,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The record is devoid of any evidence of the amount of benefits Wife might expect to receive at age sixty-five. Because the family court must have sufficient evidence upon which to base a determination of a person's earning potential for purposes of awarding alimony, the family court was not presented with sufficient evidence to prospectively consider the amount of benefits Wife reasonably anticipates receiving at age sixty-five in awarding alimony and, thus, did not err in refusing to engage in such speculation.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"affirming the trial court's refusal to consider future social security benefits due to their \"speculative nature\"","sentence":"See Sexton v. Sexton, 308 S.C. 37, 42, 416 S.E.2d 649, 653 (Ct.App.1992) (reversing the family court\u2019s alimony award because it was based on an unsupported finding of the husband\u2019s earning capacity), rev\u2019d on other grounds, 310 S.C. 501, 427 S.E.2d 665 (1993); see also Nelson v. Nelson, 651 So.2d 1252 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1995) (\u201cAs a general rule, trial courts may not consider future or anticipated events in setting current alimony and child support amounts due to the lack of evidentiary basis or the uncertainty surrounding such future events.\u201d); cf. Cox v. Cox, 882 P.2d 909 (Alaska 1994) (affirming the trial court\u2019s refusal to consider future social security benefits due to their \u201cspeculative nature\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"416 S.E.2d 649, 653","parenthetical":"reversing the family court's alimony award because it was based on an unsupported finding of the husband's earning capacity","sentence":"See Sexton v. Sexton, 308 S.C. 37, 42, 416 S.E.2d 649, 653 (Ct.App.1992) (reversing the family court\u2019s alimony award because it was based on an unsupported finding of the husband\u2019s earning capacity), rev\u2019d on other grounds, 310 S.C. 501, 427 S.E.2d 665 (1993); see also Nelson v. Nelson, 651 So.2d 1252 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1995) (\u201cAs a general rule, trial courts may not consider future or anticipated events in setting current alimony and child support amounts due to the lack of evidentiary basis or the uncertainty surrounding such future events.\u201d); cf. Cox v. Cox, 882 P.2d 909 (Alaska 1994) (affirming the trial court\u2019s refusal to consider future social security benefits due to their \u201cspeculative nature\u201d)."},"case_id":4078800,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The record is devoid of any evidence of the amount of benefits Wife might expect to receive at age sixty-five. Because the family court must have sufficient evidence upon which to base a determination of a person's earning potential for purposes of awarding alimony, the family court was not presented with sufficient evidence to prospectively consider the amount of benefits Wife reasonably anticipates receiving at age sixty-five in awarding alimony and, thus, did not err in refusing to engage in such speculation.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"As a general rule, trial courts may not consider future or anticipated events in setting current alimony and child support amounts due to the lack of evidentiary basis or the uncertainty surrounding such future events.\"","sentence":"See Sexton v. Sexton, 308 S.C. 37, 42, 416 S.E.2d 649, 653 (Ct.App.1992) (reversing the family court\u2019s alimony award because it was based on an unsupported finding of the husband\u2019s earning capacity), rev\u2019d on other grounds, 310 S.C. 501, 427 S.E.2d 665 (1993); see also Nelson v. Nelson, 651 So.2d 1252 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1995) (\u201cAs a general rule, trial courts may not consider future or anticipated events in setting current alimony and child support amounts due to the lack of evidentiary basis or the uncertainty surrounding such future events.\u201d); cf. Cox v. Cox, 882 P.2d 909 (Alaska 1994) (affirming the trial court\u2019s refusal to consider future social security benefits due to their \u201cspeculative nature\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"reversing the family court's alimony award because it was based on an unsupported finding of the husband's earning capacity","sentence":"See Sexton v. Sexton, 308 S.C. 37, 42, 416 S.E.2d 649, 653 (Ct.App.1992) (reversing the family court\u2019s alimony award because it was based on an unsupported finding of the husband\u2019s earning capacity), rev\u2019d on other grounds, 310 S.C. 501, 427 S.E.2d 665 (1993); see also Nelson v. Nelson, 651 So.2d 1252 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1995) (\u201cAs a general rule, trial courts may not consider future or anticipated events in setting current alimony and child support amounts due to the lack of evidentiary basis or the uncertainty surrounding such future events.\u201d); cf. Cox v. Cox, 882 P.2d 909 (Alaska 1994) (affirming the trial court\u2019s refusal to consider future social security benefits due to their \u201cspeculative nature\u201d)."},"case_id":4078800,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The record is devoid of any evidence of the amount of benefits Wife might expect to receive at age sixty-five. Because the family court must have sufficient evidence upon which to base a determination of a person's earning potential for purposes of awarding alimony, the family court was not presented with sufficient evidence to prospectively consider the amount of benefits Wife reasonably anticipates receiving at age sixty-five in awarding alimony and, thus, did not err in refusing to engage in such speculation.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"affirming the trial court's refusal to consider future social security benefits due to their \"speculative nature\"","sentence":"See Sexton v. Sexton, 308 S.C. 37, 42, 416 S.E.2d 649, 653 (Ct.App.1992) (reversing the family court\u2019s alimony award because it was based on an unsupported finding of the husband\u2019s earning capacity), rev\u2019d on other grounds, 310 S.C. 501, 427 S.E.2d 665 (1993); see also Nelson v. Nelson, 651 So.2d 1252 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1995) (\u201cAs a general rule, trial courts may not consider future or anticipated events in setting current alimony and child support amounts due to the lack of evidentiary basis or the uncertainty surrounding such future events.\u201d); cf. Cox v. Cox, 882 P.2d 909 (Alaska 1994) (affirming the trial court\u2019s refusal to consider future social security benefits due to their \u201cspeculative nature\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"reversing the family court's alimony award because it was based on an unsupported finding of the husband's earning capacity","sentence":"See Sexton v. Sexton, 308 S.C. 37, 42, 416 S.E.2d 649, 653 (Ct.App.1992) (reversing the family court\u2019s alimony award because it was based on an unsupported finding of the husband\u2019s earning capacity), rev\u2019d on other grounds, 310 S.C. 501, 427 S.E.2d 665 (1993); see also Nelson v. Nelson, 651 So.2d 1252 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1995) (\u201cAs a general rule, trial courts may not consider future or anticipated events in setting current alimony and child support amounts due to the lack of evidentiary basis or the uncertainty surrounding such future events.\u201d); cf. Cox v. Cox, 882 P.2d 909 (Alaska 1994) (affirming the trial court\u2019s refusal to consider future social security benefits due to their \u201cspeculative nature\u201d)."},"case_id":4078800,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The record is devoid of any evidence of the amount of benefits Wife might expect to receive at age sixty-five. Because the family court must have sufficient evidence upon which to base a determination of a person's earning potential for purposes of awarding alimony, the family court was not presented with sufficient evidence to prospectively consider the amount of benefits Wife reasonably anticipates receiving at age sixty-five in awarding alimony and, thus, did not err in refusing to engage in such speculation.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"As a general rule, trial courts may not consider future or anticipated events in setting current alimony and child support amounts due to the lack of evidentiary basis or the uncertainty surrounding such future events.\"","sentence":"See Sexton v. Sexton, 308 S.C. 37, 42, 416 S.E.2d 649, 653 (Ct.App.1992) (reversing the family court\u2019s alimony award because it was based on an unsupported finding of the husband\u2019s earning capacity), rev\u2019d on other grounds, 310 S.C. 501, 427 S.E.2d 665 (1993); see also Nelson v. Nelson, 651 So.2d 1252 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1995) (\u201cAs a general rule, trial courts may not consider future or anticipated events in setting current alimony and child support amounts due to the lack of evidentiary basis or the uncertainty surrounding such future events.\u201d); cf. Cox v. Cox, 882 P.2d 909 (Alaska 1994) (affirming the trial court\u2019s refusal to consider future social security benefits due to their \u201cspeculative nature\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"reversing the family court's alimony award because it was based on an unsupported finding of the husband's earning capacity","sentence":"See Sexton v. Sexton, 308 S.C. 37, 42, 416 S.E.2d 649, 653 (Ct.App.1992) (reversing the family court\u2019s alimony award because it was based on an unsupported finding of the husband\u2019s earning capacity), rev\u2019d on other grounds, 310 S.C. 501, 427 S.E.2d 665 (1993); see also Nelson v. Nelson, 651 So.2d 1252 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1995) (\u201cAs a general rule, trial courts may not consider future or anticipated events in setting current alimony and child support amounts due to the lack of evidentiary basis or the uncertainty surrounding such future events.\u201d); cf. Cox v. Cox, 882 P.2d 909 (Alaska 1994) (affirming the trial court\u2019s refusal to consider future social security benefits due to their \u201cspeculative nature\u201d)."},"case_id":4078800,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The record is devoid of any evidence of the amount of benefits Wife might expect to receive at age sixty-five. Because the family court must have sufficient evidence upon which to base a determination of a person's earning potential for purposes of awarding alimony, the family court was not presented with sufficient evidence to prospectively consider the amount of benefits Wife reasonably anticipates receiving at age sixty-five in awarding alimony and, thus, did not err in refusing to engage in such speculation.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"affirming the trial court's refusal to consider future social security benefits due to their \"speculative nature\"","sentence":"See Sexton v. Sexton, 308 S.C. 37, 42, 416 S.E.2d 649, 653 (Ct.App.1992) (reversing the family court\u2019s alimony award because it was based on an unsupported finding of the husband\u2019s earning capacity), rev\u2019d on other grounds, 310 S.C. 501, 427 S.E.2d 665 (1993); see also Nelson v. Nelson, 651 So.2d 1252 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1995) (\u201cAs a general rule, trial courts may not consider future or anticipated events in setting current alimony and child support amounts due to the lack of evidentiary basis or the uncertainty surrounding such future events.\u201d); cf. Cox v. Cox, 882 P.2d 909 (Alaska 1994) (affirming the trial court\u2019s refusal to consider future social security benefits due to their \u201cspeculative nature\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"reversing the family court's alimony award because it was based on an unsupported finding of the husband's earning capacity","sentence":"See Sexton v. Sexton, 308 S.C. 37, 42, 416 S.E.2d 649, 653 (Ct.App.1992) (reversing the family court\u2019s alimony award because it was based on an unsupported finding of the husband\u2019s earning capacity), rev\u2019d on other grounds, 310 S.C. 501, 427 S.E.2d 665 (1993); see also Nelson v. Nelson, 651 So.2d 1252 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1995) (\u201cAs a general rule, trial courts may not consider future or anticipated events in setting current alimony and child support amounts due to the lack of evidentiary basis or the uncertainty surrounding such future events.\u201d); cf. Cox v. Cox, 882 P.2d 909 (Alaska 1994) (affirming the trial court\u2019s refusal to consider future social security benefits due to their \u201cspeculative nature\u201d)."},"case_id":4078800,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The record is devoid of any evidence of the amount of benefits Wife might expect to receive at age sixty-five. Because the family court must have sufficient evidence upon which to base a determination of a person's earning potential for purposes of awarding alimony, the family court was not presented with sufficient evidence to prospectively consider the amount of benefits Wife reasonably anticipates receiving at age sixty-five in awarding alimony and, thus, did not err in refusing to engage in such speculation.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"As a general rule, trial courts may not consider future or anticipated events in setting current alimony and child support amounts due to the lack of evidentiary basis or the uncertainty surrounding such future events.\"","sentence":"See Sexton v. Sexton, 308 S.C. 37, 42, 416 S.E.2d 649, 653 (Ct.App.1992) (reversing the family court\u2019s alimony award because it was based on an unsupported finding of the husband\u2019s earning capacity), rev\u2019d on other grounds, 310 S.C. 501, 427 S.E.2d 665 (1993); see also Nelson v. Nelson, 651 So.2d 1252 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1995) (\u201cAs a general rule, trial courts may not consider future or anticipated events in setting current alimony and child support amounts due to the lack of evidentiary basis or the uncertainty surrounding such future events.\u201d); cf. Cox v. Cox, 882 P.2d 909 (Alaska 1994) (affirming the trial court\u2019s refusal to consider future social security benefits due to their \u201cspeculative nature\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"affirming the trial court's refusal to consider future social security benefits due to their \"speculative nature\"","sentence":"See Sexton v. Sexton, 308 S.C. 37, 42, 416 S.E.2d 649, 653 (Ct.App.1992) (reversing the family court\u2019s alimony award because it was based on an unsupported finding of the husband\u2019s earning capacity), rev\u2019d on other grounds, 310 S.C. 501, 427 S.E.2d 665 (1993); see also Nelson v. Nelson, 651 So.2d 1252 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1995) (\u201cAs a general rule, trial courts may not consider future or anticipated events in setting current alimony and child support amounts due to the lack of evidentiary basis or the uncertainty surrounding such future events.\u201d); cf. Cox v. Cox, 882 P.2d 909 (Alaska 1994) (affirming the trial court\u2019s refusal to consider future social security benefits due to their \u201cspeculative nature\u201d)."},"case_id":4078800,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Subsequently, the court clerk asked every juror: \"As to the weighing, do you unanimously agree that the aggravating factor proven beyond a reasonable doubt by the state of Connecticut outweighs the mitigating factor or factors found to exist, yes or no?\" Every juror responded \"yes,\" signifying that the jury had intended to mark \"yes,\" on the initial verdict form in responding to the question of whether the jury unanimously had agreed that the aggravating factor outweighed the mitigating factor or factors. Furthermore, during an evidentiary hearing before Damiani, J., regarding the propriety of the jury's contact with the trial court after the initial verdict was recorded, all of the jurors testified that when they entered the courtroom to deliver their first verdict, their intended result was that the defendant receive the death penalty. Thus, the record clearly indicates that the jury actually found that the aggravating factor outweighed the mitigating factor or factors. Accordingly, the trial court's finding that the initial verdict form contained a scrivener's error and, therefore, was amenable to correction to indicate the jury's actual intent, was not clearly erroneous.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"158 N.C. App. 699, 705","parenthetical":"trial court properly gave jury second verdict form to correct clerical error in first verdict form that resulted in incorrect verdict","sentence":"See, e.g., State v. Farmer, 158 N.C. App. 699, 705, 582 S.E.2d 352 (2003) (trial court properly gave jury second verdict form to correct clerical error in first verdict form that resulted in incorrect verdict); cf. Martin v. State, 732 So. 2d 847, 854 (Miss. 1998) (evidentiary rule prohibiting juror from testifying as to any matter or statement occurring during course of jury deliberations upon inquiry into validity of verdict \u201csimply would not apply to a situation [in which] a jury reports a verdict that is not the actual verdict voted and agreed upon\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"732 So. 2d 847, 854","parenthetical":"evidentiary rule prohibiting juror from testifying as to any matter or statement occurring during course of jury deliberations upon inquiry into validity of verdict \"simply would not apply to a situation [in which] a jury reports a verdict that is not the actual verdict voted and agreed upon\"","sentence":"See, e.g., State v. Farmer, 158 N.C. App. 699, 705, 582 S.E.2d 352 (2003) (trial court properly gave jury second verdict form to correct clerical error in first verdict form that resulted in incorrect verdict); cf. Martin v. State, 732 So. 2d 847, 854 (Miss. 1998) (evidentiary rule prohibiting juror from testifying as to any matter or statement occurring during course of jury deliberations upon inquiry into validity of verdict \u201csimply would not apply to a situation [in which] a jury reports a verdict that is not the actual verdict voted and agreed upon\u201d)."},"case_id":3593641,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Subsequently, the court clerk asked every juror: \"As to the weighing, do you unanimously agree that the aggravating factor proven beyond a reasonable doubt by the state of Connecticut outweighs the mitigating factor or factors found to exist, yes or no?\" Every juror responded \"yes,\" signifying that the jury had intended to mark \"yes,\" on the initial verdict form in responding to the question of whether the jury unanimously had agreed that the aggravating factor outweighed the mitigating factor or factors. Furthermore, during an evidentiary hearing before Damiani, J., regarding the propriety of the jury's contact with the trial court after the initial verdict was recorded, all of the jurors testified that when they entered the courtroom to deliver their first verdict, their intended result was that the defendant receive the death penalty. Thus, the record clearly indicates that the jury actually found that the aggravating factor outweighed the mitigating factor or factors. Accordingly, the trial court's finding that the initial verdict form contained a scrivener's error and, therefore, was amenable to correction to indicate the jury's actual intent, was not clearly erroneous.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"trial court properly gave jury second verdict form to correct clerical error in first verdict form that resulted in incorrect verdict","sentence":"See, e.g., State v. Farmer, 158 N.C. App. 699, 705, 582 S.E.2d 352 (2003) (trial court properly gave jury second verdict form to correct clerical error in first verdict form that resulted in incorrect verdict); cf. Martin v. State, 732 So. 2d 847, 854 (Miss. 1998) (evidentiary rule prohibiting juror from testifying as to any matter or statement occurring during course of jury deliberations upon inquiry into validity of verdict \u201csimply would not apply to a situation [in which] a jury reports a verdict that is not the actual verdict voted and agreed upon\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"732 So. 2d 847, 854","parenthetical":"evidentiary rule prohibiting juror from testifying as to any matter or statement occurring during course of jury deliberations upon inquiry into validity of verdict \"simply would not apply to a situation [in which] a jury reports a verdict that is not the actual verdict voted and agreed upon\"","sentence":"See, e.g., State v. Farmer, 158 N.C. App. 699, 705, 582 S.E.2d 352 (2003) (trial court properly gave jury second verdict form to correct clerical error in first verdict form that resulted in incorrect verdict); cf. Martin v. State, 732 So. 2d 847, 854 (Miss. 1998) (evidentiary rule prohibiting juror from testifying as to any matter or statement occurring during course of jury deliberations upon inquiry into validity of verdict \u201csimply would not apply to a situation [in which] a jury reports a verdict that is not the actual verdict voted and agreed upon\u201d)."},"case_id":3593641,"label":"a"}
{"context":"When examining these circumstances, we must refrain from \"engaging in a 'divide-and-conquer analysis' that examines the factors supporting reasonable suspicion 'in isolation from each other.'\" Thus, in light of the rapidly developing and potentially dangerous nature of the situation, it was reasonable under the circumstances for the officers to detain Chambers and Collins briefly and inquire as to whether they were armed.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"540 F.3d 356, 362","parenthetical":"upholding stop and frisk of a suspect encountered near the. scene of a reported burglary in light of the officer's perception that \"burglary suspects are often armed\" and \"safety required a pat-down\"","sentence":"See, e.g., United States v. Vickers, 540 F.3d 356, 362 (5th Cir.2008) (upholding stop and frisk of a suspect encountered near the. scene of a reported burglary in light of the officer\u2019s perception that \u201cburglary suspects are often armed\u201d and \u201csafety required a pat-down\u201d); cf. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 11, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989) (In the Fourth Amendment context, courts should avoid making \u201crule[s that] would unduly hamper the police\u2019s ability to make swift, on-the-spot decisions.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"490 U.S. 1, 11","parenthetical":"In the Fourth Amendment context, courts should avoid making \"rule[s that] would unduly hamper the police's ability to make swift, on-the-spot decisions.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., United States v. Vickers, 540 F.3d 356, 362 (5th Cir.2008) (upholding stop and frisk of a suspect encountered near the. scene of a reported burglary in light of the officer\u2019s perception that \u201cburglary suspects are often armed\u201d and \u201csafety required a pat-down\u201d); cf. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 11, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989) (In the Fourth Amendment context, courts should avoid making \u201crule[s that] would unduly hamper the police\u2019s ability to make swift, on-the-spot decisions.\u201d)."},"case_id":4251106,"label":"a"}
{"context":"When examining these circumstances, we must refrain from \"engaging in a 'divide-and-conquer analysis' that examines the factors supporting reasonable suspicion 'in isolation from each other.'\" Thus, in light of the rapidly developing and potentially dangerous nature of the situation, it was reasonable under the circumstances for the officers to detain Chambers and Collins briefly and inquire as to whether they were armed.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"In the Fourth Amendment context, courts should avoid making \"rule[s that] would unduly hamper the police's ability to make swift, on-the-spot decisions.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., United States v. Vickers, 540 F.3d 356, 362 (5th Cir.2008) (upholding stop and frisk of a suspect encountered near the. scene of a reported burglary in light of the officer\u2019s perception that \u201cburglary suspects are often armed\u201d and \u201csafety required a pat-down\u201d); cf. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 11, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989) (In the Fourth Amendment context, courts should avoid making \u201crule[s that] would unduly hamper the police\u2019s ability to make swift, on-the-spot decisions.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"540 F.3d 356, 362","parenthetical":"upholding stop and frisk of a suspect encountered near the. scene of a reported burglary in light of the officer's perception that \"burglary suspects are often armed\" and \"safety required a pat-down\"","sentence":"See, e.g., United States v. Vickers, 540 F.3d 356, 362 (5th Cir.2008) (upholding stop and frisk of a suspect encountered near the. scene of a reported burglary in light of the officer\u2019s perception that \u201cburglary suspects are often armed\u201d and \u201csafety required a pat-down\u201d); cf. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 11, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989) (In the Fourth Amendment context, courts should avoid making \u201crule[s that] would unduly hamper the police\u2019s ability to make swift, on-the-spot decisions.\u201d)."},"case_id":4251106,"label":"b"}
{"context":"When examining these circumstances, we must refrain from \"engaging in a 'divide-and-conquer analysis' that examines the factors supporting reasonable suspicion 'in isolation from each other.'\" Thus, in light of the rapidly developing and potentially dangerous nature of the situation, it was reasonable under the circumstances for the officers to detain Chambers and Collins briefly and inquire as to whether they were armed.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"540 F.3d 356, 362","parenthetical":"upholding stop and frisk of a suspect encountered near the. scene of a reported burglary in light of the officer's perception that \"burglary suspects are often armed\" and \"safety required a pat-down\"","sentence":"See, e.g., United States v. Vickers, 540 F.3d 356, 362 (5th Cir.2008) (upholding stop and frisk of a suspect encountered near the. scene of a reported burglary in light of the officer\u2019s perception that \u201cburglary suspects are often armed\u201d and \u201csafety required a pat-down\u201d); cf. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 11, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989) (In the Fourth Amendment context, courts should avoid making \u201crule[s that] would unduly hamper the police\u2019s ability to make swift, on-the-spot decisions.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"In the Fourth Amendment context, courts should avoid making \"rule[s that] would unduly hamper the police's ability to make swift, on-the-spot decisions.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., United States v. Vickers, 540 F.3d 356, 362 (5th Cir.2008) (upholding stop and frisk of a suspect encountered near the. scene of a reported burglary in light of the officer\u2019s perception that \u201cburglary suspects are often armed\u201d and \u201csafety required a pat-down\u201d); cf. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 11, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989) (In the Fourth Amendment context, courts should avoid making \u201crule[s that] would unduly hamper the police\u2019s ability to make swift, on-the-spot decisions.\u201d)."},"case_id":4251106,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Reference to a defendant's invocation of his right to silence and his right to counsel implicates the \"integrity of the grand jury proceedings,\" Commonwealth v. Freeman, supra, and justifies further inquiry. There is no doubt that Waterfield's testimony regarding Mathews's silence and his request for counsel was improper.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"396 Mass. 746, 752","parenthetical":"holding that, in context of criminal trial, \"defendant's right to remain silent cannot be compromised by prosecutorial comments that cast aspersions on its exercise\"","sentence":"Cf. Commonwealth v. Teixera, 396 Mass. 746, 752 (1986) (holding that, in context of criminal trial, \u201cdefendant\u2019s right to remain silent cannot be compromised by prosecutorial comments that cast aspersions on its exercise\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"33 Mass. App. Ct. 85, 88-89","parenthetical":"noting \"strong disapproval of [testimony] informing a grand jury that a suspect elected to exercise his right to remain silent\"","sentence":"See Commonwealth v. Callagy, 33 Mass. App. Ct. 85, 88-89 (1992) (noting \u201cstrong disapproval of [testimony] informing a grand jury that a suspect elected to exercise his right to remain silent\u201d)."},"case_id":3777926,"label":"b"}
{"context":"As an initial matter, Mr. Pettigrew does not contest that his first two statements were voluntary, albeit made in violation of Miranda. Further, he no longer argues that his third statement was the product of a custodial interrogation. Accordingly, it is undisputed that if Mr. Pettigrew's third statement was the only statement he made, it would be admissible because it was volunteered and not made in response to any question posed by Officer Williams.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"384 U.S. 478, 478","parenthetical":"explaining that \"[t]he fundamental import of the privilege [against compelled self-incrimination] while an individual is in custody is not whether he is allowed to talk to the police without the benefit of warning's and counsel, but whether he can be interrogated\"","sentence":"See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478, 86 S.Ct. 1602 (explaining that \u201c[t]he fundamental import of the privilege [against compelled self-incrimination] while an individual is in custody is not whether he is allowed to talk to the police without the benefit of warning's and counsel, but whether he can be interrogated\u201d); see also United States v. Abdulla, 294 F.3d 830, 835 (7th Cir.2002) (volunteered statements made while in custody but not in response to questions posed by the police are not subject to the Miranda exclusionary rule); Medeiros v. Shimoda, 889 F.2d 819, 823-25 (9th Cir.1989) (same)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"294 F.3d 830, 835","parenthetical":"volunteered statements made while in custody but not in response to questions posed by the police are not subject to the Miranda exclusionary rule","sentence":"See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478, 86 S.Ct. 1602 (explaining that \u201c[t]he fundamental import of the privilege [against compelled self-incrimination] while an individual is in custody is not whether he is allowed to talk to the police without the benefit of warning's and counsel, but whether he can be interrogated\u201d); see also United States v. Abdulla, 294 F.3d 830, 835 (7th Cir.2002) (volunteered statements made while in custody but not in response to questions posed by the police are not subject to the Miranda exclusionary rule); Medeiros v. Shimoda, 889 F.2d 819, 823-25 (9th Cir.1989) (same)."},"case_id":8454081,"label":"a"}
{"context":"As an initial matter, Mr. Pettigrew does not contest that his first two statements were voluntary, albeit made in violation of Miranda. Further, he no longer argues that his third statement was the product of a custodial interrogation. Accordingly, it is undisputed that if Mr. Pettigrew's third statement was the only statement he made, it would be admissible because it was volunteered and not made in response to any question posed by Officer Williams.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"294 F.3d 830, 835","parenthetical":"volunteered statements made while in custody but not in response to questions posed by the police are not subject to the Miranda exclusionary rule","sentence":"See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478, 86 S.Ct. 1602 (explaining that \u201c[t]he fundamental import of the privilege [against compelled self-incrimination] while an individual is in custody is not whether he is allowed to talk to the police without the benefit of warning's and counsel, but whether he can be interrogated\u201d); see also United States v. Abdulla, 294 F.3d 830, 835 (7th Cir.2002) (volunteered statements made while in custody but not in response to questions posed by the police are not subject to the Miranda exclusionary rule); Medeiros v. Shimoda, 889 F.2d 819, 823-25 (9th Cir.1989) (same)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"explaining that \"[t]he fundamental import of the privilege [against compelled self-incrimination] while an individual is in custody is not whether he is allowed to talk to the police without the benefit of warning's and counsel, but whether he can be interrogated\"","sentence":"See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478, 86 S.Ct. 1602 (explaining that \u201c[t]he fundamental import of the privilege [against compelled self-incrimination] while an individual is in custody is not whether he is allowed to talk to the police without the benefit of warning's and counsel, but whether he can be interrogated\u201d); see also United States v. Abdulla, 294 F.3d 830, 835 (7th Cir.2002) (volunteered statements made while in custody but not in response to questions posed by the police are not subject to the Miranda exclusionary rule); Medeiros v. Shimoda, 889 F.2d 819, 823-25 (9th Cir.1989) (same)."},"case_id":8454081,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Other courts agree that shareholders who receive notice of a proposed settlement may object regardless of whether they could institute or maintain the action themselves.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"127 F.2d 721, 724","parenthetical":"treating an objector responding to a trial court's notice of proposed settlement like \"a defendant who is summoned by process into court and after an adverse ruling has the right to appeal,\" and holding dismissal of objector's intervention was \"not decisive\"","sentence":"Cohen v. Young, 127 F.2d 721, 724 (6th Cir.1942) (treating an objector responding to a trial court\u2019s notice of proposed settlement like \u201ca defendant who is summoned by process into court and after an adverse ruling has the right to appeal,\u201d and holding dismissal of objector\u2019s intervention was \u201cnot decisive\u201d); see also Kaplan, 192 F.3d at 66 (holding that appellant who properly filed an objection in accordance with the notice he received from the trial court had standing to appeal); Rosenbaum v. MacAllister, 64 F.3d 1439, 1443 n. 2 (10th Cir.1995) (\u201cTo merely object to the settlement of a derivative action, however, the objector apparently need only own stock in the corporation at the time of the settlement hearing, and appear at the settlement hearing to raise his or her objections.\u201d); Saylor v. Bastedo, 78 F.R.D. 150, 152-53 (S.D.N.Y.1978) (holding non-contemporaneous shareholder\u2019s status is that of an objector). Also, as discussed in Part II below, most courts hold that an objector does not need to intervene to challenge the settlement of a derivative suit, so there is no reason an objector should have to meet the test for intervention."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"192 F.3d 66, 66","parenthetical":"holding that appellant who properly filed an objection in accordance with the notice he received from the trial court had standing to appeal","sentence":"Cohen v. Young, 127 F.2d 721, 724 (6th Cir.1942) (treating an objector responding to a trial court\u2019s notice of proposed settlement like \u201ca defendant who is summoned by process into court and after an adverse ruling has the right to appeal,\u201d and holding dismissal of objector\u2019s intervention was \u201cnot decisive\u201d); see also Kaplan, 192 F.3d at 66 (holding that appellant who properly filed an objection in accordance with the notice he received from the trial court had standing to appeal); Rosenbaum v. MacAllister, 64 F.3d 1439, 1443 n. 2 (10th Cir.1995) (\u201cTo merely object to the settlement of a derivative action, however, the objector apparently need only own stock in the corporation at the time of the settlement hearing, and appear at the settlement hearing to raise his or her objections.\u201d); Saylor v. Bastedo, 78 F.R.D. 150, 152-53 (S.D.N.Y.1978) (holding non-contemporaneous shareholder\u2019s status is that of an objector). Also, as discussed in Part II below, most courts hold that an objector does not need to intervene to challenge the settlement of a derivative suit, so there is no reason an objector should have to meet the test for intervention."},"case_id":6963364,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Other courts agree that shareholders who receive notice of a proposed settlement may object regardless of whether they could institute or maintain the action themselves.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"127 F.2d 721, 724","parenthetical":"treating an objector responding to a trial court's notice of proposed settlement like \"a defendant who is summoned by process into court and after an adverse ruling has the right to appeal,\" and holding dismissal of objector's intervention was \"not decisive\"","sentence":"Cohen v. Young, 127 F.2d 721, 724 (6th Cir.1942) (treating an objector responding to a trial court\u2019s notice of proposed settlement like \u201ca defendant who is summoned by process into court and after an adverse ruling has the right to appeal,\u201d and holding dismissal of objector\u2019s intervention was \u201cnot decisive\u201d); see also Kaplan, 192 F.3d at 66 (holding that appellant who properly filed an objection in accordance with the notice he received from the trial court had standing to appeal); Rosenbaum v. MacAllister, 64 F.3d 1439, 1443 n. 2 (10th Cir.1995) (\u201cTo merely object to the settlement of a derivative action, however, the objector apparently need only own stock in the corporation at the time of the settlement hearing, and appear at the settlement hearing to raise his or her objections.\u201d); Saylor v. Bastedo, 78 F.R.D. 150, 152-53 (S.D.N.Y.1978) (holding non-contemporaneous shareholder\u2019s status is that of an objector). Also, as discussed in Part II below, most courts hold that an objector does not need to intervene to challenge the settlement of a derivative suit, so there is no reason an objector should have to meet the test for intervention."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"To merely object to the settlement of a derivative action, however, the objector apparently need only own stock in the corporation at the time of the settlement hearing, and appear at the settlement hearing to raise his or her objections.\"","sentence":"Cohen v. Young, 127 F.2d 721, 724 (6th Cir.1942) (treating an objector responding to a trial court\u2019s notice of proposed settlement like \u201ca defendant who is summoned by process into court and after an adverse ruling has the right to appeal,\u201d and holding dismissal of objector\u2019s intervention was \u201cnot decisive\u201d); see also Kaplan, 192 F.3d at 66 (holding that appellant who properly filed an objection in accordance with the notice he received from the trial court had standing to appeal); Rosenbaum v. MacAllister, 64 F.3d 1439, 1443 n. 2 (10th Cir.1995) (\u201cTo merely object to the settlement of a derivative action, however, the objector apparently need only own stock in the corporation at the time of the settlement hearing, and appear at the settlement hearing to raise his or her objections.\u201d); Saylor v. Bastedo, 78 F.R.D. 150, 152-53 (S.D.N.Y.1978) (holding non-contemporaneous shareholder\u2019s status is that of an objector). Also, as discussed in Part II below, most courts hold that an objector does not need to intervene to challenge the settlement of a derivative suit, so there is no reason an objector should have to meet the test for intervention."},"case_id":6963364,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Other courts agree that shareholders who receive notice of a proposed settlement may object regardless of whether they could institute or maintain the action themselves.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"127 F.2d 721, 724","parenthetical":"treating an objector responding to a trial court's notice of proposed settlement like \"a defendant who is summoned by process into court and after an adverse ruling has the right to appeal,\" and holding dismissal of objector's intervention was \"not decisive\"","sentence":"Cohen v. Young, 127 F.2d 721, 724 (6th Cir.1942) (treating an objector responding to a trial court\u2019s notice of proposed settlement like \u201ca defendant who is summoned by process into court and after an adverse ruling has the right to appeal,\u201d and holding dismissal of objector\u2019s intervention was \u201cnot decisive\u201d); see also Kaplan, 192 F.3d at 66 (holding that appellant who properly filed an objection in accordance with the notice he received from the trial court had standing to appeal); Rosenbaum v. MacAllister, 64 F.3d 1439, 1443 n. 2 (10th Cir.1995) (\u201cTo merely object to the settlement of a derivative action, however, the objector apparently need only own stock in the corporation at the time of the settlement hearing, and appear at the settlement hearing to raise his or her objections.\u201d); Saylor v. Bastedo, 78 F.R.D. 150, 152-53 (S.D.N.Y.1978) (holding non-contemporaneous shareholder\u2019s status is that of an objector). Also, as discussed in Part II below, most courts hold that an objector does not need to intervene to challenge the settlement of a derivative suit, so there is no reason an objector should have to meet the test for intervention."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"109 S.W.3d 755, 755","parenthetical":"\"Requiring intervention prior to the settlement fairness hearing creates more work for all involved with no corresponding benefit.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., City of San Benito, 109 S.W.3d at 755 (\u201cRequiring intervention prior to the settlement fairness hearing creates more work for all involved with no corresponding benefit.\u201d)."},"case_id":6963364,"label":"a"}
{"context":"When balancing the competing interests of a parent and the State, we must also consider the risk of error created by the challenged procedure, namely, Brown's absence from the termination hearing. However, this statutory provision does not create a constitutional right for Brown to be physically present at the termination hearing.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"853 N.E.2d 1044, 1044","parenthetical":"stating that parent does not have a constitutional right to be present at a termination hearing","sentence":"See E.E., 853 N.E.2d at 1044 (stating that parent does not have a constitutional right to be present at a termination hearing); see also J.T., 740 N.E.2d at 1264 (stating incarcerated parent has no absolute right to be physically present at the termination hearing)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"740 N.E.2d 1264, 1264","parenthetical":"stating incarcerated parent has no absolute right to be physically present at the termination hearing","sentence":"See E.E., 853 N.E.2d at 1044 (stating that parent does not have a constitutional right to be present at a termination hearing); see also J.T., 740 N.E.2d at 1264 (stating incarcerated parent has no absolute right to be physically present at the termination hearing)."},"case_id":8199511,"label":"a"}
{"context":". Some courts, noting that it could be difficult to \"prove a negative\" -- that is, to prove reliance on facts that were not disclosed-- have focused their inquiry on whether the concealed information was material, that is, whether it would have affected decision-making had it been disclosed, a standard plainly met here.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"96 F.3d 1319, 1323-24","parenthetical":"applying principle of Titan and other cases to bankruptcy context, holding that a finding of materiality sufficed for the reliance element, and citing other cases so holding","sentence":"See Titan Grp. v. Faggen, 513 F.2d 234, 239 (2d Cir.1975) (holding, in securities law context, that \"[i]n cases involving nondisclosure of material facts ... materiality rather than reliance ... becomes the decisive element of causation.\u201d); see also Apte v. Japra (In re Apte), 96 F.3d 1319, 1323-24 (9th Cir.1996) (applying principle of Titan and other cases to bankruptcy context, holding that a finding of materiality sufficed for the reliance element, and citing other cases so holding). Courts have explicitly held that \"the nondisclosure of a material fact in the face of a duty to disclose ... establishes] the requisite reliance\u201d under \u00a7 523(a)(2)(A). Apte, 96 F.3d at 1323; see Starr v. Reynolds (In re Reynolds), 193 B.R. 195, 203 (D.N.J.1996) (so holding); Bankcard Centr., Inc. v. Gonzales (In re Gonzales), Adv."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"513 F.2d 234, 239","parenthetical":"holding, in securities law context, that \"[i]n cases involving nondisclosure of material facts ... materiality rather than reliance ... becomes the decisive element of causation.\"","sentence":"See Titan Grp. v. Faggen, 513 F.2d 234, 239 (2d Cir.1975) (holding, in securities law context, that \"[i]n cases involving nondisclosure of material facts ... materiality rather than reliance ... becomes the decisive element of causation.\u201d); see also Apte v. Japra (In re Apte), 96 F.3d 1319, 1323-24 (9th Cir.1996) (applying principle of Titan and other cases to bankruptcy context, holding that a finding of materiality sufficed for the reliance element, and citing other cases so holding). Courts have explicitly held that \"the nondisclosure of a material fact in the face of a duty to disclose ... establishes] the requisite reliance\u201d under \u00a7 523(a)(2)(A). Apte, 96 F.3d at 1323; see Starr v. Reynolds (In re Reynolds), 193 B.R. 195, 203 (D.N.J.1996) (so holding); Bankcard Centr., Inc. v. Gonzales (In re Gonzales), Adv."},"case_id":4161594,"label":"b"}
{"context":". Some courts, noting that it could be difficult to \"prove a negative\" -- that is, to prove reliance on facts that were not disclosed-- have focused their inquiry on whether the concealed information was material, that is, whether it would have affected decision-making had it been disclosed, a standard plainly met here.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"96 F.3d 1323, 1323","parenthetical":"applying principle of Titan and other cases to bankruptcy context, holding that a finding of materiality sufficed for the reliance element, and citing other cases so holding","sentence":"See Titan Grp. v. Faggen, 513 F.2d 234, 239 (2d Cir.1975) (holding, in securities law context, that \"[i]n cases involving nondisclosure of material facts ... materiality rather than reliance ... becomes the decisive element of causation.\u201d); see also Apte v. Japra (In re Apte), 96 F.3d 1319, 1323-24 (9th Cir.1996) (applying principle of Titan and other cases to bankruptcy context, holding that a finding of materiality sufficed for the reliance element, and citing other cases so holding). Courts have explicitly held that \"the nondisclosure of a material fact in the face of a duty to disclose ... establishes] the requisite reliance\u201d under \u00a7 523(a)(2)(A). Apte, 96 F.3d at 1323; see Starr v. Reynolds (In re Reynolds), 193 B.R. 195, 203 (D.N.J.1996) (so holding); Bankcard Centr., Inc. v. Gonzales (In re Gonzales), Adv."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"513 F.2d 234, 239","parenthetical":"holding, in securities law context, that \"[i]n cases involving nondisclosure of material facts ... materiality rather than reliance ... becomes the decisive element of causation.\"","sentence":"See Titan Grp. v. Faggen, 513 F.2d 234, 239 (2d Cir.1975) (holding, in securities law context, that \"[i]n cases involving nondisclosure of material facts ... materiality rather than reliance ... becomes the decisive element of causation.\u201d); see also Apte v. Japra (In re Apte), 96 F.3d 1319, 1323-24 (9th Cir.1996) (applying principle of Titan and other cases to bankruptcy context, holding that a finding of materiality sufficed for the reliance element, and citing other cases so holding). Courts have explicitly held that \"the nondisclosure of a material fact in the face of a duty to disclose ... establishes] the requisite reliance\u201d under \u00a7 523(a)(2)(A). Apte, 96 F.3d at 1323; see Starr v. Reynolds (In re Reynolds), 193 B.R. 195, 203 (D.N.J.1996) (so holding); Bankcard Centr., Inc. v. Gonzales (In re Gonzales), Adv."},"case_id":4161594,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In order to determine whether a genuine issue exists under the second factor of the rescue doctrine test, we must consider all circumstances surrounding the initial and subsequent collisions, as well as factors that could have affected the parties' states of mind during the rescue.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"619 A.2d 370, 370","parenthetical":"court looks to \"the facts alleged ... together with the reasonable inferences deducible from those facts\" to determine reasonableness of belief","sentence":"See Bell, 619 A.2d at 370 (court looks to \u201cthe facts alleged ... together with the reasonable inferences deducible from those facts\u201d to determine reasonableness of belief); see also Truitt v. Hays, 33 Pa. D. & C.2d 453, 463 (Ct.Com.Pl.Pa.1963) (court states that \u201c[a] rescuer is not to be charged with errors of judgment that result from the excitement and confusion of the moment\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"33 Pa. D. & C.2d 453, 463","parenthetical":"court states that \"[a] rescuer is not to be charged with errors of judgment that result from the excitement and confusion of the moment\"","sentence":"See Bell, 619 A.2d at 370 (court looks to \u201cthe facts alleged ... together with the reasonable inferences deducible from those facts\u201d to determine reasonableness of belief); see also Truitt v. Hays, 33 Pa. D. & C.2d 453, 463 (Ct.Com.Pl.Pa.1963) (court states that \u201c[a] rescuer is not to be charged with errors of judgment that result from the excitement and confusion of the moment\u201d)."},"case_id":5198131,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Moreover, in determining probable cause, the circumstances must be viewed from the vantage point of a prudent, reasonable, cautious police officer guided by his training and experience. While a single surreptitious \"commercial transaction\" may not give rise to probable cause, and while flight alone does not give rise to probable cause, the totality of those circumstances surely does, especially when the flight following a transaction consistent with an illicit drug sale, is unprovoked by any actions of the police other than their \"mere presence.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"392 U.S. 40, 66","parenthetical":"\"deliberately furtive actions and flight at the approach of strangers or law officers are strong indicia of mens rea\"","sentence":"See Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 66, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 1904, 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968) (\u201cdeliberately furtive actions and flight at the approach of strangers or law officers are strong indicia of mens rea\u201d) (citations omitted); Commonwealth v. Collins, 440 Pa. 368, 371, 269 A.2d 882, 884 (1970) (flight may indicate \u201cconsciousness of guilt\u201d); see also, Commonwealth v. Pegram, 450 Pa. 590, 593-594, 301 A.2d 695, 697 (1973) (flight plus other factors indicating that the person flee ing has something to hide may constitute probable cause to arrest) (citations omitted); Commonwealth v. Frank, 407 Pa.Super. 500, 507, 595 A.2d 1258, 1262 (1991) (flight coupled with additional facts that point to the suspect\u2019s guilt may give rise to probable cause to arrest). Certainly, these were not the actions of an innocent individual and those actions gave rise to probable cause which supported the officers\u2019s arrest and search of appellant. See Commonwealth v. Lawson, 454 Pa. 23, 309 A.2d 391 (1973) (probable cause existed where police officer observed three commercial transactions on the street involving unidentified items)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"450 Pa. 590, 593-594","parenthetical":"flight plus other factors indicating that the person flee ing has something to hide may constitute probable cause to arrest","sentence":"See Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 66, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 1904, 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968) (\u201cdeliberately furtive actions and flight at the approach of strangers or law officers are strong indicia of mens rea\u201d) (citations omitted); Commonwealth v. Collins, 440 Pa. 368, 371, 269 A.2d 882, 884 (1970) (flight may indicate \u201cconsciousness of guilt\u201d); see also, Commonwealth v. Pegram, 450 Pa. 590, 593-594, 301 A.2d 695, 697 (1973) (flight plus other factors indicating that the person flee ing has something to hide may constitute probable cause to arrest) (citations omitted); Commonwealth v. Frank, 407 Pa.Super. 500, 507, 595 A.2d 1258, 1262 (1991) (flight coupled with additional facts that point to the suspect\u2019s guilt may give rise to probable cause to arrest). Certainly, these were not the actions of an innocent individual and those actions gave rise to probable cause which supported the officers\u2019s arrest and search of appellant. See Commonwealth v. Lawson, 454 Pa. 23, 309 A.2d 391 (1973) (probable cause existed where police officer observed three commercial transactions on the street involving unidentified items)."},"case_id":7872252,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Moreover, in determining probable cause, the circumstances must be viewed from the vantage point of a prudent, reasonable, cautious police officer guided by his training and experience. While a single surreptitious \"commercial transaction\" may not give rise to probable cause, and while flight alone does not give rise to probable cause, the totality of those circumstances surely does, especially when the flight following a transaction consistent with an illicit drug sale, is unprovoked by any actions of the police other than their \"mere presence.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"392 U.S. 40, 66","parenthetical":"\"deliberately furtive actions and flight at the approach of strangers or law officers are strong indicia of mens rea\"","sentence":"See Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 66, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 1904, 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968) (\u201cdeliberately furtive actions and flight at the approach of strangers or law officers are strong indicia of mens rea\u201d) (citations omitted); Commonwealth v. Collins, 440 Pa. 368, 371, 269 A.2d 882, 884 (1970) (flight may indicate \u201cconsciousness of guilt\u201d); see also, Commonwealth v. Pegram, 450 Pa. 590, 593-594, 301 A.2d 695, 697 (1973) (flight plus other factors indicating that the person flee ing has something to hide may constitute probable cause to arrest) (citations omitted); Commonwealth v. Frank, 407 Pa.Super. 500, 507, 595 A.2d 1258, 1262 (1991) (flight coupled with additional facts that point to the suspect\u2019s guilt may give rise to probable cause to arrest). Certainly, these were not the actions of an innocent individual and those actions gave rise to probable cause which supported the officers\u2019s arrest and search of appellant. See Commonwealth v. Lawson, 454 Pa. 23, 309 A.2d 391 (1973) (probable cause existed where police officer observed three commercial transactions on the street involving unidentified items)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"301 A.2d 695, 697","parenthetical":"flight plus other factors indicating that the person flee ing has something to hide may constitute probable cause to arrest","sentence":"See Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 66, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 1904, 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968) (\u201cdeliberately furtive actions and flight at the approach of strangers or law officers are strong indicia of mens rea\u201d) (citations omitted); Commonwealth v. Collins, 440 Pa. 368, 371, 269 A.2d 882, 884 (1970) (flight may indicate \u201cconsciousness of guilt\u201d); see also, Commonwealth v. Pegram, 450 Pa. 590, 593-594, 301 A.2d 695, 697 (1973) (flight plus other factors indicating that the person flee ing has something to hide may constitute probable cause to arrest) (citations omitted); Commonwealth v. Frank, 407 Pa.Super. 500, 507, 595 A.2d 1258, 1262 (1991) (flight coupled with additional facts that point to the suspect\u2019s guilt may give rise to probable cause to arrest). Certainly, these were not the actions of an innocent individual and those actions gave rise to probable cause which supported the officers\u2019s arrest and search of appellant. See Commonwealth v. Lawson, 454 Pa. 23, 309 A.2d 391 (1973) (probable cause existed where police officer observed three commercial transactions on the street involving unidentified items)."},"case_id":7872252,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Moreover, in determining probable cause, the circumstances must be viewed from the vantage point of a prudent, reasonable, cautious police officer guided by his training and experience. While a single surreptitious \"commercial transaction\" may not give rise to probable cause, and while flight alone does not give rise to probable cause, the totality of those circumstances surely does, especially when the flight following a transaction consistent with an illicit drug sale, is unprovoked by any actions of the police other than their \"mere presence.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"392 U.S. 40, 66","parenthetical":"\"deliberately furtive actions and flight at the approach of strangers or law officers are strong indicia of mens rea\"","sentence":"See Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 66, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 1904, 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968) (\u201cdeliberately furtive actions and flight at the approach of strangers or law officers are strong indicia of mens rea\u201d) (citations omitted); Commonwealth v. Collins, 440 Pa. 368, 371, 269 A.2d 882, 884 (1970) (flight may indicate \u201cconsciousness of guilt\u201d); see also, Commonwealth v. Pegram, 450 Pa. 590, 593-594, 301 A.2d 695, 697 (1973) (flight plus other factors indicating that the person flee ing has something to hide may constitute probable cause to arrest) (citations omitted); Commonwealth v. Frank, 407 Pa.Super. 500, 507, 595 A.2d 1258, 1262 (1991) (flight coupled with additional facts that point to the suspect\u2019s guilt may give rise to probable cause to arrest). Certainly, these were not the actions of an innocent individual and those actions gave rise to probable cause which supported the officers\u2019s arrest and search of appellant. See Commonwealth v. Lawson, 454 Pa. 23, 309 A.2d 391 (1973) (probable cause existed where police officer observed three commercial transactions on the street involving unidentified items)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"407 Pa.Super. 500, 507","parenthetical":"flight coupled with additional facts that point to the suspect's guilt may give rise to probable cause to arrest","sentence":"See Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 66, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 1904, 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968) (\u201cdeliberately furtive actions and flight at the approach of strangers or law officers are strong indicia of mens rea\u201d) (citations omitted); Commonwealth v. Collins, 440 Pa. 368, 371, 269 A.2d 882, 884 (1970) (flight may indicate \u201cconsciousness of guilt\u201d); see also, Commonwealth v. Pegram, 450 Pa. 590, 593-594, 301 A.2d 695, 697 (1973) (flight plus other factors indicating that the person flee ing has something to hide may constitute probable cause to arrest) (citations omitted); Commonwealth v. Frank, 407 Pa.Super. 500, 507, 595 A.2d 1258, 1262 (1991) (flight coupled with additional facts that point to the suspect\u2019s guilt may give rise to probable cause to arrest). Certainly, these were not the actions of an innocent individual and those actions gave rise to probable cause which supported the officers\u2019s arrest and search of appellant. See Commonwealth v. Lawson, 454 Pa. 23, 309 A.2d 391 (1973) (probable cause existed where police officer observed three commercial transactions on the street involving unidentified items)."},"case_id":7872252,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Moreover, in determining probable cause, the circumstances must be viewed from the vantage point of a prudent, reasonable, cautious police officer guided by his training and experience. While a single surreptitious \"commercial transaction\" may not give rise to probable cause, and while flight alone does not give rise to probable cause, the totality of those circumstances surely does, especially when the flight following a transaction consistent with an illicit drug sale, is unprovoked by any actions of the police other than their \"mere presence.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"392 U.S. 40, 66","parenthetical":"\"deliberately furtive actions and flight at the approach of strangers or law officers are strong indicia of mens rea\"","sentence":"See Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 66, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 1904, 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968) (\u201cdeliberately furtive actions and flight at the approach of strangers or law officers are strong indicia of mens rea\u201d) (citations omitted); Commonwealth v. Collins, 440 Pa. 368, 371, 269 A.2d 882, 884 (1970) (flight may indicate \u201cconsciousness of guilt\u201d); see also, Commonwealth v. Pegram, 450 Pa. 590, 593-594, 301 A.2d 695, 697 (1973) (flight plus other factors indicating that the person flee ing has something to hide may constitute probable cause to arrest) (citations omitted); Commonwealth v. Frank, 407 Pa.Super. 500, 507, 595 A.2d 1258, 1262 (1991) (flight coupled with additional facts that point to the suspect\u2019s guilt may give rise to probable cause to arrest). Certainly, these were not the actions of an innocent individual and those actions gave rise to probable cause which supported the officers\u2019s arrest and search of appellant. See Commonwealth v. Lawson, 454 Pa. 23, 309 A.2d 391 (1973) (probable cause existed where police officer observed three commercial transactions on the street involving unidentified items)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"595 A.2d 1258, 1262","parenthetical":"flight coupled with additional facts that point to the suspect's guilt may give rise to probable cause to arrest","sentence":"See Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 66, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 1904, 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968) (\u201cdeliberately furtive actions and flight at the approach of strangers or law officers are strong indicia of mens rea\u201d) (citations omitted); Commonwealth v. Collins, 440 Pa. 368, 371, 269 A.2d 882, 884 (1970) (flight may indicate \u201cconsciousness of guilt\u201d); see also, Commonwealth v. Pegram, 450 Pa. 590, 593-594, 301 A.2d 695, 697 (1973) (flight plus other factors indicating that the person flee ing has something to hide may constitute probable cause to arrest) (citations omitted); Commonwealth v. Frank, 407 Pa.Super. 500, 507, 595 A.2d 1258, 1262 (1991) (flight coupled with additional facts that point to the suspect\u2019s guilt may give rise to probable cause to arrest). Certainly, these were not the actions of an innocent individual and those actions gave rise to probable cause which supported the officers\u2019s arrest and search of appellant. See Commonwealth v. Lawson, 454 Pa. 23, 309 A.2d 391 (1973) (probable cause existed where police officer observed three commercial transactions on the street involving unidentified items)."},"case_id":7872252,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Moreover, in determining probable cause, the circumstances must be viewed from the vantage point of a prudent, reasonable, cautious police officer guided by his training and experience. While a single surreptitious \"commercial transaction\" may not give rise to probable cause, and while flight alone does not give rise to probable cause, the totality of those circumstances surely does, especially when the flight following a transaction consistent with an illicit drug sale, is unprovoked by any actions of the police other than their \"mere presence.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"392 U.S. 40, 66","parenthetical":"\"deliberately furtive actions and flight at the approach of strangers or law officers are strong indicia of mens rea\"","sentence":"See Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 66, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 1904, 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968) (\u201cdeliberately furtive actions and flight at the approach of strangers or law officers are strong indicia of mens rea\u201d) (citations omitted); Commonwealth v. Collins, 440 Pa. 368, 371, 269 A.2d 882, 884 (1970) (flight may indicate \u201cconsciousness of guilt\u201d); see also, Commonwealth v. Pegram, 450 Pa. 590, 593-594, 301 A.2d 695, 697 (1973) (flight plus other factors indicating that the person flee ing has something to hide may constitute probable cause to arrest) (citations omitted); Commonwealth v. Frank, 407 Pa.Super. 500, 507, 595 A.2d 1258, 1262 (1991) (flight coupled with additional facts that point to the suspect\u2019s guilt may give rise to probable cause to arrest). Certainly, these were not the actions of an innocent individual and those actions gave rise to probable cause which supported the officers\u2019s arrest and search of appellant. See Commonwealth v. Lawson, 454 Pa. 23, 309 A.2d 391 (1973) (probable cause existed where police officer observed three commercial transactions on the street involving unidentified items)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"probable cause existed where police officer observed three commercial transactions on the street involving unidentified items","sentence":"See Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 66, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 1904, 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968) (\u201cdeliberately furtive actions and flight at the approach of strangers or law officers are strong indicia of mens rea\u201d) (citations omitted); Commonwealth v. Collins, 440 Pa. 368, 371, 269 A.2d 882, 884 (1970) (flight may indicate \u201cconsciousness of guilt\u201d); see also, Commonwealth v. Pegram, 450 Pa. 590, 593-594, 301 A.2d 695, 697 (1973) (flight plus other factors indicating that the person flee ing has something to hide may constitute probable cause to arrest) (citations omitted); Commonwealth v. Frank, 407 Pa.Super. 500, 507, 595 A.2d 1258, 1262 (1991) (flight coupled with additional facts that point to the suspect\u2019s guilt may give rise to probable cause to arrest). Certainly, these were not the actions of an innocent individual and those actions gave rise to probable cause which supported the officers\u2019s arrest and search of appellant. See Commonwealth v. Lawson, 454 Pa. 23, 309 A.2d 391 (1973) (probable cause existed where police officer observed three commercial transactions on the street involving unidentified items)."},"case_id":7872252,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Moreover, in determining probable cause, the circumstances must be viewed from the vantage point of a prudent, reasonable, cautious police officer guided by his training and experience. While a single surreptitious \"commercial transaction\" may not give rise to probable cause, and while flight alone does not give rise to probable cause, the totality of those circumstances surely does, especially when the flight following a transaction consistent with an illicit drug sale, is unprovoked by any actions of the police other than their \"mere presence.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"probable cause existed where police officer observed three commercial transactions on the street involving unidentified items","sentence":"See Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 66, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 1904, 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968) (\u201cdeliberately furtive actions and flight at the approach of strangers or law officers are strong indicia of mens rea\u201d) (citations omitted); Commonwealth v. Collins, 440 Pa. 368, 371, 269 A.2d 882, 884 (1970) (flight may indicate \u201cconsciousness of guilt\u201d); see also, Commonwealth v. Pegram, 450 Pa. 590, 593-594, 301 A.2d 695, 697 (1973) (flight plus other factors indicating that the person flee ing has something to hide may constitute probable cause to arrest) (citations omitted); Commonwealth v. Frank, 407 Pa.Super. 500, 507, 595 A.2d 1258, 1262 (1991) (flight coupled with additional facts that point to the suspect\u2019s guilt may give rise to probable cause to arrest). Certainly, these were not the actions of an innocent individual and those actions gave rise to probable cause which supported the officers\u2019s arrest and search of appellant. See Commonwealth v. Lawson, 454 Pa. 23, 309 A.2d 391 (1973) (probable cause existed where police officer observed three commercial transactions on the street involving unidentified items)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"392 U.S. 40, 66","parenthetical":"\"deliberately furtive actions and flight at the approach of strangers or law officers are strong indicia of mens rea\"","sentence":"See Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 66, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 1904, 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968) (\u201cdeliberately furtive actions and flight at the approach of strangers or law officers are strong indicia of mens rea\u201d) (citations omitted); Commonwealth v. Collins, 440 Pa. 368, 371, 269 A.2d 882, 884 (1970) (flight may indicate \u201cconsciousness of guilt\u201d); see also, Commonwealth v. Pegram, 450 Pa. 590, 593-594, 301 A.2d 695, 697 (1973) (flight plus other factors indicating that the person flee ing has something to hide may constitute probable cause to arrest) (citations omitted); Commonwealth v. Frank, 407 Pa.Super. 500, 507, 595 A.2d 1258, 1262 (1991) (flight coupled with additional facts that point to the suspect\u2019s guilt may give rise to probable cause to arrest). Certainly, these were not the actions of an innocent individual and those actions gave rise to probable cause which supported the officers\u2019s arrest and search of appellant. See Commonwealth v. Lawson, 454 Pa. 23, 309 A.2d 391 (1973) (probable cause existed where police officer observed three commercial transactions on the street involving unidentified items)."},"case_id":7872252,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Moreover, in determining probable cause, the circumstances must be viewed from the vantage point of a prudent, reasonable, cautious police officer guided by his training and experience. While a single surreptitious \"commercial transaction\" may not give rise to probable cause, and while flight alone does not give rise to probable cause, the totality of those circumstances surely does, especially when the flight following a transaction consistent with an illicit drug sale, is unprovoked by any actions of the police other than their \"mere presence.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"88 S.Ct. 1889, 1904","parenthetical":"\"deliberately furtive actions and flight at the approach of strangers or law officers are strong indicia of mens rea\"","sentence":"See Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 66, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 1904, 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968) (\u201cdeliberately furtive actions and flight at the approach of strangers or law officers are strong indicia of mens rea\u201d) (citations omitted); Commonwealth v. Collins, 440 Pa. 368, 371, 269 A.2d 882, 884 (1970) (flight may indicate \u201cconsciousness of guilt\u201d); see also, Commonwealth v. Pegram, 450 Pa. 590, 593-594, 301 A.2d 695, 697 (1973) (flight plus other factors indicating that the person flee ing has something to hide may constitute probable cause to arrest) (citations omitted); Commonwealth v. Frank, 407 Pa.Super. 500, 507, 595 A.2d 1258, 1262 (1991) (flight coupled with additional facts that point to the suspect\u2019s guilt may give rise to probable cause to arrest). Certainly, these were not the actions of an innocent individual and those actions gave rise to probable cause which supported the officers\u2019s arrest and search of appellant. See Commonwealth v. Lawson, 454 Pa. 23, 309 A.2d 391 (1973) (probable cause existed where police officer observed three commercial transactions on the street involving unidentified items)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"450 Pa. 590, 593-594","parenthetical":"flight plus other factors indicating that the person flee ing has something to hide may constitute probable cause to arrest","sentence":"See Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 66, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 1904, 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968) (\u201cdeliberately furtive actions and flight at the approach of strangers or law officers are strong indicia of mens rea\u201d) (citations omitted); Commonwealth v. Collins, 440 Pa. 368, 371, 269 A.2d 882, 884 (1970) (flight may indicate \u201cconsciousness of guilt\u201d); see also, Commonwealth v. Pegram, 450 Pa. 590, 593-594, 301 A.2d 695, 697 (1973) (flight plus other factors indicating that the person flee ing has something to hide may constitute probable cause to arrest) (citations omitted); Commonwealth v. Frank, 407 Pa.Super. 500, 507, 595 A.2d 1258, 1262 (1991) (flight coupled with additional facts that point to the suspect\u2019s guilt may give rise to probable cause to arrest). Certainly, these were not the actions of an innocent individual and those actions gave rise to probable cause which supported the officers\u2019s arrest and search of appellant. See Commonwealth v. Lawson, 454 Pa. 23, 309 A.2d 391 (1973) (probable cause existed where police officer observed three commercial transactions on the street involving unidentified items)."},"case_id":7872252,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Moreover, in determining probable cause, the circumstances must be viewed from the vantage point of a prudent, reasonable, cautious police officer guided by his training and experience. While a single surreptitious \"commercial transaction\" may not give rise to probable cause, and while flight alone does not give rise to probable cause, the totality of those circumstances surely does, especially when the flight following a transaction consistent with an illicit drug sale, is unprovoked by any actions of the police other than their \"mere presence.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"301 A.2d 695, 697","parenthetical":"flight plus other factors indicating that the person flee ing has something to hide may constitute probable cause to arrest","sentence":"See Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 66, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 1904, 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968) (\u201cdeliberately furtive actions and flight at the approach of strangers or law officers are strong indicia of mens rea\u201d) (citations omitted); Commonwealth v. Collins, 440 Pa. 368, 371, 269 A.2d 882, 884 (1970) (flight may indicate \u201cconsciousness of guilt\u201d); see also, Commonwealth v. Pegram, 450 Pa. 590, 593-594, 301 A.2d 695, 697 (1973) (flight plus other factors indicating that the person flee ing has something to hide may constitute probable cause to arrest) (citations omitted); Commonwealth v. Frank, 407 Pa.Super. 500, 507, 595 A.2d 1258, 1262 (1991) (flight coupled with additional facts that point to the suspect\u2019s guilt may give rise to probable cause to arrest). Certainly, these were not the actions of an innocent individual and those actions gave rise to probable cause which supported the officers\u2019s arrest and search of appellant. See Commonwealth v. Lawson, 454 Pa. 23, 309 A.2d 391 (1973) (probable cause existed where police officer observed three commercial transactions on the street involving unidentified items)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"88 S.Ct. 1889, 1904","parenthetical":"\"deliberately furtive actions and flight at the approach of strangers or law officers are strong indicia of mens rea\"","sentence":"See Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 66, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 1904, 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968) (\u201cdeliberately furtive actions and flight at the approach of strangers or law officers are strong indicia of mens rea\u201d) (citations omitted); Commonwealth v. Collins, 440 Pa. 368, 371, 269 A.2d 882, 884 (1970) (flight may indicate \u201cconsciousness of guilt\u201d); see also, Commonwealth v. Pegram, 450 Pa. 590, 593-594, 301 A.2d 695, 697 (1973) (flight plus other factors indicating that the person flee ing has something to hide may constitute probable cause to arrest) (citations omitted); Commonwealth v. Frank, 407 Pa.Super. 500, 507, 595 A.2d 1258, 1262 (1991) (flight coupled with additional facts that point to the suspect\u2019s guilt may give rise to probable cause to arrest). Certainly, these were not the actions of an innocent individual and those actions gave rise to probable cause which supported the officers\u2019s arrest and search of appellant. See Commonwealth v. Lawson, 454 Pa. 23, 309 A.2d 391 (1973) (probable cause existed where police officer observed three commercial transactions on the street involving unidentified items)."},"case_id":7872252,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Moreover, in determining probable cause, the circumstances must be viewed from the vantage point of a prudent, reasonable, cautious police officer guided by his training and experience. While a single surreptitious \"commercial transaction\" may not give rise to probable cause, and while flight alone does not give rise to probable cause, the totality of those circumstances surely does, especially when the flight following a transaction consistent with an illicit drug sale, is unprovoked by any actions of the police other than their \"mere presence.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"88 S.Ct. 1889, 1904","parenthetical":"\"deliberately furtive actions and flight at the approach of strangers or law officers are strong indicia of mens rea\"","sentence":"See Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 66, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 1904, 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968) (\u201cdeliberately furtive actions and flight at the approach of strangers or law officers are strong indicia of mens rea\u201d) (citations omitted); Commonwealth v. Collins, 440 Pa. 368, 371, 269 A.2d 882, 884 (1970) (flight may indicate \u201cconsciousness of guilt\u201d); see also, Commonwealth v. Pegram, 450 Pa. 590, 593-594, 301 A.2d 695, 697 (1973) (flight plus other factors indicating that the person flee ing has something to hide may constitute probable cause to arrest) (citations omitted); Commonwealth v. Frank, 407 Pa.Super. 500, 507, 595 A.2d 1258, 1262 (1991) (flight coupled with additional facts that point to the suspect\u2019s guilt may give rise to probable cause to arrest). Certainly, these were not the actions of an innocent individual and those actions gave rise to probable cause which supported the officers\u2019s arrest and search of appellant. See Commonwealth v. Lawson, 454 Pa. 23, 309 A.2d 391 (1973) (probable cause existed where police officer observed three commercial transactions on the street involving unidentified items)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"407 Pa.Super. 500, 507","parenthetical":"flight coupled with additional facts that point to the suspect's guilt may give rise to probable cause to arrest","sentence":"See Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 66, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 1904, 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968) (\u201cdeliberately furtive actions and flight at the approach of strangers or law officers are strong indicia of mens rea\u201d) (citations omitted); Commonwealth v. Collins, 440 Pa. 368, 371, 269 A.2d 882, 884 (1970) (flight may indicate \u201cconsciousness of guilt\u201d); see also, Commonwealth v. Pegram, 450 Pa. 590, 593-594, 301 A.2d 695, 697 (1973) (flight plus other factors indicating that the person flee ing has something to hide may constitute probable cause to arrest) (citations omitted); Commonwealth v. Frank, 407 Pa.Super. 500, 507, 595 A.2d 1258, 1262 (1991) (flight coupled with additional facts that point to the suspect\u2019s guilt may give rise to probable cause to arrest). Certainly, these were not the actions of an innocent individual and those actions gave rise to probable cause which supported the officers\u2019s arrest and search of appellant. See Commonwealth v. Lawson, 454 Pa. 23, 309 A.2d 391 (1973) (probable cause existed where police officer observed three commercial transactions on the street involving unidentified items)."},"case_id":7872252,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Moreover, in determining probable cause, the circumstances must be viewed from the vantage point of a prudent, reasonable, cautious police officer guided by his training and experience. While a single surreptitious \"commercial transaction\" may not give rise to probable cause, and while flight alone does not give rise to probable cause, the totality of those circumstances surely does, especially when the flight following a transaction consistent with an illicit drug sale, is unprovoked by any actions of the police other than their \"mere presence.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"88 S.Ct. 1889, 1904","parenthetical":"\"deliberately furtive actions and flight at the approach of strangers or law officers are strong indicia of mens rea\"","sentence":"See Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 66, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 1904, 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968) (\u201cdeliberately furtive actions and flight at the approach of strangers or law officers are strong indicia of mens rea\u201d) (citations omitted); Commonwealth v. Collins, 440 Pa. 368, 371, 269 A.2d 882, 884 (1970) (flight may indicate \u201cconsciousness of guilt\u201d); see also, Commonwealth v. Pegram, 450 Pa. 590, 593-594, 301 A.2d 695, 697 (1973) (flight plus other factors indicating that the person flee ing has something to hide may constitute probable cause to arrest) (citations omitted); Commonwealth v. Frank, 407 Pa.Super. 500, 507, 595 A.2d 1258, 1262 (1991) (flight coupled with additional facts that point to the suspect\u2019s guilt may give rise to probable cause to arrest). Certainly, these were not the actions of an innocent individual and those actions gave rise to probable cause which supported the officers\u2019s arrest and search of appellant. See Commonwealth v. Lawson, 454 Pa. 23, 309 A.2d 391 (1973) (probable cause existed where police officer observed three commercial transactions on the street involving unidentified items)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"595 A.2d 1258, 1262","parenthetical":"flight coupled with additional facts that point to the suspect's guilt may give rise to probable cause to arrest","sentence":"See Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 66, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 1904, 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968) (\u201cdeliberately furtive actions and flight at the approach of strangers or law officers are strong indicia of mens rea\u201d) (citations omitted); Commonwealth v. Collins, 440 Pa. 368, 371, 269 A.2d 882, 884 (1970) (flight may indicate \u201cconsciousness of guilt\u201d); see also, Commonwealth v. Pegram, 450 Pa. 590, 593-594, 301 A.2d 695, 697 (1973) (flight plus other factors indicating that the person flee ing has something to hide may constitute probable cause to arrest) (citations omitted); Commonwealth v. Frank, 407 Pa.Super. 500, 507, 595 A.2d 1258, 1262 (1991) (flight coupled with additional facts that point to the suspect\u2019s guilt may give rise to probable cause to arrest). Certainly, these were not the actions of an innocent individual and those actions gave rise to probable cause which supported the officers\u2019s arrest and search of appellant. See Commonwealth v. Lawson, 454 Pa. 23, 309 A.2d 391 (1973) (probable cause existed where police officer observed three commercial transactions on the street involving unidentified items)."},"case_id":7872252,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Moreover, in determining probable cause, the circumstances must be viewed from the vantage point of a prudent, reasonable, cautious police officer guided by his training and experience. While a single surreptitious \"commercial transaction\" may not give rise to probable cause, and while flight alone does not give rise to probable cause, the totality of those circumstances surely does, especially when the flight following a transaction consistent with an illicit drug sale, is unprovoked by any actions of the police other than their \"mere presence.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"88 S.Ct. 1889, 1904","parenthetical":"\"deliberately furtive actions and flight at the approach of strangers or law officers are strong indicia of mens rea\"","sentence":"See Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 66, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 1904, 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968) (\u201cdeliberately furtive actions and flight at the approach of strangers or law officers are strong indicia of mens rea\u201d) (citations omitted); Commonwealth v. Collins, 440 Pa. 368, 371, 269 A.2d 882, 884 (1970) (flight may indicate \u201cconsciousness of guilt\u201d); see also, Commonwealth v. Pegram, 450 Pa. 590, 593-594, 301 A.2d 695, 697 (1973) (flight plus other factors indicating that the person flee ing has something to hide may constitute probable cause to arrest) (citations omitted); Commonwealth v. Frank, 407 Pa.Super. 500, 507, 595 A.2d 1258, 1262 (1991) (flight coupled with additional facts that point to the suspect\u2019s guilt may give rise to probable cause to arrest). Certainly, these were not the actions of an innocent individual and those actions gave rise to probable cause which supported the officers\u2019s arrest and search of appellant. See Commonwealth v. Lawson, 454 Pa. 23, 309 A.2d 391 (1973) (probable cause existed where police officer observed three commercial transactions on the street involving unidentified items)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"probable cause existed where police officer observed three commercial transactions on the street involving unidentified items","sentence":"See Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 66, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 1904, 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968) (\u201cdeliberately furtive actions and flight at the approach of strangers or law officers are strong indicia of mens rea\u201d) (citations omitted); Commonwealth v. Collins, 440 Pa. 368, 371, 269 A.2d 882, 884 (1970) (flight may indicate \u201cconsciousness of guilt\u201d); see also, Commonwealth v. Pegram, 450 Pa. 590, 593-594, 301 A.2d 695, 697 (1973) (flight plus other factors indicating that the person flee ing has something to hide may constitute probable cause to arrest) (citations omitted); Commonwealth v. Frank, 407 Pa.Super. 500, 507, 595 A.2d 1258, 1262 (1991) (flight coupled with additional facts that point to the suspect\u2019s guilt may give rise to probable cause to arrest). Certainly, these were not the actions of an innocent individual and those actions gave rise to probable cause which supported the officers\u2019s arrest and search of appellant. See Commonwealth v. Lawson, 454 Pa. 23, 309 A.2d 391 (1973) (probable cause existed where police officer observed three commercial transactions on the street involving unidentified items)."},"case_id":7872252,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Moreover, in determining probable cause, the circumstances must be viewed from the vantage point of a prudent, reasonable, cautious police officer guided by his training and experience. While a single surreptitious \"commercial transaction\" may not give rise to probable cause, and while flight alone does not give rise to probable cause, the totality of those circumstances surely does, especially when the flight following a transaction consistent with an illicit drug sale, is unprovoked by any actions of the police other than their \"mere presence.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"88 S.Ct. 1889, 1904","parenthetical":"\"deliberately furtive actions and flight at the approach of strangers or law officers are strong indicia of mens rea\"","sentence":"See Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 66, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 1904, 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968) (\u201cdeliberately furtive actions and flight at the approach of strangers or law officers are strong indicia of mens rea\u201d) (citations omitted); Commonwealth v. Collins, 440 Pa. 368, 371, 269 A.2d 882, 884 (1970) (flight may indicate \u201cconsciousness of guilt\u201d); see also, Commonwealth v. Pegram, 450 Pa. 590, 593-594, 301 A.2d 695, 697 (1973) (flight plus other factors indicating that the person flee ing has something to hide may constitute probable cause to arrest) (citations omitted); Commonwealth v. Frank, 407 Pa.Super. 500, 507, 595 A.2d 1258, 1262 (1991) (flight coupled with additional facts that point to the suspect\u2019s guilt may give rise to probable cause to arrest). Certainly, these were not the actions of an innocent individual and those actions gave rise to probable cause which supported the officers\u2019s arrest and search of appellant. See Commonwealth v. Lawson, 454 Pa. 23, 309 A.2d 391 (1973) (probable cause existed where police officer observed three commercial transactions on the street involving unidentified items)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"probable cause existed where police officer observed three commercial transactions on the street involving unidentified items","sentence":"See Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 66, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 1904, 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968) (\u201cdeliberately furtive actions and flight at the approach of strangers or law officers are strong indicia of mens rea\u201d) (citations omitted); Commonwealth v. Collins, 440 Pa. 368, 371, 269 A.2d 882, 884 (1970) (flight may indicate \u201cconsciousness of guilt\u201d); see also, Commonwealth v. Pegram, 450 Pa. 590, 593-594, 301 A.2d 695, 697 (1973) (flight plus other factors indicating that the person flee ing has something to hide may constitute probable cause to arrest) (citations omitted); Commonwealth v. Frank, 407 Pa.Super. 500, 507, 595 A.2d 1258, 1262 (1991) (flight coupled with additional facts that point to the suspect\u2019s guilt may give rise to probable cause to arrest). Certainly, these were not the actions of an innocent individual and those actions gave rise to probable cause which supported the officers\u2019s arrest and search of appellant. See Commonwealth v. Lawson, 454 Pa. 23, 309 A.2d 391 (1973) (probable cause existed where police officer observed three commercial transactions on the street involving unidentified items)."},"case_id":7872252,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Moreover, in determining probable cause, the circumstances must be viewed from the vantage point of a prudent, reasonable, cautious police officer guided by his training and experience. While a single surreptitious \"commercial transaction\" may not give rise to probable cause, and while flight alone does not give rise to probable cause, the totality of those circumstances surely does, especially when the flight following a transaction consistent with an illicit drug sale, is unprovoked by any actions of the police other than their \"mere presence.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"450 Pa. 590, 593-594","parenthetical":"flight plus other factors indicating that the person flee ing has something to hide may constitute probable cause to arrest","sentence":"See Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 66, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 1904, 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968) (\u201cdeliberately furtive actions and flight at the approach of strangers or law officers are strong indicia of mens rea\u201d) (citations omitted); Commonwealth v. Collins, 440 Pa. 368, 371, 269 A.2d 882, 884 (1970) (flight may indicate \u201cconsciousness of guilt\u201d); see also, Commonwealth v. Pegram, 450 Pa. 590, 593-594, 301 A.2d 695, 697 (1973) (flight plus other factors indicating that the person flee ing has something to hide may constitute probable cause to arrest) (citations omitted); Commonwealth v. Frank, 407 Pa.Super. 500, 507, 595 A.2d 1258, 1262 (1991) (flight coupled with additional facts that point to the suspect\u2019s guilt may give rise to probable cause to arrest). Certainly, these were not the actions of an innocent individual and those actions gave rise to probable cause which supported the officers\u2019s arrest and search of appellant. See Commonwealth v. Lawson, 454 Pa. 23, 309 A.2d 391 (1973) (probable cause existed where police officer observed three commercial transactions on the street involving unidentified items)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"deliberately furtive actions and flight at the approach of strangers or law officers are strong indicia of mens rea\"","sentence":"See Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 66, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 1904, 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968) (\u201cdeliberately furtive actions and flight at the approach of strangers or law officers are strong indicia of mens rea\u201d) (citations omitted); Commonwealth v. Collins, 440 Pa. 368, 371, 269 A.2d 882, 884 (1970) (flight may indicate \u201cconsciousness of guilt\u201d); see also, Commonwealth v. Pegram, 450 Pa. 590, 593-594, 301 A.2d 695, 697 (1973) (flight plus other factors indicating that the person flee ing has something to hide may constitute probable cause to arrest) (citations omitted); Commonwealth v. Frank, 407 Pa.Super. 500, 507, 595 A.2d 1258, 1262 (1991) (flight coupled with additional facts that point to the suspect\u2019s guilt may give rise to probable cause to arrest). Certainly, these were not the actions of an innocent individual and those actions gave rise to probable cause which supported the officers\u2019s arrest and search of appellant. See Commonwealth v. Lawson, 454 Pa. 23, 309 A.2d 391 (1973) (probable cause existed where police officer observed three commercial transactions on the street involving unidentified items)."},"case_id":7872252,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Moreover, in determining probable cause, the circumstances must be viewed from the vantage point of a prudent, reasonable, cautious police officer guided by his training and experience. While a single surreptitious \"commercial transaction\" may not give rise to probable cause, and while flight alone does not give rise to probable cause, the totality of those circumstances surely does, especially when the flight following a transaction consistent with an illicit drug sale, is unprovoked by any actions of the police other than their \"mere presence.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"deliberately furtive actions and flight at the approach of strangers or law officers are strong indicia of mens rea\"","sentence":"See Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 66, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 1904, 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968) (\u201cdeliberately furtive actions and flight at the approach of strangers or law officers are strong indicia of mens rea\u201d) (citations omitted); Commonwealth v. Collins, 440 Pa. 368, 371, 269 A.2d 882, 884 (1970) (flight may indicate \u201cconsciousness of guilt\u201d); see also, Commonwealth v. Pegram, 450 Pa. 590, 593-594, 301 A.2d 695, 697 (1973) (flight plus other factors indicating that the person flee ing has something to hide may constitute probable cause to arrest) (citations omitted); Commonwealth v. Frank, 407 Pa.Super. 500, 507, 595 A.2d 1258, 1262 (1991) (flight coupled with additional facts that point to the suspect\u2019s guilt may give rise to probable cause to arrest). Certainly, these were not the actions of an innocent individual and those actions gave rise to probable cause which supported the officers\u2019s arrest and search of appellant. See Commonwealth v. Lawson, 454 Pa. 23, 309 A.2d 391 (1973) (probable cause existed where police officer observed three commercial transactions on the street involving unidentified items)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"301 A.2d 695, 697","parenthetical":"flight plus other factors indicating that the person flee ing has something to hide may constitute probable cause to arrest","sentence":"See Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 66, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 1904, 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968) (\u201cdeliberately furtive actions and flight at the approach of strangers or law officers are strong indicia of mens rea\u201d) (citations omitted); Commonwealth v. Collins, 440 Pa. 368, 371, 269 A.2d 882, 884 (1970) (flight may indicate \u201cconsciousness of guilt\u201d); see also, Commonwealth v. Pegram, 450 Pa. 590, 593-594, 301 A.2d 695, 697 (1973) (flight plus other factors indicating that the person flee ing has something to hide may constitute probable cause to arrest) (citations omitted); Commonwealth v. Frank, 407 Pa.Super. 500, 507, 595 A.2d 1258, 1262 (1991) (flight coupled with additional facts that point to the suspect\u2019s guilt may give rise to probable cause to arrest). Certainly, these were not the actions of an innocent individual and those actions gave rise to probable cause which supported the officers\u2019s arrest and search of appellant. See Commonwealth v. Lawson, 454 Pa. 23, 309 A.2d 391 (1973) (probable cause existed where police officer observed three commercial transactions on the street involving unidentified items)."},"case_id":7872252,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Moreover, in determining probable cause, the circumstances must be viewed from the vantage point of a prudent, reasonable, cautious police officer guided by his training and experience. While a single surreptitious \"commercial transaction\" may not give rise to probable cause, and while flight alone does not give rise to probable cause, the totality of those circumstances surely does, especially when the flight following a transaction consistent with an illicit drug sale, is unprovoked by any actions of the police other than their \"mere presence.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"deliberately furtive actions and flight at the approach of strangers or law officers are strong indicia of mens rea\"","sentence":"See Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 66, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 1904, 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968) (\u201cdeliberately furtive actions and flight at the approach of strangers or law officers are strong indicia of mens rea\u201d) (citations omitted); Commonwealth v. Collins, 440 Pa. 368, 371, 269 A.2d 882, 884 (1970) (flight may indicate \u201cconsciousness of guilt\u201d); see also, Commonwealth v. Pegram, 450 Pa. 590, 593-594, 301 A.2d 695, 697 (1973) (flight plus other factors indicating that the person flee ing has something to hide may constitute probable cause to arrest) (citations omitted); Commonwealth v. Frank, 407 Pa.Super. 500, 507, 595 A.2d 1258, 1262 (1991) (flight coupled with additional facts that point to the suspect\u2019s guilt may give rise to probable cause to arrest). Certainly, these were not the actions of an innocent individual and those actions gave rise to probable cause which supported the officers\u2019s arrest and search of appellant. See Commonwealth v. Lawson, 454 Pa. 23, 309 A.2d 391 (1973) (probable cause existed where police officer observed three commercial transactions on the street involving unidentified items)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"407 Pa.Super. 500, 507","parenthetical":"flight coupled with additional facts that point to the suspect's guilt may give rise to probable cause to arrest","sentence":"See Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 66, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 1904, 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968) (\u201cdeliberately furtive actions and flight at the approach of strangers or law officers are strong indicia of mens rea\u201d) (citations omitted); Commonwealth v. Collins, 440 Pa. 368, 371, 269 A.2d 882, 884 (1970) (flight may indicate \u201cconsciousness of guilt\u201d); see also, Commonwealth v. Pegram, 450 Pa. 590, 593-594, 301 A.2d 695, 697 (1973) (flight plus other factors indicating that the person flee ing has something to hide may constitute probable cause to arrest) (citations omitted); Commonwealth v. Frank, 407 Pa.Super. 500, 507, 595 A.2d 1258, 1262 (1991) (flight coupled with additional facts that point to the suspect\u2019s guilt may give rise to probable cause to arrest). Certainly, these were not the actions of an innocent individual and those actions gave rise to probable cause which supported the officers\u2019s arrest and search of appellant. See Commonwealth v. Lawson, 454 Pa. 23, 309 A.2d 391 (1973) (probable cause existed where police officer observed three commercial transactions on the street involving unidentified items)."},"case_id":7872252,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Moreover, in determining probable cause, the circumstances must be viewed from the vantage point of a prudent, reasonable, cautious police officer guided by his training and experience. While a single surreptitious \"commercial transaction\" may not give rise to probable cause, and while flight alone does not give rise to probable cause, the totality of those circumstances surely does, especially when the flight following a transaction consistent with an illicit drug sale, is unprovoked by any actions of the police other than their \"mere presence.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"deliberately furtive actions and flight at the approach of strangers or law officers are strong indicia of mens rea\"","sentence":"See Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 66, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 1904, 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968) (\u201cdeliberately furtive actions and flight at the approach of strangers or law officers are strong indicia of mens rea\u201d) (citations omitted); Commonwealth v. Collins, 440 Pa. 368, 371, 269 A.2d 882, 884 (1970) (flight may indicate \u201cconsciousness of guilt\u201d); see also, Commonwealth v. Pegram, 450 Pa. 590, 593-594, 301 A.2d 695, 697 (1973) (flight plus other factors indicating that the person flee ing has something to hide may constitute probable cause to arrest) (citations omitted); Commonwealth v. Frank, 407 Pa.Super. 500, 507, 595 A.2d 1258, 1262 (1991) (flight coupled with additional facts that point to the suspect\u2019s guilt may give rise to probable cause to arrest). Certainly, these were not the actions of an innocent individual and those actions gave rise to probable cause which supported the officers\u2019s arrest and search of appellant. See Commonwealth v. Lawson, 454 Pa. 23, 309 A.2d 391 (1973) (probable cause existed where police officer observed three commercial transactions on the street involving unidentified items)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"595 A.2d 1258, 1262","parenthetical":"flight coupled with additional facts that point to the suspect's guilt may give rise to probable cause to arrest","sentence":"See Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 66, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 1904, 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968) (\u201cdeliberately furtive actions and flight at the approach of strangers or law officers are strong indicia of mens rea\u201d) (citations omitted); Commonwealth v. Collins, 440 Pa. 368, 371, 269 A.2d 882, 884 (1970) (flight may indicate \u201cconsciousness of guilt\u201d); see also, Commonwealth v. Pegram, 450 Pa. 590, 593-594, 301 A.2d 695, 697 (1973) (flight plus other factors indicating that the person flee ing has something to hide may constitute probable cause to arrest) (citations omitted); Commonwealth v. Frank, 407 Pa.Super. 500, 507, 595 A.2d 1258, 1262 (1991) (flight coupled with additional facts that point to the suspect\u2019s guilt may give rise to probable cause to arrest). Certainly, these were not the actions of an innocent individual and those actions gave rise to probable cause which supported the officers\u2019s arrest and search of appellant. See Commonwealth v. Lawson, 454 Pa. 23, 309 A.2d 391 (1973) (probable cause existed where police officer observed three commercial transactions on the street involving unidentified items)."},"case_id":7872252,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Moreover, in determining probable cause, the circumstances must be viewed from the vantage point of a prudent, reasonable, cautious police officer guided by his training and experience. While a single surreptitious \"commercial transaction\" may not give rise to probable cause, and while flight alone does not give rise to probable cause, the totality of those circumstances surely does, especially when the flight following a transaction consistent with an illicit drug sale, is unprovoked by any actions of the police other than their \"mere presence.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"deliberately furtive actions and flight at the approach of strangers or law officers are strong indicia of mens rea\"","sentence":"See Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 66, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 1904, 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968) (\u201cdeliberately furtive actions and flight at the approach of strangers or law officers are strong indicia of mens rea\u201d) (citations omitted); Commonwealth v. Collins, 440 Pa. 368, 371, 269 A.2d 882, 884 (1970) (flight may indicate \u201cconsciousness of guilt\u201d); see also, Commonwealth v. Pegram, 450 Pa. 590, 593-594, 301 A.2d 695, 697 (1973) (flight plus other factors indicating that the person flee ing has something to hide may constitute probable cause to arrest) (citations omitted); Commonwealth v. Frank, 407 Pa.Super. 500, 507, 595 A.2d 1258, 1262 (1991) (flight coupled with additional facts that point to the suspect\u2019s guilt may give rise to probable cause to arrest). Certainly, these were not the actions of an innocent individual and those actions gave rise to probable cause which supported the officers\u2019s arrest and search of appellant. See Commonwealth v. Lawson, 454 Pa. 23, 309 A.2d 391 (1973) (probable cause existed where police officer observed three commercial transactions on the street involving unidentified items)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"probable cause existed where police officer observed three commercial transactions on the street involving unidentified items","sentence":"See Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 66, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 1904, 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968) (\u201cdeliberately furtive actions and flight at the approach of strangers or law officers are strong indicia of mens rea\u201d) (citations omitted); Commonwealth v. Collins, 440 Pa. 368, 371, 269 A.2d 882, 884 (1970) (flight may indicate \u201cconsciousness of guilt\u201d); see also, Commonwealth v. Pegram, 450 Pa. 590, 593-594, 301 A.2d 695, 697 (1973) (flight plus other factors indicating that the person flee ing has something to hide may constitute probable cause to arrest) (citations omitted); Commonwealth v. Frank, 407 Pa.Super. 500, 507, 595 A.2d 1258, 1262 (1991) (flight coupled with additional facts that point to the suspect\u2019s guilt may give rise to probable cause to arrest). Certainly, these were not the actions of an innocent individual and those actions gave rise to probable cause which supported the officers\u2019s arrest and search of appellant. See Commonwealth v. Lawson, 454 Pa. 23, 309 A.2d 391 (1973) (probable cause existed where police officer observed three commercial transactions on the street involving unidentified items)."},"case_id":7872252,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Moreover, in determining probable cause, the circumstances must be viewed from the vantage point of a prudent, reasonable, cautious police officer guided by his training and experience. While a single surreptitious \"commercial transaction\" may not give rise to probable cause, and while flight alone does not give rise to probable cause, the totality of those circumstances surely does, especially when the flight following a transaction consistent with an illicit drug sale, is unprovoked by any actions of the police other than their \"mere presence.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"probable cause existed where police officer observed three commercial transactions on the street involving unidentified items","sentence":"See Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 66, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 1904, 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968) (\u201cdeliberately furtive actions and flight at the approach of strangers or law officers are strong indicia of mens rea\u201d) (citations omitted); Commonwealth v. Collins, 440 Pa. 368, 371, 269 A.2d 882, 884 (1970) (flight may indicate \u201cconsciousness of guilt\u201d); see also, Commonwealth v. Pegram, 450 Pa. 590, 593-594, 301 A.2d 695, 697 (1973) (flight plus other factors indicating that the person flee ing has something to hide may constitute probable cause to arrest) (citations omitted); Commonwealth v. Frank, 407 Pa.Super. 500, 507, 595 A.2d 1258, 1262 (1991) (flight coupled with additional facts that point to the suspect\u2019s guilt may give rise to probable cause to arrest). Certainly, these were not the actions of an innocent individual and those actions gave rise to probable cause which supported the officers\u2019s arrest and search of appellant. See Commonwealth v. Lawson, 454 Pa. 23, 309 A.2d 391 (1973) (probable cause existed where police officer observed three commercial transactions on the street involving unidentified items)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"deliberately furtive actions and flight at the approach of strangers or law officers are strong indicia of mens rea\"","sentence":"See Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 66, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 1904, 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968) (\u201cdeliberately furtive actions and flight at the approach of strangers or law officers are strong indicia of mens rea\u201d) (citations omitted); Commonwealth v. Collins, 440 Pa. 368, 371, 269 A.2d 882, 884 (1970) (flight may indicate \u201cconsciousness of guilt\u201d); see also, Commonwealth v. Pegram, 450 Pa. 590, 593-594, 301 A.2d 695, 697 (1973) (flight plus other factors indicating that the person flee ing has something to hide may constitute probable cause to arrest) (citations omitted); Commonwealth v. Frank, 407 Pa.Super. 500, 507, 595 A.2d 1258, 1262 (1991) (flight coupled with additional facts that point to the suspect\u2019s guilt may give rise to probable cause to arrest). Certainly, these were not the actions of an innocent individual and those actions gave rise to probable cause which supported the officers\u2019s arrest and search of appellant. See Commonwealth v. Lawson, 454 Pa. 23, 309 A.2d 391 (1973) (probable cause existed where police officer observed three commercial transactions on the street involving unidentified items)."},"case_id":7872252,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Rather, materiality under Harrington requires that the evidence in question will materially alter the result on retrial. In many cases, there will be little or no practical difference. But the Harrington test is clearly framed in terms of what will happen on retrial rather than what happened at the original trial.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"410 F.3d 601, 601","parenthetical":"\"[T]he evidence must indicate that a new trial would probably result in acquittal.\"","sentence":"See Harrington, 410 F.3d at 601 (\u201c[T]he evidence must indicate that a new trial would probably result in acquittal.\u201d); see also Krasny, 607 F.2d at 844 (\u201cYet, we have always required a showing that the new evidence would \u2018probably\u2019 result in an acquittal upon a new trial.\u201d); id. at 845 n. 3 (explaining that materiality and probability \u201care really two means of measuring the same thing\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"607 F.2d 844, 844","parenthetical":"\"Yet, we have always required a showing that the new evidence would 'probably' result in an acquittal upon a new trial.\"","sentence":"See Harrington, 410 F.3d at 601 (\u201c[T]he evidence must indicate that a new trial would probably result in acquittal.\u201d); see also Krasny, 607 F.2d at 844 (\u201cYet, we have always required a showing that the new evidence would \u2018probably\u2019 result in an acquittal upon a new trial.\u201d); id. at 845 n. 3 (explaining that materiality and probability \u201care really two means of measuring the same thing\u201d)."},"case_id":3698970,"label":"a"}
{"context":"She noted that the letter makes no reference to the basis or source of the threat and concluded that \"[i]t could as easily be ... due to a love dispute.\" This not only constitutes further conjecture, but, as another court has observed, persecutors are hardly \"given adequate notice that our government expects them to sign their names and reveal their individual identities when they deliver threatening messages.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"914 F.2d 1380, 1380","parenthetical":"noting they are also unlikely to provide affidavits attesting to acts of persecution","sentence":"Aguilera-Cota, 914 F.2d at 1380 (noting they are also unlikely to provide affidavits attesting to acts of persecution); see also Ladha v. INS, 215 F.3d 889, 905 n. 17 (9th Cir.2000) (excluding documents simply because they are \u201cself-serving\u201d is not a sound practice)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"excluding documents simply because they are \"self-serving\" is not a sound practice","sentence":"Aguilera-Cota, 914 F.2d at 1380 (noting they are also unlikely to provide affidavits attesting to acts of persecution); see also Ladha v. INS, 215 F.3d 889, 905 n. 17 (9th Cir.2000) (excluding documents simply because they are \u201cself-serving\u201d is not a sound practice)."},"case_id":9111466,"label":"a"}
{"context":"To determine the contours of the relevant claim, we need to establish which of Frazier's petitions -- his Rule 32 petition presented to the Alabama courts or his habeas petition, along with the expanded record, presented to the district court -- we must review. In short, we review the former and may not consider the latter.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"602 F.3d 1273, 1273","parenthetical":"\"[W]e look only to the allegations in [petitioner's] Rule 32 petition and whether those allegations sufficiently state a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel.\"","sentence":"Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. \u2014, 131 S.Ct. 1388, 1398, 179 L.Ed.2d 557 (2011) (\u201cWe now hold that review under \u00a7 2254(d)(1) is limited to the record that was before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits.\u201d); see also Powell, 602 F.3d at 1273 (\u201c[W]e look only to the allegations in [petitioner\u2019s] Rule 32 petition and whether those allegations sufficiently state a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel.\u201d). Our review is therefore limited to the claims presented to and the record developed by the Alabama courts in Frazier\u2019s Rule 32 proceedings."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"131 S.Ct. 1388, 1398","parenthetical":"\"We now hold that review under SS 2254(d)(1) is limited to the record that was before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits.\"","sentence":"Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. \u2014, 131 S.Ct. 1388, 1398, 179 L.Ed.2d 557 (2011) (\u201cWe now hold that review under \u00a7 2254(d)(1) is limited to the record that was before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits.\u201d); see also Powell, 602 F.3d at 1273 (\u201c[W]e look only to the allegations in [petitioner\u2019s] Rule 32 petition and whether those allegations sufficiently state a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel.\u201d). Our review is therefore limited to the claims presented to and the record developed by the Alabama courts in Frazier\u2019s Rule 32 proceedings."},"case_id":6050449,"label":"b"}
{"context":"To determine the contours of the relevant claim, we need to establish which of Frazier's petitions -- his Rule 32 petition presented to the Alabama courts or his habeas petition, along with the expanded record, presented to the district court -- we must review. In short, we review the former and may not consider the latter.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"We now hold that review under SS 2254(d)(1) is limited to the record that was before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits.\"","sentence":"Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. \u2014, 131 S.Ct. 1388, 1398, 179 L.Ed.2d 557 (2011) (\u201cWe now hold that review under \u00a7 2254(d)(1) is limited to the record that was before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits.\u201d); see also Powell, 602 F.3d at 1273 (\u201c[W]e look only to the allegations in [petitioner\u2019s] Rule 32 petition and whether those allegations sufficiently state a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel.\u201d). Our review is therefore limited to the claims presented to and the record developed by the Alabama courts in Frazier\u2019s Rule 32 proceedings."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"602 F.3d 1273, 1273","parenthetical":"\"[W]e look only to the allegations in [petitioner's] Rule 32 petition and whether those allegations sufficiently state a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel.\"","sentence":"Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. \u2014, 131 S.Ct. 1388, 1398, 179 L.Ed.2d 557 (2011) (\u201cWe now hold that review under \u00a7 2254(d)(1) is limited to the record that was before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits.\u201d); see also Powell, 602 F.3d at 1273 (\u201c[W]e look only to the allegations in [petitioner\u2019s] Rule 32 petition and whether those allegations sufficiently state a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel.\u201d). Our review is therefore limited to the claims presented to and the record developed by the Alabama courts in Frazier\u2019s Rule 32 proceedings."},"case_id":6050449,"label":"a"}
{"context":"However, Officer Gustin did not testify or otherwise indicate that he believed the vehicle was stolen, or that at the time when he checked the VINs, he had any reason to suspect drugs were in the vehicle. No circumstances existed which suggested to Officer Gustin that the vehicle was stolen or that the Castners had committed any crime.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"864 F.2d 1519, 1519-20","parenthetical":"no objective circumstances suggested defendant had committed any crime more serious than failure to wear seat belt","sentence":"See Guzman, 864 F.2d at 1519-20 (no objective circumstances suggested defendant had committed any crime more serious than failure to wear seat belt); cf. United States v. Obregon, 748 F.2d 1371, 1376 (10th Cir.1984) (when driver of rented vehicle was not listed as authorized driver, continued detention was justified); State v. Marshall, 791 P.2d 880, 883-84 (Utah App.) (...), cert. denied, 800 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1990)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"748 F.2d 1371, 1376","parenthetical":"when driver of rented vehicle was not listed as authorized driver, continued detention was justified","sentence":"See Guzman, 864 F.2d at 1519-20 (no objective circumstances suggested defendant had committed any crime more serious than failure to wear seat belt); cf. United States v. Obregon, 748 F.2d 1371, 1376 (10th Cir.1984) (when driver of rented vehicle was not listed as authorized driver, continued detention was justified); State v. Marshall, 791 P.2d 880, 883-84 (Utah App.) (...), cert. denied, 800 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1990)."},"case_id":11716142,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The Traylor holding mirrors Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.111(d)(5), which provides that \"[i]f a waiver [of counsel] is accepted at any stage of the proceedings, the offer of assistance of counsel shall be renewed by the court at each subsequent stage of the proceedings at which the defendant appears without counsel.\" Thus, both Traylor and Rule 3.111(d)(5) indicate that a defendant may change his mind about self-representation at the beginning of any crucial stage of a criminal prosecution.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"576 So.2d 927, 928-29","parenthetical":"observing that a trial court incorrectly advised a defendant in stating that if the defendant elected self-representation at a suppression hearing, he could not change his mind and be represented at trial","sentence":"See Stinnett v. State, 576 So.2d 927, 928-29 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991) (observing that a trial court incorrectly advised a defendant in stating that if the defendant elected self-representation at a suppression hearing, he could not change his mind and be represented at trial); Cf. Horton v. Dugger, 895 F.2d 714, 716 (11th Cir.1990) (indicating that, under federal law, \u201c[t]he functional right of a defendant to withdraw his request to represent himself and reassert the right to counsel at any time immediately before, or perhaps even during trial, is, absent deliberate manipulation, virtually assured\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"895 F.2d 714, 716","parenthetical":"indicating that, under federal law, \"[t]he functional right of a defendant to withdraw his request to represent himself and reassert the right to counsel at any time immediately before, or perhaps even during trial, is, absent deliberate manipulation, virtually assured\"","sentence":"See Stinnett v. State, 576 So.2d 927, 928-29 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991) (observing that a trial court incorrectly advised a defendant in stating that if the defendant elected self-representation at a suppression hearing, he could not change his mind and be represented at trial); Cf. Horton v. Dugger, 895 F.2d 714, 716 (11th Cir.1990) (indicating that, under federal law, \u201c[t]he functional right of a defendant to withdraw his request to represent himself and reassert the right to counsel at any time immediately before, or perhaps even during trial, is, absent deliberate manipulation, virtually assured\u201d)."},"case_id":7037789,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Although all four instances can be described as impolite, none changes Adam's \"wealth\" or \"career prospects.\" And although they might be characterized as \"humiliating\" or \"degrading,\" Adam's allegations fail to rise to the level that the Seventh Circuit has held is necessary to demonstrate a \"significant negative alteration in the workplace.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"512 F.3d 972, 982","parenthetical":"holding that scolding an em ployee for absence by introducing the employee by saying, \"This is Amy, you probably haven't met her yet because she is never here,\" may have been \"offensive\" to the employee, but was merely a \"petty slight\" that \"does not amount to a materially adverse action\"","sentence":"See Breneisen v. Motorola, Inc., 512 F.3d 972, 982 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding that scolding an em ployee for absence by introducing the employee by saying, \u201cThis is Amy, you probably haven\u2019t met her yet because she is never here,\u201d may have been \u201coffensive\u201d to the employee, but was merely a \u201cpetty slight\u201d that \u201cdoes not amount to a materially adverse action\u201d); Rhodes v. Ill. DOT, 359 F.3d 498, 505 (7th Cir. 2004) (job reassignment, being marked absent in a manner inconsistent with company policy, being assigned uncomfortable and inconvenient tasks \u201cconstitute mere temporary inconveniences and do not rise to the level of an adverse employment action\u201d); Bell v. E.P.A., 232 F.3d 546, 554-55 (7th Cir. 2000) (\u201cdemeaning assignments, verbal abuse, surveillance, diminished responsibilities, refusal to cooperate on job assignments, and placements in situations designed to result in failure\u201d even in the aggregate, \u201cdo not rise to the level of actionable retaliation\u201d); Parkins v. Civil Constructors of Ill., Inc., 163 F.3d 1027, 1039 (7th Cir. 1998) (\u201costracism by fellow workers... .is not an adverse employment action where the plaintiff did not allege that the ostracism resulted in a reduced salary, benefits, seniority, or responsibilities\u201d (citing Flannery v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 160 F.3d 425, 428 (8th Cir. 1998))); see also Somoza v. Univ. of Denver, 513 F.3d 1206, 1214-15 (10th Cir. 2008) (isolated incidents of co-worker incivility at a meeting, including eye-rolling, laughing at plaintiffs opinions, and commenting behind his back, were not materially adverse)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"513 F.3d 1206, 1214-15","parenthetical":"isolated incidents of co-worker incivility at a meeting, including eye-rolling, laughing at plaintiffs opinions, and commenting behind his back, were not materially adverse","sentence":"See Breneisen v. Motorola, Inc., 512 F.3d 972, 982 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding that scolding an em ployee for absence by introducing the employee by saying, \u201cThis is Amy, you probably haven\u2019t met her yet because she is never here,\u201d may have been \u201coffensive\u201d to the employee, but was merely a \u201cpetty slight\u201d that \u201cdoes not amount to a materially adverse action\u201d); Rhodes v. Ill. DOT, 359 F.3d 498, 505 (7th Cir. 2004) (job reassignment, being marked absent in a manner inconsistent with company policy, being assigned uncomfortable and inconvenient tasks \u201cconstitute mere temporary inconveniences and do not rise to the level of an adverse employment action\u201d); Bell v. E.P.A., 232 F.3d 546, 554-55 (7th Cir. 2000) (\u201cdemeaning assignments, verbal abuse, surveillance, diminished responsibilities, refusal to cooperate on job assignments, and placements in situations designed to result in failure\u201d even in the aggregate, \u201cdo not rise to the level of actionable retaliation\u201d); Parkins v. Civil Constructors of Ill., Inc., 163 F.3d 1027, 1039 (7th Cir. 1998) (\u201costracism by fellow workers... .is not an adverse employment action where the plaintiff did not allege that the ostracism resulted in a reduced salary, benefits, seniority, or responsibilities\u201d (citing Flannery v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 160 F.3d 425, 428 (8th Cir. 1998))); see also Somoza v. Univ. of Denver, 513 F.3d 1206, 1214-15 (10th Cir. 2008) (isolated incidents of co-worker incivility at a meeting, including eye-rolling, laughing at plaintiffs opinions, and commenting behind his back, were not materially adverse)."},"case_id":12272275,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Although all four instances can be described as impolite, none changes Adam's \"wealth\" or \"career prospects.\" And although they might be characterized as \"humiliating\" or \"degrading,\" Adam's allegations fail to rise to the level that the Seventh Circuit has held is necessary to demonstrate a \"significant negative alteration in the workplace.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"359 F.3d 498, 505","parenthetical":"job reassignment, being marked absent in a manner inconsistent with company policy, being assigned uncomfortable and inconvenient tasks \"constitute mere temporary inconveniences and do not rise to the level of an adverse employment action\"","sentence":"See Breneisen v. Motorola, Inc., 512 F.3d 972, 982 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding that scolding an em ployee for absence by introducing the employee by saying, \u201cThis is Amy, you probably haven\u2019t met her yet because she is never here,\u201d may have been \u201coffensive\u201d to the employee, but was merely a \u201cpetty slight\u201d that \u201cdoes not amount to a materially adverse action\u201d); Rhodes v. Ill. DOT, 359 F.3d 498, 505 (7th Cir. 2004) (job reassignment, being marked absent in a manner inconsistent with company policy, being assigned uncomfortable and inconvenient tasks \u201cconstitute mere temporary inconveniences and do not rise to the level of an adverse employment action\u201d); Bell v. E.P.A., 232 F.3d 546, 554-55 (7th Cir. 2000) (\u201cdemeaning assignments, verbal abuse, surveillance, diminished responsibilities, refusal to cooperate on job assignments, and placements in situations designed to result in failure\u201d even in the aggregate, \u201cdo not rise to the level of actionable retaliation\u201d); Parkins v. Civil Constructors of Ill., Inc., 163 F.3d 1027, 1039 (7th Cir. 1998) (\u201costracism by fellow workers... .is not an adverse employment action where the plaintiff did not allege that the ostracism resulted in a reduced salary, benefits, seniority, or responsibilities\u201d (citing Flannery v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 160 F.3d 425, 428 (8th Cir. 1998))); see also Somoza v. Univ. of Denver, 513 F.3d 1206, 1214-15 (10th Cir. 2008) (isolated incidents of co-worker incivility at a meeting, including eye-rolling, laughing at plaintiffs opinions, and commenting behind his back, were not materially adverse)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"513 F.3d 1206, 1214-15","parenthetical":"isolated incidents of co-worker incivility at a meeting, including eye-rolling, laughing at plaintiffs opinions, and commenting behind his back, were not materially adverse","sentence":"See Breneisen v. Motorola, Inc., 512 F.3d 972, 982 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding that scolding an em ployee for absence by introducing the employee by saying, \u201cThis is Amy, you probably haven\u2019t met her yet because she is never here,\u201d may have been \u201coffensive\u201d to the employee, but was merely a \u201cpetty slight\u201d that \u201cdoes not amount to a materially adverse action\u201d); Rhodes v. Ill. DOT, 359 F.3d 498, 505 (7th Cir. 2004) (job reassignment, being marked absent in a manner inconsistent with company policy, being assigned uncomfortable and inconvenient tasks \u201cconstitute mere temporary inconveniences and do not rise to the level of an adverse employment action\u201d); Bell v. E.P.A., 232 F.3d 546, 554-55 (7th Cir. 2000) (\u201cdemeaning assignments, verbal abuse, surveillance, diminished responsibilities, refusal to cooperate on job assignments, and placements in situations designed to result in failure\u201d even in the aggregate, \u201cdo not rise to the level of actionable retaliation\u201d); Parkins v. Civil Constructors of Ill., Inc., 163 F.3d 1027, 1039 (7th Cir. 1998) (\u201costracism by fellow workers... .is not an adverse employment action where the plaintiff did not allege that the ostracism resulted in a reduced salary, benefits, seniority, or responsibilities\u201d (citing Flannery v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 160 F.3d 425, 428 (8th Cir. 1998))); see also Somoza v. Univ. of Denver, 513 F.3d 1206, 1214-15 (10th Cir. 2008) (isolated incidents of co-worker incivility at a meeting, including eye-rolling, laughing at plaintiffs opinions, and commenting behind his back, were not materially adverse)."},"case_id":12272275,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Although all four instances can be described as impolite, none changes Adam's \"wealth\" or \"career prospects.\" And although they might be characterized as \"humiliating\" or \"degrading,\" Adam's allegations fail to rise to the level that the Seventh Circuit has held is necessary to demonstrate a \"significant negative alteration in the workplace.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"232 F.3d 546, 554-55","parenthetical":"\"demeaning assignments, verbal abuse, surveillance, diminished responsibilities, refusal to cooperate on job assignments, and placements in situations designed to result in failure\" even in the aggregate, \"do not rise to the level of actionable retaliation\"","sentence":"See Breneisen v. Motorola, Inc., 512 F.3d 972, 982 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding that scolding an em ployee for absence by introducing the employee by saying, \u201cThis is Amy, you probably haven\u2019t met her yet because she is never here,\u201d may have been \u201coffensive\u201d to the employee, but was merely a \u201cpetty slight\u201d that \u201cdoes not amount to a materially adverse action\u201d); Rhodes v. Ill. DOT, 359 F.3d 498, 505 (7th Cir. 2004) (job reassignment, being marked absent in a manner inconsistent with company policy, being assigned uncomfortable and inconvenient tasks \u201cconstitute mere temporary inconveniences and do not rise to the level of an adverse employment action\u201d); Bell v. E.P.A., 232 F.3d 546, 554-55 (7th Cir. 2000) (\u201cdemeaning assignments, verbal abuse, surveillance, diminished responsibilities, refusal to cooperate on job assignments, and placements in situations designed to result in failure\u201d even in the aggregate, \u201cdo not rise to the level of actionable retaliation\u201d); Parkins v. Civil Constructors of Ill., Inc., 163 F.3d 1027, 1039 (7th Cir. 1998) (\u201costracism by fellow workers... .is not an adverse employment action where the plaintiff did not allege that the ostracism resulted in a reduced salary, benefits, seniority, or responsibilities\u201d (citing Flannery v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 160 F.3d 425, 428 (8th Cir. 1998))); see also Somoza v. Univ. of Denver, 513 F.3d 1206, 1214-15 (10th Cir. 2008) (isolated incidents of co-worker incivility at a meeting, including eye-rolling, laughing at plaintiffs opinions, and commenting behind his back, were not materially adverse)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"513 F.3d 1206, 1214-15","parenthetical":"isolated incidents of co-worker incivility at a meeting, including eye-rolling, laughing at plaintiffs opinions, and commenting behind his back, were not materially adverse","sentence":"See Breneisen v. Motorola, Inc., 512 F.3d 972, 982 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding that scolding an em ployee for absence by introducing the employee by saying, \u201cThis is Amy, you probably haven\u2019t met her yet because she is never here,\u201d may have been \u201coffensive\u201d to the employee, but was merely a \u201cpetty slight\u201d that \u201cdoes not amount to a materially adverse action\u201d); Rhodes v. Ill. DOT, 359 F.3d 498, 505 (7th Cir. 2004) (job reassignment, being marked absent in a manner inconsistent with company policy, being assigned uncomfortable and inconvenient tasks \u201cconstitute mere temporary inconveniences and do not rise to the level of an adverse employment action\u201d); Bell v. E.P.A., 232 F.3d 546, 554-55 (7th Cir. 2000) (\u201cdemeaning assignments, verbal abuse, surveillance, diminished responsibilities, refusal to cooperate on job assignments, and placements in situations designed to result in failure\u201d even in the aggregate, \u201cdo not rise to the level of actionable retaliation\u201d); Parkins v. Civil Constructors of Ill., Inc., 163 F.3d 1027, 1039 (7th Cir. 1998) (\u201costracism by fellow workers... .is not an adverse employment action where the plaintiff did not allege that the ostracism resulted in a reduced salary, benefits, seniority, or responsibilities\u201d (citing Flannery v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 160 F.3d 425, 428 (8th Cir. 1998))); see also Somoza v. Univ. of Denver, 513 F.3d 1206, 1214-15 (10th Cir. 2008) (isolated incidents of co-worker incivility at a meeting, including eye-rolling, laughing at plaintiffs opinions, and commenting behind his back, were not materially adverse)."},"case_id":12272275,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In her opening brief, White fails to challenge the district court's dismissal of her action, and thus she has waived any such challenge.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"194 F.3d 1045, 1052","parenthetical":"\"[0]n appeal, arguments not raised by a party in its opening brief are deemed waived.\"","sentence":"See Smith v. Marsh, 194 F.3d 1045, 1052 (9th Cir. 1999) (\u201c[0]n appeal, arguments not raised by a party in its opening brief are deemed waived.\u201d); see also Greenwood v. FAA, 28 F.3d 971, 977 (9th Cir. 1994) (\u201cWe will not manufacture arguments for an appellant, and a bare assertion does not preserve a claim.... \u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"28 F.3d 971, 977","parenthetical":"\"We will not manufacture arguments for an appellant, and a bare assertion does not preserve a claim.... \"","sentence":"See Smith v. Marsh, 194 F.3d 1045, 1052 (9th Cir. 1999) (\u201c[0]n appeal, arguments not raised by a party in its opening brief are deemed waived.\u201d); see also Greenwood v. FAA, 28 F.3d 971, 977 (9th Cir. 1994) (\u201cWe will not manufacture arguments for an appellant, and a bare assertion does not preserve a claim.... \u201d)."},"case_id":12405356,"label":"a"}
{"context":"When an employment agreement contains a noncompete covenant, the restriction survives the termination of the agreement if the agreement contains express language demonstrating that the parties intended its survival. Brenner v. Barco Chems.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"209 So.2d 277, 278","parenthetical":"holding that non-compete provisions survived the expiration of an employment agreement where (1","sentence":"Div., Inc., 209 So.2d 277, 278 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968) (holding that non-compete provisions survived the expiration of an employment agreement where (1) the contract expressly provided that the provisions would continue to apply if the employee continued working; and (2) the noncompete clause expressly stated it would continue to be in effect after the expiration or termination of employment). Where the parties expressly provide that the employee\u2019s rights and obligations outlast the expiration of the \u201cterm,\u201d the contract does not expire and enforcement of the noncompete provisions is warranted. Id. at 278; see also Century 21 Real Estate of S. Fla., Inc. v. Braun & May Realty, Inc., 706 So.2d 878, 879 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997) (approving Brenner, holding that agreement did not lapse where its terms provided for its post-term survival); cf. Gray v. Prime Mgmt. Group, Inc., 912 So.2d 711, 713 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005) (where a written employment agreement expires and the employee continues at-will via an oral agreement, a noncompete provision in the original written contract \u201ccannot always be enforced\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"706 So.2d 878, 879","parenthetical":"approving Brenner, holding that agreement did not lapse where its terms provided for its post-term survival","sentence":"Div., Inc., 209 So.2d 277, 278 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968) (holding that non-compete provisions survived the expiration of an employment agreement where (1) the contract expressly provided that the provisions would continue to apply if the employee continued working; and (2) the noncompete clause expressly stated it would continue to be in effect after the expiration or termination of employment). Where the parties expressly provide that the employee\u2019s rights and obligations outlast the expiration of the \u201cterm,\u201d the contract does not expire and enforcement of the noncompete provisions is warranted. Id. at 278; see also Century 21 Real Estate of S. Fla., Inc. v. Braun & May Realty, Inc., 706 So.2d 878, 879 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997) (approving Brenner, holding that agreement did not lapse where its terms provided for its post-term survival); cf. Gray v. Prime Mgmt. Group, Inc., 912 So.2d 711, 713 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005) (where a written employment agreement expires and the employee continues at-will via an oral agreement, a noncompete provision in the original written contract \u201ccannot always be enforced\u201d)."},"case_id":7029775,"label":"a"}
{"context":"When an employment agreement contains a noncompete covenant, the restriction survives the termination of the agreement if the agreement contains express language demonstrating that the parties intended its survival. Brenner v. Barco Chems.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"912 So.2d 711, 713","parenthetical":"where a written employment agreement expires and the employee continues at-will via an oral agreement, a noncompete provision in the original written contract \"cannot always be enforced\"","sentence":"Div., Inc., 209 So.2d 277, 278 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968) (holding that non-compete provisions survived the expiration of an employment agreement where (1) the contract expressly provided that the provisions would continue to apply if the employee continued working; and (2) the noncompete clause expressly stated it would continue to be in effect after the expiration or termination of employment). Where the parties expressly provide that the employee\u2019s rights and obligations outlast the expiration of the \u201cterm,\u201d the contract does not expire and enforcement of the noncompete provisions is warranted. Id. at 278; see also Century 21 Real Estate of S. Fla., Inc. v. Braun & May Realty, Inc., 706 So.2d 878, 879 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997) (approving Brenner, holding that agreement did not lapse where its terms provided for its post-term survival); cf. Gray v. Prime Mgmt. Group, Inc., 912 So.2d 711, 713 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005) (where a written employment agreement expires and the employee continues at-will via an oral agreement, a noncompete provision in the original written contract \u201ccannot always be enforced\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"209 So.2d 277, 278","parenthetical":"holding that non-compete provisions survived the expiration of an employment agreement where (1","sentence":"Div., Inc., 209 So.2d 277, 278 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968) (holding that non-compete provisions survived the expiration of an employment agreement where (1) the contract expressly provided that the provisions would continue to apply if the employee continued working; and (2) the noncompete clause expressly stated it would continue to be in effect after the expiration or termination of employment). Where the parties expressly provide that the employee\u2019s rights and obligations outlast the expiration of the \u201cterm,\u201d the contract does not expire and enforcement of the noncompete provisions is warranted. Id. at 278; see also Century 21 Real Estate of S. Fla., Inc. v. Braun & May Realty, Inc., 706 So.2d 878, 879 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997) (approving Brenner, holding that agreement did not lapse where its terms provided for its post-term survival); cf. Gray v. Prime Mgmt. Group, Inc., 912 So.2d 711, 713 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005) (where a written employment agreement expires and the employee continues at-will via an oral agreement, a noncompete provision in the original written contract \u201ccannot always be enforced\u201d)."},"case_id":7029775,"label":"b"}
{"context":"When an employment agreement contains a noncompete covenant, the restriction survives the termination of the agreement if the agreement contains express language demonstrating that the parties intended its survival. Brenner v. Barco Chems.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"706 So.2d 878, 879","parenthetical":"approving Brenner, holding that agreement did not lapse where its terms provided for its post-term survival","sentence":"Div., Inc., 209 So.2d 277, 278 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968) (holding that non-compete provisions survived the expiration of an employment agreement where (1) the contract expressly provided that the provisions would continue to apply if the employee continued working; and (2) the noncompete clause expressly stated it would continue to be in effect after the expiration or termination of employment). Where the parties expressly provide that the employee\u2019s rights and obligations outlast the expiration of the \u201cterm,\u201d the contract does not expire and enforcement of the noncompete provisions is warranted. Id. at 278; see also Century 21 Real Estate of S. Fla., Inc. v. Braun & May Realty, Inc., 706 So.2d 878, 879 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997) (approving Brenner, holding that agreement did not lapse where its terms provided for its post-term survival); cf. Gray v. Prime Mgmt. Group, Inc., 912 So.2d 711, 713 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005) (where a written employment agreement expires and the employee continues at-will via an oral agreement, a noncompete provision in the original written contract \u201ccannot always be enforced\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"912 So.2d 711, 713","parenthetical":"where a written employment agreement expires and the employee continues at-will via an oral agreement, a noncompete provision in the original written contract \"cannot always be enforced\"","sentence":"Div., Inc., 209 So.2d 277, 278 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968) (holding that non-compete provisions survived the expiration of an employment agreement where (1) the contract expressly provided that the provisions would continue to apply if the employee continued working; and (2) the noncompete clause expressly stated it would continue to be in effect after the expiration or termination of employment). Where the parties expressly provide that the employee\u2019s rights and obligations outlast the expiration of the \u201cterm,\u201d the contract does not expire and enforcement of the noncompete provisions is warranted. Id. at 278; see also Century 21 Real Estate of S. Fla., Inc. v. Braun & May Realty, Inc., 706 So.2d 878, 879 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997) (approving Brenner, holding that agreement did not lapse where its terms provided for its post-term survival); cf. Gray v. Prime Mgmt. Group, Inc., 912 So.2d 711, 713 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005) (where a written employment agreement expires and the employee continues at-will via an oral agreement, a noncompete provision in the original written contract \u201ccannot always be enforced\u201d)."},"case_id":7029775,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In a factually similar case, our court \"observe[d] that defendant's attorney could have been more careful by personally inspecting the [expert's] report before sending it out, on balance, thjs [first] factor weighs in favor of finding the work product protection was not waived.\" Applying these factors, our court's case law counsels against finding a waiver when a party must sift through a large expert report in a short amount of time and only produces a small number of documents inadvertently.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"179 F.R.D. 314, 314","parenthetical":"holding defendant had taken reasonable precautions to prevent inadvertent disclosure because defendant's attorney and an experienced legal assistant each reviewed thousands of documents before production","sentence":"See id. (finding evidence of reasonable precautionary measures when defense counsel had seven days\u2019 notice, produced more than 1,000 documents, and inadvertently produced just one document during three and half years of litigation); see also Wallace, 179 F.R.D. at 314 (holding defendant had taken reasonable precautions to prevent inadvertent disclosure because defendant\u2019s attorney and an experienced legal assistant each reviewed thousands of documents before production); but see Am. Cas. Co. v. Healthcare Indem., Inc., No. 00-2301-DJW, 2002 WL 1156273, at *1 (D. Kan. Apr. 19, 2002) (finding precautionary measures inadequate when the producing party had 17 days to produce the documents compared to the seven-day window in Zapata and inadvertently produced more than one privileged document)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"2002 WL 1156273, at *1","parenthetical":"finding precautionary measures inadequate when the producing party had 17 days to produce the documents compared to the seven-day window in Zapata and inadvertently produced more than one privileged document","sentence":"See id. (finding evidence of reasonable precautionary measures when defense counsel had seven days\u2019 notice, produced more than 1,000 documents, and inadvertently produced just one document during three and half years of litigation); see also Wallace, 179 F.R.D. at 314 (holding defendant had taken reasonable precautions to prevent inadvertent disclosure because defendant\u2019s attorney and an experienced legal assistant each reviewed thousands of documents before production); but see Am. Cas. Co. v. Healthcare Indem., Inc., No. 00-2301-DJW, 2002 WL 1156273, at *1 (D. Kan. Apr. 19, 2002) (finding precautionary measures inadequate when the producing party had 17 days to produce the documents compared to the seven-day window in Zapata and inadvertently produced more than one privileged document)."},"case_id":12310080,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The Court accepted that explanation of legislative intent, purpose and effect, understanding that SS 19.05(a)(2) connotes recklessness per se.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"529 S.W.2d 550, at 552","parenthetical":"specific intent to kill not element of SS 19.05 offense","sentence":"Guerrero v. State, 605 S.W.2d 262, at 264 (Tex.Cr.App.1980) (legislature determined conduct proscribed by \u00a7 19.05(a)(2) is \u201cequivalent of \u2018recklessly1 causing death of another\u201d under \u00a7 19.05(a)(1)); Ex parte Ross, 522 S.W.2d 214, at 218 (Tex.Cr.App. 1975) (involuntary manslaughter committed in either of two ways: recklessly causing death of another or by accident or mistake causing death by reason of intoxication while operating a motor vehicle); see Lewis v. State, 529 S.W.2d 550, at 552 (Tex.Cr.App.1975) (specific intent to kill not element of \u00a7 19.05 offense); Hardie v. State, 588 S.W.2d 936, at 938 (Tex.Cr.App.1979) (unnecessary allegation of \u201cknowingly and intentionally5\u2019 is surplusage properly excluded from jury charge); Daniel v. State, 577 S.W.2d 231, at 233 (Tex.Cr.App.1979) (\u201cmistake\u201d and \u201caccident\u201d mean \u201cunintentional\u201d); Thomason v. State, 388 S.W.2d 700, at 702 (Tex.Cr.App.1964) (as used in statute \u201cmistake\u201d and \u201caccident\u201d mean \u201cunintentional\u201d); Johnson v. State, 153 Tex.Cr.R. 59, 216 S.W.2d 573, at 578 (1948) (terms used in sense ordinarily understood and mean \u201cunintentional\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"522 S.W.2d 214, at 218","parenthetical":"involuntary manslaughter committed in either of two ways: recklessly causing death of another or by accident or mistake causing death by reason of intoxication while operating a motor vehicle","sentence":"Guerrero v. State, 605 S.W.2d 262, at 264 (Tex.Cr.App.1980) (legislature determined conduct proscribed by \u00a7 19.05(a)(2) is \u201cequivalent of \u2018recklessly1 causing death of another\u201d under \u00a7 19.05(a)(1)); Ex parte Ross, 522 S.W.2d 214, at 218 (Tex.Cr.App. 1975) (involuntary manslaughter committed in either of two ways: recklessly causing death of another or by accident or mistake causing death by reason of intoxication while operating a motor vehicle); see Lewis v. State, 529 S.W.2d 550, at 552 (Tex.Cr.App.1975) (specific intent to kill not element of \u00a7 19.05 offense); Hardie v. State, 588 S.W.2d 936, at 938 (Tex.Cr.App.1979) (unnecessary allegation of \u201cknowingly and intentionally5\u2019 is surplusage properly excluded from jury charge); Daniel v. State, 577 S.W.2d 231, at 233 (Tex.Cr.App.1979) (\u201cmistake\u201d and \u201caccident\u201d mean \u201cunintentional\u201d); Thomason v. State, 388 S.W.2d 700, at 702 (Tex.Cr.App.1964) (as used in statute \u201cmistake\u201d and \u201caccident\u201d mean \u201cunintentional\u201d); Johnson v. State, 153 Tex.Cr.R. 59, 216 S.W.2d 573, at 578 (1948) (terms used in sense ordinarily understood and mean \u201cunintentional\u201d)."},"case_id":10020493,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The Court accepted that explanation of legislative intent, purpose and effect, understanding that SS 19.05(a)(2) connotes recklessness per se.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"588 S.W.2d 936, at 938","parenthetical":"unnecessary allegation of \"knowingly and intentionally5' is surplusage properly excluded from jury charge","sentence":"Guerrero v. State, 605 S.W.2d 262, at 264 (Tex.Cr.App.1980) (legislature determined conduct proscribed by \u00a7 19.05(a)(2) is \u201cequivalent of \u2018recklessly1 causing death of another\u201d under \u00a7 19.05(a)(1)); Ex parte Ross, 522 S.W.2d 214, at 218 (Tex.Cr.App. 1975) (involuntary manslaughter committed in either of two ways: recklessly causing death of another or by accident or mistake causing death by reason of intoxication while operating a motor vehicle); see Lewis v. State, 529 S.W.2d 550, at 552 (Tex.Cr.App.1975) (specific intent to kill not element of \u00a7 19.05 offense); Hardie v. State, 588 S.W.2d 936, at 938 (Tex.Cr.App.1979) (unnecessary allegation of \u201cknowingly and intentionally5\u2019 is surplusage properly excluded from jury charge); Daniel v. State, 577 S.W.2d 231, at 233 (Tex.Cr.App.1979) (\u201cmistake\u201d and \u201caccident\u201d mean \u201cunintentional\u201d); Thomason v. State, 388 S.W.2d 700, at 702 (Tex.Cr.App.1964) (as used in statute \u201cmistake\u201d and \u201caccident\u201d mean \u201cunintentional\u201d); Johnson v. State, 153 Tex.Cr.R. 59, 216 S.W.2d 573, at 578 (1948) (terms used in sense ordinarily understood and mean \u201cunintentional\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"522 S.W.2d 214, at 218","parenthetical":"involuntary manslaughter committed in either of two ways: recklessly causing death of another or by accident or mistake causing death by reason of intoxication while operating a motor vehicle","sentence":"Guerrero v. State, 605 S.W.2d 262, at 264 (Tex.Cr.App.1980) (legislature determined conduct proscribed by \u00a7 19.05(a)(2) is \u201cequivalent of \u2018recklessly1 causing death of another\u201d under \u00a7 19.05(a)(1)); Ex parte Ross, 522 S.W.2d 214, at 218 (Tex.Cr.App. 1975) (involuntary manslaughter committed in either of two ways: recklessly causing death of another or by accident or mistake causing death by reason of intoxication while operating a motor vehicle); see Lewis v. State, 529 S.W.2d 550, at 552 (Tex.Cr.App.1975) (specific intent to kill not element of \u00a7 19.05 offense); Hardie v. State, 588 S.W.2d 936, at 938 (Tex.Cr.App.1979) (unnecessary allegation of \u201cknowingly and intentionally5\u2019 is surplusage properly excluded from jury charge); Daniel v. State, 577 S.W.2d 231, at 233 (Tex.Cr.App.1979) (\u201cmistake\u201d and \u201caccident\u201d mean \u201cunintentional\u201d); Thomason v. State, 388 S.W.2d 700, at 702 (Tex.Cr.App.1964) (as used in statute \u201cmistake\u201d and \u201caccident\u201d mean \u201cunintentional\u201d); Johnson v. State, 153 Tex.Cr.R. 59, 216 S.W.2d 573, at 578 (1948) (terms used in sense ordinarily understood and mean \u201cunintentional\u201d)."},"case_id":10020493,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In adopting a test that permits a plaintiff to make a prima facie showing by reference to either similarly situated individuals or a markedly hostile treatment, the Court does not suggest that merely receiving poor customer service will rise to the level of a civil rights violation.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"98 F.Supp.2d 706, 706","parenthetical":"stating that the trivialities and frustrations of life must not be made the fodder for federal civil rights claims simply because service was lacking","sentence":"Callwood, 98 F.Supp.2d at 706 (stating that the trivialities and frustrations of life must not be made the fodder for federal civil rights claims simply because service was lacking); see Bobbitt v. Rage, Inc., 19 F.Supp.2d 512, 519 (W.D.N.C.1998) (stating that, while poor service is regrettable and frustrating, it is a phenomenon familiar to all who eat at restaurants); Robertson v. Burger King, 848 F.Supp. 78, 81 (E.D.La.1994) (stating that while frustrating and all too common, mere fact of slow service does not rise to the level of a civil rights violation)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"19 F.Supp.2d 512, 519","parenthetical":"stating that, while poor service is regrettable and frustrating, it is a phenomenon familiar to all who eat at restaurants","sentence":"Callwood, 98 F.Supp.2d at 706 (stating that the trivialities and frustrations of life must not be made the fodder for federal civil rights claims simply because service was lacking); see Bobbitt v. Rage, Inc., 19 F.Supp.2d 512, 519 (W.D.N.C.1998) (stating that, while poor service is regrettable and frustrating, it is a phenomenon familiar to all who eat at restaurants); Robertson v. Burger King, 848 F.Supp. 78, 81 (E.D.La.1994) (stating that while frustrating and all too common, mere fact of slow service does not rise to the level of a civil rights violation)."},"case_id":9013247,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In adopting a test that permits a plaintiff to make a prima facie showing by reference to either similarly situated individuals or a markedly hostile treatment, the Court does not suggest that merely receiving poor customer service will rise to the level of a civil rights violation.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"98 F.Supp.2d 706, 706","parenthetical":"stating that the trivialities and frustrations of life must not be made the fodder for federal civil rights claims simply because service was lacking","sentence":"Callwood, 98 F.Supp.2d at 706 (stating that the trivialities and frustrations of life must not be made the fodder for federal civil rights claims simply because service was lacking); see Bobbitt v. Rage, Inc., 19 F.Supp.2d 512, 519 (W.D.N.C.1998) (stating that, while poor service is regrettable and frustrating, it is a phenomenon familiar to all who eat at restaurants); Robertson v. Burger King, 848 F.Supp. 78, 81 (E.D.La.1994) (stating that while frustrating and all too common, mere fact of slow service does not rise to the level of a civil rights violation)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"848 F.Supp. 78, 81","parenthetical":"stating that while frustrating and all too common, mere fact of slow service does not rise to the level of a civil rights violation","sentence":"Callwood, 98 F.Supp.2d at 706 (stating that the trivialities and frustrations of life must not be made the fodder for federal civil rights claims simply because service was lacking); see Bobbitt v. Rage, Inc., 19 F.Supp.2d 512, 519 (W.D.N.C.1998) (stating that, while poor service is regrettable and frustrating, it is a phenomenon familiar to all who eat at restaurants); Robertson v. Burger King, 848 F.Supp. 78, 81 (E.D.La.1994) (stating that while frustrating and all too common, mere fact of slow service does not rise to the level of a civil rights violation)."},"case_id":9013247,"label":"a"}
{"context":"To determine whether restitution owed to private victims is still for the benefit of the Government, an analysis of whether restitution is fundamentally penal or compensatory is helpful but not dispositive. Courts have often considered restitution fundamentally penal.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"95 F.3d 999, 1005","parenthetical":"\"[R]estitution orders issued pursuant to the VWPA are predominantly compensatory.\"","sentence":"But see United States v. Hampshire, 95 F.3d 999, 1005 (10th Cir.1996) (\u201c[R]estitution orders issued pursuant to the VWPA are predominantly compensatory.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"810 F.2d 456, 460-461","parenthetical":"concluding that VWPA is fundamentally penal in nature but that nevertheless a civil settlement can absolve the defendant of a need to pay restitution","sentence":"See United States v. Edwards, 162 F.3d 87, 91 (3d Cir.1998); United States v. Sheinbaum, 136 F.3d 443, 448 (5th Cir.1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1133, 119 S.Ct. 1808, 143 L.Ed.2d 1011 (1999); United States v. Savoie, 985 F.2d 612, 619 (1st Cir.1993); United States v. Vetter, 895 F.2d 456, 459 (8th Cir.1990); see also United States v. Bruchey, 810 F.2d 456, 460-461 (4th Cir.1987) (concluding that VWPA is fundamentally penal in nature but that nevertheless a civil settlement can absolve the defendant of a need to pay restitution)."},"case_id":11527303,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Swenson's key complaint relates to the arbitrator's ex parte contact with the expert, and the arbitrator's subsequent failure to accurately disclose the substance of his discussions with the expert. Although the arbitrator should not have contacted the expert ex parte, Swenson has failed to demonstrate any resulting prejudice.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"607 F.2d 649, 653","parenthetical":"award vacated in part because the \"ex parte receipt of evidence bearing on this matter constituted ... prejudice] to Totem's rights\"","sentence":"See Employers Ins. v. Nat\u2019l Union, 933 F.2d 1481 (9th Cir.1991) (vacatur inappropriate where party failed to show prejudice from ex parte contacts); cf. Totem Marine Tug & Barge, Inc. v. N. Am. Towing, Inc., 607 F.2d 649, 653 (5th Cir.1979) (award vacated in part because the \u201cex parte receipt of evidence bearing on this matter constituted ... prejudice] to Totem\u2019s rights\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"vacatur inappropriate where party failed to show prejudice from ex parte contacts","sentence":"See Employers Ins. v. Nat\u2019l Union, 933 F.2d 1481 (9th Cir.1991) (vacatur inappropriate where party failed to show prejudice from ex parte contacts); cf. Totem Marine Tug & Barge, Inc. v. N. Am. Towing, Inc., 607 F.2d 649, 653 (5th Cir.1979) (award vacated in part because the \u201cex parte receipt of evidence bearing on this matter constituted ... prejudice] to Totem\u2019s rights\u201d)."},"case_id":3840412,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Despite section 451.250, Finan alleges that, \"[u]nder Missouri law, property owned by husband and wife [is] presumed to be marital.\" Finan's Amended Petition at 1. Although Finan cites to no authority, it appears that this statement is based on Missouri Revised Statute section 452.330, which governs property division upon dissolution of marriage. See Mo-.Rev.Stat. SSSS 452.330.2 and 452.330.3 (defining \"marital property\" for purposes of chapter 452 only and providing that \"[a]ll property acquired by either spouse subsequent to marriage and prior to a decree of legal separation or dissolution of marriage is presumed to be marital property\"). The Eighth Circuit, however, has held that \"[d]ivorce law does not govern a spouse's claimed interest in forfeited property.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"345 F.3d 997, 997-98","parenthetical":"collecting cases that \"have rejected state divorce law as the basis for a spouse's claim to a legal right, title or interest in forfeited property\"","sentence":"United States v. Cochenour, 441 F.3d 599, 600-01 (8th Cir.2006) (affirming the district court\u2019s finding that the petitioner had \u201cno legal interest in the forfeited property\u201d because \u201c[t]he Missouri statute relied upon by [the petitioner] specifically limits its applicability to dissolution of marriage\u201d); see also Totaro, 345 F.3d at 997-98 (collecting cases that \u201chave rejected state divorce law as the basis for a spouse\u2019s claim to a legal right, title or interest in forfeited property\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"441 F.3d 599, 600-01","parenthetical":"affirming the district court's finding that the petitioner had \"no legal interest in the forfeited property\" because \"[t]he Missouri statute relied upon by [the petitioner] specifically limits its applicability to dissolution of marriage\"","sentence":"United States v. Cochenour, 441 F.3d 599, 600-01 (8th Cir.2006) (affirming the district court\u2019s finding that the petitioner had \u201cno legal interest in the forfeited property\u201d because \u201c[t]he Missouri statute relied upon by [the petitioner] specifically limits its applicability to dissolution of marriage\u201d); see also Totaro, 345 F.3d at 997-98 (collecting cases that \u201chave rejected state divorce law as the basis for a spouse\u2019s claim to a legal right, title or interest in forfeited property\u201d)."},"case_id":3908502,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Having reviewed the parties' prenuptial agreement, we are satisfied that it does not abrogate Ms. Shaffer's right to support. The agreement does not provide that there has been a full and fair disclosure to both parties of the marital property rights waived.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"prenuptial agreement upheld where wife specifically waived right to spousal support","sentence":"See Cooper v. Oakes, 427 Pa. Super. 430, 629 A.2d 944 (1993) (full and fair disclosure includes disclosure of marital property rights waived); Simeone v. Simeone, 380 Pa. Super. 37, 551 A.2d 219 (1988), aff\u2019d, 525 Pa. 392, 581 A.2d 162 (1990); cf. Hamilton v. Hamilton, 404 Pa. Super. 533, 591 A.2d 720 (1991) (prenuptial agreement upheld where wife specifically waived right to spousal support)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"full and fair disclosure includes disclosure of marital property rights waived","sentence":"See Cooper v. Oakes, 427 Pa. Super. 430, 629 A.2d 944 (1993) (full and fair disclosure includes disclosure of marital property rights waived); Simeone v. Simeone, 380 Pa. Super. 37, 551 A.2d 219 (1988), aff\u2019d, 525 Pa. 392, 581 A.2d 162 (1990); cf. Hamilton v. Hamilton, 404 Pa. Super. 533, 591 A.2d 720 (1991) (prenuptial agreement upheld where wife specifically waived right to spousal support)."},"case_id":1382686,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Having reviewed the parties' prenuptial agreement, we are satisfied that it does not abrogate Ms. Shaffer's right to support. The agreement does not provide that there has been a full and fair disclosure to both parties of the marital property rights waived.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"prenuptial agreement upheld where wife specifically waived right to spousal support","sentence":"See Cooper v. Oakes, 427 Pa. Super. 430, 629 A.2d 944 (1993) (full and fair disclosure includes disclosure of marital property rights waived); Simeone v. Simeone, 380 Pa. Super. 37, 551 A.2d 219 (1988), aff\u2019d, 525 Pa. 392, 581 A.2d 162 (1990); cf. Hamilton v. Hamilton, 404 Pa. Super. 533, 591 A.2d 720 (1991) (prenuptial agreement upheld where wife specifically waived right to spousal support)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"full and fair disclosure includes disclosure of marital property rights waived","sentence":"See Cooper v. Oakes, 427 Pa. Super. 430, 629 A.2d 944 (1993) (full and fair disclosure includes disclosure of marital property rights waived); Simeone v. Simeone, 380 Pa. Super. 37, 551 A.2d 219 (1988), aff\u2019d, 525 Pa. 392, 581 A.2d 162 (1990); cf. Hamilton v. Hamilton, 404 Pa. Super. 533, 591 A.2d 720 (1991) (prenuptial agreement upheld where wife specifically waived right to spousal support)."},"case_id":1382686,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Having reviewed the parties' prenuptial agreement, we are satisfied that it does not abrogate Ms. Shaffer's right to support. The agreement does not provide that there has been a full and fair disclosure to both parties of the marital property rights waived.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"full and fair disclosure includes disclosure of marital property rights waived","sentence":"See Cooper v. Oakes, 427 Pa. Super. 430, 629 A.2d 944 (1993) (full and fair disclosure includes disclosure of marital property rights waived); Simeone v. Simeone, 380 Pa. Super. 37, 551 A.2d 219 (1988), aff\u2019d, 525 Pa. 392, 581 A.2d 162 (1990); cf. Hamilton v. Hamilton, 404 Pa. Super. 533, 591 A.2d 720 (1991) (prenuptial agreement upheld where wife specifically waived right to spousal support)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"prenuptial agreement upheld where wife specifically waived right to spousal support","sentence":"See Cooper v. Oakes, 427 Pa. Super. 430, 629 A.2d 944 (1993) (full and fair disclosure includes disclosure of marital property rights waived); Simeone v. Simeone, 380 Pa. Super. 37, 551 A.2d 219 (1988), aff\u2019d, 525 Pa. 392, 581 A.2d 162 (1990); cf. Hamilton v. Hamilton, 404 Pa. Super. 533, 591 A.2d 720 (1991) (prenuptial agreement upheld where wife specifically waived right to spousal support)."},"case_id":1382686,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Having reviewed the parties' prenuptial agreement, we are satisfied that it does not abrogate Ms. Shaffer's right to support. The agreement does not provide that there has been a full and fair disclosure to both parties of the marital property rights waived.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"prenuptial agreement upheld where wife specifically waived right to spousal support","sentence":"See Cooper v. Oakes, 427 Pa. Super. 430, 629 A.2d 944 (1993) (full and fair disclosure includes disclosure of marital property rights waived); Simeone v. Simeone, 380 Pa. Super. 37, 551 A.2d 219 (1988), aff\u2019d, 525 Pa. 392, 581 A.2d 162 (1990); cf. Hamilton v. Hamilton, 404 Pa. Super. 533, 591 A.2d 720 (1991) (prenuptial agreement upheld where wife specifically waived right to spousal support)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"full and fair disclosure includes disclosure of marital property rights waived","sentence":"See Cooper v. Oakes, 427 Pa. Super. 430, 629 A.2d 944 (1993) (full and fair disclosure includes disclosure of marital property rights waived); Simeone v. Simeone, 380 Pa. Super. 37, 551 A.2d 219 (1988), aff\u2019d, 525 Pa. 392, 581 A.2d 162 (1990); cf. Hamilton v. Hamilton, 404 Pa. Super. 533, 591 A.2d 720 (1991) (prenuptial agreement upheld where wife specifically waived right to spousal support)."},"case_id":1382686,"label":"b"}
{"context":"I reject Respondents' contention that Dr. Saylor was not properly qualified as an expert. While I acknowledge testimony of an expert -witness who possesses knowledge of Indian culture may be helpful, it is not required by section 1912(f). Moreover, where the basis for termination of parental rights is unrelated to Indian culture, the need for expert testimony possessing a familiarity with such culture becomes less crucial.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"indicating expert testimony by someone that has knowledge of tribal cultural and childrearing practices may be valuable to a court, but is not required","sentence":"See Marcia V v. State, 201 P.3d 496, 504 (Alaska 2009) (stating \u201cwhen the basis for termination is unrelated to Native culture and society and when any lack of familiarity with culture mores will not influence the termination decision or implicate cultural bias in the termination proceeding, the qualifications of an expert testifying under \u00a7 1912(f) need not include familiarity with Native culture\u201d); see also Bureau of Indian Affairs (\u201cBIA\u201d) Guidelines for State Courts; Indian Child Custody Proceedings, 44 Fed. Reg. 67594 (1979) (indicating expert testimony by someone that has knowledge of tribal cultural and childrearing practices may be valuable to a court, but is not required)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"201 P.3d 496, 504","parenthetical":"stating \"when the basis for termination is unrelated to Native culture and society and when any lack of familiarity with culture mores will not influence the termination decision or implicate cultural bias in the termination proceeding, the qualifications of an expert testifying under SS 1912(f","sentence":"See Marcia V v. State, 201 P.3d 496, 504 (Alaska 2009) (stating \u201cwhen the basis for termination is unrelated to Native culture and society and when any lack of familiarity with culture mores will not influence the termination decision or implicate cultural bias in the termination proceeding, the qualifications of an expert testifying under \u00a7 1912(f) need not include familiarity with Native culture\u201d); see also Bureau of Indian Affairs (\u201cBIA\u201d) Guidelines for State Courts; Indian Child Custody Proceedings, 44 Fed. Reg. 67594 (1979) (indicating expert testimony by someone that has knowledge of tribal cultural and childrearing practices may be valuable to a court, but is not required)."},"case_id":3879494,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Neither this court, nor the Supreme Judicial Court, has had occasion to consider whether an injury resulting from an object thrown from a moving vehicle arises from the ownership, maintenance, or use of that vehicle. In other contexts, however, the court has stated that in order for coverage to exist there must be a causal connection between the injury and the use of the automobile.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"369 Mass. 674, 677","parenthetical":"denying coverage where the insured, while sitting in his automobile, intentionally shot the plaintiff","sentence":"See Sabatinelli v. Travelers Ins. Co., 369 Mass. 674, 677 (1976) (denying coverage where the insured, while sitting in his automobile, intentionally shot the plaintiff); Rischitelli v. Safety Ins. Co., 423 Mass. 703, 706 (1996) (finding no causal connection \u201cwhen a battery [was] committed following the collision of two motor vehicles\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"34 Mass. App. Ct. 726, 729-730","parenthetical":"sexual assault of a passenger on a school bus by the bus driver held to have arisen out of the \"ownership, maintenance or use\" of the bus","sentence":"See also Roe v. Lawn, 34 Mass. App. Ct. 726, 729-730 (1993), S.C., 418 Mass. 66 (1994) (sexual assault of a passenger on a school bus by the bus driver held to have arisen out of the \u201cownership, maintenance or use\u201d of the bus)."},"case_id":382265,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Neither this court, nor the Supreme Judicial Court, has had occasion to consider whether an injury resulting from an object thrown from a moving vehicle arises from the ownership, maintenance, or use of that vehicle. In other contexts, however, the court has stated that in order for coverage to exist there must be a causal connection between the injury and the use of the automobile.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"sexual assault of a passenger on a school bus by the bus driver held to have arisen out of the \"ownership, maintenance or use\" of the bus","sentence":"See also Roe v. Lawn, 34 Mass. App. Ct. 726, 729-730 (1993), S.C., 418 Mass. 66 (1994) (sexual assault of a passenger on a school bus by the bus driver held to have arisen out of the \u201cownership, maintenance or use\u201d of the bus)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"369 Mass. 674, 677","parenthetical":"denying coverage where the insured, while sitting in his automobile, intentionally shot the plaintiff","sentence":"See Sabatinelli v. Travelers Ins. Co., 369 Mass. 674, 677 (1976) (denying coverage where the insured, while sitting in his automobile, intentionally shot the plaintiff); Rischitelli v. Safety Ins. Co., 423 Mass. 703, 706 (1996) (finding no causal connection \u201cwhen a battery [was] committed following the collision of two motor vehicles\u201d)."},"case_id":382265,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Neither this court, nor the Supreme Judicial Court, has had occasion to consider whether an injury resulting from an object thrown from a moving vehicle arises from the ownership, maintenance, or use of that vehicle. In other contexts, however, the court has stated that in order for coverage to exist there must be a causal connection between the injury and the use of the automobile.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"34 Mass. App. Ct. 726, 729-730","parenthetical":"sexual assault of a passenger on a school bus by the bus driver held to have arisen out of the \"ownership, maintenance or use\" of the bus","sentence":"See also Roe v. Lawn, 34 Mass. App. Ct. 726, 729-730 (1993), S.C., 418 Mass. 66 (1994) (sexual assault of a passenger on a school bus by the bus driver held to have arisen out of the \u201cownership, maintenance or use\u201d of the bus)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"423 Mass. 703, 706","parenthetical":"finding no causal connection \"when a battery [was] committed following the collision of two motor vehicles\"","sentence":"See Sabatinelli v. Travelers Ins. Co., 369 Mass. 674, 677 (1976) (denying coverage where the insured, while sitting in his automobile, intentionally shot the plaintiff); Rischitelli v. Safety Ins. Co., 423 Mass. 703, 706 (1996) (finding no causal connection \u201cwhen a battery [was] committed following the collision of two motor vehicles\u201d)."},"case_id":382265,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Neither this court, nor the Supreme Judicial Court, has had occasion to consider whether an injury resulting from an object thrown from a moving vehicle arises from the ownership, maintenance, or use of that vehicle. In other contexts, however, the court has stated that in order for coverage to exist there must be a causal connection between the injury and the use of the automobile.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"423 Mass. 703, 706","parenthetical":"finding no causal connection \"when a battery [was] committed following the collision of two motor vehicles\"","sentence":"See Sabatinelli v. Travelers Ins. Co., 369 Mass. 674, 677 (1976) (denying coverage where the insured, while sitting in his automobile, intentionally shot the plaintiff); Rischitelli v. Safety Ins. Co., 423 Mass. 703, 706 (1996) (finding no causal connection \u201cwhen a battery [was] committed following the collision of two motor vehicles\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"sexual assault of a passenger on a school bus by the bus driver held to have arisen out of the \"ownership, maintenance or use\" of the bus","sentence":"See also Roe v. Lawn, 34 Mass. App. Ct. 726, 729-730 (1993), S.C., 418 Mass. 66 (1994) (sexual assault of a passenger on a school bus by the bus driver held to have arisen out of the \u201cownership, maintenance or use\u201d of the bus)."},"case_id":382265,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Finally, we note that while we have found no case in which a federal court has directly addressed the question of the appealability of a statute of limitations decision under the collateral order doctrine, there are scores of cases in which the courts have operated under an assumption that these appeals are interlocutory, including a number in this circuit.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"interlocutory appeal from denial of summary judgment motion based on statute of limitations under 28 U.S.C. SS 1292(b","sentence":"See, e.g., Juzwin v. Asbestos Corp., 900 F.2d 686 (3d Cir.) (interlocutory appeal from denial of summary judgment motion based on statute of limitations under 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1292(b)), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 896, 111 S.Ct. 246, 112 L.Ed.2d 204 (1990); Hopkins v. Kelsey-Hayes, Inc., 628 F.2d 801 (3d Cir.1980) (same), vacated on other grounds, 455 U.S. 404, 102 S.Ct. 1137, 71 L.Ed.2d 250 (1982); Galvan v. Hess Oil Virgin Islands Corp., 549 F.2d 281 (3d Cir.1977) (same); see also Johnson v. Burken, 930 F.2d 1202, 1207 (7th Cir.1991) (stating, in connection with a hypothetical on the law of the case doctrine, that \u201c[t]he denial [of the motion to dismiss on the grounds that the statute of limitations had expired] is an interlocutory order and therefore not appealable at the'time made\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"930 F.2d 1202, 1207","parenthetical":"stating, in connection with a hypothetical on the law of the case doctrine, that \"[t]he denial [of the motion to dismiss on the grounds that the statute of limitations had expired] is an interlocutory order and therefore not appealable at the'time made\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Juzwin v. Asbestos Corp., 900 F.2d 686 (3d Cir.) (interlocutory appeal from denial of summary judgment motion based on statute of limitations under 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1292(b)), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 896, 111 S.Ct. 246, 112 L.Ed.2d 204 (1990); Hopkins v. Kelsey-Hayes, Inc., 628 F.2d 801 (3d Cir.1980) (same), vacated on other grounds, 455 U.S. 404, 102 S.Ct. 1137, 71 L.Ed.2d 250 (1982); Galvan v. Hess Oil Virgin Islands Corp., 549 F.2d 281 (3d Cir.1977) (same); see also Johnson v. Burken, 930 F.2d 1202, 1207 (7th Cir.1991) (stating, in connection with a hypothetical on the law of the case doctrine, that \u201c[t]he denial [of the motion to dismiss on the grounds that the statute of limitations had expired] is an interlocutory order and therefore not appealable at the'time made\u201d)."},"case_id":11930141,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Finally, we note that while we have found no case in which a federal court has directly addressed the question of the appealability of a statute of limitations decision under the collateral order doctrine, there are scores of cases in which the courts have operated under an assumption that these appeals are interlocutory, including a number in this circuit.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"interlocutory appeal from denial of summary judgment motion based on statute of limitations under 28 U.S.C. SS 1292(b","sentence":"See, e.g., Juzwin v. Asbestos Corp., 900 F.2d 686 (3d Cir.) (interlocutory appeal from denial of summary judgment motion based on statute of limitations under 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1292(b)), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 896, 111 S.Ct. 246, 112 L.Ed.2d 204 (1990); Hopkins v. Kelsey-Hayes, Inc., 628 F.2d 801 (3d Cir.1980) (same), vacated on other grounds, 455 U.S. 404, 102 S.Ct. 1137, 71 L.Ed.2d 250 (1982); Galvan v. Hess Oil Virgin Islands Corp., 549 F.2d 281 (3d Cir.1977) (same); see also Johnson v. Burken, 930 F.2d 1202, 1207 (7th Cir.1991) (stating, in connection with a hypothetical on the law of the case doctrine, that \u201c[t]he denial [of the motion to dismiss on the grounds that the statute of limitations had expired] is an interlocutory order and therefore not appealable at the'time made\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"930 F.2d 1202, 1207","parenthetical":"stating, in connection with a hypothetical on the law of the case doctrine, that \"[t]he denial [of the motion to dismiss on the grounds that the statute of limitations had expired] is an interlocutory order and therefore not appealable at the'time made\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Juzwin v. Asbestos Corp., 900 F.2d 686 (3d Cir.) (interlocutory appeal from denial of summary judgment motion based on statute of limitations under 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1292(b)), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 896, 111 S.Ct. 246, 112 L.Ed.2d 204 (1990); Hopkins v. Kelsey-Hayes, Inc., 628 F.2d 801 (3d Cir.1980) (same), vacated on other grounds, 455 U.S. 404, 102 S.Ct. 1137, 71 L.Ed.2d 250 (1982); Galvan v. Hess Oil Virgin Islands Corp., 549 F.2d 281 (3d Cir.1977) (same); see also Johnson v. Burken, 930 F.2d 1202, 1207 (7th Cir.1991) (stating, in connection with a hypothetical on the law of the case doctrine, that \u201c[t]he denial [of the motion to dismiss on the grounds that the statute of limitations had expired] is an interlocutory order and therefore not appealable at the'time made\u201d)."},"case_id":11930141,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Finally, we note that while we have found no case in which a federal court has directly addressed the question of the appealability of a statute of limitations decision under the collateral order doctrine, there are scores of cases in which the courts have operated under an assumption that these appeals are interlocutory, including a number in this circuit.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"interlocutory appeal from denial of summary judgment motion based on statute of limitations under 28 U.S.C. SS 1292(b","sentence":"See, e.g., Juzwin v. Asbestos Corp., 900 F.2d 686 (3d Cir.) (interlocutory appeal from denial of summary judgment motion based on statute of limitations under 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1292(b)), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 896, 111 S.Ct. 246, 112 L.Ed.2d 204 (1990); Hopkins v. Kelsey-Hayes, Inc., 628 F.2d 801 (3d Cir.1980) (same), vacated on other grounds, 455 U.S. 404, 102 S.Ct. 1137, 71 L.Ed.2d 250 (1982); Galvan v. Hess Oil Virgin Islands Corp., 549 F.2d 281 (3d Cir.1977) (same); see also Johnson v. Burken, 930 F.2d 1202, 1207 (7th Cir.1991) (stating, in connection with a hypothetical on the law of the case doctrine, that \u201c[t]he denial [of the motion to dismiss on the grounds that the statute of limitations had expired] is an interlocutory order and therefore not appealable at the'time made\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"930 F.2d 1202, 1207","parenthetical":"stating, in connection with a hypothetical on the law of the case doctrine, that \"[t]he denial [of the motion to dismiss on the grounds that the statute of limitations had expired] is an interlocutory order and therefore not appealable at the'time made\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Juzwin v. Asbestos Corp., 900 F.2d 686 (3d Cir.) (interlocutory appeal from denial of summary judgment motion based on statute of limitations under 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1292(b)), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 896, 111 S.Ct. 246, 112 L.Ed.2d 204 (1990); Hopkins v. Kelsey-Hayes, Inc., 628 F.2d 801 (3d Cir.1980) (same), vacated on other grounds, 455 U.S. 404, 102 S.Ct. 1137, 71 L.Ed.2d 250 (1982); Galvan v. Hess Oil Virgin Islands Corp., 549 F.2d 281 (3d Cir.1977) (same); see also Johnson v. Burken, 930 F.2d 1202, 1207 (7th Cir.1991) (stating, in connection with a hypothetical on the law of the case doctrine, that \u201c[t]he denial [of the motion to dismiss on the grounds that the statute of limitations had expired] is an interlocutory order and therefore not appealable at the'time made\u201d)."},"case_id":11930141,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Finally, we note that while we have found no case in which a federal court has directly addressed the question of the appealability of a statute of limitations decision under the collateral order doctrine, there are scores of cases in which the courts have operated under an assumption that these appeals are interlocutory, including a number in this circuit.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"930 F.2d 1202, 1207","parenthetical":"stating, in connection with a hypothetical on the law of the case doctrine, that \"[t]he denial [of the motion to dismiss on the grounds that the statute of limitations had expired] is an interlocutory order and therefore not appealable at the'time made\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Juzwin v. Asbestos Corp., 900 F.2d 686 (3d Cir.) (interlocutory appeal from denial of summary judgment motion based on statute of limitations under 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1292(b)), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 896, 111 S.Ct. 246, 112 L.Ed.2d 204 (1990); Hopkins v. Kelsey-Hayes, Inc., 628 F.2d 801 (3d Cir.1980) (same), vacated on other grounds, 455 U.S. 404, 102 S.Ct. 1137, 71 L.Ed.2d 250 (1982); Galvan v. Hess Oil Virgin Islands Corp., 549 F.2d 281 (3d Cir.1977) (same); see also Johnson v. Burken, 930 F.2d 1202, 1207 (7th Cir.1991) (stating, in connection with a hypothetical on the law of the case doctrine, that \u201c[t]he denial [of the motion to dismiss on the grounds that the statute of limitations had expired] is an interlocutory order and therefore not appealable at the'time made\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"interlocutory appeal from denial of summary judgment motion based on statute of limitations under 28 U.S.C. SS 1292(b","sentence":"See, e.g., Juzwin v. Asbestos Corp., 900 F.2d 686 (3d Cir.) (interlocutory appeal from denial of summary judgment motion based on statute of limitations under 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1292(b)), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 896, 111 S.Ct. 246, 112 L.Ed.2d 204 (1990); Hopkins v. Kelsey-Hayes, Inc., 628 F.2d 801 (3d Cir.1980) (same), vacated on other grounds, 455 U.S. 404, 102 S.Ct. 1137, 71 L.Ed.2d 250 (1982); Galvan v. Hess Oil Virgin Islands Corp., 549 F.2d 281 (3d Cir.1977) (same); see also Johnson v. Burken, 930 F.2d 1202, 1207 (7th Cir.1991) (stating, in connection with a hypothetical on the law of the case doctrine, that \u201c[t]he denial [of the motion to dismiss on the grounds that the statute of limitations had expired] is an interlocutory order and therefore not appealable at the'time made\u201d)."},"case_id":11930141,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Because plaintiff knew about her 1996 performance appraisal score in early 1997, when it was issued to her , any discrimination claim Burnett had would ae-crue at that time.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"454 U.S. 6, 8","parenthetical":"\"the proper focus [in an employment discrimination case] is on the time of the discriminatory act, not the point at which the consequences of the act become painful\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Harris v. City of New York, 186 F.3d 243, 247-249 (2d Cir.1999) (discrimination claims accrue when plaintiff knew or had reason to know of the injury serving as the basis for the claim); Cornwell v. Robinson, 23 F.3d 694, 703 (2d Cir.1994); see also Chardon v. Fernandez, 454 U.S. 6, 8, 102 S.Ct. 28, 70 L.Ed.2d 6 (1981) (\u201cthe proper focus [in an employment discrimination case] is on the time of the discriminatory act, not the point at which the consequences of the act become painful\u201d); O\u2019Malley v. GTE Serv. Corp., 758 F.2d 818, 820 (2d Cir.1985) (\u201cthe timeliness of a discrimination claim is measured from the date the claimant receives notice of the allegedly discriminatory decision ... \u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"186 F.3d 243, 247-249","parenthetical":"discrimination claims accrue when plaintiff knew or had reason to know of the injury serving as the basis for the claim","sentence":"See, e.g., Harris v. City of New York, 186 F.3d 243, 247-249 (2d Cir.1999) (discrimination claims accrue when plaintiff knew or had reason to know of the injury serving as the basis for the claim); Cornwell v. Robinson, 23 F.3d 694, 703 (2d Cir.1994); see also Chardon v. Fernandez, 454 U.S. 6, 8, 102 S.Ct. 28, 70 L.Ed.2d 6 (1981) (\u201cthe proper focus [in an employment discrimination case] is on the time of the discriminatory act, not the point at which the consequences of the act become painful\u201d); O\u2019Malley v. GTE Serv. Corp., 758 F.2d 818, 820 (2d Cir.1985) (\u201cthe timeliness of a discrimination claim is measured from the date the claimant receives notice of the allegedly discriminatory decision ... \u201d)."},"case_id":9431816,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Because plaintiff knew about her 1996 performance appraisal score in early 1997, when it was issued to her , any discrimination claim Burnett had would ae-crue at that time.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"the proper focus [in an employment discrimination case] is on the time of the discriminatory act, not the point at which the consequences of the act become painful\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Harris v. City of New York, 186 F.3d 243, 247-249 (2d Cir.1999) (discrimination claims accrue when plaintiff knew or had reason to know of the injury serving as the basis for the claim); Cornwell v. Robinson, 23 F.3d 694, 703 (2d Cir.1994); see also Chardon v. Fernandez, 454 U.S. 6, 8, 102 S.Ct. 28, 70 L.Ed.2d 6 (1981) (\u201cthe proper focus [in an employment discrimination case] is on the time of the discriminatory act, not the point at which the consequences of the act become painful\u201d); O\u2019Malley v. GTE Serv. Corp., 758 F.2d 818, 820 (2d Cir.1985) (\u201cthe timeliness of a discrimination claim is measured from the date the claimant receives notice of the allegedly discriminatory decision ... \u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"186 F.3d 243, 247-249","parenthetical":"discrimination claims accrue when plaintiff knew or had reason to know of the injury serving as the basis for the claim","sentence":"See, e.g., Harris v. City of New York, 186 F.3d 243, 247-249 (2d Cir.1999) (discrimination claims accrue when plaintiff knew or had reason to know of the injury serving as the basis for the claim); Cornwell v. Robinson, 23 F.3d 694, 703 (2d Cir.1994); see also Chardon v. Fernandez, 454 U.S. 6, 8, 102 S.Ct. 28, 70 L.Ed.2d 6 (1981) (\u201cthe proper focus [in an employment discrimination case] is on the time of the discriminatory act, not the point at which the consequences of the act become painful\u201d); O\u2019Malley v. GTE Serv. Corp., 758 F.2d 818, 820 (2d Cir.1985) (\u201cthe timeliness of a discrimination claim is measured from the date the claimant receives notice of the allegedly discriminatory decision ... \u201d)."},"case_id":9431816,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Because plaintiff knew about her 1996 performance appraisal score in early 1997, when it was issued to her , any discrimination claim Burnett had would ae-crue at that time.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"186 F.3d 243, 247-249","parenthetical":"discrimination claims accrue when plaintiff knew or had reason to know of the injury serving as the basis for the claim","sentence":"See, e.g., Harris v. City of New York, 186 F.3d 243, 247-249 (2d Cir.1999) (discrimination claims accrue when plaintiff knew or had reason to know of the injury serving as the basis for the claim); Cornwell v. Robinson, 23 F.3d 694, 703 (2d Cir.1994); see also Chardon v. Fernandez, 454 U.S. 6, 8, 102 S.Ct. 28, 70 L.Ed.2d 6 (1981) (\u201cthe proper focus [in an employment discrimination case] is on the time of the discriminatory act, not the point at which the consequences of the act become painful\u201d); O\u2019Malley v. GTE Serv. Corp., 758 F.2d 818, 820 (2d Cir.1985) (\u201cthe timeliness of a discrimination claim is measured from the date the claimant receives notice of the allegedly discriminatory decision ... \u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"the proper focus [in an employment discrimination case] is on the time of the discriminatory act, not the point at which the consequences of the act become painful\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Harris v. City of New York, 186 F.3d 243, 247-249 (2d Cir.1999) (discrimination claims accrue when plaintiff knew or had reason to know of the injury serving as the basis for the claim); Cornwell v. Robinson, 23 F.3d 694, 703 (2d Cir.1994); see also Chardon v. Fernandez, 454 U.S. 6, 8, 102 S.Ct. 28, 70 L.Ed.2d 6 (1981) (\u201cthe proper focus [in an employment discrimination case] is on the time of the discriminatory act, not the point at which the consequences of the act become painful\u201d); O\u2019Malley v. GTE Serv. Corp., 758 F.2d 818, 820 (2d Cir.1985) (\u201cthe timeliness of a discrimination claim is measured from the date the claimant receives notice of the allegedly discriminatory decision ... \u201d)."},"case_id":9431816,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Because plaintiff knew about her 1996 performance appraisal score in early 1997, when it was issued to her , any discrimination claim Burnett had would ae-crue at that time.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"758 F.2d 818, 820","parenthetical":"\"the timeliness of a discrimination claim is measured from the date the claimant receives notice of the allegedly discriminatory decision ... \"","sentence":"See, e.g., Harris v. City of New York, 186 F.3d 243, 247-249 (2d Cir.1999) (discrimination claims accrue when plaintiff knew or had reason to know of the injury serving as the basis for the claim); Cornwell v. Robinson, 23 F.3d 694, 703 (2d Cir.1994); see also Chardon v. Fernandez, 454 U.S. 6, 8, 102 S.Ct. 28, 70 L.Ed.2d 6 (1981) (\u201cthe proper focus [in an employment discrimination case] is on the time of the discriminatory act, not the point at which the consequences of the act become painful\u201d); O\u2019Malley v. GTE Serv. Corp., 758 F.2d 818, 820 (2d Cir.1985) (\u201cthe timeliness of a discrimination claim is measured from the date the claimant receives notice of the allegedly discriminatory decision ... \u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"186 F.3d 243, 247-249","parenthetical":"discrimination claims accrue when plaintiff knew or had reason to know of the injury serving as the basis for the claim","sentence":"See, e.g., Harris v. City of New York, 186 F.3d 243, 247-249 (2d Cir.1999) (discrimination claims accrue when plaintiff knew or had reason to know of the injury serving as the basis for the claim); Cornwell v. Robinson, 23 F.3d 694, 703 (2d Cir.1994); see also Chardon v. Fernandez, 454 U.S. 6, 8, 102 S.Ct. 28, 70 L.Ed.2d 6 (1981) (\u201cthe proper focus [in an employment discrimination case] is on the time of the discriminatory act, not the point at which the consequences of the act become painful\u201d); O\u2019Malley v. GTE Serv. Corp., 758 F.2d 818, 820 (2d Cir.1985) (\u201cthe timeliness of a discrimination claim is measured from the date the claimant receives notice of the allegedly discriminatory decision ... \u201d)."},"case_id":9431816,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Bowling's second claim is that he was forced to use peremptory challenges to strike three other jurors who should have been disqualified for cause, and that he could have used these peremptories to exclude Livingston. The Supreme Court has made it clear that this is not a constitutional injury.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"528 U.S. 304, 307","parenthetical":"noting that there is no violation if the defendant \"elects to cure [the] error by exercising a peremptory challenge, and is subsequently convicted by a jury on which no biased juror sat\"","sentence":"See Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 88, 108 S.Ct. 2273, 101 L.Ed.2d 80 (1988) (\u201cSo long as the jury that sits is impartial, the fact that the defendant had to use a peremptory challenge to achieve that result does not mean the Sixth Amendment was violated.\u201d); see also United States v. Martinez-Salazar, 528 U.S. 304, 307, 120 S.Ct. 774, 145 L.Ed.2d 792 (2000) (noting that there is no violation if the defendant \u201celects to cure [the] error by exercising a peremptory challenge, and is subsequently convicted by a jury on which no biased juror sat\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"487 U.S. 81, 88","parenthetical":"\"So long as the jury that sits is impartial, the fact that the defendant had to use a peremptory challenge to achieve that result does not mean the Sixth Amendment was violated.\"","sentence":"See Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 88, 108 S.Ct. 2273, 101 L.Ed.2d 80 (1988) (\u201cSo long as the jury that sits is impartial, the fact that the defendant had to use a peremptory challenge to achieve that result does not mean the Sixth Amendment was violated.\u201d); see also United States v. Martinez-Salazar, 528 U.S. 304, 307, 120 S.Ct. 774, 145 L.Ed.2d 792 (2000) (noting that there is no violation if the defendant \u201celects to cure [the] error by exercising a peremptory challenge, and is subsequently convicted by a jury on which no biased juror sat\u201d)."},"case_id":781068,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Bowling's second claim is that he was forced to use peremptory challenges to strike three other jurors who should have been disqualified for cause, and that he could have used these peremptories to exclude Livingston. The Supreme Court has made it clear that this is not a constitutional injury.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"487 U.S. 81, 88","parenthetical":"\"So long as the jury that sits is impartial, the fact that the defendant had to use a peremptory challenge to achieve that result does not mean the Sixth Amendment was violated.\"","sentence":"See Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 88, 108 S.Ct. 2273, 101 L.Ed.2d 80 (1988) (\u201cSo long as the jury that sits is impartial, the fact that the defendant had to use a peremptory challenge to achieve that result does not mean the Sixth Amendment was violated.\u201d); see also United States v. Martinez-Salazar, 528 U.S. 304, 307, 120 S.Ct. 774, 145 L.Ed.2d 792 (2000) (noting that there is no violation if the defendant \u201celects to cure [the] error by exercising a peremptory challenge, and is subsequently convicted by a jury on which no biased juror sat\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting that there is no violation if the defendant \"elects to cure [the] error by exercising a peremptory challenge, and is subsequently convicted by a jury on which no biased juror sat\"","sentence":"See Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 88, 108 S.Ct. 2273, 101 L.Ed.2d 80 (1988) (\u201cSo long as the jury that sits is impartial, the fact that the defendant had to use a peremptory challenge to achieve that result does not mean the Sixth Amendment was violated.\u201d); see also United States v. Martinez-Salazar, 528 U.S. 304, 307, 120 S.Ct. 774, 145 L.Ed.2d 792 (2000) (noting that there is no violation if the defendant \u201celects to cure [the] error by exercising a peremptory challenge, and is subsequently convicted by a jury on which no biased juror sat\u201d)."},"case_id":781068,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Bowling's second claim is that he was forced to use peremptory challenges to strike three other jurors who should have been disqualified for cause, and that he could have used these peremptories to exclude Livingston. The Supreme Court has made it clear that this is not a constitutional injury.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting that there is no violation if the defendant \"elects to cure [the] error by exercising a peremptory challenge, and is subsequently convicted by a jury on which no biased juror sat\"","sentence":"See Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 88, 108 S.Ct. 2273, 101 L.Ed.2d 80 (1988) (\u201cSo long as the jury that sits is impartial, the fact that the defendant had to use a peremptory challenge to achieve that result does not mean the Sixth Amendment was violated.\u201d); see also United States v. Martinez-Salazar, 528 U.S. 304, 307, 120 S.Ct. 774, 145 L.Ed.2d 792 (2000) (noting that there is no violation if the defendant \u201celects to cure [the] error by exercising a peremptory challenge, and is subsequently convicted by a jury on which no biased juror sat\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"487 U.S. 81, 88","parenthetical":"\"So long as the jury that sits is impartial, the fact that the defendant had to use a peremptory challenge to achieve that result does not mean the Sixth Amendment was violated.\"","sentence":"See Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 88, 108 S.Ct. 2273, 101 L.Ed.2d 80 (1988) (\u201cSo long as the jury that sits is impartial, the fact that the defendant had to use a peremptory challenge to achieve that result does not mean the Sixth Amendment was violated.\u201d); see also United States v. Martinez-Salazar, 528 U.S. 304, 307, 120 S.Ct. 774, 145 L.Ed.2d 792 (2000) (noting that there is no violation if the defendant \u201celects to cure [the] error by exercising a peremptory challenge, and is subsequently convicted by a jury on which no biased juror sat\u201d)."},"case_id":781068,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Bowling's second claim is that he was forced to use peremptory challenges to strike three other jurors who should have been disqualified for cause, and that he could have used these peremptories to exclude Livingston. The Supreme Court has made it clear that this is not a constitutional injury.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"528 U.S. 304, 307","parenthetical":"noting that there is no violation if the defendant \"elects to cure [the] error by exercising a peremptory challenge, and is subsequently convicted by a jury on which no biased juror sat\"","sentence":"See Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 88, 108 S.Ct. 2273, 101 L.Ed.2d 80 (1988) (\u201cSo long as the jury that sits is impartial, the fact that the defendant had to use a peremptory challenge to achieve that result does not mean the Sixth Amendment was violated.\u201d); see also United States v. Martinez-Salazar, 528 U.S. 304, 307, 120 S.Ct. 774, 145 L.Ed.2d 792 (2000) (noting that there is no violation if the defendant \u201celects to cure [the] error by exercising a peremptory challenge, and is subsequently convicted by a jury on which no biased juror sat\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"So long as the jury that sits is impartial, the fact that the defendant had to use a peremptory challenge to achieve that result does not mean the Sixth Amendment was violated.\"","sentence":"See Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 88, 108 S.Ct. 2273, 101 L.Ed.2d 80 (1988) (\u201cSo long as the jury that sits is impartial, the fact that the defendant had to use a peremptory challenge to achieve that result does not mean the Sixth Amendment was violated.\u201d); see also United States v. Martinez-Salazar, 528 U.S. 304, 307, 120 S.Ct. 774, 145 L.Ed.2d 792 (2000) (noting that there is no violation if the defendant \u201celects to cure [the] error by exercising a peremptory challenge, and is subsequently convicted by a jury on which no biased juror sat\u201d)."},"case_id":781068,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Bowling's second claim is that he was forced to use peremptory challenges to strike three other jurors who should have been disqualified for cause, and that he could have used these peremptories to exclude Livingston. The Supreme Court has made it clear that this is not a constitutional injury.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting that there is no violation if the defendant \"elects to cure [the] error by exercising a peremptory challenge, and is subsequently convicted by a jury on which no biased juror sat\"","sentence":"See Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 88, 108 S.Ct. 2273, 101 L.Ed.2d 80 (1988) (\u201cSo long as the jury that sits is impartial, the fact that the defendant had to use a peremptory challenge to achieve that result does not mean the Sixth Amendment was violated.\u201d); see also United States v. Martinez-Salazar, 528 U.S. 304, 307, 120 S.Ct. 774, 145 L.Ed.2d 792 (2000) (noting that there is no violation if the defendant \u201celects to cure [the] error by exercising a peremptory challenge, and is subsequently convicted by a jury on which no biased juror sat\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"So long as the jury that sits is impartial, the fact that the defendant had to use a peremptory challenge to achieve that result does not mean the Sixth Amendment was violated.\"","sentence":"See Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 88, 108 S.Ct. 2273, 101 L.Ed.2d 80 (1988) (\u201cSo long as the jury that sits is impartial, the fact that the defendant had to use a peremptory challenge to achieve that result does not mean the Sixth Amendment was violated.\u201d); see also United States v. Martinez-Salazar, 528 U.S. 304, 307, 120 S.Ct. 774, 145 L.Ed.2d 792 (2000) (noting that there is no violation if the defendant \u201celects to cure [the] error by exercising a peremptory challenge, and is subsequently convicted by a jury on which no biased juror sat\u201d)."},"case_id":781068,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Bowling's second claim is that he was forced to use peremptory challenges to strike three other jurors who should have been disqualified for cause, and that he could have used these peremptories to exclude Livingston. The Supreme Court has made it clear that this is not a constitutional injury.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting that there is no violation if the defendant \"elects to cure [the] error by exercising a peremptory challenge, and is subsequently convicted by a jury on which no biased juror sat\"","sentence":"See Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 88, 108 S.Ct. 2273, 101 L.Ed.2d 80 (1988) (\u201cSo long as the jury that sits is impartial, the fact that the defendant had to use a peremptory challenge to achieve that result does not mean the Sixth Amendment was violated.\u201d); see also United States v. Martinez-Salazar, 528 U.S. 304, 307, 120 S.Ct. 774, 145 L.Ed.2d 792 (2000) (noting that there is no violation if the defendant \u201celects to cure [the] error by exercising a peremptory challenge, and is subsequently convicted by a jury on which no biased juror sat\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"So long as the jury that sits is impartial, the fact that the defendant had to use a peremptory challenge to achieve that result does not mean the Sixth Amendment was violated.\"","sentence":"See Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 88, 108 S.Ct. 2273, 101 L.Ed.2d 80 (1988) (\u201cSo long as the jury that sits is impartial, the fact that the defendant had to use a peremptory challenge to achieve that result does not mean the Sixth Amendment was violated.\u201d); see also United States v. Martinez-Salazar, 528 U.S. 304, 307, 120 S.Ct. 774, 145 L.Ed.2d 792 (2000) (noting that there is no violation if the defendant \u201celects to cure [the] error by exercising a peremptory challenge, and is subsequently convicted by a jury on which no biased juror sat\u201d)."},"case_id":781068,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Bowling's second claim is that he was forced to use peremptory challenges to strike three other jurors who should have been disqualified for cause, and that he could have used these peremptories to exclude Livingston. The Supreme Court has made it clear that this is not a constitutional injury.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"So long as the jury that sits is impartial, the fact that the defendant had to use a peremptory challenge to achieve that result does not mean the Sixth Amendment was violated.\"","sentence":"See Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 88, 108 S.Ct. 2273, 101 L.Ed.2d 80 (1988) (\u201cSo long as the jury that sits is impartial, the fact that the defendant had to use a peremptory challenge to achieve that result does not mean the Sixth Amendment was violated.\u201d); see also United States v. Martinez-Salazar, 528 U.S. 304, 307, 120 S.Ct. 774, 145 L.Ed.2d 792 (2000) (noting that there is no violation if the defendant \u201celects to cure [the] error by exercising a peremptory challenge, and is subsequently convicted by a jury on which no biased juror sat\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"528 U.S. 304, 307","parenthetical":"noting that there is no violation if the defendant \"elects to cure [the] error by exercising a peremptory challenge, and is subsequently convicted by a jury on which no biased juror sat\"","sentence":"See Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 88, 108 S.Ct. 2273, 101 L.Ed.2d 80 (1988) (\u201cSo long as the jury that sits is impartial, the fact that the defendant had to use a peremptory challenge to achieve that result does not mean the Sixth Amendment was violated.\u201d); see also United States v. Martinez-Salazar, 528 U.S. 304, 307, 120 S.Ct. 774, 145 L.Ed.2d 792 (2000) (noting that there is no violation if the defendant \u201celects to cure [the] error by exercising a peremptory challenge, and is subsequently convicted by a jury on which no biased juror sat\u201d)."},"case_id":781068,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Bowling's second claim is that he was forced to use peremptory challenges to strike three other jurors who should have been disqualified for cause, and that he could have used these peremptories to exclude Livingston. The Supreme Court has made it clear that this is not a constitutional injury.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"So long as the jury that sits is impartial, the fact that the defendant had to use a peremptory challenge to achieve that result does not mean the Sixth Amendment was violated.\"","sentence":"See Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 88, 108 S.Ct. 2273, 101 L.Ed.2d 80 (1988) (\u201cSo long as the jury that sits is impartial, the fact that the defendant had to use a peremptory challenge to achieve that result does not mean the Sixth Amendment was violated.\u201d); see also United States v. Martinez-Salazar, 528 U.S. 304, 307, 120 S.Ct. 774, 145 L.Ed.2d 792 (2000) (noting that there is no violation if the defendant \u201celects to cure [the] error by exercising a peremptory challenge, and is subsequently convicted by a jury on which no biased juror sat\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting that there is no violation if the defendant \"elects to cure [the] error by exercising a peremptory challenge, and is subsequently convicted by a jury on which no biased juror sat\"","sentence":"See Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 88, 108 S.Ct. 2273, 101 L.Ed.2d 80 (1988) (\u201cSo long as the jury that sits is impartial, the fact that the defendant had to use a peremptory challenge to achieve that result does not mean the Sixth Amendment was violated.\u201d); see also United States v. Martinez-Salazar, 528 U.S. 304, 307, 120 S.Ct. 774, 145 L.Ed.2d 792 (2000) (noting that there is no violation if the defendant \u201celects to cure [the] error by exercising a peremptory challenge, and is subsequently convicted by a jury on which no biased juror sat\u201d)."},"case_id":781068,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Bowling's second claim is that he was forced to use peremptory challenges to strike three other jurors who should have been disqualified for cause, and that he could have used these peremptories to exclude Livingston. The Supreme Court has made it clear that this is not a constitutional injury.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"So long as the jury that sits is impartial, the fact that the defendant had to use a peremptory challenge to achieve that result does not mean the Sixth Amendment was violated.\"","sentence":"See Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 88, 108 S.Ct. 2273, 101 L.Ed.2d 80 (1988) (\u201cSo long as the jury that sits is impartial, the fact that the defendant had to use a peremptory challenge to achieve that result does not mean the Sixth Amendment was violated.\u201d); see also United States v. Martinez-Salazar, 528 U.S. 304, 307, 120 S.Ct. 774, 145 L.Ed.2d 792 (2000) (noting that there is no violation if the defendant \u201celects to cure [the] error by exercising a peremptory challenge, and is subsequently convicted by a jury on which no biased juror sat\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting that there is no violation if the defendant \"elects to cure [the] error by exercising a peremptory challenge, and is subsequently convicted by a jury on which no biased juror sat\"","sentence":"See Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 88, 108 S.Ct. 2273, 101 L.Ed.2d 80 (1988) (\u201cSo long as the jury that sits is impartial, the fact that the defendant had to use a peremptory challenge to achieve that result does not mean the Sixth Amendment was violated.\u201d); see also United States v. Martinez-Salazar, 528 U.S. 304, 307, 120 S.Ct. 774, 145 L.Ed.2d 792 (2000) (noting that there is no violation if the defendant \u201celects to cure [the] error by exercising a peremptory challenge, and is subsequently convicted by a jury on which no biased juror sat\u201d)."},"case_id":781068,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Although defendants' analysis of this question begins with the factors to be considered under Fed.R.Civ.P. 19(b), the court's analysis properly begins with the question of whether or not the trustees are \"necessary\" parties under Fed.R.Civ.P. 19(a) to a claim of set-off of assets belonging to the plaintiffs against Morken's overdrafts at the bank.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"15 F.3d 1422, 1422-23","parenthetical":"in 12(b)(7) analysis, court begins with Rule 19(a), and only if those requirements are met, does court consider Rule 19(b","sentence":"Gwartz, 23 F.3d at 1428 (court must first determine whether party is \u201cnecessary\u201d under 19(a) before turning to 19(b) analysis); Rochester Methodist Hosp., 728 F.2d at 1016-17 (Rule 19(b) must be read in conjunction with Rule 19(a) analysis); see also Boulevard Bank, 15 F.3d at 1422-23 (in 12(b)(7) analysis, court begins with Rule 19(a), and only if those requirements are met, does court consider Rule 19(b)); Keweenaw Bay Indian Community, 11 F.3d at 1346-47 (analysis under Rule 12(b)(7) begins with Rule 19(a)); Bank One Texas, 968 F.2d at 100 (if absent party is not necessary under 19(a), they cannot be indispensable under 19(b), and Rule 12(b)(7) motion must fail); Moore, 901 F.2d at 1447 (Rule 19(a) provides the \u201cthreshold\u201d analysis to indispensability); McLaughlin, 847 F.2d at 621 (Only if party is necessary under rule 19(a) does court proceed to next step in 12(b)(7) analysis considering question of indispensability under 19(b))."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"23 F.3d 1428, 1428","parenthetical":"court must first determine whether party is \"necessary\" under 19(a) before turning to 19(b) analysis","sentence":"Gwartz, 23 F.3d at 1428 (court must first determine whether party is \u201cnecessary\u201d under 19(a) before turning to 19(b) analysis); Rochester Methodist Hosp., 728 F.2d at 1016-17 (Rule 19(b) must be read in conjunction with Rule 19(a) analysis); see also Boulevard Bank, 15 F.3d at 1422-23 (in 12(b)(7) analysis, court begins with Rule 19(a), and only if those requirements are met, does court consider Rule 19(b)); Keweenaw Bay Indian Community, 11 F.3d at 1346-47 (analysis under Rule 12(b)(7) begins with Rule 19(a)); Bank One Texas, 968 F.2d at 100 (if absent party is not necessary under 19(a), they cannot be indispensable under 19(b), and Rule 12(b)(7) motion must fail); Moore, 901 F.2d at 1447 (Rule 19(a) provides the \u201cthreshold\u201d analysis to indispensability); McLaughlin, 847 F.2d at 621 (Only if party is necessary under rule 19(a) does court proceed to next step in 12(b)(7) analysis considering question of indispensability under 19(b))."},"case_id":7846299,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Although defendants' analysis of this question begins with the factors to be considered under Fed.R.Civ.P. 19(b), the court's analysis properly begins with the question of whether or not the trustees are \"necessary\" parties under Fed.R.Civ.P. 19(a) to a claim of set-off of assets belonging to the plaintiffs against Morken's overdrafts at the bank.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"968 F.2d 100, 100","parenthetical":"if absent party is not necessary under 19(a), they cannot be indispensable under 19(b), and Rule 12(b)(7) motion must fail","sentence":"Gwartz, 23 F.3d at 1428 (court must first determine whether party is \u201cnecessary\u201d under 19(a) before turning to 19(b) analysis); Rochester Methodist Hosp., 728 F.2d at 1016-17 (Rule 19(b) must be read in conjunction with Rule 19(a) analysis); see also Boulevard Bank, 15 F.3d at 1422-23 (in 12(b)(7) analysis, court begins with Rule 19(a), and only if those requirements are met, does court consider Rule 19(b)); Keweenaw Bay Indian Community, 11 F.3d at 1346-47 (analysis under Rule 12(b)(7) begins with Rule 19(a)); Bank One Texas, 968 F.2d at 100 (if absent party is not necessary under 19(a), they cannot be indispensable under 19(b), and Rule 12(b)(7) motion must fail); Moore, 901 F.2d at 1447 (Rule 19(a) provides the \u201cthreshold\u201d analysis to indispensability); McLaughlin, 847 F.2d at 621 (Only if party is necessary under rule 19(a) does court proceed to next step in 12(b)(7) analysis considering question of indispensability under 19(b))."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"23 F.3d 1428, 1428","parenthetical":"court must first determine whether party is \"necessary\" under 19(a) before turning to 19(b) analysis","sentence":"Gwartz, 23 F.3d at 1428 (court must first determine whether party is \u201cnecessary\u201d under 19(a) before turning to 19(b) analysis); Rochester Methodist Hosp., 728 F.2d at 1016-17 (Rule 19(b) must be read in conjunction with Rule 19(a) analysis); see also Boulevard Bank, 15 F.3d at 1422-23 (in 12(b)(7) analysis, court begins with Rule 19(a), and only if those requirements are met, does court consider Rule 19(b)); Keweenaw Bay Indian Community, 11 F.3d at 1346-47 (analysis under Rule 12(b)(7) begins with Rule 19(a)); Bank One Texas, 968 F.2d at 100 (if absent party is not necessary under 19(a), they cannot be indispensable under 19(b), and Rule 12(b)(7) motion must fail); Moore, 901 F.2d at 1447 (Rule 19(a) provides the \u201cthreshold\u201d analysis to indispensability); McLaughlin, 847 F.2d at 621 (Only if party is necessary under rule 19(a) does court proceed to next step in 12(b)(7) analysis considering question of indispensability under 19(b))."},"case_id":7846299,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Although defendants' analysis of this question begins with the factors to be considered under Fed.R.Civ.P. 19(b), the court's analysis properly begins with the question of whether or not the trustees are \"necessary\" parties under Fed.R.Civ.P. 19(a) to a claim of set-off of assets belonging to the plaintiffs against Morken's overdrafts at the bank.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"23 F.3d 1428, 1428","parenthetical":"court must first determine whether party is \"necessary\" under 19(a) before turning to 19(b) analysis","sentence":"Gwartz, 23 F.3d at 1428 (court must first determine whether party is \u201cnecessary\u201d under 19(a) before turning to 19(b) analysis); Rochester Methodist Hosp., 728 F.2d at 1016-17 (Rule 19(b) must be read in conjunction with Rule 19(a) analysis); see also Boulevard Bank, 15 F.3d at 1422-23 (in 12(b)(7) analysis, court begins with Rule 19(a), and only if those requirements are met, does court consider Rule 19(b)); Keweenaw Bay Indian Community, 11 F.3d at 1346-47 (analysis under Rule 12(b)(7) begins with Rule 19(a)); Bank One Texas, 968 F.2d at 100 (if absent party is not necessary under 19(a), they cannot be indispensable under 19(b), and Rule 12(b)(7) motion must fail); Moore, 901 F.2d at 1447 (Rule 19(a) provides the \u201cthreshold\u201d analysis to indispensability); McLaughlin, 847 F.2d at 621 (Only if party is necessary under rule 19(a) does court proceed to next step in 12(b)(7) analysis considering question of indispensability under 19(b))."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"847 F.2d 621, 621","parenthetical":"Only if party is necessary under rule 19(a) does court proceed to next step in 12(b)(7) analysis considering question of indispensability under 19(b","sentence":"Gwartz, 23 F.3d at 1428 (court must first determine whether party is \u201cnecessary\u201d under 19(a) before turning to 19(b) analysis); Rochester Methodist Hosp., 728 F.2d at 1016-17 (Rule 19(b) must be read in conjunction with Rule 19(a) analysis); see also Boulevard Bank, 15 F.3d at 1422-23 (in 12(b)(7) analysis, court begins with Rule 19(a), and only if those requirements are met, does court consider Rule 19(b)); Keweenaw Bay Indian Community, 11 F.3d at 1346-47 (analysis under Rule 12(b)(7) begins with Rule 19(a)); Bank One Texas, 968 F.2d at 100 (if absent party is not necessary under 19(a), they cannot be indispensable under 19(b), and Rule 12(b)(7) motion must fail); Moore, 901 F.2d at 1447 (Rule 19(a) provides the \u201cthreshold\u201d analysis to indispensability); McLaughlin, 847 F.2d at 621 (Only if party is necessary under rule 19(a) does court proceed to next step in 12(b)(7) analysis considering question of indispensability under 19(b))."},"case_id":7846299,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Although defendants' analysis of this question begins with the factors to be considered under Fed.R.Civ.P. 19(b), the court's analysis properly begins with the question of whether or not the trustees are \"necessary\" parties under Fed.R.Civ.P. 19(a) to a claim of set-off of assets belonging to the plaintiffs against Morken's overdrafts at the bank.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"728 F.2d 1016, 1016-17","parenthetical":"Rule 19(b) must be read in conjunction with Rule 19(a) analysis","sentence":"Gwartz, 23 F.3d at 1428 (court must first determine whether party is \u201cnecessary\u201d under 19(a) before turning to 19(b) analysis); Rochester Methodist Hosp., 728 F.2d at 1016-17 (Rule 19(b) must be read in conjunction with Rule 19(a) analysis); see also Boulevard Bank, 15 F.3d at 1422-23 (in 12(b)(7) analysis, court begins with Rule 19(a), and only if those requirements are met, does court consider Rule 19(b)); Keweenaw Bay Indian Community, 11 F.3d at 1346-47 (analysis under Rule 12(b)(7) begins with Rule 19(a)); Bank One Texas, 968 F.2d at 100 (if absent party is not necessary under 19(a), they cannot be indispensable under 19(b), and Rule 12(b)(7) motion must fail); Moore, 901 F.2d at 1447 (Rule 19(a) provides the \u201cthreshold\u201d analysis to indispensability); McLaughlin, 847 F.2d at 621 (Only if party is necessary under rule 19(a) does court proceed to next step in 12(b)(7) analysis considering question of indispensability under 19(b))."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"15 F.3d 1422, 1422-23","parenthetical":"in 12(b)(7) analysis, court begins with Rule 19(a), and only if those requirements are met, does court consider Rule 19(b","sentence":"Gwartz, 23 F.3d at 1428 (court must first determine whether party is \u201cnecessary\u201d under 19(a) before turning to 19(b) analysis); Rochester Methodist Hosp., 728 F.2d at 1016-17 (Rule 19(b) must be read in conjunction with Rule 19(a) analysis); see also Boulevard Bank, 15 F.3d at 1422-23 (in 12(b)(7) analysis, court begins with Rule 19(a), and only if those requirements are met, does court consider Rule 19(b)); Keweenaw Bay Indian Community, 11 F.3d at 1346-47 (analysis under Rule 12(b)(7) begins with Rule 19(a)); Bank One Texas, 968 F.2d at 100 (if absent party is not necessary under 19(a), they cannot be indispensable under 19(b), and Rule 12(b)(7) motion must fail); Moore, 901 F.2d at 1447 (Rule 19(a) provides the \u201cthreshold\u201d analysis to indispensability); McLaughlin, 847 F.2d at 621 (Only if party is necessary under rule 19(a) does court proceed to next step in 12(b)(7) analysis considering question of indispensability under 19(b))."},"case_id":7846299,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Although defendants' analysis of this question begins with the factors to be considered under Fed.R.Civ.P. 19(b), the court's analysis properly begins with the question of whether or not the trustees are \"necessary\" parties under Fed.R.Civ.P. 19(a) to a claim of set-off of assets belonging to the plaintiffs against Morken's overdrafts at the bank.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"728 F.2d 1016, 1016-17","parenthetical":"Rule 19(b) must be read in conjunction with Rule 19(a) analysis","sentence":"Gwartz, 23 F.3d at 1428 (court must first determine whether party is \u201cnecessary\u201d under 19(a) before turning to 19(b) analysis); Rochester Methodist Hosp., 728 F.2d at 1016-17 (Rule 19(b) must be read in conjunction with Rule 19(a) analysis); see also Boulevard Bank, 15 F.3d at 1422-23 (in 12(b)(7) analysis, court begins with Rule 19(a), and only if those requirements are met, does court consider Rule 19(b)); Keweenaw Bay Indian Community, 11 F.3d at 1346-47 (analysis under Rule 12(b)(7) begins with Rule 19(a)); Bank One Texas, 968 F.2d at 100 (if absent party is not necessary under 19(a), they cannot be indispensable under 19(b), and Rule 12(b)(7) motion must fail); Moore, 901 F.2d at 1447 (Rule 19(a) provides the \u201cthreshold\u201d analysis to indispensability); McLaughlin, 847 F.2d at 621 (Only if party is necessary under rule 19(a) does court proceed to next step in 12(b)(7) analysis considering question of indispensability under 19(b))."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"968 F.2d 100, 100","parenthetical":"if absent party is not necessary under 19(a), they cannot be indispensable under 19(b), and Rule 12(b)(7) motion must fail","sentence":"Gwartz, 23 F.3d at 1428 (court must first determine whether party is \u201cnecessary\u201d under 19(a) before turning to 19(b) analysis); Rochester Methodist Hosp., 728 F.2d at 1016-17 (Rule 19(b) must be read in conjunction with Rule 19(a) analysis); see also Boulevard Bank, 15 F.3d at 1422-23 (in 12(b)(7) analysis, court begins with Rule 19(a), and only if those requirements are met, does court consider Rule 19(b)); Keweenaw Bay Indian Community, 11 F.3d at 1346-47 (analysis under Rule 12(b)(7) begins with Rule 19(a)); Bank One Texas, 968 F.2d at 100 (if absent party is not necessary under 19(a), they cannot be indispensable under 19(b), and Rule 12(b)(7) motion must fail); Moore, 901 F.2d at 1447 (Rule 19(a) provides the \u201cthreshold\u201d analysis to indispensability); McLaughlin, 847 F.2d at 621 (Only if party is necessary under rule 19(a) does court proceed to next step in 12(b)(7) analysis considering question of indispensability under 19(b))."},"case_id":7846299,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Although defendants' analysis of this question begins with the factors to be considered under Fed.R.Civ.P. 19(b), the court's analysis properly begins with the question of whether or not the trustees are \"necessary\" parties under Fed.R.Civ.P. 19(a) to a claim of set-off of assets belonging to the plaintiffs against Morken's overdrafts at the bank.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"847 F.2d 621, 621","parenthetical":"Only if party is necessary under rule 19(a) does court proceed to next step in 12(b)(7) analysis considering question of indispensability under 19(b","sentence":"Gwartz, 23 F.3d at 1428 (court must first determine whether party is \u201cnecessary\u201d under 19(a) before turning to 19(b) analysis); Rochester Methodist Hosp., 728 F.2d at 1016-17 (Rule 19(b) must be read in conjunction with Rule 19(a) analysis); see also Boulevard Bank, 15 F.3d at 1422-23 (in 12(b)(7) analysis, court begins with Rule 19(a), and only if those requirements are met, does court consider Rule 19(b)); Keweenaw Bay Indian Community, 11 F.3d at 1346-47 (analysis under Rule 12(b)(7) begins with Rule 19(a)); Bank One Texas, 968 F.2d at 100 (if absent party is not necessary under 19(a), they cannot be indispensable under 19(b), and Rule 12(b)(7) motion must fail); Moore, 901 F.2d at 1447 (Rule 19(a) provides the \u201cthreshold\u201d analysis to indispensability); McLaughlin, 847 F.2d at 621 (Only if party is necessary under rule 19(a) does court proceed to next step in 12(b)(7) analysis considering question of indispensability under 19(b))."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"728 F.2d 1016, 1016-17","parenthetical":"Rule 19(b) must be read in conjunction with Rule 19(a) analysis","sentence":"Gwartz, 23 F.3d at 1428 (court must first determine whether party is \u201cnecessary\u201d under 19(a) before turning to 19(b) analysis); Rochester Methodist Hosp., 728 F.2d at 1016-17 (Rule 19(b) must be read in conjunction with Rule 19(a) analysis); see also Boulevard Bank, 15 F.3d at 1422-23 (in 12(b)(7) analysis, court begins with Rule 19(a), and only if those requirements are met, does court consider Rule 19(b)); Keweenaw Bay Indian Community, 11 F.3d at 1346-47 (analysis under Rule 12(b)(7) begins with Rule 19(a)); Bank One Texas, 968 F.2d at 100 (if absent party is not necessary under 19(a), they cannot be indispensable under 19(b), and Rule 12(b)(7) motion must fail); Moore, 901 F.2d at 1447 (Rule 19(a) provides the \u201cthreshold\u201d analysis to indispensability); McLaughlin, 847 F.2d at 621 (Only if party is necessary under rule 19(a) does court proceed to next step in 12(b)(7) analysis considering question of indispensability under 19(b))."},"case_id":7846299,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In addition, a disabled plaintiff ceases to be otherwise qualified for a position when she or he engages in misconduct in violation of a workplace policy of the employer or poses a direct threat to the health or safety of others which cannot be eliminated by a reasonable accommodation.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"977 F.Supp. 226, 233-34","parenthetical":"\"[w]here the record demonstrates that an employee poses a significant risk to the health and safety of others which cannot be eliminated by reasonable accommodation, summary judgment in favor of the employer is appropriate\"","sentence":"See 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 12113(b) (\u201can individual shall not pose a direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals in the workplace\u201d); Adams v. Rochester Gen. Hosp., 977 F.Supp. 226, 233-34 (W.D.N.Y.1997) (\u201c[w]here the record demonstrates that an employee poses a significant risk to the health and safety of others which cannot be eliminated by reasonable accommodation, summary judgment in favor of the employer is appropriate\u201d); Altman v. New York City Health and Hosp. Corp., 903 F.Supp. 503 (S.-D.N.Y.1995) (conduct demonstrated to be a manifestation of plaintiffs disability which may implicate public safety concerns should be considered when determining whether plaintiff is otherwise qualified), aff'd, 100 F.3d 1054 (2d Cir. 1996); see also Hamilton v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 136 F.3d 1047, 1052 (5th Cir.1998) (affirming summary judgment for employer where plaintiff was terminated for violation of policy on workplace violence); Palmer v. Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, 117 F.3d 351, 352 (7th Cir.1997) (affirming summary judgment for employer where plaintiff threatened to kill another employee, -because ADA \u201cdoes not- require an employer to retain a potentially violent employee\u201d), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S.-, 118 S.Ct. 893, 139 L.Ed.2d 879 (1998); Amego, Inc., 110 F.3d at 144 (where essential job functions \u201cnecessarily implicate the safety of others, plaintiff must demonstrate that she can perform those functions in a way that does not endanger others\u201d); Crawford v. Runyon, 79 F.3d 743, 744 (8th Cir.1996) (affirming judgment against employee who threatened to hurt or kill his supervisor); Hardy v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., No. 4:95-CV-"},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"136 F.3d 1047, 1052","parenthetical":"affirming summary judgment for employer where plaintiff was terminated for violation of policy on workplace violence","sentence":"See 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 12113(b) (\u201can individual shall not pose a direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals in the workplace\u201d); Adams v. Rochester Gen. Hosp., 977 F.Supp. 226, 233-34 (W.D.N.Y.1997) (\u201c[w]here the record demonstrates that an employee poses a significant risk to the health and safety of others which cannot be eliminated by reasonable accommodation, summary judgment in favor of the employer is appropriate\u201d); Altman v. New York City Health and Hosp. Corp., 903 F.Supp. 503 (S.-D.N.Y.1995) (conduct demonstrated to be a manifestation of plaintiffs disability which may implicate public safety concerns should be considered when determining whether plaintiff is otherwise qualified), aff'd, 100 F.3d 1054 (2d Cir. 1996); see also Hamilton v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 136 F.3d 1047, 1052 (5th Cir.1998) (affirming summary judgment for employer where plaintiff was terminated for violation of policy on workplace violence); Palmer v. Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, 117 F.3d 351, 352 (7th Cir.1997) (affirming summary judgment for employer where plaintiff threatened to kill another employee, -because ADA \u201cdoes not- require an employer to retain a potentially violent employee\u201d), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S.-, 118 S.Ct. 893, 139 L.Ed.2d 879 (1998); Amego, Inc., 110 F.3d at 144 (where essential job functions \u201cnecessarily implicate the safety of others, plaintiff must demonstrate that she can perform those functions in a way that does not endanger others\u201d); Crawford v. Runyon, 79 F.3d 743, 744 (8th Cir.1996) (affirming judgment against employee who threatened to hurt or kill his supervisor); Hardy v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., No. 4:95-CV-"},"case_id":11660093,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In addition, a disabled plaintiff ceases to be otherwise qualified for a position when she or he engages in misconduct in violation of a workplace policy of the employer or poses a direct threat to the health or safety of others which cannot be eliminated by a reasonable accommodation.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"977 F.Supp. 226, 233-34","parenthetical":"\"[w]here the record demonstrates that an employee poses a significant risk to the health and safety of others which cannot be eliminated by reasonable accommodation, summary judgment in favor of the employer is appropriate\"","sentence":"See 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 12113(b) (\u201can individual shall not pose a direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals in the workplace\u201d); Adams v. Rochester Gen. Hosp., 977 F.Supp. 226, 233-34 (W.D.N.Y.1997) (\u201c[w]here the record demonstrates that an employee poses a significant risk to the health and safety of others which cannot be eliminated by reasonable accommodation, summary judgment in favor of the employer is appropriate\u201d); Altman v. New York City Health and Hosp. Corp., 903 F.Supp. 503 (S.-D.N.Y.1995) (conduct demonstrated to be a manifestation of plaintiffs disability which may implicate public safety concerns should be considered when determining whether plaintiff is otherwise qualified), aff'd, 100 F.3d 1054 (2d Cir. 1996); see also Hamilton v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 136 F.3d 1047, 1052 (5th Cir.1998) (affirming summary judgment for employer where plaintiff was terminated for violation of policy on workplace violence); Palmer v. Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, 117 F.3d 351, 352 (7th Cir.1997) (affirming summary judgment for employer where plaintiff threatened to kill another employee, -because ADA \u201cdoes not- require an employer to retain a potentially violent employee\u201d), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S.-, 118 S.Ct. 893, 139 L.Ed.2d 879 (1998); Amego, Inc., 110 F.3d at 144 (where essential job functions \u201cnecessarily implicate the safety of others, plaintiff must demonstrate that she can perform those functions in a way that does not endanger others\u201d); Crawford v. Runyon, 79 F.3d 743, 744 (8th Cir.1996) (affirming judgment against employee who threatened to hurt or kill his supervisor); Hardy v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., No. 4:95-CV-"},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"117 F.3d 351, 352","parenthetical":"affirming summary judgment for employer where plaintiff threatened to kill another employee, -because ADA \"does not- require an employer to retain a potentially violent employee\"","sentence":"See 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 12113(b) (\u201can individual shall not pose a direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals in the workplace\u201d); Adams v. Rochester Gen. Hosp., 977 F.Supp. 226, 233-34 (W.D.N.Y.1997) (\u201c[w]here the record demonstrates that an employee poses a significant risk to the health and safety of others which cannot be eliminated by reasonable accommodation, summary judgment in favor of the employer is appropriate\u201d); Altman v. New York City Health and Hosp. Corp., 903 F.Supp. 503 (S.-D.N.Y.1995) (conduct demonstrated to be a manifestation of plaintiffs disability which may implicate public safety concerns should be considered when determining whether plaintiff is otherwise qualified), aff'd, 100 F.3d 1054 (2d Cir. 1996); see also Hamilton v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 136 F.3d 1047, 1052 (5th Cir.1998) (affirming summary judgment for employer where plaintiff was terminated for violation of policy on workplace violence); Palmer v. Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, 117 F.3d 351, 352 (7th Cir.1997) (affirming summary judgment for employer where plaintiff threatened to kill another employee, -because ADA \u201cdoes not- require an employer to retain a potentially violent employee\u201d), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S.-, 118 S.Ct. 893, 139 L.Ed.2d 879 (1998); Amego, Inc., 110 F.3d at 144 (where essential job functions \u201cnecessarily implicate the safety of others, plaintiff must demonstrate that she can perform those functions in a way that does not endanger others\u201d); Crawford v. Runyon, 79 F.3d 743, 744 (8th Cir.1996) (affirming judgment against employee who threatened to hurt or kill his supervisor); Hardy v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., No. 4:95-CV-"},"case_id":11660093,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In addition, a disabled plaintiff ceases to be otherwise qualified for a position when she or he engages in misconduct in violation of a workplace policy of the employer or poses a direct threat to the health or safety of others which cannot be eliminated by a reasonable accommodation.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"977 F.Supp. 226, 233-34","parenthetical":"\"[w]here the record demonstrates that an employee poses a significant risk to the health and safety of others which cannot be eliminated by reasonable accommodation, summary judgment in favor of the employer is appropriate\"","sentence":"See 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 12113(b) (\u201can individual shall not pose a direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals in the workplace\u201d); Adams v. Rochester Gen. Hosp., 977 F.Supp. 226, 233-34 (W.D.N.Y.1997) (\u201c[w]here the record demonstrates that an employee poses a significant risk to the health and safety of others which cannot be eliminated by reasonable accommodation, summary judgment in favor of the employer is appropriate\u201d); Altman v. New York City Health and Hosp. Corp., 903 F.Supp. 503 (S.-D.N.Y.1995) (conduct demonstrated to be a manifestation of plaintiffs disability which may implicate public safety concerns should be considered when determining whether plaintiff is otherwise qualified), aff'd, 100 F.3d 1054 (2d Cir. 1996); see also Hamilton v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 136 F.3d 1047, 1052 (5th Cir.1998) (affirming summary judgment for employer where plaintiff was terminated for violation of policy on workplace violence); Palmer v. Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, 117 F.3d 351, 352 (7th Cir.1997) (affirming summary judgment for employer where plaintiff threatened to kill another employee, -because ADA \u201cdoes not- require an employer to retain a potentially violent employee\u201d), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S.-, 118 S.Ct. 893, 139 L.Ed.2d 879 (1998); Amego, Inc., 110 F.3d at 144 (where essential job functions \u201cnecessarily implicate the safety of others, plaintiff must demonstrate that she can perform those functions in a way that does not endanger others\u201d); Crawford v. Runyon, 79 F.3d 743, 744 (8th Cir.1996) (affirming judgment against employee who threatened to hurt or kill his supervisor); Hardy v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., No. 4:95-CV-"},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"affirming summary judgment for employer where plaintiff threatened to kill another employee, -because ADA \"does not- require an employer to retain a potentially violent employee\"","sentence":"See 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 12113(b) (\u201can individual shall not pose a direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals in the workplace\u201d); Adams v. Rochester Gen. Hosp., 977 F.Supp. 226, 233-34 (W.D.N.Y.1997) (\u201c[w]here the record demonstrates that an employee poses a significant risk to the health and safety of others which cannot be eliminated by reasonable accommodation, summary judgment in favor of the employer is appropriate\u201d); Altman v. New York City Health and Hosp. Corp., 903 F.Supp. 503 (S.-D.N.Y.1995) (conduct demonstrated to be a manifestation of plaintiffs disability which may implicate public safety concerns should be considered when determining whether plaintiff is otherwise qualified), aff'd, 100 F.3d 1054 (2d Cir. 1996); see also Hamilton v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 136 F.3d 1047, 1052 (5th Cir.1998) (affirming summary judgment for employer where plaintiff was terminated for violation of policy on workplace violence); Palmer v. Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, 117 F.3d 351, 352 (7th Cir.1997) (affirming summary judgment for employer where plaintiff threatened to kill another employee, -because ADA \u201cdoes not- require an employer to retain a potentially violent employee\u201d), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S.-, 118 S.Ct. 893, 139 L.Ed.2d 879 (1998); Amego, Inc., 110 F.3d at 144 (where essential job functions \u201cnecessarily implicate the safety of others, plaintiff must demonstrate that she can perform those functions in a way that does not endanger others\u201d); Crawford v. Runyon, 79 F.3d 743, 744 (8th Cir.1996) (affirming judgment against employee who threatened to hurt or kill his supervisor); Hardy v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., No. 4:95-CV-"},"case_id":11660093,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In addition, a disabled plaintiff ceases to be otherwise qualified for a position when she or he engages in misconduct in violation of a workplace policy of the employer or poses a direct threat to the health or safety of others which cannot be eliminated by a reasonable accommodation.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"977 F.Supp. 226, 233-34","parenthetical":"\"[w]here the record demonstrates that an employee poses a significant risk to the health and safety of others which cannot be eliminated by reasonable accommodation, summary judgment in favor of the employer is appropriate\"","sentence":"See 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 12113(b) (\u201can individual shall not pose a direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals in the workplace\u201d); Adams v. Rochester Gen. Hosp., 977 F.Supp. 226, 233-34 (W.D.N.Y.1997) (\u201c[w]here the record demonstrates that an employee poses a significant risk to the health and safety of others which cannot be eliminated by reasonable accommodation, summary judgment in favor of the employer is appropriate\u201d); Altman v. New York City Health and Hosp. Corp., 903 F.Supp. 503 (S.-D.N.Y.1995) (conduct demonstrated to be a manifestation of plaintiffs disability which may implicate public safety concerns should be considered when determining whether plaintiff is otherwise qualified), aff'd, 100 F.3d 1054 (2d Cir. 1996); see also Hamilton v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 136 F.3d 1047, 1052 (5th Cir.1998) (affirming summary judgment for employer where plaintiff was terminated for violation of policy on workplace violence); Palmer v. Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, 117 F.3d 351, 352 (7th Cir.1997) (affirming summary judgment for employer where plaintiff threatened to kill another employee, -because ADA \u201cdoes not- require an employer to retain a potentially violent employee\u201d), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S.-, 118 S.Ct. 893, 139 L.Ed.2d 879 (1998); Amego, Inc., 110 F.3d at 144 (where essential job functions \u201cnecessarily implicate the safety of others, plaintiff must demonstrate that she can perform those functions in a way that does not endanger others\u201d); Crawford v. Runyon, 79 F.3d 743, 744 (8th Cir.1996) (affirming judgment against employee who threatened to hurt or kill his supervisor); Hardy v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., No. 4:95-CV-"},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"affirming summary judgment for employer where plaintiff threatened to kill another employee, -because ADA \"does not- require an employer to retain a potentially violent employee\"","sentence":"See 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 12113(b) (\u201can individual shall not pose a direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals in the workplace\u201d); Adams v. Rochester Gen. Hosp., 977 F.Supp. 226, 233-34 (W.D.N.Y.1997) (\u201c[w]here the record demonstrates that an employee poses a significant risk to the health and safety of others which cannot be eliminated by reasonable accommodation, summary judgment in favor of the employer is appropriate\u201d); Altman v. New York City Health and Hosp. Corp., 903 F.Supp. 503 (S.-D.N.Y.1995) (conduct demonstrated to be a manifestation of plaintiffs disability which may implicate public safety concerns should be considered when determining whether plaintiff is otherwise qualified), aff'd, 100 F.3d 1054 (2d Cir. 1996); see also Hamilton v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 136 F.3d 1047, 1052 (5th Cir.1998) (affirming summary judgment for employer where plaintiff was terminated for violation of policy on workplace violence); Palmer v. Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, 117 F.3d 351, 352 (7th Cir.1997) (affirming summary judgment for employer where plaintiff threatened to kill another employee, -because ADA \u201cdoes not- require an employer to retain a potentially violent employee\u201d), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S.-, 118 S.Ct. 893, 139 L.Ed.2d 879 (1998); Amego, Inc., 110 F.3d at 144 (where essential job functions \u201cnecessarily implicate the safety of others, plaintiff must demonstrate that she can perform those functions in a way that does not endanger others\u201d); Crawford v. Runyon, 79 F.3d 743, 744 (8th Cir.1996) (affirming judgment against employee who threatened to hurt or kill his supervisor); Hardy v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., No. 4:95-CV-"},"case_id":11660093,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In addition, a disabled plaintiff ceases to be otherwise qualified for a position when she or he engages in misconduct in violation of a workplace policy of the employer or poses a direct threat to the health or safety of others which cannot be eliminated by a reasonable accommodation.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"110 F.3d 144, 144","parenthetical":"where essential job functions \"necessarily implicate the safety of others, plaintiff must demonstrate that she can perform those functions in a way that does not endanger others\"","sentence":"See 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 12113(b) (\u201can individual shall not pose a direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals in the workplace\u201d); Adams v. Rochester Gen. Hosp., 977 F.Supp. 226, 233-34 (W.D.N.Y.1997) (\u201c[w]here the record demonstrates that an employee poses a significant risk to the health and safety of others which cannot be eliminated by reasonable accommodation, summary judgment in favor of the employer is appropriate\u201d); Altman v. New York City Health and Hosp. Corp., 903 F.Supp. 503 (S.-D.N.Y.1995) (conduct demonstrated to be a manifestation of plaintiffs disability which may implicate public safety concerns should be considered when determining whether plaintiff is otherwise qualified), aff'd, 100 F.3d 1054 (2d Cir. 1996); see also Hamilton v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 136 F.3d 1047, 1052 (5th Cir.1998) (affirming summary judgment for employer where plaintiff was terminated for violation of policy on workplace violence); Palmer v. Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, 117 F.3d 351, 352 (7th Cir.1997) (affirming summary judgment for employer where plaintiff threatened to kill another employee, -because ADA \u201cdoes not- require an employer to retain a potentially violent employee\u201d), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S.-, 118 S.Ct. 893, 139 L.Ed.2d 879 (1998); Amego, Inc., 110 F.3d at 144 (where essential job functions \u201cnecessarily implicate the safety of others, plaintiff must demonstrate that she can perform those functions in a way that does not endanger others\u201d); Crawford v. Runyon, 79 F.3d 743, 744 (8th Cir.1996) (affirming judgment against employee who threatened to hurt or kill his supervisor); Hardy v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., No. 4:95-CV-"},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"977 F.Supp. 226, 233-34","parenthetical":"\"[w]here the record demonstrates that an employee poses a significant risk to the health and safety of others which cannot be eliminated by reasonable accommodation, summary judgment in favor of the employer is appropriate\"","sentence":"See 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 12113(b) (\u201can individual shall not pose a direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals in the workplace\u201d); Adams v. Rochester Gen. Hosp., 977 F.Supp. 226, 233-34 (W.D.N.Y.1997) (\u201c[w]here the record demonstrates that an employee poses a significant risk to the health and safety of others which cannot be eliminated by reasonable accommodation, summary judgment in favor of the employer is appropriate\u201d); Altman v. New York City Health and Hosp. Corp., 903 F.Supp. 503 (S.-D.N.Y.1995) (conduct demonstrated to be a manifestation of plaintiffs disability which may implicate public safety concerns should be considered when determining whether plaintiff is otherwise qualified), aff'd, 100 F.3d 1054 (2d Cir. 1996); see also Hamilton v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 136 F.3d 1047, 1052 (5th Cir.1998) (affirming summary judgment for employer where plaintiff was terminated for violation of policy on workplace violence); Palmer v. Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, 117 F.3d 351, 352 (7th Cir.1997) (affirming summary judgment for employer where plaintiff threatened to kill another employee, -because ADA \u201cdoes not- require an employer to retain a potentially violent employee\u201d), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S.-, 118 S.Ct. 893, 139 L.Ed.2d 879 (1998); Amego, Inc., 110 F.3d at 144 (where essential job functions \u201cnecessarily implicate the safety of others, plaintiff must demonstrate that she can perform those functions in a way that does not endanger others\u201d); Crawford v. Runyon, 79 F.3d 743, 744 (8th Cir.1996) (affirming judgment against employee who threatened to hurt or kill his supervisor); Hardy v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., No. 4:95-CV-"},"case_id":11660093,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In addition, a disabled plaintiff ceases to be otherwise qualified for a position when she or he engages in misconduct in violation of a workplace policy of the employer or poses a direct threat to the health or safety of others which cannot be eliminated by a reasonable accommodation.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"79 F.3d 743, 744","parenthetical":"affirming judgment against employee who threatened to hurt or kill his supervisor","sentence":"See 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 12113(b) (\u201can individual shall not pose a direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals in the workplace\u201d); Adams v. Rochester Gen. Hosp., 977 F.Supp. 226, 233-34 (W.D.N.Y.1997) (\u201c[w]here the record demonstrates that an employee poses a significant risk to the health and safety of others which cannot be eliminated by reasonable accommodation, summary judgment in favor of the employer is appropriate\u201d); Altman v. New York City Health and Hosp. Corp., 903 F.Supp. 503 (S.-D.N.Y.1995) (conduct demonstrated to be a manifestation of plaintiffs disability which may implicate public safety concerns should be considered when determining whether plaintiff is otherwise qualified), aff'd, 100 F.3d 1054 (2d Cir. 1996); see also Hamilton v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 136 F.3d 1047, 1052 (5th Cir.1998) (affirming summary judgment for employer where plaintiff was terminated for violation of policy on workplace violence); Palmer v. Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, 117 F.3d 351, 352 (7th Cir.1997) (affirming summary judgment for employer where plaintiff threatened to kill another employee, -because ADA \u201cdoes not- require an employer to retain a potentially violent employee\u201d), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S.-, 118 S.Ct. 893, 139 L.Ed.2d 879 (1998); Amego, Inc., 110 F.3d at 144 (where essential job functions \u201cnecessarily implicate the safety of others, plaintiff must demonstrate that she can perform those functions in a way that does not endanger others\u201d); Crawford v. Runyon, 79 F.3d 743, 744 (8th Cir.1996) (affirming judgment against employee who threatened to hurt or kill his supervisor); Hardy v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., No. 4:95-CV-"},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"977 F.Supp. 226, 233-34","parenthetical":"\"[w]here the record demonstrates that an employee poses a significant risk to the health and safety of others which cannot be eliminated by reasonable accommodation, summary judgment in favor of the employer is appropriate\"","sentence":"See 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 12113(b) (\u201can individual shall not pose a direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals in the workplace\u201d); Adams v. Rochester Gen. Hosp., 977 F.Supp. 226, 233-34 (W.D.N.Y.1997) (\u201c[w]here the record demonstrates that an employee poses a significant risk to the health and safety of others which cannot be eliminated by reasonable accommodation, summary judgment in favor of the employer is appropriate\u201d); Altman v. New York City Health and Hosp. Corp., 903 F.Supp. 503 (S.-D.N.Y.1995) (conduct demonstrated to be a manifestation of plaintiffs disability which may implicate public safety concerns should be considered when determining whether plaintiff is otherwise qualified), aff'd, 100 F.3d 1054 (2d Cir. 1996); see also Hamilton v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 136 F.3d 1047, 1052 (5th Cir.1998) (affirming summary judgment for employer where plaintiff was terminated for violation of policy on workplace violence); Palmer v. Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, 117 F.3d 351, 352 (7th Cir.1997) (affirming summary judgment for employer where plaintiff threatened to kill another employee, -because ADA \u201cdoes not- require an employer to retain a potentially violent employee\u201d), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S.-, 118 S.Ct. 893, 139 L.Ed.2d 879 (1998); Amego, Inc., 110 F.3d at 144 (where essential job functions \u201cnecessarily implicate the safety of others, plaintiff must demonstrate that she can perform those functions in a way that does not endanger others\u201d); Crawford v. Runyon, 79 F.3d 743, 744 (8th Cir.1996) (affirming judgment against employee who threatened to hurt or kill his supervisor); Hardy v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., No. 4:95-CV-"},"case_id":11660093,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In addition, a disabled plaintiff ceases to be otherwise qualified for a position when she or he engages in misconduct in violation of a workplace policy of the employer or poses a direct threat to the health or safety of others which cannot be eliminated by a reasonable accommodation.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"136 F.3d 1047, 1052","parenthetical":"affirming summary judgment for employer where plaintiff was terminated for violation of policy on workplace violence","sentence":"See 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 12113(b) (\u201can individual shall not pose a direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals in the workplace\u201d); Adams v. Rochester Gen. Hosp., 977 F.Supp. 226, 233-34 (W.D.N.Y.1997) (\u201c[w]here the record demonstrates that an employee poses a significant risk to the health and safety of others which cannot be eliminated by reasonable accommodation, summary judgment in favor of the employer is appropriate\u201d); Altman v. New York City Health and Hosp. Corp., 903 F.Supp. 503 (S.-D.N.Y.1995) (conduct demonstrated to be a manifestation of plaintiffs disability which may implicate public safety concerns should be considered when determining whether plaintiff is otherwise qualified), aff'd, 100 F.3d 1054 (2d Cir. 1996); see also Hamilton v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 136 F.3d 1047, 1052 (5th Cir.1998) (affirming summary judgment for employer where plaintiff was terminated for violation of policy on workplace violence); Palmer v. Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, 117 F.3d 351, 352 (7th Cir.1997) (affirming summary judgment for employer where plaintiff threatened to kill another employee, -because ADA \u201cdoes not- require an employer to retain a potentially violent employee\u201d), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S.-, 118 S.Ct. 893, 139 L.Ed.2d 879 (1998); Amego, Inc., 110 F.3d at 144 (where essential job functions \u201cnecessarily implicate the safety of others, plaintiff must demonstrate that she can perform those functions in a way that does not endanger others\u201d); Crawford v. Runyon, 79 F.3d 743, 744 (8th Cir.1996) (affirming judgment against employee who threatened to hurt or kill his supervisor); Hardy v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., No. 4:95-CV-"},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"conduct demonstrated to be a manifestation of plaintiffs disability which may implicate public safety concerns should be considered when determining whether plaintiff is otherwise qualified","sentence":"See 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 12113(b) (\u201can individual shall not pose a direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals in the workplace\u201d); Adams v. Rochester Gen. Hosp., 977 F.Supp. 226, 233-34 (W.D.N.Y.1997) (\u201c[w]here the record demonstrates that an employee poses a significant risk to the health and safety of others which cannot be eliminated by reasonable accommodation, summary judgment in favor of the employer is appropriate\u201d); Altman v. New York City Health and Hosp. Corp., 903 F.Supp. 503 (S.-D.N.Y.1995) (conduct demonstrated to be a manifestation of plaintiffs disability which may implicate public safety concerns should be considered when determining whether plaintiff is otherwise qualified), aff'd, 100 F.3d 1054 (2d Cir. 1996); see also Hamilton v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 136 F.3d 1047, 1052 (5th Cir.1998) (affirming summary judgment for employer where plaintiff was terminated for violation of policy on workplace violence); Palmer v. Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, 117 F.3d 351, 352 (7th Cir.1997) (affirming summary judgment for employer where plaintiff threatened to kill another employee, -because ADA \u201cdoes not- require an employer to retain a potentially violent employee\u201d), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S.-, 118 S.Ct. 893, 139 L.Ed.2d 879 (1998); Amego, Inc., 110 F.3d at 144 (where essential job functions \u201cnecessarily implicate the safety of others, plaintiff must demonstrate that she can perform those functions in a way that does not endanger others\u201d); Crawford v. Runyon, 79 F.3d 743, 744 (8th Cir.1996) (affirming judgment against employee who threatened to hurt or kill his supervisor); Hardy v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., No. 4:95-CV-"},"case_id":11660093,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In addition, a disabled plaintiff ceases to be otherwise qualified for a position when she or he engages in misconduct in violation of a workplace policy of the employer or poses a direct threat to the health or safety of others which cannot be eliminated by a reasonable accommodation.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"conduct demonstrated to be a manifestation of plaintiffs disability which may implicate public safety concerns should be considered when determining whether plaintiff is otherwise qualified","sentence":"See 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 12113(b) (\u201can individual shall not pose a direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals in the workplace\u201d); Adams v. Rochester Gen. Hosp., 977 F.Supp. 226, 233-34 (W.D.N.Y.1997) (\u201c[w]here the record demonstrates that an employee poses a significant risk to the health and safety of others which cannot be eliminated by reasonable accommodation, summary judgment in favor of the employer is appropriate\u201d); Altman v. New York City Health and Hosp. Corp., 903 F.Supp. 503 (S.-D.N.Y.1995) (conduct demonstrated to be a manifestation of plaintiffs disability which may implicate public safety concerns should be considered when determining whether plaintiff is otherwise qualified), aff'd, 100 F.3d 1054 (2d Cir. 1996); see also Hamilton v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 136 F.3d 1047, 1052 (5th Cir.1998) (affirming summary judgment for employer where plaintiff was terminated for violation of policy on workplace violence); Palmer v. Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, 117 F.3d 351, 352 (7th Cir.1997) (affirming summary judgment for employer where plaintiff threatened to kill another employee, -because ADA \u201cdoes not- require an employer to retain a potentially violent employee\u201d), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S.-, 118 S.Ct. 893, 139 L.Ed.2d 879 (1998); Amego, Inc., 110 F.3d at 144 (where essential job functions \u201cnecessarily implicate the safety of others, plaintiff must demonstrate that she can perform those functions in a way that does not endanger others\u201d); Crawford v. Runyon, 79 F.3d 743, 744 (8th Cir.1996) (affirming judgment against employee who threatened to hurt or kill his supervisor); Hardy v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., No. 4:95-CV-"},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"117 F.3d 351, 352","parenthetical":"affirming summary judgment for employer where plaintiff threatened to kill another employee, -because ADA \"does not- require an employer to retain a potentially violent employee\"","sentence":"See 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 12113(b) (\u201can individual shall not pose a direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals in the workplace\u201d); Adams v. Rochester Gen. Hosp., 977 F.Supp. 226, 233-34 (W.D.N.Y.1997) (\u201c[w]here the record demonstrates that an employee poses a significant risk to the health and safety of others which cannot be eliminated by reasonable accommodation, summary judgment in favor of the employer is appropriate\u201d); Altman v. New York City Health and Hosp. Corp., 903 F.Supp. 503 (S.-D.N.Y.1995) (conduct demonstrated to be a manifestation of plaintiffs disability which may implicate public safety concerns should be considered when determining whether plaintiff is otherwise qualified), aff'd, 100 F.3d 1054 (2d Cir. 1996); see also Hamilton v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 136 F.3d 1047, 1052 (5th Cir.1998) (affirming summary judgment for employer where plaintiff was terminated for violation of policy on workplace violence); Palmer v. Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, 117 F.3d 351, 352 (7th Cir.1997) (affirming summary judgment for employer where plaintiff threatened to kill another employee, -because ADA \u201cdoes not- require an employer to retain a potentially violent employee\u201d), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S.-, 118 S.Ct. 893, 139 L.Ed.2d 879 (1998); Amego, Inc., 110 F.3d at 144 (where essential job functions \u201cnecessarily implicate the safety of others, plaintiff must demonstrate that she can perform those functions in a way that does not endanger others\u201d); Crawford v. Runyon, 79 F.3d 743, 744 (8th Cir.1996) (affirming judgment against employee who threatened to hurt or kill his supervisor); Hardy v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., No. 4:95-CV-"},"case_id":11660093,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In addition, a disabled plaintiff ceases to be otherwise qualified for a position when she or he engages in misconduct in violation of a workplace policy of the employer or poses a direct threat to the health or safety of others which cannot be eliminated by a reasonable accommodation.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"affirming summary judgment for employer where plaintiff threatened to kill another employee, -because ADA \"does not- require an employer to retain a potentially violent employee\"","sentence":"See 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 12113(b) (\u201can individual shall not pose a direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals in the workplace\u201d); Adams v. Rochester Gen. Hosp., 977 F.Supp. 226, 233-34 (W.D.N.Y.1997) (\u201c[w]here the record demonstrates that an employee poses a significant risk to the health and safety of others which cannot be eliminated by reasonable accommodation, summary judgment in favor of the employer is appropriate\u201d); Altman v. New York City Health and Hosp. Corp., 903 F.Supp. 503 (S.-D.N.Y.1995) (conduct demonstrated to be a manifestation of plaintiffs disability which may implicate public safety concerns should be considered when determining whether plaintiff is otherwise qualified), aff'd, 100 F.3d 1054 (2d Cir. 1996); see also Hamilton v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 136 F.3d 1047, 1052 (5th Cir.1998) (affirming summary judgment for employer where plaintiff was terminated for violation of policy on workplace violence); Palmer v. Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, 117 F.3d 351, 352 (7th Cir.1997) (affirming summary judgment for employer where plaintiff threatened to kill another employee, -because ADA \u201cdoes not- require an employer to retain a potentially violent employee\u201d), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S.-, 118 S.Ct. 893, 139 L.Ed.2d 879 (1998); Amego, Inc., 110 F.3d at 144 (where essential job functions \u201cnecessarily implicate the safety of others, plaintiff must demonstrate that she can perform those functions in a way that does not endanger others\u201d); Crawford v. Runyon, 79 F.3d 743, 744 (8th Cir.1996) (affirming judgment against employee who threatened to hurt or kill his supervisor); Hardy v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., No. 4:95-CV-"},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"conduct demonstrated to be a manifestation of plaintiffs disability which may implicate public safety concerns should be considered when determining whether plaintiff is otherwise qualified","sentence":"See 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 12113(b) (\u201can individual shall not pose a direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals in the workplace\u201d); Adams v. Rochester Gen. Hosp., 977 F.Supp. 226, 233-34 (W.D.N.Y.1997) (\u201c[w]here the record demonstrates that an employee poses a significant risk to the health and safety of others which cannot be eliminated by reasonable accommodation, summary judgment in favor of the employer is appropriate\u201d); Altman v. New York City Health and Hosp. Corp., 903 F.Supp. 503 (S.-D.N.Y.1995) (conduct demonstrated to be a manifestation of plaintiffs disability which may implicate public safety concerns should be considered when determining whether plaintiff is otherwise qualified), aff'd, 100 F.3d 1054 (2d Cir. 1996); see also Hamilton v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 136 F.3d 1047, 1052 (5th Cir.1998) (affirming summary judgment for employer where plaintiff was terminated for violation of policy on workplace violence); Palmer v. Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, 117 F.3d 351, 352 (7th Cir.1997) (affirming summary judgment for employer where plaintiff threatened to kill another employee, -because ADA \u201cdoes not- require an employer to retain a potentially violent employee\u201d), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S.-, 118 S.Ct. 893, 139 L.Ed.2d 879 (1998); Amego, Inc., 110 F.3d at 144 (where essential job functions \u201cnecessarily implicate the safety of others, plaintiff must demonstrate that she can perform those functions in a way that does not endanger others\u201d); Crawford v. Runyon, 79 F.3d 743, 744 (8th Cir.1996) (affirming judgment against employee who threatened to hurt or kill his supervisor); Hardy v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., No. 4:95-CV-"},"case_id":11660093,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In addition, a disabled plaintiff ceases to be otherwise qualified for a position when she or he engages in misconduct in violation of a workplace policy of the employer or poses a direct threat to the health or safety of others which cannot be eliminated by a reasonable accommodation.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"conduct demonstrated to be a manifestation of plaintiffs disability which may implicate public safety concerns should be considered when determining whether plaintiff is otherwise qualified","sentence":"See 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 12113(b) (\u201can individual shall not pose a direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals in the workplace\u201d); Adams v. Rochester Gen. Hosp., 977 F.Supp. 226, 233-34 (W.D.N.Y.1997) (\u201c[w]here the record demonstrates that an employee poses a significant risk to the health and safety of others which cannot be eliminated by reasonable accommodation, summary judgment in favor of the employer is appropriate\u201d); Altman v. New York City Health and Hosp. Corp., 903 F.Supp. 503 (S.-D.N.Y.1995) (conduct demonstrated to be a manifestation of plaintiffs disability which may implicate public safety concerns should be considered when determining whether plaintiff is otherwise qualified), aff'd, 100 F.3d 1054 (2d Cir. 1996); see also Hamilton v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 136 F.3d 1047, 1052 (5th Cir.1998) (affirming summary judgment for employer where plaintiff was terminated for violation of policy on workplace violence); Palmer v. Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, 117 F.3d 351, 352 (7th Cir.1997) (affirming summary judgment for employer where plaintiff threatened to kill another employee, -because ADA \u201cdoes not- require an employer to retain a potentially violent employee\u201d), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S.-, 118 S.Ct. 893, 139 L.Ed.2d 879 (1998); Amego, Inc., 110 F.3d at 144 (where essential job functions \u201cnecessarily implicate the safety of others, plaintiff must demonstrate that she can perform those functions in a way that does not endanger others\u201d); Crawford v. Runyon, 79 F.3d 743, 744 (8th Cir.1996) (affirming judgment against employee who threatened to hurt or kill his supervisor); Hardy v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., No. 4:95-CV-"},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"affirming summary judgment for employer where plaintiff threatened to kill another employee, -because ADA \"does not- require an employer to retain a potentially violent employee\"","sentence":"See 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 12113(b) (\u201can individual shall not pose a direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals in the workplace\u201d); Adams v. Rochester Gen. Hosp., 977 F.Supp. 226, 233-34 (W.D.N.Y.1997) (\u201c[w]here the record demonstrates that an employee poses a significant risk to the health and safety of others which cannot be eliminated by reasonable accommodation, summary judgment in favor of the employer is appropriate\u201d); Altman v. New York City Health and Hosp. Corp., 903 F.Supp. 503 (S.-D.N.Y.1995) (conduct demonstrated to be a manifestation of plaintiffs disability which may implicate public safety concerns should be considered when determining whether plaintiff is otherwise qualified), aff'd, 100 F.3d 1054 (2d Cir. 1996); see also Hamilton v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 136 F.3d 1047, 1052 (5th Cir.1998) (affirming summary judgment for employer where plaintiff was terminated for violation of policy on workplace violence); Palmer v. Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, 117 F.3d 351, 352 (7th Cir.1997) (affirming summary judgment for employer where plaintiff threatened to kill another employee, -because ADA \u201cdoes not- require an employer to retain a potentially violent employee\u201d), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S.-, 118 S.Ct. 893, 139 L.Ed.2d 879 (1998); Amego, Inc., 110 F.3d at 144 (where essential job functions \u201cnecessarily implicate the safety of others, plaintiff must demonstrate that she can perform those functions in a way that does not endanger others\u201d); Crawford v. Runyon, 79 F.3d 743, 744 (8th Cir.1996) (affirming judgment against employee who threatened to hurt or kill his supervisor); Hardy v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., No. 4:95-CV-"},"case_id":11660093,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In addition, a disabled plaintiff ceases to be otherwise qualified for a position when she or he engages in misconduct in violation of a workplace policy of the employer or poses a direct threat to the health or safety of others which cannot be eliminated by a reasonable accommodation.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"110 F.3d 144, 144","parenthetical":"where essential job functions \"necessarily implicate the safety of others, plaintiff must demonstrate that she can perform those functions in a way that does not endanger others\"","sentence":"See 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 12113(b) (\u201can individual shall not pose a direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals in the workplace\u201d); Adams v. Rochester Gen. Hosp., 977 F.Supp. 226, 233-34 (W.D.N.Y.1997) (\u201c[w]here the record demonstrates that an employee poses a significant risk to the health and safety of others which cannot be eliminated by reasonable accommodation, summary judgment in favor of the employer is appropriate\u201d); Altman v. New York City Health and Hosp. Corp., 903 F.Supp. 503 (S.-D.N.Y.1995) (conduct demonstrated to be a manifestation of plaintiffs disability which may implicate public safety concerns should be considered when determining whether plaintiff is otherwise qualified), aff'd, 100 F.3d 1054 (2d Cir. 1996); see also Hamilton v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 136 F.3d 1047, 1052 (5th Cir.1998) (affirming summary judgment for employer where plaintiff was terminated for violation of policy on workplace violence); Palmer v. Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, 117 F.3d 351, 352 (7th Cir.1997) (affirming summary judgment for employer where plaintiff threatened to kill another employee, -because ADA \u201cdoes not- require an employer to retain a potentially violent employee\u201d), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S.-, 118 S.Ct. 893, 139 L.Ed.2d 879 (1998); Amego, Inc., 110 F.3d at 144 (where essential job functions \u201cnecessarily implicate the safety of others, plaintiff must demonstrate that she can perform those functions in a way that does not endanger others\u201d); Crawford v. Runyon, 79 F.3d 743, 744 (8th Cir.1996) (affirming judgment against employee who threatened to hurt or kill his supervisor); Hardy v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., No. 4:95-CV-"},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"conduct demonstrated to be a manifestation of plaintiffs disability which may implicate public safety concerns should be considered when determining whether plaintiff is otherwise qualified","sentence":"See 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 12113(b) (\u201can individual shall not pose a direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals in the workplace\u201d); Adams v. Rochester Gen. Hosp., 977 F.Supp. 226, 233-34 (W.D.N.Y.1997) (\u201c[w]here the record demonstrates that an employee poses a significant risk to the health and safety of others which cannot be eliminated by reasonable accommodation, summary judgment in favor of the employer is appropriate\u201d); Altman v. New York City Health and Hosp. Corp., 903 F.Supp. 503 (S.-D.N.Y.1995) (conduct demonstrated to be a manifestation of plaintiffs disability which may implicate public safety concerns should be considered when determining whether plaintiff is otherwise qualified), aff'd, 100 F.3d 1054 (2d Cir. 1996); see also Hamilton v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 136 F.3d 1047, 1052 (5th Cir.1998) (affirming summary judgment for employer where plaintiff was terminated for violation of policy on workplace violence); Palmer v. Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, 117 F.3d 351, 352 (7th Cir.1997) (affirming summary judgment for employer where plaintiff threatened to kill another employee, -because ADA \u201cdoes not- require an employer to retain a potentially violent employee\u201d), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S.-, 118 S.Ct. 893, 139 L.Ed.2d 879 (1998); Amego, Inc., 110 F.3d at 144 (where essential job functions \u201cnecessarily implicate the safety of others, plaintiff must demonstrate that she can perform those functions in a way that does not endanger others\u201d); Crawford v. Runyon, 79 F.3d 743, 744 (8th Cir.1996) (affirming judgment against employee who threatened to hurt or kill his supervisor); Hardy v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., No. 4:95-CV-"},"case_id":11660093,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In addition, a disabled plaintiff ceases to be otherwise qualified for a position when she or he engages in misconduct in violation of a workplace policy of the employer or poses a direct threat to the health or safety of others which cannot be eliminated by a reasonable accommodation.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"79 F.3d 743, 744","parenthetical":"affirming judgment against employee who threatened to hurt or kill his supervisor","sentence":"See 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 12113(b) (\u201can individual shall not pose a direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals in the workplace\u201d); Adams v. Rochester Gen. Hosp., 977 F.Supp. 226, 233-34 (W.D.N.Y.1997) (\u201c[w]here the record demonstrates that an employee poses a significant risk to the health and safety of others which cannot be eliminated by reasonable accommodation, summary judgment in favor of the employer is appropriate\u201d); Altman v. New York City Health and Hosp. Corp., 903 F.Supp. 503 (S.-D.N.Y.1995) (conduct demonstrated to be a manifestation of plaintiffs disability which may implicate public safety concerns should be considered when determining whether plaintiff is otherwise qualified), aff'd, 100 F.3d 1054 (2d Cir. 1996); see also Hamilton v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 136 F.3d 1047, 1052 (5th Cir.1998) (affirming summary judgment for employer where plaintiff was terminated for violation of policy on workplace violence); Palmer v. Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, 117 F.3d 351, 352 (7th Cir.1997) (affirming summary judgment for employer where plaintiff threatened to kill another employee, -because ADA \u201cdoes not- require an employer to retain a potentially violent employee\u201d), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S.-, 118 S.Ct. 893, 139 L.Ed.2d 879 (1998); Amego, Inc., 110 F.3d at 144 (where essential job functions \u201cnecessarily implicate the safety of others, plaintiff must demonstrate that she can perform those functions in a way that does not endanger others\u201d); Crawford v. Runyon, 79 F.3d 743, 744 (8th Cir.1996) (affirming judgment against employee who threatened to hurt or kill his supervisor); Hardy v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., No. 4:95-CV-"},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"conduct demonstrated to be a manifestation of plaintiffs disability which may implicate public safety concerns should be considered when determining whether plaintiff is otherwise qualified","sentence":"See 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 12113(b) (\u201can individual shall not pose a direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals in the workplace\u201d); Adams v. Rochester Gen. Hosp., 977 F.Supp. 226, 233-34 (W.D.N.Y.1997) (\u201c[w]here the record demonstrates that an employee poses a significant risk to the health and safety of others which cannot be eliminated by reasonable accommodation, summary judgment in favor of the employer is appropriate\u201d); Altman v. New York City Health and Hosp. Corp., 903 F.Supp. 503 (S.-D.N.Y.1995) (conduct demonstrated to be a manifestation of plaintiffs disability which may implicate public safety concerns should be considered when determining whether plaintiff is otherwise qualified), aff'd, 100 F.3d 1054 (2d Cir. 1996); see also Hamilton v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 136 F.3d 1047, 1052 (5th Cir.1998) (affirming summary judgment for employer where plaintiff was terminated for violation of policy on workplace violence); Palmer v. Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, 117 F.3d 351, 352 (7th Cir.1997) (affirming summary judgment for employer where plaintiff threatened to kill another employee, -because ADA \u201cdoes not- require an employer to retain a potentially violent employee\u201d), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S.-, 118 S.Ct. 893, 139 L.Ed.2d 879 (1998); Amego, Inc., 110 F.3d at 144 (where essential job functions \u201cnecessarily implicate the safety of others, plaintiff must demonstrate that she can perform those functions in a way that does not endanger others\u201d); Crawford v. Runyon, 79 F.3d 743, 744 (8th Cir.1996) (affirming judgment against employee who threatened to hurt or kill his supervisor); Hardy v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., No. 4:95-CV-"},"case_id":11660093,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In addition, a disabled plaintiff ceases to be otherwise qualified for a position when she or he engages in misconduct in violation of a workplace policy of the employer or poses a direct threat to the health or safety of others which cannot be eliminated by a reasonable accommodation.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"136 F.3d 1047, 1052","parenthetical":"affirming summary judgment for employer where plaintiff was terminated for violation of policy on workplace violence","sentence":"See 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 12113(b) (\u201can individual shall not pose a direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals in the workplace\u201d); Adams v. Rochester Gen. Hosp., 977 F.Supp. 226, 233-34 (W.D.N.Y.1997) (\u201c[w]here the record demonstrates that an employee poses a significant risk to the health and safety of others which cannot be eliminated by reasonable accommodation, summary judgment in favor of the employer is appropriate\u201d); Altman v. New York City Health and Hosp. Corp., 903 F.Supp. 503 (S.-D.N.Y.1995) (conduct demonstrated to be a manifestation of plaintiffs disability which may implicate public safety concerns should be considered when determining whether plaintiff is otherwise qualified), aff'd, 100 F.3d 1054 (2d Cir. 1996); see also Hamilton v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 136 F.3d 1047, 1052 (5th Cir.1998) (affirming summary judgment for employer where plaintiff was terminated for violation of policy on workplace violence); Palmer v. Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, 117 F.3d 351, 352 (7th Cir.1997) (affirming summary judgment for employer where plaintiff threatened to kill another employee, -because ADA \u201cdoes not- require an employer to retain a potentially violent employee\u201d), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S.-, 118 S.Ct. 893, 139 L.Ed.2d 879 (1998); Amego, Inc., 110 F.3d at 144 (where essential job functions \u201cnecessarily implicate the safety of others, plaintiff must demonstrate that she can perform those functions in a way that does not endanger others\u201d); Crawford v. Runyon, 79 F.3d 743, 744 (8th Cir.1996) (affirming judgment against employee who threatened to hurt or kill his supervisor); Hardy v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., No. 4:95-CV-"},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"conduct demonstrated to be a manifestation of plaintiffs disability which may implicate public safety concerns should be considered when determining whether plaintiff is otherwise qualified","sentence":"See 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 12113(b) (\u201can individual shall not pose a direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals in the workplace\u201d); Adams v. Rochester Gen. Hosp., 977 F.Supp. 226, 233-34 (W.D.N.Y.1997) (\u201c[w]here the record demonstrates that an employee poses a significant risk to the health and safety of others which cannot be eliminated by reasonable accommodation, summary judgment in favor of the employer is appropriate\u201d); Altman v. New York City Health and Hosp. Corp., 903 F.Supp. 503 (S.-D.N.Y.1995) (conduct demonstrated to be a manifestation of plaintiffs disability which may implicate public safety concerns should be considered when determining whether plaintiff is otherwise qualified), aff'd, 100 F.3d 1054 (2d Cir. 1996); see also Hamilton v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 136 F.3d 1047, 1052 (5th Cir.1998) (affirming summary judgment for employer where plaintiff was terminated for violation of policy on workplace violence); Palmer v. Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, 117 F.3d 351, 352 (7th Cir.1997) (affirming summary judgment for employer where plaintiff threatened to kill another employee, -because ADA \u201cdoes not- require an employer to retain a potentially violent employee\u201d), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S.-, 118 S.Ct. 893, 139 L.Ed.2d 879 (1998); Amego, Inc., 110 F.3d at 144 (where essential job functions \u201cnecessarily implicate the safety of others, plaintiff must demonstrate that she can perform those functions in a way that does not endanger others\u201d); Crawford v. Runyon, 79 F.3d 743, 744 (8th Cir.1996) (affirming judgment against employee who threatened to hurt or kill his supervisor); Hardy v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., No. 4:95-CV-"},"case_id":11660093,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In addition, a disabled plaintiff ceases to be otherwise qualified for a position when she or he engages in misconduct in violation of a workplace policy of the employer or poses a direct threat to the health or safety of others which cannot be eliminated by a reasonable accommodation.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"conduct demonstrated to be a manifestation of plaintiffs disability which may implicate public safety concerns should be considered when determining whether plaintiff is otherwise qualified","sentence":"See 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 12113(b) (\u201can individual shall not pose a direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals in the workplace\u201d); Adams v. Rochester Gen. Hosp., 977 F.Supp. 226, 233-34 (W.D.N.Y.1997) (\u201c[w]here the record demonstrates that an employee poses a significant risk to the health and safety of others which cannot be eliminated by reasonable accommodation, summary judgment in favor of the employer is appropriate\u201d); Altman v. New York City Health and Hosp. Corp., 903 F.Supp. 503 (S.-D.N.Y.1995) (conduct demonstrated to be a manifestation of plaintiffs disability which may implicate public safety concerns should be considered when determining whether plaintiff is otherwise qualified), aff'd, 100 F.3d 1054 (2d Cir. 1996); see also Hamilton v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 136 F.3d 1047, 1052 (5th Cir.1998) (affirming summary judgment for employer where plaintiff was terminated for violation of policy on workplace violence); Palmer v. Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, 117 F.3d 351, 352 (7th Cir.1997) (affirming summary judgment for employer where plaintiff threatened to kill another employee, -because ADA \u201cdoes not- require an employer to retain a potentially violent employee\u201d), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S.-, 118 S.Ct. 893, 139 L.Ed.2d 879 (1998); Amego, Inc., 110 F.3d at 144 (where essential job functions \u201cnecessarily implicate the safety of others, plaintiff must demonstrate that she can perform those functions in a way that does not endanger others\u201d); Crawford v. Runyon, 79 F.3d 743, 744 (8th Cir.1996) (affirming judgment against employee who threatened to hurt or kill his supervisor); Hardy v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., No. 4:95-CV-"},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"117 F.3d 351, 352","parenthetical":"affirming summary judgment for employer where plaintiff threatened to kill another employee, -because ADA \"does not- require an employer to retain a potentially violent employee\"","sentence":"See 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 12113(b) (\u201can individual shall not pose a direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals in the workplace\u201d); Adams v. Rochester Gen. Hosp., 977 F.Supp. 226, 233-34 (W.D.N.Y.1997) (\u201c[w]here the record demonstrates that an employee poses a significant risk to the health and safety of others which cannot be eliminated by reasonable accommodation, summary judgment in favor of the employer is appropriate\u201d); Altman v. New York City Health and Hosp. Corp., 903 F.Supp. 503 (S.-D.N.Y.1995) (conduct demonstrated to be a manifestation of plaintiffs disability which may implicate public safety concerns should be considered when determining whether plaintiff is otherwise qualified), aff'd, 100 F.3d 1054 (2d Cir. 1996); see also Hamilton v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 136 F.3d 1047, 1052 (5th Cir.1998) (affirming summary judgment for employer where plaintiff was terminated for violation of policy on workplace violence); Palmer v. Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, 117 F.3d 351, 352 (7th Cir.1997) (affirming summary judgment for employer where plaintiff threatened to kill another employee, -because ADA \u201cdoes not- require an employer to retain a potentially violent employee\u201d), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S.-, 118 S.Ct. 893, 139 L.Ed.2d 879 (1998); Amego, Inc., 110 F.3d at 144 (where essential job functions \u201cnecessarily implicate the safety of others, plaintiff must demonstrate that she can perform those functions in a way that does not endanger others\u201d); Crawford v. Runyon, 79 F.3d 743, 744 (8th Cir.1996) (affirming judgment against employee who threatened to hurt or kill his supervisor); Hardy v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., No. 4:95-CV-"},"case_id":11660093,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In addition, a disabled plaintiff ceases to be otherwise qualified for a position when she or he engages in misconduct in violation of a workplace policy of the employer or poses a direct threat to the health or safety of others which cannot be eliminated by a reasonable accommodation.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"affirming summary judgment for employer where plaintiff threatened to kill another employee, -because ADA \"does not- require an employer to retain a potentially violent employee\"","sentence":"See 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 12113(b) (\u201can individual shall not pose a direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals in the workplace\u201d); Adams v. Rochester Gen. Hosp., 977 F.Supp. 226, 233-34 (W.D.N.Y.1997) (\u201c[w]here the record demonstrates that an employee poses a significant risk to the health and safety of others which cannot be eliminated by reasonable accommodation, summary judgment in favor of the employer is appropriate\u201d); Altman v. New York City Health and Hosp. Corp., 903 F.Supp. 503 (S.-D.N.Y.1995) (conduct demonstrated to be a manifestation of plaintiffs disability which may implicate public safety concerns should be considered when determining whether plaintiff is otherwise qualified), aff'd, 100 F.3d 1054 (2d Cir. 1996); see also Hamilton v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 136 F.3d 1047, 1052 (5th Cir.1998) (affirming summary judgment for employer where plaintiff was terminated for violation of policy on workplace violence); Palmer v. Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, 117 F.3d 351, 352 (7th Cir.1997) (affirming summary judgment for employer where plaintiff threatened to kill another employee, -because ADA \u201cdoes not- require an employer to retain a potentially violent employee\u201d), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S.-, 118 S.Ct. 893, 139 L.Ed.2d 879 (1998); Amego, Inc., 110 F.3d at 144 (where essential job functions \u201cnecessarily implicate the safety of others, plaintiff must demonstrate that she can perform those functions in a way that does not endanger others\u201d); Crawford v. Runyon, 79 F.3d 743, 744 (8th Cir.1996) (affirming judgment against employee who threatened to hurt or kill his supervisor); Hardy v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., No. 4:95-CV-"},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"conduct demonstrated to be a manifestation of plaintiffs disability which may implicate public safety concerns should be considered when determining whether plaintiff is otherwise qualified","sentence":"See 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 12113(b) (\u201can individual shall not pose a direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals in the workplace\u201d); Adams v. Rochester Gen. Hosp., 977 F.Supp. 226, 233-34 (W.D.N.Y.1997) (\u201c[w]here the record demonstrates that an employee poses a significant risk to the health and safety of others which cannot be eliminated by reasonable accommodation, summary judgment in favor of the employer is appropriate\u201d); Altman v. New York City Health and Hosp. Corp., 903 F.Supp. 503 (S.-D.N.Y.1995) (conduct demonstrated to be a manifestation of plaintiffs disability which may implicate public safety concerns should be considered when determining whether plaintiff is otherwise qualified), aff'd, 100 F.3d 1054 (2d Cir. 1996); see also Hamilton v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 136 F.3d 1047, 1052 (5th Cir.1998) (affirming summary judgment for employer where plaintiff was terminated for violation of policy on workplace violence); Palmer v. Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, 117 F.3d 351, 352 (7th Cir.1997) (affirming summary judgment for employer where plaintiff threatened to kill another employee, -because ADA \u201cdoes not- require an employer to retain a potentially violent employee\u201d), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S.-, 118 S.Ct. 893, 139 L.Ed.2d 879 (1998); Amego, Inc., 110 F.3d at 144 (where essential job functions \u201cnecessarily implicate the safety of others, plaintiff must demonstrate that she can perform those functions in a way that does not endanger others\u201d); Crawford v. Runyon, 79 F.3d 743, 744 (8th Cir.1996) (affirming judgment against employee who threatened to hurt or kill his supervisor); Hardy v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., No. 4:95-CV-"},"case_id":11660093,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In addition, a disabled plaintiff ceases to be otherwise qualified for a position when she or he engages in misconduct in violation of a workplace policy of the employer or poses a direct threat to the health or safety of others which cannot be eliminated by a reasonable accommodation.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"affirming summary judgment for employer where plaintiff threatened to kill another employee, -because ADA \"does not- require an employer to retain a potentially violent employee\"","sentence":"See 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 12113(b) (\u201can individual shall not pose a direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals in the workplace\u201d); Adams v. Rochester Gen. Hosp., 977 F.Supp. 226, 233-34 (W.D.N.Y.1997) (\u201c[w]here the record demonstrates that an employee poses a significant risk to the health and safety of others which cannot be eliminated by reasonable accommodation, summary judgment in favor of the employer is appropriate\u201d); Altman v. New York City Health and Hosp. Corp., 903 F.Supp. 503 (S.-D.N.Y.1995) (conduct demonstrated to be a manifestation of plaintiffs disability which may implicate public safety concerns should be considered when determining whether plaintiff is otherwise qualified), aff'd, 100 F.3d 1054 (2d Cir. 1996); see also Hamilton v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 136 F.3d 1047, 1052 (5th Cir.1998) (affirming summary judgment for employer where plaintiff was terminated for violation of policy on workplace violence); Palmer v. Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, 117 F.3d 351, 352 (7th Cir.1997) (affirming summary judgment for employer where plaintiff threatened to kill another employee, -because ADA \u201cdoes not- require an employer to retain a potentially violent employee\u201d), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S.-, 118 S.Ct. 893, 139 L.Ed.2d 879 (1998); Amego, Inc., 110 F.3d at 144 (where essential job functions \u201cnecessarily implicate the safety of others, plaintiff must demonstrate that she can perform those functions in a way that does not endanger others\u201d); Crawford v. Runyon, 79 F.3d 743, 744 (8th Cir.1996) (affirming judgment against employee who threatened to hurt or kill his supervisor); Hardy v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., No. 4:95-CV-"},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"conduct demonstrated to be a manifestation of plaintiffs disability which may implicate public safety concerns should be considered when determining whether plaintiff is otherwise qualified","sentence":"See 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 12113(b) (\u201can individual shall not pose a direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals in the workplace\u201d); Adams v. Rochester Gen. Hosp., 977 F.Supp. 226, 233-34 (W.D.N.Y.1997) (\u201c[w]here the record demonstrates that an employee poses a significant risk to the health and safety of others which cannot be eliminated by reasonable accommodation, summary judgment in favor of the employer is appropriate\u201d); Altman v. New York City Health and Hosp. Corp., 903 F.Supp. 503 (S.-D.N.Y.1995) (conduct demonstrated to be a manifestation of plaintiffs disability which may implicate public safety concerns should be considered when determining whether plaintiff is otherwise qualified), aff'd, 100 F.3d 1054 (2d Cir. 1996); see also Hamilton v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 136 F.3d 1047, 1052 (5th Cir.1998) (affirming summary judgment for employer where plaintiff was terminated for violation of policy on workplace violence); Palmer v. Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, 117 F.3d 351, 352 (7th Cir.1997) (affirming summary judgment for employer where plaintiff threatened to kill another employee, -because ADA \u201cdoes not- require an employer to retain a potentially violent employee\u201d), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S.-, 118 S.Ct. 893, 139 L.Ed.2d 879 (1998); Amego, Inc., 110 F.3d at 144 (where essential job functions \u201cnecessarily implicate the safety of others, plaintiff must demonstrate that she can perform those functions in a way that does not endanger others\u201d); Crawford v. Runyon, 79 F.3d 743, 744 (8th Cir.1996) (affirming judgment against employee who threatened to hurt or kill his supervisor); Hardy v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., No. 4:95-CV-"},"case_id":11660093,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In addition, a disabled plaintiff ceases to be otherwise qualified for a position when she or he engages in misconduct in violation of a workplace policy of the employer or poses a direct threat to the health or safety of others which cannot be eliminated by a reasonable accommodation.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"conduct demonstrated to be a manifestation of plaintiffs disability which may implicate public safety concerns should be considered when determining whether plaintiff is otherwise qualified","sentence":"See 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 12113(b) (\u201can individual shall not pose a direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals in the workplace\u201d); Adams v. Rochester Gen. Hosp., 977 F.Supp. 226, 233-34 (W.D.N.Y.1997) (\u201c[w]here the record demonstrates that an employee poses a significant risk to the health and safety of others which cannot be eliminated by reasonable accommodation, summary judgment in favor of the employer is appropriate\u201d); Altman v. New York City Health and Hosp. Corp., 903 F.Supp. 503 (S.-D.N.Y.1995) (conduct demonstrated to be a manifestation of plaintiffs disability which may implicate public safety concerns should be considered when determining whether plaintiff is otherwise qualified), aff'd, 100 F.3d 1054 (2d Cir. 1996); see also Hamilton v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 136 F.3d 1047, 1052 (5th Cir.1998) (affirming summary judgment for employer where plaintiff was terminated for violation of policy on workplace violence); Palmer v. Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, 117 F.3d 351, 352 (7th Cir.1997) (affirming summary judgment for employer where plaintiff threatened to kill another employee, -because ADA \u201cdoes not- require an employer to retain a potentially violent employee\u201d), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S.-, 118 S.Ct. 893, 139 L.Ed.2d 879 (1998); Amego, Inc., 110 F.3d at 144 (where essential job functions \u201cnecessarily implicate the safety of others, plaintiff must demonstrate that she can perform those functions in a way that does not endanger others\u201d); Crawford v. Runyon, 79 F.3d 743, 744 (8th Cir.1996) (affirming judgment against employee who threatened to hurt or kill his supervisor); Hardy v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., No. 4:95-CV-"},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"110 F.3d 144, 144","parenthetical":"where essential job functions \"necessarily implicate the safety of others, plaintiff must demonstrate that she can perform those functions in a way that does not endanger others\"","sentence":"See 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 12113(b) (\u201can individual shall not pose a direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals in the workplace\u201d); Adams v. Rochester Gen. Hosp., 977 F.Supp. 226, 233-34 (W.D.N.Y.1997) (\u201c[w]here the record demonstrates that an employee poses a significant risk to the health and safety of others which cannot be eliminated by reasonable accommodation, summary judgment in favor of the employer is appropriate\u201d); Altman v. New York City Health and Hosp. Corp., 903 F.Supp. 503 (S.-D.N.Y.1995) (conduct demonstrated to be a manifestation of plaintiffs disability which may implicate public safety concerns should be considered when determining whether plaintiff is otherwise qualified), aff'd, 100 F.3d 1054 (2d Cir. 1996); see also Hamilton v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 136 F.3d 1047, 1052 (5th Cir.1998) (affirming summary judgment for employer where plaintiff was terminated for violation of policy on workplace violence); Palmer v. Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, 117 F.3d 351, 352 (7th Cir.1997) (affirming summary judgment for employer where plaintiff threatened to kill another employee, -because ADA \u201cdoes not- require an employer to retain a potentially violent employee\u201d), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S.-, 118 S.Ct. 893, 139 L.Ed.2d 879 (1998); Amego, Inc., 110 F.3d at 144 (where essential job functions \u201cnecessarily implicate the safety of others, plaintiff must demonstrate that she can perform those functions in a way that does not endanger others\u201d); Crawford v. Runyon, 79 F.3d 743, 744 (8th Cir.1996) (affirming judgment against employee who threatened to hurt or kill his supervisor); Hardy v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., No. 4:95-CV-"},"case_id":11660093,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In addition, a disabled plaintiff ceases to be otherwise qualified for a position when she or he engages in misconduct in violation of a workplace policy of the employer or poses a direct threat to the health or safety of others which cannot be eliminated by a reasonable accommodation.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"conduct demonstrated to be a manifestation of plaintiffs disability which may implicate public safety concerns should be considered when determining whether plaintiff is otherwise qualified","sentence":"See 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 12113(b) (\u201can individual shall not pose a direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals in the workplace\u201d); Adams v. Rochester Gen. Hosp., 977 F.Supp. 226, 233-34 (W.D.N.Y.1997) (\u201c[w]here the record demonstrates that an employee poses a significant risk to the health and safety of others which cannot be eliminated by reasonable accommodation, summary judgment in favor of the employer is appropriate\u201d); Altman v. New York City Health and Hosp. Corp., 903 F.Supp. 503 (S.-D.N.Y.1995) (conduct demonstrated to be a manifestation of plaintiffs disability which may implicate public safety concerns should be considered when determining whether plaintiff is otherwise qualified), aff'd, 100 F.3d 1054 (2d Cir. 1996); see also Hamilton v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 136 F.3d 1047, 1052 (5th Cir.1998) (affirming summary judgment for employer where plaintiff was terminated for violation of policy on workplace violence); Palmer v. Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, 117 F.3d 351, 352 (7th Cir.1997) (affirming summary judgment for employer where plaintiff threatened to kill another employee, -because ADA \u201cdoes not- require an employer to retain a potentially violent employee\u201d), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S.-, 118 S.Ct. 893, 139 L.Ed.2d 879 (1998); Amego, Inc., 110 F.3d at 144 (where essential job functions \u201cnecessarily implicate the safety of others, plaintiff must demonstrate that she can perform those functions in a way that does not endanger others\u201d); Crawford v. Runyon, 79 F.3d 743, 744 (8th Cir.1996) (affirming judgment against employee who threatened to hurt or kill his supervisor); Hardy v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., No. 4:95-CV-"},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"79 F.3d 743, 744","parenthetical":"affirming judgment against employee who threatened to hurt or kill his supervisor","sentence":"See 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 12113(b) (\u201can individual shall not pose a direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals in the workplace\u201d); Adams v. Rochester Gen. Hosp., 977 F.Supp. 226, 233-34 (W.D.N.Y.1997) (\u201c[w]here the record demonstrates that an employee poses a significant risk to the health and safety of others which cannot be eliminated by reasonable accommodation, summary judgment in favor of the employer is appropriate\u201d); Altman v. New York City Health and Hosp. Corp., 903 F.Supp. 503 (S.-D.N.Y.1995) (conduct demonstrated to be a manifestation of plaintiffs disability which may implicate public safety concerns should be considered when determining whether plaintiff is otherwise qualified), aff'd, 100 F.3d 1054 (2d Cir. 1996); see also Hamilton v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 136 F.3d 1047, 1052 (5th Cir.1998) (affirming summary judgment for employer where plaintiff was terminated for violation of policy on workplace violence); Palmer v. Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, 117 F.3d 351, 352 (7th Cir.1997) (affirming summary judgment for employer where plaintiff threatened to kill another employee, -because ADA \u201cdoes not- require an employer to retain a potentially violent employee\u201d), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S.-, 118 S.Ct. 893, 139 L.Ed.2d 879 (1998); Amego, Inc., 110 F.3d at 144 (where essential job functions \u201cnecessarily implicate the safety of others, plaintiff must demonstrate that she can perform those functions in a way that does not endanger others\u201d); Crawford v. Runyon, 79 F.3d 743, 744 (8th Cir.1996) (affirming judgment against employee who threatened to hurt or kill his supervisor); Hardy v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., No. 4:95-CV-"},"case_id":11660093,"label":"a"}
{"context":"When a defendant raises an entrapment defense, the government may demonstrate predisposition through evidence that the defendant committed similar crimes in the past.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"It is clear that the government is permitted broad latitude under Rule 404(b","sentence":"See United States v. Tanner, 61 F.3d 231, 238 (4th Cir.1995) (\u201c[The defendant] demonstrated his predisposition to [distribute a drug] over and over again, through his pattern of illegal sales of various drugs over many years.\u201d); see also United States v. Abulhawa, 833 F.2d 1006 (4th Cir.1987) (unpublished table decision) (\u201cIt is clear that the government is permitted broad latitude under Rule 404(b) to introduce evidence of relevant prior acts once a defendant has raised a claim of entrapment thereby putting into issue his predisposition to commit the crimes with which he is charged.\u201d). As the Second Circuit explained, \u201cthis past conduct should be \u2018near enough in kind to support an inference that his purpose included offenses of the sort charged;\u2019 although it is not necessary that the past conduct be precisely the same as that for which the defendant is being prosecuted.\u201d"},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"61 F.3d 231, 238","parenthetical":"\"[The defendant] demonstrated his predisposition to [distribute a drug] over and over again, through his pattern of illegal sales of various drugs over many years.\"","sentence":"See United States v. Tanner, 61 F.3d 231, 238 (4th Cir.1995) (\u201c[The defendant] demonstrated his predisposition to [distribute a drug] over and over again, through his pattern of illegal sales of various drugs over many years.\u201d); see also United States v. Abulhawa, 833 F.2d 1006 (4th Cir.1987) (unpublished table decision) (\u201cIt is clear that the government is permitted broad latitude under Rule 404(b) to introduce evidence of relevant prior acts once a defendant has raised a claim of entrapment thereby putting into issue his predisposition to commit the crimes with which he is charged.\u201d). As the Second Circuit explained, \u201cthis past conduct should be \u2018near enough in kind to support an inference that his purpose included offenses of the sort charged;\u2019 although it is not necessary that the past conduct be precisely the same as that for which the defendant is being prosecuted.\u201d"},"case_id":4183017,"label":"b"}
{"context":"This is especially true in Florida where it is improper for courts to look beyond the face of a conviction to determine whether the conviction is for a crime involving dishonesty. Page, 449 So.2d at 816. Instead, the dishonesty must appear on the face of the conviction, such that an element of the crime reflects dishonesty.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"887 F.Supp. 95, 96","parenthetical":"holding that a conviction under a New York state statute for failure to file tax returns requires proof of a specific intent to evade taxes, and as such, can be used for impeachment purposes consistently with the Third Circuit holding in Cree","sentence":"Cf. United States v. Yang, 887 F.Supp. 95, 96 (S.D.N.Y.1995)(holding that a conviction under a New York state statute for failure to file tax returns requires proof of a specific intent to evade taxes, and as such, can be used for impeachment purposes consistently with the Third Circuit holding in Cree); Commonwealth v. Vitale, 445 Pa.Super. 43, 664 A.2d 999, 1003-04 (1995)(holding that a witness may be impeached with evidence of a conviction under 26 U.S.C. \u00a7 7201 because that crime requires an attempt to evade or defeat a tax, which implies cheating or defrauding the government, and, as such, involves dishonesty); but see United States v. Lundy, 416 F.Supp.2d 325 (E.D.Pa.2005)(failing to mention Cree and stating that the Third Circuit has upheld the use of convictions for failure to file tax returns for impeachment, but nevertheless prohibiting the introduction of such evidence)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"failing to mention Cree and stating that the Third Circuit has upheld the use of convictions for failure to file tax returns for impeachment, but nevertheless prohibiting the introduction of such evidence","sentence":"Cf. United States v. Yang, 887 F.Supp. 95, 96 (S.D.N.Y.1995)(holding that a conviction under a New York state statute for failure to file tax returns requires proof of a specific intent to evade taxes, and as such, can be used for impeachment purposes consistently with the Third Circuit holding in Cree); Commonwealth v. Vitale, 445 Pa.Super. 43, 664 A.2d 999, 1003-04 (1995)(holding that a witness may be impeached with evidence of a conviction under 26 U.S.C. \u00a7 7201 because that crime requires an attempt to evade or defeat a tax, which implies cheating or defrauding the government, and, as such, involves dishonesty); but see United States v. Lundy, 416 F.Supp.2d 325 (E.D.Pa.2005)(failing to mention Cree and stating that the Third Circuit has upheld the use of convictions for failure to file tax returns for impeachment, but nevertheless prohibiting the introduction of such evidence)."},"case_id":8440654,"label":"a"}
{"context":"This is especially true in Florida where it is improper for courts to look beyond the face of a conviction to determine whether the conviction is for a crime involving dishonesty. Page, 449 So.2d at 816. Instead, the dishonesty must appear on the face of the conviction, such that an element of the crime reflects dishonesty.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"failing to mention Cree and stating that the Third Circuit has upheld the use of convictions for failure to file tax returns for impeachment, but nevertheless prohibiting the introduction of such evidence","sentence":"Cf. United States v. Yang, 887 F.Supp. 95, 96 (S.D.N.Y.1995)(holding that a conviction under a New York state statute for failure to file tax returns requires proof of a specific intent to evade taxes, and as such, can be used for impeachment purposes consistently with the Third Circuit holding in Cree); Commonwealth v. Vitale, 445 Pa.Super. 43, 664 A.2d 999, 1003-04 (1995)(holding that a witness may be impeached with evidence of a conviction under 26 U.S.C. \u00a7 7201 because that crime requires an attempt to evade or defeat a tax, which implies cheating or defrauding the government, and, as such, involves dishonesty); but see United States v. Lundy, 416 F.Supp.2d 325 (E.D.Pa.2005)(failing to mention Cree and stating that the Third Circuit has upheld the use of convictions for failure to file tax returns for impeachment, but nevertheless prohibiting the introduction of such evidence)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that a witness may be impeached with evidence of a conviction under 26 U.S.C. SS 7201 because that crime requires an attempt to evade or defeat a tax, which implies cheating or defrauding the government, and, as such, involves dishonesty","sentence":"Cf. United States v. Yang, 887 F.Supp. 95, 96 (S.D.N.Y.1995)(holding that a conviction under a New York state statute for failure to file tax returns requires proof of a specific intent to evade taxes, and as such, can be used for impeachment purposes consistently with the Third Circuit holding in Cree); Commonwealth v. Vitale, 445 Pa.Super. 43, 664 A.2d 999, 1003-04 (1995)(holding that a witness may be impeached with evidence of a conviction under 26 U.S.C. \u00a7 7201 because that crime requires an attempt to evade or defeat a tax, which implies cheating or defrauding the government, and, as such, involves dishonesty); but see United States v. Lundy, 416 F.Supp.2d 325 (E.D.Pa.2005)(failing to mention Cree and stating that the Third Circuit has upheld the use of convictions for failure to file tax returns for impeachment, but nevertheless prohibiting the introduction of such evidence)."},"case_id":8440654,"label":"b"}
{"context":"This is especially true in Florida where it is improper for courts to look beyond the face of a conviction to determine whether the conviction is for a crime involving dishonesty. Page, 449 So.2d at 816. Instead, the dishonesty must appear on the face of the conviction, such that an element of the crime reflects dishonesty.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"664 A.2d 999, 1003-04","parenthetical":"holding that a witness may be impeached with evidence of a conviction under 26 U.S.C. SS 7201 because that crime requires an attempt to evade or defeat a tax, which implies cheating or defrauding the government, and, as such, involves dishonesty","sentence":"Cf. United States v. Yang, 887 F.Supp. 95, 96 (S.D.N.Y.1995)(holding that a conviction under a New York state statute for failure to file tax returns requires proof of a specific intent to evade taxes, and as such, can be used for impeachment purposes consistently with the Third Circuit holding in Cree); Commonwealth v. Vitale, 445 Pa.Super. 43, 664 A.2d 999, 1003-04 (1995)(holding that a witness may be impeached with evidence of a conviction under 26 U.S.C. \u00a7 7201 because that crime requires an attempt to evade or defeat a tax, which implies cheating or defrauding the government, and, as such, involves dishonesty); but see United States v. Lundy, 416 F.Supp.2d 325 (E.D.Pa.2005)(failing to mention Cree and stating that the Third Circuit has upheld the use of convictions for failure to file tax returns for impeachment, but nevertheless prohibiting the introduction of such evidence)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"failing to mention Cree and stating that the Third Circuit has upheld the use of convictions for failure to file tax returns for impeachment, but nevertheless prohibiting the introduction of such evidence","sentence":"Cf. United States v. Yang, 887 F.Supp. 95, 96 (S.D.N.Y.1995)(holding that a conviction under a New York state statute for failure to file tax returns requires proof of a specific intent to evade taxes, and as such, can be used for impeachment purposes consistently with the Third Circuit holding in Cree); Commonwealth v. Vitale, 445 Pa.Super. 43, 664 A.2d 999, 1003-04 (1995)(holding that a witness may be impeached with evidence of a conviction under 26 U.S.C. \u00a7 7201 because that crime requires an attempt to evade or defeat a tax, which implies cheating or defrauding the government, and, as such, involves dishonesty); but see United States v. Lundy, 416 F.Supp.2d 325 (E.D.Pa.2005)(failing to mention Cree and stating that the Third Circuit has upheld the use of convictions for failure to file tax returns for impeachment, but nevertheless prohibiting the introduction of such evidence)."},"case_id":8440654,"label":"a"}
{"context":"As a threshold matter, Hazelbaker may well have waived the second-lease argument by her apparent failure to raise it to the bankruptcy court, despite having known of it since well before the inception of the proceedings.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"991 F.2d 105, 107","parenthetical":"noting that failure to raise an issue before bankruptcy court waives it on appeal","sentence":"See Lane v. Sullivan (In re Lane), 991 F.2d 105, 107 (4th Cir.1993) (noting that failure to raise an issue before bankruptcy court waives it on appeal); see also Ginther v. Ginther Trusts (In re Ginther Trusts), 238 F.3d 686, 689 (5th Cir.2001) (per curiam) (declining to review good faith where plaintiff had not challenged it before the bankruptcy court); Gilchrist v. Westcott (In re Gilchrist), 891 F.2d 559, 561 (5th Cir.1990) (same)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"238 F.3d 686, 689","parenthetical":"declining to review good faith where plaintiff had not challenged it before the bankruptcy court","sentence":"See Lane v. Sullivan (In re Lane), 991 F.2d 105, 107 (4th Cir.1993) (noting that failure to raise an issue before bankruptcy court waives it on appeal); see also Ginther v. Ginther Trusts (In re Ginther Trusts), 238 F.3d 686, 689 (5th Cir.2001) (per curiam) (declining to review good faith where plaintiff had not challenged it before the bankruptcy court); Gilchrist v. Westcott (In re Gilchrist), 891 F.2d 559, 561 (5th Cir.1990) (same)."},"case_id":2781088,"label":"a"}
{"context":"This question, in turn, depends on whether Dole is subject to jurisdiction in California, whether venue is appropriate in the Central District, and whether Dole is amenable to service of process in California. See Jewelmasters, Inc. v. May Dept. The United States Supreme Court has held that it is not enough to satisfy the \"might have been brought requirement\" that the defendant waives or consents to jurisdiction in the proposed transferee court.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"interpreting \"might have been brought\" to refer only to time when action was brought, not the time of the transfer","sentence":"See id.; see also Harris v. Garner, 216 F.3d 970., 973 (11th Cir.2000) (interpreting \u201cmight have been brought\u201d to refer only to time when action was brought, not the time of the transfer)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"363 U.S. 335, 344","parenthetical":"holding that, under 28 U.S.C. SS 1404(a), \"might have been brought\" requirement was not satisfied by defendant's consent to jurisdiction","sentence":"See Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335, 344, 80 S.Ct. 1084, 1090, 4 L.Ed.2d 1254 (1960) (holding that, under 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1404(a), \u201cmight have been brought\u201d requirement was not satisfied by defendant\u2019s consent to jurisdiction). Instead, the plaintiff must have had the right to bring the action in the district where the movant seeks to have the case transferred at the time the complaint was filed."},"case_id":11114881,"label":"b"}
{"context":"This question, in turn, depends on whether Dole is subject to jurisdiction in California, whether venue is appropriate in the Central District, and whether Dole is amenable to service of process in California. See Jewelmasters, Inc. v. May Dept. The United States Supreme Court has held that it is not enough to satisfy the \"might have been brought requirement\" that the defendant waives or consents to jurisdiction in the proposed transferee court.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"80 S.Ct. 1084, 1090","parenthetical":"holding that, under 28 U.S.C. SS 1404(a), \"might have been brought\" requirement was not satisfied by defendant's consent to jurisdiction","sentence":"See Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335, 344, 80 S.Ct. 1084, 1090, 4 L.Ed.2d 1254 (1960) (holding that, under 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1404(a), \u201cmight have been brought\u201d requirement was not satisfied by defendant\u2019s consent to jurisdiction). Instead, the plaintiff must have had the right to bring the action in the district where the movant seeks to have the case transferred at the time the complaint was filed."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"interpreting \"might have been brought\" to refer only to time when action was brought, not the time of the transfer","sentence":"See id.; see also Harris v. Garner, 216 F.3d 970., 973 (11th Cir.2000) (interpreting \u201cmight have been brought\u201d to refer only to time when action was brought, not the time of the transfer)."},"case_id":11114881,"label":"a"}
{"context":"This question, in turn, depends on whether Dole is subject to jurisdiction in California, whether venue is appropriate in the Central District, and whether Dole is amenable to service of process in California. See Jewelmasters, Inc. v. May Dept. The United States Supreme Court has held that it is not enough to satisfy the \"might have been brought requirement\" that the defendant waives or consents to jurisdiction in the proposed transferee court.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that, under 28 U.S.C. SS 1404(a), \"might have been brought\" requirement was not satisfied by defendant's consent to jurisdiction","sentence":"See Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335, 344, 80 S.Ct. 1084, 1090, 4 L.Ed.2d 1254 (1960) (holding that, under 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1404(a), \u201cmight have been brought\u201d requirement was not satisfied by defendant\u2019s consent to jurisdiction). Instead, the plaintiff must have had the right to bring the action in the district where the movant seeks to have the case transferred at the time the complaint was filed."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"interpreting \"might have been brought\" to refer only to time when action was brought, not the time of the transfer","sentence":"See id.; see also Harris v. Garner, 216 F.3d 970., 973 (11th Cir.2000) (interpreting \u201cmight have been brought\u201d to refer only to time when action was brought, not the time of the transfer)."},"case_id":11114881,"label":"a"}
{"context":"We agree that a state agency's failure to follow its own ordinances and regulations may constitute a deprivation of property without due process.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"668 F.2d 380, 382-383","parenthetical":"county ordinance requiring two weeks notice prior to the termination of non-probationary sheriff's deputies creates a property interest protectable under the fourteenth amendment","sentence":"See Wilson v. Robinson, 668 F.2d 380, 382-383 (8th Cir.1981) (county ordinance requiring two weeks notice prior to the termination of non-probationary sheriff\u2019s deputies creates a property interest protectable under the fourteenth amendment)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"577 F.2d 951, 952","parenthetical":"state procedural protections cited as alternative source of the \"property interest\" held by \"non-tenured\" teachers in Mississippi","sentence":"Cf. McDonald v. Mims, 577 F.2d 951, 952 (5th Cir.1978) (state procedural protections cited as alternative source of the \u201cproperty interest\u201d held by \u201cnon-tenured\u201d teachers in Mississippi). In this case, however, we find that the defendants\u2019 alleged minor deviations from the regulations at issue, as a matter of law, do not amount to a constitutional deprivation."},"case_id":3701332,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Taking the collective entity doctrine to its logical ends, it is of no Fifth Amendment consequence that the agent may be ordered to produce documents of the collective entity which may contain information that incriminates the agent personally. Likewise, the size of the entity has no effect on the agent's consequence to assert a Fifth Amendment privilege.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"417 U.S. 94, 94-95","parenthetical":"declining to allow partner in three-person law firm to resist production of firm documents","sentence":"Bellis, 417 U.S. at 100, 94 S.Ct. 2179 (\u201cIt is well settled that no privilege can be claimed by the custodian of corporate records, regardless of how small the corporation may be.\u201d); see also Bellis, 417 U.S. at 94-95, 94 S.Ct. 2179 (declining to allow partner in three-person law firm to resist production of firm documents); Amato v. United States, 450 F.3d 46, 53 (1st Cir.2006) (rejecting claim of Fifth Amendment privilege by the sole officer and employee of a corporation)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"417 U.S. 100, 100","parenthetical":"\"It is well settled that no privilege can be claimed by the custodian of corporate records, regardless of how small the corporation may be.\"","sentence":"Bellis, 417 U.S. at 100, 94 S.Ct. 2179 (\u201cIt is well settled that no privilege can be claimed by the custodian of corporate records, regardless of how small the corporation may be.\u201d); see also Bellis, 417 U.S. at 94-95, 94 S.Ct. 2179 (declining to allow partner in three-person law firm to resist production of firm documents); Amato v. United States, 450 F.3d 46, 53 (1st Cir.2006) (rejecting claim of Fifth Amendment privilege by the sole officer and employee of a corporation)."},"case_id":3786323,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Taking the collective entity doctrine to its logical ends, it is of no Fifth Amendment consequence that the agent may be ordered to produce documents of the collective entity which may contain information that incriminates the agent personally. Likewise, the size of the entity has no effect on the agent's consequence to assert a Fifth Amendment privilege.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"declining to allow partner in three-person law firm to resist production of firm documents","sentence":"Bellis, 417 U.S. at 100, 94 S.Ct. 2179 (\u201cIt is well settled that no privilege can be claimed by the custodian of corporate records, regardless of how small the corporation may be.\u201d); see also Bellis, 417 U.S. at 94-95, 94 S.Ct. 2179 (declining to allow partner in three-person law firm to resist production of firm documents); Amato v. United States, 450 F.3d 46, 53 (1st Cir.2006) (rejecting claim of Fifth Amendment privilege by the sole officer and employee of a corporation)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"417 U.S. 100, 100","parenthetical":"\"It is well settled that no privilege can be claimed by the custodian of corporate records, regardless of how small the corporation may be.\"","sentence":"Bellis, 417 U.S. at 100, 94 S.Ct. 2179 (\u201cIt is well settled that no privilege can be claimed by the custodian of corporate records, regardless of how small the corporation may be.\u201d); see also Bellis, 417 U.S. at 94-95, 94 S.Ct. 2179 (declining to allow partner in three-person law firm to resist production of firm documents); Amato v. United States, 450 F.3d 46, 53 (1st Cir.2006) (rejecting claim of Fifth Amendment privilege by the sole officer and employee of a corporation)."},"case_id":3786323,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Taking the collective entity doctrine to its logical ends, it is of no Fifth Amendment consequence that the agent may be ordered to produce documents of the collective entity which may contain information that incriminates the agent personally. Likewise, the size of the entity has no effect on the agent's consequence to assert a Fifth Amendment privilege.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"417 U.S. 100, 100","parenthetical":"\"It is well settled that no privilege can be claimed by the custodian of corporate records, regardless of how small the corporation may be.\"","sentence":"Bellis, 417 U.S. at 100, 94 S.Ct. 2179 (\u201cIt is well settled that no privilege can be claimed by the custodian of corporate records, regardless of how small the corporation may be.\u201d); see also Bellis, 417 U.S. at 94-95, 94 S.Ct. 2179 (declining to allow partner in three-person law firm to resist production of firm documents); Amato v. United States, 450 F.3d 46, 53 (1st Cir.2006) (rejecting claim of Fifth Amendment privilege by the sole officer and employee of a corporation)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"450 F.3d 46, 53","parenthetical":"rejecting claim of Fifth Amendment privilege by the sole officer and employee of a corporation","sentence":"Bellis, 417 U.S. at 100, 94 S.Ct. 2179 (\u201cIt is well settled that no privilege can be claimed by the custodian of corporate records, regardless of how small the corporation may be.\u201d); see also Bellis, 417 U.S. at 94-95, 94 S.Ct. 2179 (declining to allow partner in three-person law firm to resist production of firm documents); Amato v. United States, 450 F.3d 46, 53 (1st Cir.2006) (rejecting claim of Fifth Amendment privilege by the sole officer and employee of a corporation)."},"case_id":3786323,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Taking the collective entity doctrine to its logical ends, it is of no Fifth Amendment consequence that the agent may be ordered to produce documents of the collective entity which may contain information that incriminates the agent personally. Likewise, the size of the entity has no effect on the agent's consequence to assert a Fifth Amendment privilege.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"417 U.S. 94, 94-95","parenthetical":"declining to allow partner in three-person law firm to resist production of firm documents","sentence":"Bellis, 417 U.S. at 100, 94 S.Ct. 2179 (\u201cIt is well settled that no privilege can be claimed by the custodian of corporate records, regardless of how small the corporation may be.\u201d); see also Bellis, 417 U.S. at 94-95, 94 S.Ct. 2179 (declining to allow partner in three-person law firm to resist production of firm documents); Amato v. United States, 450 F.3d 46, 53 (1st Cir.2006) (rejecting claim of Fifth Amendment privilege by the sole officer and employee of a corporation)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"It is well settled that no privilege can be claimed by the custodian of corporate records, regardless of how small the corporation may be.\"","sentence":"Bellis, 417 U.S. at 100, 94 S.Ct. 2179 (\u201cIt is well settled that no privilege can be claimed by the custodian of corporate records, regardless of how small the corporation may be.\u201d); see also Bellis, 417 U.S. at 94-95, 94 S.Ct. 2179 (declining to allow partner in three-person law firm to resist production of firm documents); Amato v. United States, 450 F.3d 46, 53 (1st Cir.2006) (rejecting claim of Fifth Amendment privilege by the sole officer and employee of a corporation)."},"case_id":3786323,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Taking the collective entity doctrine to its logical ends, it is of no Fifth Amendment consequence that the agent may be ordered to produce documents of the collective entity which may contain information that incriminates the agent personally. Likewise, the size of the entity has no effect on the agent's consequence to assert a Fifth Amendment privilege.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"declining to allow partner in three-person law firm to resist production of firm documents","sentence":"Bellis, 417 U.S. at 100, 94 S.Ct. 2179 (\u201cIt is well settled that no privilege can be claimed by the custodian of corporate records, regardless of how small the corporation may be.\u201d); see also Bellis, 417 U.S. at 94-95, 94 S.Ct. 2179 (declining to allow partner in three-person law firm to resist production of firm documents); Amato v. United States, 450 F.3d 46, 53 (1st Cir.2006) (rejecting claim of Fifth Amendment privilege by the sole officer and employee of a corporation)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"It is well settled that no privilege can be claimed by the custodian of corporate records, regardless of how small the corporation may be.\"","sentence":"Bellis, 417 U.S. at 100, 94 S.Ct. 2179 (\u201cIt is well settled that no privilege can be claimed by the custodian of corporate records, regardless of how small the corporation may be.\u201d); see also Bellis, 417 U.S. at 94-95, 94 S.Ct. 2179 (declining to allow partner in three-person law firm to resist production of firm documents); Amato v. United States, 450 F.3d 46, 53 (1st Cir.2006) (rejecting claim of Fifth Amendment privilege by the sole officer and employee of a corporation)."},"case_id":3786323,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Taking the collective entity doctrine to its logical ends, it is of no Fifth Amendment consequence that the agent may be ordered to produce documents of the collective entity which may contain information that incriminates the agent personally. Likewise, the size of the entity has no effect on the agent's consequence to assert a Fifth Amendment privilege.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"It is well settled that no privilege can be claimed by the custodian of corporate records, regardless of how small the corporation may be.\"","sentence":"Bellis, 417 U.S. at 100, 94 S.Ct. 2179 (\u201cIt is well settled that no privilege can be claimed by the custodian of corporate records, regardless of how small the corporation may be.\u201d); see also Bellis, 417 U.S. at 94-95, 94 S.Ct. 2179 (declining to allow partner in three-person law firm to resist production of firm documents); Amato v. United States, 450 F.3d 46, 53 (1st Cir.2006) (rejecting claim of Fifth Amendment privilege by the sole officer and employee of a corporation)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"450 F.3d 46, 53","parenthetical":"rejecting claim of Fifth Amendment privilege by the sole officer and employee of a corporation","sentence":"Bellis, 417 U.S. at 100, 94 S.Ct. 2179 (\u201cIt is well settled that no privilege can be claimed by the custodian of corporate records, regardless of how small the corporation may be.\u201d); see also Bellis, 417 U.S. at 94-95, 94 S.Ct. 2179 (declining to allow partner in three-person law firm to resist production of firm documents); Amato v. United States, 450 F.3d 46, 53 (1st Cir.2006) (rejecting claim of Fifth Amendment privilege by the sole officer and employee of a corporation)."},"case_id":3786323,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Moreover, as long as PSIs are not publicly released, press coverage of sentencings will necessarily be incomplete, and the public will learn only part of the reason for a given sentence. This lack of information may lead to public confusion and misunderstandings, as when the public knows the facts of the crime and hears the victim-impact statement, but never learns the mitigating factors reported in the PSI.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"842 F.2d 1580, 1580","parenthetical":"increased disclosure of PSIs, rather than restricting free flow of information, in fact had positive impact on PSIs and brought greater objectivity to sentencing process","sentence":"See Densmore, 160 Vt. at 137, 624 A.2d at 1142 (public access to sentencing information \u201ccontributes to public understanding of the criminal justice system\u201d and gives public \u201cfull understanding of the sentence or assurance that justice has been done\u201d); cf. Schlette, 842 F.2d at 1580 (increased disclosure of PSIs, rather than restricting free flow of information, in fact had positive impact on PSIs and brought greater objectivity to sentencing process)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"160 Vt. 137, 137","parenthetical":"public access to sentencing information \"contributes to public understanding of the criminal justice system\" and gives public \"full understanding of the sentence or assurance that justice has been done\"","sentence":"See Densmore, 160 Vt. at 137, 624 A.2d at 1142 (public access to sentencing information \u201ccontributes to public understanding of the criminal justice system\u201d and gives public \u201cfull understanding of the sentence or assurance that justice has been done\u201d); cf. Schlette, 842 F.2d at 1580 (increased disclosure of PSIs, rather than restricting free flow of information, in fact had positive impact on PSIs and brought greater objectivity to sentencing process)."},"case_id":688154,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Moreover, as long as PSIs are not publicly released, press coverage of sentencings will necessarily be incomplete, and the public will learn only part of the reason for a given sentence. This lack of information may lead to public confusion and misunderstandings, as when the public knows the facts of the crime and hears the victim-impact statement, but never learns the mitigating factors reported in the PSI.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"624 A.2d 1142, 1142","parenthetical":"public access to sentencing information \"contributes to public understanding of the criminal justice system\" and gives public \"full understanding of the sentence or assurance that justice has been done\"","sentence":"See Densmore, 160 Vt. at 137, 624 A.2d at 1142 (public access to sentencing information \u201ccontributes to public understanding of the criminal justice system\u201d and gives public \u201cfull understanding of the sentence or assurance that justice has been done\u201d); cf. Schlette, 842 F.2d at 1580 (increased disclosure of PSIs, rather than restricting free flow of information, in fact had positive impact on PSIs and brought greater objectivity to sentencing process)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"842 F.2d 1580, 1580","parenthetical":"increased disclosure of PSIs, rather than restricting free flow of information, in fact had positive impact on PSIs and brought greater objectivity to sentencing process","sentence":"See Densmore, 160 Vt. at 137, 624 A.2d at 1142 (public access to sentencing information \u201ccontributes to public understanding of the criminal justice system\u201d and gives public \u201cfull understanding of the sentence or assurance that justice has been done\u201d); cf. Schlette, 842 F.2d at 1580 (increased disclosure of PSIs, rather than restricting free flow of information, in fact had positive impact on PSIs and brought greater objectivity to sentencing process)."},"case_id":688154,"label":"a"}
{"context":"\"Numerous courts, including the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, have held that a creditor's inability to collect from a bankrupt debt- or cannot extinguish the liability of third parties, such as insurance companies, who may be secondarily obligated for the debts of the bankrupt debtor.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"883 F.2d 970, 975","parenthetical":"stating that the ' \"fresh start policy\" [of the Bankruptcy Code] is not intended to provide a method by which an insurer can escape its obligations based simply on the financial misfortunes of the insured'","sentence":"See In re Jet Florida Systems, Inc., 883 F.2d 970, 975 (11th Cir.1989)(stating that the \u2018 \u201cfresh start policy\u201d [of the Bankruptcy Code] is not intended to provide a method by which an insurer can escape its obligations based simply on the financial misfortunes of the insured\u2019)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"224 B.R. 315, 321","parenthetical":"stating that 'the discharge in bankruptcy, along with the coextensive permanent injunction and fresh start, are exclusive to the debtor and do not otherwise affect the enforcement of any underlying debt, or any nondebtor liability thereon 'Xemphasis in original","sentence":"See also Jason Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 224 B.R. 315, 321 (Bankr.D.Md.1998) (stating that \u2018the discharge in bankruptcy, along with the coextensive permanent injunction and fresh start, are exclusive to the debtor and do not otherwise affect the enforcement of any underlying debt, or any nondebtor liability thereon \u2019Xemphasis in original); In re Bracy, 449 F.Supp. 70, 71 (D.Mont.1978)(holding that \u2018if an insurance company is as a matter of state law liable to a plaintiff in the personal injury action, subsequent discharge of the assured in bankruptcy does not alter the obligation of the insurance company\u2019 and further finding that \u2018it is the policy of the law to discharge the bankrupt but not to release from liabilities those who are liable with him\u2019).\u201d"},"case_id":9102413,"label":"a"}
{"context":"\"Numerous courts, including the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, have held that a creditor's inability to collect from a bankrupt debt- or cannot extinguish the liability of third parties, such as insurance companies, who may be secondarily obligated for the debts of the bankrupt debtor.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"449 F.Supp. 70, 71","parenthetical":"holding that 'if an insurance company is as a matter of state law liable to a plaintiff in the personal injury action, subsequent discharge of the assured in bankruptcy does not alter the obligation of the insurance company' and further finding that 'it is the policy of the law to discharge the bankrupt but not to release from liabilities those who are liable with him'","sentence":"See also Jason Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 224 B.R. 315, 321 (Bankr.D.Md.1998) (stating that \u2018the discharge in bankruptcy, along with the coextensive permanent injunction and fresh start, are exclusive to the debtor and do not otherwise affect the enforcement of any underlying debt, or any nondebtor liability thereon \u2019Xemphasis in original); In re Bracy, 449 F.Supp. 70, 71 (D.Mont.1978)(holding that \u2018if an insurance company is as a matter of state law liable to a plaintiff in the personal injury action, subsequent discharge of the assured in bankruptcy does not alter the obligation of the insurance company\u2019 and further finding that \u2018it is the policy of the law to discharge the bankrupt but not to release from liabilities those who are liable with him\u2019).\u201d"},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"883 F.2d 970, 975","parenthetical":"stating that the ' \"fresh start policy\" [of the Bankruptcy Code] is not intended to provide a method by which an insurer can escape its obligations based simply on the financial misfortunes of the insured'","sentence":"See In re Jet Florida Systems, Inc., 883 F.2d 970, 975 (11th Cir.1989)(stating that the \u2018 \u201cfresh start policy\u201d [of the Bankruptcy Code] is not intended to provide a method by which an insurer can escape its obligations based simply on the financial misfortunes of the insured\u2019)."},"case_id":9102413,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Second, consider why that error could affect a decision to impose death. . If the error causes harm, it is because a jury has given special weight to its finding of (or the evidence that shows) the invalid \"aggravating factor.\" The jury might do so because the judge or prosecutor led it to believe that state law attaches particular importance to that factor: Indeed, why else would the State call that factor an \"aggravator\" and\/or permit it to render a defendant death eligible?","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"462 U. S. 862, 888","parenthetical":"recognizing that statutory label \"arguably might have caused the jury to give somewhat greater weight to respondent's prior criminal record than it otherwise would have given\"","sentence":"See Zant v. Stephens, 462 U. S. 862, 888 (1983) (recognizing that statutory label \u201carguably might have caused the jury to give somewhat greater weight to respondent\u2019s prior criminal record than it otherwise would have given\u201d); see also ante, at 226 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that jury may consider the aggravating label \u201ca legislative imprimatur on a decision to impose death and therefore give greater weight to its improper heinousness finding . . . \u201d); Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U. S. 738, 753, 755 (1990) (noting that the prosecutor \u201crepeatedly emphasized and argued the \u2018especially heinous\u2019 factor during the sentencing hearing\u201d and remanding for the Mississippi Supreme Court to conduct harmless-error review)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"494 U. S. 738, 753, 755","parenthetical":"noting that the prosecutor \"repeatedly emphasized and argued the 'especially heinous' factor during the sentencing hearing\" and remanding for the Mississippi Supreme Court to conduct harmless-error review","sentence":"See Zant v. Stephens, 462 U. S. 862, 888 (1983) (recognizing that statutory label \u201carguably might have caused the jury to give somewhat greater weight to respondent\u2019s prior criminal record than it otherwise would have given\u201d); see also ante, at 226 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that jury may consider the aggravating label \u201ca legislative imprimatur on a decision to impose death and therefore give greater weight to its improper heinousness finding . . . \u201d); Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U. S. 738, 753, 755 (1990) (noting that the prosecutor \u201crepeatedly emphasized and argued the \u2018especially heinous\u2019 factor during the sentencing hearing\u201d and remanding for the Mississippi Supreme Court to conduct harmless-error review)."},"case_id":5884272,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Intermediate scrutiny queries whether a statute is substantially related to an important governmental interest.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"429 U.S. 190, 197","parenthetical":"\"To withstand constitutional challenge, previous cases establish that classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives.\"","sentence":"See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197, 97 S.Ct. 451, 50 L.Ed.2d 397 (1976) (\u201cTo withstand constitutional challenge, previous cases establish that classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives.\u201d); see also Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 265-66, 103 S.Ct. 2985, 77 L.Ed.2d 614 (1983) (\u201cThe sovereign may not draw distinctions between individuals based solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective.... when there is no substantial relation between the disparity and an important state purpose\u201d) (internal citations omitted); Adkins v. Rumsfeld, 464 F.3d 456, 468 (4th Cir. 2006) (for facially neutral gender-based classifications we demand \u201cat least that the challenged classification serves important governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means employed are substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.\u201d); cf. Skoien, 614 F.3d at 642."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"463 U.S. 248, 265-66","parenthetical":"\"The sovereign may not draw distinctions between individuals based solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective.... when there is no substantial relation between the disparity and an important state purpose\"","sentence":"See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197, 97 S.Ct. 451, 50 L.Ed.2d 397 (1976) (\u201cTo withstand constitutional challenge, previous cases establish that classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives.\u201d); see also Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 265-66, 103 S.Ct. 2985, 77 L.Ed.2d 614 (1983) (\u201cThe sovereign may not draw distinctions between individuals based solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective.... when there is no substantial relation between the disparity and an important state purpose\u201d) (internal citations omitted); Adkins v. Rumsfeld, 464 F.3d 456, 468 (4th Cir. 2006) (for facially neutral gender-based classifications we demand \u201cat least that the challenged classification serves important governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means employed are substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.\u201d); cf. Skoien, 614 F.3d at 642."},"case_id":4075360,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Intermediate scrutiny queries whether a statute is substantially related to an important governmental interest.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"The sovereign may not draw distinctions between individuals based solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective.... when there is no substantial relation between the disparity and an important state purpose\"","sentence":"See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197, 97 S.Ct. 451, 50 L.Ed.2d 397 (1976) (\u201cTo withstand constitutional challenge, previous cases establish that classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives.\u201d); see also Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 265-66, 103 S.Ct. 2985, 77 L.Ed.2d 614 (1983) (\u201cThe sovereign may not draw distinctions between individuals based solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective.... when there is no substantial relation between the disparity and an important state purpose\u201d) (internal citations omitted); Adkins v. Rumsfeld, 464 F.3d 456, 468 (4th Cir. 2006) (for facially neutral gender-based classifications we demand \u201cat least that the challenged classification serves important governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means employed are substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.\u201d); cf. Skoien, 614 F.3d at 642."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"429 U.S. 190, 197","parenthetical":"\"To withstand constitutional challenge, previous cases establish that classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives.\"","sentence":"See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197, 97 S.Ct. 451, 50 L.Ed.2d 397 (1976) (\u201cTo withstand constitutional challenge, previous cases establish that classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives.\u201d); see also Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 265-66, 103 S.Ct. 2985, 77 L.Ed.2d 614 (1983) (\u201cThe sovereign may not draw distinctions between individuals based solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective.... when there is no substantial relation between the disparity and an important state purpose\u201d) (internal citations omitted); Adkins v. Rumsfeld, 464 F.3d 456, 468 (4th Cir. 2006) (for facially neutral gender-based classifications we demand \u201cat least that the challenged classification serves important governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means employed are substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.\u201d); cf. Skoien, 614 F.3d at 642."},"case_id":4075360,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Intermediate scrutiny queries whether a statute is substantially related to an important governmental interest.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"429 U.S. 190, 197","parenthetical":"\"To withstand constitutional challenge, previous cases establish that classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives.\"","sentence":"See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197, 97 S.Ct. 451, 50 L.Ed.2d 397 (1976) (\u201cTo withstand constitutional challenge, previous cases establish that classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives.\u201d); see also Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 265-66, 103 S.Ct. 2985, 77 L.Ed.2d 614 (1983) (\u201cThe sovereign may not draw distinctions between individuals based solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective.... when there is no substantial relation between the disparity and an important state purpose\u201d) (internal citations omitted); Adkins v. Rumsfeld, 464 F.3d 456, 468 (4th Cir. 2006) (for facially neutral gender-based classifications we demand \u201cat least that the challenged classification serves important governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means employed are substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.\u201d); cf. Skoien, 614 F.3d at 642."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"The sovereign may not draw distinctions between individuals based solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective.... when there is no substantial relation between the disparity and an important state purpose\"","sentence":"See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197, 97 S.Ct. 451, 50 L.Ed.2d 397 (1976) (\u201cTo withstand constitutional challenge, previous cases establish that classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives.\u201d); see also Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 265-66, 103 S.Ct. 2985, 77 L.Ed.2d 614 (1983) (\u201cThe sovereign may not draw distinctions between individuals based solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective.... when there is no substantial relation between the disparity and an important state purpose\u201d) (internal citations omitted); Adkins v. Rumsfeld, 464 F.3d 456, 468 (4th Cir. 2006) (for facially neutral gender-based classifications we demand \u201cat least that the challenged classification serves important governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means employed are substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.\u201d); cf. Skoien, 614 F.3d at 642."},"case_id":4075360,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Intermediate scrutiny queries whether a statute is substantially related to an important governmental interest.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"429 U.S. 190, 197","parenthetical":"\"To withstand constitutional challenge, previous cases establish that classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives.\"","sentence":"See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197, 97 S.Ct. 451, 50 L.Ed.2d 397 (1976) (\u201cTo withstand constitutional challenge, previous cases establish that classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives.\u201d); see also Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 265-66, 103 S.Ct. 2985, 77 L.Ed.2d 614 (1983) (\u201cThe sovereign may not draw distinctions between individuals based solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective.... when there is no substantial relation between the disparity and an important state purpose\u201d) (internal citations omitted); Adkins v. Rumsfeld, 464 F.3d 456, 468 (4th Cir. 2006) (for facially neutral gender-based classifications we demand \u201cat least that the challenged classification serves important governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means employed are substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.\u201d); cf. Skoien, 614 F.3d at 642."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"464 F.3d 456, 468","parenthetical":"for facially neutral gender-based classifications we demand \"at least that the challenged classification serves important governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means employed are substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.\"","sentence":"See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197, 97 S.Ct. 451, 50 L.Ed.2d 397 (1976) (\u201cTo withstand constitutional challenge, previous cases establish that classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives.\u201d); see also Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 265-66, 103 S.Ct. 2985, 77 L.Ed.2d 614 (1983) (\u201cThe sovereign may not draw distinctions between individuals based solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective.... when there is no substantial relation between the disparity and an important state purpose\u201d) (internal citations omitted); Adkins v. Rumsfeld, 464 F.3d 456, 468 (4th Cir. 2006) (for facially neutral gender-based classifications we demand \u201cat least that the challenged classification serves important governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means employed are substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.\u201d); cf. Skoien, 614 F.3d at 642."},"case_id":4075360,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Intermediate scrutiny queries whether a statute is substantially related to an important governmental interest.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"463 U.S. 248, 265-66","parenthetical":"\"The sovereign may not draw distinctions between individuals based solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective.... when there is no substantial relation between the disparity and an important state purpose\"","sentence":"See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197, 97 S.Ct. 451, 50 L.Ed.2d 397 (1976) (\u201cTo withstand constitutional challenge, previous cases establish that classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives.\u201d); see also Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 265-66, 103 S.Ct. 2985, 77 L.Ed.2d 614 (1983) (\u201cThe sovereign may not draw distinctions between individuals based solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective.... when there is no substantial relation between the disparity and an important state purpose\u201d) (internal citations omitted); Adkins v. Rumsfeld, 464 F.3d 456, 468 (4th Cir. 2006) (for facially neutral gender-based classifications we demand \u201cat least that the challenged classification serves important governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means employed are substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.\u201d); cf. Skoien, 614 F.3d at 642."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"To withstand constitutional challenge, previous cases establish that classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives.\"","sentence":"See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197, 97 S.Ct. 451, 50 L.Ed.2d 397 (1976) (\u201cTo withstand constitutional challenge, previous cases establish that classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives.\u201d); see also Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 265-66, 103 S.Ct. 2985, 77 L.Ed.2d 614 (1983) (\u201cThe sovereign may not draw distinctions between individuals based solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective.... when there is no substantial relation between the disparity and an important state purpose\u201d) (internal citations omitted); Adkins v. Rumsfeld, 464 F.3d 456, 468 (4th Cir. 2006) (for facially neutral gender-based classifications we demand \u201cat least that the challenged classification serves important governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means employed are substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.\u201d); cf. Skoien, 614 F.3d at 642."},"case_id":4075360,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Intermediate scrutiny queries whether a statute is substantially related to an important governmental interest.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"The sovereign may not draw distinctions between individuals based solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective.... when there is no substantial relation between the disparity and an important state purpose\"","sentence":"See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197, 97 S.Ct. 451, 50 L.Ed.2d 397 (1976) (\u201cTo withstand constitutional challenge, previous cases establish that classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives.\u201d); see also Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 265-66, 103 S.Ct. 2985, 77 L.Ed.2d 614 (1983) (\u201cThe sovereign may not draw distinctions between individuals based solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective.... when there is no substantial relation between the disparity and an important state purpose\u201d) (internal citations omitted); Adkins v. Rumsfeld, 464 F.3d 456, 468 (4th Cir. 2006) (for facially neutral gender-based classifications we demand \u201cat least that the challenged classification serves important governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means employed are substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.\u201d); cf. Skoien, 614 F.3d at 642."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"To withstand constitutional challenge, previous cases establish that classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives.\"","sentence":"See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197, 97 S.Ct. 451, 50 L.Ed.2d 397 (1976) (\u201cTo withstand constitutional challenge, previous cases establish that classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives.\u201d); see also Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 265-66, 103 S.Ct. 2985, 77 L.Ed.2d 614 (1983) (\u201cThe sovereign may not draw distinctions between individuals based solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective.... when there is no substantial relation between the disparity and an important state purpose\u201d) (internal citations omitted); Adkins v. Rumsfeld, 464 F.3d 456, 468 (4th Cir. 2006) (for facially neutral gender-based classifications we demand \u201cat least that the challenged classification serves important governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means employed are substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.\u201d); cf. Skoien, 614 F.3d at 642."},"case_id":4075360,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Intermediate scrutiny queries whether a statute is substantially related to an important governmental interest.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"The sovereign may not draw distinctions between individuals based solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective.... when there is no substantial relation between the disparity and an important state purpose\"","sentence":"See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197, 97 S.Ct. 451, 50 L.Ed.2d 397 (1976) (\u201cTo withstand constitutional challenge, previous cases establish that classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives.\u201d); see also Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 265-66, 103 S.Ct. 2985, 77 L.Ed.2d 614 (1983) (\u201cThe sovereign may not draw distinctions between individuals based solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective.... when there is no substantial relation between the disparity and an important state purpose\u201d) (internal citations omitted); Adkins v. Rumsfeld, 464 F.3d 456, 468 (4th Cir. 2006) (for facially neutral gender-based classifications we demand \u201cat least that the challenged classification serves important governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means employed are substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.\u201d); cf. Skoien, 614 F.3d at 642."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"To withstand constitutional challenge, previous cases establish that classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives.\"","sentence":"See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197, 97 S.Ct. 451, 50 L.Ed.2d 397 (1976) (\u201cTo withstand constitutional challenge, previous cases establish that classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives.\u201d); see also Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 265-66, 103 S.Ct. 2985, 77 L.Ed.2d 614 (1983) (\u201cThe sovereign may not draw distinctions between individuals based solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective.... when there is no substantial relation between the disparity and an important state purpose\u201d) (internal citations omitted); Adkins v. Rumsfeld, 464 F.3d 456, 468 (4th Cir. 2006) (for facially neutral gender-based classifications we demand \u201cat least that the challenged classification serves important governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means employed are substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.\u201d); cf. Skoien, 614 F.3d at 642."},"case_id":4075360,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Intermediate scrutiny queries whether a statute is substantially related to an important governmental interest.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"To withstand constitutional challenge, previous cases establish that classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives.\"","sentence":"See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197, 97 S.Ct. 451, 50 L.Ed.2d 397 (1976) (\u201cTo withstand constitutional challenge, previous cases establish that classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives.\u201d); see also Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 265-66, 103 S.Ct. 2985, 77 L.Ed.2d 614 (1983) (\u201cThe sovereign may not draw distinctions between individuals based solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective.... when there is no substantial relation between the disparity and an important state purpose\u201d) (internal citations omitted); Adkins v. Rumsfeld, 464 F.3d 456, 468 (4th Cir. 2006) (for facially neutral gender-based classifications we demand \u201cat least that the challenged classification serves important governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means employed are substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.\u201d); cf. Skoien, 614 F.3d at 642."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"464 F.3d 456, 468","parenthetical":"for facially neutral gender-based classifications we demand \"at least that the challenged classification serves important governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means employed are substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.\"","sentence":"See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197, 97 S.Ct. 451, 50 L.Ed.2d 397 (1976) (\u201cTo withstand constitutional challenge, previous cases establish that classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives.\u201d); see also Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 265-66, 103 S.Ct. 2985, 77 L.Ed.2d 614 (1983) (\u201cThe sovereign may not draw distinctions between individuals based solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective.... when there is no substantial relation between the disparity and an important state purpose\u201d) (internal citations omitted); Adkins v. Rumsfeld, 464 F.3d 456, 468 (4th Cir. 2006) (for facially neutral gender-based classifications we demand \u201cat least that the challenged classification serves important governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means employed are substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.\u201d); cf. Skoien, 614 F.3d at 642."},"case_id":4075360,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Intermediate scrutiny queries whether a statute is substantially related to an important governmental interest.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"463 U.S. 248, 265-66","parenthetical":"\"The sovereign may not draw distinctions between individuals based solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective.... when there is no substantial relation between the disparity and an important state purpose\"","sentence":"See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197, 97 S.Ct. 451, 50 L.Ed.2d 397 (1976) (\u201cTo withstand constitutional challenge, previous cases establish that classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives.\u201d); see also Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 265-66, 103 S.Ct. 2985, 77 L.Ed.2d 614 (1983) (\u201cThe sovereign may not draw distinctions between individuals based solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective.... when there is no substantial relation between the disparity and an important state purpose\u201d) (internal citations omitted); Adkins v. Rumsfeld, 464 F.3d 456, 468 (4th Cir. 2006) (for facially neutral gender-based classifications we demand \u201cat least that the challenged classification serves important governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means employed are substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.\u201d); cf. Skoien, 614 F.3d at 642."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"To withstand constitutional challenge, previous cases establish that classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives.\"","sentence":"See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197, 97 S.Ct. 451, 50 L.Ed.2d 397 (1976) (\u201cTo withstand constitutional challenge, previous cases establish that classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives.\u201d); see also Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 265-66, 103 S.Ct. 2985, 77 L.Ed.2d 614 (1983) (\u201cThe sovereign may not draw distinctions between individuals based solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective.... when there is no substantial relation between the disparity and an important state purpose\u201d) (internal citations omitted); Adkins v. Rumsfeld, 464 F.3d 456, 468 (4th Cir. 2006) (for facially neutral gender-based classifications we demand \u201cat least that the challenged classification serves important governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means employed are substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.\u201d); cf. Skoien, 614 F.3d at 642."},"case_id":4075360,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Intermediate scrutiny queries whether a statute is substantially related to an important governmental interest.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"To withstand constitutional challenge, previous cases establish that classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives.\"","sentence":"See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197, 97 S.Ct. 451, 50 L.Ed.2d 397 (1976) (\u201cTo withstand constitutional challenge, previous cases establish that classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives.\u201d); see also Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 265-66, 103 S.Ct. 2985, 77 L.Ed.2d 614 (1983) (\u201cThe sovereign may not draw distinctions between individuals based solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective.... when there is no substantial relation between the disparity and an important state purpose\u201d) (internal citations omitted); Adkins v. Rumsfeld, 464 F.3d 456, 468 (4th Cir. 2006) (for facially neutral gender-based classifications we demand \u201cat least that the challenged classification serves important governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means employed are substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.\u201d); cf. Skoien, 614 F.3d at 642."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"The sovereign may not draw distinctions between individuals based solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective.... when there is no substantial relation between the disparity and an important state purpose\"","sentence":"See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197, 97 S.Ct. 451, 50 L.Ed.2d 397 (1976) (\u201cTo withstand constitutional challenge, previous cases establish that classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives.\u201d); see also Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 265-66, 103 S.Ct. 2985, 77 L.Ed.2d 614 (1983) (\u201cThe sovereign may not draw distinctions between individuals based solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective.... when there is no substantial relation between the disparity and an important state purpose\u201d) (internal citations omitted); Adkins v. Rumsfeld, 464 F.3d 456, 468 (4th Cir. 2006) (for facially neutral gender-based classifications we demand \u201cat least that the challenged classification serves important governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means employed are substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.\u201d); cf. Skoien, 614 F.3d at 642."},"case_id":4075360,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Intermediate scrutiny queries whether a statute is substantially related to an important governmental interest.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"The sovereign may not draw distinctions between individuals based solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective.... when there is no substantial relation between the disparity and an important state purpose\"","sentence":"See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197, 97 S.Ct. 451, 50 L.Ed.2d 397 (1976) (\u201cTo withstand constitutional challenge, previous cases establish that classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives.\u201d); see also Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 265-66, 103 S.Ct. 2985, 77 L.Ed.2d 614 (1983) (\u201cThe sovereign may not draw distinctions between individuals based solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective.... when there is no substantial relation between the disparity and an important state purpose\u201d) (internal citations omitted); Adkins v. Rumsfeld, 464 F.3d 456, 468 (4th Cir. 2006) (for facially neutral gender-based classifications we demand \u201cat least that the challenged classification serves important governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means employed are substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.\u201d); cf. Skoien, 614 F.3d at 642."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"To withstand constitutional challenge, previous cases establish that classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives.\"","sentence":"See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197, 97 S.Ct. 451, 50 L.Ed.2d 397 (1976) (\u201cTo withstand constitutional challenge, previous cases establish that classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives.\u201d); see also Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 265-66, 103 S.Ct. 2985, 77 L.Ed.2d 614 (1983) (\u201cThe sovereign may not draw distinctions between individuals based solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective.... when there is no substantial relation between the disparity and an important state purpose\u201d) (internal citations omitted); Adkins v. Rumsfeld, 464 F.3d 456, 468 (4th Cir. 2006) (for facially neutral gender-based classifications we demand \u201cat least that the challenged classification serves important governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means employed are substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.\u201d); cf. Skoien, 614 F.3d at 642."},"case_id":4075360,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Intermediate scrutiny queries whether a statute is substantially related to an important governmental interest.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"To withstand constitutional challenge, previous cases establish that classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives.\"","sentence":"See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197, 97 S.Ct. 451, 50 L.Ed.2d 397 (1976) (\u201cTo withstand constitutional challenge, previous cases establish that classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives.\u201d); see also Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 265-66, 103 S.Ct. 2985, 77 L.Ed.2d 614 (1983) (\u201cThe sovereign may not draw distinctions between individuals based solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective.... when there is no substantial relation between the disparity and an important state purpose\u201d) (internal citations omitted); Adkins v. Rumsfeld, 464 F.3d 456, 468 (4th Cir. 2006) (for facially neutral gender-based classifications we demand \u201cat least that the challenged classification serves important governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means employed are substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.\u201d); cf. Skoien, 614 F.3d at 642."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"464 F.3d 456, 468","parenthetical":"for facially neutral gender-based classifications we demand \"at least that the challenged classification serves important governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means employed are substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.\"","sentence":"See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197, 97 S.Ct. 451, 50 L.Ed.2d 397 (1976) (\u201cTo withstand constitutional challenge, previous cases establish that classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives.\u201d); see also Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 265-66, 103 S.Ct. 2985, 77 L.Ed.2d 614 (1983) (\u201cThe sovereign may not draw distinctions between individuals based solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective.... when there is no substantial relation between the disparity and an important state purpose\u201d) (internal citations omitted); Adkins v. Rumsfeld, 464 F.3d 456, 468 (4th Cir. 2006) (for facially neutral gender-based classifications we demand \u201cat least that the challenged classification serves important governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means employed are substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.\u201d); cf. Skoien, 614 F.3d at 642."},"case_id":4075360,"label":"a"}
{"context":". Although we conclude infra that Marcantel is entitled to qualified immunity because he relied on Tarver's statements, that reliance does not make an otherwise unconstitutional arrest lawful.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"120 F.3d 446, 455-56","parenthetical":"holding that arrest was unsupported by probable cause but granting qualified immunity to defendants who made the arrest in reliance on communications with other officers","sentence":"See Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560, 568-69, 91 S.Ct. 1031, 28 L.Ed.2d 306 (1971) (holding that \u201can otherwise illegal arrest cannot be insulated from challenge by the decision of the instigating officer to rely on fellow officers to make the arrest\u2019\u2019); see also Rogers v. Powell, 120 F.3d 446, 455-56 (3d Cir.1997) (holding that arrest was unsupported by probable cause but granting qualified immunity to defendants who made the arrest in reliance on communications with other officers)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"401 U.S. 560, 568-69","parenthetical":"holding that \"an otherwise illegal arrest cannot be insulated from challenge by the decision of the instigating officer to rely on fellow officers to make the arrest''","sentence":"See Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560, 568-69, 91 S.Ct. 1031, 28 L.Ed.2d 306 (1971) (holding that \u201can otherwise illegal arrest cannot be insulated from challenge by the decision of the instigating officer to rely on fellow officers to make the arrest\u2019\u2019); see also Rogers v. Powell, 120 F.3d 446, 455-56 (3d Cir.1997) (holding that arrest was unsupported by probable cause but granting qualified immunity to defendants who made the arrest in reliance on communications with other officers)."},"case_id":3650316,"label":"b"}
{"context":". Although we conclude infra that Marcantel is entitled to qualified immunity because he relied on Tarver's statements, that reliance does not make an otherwise unconstitutional arrest lawful.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that \"an otherwise illegal arrest cannot be insulated from challenge by the decision of the instigating officer to rely on fellow officers to make the arrest''","sentence":"See Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560, 568-69, 91 S.Ct. 1031, 28 L.Ed.2d 306 (1971) (holding that \u201can otherwise illegal arrest cannot be insulated from challenge by the decision of the instigating officer to rely on fellow officers to make the arrest\u2019\u2019); see also Rogers v. Powell, 120 F.3d 446, 455-56 (3d Cir.1997) (holding that arrest was unsupported by probable cause but granting qualified immunity to defendants who made the arrest in reliance on communications with other officers)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"120 F.3d 446, 455-56","parenthetical":"holding that arrest was unsupported by probable cause but granting qualified immunity to defendants who made the arrest in reliance on communications with other officers","sentence":"See Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560, 568-69, 91 S.Ct. 1031, 28 L.Ed.2d 306 (1971) (holding that \u201can otherwise illegal arrest cannot be insulated from challenge by the decision of the instigating officer to rely on fellow officers to make the arrest\u2019\u2019); see also Rogers v. Powell, 120 F.3d 446, 455-56 (3d Cir.1997) (holding that arrest was unsupported by probable cause but granting qualified immunity to defendants who made the arrest in reliance on communications with other officers)."},"case_id":3650316,"label":"a"}
{"context":". Although we conclude infra that Marcantel is entitled to qualified immunity because he relied on Tarver's statements, that reliance does not make an otherwise unconstitutional arrest lawful.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"120 F.3d 446, 455-56","parenthetical":"holding that arrest was unsupported by probable cause but granting qualified immunity to defendants who made the arrest in reliance on communications with other officers","sentence":"See Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560, 568-69, 91 S.Ct. 1031, 28 L.Ed.2d 306 (1971) (holding that \u201can otherwise illegal arrest cannot be insulated from challenge by the decision of the instigating officer to rely on fellow officers to make the arrest\u2019\u2019); see also Rogers v. Powell, 120 F.3d 446, 455-56 (3d Cir.1997) (holding that arrest was unsupported by probable cause but granting qualified immunity to defendants who made the arrest in reliance on communications with other officers)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that \"an otherwise illegal arrest cannot be insulated from challenge by the decision of the instigating officer to rely on fellow officers to make the arrest''","sentence":"See Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560, 568-69, 91 S.Ct. 1031, 28 L.Ed.2d 306 (1971) (holding that \u201can otherwise illegal arrest cannot be insulated from challenge by the decision of the instigating officer to rely on fellow officers to make the arrest\u2019\u2019); see also Rogers v. Powell, 120 F.3d 446, 455-56 (3d Cir.1997) (holding that arrest was unsupported by probable cause but granting qualified immunity to defendants who made the arrest in reliance on communications with other officers)."},"case_id":3650316,"label":"b"}
{"context":"A claim of legal error in a discovery decision generally does not fall within our mandamus authority. The Commonwealth has not, for example, set forth a claim that the District Court acted entirely without jurisdiction.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"133 F.3d 275, 280","parenthetical":"\"Because the issue involves the court's authority to act ex parte at all and not whether discretion was or was not properly exercised, we believe mandamus is the only 'adequate' means of testing the issue.\"","sentence":"See In re Sch. Asbestos Litig., 921 F.2d 1310, 1314 (3d Cir.2000) (\u201cCourts traditionally have employed writs to restrain jurisdictional excesses, particularly when a lower court has acted without authority to do so.\u201d); see also In re Pruett, 133 F.3d 275, 280 (4th Cir.1997) (\u201cBecause the issue involves the court\u2019s authority to act ex parte at all and not whether discretion was or was not properly exercised, we believe mandamus is the only \u2018adequate\u2019 means of testing the issue.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"921 F.2d 1310, 1314","parenthetical":"\"Courts traditionally have employed writs to restrain jurisdictional excesses, particularly when a lower court has acted without authority to do so.\"","sentence":"See In re Sch. Asbestos Litig., 921 F.2d 1310, 1314 (3d Cir.2000) (\u201cCourts traditionally have employed writs to restrain jurisdictional excesses, particularly when a lower court has acted without authority to do so.\u201d); see also In re Pruett, 133 F.3d 275, 280 (4th Cir.1997) (\u201cBecause the issue involves the court\u2019s authority to act ex parte at all and not whether discretion was or was not properly exercised, we believe mandamus is the only \u2018adequate\u2019 means of testing the issue.\u201d)."},"case_id":5724544,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Because the Court is granting the Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings as to Count One, declaratory relief, there was no contract of insurance in place at the time of the accident and therefore the remaining Counts Two and Three of Plaintiffs' complaint fail as a matter of law. There can be no breach of a contract where no contract exists. Likewise, where no- contract exists, there can be no claim for bad faith.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"we reiterate the well-settled principle that a contract must exist before there can be a breach of the covenants of good faith and fair dealing implied in every contract\"","sentence":"Id. at 198, 33 P.3d 530 (\u201cwe reiterate the well-settled principle that a contract must exist before there can be a breach of the covenants of good faith and fair dealing implied in every contract\u201d); see also Manterola v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 200 Ariz. 572, 579, 30 P.3d 639 (Ct. App. 2001) (\u201ca bad faith claim based solely on a carrier\u2019s denial of coverage will fail on the merits if a final determination of noncoverage ultimately is made\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"200 Ariz. 572, 579","parenthetical":"\"a bad faith claim based solely on a carrier's denial of coverage will fail on the merits if a final determination of noncoverage ultimately is made\"","sentence":"Id. at 198, 33 P.3d 530 (\u201cwe reiterate the well-settled principle that a contract must exist before there can be a breach of the covenants of good faith and fair dealing implied in every contract\u201d); see also Manterola v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 200 Ariz. 572, 579, 30 P.3d 639 (Ct. App. 2001) (\u201ca bad faith claim based solely on a carrier\u2019s denial of coverage will fail on the merits if a final determination of noncoverage ultimately is made\u201d)."},"case_id":12270576,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Because the Court is granting the Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings as to Count One, declaratory relief, there was no contract of insurance in place at the time of the accident and therefore the remaining Counts Two and Three of Plaintiffs' complaint fail as a matter of law. There can be no breach of a contract where no contract exists. Likewise, where no- contract exists, there can be no claim for bad faith.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"a bad faith claim based solely on a carrier's denial of coverage will fail on the merits if a final determination of noncoverage ultimately is made\"","sentence":"Id. at 198, 33 P.3d 530 (\u201cwe reiterate the well-settled principle that a contract must exist before there can be a breach of the covenants of good faith and fair dealing implied in every contract\u201d); see also Manterola v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 200 Ariz. 572, 579, 30 P.3d 639 (Ct. App. 2001) (\u201ca bad faith claim based solely on a carrier\u2019s denial of coverage will fail on the merits if a final determination of noncoverage ultimately is made\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"we reiterate the well-settled principle that a contract must exist before there can be a breach of the covenants of good faith and fair dealing implied in every contract\"","sentence":"Id. at 198, 33 P.3d 530 (\u201cwe reiterate the well-settled principle that a contract must exist before there can be a breach of the covenants of good faith and fair dealing implied in every contract\u201d); see also Manterola v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 200 Ariz. 572, 579, 30 P.3d 639 (Ct. App. 2001) (\u201ca bad faith claim based solely on a carrier\u2019s denial of coverage will fail on the merits if a final determination of noncoverage ultimately is made\u201d)."},"case_id":12270576,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Our own precedent answers the question in the negative and requires us to affirm Kaigler's convictions. Other district courts of appeal have ruled similarly.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"740 So.2d 89, 91-92","parenthetical":"reversing convictions for resisting with violence and. battery of a law enforcement officer because the evidence was insufficient to support a finding that the officer was engaged in a lawful duty at the time of the alleged offenses","sentence":"But see Taylor v. State, 740 So.2d 89, 91-92 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999) (reversing convictions for resisting with violence and. battery of a law enforcement officer because the evidence was insufficient to support a finding that the officer was engaged in a lawful duty at the time of the alleged offenses)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"846 So.2d 684, 589","parenthetical":"holding that an officer's noncompliance with the strip search statute was not a defense to resisting an officer with violence","sentence":"See, e.g., Perry v. State, 846 So.2d 684, 589 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) (holding that an officer\u2019s noncompliance with the strip search statute was not a defense to resisting an officer with violence), review granted, 894 So.2d 971 (Fla.2005); Tillman v. State, 807 So.2d 106, 110 (Fla. 5th DCA) (holding that \u201cwhile the state must prove that the alleged victim was a law enforcement officer who was engaged in the lawful execution or performance of a legal duty, the technical illegality of that action does not justify resisting with violence or battering the officer\u201d), review granted, 835 So.2d 271 (Fla.2002)."},"case_id":8916326,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Our own precedent answers the question in the negative and requires us to affirm Kaigler's convictions. Other district courts of appeal have ruled similarly.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"740 So.2d 89, 91-92","parenthetical":"reversing convictions for resisting with violence and. battery of a law enforcement officer because the evidence was insufficient to support a finding that the officer was engaged in a lawful duty at the time of the alleged offenses","sentence":"But see Taylor v. State, 740 So.2d 89, 91-92 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999) (reversing convictions for resisting with violence and. battery of a law enforcement officer because the evidence was insufficient to support a finding that the officer was engaged in a lawful duty at the time of the alleged offenses)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that an officer's noncompliance with the strip search statute was not a defense to resisting an officer with violence","sentence":"See, e.g., Perry v. State, 846 So.2d 684, 589 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) (holding that an officer\u2019s noncompliance with the strip search statute was not a defense to resisting an officer with violence), review granted, 894 So.2d 971 (Fla.2005); Tillman v. State, 807 So.2d 106, 110 (Fla. 5th DCA) (holding that \u201cwhile the state must prove that the alleged victim was a law enforcement officer who was engaged in the lawful execution or performance of a legal duty, the technical illegality of that action does not justify resisting with violence or battering the officer\u201d), review granted, 835 So.2d 271 (Fla.2002)."},"case_id":8916326,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Our own precedent answers the question in the negative and requires us to affirm Kaigler's convictions. Other district courts of appeal have ruled similarly.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"807 So.2d 106, 110","parenthetical":"holding that \"while the state must prove that the alleged victim was a law enforcement officer who was engaged in the lawful execution or performance of a legal duty, the technical illegality of that action does not justify resisting with violence or battering the officer\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Perry v. State, 846 So.2d 684, 589 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) (holding that an officer\u2019s noncompliance with the strip search statute was not a defense to resisting an officer with violence), review granted, 894 So.2d 971 (Fla.2005); Tillman v. State, 807 So.2d 106, 110 (Fla. 5th DCA) (holding that \u201cwhile the state must prove that the alleged victim was a law enforcement officer who was engaged in the lawful execution or performance of a legal duty, the technical illegality of that action does not justify resisting with violence or battering the officer\u201d), review granted, 835 So.2d 271 (Fla.2002)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"740 So.2d 89, 91-92","parenthetical":"reversing convictions for resisting with violence and. battery of a law enforcement officer because the evidence was insufficient to support a finding that the officer was engaged in a lawful duty at the time of the alleged offenses","sentence":"But see Taylor v. State, 740 So.2d 89, 91-92 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999) (reversing convictions for resisting with violence and. battery of a law enforcement officer because the evidence was insufficient to support a finding that the officer was engaged in a lawful duty at the time of the alleged offenses)."},"case_id":8916326,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Our own precedent answers the question in the negative and requires us to affirm Kaigler's convictions. Other district courts of appeal have ruled similarly.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that \"while the state must prove that the alleged victim was a law enforcement officer who was engaged in the lawful execution or performance of a legal duty, the technical illegality of that action does not justify resisting with violence or battering the officer\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Perry v. State, 846 So.2d 684, 589 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) (holding that an officer\u2019s noncompliance with the strip search statute was not a defense to resisting an officer with violence), review granted, 894 So.2d 971 (Fla.2005); Tillman v. State, 807 So.2d 106, 110 (Fla. 5th DCA) (holding that \u201cwhile the state must prove that the alleged victim was a law enforcement officer who was engaged in the lawful execution or performance of a legal duty, the technical illegality of that action does not justify resisting with violence or battering the officer\u201d), review granted, 835 So.2d 271 (Fla.2002)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"740 So.2d 89, 91-92","parenthetical":"reversing convictions for resisting with violence and. battery of a law enforcement officer because the evidence was insufficient to support a finding that the officer was engaged in a lawful duty at the time of the alleged offenses","sentence":"But see Taylor v. State, 740 So.2d 89, 91-92 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999) (reversing convictions for resisting with violence and. battery of a law enforcement officer because the evidence was insufficient to support a finding that the officer was engaged in a lawful duty at the time of the alleged offenses)."},"case_id":8916326,"label":"a"}
{"context":"While the contract remains in effect, the performing party cannot recover more than the contract price by bringing a quantum meruit action for unjust enrichment. Even if the defendant's gain exceeds the price plaintiff bargained for, the plaintiff is obviously precluded from adjusting the contract price by the mere expedient of recharacterizing his claim.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[I]t is impermissible ... to seek damages in an action sounding in quasi[-] contract where the suing party has fully performed on a valid written agreement, the existence of which is undisputed, and the scope of which clearly covers the dispute between the parties.\"","sentence":"See id. at 389, 521 N.Y.S.2d 653, 516 N.E.2d 190 (\u201c[I]t is impermissible ... to seek damages in an action sounding in quasi[-] contract where the suing party has fully performed on a valid written agreement, the existence of which is undisputed, and the scope of which clearly covers the dispute between the parties.\u201d); cf. Henry Loheac, P.C. v. Children\u2019s Comer Learning Ctr., 51 A.D.3d 476, 857 N.Y.S.2d 143, 144 (1st Dep\u2019t 2008) (plaintiff could recover under quantum meruit \/unjust enrichment theory if it could show that it had performed work outside the scope of the original contract)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"plaintiff could recover under quantum meruit \/unjust enrichment theory if it could show that it had performed work outside the scope of the original contract","sentence":"See id. at 389, 521 N.Y.S.2d 653, 516 N.E.2d 190 (\u201c[I]t is impermissible ... to seek damages in an action sounding in quasi[-] contract where the suing party has fully performed on a valid written agreement, the existence of which is undisputed, and the scope of which clearly covers the dispute between the parties.\u201d); cf. Henry Loheac, P.C. v. Children\u2019s Comer Learning Ctr., 51 A.D.3d 476, 857 N.Y.S.2d 143, 144 (1st Dep\u2019t 2008) (plaintiff could recover under quantum meruit \/unjust enrichment theory if it could show that it had performed work outside the scope of the original contract)."},"case_id":4026914,"label":"a"}
{"context":"While the contract remains in effect, the performing party cannot recover more than the contract price by bringing a quantum meruit action for unjust enrichment. Even if the defendant's gain exceeds the price plaintiff bargained for, the plaintiff is obviously precluded from adjusting the contract price by the mere expedient of recharacterizing his claim.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[I]t is impermissible ... to seek damages in an action sounding in quasi[-] contract where the suing party has fully performed on a valid written agreement, the existence of which is undisputed, and the scope of which clearly covers the dispute between the parties.\"","sentence":"See id. at 389, 521 N.Y.S.2d 653, 516 N.E.2d 190 (\u201c[I]t is impermissible ... to seek damages in an action sounding in quasi[-] contract where the suing party has fully performed on a valid written agreement, the existence of which is undisputed, and the scope of which clearly covers the dispute between the parties.\u201d); cf. Henry Loheac, P.C. v. Children\u2019s Comer Learning Ctr., 51 A.D.3d 476, 857 N.Y.S.2d 143, 144 (1st Dep\u2019t 2008) (plaintiff could recover under quantum meruit \/unjust enrichment theory if it could show that it had performed work outside the scope of the original contract)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"857 N.Y.S.2d 143, 144","parenthetical":"plaintiff could recover under quantum meruit \/unjust enrichment theory if it could show that it had performed work outside the scope of the original contract","sentence":"See id. at 389, 521 N.Y.S.2d 653, 516 N.E.2d 190 (\u201c[I]t is impermissible ... to seek damages in an action sounding in quasi[-] contract where the suing party has fully performed on a valid written agreement, the existence of which is undisputed, and the scope of which clearly covers the dispute between the parties.\u201d); cf. Henry Loheac, P.C. v. Children\u2019s Comer Learning Ctr., 51 A.D.3d 476, 857 N.Y.S.2d 143, 144 (1st Dep\u2019t 2008) (plaintiff could recover under quantum meruit \/unjust enrichment theory if it could show that it had performed work outside the scope of the original contract)."},"case_id":4026914,"label":"a"}
{"context":"While the contract remains in effect, the performing party cannot recover more than the contract price by bringing a quantum meruit action for unjust enrichment. Even if the defendant's gain exceeds the price plaintiff bargained for, the plaintiff is obviously precluded from adjusting the contract price by the mere expedient of recharacterizing his claim.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"plaintiff could recover under quantum meruit \/unjust enrichment theory if it could show that it had performed work outside the scope of the original contract","sentence":"See id. at 389, 521 N.Y.S.2d 653, 516 N.E.2d 190 (\u201c[I]t is impermissible ... to seek damages in an action sounding in quasi[-] contract where the suing party has fully performed on a valid written agreement, the existence of which is undisputed, and the scope of which clearly covers the dispute between the parties.\u201d); cf. Henry Loheac, P.C. v. Children\u2019s Comer Learning Ctr., 51 A.D.3d 476, 857 N.Y.S.2d 143, 144 (1st Dep\u2019t 2008) (plaintiff could recover under quantum meruit \/unjust enrichment theory if it could show that it had performed work outside the scope of the original contract)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[I]t is impermissible ... to seek damages in an action sounding in quasi[-] contract where the suing party has fully performed on a valid written agreement, the existence of which is undisputed, and the scope of which clearly covers the dispute between the parties.\"","sentence":"See id. at 389, 521 N.Y.S.2d 653, 516 N.E.2d 190 (\u201c[I]t is impermissible ... to seek damages in an action sounding in quasi[-] contract where the suing party has fully performed on a valid written agreement, the existence of which is undisputed, and the scope of which clearly covers the dispute between the parties.\u201d); cf. Henry Loheac, P.C. v. Children\u2019s Comer Learning Ctr., 51 A.D.3d 476, 857 N.Y.S.2d 143, 144 (1st Dep\u2019t 2008) (plaintiff could recover under quantum meruit \/unjust enrichment theory if it could show that it had performed work outside the scope of the original contract)."},"case_id":4026914,"label":"b"}
{"context":"While the contract remains in effect, the performing party cannot recover more than the contract price by bringing a quantum meruit action for unjust enrichment. Even if the defendant's gain exceeds the price plaintiff bargained for, the plaintiff is obviously precluded from adjusting the contract price by the mere expedient of recharacterizing his claim.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[I]t is impermissible ... to seek damages in an action sounding in quasi[-] contract where the suing party has fully performed on a valid written agreement, the existence of which is undisputed, and the scope of which clearly covers the dispute between the parties.\"","sentence":"See id. at 389, 521 N.Y.S.2d 653, 516 N.E.2d 190 (\u201c[I]t is impermissible ... to seek damages in an action sounding in quasi[-] contract where the suing party has fully performed on a valid written agreement, the existence of which is undisputed, and the scope of which clearly covers the dispute between the parties.\u201d); cf. Henry Loheac, P.C. v. Children\u2019s Comer Learning Ctr., 51 A.D.3d 476, 857 N.Y.S.2d 143, 144 (1st Dep\u2019t 2008) (plaintiff could recover under quantum meruit \/unjust enrichment theory if it could show that it had performed work outside the scope of the original contract)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"857 N.Y.S.2d 143, 144","parenthetical":"plaintiff could recover under quantum meruit \/unjust enrichment theory if it could show that it had performed work outside the scope of the original contract","sentence":"See id. at 389, 521 N.Y.S.2d 653, 516 N.E.2d 190 (\u201c[I]t is impermissible ... to seek damages in an action sounding in quasi[-] contract where the suing party has fully performed on a valid written agreement, the existence of which is undisputed, and the scope of which clearly covers the dispute between the parties.\u201d); cf. Henry Loheac, P.C. v. Children\u2019s Comer Learning Ctr., 51 A.D.3d 476, 857 N.Y.S.2d 143, 144 (1st Dep\u2019t 2008) (plaintiff could recover under quantum meruit \/unjust enrichment theory if it could show that it had performed work outside the scope of the original contract)."},"case_id":4026914,"label":"a"}
{"context":". Banco argued to the Panel that it should not make a decision on prejudgment security without giving the parties an opportunity to engage in discovery and present their evidence at a hearing. See Banco's Statement of Position at 5-8. Notably, however, Banco has not argued here that the Panel's decision to deny this request deprived it of \"fundamental fairness,\" a valid basis for vacatur of an arbitration award.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that arbitrators denied defendant \"fundamental fairness\" by issuing an interim order requiring the posting of prejudgment security based on \"the parties' Statements of Position, as well as oral argument from counsel\" but without \"even a threshold review of the underlying dispute or its merits in relation to either party's case\" and without permitting \"discovery of files central and dispositive to the dispute before it\"","sentence":"See British Ins. Co. of Cayman, 93 F.Supp.2d at 517-19 (holding that arbitrators did not violate \"fundamental fairness\u201d by ordering prejudgment security based on the parties' \"many long and forceful submissions,\u201d although there was no oral argument and no hearing on the merits of the underlying claims or substantive defenses); Atlas Assurance Co. of Am., 1991 WL 4741, at *2-*3 (holding that arbitration panel did not violate \"fundamental fairness\u201d when it issued an interim award directing a defendant to post pre-judgment security after holding an \u201cOrganizational Meeting\u201d at which it \"received, considered and discussed the parties' statements of issues and heard verbal statements by the parties' representatives\u201d); but see Home Indemnity Co., 1997 WL 773712, at *2-*5 (holding that arbitrators denied defendant \u201cfundamental fairness\u201d by issuing an interim order requiring the posting of prejudgment security based on \"the parties\u2019 Statements of Position, as well as oral argument from counsel\u201d but without \"even a threshold review of the underlying dispute or its merits in relation to either party\u2019s case\u201d and without permitting \"discovery of files central and dispositive to the dispute before it\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"93 F.Supp.2d 517, 517-19","parenthetical":"holding that arbitrators did not violate \"fundamental fairness\" by ordering prejudgment security based on the parties' \"many long and forceful submissions,\" although there was no oral argument and no hearing on the merits of the underlying claims or substantive defenses","sentence":"See British Ins. Co. of Cayman, 93 F.Supp.2d at 517-19 (holding that arbitrators did not violate \"fundamental fairness\u201d by ordering prejudgment security based on the parties' \"many long and forceful submissions,\u201d although there was no oral argument and no hearing on the merits of the underlying claims or substantive defenses); Atlas Assurance Co. of Am., 1991 WL 4741, at *2-*3 (holding that arbitration panel did not violate \"fundamental fairness\u201d when it issued an interim award directing a defendant to post pre-judgment security after holding an \u201cOrganizational Meeting\u201d at which it \"received, considered and discussed the parties' statements of issues and heard verbal statements by the parties' representatives\u201d); but see Home Indemnity Co., 1997 WL 773712, at *2-*5 (holding that arbitrators denied defendant \u201cfundamental fairness\u201d by issuing an interim order requiring the posting of prejudgment security based on \"the parties\u2019 Statements of Position, as well as oral argument from counsel\u201d but without \"even a threshold review of the underlying dispute or its merits in relation to either party\u2019s case\u201d and without permitting \"discovery of files central and dispositive to the dispute before it\u201d)."},"case_id":9321504,"label":"b"}
{"context":". Banco argued to the Panel that it should not make a decision on prejudgment security without giving the parties an opportunity to engage in discovery and present their evidence at a hearing. See Banco's Statement of Position at 5-8. Notably, however, Banco has not argued here that the Panel's decision to deny this request deprived it of \"fundamental fairness,\" a valid basis for vacatur of an arbitration award.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that arbitration panel did not violate \"fundamental fairness\" when it issued an interim award directing a defendant to post pre-judgment security after holding an \"Organizational Meeting\" at which it \"received, considered and discussed the parties' statements of issues and heard verbal statements by the parties' representatives\"","sentence":"See British Ins. Co. of Cayman, 93 F.Supp.2d at 517-19 (holding that arbitrators did not violate \"fundamental fairness\u201d by ordering prejudgment security based on the parties' \"many long and forceful submissions,\u201d although there was no oral argument and no hearing on the merits of the underlying claims or substantive defenses); Atlas Assurance Co. of Am., 1991 WL 4741, at *2-*3 (holding that arbitration panel did not violate \"fundamental fairness\u201d when it issued an interim award directing a defendant to post pre-judgment security after holding an \u201cOrganizational Meeting\u201d at which it \"received, considered and discussed the parties' statements of issues and heard verbal statements by the parties' representatives\u201d); but see Home Indemnity Co., 1997 WL 773712, at *2-*5 (holding that arbitrators denied defendant \u201cfundamental fairness\u201d by issuing an interim order requiring the posting of prejudgment security based on \"the parties\u2019 Statements of Position, as well as oral argument from counsel\u201d but without \"even a threshold review of the underlying dispute or its merits in relation to either party\u2019s case\u201d and without permitting \"discovery of files central and dispositive to the dispute before it\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that arbitrators denied defendant \"fundamental fairness\" by issuing an interim order requiring the posting of prejudgment security based on \"the parties' Statements of Position, as well as oral argument from counsel\" but without \"even a threshold review of the underlying dispute or its merits in relation to either party's case\" and without permitting \"discovery of files central and dispositive to the dispute before it\"","sentence":"See British Ins. Co. of Cayman, 93 F.Supp.2d at 517-19 (holding that arbitrators did not violate \"fundamental fairness\u201d by ordering prejudgment security based on the parties' \"many long and forceful submissions,\u201d although there was no oral argument and no hearing on the merits of the underlying claims or substantive defenses); Atlas Assurance Co. of Am., 1991 WL 4741, at *2-*3 (holding that arbitration panel did not violate \"fundamental fairness\u201d when it issued an interim award directing a defendant to post pre-judgment security after holding an \u201cOrganizational Meeting\u201d at which it \"received, considered and discussed the parties' statements of issues and heard verbal statements by the parties' representatives\u201d); but see Home Indemnity Co., 1997 WL 773712, at *2-*5 (holding that arbitrators denied defendant \u201cfundamental fairness\u201d by issuing an interim order requiring the posting of prejudgment security based on \"the parties\u2019 Statements of Position, as well as oral argument from counsel\u201d but without \"even a threshold review of the underlying dispute or its merits in relation to either party\u2019s case\u201d and without permitting \"discovery of files central and dispositive to the dispute before it\u201d)."},"case_id":9321504,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In other instances, the statements have been made to medical professionals at centers specializing in sexual assault or to physicians otherwise specializing in sexual abuse.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"373 Ark. 141, 154-56","parenthetical":"child victim's statements to a social worker whose duties included interviewing chil dren brought to the hospital for physical or sexual abuse were non-testimonial where the parent brought the victim to hospital, law enforcement did not request or participate in the interview, and the social worker's primary purpose was to assess victim's safety and need for medical treatment","sentence":"See People v. Vigil, 127 P.3d 916, 922-24 (Colo. 2006) (child victim\u2019s statements about sexual assault to physician who performed the sexual assault kit were nontestimonial; although physician was member of child protection team, law enforcement officer was not present during examination and objectively reasonable person in position of declarant would have believed that statements were for medical purpose rather than use at later trial); People v. Garland, 286 Mich. App. 1, 10-11, 777 N.W.2d 732 (2009) (adult victim\u2019s statements to nurse at center for sexual assault survivors were nontestimonial, despite nurse\u2019s collection of evidence, because primary purpose of patient history and examination after sexual assault is for diagnosis and treatment; \u201calthough the nurse does collect evidence during the course of the examination after taking a patient\u2019s history and the nurse is required to report the sexual assault and turn over the evidence to law enforcement officials, the nurse is not involved in the police officer\u2019s interview of the victim after the examination and is not personally involved in the officer\u2019s investigation of die crime\u201d); State v. Krasky, 736 N.W.2d 636, 641-42 (Minn. 2007) (videotaped statements of child victim to nurse at Midwest Children\u2019s Resource Center regarding prior sexual abuse were nontestimonial because primary purpose of the statements was to assess and protect child\u2019s health and welfare); State v. Scacchetti, 690 N.W.2d 393, 396 (Minn. App. 2005) (admission of 3-year-old victim\u2019s statements to physician specializing in diagnosing sexual abuse did not violate defendant\u2019s confrontation rights because circumstances did not suggest victim believed statements would be available for use at later trial and physician was not working on behalf of investigating officers or government officials; purpose of exam was diagnosis and treatment); State v. Stahl, 111 Ohio St. 3d 186, 198-99, 855 N.E.2d 834 (2006) (statement identifying rapist by deceased victim to nurse specializing in treatment of sexual assault victims was nontestimonial because although law enforcement officer who transported victim to the hospital was present during the examination, statement was made to nurse in the ordinary course of medical examination and not elicited by law enforcement interrogation; while specialized unit gathers evidence for future prosecution, primary purpose is to render medical treatment; and since victim had already given statement to officer, objective witness would believe statement to nurse was for medical treatment purpose); State v. Castilla, 131 Wash. App. 7, 87 P.3d 1211, at *13 (2004) (unpublished part of opinion only online) (statements made by victim to sexual assault nurse regarding rape were nontestimonial because not elicited by government official and were not given with an eye toward trial); see also Seely v. State, 373 Ark. 141, 154-56, 282 S.W.3d 778 (2008) (child victim\u2019s statements to a social worker whose duties included interviewing chil dren brought to the hospital for physical or sexual abuse were non-testimonial where the parent brought the victim to hospital, law enforcement did not request or participate in the interview, and the social worker\u2019s primary purpose was to assess victim\u2019s safety and need for medical treatment)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"736 N.W.2d 636, 641-42","parenthetical":"videotaped statements of child victim to nurse at Midwest Children's Resource Center regarding prior sexual abuse were nontestimonial because primary purpose of the statements was to assess and protect child's health and welfare","sentence":"See People v. Vigil, 127 P.3d 916, 922-24 (Colo. 2006) (child victim\u2019s statements about sexual assault to physician who performed the sexual assault kit were nontestimonial; although physician was member of child protection team, law enforcement officer was not present during examination and objectively reasonable person in position of declarant would have believed that statements were for medical purpose rather than use at later trial); People v. Garland, 286 Mich. App. 1, 10-11, 777 N.W.2d 732 (2009) (adult victim\u2019s statements to nurse at center for sexual assault survivors were nontestimonial, despite nurse\u2019s collection of evidence, because primary purpose of patient history and examination after sexual assault is for diagnosis and treatment; \u201calthough the nurse does collect evidence during the course of the examination after taking a patient\u2019s history and the nurse is required to report the sexual assault and turn over the evidence to law enforcement officials, the nurse is not involved in the police officer\u2019s interview of the victim after the examination and is not personally involved in the officer\u2019s investigation of die crime\u201d); State v. Krasky, 736 N.W.2d 636, 641-42 (Minn. 2007) (videotaped statements of child victim to nurse at Midwest Children\u2019s Resource Center regarding prior sexual abuse were nontestimonial because primary purpose of the statements was to assess and protect child\u2019s health and welfare); State v. Scacchetti, 690 N.W.2d 393, 396 (Minn. App. 2005) (admission of 3-year-old victim\u2019s statements to physician specializing in diagnosing sexual abuse did not violate defendant\u2019s confrontation rights because circumstances did not suggest victim believed statements would be available for use at later trial and physician was not working on behalf of investigating officers or government officials; purpose of exam was diagnosis and treatment); State v. Stahl, 111 Ohio St. 3d 186, 198-99, 855 N.E.2d 834 (2006) (statement identifying rapist by deceased victim to nurse specializing in treatment of sexual assault victims was nontestimonial because although law enforcement officer who transported victim to the hospital was present during the examination, statement was made to nurse in the ordinary course of medical examination and not elicited by law enforcement interrogation; while specialized unit gathers evidence for future prosecution, primary purpose is to render medical treatment; and since victim had already given statement to officer, objective witness would believe statement to nurse was for medical treatment purpose); State v. Castilla, 131 Wash. App. 7, 87 P.3d 1211, at *13 (2004) (unpublished part of opinion only online) (statements made by victim to sexual assault nurse regarding rape were nontestimonial because not elicited by government official and were not given with an eye toward trial); see also Seely v. State, 373 Ark. 141, 154-56, 282 S.W.3d 778 (2008) (child victim\u2019s statements to a social worker whose duties included interviewing chil dren brought to the hospital for physical or sexual abuse were non-testimonial where the parent brought the victim to hospital, law enforcement did not request or participate in the interview, and the social worker\u2019s primary purpose was to assess victim\u2019s safety and need for medical treatment)."},"case_id":4365542,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In other instances, the statements have been made to medical professionals at centers specializing in sexual assault or to physicians otherwise specializing in sexual abuse.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"child victim's statements to a social worker whose duties included interviewing chil dren brought to the hospital for physical or sexual abuse were non-testimonial where the parent brought the victim to hospital, law enforcement did not request or participate in the interview, and the social worker's primary purpose was to assess victim's safety and need for medical treatment","sentence":"See People v. Vigil, 127 P.3d 916, 922-24 (Colo. 2006) (child victim\u2019s statements about sexual assault to physician who performed the sexual assault kit were nontestimonial; although physician was member of child protection team, law enforcement officer was not present during examination and objectively reasonable person in position of declarant would have believed that statements were for medical purpose rather than use at later trial); People v. Garland, 286 Mich. App. 1, 10-11, 777 N.W.2d 732 (2009) (adult victim\u2019s statements to nurse at center for sexual assault survivors were nontestimonial, despite nurse\u2019s collection of evidence, because primary purpose of patient history and examination after sexual assault is for diagnosis and treatment; \u201calthough the nurse does collect evidence during the course of the examination after taking a patient\u2019s history and the nurse is required to report the sexual assault and turn over the evidence to law enforcement officials, the nurse is not involved in the police officer\u2019s interview of the victim after the examination and is not personally involved in the officer\u2019s investigation of die crime\u201d); State v. Krasky, 736 N.W.2d 636, 641-42 (Minn. 2007) (videotaped statements of child victim to nurse at Midwest Children\u2019s Resource Center regarding prior sexual abuse were nontestimonial because primary purpose of the statements was to assess and protect child\u2019s health and welfare); State v. Scacchetti, 690 N.W.2d 393, 396 (Minn. App. 2005) (admission of 3-year-old victim\u2019s statements to physician specializing in diagnosing sexual abuse did not violate defendant\u2019s confrontation rights because circumstances did not suggest victim believed statements would be available for use at later trial and physician was not working on behalf of investigating officers or government officials; purpose of exam was diagnosis and treatment); State v. Stahl, 111 Ohio St. 3d 186, 198-99, 855 N.E.2d 834 (2006) (statement identifying rapist by deceased victim to nurse specializing in treatment of sexual assault victims was nontestimonial because although law enforcement officer who transported victim to the hospital was present during the examination, statement was made to nurse in the ordinary course of medical examination and not elicited by law enforcement interrogation; while specialized unit gathers evidence for future prosecution, primary purpose is to render medical treatment; and since victim had already given statement to officer, objective witness would believe statement to nurse was for medical treatment purpose); State v. Castilla, 131 Wash. App. 7, 87 P.3d 1211, at *13 (2004) (unpublished part of opinion only online) (statements made by victim to sexual assault nurse regarding rape were nontestimonial because not elicited by government official and were not given with an eye toward trial); see also Seely v. State, 373 Ark. 141, 154-56, 282 S.W.3d 778 (2008) (child victim\u2019s statements to a social worker whose duties included interviewing chil dren brought to the hospital for physical or sexual abuse were non-testimonial where the parent brought the victim to hospital, law enforcement did not request or participate in the interview, and the social worker\u2019s primary purpose was to assess victim\u2019s safety and need for medical treatment)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"736 N.W.2d 636, 641-42","parenthetical":"videotaped statements of child victim to nurse at Midwest Children's Resource Center regarding prior sexual abuse were nontestimonial because primary purpose of the statements was to assess and protect child's health and welfare","sentence":"See People v. Vigil, 127 P.3d 916, 922-24 (Colo. 2006) (child victim\u2019s statements about sexual assault to physician who performed the sexual assault kit were nontestimonial; although physician was member of child protection team, law enforcement officer was not present during examination and objectively reasonable person in position of declarant would have believed that statements were for medical purpose rather than use at later trial); People v. Garland, 286 Mich. App. 1, 10-11, 777 N.W.2d 732 (2009) (adult victim\u2019s statements to nurse at center for sexual assault survivors were nontestimonial, despite nurse\u2019s collection of evidence, because primary purpose of patient history and examination after sexual assault is for diagnosis and treatment; \u201calthough the nurse does collect evidence during the course of the examination after taking a patient\u2019s history and the nurse is required to report the sexual assault and turn over the evidence to law enforcement officials, the nurse is not involved in the police officer\u2019s interview of the victim after the examination and is not personally involved in the officer\u2019s investigation of die crime\u201d); State v. Krasky, 736 N.W.2d 636, 641-42 (Minn. 2007) (videotaped statements of child victim to nurse at Midwest Children\u2019s Resource Center regarding prior sexual abuse were nontestimonial because primary purpose of the statements was to assess and protect child\u2019s health and welfare); State v. Scacchetti, 690 N.W.2d 393, 396 (Minn. App. 2005) (admission of 3-year-old victim\u2019s statements to physician specializing in diagnosing sexual abuse did not violate defendant\u2019s confrontation rights because circumstances did not suggest victim believed statements would be available for use at later trial and physician was not working on behalf of investigating officers or government officials; purpose of exam was diagnosis and treatment); State v. Stahl, 111 Ohio St. 3d 186, 198-99, 855 N.E.2d 834 (2006) (statement identifying rapist by deceased victim to nurse specializing in treatment of sexual assault victims was nontestimonial because although law enforcement officer who transported victim to the hospital was present during the examination, statement was made to nurse in the ordinary course of medical examination and not elicited by law enforcement interrogation; while specialized unit gathers evidence for future prosecution, primary purpose is to render medical treatment; and since victim had already given statement to officer, objective witness would believe statement to nurse was for medical treatment purpose); State v. Castilla, 131 Wash. App. 7, 87 P.3d 1211, at *13 (2004) (unpublished part of opinion only online) (statements made by victim to sexual assault nurse regarding rape were nontestimonial because not elicited by government official and were not given with an eye toward trial); see also Seely v. State, 373 Ark. 141, 154-56, 282 S.W.3d 778 (2008) (child victim\u2019s statements to a social worker whose duties included interviewing chil dren brought to the hospital for physical or sexual abuse were non-testimonial where the parent brought the victim to hospital, law enforcement did not request or participate in the interview, and the social worker\u2019s primary purpose was to assess victim\u2019s safety and need for medical treatment)."},"case_id":4365542,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Mere possession of a firearm by one who, like the petitioner, routinely carried a gun (Tr. 209) is not, however, evidence of prior calculation and design.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"1998 WL 226441, at *6","parenthetical":"\"That defendant had a gun with him at the Carter residence is not, by itself, evidence of prior calculation and design, given the testimony offered by defendant's girlfriend that he 'sort of frequently carried a weapon.\"","sentence":"State v. Johnson, No. 97APA03-315,1998 WL 226441, at *6 (Ohio App. May 5, 1998) (\u201cThat defendant had a gun with him at the Carter residence is not, by itself, evidence of prior calculation and design, given the testimony offered by defendant\u2019s girlfriend that he \u2018sort of frequently carried a weapon.\u201d); see also State v. Williams, No. 1-85-2, 1986 WL 5907, at *2 (Ohio App. May 19,1986)(\u201cThe fact that appellant possessed a gun on the day of the shooting when the witness had never before known the appellant to carry a gun, could have been interpreted by the jury as evidence that appellant had acted purposely with prior calculation and design\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"1986 WL 5907, at *2","parenthetical":"\"The fact that appellant possessed a gun on the day of the shooting when the witness had never before known the appellant to carry a gun, could have been interpreted by the jury as evidence that appellant had acted purposely with prior calculation and design\"","sentence":"State v. Johnson, No. 97APA03-315,1998 WL 226441, at *6 (Ohio App. May 5, 1998) (\u201cThat defendant had a gun with him at the Carter residence is not, by itself, evidence of prior calculation and design, given the testimony offered by defendant\u2019s girlfriend that he \u2018sort of frequently carried a weapon.\u201d); see also State v. Williams, No. 1-85-2, 1986 WL 5907, at *2 (Ohio App. May 19,1986)(\u201cThe fact that appellant possessed a gun on the day of the shooting when the witness had never before known the appellant to carry a gun, could have been interpreted by the jury as evidence that appellant had acted purposely with prior calculation and design\u201d)."},"case_id":9057814,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The district court properly dismissed Wolinski's action because Wolinski failed to allege facts sufficient to state any plausible claims.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"627 F.3d 338, 341-42","parenthetical":"although pro se pleadings are construed liberally, a plaintiff must present factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief","sentence":"See Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341-42 (9th Cir. 2010) (although pro se pleadings are construed liberally, a plaintiff must present factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief); see also West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48, 108 S.Ct. 2250, 101 L.Ed.2d 40 (1988) (elements of a claim under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 225, 96 S.Ct. 2532, 49 L.Ed.2d 451 (1976) (prisoners have no liberty interest under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in a transfer)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"427 U.S. 215, 225","parenthetical":"prisoners have no liberty interest under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in a transfer","sentence":"See Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341-42 (9th Cir. 2010) (although pro se pleadings are construed liberally, a plaintiff must present factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief); see also West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48, 108 S.Ct. 2250, 101 L.Ed.2d 40 (1988) (elements of a claim under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 225, 96 S.Ct. 2532, 49 L.Ed.2d 451 (1976) (prisoners have no liberty interest under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in a transfer)."},"case_id":12134602,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The district court properly dismissed Wolinski's action because Wolinski failed to allege facts sufficient to state any plausible claims.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"prisoners have no liberty interest under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in a transfer","sentence":"See Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341-42 (9th Cir. 2010) (although pro se pleadings are construed liberally, a plaintiff must present factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief); see also West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48, 108 S.Ct. 2250, 101 L.Ed.2d 40 (1988) (elements of a claim under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 225, 96 S.Ct. 2532, 49 L.Ed.2d 451 (1976) (prisoners have no liberty interest under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in a transfer)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"627 F.3d 338, 341-42","parenthetical":"although pro se pleadings are construed liberally, a plaintiff must present factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief","sentence":"See Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341-42 (9th Cir. 2010) (although pro se pleadings are construed liberally, a plaintiff must present factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief); see also West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48, 108 S.Ct. 2250, 101 L.Ed.2d 40 (1988) (elements of a claim under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 225, 96 S.Ct. 2532, 49 L.Ed.2d 451 (1976) (prisoners have no liberty interest under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in a transfer)."},"case_id":12134602,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The district court properly dismissed Wolinski's action because Wolinski failed to allege facts sufficient to state any plausible claims.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"627 F.3d 338, 341-42","parenthetical":"although pro se pleadings are construed liberally, a plaintiff must present factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief","sentence":"See Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341-42 (9th Cir. 2010) (although pro se pleadings are construed liberally, a plaintiff must present factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief); see also West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48, 108 S.Ct. 2250, 101 L.Ed.2d 40 (1988) (elements of a claim under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 225, 96 S.Ct. 2532, 49 L.Ed.2d 451 (1976) (prisoners have no liberty interest under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in a transfer)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"prisoners have no liberty interest under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in a transfer","sentence":"See Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341-42 (9th Cir. 2010) (although pro se pleadings are construed liberally, a plaintiff must present factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief); see also West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48, 108 S.Ct. 2250, 101 L.Ed.2d 40 (1988) (elements of a claim under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 225, 96 S.Ct. 2532, 49 L.Ed.2d 451 (1976) (prisoners have no liberty interest under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in a transfer)."},"case_id":12134602,"label":"a"}
{"context":"See FAR 52.243-4(a)-(d). As a result, contractors are not entitled to compensation for excusable delays not caused by the government.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"224 F.3d 1340, 1348","parenthetical":"requiring that the contractor \"demonstrate! ] a government-imposed delay, i.e., a compensable delay\" to recover damages","sentence":"See, e.g., Sauer Inc. v. Danzig, 224 F.3d 1340, 1348 (Fed.Cir.2000) (requiring that the contractor \u201cdemonstrate! ] a government-imposed delay, i.e., a compensable delay\u201d to recover damages); cf. Luria Bros. & Co., Inc. v. United States, 177 Ct.Cl. 676, 369 F.2d 701, 714 (1966) (recognizing that the contractor may recover costs when loss of productivity results from the government\u2019s actions)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"recognizing that the contractor may recover costs when loss of productivity results from the government's actions","sentence":"See, e.g., Sauer Inc. v. Danzig, 224 F.3d 1340, 1348 (Fed.Cir.2000) (requiring that the contractor \u201cdemonstrate! ] a government-imposed delay, i.e., a compensable delay\u201d to recover damages); cf. Luria Bros. & Co., Inc. v. United States, 177 Ct.Cl. 676, 369 F.2d 701, 714 (1966) (recognizing that the contractor may recover costs when loss of productivity results from the government\u2019s actions)."},"case_id":4086076,"label":"a"}
{"context":"See FAR 52.243-4(a)-(d). As a result, contractors are not entitled to compensation for excusable delays not caused by the government.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"369 F.2d 701, 714","parenthetical":"recognizing that the contractor may recover costs when loss of productivity results from the government's actions","sentence":"See, e.g., Sauer Inc. v. Danzig, 224 F.3d 1340, 1348 (Fed.Cir.2000) (requiring that the contractor \u201cdemonstrate! ] a government-imposed delay, i.e., a compensable delay\u201d to recover damages); cf. Luria Bros. & Co., Inc. v. United States, 177 Ct.Cl. 676, 369 F.2d 701, 714 (1966) (recognizing that the contractor may recover costs when loss of productivity results from the government\u2019s actions)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"224 F.3d 1340, 1348","parenthetical":"requiring that the contractor \"demonstrate! ] a government-imposed delay, i.e., a compensable delay\" to recover damages","sentence":"See, e.g., Sauer Inc. v. Danzig, 224 F.3d 1340, 1348 (Fed.Cir.2000) (requiring that the contractor \u201cdemonstrate! ] a government-imposed delay, i.e., a compensable delay\u201d to recover damages); cf. Luria Bros. & Co., Inc. v. United States, 177 Ct.Cl. 676, 369 F.2d 701, 714 (1966) (recognizing that the contractor may recover costs when loss of productivity results from the government\u2019s actions)."},"case_id":4086076,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Much of the check-cashing evidence -- specifically, Hill's and Anderson's testimony explaining how the check fraud scheme evolved into a plan to rob Acme-- was properly admitted under Rule 404(b). Given the strength of the ease against Foster, we believe the relatively modest quantity of evidence provided by the victim had no meaningful effect on the jury's verdict on the bank robbery and firearm charges.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"628 F.3d 903, 903","parenthetical":"finding no reversible error where portion of testimony inadmissible under Rule 403 was \"cumulative\" and \"not so prejudicial relative to the extremely strong evidence of [the defendant's] guilt\"","sentence":"See, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 8 F.3d 398, 411 (7th Cir.1993) (explaining that \u201ca non-constitutional error is harmless if ... it did not substantially affect the jury\u2019s decision\u201d); see also Tanner., 628 F.3d at 903 (finding no reversible error where portion of testimony inadmissible under Rule 403 was \u201ccumulative\u201d and \u201cnot so prejudicial relative to the extremely strong evidence of [the defendant\u2019s] guilt\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"8 F.3d 398, 411","parenthetical":"explaining that \"a non-constitutional error is harmless if ... it did not substantially affect the jury's decision\"","sentence":"See, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 8 F.3d 398, 411 (7th Cir.1993) (explaining that \u201ca non-constitutional error is harmless if ... it did not substantially affect the jury\u2019s decision\u201d); see also Tanner., 628 F.3d at 903 (finding no reversible error where portion of testimony inadmissible under Rule 403 was \u201ccumulative\u201d and \u201cnot so prejudicial relative to the extremely strong evidence of [the defendant\u2019s] guilt\u201d)."},"case_id":3759919,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The Legislature used the word \"cause\" in the assault-fear provision, but chose the word \"infliction\" for the assault-harm provision. Dorn argues that \"inflict\" is a stricter standard than \"cause\" and requires direct, not just proximate or \"substantial factor,\" causation.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"435 N.W.2d 534, 534","parenthetical":"explaining that a defendant may rebut substantial causation by establishing that \"intervening conduct [was] the sole cause of the end result\"","sentence":"See State v. Gatson, 801 N.W.2d 134, 146 (Minn. 2011) (explaining that under a homicide statute in which the word \u201ccause\u201d is used, the State need only prove that the defendant\u2019s acts were a \u201c \u2018substantial causal factor\u2019 leading to the death\u201d) (quoting State v. Olson, 435 N.W.2d 530, 534 (Minn. 1989)); see also Olson, 435 N.W.2d at 534 (explaining that a defendant may rebut substantial causation by establishing that \u201cintervening conduct [was] the sole cause of the end result\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"801 N.W.2d 134, 146","parenthetical":"explaining that under a homicide statute in which the word \"cause\" is used, the State need only prove that the defendant's acts were a \" 'substantial causal factor' leading to the death\"","sentence":"See State v. Gatson, 801 N.W.2d 134, 146 (Minn. 2011) (explaining that under a homicide statute in which the word \u201ccause\u201d is used, the State need only prove that the defendant\u2019s acts were a \u201c \u2018substantial causal factor\u2019 leading to the death\u201d) (quoting State v. Olson, 435 N.W.2d 530, 534 (Minn. 1989)); see also Olson, 435 N.W.2d at 534 (explaining that a defendant may rebut substantial causation by establishing that \u201cintervening conduct [was] the sole cause of the end result\u201d)."},"case_id":12154279,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Had the Court, as Arce argues, intended to retain the traditional Hewitt analysis for challenges to nondisciplinary segregation, it seems it would have expressly said so. Notably, the Court did expressly limit the breadth of Sandin's holding but made no mention of its purported limitation to inmate challenges against prison disciplinary measures.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"66 F.3d 470, 480","parenthetical":"\"Sandin may be read as calling into question the continuing viability of our cases holding that New York regulations afford inmates a liberty interest in remaining free from administrative segregation.\" (emphasis added","sentence":"See Sandin, 515 U.S. at 487 n. 11,115 S.Ct. at 2302 n. 11 (confirming that \u201c[p]risoners ... retain other protection from arbitrary state action even within the expected conditions of confinement. They may invoke the First and Eighth Amendments and the Equal Protection Clause\u201d); see Cody, 895 F.Supp. at 441 (\u201c[I]t seems ... that if the Supreme Court intended to limit the impact of Sandin to disciplinary cases, it could easily have done so, but it did not.\u201d); cf. Rodriguez v. Phillips, 66 F.3d 470, 480 (2d Cir.1995) (\u201cSandin may be read as calling into question the continuing viability of our cases holding that New York regulations afford inmates a liberty interest in remaining free from administrative segregation.\u201d (emphasis added))."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"confirming that \"[p]risoners ... retain other protection from arbitrary state action even within the expected conditions of confinement. They may invoke the First and Eighth Amendments and the Equal Protection Clause\"","sentence":"See Sandin, 515 U.S. at 487 n. 11,115 S.Ct. at 2302 n. 11 (confirming that \u201c[p]risoners ... retain other protection from arbitrary state action even within the expected conditions of confinement. They may invoke the First and Eighth Amendments and the Equal Protection Clause\u201d); see Cody, 895 F.Supp. at 441 (\u201c[I]t seems ... that if the Supreme Court intended to limit the impact of Sandin to disciplinary cases, it could easily have done so, but it did not.\u201d); cf. Rodriguez v. Phillips, 66 F.3d 470, 480 (2d Cir.1995) (\u201cSandin may be read as calling into question the continuing viability of our cases holding that New York regulations afford inmates a liberty interest in remaining free from administrative segregation.\u201d (emphasis added))."},"case_id":11835046,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Had the Court, as Arce argues, intended to retain the traditional Hewitt analysis for challenges to nondisciplinary segregation, it seems it would have expressly said so. Notably, the Court did expressly limit the breadth of Sandin's holding but made no mention of its purported limitation to inmate challenges against prison disciplinary measures.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"confirming that \"[p]risoners ... retain other protection from arbitrary state action even within the expected conditions of confinement. They may invoke the First and Eighth Amendments and the Equal Protection Clause\"","sentence":"See Sandin, 515 U.S. at 487 n. 11,115 S.Ct. at 2302 n. 11 (confirming that \u201c[p]risoners ... retain other protection from arbitrary state action even within the expected conditions of confinement. They may invoke the First and Eighth Amendments and the Equal Protection Clause\u201d); see Cody, 895 F.Supp. at 441 (\u201c[I]t seems ... that if the Supreme Court intended to limit the impact of Sandin to disciplinary cases, it could easily have done so, but it did not.\u201d); cf. Rodriguez v. Phillips, 66 F.3d 470, 480 (2d Cir.1995) (\u201cSandin may be read as calling into question the continuing viability of our cases holding that New York regulations afford inmates a liberty interest in remaining free from administrative segregation.\u201d (emphasis added))."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"66 F.3d 470, 480","parenthetical":"\"Sandin may be read as calling into question the continuing viability of our cases holding that New York regulations afford inmates a liberty interest in remaining free from administrative segregation.\" (emphasis added","sentence":"See Sandin, 515 U.S. at 487 n. 11,115 S.Ct. at 2302 n. 11 (confirming that \u201c[p]risoners ... retain other protection from arbitrary state action even within the expected conditions of confinement. They may invoke the First and Eighth Amendments and the Equal Protection Clause\u201d); see Cody, 895 F.Supp. at 441 (\u201c[I]t seems ... that if the Supreme Court intended to limit the impact of Sandin to disciplinary cases, it could easily have done so, but it did not.\u201d); cf. Rodriguez v. Phillips, 66 F.3d 470, 480 (2d Cir.1995) (\u201cSandin may be read as calling into question the continuing viability of our cases holding that New York regulations afford inmates a liberty interest in remaining free from administrative segregation.\u201d (emphasis added))."},"case_id":11835046,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Had the Court, as Arce argues, intended to retain the traditional Hewitt analysis for challenges to nondisciplinary segregation, it seems it would have expressly said so. Notably, the Court did expressly limit the breadth of Sandin's holding but made no mention of its purported limitation to inmate challenges against prison disciplinary measures.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"895 F.Supp. 441, 441","parenthetical":"\"[I]t seems ... that if the Supreme Court intended to limit the impact of Sandin to disciplinary cases, it could easily have done so, but it did not.\"","sentence":"See Sandin, 515 U.S. at 487 n. 11,115 S.Ct. at 2302 n. 11 (confirming that \u201c[p]risoners ... retain other protection from arbitrary state action even within the expected conditions of confinement. They may invoke the First and Eighth Amendments and the Equal Protection Clause\u201d); see Cody, 895 F.Supp. at 441 (\u201c[I]t seems ... that if the Supreme Court intended to limit the impact of Sandin to disciplinary cases, it could easily have done so, but it did not.\u201d); cf. Rodriguez v. Phillips, 66 F.3d 470, 480 (2d Cir.1995) (\u201cSandin may be read as calling into question the continuing viability of our cases holding that New York regulations afford inmates a liberty interest in remaining free from administrative segregation.\u201d (emphasis added))."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"66 F.3d 470, 480","parenthetical":"\"Sandin may be read as calling into question the continuing viability of our cases holding that New York regulations afford inmates a liberty interest in remaining free from administrative segregation.\" (emphasis added","sentence":"See Sandin, 515 U.S. at 487 n. 11,115 S.Ct. at 2302 n. 11 (confirming that \u201c[p]risoners ... retain other protection from arbitrary state action even within the expected conditions of confinement. They may invoke the First and Eighth Amendments and the Equal Protection Clause\u201d); see Cody, 895 F.Supp. at 441 (\u201c[I]t seems ... that if the Supreme Court intended to limit the impact of Sandin to disciplinary cases, it could easily have done so, but it did not.\u201d); cf. Rodriguez v. Phillips, 66 F.3d 470, 480 (2d Cir.1995) (\u201cSandin may be read as calling into question the continuing viability of our cases holding that New York regulations afford inmates a liberty interest in remaining free from administrative segregation.\u201d (emphasis added))."},"case_id":11835046,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Instead, the agreement gives plaintiff -- at his discretion -- an affirmative opportunity to purchase defendants' property, at an agreed-upon price, if the loan is not repaid within the required period. In other words, the text of the agreement does not in any way pledge a conveyance of an interest in the land as security for the debt.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"contract language requiring the satisfaction of a debt prior to conveyance of the promisor's interest in the property, where nothing in the contract disclosed the promisor's intent to make his estate in the lands security for his debt and obligation, did not create an equitable lien on the property","sentence":"See Potter v. Schlesser Co., Inc., 335 Or 209, 213, 63 P3d 1172 (2003) (\u201cAccording to its dictionary definition, a lien\u2019 denotes a \u2018charge upon real or personal property for the satisfaction of some debt or duty ordinarily arising by operation of law\u2019 or \u2018a right in one to control or to hold and retain or enforce a charge against the property of another until some claim of the former is paid or satisfied[.]\u2019 \u201d (quoting Webster\u2019s Third New Int\u2019l Dictionary 1306 (unabridged ed 1993) (alteration in Potter))); cf. Western States Finance Co. v. Ruff, 108 Or 442, 215 P 501, on reh\u2019g, 216 P 1020 (1923) (contract language requiring the satisfaction of a debt prior to conveyance of the promisor\u2019s interest in the property, where nothing in the contract disclosed the promisor\u2019s intent to make his estate in the lands security for his debt and obligation, did not create an equitable lien on the property)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"335 Or 209, 213","parenthetical":"\"According to its dictionary definition, a lien' denotes a 'charge upon real or personal property for the satisfaction of some debt or duty ordinarily arising by operation of law' or 'a right in one to control or to hold and retain or enforce a charge against the property of another until some claim of the former is paid or satisfied[.]' \" (quoting Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary 1306 (unabridged ed 1993","sentence":"See Potter v. Schlesser Co., Inc., 335 Or 209, 213, 63 P3d 1172 (2003) (\u201cAccording to its dictionary definition, a lien\u2019 denotes a \u2018charge upon real or personal property for the satisfaction of some debt or duty ordinarily arising by operation of law\u2019 or \u2018a right in one to control or to hold and retain or enforce a charge against the property of another until some claim of the former is paid or satisfied[.]\u2019 \u201d (quoting Webster\u2019s Third New Int\u2019l Dictionary 1306 (unabridged ed 1993) (alteration in Potter))); cf. Western States Finance Co. v. Ruff, 108 Or 442, 215 P 501, on reh\u2019g, 216 P 1020 (1923) (contract language requiring the satisfaction of a debt prior to conveyance of the promisor\u2019s interest in the property, where nothing in the contract disclosed the promisor\u2019s intent to make his estate in the lands security for his debt and obligation, did not create an equitable lien on the property)."},"case_id":4208394,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Instead, the agreement gives plaintiff -- at his discretion -- an affirmative opportunity to purchase defendants' property, at an agreed-upon price, if the loan is not repaid within the required period. In other words, the text of the agreement does not in any way pledge a conveyance of an interest in the land as security for the debt.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"contract language requiring the satisfaction of a debt prior to conveyance of the promisor's interest in the property, where nothing in the contract disclosed the promisor's intent to make his estate in the lands security for his debt and obligation, did not create an equitable lien on the property","sentence":"See Potter v. Schlesser Co., Inc., 335 Or 209, 213, 63 P3d 1172 (2003) (\u201cAccording to its dictionary definition, a lien\u2019 denotes a \u2018charge upon real or personal property for the satisfaction of some debt or duty ordinarily arising by operation of law\u2019 or \u2018a right in one to control or to hold and retain or enforce a charge against the property of another until some claim of the former is paid or satisfied[.]\u2019 \u201d (quoting Webster\u2019s Third New Int\u2019l Dictionary 1306 (unabridged ed 1993) (alteration in Potter))); cf. Western States Finance Co. v. Ruff, 108 Or 442, 215 P 501, on reh\u2019g, 216 P 1020 (1923) (contract language requiring the satisfaction of a debt prior to conveyance of the promisor\u2019s interest in the property, where nothing in the contract disclosed the promisor\u2019s intent to make his estate in the lands security for his debt and obligation, did not create an equitable lien on the property)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"335 Or 209, 213","parenthetical":"\"According to its dictionary definition, a lien' denotes a 'charge upon real or personal property for the satisfaction of some debt or duty ordinarily arising by operation of law' or 'a right in one to control or to hold and retain or enforce a charge against the property of another until some claim of the former is paid or satisfied[.]' \" (quoting Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary 1306 (unabridged ed 1993","sentence":"See Potter v. Schlesser Co., Inc., 335 Or 209, 213, 63 P3d 1172 (2003) (\u201cAccording to its dictionary definition, a lien\u2019 denotes a \u2018charge upon real or personal property for the satisfaction of some debt or duty ordinarily arising by operation of law\u2019 or \u2018a right in one to control or to hold and retain or enforce a charge against the property of another until some claim of the former is paid or satisfied[.]\u2019 \u201d (quoting Webster\u2019s Third New Int\u2019l Dictionary 1306 (unabridged ed 1993) (alteration in Potter))); cf. Western States Finance Co. v. Ruff, 108 Or 442, 215 P 501, on reh\u2019g, 216 P 1020 (1923) (contract language requiring the satisfaction of a debt prior to conveyance of the promisor\u2019s interest in the property, where nothing in the contract disclosed the promisor\u2019s intent to make his estate in the lands security for his debt and obligation, did not create an equitable lien on the property)."},"case_id":4208394,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Instead, the agreement gives plaintiff -- at his discretion -- an affirmative opportunity to purchase defendants' property, at an agreed-upon price, if the loan is not repaid within the required period. In other words, the text of the agreement does not in any way pledge a conveyance of an interest in the land as security for the debt.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"335 Or 209, 213","parenthetical":"\"According to its dictionary definition, a lien' denotes a 'charge upon real or personal property for the satisfaction of some debt or duty ordinarily arising by operation of law' or 'a right in one to control or to hold and retain or enforce a charge against the property of another until some claim of the former is paid or satisfied[.]' \" (quoting Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary 1306 (unabridged ed 1993","sentence":"See Potter v. Schlesser Co., Inc., 335 Or 209, 213, 63 P3d 1172 (2003) (\u201cAccording to its dictionary definition, a lien\u2019 denotes a \u2018charge upon real or personal property for the satisfaction of some debt or duty ordinarily arising by operation of law\u2019 or \u2018a right in one to control or to hold and retain or enforce a charge against the property of another until some claim of the former is paid or satisfied[.]\u2019 \u201d (quoting Webster\u2019s Third New Int\u2019l Dictionary 1306 (unabridged ed 1993) (alteration in Potter))); cf. Western States Finance Co. v. Ruff, 108 Or 442, 215 P 501, on reh\u2019g, 216 P 1020 (1923) (contract language requiring the satisfaction of a debt prior to conveyance of the promisor\u2019s interest in the property, where nothing in the contract disclosed the promisor\u2019s intent to make his estate in the lands security for his debt and obligation, did not create an equitable lien on the property)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"contract language requiring the satisfaction of a debt prior to conveyance of the promisor's interest in the property, where nothing in the contract disclosed the promisor's intent to make his estate in the lands security for his debt and obligation, did not create an equitable lien on the property","sentence":"See Potter v. Schlesser Co., Inc., 335 Or 209, 213, 63 P3d 1172 (2003) (\u201cAccording to its dictionary definition, a lien\u2019 denotes a \u2018charge upon real or personal property for the satisfaction of some debt or duty ordinarily arising by operation of law\u2019 or \u2018a right in one to control or to hold and retain or enforce a charge against the property of another until some claim of the former is paid or satisfied[.]\u2019 \u201d (quoting Webster\u2019s Third New Int\u2019l Dictionary 1306 (unabridged ed 1993) (alteration in Potter))); cf. Western States Finance Co. v. Ruff, 108 Or 442, 215 P 501, on reh\u2019g, 216 P 1020 (1923) (contract language requiring the satisfaction of a debt prior to conveyance of the promisor\u2019s interest in the property, where nothing in the contract disclosed the promisor\u2019s intent to make his estate in the lands security for his debt and obligation, did not create an equitable lien on the property)."},"case_id":4208394,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Our court has yet to analyze the concept of reasonable foreseeability in a FELA action, though we consistently have declined to infer negligence when a plaintiff fails to produce any evidence suggesting that the employer played even the slightest role in bringing about the injury.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"102 F.3d 301, 301","parenthetical":"crew member tripped over his own suitcase in a darkened engine cab","sentence":"McGinn, 102 F.3d at 301 (crew member tripped over his own suitcase in a darkened engine cab); Lisek v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co., 30 F.3d 823, 832-34 (7th Cir.1994) (worker fell and injured his knee while attempting to align the drawbar on a rail car); Deutsch v. Burlington Northern R.R. Co., 983 F.2d 741, 744 (7th Cir.1992) (railroad brakeman slipped on a ladder after adjusting the handbrake on top of a rail car); see also Reardon, 26 F.3d at 53-54 (under Learned Hand\u2019s formula for negligence, an injury is not \u201cforeseeable\u201d if the costs of precautions prohibitively exceed the expected costs of a likely accident)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"26 F.3d 53, 53-54","parenthetical":"under Learned Hand's formula for negligence, an injury is not \"foreseeable\" if the costs of precautions prohibitively exceed the expected costs of a likely accident","sentence":"McGinn, 102 F.3d at 301 (crew member tripped over his own suitcase in a darkened engine cab); Lisek v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co., 30 F.3d 823, 832-34 (7th Cir.1994) (worker fell and injured his knee while attempting to align the drawbar on a rail car); Deutsch v. Burlington Northern R.R. Co., 983 F.2d 741, 744 (7th Cir.1992) (railroad brakeman slipped on a ladder after adjusting the handbrake on top of a rail car); see also Reardon, 26 F.3d at 53-54 (under Learned Hand\u2019s formula for negligence, an injury is not \u201cforeseeable\u201d if the costs of precautions prohibitively exceed the expected costs of a likely accident)."},"case_id":1366599,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Our court has yet to analyze the concept of reasonable foreseeability in a FELA action, though we consistently have declined to infer negligence when a plaintiff fails to produce any evidence suggesting that the employer played even the slightest role in bringing about the injury.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"26 F.3d 53, 53-54","parenthetical":"under Learned Hand's formula for negligence, an injury is not \"foreseeable\" if the costs of precautions prohibitively exceed the expected costs of a likely accident","sentence":"McGinn, 102 F.3d at 301 (crew member tripped over his own suitcase in a darkened engine cab); Lisek v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co., 30 F.3d 823, 832-34 (7th Cir.1994) (worker fell and injured his knee while attempting to align the drawbar on a rail car); Deutsch v. Burlington Northern R.R. Co., 983 F.2d 741, 744 (7th Cir.1992) (railroad brakeman slipped on a ladder after adjusting the handbrake on top of a rail car); see also Reardon, 26 F.3d at 53-54 (under Learned Hand\u2019s formula for negligence, an injury is not \u201cforeseeable\u201d if the costs of precautions prohibitively exceed the expected costs of a likely accident)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"30 F.3d 823, 832-34","parenthetical":"worker fell and injured his knee while attempting to align the drawbar on a rail car","sentence":"McGinn, 102 F.3d at 301 (crew member tripped over his own suitcase in a darkened engine cab); Lisek v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co., 30 F.3d 823, 832-34 (7th Cir.1994) (worker fell and injured his knee while attempting to align the drawbar on a rail car); Deutsch v. Burlington Northern R.R. Co., 983 F.2d 741, 744 (7th Cir.1992) (railroad brakeman slipped on a ladder after adjusting the handbrake on top of a rail car); see also Reardon, 26 F.3d at 53-54 (under Learned Hand\u2019s formula for negligence, an injury is not \u201cforeseeable\u201d if the costs of precautions prohibitively exceed the expected costs of a likely accident)."},"case_id":1366599,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Our court has yet to analyze the concept of reasonable foreseeability in a FELA action, though we consistently have declined to infer negligence when a plaintiff fails to produce any evidence suggesting that the employer played even the slightest role in bringing about the injury.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"983 F.2d 741, 744","parenthetical":"railroad brakeman slipped on a ladder after adjusting the handbrake on top of a rail car","sentence":"McGinn, 102 F.3d at 301 (crew member tripped over his own suitcase in a darkened engine cab); Lisek v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co., 30 F.3d 823, 832-34 (7th Cir.1994) (worker fell and injured his knee while attempting to align the drawbar on a rail car); Deutsch v. Burlington Northern R.R. Co., 983 F.2d 741, 744 (7th Cir.1992) (railroad brakeman slipped on a ladder after adjusting the handbrake on top of a rail car); see also Reardon, 26 F.3d at 53-54 (under Learned Hand\u2019s formula for negligence, an injury is not \u201cforeseeable\u201d if the costs of precautions prohibitively exceed the expected costs of a likely accident)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"26 F.3d 53, 53-54","parenthetical":"under Learned Hand's formula for negligence, an injury is not \"foreseeable\" if the costs of precautions prohibitively exceed the expected costs of a likely accident","sentence":"McGinn, 102 F.3d at 301 (crew member tripped over his own suitcase in a darkened engine cab); Lisek v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co., 30 F.3d 823, 832-34 (7th Cir.1994) (worker fell and injured his knee while attempting to align the drawbar on a rail car); Deutsch v. Burlington Northern R.R. Co., 983 F.2d 741, 744 (7th Cir.1992) (railroad brakeman slipped on a ladder after adjusting the handbrake on top of a rail car); see also Reardon, 26 F.3d at 53-54 (under Learned Hand\u2019s formula for negligence, an injury is not \u201cforeseeable\u201d if the costs of precautions prohibitively exceed the expected costs of a likely accident)."},"case_id":1366599,"label":"a"}
{"context":"It has also shown that it knows how to distinguish between classes of employers and employees based on an express, statutorily defined relationship, or lack thereof, between the relevant employment and the employer's Minnesota business activities. See City of Brainerd v. Brainerd Invs.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"827 N.W.2d 752, 756","parenthetical":"inclusion of language in one statute may demonstrate opposite intent in other statutes wherein legislature could have, but did not, include same language","sentence":"P\u2019ship, 827 N.W.2d 752, 756 (Minn.2013) (inclusion of language in one statute may demonstrate opposite intent in other statutes wherein legislature could have, but did not, include same language); cf. State v. Wenthe, No. A12-0263, 2015 WL 3875366, at *9 (Minn. June 24, 2015) (it is inappropriate to assume that legislature intended scope of statute to be coextensive with other statutes that contain different language)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"2015 WL 3875366, at *9","parenthetical":"it is inappropriate to assume that legislature intended scope of statute to be coextensive with other statutes that contain different language","sentence":"P\u2019ship, 827 N.W.2d 752, 756 (Minn.2013) (inclusion of language in one statute may demonstrate opposite intent in other statutes wherein legislature could have, but did not, include same language); cf. State v. Wenthe, No. A12-0263, 2015 WL 3875366, at *9 (Minn. June 24, 2015) (it is inappropriate to assume that legislature intended scope of statute to be coextensive with other statutes that contain different language)."},"case_id":4269727,"label":"a"}
{"context":"[The Block-burger test] is not a constitutional test in and of itself. Rather, it is simply a means of evaluating legislative intent.\"). As long as the state court has concluded that the legislature intended cumulative punishment, this court is bound by that conclusion.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"467 U.S. 493, 499","parenthetical":"'We accept, as we must, the Ohio Supreme Court's determination that the Ohio legislature did not intend cumulative punishment for the two pairs of crimes involved here.\"","sentence":"Banner, 886 F.2d at 782 (\u201cContrary to [the petitioner\u2019s] assertion, then, we may not use the Blockburger test \u2014 a rule of statutory construction for federal statutes \u2014 to independently evaluate the scope of the Tennessee statute here, the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals and Supreme Court having already held that the legislature intended cumulative punishment.\u201d); see also Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493, 499, 104 S.Ct. 2536, 81 L.Ed.2d 425 (1984) (\u2018We accept, as we must, the Ohio Supreme Court\u2019s determination that the Ohio legislature did not intend cumulative punishment for the two pairs of crimes involved here.\u201d); of."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"886 F.2d 782, 782","parenthetical":"\"Contrary to [the petitioner's] assertion, then, we may not use the Blockburger test -- a rule of statutory construction for federal statutes -- to independently evaluate the scope of the Tennessee statute here, the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals and Supreme Court having already held that the legislature intended cumulative punishment.\"","sentence":"Banner, 886 F.2d at 782 (\u201cContrary to [the petitioner\u2019s] assertion, then, we may not use the Blockburger test \u2014 a rule of statutory construction for federal statutes \u2014 to independently evaluate the scope of the Tennessee statute here, the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals and Supreme Court having already held that the legislature intended cumulative punishment.\u201d); see also Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493, 499, 104 S.Ct. 2536, 81 L.Ed.2d 425 (1984) (\u2018We accept, as we must, the Ohio Supreme Court\u2019s determination that the Ohio legislature did not intend cumulative punishment for the two pairs of crimes involved here.\u201d); of."},"case_id":3592968,"label":"b"}
{"context":"[The Block-burger test] is not a constitutional test in and of itself. Rather, it is simply a means of evaluating legislative intent.\"). As long as the state court has concluded that the legislature intended cumulative punishment, this court is bound by that conclusion.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"'We accept, as we must, the Ohio Supreme Court's determination that the Ohio legislature did not intend cumulative punishment for the two pairs of crimes involved here.\"","sentence":"Banner, 886 F.2d at 782 (\u201cContrary to [the petitioner\u2019s] assertion, then, we may not use the Blockburger test \u2014 a rule of statutory construction for federal statutes \u2014 to independently evaluate the scope of the Tennessee statute here, the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals and Supreme Court having already held that the legislature intended cumulative punishment.\u201d); see also Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493, 499, 104 S.Ct. 2536, 81 L.Ed.2d 425 (1984) (\u2018We accept, as we must, the Ohio Supreme Court\u2019s determination that the Ohio legislature did not intend cumulative punishment for the two pairs of crimes involved here.\u201d); of."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"886 F.2d 782, 782","parenthetical":"\"Contrary to [the petitioner's] assertion, then, we may not use the Blockburger test -- a rule of statutory construction for federal statutes -- to independently evaluate the scope of the Tennessee statute here, the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals and Supreme Court having already held that the legislature intended cumulative punishment.\"","sentence":"Banner, 886 F.2d at 782 (\u201cContrary to [the petitioner\u2019s] assertion, then, we may not use the Blockburger test \u2014 a rule of statutory construction for federal statutes \u2014 to independently evaluate the scope of the Tennessee statute here, the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals and Supreme Court having already held that the legislature intended cumulative punishment.\u201d); see also Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493, 499, 104 S.Ct. 2536, 81 L.Ed.2d 425 (1984) (\u2018We accept, as we must, the Ohio Supreme Court\u2019s determination that the Ohio legislature did not intend cumulative punishment for the two pairs of crimes involved here.\u201d); of."},"case_id":3592968,"label":"b"}
{"context":"[The Block-burger test] is not a constitutional test in and of itself. Rather, it is simply a means of evaluating legislative intent.\"). As long as the state court has concluded that the legislature intended cumulative punishment, this court is bound by that conclusion.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"'We accept, as we must, the Ohio Supreme Court's determination that the Ohio legislature did not intend cumulative punishment for the two pairs of crimes involved here.\"","sentence":"Banner, 886 F.2d at 782 (\u201cContrary to [the petitioner\u2019s] assertion, then, we may not use the Blockburger test \u2014 a rule of statutory construction for federal statutes \u2014 to independently evaluate the scope of the Tennessee statute here, the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals and Supreme Court having already held that the legislature intended cumulative punishment.\u201d); see also Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493, 499, 104 S.Ct. 2536, 81 L.Ed.2d 425 (1984) (\u2018We accept, as we must, the Ohio Supreme Court\u2019s determination that the Ohio legislature did not intend cumulative punishment for the two pairs of crimes involved here.\u201d); of."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"886 F.2d 782, 782","parenthetical":"\"Contrary to [the petitioner's] assertion, then, we may not use the Blockburger test -- a rule of statutory construction for federal statutes -- to independently evaluate the scope of the Tennessee statute here, the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals and Supreme Court having already held that the legislature intended cumulative punishment.\"","sentence":"Banner, 886 F.2d at 782 (\u201cContrary to [the petitioner\u2019s] assertion, then, we may not use the Blockburger test \u2014 a rule of statutory construction for federal statutes \u2014 to independently evaluate the scope of the Tennessee statute here, the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals and Supreme Court having already held that the legislature intended cumulative punishment.\u201d); see also Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493, 499, 104 S.Ct. 2536, 81 L.Ed.2d 425 (1984) (\u2018We accept, as we must, the Ohio Supreme Court\u2019s determination that the Ohio legislature did not intend cumulative punishment for the two pairs of crimes involved here.\u201d); of."},"case_id":3592968,"label":"b"}
{"context":". To the extent that the complaint could be construed as alleging breach-of-warranty and breach-of-contract claims, the Gunns do not assert that the trial court committed any error in entering the summary judgment on those claims; therefore, those claims are considered waived.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"418 So.2d 89, 92","parenthetical":"\"When an appellant fails to argue an issue in its [initial] brief, that issue is waived.\"","sentence":"Boshell v. Keith, 418 So.2d 89, 92 (Ala.1982) (\"When an appellant fails to argue an issue in its [initial] brief, that issue is waived.\u201d). The Gunns do belatedly assert in their reply brief that the trial court erred in entering a summary judgment on any claim based on the Alabama Extended Manufacturer's Liability Doctrine, but we cannot consider that argument."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"''Ordinarily, we do not consider issues raised for the first time in a reply brief.\"","sentence":"See McGough v. G & A, Inc., 999 So.2d 898, 905 n. 3 (Ala.Civ.App.2007) (''Ordinarily, we do not consider issues raised for the first time in a reply brief.\u201d)."},"case_id":7020890,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Furthermore, if damages awards received on account of personal injury were not income, there would be no need for the exclusion laid out in SS 104(a)(2), which exempts from income taxation any damages received on account of personal physical injuries or physical sickness.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"493 F.3d 170, 180","parenthetical":"holding that money received in compensation for emotional injuries is taxable income pursuant to SS 61(a","sentence":"See also Murphy v. I.R.S., 493 F.3d 170, 180 (D.C.Cir.2007) (holding that money received in compensation for emotional injuries is taxable income pursuant to \u00a7 61(a) because the 1996 amendments to \u00a7 104(a)(2) would make little sense if \u00a7 61(a) did not include compensation for personal injuries)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"481 U.S. 368, 376","parenthetical":"rejecting the argument \"that personal injury awards are [generally] not treated as income under the Internal Revenue Code\" and noting that \"in each of these instances [where personal injury awards are excluded from SS 61(a","sentence":"See Luk-hard v. Reed, 481 U.S. 368, 376, 107 S.Ct. 1807, 95 L.Ed.2d 328 (1987) (rejecting the argument \u201cthat personal injury awards are [generally] not treated as income under the Internal Revenue Code\u201d and noting that \u201cin each of these instances [where personal injury awards are excluded from \u00a7 61(a) ] there is an express provision that personal injury awards are not to be treated as income \u2014 which causes them not only to fail to support the proposition that the term \u2018income\u2019 automatically excludes personal injury awards, but to support the opposite proposition that absent express exclusion it embraces them\u201d)."},"case_id":4135963,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Furthermore, if damages awards received on account of personal injury were not income, there would be no need for the exclusion laid out in SS 104(a)(2), which exempts from income taxation any damages received on account of personal physical injuries or physical sickness.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"493 F.3d 170, 180","parenthetical":"holding that money received in compensation for emotional injuries is taxable income pursuant to SS 61(a","sentence":"See also Murphy v. I.R.S., 493 F.3d 170, 180 (D.C.Cir.2007) (holding that money received in compensation for emotional injuries is taxable income pursuant to \u00a7 61(a) because the 1996 amendments to \u00a7 104(a)(2) would make little sense if \u00a7 61(a) did not include compensation for personal injuries)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"rejecting the argument \"that personal injury awards are [generally] not treated as income under the Internal Revenue Code\" and noting that \"in each of these instances [where personal injury awards are excluded from SS 61(a","sentence":"See Luk-hard v. Reed, 481 U.S. 368, 376, 107 S.Ct. 1807, 95 L.Ed.2d 328 (1987) (rejecting the argument \u201cthat personal injury awards are [generally] not treated as income under the Internal Revenue Code\u201d and noting that \u201cin each of these instances [where personal injury awards are excluded from \u00a7 61(a) ] there is an express provision that personal injury awards are not to be treated as income \u2014 which causes them not only to fail to support the proposition that the term \u2018income\u2019 automatically excludes personal injury awards, but to support the opposite proposition that absent express exclusion it embraces them\u201d)."},"case_id":4135963,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Furthermore, if damages awards received on account of personal injury were not income, there would be no need for the exclusion laid out in SS 104(a)(2), which exempts from income taxation any damages received on account of personal physical injuries or physical sickness.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"493 F.3d 170, 180","parenthetical":"holding that money received in compensation for emotional injuries is taxable income pursuant to SS 61(a","sentence":"See also Murphy v. I.R.S., 493 F.3d 170, 180 (D.C.Cir.2007) (holding that money received in compensation for emotional injuries is taxable income pursuant to \u00a7 61(a) because the 1996 amendments to \u00a7 104(a)(2) would make little sense if \u00a7 61(a) did not include compensation for personal injuries)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"rejecting the argument \"that personal injury awards are [generally] not treated as income under the Internal Revenue Code\" and noting that \"in each of these instances [where personal injury awards are excluded from SS 61(a","sentence":"See Luk-hard v. Reed, 481 U.S. 368, 376, 107 S.Ct. 1807, 95 L.Ed.2d 328 (1987) (rejecting the argument \u201cthat personal injury awards are [generally] not treated as income under the Internal Revenue Code\u201d and noting that \u201cin each of these instances [where personal injury awards are excluded from \u00a7 61(a) ] there is an express provision that personal injury awards are not to be treated as income \u2014 which causes them not only to fail to support the proposition that the term \u2018income\u2019 automatically excludes personal injury awards, but to support the opposite proposition that absent express exclusion it embraces them\u201d)."},"case_id":4135963,"label":"b"}
{"context":"An excessive-force claim shares with an unreasonable-seizure claim the requirement that a Fourth Amendment seizure occurred. But unlike the former count, in which Plaintiff must .show that the seizure was itself unjustified, here she must prove that the force used to carry out that seizure was objectively unreasonable.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"550 U.S. 372, 381","parenthetical":"In deeiding whether force used to carry out a seizure was excessive, the Court must determine ''whether [the defendant's] actions were objectively reasonable.\"","sentence":"See Graham, 490 U.S. at 395, 109 S.Ct. 1865 (\u201c[A]ll claims that law enforcement officers have used excessive force \u2014 deadly or nothin the course of an arrest, investigatory stop, or other \u2018seizure\u2019 of a free citizen should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its \u2018reasonableness\u2019 standard ____\u201d); see also Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 381, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007) (In deeiding whether force used to carry out a seizure was excessive, the Court must determine \u2018\u2018whether [the defendant\u2019s] actions were objectively reasonable.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"490 U.S. 395, 395","parenthetical":"\"[A]ll claims that law enforcement officers have used excessive force -- deadly or nothin the course of an arrest, investigatory stop, or other 'seizure' of a free citizen should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its 'reasonableness' standard ____\"","sentence":"See Graham, 490 U.S. at 395, 109 S.Ct. 1865 (\u201c[A]ll claims that law enforcement officers have used excessive force \u2014 deadly or nothin the course of an arrest, investigatory stop, or other \u2018seizure\u2019 of a free citizen should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its \u2018reasonableness\u2019 standard ____\u201d); see also Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 381, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007) (In deeiding whether force used to carry out a seizure was excessive, the Court must determine \u2018\u2018whether [the defendant\u2019s] actions were objectively reasonable.\u201d)."},"case_id":5763576,"label":"b"}
{"context":"An excessive-force claim shares with an unreasonable-seizure claim the requirement that a Fourth Amendment seizure occurred. But unlike the former count, in which Plaintiff must .show that the seizure was itself unjustified, here she must prove that the force used to carry out that seizure was objectively unreasonable.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"490 U.S. 395, 395","parenthetical":"\"[A]ll claims that law enforcement officers have used excessive force -- deadly or nothin the course of an arrest, investigatory stop, or other 'seizure' of a free citizen should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its 'reasonableness' standard ____\"","sentence":"See Graham, 490 U.S. at 395, 109 S.Ct. 1865 (\u201c[A]ll claims that law enforcement officers have used excessive force \u2014 deadly or nothin the course of an arrest, investigatory stop, or other \u2018seizure\u2019 of a free citizen should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its \u2018reasonableness\u2019 standard ____\u201d); see also Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 381, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007) (In deeiding whether force used to carry out a seizure was excessive, the Court must determine \u2018\u2018whether [the defendant\u2019s] actions were objectively reasonable.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"In deeiding whether force used to carry out a seizure was excessive, the Court must determine ''whether [the defendant's] actions were objectively reasonable.\"","sentence":"See Graham, 490 U.S. at 395, 109 S.Ct. 1865 (\u201c[A]ll claims that law enforcement officers have used excessive force \u2014 deadly or nothin the course of an arrest, investigatory stop, or other \u2018seizure\u2019 of a free citizen should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its \u2018reasonableness\u2019 standard ____\u201d); see also Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 381, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007) (In deeiding whether force used to carry out a seizure was excessive, the Court must determine \u2018\u2018whether [the defendant\u2019s] actions were objectively reasonable.\u201d)."},"case_id":5763576,"label":"a"}
{"context":"An excessive-force claim shares with an unreasonable-seizure claim the requirement that a Fourth Amendment seizure occurred. But unlike the former count, in which Plaintiff must .show that the seizure was itself unjustified, here she must prove that the force used to carry out that seizure was objectively unreasonable.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"490 U.S. 395, 395","parenthetical":"\"[A]ll claims that law enforcement officers have used excessive force -- deadly or nothin the course of an arrest, investigatory stop, or other 'seizure' of a free citizen should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its 'reasonableness' standard ____\"","sentence":"See Graham, 490 U.S. at 395, 109 S.Ct. 1865 (\u201c[A]ll claims that law enforcement officers have used excessive force \u2014 deadly or nothin the course of an arrest, investigatory stop, or other \u2018seizure\u2019 of a free citizen should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its \u2018reasonableness\u2019 standard ____\u201d); see also Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 381, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007) (In deeiding whether force used to carry out a seizure was excessive, the Court must determine \u2018\u2018whether [the defendant\u2019s] actions were objectively reasonable.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"In deeiding whether force used to carry out a seizure was excessive, the Court must determine ''whether [the defendant's] actions were objectively reasonable.\"","sentence":"See Graham, 490 U.S. at 395, 109 S.Ct. 1865 (\u201c[A]ll claims that law enforcement officers have used excessive force \u2014 deadly or nothin the course of an arrest, investigatory stop, or other \u2018seizure\u2019 of a free citizen should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its \u2018reasonableness\u2019 standard ____\u201d); see also Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 381, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007) (In deeiding whether force used to carry out a seizure was excessive, the Court must determine \u2018\u2018whether [the defendant\u2019s] actions were objectively reasonable.\u201d)."},"case_id":5763576,"label":"a"}
{"context":"An excessive-force claim shares with an unreasonable-seizure claim the requirement that a Fourth Amendment seizure occurred. But unlike the former count, in which Plaintiff must .show that the seizure was itself unjustified, here she must prove that the force used to carry out that seizure was objectively unreasonable.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"550 U.S. 372, 381","parenthetical":"In deeiding whether force used to carry out a seizure was excessive, the Court must determine ''whether [the defendant's] actions were objectively reasonable.\"","sentence":"See Graham, 490 U.S. at 395, 109 S.Ct. 1865 (\u201c[A]ll claims that law enforcement officers have used excessive force \u2014 deadly or nothin the course of an arrest, investigatory stop, or other \u2018seizure\u2019 of a free citizen should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its \u2018reasonableness\u2019 standard ____\u201d); see also Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 381, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007) (In deeiding whether force used to carry out a seizure was excessive, the Court must determine \u2018\u2018whether [the defendant\u2019s] actions were objectively reasonable.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[A]ll claims that law enforcement officers have used excessive force -- deadly or nothin the course of an arrest, investigatory stop, or other 'seizure' of a free citizen should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its 'reasonableness' standard ____\"","sentence":"See Graham, 490 U.S. at 395, 109 S.Ct. 1865 (\u201c[A]ll claims that law enforcement officers have used excessive force \u2014 deadly or nothin the course of an arrest, investigatory stop, or other \u2018seizure\u2019 of a free citizen should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its \u2018reasonableness\u2019 standard ____\u201d); see also Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 381, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007) (In deeiding whether force used to carry out a seizure was excessive, the Court must determine \u2018\u2018whether [the defendant\u2019s] actions were objectively reasonable.\u201d)."},"case_id":5763576,"label":"b"}
{"context":"An excessive-force claim shares with an unreasonable-seizure claim the requirement that a Fourth Amendment seizure occurred. But unlike the former count, in which Plaintiff must .show that the seizure was itself unjustified, here she must prove that the force used to carry out that seizure was objectively unreasonable.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"In deeiding whether force used to carry out a seizure was excessive, the Court must determine ''whether [the defendant's] actions were objectively reasonable.\"","sentence":"See Graham, 490 U.S. at 395, 109 S.Ct. 1865 (\u201c[A]ll claims that law enforcement officers have used excessive force \u2014 deadly or nothin the course of an arrest, investigatory stop, or other \u2018seizure\u2019 of a free citizen should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its \u2018reasonableness\u2019 standard ____\u201d); see also Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 381, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007) (In deeiding whether force used to carry out a seizure was excessive, the Court must determine \u2018\u2018whether [the defendant\u2019s] actions were objectively reasonable.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[A]ll claims that law enforcement officers have used excessive force -- deadly or nothin the course of an arrest, investigatory stop, or other 'seizure' of a free citizen should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its 'reasonableness' standard ____\"","sentence":"See Graham, 490 U.S. at 395, 109 S.Ct. 1865 (\u201c[A]ll claims that law enforcement officers have used excessive force \u2014 deadly or nothin the course of an arrest, investigatory stop, or other \u2018seizure\u2019 of a free citizen should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its \u2018reasonableness\u2019 standard ____\u201d); see also Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 381, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007) (In deeiding whether force used to carry out a seizure was excessive, the Court must determine \u2018\u2018whether [the defendant\u2019s] actions were objectively reasonable.\u201d)."},"case_id":5763576,"label":"b"}
{"context":"An excessive-force claim shares with an unreasonable-seizure claim the requirement that a Fourth Amendment seizure occurred. But unlike the former count, in which Plaintiff must .show that the seizure was itself unjustified, here she must prove that the force used to carry out that seizure was objectively unreasonable.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[A]ll claims that law enforcement officers have used excessive force -- deadly or nothin the course of an arrest, investigatory stop, or other 'seizure' of a free citizen should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its 'reasonableness' standard ____\"","sentence":"See Graham, 490 U.S. at 395, 109 S.Ct. 1865 (\u201c[A]ll claims that law enforcement officers have used excessive force \u2014 deadly or nothin the course of an arrest, investigatory stop, or other \u2018seizure\u2019 of a free citizen should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its \u2018reasonableness\u2019 standard ____\u201d); see also Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 381, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007) (In deeiding whether force used to carry out a seizure was excessive, the Court must determine \u2018\u2018whether [the defendant\u2019s] actions were objectively reasonable.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"In deeiding whether force used to carry out a seizure was excessive, the Court must determine ''whether [the defendant's] actions were objectively reasonable.\"","sentence":"See Graham, 490 U.S. at 395, 109 S.Ct. 1865 (\u201c[A]ll claims that law enforcement officers have used excessive force \u2014 deadly or nothin the course of an arrest, investigatory stop, or other \u2018seizure\u2019 of a free citizen should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its \u2018reasonableness\u2019 standard ____\u201d); see also Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 381, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007) (In deeiding whether force used to carry out a seizure was excessive, the Court must determine \u2018\u2018whether [the defendant\u2019s] actions were objectively reasonable.\u201d)."},"case_id":5763576,"label":"a"}
{"context":"An investor in a commodities account who establishes that he or she relied solely on the investment advice of a promoter satisfies the \"solely from the efforts of others\" requirement. In addition, courts have held that schemes similar to appellant's constituted a sale of \"investment contracts\" and thus securities.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"497 F.2d 485, 485","parenthetical":"holding schemes in which promoters retain essential managerial control over essential managerial functions of enterprise and where investors' realization of profits is inextricably tied to success of a promotional pyramid scheme constituted security","sentence":"See Koscot, 497 F.2d at 485 (holding schemes in which promoters retain essential managerial control over essential managerial functions of enterprise and where investors\u2019 realization of profits is inextricably tied to success of a promotional pyramid scheme constituted security); see also Securities & Exchange Comm\u2019n v. Unique Financial Concepts, Inc., 196 F.3d 1195, 1201 (11th Cir.1999) (holding investment program tied to success of appellant\u2019s \u201cPonzi\u201d scheme was investment contract); Securities & Exchange Comm\u2019n v. Infinity Group Co., 212 F.3d 180, 189 (3rd Cir.2000) (holding defendant sold investment contracts when it substituted new investors\u2019 money for real investment return on old investors\u2019 funds)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"196 F.3d 1195, 1201","parenthetical":"holding investment program tied to success of appellant's \"Ponzi\" scheme was investment contract","sentence":"See Koscot, 497 F.2d at 485 (holding schemes in which promoters retain essential managerial control over essential managerial functions of enterprise and where investors\u2019 realization of profits is inextricably tied to success of a promotional pyramid scheme constituted security); see also Securities & Exchange Comm\u2019n v. Unique Financial Concepts, Inc., 196 F.3d 1195, 1201 (11th Cir.1999) (holding investment program tied to success of appellant\u2019s \u201cPonzi\u201d scheme was investment contract); Securities & Exchange Comm\u2019n v. Infinity Group Co., 212 F.3d 180, 189 (3rd Cir.2000) (holding defendant sold investment contracts when it substituted new investors\u2019 money for real investment return on old investors\u2019 funds)."},"case_id":9332823,"label":"a"}
{"context":"An investor in a commodities account who establishes that he or she relied solely on the investment advice of a promoter satisfies the \"solely from the efforts of others\" requirement. In addition, courts have held that schemes similar to appellant's constituted a sale of \"investment contracts\" and thus securities.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"212 F.3d 180, 189","parenthetical":"holding defendant sold investment contracts when it substituted new investors' money for real investment return on old investors' funds","sentence":"See Koscot, 497 F.2d at 485 (holding schemes in which promoters retain essential managerial control over essential managerial functions of enterprise and where investors\u2019 realization of profits is inextricably tied to success of a promotional pyramid scheme constituted security); see also Securities & Exchange Comm\u2019n v. Unique Financial Concepts, Inc., 196 F.3d 1195, 1201 (11th Cir.1999) (holding investment program tied to success of appellant\u2019s \u201cPonzi\u201d scheme was investment contract); Securities & Exchange Comm\u2019n v. Infinity Group Co., 212 F.3d 180, 189 (3rd Cir.2000) (holding defendant sold investment contracts when it substituted new investors\u2019 money for real investment return on old investors\u2019 funds)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"497 F.2d 485, 485","parenthetical":"holding schemes in which promoters retain essential managerial control over essential managerial functions of enterprise and where investors' realization of profits is inextricably tied to success of a promotional pyramid scheme constituted security","sentence":"See Koscot, 497 F.2d at 485 (holding schemes in which promoters retain essential managerial control over essential managerial functions of enterprise and where investors\u2019 realization of profits is inextricably tied to success of a promotional pyramid scheme constituted security); see also Securities & Exchange Comm\u2019n v. Unique Financial Concepts, Inc., 196 F.3d 1195, 1201 (11th Cir.1999) (holding investment program tied to success of appellant\u2019s \u201cPonzi\u201d scheme was investment contract); Securities & Exchange Comm\u2019n v. Infinity Group Co., 212 F.3d 180, 189 (3rd Cir.2000) (holding defendant sold investment contracts when it substituted new investors\u2019 money for real investment return on old investors\u2019 funds)."},"case_id":9332823,"label":"b"}
{"context":"We further note that there is no civil remedy for perjury.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"200 Conn. 243, 245","parenthetical":"\"[i]t has long been established that there is an absolute privilege for statements made in judicial proceedings\"","sentence":"See DeLaurentis v. New Haven, 220 Conn. 225, 264, 597 A.2d 807 (1991) (\u201c[w]hile no civil remedies can guard against lies, the oath and the fear of being charged with perjury are adequate to warrant an absolute privilege for a witness\u2019 statements\u201d); see also Petyan v. Ellis, 200 Conn. 243, 245, 510 A.2d 1337 (1986) (\u201c[i]t has long been established that there is an absolute privilege for statements made in judicial proceedings\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"220 Conn. 225, 264","parenthetical":"\"[w]hile no civil remedies can guard against lies, the oath and the fear of being charged with perjury are adequate to warrant an absolute privilege for a witness' statements\"","sentence":"See DeLaurentis v. New Haven, 220 Conn. 225, 264, 597 A.2d 807 (1991) (\u201c[w]hile no civil remedies can guard against lies, the oath and the fear of being charged with perjury are adequate to warrant an absolute privilege for a witness\u2019 statements\u201d); see also Petyan v. Ellis, 200 Conn. 243, 245, 510 A.2d 1337 (1986) (\u201c[i]t has long been established that there is an absolute privilege for statements made in judicial proceedings\u201d)."},"case_id":4186115,"label":"b"}
{"context":"We further note that there is no civil remedy for perjury.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"220 Conn. 225, 264","parenthetical":"\"[w]hile no civil remedies can guard against lies, the oath and the fear of being charged with perjury are adequate to warrant an absolute privilege for a witness' statements\"","sentence":"See DeLaurentis v. New Haven, 220 Conn. 225, 264, 597 A.2d 807 (1991) (\u201c[w]hile no civil remedies can guard against lies, the oath and the fear of being charged with perjury are adequate to warrant an absolute privilege for a witness\u2019 statements\u201d); see also Petyan v. Ellis, 200 Conn. 243, 245, 510 A.2d 1337 (1986) (\u201c[i]t has long been established that there is an absolute privilege for statements made in judicial proceedings\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[i]t has long been established that there is an absolute privilege for statements made in judicial proceedings\"","sentence":"See DeLaurentis v. New Haven, 220 Conn. 225, 264, 597 A.2d 807 (1991) (\u201c[w]hile no civil remedies can guard against lies, the oath and the fear of being charged with perjury are adequate to warrant an absolute privilege for a witness\u2019 statements\u201d); see also Petyan v. Ellis, 200 Conn. 243, 245, 510 A.2d 1337 (1986) (\u201c[i]t has long been established that there is an absolute privilege for statements made in judicial proceedings\u201d)."},"case_id":4186115,"label":"a"}
{"context":"We further note that there is no civil remedy for perjury.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"200 Conn. 243, 245","parenthetical":"\"[i]t has long been established that there is an absolute privilege for statements made in judicial proceedings\"","sentence":"See DeLaurentis v. New Haven, 220 Conn. 225, 264, 597 A.2d 807 (1991) (\u201c[w]hile no civil remedies can guard against lies, the oath and the fear of being charged with perjury are adequate to warrant an absolute privilege for a witness\u2019 statements\u201d); see also Petyan v. Ellis, 200 Conn. 243, 245, 510 A.2d 1337 (1986) (\u201c[i]t has long been established that there is an absolute privilege for statements made in judicial proceedings\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[w]hile no civil remedies can guard against lies, the oath and the fear of being charged with perjury are adequate to warrant an absolute privilege for a witness' statements\"","sentence":"See DeLaurentis v. New Haven, 220 Conn. 225, 264, 597 A.2d 807 (1991) (\u201c[w]hile no civil remedies can guard against lies, the oath and the fear of being charged with perjury are adequate to warrant an absolute privilege for a witness\u2019 statements\u201d); see also Petyan v. Ellis, 200 Conn. 243, 245, 510 A.2d 1337 (1986) (\u201c[i]t has long been established that there is an absolute privilege for statements made in judicial proceedings\u201d)."},"case_id":4186115,"label":"b"}
{"context":"We further note that there is no civil remedy for perjury.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[w]hile no civil remedies can guard against lies, the oath and the fear of being charged with perjury are adequate to warrant an absolute privilege for a witness' statements\"","sentence":"See DeLaurentis v. New Haven, 220 Conn. 225, 264, 597 A.2d 807 (1991) (\u201c[w]hile no civil remedies can guard against lies, the oath and the fear of being charged with perjury are adequate to warrant an absolute privilege for a witness\u2019 statements\u201d); see also Petyan v. Ellis, 200 Conn. 243, 245, 510 A.2d 1337 (1986) (\u201c[i]t has long been established that there is an absolute privilege for statements made in judicial proceedings\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[i]t has long been established that there is an absolute privilege for statements made in judicial proceedings\"","sentence":"See DeLaurentis v. New Haven, 220 Conn. 225, 264, 597 A.2d 807 (1991) (\u201c[w]hile no civil remedies can guard against lies, the oath and the fear of being charged with perjury are adequate to warrant an absolute privilege for a witness\u2019 statements\u201d); see also Petyan v. Ellis, 200 Conn. 243, 245, 510 A.2d 1337 (1986) (\u201c[i]t has long been established that there is an absolute privilege for statements made in judicial proceedings\u201d)."},"case_id":4186115,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Our goal when interpreting a contractual provision is to determine the inten tion of the parties. \"The intention of the parties is to be gathered from the whole instrument, and if this cannot be discovered, but there exists an ambiguity, then such construction must prevail as is most strong against the covenanter [sic], for he [or she] might have expressed himself [or herself] more clearly.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"35 Haw. 402, 416","parenthetical":"\"Since one who speaks or writes, can by exactness of expression more easily prevent mistakes in meaning, than one with whom he [or she] is dealing, doubts arising from ambiguity of language are resolved in favor of the latter.\"","sentence":"Coney v. Dowsett, 3 Haw. 685, 686 (1876) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see Gushiken v. Shell Oil Co., 35 Haw. 402, 416 (1940) (\u201cSince one who speaks or writes, can by exactness of expression more easily prevent mistakes in meaning, than one with whom he [or she] is dealing, doubts arising from ambiguity of language are resolved in favor of the latter.\u201d) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Brazelton v. Jackson Drug Co., Inc., 796 P.2d 808, 810 (Wyo.1990) (any doubts concerning meaning of lease are resolved against party drafting it)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"796 P.2d 808, 810","parenthetical":"any doubts concerning meaning of lease are resolved against party drafting it","sentence":"Coney v. Dowsett, 3 Haw. 685, 686 (1876) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see Gushiken v. Shell Oil Co., 35 Haw. 402, 416 (1940) (\u201cSince one who speaks or writes, can by exactness of expression more easily prevent mistakes in meaning, than one with whom he [or she] is dealing, doubts arising from ambiguity of language are resolved in favor of the latter.\u201d) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Brazelton v. Jackson Drug Co., Inc., 796 P.2d 808, 810 (Wyo.1990) (any doubts concerning meaning of lease are resolved against party drafting it)."},"case_id":12267080,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Thus, Harline has failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact that Vlahos proximately caused the denial of Harline's bankruptcy discharge. Harline's sole claim in these proceedings is that Vlahos' initial failure to list assets that Harline disclosed to the firm caused Harline's denial of discharge. However, \"[d]emonstrating material issues of fact with respect to defendants' negligence is not sufficient to preclude summary judgment if there is no evidence that establishes a direct causal connection between that alleged negligence and the injury.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that bankruptcy court ruling that debtor's first attorney did not commit malpractice by failing to inform debtor of deadline precluded same claim in state court against different attorneys","sentence":"See Lane v. Sullivan, 900 F.2d 1247, 1250-51 & n. 5 (8th Cir.) (holding that earlier judgment that plaintiffs understood a stock transfer precluded malpractice claim against attorney for misrepresenting or failing to represent true nature of transfer), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 847, 111 S.Ct. 134, 112 L.Ed.2d 101 (1990); Falconer v. Meehan, 804 F.2d 72, 75-76 (7th Cir.1986) (bankruptcy court finding that attorney advised client of contents of dissolution agreement precluded relitigation of issue in malpractice action); see also Standage v. Jaburg & Wilk, P.C., 177 Ariz. 221, 866 P.2d 889, 895-96 (Ct.App.1993) (holding that bankruptcy court ruling that debtor\u2019s first attorney did not commit malpractice by failing to inform debtor of deadline precluded same claim in state court against different attorneys)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that earlier judgment that plaintiffs understood a stock transfer precluded malpractice claim against attorney for misrepresenting or failing to represent true nature of transfer","sentence":"See Lane v. Sullivan, 900 F.2d 1247, 1250-51 & n. 5 (8th Cir.) (holding that earlier judgment that plaintiffs understood a stock transfer precluded malpractice claim against attorney for misrepresenting or failing to represent true nature of transfer), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 847, 111 S.Ct. 134, 112 L.Ed.2d 101 (1990); Falconer v. Meehan, 804 F.2d 72, 75-76 (7th Cir.1986) (bankruptcy court finding that attorney advised client of contents of dissolution agreement precluded relitigation of issue in malpractice action); see also Standage v. Jaburg & Wilk, P.C., 177 Ariz. 221, 866 P.2d 889, 895-96 (Ct.App.1993) (holding that bankruptcy court ruling that debtor\u2019s first attorney did not commit malpractice by failing to inform debtor of deadline precluded same claim in state court against different attorneys)."},"case_id":10336874,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Thus, Harline has failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact that Vlahos proximately caused the denial of Harline's bankruptcy discharge. Harline's sole claim in these proceedings is that Vlahos' initial failure to list assets that Harline disclosed to the firm caused Harline's denial of discharge. However, \"[d]emonstrating material issues of fact with respect to defendants' negligence is not sufficient to preclude summary judgment if there is no evidence that establishes a direct causal connection between that alleged negligence and the injury.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that earlier judgment that plaintiffs understood a stock transfer precluded malpractice claim against attorney for misrepresenting or failing to represent true nature of transfer","sentence":"See Lane v. Sullivan, 900 F.2d 1247, 1250-51 & n. 5 (8th Cir.) (holding that earlier judgment that plaintiffs understood a stock transfer precluded malpractice claim against attorney for misrepresenting or failing to represent true nature of transfer), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 847, 111 S.Ct. 134, 112 L.Ed.2d 101 (1990); Falconer v. Meehan, 804 F.2d 72, 75-76 (7th Cir.1986) (bankruptcy court finding that attorney advised client of contents of dissolution agreement precluded relitigation of issue in malpractice action); see also Standage v. Jaburg & Wilk, P.C., 177 Ariz. 221, 866 P.2d 889, 895-96 (Ct.App.1993) (holding that bankruptcy court ruling that debtor\u2019s first attorney did not commit malpractice by failing to inform debtor of deadline precluded same claim in state court against different attorneys)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"866 P.2d 889, 895-96","parenthetical":"holding that bankruptcy court ruling that debtor's first attorney did not commit malpractice by failing to inform debtor of deadline precluded same claim in state court against different attorneys","sentence":"See Lane v. Sullivan, 900 F.2d 1247, 1250-51 & n. 5 (8th Cir.) (holding that earlier judgment that plaintiffs understood a stock transfer precluded malpractice claim against attorney for misrepresenting or failing to represent true nature of transfer), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 847, 111 S.Ct. 134, 112 L.Ed.2d 101 (1990); Falconer v. Meehan, 804 F.2d 72, 75-76 (7th Cir.1986) (bankruptcy court finding that attorney advised client of contents of dissolution agreement precluded relitigation of issue in malpractice action); see also Standage v. Jaburg & Wilk, P.C., 177 Ariz. 221, 866 P.2d 889, 895-96 (Ct.App.1993) (holding that bankruptcy court ruling that debtor\u2019s first attorney did not commit malpractice by failing to inform debtor of deadline precluded same claim in state court against different attorneys)."},"case_id":10336874,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Thus, Harline has failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact that Vlahos proximately caused the denial of Harline's bankruptcy discharge. Harline's sole claim in these proceedings is that Vlahos' initial failure to list assets that Harline disclosed to the firm caused Harline's denial of discharge. However, \"[d]emonstrating material issues of fact with respect to defendants' negligence is not sufficient to preclude summary judgment if there is no evidence that establishes a direct causal connection between that alleged negligence and the injury.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that bankruptcy court ruling that debtor's first attorney did not commit malpractice by failing to inform debtor of deadline precluded same claim in state court against different attorneys","sentence":"See Lane v. Sullivan, 900 F.2d 1247, 1250-51 & n. 5 (8th Cir.) (holding that earlier judgment that plaintiffs understood a stock transfer precluded malpractice claim against attorney for misrepresenting or failing to represent true nature of transfer), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 847, 111 S.Ct. 134, 112 L.Ed.2d 101 (1990); Falconer v. Meehan, 804 F.2d 72, 75-76 (7th Cir.1986) (bankruptcy court finding that attorney advised client of contents of dissolution agreement precluded relitigation of issue in malpractice action); see also Standage v. Jaburg & Wilk, P.C., 177 Ariz. 221, 866 P.2d 889, 895-96 (Ct.App.1993) (holding that bankruptcy court ruling that debtor\u2019s first attorney did not commit malpractice by failing to inform debtor of deadline precluded same claim in state court against different attorneys)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that earlier judgment that plaintiffs understood a stock transfer precluded malpractice claim against attorney for misrepresenting or failing to represent true nature of transfer","sentence":"See Lane v. Sullivan, 900 F.2d 1247, 1250-51 & n. 5 (8th Cir.) (holding that earlier judgment that plaintiffs understood a stock transfer precluded malpractice claim against attorney for misrepresenting or failing to represent true nature of transfer), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 847, 111 S.Ct. 134, 112 L.Ed.2d 101 (1990); Falconer v. Meehan, 804 F.2d 72, 75-76 (7th Cir.1986) (bankruptcy court finding that attorney advised client of contents of dissolution agreement precluded relitigation of issue in malpractice action); see also Standage v. Jaburg & Wilk, P.C., 177 Ariz. 221, 866 P.2d 889, 895-96 (Ct.App.1993) (holding that bankruptcy court ruling that debtor\u2019s first attorney did not commit malpractice by failing to inform debtor of deadline precluded same claim in state court against different attorneys)."},"case_id":10336874,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Thus, Harline has failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact that Vlahos proximately caused the denial of Harline's bankruptcy discharge. Harline's sole claim in these proceedings is that Vlahos' initial failure to list assets that Harline disclosed to the firm caused Harline's denial of discharge. However, \"[d]emonstrating material issues of fact with respect to defendants' negligence is not sufficient to preclude summary judgment if there is no evidence that establishes a direct causal connection between that alleged negligence and the injury.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that earlier judgment that plaintiffs understood a stock transfer precluded malpractice claim against attorney for misrepresenting or failing to represent true nature of transfer","sentence":"See Lane v. Sullivan, 900 F.2d 1247, 1250-51 & n. 5 (8th Cir.) (holding that earlier judgment that plaintiffs understood a stock transfer precluded malpractice claim against attorney for misrepresenting or failing to represent true nature of transfer), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 847, 111 S.Ct. 134, 112 L.Ed.2d 101 (1990); Falconer v. Meehan, 804 F.2d 72, 75-76 (7th Cir.1986) (bankruptcy court finding that attorney advised client of contents of dissolution agreement precluded relitigation of issue in malpractice action); see also Standage v. Jaburg & Wilk, P.C., 177 Ariz. 221, 866 P.2d 889, 895-96 (Ct.App.1993) (holding that bankruptcy court ruling that debtor\u2019s first attorney did not commit malpractice by failing to inform debtor of deadline precluded same claim in state court against different attorneys)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"866 P.2d 889, 895-96","parenthetical":"holding that bankruptcy court ruling that debtor's first attorney did not commit malpractice by failing to inform debtor of deadline precluded same claim in state court against different attorneys","sentence":"See Lane v. Sullivan, 900 F.2d 1247, 1250-51 & n. 5 (8th Cir.) (holding that earlier judgment that plaintiffs understood a stock transfer precluded malpractice claim against attorney for misrepresenting or failing to represent true nature of transfer), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 847, 111 S.Ct. 134, 112 L.Ed.2d 101 (1990); Falconer v. Meehan, 804 F.2d 72, 75-76 (7th Cir.1986) (bankruptcy court finding that attorney advised client of contents of dissolution agreement precluded relitigation of issue in malpractice action); see also Standage v. Jaburg & Wilk, P.C., 177 Ariz. 221, 866 P.2d 889, 895-96 (Ct.App.1993) (holding that bankruptcy court ruling that debtor\u2019s first attorney did not commit malpractice by failing to inform debtor of deadline precluded same claim in state court against different attorneys)."},"case_id":10336874,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Thus, Harline has failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact that Vlahos proximately caused the denial of Harline's bankruptcy discharge. Harline's sole claim in these proceedings is that Vlahos' initial failure to list assets that Harline disclosed to the firm caused Harline's denial of discharge. However, \"[d]emonstrating material issues of fact with respect to defendants' negligence is not sufficient to preclude summary judgment if there is no evidence that establishes a direct causal connection between that alleged negligence and the injury.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that bankruptcy court ruling that debtor's first attorney did not commit malpractice by failing to inform debtor of deadline precluded same claim in state court against different attorneys","sentence":"See Lane v. Sullivan, 900 F.2d 1247, 1250-51 & n. 5 (8th Cir.) (holding that earlier judgment that plaintiffs understood a stock transfer precluded malpractice claim against attorney for misrepresenting or failing to represent true nature of transfer), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 847, 111 S.Ct. 134, 112 L.Ed.2d 101 (1990); Falconer v. Meehan, 804 F.2d 72, 75-76 (7th Cir.1986) (bankruptcy court finding that attorney advised client of contents of dissolution agreement precluded relitigation of issue in malpractice action); see also Standage v. Jaburg & Wilk, P.C., 177 Ariz. 221, 866 P.2d 889, 895-96 (Ct.App.1993) (holding that bankruptcy court ruling that debtor\u2019s first attorney did not commit malpractice by failing to inform debtor of deadline precluded same claim in state court against different attorneys)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that earlier judgment that plaintiffs understood a stock transfer precluded malpractice claim against attorney for misrepresenting or failing to represent true nature of transfer","sentence":"See Lane v. Sullivan, 900 F.2d 1247, 1250-51 & n. 5 (8th Cir.) (holding that earlier judgment that plaintiffs understood a stock transfer precluded malpractice claim against attorney for misrepresenting or failing to represent true nature of transfer), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 847, 111 S.Ct. 134, 112 L.Ed.2d 101 (1990); Falconer v. Meehan, 804 F.2d 72, 75-76 (7th Cir.1986) (bankruptcy court finding that attorney advised client of contents of dissolution agreement precluded relitigation of issue in malpractice action); see also Standage v. Jaburg & Wilk, P.C., 177 Ariz. 221, 866 P.2d 889, 895-96 (Ct.App.1993) (holding that bankruptcy court ruling that debtor\u2019s first attorney did not commit malpractice by failing to inform debtor of deadline precluded same claim in state court against different attorneys)."},"case_id":10336874,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Thus, Harline has failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact that Vlahos proximately caused the denial of Harline's bankruptcy discharge. Harline's sole claim in these proceedings is that Vlahos' initial failure to list assets that Harline disclosed to the firm caused Harline's denial of discharge. However, \"[d]emonstrating material issues of fact with respect to defendants' negligence is not sufficient to preclude summary judgment if there is no evidence that establishes a direct causal connection between that alleged negligence and the injury.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"866 P.2d 889, 895-96","parenthetical":"holding that bankruptcy court ruling that debtor's first attorney did not commit malpractice by failing to inform debtor of deadline precluded same claim in state court against different attorneys","sentence":"See Lane v. Sullivan, 900 F.2d 1247, 1250-51 & n. 5 (8th Cir.) (holding that earlier judgment that plaintiffs understood a stock transfer precluded malpractice claim against attorney for misrepresenting or failing to represent true nature of transfer), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 847, 111 S.Ct. 134, 112 L.Ed.2d 101 (1990); Falconer v. Meehan, 804 F.2d 72, 75-76 (7th Cir.1986) (bankruptcy court finding that attorney advised client of contents of dissolution agreement precluded relitigation of issue in malpractice action); see also Standage v. Jaburg & Wilk, P.C., 177 Ariz. 221, 866 P.2d 889, 895-96 (Ct.App.1993) (holding that bankruptcy court ruling that debtor\u2019s first attorney did not commit malpractice by failing to inform debtor of deadline precluded same claim in state court against different attorneys)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that earlier judgment that plaintiffs understood a stock transfer precluded malpractice claim against attorney for misrepresenting or failing to represent true nature of transfer","sentence":"See Lane v. Sullivan, 900 F.2d 1247, 1250-51 & n. 5 (8th Cir.) (holding that earlier judgment that plaintiffs understood a stock transfer precluded malpractice claim against attorney for misrepresenting or failing to represent true nature of transfer), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 847, 111 S.Ct. 134, 112 L.Ed.2d 101 (1990); Falconer v. Meehan, 804 F.2d 72, 75-76 (7th Cir.1986) (bankruptcy court finding that attorney advised client of contents of dissolution agreement precluded relitigation of issue in malpractice action); see also Standage v. Jaburg & Wilk, P.C., 177 Ariz. 221, 866 P.2d 889, 895-96 (Ct.App.1993) (holding that bankruptcy court ruling that debtor\u2019s first attorney did not commit malpractice by failing to inform debtor of deadline precluded same claim in state court against different attorneys)."},"case_id":10336874,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Thus, Harline has failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact that Vlahos proximately caused the denial of Harline's bankruptcy discharge. Harline's sole claim in these proceedings is that Vlahos' initial failure to list assets that Harline disclosed to the firm caused Harline's denial of discharge. However, \"[d]emonstrating material issues of fact with respect to defendants' negligence is not sufficient to preclude summary judgment if there is no evidence that establishes a direct causal connection between that alleged negligence and the injury.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that bankruptcy court ruling that debtor's first attorney did not commit malpractice by failing to inform debtor of deadline precluded same claim in state court against different attorneys","sentence":"See Lane v. Sullivan, 900 F.2d 1247, 1250-51 & n. 5 (8th Cir.) (holding that earlier judgment that plaintiffs understood a stock transfer precluded malpractice claim against attorney for misrepresenting or failing to represent true nature of transfer), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 847, 111 S.Ct. 134, 112 L.Ed.2d 101 (1990); Falconer v. Meehan, 804 F.2d 72, 75-76 (7th Cir.1986) (bankruptcy court finding that attorney advised client of contents of dissolution agreement precluded relitigation of issue in malpractice action); see also Standage v. Jaburg & Wilk, P.C., 177 Ariz. 221, 866 P.2d 889, 895-96 (Ct.App.1993) (holding that bankruptcy court ruling that debtor\u2019s first attorney did not commit malpractice by failing to inform debtor of deadline precluded same claim in state court against different attorneys)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that earlier judgment that plaintiffs understood a stock transfer precluded malpractice claim against attorney for misrepresenting or failing to represent true nature of transfer","sentence":"See Lane v. Sullivan, 900 F.2d 1247, 1250-51 & n. 5 (8th Cir.) (holding that earlier judgment that plaintiffs understood a stock transfer precluded malpractice claim against attorney for misrepresenting or failing to represent true nature of transfer), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 847, 111 S.Ct. 134, 112 L.Ed.2d 101 (1990); Falconer v. Meehan, 804 F.2d 72, 75-76 (7th Cir.1986) (bankruptcy court finding that attorney advised client of contents of dissolution agreement precluded relitigation of issue in malpractice action); see also Standage v. Jaburg & Wilk, P.C., 177 Ariz. 221, 866 P.2d 889, 895-96 (Ct.App.1993) (holding that bankruptcy court ruling that debtor\u2019s first attorney did not commit malpractice by failing to inform debtor of deadline precluded same claim in state court against different attorneys)."},"case_id":10336874,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Thus, Harline has failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact that Vlahos proximately caused the denial of Harline's bankruptcy discharge. Harline's sole claim in these proceedings is that Vlahos' initial failure to list assets that Harline disclosed to the firm caused Harline's denial of discharge. However, \"[d]emonstrating material issues of fact with respect to defendants' negligence is not sufficient to preclude summary judgment if there is no evidence that establishes a direct causal connection between that alleged negligence and the injury.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that earlier judgment that plaintiffs understood a stock transfer precluded malpractice claim against attorney for misrepresenting or failing to represent true nature of transfer","sentence":"See Lane v. Sullivan, 900 F.2d 1247, 1250-51 & n. 5 (8th Cir.) (holding that earlier judgment that plaintiffs understood a stock transfer precluded malpractice claim against attorney for misrepresenting or failing to represent true nature of transfer), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 847, 111 S.Ct. 134, 112 L.Ed.2d 101 (1990); Falconer v. Meehan, 804 F.2d 72, 75-76 (7th Cir.1986) (bankruptcy court finding that attorney advised client of contents of dissolution agreement precluded relitigation of issue in malpractice action); see also Standage v. Jaburg & Wilk, P.C., 177 Ariz. 221, 866 P.2d 889, 895-96 (Ct.App.1993) (holding that bankruptcy court ruling that debtor\u2019s first attorney did not commit malpractice by failing to inform debtor of deadline precluded same claim in state court against different attorneys)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"866 P.2d 889, 895-96","parenthetical":"holding that bankruptcy court ruling that debtor's first attorney did not commit malpractice by failing to inform debtor of deadline precluded same claim in state court against different attorneys","sentence":"See Lane v. Sullivan, 900 F.2d 1247, 1250-51 & n. 5 (8th Cir.) (holding that earlier judgment that plaintiffs understood a stock transfer precluded malpractice claim against attorney for misrepresenting or failing to represent true nature of transfer), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 847, 111 S.Ct. 134, 112 L.Ed.2d 101 (1990); Falconer v. Meehan, 804 F.2d 72, 75-76 (7th Cir.1986) (bankruptcy court finding that attorney advised client of contents of dissolution agreement precluded relitigation of issue in malpractice action); see also Standage v. Jaburg & Wilk, P.C., 177 Ariz. 221, 866 P.2d 889, 895-96 (Ct.App.1993) (holding that bankruptcy court ruling that debtor\u2019s first attorney did not commit malpractice by failing to inform debtor of deadline precluded same claim in state court against different attorneys)."},"case_id":10336874,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Thus, Harline has failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact that Vlahos proximately caused the denial of Harline's bankruptcy discharge. Harline's sole claim in these proceedings is that Vlahos' initial failure to list assets that Harline disclosed to the firm caused Harline's denial of discharge. However, \"[d]emonstrating material issues of fact with respect to defendants' negligence is not sufficient to preclude summary judgment if there is no evidence that establishes a direct causal connection between that alleged negligence and the injury.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that bankruptcy court ruling that debtor's first attorney did not commit malpractice by failing to inform debtor of deadline precluded same claim in state court against different attorneys","sentence":"See Lane v. Sullivan, 900 F.2d 1247, 1250-51 & n. 5 (8th Cir.) (holding that earlier judgment that plaintiffs understood a stock transfer precluded malpractice claim against attorney for misrepresenting or failing to represent true nature of transfer), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 847, 111 S.Ct. 134, 112 L.Ed.2d 101 (1990); Falconer v. Meehan, 804 F.2d 72, 75-76 (7th Cir.1986) (bankruptcy court finding that attorney advised client of contents of dissolution agreement precluded relitigation of issue in malpractice action); see also Standage v. Jaburg & Wilk, P.C., 177 Ariz. 221, 866 P.2d 889, 895-96 (Ct.App.1993) (holding that bankruptcy court ruling that debtor\u2019s first attorney did not commit malpractice by failing to inform debtor of deadline precluded same claim in state court against different attorneys)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"804 F.2d 72, 75-76","parenthetical":"bankruptcy court finding that attorney advised client of contents of dissolution agreement precluded relitigation of issue in malpractice action","sentence":"See Lane v. Sullivan, 900 F.2d 1247, 1250-51 & n. 5 (8th Cir.) (holding that earlier judgment that plaintiffs understood a stock transfer precluded malpractice claim against attorney for misrepresenting or failing to represent true nature of transfer), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 847, 111 S.Ct. 134, 112 L.Ed.2d 101 (1990); Falconer v. Meehan, 804 F.2d 72, 75-76 (7th Cir.1986) (bankruptcy court finding that attorney advised client of contents of dissolution agreement precluded relitigation of issue in malpractice action); see also Standage v. Jaburg & Wilk, P.C., 177 Ariz. 221, 866 P.2d 889, 895-96 (Ct.App.1993) (holding that bankruptcy court ruling that debtor\u2019s first attorney did not commit malpractice by failing to inform debtor of deadline precluded same claim in state court against different attorneys)."},"case_id":10336874,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Thus, Harline has failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact that Vlahos proximately caused the denial of Harline's bankruptcy discharge. Harline's sole claim in these proceedings is that Vlahos' initial failure to list assets that Harline disclosed to the firm caused Harline's denial of discharge. However, \"[d]emonstrating material issues of fact with respect to defendants' negligence is not sufficient to preclude summary judgment if there is no evidence that establishes a direct causal connection between that alleged negligence and the injury.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"866 P.2d 889, 895-96","parenthetical":"holding that bankruptcy court ruling that debtor's first attorney did not commit malpractice by failing to inform debtor of deadline precluded same claim in state court against different attorneys","sentence":"See Lane v. Sullivan, 900 F.2d 1247, 1250-51 & n. 5 (8th Cir.) (holding that earlier judgment that plaintiffs understood a stock transfer precluded malpractice claim against attorney for misrepresenting or failing to represent true nature of transfer), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 847, 111 S.Ct. 134, 112 L.Ed.2d 101 (1990); Falconer v. Meehan, 804 F.2d 72, 75-76 (7th Cir.1986) (bankruptcy court finding that attorney advised client of contents of dissolution agreement precluded relitigation of issue in malpractice action); see also Standage v. Jaburg & Wilk, P.C., 177 Ariz. 221, 866 P.2d 889, 895-96 (Ct.App.1993) (holding that bankruptcy court ruling that debtor\u2019s first attorney did not commit malpractice by failing to inform debtor of deadline precluded same claim in state court against different attorneys)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"804 F.2d 72, 75-76","parenthetical":"bankruptcy court finding that attorney advised client of contents of dissolution agreement precluded relitigation of issue in malpractice action","sentence":"See Lane v. Sullivan, 900 F.2d 1247, 1250-51 & n. 5 (8th Cir.) (holding that earlier judgment that plaintiffs understood a stock transfer precluded malpractice claim against attorney for misrepresenting or failing to represent true nature of transfer), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 847, 111 S.Ct. 134, 112 L.Ed.2d 101 (1990); Falconer v. Meehan, 804 F.2d 72, 75-76 (7th Cir.1986) (bankruptcy court finding that attorney advised client of contents of dissolution agreement precluded relitigation of issue in malpractice action); see also Standage v. Jaburg & Wilk, P.C., 177 Ariz. 221, 866 P.2d 889, 895-96 (Ct.App.1993) (holding that bankruptcy court ruling that debtor\u2019s first attorney did not commit malpractice by failing to inform debtor of deadline precluded same claim in state court against different attorneys)."},"case_id":10336874,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Our decisions reflect these principles from Farmer and the criminal-law concept of recklessness that Farmer adopted.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"True subjective recklessness requires knowledge both of the general risk, and also that the conduct is inappropriate in light of that risk\"","sentence":"In Parrish ex rel. Lee v. Cleveland, 372 F.3d 294 (4th Cir. 2004), we noted that, under the deliberate indifference standard, the prison official must have both \u201csubjectively recognized a substantial risk of harm\u201d and \u201csubjectively recognized that his actions were \u2018inappropriate in light of that risk.\u2019 \u201d Id. at 303 (emphasis added) (quoting Rich v. Bruce, 129 F.3d 336, 340 n.2 (4th Cir. 1997) (\u201cTrue subjective recklessness requires knowledge both of the general risk, and also that the conduct is inappropriate in light of that risk\u201d)); see also Cox, 828 F.3d at 236 (\u201c[I]n addition to subjectively recognizing that substantial risk, the prison official must also subjectively be aware that \u2018his actions were inappropriate in light -of that risk\u2019 \u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"828 F.3d 236, 236","parenthetical":"\"[I]n addition to subjectively recognizing that substantial risk, the prison official must also subjectively be aware that 'his actions were inappropriate in light -of that risk' \"","sentence":"In Parrish ex rel. Lee v. Cleveland, 372 F.3d 294 (4th Cir. 2004), we noted that, under the deliberate indifference standard, the prison official must have both \u201csubjectively recognized a substantial risk of harm\u201d and \u201csubjectively recognized that his actions were \u2018inappropriate in light of that risk.\u2019 \u201d Id. at 303 (emphasis added) (quoting Rich v. Bruce, 129 F.3d 336, 340 n.2 (4th Cir. 1997) (\u201cTrue subjective recklessness requires knowledge both of the general risk, and also that the conduct is inappropriate in light of that risk\u201d)); see also Cox, 828 F.3d at 236 (\u201c[I]n addition to subjectively recognizing that substantial risk, the prison official must also subjectively be aware that \u2018his actions were inappropriate in light -of that risk\u2019 \u201d)."},"case_id":12265226,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Significantly, and as explicitly set forth in the statute itself, the personnel policy exception is not applicable in those situations where the governmental defendant owes an independent legal duty to the injured party. Likewise, our Supreme Court has held that \"the discretionary function exception [under K.S.A. 75-6104(e)] is not applicable in those situations where a legal duty exists, either by case law or by statute, which the governmental agency must follow.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"234 Kan. 554, 570","parenthetical":"holding that discretionary immunity does not apply where plaintiff alleged facts that, if true, constituted a breach of State's duty of reasonable care","sentence":"Barrett v. U.S.D. No. 259, 272 Kan. 250, 263, 32 P.3d 1156 (2001); see Nero v. Kansas State University, 253 Kan. 567, 585, 861 P.2d 768 (1993) (\u201cIf there is a clearly defined mandatory duty or guideline, the discretionary function exception is not applicable.\u201d); see also Cansler v. State, 234 Kan. 554, 570, 675 P.2d 57 (1984) (holding that discretionary immunity does not apply where plaintiff alleged facts that, if true, constituted a breach of State\u2019s duty of reasonable care)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"253 Kan. 567, 585","parenthetical":"\"If there is a clearly defined mandatory duty or guideline, the discretionary function exception is not applicable.\"","sentence":"Barrett v. U.S.D. No. 259, 272 Kan. 250, 263, 32 P.3d 1156 (2001); see Nero v. Kansas State University, 253 Kan. 567, 585, 861 P.2d 768 (1993) (\u201cIf there is a clearly defined mandatory duty or guideline, the discretionary function exception is not applicable.\u201d); see also Cansler v. State, 234 Kan. 554, 570, 675 P.2d 57 (1984) (holding that discretionary immunity does not apply where plaintiff alleged facts that, if true, constituted a breach of State\u2019s duty of reasonable care)."},"case_id":3685428,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Significantly, and as explicitly set forth in the statute itself, the personnel policy exception is not applicable in those situations where the governmental defendant owes an independent legal duty to the injured party. Likewise, our Supreme Court has held that \"the discretionary function exception [under K.S.A. 75-6104(e)] is not applicable in those situations where a legal duty exists, either by case law or by statute, which the governmental agency must follow.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that discretionary immunity does not apply where plaintiff alleged facts that, if true, constituted a breach of State's duty of reasonable care","sentence":"Barrett v. U.S.D. No. 259, 272 Kan. 250, 263, 32 P.3d 1156 (2001); see Nero v. Kansas State University, 253 Kan. 567, 585, 861 P.2d 768 (1993) (\u201cIf there is a clearly defined mandatory duty or guideline, the discretionary function exception is not applicable.\u201d); see also Cansler v. State, 234 Kan. 554, 570, 675 P.2d 57 (1984) (holding that discretionary immunity does not apply where plaintiff alleged facts that, if true, constituted a breach of State\u2019s duty of reasonable care)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"253 Kan. 567, 585","parenthetical":"\"If there is a clearly defined mandatory duty or guideline, the discretionary function exception is not applicable.\"","sentence":"Barrett v. U.S.D. No. 259, 272 Kan. 250, 263, 32 P.3d 1156 (2001); see Nero v. Kansas State University, 253 Kan. 567, 585, 861 P.2d 768 (1993) (\u201cIf there is a clearly defined mandatory duty or guideline, the discretionary function exception is not applicable.\u201d); see also Cansler v. State, 234 Kan. 554, 570, 675 P.2d 57 (1984) (holding that discretionary immunity does not apply where plaintiff alleged facts that, if true, constituted a breach of State\u2019s duty of reasonable care)."},"case_id":3685428,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Significantly, and as explicitly set forth in the statute itself, the personnel policy exception is not applicable in those situations where the governmental defendant owes an independent legal duty to the injured party. Likewise, our Supreme Court has held that \"the discretionary function exception [under K.S.A. 75-6104(e)] is not applicable in those situations where a legal duty exists, either by case law or by statute, which the governmental agency must follow.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"If there is a clearly defined mandatory duty or guideline, the discretionary function exception is not applicable.\"","sentence":"Barrett v. U.S.D. No. 259, 272 Kan. 250, 263, 32 P.3d 1156 (2001); see Nero v. Kansas State University, 253 Kan. 567, 585, 861 P.2d 768 (1993) (\u201cIf there is a clearly defined mandatory duty or guideline, the discretionary function exception is not applicable.\u201d); see also Cansler v. State, 234 Kan. 554, 570, 675 P.2d 57 (1984) (holding that discretionary immunity does not apply where plaintiff alleged facts that, if true, constituted a breach of State\u2019s duty of reasonable care)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"234 Kan. 554, 570","parenthetical":"holding that discretionary immunity does not apply where plaintiff alleged facts that, if true, constituted a breach of State's duty of reasonable care","sentence":"Barrett v. U.S.D. No. 259, 272 Kan. 250, 263, 32 P.3d 1156 (2001); see Nero v. Kansas State University, 253 Kan. 567, 585, 861 P.2d 768 (1993) (\u201cIf there is a clearly defined mandatory duty or guideline, the discretionary function exception is not applicable.\u201d); see also Cansler v. State, 234 Kan. 554, 570, 675 P.2d 57 (1984) (holding that discretionary immunity does not apply where plaintiff alleged facts that, if true, constituted a breach of State\u2019s duty of reasonable care)."},"case_id":3685428,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Significantly, and as explicitly set forth in the statute itself, the personnel policy exception is not applicable in those situations where the governmental defendant owes an independent legal duty to the injured party. Likewise, our Supreme Court has held that \"the discretionary function exception [under K.S.A. 75-6104(e)] is not applicable in those situations where a legal duty exists, either by case law or by statute, which the governmental agency must follow.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"If there is a clearly defined mandatory duty or guideline, the discretionary function exception is not applicable.\"","sentence":"Barrett v. U.S.D. No. 259, 272 Kan. 250, 263, 32 P.3d 1156 (2001); see Nero v. Kansas State University, 253 Kan. 567, 585, 861 P.2d 768 (1993) (\u201cIf there is a clearly defined mandatory duty or guideline, the discretionary function exception is not applicable.\u201d); see also Cansler v. State, 234 Kan. 554, 570, 675 P.2d 57 (1984) (holding that discretionary immunity does not apply where plaintiff alleged facts that, if true, constituted a breach of State\u2019s duty of reasonable care)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that discretionary immunity does not apply where plaintiff alleged facts that, if true, constituted a breach of State's duty of reasonable care","sentence":"Barrett v. U.S.D. No. 259, 272 Kan. 250, 263, 32 P.3d 1156 (2001); see Nero v. Kansas State University, 253 Kan. 567, 585, 861 P.2d 768 (1993) (\u201cIf there is a clearly defined mandatory duty or guideline, the discretionary function exception is not applicable.\u201d); see also Cansler v. State, 234 Kan. 554, 570, 675 P.2d 57 (1984) (holding that discretionary immunity does not apply where plaintiff alleged facts that, if true, constituted a breach of State\u2019s duty of reasonable care)."},"case_id":3685428,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Probable cause for a warrantless arrest \"exists when the facts and circumstances within the officer's knowledge, and of which he has reasonably trustworthy information, alone are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe that an offense has been or is being committed.\" \"To determine whether an officer had probable cause to arrest an individual, we examine the events leading up to the arrest, and then decide 'whether these historical facts, viewed from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable officer, amount to' probable cause.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"532 U.S. 318, 354","parenthetical":"holding that probable cause existed to arrest for a seatbelt violation under state law","sentence":"Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 1557, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (holding that probable cause existed to arrest for a seatbelt violation under state law), quoted with approval in Joyce v. Commonwealth, 56 Va.App. 646, 658, 696 S.E.2d 237, 243 (2010) (holding that probable cause existed to arrest for trespassing under state law); see Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 171, 128 S.Ct. 1598, 1604, 170 L.Ed.2d 559 (2008) (holding that probable cause existed to arrest for driving on a suspended license under state law)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"553 U.S. 164, 171","parenthetical":"holding that probable cause existed to arrest for driving on a suspended license under state law","sentence":"Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 1557, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (holding that probable cause existed to arrest for a seatbelt violation under state law), quoted with approval in Joyce v. Commonwealth, 56 Va.App. 646, 658, 696 S.E.2d 237, 243 (2010) (holding that probable cause existed to arrest for trespassing under state law); see Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 171, 128 S.Ct. 1598, 1604, 170 L.Ed.2d 559 (2008) (holding that probable cause existed to arrest for driving on a suspended license under state law)."},"case_id":12278897,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Probable cause for a warrantless arrest \"exists when the facts and circumstances within the officer's knowledge, and of which he has reasonably trustworthy information, alone are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe that an offense has been or is being committed.\" \"To determine whether an officer had probable cause to arrest an individual, we examine the events leading up to the arrest, and then decide 'whether these historical facts, viewed from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable officer, amount to' probable cause.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"532 U.S. 318, 354","parenthetical":"holding that probable cause existed to arrest for a seatbelt violation under state law","sentence":"Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 1557, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (holding that probable cause existed to arrest for a seatbelt violation under state law), quoted with approval in Joyce v. Commonwealth, 56 Va.App. 646, 658, 696 S.E.2d 237, 243 (2010) (holding that probable cause existed to arrest for trespassing under state law); see Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 171, 128 S.Ct. 1598, 1604, 170 L.Ed.2d 559 (2008) (holding that probable cause existed to arrest for driving on a suspended license under state law)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"128 S.Ct. 1598, 1604","parenthetical":"holding that probable cause existed to arrest for driving on a suspended license under state law","sentence":"Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 1557, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (holding that probable cause existed to arrest for a seatbelt violation under state law), quoted with approval in Joyce v. Commonwealth, 56 Va.App. 646, 658, 696 S.E.2d 237, 243 (2010) (holding that probable cause existed to arrest for trespassing under state law); see Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 171, 128 S.Ct. 1598, 1604, 170 L.Ed.2d 559 (2008) (holding that probable cause existed to arrest for driving on a suspended license under state law)."},"case_id":12278897,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Probable cause for a warrantless arrest \"exists when the facts and circumstances within the officer's knowledge, and of which he has reasonably trustworthy information, alone are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe that an offense has been or is being committed.\" \"To determine whether an officer had probable cause to arrest an individual, we examine the events leading up to the arrest, and then decide 'whether these historical facts, viewed from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable officer, amount to' probable cause.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that probable cause existed to arrest for driving on a suspended license under state law","sentence":"Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 1557, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (holding that probable cause existed to arrest for a seatbelt violation under state law), quoted with approval in Joyce v. Commonwealth, 56 Va.App. 646, 658, 696 S.E.2d 237, 243 (2010) (holding that probable cause existed to arrest for trespassing under state law); see Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 171, 128 S.Ct. 1598, 1604, 170 L.Ed.2d 559 (2008) (holding that probable cause existed to arrest for driving on a suspended license under state law)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"532 U.S. 318, 354","parenthetical":"holding that probable cause existed to arrest for a seatbelt violation under state law","sentence":"Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 1557, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (holding that probable cause existed to arrest for a seatbelt violation under state law), quoted with approval in Joyce v. Commonwealth, 56 Va.App. 646, 658, 696 S.E.2d 237, 243 (2010) (holding that probable cause existed to arrest for trespassing under state law); see Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 171, 128 S.Ct. 1598, 1604, 170 L.Ed.2d 559 (2008) (holding that probable cause existed to arrest for driving on a suspended license under state law)."},"case_id":12278897,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Probable cause for a warrantless arrest \"exists when the facts and circumstances within the officer's knowledge, and of which he has reasonably trustworthy information, alone are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe that an offense has been or is being committed.\" \"To determine whether an officer had probable cause to arrest an individual, we examine the events leading up to the arrest, and then decide 'whether these historical facts, viewed from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable officer, amount to' probable cause.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"121 S.Ct. 1536, 1557","parenthetical":"holding that probable cause existed to arrest for a seatbelt violation under state law","sentence":"Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 1557, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (holding that probable cause existed to arrest for a seatbelt violation under state law), quoted with approval in Joyce v. Commonwealth, 56 Va.App. 646, 658, 696 S.E.2d 237, 243 (2010) (holding that probable cause existed to arrest for trespassing under state law); see Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 171, 128 S.Ct. 1598, 1604, 170 L.Ed.2d 559 (2008) (holding that probable cause existed to arrest for driving on a suspended license under state law)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"553 U.S. 164, 171","parenthetical":"holding that probable cause existed to arrest for driving on a suspended license under state law","sentence":"Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 1557, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (holding that probable cause existed to arrest for a seatbelt violation under state law), quoted with approval in Joyce v. Commonwealth, 56 Va.App. 646, 658, 696 S.E.2d 237, 243 (2010) (holding that probable cause existed to arrest for trespassing under state law); see Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 171, 128 S.Ct. 1598, 1604, 170 L.Ed.2d 559 (2008) (holding that probable cause existed to arrest for driving on a suspended license under state law)."},"case_id":12278897,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Probable cause for a warrantless arrest \"exists when the facts and circumstances within the officer's knowledge, and of which he has reasonably trustworthy information, alone are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe that an offense has been or is being committed.\" \"To determine whether an officer had probable cause to arrest an individual, we examine the events leading up to the arrest, and then decide 'whether these historical facts, viewed from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable officer, amount to' probable cause.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"121 S.Ct. 1536, 1557","parenthetical":"holding that probable cause existed to arrest for a seatbelt violation under state law","sentence":"Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 1557, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (holding that probable cause existed to arrest for a seatbelt violation under state law), quoted with approval in Joyce v. Commonwealth, 56 Va.App. 646, 658, 696 S.E.2d 237, 243 (2010) (holding that probable cause existed to arrest for trespassing under state law); see Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 171, 128 S.Ct. 1598, 1604, 170 L.Ed.2d 559 (2008) (holding that probable cause existed to arrest for driving on a suspended license under state law)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"128 S.Ct. 1598, 1604","parenthetical":"holding that probable cause existed to arrest for driving on a suspended license under state law","sentence":"Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 1557, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (holding that probable cause existed to arrest for a seatbelt violation under state law), quoted with approval in Joyce v. Commonwealth, 56 Va.App. 646, 658, 696 S.E.2d 237, 243 (2010) (holding that probable cause existed to arrest for trespassing under state law); see Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 171, 128 S.Ct. 1598, 1604, 170 L.Ed.2d 559 (2008) (holding that probable cause existed to arrest for driving on a suspended license under state law)."},"case_id":12278897,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Probable cause for a warrantless arrest \"exists when the facts and circumstances within the officer's knowledge, and of which he has reasonably trustworthy information, alone are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe that an offense has been or is being committed.\" \"To determine whether an officer had probable cause to arrest an individual, we examine the events leading up to the arrest, and then decide 'whether these historical facts, viewed from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable officer, amount to' probable cause.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that probable cause existed to arrest for driving on a suspended license under state law","sentence":"Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 1557, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (holding that probable cause existed to arrest for a seatbelt violation under state law), quoted with approval in Joyce v. Commonwealth, 56 Va.App. 646, 658, 696 S.E.2d 237, 243 (2010) (holding that probable cause existed to arrest for trespassing under state law); see Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 171, 128 S.Ct. 1598, 1604, 170 L.Ed.2d 559 (2008) (holding that probable cause existed to arrest for driving on a suspended license under state law)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"121 S.Ct. 1536, 1557","parenthetical":"holding that probable cause existed to arrest for a seatbelt violation under state law","sentence":"Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 1557, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (holding that probable cause existed to arrest for a seatbelt violation under state law), quoted with approval in Joyce v. Commonwealth, 56 Va.App. 646, 658, 696 S.E.2d 237, 243 (2010) (holding that probable cause existed to arrest for trespassing under state law); see Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 171, 128 S.Ct. 1598, 1604, 170 L.Ed.2d 559 (2008) (holding that probable cause existed to arrest for driving on a suspended license under state law)."},"case_id":12278897,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Probable cause for a warrantless arrest \"exists when the facts and circumstances within the officer's knowledge, and of which he has reasonably trustworthy information, alone are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe that an offense has been or is being committed.\" \"To determine whether an officer had probable cause to arrest an individual, we examine the events leading up to the arrest, and then decide 'whether these historical facts, viewed from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable officer, amount to' probable cause.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"553 U.S. 164, 171","parenthetical":"holding that probable cause existed to arrest for driving on a suspended license under state law","sentence":"Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 1557, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (holding that probable cause existed to arrest for a seatbelt violation under state law), quoted with approval in Joyce v. Commonwealth, 56 Va.App. 646, 658, 696 S.E.2d 237, 243 (2010) (holding that probable cause existed to arrest for trespassing under state law); see Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 171, 128 S.Ct. 1598, 1604, 170 L.Ed.2d 559 (2008) (holding that probable cause existed to arrest for driving on a suspended license under state law)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that probable cause existed to arrest for a seatbelt violation under state law","sentence":"Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 1557, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (holding that probable cause existed to arrest for a seatbelt violation under state law), quoted with approval in Joyce v. Commonwealth, 56 Va.App. 646, 658, 696 S.E.2d 237, 243 (2010) (holding that probable cause existed to arrest for trespassing under state law); see Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 171, 128 S.Ct. 1598, 1604, 170 L.Ed.2d 559 (2008) (holding that probable cause existed to arrest for driving on a suspended license under state law)."},"case_id":12278897,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Probable cause for a warrantless arrest \"exists when the facts and circumstances within the officer's knowledge, and of which he has reasonably trustworthy information, alone are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe that an offense has been or is being committed.\" \"To determine whether an officer had probable cause to arrest an individual, we examine the events leading up to the arrest, and then decide 'whether these historical facts, viewed from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable officer, amount to' probable cause.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"128 S.Ct. 1598, 1604","parenthetical":"holding that probable cause existed to arrest for driving on a suspended license under state law","sentence":"Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 1557, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (holding that probable cause existed to arrest for a seatbelt violation under state law), quoted with approval in Joyce v. Commonwealth, 56 Va.App. 646, 658, 696 S.E.2d 237, 243 (2010) (holding that probable cause existed to arrest for trespassing under state law); see Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 171, 128 S.Ct. 1598, 1604, 170 L.Ed.2d 559 (2008) (holding that probable cause existed to arrest for driving on a suspended license under state law)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that probable cause existed to arrest for a seatbelt violation under state law","sentence":"Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 1557, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (holding that probable cause existed to arrest for a seatbelt violation under state law), quoted with approval in Joyce v. Commonwealth, 56 Va.App. 646, 658, 696 S.E.2d 237, 243 (2010) (holding that probable cause existed to arrest for trespassing under state law); see Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 171, 128 S.Ct. 1598, 1604, 170 L.Ed.2d 559 (2008) (holding that probable cause existed to arrest for driving on a suspended license under state law)."},"case_id":12278897,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Probable cause for a warrantless arrest \"exists when the facts and circumstances within the officer's knowledge, and of which he has reasonably trustworthy information, alone are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe that an offense has been or is being committed.\" \"To determine whether an officer had probable cause to arrest an individual, we examine the events leading up to the arrest, and then decide 'whether these historical facts, viewed from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable officer, amount to' probable cause.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that probable cause existed to arrest for a seatbelt violation under state law","sentence":"Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 1557, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (holding that probable cause existed to arrest for a seatbelt violation under state law), quoted with approval in Joyce v. Commonwealth, 56 Va.App. 646, 658, 696 S.E.2d 237, 243 (2010) (holding that probable cause existed to arrest for trespassing under state law); see Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 171, 128 S.Ct. 1598, 1604, 170 L.Ed.2d 559 (2008) (holding that probable cause existed to arrest for driving on a suspended license under state law)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that probable cause existed to arrest for driving on a suspended license under state law","sentence":"Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 1557, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (holding that probable cause existed to arrest for a seatbelt violation under state law), quoted with approval in Joyce v. Commonwealth, 56 Va.App. 646, 658, 696 S.E.2d 237, 243 (2010) (holding that probable cause existed to arrest for trespassing under state law); see Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 171, 128 S.Ct. 1598, 1604, 170 L.Ed.2d 559 (2008) (holding that probable cause existed to arrest for driving on a suspended license under state law)."},"case_id":12278897,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Probable cause for a warrantless arrest \"exists when the facts and circumstances within the officer's knowledge, and of which he has reasonably trustworthy information, alone are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe that an offense has been or is being committed.\" \"To determine whether an officer had probable cause to arrest an individual, we examine the events leading up to the arrest, and then decide 'whether these historical facts, viewed from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable officer, amount to' probable cause.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"553 U.S. 164, 171","parenthetical":"holding that probable cause existed to arrest for driving on a suspended license under state law","sentence":"Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 1557, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (holding that probable cause existed to arrest for a seatbelt violation under state law), quoted with approval in Joyce v. Commonwealth, 56 Va.App. 646, 658, 696 S.E.2d 237, 243 (2010) (holding that probable cause existed to arrest for trespassing under state law); see Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 171, 128 S.Ct. 1598, 1604, 170 L.Ed.2d 559 (2008) (holding that probable cause existed to arrest for driving on a suspended license under state law)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"56 Va.App. 646, 658","parenthetical":"holding that probable cause existed to arrest for trespassing under state law","sentence":"Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 1557, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (holding that probable cause existed to arrest for a seatbelt violation under state law), quoted with approval in Joyce v. Commonwealth, 56 Va.App. 646, 658, 696 S.E.2d 237, 243 (2010) (holding that probable cause existed to arrest for trespassing under state law); see Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 171, 128 S.Ct. 1598, 1604, 170 L.Ed.2d 559 (2008) (holding that probable cause existed to arrest for driving on a suspended license under state law)."},"case_id":12278897,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Probable cause for a warrantless arrest \"exists when the facts and circumstances within the officer's knowledge, and of which he has reasonably trustworthy information, alone are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe that an offense has been or is being committed.\" \"To determine whether an officer had probable cause to arrest an individual, we examine the events leading up to the arrest, and then decide 'whether these historical facts, viewed from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable officer, amount to' probable cause.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"56 Va.App. 646, 658","parenthetical":"holding that probable cause existed to arrest for trespassing under state law","sentence":"Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 1557, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (holding that probable cause existed to arrest for a seatbelt violation under state law), quoted with approval in Joyce v. Commonwealth, 56 Va.App. 646, 658, 696 S.E.2d 237, 243 (2010) (holding that probable cause existed to arrest for trespassing under state law); see Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 171, 128 S.Ct. 1598, 1604, 170 L.Ed.2d 559 (2008) (holding that probable cause existed to arrest for driving on a suspended license under state law)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"128 S.Ct. 1598, 1604","parenthetical":"holding that probable cause existed to arrest for driving on a suspended license under state law","sentence":"Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 1557, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (holding that probable cause existed to arrest for a seatbelt violation under state law), quoted with approval in Joyce v. Commonwealth, 56 Va.App. 646, 658, 696 S.E.2d 237, 243 (2010) (holding that probable cause existed to arrest for trespassing under state law); see Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 171, 128 S.Ct. 1598, 1604, 170 L.Ed.2d 559 (2008) (holding that probable cause existed to arrest for driving on a suspended license under state law)."},"case_id":12278897,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Probable cause for a warrantless arrest \"exists when the facts and circumstances within the officer's knowledge, and of which he has reasonably trustworthy information, alone are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe that an offense has been or is being committed.\" \"To determine whether an officer had probable cause to arrest an individual, we examine the events leading up to the arrest, and then decide 'whether these historical facts, viewed from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable officer, amount to' probable cause.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that probable cause existed to arrest for driving on a suspended license under state law","sentence":"Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 1557, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (holding that probable cause existed to arrest for a seatbelt violation under state law), quoted with approval in Joyce v. Commonwealth, 56 Va.App. 646, 658, 696 S.E.2d 237, 243 (2010) (holding that probable cause existed to arrest for trespassing under state law); see Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 171, 128 S.Ct. 1598, 1604, 170 L.Ed.2d 559 (2008) (holding that probable cause existed to arrest for driving on a suspended license under state law)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"56 Va.App. 646, 658","parenthetical":"holding that probable cause existed to arrest for trespassing under state law","sentence":"Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 1557, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (holding that probable cause existed to arrest for a seatbelt violation under state law), quoted with approval in Joyce v. Commonwealth, 56 Va.App. 646, 658, 696 S.E.2d 237, 243 (2010) (holding that probable cause existed to arrest for trespassing under state law); see Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 171, 128 S.Ct. 1598, 1604, 170 L.Ed.2d 559 (2008) (holding that probable cause existed to arrest for driving on a suspended license under state law)."},"case_id":12278897,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Probable cause for a warrantless arrest \"exists when the facts and circumstances within the officer's knowledge, and of which he has reasonably trustworthy information, alone are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe that an offense has been or is being committed.\" \"To determine whether an officer had probable cause to arrest an individual, we examine the events leading up to the arrest, and then decide 'whether these historical facts, viewed from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable officer, amount to' probable cause.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"553 U.S. 164, 171","parenthetical":"holding that probable cause existed to arrest for driving on a suspended license under state law","sentence":"Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 1557, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (holding that probable cause existed to arrest for a seatbelt violation under state law), quoted with approval in Joyce v. Commonwealth, 56 Va.App. 646, 658, 696 S.E.2d 237, 243 (2010) (holding that probable cause existed to arrest for trespassing under state law); see Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 171, 128 S.Ct. 1598, 1604, 170 L.Ed.2d 559 (2008) (holding that probable cause existed to arrest for driving on a suspended license under state law)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"696 S.E.2d 237, 243","parenthetical":"holding that probable cause existed to arrest for trespassing under state law","sentence":"Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 1557, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (holding that probable cause existed to arrest for a seatbelt violation under state law), quoted with approval in Joyce v. Commonwealth, 56 Va.App. 646, 658, 696 S.E.2d 237, 243 (2010) (holding that probable cause existed to arrest for trespassing under state law); see Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 171, 128 S.Ct. 1598, 1604, 170 L.Ed.2d 559 (2008) (holding that probable cause existed to arrest for driving on a suspended license under state law)."},"case_id":12278897,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Probable cause for a warrantless arrest \"exists when the facts and circumstances within the officer's knowledge, and of which he has reasonably trustworthy information, alone are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe that an offense has been or is being committed.\" \"To determine whether an officer had probable cause to arrest an individual, we examine the events leading up to the arrest, and then decide 'whether these historical facts, viewed from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable officer, amount to' probable cause.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"128 S.Ct. 1598, 1604","parenthetical":"holding that probable cause existed to arrest for driving on a suspended license under state law","sentence":"Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 1557, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (holding that probable cause existed to arrest for a seatbelt violation under state law), quoted with approval in Joyce v. Commonwealth, 56 Va.App. 646, 658, 696 S.E.2d 237, 243 (2010) (holding that probable cause existed to arrest for trespassing under state law); see Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 171, 128 S.Ct. 1598, 1604, 170 L.Ed.2d 559 (2008) (holding that probable cause existed to arrest for driving on a suspended license under state law)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"696 S.E.2d 237, 243","parenthetical":"holding that probable cause existed to arrest for trespassing under state law","sentence":"Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 1557, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (holding that probable cause existed to arrest for a seatbelt violation under state law), quoted with approval in Joyce v. Commonwealth, 56 Va.App. 646, 658, 696 S.E.2d 237, 243 (2010) (holding that probable cause existed to arrest for trespassing under state law); see Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 171, 128 S.Ct. 1598, 1604, 170 L.Ed.2d 559 (2008) (holding that probable cause existed to arrest for driving on a suspended license under state law)."},"case_id":12278897,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Probable cause for a warrantless arrest \"exists when the facts and circumstances within the officer's knowledge, and of which he has reasonably trustworthy information, alone are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe that an offense has been or is being committed.\" \"To determine whether an officer had probable cause to arrest an individual, we examine the events leading up to the arrest, and then decide 'whether these historical facts, viewed from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable officer, amount to' probable cause.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"696 S.E.2d 237, 243","parenthetical":"holding that probable cause existed to arrest for trespassing under state law","sentence":"Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 1557, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (holding that probable cause existed to arrest for a seatbelt violation under state law), quoted with approval in Joyce v. Commonwealth, 56 Va.App. 646, 658, 696 S.E.2d 237, 243 (2010) (holding that probable cause existed to arrest for trespassing under state law); see Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 171, 128 S.Ct. 1598, 1604, 170 L.Ed.2d 559 (2008) (holding that probable cause existed to arrest for driving on a suspended license under state law)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that probable cause existed to arrest for driving on a suspended license under state law","sentence":"Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 1557, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (holding that probable cause existed to arrest for a seatbelt violation under state law), quoted with approval in Joyce v. Commonwealth, 56 Va.App. 646, 658, 696 S.E.2d 237, 243 (2010) (holding that probable cause existed to arrest for trespassing under state law); see Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 171, 128 S.Ct. 1598, 1604, 170 L.Ed.2d 559 (2008) (holding that probable cause existed to arrest for driving on a suspended license under state law)."},"case_id":12278897,"label":"a"}
{"context":"There is, finally, the question whether counsel is entitled to notice before the follow-up examinations take place, or only thereafter but before trial. I agree with my colleagues that, as in criminal prosecutions, a respondent is not entitled under the Ervin Act to have counsel present during a prehearing psychiatric examination conducted for purposes of developing the Commission report.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"422 A.2d 969, 972-73","parenthetical":"respondent in civil commitment proceeding not entitled to assistance of counsel at psychiatric examination by Commission psychiatrists before hearing","sentence":"In re Holmes, 422 A.2d 969, 972-73 (D.C.1980) (respondent in civil commitment proceeding not entitled to assistance of counsel at psychiatric examination by Commission psychiatrists before hearing); cf. White v. United States, 451 A.2d 848, 854 (D.C.1982) (defendant \u201chas no Sixth Amendment right to the presence of counsel at a pretrial psychiatric examination\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"451 A.2d 848, 854","parenthetical":"defendant \"has no Sixth Amendment right to the presence of counsel at a pretrial psychiatric examination\"","sentence":"In re Holmes, 422 A.2d 969, 972-73 (D.C.1980) (respondent in civil commitment proceeding not entitled to assistance of counsel at psychiatric examination by Commission psychiatrists before hearing); cf. White v. United States, 451 A.2d 848, 854 (D.C.1982) (defendant \u201chas no Sixth Amendment right to the presence of counsel at a pretrial psychiatric examination\u201d)."},"case_id":7976893,"label":"a"}
{"context":"This evidence is of limited value for two reasons. First, Ms. Simpson provides no information that would allow the Court to determine whether the Program Management Division employs African-Americans at rates significantly below their number in the applicant pool or general population.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"For instance, if a female plaintiff claims sex discrimination, evidence that the defendant employs women at rates far below their numbers in the applicant pool and the general population may well help her case.\"","sentence":"See Holcomb v. Powell, 433 F.3d at 901 (plaintiff \u201cproffers no statistics or other data describing the demographic composition of ODEO or FDIC as a whole.\u201d); see also Aka v. Wash. Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d at 1295 n. 11 (\u201cFor instance, if a female plaintiff claims sex discrimination, evidence that the defendant employs women at rates far below their numbers in the applicant pool and the general population may well help her case.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"433 F.3d 901, 901","parenthetical":"plaintiff \"proffers no statistics or other data describing the demographic composition of ODEO or FDIC as a whole.\"","sentence":"See Holcomb v. Powell, 433 F.3d at 901 (plaintiff \u201cproffers no statistics or other data describing the demographic composition of ODEO or FDIC as a whole.\u201d); see also Aka v. Wash. Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d at 1295 n. 11 (\u201cFor instance, if a female plaintiff claims sex discrimination, evidence that the defendant employs women at rates far below their numbers in the applicant pool and the general population may well help her case.\u201d)."},"case_id":5663657,"label":"b"}
{"context":"When a disease is first diagnosed after service, service connection may nevertheless be established by evidence demonstrating that the disease was in fact \"incurred\" during the veteran's service or by evidence that a presumption period applied. A service-connection claim generally must be accompanied by evidence that establishes that the claimant currently has the claimed disability.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"104 F.3d 1328, 1331-32","parenthetical":"implicitly rejecting appellant's contention that Babideau and Brammer, both supra, and Caluza, infra, be overruled","sentence":"See Brammer v. Derwinski, 3 Vet.App. 223, 225 (1992) (absent \u201cproof of a present disabilityf,] there can be no valid claim\u201d); Babideau v. Derwinski, 2 Vet.App. 141, 144 (1992); see also Degmetich v. Brown, 104 F.3d 1328, 1331-32 (1997) (implicitly rejecting appellant\u2019s contention that Babideau and Brammer, both supra, and Caluza, infra, be overruled)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"3 Vet.App. 223, 225","parenthetical":"absent \"proof of a present disabilityf,] there can be no valid claim\"","sentence":"See Brammer v. Derwinski, 3 Vet.App. 223, 225 (1992) (absent \u201cproof of a present disabilityf,] there can be no valid claim\u201d); Babideau v. Derwinski, 2 Vet.App. 141, 144 (1992); see also Degmetich v. Brown, 104 F.3d 1328, 1331-32 (1997) (implicitly rejecting appellant\u2019s contention that Babideau and Brammer, both supra, and Caluza, infra, be overruled)."},"case_id":1185599,"label":"b"}
{"context":". This requirement of certitude should not be confused with the government's burden of proof, which, it is well settled, requires that inevitable discovery be established by a preponderance of the evidence.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"467 U.S. 444, 444","parenthetical":"\"If the prosecution can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the information ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means ... then the deterrence ratio nale has so little basis that the evidence should be received.\" (emphasis added","sentence":"See Nix, 467 U.S. at 444, 104 S.Ct. 2501 (\"If the prosecution can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the information ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means ... then the deterrence ratio nale has so little basis that the evidence should be received.\u201d (emphasis added)); see also United States v. Cunningham, 413 F.3d 1199, 1203 (10th Cir.2005) (\"The government possesses the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the evidence at issue would have been discovered without the Fourth Amendment violation.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"413 F.3d 1199, 1203","parenthetical":"\"The government possesses the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the evidence at issue would have been discovered without the Fourth Amendment violation.\"","sentence":"See Nix, 467 U.S. at 444, 104 S.Ct. 2501 (\"If the prosecution can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the information ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means ... then the deterrence ratio nale has so little basis that the evidence should be received.\u201d (emphasis added)); see also United States v. Cunningham, 413 F.3d 1199, 1203 (10th Cir.2005) (\"The government possesses the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the evidence at issue would have been discovered without the Fourth Amendment violation.\u201d)."},"case_id":3251225,"label":"a"}
{"context":". This requirement of certitude should not be confused with the government's burden of proof, which, it is well settled, requires that inevitable discovery be established by a preponderance of the evidence.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"If the prosecution can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the information ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means ... then the deterrence ratio nale has so little basis that the evidence should be received.\" (emphasis added","sentence":"See Nix, 467 U.S. at 444, 104 S.Ct. 2501 (\"If the prosecution can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the information ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means ... then the deterrence ratio nale has so little basis that the evidence should be received.\u201d (emphasis added)); see also United States v. Cunningham, 413 F.3d 1199, 1203 (10th Cir.2005) (\"The government possesses the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the evidence at issue would have been discovered without the Fourth Amendment violation.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"413 F.3d 1199, 1203","parenthetical":"\"The government possesses the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the evidence at issue would have been discovered without the Fourth Amendment violation.\"","sentence":"See Nix, 467 U.S. at 444, 104 S.Ct. 2501 (\"If the prosecution can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the information ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means ... then the deterrence ratio nale has so little basis that the evidence should be received.\u201d (emphasis added)); see also United States v. Cunningham, 413 F.3d 1199, 1203 (10th Cir.2005) (\"The government possesses the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the evidence at issue would have been discovered without the Fourth Amendment violation.\u201d)."},"case_id":3251225,"label":"a"}
{"context":"We think the judge was warranted in finding that there was probable cause to enter the Tee Pee without a warrant, to arrest Johnson and then to arrest the other five men, including Clinkscales, and later to search Clinkscales at the police station.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"358 Mass. 721, 723-724","parenthetical":"entry of apartment and warrantless arrest based on probable cause","sentence":"Commonwealth v. Andrews, 358 Mass. 721, 723-724 (1971), and cases cited (entry of apartment and warrantless arrest based on probable cause)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"contra","identifier":"354 Mass. 523, 531","parenthetical":"arrest on sole basis that defendant accompanied suspected bank robber","sentence":"Contrast Commonwealth v. Dirring, 354 Mass. 523, 531 (1968) (arrest on sole basis that defendant accompanied suspected bank robber)."},"case_id":3868740,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Defendants contend that the above claim for damages is inconsistent with proof of actual loss as required in legal malpractice actions.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that an essential element of a claim of legal malpractice pursued under either a contract or trespass theory is \"proof of actual loss rather than breach of a professional duty causing only nominal damages, speculative harm or the threat of future harm\"","sentence":"See Mariscotti v. Tinari, 335 Pa.Super. 599, 485 A.2d 56, 57 (1984) (stating that an essential element of a claim of legal malpractice, whether the action is denominated assumpsit or trespass, is proof of actual loss); see also Kituskie v. Corbman, 552 Pa. 275, 714 A.2d 1027, 1030 (1998) (holding that an essential element of a claim of legal malpractice pursued under either a contract or trespass theory is \u201cproof of actual loss rather than breach of a professional duty causing only nominal damages, speculative harm or the threat of future harm\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"stating that an essential element of a claim of legal malpractice, whether the action is denominated assumpsit or trespass, is proof of actual loss","sentence":"See Mariscotti v. Tinari, 335 Pa.Super. 599, 485 A.2d 56, 57 (1984) (stating that an essential element of a claim of legal malpractice, whether the action is denominated assumpsit or trespass, is proof of actual loss); see also Kituskie v. Corbman, 552 Pa. 275, 714 A.2d 1027, 1030 (1998) (holding that an essential element of a claim of legal malpractice pursued under either a contract or trespass theory is \u201cproof of actual loss rather than breach of a professional duty causing only nominal damages, speculative harm or the threat of future harm\u201d)."},"case_id":7311019,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Defendants contend that the above claim for damages is inconsistent with proof of actual loss as required in legal malpractice actions.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"714 A.2d 1027, 1030","parenthetical":"holding that an essential element of a claim of legal malpractice pursued under either a contract or trespass theory is \"proof of actual loss rather than breach of a professional duty causing only nominal damages, speculative harm or the threat of future harm\"","sentence":"See Mariscotti v. Tinari, 335 Pa.Super. 599, 485 A.2d 56, 57 (1984) (stating that an essential element of a claim of legal malpractice, whether the action is denominated assumpsit or trespass, is proof of actual loss); see also Kituskie v. Corbman, 552 Pa. 275, 714 A.2d 1027, 1030 (1998) (holding that an essential element of a claim of legal malpractice pursued under either a contract or trespass theory is \u201cproof of actual loss rather than breach of a professional duty causing only nominal damages, speculative harm or the threat of future harm\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"stating that an essential element of a claim of legal malpractice, whether the action is denominated assumpsit or trespass, is proof of actual loss","sentence":"See Mariscotti v. Tinari, 335 Pa.Super. 599, 485 A.2d 56, 57 (1984) (stating that an essential element of a claim of legal malpractice, whether the action is denominated assumpsit or trespass, is proof of actual loss); see also Kituskie v. Corbman, 552 Pa. 275, 714 A.2d 1027, 1030 (1998) (holding that an essential element of a claim of legal malpractice pursued under either a contract or trespass theory is \u201cproof of actual loss rather than breach of a professional duty causing only nominal damages, speculative harm or the threat of future harm\u201d)."},"case_id":7311019,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Defendants contend that the above claim for damages is inconsistent with proof of actual loss as required in legal malpractice actions.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that an essential element of a claim of legal malpractice pursued under either a contract or trespass theory is \"proof of actual loss rather than breach of a professional duty causing only nominal damages, speculative harm or the threat of future harm\"","sentence":"See Mariscotti v. Tinari, 335 Pa.Super. 599, 485 A.2d 56, 57 (1984) (stating that an essential element of a claim of legal malpractice, whether the action is denominated assumpsit or trespass, is proof of actual loss); see also Kituskie v. Corbman, 552 Pa. 275, 714 A.2d 1027, 1030 (1998) (holding that an essential element of a claim of legal malpractice pursued under either a contract or trespass theory is \u201cproof of actual loss rather than breach of a professional duty causing only nominal damages, speculative harm or the threat of future harm\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"485 A.2d 56, 57","parenthetical":"stating that an essential element of a claim of legal malpractice, whether the action is denominated assumpsit or trespass, is proof of actual loss","sentence":"See Mariscotti v. Tinari, 335 Pa.Super. 599, 485 A.2d 56, 57 (1984) (stating that an essential element of a claim of legal malpractice, whether the action is denominated assumpsit or trespass, is proof of actual loss); see also Kituskie v. Corbman, 552 Pa. 275, 714 A.2d 1027, 1030 (1998) (holding that an essential element of a claim of legal malpractice pursued under either a contract or trespass theory is \u201cproof of actual loss rather than breach of a professional duty causing only nominal damages, speculative harm or the threat of future harm\u201d)."},"case_id":7311019,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Defendants contend that the above claim for damages is inconsistent with proof of actual loss as required in legal malpractice actions.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"714 A.2d 1027, 1030","parenthetical":"holding that an essential element of a claim of legal malpractice pursued under either a contract or trespass theory is \"proof of actual loss rather than breach of a professional duty causing only nominal damages, speculative harm or the threat of future harm\"","sentence":"See Mariscotti v. Tinari, 335 Pa.Super. 599, 485 A.2d 56, 57 (1984) (stating that an essential element of a claim of legal malpractice, whether the action is denominated assumpsit or trespass, is proof of actual loss); see also Kituskie v. Corbman, 552 Pa. 275, 714 A.2d 1027, 1030 (1998) (holding that an essential element of a claim of legal malpractice pursued under either a contract or trespass theory is \u201cproof of actual loss rather than breach of a professional duty causing only nominal damages, speculative harm or the threat of future harm\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"485 A.2d 56, 57","parenthetical":"stating that an essential element of a claim of legal malpractice, whether the action is denominated assumpsit or trespass, is proof of actual loss","sentence":"See Mariscotti v. Tinari, 335 Pa.Super. 599, 485 A.2d 56, 57 (1984) (stating that an essential element of a claim of legal malpractice, whether the action is denominated assumpsit or trespass, is proof of actual loss); see also Kituskie v. Corbman, 552 Pa. 275, 714 A.2d 1027, 1030 (1998) (holding that an essential element of a claim of legal malpractice pursued under either a contract or trespass theory is \u201cproof of actual loss rather than breach of a professional duty causing only nominal damages, speculative harm or the threat of future harm\u201d)."},"case_id":7311019,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Aplt's Verified Motion for Issuance of a COA at 12 (quotation marks and citation omitted). But this statement alone falls short of establishing, as Mr. Galvan must, a reasonable probability that the ultimate result would have been different.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"547 U.S. 499, 499","parenthetical":"where charges are dismissed without prejudice, the government can seek and obtain a new indictment","sentence":"See Zedner, 547 U.S. at 499, 126 S.Ct. 1976 (where charges are dismissed without prejudice, the government can seek and obtain a new indictment); see also Rushin, 642 F.3d at 1310 n. 12 (collecting cases holding that a defendant could not show prejudice based on counsel\u2019s failure to seek dismissal under the STA where an indictment would have been dismissed without prejudice); Id. at 1312 (Holmes, J., concurring) (\u201c[Movant] must show that the government would have been precluded from refiling the charges, either because the dismissal would have been with prejudice or because the applicable statute-of-limitations period would have elapsed.\u201d (citation omitted))."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"collecting cases holding that a defendant could not show prejudice based on counsel's failure to seek dismissal under the STA where an indictment would have been dismissed without prejudice","sentence":"See Zedner, 547 U.S. at 499, 126 S.Ct. 1976 (where charges are dismissed without prejudice, the government can seek and obtain a new indictment); see also Rushin, 642 F.3d at 1310 n. 12 (collecting cases holding that a defendant could not show prejudice based on counsel\u2019s failure to seek dismissal under the STA where an indictment would have been dismissed without prejudice); Id. at 1312 (Holmes, J., concurring) (\u201c[Movant] must show that the government would have been precluded from refiling the charges, either because the dismissal would have been with prejudice or because the applicable statute-of-limitations period would have elapsed.\u201d (citation omitted))."},"case_id":3917528,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Aplt's Verified Motion for Issuance of a COA at 12 (quotation marks and citation omitted). But this statement alone falls short of establishing, as Mr. Galvan must, a reasonable probability that the ultimate result would have been different.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"where charges are dismissed without prejudice, the government can seek and obtain a new indictment","sentence":"See Zedner, 547 U.S. at 499, 126 S.Ct. 1976 (where charges are dismissed without prejudice, the government can seek and obtain a new indictment); see also Rushin, 642 F.3d at 1310 n. 12 (collecting cases holding that a defendant could not show prejudice based on counsel\u2019s failure to seek dismissal under the STA where an indictment would have been dismissed without prejudice); Id. at 1312 (Holmes, J., concurring) (\u201c[Movant] must show that the government would have been precluded from refiling the charges, either because the dismissal would have been with prejudice or because the applicable statute-of-limitations period would have elapsed.\u201d (citation omitted))."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"collecting cases holding that a defendant could not show prejudice based on counsel's failure to seek dismissal under the STA where an indictment would have been dismissed without prejudice","sentence":"See Zedner, 547 U.S. at 499, 126 S.Ct. 1976 (where charges are dismissed without prejudice, the government can seek and obtain a new indictment); see also Rushin, 642 F.3d at 1310 n. 12 (collecting cases holding that a defendant could not show prejudice based on counsel\u2019s failure to seek dismissal under the STA where an indictment would have been dismissed without prejudice); Id. at 1312 (Holmes, J., concurring) (\u201c[Movant] must show that the government would have been precluded from refiling the charges, either because the dismissal would have been with prejudice or because the applicable statute-of-limitations period would have elapsed.\u201d (citation omitted))."},"case_id":3917528,"label":"a"}
{"context":"However, under certain circumstances, restitution of fees by attorneys has been required.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"after judgment set aside, plaintiffs entitlement to restitution pursuant to stipulation signed by defendant's attorney meant that attorney must return fees he had retained from that money","sentence":"See In re Marriage of Mason, 48 Wash.App. 688, 740 P.2d 356 (1987) (because the attorney for the prevailing party was on notice of an appeal, aware of possible reversal, and therefore not a bona fide purchaser, restitution of fees was ordered); see also Brown v. Howard, 86 Cal.App. 532, 261 P. 732 (1927) (after judgment set aside, plaintiffs entitlement to restitution pursuant to stipulation signed by defendant\u2019s attorney meant that attorney must return fees he had retained from that money); Champion International Corp. v. McChesney, 239 Mont. 287, 779 P.2d 527 (1989) (since attorney in workers\u2019 compensation proceeding was aware that claimant could be required to reimburse employer for overpayment and his fees were based solely on benefits received by claimant, the attorney was required to repay the employer); Bruns v. Mattocks, 6 N.J.Super. 174, 70 A.2d 780 (1950) (restitution entered against attorney who was aware that return of taxed costs paid under compulsion would be expeeted in the event of a reversal on appeal); Trans-america."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"because the attorney for the prevailing party was on notice of an appeal, aware of possible reversal, and therefore not a bona fide purchaser, restitution of fees was ordered","sentence":"See In re Marriage of Mason, 48 Wash.App. 688, 740 P.2d 356 (1987) (because the attorney for the prevailing party was on notice of an appeal, aware of possible reversal, and therefore not a bona fide purchaser, restitution of fees was ordered); see also Brown v. Howard, 86 Cal.App. 532, 261 P. 732 (1927) (after judgment set aside, plaintiffs entitlement to restitution pursuant to stipulation signed by defendant\u2019s attorney meant that attorney must return fees he had retained from that money); Champion International Corp. v. McChesney, 239 Mont. 287, 779 P.2d 527 (1989) (since attorney in workers\u2019 compensation proceeding was aware that claimant could be required to reimburse employer for overpayment and his fees were based solely on benefits received by claimant, the attorney was required to repay the employer); Bruns v. Mattocks, 6 N.J.Super. 174, 70 A.2d 780 (1950) (restitution entered against attorney who was aware that return of taxed costs paid under compulsion would be expeeted in the event of a reversal on appeal); Trans-america."},"case_id":10366057,"label":"b"}
{"context":"However, under certain circumstances, restitution of fees by attorneys has been required.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"after judgment set aside, plaintiffs entitlement to restitution pursuant to stipulation signed by defendant's attorney meant that attorney must return fees he had retained from that money","sentence":"See In re Marriage of Mason, 48 Wash.App. 688, 740 P.2d 356 (1987) (because the attorney for the prevailing party was on notice of an appeal, aware of possible reversal, and therefore not a bona fide purchaser, restitution of fees was ordered); see also Brown v. Howard, 86 Cal.App. 532, 261 P. 732 (1927) (after judgment set aside, plaintiffs entitlement to restitution pursuant to stipulation signed by defendant\u2019s attorney meant that attorney must return fees he had retained from that money); Champion International Corp. v. McChesney, 239 Mont. 287, 779 P.2d 527 (1989) (since attorney in workers\u2019 compensation proceeding was aware that claimant could be required to reimburse employer for overpayment and his fees were based solely on benefits received by claimant, the attorney was required to repay the employer); Bruns v. Mattocks, 6 N.J.Super. 174, 70 A.2d 780 (1950) (restitution entered against attorney who was aware that return of taxed costs paid under compulsion would be expeeted in the event of a reversal on appeal); Trans-america."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"because the attorney for the prevailing party was on notice of an appeal, aware of possible reversal, and therefore not a bona fide purchaser, restitution of fees was ordered","sentence":"See In re Marriage of Mason, 48 Wash.App. 688, 740 P.2d 356 (1987) (because the attorney for the prevailing party was on notice of an appeal, aware of possible reversal, and therefore not a bona fide purchaser, restitution of fees was ordered); see also Brown v. Howard, 86 Cal.App. 532, 261 P. 732 (1927) (after judgment set aside, plaintiffs entitlement to restitution pursuant to stipulation signed by defendant\u2019s attorney meant that attorney must return fees he had retained from that money); Champion International Corp. v. McChesney, 239 Mont. 287, 779 P.2d 527 (1989) (since attorney in workers\u2019 compensation proceeding was aware that claimant could be required to reimburse employer for overpayment and his fees were based solely on benefits received by claimant, the attorney was required to repay the employer); Bruns v. Mattocks, 6 N.J.Super. 174, 70 A.2d 780 (1950) (restitution entered against attorney who was aware that return of taxed costs paid under compulsion would be expeeted in the event of a reversal on appeal); Trans-america."},"case_id":10366057,"label":"b"}
{"context":"However, under certain circumstances, restitution of fees by attorneys has been required.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"because the attorney for the prevailing party was on notice of an appeal, aware of possible reversal, and therefore not a bona fide purchaser, restitution of fees was ordered","sentence":"See In re Marriage of Mason, 48 Wash.App. 688, 740 P.2d 356 (1987) (because the attorney for the prevailing party was on notice of an appeal, aware of possible reversal, and therefore not a bona fide purchaser, restitution of fees was ordered); see also Brown v. Howard, 86 Cal.App. 532, 261 P. 732 (1927) (after judgment set aside, plaintiffs entitlement to restitution pursuant to stipulation signed by defendant\u2019s attorney meant that attorney must return fees he had retained from that money); Champion International Corp. v. McChesney, 239 Mont. 287, 779 P.2d 527 (1989) (since attorney in workers\u2019 compensation proceeding was aware that claimant could be required to reimburse employer for overpayment and his fees were based solely on benefits received by claimant, the attorney was required to repay the employer); Bruns v. Mattocks, 6 N.J.Super. 174, 70 A.2d 780 (1950) (restitution entered against attorney who was aware that return of taxed costs paid under compulsion would be expeeted in the event of a reversal on appeal); Trans-america."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"since attorney in workers' compensation proceeding was aware that claimant could be required to reimburse employer for overpayment and his fees were based solely on benefits received by claimant, the attorney was required to repay the employer","sentence":"See In re Marriage of Mason, 48 Wash.App. 688, 740 P.2d 356 (1987) (because the attorney for the prevailing party was on notice of an appeal, aware of possible reversal, and therefore not a bona fide purchaser, restitution of fees was ordered); see also Brown v. Howard, 86 Cal.App. 532, 261 P. 732 (1927) (after judgment set aside, plaintiffs entitlement to restitution pursuant to stipulation signed by defendant\u2019s attorney meant that attorney must return fees he had retained from that money); Champion International Corp. v. McChesney, 239 Mont. 287, 779 P.2d 527 (1989) (since attorney in workers\u2019 compensation proceeding was aware that claimant could be required to reimburse employer for overpayment and his fees were based solely on benefits received by claimant, the attorney was required to repay the employer); Bruns v. Mattocks, 6 N.J.Super. 174, 70 A.2d 780 (1950) (restitution entered against attorney who was aware that return of taxed costs paid under compulsion would be expeeted in the event of a reversal on appeal); Trans-america."},"case_id":10366057,"label":"a"}
{"context":"However, under certain circumstances, restitution of fees by attorneys has been required.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"because the attorney for the prevailing party was on notice of an appeal, aware of possible reversal, and therefore not a bona fide purchaser, restitution of fees was ordered","sentence":"See In re Marriage of Mason, 48 Wash.App. 688, 740 P.2d 356 (1987) (because the attorney for the prevailing party was on notice of an appeal, aware of possible reversal, and therefore not a bona fide purchaser, restitution of fees was ordered); see also Brown v. Howard, 86 Cal.App. 532, 261 P. 732 (1927) (after judgment set aside, plaintiffs entitlement to restitution pursuant to stipulation signed by defendant\u2019s attorney meant that attorney must return fees he had retained from that money); Champion International Corp. v. McChesney, 239 Mont. 287, 779 P.2d 527 (1989) (since attorney in workers\u2019 compensation proceeding was aware that claimant could be required to reimburse employer for overpayment and his fees were based solely on benefits received by claimant, the attorney was required to repay the employer); Bruns v. Mattocks, 6 N.J.Super. 174, 70 A.2d 780 (1950) (restitution entered against attorney who was aware that return of taxed costs paid under compulsion would be expeeted in the event of a reversal on appeal); Trans-america."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"since attorney in workers' compensation proceeding was aware that claimant could be required to reimburse employer for overpayment and his fees were based solely on benefits received by claimant, the attorney was required to repay the employer","sentence":"See In re Marriage of Mason, 48 Wash.App. 688, 740 P.2d 356 (1987) (because the attorney for the prevailing party was on notice of an appeal, aware of possible reversal, and therefore not a bona fide purchaser, restitution of fees was ordered); see also Brown v. Howard, 86 Cal.App. 532, 261 P. 732 (1927) (after judgment set aside, plaintiffs entitlement to restitution pursuant to stipulation signed by defendant\u2019s attorney meant that attorney must return fees he had retained from that money); Champion International Corp. v. McChesney, 239 Mont. 287, 779 P.2d 527 (1989) (since attorney in workers\u2019 compensation proceeding was aware that claimant could be required to reimburse employer for overpayment and his fees were based solely on benefits received by claimant, the attorney was required to repay the employer); Bruns v. Mattocks, 6 N.J.Super. 174, 70 A.2d 780 (1950) (restitution entered against attorney who was aware that return of taxed costs paid under compulsion would be expeeted in the event of a reversal on appeal); Trans-america."},"case_id":10366057,"label":"a"}
{"context":"However, under certain circumstances, restitution of fees by attorneys has been required.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"restitution entered against attorney who was aware that return of taxed costs paid under compulsion would be expeeted in the event of a reversal on appeal","sentence":"See In re Marriage of Mason, 48 Wash.App. 688, 740 P.2d 356 (1987) (because the attorney for the prevailing party was on notice of an appeal, aware of possible reversal, and therefore not a bona fide purchaser, restitution of fees was ordered); see also Brown v. Howard, 86 Cal.App. 532, 261 P. 732 (1927) (after judgment set aside, plaintiffs entitlement to restitution pursuant to stipulation signed by defendant\u2019s attorney meant that attorney must return fees he had retained from that money); Champion International Corp. v. McChesney, 239 Mont. 287, 779 P.2d 527 (1989) (since attorney in workers\u2019 compensation proceeding was aware that claimant could be required to reimburse employer for overpayment and his fees were based solely on benefits received by claimant, the attorney was required to repay the employer); Bruns v. Mattocks, 6 N.J.Super. 174, 70 A.2d 780 (1950) (restitution entered against attorney who was aware that return of taxed costs paid under compulsion would be expeeted in the event of a reversal on appeal); Trans-america."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"because the attorney for the prevailing party was on notice of an appeal, aware of possible reversal, and therefore not a bona fide purchaser, restitution of fees was ordered","sentence":"See In re Marriage of Mason, 48 Wash.App. 688, 740 P.2d 356 (1987) (because the attorney for the prevailing party was on notice of an appeal, aware of possible reversal, and therefore not a bona fide purchaser, restitution of fees was ordered); see also Brown v. Howard, 86 Cal.App. 532, 261 P. 732 (1927) (after judgment set aside, plaintiffs entitlement to restitution pursuant to stipulation signed by defendant\u2019s attorney meant that attorney must return fees he had retained from that money); Champion International Corp. v. McChesney, 239 Mont. 287, 779 P.2d 527 (1989) (since attorney in workers\u2019 compensation proceeding was aware that claimant could be required to reimburse employer for overpayment and his fees were based solely on benefits received by claimant, the attorney was required to repay the employer); Bruns v. Mattocks, 6 N.J.Super. 174, 70 A.2d 780 (1950) (restitution entered against attorney who was aware that return of taxed costs paid under compulsion would be expeeted in the event of a reversal on appeal); Trans-america."},"case_id":10366057,"label":"b"}
{"context":"However, under certain circumstances, restitution of fees by attorneys has been required.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"because the attorney for the prevailing party was on notice of an appeal, aware of possible reversal, and therefore not a bona fide purchaser, restitution of fees was ordered","sentence":"See In re Marriage of Mason, 48 Wash.App. 688, 740 P.2d 356 (1987) (because the attorney for the prevailing party was on notice of an appeal, aware of possible reversal, and therefore not a bona fide purchaser, restitution of fees was ordered); see also Brown v. Howard, 86 Cal.App. 532, 261 P. 732 (1927) (after judgment set aside, plaintiffs entitlement to restitution pursuant to stipulation signed by defendant\u2019s attorney meant that attorney must return fees he had retained from that money); Champion International Corp. v. McChesney, 239 Mont. 287, 779 P.2d 527 (1989) (since attorney in workers\u2019 compensation proceeding was aware that claimant could be required to reimburse employer for overpayment and his fees were based solely on benefits received by claimant, the attorney was required to repay the employer); Bruns v. Mattocks, 6 N.J.Super. 174, 70 A.2d 780 (1950) (restitution entered against attorney who was aware that return of taxed costs paid under compulsion would be expeeted in the event of a reversal on appeal); Trans-america."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"restitution entered against attorney who was aware that return of taxed costs paid under compulsion would be expeeted in the event of a reversal on appeal","sentence":"See In re Marriage of Mason, 48 Wash.App. 688, 740 P.2d 356 (1987) (because the attorney for the prevailing party was on notice of an appeal, aware of possible reversal, and therefore not a bona fide purchaser, restitution of fees was ordered); see also Brown v. Howard, 86 Cal.App. 532, 261 P. 732 (1927) (after judgment set aside, plaintiffs entitlement to restitution pursuant to stipulation signed by defendant\u2019s attorney meant that attorney must return fees he had retained from that money); Champion International Corp. v. McChesney, 239 Mont. 287, 779 P.2d 527 (1989) (since attorney in workers\u2019 compensation proceeding was aware that claimant could be required to reimburse employer for overpayment and his fees were based solely on benefits received by claimant, the attorney was required to repay the employer); Bruns v. Mattocks, 6 N.J.Super. 174, 70 A.2d 780 (1950) (restitution entered against attorney who was aware that return of taxed costs paid under compulsion would be expeeted in the event of a reversal on appeal); Trans-america."},"case_id":10366057,"label":"a"}
{"context":"However, under certain circumstances, restitution of fees by attorneys has been required.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"after judgment set aside, plaintiffs entitlement to restitution pursuant to stipulation signed by defendant's attorney meant that attorney must return fees he had retained from that money","sentence":"See In re Marriage of Mason, 48 Wash.App. 688, 740 P.2d 356 (1987) (because the attorney for the prevailing party was on notice of an appeal, aware of possible reversal, and therefore not a bona fide purchaser, restitution of fees was ordered); see also Brown v. Howard, 86 Cal.App. 532, 261 P. 732 (1927) (after judgment set aside, plaintiffs entitlement to restitution pursuant to stipulation signed by defendant\u2019s attorney meant that attorney must return fees he had retained from that money); Champion International Corp. v. McChesney, 239 Mont. 287, 779 P.2d 527 (1989) (since attorney in workers\u2019 compensation proceeding was aware that claimant could be required to reimburse employer for overpayment and his fees were based solely on benefits received by claimant, the attorney was required to repay the employer); Bruns v. Mattocks, 6 N.J.Super. 174, 70 A.2d 780 (1950) (restitution entered against attorney who was aware that return of taxed costs paid under compulsion would be expeeted in the event of a reversal on appeal); Trans-america."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"because the attorney for the prevailing party was on notice of an appeal, aware of possible reversal, and therefore not a bona fide purchaser, restitution of fees was ordered","sentence":"See In re Marriage of Mason, 48 Wash.App. 688, 740 P.2d 356 (1987) (because the attorney for the prevailing party was on notice of an appeal, aware of possible reversal, and therefore not a bona fide purchaser, restitution of fees was ordered); see also Brown v. Howard, 86 Cal.App. 532, 261 P. 732 (1927) (after judgment set aside, plaintiffs entitlement to restitution pursuant to stipulation signed by defendant\u2019s attorney meant that attorney must return fees he had retained from that money); Champion International Corp. v. McChesney, 239 Mont. 287, 779 P.2d 527 (1989) (since attorney in workers\u2019 compensation proceeding was aware that claimant could be required to reimburse employer for overpayment and his fees were based solely on benefits received by claimant, the attorney was required to repay the employer); Bruns v. Mattocks, 6 N.J.Super. 174, 70 A.2d 780 (1950) (restitution entered against attorney who was aware that return of taxed costs paid under compulsion would be expeeted in the event of a reversal on appeal); Trans-america."},"case_id":10366057,"label":"b"}
{"context":"However, under certain circumstances, restitution of fees by attorneys has been required.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"because the attorney for the prevailing party was on notice of an appeal, aware of possible reversal, and therefore not a bona fide purchaser, restitution of fees was ordered","sentence":"See In re Marriage of Mason, 48 Wash.App. 688, 740 P.2d 356 (1987) (because the attorney for the prevailing party was on notice of an appeal, aware of possible reversal, and therefore not a bona fide purchaser, restitution of fees was ordered); see also Brown v. Howard, 86 Cal.App. 532, 261 P. 732 (1927) (after judgment set aside, plaintiffs entitlement to restitution pursuant to stipulation signed by defendant\u2019s attorney meant that attorney must return fees he had retained from that money); Champion International Corp. v. McChesney, 239 Mont. 287, 779 P.2d 527 (1989) (since attorney in workers\u2019 compensation proceeding was aware that claimant could be required to reimburse employer for overpayment and his fees were based solely on benefits received by claimant, the attorney was required to repay the employer); Bruns v. Mattocks, 6 N.J.Super. 174, 70 A.2d 780 (1950) (restitution entered against attorney who was aware that return of taxed costs paid under compulsion would be expeeted in the event of a reversal on appeal); Trans-america."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"after judgment set aside, plaintiffs entitlement to restitution pursuant to stipulation signed by defendant's attorney meant that attorney must return fees he had retained from that money","sentence":"See In re Marriage of Mason, 48 Wash.App. 688, 740 P.2d 356 (1987) (because the attorney for the prevailing party was on notice of an appeal, aware of possible reversal, and therefore not a bona fide purchaser, restitution of fees was ordered); see also Brown v. Howard, 86 Cal.App. 532, 261 P. 732 (1927) (after judgment set aside, plaintiffs entitlement to restitution pursuant to stipulation signed by defendant\u2019s attorney meant that attorney must return fees he had retained from that money); Champion International Corp. v. McChesney, 239 Mont. 287, 779 P.2d 527 (1989) (since attorney in workers\u2019 compensation proceeding was aware that claimant could be required to reimburse employer for overpayment and his fees were based solely on benefits received by claimant, the attorney was required to repay the employer); Bruns v. Mattocks, 6 N.J.Super. 174, 70 A.2d 780 (1950) (restitution entered against attorney who was aware that return of taxed costs paid under compulsion would be expeeted in the event of a reversal on appeal); Trans-america."},"case_id":10366057,"label":"a"}
{"context":"However, under certain circumstances, restitution of fees by attorneys has been required.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"since attorney in workers' compensation proceeding was aware that claimant could be required to reimburse employer for overpayment and his fees were based solely on benefits received by claimant, the attorney was required to repay the employer","sentence":"See In re Marriage of Mason, 48 Wash.App. 688, 740 P.2d 356 (1987) (because the attorney for the prevailing party was on notice of an appeal, aware of possible reversal, and therefore not a bona fide purchaser, restitution of fees was ordered); see also Brown v. Howard, 86 Cal.App. 532, 261 P. 732 (1927) (after judgment set aside, plaintiffs entitlement to restitution pursuant to stipulation signed by defendant\u2019s attorney meant that attorney must return fees he had retained from that money); Champion International Corp. v. McChesney, 239 Mont. 287, 779 P.2d 527 (1989) (since attorney in workers\u2019 compensation proceeding was aware that claimant could be required to reimburse employer for overpayment and his fees were based solely on benefits received by claimant, the attorney was required to repay the employer); Bruns v. Mattocks, 6 N.J.Super. 174, 70 A.2d 780 (1950) (restitution entered against attorney who was aware that return of taxed costs paid under compulsion would be expeeted in the event of a reversal on appeal); Trans-america."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"because the attorney for the prevailing party was on notice of an appeal, aware of possible reversal, and therefore not a bona fide purchaser, restitution of fees was ordered","sentence":"See In re Marriage of Mason, 48 Wash.App. 688, 740 P.2d 356 (1987) (because the attorney for the prevailing party was on notice of an appeal, aware of possible reversal, and therefore not a bona fide purchaser, restitution of fees was ordered); see also Brown v. Howard, 86 Cal.App. 532, 261 P. 732 (1927) (after judgment set aside, plaintiffs entitlement to restitution pursuant to stipulation signed by defendant\u2019s attorney meant that attorney must return fees he had retained from that money); Champion International Corp. v. McChesney, 239 Mont. 287, 779 P.2d 527 (1989) (since attorney in workers\u2019 compensation proceeding was aware that claimant could be required to reimburse employer for overpayment and his fees were based solely on benefits received by claimant, the attorney was required to repay the employer); Bruns v. Mattocks, 6 N.J.Super. 174, 70 A.2d 780 (1950) (restitution entered against attorney who was aware that return of taxed costs paid under compulsion would be expeeted in the event of a reversal on appeal); Trans-america."},"case_id":10366057,"label":"b"}
{"context":"However, under certain circumstances, restitution of fees by attorneys has been required.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"since attorney in workers' compensation proceeding was aware that claimant could be required to reimburse employer for overpayment and his fees were based solely on benefits received by claimant, the attorney was required to repay the employer","sentence":"See In re Marriage of Mason, 48 Wash.App. 688, 740 P.2d 356 (1987) (because the attorney for the prevailing party was on notice of an appeal, aware of possible reversal, and therefore not a bona fide purchaser, restitution of fees was ordered); see also Brown v. Howard, 86 Cal.App. 532, 261 P. 732 (1927) (after judgment set aside, plaintiffs entitlement to restitution pursuant to stipulation signed by defendant\u2019s attorney meant that attorney must return fees he had retained from that money); Champion International Corp. v. McChesney, 239 Mont. 287, 779 P.2d 527 (1989) (since attorney in workers\u2019 compensation proceeding was aware that claimant could be required to reimburse employer for overpayment and his fees were based solely on benefits received by claimant, the attorney was required to repay the employer); Bruns v. Mattocks, 6 N.J.Super. 174, 70 A.2d 780 (1950) (restitution entered against attorney who was aware that return of taxed costs paid under compulsion would be expeeted in the event of a reversal on appeal); Trans-america."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"because the attorney for the prevailing party was on notice of an appeal, aware of possible reversal, and therefore not a bona fide purchaser, restitution of fees was ordered","sentence":"See In re Marriage of Mason, 48 Wash.App. 688, 740 P.2d 356 (1987) (because the attorney for the prevailing party was on notice of an appeal, aware of possible reversal, and therefore not a bona fide purchaser, restitution of fees was ordered); see also Brown v. Howard, 86 Cal.App. 532, 261 P. 732 (1927) (after judgment set aside, plaintiffs entitlement to restitution pursuant to stipulation signed by defendant\u2019s attorney meant that attorney must return fees he had retained from that money); Champion International Corp. v. McChesney, 239 Mont. 287, 779 P.2d 527 (1989) (since attorney in workers\u2019 compensation proceeding was aware that claimant could be required to reimburse employer for overpayment and his fees were based solely on benefits received by claimant, the attorney was required to repay the employer); Bruns v. Mattocks, 6 N.J.Super. 174, 70 A.2d 780 (1950) (restitution entered against attorney who was aware that return of taxed costs paid under compulsion would be expeeted in the event of a reversal on appeal); Trans-america."},"case_id":10366057,"label":"b"}
{"context":"However, under certain circumstances, restitution of fees by attorneys has been required.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"because the attorney for the prevailing party was on notice of an appeal, aware of possible reversal, and therefore not a bona fide purchaser, restitution of fees was ordered","sentence":"See In re Marriage of Mason, 48 Wash.App. 688, 740 P.2d 356 (1987) (because the attorney for the prevailing party was on notice of an appeal, aware of possible reversal, and therefore not a bona fide purchaser, restitution of fees was ordered); see also Brown v. Howard, 86 Cal.App. 532, 261 P. 732 (1927) (after judgment set aside, plaintiffs entitlement to restitution pursuant to stipulation signed by defendant\u2019s attorney meant that attorney must return fees he had retained from that money); Champion International Corp. v. McChesney, 239 Mont. 287, 779 P.2d 527 (1989) (since attorney in workers\u2019 compensation proceeding was aware that claimant could be required to reimburse employer for overpayment and his fees were based solely on benefits received by claimant, the attorney was required to repay the employer); Bruns v. Mattocks, 6 N.J.Super. 174, 70 A.2d 780 (1950) (restitution entered against attorney who was aware that return of taxed costs paid under compulsion would be expeeted in the event of a reversal on appeal); Trans-america."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"restitution entered against attorney who was aware that return of taxed costs paid under compulsion would be expeeted in the event of a reversal on appeal","sentence":"See In re Marriage of Mason, 48 Wash.App. 688, 740 P.2d 356 (1987) (because the attorney for the prevailing party was on notice of an appeal, aware of possible reversal, and therefore not a bona fide purchaser, restitution of fees was ordered); see also Brown v. Howard, 86 Cal.App. 532, 261 P. 732 (1927) (after judgment set aside, plaintiffs entitlement to restitution pursuant to stipulation signed by defendant\u2019s attorney meant that attorney must return fees he had retained from that money); Champion International Corp. v. McChesney, 239 Mont. 287, 779 P.2d 527 (1989) (since attorney in workers\u2019 compensation proceeding was aware that claimant could be required to reimburse employer for overpayment and his fees were based solely on benefits received by claimant, the attorney was required to repay the employer); Bruns v. Mattocks, 6 N.J.Super. 174, 70 A.2d 780 (1950) (restitution entered against attorney who was aware that return of taxed costs paid under compulsion would be expeeted in the event of a reversal on appeal); Trans-america."},"case_id":10366057,"label":"a"}
{"context":"However, under certain circumstances, restitution of fees by attorneys has been required.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"restitution entered against attorney who was aware that return of taxed costs paid under compulsion would be expeeted in the event of a reversal on appeal","sentence":"See In re Marriage of Mason, 48 Wash.App. 688, 740 P.2d 356 (1987) (because the attorney for the prevailing party was on notice of an appeal, aware of possible reversal, and therefore not a bona fide purchaser, restitution of fees was ordered); see also Brown v. Howard, 86 Cal.App. 532, 261 P. 732 (1927) (after judgment set aside, plaintiffs entitlement to restitution pursuant to stipulation signed by defendant\u2019s attorney meant that attorney must return fees he had retained from that money); Champion International Corp. v. McChesney, 239 Mont. 287, 779 P.2d 527 (1989) (since attorney in workers\u2019 compensation proceeding was aware that claimant could be required to reimburse employer for overpayment and his fees were based solely on benefits received by claimant, the attorney was required to repay the employer); Bruns v. Mattocks, 6 N.J.Super. 174, 70 A.2d 780 (1950) (restitution entered against attorney who was aware that return of taxed costs paid under compulsion would be expeeted in the event of a reversal on appeal); Trans-america."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"because the attorney for the prevailing party was on notice of an appeal, aware of possible reversal, and therefore not a bona fide purchaser, restitution of fees was ordered","sentence":"See In re Marriage of Mason, 48 Wash.App. 688, 740 P.2d 356 (1987) (because the attorney for the prevailing party was on notice of an appeal, aware of possible reversal, and therefore not a bona fide purchaser, restitution of fees was ordered); see also Brown v. Howard, 86 Cal.App. 532, 261 P. 732 (1927) (after judgment set aside, plaintiffs entitlement to restitution pursuant to stipulation signed by defendant\u2019s attorney meant that attorney must return fees he had retained from that money); Champion International Corp. v. McChesney, 239 Mont. 287, 779 P.2d 527 (1989) (since attorney in workers\u2019 compensation proceeding was aware that claimant could be required to reimburse employer for overpayment and his fees were based solely on benefits received by claimant, the attorney was required to repay the employer); Bruns v. Mattocks, 6 N.J.Super. 174, 70 A.2d 780 (1950) (restitution entered against attorney who was aware that return of taxed costs paid under compulsion would be expeeted in the event of a reversal on appeal); Trans-america."},"case_id":10366057,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The Court is unable to find that Goldberg has purposefully availed himself of the laws and privileges of Virginia. Additionally, this single phone call is insufficient to establish in personam jurisdiction over Goldberg.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"46 Va. Cir. 558, 562","parenthetical":"\"the phone calls, the one business trip, and the catalog publication... do not confer jurisdiction\"","sentence":"See Turnbull, 61 Va. Cir. at 383 (\u201coccasionally doing employment related work in his home in Virginia and two phone calls to Virginia are not sufficient contacts to establish in personam jurisdiction over the Defendants.\u201d); see also Eastern Tech. Enters., Inc. v. Wilson & Hayes, Inc., 46 Va. Cir. 558, 562 (1997) (\u201cthe phone calls, the one business trip, and the catalog publication... do not confer jurisdiction\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"61 Va. Cir. 383, 383","parenthetical":"\"occasionally doing employment related work in his home in Virginia and two phone calls to Virginia are not sufficient contacts to establish in personam jurisdiction over the Defendants.\"","sentence":"See Turnbull, 61 Va. Cir. at 383 (\u201coccasionally doing employment related work in his home in Virginia and two phone calls to Virginia are not sufficient contacts to establish in personam jurisdiction over the Defendants.\u201d); see also Eastern Tech. Enters., Inc. v. Wilson & Hayes, Inc., 46 Va. Cir. 558, 562 (1997) (\u201cthe phone calls, the one business trip, and the catalog publication... do not confer jurisdiction\u201d)."},"case_id":3861651,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Tex.R. Civ. P. 274. Therefore, the objection and any complaint based thereon are waived.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"complaint waived as to unobjected-to charge question allowing award of elements of damages unrecoverable under the legal theory at trial","sentence":"See Wilgus v. Bond, 780 S.W.2d 670 (Tex.1987) (complaint waived as to unobjected-to charge question allowing award of elements of damages unrecoverable under the legal theory at trial); Hruska v. First State Bank of Deanville, 747 S.W.2d 783, 785 (Tex.1988) (complaint waived as to unobjected-to charge question allowing award of attorney\u2019s fees for matters for which attorney\u2019s fees are not allowed at law) (citing Aero Energy, Inc. v. Circle C Drilling Co., 699 S.W.2d 821, 823 (Tex.1985); Matthews v. Candlewood Builders, Inc., 685 S.W.2d 649, 650 (Tex.1985)); Casteel-Diebolt v. Diebolt, 912 S.W.2d 302, 304 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1995, no writ) (failure to object to omissions from the charge is a waiver of the complaint which estops a party from complaining on appeal about the omissions); see also Green Intern., Inc. v. Solis, 951 S.W.2d 384, 389 (Tex.1997) (complaint on appeal is waived when a damages question on attorney\u2019s fees which fails to segregate the fees among various claims, some of which do not allow for recovery of the fees, is submitted without objection, and the evidence is sufficient to support the award); Iron Mountain Bison Ranch, Inc. v. Easley Trailer Manufacturing, Inc., 42 S.W.3d 149, 156-57 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2000, no pet.) (Reversal is required when a damages question incorporates a legally-incorrect measure of damages only if there was a Rule 274 objection made) (citing Crown Life Insur."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"951 S.W.2d 384, 389","parenthetical":"complaint on appeal is waived when a damages question on attorney's fees which fails to segregate the fees among various claims, some of which do not allow for recovery of the fees, is submitted without objection, and the evidence is sufficient to support the award","sentence":"See Wilgus v. Bond, 780 S.W.2d 670 (Tex.1987) (complaint waived as to unobjected-to charge question allowing award of elements of damages unrecoverable under the legal theory at trial); Hruska v. First State Bank of Deanville, 747 S.W.2d 783, 785 (Tex.1988) (complaint waived as to unobjected-to charge question allowing award of attorney\u2019s fees for matters for which attorney\u2019s fees are not allowed at law) (citing Aero Energy, Inc. v. Circle C Drilling Co., 699 S.W.2d 821, 823 (Tex.1985); Matthews v. Candlewood Builders, Inc., 685 S.W.2d 649, 650 (Tex.1985)); Casteel-Diebolt v. Diebolt, 912 S.W.2d 302, 304 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1995, no writ) (failure to object to omissions from the charge is a waiver of the complaint which estops a party from complaining on appeal about the omissions); see also Green Intern., Inc. v. Solis, 951 S.W.2d 384, 389 (Tex.1997) (complaint on appeal is waived when a damages question on attorney\u2019s fees which fails to segregate the fees among various claims, some of which do not allow for recovery of the fees, is submitted without objection, and the evidence is sufficient to support the award); Iron Mountain Bison Ranch, Inc. v. Easley Trailer Manufacturing, Inc., 42 S.W.3d 149, 156-57 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2000, no pet.) (Reversal is required when a damages question incorporates a legally-incorrect measure of damages only if there was a Rule 274 objection made) (citing Crown Life Insur."},"case_id":9425604,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Tex.R. Civ. P. 274. Therefore, the objection and any complaint based thereon are waived.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"42 S.W.3d 149, 156-57","parenthetical":"Reversal is required when a damages question incorporates a legally-incorrect measure of damages only if there was a Rule 274 objection made","sentence":"See Wilgus v. Bond, 780 S.W.2d 670 (Tex.1987) (complaint waived as to unobjected-to charge question allowing award of elements of damages unrecoverable under the legal theory at trial); Hruska v. First State Bank of Deanville, 747 S.W.2d 783, 785 (Tex.1988) (complaint waived as to unobjected-to charge question allowing award of attorney\u2019s fees for matters for which attorney\u2019s fees are not allowed at law) (citing Aero Energy, Inc. v. Circle C Drilling Co., 699 S.W.2d 821, 823 (Tex.1985); Matthews v. Candlewood Builders, Inc., 685 S.W.2d 649, 650 (Tex.1985)); Casteel-Diebolt v. Diebolt, 912 S.W.2d 302, 304 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1995, no writ) (failure to object to omissions from the charge is a waiver of the complaint which estops a party from complaining on appeal about the omissions); see also Green Intern., Inc. v. Solis, 951 S.W.2d 384, 389 (Tex.1997) (complaint on appeal is waived when a damages question on attorney\u2019s fees which fails to segregate the fees among various claims, some of which do not allow for recovery of the fees, is submitted without objection, and the evidence is sufficient to support the award); Iron Mountain Bison Ranch, Inc. v. Easley Trailer Manufacturing, Inc., 42 S.W.3d 149, 156-57 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2000, no pet.) (Reversal is required when a damages question incorporates a legally-incorrect measure of damages only if there was a Rule 274 objection made) (citing Crown Life Insur."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"complaint waived as to unobjected-to charge question allowing award of elements of damages unrecoverable under the legal theory at trial","sentence":"See Wilgus v. Bond, 780 S.W.2d 670 (Tex.1987) (complaint waived as to unobjected-to charge question allowing award of elements of damages unrecoverable under the legal theory at trial); Hruska v. First State Bank of Deanville, 747 S.W.2d 783, 785 (Tex.1988) (complaint waived as to unobjected-to charge question allowing award of attorney\u2019s fees for matters for which attorney\u2019s fees are not allowed at law) (citing Aero Energy, Inc. v. Circle C Drilling Co., 699 S.W.2d 821, 823 (Tex.1985); Matthews v. Candlewood Builders, Inc., 685 S.W.2d 649, 650 (Tex.1985)); Casteel-Diebolt v. Diebolt, 912 S.W.2d 302, 304 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1995, no writ) (failure to object to omissions from the charge is a waiver of the complaint which estops a party from complaining on appeal about the omissions); see also Green Intern., Inc. v. Solis, 951 S.W.2d 384, 389 (Tex.1997) (complaint on appeal is waived when a damages question on attorney\u2019s fees which fails to segregate the fees among various claims, some of which do not allow for recovery of the fees, is submitted without objection, and the evidence is sufficient to support the award); Iron Mountain Bison Ranch, Inc. v. Easley Trailer Manufacturing, Inc., 42 S.W.3d 149, 156-57 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2000, no pet.) (Reversal is required when a damages question incorporates a legally-incorrect measure of damages only if there was a Rule 274 objection made) (citing Crown Life Insur."},"case_id":9425604,"label":"b"}
{"context":"We find there is substantial evidence in the record to support the ALJ's determinations regarding Sarna's ability as of December 31, 1994, to perform past relevant work.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"149 F.3d 876, 876-77","parenthetical":"evidence of claimant's later disability can be relevant to elucidate earlier condition","sentence":"See Haley v. Massanari, 258 F.3d 742, 748 (8th Cir.2001) (holding the ALJ may discredit complaints of claimant where inconsistencies appear in record); see also Pyland, 149 F.3d at 876-77 (evidence of claimant\u2019s later disability can be relevant to elucidate earlier condition); 20 C.F.R. \u00a7 404.1508 (1999) (mental impairment must be established by medical evidence, not only by claimant\u2019s statement of symptoms)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"258 F.3d 742, 748","parenthetical":"holding the ALJ may discredit complaints of claimant where inconsistencies appear in record","sentence":"See Haley v. Massanari, 258 F.3d 742, 748 (8th Cir.2001) (holding the ALJ may discredit complaints of claimant where inconsistencies appear in record); see also Pyland, 149 F.3d at 876-77 (evidence of claimant\u2019s later disability can be relevant to elucidate earlier condition); 20 C.F.R. \u00a7 404.1508 (1999) (mental impairment must be established by medical evidence, not only by claimant\u2019s statement of symptoms)."},"case_id":437947,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Def.'s Mot. at 13. Accordingly, the court turns directly to the dispositive question: whether the plaintiff produced sufficient evidence for a reasonable factfinder to conclude that the defendant's asserted non-retaliatory reason was not the actual reason and that the employer intentionally retaliated against the employee. At a minimum, the plaintiff must offer some evidence of a causal relationship between his involvement in protected activity and his nonselection.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"601 F.Supp.2d 64, 79","parenthetical":"holding that the plaintiff failed to raise an issue of fact regarding her retaliation claim because she failed to offer any evidence of a causal relationship between her involvement in protected activity and the adverse employment action","sentence":"See Cooke v. Rosenker, 601 F.Supp.2d 64, 79 (D.D.C.2009) (holding that the plaintiff failed to raise an issue of fact regarding her retaliation claim because she failed to offer any evidence of a causal relationship between her involvement in protected activity and the adverse employment action); see also Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 148-49, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000) (observing that the strength of the plaintiffs prima case is relevant to the analysis of the defendant\u2019s proffered non-discriminatory justification)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"530 U.S. 133, 148-49","parenthetical":"observing that the strength of the plaintiffs prima case is relevant to the analysis of the defendant's proffered non-discriminatory justification","sentence":"See Cooke v. Rosenker, 601 F.Supp.2d 64, 79 (D.D.C.2009) (holding that the plaintiff failed to raise an issue of fact regarding her retaliation claim because she failed to offer any evidence of a causal relationship between her involvement in protected activity and the adverse employment action); see also Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 148-49, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000) (observing that the strength of the plaintiffs prima case is relevant to the analysis of the defendant\u2019s proffered non-discriminatory justification)."},"case_id":4184811,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Def.'s Mot. at 13. Accordingly, the court turns directly to the dispositive question: whether the plaintiff produced sufficient evidence for a reasonable factfinder to conclude that the defendant's asserted non-retaliatory reason was not the actual reason and that the employer intentionally retaliated against the employee. At a minimum, the plaintiff must offer some evidence of a causal relationship between his involvement in protected activity and his nonselection.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"observing that the strength of the plaintiffs prima case is relevant to the analysis of the defendant's proffered non-discriminatory justification","sentence":"See Cooke v. Rosenker, 601 F.Supp.2d 64, 79 (D.D.C.2009) (holding that the plaintiff failed to raise an issue of fact regarding her retaliation claim because she failed to offer any evidence of a causal relationship between her involvement in protected activity and the adverse employment action); see also Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 148-49, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000) (observing that the strength of the plaintiffs prima case is relevant to the analysis of the defendant\u2019s proffered non-discriminatory justification)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"601 F.Supp.2d 64, 79","parenthetical":"holding that the plaintiff failed to raise an issue of fact regarding her retaliation claim because she failed to offer any evidence of a causal relationship between her involvement in protected activity and the adverse employment action","sentence":"See Cooke v. Rosenker, 601 F.Supp.2d 64, 79 (D.D.C.2009) (holding that the plaintiff failed to raise an issue of fact regarding her retaliation claim because she failed to offer any evidence of a causal relationship between her involvement in protected activity and the adverse employment action); see also Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 148-49, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000) (observing that the strength of the plaintiffs prima case is relevant to the analysis of the defendant\u2019s proffered non-discriminatory justification)."},"case_id":4184811,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Def.'s Mot. at 13. Accordingly, the court turns directly to the dispositive question: whether the plaintiff produced sufficient evidence for a reasonable factfinder to conclude that the defendant's asserted non-retaliatory reason was not the actual reason and that the employer intentionally retaliated against the employee. At a minimum, the plaintiff must offer some evidence of a causal relationship between his involvement in protected activity and his nonselection.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"601 F.Supp.2d 64, 79","parenthetical":"holding that the plaintiff failed to raise an issue of fact regarding her retaliation claim because she failed to offer any evidence of a causal relationship between her involvement in protected activity and the adverse employment action","sentence":"See Cooke v. Rosenker, 601 F.Supp.2d 64, 79 (D.D.C.2009) (holding that the plaintiff failed to raise an issue of fact regarding her retaliation claim because she failed to offer any evidence of a causal relationship between her involvement in protected activity and the adverse employment action); see also Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 148-49, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000) (observing that the strength of the plaintiffs prima case is relevant to the analysis of the defendant\u2019s proffered non-discriminatory justification)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"observing that the strength of the plaintiffs prima case is relevant to the analysis of the defendant's proffered non-discriminatory justification","sentence":"See Cooke v. Rosenker, 601 F.Supp.2d 64, 79 (D.D.C.2009) (holding that the plaintiff failed to raise an issue of fact regarding her retaliation claim because she failed to offer any evidence of a causal relationship between her involvement in protected activity and the adverse employment action); see also Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 148-49, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000) (observing that the strength of the plaintiffs prima case is relevant to the analysis of the defendant\u2019s proffered non-discriminatory justification)."},"case_id":4184811,"label":"a"}
{"context":"But the Supreme Court rejected Paccar on the precise point for which Kassa cites it. See K.P.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"579 F.3d 612, 612","parenthetical":"\"The fair--use defense contemplates and tolerates 'some possibility of consumer confusion.'-\"","sentence":"See also Hensley, 579 F.3d at 612 (\u201cThe fair--use defense contemplates and tolerates \u2019some possibility of consumer confusion.\u2019-\u201d) (quoting K.P."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"543 U.S. 116, 116, 123-124","parenthetical":"rejecting Paccar and holding that \"fair use can - occur along with some degree of [consumer] confusion\"","sentence":"Permanent, 543 U.S. at 116, 123-124, 125 S.Ct. 542 (rejecting Paccar and holding that \u201cfair use can - occur along with some degree of [consumer] confusion\u201d)\u2019."},"case_id":4275032,"label":"b"}
{"context":"But the Supreme Court rejected Paccar on the precise point for which Kassa cites it. See K.P.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"rejecting Paccar and holding that \"fair use can - occur along with some degree of [consumer] confusion\"","sentence":"Permanent, 543 U.S. at 116, 123-124, 125 S.Ct. 542 (rejecting Paccar and holding that \u201cfair use can - occur along with some degree of [consumer] confusion\u201d)\u2019."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"579 F.3d 612, 612","parenthetical":"\"The fair--use defense contemplates and tolerates 'some possibility of consumer confusion.'-\"","sentence":"See also Hensley, 579 F.3d at 612 (\u201cThe fair--use defense contemplates and tolerates \u2019some possibility of consumer confusion.\u2019-\u201d) (quoting K.P."},"case_id":4275032,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The Defendants argue the security officers are independent contractors, not employees, and are not subject to this Court's jurisdiction. Therefore, the Defendants will not be able to implead them if this case remains in Florida and Defendants will face certain prejudice if they are forced to litigate this case here.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"184 F.Supp.2d 1264, 1264","parenthetical":"explaining that courts \"look to the various theories of recovery in order to determine whether the joinder of [a] potential third-party is in fact crucial to the defendant's case\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Sun Trust, 184 F.Supp.2d at 1264 (explaining that courts \u201clook to the various theories of recovery in order to determine whether the joinder of [a] potential third-party is in fact crucial to the defendant\u2019s case\u201d); cf. Ward, 2005 WL 2456191, at *3 n. 4 (\u201cEven assuming that there are third parties that need to be joined[,] the defendants have not established that it would be unduly burdensome to pursue a separate indemnification action against any such third parties in the Bahamas.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"Even assuming that there are third parties that need to be joined[,] the defendants have not established that it would be unduly burdensome to pursue a separate indemnification action against any such third parties in the Bahamas.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Sun Trust, 184 F.Supp.2d at 1264 (explaining that courts \u201clook to the various theories of recovery in order to determine whether the joinder of [a] potential third-party is in fact crucial to the defendant\u2019s case\u201d); cf. Ward, 2005 WL 2456191, at *3 n. 4 (\u201cEven assuming that there are third parties that need to be joined[,] the defendants have not established that it would be unduly burdensome to pursue a separate indemnification action against any such third parties in the Bahamas.\u201d)."},"case_id":4058664,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Finally, the defendant contends that it should not be required to turn over confidential settlement agreements reached in other cases involving sexual harassment. FCA argues that the strong congressional policy favoring settlement weighs in favor of keeping such documents protected, so long as the information is available through other means.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"132 F.R.D. 548, 554-55","parenthetical":"denying motion to compel production of documents containing information about confidential settlement discussions","sentence":"See Cook v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 132 F.R.D. 548, 554-55 (ED.Cal.1990) (denying motion to compel production of documents containing information about confidential settlement discussions); Bottaro v. Hatton Assocs., 96 F.R.D. 158,160 (E.D.N.Y.1982) (denying motion to compel production of settlement agreement); see also Grove Fresh Distribs., Inc. v. John Labatt, Ltd., 888 F.Supp. 1427, 1441 (N.D.Ill.1995) (\u201cAnd while there is simply no legitimate public interest to be served by disclosing settlement agreements, the parties to the agreement are likely to have a compelling interest in keeping the settlement amount confidential.\u201d) (quotations omitted)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"888 F.Supp. 1427, 1441","parenthetical":"\"And while there is simply no legitimate public interest to be served by disclosing settlement agreements, the parties to the agreement are likely to have a compelling interest in keeping the settlement amount confidential.\"","sentence":"See Cook v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 132 F.R.D. 548, 554-55 (ED.Cal.1990) (denying motion to compel production of documents containing information about confidential settlement discussions); Bottaro v. Hatton Assocs., 96 F.R.D. 158,160 (E.D.N.Y.1982) (denying motion to compel production of settlement agreement); see also Grove Fresh Distribs., Inc. v. John Labatt, Ltd., 888 F.Supp. 1427, 1441 (N.D.Ill.1995) (\u201cAnd while there is simply no legitimate public interest to be served by disclosing settlement agreements, the parties to the agreement are likely to have a compelling interest in keeping the settlement amount confidential.\u201d) (quotations omitted)."},"case_id":7847629,"label":"a"}
{"context":"It establishes rules on which management may plan with a large degree of confidence; and while the test undoubtedly leaves areas of uncertainty between relocation decisions that are clearly within the exclusive prerogatives of management and those that are equally clearly subject to negotiation, these will in time be narrowed through future adjudications. We therefore conclude that the standard adopted by the Board was a reasonable policy choice and that its decision to proceed by adjudication, not rulemaking, was also within its discretion.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"957 F.2d 873, 881","parenthetical":"affirming that an agency may \"choose to make new policy through either rulemaking or adjudication\"","sentence":"See NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 294, 94 S.Ct. 1757, 1772, 40 L.Ed.2d 134 (1974) (upholding a decision to proceed by adjudication where the relevant facts \u201cvary widely depending on the company or industry\u201d); see also Bechtel v. FCC, 957 F.2d 873, 881 (D.C.Cir.1992) (affirming that an agency may \u201cchoose to make new policy through either rulemaking or adjudication\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"416 U.S. 267, 294","parenthetical":"upholding a decision to proceed by adjudication where the relevant facts \"vary widely depending on the company or industry\"","sentence":"See NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 294, 94 S.Ct. 1757, 1772, 40 L.Ed.2d 134 (1974) (upholding a decision to proceed by adjudication where the relevant facts \u201cvary widely depending on the company or industry\u201d); see also Bechtel v. FCC, 957 F.2d 873, 881 (D.C.Cir.1992) (affirming that an agency may \u201cchoose to make new policy through either rulemaking or adjudication\u201d)."},"case_id":3723813,"label":"b"}
{"context":"It establishes rules on which management may plan with a large degree of confidence; and while the test undoubtedly leaves areas of uncertainty between relocation decisions that are clearly within the exclusive prerogatives of management and those that are equally clearly subject to negotiation, these will in time be narrowed through future adjudications. We therefore conclude that the standard adopted by the Board was a reasonable policy choice and that its decision to proceed by adjudication, not rulemaking, was also within its discretion.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"94 S.Ct. 1757, 1772","parenthetical":"upholding a decision to proceed by adjudication where the relevant facts \"vary widely depending on the company or industry\"","sentence":"See NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 294, 94 S.Ct. 1757, 1772, 40 L.Ed.2d 134 (1974) (upholding a decision to proceed by adjudication where the relevant facts \u201cvary widely depending on the company or industry\u201d); see also Bechtel v. FCC, 957 F.2d 873, 881 (D.C.Cir.1992) (affirming that an agency may \u201cchoose to make new policy through either rulemaking or adjudication\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"957 F.2d 873, 881","parenthetical":"affirming that an agency may \"choose to make new policy through either rulemaking or adjudication\"","sentence":"See NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 294, 94 S.Ct. 1757, 1772, 40 L.Ed.2d 134 (1974) (upholding a decision to proceed by adjudication where the relevant facts \u201cvary widely depending on the company or industry\u201d); see also Bechtel v. FCC, 957 F.2d 873, 881 (D.C.Cir.1992) (affirming that an agency may \u201cchoose to make new policy through either rulemaking or adjudication\u201d)."},"case_id":3723813,"label":"a"}
{"context":"It establishes rules on which management may plan with a large degree of confidence; and while the test undoubtedly leaves areas of uncertainty between relocation decisions that are clearly within the exclusive prerogatives of management and those that are equally clearly subject to negotiation, these will in time be narrowed through future adjudications. We therefore conclude that the standard adopted by the Board was a reasonable policy choice and that its decision to proceed by adjudication, not rulemaking, was also within its discretion.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"upholding a decision to proceed by adjudication where the relevant facts \"vary widely depending on the company or industry\"","sentence":"See NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 294, 94 S.Ct. 1757, 1772, 40 L.Ed.2d 134 (1974) (upholding a decision to proceed by adjudication where the relevant facts \u201cvary widely depending on the company or industry\u201d); see also Bechtel v. FCC, 957 F.2d 873, 881 (D.C.Cir.1992) (affirming that an agency may \u201cchoose to make new policy through either rulemaking or adjudication\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"957 F.2d 873, 881","parenthetical":"affirming that an agency may \"choose to make new policy through either rulemaking or adjudication\"","sentence":"See NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 294, 94 S.Ct. 1757, 1772, 40 L.Ed.2d 134 (1974) (upholding a decision to proceed by adjudication where the relevant facts \u201cvary widely depending on the company or industry\u201d); see also Bechtel v. FCC, 957 F.2d 873, 881 (D.C.Cir.1992) (affirming that an agency may \u201cchoose to make new policy through either rulemaking or adjudication\u201d)."},"case_id":3723813,"label":"a"}
{"context":". We observe that the question whether an address is a party's dwelling place or usual place of abode is extremely fact-sensitive.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"658 N.E.2d 107, 109","parenthetical":"\"What is or is not a party's dwelling house or usual place of abode within the context of T.R. 4.1 is a question that turns on the particular facts of the case.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Doyle v. Barnett, 658 N.E.2d 107, 109 (Ind.Ct.App.1995) (\"What is or is not a party\u2019s dwelling house or usual place of abode within the context of T.R. 4.1 is a question that turns on the particular facts of the case.\u201d); Poteet v. Bethke, 507 N.E.2d 652, 654 (Ind.Ct.App.1987) (concluding that address to which summons and complaint was delivered was not defendant\u2019s dwelling house or usual place of abode where defendant had permanently left address approximately ten months before service, and therefore service was defective); Mills v. Coil, 647 N.E.2d 679, 680-81 (Ind.Ct.App.1995) (concluding that service to defendant\u2019s mother\u2019s home did not comply with Trial Rule 4.1, where defendant had moved out of mother\u2019s home three months earlier with no intention of returning, and stating, \"Service upon a defendant\u2019s former residence is insufficient to confer personal jurisdiction.\u201d), trans. denied; but cf. Grecco v. Campbell, 179 Ind.App. 530, 533-34, 386 N.E.2d 960, 962 (1979) (concluding that address to which summons and complaint were delivered was defendant's dwelling house or usual place of abode for purposes of Trial Rule 4.1 where defendant had temporarily gone to stay with relatives at time of service); Doyle v. Barnett, 658 N.E.2d 107, 109 (Ind.Ct.App.1995) (concluding that evidence supported finding that defendant's father's address was defendant\u2019s usual place of abode, where defendant received all his mail at father's address, listed father\u2019s address on accident report, defendant's insurance company maintained defendant\u2019s address as that of his father, and address listed on defendant\u2019s driver's license was that of his father both at time service was attempted and at time defendant sought to set aside default judgment), trans. denied (1996)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but cf.","identifier":"179 Ind.App. 530, 533-34","parenthetical":"concluding that address to which summons and complaint were delivered was defendant's dwelling house or usual place of abode for purposes of Trial Rule 4.1 where defendant had temporarily gone to stay with relatives at time of service","sentence":"See, e.g., Doyle v. Barnett, 658 N.E.2d 107, 109 (Ind.Ct.App.1995) (\"What is or is not a party\u2019s dwelling house or usual place of abode within the context of T.R. 4.1 is a question that turns on the particular facts of the case.\u201d); Poteet v. Bethke, 507 N.E.2d 652, 654 (Ind.Ct.App.1987) (concluding that address to which summons and complaint was delivered was not defendant\u2019s dwelling house or usual place of abode where defendant had permanently left address approximately ten months before service, and therefore service was defective); Mills v. Coil, 647 N.E.2d 679, 680-81 (Ind.Ct.App.1995) (concluding that service to defendant\u2019s mother\u2019s home did not comply with Trial Rule 4.1, where defendant had moved out of mother\u2019s home three months earlier with no intention of returning, and stating, \"Service upon a defendant\u2019s former residence is insufficient to confer personal jurisdiction.\u201d), trans. denied; but cf. Grecco v. Campbell, 179 Ind.App. 530, 533-34, 386 N.E.2d 960, 962 (1979) (concluding that address to which summons and complaint were delivered was defendant's dwelling house or usual place of abode for purposes of Trial Rule 4.1 where defendant had temporarily gone to stay with relatives at time of service); Doyle v. Barnett, 658 N.E.2d 107, 109 (Ind.Ct.App.1995) (concluding that evidence supported finding that defendant's father's address was defendant\u2019s usual place of abode, where defendant received all his mail at father's address, listed father\u2019s address on accident report, defendant's insurance company maintained defendant\u2019s address as that of his father, and address listed on defendant\u2019s driver's license was that of his father both at time service was attempted and at time defendant sought to set aside default judgment), trans. denied (1996)."},"case_id":7171832,"label":"a"}
{"context":". We observe that the question whether an address is a party's dwelling place or usual place of abode is extremely fact-sensitive.","citation_a":{"signal":"but cf.","identifier":"386 N.E.2d 960, 962","parenthetical":"concluding that address to which summons and complaint were delivered was defendant's dwelling house or usual place of abode for purposes of Trial Rule 4.1 where defendant had temporarily gone to stay with relatives at time of service","sentence":"See, e.g., Doyle v. Barnett, 658 N.E.2d 107, 109 (Ind.Ct.App.1995) (\"What is or is not a party\u2019s dwelling house or usual place of abode within the context of T.R. 4.1 is a question that turns on the particular facts of the case.\u201d); Poteet v. Bethke, 507 N.E.2d 652, 654 (Ind.Ct.App.1987) (concluding that address to which summons and complaint was delivered was not defendant\u2019s dwelling house or usual place of abode where defendant had permanently left address approximately ten months before service, and therefore service was defective); Mills v. Coil, 647 N.E.2d 679, 680-81 (Ind.Ct.App.1995) (concluding that service to defendant\u2019s mother\u2019s home did not comply with Trial Rule 4.1, where defendant had moved out of mother\u2019s home three months earlier with no intention of returning, and stating, \"Service upon a defendant\u2019s former residence is insufficient to confer personal jurisdiction.\u201d), trans. denied; but cf. Grecco v. Campbell, 179 Ind.App. 530, 533-34, 386 N.E.2d 960, 962 (1979) (concluding that address to which summons and complaint were delivered was defendant's dwelling house or usual place of abode for purposes of Trial Rule 4.1 where defendant had temporarily gone to stay with relatives at time of service); Doyle v. Barnett, 658 N.E.2d 107, 109 (Ind.Ct.App.1995) (concluding that evidence supported finding that defendant's father's address was defendant\u2019s usual place of abode, where defendant received all his mail at father's address, listed father\u2019s address on accident report, defendant's insurance company maintained defendant\u2019s address as that of his father, and address listed on defendant\u2019s driver's license was that of his father both at time service was attempted and at time defendant sought to set aside default judgment), trans. denied (1996)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"658 N.E.2d 107, 109","parenthetical":"\"What is or is not a party's dwelling house or usual place of abode within the context of T.R. 4.1 is a question that turns on the particular facts of the case.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Doyle v. Barnett, 658 N.E.2d 107, 109 (Ind.Ct.App.1995) (\"What is or is not a party\u2019s dwelling house or usual place of abode within the context of T.R. 4.1 is a question that turns on the particular facts of the case.\u201d); Poteet v. Bethke, 507 N.E.2d 652, 654 (Ind.Ct.App.1987) (concluding that address to which summons and complaint was delivered was not defendant\u2019s dwelling house or usual place of abode where defendant had permanently left address approximately ten months before service, and therefore service was defective); Mills v. Coil, 647 N.E.2d 679, 680-81 (Ind.Ct.App.1995) (concluding that service to defendant\u2019s mother\u2019s home did not comply with Trial Rule 4.1, where defendant had moved out of mother\u2019s home three months earlier with no intention of returning, and stating, \"Service upon a defendant\u2019s former residence is insufficient to confer personal jurisdiction.\u201d), trans. denied; but cf. Grecco v. Campbell, 179 Ind.App. 530, 533-34, 386 N.E.2d 960, 962 (1979) (concluding that address to which summons and complaint were delivered was defendant's dwelling house or usual place of abode for purposes of Trial Rule 4.1 where defendant had temporarily gone to stay with relatives at time of service); Doyle v. Barnett, 658 N.E.2d 107, 109 (Ind.Ct.App.1995) (concluding that evidence supported finding that defendant's father's address was defendant\u2019s usual place of abode, where defendant received all his mail at father's address, listed father\u2019s address on accident report, defendant's insurance company maintained defendant\u2019s address as that of his father, and address listed on defendant\u2019s driver's license was that of his father both at time service was attempted and at time defendant sought to set aside default judgment), trans. denied (1996)."},"case_id":7171832,"label":"b"}
{"context":". We observe that the question whether an address is a party's dwelling place or usual place of abode is extremely fact-sensitive.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"658 N.E.2d 107, 109","parenthetical":"\"What is or is not a party's dwelling house or usual place of abode within the context of T.R. 4.1 is a question that turns on the particular facts of the case.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Doyle v. Barnett, 658 N.E.2d 107, 109 (Ind.Ct.App.1995) (\"What is or is not a party\u2019s dwelling house or usual place of abode within the context of T.R. 4.1 is a question that turns on the particular facts of the case.\u201d); Poteet v. Bethke, 507 N.E.2d 652, 654 (Ind.Ct.App.1987) (concluding that address to which summons and complaint was delivered was not defendant\u2019s dwelling house or usual place of abode where defendant had permanently left address approximately ten months before service, and therefore service was defective); Mills v. Coil, 647 N.E.2d 679, 680-81 (Ind.Ct.App.1995) (concluding that service to defendant\u2019s mother\u2019s home did not comply with Trial Rule 4.1, where defendant had moved out of mother\u2019s home three months earlier with no intention of returning, and stating, \"Service upon a defendant\u2019s former residence is insufficient to confer personal jurisdiction.\u201d), trans. denied; but cf. Grecco v. Campbell, 179 Ind.App. 530, 533-34, 386 N.E.2d 960, 962 (1979) (concluding that address to which summons and complaint were delivered was defendant's dwelling house or usual place of abode for purposes of Trial Rule 4.1 where defendant had temporarily gone to stay with relatives at time of service); Doyle v. Barnett, 658 N.E.2d 107, 109 (Ind.Ct.App.1995) (concluding that evidence supported finding that defendant's father's address was defendant\u2019s usual place of abode, where defendant received all his mail at father's address, listed father\u2019s address on accident report, defendant's insurance company maintained defendant\u2019s address as that of his father, and address listed on defendant\u2019s driver's license was that of his father both at time service was attempted and at time defendant sought to set aside default judgment), trans. denied (1996)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but cf.","identifier":"658 N.E.2d 107, 109","parenthetical":"concluding that evidence supported finding that defendant's father's address was defendant's usual place of abode, where defendant received all his mail at father's address, listed father's address on accident report, defendant's insurance company maintained defendant's address as that of his father, and address listed on defendant's driver's license was that of his father both at time service was attempted and at time defendant sought to set aside default judgment","sentence":"See, e.g., Doyle v. Barnett, 658 N.E.2d 107, 109 (Ind.Ct.App.1995) (\"What is or is not a party\u2019s dwelling house or usual place of abode within the context of T.R. 4.1 is a question that turns on the particular facts of the case.\u201d); Poteet v. Bethke, 507 N.E.2d 652, 654 (Ind.Ct.App.1987) (concluding that address to which summons and complaint was delivered was not defendant\u2019s dwelling house or usual place of abode where defendant had permanently left address approximately ten months before service, and therefore service was defective); Mills v. Coil, 647 N.E.2d 679, 680-81 (Ind.Ct.App.1995) (concluding that service to defendant\u2019s mother\u2019s home did not comply with Trial Rule 4.1, where defendant had moved out of mother\u2019s home three months earlier with no intention of returning, and stating, \"Service upon a defendant\u2019s former residence is insufficient to confer personal jurisdiction.\u201d), trans. denied; but cf. Grecco v. Campbell, 179 Ind.App. 530, 533-34, 386 N.E.2d 960, 962 (1979) (concluding that address to which summons and complaint were delivered was defendant's dwelling house or usual place of abode for purposes of Trial Rule 4.1 where defendant had temporarily gone to stay with relatives at time of service); Doyle v. Barnett, 658 N.E.2d 107, 109 (Ind.Ct.App.1995) (concluding that evidence supported finding that defendant's father's address was defendant\u2019s usual place of abode, where defendant received all his mail at father's address, listed father\u2019s address on accident report, defendant's insurance company maintained defendant\u2019s address as that of his father, and address listed on defendant\u2019s driver's license was that of his father both at time service was attempted and at time defendant sought to set aside default judgment), trans. denied (1996)."},"case_id":7171832,"label":"a"}
{"context":". We observe that the question whether an address is a party's dwelling place or usual place of abode is extremely fact-sensitive.","citation_a":{"signal":"but cf.","identifier":"179 Ind.App. 530, 533-34","parenthetical":"concluding that address to which summons and complaint were delivered was defendant's dwelling house or usual place of abode for purposes of Trial Rule 4.1 where defendant had temporarily gone to stay with relatives at time of service","sentence":"See, e.g., Doyle v. Barnett, 658 N.E.2d 107, 109 (Ind.Ct.App.1995) (\"What is or is not a party\u2019s dwelling house or usual place of abode within the context of T.R. 4.1 is a question that turns on the particular facts of the case.\u201d); Poteet v. Bethke, 507 N.E.2d 652, 654 (Ind.Ct.App.1987) (concluding that address to which summons and complaint was delivered was not defendant\u2019s dwelling house or usual place of abode where defendant had permanently left address approximately ten months before service, and therefore service was defective); Mills v. Coil, 647 N.E.2d 679, 680-81 (Ind.Ct.App.1995) (concluding that service to defendant\u2019s mother\u2019s home did not comply with Trial Rule 4.1, where defendant had moved out of mother\u2019s home three months earlier with no intention of returning, and stating, \"Service upon a defendant\u2019s former residence is insufficient to confer personal jurisdiction.\u201d), trans. denied; but cf. Grecco v. Campbell, 179 Ind.App. 530, 533-34, 386 N.E.2d 960, 962 (1979) (concluding that address to which summons and complaint were delivered was defendant's dwelling house or usual place of abode for purposes of Trial Rule 4.1 where defendant had temporarily gone to stay with relatives at time of service); Doyle v. Barnett, 658 N.E.2d 107, 109 (Ind.Ct.App.1995) (concluding that evidence supported finding that defendant's father's address was defendant\u2019s usual place of abode, where defendant received all his mail at father's address, listed father\u2019s address on accident report, defendant's insurance company maintained defendant\u2019s address as that of his father, and address listed on defendant\u2019s driver's license was that of his father both at time service was attempted and at time defendant sought to set aside default judgment), trans. denied (1996)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"507 N.E.2d 652, 654","parenthetical":"concluding that address to which summons and complaint was delivered was not defendant's dwelling house or usual place of abode where defendant had permanently left address approximately ten months before service, and therefore service was defective","sentence":"See, e.g., Doyle v. Barnett, 658 N.E.2d 107, 109 (Ind.Ct.App.1995) (\"What is or is not a party\u2019s dwelling house or usual place of abode within the context of T.R. 4.1 is a question that turns on the particular facts of the case.\u201d); Poteet v. Bethke, 507 N.E.2d 652, 654 (Ind.Ct.App.1987) (concluding that address to which summons and complaint was delivered was not defendant\u2019s dwelling house or usual place of abode where defendant had permanently left address approximately ten months before service, and therefore service was defective); Mills v. Coil, 647 N.E.2d 679, 680-81 (Ind.Ct.App.1995) (concluding that service to defendant\u2019s mother\u2019s home did not comply with Trial Rule 4.1, where defendant had moved out of mother\u2019s home three months earlier with no intention of returning, and stating, \"Service upon a defendant\u2019s former residence is insufficient to confer personal jurisdiction.\u201d), trans. denied; but cf. Grecco v. Campbell, 179 Ind.App. 530, 533-34, 386 N.E.2d 960, 962 (1979) (concluding that address to which summons and complaint were delivered was defendant's dwelling house or usual place of abode for purposes of Trial Rule 4.1 where defendant had temporarily gone to stay with relatives at time of service); Doyle v. Barnett, 658 N.E.2d 107, 109 (Ind.Ct.App.1995) (concluding that evidence supported finding that defendant's father's address was defendant\u2019s usual place of abode, where defendant received all his mail at father's address, listed father\u2019s address on accident report, defendant's insurance company maintained defendant\u2019s address as that of his father, and address listed on defendant\u2019s driver's license was that of his father both at time service was attempted and at time defendant sought to set aside default judgment), trans. denied (1996)."},"case_id":7171832,"label":"b"}
{"context":". We observe that the question whether an address is a party's dwelling place or usual place of abode is extremely fact-sensitive.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"507 N.E.2d 652, 654","parenthetical":"concluding that address to which summons and complaint was delivered was not defendant's dwelling house or usual place of abode where defendant had permanently left address approximately ten months before service, and therefore service was defective","sentence":"See, e.g., Doyle v. Barnett, 658 N.E.2d 107, 109 (Ind.Ct.App.1995) (\"What is or is not a party\u2019s dwelling house or usual place of abode within the context of T.R. 4.1 is a question that turns on the particular facts of the case.\u201d); Poteet v. Bethke, 507 N.E.2d 652, 654 (Ind.Ct.App.1987) (concluding that address to which summons and complaint was delivered was not defendant\u2019s dwelling house or usual place of abode where defendant had permanently left address approximately ten months before service, and therefore service was defective); Mills v. Coil, 647 N.E.2d 679, 680-81 (Ind.Ct.App.1995) (concluding that service to defendant\u2019s mother\u2019s home did not comply with Trial Rule 4.1, where defendant had moved out of mother\u2019s home three months earlier with no intention of returning, and stating, \"Service upon a defendant\u2019s former residence is insufficient to confer personal jurisdiction.\u201d), trans. denied; but cf. Grecco v. Campbell, 179 Ind.App. 530, 533-34, 386 N.E.2d 960, 962 (1979) (concluding that address to which summons and complaint were delivered was defendant's dwelling house or usual place of abode for purposes of Trial Rule 4.1 where defendant had temporarily gone to stay with relatives at time of service); Doyle v. Barnett, 658 N.E.2d 107, 109 (Ind.Ct.App.1995) (concluding that evidence supported finding that defendant's father's address was defendant\u2019s usual place of abode, where defendant received all his mail at father's address, listed father\u2019s address on accident report, defendant's insurance company maintained defendant\u2019s address as that of his father, and address listed on defendant\u2019s driver's license was that of his father both at time service was attempted and at time defendant sought to set aside default judgment), trans. denied (1996)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but cf.","identifier":"386 N.E.2d 960, 962","parenthetical":"concluding that address to which summons and complaint were delivered was defendant's dwelling house or usual place of abode for purposes of Trial Rule 4.1 where defendant had temporarily gone to stay with relatives at time of service","sentence":"See, e.g., Doyle v. Barnett, 658 N.E.2d 107, 109 (Ind.Ct.App.1995) (\"What is or is not a party\u2019s dwelling house or usual place of abode within the context of T.R. 4.1 is a question that turns on the particular facts of the case.\u201d); Poteet v. Bethke, 507 N.E.2d 652, 654 (Ind.Ct.App.1987) (concluding that address to which summons and complaint was delivered was not defendant\u2019s dwelling house or usual place of abode where defendant had permanently left address approximately ten months before service, and therefore service was defective); Mills v. Coil, 647 N.E.2d 679, 680-81 (Ind.Ct.App.1995) (concluding that service to defendant\u2019s mother\u2019s home did not comply with Trial Rule 4.1, where defendant had moved out of mother\u2019s home three months earlier with no intention of returning, and stating, \"Service upon a defendant\u2019s former residence is insufficient to confer personal jurisdiction.\u201d), trans. denied; but cf. Grecco v. Campbell, 179 Ind.App. 530, 533-34, 386 N.E.2d 960, 962 (1979) (concluding that address to which summons and complaint were delivered was defendant's dwelling house or usual place of abode for purposes of Trial Rule 4.1 where defendant had temporarily gone to stay with relatives at time of service); Doyle v. Barnett, 658 N.E.2d 107, 109 (Ind.Ct.App.1995) (concluding that evidence supported finding that defendant's father's address was defendant\u2019s usual place of abode, where defendant received all his mail at father's address, listed father\u2019s address on accident report, defendant's insurance company maintained defendant\u2019s address as that of his father, and address listed on defendant\u2019s driver's license was that of his father both at time service was attempted and at time defendant sought to set aside default judgment), trans. denied (1996)."},"case_id":7171832,"label":"a"}
{"context":". We observe that the question whether an address is a party's dwelling place or usual place of abode is extremely fact-sensitive.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"507 N.E.2d 652, 654","parenthetical":"concluding that address to which summons and complaint was delivered was not defendant's dwelling house or usual place of abode where defendant had permanently left address approximately ten months before service, and therefore service was defective","sentence":"See, e.g., Doyle v. Barnett, 658 N.E.2d 107, 109 (Ind.Ct.App.1995) (\"What is or is not a party\u2019s dwelling house or usual place of abode within the context of T.R. 4.1 is a question that turns on the particular facts of the case.\u201d); Poteet v. Bethke, 507 N.E.2d 652, 654 (Ind.Ct.App.1987) (concluding that address to which summons and complaint was delivered was not defendant\u2019s dwelling house or usual place of abode where defendant had permanently left address approximately ten months before service, and therefore service was defective); Mills v. Coil, 647 N.E.2d 679, 680-81 (Ind.Ct.App.1995) (concluding that service to defendant\u2019s mother\u2019s home did not comply with Trial Rule 4.1, where defendant had moved out of mother\u2019s home three months earlier with no intention of returning, and stating, \"Service upon a defendant\u2019s former residence is insufficient to confer personal jurisdiction.\u201d), trans. denied; but cf. Grecco v. Campbell, 179 Ind.App. 530, 533-34, 386 N.E.2d 960, 962 (1979) (concluding that address to which summons and complaint were delivered was defendant's dwelling house or usual place of abode for purposes of Trial Rule 4.1 where defendant had temporarily gone to stay with relatives at time of service); Doyle v. Barnett, 658 N.E.2d 107, 109 (Ind.Ct.App.1995) (concluding that evidence supported finding that defendant's father's address was defendant\u2019s usual place of abode, where defendant received all his mail at father's address, listed father\u2019s address on accident report, defendant's insurance company maintained defendant\u2019s address as that of his father, and address listed on defendant\u2019s driver's license was that of his father both at time service was attempted and at time defendant sought to set aside default judgment), trans. denied (1996)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but cf.","identifier":"658 N.E.2d 107, 109","parenthetical":"concluding that evidence supported finding that defendant's father's address was defendant's usual place of abode, where defendant received all his mail at father's address, listed father's address on accident report, defendant's insurance company maintained defendant's address as that of his father, and address listed on defendant's driver's license was that of his father both at time service was attempted and at time defendant sought to set aside default judgment","sentence":"See, e.g., Doyle v. Barnett, 658 N.E.2d 107, 109 (Ind.Ct.App.1995) (\"What is or is not a party\u2019s dwelling house or usual place of abode within the context of T.R. 4.1 is a question that turns on the particular facts of the case.\u201d); Poteet v. Bethke, 507 N.E.2d 652, 654 (Ind.Ct.App.1987) (concluding that address to which summons and complaint was delivered was not defendant\u2019s dwelling house or usual place of abode where defendant had permanently left address approximately ten months before service, and therefore service was defective); Mills v. Coil, 647 N.E.2d 679, 680-81 (Ind.Ct.App.1995) (concluding that service to defendant\u2019s mother\u2019s home did not comply with Trial Rule 4.1, where defendant had moved out of mother\u2019s home three months earlier with no intention of returning, and stating, \"Service upon a defendant\u2019s former residence is insufficient to confer personal jurisdiction.\u201d), trans. denied; but cf. Grecco v. Campbell, 179 Ind.App. 530, 533-34, 386 N.E.2d 960, 962 (1979) (concluding that address to which summons and complaint were delivered was defendant's dwelling house or usual place of abode for purposes of Trial Rule 4.1 where defendant had temporarily gone to stay with relatives at time of service); Doyle v. Barnett, 658 N.E.2d 107, 109 (Ind.Ct.App.1995) (concluding that evidence supported finding that defendant's father's address was defendant\u2019s usual place of abode, where defendant received all his mail at father's address, listed father\u2019s address on accident report, defendant's insurance company maintained defendant\u2019s address as that of his father, and address listed on defendant\u2019s driver's license was that of his father both at time service was attempted and at time defendant sought to set aside default judgment), trans. denied (1996)."},"case_id":7171832,"label":"a"}
{"context":". We observe that the question whether an address is a party's dwelling place or usual place of abode is extremely fact-sensitive.","citation_a":{"signal":"but cf.","identifier":"179 Ind.App. 530, 533-34","parenthetical":"concluding that address to which summons and complaint were delivered was defendant's dwelling house or usual place of abode for purposes of Trial Rule 4.1 where defendant had temporarily gone to stay with relatives at time of service","sentence":"See, e.g., Doyle v. Barnett, 658 N.E.2d 107, 109 (Ind.Ct.App.1995) (\"What is or is not a party\u2019s dwelling house or usual place of abode within the context of T.R. 4.1 is a question that turns on the particular facts of the case.\u201d); Poteet v. Bethke, 507 N.E.2d 652, 654 (Ind.Ct.App.1987) (concluding that address to which summons and complaint was delivered was not defendant\u2019s dwelling house or usual place of abode where defendant had permanently left address approximately ten months before service, and therefore service was defective); Mills v. Coil, 647 N.E.2d 679, 680-81 (Ind.Ct.App.1995) (concluding that service to defendant\u2019s mother\u2019s home did not comply with Trial Rule 4.1, where defendant had moved out of mother\u2019s home three months earlier with no intention of returning, and stating, \"Service upon a defendant\u2019s former residence is insufficient to confer personal jurisdiction.\u201d), trans. denied; but cf. Grecco v. Campbell, 179 Ind.App. 530, 533-34, 386 N.E.2d 960, 962 (1979) (concluding that address to which summons and complaint were delivered was defendant's dwelling house or usual place of abode for purposes of Trial Rule 4.1 where defendant had temporarily gone to stay with relatives at time of service); Doyle v. Barnett, 658 N.E.2d 107, 109 (Ind.Ct.App.1995) (concluding that evidence supported finding that defendant's father's address was defendant\u2019s usual place of abode, where defendant received all his mail at father's address, listed father\u2019s address on accident report, defendant's insurance company maintained defendant\u2019s address as that of his father, and address listed on defendant\u2019s driver's license was that of his father both at time service was attempted and at time defendant sought to set aside default judgment), trans. denied (1996)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"647 N.E.2d 679, 680-81","parenthetical":"concluding that service to defendant's mother's home did not comply with Trial Rule 4.1, where defendant had moved out of mother's home three months earlier with no intention of returning, and stating, \"Service upon a defendant's former residence is insufficient to confer personal jurisdiction.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Doyle v. Barnett, 658 N.E.2d 107, 109 (Ind.Ct.App.1995) (\"What is or is not a party\u2019s dwelling house or usual place of abode within the context of T.R. 4.1 is a question that turns on the particular facts of the case.\u201d); Poteet v. Bethke, 507 N.E.2d 652, 654 (Ind.Ct.App.1987) (concluding that address to which summons and complaint was delivered was not defendant\u2019s dwelling house or usual place of abode where defendant had permanently left address approximately ten months before service, and therefore service was defective); Mills v. Coil, 647 N.E.2d 679, 680-81 (Ind.Ct.App.1995) (concluding that service to defendant\u2019s mother\u2019s home did not comply with Trial Rule 4.1, where defendant had moved out of mother\u2019s home three months earlier with no intention of returning, and stating, \"Service upon a defendant\u2019s former residence is insufficient to confer personal jurisdiction.\u201d), trans. denied; but cf. Grecco v. Campbell, 179 Ind.App. 530, 533-34, 386 N.E.2d 960, 962 (1979) (concluding that address to which summons and complaint were delivered was defendant's dwelling house or usual place of abode for purposes of Trial Rule 4.1 where defendant had temporarily gone to stay with relatives at time of service); Doyle v. Barnett, 658 N.E.2d 107, 109 (Ind.Ct.App.1995) (concluding that evidence supported finding that defendant's father's address was defendant\u2019s usual place of abode, where defendant received all his mail at father's address, listed father\u2019s address on accident report, defendant's insurance company maintained defendant\u2019s address as that of his father, and address listed on defendant\u2019s driver's license was that of his father both at time service was attempted and at time defendant sought to set aside default judgment), trans. denied (1996)."},"case_id":7171832,"label":"b"}
{"context":". We observe that the question whether an address is a party's dwelling place or usual place of abode is extremely fact-sensitive.","citation_a":{"signal":"but cf.","identifier":"386 N.E.2d 960, 962","parenthetical":"concluding that address to which summons and complaint were delivered was defendant's dwelling house or usual place of abode for purposes of Trial Rule 4.1 where defendant had temporarily gone to stay with relatives at time of service","sentence":"See, e.g., Doyle v. Barnett, 658 N.E.2d 107, 109 (Ind.Ct.App.1995) (\"What is or is not a party\u2019s dwelling house or usual place of abode within the context of T.R. 4.1 is a question that turns on the particular facts of the case.\u201d); Poteet v. Bethke, 507 N.E.2d 652, 654 (Ind.Ct.App.1987) (concluding that address to which summons and complaint was delivered was not defendant\u2019s dwelling house or usual place of abode where defendant had permanently left address approximately ten months before service, and therefore service was defective); Mills v. Coil, 647 N.E.2d 679, 680-81 (Ind.Ct.App.1995) (concluding that service to defendant\u2019s mother\u2019s home did not comply with Trial Rule 4.1, where defendant had moved out of mother\u2019s home three months earlier with no intention of returning, and stating, \"Service upon a defendant\u2019s former residence is insufficient to confer personal jurisdiction.\u201d), trans. denied; but cf. Grecco v. Campbell, 179 Ind.App. 530, 533-34, 386 N.E.2d 960, 962 (1979) (concluding that address to which summons and complaint were delivered was defendant's dwelling house or usual place of abode for purposes of Trial Rule 4.1 where defendant had temporarily gone to stay with relatives at time of service); Doyle v. Barnett, 658 N.E.2d 107, 109 (Ind.Ct.App.1995) (concluding that evidence supported finding that defendant's father's address was defendant\u2019s usual place of abode, where defendant received all his mail at father's address, listed father\u2019s address on accident report, defendant's insurance company maintained defendant\u2019s address as that of his father, and address listed on defendant\u2019s driver's license was that of his father both at time service was attempted and at time defendant sought to set aside default judgment), trans. denied (1996)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"647 N.E.2d 679, 680-81","parenthetical":"concluding that service to defendant's mother's home did not comply with Trial Rule 4.1, where defendant had moved out of mother's home three months earlier with no intention of returning, and stating, \"Service upon a defendant's former residence is insufficient to confer personal jurisdiction.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Doyle v. Barnett, 658 N.E.2d 107, 109 (Ind.Ct.App.1995) (\"What is or is not a party\u2019s dwelling house or usual place of abode within the context of T.R. 4.1 is a question that turns on the particular facts of the case.\u201d); Poteet v. Bethke, 507 N.E.2d 652, 654 (Ind.Ct.App.1987) (concluding that address to which summons and complaint was delivered was not defendant\u2019s dwelling house or usual place of abode where defendant had permanently left address approximately ten months before service, and therefore service was defective); Mills v. Coil, 647 N.E.2d 679, 680-81 (Ind.Ct.App.1995) (concluding that service to defendant\u2019s mother\u2019s home did not comply with Trial Rule 4.1, where defendant had moved out of mother\u2019s home three months earlier with no intention of returning, and stating, \"Service upon a defendant\u2019s former residence is insufficient to confer personal jurisdiction.\u201d), trans. denied; but cf. Grecco v. Campbell, 179 Ind.App. 530, 533-34, 386 N.E.2d 960, 962 (1979) (concluding that address to which summons and complaint were delivered was defendant's dwelling house or usual place of abode for purposes of Trial Rule 4.1 where defendant had temporarily gone to stay with relatives at time of service); Doyle v. Barnett, 658 N.E.2d 107, 109 (Ind.Ct.App.1995) (concluding that evidence supported finding that defendant's father's address was defendant\u2019s usual place of abode, where defendant received all his mail at father's address, listed father\u2019s address on accident report, defendant's insurance company maintained defendant\u2019s address as that of his father, and address listed on defendant\u2019s driver's license was that of his father both at time service was attempted and at time defendant sought to set aside default judgment), trans. denied (1996)."},"case_id":7171832,"label":"b"}
{"context":". We observe that the question whether an address is a party's dwelling place or usual place of abode is extremely fact-sensitive.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"647 N.E.2d 679, 680-81","parenthetical":"concluding that service to defendant's mother's home did not comply with Trial Rule 4.1, where defendant had moved out of mother's home three months earlier with no intention of returning, and stating, \"Service upon a defendant's former residence is insufficient to confer personal jurisdiction.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Doyle v. Barnett, 658 N.E.2d 107, 109 (Ind.Ct.App.1995) (\"What is or is not a party\u2019s dwelling house or usual place of abode within the context of T.R. 4.1 is a question that turns on the particular facts of the case.\u201d); Poteet v. Bethke, 507 N.E.2d 652, 654 (Ind.Ct.App.1987) (concluding that address to which summons and complaint was delivered was not defendant\u2019s dwelling house or usual place of abode where defendant had permanently left address approximately ten months before service, and therefore service was defective); Mills v. Coil, 647 N.E.2d 679, 680-81 (Ind.Ct.App.1995) (concluding that service to defendant\u2019s mother\u2019s home did not comply with Trial Rule 4.1, where defendant had moved out of mother\u2019s home three months earlier with no intention of returning, and stating, \"Service upon a defendant\u2019s former residence is insufficient to confer personal jurisdiction.\u201d), trans. denied; but cf. Grecco v. Campbell, 179 Ind.App. 530, 533-34, 386 N.E.2d 960, 962 (1979) (concluding that address to which summons and complaint were delivered was defendant's dwelling house or usual place of abode for purposes of Trial Rule 4.1 where defendant had temporarily gone to stay with relatives at time of service); Doyle v. Barnett, 658 N.E.2d 107, 109 (Ind.Ct.App.1995) (concluding that evidence supported finding that defendant's father's address was defendant\u2019s usual place of abode, where defendant received all his mail at father's address, listed father\u2019s address on accident report, defendant's insurance company maintained defendant\u2019s address as that of his father, and address listed on defendant\u2019s driver's license was that of his father both at time service was attempted and at time defendant sought to set aside default judgment), trans. denied (1996)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but cf.","identifier":"658 N.E.2d 107, 109","parenthetical":"concluding that evidence supported finding that defendant's father's address was defendant's usual place of abode, where defendant received all his mail at father's address, listed father's address on accident report, defendant's insurance company maintained defendant's address as that of his father, and address listed on defendant's driver's license was that of his father both at time service was attempted and at time defendant sought to set aside default judgment","sentence":"See, e.g., Doyle v. Barnett, 658 N.E.2d 107, 109 (Ind.Ct.App.1995) (\"What is or is not a party\u2019s dwelling house or usual place of abode within the context of T.R. 4.1 is a question that turns on the particular facts of the case.\u201d); Poteet v. Bethke, 507 N.E.2d 652, 654 (Ind.Ct.App.1987) (concluding that address to which summons and complaint was delivered was not defendant\u2019s dwelling house or usual place of abode where defendant had permanently left address approximately ten months before service, and therefore service was defective); Mills v. Coil, 647 N.E.2d 679, 680-81 (Ind.Ct.App.1995) (concluding that service to defendant\u2019s mother\u2019s home did not comply with Trial Rule 4.1, where defendant had moved out of mother\u2019s home three months earlier with no intention of returning, and stating, \"Service upon a defendant\u2019s former residence is insufficient to confer personal jurisdiction.\u201d), trans. denied; but cf. Grecco v. Campbell, 179 Ind.App. 530, 533-34, 386 N.E.2d 960, 962 (1979) (concluding that address to which summons and complaint were delivered was defendant's dwelling house or usual place of abode for purposes of Trial Rule 4.1 where defendant had temporarily gone to stay with relatives at time of service); Doyle v. Barnett, 658 N.E.2d 107, 109 (Ind.Ct.App.1995) (concluding that evidence supported finding that defendant's father's address was defendant\u2019s usual place of abode, where defendant received all his mail at father's address, listed father\u2019s address on accident report, defendant's insurance company maintained defendant\u2019s address as that of his father, and address listed on defendant\u2019s driver's license was that of his father both at time service was attempted and at time defendant sought to set aside default judgment), trans. denied (1996)."},"case_id":7171832,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Although that regulation is not dispositive of the issue before us, it offers a significant insight into the Attorney General's view that the relevant documents remain confidential. In our view, the Attorney General's regulatory expression of the importance of confidentiality weighs very heavily, but not conclusively, in the balancing process.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"141 N.J. 35, 49","parenthetical":"stating that although not determinative under common-law balancing test, \"amendment [to the Righh-to-Know Law that restricted public access regarding public records to receipt of only printed copies 'of records] is a factor to be considered\"","sentence":"See Shuttleworth, supra, 258 N.J.Super. at 594, 610 A.2d 903 (stating that Executive Branch \u201cregulation by itself cannot control the common-law disposition,\u201d although \u201ca legitimate need for confidentiality and the policy behind [such a] regulation can be considered as a factor in determining the common-law balance\u201d); see also Higg-A-Rella, Inc. v. County of Essex, 141 N.J. 35, 49, 660 A.2d 1163 (1995) (stating that although not determinative under common-law balancing test, \u201camendment [to the Righh-to-Know Law that restricted public access regarding public records to receipt of only printed copies 'of records] is a factor to be considered\u201d); cf. South Jersey Publishing, supra, 124 N.J. at 489, 591 A.2d 921 (noting that Right-to-Know Law \u201cdid not curtail or affect the common-law right to inspect and examine public records\u201d); Irval, supra, 61 N.J. at 373, 294 A.2d 425 (observing that Right-to-Know Law \u201cwas not intended to diminish or in any way curtail the common law right of examination. That right remains unaffected by this legislation.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"258 N.J.Super. 594, 594","parenthetical":"stating that Executive Branch \"regulation by itself cannot control the common-law disposition,\" although \"a legitimate need for confidentiality and the policy behind [such a] regulation can be considered as a factor in determining the common-law balance\"","sentence":"See Shuttleworth, supra, 258 N.J.Super. at 594, 610 A.2d 903 (stating that Executive Branch \u201cregulation by itself cannot control the common-law disposition,\u201d although \u201ca legitimate need for confidentiality and the policy behind [such a] regulation can be considered as a factor in determining the common-law balance\u201d); see also Higg-A-Rella, Inc. v. County of Essex, 141 N.J. 35, 49, 660 A.2d 1163 (1995) (stating that although not determinative under common-law balancing test, \u201camendment [to the Righh-to-Know Law that restricted public access regarding public records to receipt of only printed copies 'of records] is a factor to be considered\u201d); cf. South Jersey Publishing, supra, 124 N.J. at 489, 591 A.2d 921 (noting that Right-to-Know Law \u201cdid not curtail or affect the common-law right to inspect and examine public records\u201d); Irval, supra, 61 N.J. at 373, 294 A.2d 425 (observing that Right-to-Know Law \u201cwas not intended to diminish or in any way curtail the common law right of examination. That right remains unaffected by this legislation.\u201d)."},"case_id":306100,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Although that regulation is not dispositive of the issue before us, it offers a significant insight into the Attorney General's view that the relevant documents remain confidential. In our view, the Attorney General's regulatory expression of the importance of confidentiality weighs very heavily, but not conclusively, in the balancing process.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"258 N.J.Super. 594, 594","parenthetical":"stating that Executive Branch \"regulation by itself cannot control the common-law disposition,\" although \"a legitimate need for confidentiality and the policy behind [such a] regulation can be considered as a factor in determining the common-law balance\"","sentence":"See Shuttleworth, supra, 258 N.J.Super. at 594, 610 A.2d 903 (stating that Executive Branch \u201cregulation by itself cannot control the common-law disposition,\u201d although \u201ca legitimate need for confidentiality and the policy behind [such a] regulation can be considered as a factor in determining the common-law balance\u201d); see also Higg-A-Rella, Inc. v. County of Essex, 141 N.J. 35, 49, 660 A.2d 1163 (1995) (stating that although not determinative under common-law balancing test, \u201camendment [to the Righh-to-Know Law that restricted public access regarding public records to receipt of only printed copies 'of records] is a factor to be considered\u201d); cf. South Jersey Publishing, supra, 124 N.J. at 489, 591 A.2d 921 (noting that Right-to-Know Law \u201cdid not curtail or affect the common-law right to inspect and examine public records\u201d); Irval, supra, 61 N.J. at 373, 294 A.2d 425 (observing that Right-to-Know Law \u201cwas not intended to diminish or in any way curtail the common law right of examination. That right remains unaffected by this legislation.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"stating that although not determinative under common-law balancing test, \"amendment [to the Righh-to-Know Law that restricted public access regarding public records to receipt of only printed copies 'of records] is a factor to be considered\"","sentence":"See Shuttleworth, supra, 258 N.J.Super. at 594, 610 A.2d 903 (stating that Executive Branch \u201cregulation by itself cannot control the common-law disposition,\u201d although \u201ca legitimate need for confidentiality and the policy behind [such a] regulation can be considered as a factor in determining the common-law balance\u201d); see also Higg-A-Rella, Inc. v. County of Essex, 141 N.J. 35, 49, 660 A.2d 1163 (1995) (stating that although not determinative under common-law balancing test, \u201camendment [to the Righh-to-Know Law that restricted public access regarding public records to receipt of only printed copies 'of records] is a factor to be considered\u201d); cf. South Jersey Publishing, supra, 124 N.J. at 489, 591 A.2d 921 (noting that Right-to-Know Law \u201cdid not curtail or affect the common-law right to inspect and examine public records\u201d); Irval, supra, 61 N.J. at 373, 294 A.2d 425 (observing that Right-to-Know Law \u201cwas not intended to diminish or in any way curtail the common law right of examination. That right remains unaffected by this legislation.\u201d)."},"case_id":306100,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Although that regulation is not dispositive of the issue before us, it offers a significant insight into the Attorney General's view that the relevant documents remain confidential. In our view, the Attorney General's regulatory expression of the importance of confidentiality weighs very heavily, but not conclusively, in the balancing process.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"124 N.J. 489, 489","parenthetical":"noting that Right-to-Know Law \"did not curtail or affect the common-law right to inspect and examine public records\"","sentence":"See Shuttleworth, supra, 258 N.J.Super. at 594, 610 A.2d 903 (stating that Executive Branch \u201cregulation by itself cannot control the common-law disposition,\u201d although \u201ca legitimate need for confidentiality and the policy behind [such a] regulation can be considered as a factor in determining the common-law balance\u201d); see also Higg-A-Rella, Inc. v. County of Essex, 141 N.J. 35, 49, 660 A.2d 1163 (1995) (stating that although not determinative under common-law balancing test, \u201camendment [to the Righh-to-Know Law that restricted public access regarding public records to receipt of only printed copies 'of records] is a factor to be considered\u201d); cf. South Jersey Publishing, supra, 124 N.J. at 489, 591 A.2d 921 (noting that Right-to-Know Law \u201cdid not curtail or affect the common-law right to inspect and examine public records\u201d); Irval, supra, 61 N.J. at 373, 294 A.2d 425 (observing that Right-to-Know Law \u201cwas not intended to diminish or in any way curtail the common law right of examination. That right remains unaffected by this legislation.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"258 N.J.Super. 594, 594","parenthetical":"stating that Executive Branch \"regulation by itself cannot control the common-law disposition,\" although \"a legitimate need for confidentiality and the policy behind [such a] regulation can be considered as a factor in determining the common-law balance\"","sentence":"See Shuttleworth, supra, 258 N.J.Super. at 594, 610 A.2d 903 (stating that Executive Branch \u201cregulation by itself cannot control the common-law disposition,\u201d although \u201ca legitimate need for confidentiality and the policy behind [such a] regulation can be considered as a factor in determining the common-law balance\u201d); see also Higg-A-Rella, Inc. v. County of Essex, 141 N.J. 35, 49, 660 A.2d 1163 (1995) (stating that although not determinative under common-law balancing test, \u201camendment [to the Righh-to-Know Law that restricted public access regarding public records to receipt of only printed copies 'of records] is a factor to be considered\u201d); cf. South Jersey Publishing, supra, 124 N.J. at 489, 591 A.2d 921 (noting that Right-to-Know Law \u201cdid not curtail or affect the common-law right to inspect and examine public records\u201d); Irval, supra, 61 N.J. at 373, 294 A.2d 425 (observing that Right-to-Know Law \u201cwas not intended to diminish or in any way curtail the common law right of examination. That right remains unaffected by this legislation.\u201d)."},"case_id":306100,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Although that regulation is not dispositive of the issue before us, it offers a significant insight into the Attorney General's view that the relevant documents remain confidential. In our view, the Attorney General's regulatory expression of the importance of confidentiality weighs very heavily, but not conclusively, in the balancing process.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"258 N.J.Super. 594, 594","parenthetical":"stating that Executive Branch \"regulation by itself cannot control the common-law disposition,\" although \"a legitimate need for confidentiality and the policy behind [such a] regulation can be considered as a factor in determining the common-law balance\"","sentence":"See Shuttleworth, supra, 258 N.J.Super. at 594, 610 A.2d 903 (stating that Executive Branch \u201cregulation by itself cannot control the common-law disposition,\u201d although \u201ca legitimate need for confidentiality and the policy behind [such a] regulation can be considered as a factor in determining the common-law balance\u201d); see also Higg-A-Rella, Inc. v. County of Essex, 141 N.J. 35, 49, 660 A.2d 1163 (1995) (stating that although not determinative under common-law balancing test, \u201camendment [to the Righh-to-Know Law that restricted public access regarding public records to receipt of only printed copies 'of records] is a factor to be considered\u201d); cf. South Jersey Publishing, supra, 124 N.J. at 489, 591 A.2d 921 (noting that Right-to-Know Law \u201cdid not curtail or affect the common-law right to inspect and examine public records\u201d); Irval, supra, 61 N.J. at 373, 294 A.2d 425 (observing that Right-to-Know Law \u201cwas not intended to diminish or in any way curtail the common law right of examination. That right remains unaffected by this legislation.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting that Right-to-Know Law \"did not curtail or affect the common-law right to inspect and examine public records\"","sentence":"See Shuttleworth, supra, 258 N.J.Super. at 594, 610 A.2d 903 (stating that Executive Branch \u201cregulation by itself cannot control the common-law disposition,\u201d although \u201ca legitimate need for confidentiality and the policy behind [such a] regulation can be considered as a factor in determining the common-law balance\u201d); see also Higg-A-Rella, Inc. v. County of Essex, 141 N.J. 35, 49, 660 A.2d 1163 (1995) (stating that although not determinative under common-law balancing test, \u201camendment [to the Righh-to-Know Law that restricted public access regarding public records to receipt of only printed copies 'of records] is a factor to be considered\u201d); cf. South Jersey Publishing, supra, 124 N.J. at 489, 591 A.2d 921 (noting that Right-to-Know Law \u201cdid not curtail or affect the common-law right to inspect and examine public records\u201d); Irval, supra, 61 N.J. at 373, 294 A.2d 425 (observing that Right-to-Know Law \u201cwas not intended to diminish or in any way curtail the common law right of examination. That right remains unaffected by this legislation.\u201d)."},"case_id":306100,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Although that regulation is not dispositive of the issue before us, it offers a significant insight into the Attorney General's view that the relevant documents remain confidential. In our view, the Attorney General's regulatory expression of the importance of confidentiality weighs very heavily, but not conclusively, in the balancing process.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"61 N.J. 373, 373","parenthetical":"observing that Right-to-Know Law \"was not intended to diminish or in any way curtail the common law right of examination. That right remains unaffected by this legislation.\"","sentence":"See Shuttleworth, supra, 258 N.J.Super. at 594, 610 A.2d 903 (stating that Executive Branch \u201cregulation by itself cannot control the common-law disposition,\u201d although \u201ca legitimate need for confidentiality and the policy behind [such a] regulation can be considered as a factor in determining the common-law balance\u201d); see also Higg-A-Rella, Inc. v. County of Essex, 141 N.J. 35, 49, 660 A.2d 1163 (1995) (stating that although not determinative under common-law balancing test, \u201camendment [to the Righh-to-Know Law that restricted public access regarding public records to receipt of only printed copies 'of records] is a factor to be considered\u201d); cf. South Jersey Publishing, supra, 124 N.J. at 489, 591 A.2d 921 (noting that Right-to-Know Law \u201cdid not curtail or affect the common-law right to inspect and examine public records\u201d); Irval, supra, 61 N.J. at 373, 294 A.2d 425 (observing that Right-to-Know Law \u201cwas not intended to diminish or in any way curtail the common law right of examination. That right remains unaffected by this legislation.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"258 N.J.Super. 594, 594","parenthetical":"stating that Executive Branch \"regulation by itself cannot control the common-law disposition,\" although \"a legitimate need for confidentiality and the policy behind [such a] regulation can be considered as a factor in determining the common-law balance\"","sentence":"See Shuttleworth, supra, 258 N.J.Super. at 594, 610 A.2d 903 (stating that Executive Branch \u201cregulation by itself cannot control the common-law disposition,\u201d although \u201ca legitimate need for confidentiality and the policy behind [such a] regulation can be considered as a factor in determining the common-law balance\u201d); see also Higg-A-Rella, Inc. v. County of Essex, 141 N.J. 35, 49, 660 A.2d 1163 (1995) (stating that although not determinative under common-law balancing test, \u201camendment [to the Righh-to-Know Law that restricted public access regarding public records to receipt of only printed copies 'of records] is a factor to be considered\u201d); cf. South Jersey Publishing, supra, 124 N.J. at 489, 591 A.2d 921 (noting that Right-to-Know Law \u201cdid not curtail or affect the common-law right to inspect and examine public records\u201d); Irval, supra, 61 N.J. at 373, 294 A.2d 425 (observing that Right-to-Know Law \u201cwas not intended to diminish or in any way curtail the common law right of examination. That right remains unaffected by this legislation.\u201d)."},"case_id":306100,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Although that regulation is not dispositive of the issue before us, it offers a significant insight into the Attorney General's view that the relevant documents remain confidential. In our view, the Attorney General's regulatory expression of the importance of confidentiality weighs very heavily, but not conclusively, in the balancing process.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"258 N.J.Super. 594, 594","parenthetical":"stating that Executive Branch \"regulation by itself cannot control the common-law disposition,\" although \"a legitimate need for confidentiality and the policy behind [such a] regulation can be considered as a factor in determining the common-law balance\"","sentence":"See Shuttleworth, supra, 258 N.J.Super. at 594, 610 A.2d 903 (stating that Executive Branch \u201cregulation by itself cannot control the common-law disposition,\u201d although \u201ca legitimate need for confidentiality and the policy behind [such a] regulation can be considered as a factor in determining the common-law balance\u201d); see also Higg-A-Rella, Inc. v. County of Essex, 141 N.J. 35, 49, 660 A.2d 1163 (1995) (stating that although not determinative under common-law balancing test, \u201camendment [to the Righh-to-Know Law that restricted public access regarding public records to receipt of only printed copies 'of records] is a factor to be considered\u201d); cf. South Jersey Publishing, supra, 124 N.J. at 489, 591 A.2d 921 (noting that Right-to-Know Law \u201cdid not curtail or affect the common-law right to inspect and examine public records\u201d); Irval, supra, 61 N.J. at 373, 294 A.2d 425 (observing that Right-to-Know Law \u201cwas not intended to diminish or in any way curtail the common law right of examination. That right remains unaffected by this legislation.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"observing that Right-to-Know Law \"was not intended to diminish or in any way curtail the common law right of examination. That right remains unaffected by this legislation.\"","sentence":"See Shuttleworth, supra, 258 N.J.Super. at 594, 610 A.2d 903 (stating that Executive Branch \u201cregulation by itself cannot control the common-law disposition,\u201d although \u201ca legitimate need for confidentiality and the policy behind [such a] regulation can be considered as a factor in determining the common-law balance\u201d); see also Higg-A-Rella, Inc. v. County of Essex, 141 N.J. 35, 49, 660 A.2d 1163 (1995) (stating that although not determinative under common-law balancing test, \u201camendment [to the Righh-to-Know Law that restricted public access regarding public records to receipt of only printed copies 'of records] is a factor to be considered\u201d); cf. South Jersey Publishing, supra, 124 N.J. at 489, 591 A.2d 921 (noting that Right-to-Know Law \u201cdid not curtail or affect the common-law right to inspect and examine public records\u201d); Irval, supra, 61 N.J. at 373, 294 A.2d 425 (observing that Right-to-Know Law \u201cwas not intended to diminish or in any way curtail the common law right of examination. That right remains unaffected by this legislation.\u201d)."},"case_id":306100,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Although that regulation is not dispositive of the issue before us, it offers a significant insight into the Attorney General's view that the relevant documents remain confidential. In our view, the Attorney General's regulatory expression of the importance of confidentiality weighs very heavily, but not conclusively, in the balancing process.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"stating that Executive Branch \"regulation by itself cannot control the common-law disposition,\" although \"a legitimate need for confidentiality and the policy behind [such a] regulation can be considered as a factor in determining the common-law balance\"","sentence":"See Shuttleworth, supra, 258 N.J.Super. at 594, 610 A.2d 903 (stating that Executive Branch \u201cregulation by itself cannot control the common-law disposition,\u201d although \u201ca legitimate need for confidentiality and the policy behind [such a] regulation can be considered as a factor in determining the common-law balance\u201d); see also Higg-A-Rella, Inc. v. County of Essex, 141 N.J. 35, 49, 660 A.2d 1163 (1995) (stating that although not determinative under common-law balancing test, \u201camendment [to the Righh-to-Know Law that restricted public access regarding public records to receipt of only printed copies 'of records] is a factor to be considered\u201d); cf. South Jersey Publishing, supra, 124 N.J. at 489, 591 A.2d 921 (noting that Right-to-Know Law \u201cdid not curtail or affect the common-law right to inspect and examine public records\u201d); Irval, supra, 61 N.J. at 373, 294 A.2d 425 (observing that Right-to-Know Law \u201cwas not intended to diminish or in any way curtail the common law right of examination. That right remains unaffected by this legislation.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"141 N.J. 35, 49","parenthetical":"stating that although not determinative under common-law balancing test, \"amendment [to the Righh-to-Know Law that restricted public access regarding public records to receipt of only printed copies 'of records] is a factor to be considered\"","sentence":"See Shuttleworth, supra, 258 N.J.Super. at 594, 610 A.2d 903 (stating that Executive Branch \u201cregulation by itself cannot control the common-law disposition,\u201d although \u201ca legitimate need for confidentiality and the policy behind [such a] regulation can be considered as a factor in determining the common-law balance\u201d); see also Higg-A-Rella, Inc. v. County of Essex, 141 N.J. 35, 49, 660 A.2d 1163 (1995) (stating that although not determinative under common-law balancing test, \u201camendment [to the Righh-to-Know Law that restricted public access regarding public records to receipt of only printed copies 'of records] is a factor to be considered\u201d); cf. South Jersey Publishing, supra, 124 N.J. at 489, 591 A.2d 921 (noting that Right-to-Know Law \u201cdid not curtail or affect the common-law right to inspect and examine public records\u201d); Irval, supra, 61 N.J. at 373, 294 A.2d 425 (observing that Right-to-Know Law \u201cwas not intended to diminish or in any way curtail the common law right of examination. That right remains unaffected by this legislation.\u201d)."},"case_id":306100,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Although that regulation is not dispositive of the issue before us, it offers a significant insight into the Attorney General's view that the relevant documents remain confidential. In our view, the Attorney General's regulatory expression of the importance of confidentiality weighs very heavily, but not conclusively, in the balancing process.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"stating that although not determinative under common-law balancing test, \"amendment [to the Righh-to-Know Law that restricted public access regarding public records to receipt of only printed copies 'of records] is a factor to be considered\"","sentence":"See Shuttleworth, supra, 258 N.J.Super. at 594, 610 A.2d 903 (stating that Executive Branch \u201cregulation by itself cannot control the common-law disposition,\u201d although \u201ca legitimate need for confidentiality and the policy behind [such a] regulation can be considered as a factor in determining the common-law balance\u201d); see also Higg-A-Rella, Inc. v. County of Essex, 141 N.J. 35, 49, 660 A.2d 1163 (1995) (stating that although not determinative under common-law balancing test, \u201camendment [to the Righh-to-Know Law that restricted public access regarding public records to receipt of only printed copies 'of records] is a factor to be considered\u201d); cf. South Jersey Publishing, supra, 124 N.J. at 489, 591 A.2d 921 (noting that Right-to-Know Law \u201cdid not curtail or affect the common-law right to inspect and examine public records\u201d); Irval, supra, 61 N.J. at 373, 294 A.2d 425 (observing that Right-to-Know Law \u201cwas not intended to diminish or in any way curtail the common law right of examination. That right remains unaffected by this legislation.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"stating that Executive Branch \"regulation by itself cannot control the common-law disposition,\" although \"a legitimate need for confidentiality and the policy behind [such a] regulation can be considered as a factor in determining the common-law balance\"","sentence":"See Shuttleworth, supra, 258 N.J.Super. at 594, 610 A.2d 903 (stating that Executive Branch \u201cregulation by itself cannot control the common-law disposition,\u201d although \u201ca legitimate need for confidentiality and the policy behind [such a] regulation can be considered as a factor in determining the common-law balance\u201d); see also Higg-A-Rella, Inc. v. County of Essex, 141 N.J. 35, 49, 660 A.2d 1163 (1995) (stating that although not determinative under common-law balancing test, \u201camendment [to the Righh-to-Know Law that restricted public access regarding public records to receipt of only printed copies 'of records] is a factor to be considered\u201d); cf. South Jersey Publishing, supra, 124 N.J. at 489, 591 A.2d 921 (noting that Right-to-Know Law \u201cdid not curtail or affect the common-law right to inspect and examine public records\u201d); Irval, supra, 61 N.J. at 373, 294 A.2d 425 (observing that Right-to-Know Law \u201cwas not intended to diminish or in any way curtail the common law right of examination. That right remains unaffected by this legislation.\u201d)."},"case_id":306100,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Although that regulation is not dispositive of the issue before us, it offers a significant insight into the Attorney General's view that the relevant documents remain confidential. In our view, the Attorney General's regulatory expression of the importance of confidentiality weighs very heavily, but not conclusively, in the balancing process.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"stating that Executive Branch \"regulation by itself cannot control the common-law disposition,\" although \"a legitimate need for confidentiality and the policy behind [such a] regulation can be considered as a factor in determining the common-law balance\"","sentence":"See Shuttleworth, supra, 258 N.J.Super. at 594, 610 A.2d 903 (stating that Executive Branch \u201cregulation by itself cannot control the common-law disposition,\u201d although \u201ca legitimate need for confidentiality and the policy behind [such a] regulation can be considered as a factor in determining the common-law balance\u201d); see also Higg-A-Rella, Inc. v. County of Essex, 141 N.J. 35, 49, 660 A.2d 1163 (1995) (stating that although not determinative under common-law balancing test, \u201camendment [to the Righh-to-Know Law that restricted public access regarding public records to receipt of only printed copies 'of records] is a factor to be considered\u201d); cf. South Jersey Publishing, supra, 124 N.J. at 489, 591 A.2d 921 (noting that Right-to-Know Law \u201cdid not curtail or affect the common-law right to inspect and examine public records\u201d); Irval, supra, 61 N.J. at 373, 294 A.2d 425 (observing that Right-to-Know Law \u201cwas not intended to diminish or in any way curtail the common law right of examination. That right remains unaffected by this legislation.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"124 N.J. 489, 489","parenthetical":"noting that Right-to-Know Law \"did not curtail or affect the common-law right to inspect and examine public records\"","sentence":"See Shuttleworth, supra, 258 N.J.Super. at 594, 610 A.2d 903 (stating that Executive Branch \u201cregulation by itself cannot control the common-law disposition,\u201d although \u201ca legitimate need for confidentiality and the policy behind [such a] regulation can be considered as a factor in determining the common-law balance\u201d); see also Higg-A-Rella, Inc. v. County of Essex, 141 N.J. 35, 49, 660 A.2d 1163 (1995) (stating that although not determinative under common-law balancing test, \u201camendment [to the Righh-to-Know Law that restricted public access regarding public records to receipt of only printed copies 'of records] is a factor to be considered\u201d); cf. South Jersey Publishing, supra, 124 N.J. at 489, 591 A.2d 921 (noting that Right-to-Know Law \u201cdid not curtail or affect the common-law right to inspect and examine public records\u201d); Irval, supra, 61 N.J. at 373, 294 A.2d 425 (observing that Right-to-Know Law \u201cwas not intended to diminish or in any way curtail the common law right of examination. That right remains unaffected by this legislation.\u201d)."},"case_id":306100,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Although that regulation is not dispositive of the issue before us, it offers a significant insight into the Attorney General's view that the relevant documents remain confidential. In our view, the Attorney General's regulatory expression of the importance of confidentiality weighs very heavily, but not conclusively, in the balancing process.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting that Right-to-Know Law \"did not curtail or affect the common-law right to inspect and examine public records\"","sentence":"See Shuttleworth, supra, 258 N.J.Super. at 594, 610 A.2d 903 (stating that Executive Branch \u201cregulation by itself cannot control the common-law disposition,\u201d although \u201ca legitimate need for confidentiality and the policy behind [such a] regulation can be considered as a factor in determining the common-law balance\u201d); see also Higg-A-Rella, Inc. v. County of Essex, 141 N.J. 35, 49, 660 A.2d 1163 (1995) (stating that although not determinative under common-law balancing test, \u201camendment [to the Righh-to-Know Law that restricted public access regarding public records to receipt of only printed copies 'of records] is a factor to be considered\u201d); cf. South Jersey Publishing, supra, 124 N.J. at 489, 591 A.2d 921 (noting that Right-to-Know Law \u201cdid not curtail or affect the common-law right to inspect and examine public records\u201d); Irval, supra, 61 N.J. at 373, 294 A.2d 425 (observing that Right-to-Know Law \u201cwas not intended to diminish or in any way curtail the common law right of examination. That right remains unaffected by this legislation.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"stating that Executive Branch \"regulation by itself cannot control the common-law disposition,\" although \"a legitimate need for confidentiality and the policy behind [such a] regulation can be considered as a factor in determining the common-law balance\"","sentence":"See Shuttleworth, supra, 258 N.J.Super. at 594, 610 A.2d 903 (stating that Executive Branch \u201cregulation by itself cannot control the common-law disposition,\u201d although \u201ca legitimate need for confidentiality and the policy behind [such a] regulation can be considered as a factor in determining the common-law balance\u201d); see also Higg-A-Rella, Inc. v. County of Essex, 141 N.J. 35, 49, 660 A.2d 1163 (1995) (stating that although not determinative under common-law balancing test, \u201camendment [to the Righh-to-Know Law that restricted public access regarding public records to receipt of only printed copies 'of records] is a factor to be considered\u201d); cf. South Jersey Publishing, supra, 124 N.J. at 489, 591 A.2d 921 (noting that Right-to-Know Law \u201cdid not curtail or affect the common-law right to inspect and examine public records\u201d); Irval, supra, 61 N.J. at 373, 294 A.2d 425 (observing that Right-to-Know Law \u201cwas not intended to diminish or in any way curtail the common law right of examination. That right remains unaffected by this legislation.\u201d)."},"case_id":306100,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Although that regulation is not dispositive of the issue before us, it offers a significant insight into the Attorney General's view that the relevant documents remain confidential. In our view, the Attorney General's regulatory expression of the importance of confidentiality weighs very heavily, but not conclusively, in the balancing process.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"stating that Executive Branch \"regulation by itself cannot control the common-law disposition,\" although \"a legitimate need for confidentiality and the policy behind [such a] regulation can be considered as a factor in determining the common-law balance\"","sentence":"See Shuttleworth, supra, 258 N.J.Super. at 594, 610 A.2d 903 (stating that Executive Branch \u201cregulation by itself cannot control the common-law disposition,\u201d although \u201ca legitimate need for confidentiality and the policy behind [such a] regulation can be considered as a factor in determining the common-law balance\u201d); see also Higg-A-Rella, Inc. v. County of Essex, 141 N.J. 35, 49, 660 A.2d 1163 (1995) (stating that although not determinative under common-law balancing test, \u201camendment [to the Righh-to-Know Law that restricted public access regarding public records to receipt of only printed copies 'of records] is a factor to be considered\u201d); cf. South Jersey Publishing, supra, 124 N.J. at 489, 591 A.2d 921 (noting that Right-to-Know Law \u201cdid not curtail or affect the common-law right to inspect and examine public records\u201d); Irval, supra, 61 N.J. at 373, 294 A.2d 425 (observing that Right-to-Know Law \u201cwas not intended to diminish or in any way curtail the common law right of examination. That right remains unaffected by this legislation.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"61 N.J. 373, 373","parenthetical":"observing that Right-to-Know Law \"was not intended to diminish or in any way curtail the common law right of examination. That right remains unaffected by this legislation.\"","sentence":"See Shuttleworth, supra, 258 N.J.Super. at 594, 610 A.2d 903 (stating that Executive Branch \u201cregulation by itself cannot control the common-law disposition,\u201d although \u201ca legitimate need for confidentiality and the policy behind [such a] regulation can be considered as a factor in determining the common-law balance\u201d); see also Higg-A-Rella, Inc. v. County of Essex, 141 N.J. 35, 49, 660 A.2d 1163 (1995) (stating that although not determinative under common-law balancing test, \u201camendment [to the Righh-to-Know Law that restricted public access regarding public records to receipt of only printed copies 'of records] is a factor to be considered\u201d); cf. South Jersey Publishing, supra, 124 N.J. at 489, 591 A.2d 921 (noting that Right-to-Know Law \u201cdid not curtail or affect the common-law right to inspect and examine public records\u201d); Irval, supra, 61 N.J. at 373, 294 A.2d 425 (observing that Right-to-Know Law \u201cwas not intended to diminish or in any way curtail the common law right of examination. That right remains unaffected by this legislation.\u201d)."},"case_id":306100,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Although that regulation is not dispositive of the issue before us, it offers a significant insight into the Attorney General's view that the relevant documents remain confidential. In our view, the Attorney General's regulatory expression of the importance of confidentiality weighs very heavily, but not conclusively, in the balancing process.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"observing that Right-to-Know Law \"was not intended to diminish or in any way curtail the common law right of examination. That right remains unaffected by this legislation.\"","sentence":"See Shuttleworth, supra, 258 N.J.Super. at 594, 610 A.2d 903 (stating that Executive Branch \u201cregulation by itself cannot control the common-law disposition,\u201d although \u201ca legitimate need for confidentiality and the policy behind [such a] regulation can be considered as a factor in determining the common-law balance\u201d); see also Higg-A-Rella, Inc. v. County of Essex, 141 N.J. 35, 49, 660 A.2d 1163 (1995) (stating that although not determinative under common-law balancing test, \u201camendment [to the Righh-to-Know Law that restricted public access regarding public records to receipt of only printed copies 'of records] is a factor to be considered\u201d); cf. South Jersey Publishing, supra, 124 N.J. at 489, 591 A.2d 921 (noting that Right-to-Know Law \u201cdid not curtail or affect the common-law right to inspect and examine public records\u201d); Irval, supra, 61 N.J. at 373, 294 A.2d 425 (observing that Right-to-Know Law \u201cwas not intended to diminish or in any way curtail the common law right of examination. That right remains unaffected by this legislation.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"stating that Executive Branch \"regulation by itself cannot control the common-law disposition,\" although \"a legitimate need for confidentiality and the policy behind [such a] regulation can be considered as a factor in determining the common-law balance\"","sentence":"See Shuttleworth, supra, 258 N.J.Super. at 594, 610 A.2d 903 (stating that Executive Branch \u201cregulation by itself cannot control the common-law disposition,\u201d although \u201ca legitimate need for confidentiality and the policy behind [such a] regulation can be considered as a factor in determining the common-law balance\u201d); see also Higg-A-Rella, Inc. v. County of Essex, 141 N.J. 35, 49, 660 A.2d 1163 (1995) (stating that although not determinative under common-law balancing test, \u201camendment [to the Righh-to-Know Law that restricted public access regarding public records to receipt of only printed copies 'of records] is a factor to be considered\u201d); cf. South Jersey Publishing, supra, 124 N.J. at 489, 591 A.2d 921 (noting that Right-to-Know Law \u201cdid not curtail or affect the common-law right to inspect and examine public records\u201d); Irval, supra, 61 N.J. at 373, 294 A.2d 425 (observing that Right-to-Know Law \u201cwas not intended to diminish or in any way curtail the common law right of examination. That right remains unaffected by this legislation.\u201d)."},"case_id":306100,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Although that regulation is not dispositive of the issue before us, it offers a significant insight into the Attorney General's view that the relevant documents remain confidential. In our view, the Attorney General's regulatory expression of the importance of confidentiality weighs very heavily, but not conclusively, in the balancing process.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"141 N.J. 35, 49","parenthetical":"stating that although not determinative under common-law balancing test, \"amendment [to the Righh-to-Know Law that restricted public access regarding public records to receipt of only printed copies 'of records] is a factor to be considered\"","sentence":"See Shuttleworth, supra, 258 N.J.Super. at 594, 610 A.2d 903 (stating that Executive Branch \u201cregulation by itself cannot control the common-law disposition,\u201d although \u201ca legitimate need for confidentiality and the policy behind [such a] regulation can be considered as a factor in determining the common-law balance\u201d); see also Higg-A-Rella, Inc. v. County of Essex, 141 N.J. 35, 49, 660 A.2d 1163 (1995) (stating that although not determinative under common-law balancing test, \u201camendment [to the Righh-to-Know Law that restricted public access regarding public records to receipt of only printed copies 'of records] is a factor to be considered\u201d); cf. South Jersey Publishing, supra, 124 N.J. at 489, 591 A.2d 921 (noting that Right-to-Know Law \u201cdid not curtail or affect the common-law right to inspect and examine public records\u201d); Irval, supra, 61 N.J. at 373, 294 A.2d 425 (observing that Right-to-Know Law \u201cwas not intended to diminish or in any way curtail the common law right of examination. That right remains unaffected by this legislation.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"124 N.J. 489, 489","parenthetical":"noting that Right-to-Know Law \"did not curtail or affect the common-law right to inspect and examine public records\"","sentence":"See Shuttleworth, supra, 258 N.J.Super. at 594, 610 A.2d 903 (stating that Executive Branch \u201cregulation by itself cannot control the common-law disposition,\u201d although \u201ca legitimate need for confidentiality and the policy behind [such a] regulation can be considered as a factor in determining the common-law balance\u201d); see also Higg-A-Rella, Inc. v. County of Essex, 141 N.J. 35, 49, 660 A.2d 1163 (1995) (stating that although not determinative under common-law balancing test, \u201camendment [to the Righh-to-Know Law that restricted public access regarding public records to receipt of only printed copies 'of records] is a factor to be considered\u201d); cf. South Jersey Publishing, supra, 124 N.J. at 489, 591 A.2d 921 (noting that Right-to-Know Law \u201cdid not curtail or affect the common-law right to inspect and examine public records\u201d); Irval, supra, 61 N.J. at 373, 294 A.2d 425 (observing that Right-to-Know Law \u201cwas not intended to diminish or in any way curtail the common law right of examination. That right remains unaffected by this legislation.\u201d)."},"case_id":306100,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Although that regulation is not dispositive of the issue before us, it offers a significant insight into the Attorney General's view that the relevant documents remain confidential. In our view, the Attorney General's regulatory expression of the importance of confidentiality weighs very heavily, but not conclusively, in the balancing process.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"141 N.J. 35, 49","parenthetical":"stating that although not determinative under common-law balancing test, \"amendment [to the Righh-to-Know Law that restricted public access regarding public records to receipt of only printed copies 'of records] is a factor to be considered\"","sentence":"See Shuttleworth, supra, 258 N.J.Super. at 594, 610 A.2d 903 (stating that Executive Branch \u201cregulation by itself cannot control the common-law disposition,\u201d although \u201ca legitimate need for confidentiality and the policy behind [such a] regulation can be considered as a factor in determining the common-law balance\u201d); see also Higg-A-Rella, Inc. v. County of Essex, 141 N.J. 35, 49, 660 A.2d 1163 (1995) (stating that although not determinative under common-law balancing test, \u201camendment [to the Righh-to-Know Law that restricted public access regarding public records to receipt of only printed copies 'of records] is a factor to be considered\u201d); cf. South Jersey Publishing, supra, 124 N.J. at 489, 591 A.2d 921 (noting that Right-to-Know Law \u201cdid not curtail or affect the common-law right to inspect and examine public records\u201d); Irval, supra, 61 N.J. at 373, 294 A.2d 425 (observing that Right-to-Know Law \u201cwas not intended to diminish or in any way curtail the common law right of examination. That right remains unaffected by this legislation.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting that Right-to-Know Law \"did not curtail or affect the common-law right to inspect and examine public records\"","sentence":"See Shuttleworth, supra, 258 N.J.Super. at 594, 610 A.2d 903 (stating that Executive Branch \u201cregulation by itself cannot control the common-law disposition,\u201d although \u201ca legitimate need for confidentiality and the policy behind [such a] regulation can be considered as a factor in determining the common-law balance\u201d); see also Higg-A-Rella, Inc. v. County of Essex, 141 N.J. 35, 49, 660 A.2d 1163 (1995) (stating that although not determinative under common-law balancing test, \u201camendment [to the Righh-to-Know Law that restricted public access regarding public records to receipt of only printed copies 'of records] is a factor to be considered\u201d); cf. South Jersey Publishing, supra, 124 N.J. at 489, 591 A.2d 921 (noting that Right-to-Know Law \u201cdid not curtail or affect the common-law right to inspect and examine public records\u201d); Irval, supra, 61 N.J. at 373, 294 A.2d 425 (observing that Right-to-Know Law \u201cwas not intended to diminish or in any way curtail the common law right of examination. That right remains unaffected by this legislation.\u201d)."},"case_id":306100,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Although that regulation is not dispositive of the issue before us, it offers a significant insight into the Attorney General's view that the relevant documents remain confidential. In our view, the Attorney General's regulatory expression of the importance of confidentiality weighs very heavily, but not conclusively, in the balancing process.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"141 N.J. 35, 49","parenthetical":"stating that although not determinative under common-law balancing test, \"amendment [to the Righh-to-Know Law that restricted public access regarding public records to receipt of only printed copies 'of records] is a factor to be considered\"","sentence":"See Shuttleworth, supra, 258 N.J.Super. at 594, 610 A.2d 903 (stating that Executive Branch \u201cregulation by itself cannot control the common-law disposition,\u201d although \u201ca legitimate need for confidentiality and the policy behind [such a] regulation can be considered as a factor in determining the common-law balance\u201d); see also Higg-A-Rella, Inc. v. County of Essex, 141 N.J. 35, 49, 660 A.2d 1163 (1995) (stating that although not determinative under common-law balancing test, \u201camendment [to the Righh-to-Know Law that restricted public access regarding public records to receipt of only printed copies 'of records] is a factor to be considered\u201d); cf. South Jersey Publishing, supra, 124 N.J. at 489, 591 A.2d 921 (noting that Right-to-Know Law \u201cdid not curtail or affect the common-law right to inspect and examine public records\u201d); Irval, supra, 61 N.J. at 373, 294 A.2d 425 (observing that Right-to-Know Law \u201cwas not intended to diminish or in any way curtail the common law right of examination. That right remains unaffected by this legislation.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"61 N.J. 373, 373","parenthetical":"observing that Right-to-Know Law \"was not intended to diminish or in any way curtail the common law right of examination. That right remains unaffected by this legislation.\"","sentence":"See Shuttleworth, supra, 258 N.J.Super. at 594, 610 A.2d 903 (stating that Executive Branch \u201cregulation by itself cannot control the common-law disposition,\u201d although \u201ca legitimate need for confidentiality and the policy behind [such a] regulation can be considered as a factor in determining the common-law balance\u201d); see also Higg-A-Rella, Inc. v. County of Essex, 141 N.J. 35, 49, 660 A.2d 1163 (1995) (stating that although not determinative under common-law balancing test, \u201camendment [to the Righh-to-Know Law that restricted public access regarding public records to receipt of only printed copies 'of records] is a factor to be considered\u201d); cf. South Jersey Publishing, supra, 124 N.J. at 489, 591 A.2d 921 (noting that Right-to-Know Law \u201cdid not curtail or affect the common-law right to inspect and examine public records\u201d); Irval, supra, 61 N.J. at 373, 294 A.2d 425 (observing that Right-to-Know Law \u201cwas not intended to diminish or in any way curtail the common law right of examination. That right remains unaffected by this legislation.\u201d)."},"case_id":306100,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Although that regulation is not dispositive of the issue before us, it offers a significant insight into the Attorney General's view that the relevant documents remain confidential. In our view, the Attorney General's regulatory expression of the importance of confidentiality weighs very heavily, but not conclusively, in the balancing process.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"observing that Right-to-Know Law \"was not intended to diminish or in any way curtail the common law right of examination. That right remains unaffected by this legislation.\"","sentence":"See Shuttleworth, supra, 258 N.J.Super. at 594, 610 A.2d 903 (stating that Executive Branch \u201cregulation by itself cannot control the common-law disposition,\u201d although \u201ca legitimate need for confidentiality and the policy behind [such a] regulation can be considered as a factor in determining the common-law balance\u201d); see also Higg-A-Rella, Inc. v. County of Essex, 141 N.J. 35, 49, 660 A.2d 1163 (1995) (stating that although not determinative under common-law balancing test, \u201camendment [to the Righh-to-Know Law that restricted public access regarding public records to receipt of only printed copies 'of records] is a factor to be considered\u201d); cf. South Jersey Publishing, supra, 124 N.J. at 489, 591 A.2d 921 (noting that Right-to-Know Law \u201cdid not curtail or affect the common-law right to inspect and examine public records\u201d); Irval, supra, 61 N.J. at 373, 294 A.2d 425 (observing that Right-to-Know Law \u201cwas not intended to diminish or in any way curtail the common law right of examination. That right remains unaffected by this legislation.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"141 N.J. 35, 49","parenthetical":"stating that although not determinative under common-law balancing test, \"amendment [to the Righh-to-Know Law that restricted public access regarding public records to receipt of only printed copies 'of records] is a factor to be considered\"","sentence":"See Shuttleworth, supra, 258 N.J.Super. at 594, 610 A.2d 903 (stating that Executive Branch \u201cregulation by itself cannot control the common-law disposition,\u201d although \u201ca legitimate need for confidentiality and the policy behind [such a] regulation can be considered as a factor in determining the common-law balance\u201d); see also Higg-A-Rella, Inc. v. County of Essex, 141 N.J. 35, 49, 660 A.2d 1163 (1995) (stating that although not determinative under common-law balancing test, \u201camendment [to the Righh-to-Know Law that restricted public access regarding public records to receipt of only printed copies 'of records] is a factor to be considered\u201d); cf. South Jersey Publishing, supra, 124 N.J. at 489, 591 A.2d 921 (noting that Right-to-Know Law \u201cdid not curtail or affect the common-law right to inspect and examine public records\u201d); Irval, supra, 61 N.J. at 373, 294 A.2d 425 (observing that Right-to-Know Law \u201cwas not intended to diminish or in any way curtail the common law right of examination. That right remains unaffected by this legislation.\u201d)."},"case_id":306100,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Although that regulation is not dispositive of the issue before us, it offers a significant insight into the Attorney General's view that the relevant documents remain confidential. In our view, the Attorney General's regulatory expression of the importance of confidentiality weighs very heavily, but not conclusively, in the balancing process.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"124 N.J. 489, 489","parenthetical":"noting that Right-to-Know Law \"did not curtail or affect the common-law right to inspect and examine public records\"","sentence":"See Shuttleworth, supra, 258 N.J.Super. at 594, 610 A.2d 903 (stating that Executive Branch \u201cregulation by itself cannot control the common-law disposition,\u201d although \u201ca legitimate need for confidentiality and the policy behind [such a] regulation can be considered as a factor in determining the common-law balance\u201d); see also Higg-A-Rella, Inc. v. County of Essex, 141 N.J. 35, 49, 660 A.2d 1163 (1995) (stating that although not determinative under common-law balancing test, \u201camendment [to the Righh-to-Know Law that restricted public access regarding public records to receipt of only printed copies 'of records] is a factor to be considered\u201d); cf. South Jersey Publishing, supra, 124 N.J. at 489, 591 A.2d 921 (noting that Right-to-Know Law \u201cdid not curtail or affect the common-law right to inspect and examine public records\u201d); Irval, supra, 61 N.J. at 373, 294 A.2d 425 (observing that Right-to-Know Law \u201cwas not intended to diminish or in any way curtail the common law right of examination. That right remains unaffected by this legislation.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"stating that although not determinative under common-law balancing test, \"amendment [to the Righh-to-Know Law that restricted public access regarding public records to receipt of only printed copies 'of records] is a factor to be considered\"","sentence":"See Shuttleworth, supra, 258 N.J.Super. at 594, 610 A.2d 903 (stating that Executive Branch \u201cregulation by itself cannot control the common-law disposition,\u201d although \u201ca legitimate need for confidentiality and the policy behind [such a] regulation can be considered as a factor in determining the common-law balance\u201d); see also Higg-A-Rella, Inc. v. County of Essex, 141 N.J. 35, 49, 660 A.2d 1163 (1995) (stating that although not determinative under common-law balancing test, \u201camendment [to the Righh-to-Know Law that restricted public access regarding public records to receipt of only printed copies 'of records] is a factor to be considered\u201d); cf. South Jersey Publishing, supra, 124 N.J. at 489, 591 A.2d 921 (noting that Right-to-Know Law \u201cdid not curtail or affect the common-law right to inspect and examine public records\u201d); Irval, supra, 61 N.J. at 373, 294 A.2d 425 (observing that Right-to-Know Law \u201cwas not intended to diminish or in any way curtail the common law right of examination. That right remains unaffected by this legislation.\u201d)."},"case_id":306100,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Although that regulation is not dispositive of the issue before us, it offers a significant insight into the Attorney General's view that the relevant documents remain confidential. In our view, the Attorney General's regulatory expression of the importance of confidentiality weighs very heavily, but not conclusively, in the balancing process.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting that Right-to-Know Law \"did not curtail or affect the common-law right to inspect and examine public records\"","sentence":"See Shuttleworth, supra, 258 N.J.Super. at 594, 610 A.2d 903 (stating that Executive Branch \u201cregulation by itself cannot control the common-law disposition,\u201d although \u201ca legitimate need for confidentiality and the policy behind [such a] regulation can be considered as a factor in determining the common-law balance\u201d); see also Higg-A-Rella, Inc. v. County of Essex, 141 N.J. 35, 49, 660 A.2d 1163 (1995) (stating that although not determinative under common-law balancing test, \u201camendment [to the Righh-to-Know Law that restricted public access regarding public records to receipt of only printed copies 'of records] is a factor to be considered\u201d); cf. South Jersey Publishing, supra, 124 N.J. at 489, 591 A.2d 921 (noting that Right-to-Know Law \u201cdid not curtail or affect the common-law right to inspect and examine public records\u201d); Irval, supra, 61 N.J. at 373, 294 A.2d 425 (observing that Right-to-Know Law \u201cwas not intended to diminish or in any way curtail the common law right of examination. That right remains unaffected by this legislation.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"stating that although not determinative under common-law balancing test, \"amendment [to the Righh-to-Know Law that restricted public access regarding public records to receipt of only printed copies 'of records] is a factor to be considered\"","sentence":"See Shuttleworth, supra, 258 N.J.Super. at 594, 610 A.2d 903 (stating that Executive Branch \u201cregulation by itself cannot control the common-law disposition,\u201d although \u201ca legitimate need for confidentiality and the policy behind [such a] regulation can be considered as a factor in determining the common-law balance\u201d); see also Higg-A-Rella, Inc. v. County of Essex, 141 N.J. 35, 49, 660 A.2d 1163 (1995) (stating that although not determinative under common-law balancing test, \u201camendment [to the Righh-to-Know Law that restricted public access regarding public records to receipt of only printed copies 'of records] is a factor to be considered\u201d); cf. South Jersey Publishing, supra, 124 N.J. at 489, 591 A.2d 921 (noting that Right-to-Know Law \u201cdid not curtail or affect the common-law right to inspect and examine public records\u201d); Irval, supra, 61 N.J. at 373, 294 A.2d 425 (observing that Right-to-Know Law \u201cwas not intended to diminish or in any way curtail the common law right of examination. That right remains unaffected by this legislation.\u201d)."},"case_id":306100,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Although that regulation is not dispositive of the issue before us, it offers a significant insight into the Attorney General's view that the relevant documents remain confidential. In our view, the Attorney General's regulatory expression of the importance of confidentiality weighs very heavily, but not conclusively, in the balancing process.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"61 N.J. 373, 373","parenthetical":"observing that Right-to-Know Law \"was not intended to diminish or in any way curtail the common law right of examination. That right remains unaffected by this legislation.\"","sentence":"See Shuttleworth, supra, 258 N.J.Super. at 594, 610 A.2d 903 (stating that Executive Branch \u201cregulation by itself cannot control the common-law disposition,\u201d although \u201ca legitimate need for confidentiality and the policy behind [such a] regulation can be considered as a factor in determining the common-law balance\u201d); see also Higg-A-Rella, Inc. v. County of Essex, 141 N.J. 35, 49, 660 A.2d 1163 (1995) (stating that although not determinative under common-law balancing test, \u201camendment [to the Righh-to-Know Law that restricted public access regarding public records to receipt of only printed copies 'of records] is a factor to be considered\u201d); cf. South Jersey Publishing, supra, 124 N.J. at 489, 591 A.2d 921 (noting that Right-to-Know Law \u201cdid not curtail or affect the common-law right to inspect and examine public records\u201d); Irval, supra, 61 N.J. at 373, 294 A.2d 425 (observing that Right-to-Know Law \u201cwas not intended to diminish or in any way curtail the common law right of examination. That right remains unaffected by this legislation.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"stating that although not determinative under common-law balancing test, \"amendment [to the Righh-to-Know Law that restricted public access regarding public records to receipt of only printed copies 'of records] is a factor to be considered\"","sentence":"See Shuttleworth, supra, 258 N.J.Super. at 594, 610 A.2d 903 (stating that Executive Branch \u201cregulation by itself cannot control the common-law disposition,\u201d although \u201ca legitimate need for confidentiality and the policy behind [such a] regulation can be considered as a factor in determining the common-law balance\u201d); see also Higg-A-Rella, Inc. v. County of Essex, 141 N.J. 35, 49, 660 A.2d 1163 (1995) (stating that although not determinative under common-law balancing test, \u201camendment [to the Righh-to-Know Law that restricted public access regarding public records to receipt of only printed copies 'of records] is a factor to be considered\u201d); cf. South Jersey Publishing, supra, 124 N.J. at 489, 591 A.2d 921 (noting that Right-to-Know Law \u201cdid not curtail or affect the common-law right to inspect and examine public records\u201d); Irval, supra, 61 N.J. at 373, 294 A.2d 425 (observing that Right-to-Know Law \u201cwas not intended to diminish or in any way curtail the common law right of examination. That right remains unaffected by this legislation.\u201d)."},"case_id":306100,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Although that regulation is not dispositive of the issue before us, it offers a significant insight into the Attorney General's view that the relevant documents remain confidential. In our view, the Attorney General's regulatory expression of the importance of confidentiality weighs very heavily, but not conclusively, in the balancing process.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"stating that although not determinative under common-law balancing test, \"amendment [to the Righh-to-Know Law that restricted public access regarding public records to receipt of only printed copies 'of records] is a factor to be considered\"","sentence":"See Shuttleworth, supra, 258 N.J.Super. at 594, 610 A.2d 903 (stating that Executive Branch \u201cregulation by itself cannot control the common-law disposition,\u201d although \u201ca legitimate need for confidentiality and the policy behind [such a] regulation can be considered as a factor in determining the common-law balance\u201d); see also Higg-A-Rella, Inc. v. County of Essex, 141 N.J. 35, 49, 660 A.2d 1163 (1995) (stating that although not determinative under common-law balancing test, \u201camendment [to the Righh-to-Know Law that restricted public access regarding public records to receipt of only printed copies 'of records] is a factor to be considered\u201d); cf. South Jersey Publishing, supra, 124 N.J. at 489, 591 A.2d 921 (noting that Right-to-Know Law \u201cdid not curtail or affect the common-law right to inspect and examine public records\u201d); Irval, supra, 61 N.J. at 373, 294 A.2d 425 (observing that Right-to-Know Law \u201cwas not intended to diminish or in any way curtail the common law right of examination. That right remains unaffected by this legislation.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"observing that Right-to-Know Law \"was not intended to diminish or in any way curtail the common law right of examination. That right remains unaffected by this legislation.\"","sentence":"See Shuttleworth, supra, 258 N.J.Super. at 594, 610 A.2d 903 (stating that Executive Branch \u201cregulation by itself cannot control the common-law disposition,\u201d although \u201ca legitimate need for confidentiality and the policy behind [such a] regulation can be considered as a factor in determining the common-law balance\u201d); see also Higg-A-Rella, Inc. v. County of Essex, 141 N.J. 35, 49, 660 A.2d 1163 (1995) (stating that although not determinative under common-law balancing test, \u201camendment [to the Righh-to-Know Law that restricted public access regarding public records to receipt of only printed copies 'of records] is a factor to be considered\u201d); cf. South Jersey Publishing, supra, 124 N.J. at 489, 591 A.2d 921 (noting that Right-to-Know Law \u201cdid not curtail or affect the common-law right to inspect and examine public records\u201d); Irval, supra, 61 N.J. at 373, 294 A.2d 425 (observing that Right-to-Know Law \u201cwas not intended to diminish or in any way curtail the common law right of examination. That right remains unaffected by this legislation.\u201d)."},"case_id":306100,"label":"a"}
{"context":"We note, .but place no reliance upon, the Sixth Circuit's reasoning that section 1915(g) does not prevent frequent filer prisoner indigents from proceeding IFP in state court.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"106 F.3d 1284, 1284","parenthetical":"The PLRA \"does not affect an inmate's ability to-seek relief in state court or through state grievance procedures.\"","sentence":"See Wilson, 148 F.3d at 604-05; see also Hampton, 106 F.3d at 1284 (The PLRA \"does not affect an inmate\u2019s ability to-seek relief in state court or through state grievance procedures.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but cf.","identifier":"940 F.Supp. 1433, 1437","parenthetical":"\"Although inmates can also bring SS 1983 claims in state court, plaintiffs have an important interest in access to federal courts for vindication of their federal constitutional rights.\"","sentence":"But cf. Lyon v. Krol, 940 F.Supp. 1433, 1437 (S.D.Iowa 1996) (\u201cAlthough inmates can also bring \u00a7 1983 claims in state court, plaintiffs have an important interest in access to federal courts for vindication of their federal constitutional rights.\u201d), appeal dismissed and remanded, 127 F.3d 763 (8th Cir.1997)."},"case_id":1306876,"label":"a"}
{"context":"We note, .but place no reliance upon, the Sixth Circuit's reasoning that section 1915(g) does not prevent frequent filer prisoner indigents from proceeding IFP in state court.","citation_a":{"signal":"but cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"Although inmates can also bring SS 1983 claims in state court, plaintiffs have an important interest in access to federal courts for vindication of their federal constitutional rights.\"","sentence":"But cf. Lyon v. Krol, 940 F.Supp. 1433, 1437 (S.D.Iowa 1996) (\u201cAlthough inmates can also bring \u00a7 1983 claims in state court, plaintiffs have an important interest in access to federal courts for vindication of their federal constitutional rights.\u201d), appeal dismissed and remanded, 127 F.3d 763 (8th Cir.1997)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"106 F.3d 1284, 1284","parenthetical":"The PLRA \"does not affect an inmate's ability to-seek relief in state court or through state grievance procedures.\"","sentence":"See Wilson, 148 F.3d at 604-05; see also Hampton, 106 F.3d at 1284 (The PLRA \"does not affect an inmate\u2019s ability to-seek relief in state court or through state grievance procedures.\u201d)."},"case_id":1306876,"label":"b"}
{"context":". To the extent the Bar argues in the Bar Motion and Bar Reply that \"Don't settle for less than you deserve\" is not protected under the First Amendment because it does not provide \"accurate factual information that can be objectively verifiable [sic],\" see Bar Reply at 8; Bar Motion at 14, the Bar abandoned this argument at the Hearing and acknowledged that \"Don't settle for less than you deserve\" is entitled to the First Amendment protections afforded commercial speech. Regardless, the Court finds that the Bar's prior position to the contrary is without merit.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"515 U.S. 623, 623-24","parenthetical":"explaining that \"the government may freely regulate commercial speech that concerns unlawful activity or is misleading. Commercial speech that falls into neither of those categories ... may be regulated if the government satisfies\" the three remaining Central Hudson prongs","sentence":"See Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. at 623-24, 115 S.Ct. 2371 (explaining that \"the government may freely regulate commercial speech that concerns unlawful activity or is misleading. Commercial speech that falls into neither of those categories ... may be regulated if the government satisfies\u201d the three remaining Central Hudson prongs); Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 767, 113 S.Ct. 1792 (\u201c[E]ven a communication that does no more than propose a commercial transaction is entitled to the coverage of the First Amendment.\u201d); see also Alexander v. Cahill, 598 F.3d 79, 89 (2d Cir.2010) cert. denied - U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 820, 178 L.Ed.2d 576 (2010); Bad Frog Brewery, Inc. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 134 F.3d 87, 96-97 (2d Cir.1998) (\"Though the label communicates no information beyond the source of the product, we think that minimal information, conveyed in the context of a proposal of a commercial transaction, suffices to invoke the protections for commercial speech, articulated in Central Hudson.\")."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"134 F.3d 87, 96-97","parenthetical":"\"Though the label communicates no information beyond the source of the product, we think that minimal information, conveyed in the context of a proposal of a commercial transaction, suffices to invoke the protections for commercial speech, articulated in Central Hudson.\"","sentence":"See Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. at 623-24, 115 S.Ct. 2371 (explaining that \"the government may freely regulate commercial speech that concerns unlawful activity or is misleading. Commercial speech that falls into neither of those categories ... may be regulated if the government satisfies\u201d the three remaining Central Hudson prongs); Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 767, 113 S.Ct. 1792 (\u201c[E]ven a communication that does no more than propose a commercial transaction is entitled to the coverage of the First Amendment.\u201d); see also Alexander v. Cahill, 598 F.3d 79, 89 (2d Cir.2010) cert. denied - U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 820, 178 L.Ed.2d 576 (2010); Bad Frog Brewery, Inc. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 134 F.3d 87, 96-97 (2d Cir.1998) (\"Though the label communicates no information beyond the source of the product, we think that minimal information, conveyed in the context of a proposal of a commercial transaction, suffices to invoke the protections for commercial speech, articulated in Central Hudson.\")."},"case_id":4300950,"label":"a"}
{"context":". To the extent the Bar argues in the Bar Motion and Bar Reply that \"Don't settle for less than you deserve\" is not protected under the First Amendment because it does not provide \"accurate factual information that can be objectively verifiable [sic],\" see Bar Reply at 8; Bar Motion at 14, the Bar abandoned this argument at the Hearing and acknowledged that \"Don't settle for less than you deserve\" is entitled to the First Amendment protections afforded commercial speech. Regardless, the Court finds that the Bar's prior position to the contrary is without merit.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"explaining that \"the government may freely regulate commercial speech that concerns unlawful activity or is misleading. Commercial speech that falls into neither of those categories ... may be regulated if the government satisfies\" the three remaining Central Hudson prongs","sentence":"See Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. at 623-24, 115 S.Ct. 2371 (explaining that \"the government may freely regulate commercial speech that concerns unlawful activity or is misleading. Commercial speech that falls into neither of those categories ... may be regulated if the government satisfies\u201d the three remaining Central Hudson prongs); Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 767, 113 S.Ct. 1792 (\u201c[E]ven a communication that does no more than propose a commercial transaction is entitled to the coverage of the First Amendment.\u201d); see also Alexander v. Cahill, 598 F.3d 79, 89 (2d Cir.2010) cert. denied - U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 820, 178 L.Ed.2d 576 (2010); Bad Frog Brewery, Inc. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 134 F.3d 87, 96-97 (2d Cir.1998) (\"Though the label communicates no information beyond the source of the product, we think that minimal information, conveyed in the context of a proposal of a commercial transaction, suffices to invoke the protections for commercial speech, articulated in Central Hudson.\")."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"134 F.3d 87, 96-97","parenthetical":"\"Though the label communicates no information beyond the source of the product, we think that minimal information, conveyed in the context of a proposal of a commercial transaction, suffices to invoke the protections for commercial speech, articulated in Central Hudson.\"","sentence":"See Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. at 623-24, 115 S.Ct. 2371 (explaining that \"the government may freely regulate commercial speech that concerns unlawful activity or is misleading. Commercial speech that falls into neither of those categories ... may be regulated if the government satisfies\u201d the three remaining Central Hudson prongs); Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 767, 113 S.Ct. 1792 (\u201c[E]ven a communication that does no more than propose a commercial transaction is entitled to the coverage of the First Amendment.\u201d); see also Alexander v. Cahill, 598 F.3d 79, 89 (2d Cir.2010) cert. denied - U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 820, 178 L.Ed.2d 576 (2010); Bad Frog Brewery, Inc. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 134 F.3d 87, 96-97 (2d Cir.1998) (\"Though the label communicates no information beyond the source of the product, we think that minimal information, conveyed in the context of a proposal of a commercial transaction, suffices to invoke the protections for commercial speech, articulated in Central Hudson.\")."},"case_id":4300950,"label":"a"}
{"context":". To the extent the Bar argues in the Bar Motion and Bar Reply that \"Don't settle for less than you deserve\" is not protected under the First Amendment because it does not provide \"accurate factual information that can be objectively verifiable [sic],\" see Bar Reply at 8; Bar Motion at 14, the Bar abandoned this argument at the Hearing and acknowledged that \"Don't settle for less than you deserve\" is entitled to the First Amendment protections afforded commercial speech. Regardless, the Court finds that the Bar's prior position to the contrary is without merit.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"507 U.S. 767, 767","parenthetical":"\"[E]ven a communication that does no more than propose a commercial transaction is entitled to the coverage of the First Amendment.\"","sentence":"See Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. at 623-24, 115 S.Ct. 2371 (explaining that \"the government may freely regulate commercial speech that concerns unlawful activity or is misleading. Commercial speech that falls into neither of those categories ... may be regulated if the government satisfies\u201d the three remaining Central Hudson prongs); Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 767, 113 S.Ct. 1792 (\u201c[E]ven a communication that does no more than propose a commercial transaction is entitled to the coverage of the First Amendment.\u201d); see also Alexander v. Cahill, 598 F.3d 79, 89 (2d Cir.2010) cert. denied - U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 820, 178 L.Ed.2d 576 (2010); Bad Frog Brewery, Inc. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 134 F.3d 87, 96-97 (2d Cir.1998) (\"Though the label communicates no information beyond the source of the product, we think that minimal information, conveyed in the context of a proposal of a commercial transaction, suffices to invoke the protections for commercial speech, articulated in Central Hudson.\")."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"134 F.3d 87, 96-97","parenthetical":"\"Though the label communicates no information beyond the source of the product, we think that minimal information, conveyed in the context of a proposal of a commercial transaction, suffices to invoke the protections for commercial speech, articulated in Central Hudson.\"","sentence":"See Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. at 623-24, 115 S.Ct. 2371 (explaining that \"the government may freely regulate commercial speech that concerns unlawful activity or is misleading. Commercial speech that falls into neither of those categories ... may be regulated if the government satisfies\u201d the three remaining Central Hudson prongs); Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 767, 113 S.Ct. 1792 (\u201c[E]ven a communication that does no more than propose a commercial transaction is entitled to the coverage of the First Amendment.\u201d); see also Alexander v. Cahill, 598 F.3d 79, 89 (2d Cir.2010) cert. denied - U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 820, 178 L.Ed.2d 576 (2010); Bad Frog Brewery, Inc. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 134 F.3d 87, 96-97 (2d Cir.1998) (\"Though the label communicates no information beyond the source of the product, we think that minimal information, conveyed in the context of a proposal of a commercial transaction, suffices to invoke the protections for commercial speech, articulated in Central Hudson.\")."},"case_id":4300950,"label":"a"}
{"context":". To the extent the Bar argues in the Bar Motion and Bar Reply that \"Don't settle for less than you deserve\" is not protected under the First Amendment because it does not provide \"accurate factual information that can be objectively verifiable [sic],\" see Bar Reply at 8; Bar Motion at 14, the Bar abandoned this argument at the Hearing and acknowledged that \"Don't settle for less than you deserve\" is entitled to the First Amendment protections afforded commercial speech. Regardless, the Court finds that the Bar's prior position to the contrary is without merit.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"134 F.3d 87, 96-97","parenthetical":"\"Though the label communicates no information beyond the source of the product, we think that minimal information, conveyed in the context of a proposal of a commercial transaction, suffices to invoke the protections for commercial speech, articulated in Central Hudson.\"","sentence":"See Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. at 623-24, 115 S.Ct. 2371 (explaining that \"the government may freely regulate commercial speech that concerns unlawful activity or is misleading. Commercial speech that falls into neither of those categories ... may be regulated if the government satisfies\u201d the three remaining Central Hudson prongs); Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 767, 113 S.Ct. 1792 (\u201c[E]ven a communication that does no more than propose a commercial transaction is entitled to the coverage of the First Amendment.\u201d); see also Alexander v. Cahill, 598 F.3d 79, 89 (2d Cir.2010) cert. denied - U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 820, 178 L.Ed.2d 576 (2010); Bad Frog Brewery, Inc. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 134 F.3d 87, 96-97 (2d Cir.1998) (\"Though the label communicates no information beyond the source of the product, we think that minimal information, conveyed in the context of a proposal of a commercial transaction, suffices to invoke the protections for commercial speech, articulated in Central Hudson.\")."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[E]ven a communication that does no more than propose a commercial transaction is entitled to the coverage of the First Amendment.\"","sentence":"See Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. at 623-24, 115 S.Ct. 2371 (explaining that \"the government may freely regulate commercial speech that concerns unlawful activity or is misleading. Commercial speech that falls into neither of those categories ... may be regulated if the government satisfies\u201d the three remaining Central Hudson prongs); Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 767, 113 S.Ct. 1792 (\u201c[E]ven a communication that does no more than propose a commercial transaction is entitled to the coverage of the First Amendment.\u201d); see also Alexander v. Cahill, 598 F.3d 79, 89 (2d Cir.2010) cert. denied - U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 820, 178 L.Ed.2d 576 (2010); Bad Frog Brewery, Inc. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 134 F.3d 87, 96-97 (2d Cir.1998) (\"Though the label communicates no information beyond the source of the product, we think that minimal information, conveyed in the context of a proposal of a commercial transaction, suffices to invoke the protections for commercial speech, articulated in Central Hudson.\")."},"case_id":4300950,"label":"b"}
{"context":"f34 While NASD Rules do not create a private cause of action, courts have looked to the Rules to define the scope of a common law duty such as negligent supervision.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"637 F.2d 318, 333","parenthetical":"NYSE and NASD Rules are \"excellent tools\" to assess reasonableness of broker's conduct","sentence":"Craighead v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 899 F.2d 485, 493 (6th Cir. 1990) (\u201cWe agree with the district court that NYSE [(New York Stock Exchange)] Rule 405 does not imply a private right of action cognizable in federal court.\u201d); As You Sow, 584 F. Supp. 2d at 1048-49 (\u201cviolations of NASD rules alone do not give rise to actionable claims,\u201d but NASD Rule 3040 and other NASD Rules \u201cassist Tennessee and other courts in defining the extent of a legal duty at common law\u201d); McGraw v. Wachovia Sec., LLC, 756 F. Supp. 2d 1053, 1075 (N.D. Iowa 2010) (recognizing duty based on NASD Rules); Colbert & Winstead, PC 401(K) Plan v. AIG Fin. Advisors, Inc., No. 3:07-1117, 2008 WL 2704367, at *10, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53179, at *27 (M.D. Tenn. July 8, 2008) (court order) (\u201cthe NASD may define the scope of a duty of a broker dealer\u201d); cf. Miley v. Oppenheimer & Co., 637 F.2d 318, 333 (5th Cir. 1981) (NYSE and NASD Rules are \u201cexcellent tools\u201d to assess reasonableness of broker\u2019s conduct); Piper, Jaffray & Hopwood Inc. v. Ladin, 399 F. Supp. 292, 299 (S.D. Iowa 1975) (concluding NASD and NYSE rules are \u201cadmissible as evidence of negligence\u201d); Mihara v. Dean Witter & Co., 619 F.2d 814, 824 (9th Cir. 1980) (NASD and NYSE rules \u201creflect the standard to which all brokers are held\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"899 F.2d 485, 493","parenthetical":"\"We agree with the district court that NYSE [(New York Stock Exchange)] Rule 405 does not imply a private right of action cognizable in federal court.\"","sentence":"Craighead v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 899 F.2d 485, 493 (6th Cir. 1990) (\u201cWe agree with the district court that NYSE [(New York Stock Exchange)] Rule 405 does not imply a private right of action cognizable in federal court.\u201d); As You Sow, 584 F. Supp. 2d at 1048-49 (\u201cviolations of NASD rules alone do not give rise to actionable claims,\u201d but NASD Rule 3040 and other NASD Rules \u201cassist Tennessee and other courts in defining the extent of a legal duty at common law\u201d); McGraw v. Wachovia Sec., LLC, 756 F. Supp. 2d 1053, 1075 (N.D. Iowa 2010) (recognizing duty based on NASD Rules); Colbert & Winstead, PC 401(K) Plan v. AIG Fin. Advisors, Inc., No. 3:07-1117, 2008 WL 2704367, at *10, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53179, at *27 (M.D. Tenn. July 8, 2008) (court order) (\u201cthe NASD may define the scope of a duty of a broker dealer\u201d); cf. Miley v. Oppenheimer & Co., 637 F.2d 318, 333 (5th Cir. 1981) (NYSE and NASD Rules are \u201cexcellent tools\u201d to assess reasonableness of broker\u2019s conduct); Piper, Jaffray & Hopwood Inc. v. Ladin, 399 F. Supp. 292, 299 (S.D. Iowa 1975) (concluding NASD and NYSE rules are \u201cadmissible as evidence of negligence\u201d); Mihara v. Dean Witter & Co., 619 F.2d 814, 824 (9th Cir. 1980) (NASD and NYSE rules \u201creflect the standard to which all brokers are held\u201d)."},"case_id":4358074,"label":"b"}
{"context":"f34 While NASD Rules do not create a private cause of action, courts have looked to the Rules to define the scope of a common law duty such as negligent supervision.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"899 F.2d 485, 493","parenthetical":"\"We agree with the district court that NYSE [(New York Stock Exchange)] Rule 405 does not imply a private right of action cognizable in federal court.\"","sentence":"Craighead v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 899 F.2d 485, 493 (6th Cir. 1990) (\u201cWe agree with the district court that NYSE [(New York Stock Exchange)] Rule 405 does not imply a private right of action cognizable in federal court.\u201d); As You Sow, 584 F. Supp. 2d at 1048-49 (\u201cviolations of NASD rules alone do not give rise to actionable claims,\u201d but NASD Rule 3040 and other NASD Rules \u201cassist Tennessee and other courts in defining the extent of a legal duty at common law\u201d); McGraw v. Wachovia Sec., LLC, 756 F. Supp. 2d 1053, 1075 (N.D. Iowa 2010) (recognizing duty based on NASD Rules); Colbert & Winstead, PC 401(K) Plan v. AIG Fin. Advisors, Inc., No. 3:07-1117, 2008 WL 2704367, at *10, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53179, at *27 (M.D. Tenn. July 8, 2008) (court order) (\u201cthe NASD may define the scope of a duty of a broker dealer\u201d); cf. Miley v. Oppenheimer & Co., 637 F.2d 318, 333 (5th Cir. 1981) (NYSE and NASD Rules are \u201cexcellent tools\u201d to assess reasonableness of broker\u2019s conduct); Piper, Jaffray & Hopwood Inc. v. Ladin, 399 F. Supp. 292, 299 (S.D. Iowa 1975) (concluding NASD and NYSE rules are \u201cadmissible as evidence of negligence\u201d); Mihara v. Dean Witter & Co., 619 F.2d 814, 824 (9th Cir. 1980) (NASD and NYSE rules \u201creflect the standard to which all brokers are held\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"399 F. Supp. 292, 299","parenthetical":"concluding NASD and NYSE rules are \"admissible as evidence of negligence\"","sentence":"Craighead v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 899 F.2d 485, 493 (6th Cir. 1990) (\u201cWe agree with the district court that NYSE [(New York Stock Exchange)] Rule 405 does not imply a private right of action cognizable in federal court.\u201d); As You Sow, 584 F. Supp. 2d at 1048-49 (\u201cviolations of NASD rules alone do not give rise to actionable claims,\u201d but NASD Rule 3040 and other NASD Rules \u201cassist Tennessee and other courts in defining the extent of a legal duty at common law\u201d); McGraw v. Wachovia Sec., LLC, 756 F. Supp. 2d 1053, 1075 (N.D. Iowa 2010) (recognizing duty based on NASD Rules); Colbert & Winstead, PC 401(K) Plan v. AIG Fin. Advisors, Inc., No. 3:07-1117, 2008 WL 2704367, at *10, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53179, at *27 (M.D. Tenn. July 8, 2008) (court order) (\u201cthe NASD may define the scope of a duty of a broker dealer\u201d); cf. Miley v. Oppenheimer & Co., 637 F.2d 318, 333 (5th Cir. 1981) (NYSE and NASD Rules are \u201cexcellent tools\u201d to assess reasonableness of broker\u2019s conduct); Piper, Jaffray & Hopwood Inc. v. Ladin, 399 F. Supp. 292, 299 (S.D. Iowa 1975) (concluding NASD and NYSE rules are \u201cadmissible as evidence of negligence\u201d); Mihara v. Dean Witter & Co., 619 F.2d 814, 824 (9th Cir. 1980) (NASD and NYSE rules \u201creflect the standard to which all brokers are held\u201d)."},"case_id":4358074,"label":"a"}
{"context":"f34 While NASD Rules do not create a private cause of action, courts have looked to the Rules to define the scope of a common law duty such as negligent supervision.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"619 F.2d 814, 824","parenthetical":"NASD and NYSE rules \"reflect the standard to which all brokers are held\"","sentence":"Craighead v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 899 F.2d 485, 493 (6th Cir. 1990) (\u201cWe agree with the district court that NYSE [(New York Stock Exchange)] Rule 405 does not imply a private right of action cognizable in federal court.\u201d); As You Sow, 584 F. Supp. 2d at 1048-49 (\u201cviolations of NASD rules alone do not give rise to actionable claims,\u201d but NASD Rule 3040 and other NASD Rules \u201cassist Tennessee and other courts in defining the extent of a legal duty at common law\u201d); McGraw v. Wachovia Sec., LLC, 756 F. Supp. 2d 1053, 1075 (N.D. Iowa 2010) (recognizing duty based on NASD Rules); Colbert & Winstead, PC 401(K) Plan v. AIG Fin. Advisors, Inc., No. 3:07-1117, 2008 WL 2704367, at *10, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53179, at *27 (M.D. Tenn. July 8, 2008) (court order) (\u201cthe NASD may define the scope of a duty of a broker dealer\u201d); cf. Miley v. Oppenheimer & Co., 637 F.2d 318, 333 (5th Cir. 1981) (NYSE and NASD Rules are \u201cexcellent tools\u201d to assess reasonableness of broker\u2019s conduct); Piper, Jaffray & Hopwood Inc. v. Ladin, 399 F. Supp. 292, 299 (S.D. Iowa 1975) (concluding NASD and NYSE rules are \u201cadmissible as evidence of negligence\u201d); Mihara v. Dean Witter & Co., 619 F.2d 814, 824 (9th Cir. 1980) (NASD and NYSE rules \u201creflect the standard to which all brokers are held\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"899 F.2d 485, 493","parenthetical":"\"We agree with the district court that NYSE [(New York Stock Exchange)] Rule 405 does not imply a private right of action cognizable in federal court.\"","sentence":"Craighead v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 899 F.2d 485, 493 (6th Cir. 1990) (\u201cWe agree with the district court that NYSE [(New York Stock Exchange)] Rule 405 does not imply a private right of action cognizable in federal court.\u201d); As You Sow, 584 F. Supp. 2d at 1048-49 (\u201cviolations of NASD rules alone do not give rise to actionable claims,\u201d but NASD Rule 3040 and other NASD Rules \u201cassist Tennessee and other courts in defining the extent of a legal duty at common law\u201d); McGraw v. Wachovia Sec., LLC, 756 F. Supp. 2d 1053, 1075 (N.D. Iowa 2010) (recognizing duty based on NASD Rules); Colbert & Winstead, PC 401(K) Plan v. AIG Fin. Advisors, Inc., No. 3:07-1117, 2008 WL 2704367, at *10, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53179, at *27 (M.D. Tenn. July 8, 2008) (court order) (\u201cthe NASD may define the scope of a duty of a broker dealer\u201d); cf. Miley v. Oppenheimer & Co., 637 F.2d 318, 333 (5th Cir. 1981) (NYSE and NASD Rules are \u201cexcellent tools\u201d to assess reasonableness of broker\u2019s conduct); Piper, Jaffray & Hopwood Inc. v. Ladin, 399 F. Supp. 292, 299 (S.D. Iowa 1975) (concluding NASD and NYSE rules are \u201cadmissible as evidence of negligence\u201d); Mihara v. Dean Witter & Co., 619 F.2d 814, 824 (9th Cir. 1980) (NASD and NYSE rules \u201creflect the standard to which all brokers are held\u201d)."},"case_id":4358074,"label":"b"}
{"context":"f34 While NASD Rules do not create a private cause of action, courts have looked to the Rules to define the scope of a common law duty such as negligent supervision.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"584 F. Supp. 2d 1048, 1048-49","parenthetical":"\"violations of NASD rules alone do not give rise to actionable claims,\" but NASD Rule 3040 and other NASD Rules \"assist Tennessee and other courts in defining the extent of a legal duty at common law\"","sentence":"Craighead v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 899 F.2d 485, 493 (6th Cir. 1990) (\u201cWe agree with the district court that NYSE [(New York Stock Exchange)] Rule 405 does not imply a private right of action cognizable in federal court.\u201d); As You Sow, 584 F. Supp. 2d at 1048-49 (\u201cviolations of NASD rules alone do not give rise to actionable claims,\u201d but NASD Rule 3040 and other NASD Rules \u201cassist Tennessee and other courts in defining the extent of a legal duty at common law\u201d); McGraw v. Wachovia Sec., LLC, 756 F. Supp. 2d 1053, 1075 (N.D. Iowa 2010) (recognizing duty based on NASD Rules); Colbert & Winstead, PC 401(K) Plan v. AIG Fin. Advisors, Inc., No. 3:07-1117, 2008 WL 2704367, at *10, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53179, at *27 (M.D. Tenn. July 8, 2008) (court order) (\u201cthe NASD may define the scope of a duty of a broker dealer\u201d); cf. Miley v. Oppenheimer & Co., 637 F.2d 318, 333 (5th Cir. 1981) (NYSE and NASD Rules are \u201cexcellent tools\u201d to assess reasonableness of broker\u2019s conduct); Piper, Jaffray & Hopwood Inc. v. Ladin, 399 F. Supp. 292, 299 (S.D. Iowa 1975) (concluding NASD and NYSE rules are \u201cadmissible as evidence of negligence\u201d); Mihara v. Dean Witter & Co., 619 F.2d 814, 824 (9th Cir. 1980) (NASD and NYSE rules \u201creflect the standard to which all brokers are held\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"637 F.2d 318, 333","parenthetical":"NYSE and NASD Rules are \"excellent tools\" to assess reasonableness of broker's conduct","sentence":"Craighead v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 899 F.2d 485, 493 (6th Cir. 1990) (\u201cWe agree with the district court that NYSE [(New York Stock Exchange)] Rule 405 does not imply a private right of action cognizable in federal court.\u201d); As You Sow, 584 F. Supp. 2d at 1048-49 (\u201cviolations of NASD rules alone do not give rise to actionable claims,\u201d but NASD Rule 3040 and other NASD Rules \u201cassist Tennessee and other courts in defining the extent of a legal duty at common law\u201d); McGraw v. Wachovia Sec., LLC, 756 F. Supp. 2d 1053, 1075 (N.D. Iowa 2010) (recognizing duty based on NASD Rules); Colbert & Winstead, PC 401(K) Plan v. AIG Fin. Advisors, Inc., No. 3:07-1117, 2008 WL 2704367, at *10, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53179, at *27 (M.D. Tenn. July 8, 2008) (court order) (\u201cthe NASD may define the scope of a duty of a broker dealer\u201d); cf. Miley v. Oppenheimer & Co., 637 F.2d 318, 333 (5th Cir. 1981) (NYSE and NASD Rules are \u201cexcellent tools\u201d to assess reasonableness of broker\u2019s conduct); Piper, Jaffray & Hopwood Inc. v. Ladin, 399 F. Supp. 292, 299 (S.D. Iowa 1975) (concluding NASD and NYSE rules are \u201cadmissible as evidence of negligence\u201d); Mihara v. Dean Witter & Co., 619 F.2d 814, 824 (9th Cir. 1980) (NASD and NYSE rules \u201creflect the standard to which all brokers are held\u201d)."},"case_id":4358074,"label":"a"}
{"context":"f34 While NASD Rules do not create a private cause of action, courts have looked to the Rules to define the scope of a common law duty such as negligent supervision.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"584 F. Supp. 2d 1048, 1048-49","parenthetical":"\"violations of NASD rules alone do not give rise to actionable claims,\" but NASD Rule 3040 and other NASD Rules \"assist Tennessee and other courts in defining the extent of a legal duty at common law\"","sentence":"Craighead v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 899 F.2d 485, 493 (6th Cir. 1990) (\u201cWe agree with the district court that NYSE [(New York Stock Exchange)] Rule 405 does not imply a private right of action cognizable in federal court.\u201d); As You Sow, 584 F. Supp. 2d at 1048-49 (\u201cviolations of NASD rules alone do not give rise to actionable claims,\u201d but NASD Rule 3040 and other NASD Rules \u201cassist Tennessee and other courts in defining the extent of a legal duty at common law\u201d); McGraw v. Wachovia Sec., LLC, 756 F. Supp. 2d 1053, 1075 (N.D. Iowa 2010) (recognizing duty based on NASD Rules); Colbert & Winstead, PC 401(K) Plan v. AIG Fin. Advisors, Inc., No. 3:07-1117, 2008 WL 2704367, at *10, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53179, at *27 (M.D. Tenn. July 8, 2008) (court order) (\u201cthe NASD may define the scope of a duty of a broker dealer\u201d); cf. Miley v. Oppenheimer & Co., 637 F.2d 318, 333 (5th Cir. 1981) (NYSE and NASD Rules are \u201cexcellent tools\u201d to assess reasonableness of broker\u2019s conduct); Piper, Jaffray & Hopwood Inc. v. Ladin, 399 F. Supp. 292, 299 (S.D. Iowa 1975) (concluding NASD and NYSE rules are \u201cadmissible as evidence of negligence\u201d); Mihara v. Dean Witter & Co., 619 F.2d 814, 824 (9th Cir. 1980) (NASD and NYSE rules \u201creflect the standard to which all brokers are held\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"399 F. Supp. 292, 299","parenthetical":"concluding NASD and NYSE rules are \"admissible as evidence of negligence\"","sentence":"Craighead v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 899 F.2d 485, 493 (6th Cir. 1990) (\u201cWe agree with the district court that NYSE [(New York Stock Exchange)] Rule 405 does not imply a private right of action cognizable in federal court.\u201d); As You Sow, 584 F. Supp. 2d at 1048-49 (\u201cviolations of NASD rules alone do not give rise to actionable claims,\u201d but NASD Rule 3040 and other NASD Rules \u201cassist Tennessee and other courts in defining the extent of a legal duty at common law\u201d); McGraw v. Wachovia Sec., LLC, 756 F. Supp. 2d 1053, 1075 (N.D. Iowa 2010) (recognizing duty based on NASD Rules); Colbert & Winstead, PC 401(K) Plan v. AIG Fin. Advisors, Inc., No. 3:07-1117, 2008 WL 2704367, at *10, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53179, at *27 (M.D. Tenn. July 8, 2008) (court order) (\u201cthe NASD may define the scope of a duty of a broker dealer\u201d); cf. Miley v. Oppenheimer & Co., 637 F.2d 318, 333 (5th Cir. 1981) (NYSE and NASD Rules are \u201cexcellent tools\u201d to assess reasonableness of broker\u2019s conduct); Piper, Jaffray & Hopwood Inc. v. Ladin, 399 F. Supp. 292, 299 (S.D. Iowa 1975) (concluding NASD and NYSE rules are \u201cadmissible as evidence of negligence\u201d); Mihara v. Dean Witter & Co., 619 F.2d 814, 824 (9th Cir. 1980) (NASD and NYSE rules \u201creflect the standard to which all brokers are held\u201d)."},"case_id":4358074,"label":"a"}
{"context":"f34 While NASD Rules do not create a private cause of action, courts have looked to the Rules to define the scope of a common law duty such as negligent supervision.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"584 F. Supp. 2d 1048, 1048-49","parenthetical":"\"violations of NASD rules alone do not give rise to actionable claims,\" but NASD Rule 3040 and other NASD Rules \"assist Tennessee and other courts in defining the extent of a legal duty at common law\"","sentence":"Craighead v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 899 F.2d 485, 493 (6th Cir. 1990) (\u201cWe agree with the district court that NYSE [(New York Stock Exchange)] Rule 405 does not imply a private right of action cognizable in federal court.\u201d); As You Sow, 584 F. Supp. 2d at 1048-49 (\u201cviolations of NASD rules alone do not give rise to actionable claims,\u201d but NASD Rule 3040 and other NASD Rules \u201cassist Tennessee and other courts in defining the extent of a legal duty at common law\u201d); McGraw v. Wachovia Sec., LLC, 756 F. Supp. 2d 1053, 1075 (N.D. Iowa 2010) (recognizing duty based on NASD Rules); Colbert & Winstead, PC 401(K) Plan v. AIG Fin. Advisors, Inc., No. 3:07-1117, 2008 WL 2704367, at *10, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53179, at *27 (M.D. Tenn. July 8, 2008) (court order) (\u201cthe NASD may define the scope of a duty of a broker dealer\u201d); cf. Miley v. Oppenheimer & Co., 637 F.2d 318, 333 (5th Cir. 1981) (NYSE and NASD Rules are \u201cexcellent tools\u201d to assess reasonableness of broker\u2019s conduct); Piper, Jaffray & Hopwood Inc. v. Ladin, 399 F. Supp. 292, 299 (S.D. Iowa 1975) (concluding NASD and NYSE rules are \u201cadmissible as evidence of negligence\u201d); Mihara v. Dean Witter & Co., 619 F.2d 814, 824 (9th Cir. 1980) (NASD and NYSE rules \u201creflect the standard to which all brokers are held\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"619 F.2d 814, 824","parenthetical":"NASD and NYSE rules \"reflect the standard to which all brokers are held\"","sentence":"Craighead v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 899 F.2d 485, 493 (6th Cir. 1990) (\u201cWe agree with the district court that NYSE [(New York Stock Exchange)] Rule 405 does not imply a private right of action cognizable in federal court.\u201d); As You Sow, 584 F. Supp. 2d at 1048-49 (\u201cviolations of NASD rules alone do not give rise to actionable claims,\u201d but NASD Rule 3040 and other NASD Rules \u201cassist Tennessee and other courts in defining the extent of a legal duty at common law\u201d); McGraw v. Wachovia Sec., LLC, 756 F. Supp. 2d 1053, 1075 (N.D. Iowa 2010) (recognizing duty based on NASD Rules); Colbert & Winstead, PC 401(K) Plan v. AIG Fin. Advisors, Inc., No. 3:07-1117, 2008 WL 2704367, at *10, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53179, at *27 (M.D. Tenn. July 8, 2008) (court order) (\u201cthe NASD may define the scope of a duty of a broker dealer\u201d); cf. Miley v. Oppenheimer & Co., 637 F.2d 318, 333 (5th Cir. 1981) (NYSE and NASD Rules are \u201cexcellent tools\u201d to assess reasonableness of broker\u2019s conduct); Piper, Jaffray & Hopwood Inc. v. Ladin, 399 F. Supp. 292, 299 (S.D. Iowa 1975) (concluding NASD and NYSE rules are \u201cadmissible as evidence of negligence\u201d); Mihara v. Dean Witter & Co., 619 F.2d 814, 824 (9th Cir. 1980) (NASD and NYSE rules \u201creflect the standard to which all brokers are held\u201d)."},"case_id":4358074,"label":"a"}
{"context":"With respect to the HAC instruction, this Court has found that a constitutionally vague HAC instruction may be found harmless where the facts of the murder support finding the aggravator beyond a reasonable doubt.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"614 So.2d 483, 484","parenthetical":"vacating sentence based on unconstitutional HAC instructional error without conducting a harmless error analysis, on facts similar to those in the instant case","sentence":"See Doyle v. Singletary, 655 So.2d 1120, 1121 (Fla.1995) (explaining that error concerning constitutionally vague HAC instruction was sub ject to harmless error analysis under State v. DiGuilio, 491 So.2d 1129 (Fla.1986)); Johnston v. Singletary, 640 So.2d 1102, 1104-05 (Fla.1994) (explaining that the \u201cjury would have found Johnston\u2019s brutal stabbing and strangulation of the eighty-four-year-old victim, who undoubtedly suffered great terror and pain before she died, heinous, atrocious, or cruel, even with the limiting instruction\u201d); but see Hitchcock v. State, 614 So.2d 483, 484 (Fla.1993) (vacating sentence based on unconstitutional HAC instructional error without conducting a harmless error analysis, on facts similar to those in the instant case)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"640 So.2d 1102, 1104-05","parenthetical":"explaining that the \"jury would have found Johnston's brutal stabbing and strangulation of the eighty-four-year-old victim, who undoubtedly suffered great terror and pain before she died, heinous, atrocious, or cruel, even with the limiting instruction\"","sentence":"See Doyle v. Singletary, 655 So.2d 1120, 1121 (Fla.1995) (explaining that error concerning constitutionally vague HAC instruction was sub ject to harmless error analysis under State v. DiGuilio, 491 So.2d 1129 (Fla.1986)); Johnston v. Singletary, 640 So.2d 1102, 1104-05 (Fla.1994) (explaining that the \u201cjury would have found Johnston\u2019s brutal stabbing and strangulation of the eighty-four-year-old victim, who undoubtedly suffered great terror and pain before she died, heinous, atrocious, or cruel, even with the limiting instruction\u201d); but see Hitchcock v. State, 614 So.2d 483, 484 (Fla.1993) (vacating sentence based on unconstitutional HAC instructional error without conducting a harmless error analysis, on facts similar to those in the instant case)."},"case_id":11112642,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The district court properly dismissed the action with prejudice because Smith's second amended complaint did not state a claim for deliberate indifference and'Smith failed to correct the defects.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"880 F.2d 1040, 1045","parenthetical":"explaining that to establish a supervisor's liability under section 1983, an inmate must demonstrate that the official \"participated in or directed the violations, or knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them.\"","sentence":"See Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir.1989) (explaining that to establish a supervisor\u2019s liability under section 1983, an inmate must demonstrate that the official \u201cparticipated in or directed the violations, or knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them.\u201d); see also DCD Programs Ltd. v. Leighton, 833 F.2d 183, 186 n. 3 (9th Cir.1987) (\u201ca district court\u2019s discretion over amendments is especially broad where the court has already given a plaintiff one or more opportunities to amend his complaint\u201d) (internal quotations omitted)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"a district court's discretion over amendments is especially broad where the court has already given a plaintiff one or more opportunities to amend his complaint\"","sentence":"See Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir.1989) (explaining that to establish a supervisor\u2019s liability under section 1983, an inmate must demonstrate that the official \u201cparticipated in or directed the violations, or knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them.\u201d); see also DCD Programs Ltd. v. Leighton, 833 F.2d 183, 186 n. 3 (9th Cir.1987) (\u201ca district court\u2019s discretion over amendments is especially broad where the court has already given a plaintiff one or more opportunities to amend his complaint\u201d) (internal quotations omitted)."},"case_id":4254173,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The undisputed evidence shows that, at most, the water on which Hartman slipped remained on the floor for ten minutes. Regardless of when restaurant employees last inspected the restroom, this limited period of time was \"insufficient asa matter of law to hold that [Clark] should have discovered and removed the liquid prior to [Hartman's] fall.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"228 Ga.App. 52, 55","parenthetical":"\"In cases involving grocery stores, parking lots, and restaurants, we have found that 15 or 20 minutes was a legally insufficient amount of time for a proprietor to discover a foreign substance on the floor.\"","sentence":"All American Quality Foods, 340 Ga. App. at 396 (inspection-related evidence irrelevant where evidence showed that hazardous substance was on grocery store floor only six or seven minutes); see also Gleaton v. APAC-Georgia, 228 Ga.App. 52, 55 (2) (491 SE2d 138) (1997) (\u201cIn cases involving grocery stores, parking lots, and restaurants, we have found that 15 or 20 minutes was a legally insufficient amount of time for a proprietor to discover a foreign substance on the floor.\u201d); Mazur v. Food Giant, 183 Ga.App. 453, 454 (1) (359 SE2d 178) (1987) (\u201cWhere it appears a foreign object had not been present for more than 10 to 15 minutes, the allegations show no actionable negligence on the part of the proprietor in failing to discover it.\u201d) (citation and punctuation omitted)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"340 Ga. App. 396, 396","parenthetical":"inspection-related evidence irrelevant where evidence showed that hazardous substance was on grocery store floor only six or seven minutes","sentence":"All American Quality Foods, 340 Ga. App. at 396 (inspection-related evidence irrelevant where evidence showed that hazardous substance was on grocery store floor only six or seven minutes); see also Gleaton v. APAC-Georgia, 228 Ga.App. 52, 55 (2) (491 SE2d 138) (1997) (\u201cIn cases involving grocery stores, parking lots, and restaurants, we have found that 15 or 20 minutes was a legally insufficient amount of time for a proprietor to discover a foreign substance on the floor.\u201d); Mazur v. Food Giant, 183 Ga.App. 453, 454 (1) (359 SE2d 178) (1987) (\u201cWhere it appears a foreign object had not been present for more than 10 to 15 minutes, the allegations show no actionable negligence on the part of the proprietor in failing to discover it.\u201d) (citation and punctuation omitted)."},"case_id":12452859,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The undisputed evidence shows that, at most, the water on which Hartman slipped remained on the floor for ten minutes. Regardless of when restaurant employees last inspected the restroom, this limited period of time was \"insufficient asa matter of law to hold that [Clark] should have discovered and removed the liquid prior to [Hartman's] fall.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"183 Ga.App. 453, 454","parenthetical":"\"Where it appears a foreign object had not been present for more than 10 to 15 minutes, the allegations show no actionable negligence on the part of the proprietor in failing to discover it.\"","sentence":"All American Quality Foods, 340 Ga. App. at 396 (inspection-related evidence irrelevant where evidence showed that hazardous substance was on grocery store floor only six or seven minutes); see also Gleaton v. APAC-Georgia, 228 Ga.App. 52, 55 (2) (491 SE2d 138) (1997) (\u201cIn cases involving grocery stores, parking lots, and restaurants, we have found that 15 or 20 minutes was a legally insufficient amount of time for a proprietor to discover a foreign substance on the floor.\u201d); Mazur v. Food Giant, 183 Ga.App. 453, 454 (1) (359 SE2d 178) (1987) (\u201cWhere it appears a foreign object had not been present for more than 10 to 15 minutes, the allegations show no actionable negligence on the part of the proprietor in failing to discover it.\u201d) (citation and punctuation omitted)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"340 Ga. App. 396, 396","parenthetical":"inspection-related evidence irrelevant where evidence showed that hazardous substance was on grocery store floor only six or seven minutes","sentence":"All American Quality Foods, 340 Ga. App. at 396 (inspection-related evidence irrelevant where evidence showed that hazardous substance was on grocery store floor only six or seven minutes); see also Gleaton v. APAC-Georgia, 228 Ga.App. 52, 55 (2) (491 SE2d 138) (1997) (\u201cIn cases involving grocery stores, parking lots, and restaurants, we have found that 15 or 20 minutes was a legally insufficient amount of time for a proprietor to discover a foreign substance on the floor.\u201d); Mazur v. Food Giant, 183 Ga.App. 453, 454 (1) (359 SE2d 178) (1987) (\u201cWhere it appears a foreign object had not been present for more than 10 to 15 minutes, the allegations show no actionable negligence on the part of the proprietor in failing to discover it.\u201d) (citation and punctuation omitted)."},"case_id":12452859,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The Seventh Amendment to the Constitution of the United States does not apply to a State civil trial. However, the court's analysis of Title VII claims under the Seventh Amendment is similar to our analysis under art. 15.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"Seventh Amendment guarantees the right to a jury trial in suits alleging fair housing violations under 42 U.S.C. SS 3612","sentence":"See also Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974) (Seventh Amendment guarantees the right to a jury trial in suits alleging fair housing violations under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 3612). Because the result we reach is consistent with the result reached in Federal courts, the right to a jury trial is not affected by the forum selected."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"733 F.2d 260, 263","parenthetical":"\"A party seeking com pensatory and punitive damages or other legal relief under 42 U.S.C. SS 1981 has a right to a jury trial\"","sentence":"See Laskaris v. Thornburgh, 733 F.2d 260, 263 (3d Cir.), cert, denied, 469 U.S. 886 (1984) (\u201cA party seeking com pensatory and punitive damages or other legal relief under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1981 has a right to a jury trial\u201d)."},"case_id":480448,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The Seventh Amendment to the Constitution of the United States does not apply to a State civil trial. However, the court's analysis of Title VII claims under the Seventh Amendment is similar to our analysis under art. 15.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"A party seeking com pensatory and punitive damages or other legal relief under 42 U.S.C. SS 1981 has a right to a jury trial\"","sentence":"See Laskaris v. Thornburgh, 733 F.2d 260, 263 (3d Cir.), cert, denied, 469 U.S. 886 (1984) (\u201cA party seeking com pensatory and punitive damages or other legal relief under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1981 has a right to a jury trial\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"Seventh Amendment guarantees the right to a jury trial in suits alleging fair housing violations under 42 U.S.C. SS 3612","sentence":"See also Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974) (Seventh Amendment guarantees the right to a jury trial in suits alleging fair housing violations under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 3612). Because the result we reach is consistent with the result reached in Federal courts, the right to a jury trial is not affected by the forum selected."},"case_id":480448,"label":"a"}
{"context":"\"Knowledge of facts, and not knowledge of the legal significance of those facts, controls the time of accrual.\" Johnson v. Long Beach Mortg. Thus, when one cause of action accrues, the limitations period begins to run for all possible dependent or intertwined causes of action, and if one claim is barred by the statute of limitations, then dependent or intertwined claims are also barred.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting that the plaintiff did not challenge the trial court's ruling that because his defamation claim was time-barred, the other intertwined claims were also time-barred","sentence":"Morton v. Nat\u2019l Med. Enterprs., Inc., 725 A.2d 462, 471 (D.C.1999) (concluding that fraud claims were completely dependent upon and intertwined with plaintiffs\u2019 malpractice claims, and therefore accrued when the malpractice claims accrued); Saunders v. Nemati, 580 A.2d 660, 662 (D.C.1990) (discussing cases where the dependent emotional distress claim accrued when the cause of action accrued for the underlying tort); see also Mullin, 785 A.2d at 298 n. 3 (noting that the plaintiff did not challenge the trial court\u2019s ruling that because his defamation claim was time-barred, the other intertwined claims were also time-barred)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"725 A.2d 462, 471","parenthetical":"concluding that fraud claims were completely dependent upon and intertwined with plaintiffs' malpractice claims, and therefore accrued when the malpractice claims accrued","sentence":"Morton v. Nat\u2019l Med. Enterprs., Inc., 725 A.2d 462, 471 (D.C.1999) (concluding that fraud claims were completely dependent upon and intertwined with plaintiffs\u2019 malpractice claims, and therefore accrued when the malpractice claims accrued); Saunders v. Nemati, 580 A.2d 660, 662 (D.C.1990) (discussing cases where the dependent emotional distress claim accrued when the cause of action accrued for the underlying tort); see also Mullin, 785 A.2d at 298 n. 3 (noting that the plaintiff did not challenge the trial court\u2019s ruling that because his defamation claim was time-barred, the other intertwined claims were also time-barred)."},"case_id":5603481,"label":"b"}
{"context":"\"Knowledge of facts, and not knowledge of the legal significance of those facts, controls the time of accrual.\" Johnson v. Long Beach Mortg. Thus, when one cause of action accrues, the limitations period begins to run for all possible dependent or intertwined causes of action, and if one claim is barred by the statute of limitations, then dependent or intertwined claims are also barred.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"580 A.2d 660, 662","parenthetical":"discussing cases where the dependent emotional distress claim accrued when the cause of action accrued for the underlying tort","sentence":"Morton v. Nat\u2019l Med. Enterprs., Inc., 725 A.2d 462, 471 (D.C.1999) (concluding that fraud claims were completely dependent upon and intertwined with plaintiffs\u2019 malpractice claims, and therefore accrued when the malpractice claims accrued); Saunders v. Nemati, 580 A.2d 660, 662 (D.C.1990) (discussing cases where the dependent emotional distress claim accrued when the cause of action accrued for the underlying tort); see also Mullin, 785 A.2d at 298 n. 3 (noting that the plaintiff did not challenge the trial court\u2019s ruling that because his defamation claim was time-barred, the other intertwined claims were also time-barred)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting that the plaintiff did not challenge the trial court's ruling that because his defamation claim was time-barred, the other intertwined claims were also time-barred","sentence":"Morton v. Nat\u2019l Med. Enterprs., Inc., 725 A.2d 462, 471 (D.C.1999) (concluding that fraud claims were completely dependent upon and intertwined with plaintiffs\u2019 malpractice claims, and therefore accrued when the malpractice claims accrued); Saunders v. Nemati, 580 A.2d 660, 662 (D.C.1990) (discussing cases where the dependent emotional distress claim accrued when the cause of action accrued for the underlying tort); see also Mullin, 785 A.2d at 298 n. 3 (noting that the plaintiff did not challenge the trial court\u2019s ruling that because his defamation claim was time-barred, the other intertwined claims were also time-barred)."},"case_id":5603481,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In the instant case, this grossly irresponsible policy allowed a young patron inexperienced with the effects of hard liquor to consume a large quantity of Jack Daniels bourbon, leave the club, and venture onto Virginia highways. Patterson's reckless driving on the morning, of December 20, 1981, which culminated in the tragic accident, was a direct, predictable result of the Army's failure to abide by Virginia law and its own drinking regulations.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"United States held liable under common law to third party for negligently serving alcohol to a minor serviceman in an Air Force NCO Club where the serviceman, after leaving the club, injured the third party in a drunken driving incident","sentence":"See Vance v. United States, 355 F.Supp. 756 (D.Alaska 1973) (United States could be held liable under common law to intoxicated patron of Air Force NCO Club for injuries sustained by that patron after an agent of the United States negligently served alcohol to him); see also Deeds v. United States, 306 F.Supp. 348 (D.Montana 1969) (United States held liable under common law to third party for negligently serving alcohol to a minor serviceman in an Air Force NCO Club where the serviceman, after leaving the club, injured the third party in a drunken driving incident)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"United States could be held liable under common law to intoxicated patron of Air Force NCO Club for injuries sustained by that patron after an agent of the United States negligently served alcohol to him","sentence":"See Vance v. United States, 355 F.Supp. 756 (D.Alaska 1973) (United States could be held liable under common law to intoxicated patron of Air Force NCO Club for injuries sustained by that patron after an agent of the United States negligently served alcohol to him); see also Deeds v. United States, 306 F.Supp. 348 (D.Montana 1969) (United States held liable under common law to third party for negligently serving alcohol to a minor serviceman in an Air Force NCO Club where the serviceman, after leaving the club, injured the third party in a drunken driving incident)."},"case_id":117176,"label":"b"}
{"context":"We have generally eschewed the relevance or significance of the actual state of mind of the executing officer. In recent cases we have been emphatic and consistent in our adherence to the proposition that probable cause must be demonstrated by reference to objective circumstances -- what an informed, trained and reasonably experienced police officer under all of the circumstances would have understood in terms of whether there is probable cause.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"93 N.J. 146, 152","parenthetical":"\"if the validity of a search can be sustained independently on objective grounds demonstrating reasonableness, the existence of other defects that do not derogate from the overall objective reasonableness of the search or impugn the integrity of the judicial process should not be relied upon to invalidate the search.\"","sentence":"See State v. Bruzzese, 94 N.J. 210 (1983) (police officer\u2019s search and seizure would be considered reasonable only if it conformed to objectively reasonable police standards); see also State v. Guerra, 93 N.J. 146, 152 (1983) (\u201cif the validity of a search can be sustained independently on objective grounds demonstrating reasonableness, the existence of other defects that do not derogate from the overall objective reasonableness of the search or impugn the integrity of the judicial process should not be relied upon to invalidate the search.\u201d) (emphasis added); State v. Ercolano, 79 N.J. 25, 71 (1979) (dissenting opinion)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"police officer's search and seizure would be considered reasonable only if it conformed to objectively reasonable police standards","sentence":"See State v. Bruzzese, 94 N.J. 210 (1983) (police officer\u2019s search and seizure would be considered reasonable only if it conformed to objectively reasonable police standards); see also State v. Guerra, 93 N.J. 146, 152 (1983) (\u201cif the validity of a search can be sustained independently on objective grounds demonstrating reasonableness, the existence of other defects that do not derogate from the overall objective reasonableness of the search or impugn the integrity of the judicial process should not be relied upon to invalidate the search.\u201d) (emphasis added); State v. Ercolano, 79 N.J. 25, 71 (1979) (dissenting opinion)."},"case_id":1353504,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Defendants finally argue that a class action is unnecessary to achieve Plaintiffs' requested relief, which at its heart seeks modification of barriers throughout GGNRA. They contend that any modifications ordered by the Court for the benefit of Plaintiffs would necessarily inure to the benefit of the proposed class without the expense of a class action.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20215, *17","parenthetical":"denying class certification in part because \"all putative class members would benefit from an injunction issued on behalf of a single plaintiff' so \"class vehicle is not necessary to obtain the relief sought\"","sentence":"See James v. Ball, 613 F.2d 180, 186 (9th Cir.1979) (upholding denial of class certification without discussion of Rule 23 requirements because the relief sought would produce the same result as class-wide relief); see also Sokol, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20215, *17 (denying class certification in part because \u201call putative class members would benefit from an injunction issued on behalf of a single plaintiff\u2019 so \u201cclass vehicle is not necessary to obtain the relief sought\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"613 F.2d 180, 186","parenthetical":"upholding denial of class certification without discussion of Rule 23 requirements because the relief sought would produce the same result as class-wide relief","sentence":"See James v. Ball, 613 F.2d 180, 186 (9th Cir.1979) (upholding denial of class certification without discussion of Rule 23 requirements because the relief sought would produce the same result as class-wide relief); see also Sokol, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20215, *17 (denying class certification in part because \u201call putative class members would benefit from an injunction issued on behalf of a single plaintiff\u2019 so \u201cclass vehicle is not necessary to obtain the relief sought\u201d)."},"case_id":4279084,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The case law has not always been specific as to which subsection of SS 1692g is the source of this implied \"overshadowing\" prohibition.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"516 F.3d 85, 90","parenthetical":"\"[W]e have held repeatedly that a debt collector violates SS 1692g(a","sentence":"See, e.g., Miller, 943 F.2d at 485 (holding that a debt collector\u2019s violation of the \u201covershadowing\u201d rule was a circumvention of \u201c\u00a7 1692g\u201d); Talbott v. GC Servs. Ltd. P\u2019ship, 53 F.Supp.2d 846, 852 (W.D.Va.1999) (discussing \u201covershadowing in violation of \u00a7 1692g\u201d); Creighton v. Emporia Credit Serv., Inc., 981 F.Supp. 411, 415-16 (E.D.Va.1997) (analyzing an \u201covershadowing\u201d claim and consistently referring only to \u201c\u00a7 1692g\u201d). Several courts have discussed the \u201covershadowing\u201d prohibition in the context of subsection (a)\u2019s requirement that the validation notice be provided. See, e.g., Nat\u2019l Fin. Servs., 98 F.3d at 139; Morgan v. Credit Adjustment Bd., Inc., 999 F.Supp. 803, 806-07 (E.D.Va. 1998); cf. Jacobson v. Healthcare Fin. Servs., Inc., 516 F.3d 85, 90 (2d Cir.2008) (\u201c[W]e have held repeatedly that a debt collector violates \u00a7 1692g(a), even if the collector includes an accurate validation notice, if that notice is overshadowed or contradicted by other language in communications to the debtor.\u201d (citing pre-2006 case law))."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"943 F.2d 485, 485","parenthetical":"holding that a debt collector's violation of the \"overshadowing\" rule was a circumvention of \"SS 1692g\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Miller, 943 F.2d at 485 (holding that a debt collector\u2019s violation of the \u201covershadowing\u201d rule was a circumvention of \u201c\u00a7 1692g\u201d); Talbott v. GC Servs. Ltd. P\u2019ship, 53 F.Supp.2d 846, 852 (W.D.Va.1999) (discussing \u201covershadowing in violation of \u00a7 1692g\u201d); Creighton v. Emporia Credit Serv., Inc., 981 F.Supp. 411, 415-16 (E.D.Va.1997) (analyzing an \u201covershadowing\u201d claim and consistently referring only to \u201c\u00a7 1692g\u201d). Several courts have discussed the \u201covershadowing\u201d prohibition in the context of subsection (a)\u2019s requirement that the validation notice be provided. See, e.g., Nat\u2019l Fin. Servs., 98 F.3d at 139; Morgan v. Credit Adjustment Bd., Inc., 999 F.Supp. 803, 806-07 (E.D.Va. 1998); cf. Jacobson v. Healthcare Fin. Servs., Inc., 516 F.3d 85, 90 (2d Cir.2008) (\u201c[W]e have held repeatedly that a debt collector violates \u00a7 1692g(a), even if the collector includes an accurate validation notice, if that notice is overshadowed or contradicted by other language in communications to the debtor.\u201d (citing pre-2006 case law))."},"case_id":3829873,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The case law has not always been specific as to which subsection of SS 1692g is the source of this implied \"overshadowing\" prohibition.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"981 F.Supp. 411, 415-16","parenthetical":"analyzing an \"overshadowing\" claim and consistently referring only to \"SS 1692g\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Miller, 943 F.2d at 485 (holding that a debt collector\u2019s violation of the \u201covershadowing\u201d rule was a circumvention of \u201c\u00a7 1692g\u201d); Talbott v. GC Servs. Ltd. P\u2019ship, 53 F.Supp.2d 846, 852 (W.D.Va.1999) (discussing \u201covershadowing in violation of \u00a7 1692g\u201d); Creighton v. Emporia Credit Serv., Inc., 981 F.Supp. 411, 415-16 (E.D.Va.1997) (analyzing an \u201covershadowing\u201d claim and consistently referring only to \u201c\u00a7 1692g\u201d). Several courts have discussed the \u201covershadowing\u201d prohibition in the context of subsection (a)\u2019s requirement that the validation notice be provided. See, e.g., Nat\u2019l Fin. Servs., 98 F.3d at 139; Morgan v. Credit Adjustment Bd., Inc., 999 F.Supp. 803, 806-07 (E.D.Va. 1998); cf. Jacobson v. Healthcare Fin. Servs., Inc., 516 F.3d 85, 90 (2d Cir.2008) (\u201c[W]e have held repeatedly that a debt collector violates \u00a7 1692g(a), even if the collector includes an accurate validation notice, if that notice is overshadowed or contradicted by other language in communications to the debtor.\u201d (citing pre-2006 case law))."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"516 F.3d 85, 90","parenthetical":"\"[W]e have held repeatedly that a debt collector violates SS 1692g(a","sentence":"See, e.g., Miller, 943 F.2d at 485 (holding that a debt collector\u2019s violation of the \u201covershadowing\u201d rule was a circumvention of \u201c\u00a7 1692g\u201d); Talbott v. GC Servs. Ltd. P\u2019ship, 53 F.Supp.2d 846, 852 (W.D.Va.1999) (discussing \u201covershadowing in violation of \u00a7 1692g\u201d); Creighton v. Emporia Credit Serv., Inc., 981 F.Supp. 411, 415-16 (E.D.Va.1997) (analyzing an \u201covershadowing\u201d claim and consistently referring only to \u201c\u00a7 1692g\u201d). Several courts have discussed the \u201covershadowing\u201d prohibition in the context of subsection (a)\u2019s requirement that the validation notice be provided. See, e.g., Nat\u2019l Fin. Servs., 98 F.3d at 139; Morgan v. Credit Adjustment Bd., Inc., 999 F.Supp. 803, 806-07 (E.D.Va. 1998); cf. Jacobson v. Healthcare Fin. Servs., Inc., 516 F.3d 85, 90 (2d Cir.2008) (\u201c[W]e have held repeatedly that a debt collector violates \u00a7 1692g(a), even if the collector includes an accurate validation notice, if that notice is overshadowed or contradicted by other language in communications to the debtor.\u201d (citing pre-2006 case law))."},"case_id":3829873,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The case law has not always been specific as to which subsection of SS 1692g is the source of this implied \"overshadowing\" prohibition.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"516 F.3d 85, 90","parenthetical":"\"[W]e have held repeatedly that a debt collector violates SS 1692g(a","sentence":"See, e.g., Miller, 943 F.2d at 485 (holding that a debt collector\u2019s violation of the \u201covershadowing\u201d rule was a circumvention of \u201c\u00a7 1692g\u201d); Talbott v. GC Servs. Ltd. P\u2019ship, 53 F.Supp.2d 846, 852 (W.D.Va.1999) (discussing \u201covershadowing in violation of \u00a7 1692g\u201d); Creighton v. Emporia Credit Serv., Inc., 981 F.Supp. 411, 415-16 (E.D.Va.1997) (analyzing an \u201covershadowing\u201d claim and consistently referring only to \u201c\u00a7 1692g\u201d). Several courts have discussed the \u201covershadowing\u201d prohibition in the context of subsection (a)\u2019s requirement that the validation notice be provided. See, e.g., Nat\u2019l Fin. Servs., 98 F.3d at 139; Morgan v. Credit Adjustment Bd., Inc., 999 F.Supp. 803, 806-07 (E.D.Va. 1998); cf. Jacobson v. Healthcare Fin. Servs., Inc., 516 F.3d 85, 90 (2d Cir.2008) (\u201c[W]e have held repeatedly that a debt collector violates \u00a7 1692g(a), even if the collector includes an accurate validation notice, if that notice is overshadowed or contradicted by other language in communications to the debtor.\u201d (citing pre-2006 case law))."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"98 F.3d 139, 139","parenthetical":"analyzing an \"overshadowing\" claim and consistently referring only to \"SS 1692g\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Miller, 943 F.2d at 485 (holding that a debt collector\u2019s violation of the \u201covershadowing\u201d rule was a circumvention of \u201c\u00a7 1692g\u201d); Talbott v. GC Servs. Ltd. P\u2019ship, 53 F.Supp.2d 846, 852 (W.D.Va.1999) (discussing \u201covershadowing in violation of \u00a7 1692g\u201d); Creighton v. Emporia Credit Serv., Inc., 981 F.Supp. 411, 415-16 (E.D.Va.1997) (analyzing an \u201covershadowing\u201d claim and consistently referring only to \u201c\u00a7 1692g\u201d). Several courts have discussed the \u201covershadowing\u201d prohibition in the context of subsection (a)\u2019s requirement that the validation notice be provided. See, e.g., Nat\u2019l Fin. Servs., 98 F.3d at 139; Morgan v. Credit Adjustment Bd., Inc., 999 F.Supp. 803, 806-07 (E.D.Va. 1998); cf. Jacobson v. Healthcare Fin. Servs., Inc., 516 F.3d 85, 90 (2d Cir.2008) (\u201c[W]e have held repeatedly that a debt collector violates \u00a7 1692g(a), even if the collector includes an accurate validation notice, if that notice is overshadowed or contradicted by other language in communications to the debtor.\u201d (citing pre-2006 case law))."},"case_id":3829873,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties must be afforded adequate time for general discovery before being required to respond to a motion for summary judgment.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"172 F.3d 524, 530","parenthetical":"\"[Sjummary judgment is proper 'only after the nonmovant has had adequate time for discovery.' \" (quoting In re TMJ Litigation, 113 F.3d 1484, 1490 (8th Cir.1997","sentence":"Iverson v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co., 172 F.3d 524, 530 (8th Cir.1999) (\u201c[Sjummary judgment is proper \u2018only after the nonmovant has had adequate time for discovery.\u2019 \u201d (quoting In re TMJ Litigation, 113 F.3d 1484, 1490 (8th Cir.1997))); see also Costello, Porter, Hill, Heisterkamp & Bushnell v. Providers Fidelity Life Ins. Co., 958 F.2d 836, 837-39 (8th Cir.1992) (\u201cSummary judgment is inappropriate until Providers has had an adequate opportunity to conduct discovery.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"958 F.2d 836, 837-39","parenthetical":"\"Summary judgment is inappropriate until Providers has had an adequate opportunity to conduct discovery.\"","sentence":"Iverson v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co., 172 F.3d 524, 530 (8th Cir.1999) (\u201c[Sjummary judgment is proper \u2018only after the nonmovant has had adequate time for discovery.\u2019 \u201d (quoting In re TMJ Litigation, 113 F.3d 1484, 1490 (8th Cir.1997))); see also Costello, Porter, Hill, Heisterkamp & Bushnell v. Providers Fidelity Life Ins. Co., 958 F.2d 836, 837-39 (8th Cir.1992) (\u201cSummary judgment is inappropriate until Providers has had an adequate opportunity to conduct discovery.\u201d)."},"case_id":3567441,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties must be afforded adequate time for general discovery before being required to respond to a motion for summary judgment.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"113 F.3d 1484, 1490","parenthetical":"\"[Sjummary judgment is proper 'only after the nonmovant has had adequate time for discovery.' \" (quoting In re TMJ Litigation, 113 F.3d 1484, 1490 (8th Cir.1997","sentence":"Iverson v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co., 172 F.3d 524, 530 (8th Cir.1999) (\u201c[Sjummary judgment is proper \u2018only after the nonmovant has had adequate time for discovery.\u2019 \u201d (quoting In re TMJ Litigation, 113 F.3d 1484, 1490 (8th Cir.1997))); see also Costello, Porter, Hill, Heisterkamp & Bushnell v. Providers Fidelity Life Ins. Co., 958 F.2d 836, 837-39 (8th Cir.1992) (\u201cSummary judgment is inappropriate until Providers has had an adequate opportunity to conduct discovery.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"958 F.2d 836, 837-39","parenthetical":"\"Summary judgment is inappropriate until Providers has had an adequate opportunity to conduct discovery.\"","sentence":"Iverson v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co., 172 F.3d 524, 530 (8th Cir.1999) (\u201c[Sjummary judgment is proper \u2018only after the nonmovant has had adequate time for discovery.\u2019 \u201d (quoting In re TMJ Litigation, 113 F.3d 1484, 1490 (8th Cir.1997))); see also Costello, Porter, Hill, Heisterkamp & Bushnell v. Providers Fidelity Life Ins. Co., 958 F.2d 836, 837-39 (8th Cir.1992) (\u201cSummary judgment is inappropriate until Providers has had an adequate opportunity to conduct discovery.\u201d)."},"case_id":3567441,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The plaintiffs challenge is not the first attack on provisions or implementations of the Act.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"determining that a flow control ordinance violated the Commerce Clause","sentence":"See Ben Oehrleins v. Hennepin County, 115 F.3d 1372 (8th Cir.1997) (affirming finding that enactment pursuant to \u00a7\u00a7 115A.80-.893 was in violation of the Commerce Clause); Waste Systems Corp. v. County of Martin, Minn., 985 F.2d 1381, 1388-89 (8th Cir.1993) (affirming finding of violation of the Constitution); National Solid Waste Management Ass\u2019n v. Williams, 877 F.Supp. 1367, 1379-80 (D.Minn.1995) (finding \u00a7 115A.47 violative of the Commerce Clause); see also C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, NY, 511 U.S. 383, 114 S.Ct. 1677, 128 L.Ed.2d 399 (1994) (determining that a flow control ordinance violated the Commerce Clause)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"affirming finding that enactment pursuant to SSSS 115A.80-.893 was in violation of the Commerce Clause","sentence":"See Ben Oehrleins v. Hennepin County, 115 F.3d 1372 (8th Cir.1997) (affirming finding that enactment pursuant to \u00a7\u00a7 115A.80-.893 was in violation of the Commerce Clause); Waste Systems Corp. v. County of Martin, Minn., 985 F.2d 1381, 1388-89 (8th Cir.1993) (affirming finding of violation of the Constitution); National Solid Waste Management Ass\u2019n v. Williams, 877 F.Supp. 1367, 1379-80 (D.Minn.1995) (finding \u00a7 115A.47 violative of the Commerce Clause); see also C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, NY, 511 U.S. 383, 114 S.Ct. 1677, 128 L.Ed.2d 399 (1994) (determining that a flow control ordinance violated the Commerce Clause)."},"case_id":11977556,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The plaintiffs challenge is not the first attack on provisions or implementations of the Act.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"affirming finding that enactment pursuant to SSSS 115A.80-.893 was in violation of the Commerce Clause","sentence":"See Ben Oehrleins v. Hennepin County, 115 F.3d 1372 (8th Cir.1997) (affirming finding that enactment pursuant to \u00a7\u00a7 115A.80-.893 was in violation of the Commerce Clause); Waste Systems Corp. v. County of Martin, Minn., 985 F.2d 1381, 1388-89 (8th Cir.1993) (affirming finding of violation of the Constitution); National Solid Waste Management Ass\u2019n v. Williams, 877 F.Supp. 1367, 1379-80 (D.Minn.1995) (finding \u00a7 115A.47 violative of the Commerce Clause); see also C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, NY, 511 U.S. 383, 114 S.Ct. 1677, 128 L.Ed.2d 399 (1994) (determining that a flow control ordinance violated the Commerce Clause)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"determining that a flow control ordinance violated the Commerce Clause","sentence":"See Ben Oehrleins v. Hennepin County, 115 F.3d 1372 (8th Cir.1997) (affirming finding that enactment pursuant to \u00a7\u00a7 115A.80-.893 was in violation of the Commerce Clause); Waste Systems Corp. v. County of Martin, Minn., 985 F.2d 1381, 1388-89 (8th Cir.1993) (affirming finding of violation of the Constitution); National Solid Waste Management Ass\u2019n v. Williams, 877 F.Supp. 1367, 1379-80 (D.Minn.1995) (finding \u00a7 115A.47 violative of the Commerce Clause); see also C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, NY, 511 U.S. 383, 114 S.Ct. 1677, 128 L.Ed.2d 399 (1994) (determining that a flow control ordinance violated the Commerce Clause)."},"case_id":11977556,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The plaintiffs challenge is not the first attack on provisions or implementations of the Act.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"determining that a flow control ordinance violated the Commerce Clause","sentence":"See Ben Oehrleins v. Hennepin County, 115 F.3d 1372 (8th Cir.1997) (affirming finding that enactment pursuant to \u00a7\u00a7 115A.80-.893 was in violation of the Commerce Clause); Waste Systems Corp. v. County of Martin, Minn., 985 F.2d 1381, 1388-89 (8th Cir.1993) (affirming finding of violation of the Constitution); National Solid Waste Management Ass\u2019n v. Williams, 877 F.Supp. 1367, 1379-80 (D.Minn.1995) (finding \u00a7 115A.47 violative of the Commerce Clause); see also C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, NY, 511 U.S. 383, 114 S.Ct. 1677, 128 L.Ed.2d 399 (1994) (determining that a flow control ordinance violated the Commerce Clause)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"affirming finding that enactment pursuant to SSSS 115A.80-.893 was in violation of the Commerce Clause","sentence":"See Ben Oehrleins v. Hennepin County, 115 F.3d 1372 (8th Cir.1997) (affirming finding that enactment pursuant to \u00a7\u00a7 115A.80-.893 was in violation of the Commerce Clause); Waste Systems Corp. v. County of Martin, Minn., 985 F.2d 1381, 1388-89 (8th Cir.1993) (affirming finding of violation of the Constitution); National Solid Waste Management Ass\u2019n v. Williams, 877 F.Supp. 1367, 1379-80 (D.Minn.1995) (finding \u00a7 115A.47 violative of the Commerce Clause); see also C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, NY, 511 U.S. 383, 114 S.Ct. 1677, 128 L.Ed.2d 399 (1994) (determining that a flow control ordinance violated the Commerce Clause)."},"case_id":11977556,"label":"b"}
{"context":". In this regard, I also draw guidance from the cautionary observations of other courts in instances in which legislative bodies have not specified the treatment intended to be given exceptions.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"criticizing the intermediate appellate court for \"la[ying] too much emphasis on the grammatical construction of the [a]ct rather than upon the essential elements of the offense denounced\"","sentence":"See, e.g., State v. McLemore, 782 S.W.2d 127, 129 (Mo.Ct.App.1989) (\"There is no certain principle ... to use to determine when a qualification of the scope of the proscribed conduct should be viewed as a matter of excuse or justification as distinguished from a basic element of the crime[;][c]ourts have continuously wrestled with this problem and consistently have been pinned to the mat.\u201d); id. at 130 (\u201cReliance on the positioning of the exception or proviso to determine whether it defines an element of the crime gives preeminence to what may be an accident of drafting, rather than an analysis of the exception or proviso and its relevance to the culpability of the accused.\u201d); Hall v. State, 291 Ala. 397, 281 So.2d 662, 664 (1973) (criticizing the intermediate appellate court for \u201cla[ying] too much emphasis on the grammatical construction of the [a]ct rather than upon the essential elements of the offense denounced\u201d); People v. Devinny, 227 N.Y. 397, 125 N.E. 543, 544 (1919) (\"Attempts to ... distinguish between exceptions and provisos have resulted in many technicalities and in much subtlety[;][t]he two classes of provisos \u2014 exceptions and provisos \u2014 frequently come close togetherf.]\u201d); People v. Franzoni, 75 Misc.2d 246, 347 N.Y.S.2d 910, 914 (1973) (\u201cThe rule requiring pleading and proof by the People of negative exceptions in a criminal statute has been described in an exhaustive annotation as presenting 'one of the most frequent problems in criminal procedure, yet often one of the most baffling.' \" (citation omitted)); cf. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494, 120 S.Ct. at 2365 (characterizing the distinction between sentencing factors and elements as \"constitutionally novel and elusive\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"530 U.S. 494, 494","parenthetical":"characterizing the distinction between sentencing factors and elements as \"constitutionally novel and elusive\"","sentence":"See, e.g., State v. McLemore, 782 S.W.2d 127, 129 (Mo.Ct.App.1989) (\"There is no certain principle ... to use to determine when a qualification of the scope of the proscribed conduct should be viewed as a matter of excuse or justification as distinguished from a basic element of the crime[;][c]ourts have continuously wrestled with this problem and consistently have been pinned to the mat.\u201d); id. at 130 (\u201cReliance on the positioning of the exception or proviso to determine whether it defines an element of the crime gives preeminence to what may be an accident of drafting, rather than an analysis of the exception or proviso and its relevance to the culpability of the accused.\u201d); Hall v. State, 291 Ala. 397, 281 So.2d 662, 664 (1973) (criticizing the intermediate appellate court for \u201cla[ying] too much emphasis on the grammatical construction of the [a]ct rather than upon the essential elements of the offense denounced\u201d); People v. Devinny, 227 N.Y. 397, 125 N.E. 543, 544 (1919) (\"Attempts to ... distinguish between exceptions and provisos have resulted in many technicalities and in much subtlety[;][t]he two classes of provisos \u2014 exceptions and provisos \u2014 frequently come close togetherf.]\u201d); People v. Franzoni, 75 Misc.2d 246, 347 N.Y.S.2d 910, 914 (1973) (\u201cThe rule requiring pleading and proof by the People of negative exceptions in a criminal statute has been described in an exhaustive annotation as presenting 'one of the most frequent problems in criminal procedure, yet often one of the most baffling.' \" (citation omitted)); cf. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494, 120 S.Ct. at 2365 (characterizing the distinction between sentencing factors and elements as \"constitutionally novel and elusive\u201d)."},"case_id":588008,"label":"a"}
{"context":". In this regard, I also draw guidance from the cautionary observations of other courts in instances in which legislative bodies have not specified the treatment intended to be given exceptions.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"criticizing the intermediate appellate court for \"la[ying] too much emphasis on the grammatical construction of the [a]ct rather than upon the essential elements of the offense denounced\"","sentence":"See, e.g., State v. McLemore, 782 S.W.2d 127, 129 (Mo.Ct.App.1989) (\"There is no certain principle ... to use to determine when a qualification of the scope of the proscribed conduct should be viewed as a matter of excuse or justification as distinguished from a basic element of the crime[;][c]ourts have continuously wrestled with this problem and consistently have been pinned to the mat.\u201d); id. at 130 (\u201cReliance on the positioning of the exception or proviso to determine whether it defines an element of the crime gives preeminence to what may be an accident of drafting, rather than an analysis of the exception or proviso and its relevance to the culpability of the accused.\u201d); Hall v. State, 291 Ala. 397, 281 So.2d 662, 664 (1973) (criticizing the intermediate appellate court for \u201cla[ying] too much emphasis on the grammatical construction of the [a]ct rather than upon the essential elements of the offense denounced\u201d); People v. Devinny, 227 N.Y. 397, 125 N.E. 543, 544 (1919) (\"Attempts to ... distinguish between exceptions and provisos have resulted in many technicalities and in much subtlety[;][t]he two classes of provisos \u2014 exceptions and provisos \u2014 frequently come close togetherf.]\u201d); People v. Franzoni, 75 Misc.2d 246, 347 N.Y.S.2d 910, 914 (1973) (\u201cThe rule requiring pleading and proof by the People of negative exceptions in a criminal statute has been described in an exhaustive annotation as presenting 'one of the most frequent problems in criminal procedure, yet often one of the most baffling.' \" (citation omitted)); cf. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494, 120 S.Ct. at 2365 (characterizing the distinction between sentencing factors and elements as \"constitutionally novel and elusive\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"120 S.Ct. 2365, 2365","parenthetical":"characterizing the distinction between sentencing factors and elements as \"constitutionally novel and elusive\"","sentence":"See, e.g., State v. McLemore, 782 S.W.2d 127, 129 (Mo.Ct.App.1989) (\"There is no certain principle ... to use to determine when a qualification of the scope of the proscribed conduct should be viewed as a matter of excuse or justification as distinguished from a basic element of the crime[;][c]ourts have continuously wrestled with this problem and consistently have been pinned to the mat.\u201d); id. at 130 (\u201cReliance on the positioning of the exception or proviso to determine whether it defines an element of the crime gives preeminence to what may be an accident of drafting, rather than an analysis of the exception or proviso and its relevance to the culpability of the accused.\u201d); Hall v. State, 291 Ala. 397, 281 So.2d 662, 664 (1973) (criticizing the intermediate appellate court for \u201cla[ying] too much emphasis on the grammatical construction of the [a]ct rather than upon the essential elements of the offense denounced\u201d); People v. Devinny, 227 N.Y. 397, 125 N.E. 543, 544 (1919) (\"Attempts to ... distinguish between exceptions and provisos have resulted in many technicalities and in much subtlety[;][t]he two classes of provisos \u2014 exceptions and provisos \u2014 frequently come close togetherf.]\u201d); People v. Franzoni, 75 Misc.2d 246, 347 N.Y.S.2d 910, 914 (1973) (\u201cThe rule requiring pleading and proof by the People of negative exceptions in a criminal statute has been described in an exhaustive annotation as presenting 'one of the most frequent problems in criminal procedure, yet often one of the most baffling.' \" (citation omitted)); cf. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494, 120 S.Ct. at 2365 (characterizing the distinction between sentencing factors and elements as \"constitutionally novel and elusive\u201d)."},"case_id":588008,"label":"a"}
{"context":". In this regard, I also draw guidance from the cautionary observations of other courts in instances in which legislative bodies have not specified the treatment intended to be given exceptions.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"281 So.2d 662, 664","parenthetical":"criticizing the intermediate appellate court for \"la[ying] too much emphasis on the grammatical construction of the [a]ct rather than upon the essential elements of the offense denounced\"","sentence":"See, e.g., State v. McLemore, 782 S.W.2d 127, 129 (Mo.Ct.App.1989) (\"There is no certain principle ... to use to determine when a qualification of the scope of the proscribed conduct should be viewed as a matter of excuse or justification as distinguished from a basic element of the crime[;][c]ourts have continuously wrestled with this problem and consistently have been pinned to the mat.\u201d); id. at 130 (\u201cReliance on the positioning of the exception or proviso to determine whether it defines an element of the crime gives preeminence to what may be an accident of drafting, rather than an analysis of the exception or proviso and its relevance to the culpability of the accused.\u201d); Hall v. State, 291 Ala. 397, 281 So.2d 662, 664 (1973) (criticizing the intermediate appellate court for \u201cla[ying] too much emphasis on the grammatical construction of the [a]ct rather than upon the essential elements of the offense denounced\u201d); People v. Devinny, 227 N.Y. 397, 125 N.E. 543, 544 (1919) (\"Attempts to ... distinguish between exceptions and provisos have resulted in many technicalities and in much subtlety[;][t]he two classes of provisos \u2014 exceptions and provisos \u2014 frequently come close togetherf.]\u201d); People v. Franzoni, 75 Misc.2d 246, 347 N.Y.S.2d 910, 914 (1973) (\u201cThe rule requiring pleading and proof by the People of negative exceptions in a criminal statute has been described in an exhaustive annotation as presenting 'one of the most frequent problems in criminal procedure, yet often one of the most baffling.' \" (citation omitted)); cf. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494, 120 S.Ct. at 2365 (characterizing the distinction between sentencing factors and elements as \"constitutionally novel and elusive\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"530 U.S. 494, 494","parenthetical":"characterizing the distinction between sentencing factors and elements as \"constitutionally novel and elusive\"","sentence":"See, e.g., State v. McLemore, 782 S.W.2d 127, 129 (Mo.Ct.App.1989) (\"There is no certain principle ... to use to determine when a qualification of the scope of the proscribed conduct should be viewed as a matter of excuse or justification as distinguished from a basic element of the crime[;][c]ourts have continuously wrestled with this problem and consistently have been pinned to the mat.\u201d); id. at 130 (\u201cReliance on the positioning of the exception or proviso to determine whether it defines an element of the crime gives preeminence to what may be an accident of drafting, rather than an analysis of the exception or proviso and its relevance to the culpability of the accused.\u201d); Hall v. State, 291 Ala. 397, 281 So.2d 662, 664 (1973) (criticizing the intermediate appellate court for \u201cla[ying] too much emphasis on the grammatical construction of the [a]ct rather than upon the essential elements of the offense denounced\u201d); People v. Devinny, 227 N.Y. 397, 125 N.E. 543, 544 (1919) (\"Attempts to ... distinguish between exceptions and provisos have resulted in many technicalities and in much subtlety[;][t]he two classes of provisos \u2014 exceptions and provisos \u2014 frequently come close togetherf.]\u201d); People v. Franzoni, 75 Misc.2d 246, 347 N.Y.S.2d 910, 914 (1973) (\u201cThe rule requiring pleading and proof by the People of negative exceptions in a criminal statute has been described in an exhaustive annotation as presenting 'one of the most frequent problems in criminal procedure, yet often one of the most baffling.' \" (citation omitted)); cf. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494, 120 S.Ct. at 2365 (characterizing the distinction between sentencing factors and elements as \"constitutionally novel and elusive\u201d)."},"case_id":588008,"label":"a"}
{"context":". In this regard, I also draw guidance from the cautionary observations of other courts in instances in which legislative bodies have not specified the treatment intended to be given exceptions.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"281 So.2d 662, 664","parenthetical":"criticizing the intermediate appellate court for \"la[ying] too much emphasis on the grammatical construction of the [a]ct rather than upon the essential elements of the offense denounced\"","sentence":"See, e.g., State v. McLemore, 782 S.W.2d 127, 129 (Mo.Ct.App.1989) (\"There is no certain principle ... to use to determine when a qualification of the scope of the proscribed conduct should be viewed as a matter of excuse or justification as distinguished from a basic element of the crime[;][c]ourts have continuously wrestled with this problem and consistently have been pinned to the mat.\u201d); id. at 130 (\u201cReliance on the positioning of the exception or proviso to determine whether it defines an element of the crime gives preeminence to what may be an accident of drafting, rather than an analysis of the exception or proviso and its relevance to the culpability of the accused.\u201d); Hall v. State, 291 Ala. 397, 281 So.2d 662, 664 (1973) (criticizing the intermediate appellate court for \u201cla[ying] too much emphasis on the grammatical construction of the [a]ct rather than upon the essential elements of the offense denounced\u201d); People v. Devinny, 227 N.Y. 397, 125 N.E. 543, 544 (1919) (\"Attempts to ... distinguish between exceptions and provisos have resulted in many technicalities and in much subtlety[;][t]he two classes of provisos \u2014 exceptions and provisos \u2014 frequently come close togetherf.]\u201d); People v. Franzoni, 75 Misc.2d 246, 347 N.Y.S.2d 910, 914 (1973) (\u201cThe rule requiring pleading and proof by the People of negative exceptions in a criminal statute has been described in an exhaustive annotation as presenting 'one of the most frequent problems in criminal procedure, yet often one of the most baffling.' \" (citation omitted)); cf. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494, 120 S.Ct. at 2365 (characterizing the distinction between sentencing factors and elements as \"constitutionally novel and elusive\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"120 S.Ct. 2365, 2365","parenthetical":"characterizing the distinction between sentencing factors and elements as \"constitutionally novel and elusive\"","sentence":"See, e.g., State v. McLemore, 782 S.W.2d 127, 129 (Mo.Ct.App.1989) (\"There is no certain principle ... to use to determine when a qualification of the scope of the proscribed conduct should be viewed as a matter of excuse or justification as distinguished from a basic element of the crime[;][c]ourts have continuously wrestled with this problem and consistently have been pinned to the mat.\u201d); id. at 130 (\u201cReliance on the positioning of the exception or proviso to determine whether it defines an element of the crime gives preeminence to what may be an accident of drafting, rather than an analysis of the exception or proviso and its relevance to the culpability of the accused.\u201d); Hall v. State, 291 Ala. 397, 281 So.2d 662, 664 (1973) (criticizing the intermediate appellate court for \u201cla[ying] too much emphasis on the grammatical construction of the [a]ct rather than upon the essential elements of the offense denounced\u201d); People v. Devinny, 227 N.Y. 397, 125 N.E. 543, 544 (1919) (\"Attempts to ... distinguish between exceptions and provisos have resulted in many technicalities and in much subtlety[;][t]he two classes of provisos \u2014 exceptions and provisos \u2014 frequently come close togetherf.]\u201d); People v. Franzoni, 75 Misc.2d 246, 347 N.Y.S.2d 910, 914 (1973) (\u201cThe rule requiring pleading and proof by the People of negative exceptions in a criminal statute has been described in an exhaustive annotation as presenting 'one of the most frequent problems in criminal procedure, yet often one of the most baffling.' \" (citation omitted)); cf. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494, 120 S.Ct. at 2365 (characterizing the distinction between sentencing factors and elements as \"constitutionally novel and elusive\u201d)."},"case_id":588008,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Thus, \"the standard for recusal followed by most Supreme Court justices who had previously served as United States Attorney General was whether their involvement in a case involved more than a mere pro forma relationship.\" This standard has also been followed by state judges sitting in other jurisdictions.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"It is presumed that a judge is qualified and unbiased [and [t]he defendant alleging [otherwise] has a substantial burden to show the grounds therefor.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., People v. Delongchamps, 103 Mich.App. 151, 302 N.W.2d 626 (1981) (a judge, formerly a prosecutor, was deemed qualified because he did not personally participate in the prior proceeding and because Canon 3(C) requires disqualification only if a judge \u201ccannot impartially hear a case\u201d); Payne v. State, 48 Ala.App. 401, 265 So.2d 185 (1972), cert. denied, 288 Ala. 748, 265 So.2d 192, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1079, 93 S.Ct. 703, 34 L.Ed.2d 669 (holding a prosecutorial office, as distinguished from actually working on a \u201cconcrete piece of litigation,\u201d does not in and of itself disqualify an individual who subsequently becomes a judge); see also Zitter, Prior Representation or Activity as Prosecuting as Disqualifying Judge From Sitting or Acting in Criminal Case, 16 A.L.R. 4th 550, 554 (1982) (Some courts have concluded that a judge, who had been a district attorney or an attorney general in a mere supervisory or administrative capacity at the time that a defendant was prosecuted for an offense, should not be disqualified; these courts often rationalize that disqualification on mere technical grounds \u201cwould hamper the smooth operation of the judicial administration.\u201d); W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 361 (19_) (\u201c[T]he law will not suppose a possibility of bias or favour in a judge, who is already sworn to administer impartial justice, and whose authority greatly depends upon that presumption and idea.\u201d); Williams v. State, 383 So.2d 547 (1979) (\u201cIt is presumed that a judge is qualified and unbiased [and [t]he defendant alleging [otherwise] has a substantial burden to show the grounds therefor.\u201d), aff'd, 383 So.2d 564 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 995, 101 S.Ct. 534, 66 L.Ed.2d 293."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"a judge, formerly a prosecutor, was deemed qualified because he did not personally participate in the prior proceeding and because Canon 3(C) requires disqualification only if a judge \"cannot impartially hear a case\"","sentence":"See, e.g., People v. Delongchamps, 103 Mich.App. 151, 302 N.W.2d 626 (1981) (a judge, formerly a prosecutor, was deemed qualified because he did not personally participate in the prior proceeding and because Canon 3(C) requires disqualification only if a judge \u201ccannot impartially hear a case\u201d); Payne v. State, 48 Ala.App. 401, 265 So.2d 185 (1972), cert. denied, 288 Ala. 748, 265 So.2d 192, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1079, 93 S.Ct. 703, 34 L.Ed.2d 669 (holding a prosecutorial office, as distinguished from actually working on a \u201cconcrete piece of litigation,\u201d does not in and of itself disqualify an individual who subsequently becomes a judge); see also Zitter, Prior Representation or Activity as Prosecuting as Disqualifying Judge From Sitting or Acting in Criminal Case, 16 A.L.R. 4th 550, 554 (1982) (Some courts have concluded that a judge, who had been a district attorney or an attorney general in a mere supervisory or administrative capacity at the time that a defendant was prosecuted for an offense, should not be disqualified; these courts often rationalize that disqualification on mere technical grounds \u201cwould hamper the smooth operation of the judicial administration.\u201d); W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 361 (19_) (\u201c[T]he law will not suppose a possibility of bias or favour in a judge, who is already sworn to administer impartial justice, and whose authority greatly depends upon that presumption and idea.\u201d); Williams v. State, 383 So.2d 547 (1979) (\u201cIt is presumed that a judge is qualified and unbiased [and [t]he defendant alleging [otherwise] has a substantial burden to show the grounds therefor.\u201d), aff'd, 383 So.2d 564 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 995, 101 S.Ct. 534, 66 L.Ed.2d 293."},"case_id":7513372,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Thus, \"the standard for recusal followed by most Supreme Court justices who had previously served as United States Attorney General was whether their involvement in a case involved more than a mere pro forma relationship.\" This standard has also been followed by state judges sitting in other jurisdictions.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"a judge, formerly a prosecutor, was deemed qualified because he did not personally participate in the prior proceeding and because Canon 3(C) requires disqualification only if a judge \"cannot impartially hear a case\"","sentence":"See, e.g., People v. Delongchamps, 103 Mich.App. 151, 302 N.W.2d 626 (1981) (a judge, formerly a prosecutor, was deemed qualified because he did not personally participate in the prior proceeding and because Canon 3(C) requires disqualification only if a judge \u201ccannot impartially hear a case\u201d); Payne v. State, 48 Ala.App. 401, 265 So.2d 185 (1972), cert. denied, 288 Ala. 748, 265 So.2d 192, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1079, 93 S.Ct. 703, 34 L.Ed.2d 669 (holding a prosecutorial office, as distinguished from actually working on a \u201cconcrete piece of litigation,\u201d does not in and of itself disqualify an individual who subsequently becomes a judge); see also Zitter, Prior Representation or Activity as Prosecuting as Disqualifying Judge From Sitting or Acting in Criminal Case, 16 A.L.R. 4th 550, 554 (1982) (Some courts have concluded that a judge, who had been a district attorney or an attorney general in a mere supervisory or administrative capacity at the time that a defendant was prosecuted for an offense, should not be disqualified; these courts often rationalize that disqualification on mere technical grounds \u201cwould hamper the smooth operation of the judicial administration.\u201d); W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 361 (19_) (\u201c[T]he law will not suppose a possibility of bias or favour in a judge, who is already sworn to administer impartial justice, and whose authority greatly depends upon that presumption and idea.\u201d); Williams v. State, 383 So.2d 547 (1979) (\u201cIt is presumed that a judge is qualified and unbiased [and [t]he defendant alleging [otherwise] has a substantial burden to show the grounds therefor.\u201d), aff'd, 383 So.2d 564 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 995, 101 S.Ct. 534, 66 L.Ed.2d 293."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"It is presumed that a judge is qualified and unbiased [and [t]he defendant alleging [otherwise] has a substantial burden to show the grounds therefor.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., People v. Delongchamps, 103 Mich.App. 151, 302 N.W.2d 626 (1981) (a judge, formerly a prosecutor, was deemed qualified because he did not personally participate in the prior proceeding and because Canon 3(C) requires disqualification only if a judge \u201ccannot impartially hear a case\u201d); Payne v. State, 48 Ala.App. 401, 265 So.2d 185 (1972), cert. denied, 288 Ala. 748, 265 So.2d 192, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1079, 93 S.Ct. 703, 34 L.Ed.2d 669 (holding a prosecutorial office, as distinguished from actually working on a \u201cconcrete piece of litigation,\u201d does not in and of itself disqualify an individual who subsequently becomes a judge); see also Zitter, Prior Representation or Activity as Prosecuting as Disqualifying Judge From Sitting or Acting in Criminal Case, 16 A.L.R. 4th 550, 554 (1982) (Some courts have concluded that a judge, who had been a district attorney or an attorney general in a mere supervisory or administrative capacity at the time that a defendant was prosecuted for an offense, should not be disqualified; these courts often rationalize that disqualification on mere technical grounds \u201cwould hamper the smooth operation of the judicial administration.\u201d); W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 361 (19_) (\u201c[T]he law will not suppose a possibility of bias or favour in a judge, who is already sworn to administer impartial justice, and whose authority greatly depends upon that presumption and idea.\u201d); Williams v. State, 383 So.2d 547 (1979) (\u201cIt is presumed that a judge is qualified and unbiased [and [t]he defendant alleging [otherwise] has a substantial burden to show the grounds therefor.\u201d), aff'd, 383 So.2d 564 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 995, 101 S.Ct. 534, 66 L.Ed.2d 293."},"case_id":7513372,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Thus, \"the standard for recusal followed by most Supreme Court justices who had previously served as United States Attorney General was whether their involvement in a case involved more than a mere pro forma relationship.\" This standard has also been followed by state judges sitting in other jurisdictions.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"a judge, formerly a prosecutor, was deemed qualified because he did not personally participate in the prior proceeding and because Canon 3(C) requires disqualification only if a judge \"cannot impartially hear a case\"","sentence":"See, e.g., People v. Delongchamps, 103 Mich.App. 151, 302 N.W.2d 626 (1981) (a judge, formerly a prosecutor, was deemed qualified because he did not personally participate in the prior proceeding and because Canon 3(C) requires disqualification only if a judge \u201ccannot impartially hear a case\u201d); Payne v. State, 48 Ala.App. 401, 265 So.2d 185 (1972), cert. denied, 288 Ala. 748, 265 So.2d 192, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1079, 93 S.Ct. 703, 34 L.Ed.2d 669 (holding a prosecutorial office, as distinguished from actually working on a \u201cconcrete piece of litigation,\u201d does not in and of itself disqualify an individual who subsequently becomes a judge); see also Zitter, Prior Representation or Activity as Prosecuting as Disqualifying Judge From Sitting or Acting in Criminal Case, 16 A.L.R. 4th 550, 554 (1982) (Some courts have concluded that a judge, who had been a district attorney or an attorney general in a mere supervisory or administrative capacity at the time that a defendant was prosecuted for an offense, should not be disqualified; these courts often rationalize that disqualification on mere technical grounds \u201cwould hamper the smooth operation of the judicial administration.\u201d); W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 361 (19_) (\u201c[T]he law will not suppose a possibility of bias or favour in a judge, who is already sworn to administer impartial justice, and whose authority greatly depends upon that presumption and idea.\u201d); Williams v. State, 383 So.2d 547 (1979) (\u201cIt is presumed that a judge is qualified and unbiased [and [t]he defendant alleging [otherwise] has a substantial burden to show the grounds therefor.\u201d), aff'd, 383 So.2d 564 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 995, 101 S.Ct. 534, 66 L.Ed.2d 293."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"It is presumed that a judge is qualified and unbiased [and [t]he defendant alleging [otherwise] has a substantial burden to show the grounds therefor.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., People v. Delongchamps, 103 Mich.App. 151, 302 N.W.2d 626 (1981) (a judge, formerly a prosecutor, was deemed qualified because he did not personally participate in the prior proceeding and because Canon 3(C) requires disqualification only if a judge \u201ccannot impartially hear a case\u201d); Payne v. State, 48 Ala.App. 401, 265 So.2d 185 (1972), cert. denied, 288 Ala. 748, 265 So.2d 192, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1079, 93 S.Ct. 703, 34 L.Ed.2d 669 (holding a prosecutorial office, as distinguished from actually working on a \u201cconcrete piece of litigation,\u201d does not in and of itself disqualify an individual who subsequently becomes a judge); see also Zitter, Prior Representation or Activity as Prosecuting as Disqualifying Judge From Sitting or Acting in Criminal Case, 16 A.L.R. 4th 550, 554 (1982) (Some courts have concluded that a judge, who had been a district attorney or an attorney general in a mere supervisory or administrative capacity at the time that a defendant was prosecuted for an offense, should not be disqualified; these courts often rationalize that disqualification on mere technical grounds \u201cwould hamper the smooth operation of the judicial administration.\u201d); W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 361 (19_) (\u201c[T]he law will not suppose a possibility of bias or favour in a judge, who is already sworn to administer impartial justice, and whose authority greatly depends upon that presumption and idea.\u201d); Williams v. State, 383 So.2d 547 (1979) (\u201cIt is presumed that a judge is qualified and unbiased [and [t]he defendant alleging [otherwise] has a substantial burden to show the grounds therefor.\u201d), aff'd, 383 So.2d 564 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 995, 101 S.Ct. 534, 66 L.Ed.2d 293."},"case_id":7513372,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Thus, \"the standard for recusal followed by most Supreme Court justices who had previously served as United States Attorney General was whether their involvement in a case involved more than a mere pro forma relationship.\" This standard has also been followed by state judges sitting in other jurisdictions.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"a judge, formerly a prosecutor, was deemed qualified because he did not personally participate in the prior proceeding and because Canon 3(C) requires disqualification only if a judge \"cannot impartially hear a case\"","sentence":"See, e.g., People v. Delongchamps, 103 Mich.App. 151, 302 N.W.2d 626 (1981) (a judge, formerly a prosecutor, was deemed qualified because he did not personally participate in the prior proceeding and because Canon 3(C) requires disqualification only if a judge \u201ccannot impartially hear a case\u201d); Payne v. State, 48 Ala.App. 401, 265 So.2d 185 (1972), cert. denied, 288 Ala. 748, 265 So.2d 192, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1079, 93 S.Ct. 703, 34 L.Ed.2d 669 (holding a prosecutorial office, as distinguished from actually working on a \u201cconcrete piece of litigation,\u201d does not in and of itself disqualify an individual who subsequently becomes a judge); see also Zitter, Prior Representation or Activity as Prosecuting as Disqualifying Judge From Sitting or Acting in Criminal Case, 16 A.L.R. 4th 550, 554 (1982) (Some courts have concluded that a judge, who had been a district attorney or an attorney general in a mere supervisory or administrative capacity at the time that a defendant was prosecuted for an offense, should not be disqualified; these courts often rationalize that disqualification on mere technical grounds \u201cwould hamper the smooth operation of the judicial administration.\u201d); W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 361 (19_) (\u201c[T]he law will not suppose a possibility of bias or favour in a judge, who is already sworn to administer impartial justice, and whose authority greatly depends upon that presumption and idea.\u201d); Williams v. State, 383 So.2d 547 (1979) (\u201cIt is presumed that a judge is qualified and unbiased [and [t]he defendant alleging [otherwise] has a substantial burden to show the grounds therefor.\u201d), aff'd, 383 So.2d 564 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 995, 101 S.Ct. 534, 66 L.Ed.2d 293."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"It is presumed that a judge is qualified and unbiased [and [t]he defendant alleging [otherwise] has a substantial burden to show the grounds therefor.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., People v. Delongchamps, 103 Mich.App. 151, 302 N.W.2d 626 (1981) (a judge, formerly a prosecutor, was deemed qualified because he did not personally participate in the prior proceeding and because Canon 3(C) requires disqualification only if a judge \u201ccannot impartially hear a case\u201d); Payne v. State, 48 Ala.App. 401, 265 So.2d 185 (1972), cert. denied, 288 Ala. 748, 265 So.2d 192, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1079, 93 S.Ct. 703, 34 L.Ed.2d 669 (holding a prosecutorial office, as distinguished from actually working on a \u201cconcrete piece of litigation,\u201d does not in and of itself disqualify an individual who subsequently becomes a judge); see also Zitter, Prior Representation or Activity as Prosecuting as Disqualifying Judge From Sitting or Acting in Criminal Case, 16 A.L.R. 4th 550, 554 (1982) (Some courts have concluded that a judge, who had been a district attorney or an attorney general in a mere supervisory or administrative capacity at the time that a defendant was prosecuted for an offense, should not be disqualified; these courts often rationalize that disqualification on mere technical grounds \u201cwould hamper the smooth operation of the judicial administration.\u201d); W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 361 (19_) (\u201c[T]he law will not suppose a possibility of bias or favour in a judge, who is already sworn to administer impartial justice, and whose authority greatly depends upon that presumption and idea.\u201d); Williams v. State, 383 So.2d 547 (1979) (\u201cIt is presumed that a judge is qualified and unbiased [and [t]he defendant alleging [otherwise] has a substantial burden to show the grounds therefor.\u201d), aff'd, 383 So.2d 564 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 995, 101 S.Ct. 534, 66 L.Ed.2d 293."},"case_id":7513372,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Thus, \"the standard for recusal followed by most Supreme Court justices who had previously served as United States Attorney General was whether their involvement in a case involved more than a mere pro forma relationship.\" This standard has also been followed by state judges sitting in other jurisdictions.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"a judge, formerly a prosecutor, was deemed qualified because he did not personally participate in the prior proceeding and because Canon 3(C) requires disqualification only if a judge \"cannot impartially hear a case\"","sentence":"See, e.g., People v. Delongchamps, 103 Mich.App. 151, 302 N.W.2d 626 (1981) (a judge, formerly a prosecutor, was deemed qualified because he did not personally participate in the prior proceeding and because Canon 3(C) requires disqualification only if a judge \u201ccannot impartially hear a case\u201d); Payne v. State, 48 Ala.App. 401, 265 So.2d 185 (1972), cert. denied, 288 Ala. 748, 265 So.2d 192, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1079, 93 S.Ct. 703, 34 L.Ed.2d 669 (holding a prosecutorial office, as distinguished from actually working on a \u201cconcrete piece of litigation,\u201d does not in and of itself disqualify an individual who subsequently becomes a judge); see also Zitter, Prior Representation or Activity as Prosecuting as Disqualifying Judge From Sitting or Acting in Criminal Case, 16 A.L.R. 4th 550, 554 (1982) (Some courts have concluded that a judge, who had been a district attorney or an attorney general in a mere supervisory or administrative capacity at the time that a defendant was prosecuted for an offense, should not be disqualified; these courts often rationalize that disqualification on mere technical grounds \u201cwould hamper the smooth operation of the judicial administration.\u201d); W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 361 (19_) (\u201c[T]he law will not suppose a possibility of bias or favour in a judge, who is already sworn to administer impartial justice, and whose authority greatly depends upon that presumption and idea.\u201d); Williams v. State, 383 So.2d 547 (1979) (\u201cIt is presumed that a judge is qualified and unbiased [and [t]he defendant alleging [otherwise] has a substantial burden to show the grounds therefor.\u201d), aff'd, 383 So.2d 564 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 995, 101 S.Ct. 534, 66 L.Ed.2d 293."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"It is presumed that a judge is qualified and unbiased [and [t]he defendant alleging [otherwise] has a substantial burden to show the grounds therefor.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., People v. Delongchamps, 103 Mich.App. 151, 302 N.W.2d 626 (1981) (a judge, formerly a prosecutor, was deemed qualified because he did not personally participate in the prior proceeding and because Canon 3(C) requires disqualification only if a judge \u201ccannot impartially hear a case\u201d); Payne v. State, 48 Ala.App. 401, 265 So.2d 185 (1972), cert. denied, 288 Ala. 748, 265 So.2d 192, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1079, 93 S.Ct. 703, 34 L.Ed.2d 669 (holding a prosecutorial office, as distinguished from actually working on a \u201cconcrete piece of litigation,\u201d does not in and of itself disqualify an individual who subsequently becomes a judge); see also Zitter, Prior Representation or Activity as Prosecuting as Disqualifying Judge From Sitting or Acting in Criminal Case, 16 A.L.R. 4th 550, 554 (1982) (Some courts have concluded that a judge, who had been a district attorney or an attorney general in a mere supervisory or administrative capacity at the time that a defendant was prosecuted for an offense, should not be disqualified; these courts often rationalize that disqualification on mere technical grounds \u201cwould hamper the smooth operation of the judicial administration.\u201d); W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 361 (19_) (\u201c[T]he law will not suppose a possibility of bias or favour in a judge, who is already sworn to administer impartial justice, and whose authority greatly depends upon that presumption and idea.\u201d); Williams v. State, 383 So.2d 547 (1979) (\u201cIt is presumed that a judge is qualified and unbiased [and [t]he defendant alleging [otherwise] has a substantial burden to show the grounds therefor.\u201d), aff'd, 383 So.2d 564 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 995, 101 S.Ct. 534, 66 L.Ed.2d 293."},"case_id":7513372,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Thus, \"the standard for recusal followed by most Supreme Court justices who had previously served as United States Attorney General was whether their involvement in a case involved more than a mere pro forma relationship.\" This standard has also been followed by state judges sitting in other jurisdictions.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"a judge, formerly a prosecutor, was deemed qualified because he did not personally participate in the prior proceeding and because Canon 3(C) requires disqualification only if a judge \"cannot impartially hear a case\"","sentence":"See, e.g., People v. Delongchamps, 103 Mich.App. 151, 302 N.W.2d 626 (1981) (a judge, formerly a prosecutor, was deemed qualified because he did not personally participate in the prior proceeding and because Canon 3(C) requires disqualification only if a judge \u201ccannot impartially hear a case\u201d); Payne v. State, 48 Ala.App. 401, 265 So.2d 185 (1972), cert. denied, 288 Ala. 748, 265 So.2d 192, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1079, 93 S.Ct. 703, 34 L.Ed.2d 669 (holding a prosecutorial office, as distinguished from actually working on a \u201cconcrete piece of litigation,\u201d does not in and of itself disqualify an individual who subsequently becomes a judge); see also Zitter, Prior Representation or Activity as Prosecuting as Disqualifying Judge From Sitting or Acting in Criminal Case, 16 A.L.R. 4th 550, 554 (1982) (Some courts have concluded that a judge, who had been a district attorney or an attorney general in a mere supervisory or administrative capacity at the time that a defendant was prosecuted for an offense, should not be disqualified; these courts often rationalize that disqualification on mere technical grounds \u201cwould hamper the smooth operation of the judicial administration.\u201d); W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 361 (19_) (\u201c[T]he law will not suppose a possibility of bias or favour in a judge, who is already sworn to administer impartial justice, and whose authority greatly depends upon that presumption and idea.\u201d); Williams v. State, 383 So.2d 547 (1979) (\u201cIt is presumed that a judge is qualified and unbiased [and [t]he defendant alleging [otherwise] has a substantial burden to show the grounds therefor.\u201d), aff'd, 383 So.2d 564 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 995, 101 S.Ct. 534, 66 L.Ed.2d 293."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"It is presumed that a judge is qualified and unbiased [and [t]he defendant alleging [otherwise] has a substantial burden to show the grounds therefor.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., People v. Delongchamps, 103 Mich.App. 151, 302 N.W.2d 626 (1981) (a judge, formerly a prosecutor, was deemed qualified because he did not personally participate in the prior proceeding and because Canon 3(C) requires disqualification only if a judge \u201ccannot impartially hear a case\u201d); Payne v. State, 48 Ala.App. 401, 265 So.2d 185 (1972), cert. denied, 288 Ala. 748, 265 So.2d 192, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1079, 93 S.Ct. 703, 34 L.Ed.2d 669 (holding a prosecutorial office, as distinguished from actually working on a \u201cconcrete piece of litigation,\u201d does not in and of itself disqualify an individual who subsequently becomes a judge); see also Zitter, Prior Representation or Activity as Prosecuting as Disqualifying Judge From Sitting or Acting in Criminal Case, 16 A.L.R. 4th 550, 554 (1982) (Some courts have concluded that a judge, who had been a district attorney or an attorney general in a mere supervisory or administrative capacity at the time that a defendant was prosecuted for an offense, should not be disqualified; these courts often rationalize that disqualification on mere technical grounds \u201cwould hamper the smooth operation of the judicial administration.\u201d); W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 361 (19_) (\u201c[T]he law will not suppose a possibility of bias or favour in a judge, who is already sworn to administer impartial justice, and whose authority greatly depends upon that presumption and idea.\u201d); Williams v. State, 383 So.2d 547 (1979) (\u201cIt is presumed that a judge is qualified and unbiased [and [t]he defendant alleging [otherwise] has a substantial burden to show the grounds therefor.\u201d), aff'd, 383 So.2d 564 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 995, 101 S.Ct. 534, 66 L.Ed.2d 293."},"case_id":7513372,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Thus, \"the standard for recusal followed by most Supreme Court justices who had previously served as United States Attorney General was whether their involvement in a case involved more than a mere pro forma relationship.\" This standard has also been followed by state judges sitting in other jurisdictions.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"It is presumed that a judge is qualified and unbiased [and [t]he defendant alleging [otherwise] has a substantial burden to show the grounds therefor.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., People v. Delongchamps, 103 Mich.App. 151, 302 N.W.2d 626 (1981) (a judge, formerly a prosecutor, was deemed qualified because he did not personally participate in the prior proceeding and because Canon 3(C) requires disqualification only if a judge \u201ccannot impartially hear a case\u201d); Payne v. State, 48 Ala.App. 401, 265 So.2d 185 (1972), cert. denied, 288 Ala. 748, 265 So.2d 192, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1079, 93 S.Ct. 703, 34 L.Ed.2d 669 (holding a prosecutorial office, as distinguished from actually working on a \u201cconcrete piece of litigation,\u201d does not in and of itself disqualify an individual who subsequently becomes a judge); see also Zitter, Prior Representation or Activity as Prosecuting as Disqualifying Judge From Sitting or Acting in Criminal Case, 16 A.L.R. 4th 550, 554 (1982) (Some courts have concluded that a judge, who had been a district attorney or an attorney general in a mere supervisory or administrative capacity at the time that a defendant was prosecuted for an offense, should not be disqualified; these courts often rationalize that disqualification on mere technical grounds \u201cwould hamper the smooth operation of the judicial administration.\u201d); W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 361 (19_) (\u201c[T]he law will not suppose a possibility of bias or favour in a judge, who is already sworn to administer impartial justice, and whose authority greatly depends upon that presumption and idea.\u201d); Williams v. State, 383 So.2d 547 (1979) (\u201cIt is presumed that a judge is qualified and unbiased [and [t]he defendant alleging [otherwise] has a substantial burden to show the grounds therefor.\u201d), aff'd, 383 So.2d 564 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 995, 101 S.Ct. 534, 66 L.Ed.2d 293."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"a judge, formerly a prosecutor, was deemed qualified because he did not personally participate in the prior proceeding and because Canon 3(C) requires disqualification only if a judge \"cannot impartially hear a case\"","sentence":"See, e.g., People v. Delongchamps, 103 Mich.App. 151, 302 N.W.2d 626 (1981) (a judge, formerly a prosecutor, was deemed qualified because he did not personally participate in the prior proceeding and because Canon 3(C) requires disqualification only if a judge \u201ccannot impartially hear a case\u201d); Payne v. State, 48 Ala.App. 401, 265 So.2d 185 (1972), cert. denied, 288 Ala. 748, 265 So.2d 192, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1079, 93 S.Ct. 703, 34 L.Ed.2d 669 (holding a prosecutorial office, as distinguished from actually working on a \u201cconcrete piece of litigation,\u201d does not in and of itself disqualify an individual who subsequently becomes a judge); see also Zitter, Prior Representation or Activity as Prosecuting as Disqualifying Judge From Sitting or Acting in Criminal Case, 16 A.L.R. 4th 550, 554 (1982) (Some courts have concluded that a judge, who had been a district attorney or an attorney general in a mere supervisory or administrative capacity at the time that a defendant was prosecuted for an offense, should not be disqualified; these courts often rationalize that disqualification on mere technical grounds \u201cwould hamper the smooth operation of the judicial administration.\u201d); W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 361 (19_) (\u201c[T]he law will not suppose a possibility of bias or favour in a judge, who is already sworn to administer impartial justice, and whose authority greatly depends upon that presumption and idea.\u201d); Williams v. State, 383 So.2d 547 (1979) (\u201cIt is presumed that a judge is qualified and unbiased [and [t]he defendant alleging [otherwise] has a substantial burden to show the grounds therefor.\u201d), aff'd, 383 So.2d 564 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 995, 101 S.Ct. 534, 66 L.Ed.2d 293."},"case_id":7513372,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Thus, \"the standard for recusal followed by most Supreme Court justices who had previously served as United States Attorney General was whether their involvement in a case involved more than a mere pro forma relationship.\" This standard has also been followed by state judges sitting in other jurisdictions.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"It is presumed that a judge is qualified and unbiased [and [t]he defendant alleging [otherwise] has a substantial burden to show the grounds therefor.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., People v. Delongchamps, 103 Mich.App. 151, 302 N.W.2d 626 (1981) (a judge, formerly a prosecutor, was deemed qualified because he did not personally participate in the prior proceeding and because Canon 3(C) requires disqualification only if a judge \u201ccannot impartially hear a case\u201d); Payne v. State, 48 Ala.App. 401, 265 So.2d 185 (1972), cert. denied, 288 Ala. 748, 265 So.2d 192, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1079, 93 S.Ct. 703, 34 L.Ed.2d 669 (holding a prosecutorial office, as distinguished from actually working on a \u201cconcrete piece of litigation,\u201d does not in and of itself disqualify an individual who subsequently becomes a judge); see also Zitter, Prior Representation or Activity as Prosecuting as Disqualifying Judge From Sitting or Acting in Criminal Case, 16 A.L.R. 4th 550, 554 (1982) (Some courts have concluded that a judge, who had been a district attorney or an attorney general in a mere supervisory or administrative capacity at the time that a defendant was prosecuted for an offense, should not be disqualified; these courts often rationalize that disqualification on mere technical grounds \u201cwould hamper the smooth operation of the judicial administration.\u201d); W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 361 (19_) (\u201c[T]he law will not suppose a possibility of bias or favour in a judge, who is already sworn to administer impartial justice, and whose authority greatly depends upon that presumption and idea.\u201d); Williams v. State, 383 So.2d 547 (1979) (\u201cIt is presumed that a judge is qualified and unbiased [and [t]he defendant alleging [otherwise] has a substantial burden to show the grounds therefor.\u201d), aff'd, 383 So.2d 564 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 995, 101 S.Ct. 534, 66 L.Ed.2d 293."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"a judge, formerly a prosecutor, was deemed qualified because he did not personally participate in the prior proceeding and because Canon 3(C) requires disqualification only if a judge \"cannot impartially hear a case\"","sentence":"See, e.g., People v. Delongchamps, 103 Mich.App. 151, 302 N.W.2d 626 (1981) (a judge, formerly a prosecutor, was deemed qualified because he did not personally participate in the prior proceeding and because Canon 3(C) requires disqualification only if a judge \u201ccannot impartially hear a case\u201d); Payne v. State, 48 Ala.App. 401, 265 So.2d 185 (1972), cert. denied, 288 Ala. 748, 265 So.2d 192, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1079, 93 S.Ct. 703, 34 L.Ed.2d 669 (holding a prosecutorial office, as distinguished from actually working on a \u201cconcrete piece of litigation,\u201d does not in and of itself disqualify an individual who subsequently becomes a judge); see also Zitter, Prior Representation or Activity as Prosecuting as Disqualifying Judge From Sitting or Acting in Criminal Case, 16 A.L.R. 4th 550, 554 (1982) (Some courts have concluded that a judge, who had been a district attorney or an attorney general in a mere supervisory or administrative capacity at the time that a defendant was prosecuted for an offense, should not be disqualified; these courts often rationalize that disqualification on mere technical grounds \u201cwould hamper the smooth operation of the judicial administration.\u201d); W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 361 (19_) (\u201c[T]he law will not suppose a possibility of bias or favour in a judge, who is already sworn to administer impartial justice, and whose authority greatly depends upon that presumption and idea.\u201d); Williams v. State, 383 So.2d 547 (1979) (\u201cIt is presumed that a judge is qualified and unbiased [and [t]he defendant alleging [otherwise] has a substantial burden to show the grounds therefor.\u201d), aff'd, 383 So.2d 564 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 995, 101 S.Ct. 534, 66 L.Ed.2d 293."},"case_id":7513372,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Thus, \"the standard for recusal followed by most Supreme Court justices who had previously served as United States Attorney General was whether their involvement in a case involved more than a mere pro forma relationship.\" This standard has also been followed by state judges sitting in other jurisdictions.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"a judge, formerly a prosecutor, was deemed qualified because he did not personally participate in the prior proceeding and because Canon 3(C) requires disqualification only if a judge \"cannot impartially hear a case\"","sentence":"See, e.g., People v. Delongchamps, 103 Mich.App. 151, 302 N.W.2d 626 (1981) (a judge, formerly a prosecutor, was deemed qualified because he did not personally participate in the prior proceeding and because Canon 3(C) requires disqualification only if a judge \u201ccannot impartially hear a case\u201d); Payne v. State, 48 Ala.App. 401, 265 So.2d 185 (1972), cert. denied, 288 Ala. 748, 265 So.2d 192, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1079, 93 S.Ct. 703, 34 L.Ed.2d 669 (holding a prosecutorial office, as distinguished from actually working on a \u201cconcrete piece of litigation,\u201d does not in and of itself disqualify an individual who subsequently becomes a judge); see also Zitter, Prior Representation or Activity as Prosecuting as Disqualifying Judge From Sitting or Acting in Criminal Case, 16 A.L.R. 4th 550, 554 (1982) (Some courts have concluded that a judge, who had been a district attorney or an attorney general in a mere supervisory or administrative capacity at the time that a defendant was prosecuted for an offense, should not be disqualified; these courts often rationalize that disqualification on mere technical grounds \u201cwould hamper the smooth operation of the judicial administration.\u201d); W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 361 (19_) (\u201c[T]he law will not suppose a possibility of bias or favour in a judge, who is already sworn to administer impartial justice, and whose authority greatly depends upon that presumption and idea.\u201d); Williams v. State, 383 So.2d 547 (1979) (\u201cIt is presumed that a judge is qualified and unbiased [and [t]he defendant alleging [otherwise] has a substantial burden to show the grounds therefor.\u201d), aff'd, 383 So.2d 564 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 995, 101 S.Ct. 534, 66 L.Ed.2d 293."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"It is presumed that a judge is qualified and unbiased [and [t]he defendant alleging [otherwise] has a substantial burden to show the grounds therefor.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., People v. Delongchamps, 103 Mich.App. 151, 302 N.W.2d 626 (1981) (a judge, formerly a prosecutor, was deemed qualified because he did not personally participate in the prior proceeding and because Canon 3(C) requires disqualification only if a judge \u201ccannot impartially hear a case\u201d); Payne v. State, 48 Ala.App. 401, 265 So.2d 185 (1972), cert. denied, 288 Ala. 748, 265 So.2d 192, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1079, 93 S.Ct. 703, 34 L.Ed.2d 669 (holding a prosecutorial office, as distinguished from actually working on a \u201cconcrete piece of litigation,\u201d does not in and of itself disqualify an individual who subsequently becomes a judge); see also Zitter, Prior Representation or Activity as Prosecuting as Disqualifying Judge From Sitting or Acting in Criminal Case, 16 A.L.R. 4th 550, 554 (1982) (Some courts have concluded that a judge, who had been a district attorney or an attorney general in a mere supervisory or administrative capacity at the time that a defendant was prosecuted for an offense, should not be disqualified; these courts often rationalize that disqualification on mere technical grounds \u201cwould hamper the smooth operation of the judicial administration.\u201d); W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 361 (19_) (\u201c[T]he law will not suppose a possibility of bias or favour in a judge, who is already sworn to administer impartial justice, and whose authority greatly depends upon that presumption and idea.\u201d); Williams v. State, 383 So.2d 547 (1979) (\u201cIt is presumed that a judge is qualified and unbiased [and [t]he defendant alleging [otherwise] has a substantial burden to show the grounds therefor.\u201d), aff'd, 383 So.2d 564 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 995, 101 S.Ct. 534, 66 L.Ed.2d 293."},"case_id":7513372,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Thus, \"the standard for recusal followed by most Supreme Court justices who had previously served as United States Attorney General was whether their involvement in a case involved more than a mere pro forma relationship.\" This standard has also been followed by state judges sitting in other jurisdictions.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"a judge, formerly a prosecutor, was deemed qualified because he did not personally participate in the prior proceeding and because Canon 3(C) requires disqualification only if a judge \"cannot impartially hear a case\"","sentence":"See, e.g., People v. Delongchamps, 103 Mich.App. 151, 302 N.W.2d 626 (1981) (a judge, formerly a prosecutor, was deemed qualified because he did not personally participate in the prior proceeding and because Canon 3(C) requires disqualification only if a judge \u201ccannot impartially hear a case\u201d); Payne v. State, 48 Ala.App. 401, 265 So.2d 185 (1972), cert. denied, 288 Ala. 748, 265 So.2d 192, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1079, 93 S.Ct. 703, 34 L.Ed.2d 669 (holding a prosecutorial office, as distinguished from actually working on a \u201cconcrete piece of litigation,\u201d does not in and of itself disqualify an individual who subsequently becomes a judge); see also Zitter, Prior Representation or Activity as Prosecuting as Disqualifying Judge From Sitting or Acting in Criminal Case, 16 A.L.R. 4th 550, 554 (1982) (Some courts have concluded that a judge, who had been a district attorney or an attorney general in a mere supervisory or administrative capacity at the time that a defendant was prosecuted for an offense, should not be disqualified; these courts often rationalize that disqualification on mere technical grounds \u201cwould hamper the smooth operation of the judicial administration.\u201d); W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 361 (19_) (\u201c[T]he law will not suppose a possibility of bias or favour in a judge, who is already sworn to administer impartial justice, and whose authority greatly depends upon that presumption and idea.\u201d); Williams v. State, 383 So.2d 547 (1979) (\u201cIt is presumed that a judge is qualified and unbiased [and [t]he defendant alleging [otherwise] has a substantial burden to show the grounds therefor.\u201d), aff'd, 383 So.2d 564 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 995, 101 S.Ct. 534, 66 L.Ed.2d 293."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"It is presumed that a judge is qualified and unbiased [and [t]he defendant alleging [otherwise] has a substantial burden to show the grounds therefor.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., People v. Delongchamps, 103 Mich.App. 151, 302 N.W.2d 626 (1981) (a judge, formerly a prosecutor, was deemed qualified because he did not personally participate in the prior proceeding and because Canon 3(C) requires disqualification only if a judge \u201ccannot impartially hear a case\u201d); Payne v. State, 48 Ala.App. 401, 265 So.2d 185 (1972), cert. denied, 288 Ala. 748, 265 So.2d 192, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1079, 93 S.Ct. 703, 34 L.Ed.2d 669 (holding a prosecutorial office, as distinguished from actually working on a \u201cconcrete piece of litigation,\u201d does not in and of itself disqualify an individual who subsequently becomes a judge); see also Zitter, Prior Representation or Activity as Prosecuting as Disqualifying Judge From Sitting or Acting in Criminal Case, 16 A.L.R. 4th 550, 554 (1982) (Some courts have concluded that a judge, who had been a district attorney or an attorney general in a mere supervisory or administrative capacity at the time that a defendant was prosecuted for an offense, should not be disqualified; these courts often rationalize that disqualification on mere technical grounds \u201cwould hamper the smooth operation of the judicial administration.\u201d); W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 361 (19_) (\u201c[T]he law will not suppose a possibility of bias or favour in a judge, who is already sworn to administer impartial justice, and whose authority greatly depends upon that presumption and idea.\u201d); Williams v. State, 383 So.2d 547 (1979) (\u201cIt is presumed that a judge is qualified and unbiased [and [t]he defendant alleging [otherwise] has a substantial burden to show the grounds therefor.\u201d), aff'd, 383 So.2d 564 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 995, 101 S.Ct. 534, 66 L.Ed.2d 293."},"case_id":7513372,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Thus, \"the standard for recusal followed by most Supreme Court justices who had previously served as United States Attorney General was whether their involvement in a case involved more than a mere pro forma relationship.\" This standard has also been followed by state judges sitting in other jurisdictions.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"It is presumed that a judge is qualified and unbiased [and [t]he defendant alleging [otherwise] has a substantial burden to show the grounds therefor.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., People v. Delongchamps, 103 Mich.App. 151, 302 N.W.2d 626 (1981) (a judge, formerly a prosecutor, was deemed qualified because he did not personally participate in the prior proceeding and because Canon 3(C) requires disqualification only if a judge \u201ccannot impartially hear a case\u201d); Payne v. State, 48 Ala.App. 401, 265 So.2d 185 (1972), cert. denied, 288 Ala. 748, 265 So.2d 192, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1079, 93 S.Ct. 703, 34 L.Ed.2d 669 (holding a prosecutorial office, as distinguished from actually working on a \u201cconcrete piece of litigation,\u201d does not in and of itself disqualify an individual who subsequently becomes a judge); see also Zitter, Prior Representation or Activity as Prosecuting as Disqualifying Judge From Sitting or Acting in Criminal Case, 16 A.L.R. 4th 550, 554 (1982) (Some courts have concluded that a judge, who had been a district attorney or an attorney general in a mere supervisory or administrative capacity at the time that a defendant was prosecuted for an offense, should not be disqualified; these courts often rationalize that disqualification on mere technical grounds \u201cwould hamper the smooth operation of the judicial administration.\u201d); W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 361 (19_) (\u201c[T]he law will not suppose a possibility of bias or favour in a judge, who is already sworn to administer impartial justice, and whose authority greatly depends upon that presumption and idea.\u201d); Williams v. State, 383 So.2d 547 (1979) (\u201cIt is presumed that a judge is qualified and unbiased [and [t]he defendant alleging [otherwise] has a substantial burden to show the grounds therefor.\u201d), aff'd, 383 So.2d 564 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 995, 101 S.Ct. 534, 66 L.Ed.2d 293."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding a prosecutorial office, as distinguished from actually working on a \"concrete piece of litigation,\" does not in and of itself disqualify an individual who subsequently becomes a judge","sentence":"See, e.g., People v. Delongchamps, 103 Mich.App. 151, 302 N.W.2d 626 (1981) (a judge, formerly a prosecutor, was deemed qualified because he did not personally participate in the prior proceeding and because Canon 3(C) requires disqualification only if a judge \u201ccannot impartially hear a case\u201d); Payne v. State, 48 Ala.App. 401, 265 So.2d 185 (1972), cert. denied, 288 Ala. 748, 265 So.2d 192, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1079, 93 S.Ct. 703, 34 L.Ed.2d 669 (holding a prosecutorial office, as distinguished from actually working on a \u201cconcrete piece of litigation,\u201d does not in and of itself disqualify an individual who subsequently becomes a judge); see also Zitter, Prior Representation or Activity as Prosecuting as Disqualifying Judge From Sitting or Acting in Criminal Case, 16 A.L.R. 4th 550, 554 (1982) (Some courts have concluded that a judge, who had been a district attorney or an attorney general in a mere supervisory or administrative capacity at the time that a defendant was prosecuted for an offense, should not be disqualified; these courts often rationalize that disqualification on mere technical grounds \u201cwould hamper the smooth operation of the judicial administration.\u201d); W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 361 (19_) (\u201c[T]he law will not suppose a possibility of bias or favour in a judge, who is already sworn to administer impartial justice, and whose authority greatly depends upon that presumption and idea.\u201d); Williams v. State, 383 So.2d 547 (1979) (\u201cIt is presumed that a judge is qualified and unbiased [and [t]he defendant alleging [otherwise] has a substantial burden to show the grounds therefor.\u201d), aff'd, 383 So.2d 564 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 995, 101 S.Ct. 534, 66 L.Ed.2d 293."},"case_id":7513372,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Thus, \"the standard for recusal followed by most Supreme Court justices who had previously served as United States Attorney General was whether their involvement in a case involved more than a mere pro forma relationship.\" This standard has also been followed by state judges sitting in other jurisdictions.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding a prosecutorial office, as distinguished from actually working on a \"concrete piece of litigation,\" does not in and of itself disqualify an individual who subsequently becomes a judge","sentence":"See, e.g., People v. Delongchamps, 103 Mich.App. 151, 302 N.W.2d 626 (1981) (a judge, formerly a prosecutor, was deemed qualified because he did not personally participate in the prior proceeding and because Canon 3(C) requires disqualification only if a judge \u201ccannot impartially hear a case\u201d); Payne v. State, 48 Ala.App. 401, 265 So.2d 185 (1972), cert. denied, 288 Ala. 748, 265 So.2d 192, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1079, 93 S.Ct. 703, 34 L.Ed.2d 669 (holding a prosecutorial office, as distinguished from actually working on a \u201cconcrete piece of litigation,\u201d does not in and of itself disqualify an individual who subsequently becomes a judge); see also Zitter, Prior Representation or Activity as Prosecuting as Disqualifying Judge From Sitting or Acting in Criminal Case, 16 A.L.R. 4th 550, 554 (1982) (Some courts have concluded that a judge, who had been a district attorney or an attorney general in a mere supervisory or administrative capacity at the time that a defendant was prosecuted for an offense, should not be disqualified; these courts often rationalize that disqualification on mere technical grounds \u201cwould hamper the smooth operation of the judicial administration.\u201d); W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 361 (19_) (\u201c[T]he law will not suppose a possibility of bias or favour in a judge, who is already sworn to administer impartial justice, and whose authority greatly depends upon that presumption and idea.\u201d); Williams v. State, 383 So.2d 547 (1979) (\u201cIt is presumed that a judge is qualified and unbiased [and [t]he defendant alleging [otherwise] has a substantial burden to show the grounds therefor.\u201d), aff'd, 383 So.2d 564 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 995, 101 S.Ct. 534, 66 L.Ed.2d 293."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"It is presumed that a judge is qualified and unbiased [and [t]he defendant alleging [otherwise] has a substantial burden to show the grounds therefor.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., People v. Delongchamps, 103 Mich.App. 151, 302 N.W.2d 626 (1981) (a judge, formerly a prosecutor, was deemed qualified because he did not personally participate in the prior proceeding and because Canon 3(C) requires disqualification only if a judge \u201ccannot impartially hear a case\u201d); Payne v. State, 48 Ala.App. 401, 265 So.2d 185 (1972), cert. denied, 288 Ala. 748, 265 So.2d 192, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1079, 93 S.Ct. 703, 34 L.Ed.2d 669 (holding a prosecutorial office, as distinguished from actually working on a \u201cconcrete piece of litigation,\u201d does not in and of itself disqualify an individual who subsequently becomes a judge); see also Zitter, Prior Representation or Activity as Prosecuting as Disqualifying Judge From Sitting or Acting in Criminal Case, 16 A.L.R. 4th 550, 554 (1982) (Some courts have concluded that a judge, who had been a district attorney or an attorney general in a mere supervisory or administrative capacity at the time that a defendant was prosecuted for an offense, should not be disqualified; these courts often rationalize that disqualification on mere technical grounds \u201cwould hamper the smooth operation of the judicial administration.\u201d); W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 361 (19_) (\u201c[T]he law will not suppose a possibility of bias or favour in a judge, who is already sworn to administer impartial justice, and whose authority greatly depends upon that presumption and idea.\u201d); Williams v. State, 383 So.2d 547 (1979) (\u201cIt is presumed that a judge is qualified and unbiased [and [t]he defendant alleging [otherwise] has a substantial burden to show the grounds therefor.\u201d), aff'd, 383 So.2d 564 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 995, 101 S.Ct. 534, 66 L.Ed.2d 293."},"case_id":7513372,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Thus, \"the standard for recusal followed by most Supreme Court justices who had previously served as United States Attorney General was whether their involvement in a case involved more than a mere pro forma relationship.\" This standard has also been followed by state judges sitting in other jurisdictions.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding a prosecutorial office, as distinguished from actually working on a \"concrete piece of litigation,\" does not in and of itself disqualify an individual who subsequently becomes a judge","sentence":"See, e.g., People v. Delongchamps, 103 Mich.App. 151, 302 N.W.2d 626 (1981) (a judge, formerly a prosecutor, was deemed qualified because he did not personally participate in the prior proceeding and because Canon 3(C) requires disqualification only if a judge \u201ccannot impartially hear a case\u201d); Payne v. State, 48 Ala.App. 401, 265 So.2d 185 (1972), cert. denied, 288 Ala. 748, 265 So.2d 192, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1079, 93 S.Ct. 703, 34 L.Ed.2d 669 (holding a prosecutorial office, as distinguished from actually working on a \u201cconcrete piece of litigation,\u201d does not in and of itself disqualify an individual who subsequently becomes a judge); see also Zitter, Prior Representation or Activity as Prosecuting as Disqualifying Judge From Sitting or Acting in Criminal Case, 16 A.L.R. 4th 550, 554 (1982) (Some courts have concluded that a judge, who had been a district attorney or an attorney general in a mere supervisory or administrative capacity at the time that a defendant was prosecuted for an offense, should not be disqualified; these courts often rationalize that disqualification on mere technical grounds \u201cwould hamper the smooth operation of the judicial administration.\u201d); W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 361 (19_) (\u201c[T]he law will not suppose a possibility of bias or favour in a judge, who is already sworn to administer impartial justice, and whose authority greatly depends upon that presumption and idea.\u201d); Williams v. State, 383 So.2d 547 (1979) (\u201cIt is presumed that a judge is qualified and unbiased [and [t]he defendant alleging [otherwise] has a substantial burden to show the grounds therefor.\u201d), aff'd, 383 So.2d 564 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 995, 101 S.Ct. 534, 66 L.Ed.2d 293."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"It is presumed that a judge is qualified and unbiased [and [t]he defendant alleging [otherwise] has a substantial burden to show the grounds therefor.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., People v. Delongchamps, 103 Mich.App. 151, 302 N.W.2d 626 (1981) (a judge, formerly a prosecutor, was deemed qualified because he did not personally participate in the prior proceeding and because Canon 3(C) requires disqualification only if a judge \u201ccannot impartially hear a case\u201d); Payne v. State, 48 Ala.App. 401, 265 So.2d 185 (1972), cert. denied, 288 Ala. 748, 265 So.2d 192, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1079, 93 S.Ct. 703, 34 L.Ed.2d 669 (holding a prosecutorial office, as distinguished from actually working on a \u201cconcrete piece of litigation,\u201d does not in and of itself disqualify an individual who subsequently becomes a judge); see also Zitter, Prior Representation or Activity as Prosecuting as Disqualifying Judge From Sitting or Acting in Criminal Case, 16 A.L.R. 4th 550, 554 (1982) (Some courts have concluded that a judge, who had been a district attorney or an attorney general in a mere supervisory or administrative capacity at the time that a defendant was prosecuted for an offense, should not be disqualified; these courts often rationalize that disqualification on mere technical grounds \u201cwould hamper the smooth operation of the judicial administration.\u201d); W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 361 (19_) (\u201c[T]he law will not suppose a possibility of bias or favour in a judge, who is already sworn to administer impartial justice, and whose authority greatly depends upon that presumption and idea.\u201d); Williams v. State, 383 So.2d 547 (1979) (\u201cIt is presumed that a judge is qualified and unbiased [and [t]he defendant alleging [otherwise] has a substantial burden to show the grounds therefor.\u201d), aff'd, 383 So.2d 564 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 995, 101 S.Ct. 534, 66 L.Ed.2d 293."},"case_id":7513372,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Thus, \"the standard for recusal followed by most Supreme Court justices who had previously served as United States Attorney General was whether their involvement in a case involved more than a mere pro forma relationship.\" This standard has also been followed by state judges sitting in other jurisdictions.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"It is presumed that a judge is qualified and unbiased [and [t]he defendant alleging [otherwise] has a substantial burden to show the grounds therefor.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., People v. Delongchamps, 103 Mich.App. 151, 302 N.W.2d 626 (1981) (a judge, formerly a prosecutor, was deemed qualified because he did not personally participate in the prior proceeding and because Canon 3(C) requires disqualification only if a judge \u201ccannot impartially hear a case\u201d); Payne v. State, 48 Ala.App. 401, 265 So.2d 185 (1972), cert. denied, 288 Ala. 748, 265 So.2d 192, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1079, 93 S.Ct. 703, 34 L.Ed.2d 669 (holding a prosecutorial office, as distinguished from actually working on a \u201cconcrete piece of litigation,\u201d does not in and of itself disqualify an individual who subsequently becomes a judge); see also Zitter, Prior Representation or Activity as Prosecuting as Disqualifying Judge From Sitting or Acting in Criminal Case, 16 A.L.R. 4th 550, 554 (1982) (Some courts have concluded that a judge, who had been a district attorney or an attorney general in a mere supervisory or administrative capacity at the time that a defendant was prosecuted for an offense, should not be disqualified; these courts often rationalize that disqualification on mere technical grounds \u201cwould hamper the smooth operation of the judicial administration.\u201d); W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 361 (19_) (\u201c[T]he law will not suppose a possibility of bias or favour in a judge, who is already sworn to administer impartial justice, and whose authority greatly depends upon that presumption and idea.\u201d); Williams v. State, 383 So.2d 547 (1979) (\u201cIt is presumed that a judge is qualified and unbiased [and [t]he defendant alleging [otherwise] has a substantial burden to show the grounds therefor.\u201d), aff'd, 383 So.2d 564 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 995, 101 S.Ct. 534, 66 L.Ed.2d 293."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding a prosecutorial office, as distinguished from actually working on a \"concrete piece of litigation,\" does not in and of itself disqualify an individual who subsequently becomes a judge","sentence":"See, e.g., People v. Delongchamps, 103 Mich.App. 151, 302 N.W.2d 626 (1981) (a judge, formerly a prosecutor, was deemed qualified because he did not personally participate in the prior proceeding and because Canon 3(C) requires disqualification only if a judge \u201ccannot impartially hear a case\u201d); Payne v. State, 48 Ala.App. 401, 265 So.2d 185 (1972), cert. denied, 288 Ala. 748, 265 So.2d 192, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1079, 93 S.Ct. 703, 34 L.Ed.2d 669 (holding a prosecutorial office, as distinguished from actually working on a \u201cconcrete piece of litigation,\u201d does not in and of itself disqualify an individual who subsequently becomes a judge); see also Zitter, Prior Representation or Activity as Prosecuting as Disqualifying Judge From Sitting or Acting in Criminal Case, 16 A.L.R. 4th 550, 554 (1982) (Some courts have concluded that a judge, who had been a district attorney or an attorney general in a mere supervisory or administrative capacity at the time that a defendant was prosecuted for an offense, should not be disqualified; these courts often rationalize that disqualification on mere technical grounds \u201cwould hamper the smooth operation of the judicial administration.\u201d); W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 361 (19_) (\u201c[T]he law will not suppose a possibility of bias or favour in a judge, who is already sworn to administer impartial justice, and whose authority greatly depends upon that presumption and idea.\u201d); Williams v. State, 383 So.2d 547 (1979) (\u201cIt is presumed that a judge is qualified and unbiased [and [t]he defendant alleging [otherwise] has a substantial burden to show the grounds therefor.\u201d), aff'd, 383 So.2d 564 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 995, 101 S.Ct. 534, 66 L.Ed.2d 293."},"case_id":7513372,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Thus, \"the standard for recusal followed by most Supreme Court justices who had previously served as United States Attorney General was whether their involvement in a case involved more than a mere pro forma relationship.\" This standard has also been followed by state judges sitting in other jurisdictions.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"It is presumed that a judge is qualified and unbiased [and [t]he defendant alleging [otherwise] has a substantial burden to show the grounds therefor.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., People v. Delongchamps, 103 Mich.App. 151, 302 N.W.2d 626 (1981) (a judge, formerly a prosecutor, was deemed qualified because he did not personally participate in the prior proceeding and because Canon 3(C) requires disqualification only if a judge \u201ccannot impartially hear a case\u201d); Payne v. State, 48 Ala.App. 401, 265 So.2d 185 (1972), cert. denied, 288 Ala. 748, 265 So.2d 192, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1079, 93 S.Ct. 703, 34 L.Ed.2d 669 (holding a prosecutorial office, as distinguished from actually working on a \u201cconcrete piece of litigation,\u201d does not in and of itself disqualify an individual who subsequently becomes a judge); see also Zitter, Prior Representation or Activity as Prosecuting as Disqualifying Judge From Sitting or Acting in Criminal Case, 16 A.L.R. 4th 550, 554 (1982) (Some courts have concluded that a judge, who had been a district attorney or an attorney general in a mere supervisory or administrative capacity at the time that a defendant was prosecuted for an offense, should not be disqualified; these courts often rationalize that disqualification on mere technical grounds \u201cwould hamper the smooth operation of the judicial administration.\u201d); W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 361 (19_) (\u201c[T]he law will not suppose a possibility of bias or favour in a judge, who is already sworn to administer impartial justice, and whose authority greatly depends upon that presumption and idea.\u201d); Williams v. State, 383 So.2d 547 (1979) (\u201cIt is presumed that a judge is qualified and unbiased [and [t]he defendant alleging [otherwise] has a substantial burden to show the grounds therefor.\u201d), aff'd, 383 So.2d 564 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 995, 101 S.Ct. 534, 66 L.Ed.2d 293."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding a prosecutorial office, as distinguished from actually working on a \"concrete piece of litigation,\" does not in and of itself disqualify an individual who subsequently becomes a judge","sentence":"See, e.g., People v. Delongchamps, 103 Mich.App. 151, 302 N.W.2d 626 (1981) (a judge, formerly a prosecutor, was deemed qualified because he did not personally participate in the prior proceeding and because Canon 3(C) requires disqualification only if a judge \u201ccannot impartially hear a case\u201d); Payne v. State, 48 Ala.App. 401, 265 So.2d 185 (1972), cert. denied, 288 Ala. 748, 265 So.2d 192, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1079, 93 S.Ct. 703, 34 L.Ed.2d 669 (holding a prosecutorial office, as distinguished from actually working on a \u201cconcrete piece of litigation,\u201d does not in and of itself disqualify an individual who subsequently becomes a judge); see also Zitter, Prior Representation or Activity as Prosecuting as Disqualifying Judge From Sitting or Acting in Criminal Case, 16 A.L.R. 4th 550, 554 (1982) (Some courts have concluded that a judge, who had been a district attorney or an attorney general in a mere supervisory or administrative capacity at the time that a defendant was prosecuted for an offense, should not be disqualified; these courts often rationalize that disqualification on mere technical grounds \u201cwould hamper the smooth operation of the judicial administration.\u201d); W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 361 (19_) (\u201c[T]he law will not suppose a possibility of bias or favour in a judge, who is already sworn to administer impartial justice, and whose authority greatly depends upon that presumption and idea.\u201d); Williams v. State, 383 So.2d 547 (1979) (\u201cIt is presumed that a judge is qualified and unbiased [and [t]he defendant alleging [otherwise] has a substantial burden to show the grounds therefor.\u201d), aff'd, 383 So.2d 564 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 995, 101 S.Ct. 534, 66 L.Ed.2d 293."},"case_id":7513372,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Thus, \"the standard for recusal followed by most Supreme Court justices who had previously served as United States Attorney General was whether their involvement in a case involved more than a mere pro forma relationship.\" This standard has also been followed by state judges sitting in other jurisdictions.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding a prosecutorial office, as distinguished from actually working on a \"concrete piece of litigation,\" does not in and of itself disqualify an individual who subsequently becomes a judge","sentence":"See, e.g., People v. Delongchamps, 103 Mich.App. 151, 302 N.W.2d 626 (1981) (a judge, formerly a prosecutor, was deemed qualified because he did not personally participate in the prior proceeding and because Canon 3(C) requires disqualification only if a judge \u201ccannot impartially hear a case\u201d); Payne v. State, 48 Ala.App. 401, 265 So.2d 185 (1972), cert. denied, 288 Ala. 748, 265 So.2d 192, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1079, 93 S.Ct. 703, 34 L.Ed.2d 669 (holding a prosecutorial office, as distinguished from actually working on a \u201cconcrete piece of litigation,\u201d does not in and of itself disqualify an individual who subsequently becomes a judge); see also Zitter, Prior Representation or Activity as Prosecuting as Disqualifying Judge From Sitting or Acting in Criminal Case, 16 A.L.R. 4th 550, 554 (1982) (Some courts have concluded that a judge, who had been a district attorney or an attorney general in a mere supervisory or administrative capacity at the time that a defendant was prosecuted for an offense, should not be disqualified; these courts often rationalize that disqualification on mere technical grounds \u201cwould hamper the smooth operation of the judicial administration.\u201d); W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 361 (19_) (\u201c[T]he law will not suppose a possibility of bias or favour in a judge, who is already sworn to administer impartial justice, and whose authority greatly depends upon that presumption and idea.\u201d); Williams v. State, 383 So.2d 547 (1979) (\u201cIt is presumed that a judge is qualified and unbiased [and [t]he defendant alleging [otherwise] has a substantial burden to show the grounds therefor.\u201d), aff'd, 383 So.2d 564 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 995, 101 S.Ct. 534, 66 L.Ed.2d 293."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"It is presumed that a judge is qualified and unbiased [and [t]he defendant alleging [otherwise] has a substantial burden to show the grounds therefor.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., People v. Delongchamps, 103 Mich.App. 151, 302 N.W.2d 626 (1981) (a judge, formerly a prosecutor, was deemed qualified because he did not personally participate in the prior proceeding and because Canon 3(C) requires disqualification only if a judge \u201ccannot impartially hear a case\u201d); Payne v. State, 48 Ala.App. 401, 265 So.2d 185 (1972), cert. denied, 288 Ala. 748, 265 So.2d 192, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1079, 93 S.Ct. 703, 34 L.Ed.2d 669 (holding a prosecutorial office, as distinguished from actually working on a \u201cconcrete piece of litigation,\u201d does not in and of itself disqualify an individual who subsequently becomes a judge); see also Zitter, Prior Representation or Activity as Prosecuting as Disqualifying Judge From Sitting or Acting in Criminal Case, 16 A.L.R. 4th 550, 554 (1982) (Some courts have concluded that a judge, who had been a district attorney or an attorney general in a mere supervisory or administrative capacity at the time that a defendant was prosecuted for an offense, should not be disqualified; these courts often rationalize that disqualification on mere technical grounds \u201cwould hamper the smooth operation of the judicial administration.\u201d); W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 361 (19_) (\u201c[T]he law will not suppose a possibility of bias or favour in a judge, who is already sworn to administer impartial justice, and whose authority greatly depends upon that presumption and idea.\u201d); Williams v. State, 383 So.2d 547 (1979) (\u201cIt is presumed that a judge is qualified and unbiased [and [t]he defendant alleging [otherwise] has a substantial burden to show the grounds therefor.\u201d), aff'd, 383 So.2d 564 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 995, 101 S.Ct. 534, 66 L.Ed.2d 293."},"case_id":7513372,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Thus, \"the standard for recusal followed by most Supreme Court justices who had previously served as United States Attorney General was whether their involvement in a case involved more than a mere pro forma relationship.\" This standard has also been followed by state judges sitting in other jurisdictions.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding a prosecutorial office, as distinguished from actually working on a \"concrete piece of litigation,\" does not in and of itself disqualify an individual who subsequently becomes a judge","sentence":"See, e.g., People v. Delongchamps, 103 Mich.App. 151, 302 N.W.2d 626 (1981) (a judge, formerly a prosecutor, was deemed qualified because he did not personally participate in the prior proceeding and because Canon 3(C) requires disqualification only if a judge \u201ccannot impartially hear a case\u201d); Payne v. State, 48 Ala.App. 401, 265 So.2d 185 (1972), cert. denied, 288 Ala. 748, 265 So.2d 192, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1079, 93 S.Ct. 703, 34 L.Ed.2d 669 (holding a prosecutorial office, as distinguished from actually working on a \u201cconcrete piece of litigation,\u201d does not in and of itself disqualify an individual who subsequently becomes a judge); see also Zitter, Prior Representation or Activity as Prosecuting as Disqualifying Judge From Sitting or Acting in Criminal Case, 16 A.L.R. 4th 550, 554 (1982) (Some courts have concluded that a judge, who had been a district attorney or an attorney general in a mere supervisory or administrative capacity at the time that a defendant was prosecuted for an offense, should not be disqualified; these courts often rationalize that disqualification on mere technical grounds \u201cwould hamper the smooth operation of the judicial administration.\u201d); W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 361 (19_) (\u201c[T]he law will not suppose a possibility of bias or favour in a judge, who is already sworn to administer impartial justice, and whose authority greatly depends upon that presumption and idea.\u201d); Williams v. State, 383 So.2d 547 (1979) (\u201cIt is presumed that a judge is qualified and unbiased [and [t]he defendant alleging [otherwise] has a substantial burden to show the grounds therefor.\u201d), aff'd, 383 So.2d 564 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 995, 101 S.Ct. 534, 66 L.Ed.2d 293."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"It is presumed that a judge is qualified and unbiased [and [t]he defendant alleging [otherwise] has a substantial burden to show the grounds therefor.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., People v. Delongchamps, 103 Mich.App. 151, 302 N.W.2d 626 (1981) (a judge, formerly a prosecutor, was deemed qualified because he did not personally participate in the prior proceeding and because Canon 3(C) requires disqualification only if a judge \u201ccannot impartially hear a case\u201d); Payne v. State, 48 Ala.App. 401, 265 So.2d 185 (1972), cert. denied, 288 Ala. 748, 265 So.2d 192, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1079, 93 S.Ct. 703, 34 L.Ed.2d 669 (holding a prosecutorial office, as distinguished from actually working on a \u201cconcrete piece of litigation,\u201d does not in and of itself disqualify an individual who subsequently becomes a judge); see also Zitter, Prior Representation or Activity as Prosecuting as Disqualifying Judge From Sitting or Acting in Criminal Case, 16 A.L.R. 4th 550, 554 (1982) (Some courts have concluded that a judge, who had been a district attorney or an attorney general in a mere supervisory or administrative capacity at the time that a defendant was prosecuted for an offense, should not be disqualified; these courts often rationalize that disqualification on mere technical grounds \u201cwould hamper the smooth operation of the judicial administration.\u201d); W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 361 (19_) (\u201c[T]he law will not suppose a possibility of bias or favour in a judge, who is already sworn to administer impartial justice, and whose authority greatly depends upon that presumption and idea.\u201d); Williams v. State, 383 So.2d 547 (1979) (\u201cIt is presumed that a judge is qualified and unbiased [and [t]he defendant alleging [otherwise] has a substantial burden to show the grounds therefor.\u201d), aff'd, 383 So.2d 564 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 995, 101 S.Ct. 534, 66 L.Ed.2d 293."},"case_id":7513372,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Thus, \"the standard for recusal followed by most Supreme Court justices who had previously served as United States Attorney General was whether their involvement in a case involved more than a mere pro forma relationship.\" This standard has also been followed by state judges sitting in other jurisdictions.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding a prosecutorial office, as distinguished from actually working on a \"concrete piece of litigation,\" does not in and of itself disqualify an individual who subsequently becomes a judge","sentence":"See, e.g., People v. Delongchamps, 103 Mich.App. 151, 302 N.W.2d 626 (1981) (a judge, formerly a prosecutor, was deemed qualified because he did not personally participate in the prior proceeding and because Canon 3(C) requires disqualification only if a judge \u201ccannot impartially hear a case\u201d); Payne v. State, 48 Ala.App. 401, 265 So.2d 185 (1972), cert. denied, 288 Ala. 748, 265 So.2d 192, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1079, 93 S.Ct. 703, 34 L.Ed.2d 669 (holding a prosecutorial office, as distinguished from actually working on a \u201cconcrete piece of litigation,\u201d does not in and of itself disqualify an individual who subsequently becomes a judge); see also Zitter, Prior Representation or Activity as Prosecuting as Disqualifying Judge From Sitting or Acting in Criminal Case, 16 A.L.R. 4th 550, 554 (1982) (Some courts have concluded that a judge, who had been a district attorney or an attorney general in a mere supervisory or administrative capacity at the time that a defendant was prosecuted for an offense, should not be disqualified; these courts often rationalize that disqualification on mere technical grounds \u201cwould hamper the smooth operation of the judicial administration.\u201d); W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 361 (19_) (\u201c[T]he law will not suppose a possibility of bias or favour in a judge, who is already sworn to administer impartial justice, and whose authority greatly depends upon that presumption and idea.\u201d); Williams v. State, 383 So.2d 547 (1979) (\u201cIt is presumed that a judge is qualified and unbiased [and [t]he defendant alleging [otherwise] has a substantial burden to show the grounds therefor.\u201d), aff'd, 383 So.2d 564 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 995, 101 S.Ct. 534, 66 L.Ed.2d 293."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"It is presumed that a judge is qualified and unbiased [and [t]he defendant alleging [otherwise] has a substantial burden to show the grounds therefor.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., People v. Delongchamps, 103 Mich.App. 151, 302 N.W.2d 626 (1981) (a judge, formerly a prosecutor, was deemed qualified because he did not personally participate in the prior proceeding and because Canon 3(C) requires disqualification only if a judge \u201ccannot impartially hear a case\u201d); Payne v. State, 48 Ala.App. 401, 265 So.2d 185 (1972), cert. denied, 288 Ala. 748, 265 So.2d 192, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1079, 93 S.Ct. 703, 34 L.Ed.2d 669 (holding a prosecutorial office, as distinguished from actually working on a \u201cconcrete piece of litigation,\u201d does not in and of itself disqualify an individual who subsequently becomes a judge); see also Zitter, Prior Representation or Activity as Prosecuting as Disqualifying Judge From Sitting or Acting in Criminal Case, 16 A.L.R. 4th 550, 554 (1982) (Some courts have concluded that a judge, who had been a district attorney or an attorney general in a mere supervisory or administrative capacity at the time that a defendant was prosecuted for an offense, should not be disqualified; these courts often rationalize that disqualification on mere technical grounds \u201cwould hamper the smooth operation of the judicial administration.\u201d); W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 361 (19_) (\u201c[T]he law will not suppose a possibility of bias or favour in a judge, who is already sworn to administer impartial justice, and whose authority greatly depends upon that presumption and idea.\u201d); Williams v. State, 383 So.2d 547 (1979) (\u201cIt is presumed that a judge is qualified and unbiased [and [t]he defendant alleging [otherwise] has a substantial burden to show the grounds therefor.\u201d), aff'd, 383 So.2d 564 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 995, 101 S.Ct. 534, 66 L.Ed.2d 293."},"case_id":7513372,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Thus, \"the standard for recusal followed by most Supreme Court justices who had previously served as United States Attorney General was whether their involvement in a case involved more than a mere pro forma relationship.\" This standard has also been followed by state judges sitting in other jurisdictions.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"It is presumed that a judge is qualified and unbiased [and [t]he defendant alleging [otherwise] has a substantial burden to show the grounds therefor.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., People v. Delongchamps, 103 Mich.App. 151, 302 N.W.2d 626 (1981) (a judge, formerly a prosecutor, was deemed qualified because he did not personally participate in the prior proceeding and because Canon 3(C) requires disqualification only if a judge \u201ccannot impartially hear a case\u201d); Payne v. State, 48 Ala.App. 401, 265 So.2d 185 (1972), cert. denied, 288 Ala. 748, 265 So.2d 192, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1079, 93 S.Ct. 703, 34 L.Ed.2d 669 (holding a prosecutorial office, as distinguished from actually working on a \u201cconcrete piece of litigation,\u201d does not in and of itself disqualify an individual who subsequently becomes a judge); see also Zitter, Prior Representation or Activity as Prosecuting as Disqualifying Judge From Sitting or Acting in Criminal Case, 16 A.L.R. 4th 550, 554 (1982) (Some courts have concluded that a judge, who had been a district attorney or an attorney general in a mere supervisory or administrative capacity at the time that a defendant was prosecuted for an offense, should not be disqualified; these courts often rationalize that disqualification on mere technical grounds \u201cwould hamper the smooth operation of the judicial administration.\u201d); W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 361 (19_) (\u201c[T]he law will not suppose a possibility of bias or favour in a judge, who is already sworn to administer impartial justice, and whose authority greatly depends upon that presumption and idea.\u201d); Williams v. State, 383 So.2d 547 (1979) (\u201cIt is presumed that a judge is qualified and unbiased [and [t]he defendant alleging [otherwise] has a substantial burden to show the grounds therefor.\u201d), aff'd, 383 So.2d 564 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 995, 101 S.Ct. 534, 66 L.Ed.2d 293."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding a prosecutorial office, as distinguished from actually working on a \"concrete piece of litigation,\" does not in and of itself disqualify an individual who subsequently becomes a judge","sentence":"See, e.g., People v. Delongchamps, 103 Mich.App. 151, 302 N.W.2d 626 (1981) (a judge, formerly a prosecutor, was deemed qualified because he did not personally participate in the prior proceeding and because Canon 3(C) requires disqualification only if a judge \u201ccannot impartially hear a case\u201d); Payne v. State, 48 Ala.App. 401, 265 So.2d 185 (1972), cert. denied, 288 Ala. 748, 265 So.2d 192, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1079, 93 S.Ct. 703, 34 L.Ed.2d 669 (holding a prosecutorial office, as distinguished from actually working on a \u201cconcrete piece of litigation,\u201d does not in and of itself disqualify an individual who subsequently becomes a judge); see also Zitter, Prior Representation or Activity as Prosecuting as Disqualifying Judge From Sitting or Acting in Criminal Case, 16 A.L.R. 4th 550, 554 (1982) (Some courts have concluded that a judge, who had been a district attorney or an attorney general in a mere supervisory or administrative capacity at the time that a defendant was prosecuted for an offense, should not be disqualified; these courts often rationalize that disqualification on mere technical grounds \u201cwould hamper the smooth operation of the judicial administration.\u201d); W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 361 (19_) (\u201c[T]he law will not suppose a possibility of bias or favour in a judge, who is already sworn to administer impartial justice, and whose authority greatly depends upon that presumption and idea.\u201d); Williams v. State, 383 So.2d 547 (1979) (\u201cIt is presumed that a judge is qualified and unbiased [and [t]he defendant alleging [otherwise] has a substantial burden to show the grounds therefor.\u201d), aff'd, 383 So.2d 564 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 995, 101 S.Ct. 534, 66 L.Ed.2d 293."},"case_id":7513372,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Thus, \"the standard for recusal followed by most Supreme Court justices who had previously served as United States Attorney General was whether their involvement in a case involved more than a mere pro forma relationship.\" This standard has also been followed by state judges sitting in other jurisdictions.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding a prosecutorial office, as distinguished from actually working on a \"concrete piece of litigation,\" does not in and of itself disqualify an individual who subsequently becomes a judge","sentence":"See, e.g., People v. Delongchamps, 103 Mich.App. 151, 302 N.W.2d 626 (1981) (a judge, formerly a prosecutor, was deemed qualified because he did not personally participate in the prior proceeding and because Canon 3(C) requires disqualification only if a judge \u201ccannot impartially hear a case\u201d); Payne v. State, 48 Ala.App. 401, 265 So.2d 185 (1972), cert. denied, 288 Ala. 748, 265 So.2d 192, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1079, 93 S.Ct. 703, 34 L.Ed.2d 669 (holding a prosecutorial office, as distinguished from actually working on a \u201cconcrete piece of litigation,\u201d does not in and of itself disqualify an individual who subsequently becomes a judge); see also Zitter, Prior Representation or Activity as Prosecuting as Disqualifying Judge From Sitting or Acting in Criminal Case, 16 A.L.R. 4th 550, 554 (1982) (Some courts have concluded that a judge, who had been a district attorney or an attorney general in a mere supervisory or administrative capacity at the time that a defendant was prosecuted for an offense, should not be disqualified; these courts often rationalize that disqualification on mere technical grounds \u201cwould hamper the smooth operation of the judicial administration.\u201d); W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 361 (19_) (\u201c[T]he law will not suppose a possibility of bias or favour in a judge, who is already sworn to administer impartial justice, and whose authority greatly depends upon that presumption and idea.\u201d); Williams v. State, 383 So.2d 547 (1979) (\u201cIt is presumed that a judge is qualified and unbiased [and [t]he defendant alleging [otherwise] has a substantial burden to show the grounds therefor.\u201d), aff'd, 383 So.2d 564 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 995, 101 S.Ct. 534, 66 L.Ed.2d 293."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"It is presumed that a judge is qualified and unbiased [and [t]he defendant alleging [otherwise] has a substantial burden to show the grounds therefor.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., People v. Delongchamps, 103 Mich.App. 151, 302 N.W.2d 626 (1981) (a judge, formerly a prosecutor, was deemed qualified because he did not personally participate in the prior proceeding and because Canon 3(C) requires disqualification only if a judge \u201ccannot impartially hear a case\u201d); Payne v. State, 48 Ala.App. 401, 265 So.2d 185 (1972), cert. denied, 288 Ala. 748, 265 So.2d 192, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1079, 93 S.Ct. 703, 34 L.Ed.2d 669 (holding a prosecutorial office, as distinguished from actually working on a \u201cconcrete piece of litigation,\u201d does not in and of itself disqualify an individual who subsequently becomes a judge); see also Zitter, Prior Representation or Activity as Prosecuting as Disqualifying Judge From Sitting or Acting in Criminal Case, 16 A.L.R. 4th 550, 554 (1982) (Some courts have concluded that a judge, who had been a district attorney or an attorney general in a mere supervisory or administrative capacity at the time that a defendant was prosecuted for an offense, should not be disqualified; these courts often rationalize that disqualification on mere technical grounds \u201cwould hamper the smooth operation of the judicial administration.\u201d); W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 361 (19_) (\u201c[T]he law will not suppose a possibility of bias or favour in a judge, who is already sworn to administer impartial justice, and whose authority greatly depends upon that presumption and idea.\u201d); Williams v. State, 383 So.2d 547 (1979) (\u201cIt is presumed that a judge is qualified and unbiased [and [t]he defendant alleging [otherwise] has a substantial burden to show the grounds therefor.\u201d), aff'd, 383 So.2d 564 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 995, 101 S.Ct. 534, 66 L.Ed.2d 293."},"case_id":7513372,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Thus, \"the standard for recusal followed by most Supreme Court justices who had previously served as United States Attorney General was whether their involvement in a case involved more than a mere pro forma relationship.\" This standard has also been followed by state judges sitting in other jurisdictions.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"It is presumed that a judge is qualified and unbiased [and [t]he defendant alleging [otherwise] has a substantial burden to show the grounds therefor.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., People v. Delongchamps, 103 Mich.App. 151, 302 N.W.2d 626 (1981) (a judge, formerly a prosecutor, was deemed qualified because he did not personally participate in the prior proceeding and because Canon 3(C) requires disqualification only if a judge \u201ccannot impartially hear a case\u201d); Payne v. State, 48 Ala.App. 401, 265 So.2d 185 (1972), cert. denied, 288 Ala. 748, 265 So.2d 192, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1079, 93 S.Ct. 703, 34 L.Ed.2d 669 (holding a prosecutorial office, as distinguished from actually working on a \u201cconcrete piece of litigation,\u201d does not in and of itself disqualify an individual who subsequently becomes a judge); see also Zitter, Prior Representation or Activity as Prosecuting as Disqualifying Judge From Sitting or Acting in Criminal Case, 16 A.L.R. 4th 550, 554 (1982) (Some courts have concluded that a judge, who had been a district attorney or an attorney general in a mere supervisory or administrative capacity at the time that a defendant was prosecuted for an offense, should not be disqualified; these courts often rationalize that disqualification on mere technical grounds \u201cwould hamper the smooth operation of the judicial administration.\u201d); W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 361 (19_) (\u201c[T]he law will not suppose a possibility of bias or favour in a judge, who is already sworn to administer impartial justice, and whose authority greatly depends upon that presumption and idea.\u201d); Williams v. State, 383 So.2d 547 (1979) (\u201cIt is presumed that a judge is qualified and unbiased [and [t]he defendant alleging [otherwise] has a substantial burden to show the grounds therefor.\u201d), aff'd, 383 So.2d 564 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 995, 101 S.Ct. 534, 66 L.Ed.2d 293."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding a prosecutorial office, as distinguished from actually working on a \"concrete piece of litigation,\" does not in and of itself disqualify an individual who subsequently becomes a judge","sentence":"See, e.g., People v. Delongchamps, 103 Mich.App. 151, 302 N.W.2d 626 (1981) (a judge, formerly a prosecutor, was deemed qualified because he did not personally participate in the prior proceeding and because Canon 3(C) requires disqualification only if a judge \u201ccannot impartially hear a case\u201d); Payne v. State, 48 Ala.App. 401, 265 So.2d 185 (1972), cert. denied, 288 Ala. 748, 265 So.2d 192, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1079, 93 S.Ct. 703, 34 L.Ed.2d 669 (holding a prosecutorial office, as distinguished from actually working on a \u201cconcrete piece of litigation,\u201d does not in and of itself disqualify an individual who subsequently becomes a judge); see also Zitter, Prior Representation or Activity as Prosecuting as Disqualifying Judge From Sitting or Acting in Criminal Case, 16 A.L.R. 4th 550, 554 (1982) (Some courts have concluded that a judge, who had been a district attorney or an attorney general in a mere supervisory or administrative capacity at the time that a defendant was prosecuted for an offense, should not be disqualified; these courts often rationalize that disqualification on mere technical grounds \u201cwould hamper the smooth operation of the judicial administration.\u201d); W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 361 (19_) (\u201c[T]he law will not suppose a possibility of bias or favour in a judge, who is already sworn to administer impartial justice, and whose authority greatly depends upon that presumption and idea.\u201d); Williams v. State, 383 So.2d 547 (1979) (\u201cIt is presumed that a judge is qualified and unbiased [and [t]he defendant alleging [otherwise] has a substantial burden to show the grounds therefor.\u201d), aff'd, 383 So.2d 564 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 995, 101 S.Ct. 534, 66 L.Ed.2d 293."},"case_id":7513372,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Thus, \"the standard for recusal followed by most Supreme Court justices who had previously served as United States Attorney General was whether their involvement in a case involved more than a mere pro forma relationship.\" This standard has also been followed by state judges sitting in other jurisdictions.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding a prosecutorial office, as distinguished from actually working on a \"concrete piece of litigation,\" does not in and of itself disqualify an individual who subsequently becomes a judge","sentence":"See, e.g., People v. Delongchamps, 103 Mich.App. 151, 302 N.W.2d 626 (1981) (a judge, formerly a prosecutor, was deemed qualified because he did not personally participate in the prior proceeding and because Canon 3(C) requires disqualification only if a judge \u201ccannot impartially hear a case\u201d); Payne v. State, 48 Ala.App. 401, 265 So.2d 185 (1972), cert. denied, 288 Ala. 748, 265 So.2d 192, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1079, 93 S.Ct. 703, 34 L.Ed.2d 669 (holding a prosecutorial office, as distinguished from actually working on a \u201cconcrete piece of litigation,\u201d does not in and of itself disqualify an individual who subsequently becomes a judge); see also Zitter, Prior Representation or Activity as Prosecuting as Disqualifying Judge From Sitting or Acting in Criminal Case, 16 A.L.R. 4th 550, 554 (1982) (Some courts have concluded that a judge, who had been a district attorney or an attorney general in a mere supervisory or administrative capacity at the time that a defendant was prosecuted for an offense, should not be disqualified; these courts often rationalize that disqualification on mere technical grounds \u201cwould hamper the smooth operation of the judicial administration.\u201d); W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 361 (19_) (\u201c[T]he law will not suppose a possibility of bias or favour in a judge, who is already sworn to administer impartial justice, and whose authority greatly depends upon that presumption and idea.\u201d); Williams v. State, 383 So.2d 547 (1979) (\u201cIt is presumed that a judge is qualified and unbiased [and [t]he defendant alleging [otherwise] has a substantial burden to show the grounds therefor.\u201d), aff'd, 383 So.2d 564 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 995, 101 S.Ct. 534, 66 L.Ed.2d 293."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"It is presumed that a judge is qualified and unbiased [and [t]he defendant alleging [otherwise] has a substantial burden to show the grounds therefor.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., People v. Delongchamps, 103 Mich.App. 151, 302 N.W.2d 626 (1981) (a judge, formerly a prosecutor, was deemed qualified because he did not personally participate in the prior proceeding and because Canon 3(C) requires disqualification only if a judge \u201ccannot impartially hear a case\u201d); Payne v. State, 48 Ala.App. 401, 265 So.2d 185 (1972), cert. denied, 288 Ala. 748, 265 So.2d 192, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1079, 93 S.Ct. 703, 34 L.Ed.2d 669 (holding a prosecutorial office, as distinguished from actually working on a \u201cconcrete piece of litigation,\u201d does not in and of itself disqualify an individual who subsequently becomes a judge); see also Zitter, Prior Representation or Activity as Prosecuting as Disqualifying Judge From Sitting or Acting in Criminal Case, 16 A.L.R. 4th 550, 554 (1982) (Some courts have concluded that a judge, who had been a district attorney or an attorney general in a mere supervisory or administrative capacity at the time that a defendant was prosecuted for an offense, should not be disqualified; these courts often rationalize that disqualification on mere technical grounds \u201cwould hamper the smooth operation of the judicial administration.\u201d); W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 361 (19_) (\u201c[T]he law will not suppose a possibility of bias or favour in a judge, who is already sworn to administer impartial justice, and whose authority greatly depends upon that presumption and idea.\u201d); Williams v. State, 383 So.2d 547 (1979) (\u201cIt is presumed that a judge is qualified and unbiased [and [t]he defendant alleging [otherwise] has a substantial burden to show the grounds therefor.\u201d), aff'd, 383 So.2d 564 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 995, 101 S.Ct. 534, 66 L.Ed.2d 293."},"case_id":7513372,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Thus, \"the standard for recusal followed by most Supreme Court justices who had previously served as United States Attorney General was whether their involvement in a case involved more than a mere pro forma relationship.\" This standard has also been followed by state judges sitting in other jurisdictions.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"It is presumed that a judge is qualified and unbiased [and [t]he defendant alleging [otherwise] has a substantial burden to show the grounds therefor.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., People v. Delongchamps, 103 Mich.App. 151, 302 N.W.2d 626 (1981) (a judge, formerly a prosecutor, was deemed qualified because he did not personally participate in the prior proceeding and because Canon 3(C) requires disqualification only if a judge \u201ccannot impartially hear a case\u201d); Payne v. State, 48 Ala.App. 401, 265 So.2d 185 (1972), cert. denied, 288 Ala. 748, 265 So.2d 192, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1079, 93 S.Ct. 703, 34 L.Ed.2d 669 (holding a prosecutorial office, as distinguished from actually working on a \u201cconcrete piece of litigation,\u201d does not in and of itself disqualify an individual who subsequently becomes a judge); see also Zitter, Prior Representation or Activity as Prosecuting as Disqualifying Judge From Sitting or Acting in Criminal Case, 16 A.L.R. 4th 550, 554 (1982) (Some courts have concluded that a judge, who had been a district attorney or an attorney general in a mere supervisory or administrative capacity at the time that a defendant was prosecuted for an offense, should not be disqualified; these courts often rationalize that disqualification on mere technical grounds \u201cwould hamper the smooth operation of the judicial administration.\u201d); W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 361 (19_) (\u201c[T]he law will not suppose a possibility of bias or favour in a judge, who is already sworn to administer impartial justice, and whose authority greatly depends upon that presumption and idea.\u201d); Williams v. State, 383 So.2d 547 (1979) (\u201cIt is presumed that a judge is qualified and unbiased [and [t]he defendant alleging [otherwise] has a substantial burden to show the grounds therefor.\u201d), aff'd, 383 So.2d 564 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 995, 101 S.Ct. 534, 66 L.Ed.2d 293."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding a prosecutorial office, as distinguished from actually working on a \"concrete piece of litigation,\" does not in and of itself disqualify an individual who subsequently becomes a judge","sentence":"See, e.g., People v. Delongchamps, 103 Mich.App. 151, 302 N.W.2d 626 (1981) (a judge, formerly a prosecutor, was deemed qualified because he did not personally participate in the prior proceeding and because Canon 3(C) requires disqualification only if a judge \u201ccannot impartially hear a case\u201d); Payne v. State, 48 Ala.App. 401, 265 So.2d 185 (1972), cert. denied, 288 Ala. 748, 265 So.2d 192, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1079, 93 S.Ct. 703, 34 L.Ed.2d 669 (holding a prosecutorial office, as distinguished from actually working on a \u201cconcrete piece of litigation,\u201d does not in and of itself disqualify an individual who subsequently becomes a judge); see also Zitter, Prior Representation or Activity as Prosecuting as Disqualifying Judge From Sitting or Acting in Criminal Case, 16 A.L.R. 4th 550, 554 (1982) (Some courts have concluded that a judge, who had been a district attorney or an attorney general in a mere supervisory or administrative capacity at the time that a defendant was prosecuted for an offense, should not be disqualified; these courts often rationalize that disqualification on mere technical grounds \u201cwould hamper the smooth operation of the judicial administration.\u201d); W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 361 (19_) (\u201c[T]he law will not suppose a possibility of bias or favour in a judge, who is already sworn to administer impartial justice, and whose authority greatly depends upon that presumption and idea.\u201d); Williams v. State, 383 So.2d 547 (1979) (\u201cIt is presumed that a judge is qualified and unbiased [and [t]he defendant alleging [otherwise] has a substantial burden to show the grounds therefor.\u201d), aff'd, 383 So.2d 564 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 995, 101 S.Ct. 534, 66 L.Ed.2d 293."},"case_id":7513372,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Thus, \"the standard for recusal followed by most Supreme Court justices who had previously served as United States Attorney General was whether their involvement in a case involved more than a mere pro forma relationship.\" This standard has also been followed by state judges sitting in other jurisdictions.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"It is presumed that a judge is qualified and unbiased [and [t]he defendant alleging [otherwise] has a substantial burden to show the grounds therefor.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., People v. Delongchamps, 103 Mich.App. 151, 302 N.W.2d 626 (1981) (a judge, formerly a prosecutor, was deemed qualified because he did not personally participate in the prior proceeding and because Canon 3(C) requires disqualification only if a judge \u201ccannot impartially hear a case\u201d); Payne v. State, 48 Ala.App. 401, 265 So.2d 185 (1972), cert. denied, 288 Ala. 748, 265 So.2d 192, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1079, 93 S.Ct. 703, 34 L.Ed.2d 669 (holding a prosecutorial office, as distinguished from actually working on a \u201cconcrete piece of litigation,\u201d does not in and of itself disqualify an individual who subsequently becomes a judge); see also Zitter, Prior Representation or Activity as Prosecuting as Disqualifying Judge From Sitting or Acting in Criminal Case, 16 A.L.R. 4th 550, 554 (1982) (Some courts have concluded that a judge, who had been a district attorney or an attorney general in a mere supervisory or administrative capacity at the time that a defendant was prosecuted for an offense, should not be disqualified; these courts often rationalize that disqualification on mere technical grounds \u201cwould hamper the smooth operation of the judicial administration.\u201d); W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 361 (19_) (\u201c[T]he law will not suppose a possibility of bias or favour in a judge, who is already sworn to administer impartial justice, and whose authority greatly depends upon that presumption and idea.\u201d); Williams v. State, 383 So.2d 547 (1979) (\u201cIt is presumed that a judge is qualified and unbiased [and [t]he defendant alleging [otherwise] has a substantial burden to show the grounds therefor.\u201d), aff'd, 383 So.2d 564 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 995, 101 S.Ct. 534, 66 L.Ed.2d 293."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding a prosecutorial office, as distinguished from actually working on a \"concrete piece of litigation,\" does not in and of itself disqualify an individual who subsequently becomes a judge","sentence":"See, e.g., People v. Delongchamps, 103 Mich.App. 151, 302 N.W.2d 626 (1981) (a judge, formerly a prosecutor, was deemed qualified because he did not personally participate in the prior proceeding and because Canon 3(C) requires disqualification only if a judge \u201ccannot impartially hear a case\u201d); Payne v. State, 48 Ala.App. 401, 265 So.2d 185 (1972), cert. denied, 288 Ala. 748, 265 So.2d 192, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1079, 93 S.Ct. 703, 34 L.Ed.2d 669 (holding a prosecutorial office, as distinguished from actually working on a \u201cconcrete piece of litigation,\u201d does not in and of itself disqualify an individual who subsequently becomes a judge); see also Zitter, Prior Representation or Activity as Prosecuting as Disqualifying Judge From Sitting or Acting in Criminal Case, 16 A.L.R. 4th 550, 554 (1982) (Some courts have concluded that a judge, who had been a district attorney or an attorney general in a mere supervisory or administrative capacity at the time that a defendant was prosecuted for an offense, should not be disqualified; these courts often rationalize that disqualification on mere technical grounds \u201cwould hamper the smooth operation of the judicial administration.\u201d); W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 361 (19_) (\u201c[T]he law will not suppose a possibility of bias or favour in a judge, who is already sworn to administer impartial justice, and whose authority greatly depends upon that presumption and idea.\u201d); Williams v. State, 383 So.2d 547 (1979) (\u201cIt is presumed that a judge is qualified and unbiased [and [t]he defendant alleging [otherwise] has a substantial burden to show the grounds therefor.\u201d), aff'd, 383 So.2d 564 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 995, 101 S.Ct. 534, 66 L.Ed.2d 293."},"case_id":7513372,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Thus, \"the standard for recusal followed by most Supreme Court justices who had previously served as United States Attorney General was whether their involvement in a case involved more than a mere pro forma relationship.\" This standard has also been followed by state judges sitting in other jurisdictions.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"It is presumed that a judge is qualified and unbiased [and [t]he defendant alleging [otherwise] has a substantial burden to show the grounds therefor.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., People v. Delongchamps, 103 Mich.App. 151, 302 N.W.2d 626 (1981) (a judge, formerly a prosecutor, was deemed qualified because he did not personally participate in the prior proceeding and because Canon 3(C) requires disqualification only if a judge \u201ccannot impartially hear a case\u201d); Payne v. State, 48 Ala.App. 401, 265 So.2d 185 (1972), cert. denied, 288 Ala. 748, 265 So.2d 192, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1079, 93 S.Ct. 703, 34 L.Ed.2d 669 (holding a prosecutorial office, as distinguished from actually working on a \u201cconcrete piece of litigation,\u201d does not in and of itself disqualify an individual who subsequently becomes a judge); see also Zitter, Prior Representation or Activity as Prosecuting as Disqualifying Judge From Sitting or Acting in Criminal Case, 16 A.L.R. 4th 550, 554 (1982) (Some courts have concluded that a judge, who had been a district attorney or an attorney general in a mere supervisory or administrative capacity at the time that a defendant was prosecuted for an offense, should not be disqualified; these courts often rationalize that disqualification on mere technical grounds \u201cwould hamper the smooth operation of the judicial administration.\u201d); W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 361 (19_) (\u201c[T]he law will not suppose a possibility of bias or favour in a judge, who is already sworn to administer impartial justice, and whose authority greatly depends upon that presumption and idea.\u201d); Williams v. State, 383 So.2d 547 (1979) (\u201cIt is presumed that a judge is qualified and unbiased [and [t]he defendant alleging [otherwise] has a substantial burden to show the grounds therefor.\u201d), aff'd, 383 So.2d 564 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 995, 101 S.Ct. 534, 66 L.Ed.2d 293."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding a prosecutorial office, as distinguished from actually working on a \"concrete piece of litigation,\" does not in and of itself disqualify an individual who subsequently becomes a judge","sentence":"See, e.g., People v. Delongchamps, 103 Mich.App. 151, 302 N.W.2d 626 (1981) (a judge, formerly a prosecutor, was deemed qualified because he did not personally participate in the prior proceeding and because Canon 3(C) requires disqualification only if a judge \u201ccannot impartially hear a case\u201d); Payne v. State, 48 Ala.App. 401, 265 So.2d 185 (1972), cert. denied, 288 Ala. 748, 265 So.2d 192, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1079, 93 S.Ct. 703, 34 L.Ed.2d 669 (holding a prosecutorial office, as distinguished from actually working on a \u201cconcrete piece of litigation,\u201d does not in and of itself disqualify an individual who subsequently becomes a judge); see also Zitter, Prior Representation or Activity as Prosecuting as Disqualifying Judge From Sitting or Acting in Criminal Case, 16 A.L.R. 4th 550, 554 (1982) (Some courts have concluded that a judge, who had been a district attorney or an attorney general in a mere supervisory or administrative capacity at the time that a defendant was prosecuted for an offense, should not be disqualified; these courts often rationalize that disqualification on mere technical grounds \u201cwould hamper the smooth operation of the judicial administration.\u201d); W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 361 (19_) (\u201c[T]he law will not suppose a possibility of bias or favour in a judge, who is already sworn to administer impartial justice, and whose authority greatly depends upon that presumption and idea.\u201d); Williams v. State, 383 So.2d 547 (1979) (\u201cIt is presumed that a judge is qualified and unbiased [and [t]he defendant alleging [otherwise] has a substantial burden to show the grounds therefor.\u201d), aff'd, 383 So.2d 564 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 995, 101 S.Ct. 534, 66 L.Ed.2d 293."},"case_id":7513372,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Thus, \"the standard for recusal followed by most Supreme Court justices who had previously served as United States Attorney General was whether their involvement in a case involved more than a mere pro forma relationship.\" This standard has also been followed by state judges sitting in other jurisdictions.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding a prosecutorial office, as distinguished from actually working on a \"concrete piece of litigation,\" does not in and of itself disqualify an individual who subsequently becomes a judge","sentence":"See, e.g., People v. Delongchamps, 103 Mich.App. 151, 302 N.W.2d 626 (1981) (a judge, formerly a prosecutor, was deemed qualified because he did not personally participate in the prior proceeding and because Canon 3(C) requires disqualification only if a judge \u201ccannot impartially hear a case\u201d); Payne v. State, 48 Ala.App. 401, 265 So.2d 185 (1972), cert. denied, 288 Ala. 748, 265 So.2d 192, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1079, 93 S.Ct. 703, 34 L.Ed.2d 669 (holding a prosecutorial office, as distinguished from actually working on a \u201cconcrete piece of litigation,\u201d does not in and of itself disqualify an individual who subsequently becomes a judge); see also Zitter, Prior Representation or Activity as Prosecuting as Disqualifying Judge From Sitting or Acting in Criminal Case, 16 A.L.R. 4th 550, 554 (1982) (Some courts have concluded that a judge, who had been a district attorney or an attorney general in a mere supervisory or administrative capacity at the time that a defendant was prosecuted for an offense, should not be disqualified; these courts often rationalize that disqualification on mere technical grounds \u201cwould hamper the smooth operation of the judicial administration.\u201d); W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 361 (19_) (\u201c[T]he law will not suppose a possibility of bias or favour in a judge, who is already sworn to administer impartial justice, and whose authority greatly depends upon that presumption and idea.\u201d); Williams v. State, 383 So.2d 547 (1979) (\u201cIt is presumed that a judge is qualified and unbiased [and [t]he defendant alleging [otherwise] has a substantial burden to show the grounds therefor.\u201d), aff'd, 383 So.2d 564 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 995, 101 S.Ct. 534, 66 L.Ed.2d 293."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"It is presumed that a judge is qualified and unbiased [and [t]he defendant alleging [otherwise] has a substantial burden to show the grounds therefor.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., People v. Delongchamps, 103 Mich.App. 151, 302 N.W.2d 626 (1981) (a judge, formerly a prosecutor, was deemed qualified because he did not personally participate in the prior proceeding and because Canon 3(C) requires disqualification only if a judge \u201ccannot impartially hear a case\u201d); Payne v. State, 48 Ala.App. 401, 265 So.2d 185 (1972), cert. denied, 288 Ala. 748, 265 So.2d 192, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1079, 93 S.Ct. 703, 34 L.Ed.2d 669 (holding a prosecutorial office, as distinguished from actually working on a \u201cconcrete piece of litigation,\u201d does not in and of itself disqualify an individual who subsequently becomes a judge); see also Zitter, Prior Representation or Activity as Prosecuting as Disqualifying Judge From Sitting or Acting in Criminal Case, 16 A.L.R. 4th 550, 554 (1982) (Some courts have concluded that a judge, who had been a district attorney or an attorney general in a mere supervisory or administrative capacity at the time that a defendant was prosecuted for an offense, should not be disqualified; these courts often rationalize that disqualification on mere technical grounds \u201cwould hamper the smooth operation of the judicial administration.\u201d); W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 361 (19_) (\u201c[T]he law will not suppose a possibility of bias or favour in a judge, who is already sworn to administer impartial justice, and whose authority greatly depends upon that presumption and idea.\u201d); Williams v. State, 383 So.2d 547 (1979) (\u201cIt is presumed that a judge is qualified and unbiased [and [t]he defendant alleging [otherwise] has a substantial burden to show the grounds therefor.\u201d), aff'd, 383 So.2d 564 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 995, 101 S.Ct. 534, 66 L.Ed.2d 293."},"case_id":7513372,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Thus, \"the standard for recusal followed by most Supreme Court justices who had previously served as United States Attorney General was whether their involvement in a case involved more than a mere pro forma relationship.\" This standard has also been followed by state judges sitting in other jurisdictions.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"It is presumed that a judge is qualified and unbiased [and [t]he defendant alleging [otherwise] has a substantial burden to show the grounds therefor.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., People v. Delongchamps, 103 Mich.App. 151, 302 N.W.2d 626 (1981) (a judge, formerly a prosecutor, was deemed qualified because he did not personally participate in the prior proceeding and because Canon 3(C) requires disqualification only if a judge \u201ccannot impartially hear a case\u201d); Payne v. State, 48 Ala.App. 401, 265 So.2d 185 (1972), cert. denied, 288 Ala. 748, 265 So.2d 192, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1079, 93 S.Ct. 703, 34 L.Ed.2d 669 (holding a prosecutorial office, as distinguished from actually working on a \u201cconcrete piece of litigation,\u201d does not in and of itself disqualify an individual who subsequently becomes a judge); see also Zitter, Prior Representation or Activity as Prosecuting as Disqualifying Judge From Sitting or Acting in Criminal Case, 16 A.L.R. 4th 550, 554 (1982) (Some courts have concluded that a judge, who had been a district attorney or an attorney general in a mere supervisory or administrative capacity at the time that a defendant was prosecuted for an offense, should not be disqualified; these courts often rationalize that disqualification on mere technical grounds \u201cwould hamper the smooth operation of the judicial administration.\u201d); W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 361 (19_) (\u201c[T]he law will not suppose a possibility of bias or favour in a judge, who is already sworn to administer impartial justice, and whose authority greatly depends upon that presumption and idea.\u201d); Williams v. State, 383 So.2d 547 (1979) (\u201cIt is presumed that a judge is qualified and unbiased [and [t]he defendant alleging [otherwise] has a substantial burden to show the grounds therefor.\u201d), aff'd, 383 So.2d 564 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 995, 101 S.Ct. 534, 66 L.Ed.2d 293."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding a prosecutorial office, as distinguished from actually working on a \"concrete piece of litigation,\" does not in and of itself disqualify an individual who subsequently becomes a judge","sentence":"See, e.g., People v. Delongchamps, 103 Mich.App. 151, 302 N.W.2d 626 (1981) (a judge, formerly a prosecutor, was deemed qualified because he did not personally participate in the prior proceeding and because Canon 3(C) requires disqualification only if a judge \u201ccannot impartially hear a case\u201d); Payne v. State, 48 Ala.App. 401, 265 So.2d 185 (1972), cert. denied, 288 Ala. 748, 265 So.2d 192, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1079, 93 S.Ct. 703, 34 L.Ed.2d 669 (holding a prosecutorial office, as distinguished from actually working on a \u201cconcrete piece of litigation,\u201d does not in and of itself disqualify an individual who subsequently becomes a judge); see also Zitter, Prior Representation or Activity as Prosecuting as Disqualifying Judge From Sitting or Acting in Criminal Case, 16 A.L.R. 4th 550, 554 (1982) (Some courts have concluded that a judge, who had been a district attorney or an attorney general in a mere supervisory or administrative capacity at the time that a defendant was prosecuted for an offense, should not be disqualified; these courts often rationalize that disqualification on mere technical grounds \u201cwould hamper the smooth operation of the judicial administration.\u201d); W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 361 (19_) (\u201c[T]he law will not suppose a possibility of bias or favour in a judge, who is already sworn to administer impartial justice, and whose authority greatly depends upon that presumption and idea.\u201d); Williams v. State, 383 So.2d 547 (1979) (\u201cIt is presumed that a judge is qualified and unbiased [and [t]he defendant alleging [otherwise] has a substantial burden to show the grounds therefor.\u201d), aff'd, 383 So.2d 564 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 995, 101 S.Ct. 534, 66 L.Ed.2d 293."},"case_id":7513372,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Thus, \"the standard for recusal followed by most Supreme Court justices who had previously served as United States Attorney General was whether their involvement in a case involved more than a mere pro forma relationship.\" This standard has also been followed by state judges sitting in other jurisdictions.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding a prosecutorial office, as distinguished from actually working on a \"concrete piece of litigation,\" does not in and of itself disqualify an individual who subsequently becomes a judge","sentence":"See, e.g., People v. Delongchamps, 103 Mich.App. 151, 302 N.W.2d 626 (1981) (a judge, formerly a prosecutor, was deemed qualified because he did not personally participate in the prior proceeding and because Canon 3(C) requires disqualification only if a judge \u201ccannot impartially hear a case\u201d); Payne v. State, 48 Ala.App. 401, 265 So.2d 185 (1972), cert. denied, 288 Ala. 748, 265 So.2d 192, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1079, 93 S.Ct. 703, 34 L.Ed.2d 669 (holding a prosecutorial office, as distinguished from actually working on a \u201cconcrete piece of litigation,\u201d does not in and of itself disqualify an individual who subsequently becomes a judge); see also Zitter, Prior Representation or Activity as Prosecuting as Disqualifying Judge From Sitting or Acting in Criminal Case, 16 A.L.R. 4th 550, 554 (1982) (Some courts have concluded that a judge, who had been a district attorney or an attorney general in a mere supervisory or administrative capacity at the time that a defendant was prosecuted for an offense, should not be disqualified; these courts often rationalize that disqualification on mere technical grounds \u201cwould hamper the smooth operation of the judicial administration.\u201d); W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 361 (19_) (\u201c[T]he law will not suppose a possibility of bias or favour in a judge, who is already sworn to administer impartial justice, and whose authority greatly depends upon that presumption and idea.\u201d); Williams v. State, 383 So.2d 547 (1979) (\u201cIt is presumed that a judge is qualified and unbiased [and [t]he defendant alleging [otherwise] has a substantial burden to show the grounds therefor.\u201d), aff'd, 383 So.2d 564 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 995, 101 S.Ct. 534, 66 L.Ed.2d 293."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"It is presumed that a judge is qualified and unbiased [and [t]he defendant alleging [otherwise] has a substantial burden to show the grounds therefor.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., People v. Delongchamps, 103 Mich.App. 151, 302 N.W.2d 626 (1981) (a judge, formerly a prosecutor, was deemed qualified because he did not personally participate in the prior proceeding and because Canon 3(C) requires disqualification only if a judge \u201ccannot impartially hear a case\u201d); Payne v. State, 48 Ala.App. 401, 265 So.2d 185 (1972), cert. denied, 288 Ala. 748, 265 So.2d 192, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1079, 93 S.Ct. 703, 34 L.Ed.2d 669 (holding a prosecutorial office, as distinguished from actually working on a \u201cconcrete piece of litigation,\u201d does not in and of itself disqualify an individual who subsequently becomes a judge); see also Zitter, Prior Representation or Activity as Prosecuting as Disqualifying Judge From Sitting or Acting in Criminal Case, 16 A.L.R. 4th 550, 554 (1982) (Some courts have concluded that a judge, who had been a district attorney or an attorney general in a mere supervisory or administrative capacity at the time that a defendant was prosecuted for an offense, should not be disqualified; these courts often rationalize that disqualification on mere technical grounds \u201cwould hamper the smooth operation of the judicial administration.\u201d); W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 361 (19_) (\u201c[T]he law will not suppose a possibility of bias or favour in a judge, who is already sworn to administer impartial justice, and whose authority greatly depends upon that presumption and idea.\u201d); Williams v. State, 383 So.2d 547 (1979) (\u201cIt is presumed that a judge is qualified and unbiased [and [t]he defendant alleging [otherwise] has a substantial burden to show the grounds therefor.\u201d), aff'd, 383 So.2d 564 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 995, 101 S.Ct. 534, 66 L.Ed.2d 293."},"case_id":7513372,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Thus, \"the standard for recusal followed by most Supreme Court justices who had previously served as United States Attorney General was whether their involvement in a case involved more than a mere pro forma relationship.\" This standard has also been followed by state judges sitting in other jurisdictions.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"It is presumed that a judge is qualified and unbiased [and [t]he defendant alleging [otherwise] has a substantial burden to show the grounds therefor.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., People v. Delongchamps, 103 Mich.App. 151, 302 N.W.2d 626 (1981) (a judge, formerly a prosecutor, was deemed qualified because he did not personally participate in the prior proceeding and because Canon 3(C) requires disqualification only if a judge \u201ccannot impartially hear a case\u201d); Payne v. State, 48 Ala.App. 401, 265 So.2d 185 (1972), cert. denied, 288 Ala. 748, 265 So.2d 192, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1079, 93 S.Ct. 703, 34 L.Ed.2d 669 (holding a prosecutorial office, as distinguished from actually working on a \u201cconcrete piece of litigation,\u201d does not in and of itself disqualify an individual who subsequently becomes a judge); see also Zitter, Prior Representation or Activity as Prosecuting as Disqualifying Judge From Sitting or Acting in Criminal Case, 16 A.L.R. 4th 550, 554 (1982) (Some courts have concluded that a judge, who had been a district attorney or an attorney general in a mere supervisory or administrative capacity at the time that a defendant was prosecuted for an offense, should not be disqualified; these courts often rationalize that disqualification on mere technical grounds \u201cwould hamper the smooth operation of the judicial administration.\u201d); W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 361 (19_) (\u201c[T]he law will not suppose a possibility of bias or favour in a judge, who is already sworn to administer impartial justice, and whose authority greatly depends upon that presumption and idea.\u201d); Williams v. State, 383 So.2d 547 (1979) (\u201cIt is presumed that a judge is qualified and unbiased [and [t]he defendant alleging [otherwise] has a substantial burden to show the grounds therefor.\u201d), aff'd, 383 So.2d 564 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 995, 101 S.Ct. 534, 66 L.Ed.2d 293."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding a prosecutorial office, as distinguished from actually working on a \"concrete piece of litigation,\" does not in and of itself disqualify an individual who subsequently becomes a judge","sentence":"See, e.g., People v. Delongchamps, 103 Mich.App. 151, 302 N.W.2d 626 (1981) (a judge, formerly a prosecutor, was deemed qualified because he did not personally participate in the prior proceeding and because Canon 3(C) requires disqualification only if a judge \u201ccannot impartially hear a case\u201d); Payne v. State, 48 Ala.App. 401, 265 So.2d 185 (1972), cert. denied, 288 Ala. 748, 265 So.2d 192, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1079, 93 S.Ct. 703, 34 L.Ed.2d 669 (holding a prosecutorial office, as distinguished from actually working on a \u201cconcrete piece of litigation,\u201d does not in and of itself disqualify an individual who subsequently becomes a judge); see also Zitter, Prior Representation or Activity as Prosecuting as Disqualifying Judge From Sitting or Acting in Criminal Case, 16 A.L.R. 4th 550, 554 (1982) (Some courts have concluded that a judge, who had been a district attorney or an attorney general in a mere supervisory or administrative capacity at the time that a defendant was prosecuted for an offense, should not be disqualified; these courts often rationalize that disqualification on mere technical grounds \u201cwould hamper the smooth operation of the judicial administration.\u201d); W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 361 (19_) (\u201c[T]he law will not suppose a possibility of bias or favour in a judge, who is already sworn to administer impartial justice, and whose authority greatly depends upon that presumption and idea.\u201d); Williams v. State, 383 So.2d 547 (1979) (\u201cIt is presumed that a judge is qualified and unbiased [and [t]he defendant alleging [otherwise] has a substantial burden to show the grounds therefor.\u201d), aff'd, 383 So.2d 564 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 995, 101 S.Ct. 534, 66 L.Ed.2d 293."},"case_id":7513372,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Thus, \"the standard for recusal followed by most Supreme Court justices who had previously served as United States Attorney General was whether their involvement in a case involved more than a mere pro forma relationship.\" This standard has also been followed by state judges sitting in other jurisdictions.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"It is presumed that a judge is qualified and unbiased [and [t]he defendant alleging [otherwise] has a substantial burden to show the grounds therefor.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., People v. Delongchamps, 103 Mich.App. 151, 302 N.W.2d 626 (1981) (a judge, formerly a prosecutor, was deemed qualified because he did not personally participate in the prior proceeding and because Canon 3(C) requires disqualification only if a judge \u201ccannot impartially hear a case\u201d); Payne v. State, 48 Ala.App. 401, 265 So.2d 185 (1972), cert. denied, 288 Ala. 748, 265 So.2d 192, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1079, 93 S.Ct. 703, 34 L.Ed.2d 669 (holding a prosecutorial office, as distinguished from actually working on a \u201cconcrete piece of litigation,\u201d does not in and of itself disqualify an individual who subsequently becomes a judge); see also Zitter, Prior Representation or Activity as Prosecuting as Disqualifying Judge From Sitting or Acting in Criminal Case, 16 A.L.R. 4th 550, 554 (1982) (Some courts have concluded that a judge, who had been a district attorney or an attorney general in a mere supervisory or administrative capacity at the time that a defendant was prosecuted for an offense, should not be disqualified; these courts often rationalize that disqualification on mere technical grounds \u201cwould hamper the smooth operation of the judicial administration.\u201d); W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 361 (19_) (\u201c[T]he law will not suppose a possibility of bias or favour in a judge, who is already sworn to administer impartial justice, and whose authority greatly depends upon that presumption and idea.\u201d); Williams v. State, 383 So.2d 547 (1979) (\u201cIt is presumed that a judge is qualified and unbiased [and [t]he defendant alleging [otherwise] has a substantial burden to show the grounds therefor.\u201d), aff'd, 383 So.2d 564 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 995, 101 S.Ct. 534, 66 L.Ed.2d 293."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding a prosecutorial office, as distinguished from actually working on a \"concrete piece of litigation,\" does not in and of itself disqualify an individual who subsequently becomes a judge","sentence":"See, e.g., People v. Delongchamps, 103 Mich.App. 151, 302 N.W.2d 626 (1981) (a judge, formerly a prosecutor, was deemed qualified because he did not personally participate in the prior proceeding and because Canon 3(C) requires disqualification only if a judge \u201ccannot impartially hear a case\u201d); Payne v. State, 48 Ala.App. 401, 265 So.2d 185 (1972), cert. denied, 288 Ala. 748, 265 So.2d 192, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1079, 93 S.Ct. 703, 34 L.Ed.2d 669 (holding a prosecutorial office, as distinguished from actually working on a \u201cconcrete piece of litigation,\u201d does not in and of itself disqualify an individual who subsequently becomes a judge); see also Zitter, Prior Representation or Activity as Prosecuting as Disqualifying Judge From Sitting or Acting in Criminal Case, 16 A.L.R. 4th 550, 554 (1982) (Some courts have concluded that a judge, who had been a district attorney or an attorney general in a mere supervisory or administrative capacity at the time that a defendant was prosecuted for an offense, should not be disqualified; these courts often rationalize that disqualification on mere technical grounds \u201cwould hamper the smooth operation of the judicial administration.\u201d); W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 361 (19_) (\u201c[T]he law will not suppose a possibility of bias or favour in a judge, who is already sworn to administer impartial justice, and whose authority greatly depends upon that presumption and idea.\u201d); Williams v. State, 383 So.2d 547 (1979) (\u201cIt is presumed that a judge is qualified and unbiased [and [t]he defendant alleging [otherwise] has a substantial burden to show the grounds therefor.\u201d), aff'd, 383 So.2d 564 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 995, 101 S.Ct. 534, 66 L.Ed.2d 293."},"case_id":7513372,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Thus, \"the standard for recusal followed by most Supreme Court justices who had previously served as United States Attorney General was whether their involvement in a case involved more than a mere pro forma relationship.\" This standard has also been followed by state judges sitting in other jurisdictions.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding a prosecutorial office, as distinguished from actually working on a \"concrete piece of litigation,\" does not in and of itself disqualify an individual who subsequently becomes a judge","sentence":"See, e.g., People v. Delongchamps, 103 Mich.App. 151, 302 N.W.2d 626 (1981) (a judge, formerly a prosecutor, was deemed qualified because he did not personally participate in the prior proceeding and because Canon 3(C) requires disqualification only if a judge \u201ccannot impartially hear a case\u201d); Payne v. State, 48 Ala.App. 401, 265 So.2d 185 (1972), cert. denied, 288 Ala. 748, 265 So.2d 192, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1079, 93 S.Ct. 703, 34 L.Ed.2d 669 (holding a prosecutorial office, as distinguished from actually working on a \u201cconcrete piece of litigation,\u201d does not in and of itself disqualify an individual who subsequently becomes a judge); see also Zitter, Prior Representation or Activity as Prosecuting as Disqualifying Judge From Sitting or Acting in Criminal Case, 16 A.L.R. 4th 550, 554 (1982) (Some courts have concluded that a judge, who had been a district attorney or an attorney general in a mere supervisory or administrative capacity at the time that a defendant was prosecuted for an offense, should not be disqualified; these courts often rationalize that disqualification on mere technical grounds \u201cwould hamper the smooth operation of the judicial administration.\u201d); W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 361 (19_) (\u201c[T]he law will not suppose a possibility of bias or favour in a judge, who is already sworn to administer impartial justice, and whose authority greatly depends upon that presumption and idea.\u201d); Williams v. State, 383 So.2d 547 (1979) (\u201cIt is presumed that a judge is qualified and unbiased [and [t]he defendant alleging [otherwise] has a substantial burden to show the grounds therefor.\u201d), aff'd, 383 So.2d 564 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 995, 101 S.Ct. 534, 66 L.Ed.2d 293."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"It is presumed that a judge is qualified and unbiased [and [t]he defendant alleging [otherwise] has a substantial burden to show the grounds therefor.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., People v. Delongchamps, 103 Mich.App. 151, 302 N.W.2d 626 (1981) (a judge, formerly a prosecutor, was deemed qualified because he did not personally participate in the prior proceeding and because Canon 3(C) requires disqualification only if a judge \u201ccannot impartially hear a case\u201d); Payne v. State, 48 Ala.App. 401, 265 So.2d 185 (1972), cert. denied, 288 Ala. 748, 265 So.2d 192, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1079, 93 S.Ct. 703, 34 L.Ed.2d 669 (holding a prosecutorial office, as distinguished from actually working on a \u201cconcrete piece of litigation,\u201d does not in and of itself disqualify an individual who subsequently becomes a judge); see also Zitter, Prior Representation or Activity as Prosecuting as Disqualifying Judge From Sitting or Acting in Criminal Case, 16 A.L.R. 4th 550, 554 (1982) (Some courts have concluded that a judge, who had been a district attorney or an attorney general in a mere supervisory or administrative capacity at the time that a defendant was prosecuted for an offense, should not be disqualified; these courts often rationalize that disqualification on mere technical grounds \u201cwould hamper the smooth operation of the judicial administration.\u201d); W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 361 (19_) (\u201c[T]he law will not suppose a possibility of bias or favour in a judge, who is already sworn to administer impartial justice, and whose authority greatly depends upon that presumption and idea.\u201d); Williams v. State, 383 So.2d 547 (1979) (\u201cIt is presumed that a judge is qualified and unbiased [and [t]he defendant alleging [otherwise] has a substantial burden to show the grounds therefor.\u201d), aff'd, 383 So.2d 564 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 995, 101 S.Ct. 534, 66 L.Ed.2d 293."},"case_id":7513372,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Thus, \"the standard for recusal followed by most Supreme Court justices who had previously served as United States Attorney General was whether their involvement in a case involved more than a mere pro forma relationship.\" This standard has also been followed by state judges sitting in other jurisdictions.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding a prosecutorial office, as distinguished from actually working on a \"concrete piece of litigation,\" does not in and of itself disqualify an individual who subsequently becomes a judge","sentence":"See, e.g., People v. Delongchamps, 103 Mich.App. 151, 302 N.W.2d 626 (1981) (a judge, formerly a prosecutor, was deemed qualified because he did not personally participate in the prior proceeding and because Canon 3(C) requires disqualification only if a judge \u201ccannot impartially hear a case\u201d); Payne v. State, 48 Ala.App. 401, 265 So.2d 185 (1972), cert. denied, 288 Ala. 748, 265 So.2d 192, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1079, 93 S.Ct. 703, 34 L.Ed.2d 669 (holding a prosecutorial office, as distinguished from actually working on a \u201cconcrete piece of litigation,\u201d does not in and of itself disqualify an individual who subsequently becomes a judge); see also Zitter, Prior Representation or Activity as Prosecuting as Disqualifying Judge From Sitting or Acting in Criminal Case, 16 A.L.R. 4th 550, 554 (1982) (Some courts have concluded that a judge, who had been a district attorney or an attorney general in a mere supervisory or administrative capacity at the time that a defendant was prosecuted for an offense, should not be disqualified; these courts often rationalize that disqualification on mere technical grounds \u201cwould hamper the smooth operation of the judicial administration.\u201d); W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 361 (19_) (\u201c[T]he law will not suppose a possibility of bias or favour in a judge, who is already sworn to administer impartial justice, and whose authority greatly depends upon that presumption and idea.\u201d); Williams v. State, 383 So.2d 547 (1979) (\u201cIt is presumed that a judge is qualified and unbiased [and [t]he defendant alleging [otherwise] has a substantial burden to show the grounds therefor.\u201d), aff'd, 383 So.2d 564 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 995, 101 S.Ct. 534, 66 L.Ed.2d 293."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"It is presumed that a judge is qualified and unbiased [and [t]he defendant alleging [otherwise] has a substantial burden to show the grounds therefor.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., People v. Delongchamps, 103 Mich.App. 151, 302 N.W.2d 626 (1981) (a judge, formerly a prosecutor, was deemed qualified because he did not personally participate in the prior proceeding and because Canon 3(C) requires disqualification only if a judge \u201ccannot impartially hear a case\u201d); Payne v. State, 48 Ala.App. 401, 265 So.2d 185 (1972), cert. denied, 288 Ala. 748, 265 So.2d 192, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1079, 93 S.Ct. 703, 34 L.Ed.2d 669 (holding a prosecutorial office, as distinguished from actually working on a \u201cconcrete piece of litigation,\u201d does not in and of itself disqualify an individual who subsequently becomes a judge); see also Zitter, Prior Representation or Activity as Prosecuting as Disqualifying Judge From Sitting or Acting in Criminal Case, 16 A.L.R. 4th 550, 554 (1982) (Some courts have concluded that a judge, who had been a district attorney or an attorney general in a mere supervisory or administrative capacity at the time that a defendant was prosecuted for an offense, should not be disqualified; these courts often rationalize that disqualification on mere technical grounds \u201cwould hamper the smooth operation of the judicial administration.\u201d); W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 361 (19_) (\u201c[T]he law will not suppose a possibility of bias or favour in a judge, who is already sworn to administer impartial justice, and whose authority greatly depends upon that presumption and idea.\u201d); Williams v. State, 383 So.2d 547 (1979) (\u201cIt is presumed that a judge is qualified and unbiased [and [t]he defendant alleging [otherwise] has a substantial burden to show the grounds therefor.\u201d), aff'd, 383 So.2d 564 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 995, 101 S.Ct. 534, 66 L.Ed.2d 293."},"case_id":7513372,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Thus, \"the standard for recusal followed by most Supreme Court justices who had previously served as United States Attorney General was whether their involvement in a case involved more than a mere pro forma relationship.\" This standard has also been followed by state judges sitting in other jurisdictions.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding a prosecutorial office, as distinguished from actually working on a \"concrete piece of litigation,\" does not in and of itself disqualify an individual who subsequently becomes a judge","sentence":"See, e.g., People v. Delongchamps, 103 Mich.App. 151, 302 N.W.2d 626 (1981) (a judge, formerly a prosecutor, was deemed qualified because he did not personally participate in the prior proceeding and because Canon 3(C) requires disqualification only if a judge \u201ccannot impartially hear a case\u201d); Payne v. State, 48 Ala.App. 401, 265 So.2d 185 (1972), cert. denied, 288 Ala. 748, 265 So.2d 192, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1079, 93 S.Ct. 703, 34 L.Ed.2d 669 (holding a prosecutorial office, as distinguished from actually working on a \u201cconcrete piece of litigation,\u201d does not in and of itself disqualify an individual who subsequently becomes a judge); see also Zitter, Prior Representation or Activity as Prosecuting as Disqualifying Judge From Sitting or Acting in Criminal Case, 16 A.L.R. 4th 550, 554 (1982) (Some courts have concluded that a judge, who had been a district attorney or an attorney general in a mere supervisory or administrative capacity at the time that a defendant was prosecuted for an offense, should not be disqualified; these courts often rationalize that disqualification on mere technical grounds \u201cwould hamper the smooth operation of the judicial administration.\u201d); W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 361 (19_) (\u201c[T]he law will not suppose a possibility of bias or favour in a judge, who is already sworn to administer impartial justice, and whose authority greatly depends upon that presumption and idea.\u201d); Williams v. State, 383 So.2d 547 (1979) (\u201cIt is presumed that a judge is qualified and unbiased [and [t]he defendant alleging [otherwise] has a substantial burden to show the grounds therefor.\u201d), aff'd, 383 So.2d 564 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 995, 101 S.Ct. 534, 66 L.Ed.2d 293."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"It is presumed that a judge is qualified and unbiased [and [t]he defendant alleging [otherwise] has a substantial burden to show the grounds therefor.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., People v. Delongchamps, 103 Mich.App. 151, 302 N.W.2d 626 (1981) (a judge, formerly a prosecutor, was deemed qualified because he did not personally participate in the prior proceeding and because Canon 3(C) requires disqualification only if a judge \u201ccannot impartially hear a case\u201d); Payne v. State, 48 Ala.App. 401, 265 So.2d 185 (1972), cert. denied, 288 Ala. 748, 265 So.2d 192, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1079, 93 S.Ct. 703, 34 L.Ed.2d 669 (holding a prosecutorial office, as distinguished from actually working on a \u201cconcrete piece of litigation,\u201d does not in and of itself disqualify an individual who subsequently becomes a judge); see also Zitter, Prior Representation or Activity as Prosecuting as Disqualifying Judge From Sitting or Acting in Criminal Case, 16 A.L.R. 4th 550, 554 (1982) (Some courts have concluded that a judge, who had been a district attorney or an attorney general in a mere supervisory or administrative capacity at the time that a defendant was prosecuted for an offense, should not be disqualified; these courts often rationalize that disqualification on mere technical grounds \u201cwould hamper the smooth operation of the judicial administration.\u201d); W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 361 (19_) (\u201c[T]he law will not suppose a possibility of bias or favour in a judge, who is already sworn to administer impartial justice, and whose authority greatly depends upon that presumption and idea.\u201d); Williams v. State, 383 So.2d 547 (1979) (\u201cIt is presumed that a judge is qualified and unbiased [and [t]he defendant alleging [otherwise] has a substantial burden to show the grounds therefor.\u201d), aff'd, 383 So.2d 564 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 995, 101 S.Ct. 534, 66 L.Ed.2d 293."},"case_id":7513372,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Thus, \"the standard for recusal followed by most Supreme Court justices who had previously served as United States Attorney General was whether their involvement in a case involved more than a mere pro forma relationship.\" This standard has also been followed by state judges sitting in other jurisdictions.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding a prosecutorial office, as distinguished from actually working on a \"concrete piece of litigation,\" does not in and of itself disqualify an individual who subsequently becomes a judge","sentence":"See, e.g., People v. Delongchamps, 103 Mich.App. 151, 302 N.W.2d 626 (1981) (a judge, formerly a prosecutor, was deemed qualified because he did not personally participate in the prior proceeding and because Canon 3(C) requires disqualification only if a judge \u201ccannot impartially hear a case\u201d); Payne v. State, 48 Ala.App. 401, 265 So.2d 185 (1972), cert. denied, 288 Ala. 748, 265 So.2d 192, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1079, 93 S.Ct. 703, 34 L.Ed.2d 669 (holding a prosecutorial office, as distinguished from actually working on a \u201cconcrete piece of litigation,\u201d does not in and of itself disqualify an individual who subsequently becomes a judge); see also Zitter, Prior Representation or Activity as Prosecuting as Disqualifying Judge From Sitting or Acting in Criminal Case, 16 A.L.R. 4th 550, 554 (1982) (Some courts have concluded that a judge, who had been a district attorney or an attorney general in a mere supervisory or administrative capacity at the time that a defendant was prosecuted for an offense, should not be disqualified; these courts often rationalize that disqualification on mere technical grounds \u201cwould hamper the smooth operation of the judicial administration.\u201d); W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 361 (19_) (\u201c[T]he law will not suppose a possibility of bias or favour in a judge, who is already sworn to administer impartial justice, and whose authority greatly depends upon that presumption and idea.\u201d); Williams v. State, 383 So.2d 547 (1979) (\u201cIt is presumed that a judge is qualified and unbiased [and [t]he defendant alleging [otherwise] has a substantial burden to show the grounds therefor.\u201d), aff'd, 383 So.2d 564 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 995, 101 S.Ct. 534, 66 L.Ed.2d 293."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"It is presumed that a judge is qualified and unbiased [and [t]he defendant alleging [otherwise] has a substantial burden to show the grounds therefor.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., People v. Delongchamps, 103 Mich.App. 151, 302 N.W.2d 626 (1981) (a judge, formerly a prosecutor, was deemed qualified because he did not personally participate in the prior proceeding and because Canon 3(C) requires disqualification only if a judge \u201ccannot impartially hear a case\u201d); Payne v. State, 48 Ala.App. 401, 265 So.2d 185 (1972), cert. denied, 288 Ala. 748, 265 So.2d 192, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1079, 93 S.Ct. 703, 34 L.Ed.2d 669 (holding a prosecutorial office, as distinguished from actually working on a \u201cconcrete piece of litigation,\u201d does not in and of itself disqualify an individual who subsequently becomes a judge); see also Zitter, Prior Representation or Activity as Prosecuting as Disqualifying Judge From Sitting or Acting in Criminal Case, 16 A.L.R. 4th 550, 554 (1982) (Some courts have concluded that a judge, who had been a district attorney or an attorney general in a mere supervisory or administrative capacity at the time that a defendant was prosecuted for an offense, should not be disqualified; these courts often rationalize that disqualification on mere technical grounds \u201cwould hamper the smooth operation of the judicial administration.\u201d); W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 361 (19_) (\u201c[T]he law will not suppose a possibility of bias or favour in a judge, who is already sworn to administer impartial justice, and whose authority greatly depends upon that presumption and idea.\u201d); Williams v. State, 383 So.2d 547 (1979) (\u201cIt is presumed that a judge is qualified and unbiased [and [t]he defendant alleging [otherwise] has a substantial burden to show the grounds therefor.\u201d), aff'd, 383 So.2d 564 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 995, 101 S.Ct. 534, 66 L.Ed.2d 293."},"case_id":7513372,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Thus, \"the standard for recusal followed by most Supreme Court justices who had previously served as United States Attorney General was whether their involvement in a case involved more than a mere pro forma relationship.\" This standard has also been followed by state judges sitting in other jurisdictions.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"It is presumed that a judge is qualified and unbiased [and [t]he defendant alleging [otherwise] has a substantial burden to show the grounds therefor.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., People v. Delongchamps, 103 Mich.App. 151, 302 N.W.2d 626 (1981) (a judge, formerly a prosecutor, was deemed qualified because he did not personally participate in the prior proceeding and because Canon 3(C) requires disqualification only if a judge \u201ccannot impartially hear a case\u201d); Payne v. State, 48 Ala.App. 401, 265 So.2d 185 (1972), cert. denied, 288 Ala. 748, 265 So.2d 192, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1079, 93 S.Ct. 703, 34 L.Ed.2d 669 (holding a prosecutorial office, as distinguished from actually working on a \u201cconcrete piece of litigation,\u201d does not in and of itself disqualify an individual who subsequently becomes a judge); see also Zitter, Prior Representation or Activity as Prosecuting as Disqualifying Judge From Sitting or Acting in Criminal Case, 16 A.L.R. 4th 550, 554 (1982) (Some courts have concluded that a judge, who had been a district attorney or an attorney general in a mere supervisory or administrative capacity at the time that a defendant was prosecuted for an offense, should not be disqualified; these courts often rationalize that disqualification on mere technical grounds \u201cwould hamper the smooth operation of the judicial administration.\u201d); W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 361 (19_) (\u201c[T]he law will not suppose a possibility of bias or favour in a judge, who is already sworn to administer impartial justice, and whose authority greatly depends upon that presumption and idea.\u201d); Williams v. State, 383 So.2d 547 (1979) (\u201cIt is presumed that a judge is qualified and unbiased [and [t]he defendant alleging [otherwise] has a substantial burden to show the grounds therefor.\u201d), aff'd, 383 So.2d 564 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 995, 101 S.Ct. 534, 66 L.Ed.2d 293."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding a prosecutorial office, as distinguished from actually working on a \"concrete piece of litigation,\" does not in and of itself disqualify an individual who subsequently becomes a judge","sentence":"See, e.g., People v. Delongchamps, 103 Mich.App. 151, 302 N.W.2d 626 (1981) (a judge, formerly a prosecutor, was deemed qualified because he did not personally participate in the prior proceeding and because Canon 3(C) requires disqualification only if a judge \u201ccannot impartially hear a case\u201d); Payne v. State, 48 Ala.App. 401, 265 So.2d 185 (1972), cert. denied, 288 Ala. 748, 265 So.2d 192, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1079, 93 S.Ct. 703, 34 L.Ed.2d 669 (holding a prosecutorial office, as distinguished from actually working on a \u201cconcrete piece of litigation,\u201d does not in and of itself disqualify an individual who subsequently becomes a judge); see also Zitter, Prior Representation or Activity as Prosecuting as Disqualifying Judge From Sitting or Acting in Criminal Case, 16 A.L.R. 4th 550, 554 (1982) (Some courts have concluded that a judge, who had been a district attorney or an attorney general in a mere supervisory or administrative capacity at the time that a defendant was prosecuted for an offense, should not be disqualified; these courts often rationalize that disqualification on mere technical grounds \u201cwould hamper the smooth operation of the judicial administration.\u201d); W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 361 (19_) (\u201c[T]he law will not suppose a possibility of bias or favour in a judge, who is already sworn to administer impartial justice, and whose authority greatly depends upon that presumption and idea.\u201d); Williams v. State, 383 So.2d 547 (1979) (\u201cIt is presumed that a judge is qualified and unbiased [and [t]he defendant alleging [otherwise] has a substantial burden to show the grounds therefor.\u201d), aff'd, 383 So.2d 564 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 995, 101 S.Ct. 534, 66 L.Ed.2d 293."},"case_id":7513372,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Thus, \"the standard for recusal followed by most Supreme Court justices who had previously served as United States Attorney General was whether their involvement in a case involved more than a mere pro forma relationship.\" This standard has also been followed by state judges sitting in other jurisdictions.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"It is presumed that a judge is qualified and unbiased [and [t]he defendant alleging [otherwise] has a substantial burden to show the grounds therefor.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., People v. Delongchamps, 103 Mich.App. 151, 302 N.W.2d 626 (1981) (a judge, formerly a prosecutor, was deemed qualified because he did not personally participate in the prior proceeding and because Canon 3(C) requires disqualification only if a judge \u201ccannot impartially hear a case\u201d); Payne v. State, 48 Ala.App. 401, 265 So.2d 185 (1972), cert. denied, 288 Ala. 748, 265 So.2d 192, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1079, 93 S.Ct. 703, 34 L.Ed.2d 669 (holding a prosecutorial office, as distinguished from actually working on a \u201cconcrete piece of litigation,\u201d does not in and of itself disqualify an individual who subsequently becomes a judge); see also Zitter, Prior Representation or Activity as Prosecuting as Disqualifying Judge From Sitting or Acting in Criminal Case, 16 A.L.R. 4th 550, 554 (1982) (Some courts have concluded that a judge, who had been a district attorney or an attorney general in a mere supervisory or administrative capacity at the time that a defendant was prosecuted for an offense, should not be disqualified; these courts often rationalize that disqualification on mere technical grounds \u201cwould hamper the smooth operation of the judicial administration.\u201d); W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 361 (19_) (\u201c[T]he law will not suppose a possibility of bias or favour in a judge, who is already sworn to administer impartial justice, and whose authority greatly depends upon that presumption and idea.\u201d); Williams v. State, 383 So.2d 547 (1979) (\u201cIt is presumed that a judge is qualified and unbiased [and [t]he defendant alleging [otherwise] has a substantial burden to show the grounds therefor.\u201d), aff'd, 383 So.2d 564 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 995, 101 S.Ct. 534, 66 L.Ed.2d 293."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding a prosecutorial office, as distinguished from actually working on a \"concrete piece of litigation,\" does not in and of itself disqualify an individual who subsequently becomes a judge","sentence":"See, e.g., People v. Delongchamps, 103 Mich.App. 151, 302 N.W.2d 626 (1981) (a judge, formerly a prosecutor, was deemed qualified because he did not personally participate in the prior proceeding and because Canon 3(C) requires disqualification only if a judge \u201ccannot impartially hear a case\u201d); Payne v. State, 48 Ala.App. 401, 265 So.2d 185 (1972), cert. denied, 288 Ala. 748, 265 So.2d 192, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1079, 93 S.Ct. 703, 34 L.Ed.2d 669 (holding a prosecutorial office, as distinguished from actually working on a \u201cconcrete piece of litigation,\u201d does not in and of itself disqualify an individual who subsequently becomes a judge); see also Zitter, Prior Representation or Activity as Prosecuting as Disqualifying Judge From Sitting or Acting in Criminal Case, 16 A.L.R. 4th 550, 554 (1982) (Some courts have concluded that a judge, who had been a district attorney or an attorney general in a mere supervisory or administrative capacity at the time that a defendant was prosecuted for an offense, should not be disqualified; these courts often rationalize that disqualification on mere technical grounds \u201cwould hamper the smooth operation of the judicial administration.\u201d); W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 361 (19_) (\u201c[T]he law will not suppose a possibility of bias or favour in a judge, who is already sworn to administer impartial justice, and whose authority greatly depends upon that presumption and idea.\u201d); Williams v. State, 383 So.2d 547 (1979) (\u201cIt is presumed that a judge is qualified and unbiased [and [t]he defendant alleging [otherwise] has a substantial burden to show the grounds therefor.\u201d), aff'd, 383 So.2d 564 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 995, 101 S.Ct. 534, 66 L.Ed.2d 293."},"case_id":7513372,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Thus, \"the standard for recusal followed by most Supreme Court justices who had previously served as United States Attorney General was whether their involvement in a case involved more than a mere pro forma relationship.\" This standard has also been followed by state judges sitting in other jurisdictions.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"It is presumed that a judge is qualified and unbiased [and [t]he defendant alleging [otherwise] has a substantial burden to show the grounds therefor.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., People v. Delongchamps, 103 Mich.App. 151, 302 N.W.2d 626 (1981) (a judge, formerly a prosecutor, was deemed qualified because he did not personally participate in the prior proceeding and because Canon 3(C) requires disqualification only if a judge \u201ccannot impartially hear a case\u201d); Payne v. State, 48 Ala.App. 401, 265 So.2d 185 (1972), cert. denied, 288 Ala. 748, 265 So.2d 192, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1079, 93 S.Ct. 703, 34 L.Ed.2d 669 (holding a prosecutorial office, as distinguished from actually working on a \u201cconcrete piece of litigation,\u201d does not in and of itself disqualify an individual who subsequently becomes a judge); see also Zitter, Prior Representation or Activity as Prosecuting as Disqualifying Judge From Sitting or Acting in Criminal Case, 16 A.L.R. 4th 550, 554 (1982) (Some courts have concluded that a judge, who had been a district attorney or an attorney general in a mere supervisory or administrative capacity at the time that a defendant was prosecuted for an offense, should not be disqualified; these courts often rationalize that disqualification on mere technical grounds \u201cwould hamper the smooth operation of the judicial administration.\u201d); W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 361 (19_) (\u201c[T]he law will not suppose a possibility of bias or favour in a judge, who is already sworn to administer impartial justice, and whose authority greatly depends upon that presumption and idea.\u201d); Williams v. State, 383 So.2d 547 (1979) (\u201cIt is presumed that a judge is qualified and unbiased [and [t]he defendant alleging [otherwise] has a substantial burden to show the grounds therefor.\u201d), aff'd, 383 So.2d 564 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 995, 101 S.Ct. 534, 66 L.Ed.2d 293."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding a prosecutorial office, as distinguished from actually working on a \"concrete piece of litigation,\" does not in and of itself disqualify an individual who subsequently becomes a judge","sentence":"See, e.g., People v. Delongchamps, 103 Mich.App. 151, 302 N.W.2d 626 (1981) (a judge, formerly a prosecutor, was deemed qualified because he did not personally participate in the prior proceeding and because Canon 3(C) requires disqualification only if a judge \u201ccannot impartially hear a case\u201d); Payne v. State, 48 Ala.App. 401, 265 So.2d 185 (1972), cert. denied, 288 Ala. 748, 265 So.2d 192, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1079, 93 S.Ct. 703, 34 L.Ed.2d 669 (holding a prosecutorial office, as distinguished from actually working on a \u201cconcrete piece of litigation,\u201d does not in and of itself disqualify an individual who subsequently becomes a judge); see also Zitter, Prior Representation or Activity as Prosecuting as Disqualifying Judge From Sitting or Acting in Criminal Case, 16 A.L.R. 4th 550, 554 (1982) (Some courts have concluded that a judge, who had been a district attorney or an attorney general in a mere supervisory or administrative capacity at the time that a defendant was prosecuted for an offense, should not be disqualified; these courts often rationalize that disqualification on mere technical grounds \u201cwould hamper the smooth operation of the judicial administration.\u201d); W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 361 (19_) (\u201c[T]he law will not suppose a possibility of bias or favour in a judge, who is already sworn to administer impartial justice, and whose authority greatly depends upon that presumption and idea.\u201d); Williams v. State, 383 So.2d 547 (1979) (\u201cIt is presumed that a judge is qualified and unbiased [and [t]he defendant alleging [otherwise] has a substantial burden to show the grounds therefor.\u201d), aff'd, 383 So.2d 564 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 995, 101 S.Ct. 534, 66 L.Ed.2d 293."},"case_id":7513372,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Thus, \"the standard for recusal followed by most Supreme Court justices who had previously served as United States Attorney General was whether their involvement in a case involved more than a mere pro forma relationship.\" This standard has also been followed by state judges sitting in other jurisdictions.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"It is presumed that a judge is qualified and unbiased [and [t]he defendant alleging [otherwise] has a substantial burden to show the grounds therefor.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., People v. Delongchamps, 103 Mich.App. 151, 302 N.W.2d 626 (1981) (a judge, formerly a prosecutor, was deemed qualified because he did not personally participate in the prior proceeding and because Canon 3(C) requires disqualification only if a judge \u201ccannot impartially hear a case\u201d); Payne v. State, 48 Ala.App. 401, 265 So.2d 185 (1972), cert. denied, 288 Ala. 748, 265 So.2d 192, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1079, 93 S.Ct. 703, 34 L.Ed.2d 669 (holding a prosecutorial office, as distinguished from actually working on a \u201cconcrete piece of litigation,\u201d does not in and of itself disqualify an individual who subsequently becomes a judge); see also Zitter, Prior Representation or Activity as Prosecuting as Disqualifying Judge From Sitting or Acting in Criminal Case, 16 A.L.R. 4th 550, 554 (1982) (Some courts have concluded that a judge, who had been a district attorney or an attorney general in a mere supervisory or administrative capacity at the time that a defendant was prosecuted for an offense, should not be disqualified; these courts often rationalize that disqualification on mere technical grounds \u201cwould hamper the smooth operation of the judicial administration.\u201d); W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 361 (19_) (\u201c[T]he law will not suppose a possibility of bias or favour in a judge, who is already sworn to administer impartial justice, and whose authority greatly depends upon that presumption and idea.\u201d); Williams v. State, 383 So.2d 547 (1979) (\u201cIt is presumed that a judge is qualified and unbiased [and [t]he defendant alleging [otherwise] has a substantial burden to show the grounds therefor.\u201d), aff'd, 383 So.2d 564 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 995, 101 S.Ct. 534, 66 L.Ed.2d 293."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding a prosecutorial office, as distinguished from actually working on a \"concrete piece of litigation,\" does not in and of itself disqualify an individual who subsequently becomes a judge","sentence":"See, e.g., People v. Delongchamps, 103 Mich.App. 151, 302 N.W.2d 626 (1981) (a judge, formerly a prosecutor, was deemed qualified because he did not personally participate in the prior proceeding and because Canon 3(C) requires disqualification only if a judge \u201ccannot impartially hear a case\u201d); Payne v. State, 48 Ala.App. 401, 265 So.2d 185 (1972), cert. denied, 288 Ala. 748, 265 So.2d 192, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1079, 93 S.Ct. 703, 34 L.Ed.2d 669 (holding a prosecutorial office, as distinguished from actually working on a \u201cconcrete piece of litigation,\u201d does not in and of itself disqualify an individual who subsequently becomes a judge); see also Zitter, Prior Representation or Activity as Prosecuting as Disqualifying Judge From Sitting or Acting in Criminal Case, 16 A.L.R. 4th 550, 554 (1982) (Some courts have concluded that a judge, who had been a district attorney or an attorney general in a mere supervisory or administrative capacity at the time that a defendant was prosecuted for an offense, should not be disqualified; these courts often rationalize that disqualification on mere technical grounds \u201cwould hamper the smooth operation of the judicial administration.\u201d); W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 361 (19_) (\u201c[T]he law will not suppose a possibility of bias or favour in a judge, who is already sworn to administer impartial justice, and whose authority greatly depends upon that presumption and idea.\u201d); Williams v. State, 383 So.2d 547 (1979) (\u201cIt is presumed that a judge is qualified and unbiased [and [t]he defendant alleging [otherwise] has a substantial burden to show the grounds therefor.\u201d), aff'd, 383 So.2d 564 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 995, 101 S.Ct. 534, 66 L.Ed.2d 293."},"case_id":7513372,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Thus, \"the standard for recusal followed by most Supreme Court justices who had previously served as United States Attorney General was whether their involvement in a case involved more than a mere pro forma relationship.\" This standard has also been followed by state judges sitting in other jurisdictions.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"It is presumed that a judge is qualified and unbiased [and [t]he defendant alleging [otherwise] has a substantial burden to show the grounds therefor.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., People v. Delongchamps, 103 Mich.App. 151, 302 N.W.2d 626 (1981) (a judge, formerly a prosecutor, was deemed qualified because he did not personally participate in the prior proceeding and because Canon 3(C) requires disqualification only if a judge \u201ccannot impartially hear a case\u201d); Payne v. State, 48 Ala.App. 401, 265 So.2d 185 (1972), cert. denied, 288 Ala. 748, 265 So.2d 192, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1079, 93 S.Ct. 703, 34 L.Ed.2d 669 (holding a prosecutorial office, as distinguished from actually working on a \u201cconcrete piece of litigation,\u201d does not in and of itself disqualify an individual who subsequently becomes a judge); see also Zitter, Prior Representation or Activity as Prosecuting as Disqualifying Judge From Sitting or Acting in Criminal Case, 16 A.L.R. 4th 550, 554 (1982) (Some courts have concluded that a judge, who had been a district attorney or an attorney general in a mere supervisory or administrative capacity at the time that a defendant was prosecuted for an offense, should not be disqualified; these courts often rationalize that disqualification on mere technical grounds \u201cwould hamper the smooth operation of the judicial administration.\u201d); W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 361 (19_) (\u201c[T]he law will not suppose a possibility of bias or favour in a judge, who is already sworn to administer impartial justice, and whose authority greatly depends upon that presumption and idea.\u201d); Williams v. State, 383 So.2d 547 (1979) (\u201cIt is presumed that a judge is qualified and unbiased [and [t]he defendant alleging [otherwise] has a substantial burden to show the grounds therefor.\u201d), aff'd, 383 So.2d 564 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 995, 101 S.Ct. 534, 66 L.Ed.2d 293."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding a prosecutorial office, as distinguished from actually working on a \"concrete piece of litigation,\" does not in and of itself disqualify an individual who subsequently becomes a judge","sentence":"See, e.g., People v. Delongchamps, 103 Mich.App. 151, 302 N.W.2d 626 (1981) (a judge, formerly a prosecutor, was deemed qualified because he did not personally participate in the prior proceeding and because Canon 3(C) requires disqualification only if a judge \u201ccannot impartially hear a case\u201d); Payne v. State, 48 Ala.App. 401, 265 So.2d 185 (1972), cert. denied, 288 Ala. 748, 265 So.2d 192, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1079, 93 S.Ct. 703, 34 L.Ed.2d 669 (holding a prosecutorial office, as distinguished from actually working on a \u201cconcrete piece of litigation,\u201d does not in and of itself disqualify an individual who subsequently becomes a judge); see also Zitter, Prior Representation or Activity as Prosecuting as Disqualifying Judge From Sitting or Acting in Criminal Case, 16 A.L.R. 4th 550, 554 (1982) (Some courts have concluded that a judge, who had been a district attorney or an attorney general in a mere supervisory or administrative capacity at the time that a defendant was prosecuted for an offense, should not be disqualified; these courts often rationalize that disqualification on mere technical grounds \u201cwould hamper the smooth operation of the judicial administration.\u201d); W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 361 (19_) (\u201c[T]he law will not suppose a possibility of bias or favour in a judge, who is already sworn to administer impartial justice, and whose authority greatly depends upon that presumption and idea.\u201d); Williams v. State, 383 So.2d 547 (1979) (\u201cIt is presumed that a judge is qualified and unbiased [and [t]he defendant alleging [otherwise] has a substantial burden to show the grounds therefor.\u201d), aff'd, 383 So.2d 564 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 995, 101 S.Ct. 534, 66 L.Ed.2d 293."},"case_id":7513372,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Thus, \"the standard for recusal followed by most Supreme Court justices who had previously served as United States Attorney General was whether their involvement in a case involved more than a mere pro forma relationship.\" This standard has also been followed by state judges sitting in other jurisdictions.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding a prosecutorial office, as distinguished from actually working on a \"concrete piece of litigation,\" does not in and of itself disqualify an individual who subsequently becomes a judge","sentence":"See, e.g., People v. Delongchamps, 103 Mich.App. 151, 302 N.W.2d 626 (1981) (a judge, formerly a prosecutor, was deemed qualified because he did not personally participate in the prior proceeding and because Canon 3(C) requires disqualification only if a judge \u201ccannot impartially hear a case\u201d); Payne v. State, 48 Ala.App. 401, 265 So.2d 185 (1972), cert. denied, 288 Ala. 748, 265 So.2d 192, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1079, 93 S.Ct. 703, 34 L.Ed.2d 669 (holding a prosecutorial office, as distinguished from actually working on a \u201cconcrete piece of litigation,\u201d does not in and of itself disqualify an individual who subsequently becomes a judge); see also Zitter, Prior Representation or Activity as Prosecuting as Disqualifying Judge From Sitting or Acting in Criminal Case, 16 A.L.R. 4th 550, 554 (1982) (Some courts have concluded that a judge, who had been a district attorney or an attorney general in a mere supervisory or administrative capacity at the time that a defendant was prosecuted for an offense, should not be disqualified; these courts often rationalize that disqualification on mere technical grounds \u201cwould hamper the smooth operation of the judicial administration.\u201d); W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 361 (19_) (\u201c[T]he law will not suppose a possibility of bias or favour in a judge, who is already sworn to administer impartial justice, and whose authority greatly depends upon that presumption and idea.\u201d); Williams v. State, 383 So.2d 547 (1979) (\u201cIt is presumed that a judge is qualified and unbiased [and [t]he defendant alleging [otherwise] has a substantial burden to show the grounds therefor.\u201d), aff'd, 383 So.2d 564 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 995, 101 S.Ct. 534, 66 L.Ed.2d 293."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"It is presumed that a judge is qualified and unbiased [and [t]he defendant alleging [otherwise] has a substantial burden to show the grounds therefor.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., People v. Delongchamps, 103 Mich.App. 151, 302 N.W.2d 626 (1981) (a judge, formerly a prosecutor, was deemed qualified because he did not personally participate in the prior proceeding and because Canon 3(C) requires disqualification only if a judge \u201ccannot impartially hear a case\u201d); Payne v. State, 48 Ala.App. 401, 265 So.2d 185 (1972), cert. denied, 288 Ala. 748, 265 So.2d 192, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1079, 93 S.Ct. 703, 34 L.Ed.2d 669 (holding a prosecutorial office, as distinguished from actually working on a \u201cconcrete piece of litigation,\u201d does not in and of itself disqualify an individual who subsequently becomes a judge); see also Zitter, Prior Representation or Activity as Prosecuting as Disqualifying Judge From Sitting or Acting in Criminal Case, 16 A.L.R. 4th 550, 554 (1982) (Some courts have concluded that a judge, who had been a district attorney or an attorney general in a mere supervisory or administrative capacity at the time that a defendant was prosecuted for an offense, should not be disqualified; these courts often rationalize that disqualification on mere technical grounds \u201cwould hamper the smooth operation of the judicial administration.\u201d); W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 361 (19_) (\u201c[T]he law will not suppose a possibility of bias or favour in a judge, who is already sworn to administer impartial justice, and whose authority greatly depends upon that presumption and idea.\u201d); Williams v. State, 383 So.2d 547 (1979) (\u201cIt is presumed that a judge is qualified and unbiased [and [t]he defendant alleging [otherwise] has a substantial burden to show the grounds therefor.\u201d), aff'd, 383 So.2d 564 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 995, 101 S.Ct. 534, 66 L.Ed.2d 293."},"case_id":7513372,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Thus, \"the standard for recusal followed by most Supreme Court justices who had previously served as United States Attorney General was whether their involvement in a case involved more than a mere pro forma relationship.\" This standard has also been followed by state judges sitting in other jurisdictions.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"It is presumed that a judge is qualified and unbiased [and [t]he defendant alleging [otherwise] has a substantial burden to show the grounds therefor.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., People v. Delongchamps, 103 Mich.App. 151, 302 N.W.2d 626 (1981) (a judge, formerly a prosecutor, was deemed qualified because he did not personally participate in the prior proceeding and because Canon 3(C) requires disqualification only if a judge \u201ccannot impartially hear a case\u201d); Payne v. State, 48 Ala.App. 401, 265 So.2d 185 (1972), cert. denied, 288 Ala. 748, 265 So.2d 192, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1079, 93 S.Ct. 703, 34 L.Ed.2d 669 (holding a prosecutorial office, as distinguished from actually working on a \u201cconcrete piece of litigation,\u201d does not in and of itself disqualify an individual who subsequently becomes a judge); see also Zitter, Prior Representation or Activity as Prosecuting as Disqualifying Judge From Sitting or Acting in Criminal Case, 16 A.L.R. 4th 550, 554 (1982) (Some courts have concluded that a judge, who had been a district attorney or an attorney general in a mere supervisory or administrative capacity at the time that a defendant was prosecuted for an offense, should not be disqualified; these courts often rationalize that disqualification on mere technical grounds \u201cwould hamper the smooth operation of the judicial administration.\u201d); W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 361 (19_) (\u201c[T]he law will not suppose a possibility of bias or favour in a judge, who is already sworn to administer impartial justice, and whose authority greatly depends upon that presumption and idea.\u201d); Williams v. State, 383 So.2d 547 (1979) (\u201cIt is presumed that a judge is qualified and unbiased [and [t]he defendant alleging [otherwise] has a substantial burden to show the grounds therefor.\u201d), aff'd, 383 So.2d 564 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 995, 101 S.Ct. 534, 66 L.Ed.2d 293."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding a prosecutorial office, as distinguished from actually working on a \"concrete piece of litigation,\" does not in and of itself disqualify an individual who subsequently becomes a judge","sentence":"See, e.g., People v. Delongchamps, 103 Mich.App. 151, 302 N.W.2d 626 (1981) (a judge, formerly a prosecutor, was deemed qualified because he did not personally participate in the prior proceeding and because Canon 3(C) requires disqualification only if a judge \u201ccannot impartially hear a case\u201d); Payne v. State, 48 Ala.App. 401, 265 So.2d 185 (1972), cert. denied, 288 Ala. 748, 265 So.2d 192, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1079, 93 S.Ct. 703, 34 L.Ed.2d 669 (holding a prosecutorial office, as distinguished from actually working on a \u201cconcrete piece of litigation,\u201d does not in and of itself disqualify an individual who subsequently becomes a judge); see also Zitter, Prior Representation or Activity as Prosecuting as Disqualifying Judge From Sitting or Acting in Criminal Case, 16 A.L.R. 4th 550, 554 (1982) (Some courts have concluded that a judge, who had been a district attorney or an attorney general in a mere supervisory or administrative capacity at the time that a defendant was prosecuted for an offense, should not be disqualified; these courts often rationalize that disqualification on mere technical grounds \u201cwould hamper the smooth operation of the judicial administration.\u201d); W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 361 (19_) (\u201c[T]he law will not suppose a possibility of bias or favour in a judge, who is already sworn to administer impartial justice, and whose authority greatly depends upon that presumption and idea.\u201d); Williams v. State, 383 So.2d 547 (1979) (\u201cIt is presumed that a judge is qualified and unbiased [and [t]he defendant alleging [otherwise] has a substantial burden to show the grounds therefor.\u201d), aff'd, 383 So.2d 564 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 995, 101 S.Ct. 534, 66 L.Ed.2d 293."},"case_id":7513372,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Thus, \"the standard for recusal followed by most Supreme Court justices who had previously served as United States Attorney General was whether their involvement in a case involved more than a mere pro forma relationship.\" This standard has also been followed by state judges sitting in other jurisdictions.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding a prosecutorial office, as distinguished from actually working on a \"concrete piece of litigation,\" does not in and of itself disqualify an individual who subsequently becomes a judge","sentence":"See, e.g., People v. Delongchamps, 103 Mich.App. 151, 302 N.W.2d 626 (1981) (a judge, formerly a prosecutor, was deemed qualified because he did not personally participate in the prior proceeding and because Canon 3(C) requires disqualification only if a judge \u201ccannot impartially hear a case\u201d); Payne v. State, 48 Ala.App. 401, 265 So.2d 185 (1972), cert. denied, 288 Ala. 748, 265 So.2d 192, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1079, 93 S.Ct. 703, 34 L.Ed.2d 669 (holding a prosecutorial office, as distinguished from actually working on a \u201cconcrete piece of litigation,\u201d does not in and of itself disqualify an individual who subsequently becomes a judge); see also Zitter, Prior Representation or Activity as Prosecuting as Disqualifying Judge From Sitting or Acting in Criminal Case, 16 A.L.R. 4th 550, 554 (1982) (Some courts have concluded that a judge, who had been a district attorney or an attorney general in a mere supervisory or administrative capacity at the time that a defendant was prosecuted for an offense, should not be disqualified; these courts often rationalize that disqualification on mere technical grounds \u201cwould hamper the smooth operation of the judicial administration.\u201d); W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 361 (19_) (\u201c[T]he law will not suppose a possibility of bias or favour in a judge, who is already sworn to administer impartial justice, and whose authority greatly depends upon that presumption and idea.\u201d); Williams v. State, 383 So.2d 547 (1979) (\u201cIt is presumed that a judge is qualified and unbiased [and [t]he defendant alleging [otherwise] has a substantial burden to show the grounds therefor.\u201d), aff'd, 383 So.2d 564 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 995, 101 S.Ct. 534, 66 L.Ed.2d 293."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"It is presumed that a judge is qualified and unbiased [and [t]he defendant alleging [otherwise] has a substantial burden to show the grounds therefor.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., People v. Delongchamps, 103 Mich.App. 151, 302 N.W.2d 626 (1981) (a judge, formerly a prosecutor, was deemed qualified because he did not personally participate in the prior proceeding and because Canon 3(C) requires disqualification only if a judge \u201ccannot impartially hear a case\u201d); Payne v. State, 48 Ala.App. 401, 265 So.2d 185 (1972), cert. denied, 288 Ala. 748, 265 So.2d 192, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1079, 93 S.Ct. 703, 34 L.Ed.2d 669 (holding a prosecutorial office, as distinguished from actually working on a \u201cconcrete piece of litigation,\u201d does not in and of itself disqualify an individual who subsequently becomes a judge); see also Zitter, Prior Representation or Activity as Prosecuting as Disqualifying Judge From Sitting or Acting in Criminal Case, 16 A.L.R. 4th 550, 554 (1982) (Some courts have concluded that a judge, who had been a district attorney or an attorney general in a mere supervisory or administrative capacity at the time that a defendant was prosecuted for an offense, should not be disqualified; these courts often rationalize that disqualification on mere technical grounds \u201cwould hamper the smooth operation of the judicial administration.\u201d); W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 361 (19_) (\u201c[T]he law will not suppose a possibility of bias or favour in a judge, who is already sworn to administer impartial justice, and whose authority greatly depends upon that presumption and idea.\u201d); Williams v. State, 383 So.2d 547 (1979) (\u201cIt is presumed that a judge is qualified and unbiased [and [t]he defendant alleging [otherwise] has a substantial burden to show the grounds therefor.\u201d), aff'd, 383 So.2d 564 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 995, 101 S.Ct. 534, 66 L.Ed.2d 293."},"case_id":7513372,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Thus, \"the standard for recusal followed by most Supreme Court justices who had previously served as United States Attorney General was whether their involvement in a case involved more than a mere pro forma relationship.\" This standard has also been followed by state judges sitting in other jurisdictions.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding a prosecutorial office, as distinguished from actually working on a \"concrete piece of litigation,\" does not in and of itself disqualify an individual who subsequently becomes a judge","sentence":"See, e.g., People v. Delongchamps, 103 Mich.App. 151, 302 N.W.2d 626 (1981) (a judge, formerly a prosecutor, was deemed qualified because he did not personally participate in the prior proceeding and because Canon 3(C) requires disqualification only if a judge \u201ccannot impartially hear a case\u201d); Payne v. State, 48 Ala.App. 401, 265 So.2d 185 (1972), cert. denied, 288 Ala. 748, 265 So.2d 192, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1079, 93 S.Ct. 703, 34 L.Ed.2d 669 (holding a prosecutorial office, as distinguished from actually working on a \u201cconcrete piece of litigation,\u201d does not in and of itself disqualify an individual who subsequently becomes a judge); see also Zitter, Prior Representation or Activity as Prosecuting as Disqualifying Judge From Sitting or Acting in Criminal Case, 16 A.L.R. 4th 550, 554 (1982) (Some courts have concluded that a judge, who had been a district attorney or an attorney general in a mere supervisory or administrative capacity at the time that a defendant was prosecuted for an offense, should not be disqualified; these courts often rationalize that disqualification on mere technical grounds \u201cwould hamper the smooth operation of the judicial administration.\u201d); W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 361 (19_) (\u201c[T]he law will not suppose a possibility of bias or favour in a judge, who is already sworn to administer impartial justice, and whose authority greatly depends upon that presumption and idea.\u201d); Williams v. State, 383 So.2d 547 (1979) (\u201cIt is presumed that a judge is qualified and unbiased [and [t]he defendant alleging [otherwise] has a substantial burden to show the grounds therefor.\u201d), aff'd, 383 So.2d 564 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 995, 101 S.Ct. 534, 66 L.Ed.2d 293."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"It is presumed that a judge is qualified and unbiased [and [t]he defendant alleging [otherwise] has a substantial burden to show the grounds therefor.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., People v. Delongchamps, 103 Mich.App. 151, 302 N.W.2d 626 (1981) (a judge, formerly a prosecutor, was deemed qualified because he did not personally participate in the prior proceeding and because Canon 3(C) requires disqualification only if a judge \u201ccannot impartially hear a case\u201d); Payne v. State, 48 Ala.App. 401, 265 So.2d 185 (1972), cert. denied, 288 Ala. 748, 265 So.2d 192, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1079, 93 S.Ct. 703, 34 L.Ed.2d 669 (holding a prosecutorial office, as distinguished from actually working on a \u201cconcrete piece of litigation,\u201d does not in and of itself disqualify an individual who subsequently becomes a judge); see also Zitter, Prior Representation or Activity as Prosecuting as Disqualifying Judge From Sitting or Acting in Criminal Case, 16 A.L.R. 4th 550, 554 (1982) (Some courts have concluded that a judge, who had been a district attorney or an attorney general in a mere supervisory or administrative capacity at the time that a defendant was prosecuted for an offense, should not be disqualified; these courts often rationalize that disqualification on mere technical grounds \u201cwould hamper the smooth operation of the judicial administration.\u201d); W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 361 (19_) (\u201c[T]he law will not suppose a possibility of bias or favour in a judge, who is already sworn to administer impartial justice, and whose authority greatly depends upon that presumption and idea.\u201d); Williams v. State, 383 So.2d 547 (1979) (\u201cIt is presumed that a judge is qualified and unbiased [and [t]he defendant alleging [otherwise] has a substantial burden to show the grounds therefor.\u201d), aff'd, 383 So.2d 564 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 995, 101 S.Ct. 534, 66 L.Ed.2d 293."},"case_id":7513372,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Thus, \"the standard for recusal followed by most Supreme Court justices who had previously served as United States Attorney General was whether their involvement in a case involved more than a mere pro forma relationship.\" This standard has also been followed by state judges sitting in other jurisdictions.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"It is presumed that a judge is qualified and unbiased [and [t]he defendant alleging [otherwise] has a substantial burden to show the grounds therefor.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., People v. Delongchamps, 103 Mich.App. 151, 302 N.W.2d 626 (1981) (a judge, formerly a prosecutor, was deemed qualified because he did not personally participate in the prior proceeding and because Canon 3(C) requires disqualification only if a judge \u201ccannot impartially hear a case\u201d); Payne v. State, 48 Ala.App. 401, 265 So.2d 185 (1972), cert. denied, 288 Ala. 748, 265 So.2d 192, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1079, 93 S.Ct. 703, 34 L.Ed.2d 669 (holding a prosecutorial office, as distinguished from actually working on a \u201cconcrete piece of litigation,\u201d does not in and of itself disqualify an individual who subsequently becomes a judge); see also Zitter, Prior Representation or Activity as Prosecuting as Disqualifying Judge From Sitting or Acting in Criminal Case, 16 A.L.R. 4th 550, 554 (1982) (Some courts have concluded that a judge, who had been a district attorney or an attorney general in a mere supervisory or administrative capacity at the time that a defendant was prosecuted for an offense, should not be disqualified; these courts often rationalize that disqualification on mere technical grounds \u201cwould hamper the smooth operation of the judicial administration.\u201d); W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 361 (19_) (\u201c[T]he law will not suppose a possibility of bias or favour in a judge, who is already sworn to administer impartial justice, and whose authority greatly depends upon that presumption and idea.\u201d); Williams v. State, 383 So.2d 547 (1979) (\u201cIt is presumed that a judge is qualified and unbiased [and [t]he defendant alleging [otherwise] has a substantial burden to show the grounds therefor.\u201d), aff'd, 383 So.2d 564 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 995, 101 S.Ct. 534, 66 L.Ed.2d 293."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding a prosecutorial office, as distinguished from actually working on a \"concrete piece of litigation,\" does not in and of itself disqualify an individual who subsequently becomes a judge","sentence":"See, e.g., People v. Delongchamps, 103 Mich.App. 151, 302 N.W.2d 626 (1981) (a judge, formerly a prosecutor, was deemed qualified because he did not personally participate in the prior proceeding and because Canon 3(C) requires disqualification only if a judge \u201ccannot impartially hear a case\u201d); Payne v. State, 48 Ala.App. 401, 265 So.2d 185 (1972), cert. denied, 288 Ala. 748, 265 So.2d 192, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1079, 93 S.Ct. 703, 34 L.Ed.2d 669 (holding a prosecutorial office, as distinguished from actually working on a \u201cconcrete piece of litigation,\u201d does not in and of itself disqualify an individual who subsequently becomes a judge); see also Zitter, Prior Representation or Activity as Prosecuting as Disqualifying Judge From Sitting or Acting in Criminal Case, 16 A.L.R. 4th 550, 554 (1982) (Some courts have concluded that a judge, who had been a district attorney or an attorney general in a mere supervisory or administrative capacity at the time that a defendant was prosecuted for an offense, should not be disqualified; these courts often rationalize that disqualification on mere technical grounds \u201cwould hamper the smooth operation of the judicial administration.\u201d); W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 361 (19_) (\u201c[T]he law will not suppose a possibility of bias or favour in a judge, who is already sworn to administer impartial justice, and whose authority greatly depends upon that presumption and idea.\u201d); Williams v. State, 383 So.2d 547 (1979) (\u201cIt is presumed that a judge is qualified and unbiased [and [t]he defendant alleging [otherwise] has a substantial burden to show the grounds therefor.\u201d), aff'd, 383 So.2d 564 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 995, 101 S.Ct. 534, 66 L.Ed.2d 293."},"case_id":7513372,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Thus, \"the standard for recusal followed by most Supreme Court justices who had previously served as United States Attorney General was whether their involvement in a case involved more than a mere pro forma relationship.\" This standard has also been followed by state judges sitting in other jurisdictions.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding a prosecutorial office, as distinguished from actually working on a \"concrete piece of litigation,\" does not in and of itself disqualify an individual who subsequently becomes a judge","sentence":"See, e.g., People v. Delongchamps, 103 Mich.App. 151, 302 N.W.2d 626 (1981) (a judge, formerly a prosecutor, was deemed qualified because he did not personally participate in the prior proceeding and because Canon 3(C) requires disqualification only if a judge \u201ccannot impartially hear a case\u201d); Payne v. State, 48 Ala.App. 401, 265 So.2d 185 (1972), cert. denied, 288 Ala. 748, 265 So.2d 192, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1079, 93 S.Ct. 703, 34 L.Ed.2d 669 (holding a prosecutorial office, as distinguished from actually working on a \u201cconcrete piece of litigation,\u201d does not in and of itself disqualify an individual who subsequently becomes a judge); see also Zitter, Prior Representation or Activity as Prosecuting as Disqualifying Judge From Sitting or Acting in Criminal Case, 16 A.L.R. 4th 550, 554 (1982) (Some courts have concluded that a judge, who had been a district attorney or an attorney general in a mere supervisory or administrative capacity at the time that a defendant was prosecuted for an offense, should not be disqualified; these courts often rationalize that disqualification on mere technical grounds \u201cwould hamper the smooth operation of the judicial administration.\u201d); W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 361 (19_) (\u201c[T]he law will not suppose a possibility of bias or favour in a judge, who is already sworn to administer impartial justice, and whose authority greatly depends upon that presumption and idea.\u201d); Williams v. State, 383 So.2d 547 (1979) (\u201cIt is presumed that a judge is qualified and unbiased [and [t]he defendant alleging [otherwise] has a substantial burden to show the grounds therefor.\u201d), aff'd, 383 So.2d 564 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 995, 101 S.Ct. 534, 66 L.Ed.2d 293."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"It is presumed that a judge is qualified and unbiased [and [t]he defendant alleging [otherwise] has a substantial burden to show the grounds therefor.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., People v. Delongchamps, 103 Mich.App. 151, 302 N.W.2d 626 (1981) (a judge, formerly a prosecutor, was deemed qualified because he did not personally participate in the prior proceeding and because Canon 3(C) requires disqualification only if a judge \u201ccannot impartially hear a case\u201d); Payne v. State, 48 Ala.App. 401, 265 So.2d 185 (1972), cert. denied, 288 Ala. 748, 265 So.2d 192, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1079, 93 S.Ct. 703, 34 L.Ed.2d 669 (holding a prosecutorial office, as distinguished from actually working on a \u201cconcrete piece of litigation,\u201d does not in and of itself disqualify an individual who subsequently becomes a judge); see also Zitter, Prior Representation or Activity as Prosecuting as Disqualifying Judge From Sitting or Acting in Criminal Case, 16 A.L.R. 4th 550, 554 (1982) (Some courts have concluded that a judge, who had been a district attorney or an attorney general in a mere supervisory or administrative capacity at the time that a defendant was prosecuted for an offense, should not be disqualified; these courts often rationalize that disqualification on mere technical grounds \u201cwould hamper the smooth operation of the judicial administration.\u201d); W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 361 (19_) (\u201c[T]he law will not suppose a possibility of bias or favour in a judge, who is already sworn to administer impartial justice, and whose authority greatly depends upon that presumption and idea.\u201d); Williams v. State, 383 So.2d 547 (1979) (\u201cIt is presumed that a judge is qualified and unbiased [and [t]he defendant alleging [otherwise] has a substantial burden to show the grounds therefor.\u201d), aff'd, 383 So.2d 564 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 995, 101 S.Ct. 534, 66 L.Ed.2d 293."},"case_id":7513372,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The agents' decision to stop Snowden was therefore largely due to the coincidence of what turned out to be Snowden's exceptionally poor.timing. Regardless of how the facts unfolded, they are still sufficient to have given rise to a reasonable suspicion.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"403 F.3d 496, 499","parenthetical":"holding that reasonable suspicion existed where suspect described location of his vehicle over phone to undercover officer","sentence":"See United States v. Askew, 403 F.3d 496, 499 (7th Cir.2005) (holding that reasonable suspicion existed where suspect described location of his vehicle over phone to undercover officer); but see Johnson, 383 F.3d at 543-44 (holding that arresting officer lacked reasonable suspicion for Terry stop given lack of connection between only vehicle on road at 4:30 a.m. in a known drug area and information about illegal activity in same area)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"383 F.3d 543, 543-44","parenthetical":"holding that arresting officer lacked reasonable suspicion for Terry stop given lack of connection between only vehicle on road at 4:30 a.m. in a known drug area and information about illegal activity in same area","sentence":"See United States v. Askew, 403 F.3d 496, 499 (7th Cir.2005) (holding that reasonable suspicion existed where suspect described location of his vehicle over phone to undercover officer); but see Johnson, 383 F.3d at 543-44 (holding that arresting officer lacked reasonable suspicion for Terry stop given lack of connection between only vehicle on road at 4:30 a.m. in a known drug area and information about illegal activity in same area)."},"case_id":4046928,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Further, the rule that a claim must be fairly presented in state court is applied particularly rigorously to claims involving procedural due process violations.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"146 F.3d 435, 443","parenthetical":"indicating that leeway afforded habeas petitioners in reformulating due process arguments on collateral review is more limited than in other constitutional contexts","sentence":"Kurzawa v. Jordan, 146 F.3d 435, 443 (7th Cir.1998) (indicating that leeway afforded habeas petitioners in reformulating due process arguments on collateral review is more limited than in other constitutional contexts); see also Riggins, 50 F.3d at 493 (stating that habeas petitioner claiming state trial court denied him due process must say so not only in federal court but in state court)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"50 F.3d 493, 493","parenthetical":"stating that habeas petitioner claiming state trial court denied him due process must say so not only in federal court but in state court","sentence":"Kurzawa v. Jordan, 146 F.3d 435, 443 (7th Cir.1998) (indicating that leeway afforded habeas petitioners in reformulating due process arguments on collateral review is more limited than in other constitutional contexts); see also Riggins, 50 F.3d at 493 (stating that habeas petitioner claiming state trial court denied him due process must say so not only in federal court but in state court)."},"case_id":11171903,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Although Defendants STASCO and Shell Oil cannot interpose the Statute of Frauds as a defense to Plaintiffs tor-tious interference with contract claim, the fact that the contract in question is unenforceable -- and thus voidable -- against Mo-tiva nonetheless changes the analysis of Plaintiffs claim against STASCO and Shell Oil. As noted by the New York Court of Appeals in Guard-Life, a claim of tortious interference with a voidable contract -- as opposed to an enforceable contract -- # should be treated the same as a tortious interference with business relations claim.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"952 F.Supp. 181, 190","parenthetical":"noting that because the agreement at issue was voidable, \"there is no liability for interference with such an agreement absent employment of wrongful means, unlawful restraint of trade, or lack of competitive motive\" (citing Guard-Life","sentence":"See 428 N.Y.S.2d 628, 406 N.E.2d at 449 (\u201c[W]e are persuaded that interference with performance of voidable contracts should be treated the same as interference with contracts terminable at will for purposes of imposing liability in tort, and that both fall in the same category with interference with prospective contractual relations.\u201d); see also Cent. Sports Army Club v. Arena Assocs., Inc., 952 F.Supp. 181, 190 (S.D.N.Y.1997) (noting that because the agreement at issue was voidable, \u201cthere is no liability for interference with such an agreement absent employment of wrongful means, unlawful restraint of trade, or lack of competitive motive\u201d (citing Guard-Life)); Taub v. Amana Imports, Inc., 140 A.D.2d 687, 528 N.Y.S.2d 884, 885 (1988) (\u201c[T]he existence of a valid, enforceable contract is a necessary predicate for a cause of action sounding in intentional interference with performance of a contract. However, recovery may nonetheless be had where, although the contract on which the plaintiff relies is voidable, the defendant has induced a party not to abide by its terms by means of fraud or other misconduct\u201d (citing Guard-Life ) (internal citations omitted)); see also John Danforth, Note, Tortious Interference with Contract: A Reassertion of Society\u2019s Interest in Commercial Stability and Contractual Integrity, 81 Colum. L.Rev. 1491, 1504 (1981) (\u201cSimilarly, the Guard-Life majority reasoned, unenforceable contracts contain no legal guarantee of future performance, and so should only be allowed limited tort protection."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[W]e are persuaded that interference with performance of voidable contracts should be treated the same as interference with contracts terminable at will for purposes of imposing liability in tort, and that both fall in the same category with interference with prospective contractual relations.\"","sentence":"See 428 N.Y.S.2d 628, 406 N.E.2d at 449 (\u201c[W]e are persuaded that interference with performance of voidable contracts should be treated the same as interference with contracts terminable at will for purposes of imposing liability in tort, and that both fall in the same category with interference with prospective contractual relations.\u201d); see also Cent. Sports Army Club v. Arena Assocs., Inc., 952 F.Supp. 181, 190 (S.D.N.Y.1997) (noting that because the agreement at issue was voidable, \u201cthere is no liability for interference with such an agreement absent employment of wrongful means, unlawful restraint of trade, or lack of competitive motive\u201d (citing Guard-Life)); Taub v. Amana Imports, Inc., 140 A.D.2d 687, 528 N.Y.S.2d 884, 885 (1988) (\u201c[T]he existence of a valid, enforceable contract is a necessary predicate for a cause of action sounding in intentional interference with performance of a contract. However, recovery may nonetheless be had where, although the contract on which the plaintiff relies is voidable, the defendant has induced a party not to abide by its terms by means of fraud or other misconduct\u201d (citing Guard-Life ) (internal citations omitted)); see also John Danforth, Note, Tortious Interference with Contract: A Reassertion of Society\u2019s Interest in Commercial Stability and Contractual Integrity, 81 Colum. L.Rev. 1491, 1504 (1981) (\u201cSimilarly, the Guard-Life majority reasoned, unenforceable contracts contain no legal guarantee of future performance, and so should only be allowed limited tort protection."},"case_id":3109349,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Although Defendants STASCO and Shell Oil cannot interpose the Statute of Frauds as a defense to Plaintiffs tor-tious interference with contract claim, the fact that the contract in question is unenforceable -- and thus voidable -- against Mo-tiva nonetheless changes the analysis of Plaintiffs claim against STASCO and Shell Oil. As noted by the New York Court of Appeals in Guard-Life, a claim of tortious interference with a voidable contract -- as opposed to an enforceable contract -- # should be treated the same as a tortious interference with business relations claim.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[W]e are persuaded that interference with performance of voidable contracts should be treated the same as interference with contracts terminable at will for purposes of imposing liability in tort, and that both fall in the same category with interference with prospective contractual relations.\"","sentence":"See 428 N.Y.S.2d 628, 406 N.E.2d at 449 (\u201c[W]e are persuaded that interference with performance of voidable contracts should be treated the same as interference with contracts terminable at will for purposes of imposing liability in tort, and that both fall in the same category with interference with prospective contractual relations.\u201d); see also Cent. Sports Army Club v. Arena Assocs., Inc., 952 F.Supp. 181, 190 (S.D.N.Y.1997) (noting that because the agreement at issue was voidable, \u201cthere is no liability for interference with such an agreement absent employment of wrongful means, unlawful restraint of trade, or lack of competitive motive\u201d (citing Guard-Life)); Taub v. Amana Imports, Inc., 140 A.D.2d 687, 528 N.Y.S.2d 884, 885 (1988) (\u201c[T]he existence of a valid, enforceable contract is a necessary predicate for a cause of action sounding in intentional interference with performance of a contract. However, recovery may nonetheless be had where, although the contract on which the plaintiff relies is voidable, the defendant has induced a party not to abide by its terms by means of fraud or other misconduct\u201d (citing Guard-Life ) (internal citations omitted)); see also John Danforth, Note, Tortious Interference with Contract: A Reassertion of Society\u2019s Interest in Commercial Stability and Contractual Integrity, 81 Colum. L.Rev. 1491, 1504 (1981) (\u201cSimilarly, the Guard-Life majority reasoned, unenforceable contracts contain no legal guarantee of future performance, and so should only be allowed limited tort protection."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[T]he existence of a valid, enforceable contract is a necessary predicate for a cause of action sounding in intentional interference with performance of a contract. However, recovery may nonetheless be had where, although the contract on which the plaintiff relies is voidable, the defendant has induced a party not to abide by its terms by means of fraud or other misconduct\" (citing Guard-Life ","sentence":"See 428 N.Y.S.2d 628, 406 N.E.2d at 449 (\u201c[W]e are persuaded that interference with performance of voidable contracts should be treated the same as interference with contracts terminable at will for purposes of imposing liability in tort, and that both fall in the same category with interference with prospective contractual relations.\u201d); see also Cent. Sports Army Club v. Arena Assocs., Inc., 952 F.Supp. 181, 190 (S.D.N.Y.1997) (noting that because the agreement at issue was voidable, \u201cthere is no liability for interference with such an agreement absent employment of wrongful means, unlawful restraint of trade, or lack of competitive motive\u201d (citing Guard-Life)); Taub v. Amana Imports, Inc., 140 A.D.2d 687, 528 N.Y.S.2d 884, 885 (1988) (\u201c[T]he existence of a valid, enforceable contract is a necessary predicate for a cause of action sounding in intentional interference with performance of a contract. However, recovery may nonetheless be had where, although the contract on which the plaintiff relies is voidable, the defendant has induced a party not to abide by its terms by means of fraud or other misconduct\u201d (citing Guard-Life ) (internal citations omitted)); see also John Danforth, Note, Tortious Interference with Contract: A Reassertion of Society\u2019s Interest in Commercial Stability and Contractual Integrity, 81 Colum. L.Rev. 1491, 1504 (1981) (\u201cSimilarly, the Guard-Life majority reasoned, unenforceable contracts contain no legal guarantee of future performance, and so should only be allowed limited tort protection."},"case_id":3109349,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Although Defendants STASCO and Shell Oil cannot interpose the Statute of Frauds as a defense to Plaintiffs tor-tious interference with contract claim, the fact that the contract in question is unenforceable -- and thus voidable -- against Mo-tiva nonetheless changes the analysis of Plaintiffs claim against STASCO and Shell Oil. As noted by the New York Court of Appeals in Guard-Life, a claim of tortious interference with a voidable contract -- as opposed to an enforceable contract -- # should be treated the same as a tortious interference with business relations claim.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[W]e are persuaded that interference with performance of voidable contracts should be treated the same as interference with contracts terminable at will for purposes of imposing liability in tort, and that both fall in the same category with interference with prospective contractual relations.\"","sentence":"See 428 N.Y.S.2d 628, 406 N.E.2d at 449 (\u201c[W]e are persuaded that interference with performance of voidable contracts should be treated the same as interference with contracts terminable at will for purposes of imposing liability in tort, and that both fall in the same category with interference with prospective contractual relations.\u201d); see also Cent. Sports Army Club v. Arena Assocs., Inc., 952 F.Supp. 181, 190 (S.D.N.Y.1997) (noting that because the agreement at issue was voidable, \u201cthere is no liability for interference with such an agreement absent employment of wrongful means, unlawful restraint of trade, or lack of competitive motive\u201d (citing Guard-Life)); Taub v. Amana Imports, Inc., 140 A.D.2d 687, 528 N.Y.S.2d 884, 885 (1988) (\u201c[T]he existence of a valid, enforceable contract is a necessary predicate for a cause of action sounding in intentional interference with performance of a contract. However, recovery may nonetheless be had where, although the contract on which the plaintiff relies is voidable, the defendant has induced a party not to abide by its terms by means of fraud or other misconduct\u201d (citing Guard-Life ) (internal citations omitted)); see also John Danforth, Note, Tortious Interference with Contract: A Reassertion of Society\u2019s Interest in Commercial Stability and Contractual Integrity, 81 Colum. L.Rev. 1491, 1504 (1981) (\u201cSimilarly, the Guard-Life majority reasoned, unenforceable contracts contain no legal guarantee of future performance, and so should only be allowed limited tort protection."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"528 N.Y.S.2d 884, 885","parenthetical":"\"[T]he existence of a valid, enforceable contract is a necessary predicate for a cause of action sounding in intentional interference with performance of a contract. However, recovery may nonetheless be had where, although the contract on which the plaintiff relies is voidable, the defendant has induced a party not to abide by its terms by means of fraud or other misconduct\" (citing Guard-Life ","sentence":"See 428 N.Y.S.2d 628, 406 N.E.2d at 449 (\u201c[W]e are persuaded that interference with performance of voidable contracts should be treated the same as interference with contracts terminable at will for purposes of imposing liability in tort, and that both fall in the same category with interference with prospective contractual relations.\u201d); see also Cent. Sports Army Club v. Arena Assocs., Inc., 952 F.Supp. 181, 190 (S.D.N.Y.1997) (noting that because the agreement at issue was voidable, \u201cthere is no liability for interference with such an agreement absent employment of wrongful means, unlawful restraint of trade, or lack of competitive motive\u201d (citing Guard-Life)); Taub v. Amana Imports, Inc., 140 A.D.2d 687, 528 N.Y.S.2d 884, 885 (1988) (\u201c[T]he existence of a valid, enforceable contract is a necessary predicate for a cause of action sounding in intentional interference with performance of a contract. However, recovery may nonetheless be had where, although the contract on which the plaintiff relies is voidable, the defendant has induced a party not to abide by its terms by means of fraud or other misconduct\u201d (citing Guard-Life ) (internal citations omitted)); see also John Danforth, Note, Tortious Interference with Contract: A Reassertion of Society\u2019s Interest in Commercial Stability and Contractual Integrity, 81 Colum. L.Rev. 1491, 1504 (1981) (\u201cSimilarly, the Guard-Life majority reasoned, unenforceable contracts contain no legal guarantee of future performance, and so should only be allowed limited tort protection."},"case_id":3109349,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Although Defendants STASCO and Shell Oil cannot interpose the Statute of Frauds as a defense to Plaintiffs tor-tious interference with contract claim, the fact that the contract in question is unenforceable -- and thus voidable -- against Mo-tiva nonetheless changes the analysis of Plaintiffs claim against STASCO and Shell Oil. As noted by the New York Court of Appeals in Guard-Life, a claim of tortious interference with a voidable contract -- as opposed to an enforceable contract -- # should be treated the same as a tortious interference with business relations claim.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"952 F.Supp. 181, 190","parenthetical":"noting that because the agreement at issue was voidable, \"there is no liability for interference with such an agreement absent employment of wrongful means, unlawful restraint of trade, or lack of competitive motive\" (citing Guard-Life","sentence":"See 428 N.Y.S.2d 628, 406 N.E.2d at 449 (\u201c[W]e are persuaded that interference with performance of voidable contracts should be treated the same as interference with contracts terminable at will for purposes of imposing liability in tort, and that both fall in the same category with interference with prospective contractual relations.\u201d); see also Cent. Sports Army Club v. Arena Assocs., Inc., 952 F.Supp. 181, 190 (S.D.N.Y.1997) (noting that because the agreement at issue was voidable, \u201cthere is no liability for interference with such an agreement absent employment of wrongful means, unlawful restraint of trade, or lack of competitive motive\u201d (citing Guard-Life)); Taub v. Amana Imports, Inc., 140 A.D.2d 687, 528 N.Y.S.2d 884, 885 (1988) (\u201c[T]he existence of a valid, enforceable contract is a necessary predicate for a cause of action sounding in intentional interference with performance of a contract. However, recovery may nonetheless be had where, although the contract on which the plaintiff relies is voidable, the defendant has induced a party not to abide by its terms by means of fraud or other misconduct\u201d (citing Guard-Life ) (internal citations omitted)); see also John Danforth, Note, Tortious Interference with Contract: A Reassertion of Society\u2019s Interest in Commercial Stability and Contractual Integrity, 81 Colum. L.Rev. 1491, 1504 (1981) (\u201cSimilarly, the Guard-Life majority reasoned, unenforceable contracts contain no legal guarantee of future performance, and so should only be allowed limited tort protection."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"406 N.E.2d 449, 449","parenthetical":"\"[W]e are persuaded that interference with performance of voidable contracts should be treated the same as interference with contracts terminable at will for purposes of imposing liability in tort, and that both fall in the same category with interference with prospective contractual relations.\"","sentence":"See 428 N.Y.S.2d 628, 406 N.E.2d at 449 (\u201c[W]e are persuaded that interference with performance of voidable contracts should be treated the same as interference with contracts terminable at will for purposes of imposing liability in tort, and that both fall in the same category with interference with prospective contractual relations.\u201d); see also Cent. Sports Army Club v. Arena Assocs., Inc., 952 F.Supp. 181, 190 (S.D.N.Y.1997) (noting that because the agreement at issue was voidable, \u201cthere is no liability for interference with such an agreement absent employment of wrongful means, unlawful restraint of trade, or lack of competitive motive\u201d (citing Guard-Life)); Taub v. Amana Imports, Inc., 140 A.D.2d 687, 528 N.Y.S.2d 884, 885 (1988) (\u201c[T]he existence of a valid, enforceable contract is a necessary predicate for a cause of action sounding in intentional interference with performance of a contract. However, recovery may nonetheless be had where, although the contract on which the plaintiff relies is voidable, the defendant has induced a party not to abide by its terms by means of fraud or other misconduct\u201d (citing Guard-Life ) (internal citations omitted)); see also John Danforth, Note, Tortious Interference with Contract: A Reassertion of Society\u2019s Interest in Commercial Stability and Contractual Integrity, 81 Colum. L.Rev. 1491, 1504 (1981) (\u201cSimilarly, the Guard-Life majority reasoned, unenforceable contracts contain no legal guarantee of future performance, and so should only be allowed limited tort protection."},"case_id":3109349,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Although Defendants STASCO and Shell Oil cannot interpose the Statute of Frauds as a defense to Plaintiffs tor-tious interference with contract claim, the fact that the contract in question is unenforceable -- and thus voidable -- against Mo-tiva nonetheless changes the analysis of Plaintiffs claim against STASCO and Shell Oil. As noted by the New York Court of Appeals in Guard-Life, a claim of tortious interference with a voidable contract -- as opposed to an enforceable contract -- # should be treated the same as a tortious interference with business relations claim.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"406 N.E.2d 449, 449","parenthetical":"\"[W]e are persuaded that interference with performance of voidable contracts should be treated the same as interference with contracts terminable at will for purposes of imposing liability in tort, and that both fall in the same category with interference with prospective contractual relations.\"","sentence":"See 428 N.Y.S.2d 628, 406 N.E.2d at 449 (\u201c[W]e are persuaded that interference with performance of voidable contracts should be treated the same as interference with contracts terminable at will for purposes of imposing liability in tort, and that both fall in the same category with interference with prospective contractual relations.\u201d); see also Cent. Sports Army Club v. Arena Assocs., Inc., 952 F.Supp. 181, 190 (S.D.N.Y.1997) (noting that because the agreement at issue was voidable, \u201cthere is no liability for interference with such an agreement absent employment of wrongful means, unlawful restraint of trade, or lack of competitive motive\u201d (citing Guard-Life)); Taub v. Amana Imports, Inc., 140 A.D.2d 687, 528 N.Y.S.2d 884, 885 (1988) (\u201c[T]he existence of a valid, enforceable contract is a necessary predicate for a cause of action sounding in intentional interference with performance of a contract. However, recovery may nonetheless be had where, although the contract on which the plaintiff relies is voidable, the defendant has induced a party not to abide by its terms by means of fraud or other misconduct\u201d (citing Guard-Life ) (internal citations omitted)); see also John Danforth, Note, Tortious Interference with Contract: A Reassertion of Society\u2019s Interest in Commercial Stability and Contractual Integrity, 81 Colum. L.Rev. 1491, 1504 (1981) (\u201cSimilarly, the Guard-Life majority reasoned, unenforceable contracts contain no legal guarantee of future performance, and so should only be allowed limited tort protection."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[T]he existence of a valid, enforceable contract is a necessary predicate for a cause of action sounding in intentional interference with performance of a contract. However, recovery may nonetheless be had where, although the contract on which the plaintiff relies is voidable, the defendant has induced a party not to abide by its terms by means of fraud or other misconduct\" (citing Guard-Life ","sentence":"See 428 N.Y.S.2d 628, 406 N.E.2d at 449 (\u201c[W]e are persuaded that interference with performance of voidable contracts should be treated the same as interference with contracts terminable at will for purposes of imposing liability in tort, and that both fall in the same category with interference with prospective contractual relations.\u201d); see also Cent. Sports Army Club v. Arena Assocs., Inc., 952 F.Supp. 181, 190 (S.D.N.Y.1997) (noting that because the agreement at issue was voidable, \u201cthere is no liability for interference with such an agreement absent employment of wrongful means, unlawful restraint of trade, or lack of competitive motive\u201d (citing Guard-Life)); Taub v. Amana Imports, Inc., 140 A.D.2d 687, 528 N.Y.S.2d 884, 885 (1988) (\u201c[T]he existence of a valid, enforceable contract is a necessary predicate for a cause of action sounding in intentional interference with performance of a contract. However, recovery may nonetheless be had where, although the contract on which the plaintiff relies is voidable, the defendant has induced a party not to abide by its terms by means of fraud or other misconduct\u201d (citing Guard-Life ) (internal citations omitted)); see also John Danforth, Note, Tortious Interference with Contract: A Reassertion of Society\u2019s Interest in Commercial Stability and Contractual Integrity, 81 Colum. L.Rev. 1491, 1504 (1981) (\u201cSimilarly, the Guard-Life majority reasoned, unenforceable contracts contain no legal guarantee of future performance, and so should only be allowed limited tort protection."},"case_id":3109349,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Although Defendants STASCO and Shell Oil cannot interpose the Statute of Frauds as a defense to Plaintiffs tor-tious interference with contract claim, the fact that the contract in question is unenforceable -- and thus voidable -- against Mo-tiva nonetheless changes the analysis of Plaintiffs claim against STASCO and Shell Oil. As noted by the New York Court of Appeals in Guard-Life, a claim of tortious interference with a voidable contract -- as opposed to an enforceable contract -- # should be treated the same as a tortious interference with business relations claim.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"406 N.E.2d 449, 449","parenthetical":"\"[W]e are persuaded that interference with performance of voidable contracts should be treated the same as interference with contracts terminable at will for purposes of imposing liability in tort, and that both fall in the same category with interference with prospective contractual relations.\"","sentence":"See 428 N.Y.S.2d 628, 406 N.E.2d at 449 (\u201c[W]e are persuaded that interference with performance of voidable contracts should be treated the same as interference with contracts terminable at will for purposes of imposing liability in tort, and that both fall in the same category with interference with prospective contractual relations.\u201d); see also Cent. Sports Army Club v. Arena Assocs., Inc., 952 F.Supp. 181, 190 (S.D.N.Y.1997) (noting that because the agreement at issue was voidable, \u201cthere is no liability for interference with such an agreement absent employment of wrongful means, unlawful restraint of trade, or lack of competitive motive\u201d (citing Guard-Life)); Taub v. Amana Imports, Inc., 140 A.D.2d 687, 528 N.Y.S.2d 884, 885 (1988) (\u201c[T]he existence of a valid, enforceable contract is a necessary predicate for a cause of action sounding in intentional interference with performance of a contract. However, recovery may nonetheless be had where, although the contract on which the plaintiff relies is voidable, the defendant has induced a party not to abide by its terms by means of fraud or other misconduct\u201d (citing Guard-Life ) (internal citations omitted)); see also John Danforth, Note, Tortious Interference with Contract: A Reassertion of Society\u2019s Interest in Commercial Stability and Contractual Integrity, 81 Colum. L.Rev. 1491, 1504 (1981) (\u201cSimilarly, the Guard-Life majority reasoned, unenforceable contracts contain no legal guarantee of future performance, and so should only be allowed limited tort protection."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"528 N.Y.S.2d 884, 885","parenthetical":"\"[T]he existence of a valid, enforceable contract is a necessary predicate for a cause of action sounding in intentional interference with performance of a contract. However, recovery may nonetheless be had where, although the contract on which the plaintiff relies is voidable, the defendant has induced a party not to abide by its terms by means of fraud or other misconduct\" (citing Guard-Life ","sentence":"See 428 N.Y.S.2d 628, 406 N.E.2d at 449 (\u201c[W]e are persuaded that interference with performance of voidable contracts should be treated the same as interference with contracts terminable at will for purposes of imposing liability in tort, and that both fall in the same category with interference with prospective contractual relations.\u201d); see also Cent. Sports Army Club v. Arena Assocs., Inc., 952 F.Supp. 181, 190 (S.D.N.Y.1997) (noting that because the agreement at issue was voidable, \u201cthere is no liability for interference with such an agreement absent employment of wrongful means, unlawful restraint of trade, or lack of competitive motive\u201d (citing Guard-Life)); Taub v. Amana Imports, Inc., 140 A.D.2d 687, 528 N.Y.S.2d 884, 885 (1988) (\u201c[T]he existence of a valid, enforceable contract is a necessary predicate for a cause of action sounding in intentional interference with performance of a contract. However, recovery may nonetheless be had where, although the contract on which the plaintiff relies is voidable, the defendant has induced a party not to abide by its terms by means of fraud or other misconduct\u201d (citing Guard-Life ) (internal citations omitted)); see also John Danforth, Note, Tortious Interference with Contract: A Reassertion of Society\u2019s Interest in Commercial Stability and Contractual Integrity, 81 Colum. L.Rev. 1491, 1504 (1981) (\u201cSimilarly, the Guard-Life majority reasoned, unenforceable contracts contain no legal guarantee of future performance, and so should only be allowed limited tort protection."},"case_id":3109349,"label":"a"}
{"context":"We acknowledge that it is neither practically possible nor legally required that the original trial judge make this determination in every case. However, having the original trial judge make the determination as soon as possible after a judgment has become final in the trial court is certainly preferable.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"906 S.W.2d 431, 435","parenthetical":"discussing comparable problems associated with a trial judge making a thirteenth juror determination upon remand from an appellate court long after the trial was concluded","sentence":"See Penn, 670 S.W.2d at 429 (stating that because petition filed while case was between trial and appeal can easily provide for an early hearing before the court that just heard the case); cf. State v. Moats, 906 S.W.2d 431, 435 (Tenn.1995) (discussing comparable problems associated with a trial judge making a thirteenth juror determination upon remand from an appellate court long after the trial was concluded)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"670 S.W.2d 429, 429","parenthetical":"stating that because petition filed while case was between trial and appeal can easily provide for an early hearing before the court that just heard the case","sentence":"See Penn, 670 S.W.2d at 429 (stating that because petition filed while case was between trial and appeal can easily provide for an early hearing before the court that just heard the case); cf. State v. Moats, 906 S.W.2d 431, 435 (Tenn.1995) (discussing comparable problems associated with a trial judge making a thirteenth juror determination upon remand from an appellate court long after the trial was concluded)."},"case_id":11602515,"label":"b"}
{"context":"[P 22] The defendant's right to be present and to speak when his sentence is imposed is constitutionally based.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"397 U.S. 337, 338","parenthetical":"\"One of the most basic of the rights guaranteed by the Confrontation Clause is the accused's right to be present in the courtroom at every stage of his trial.\"","sentence":"Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 338, 90 S.Ct. 1057, 1058, 25 L.Ed.2d 353, 356, reh\u2019g denied, 398 U.S. 915, 90 S.Ct. 1684, 26 L.Ed.2d 80 (1970) (\u201cOne of the most basic of the rights guaranteed by the Confrontation Clause is the accused\u2019s right to be present in the courtroom at every stage of his trial.\u201d); United States v. Jackson, 923 F.2d 1494, 1496 (11th Cir.1991); United States v. Huff, 512 F.2d 66, 71 (5th Cir.1975) (\u201cThe sentencing is, of course, a critical stage of the proceedings against the accused, at which he is constitutionally entitled to be present and represented by counsel.\u201d) (citing Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 88 S.Ct. 254, 19 L.Ed.2d 336 (1967)); cf. United States v. Turner, 532 F.Supp. 913, 915-16 (N.D.Cal.1982) (not even defendant can waive requirement of presence at sentencing)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"532 F.Supp. 913, 915-16","parenthetical":"not even defendant can waive requirement of presence at sentencing","sentence":"Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 338, 90 S.Ct. 1057, 1058, 25 L.Ed.2d 353, 356, reh\u2019g denied, 398 U.S. 915, 90 S.Ct. 1684, 26 L.Ed.2d 80 (1970) (\u201cOne of the most basic of the rights guaranteed by the Confrontation Clause is the accused\u2019s right to be present in the courtroom at every stage of his trial.\u201d); United States v. Jackson, 923 F.2d 1494, 1496 (11th Cir.1991); United States v. Huff, 512 F.2d 66, 71 (5th Cir.1975) (\u201cThe sentencing is, of course, a critical stage of the proceedings against the accused, at which he is constitutionally entitled to be present and represented by counsel.\u201d) (citing Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 88 S.Ct. 254, 19 L.Ed.2d 336 (1967)); cf. United States v. Turner, 532 F.Supp. 913, 915-16 (N.D.Cal.1982) (not even defendant can waive requirement of presence at sentencing)."},"case_id":11963083,"label":"a"}
{"context":"[P 22] The defendant's right to be present and to speak when his sentence is imposed is constitutionally based.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"532 F.Supp. 913, 915-16","parenthetical":"not even defendant can waive requirement of presence at sentencing","sentence":"Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 338, 90 S.Ct. 1057, 1058, 25 L.Ed.2d 353, 356, reh\u2019g denied, 398 U.S. 915, 90 S.Ct. 1684, 26 L.Ed.2d 80 (1970) (\u201cOne of the most basic of the rights guaranteed by the Confrontation Clause is the accused\u2019s right to be present in the courtroom at every stage of his trial.\u201d); United States v. Jackson, 923 F.2d 1494, 1496 (11th Cir.1991); United States v. Huff, 512 F.2d 66, 71 (5th Cir.1975) (\u201cThe sentencing is, of course, a critical stage of the proceedings against the accused, at which he is constitutionally entitled to be present and represented by counsel.\u201d) (citing Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 88 S.Ct. 254, 19 L.Ed.2d 336 (1967)); cf. United States v. Turner, 532 F.Supp. 913, 915-16 (N.D.Cal.1982) (not even defendant can waive requirement of presence at sentencing)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"90 S.Ct. 1057, 1058","parenthetical":"\"One of the most basic of the rights guaranteed by the Confrontation Clause is the accused's right to be present in the courtroom at every stage of his trial.\"","sentence":"Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 338, 90 S.Ct. 1057, 1058, 25 L.Ed.2d 353, 356, reh\u2019g denied, 398 U.S. 915, 90 S.Ct. 1684, 26 L.Ed.2d 80 (1970) (\u201cOne of the most basic of the rights guaranteed by the Confrontation Clause is the accused\u2019s right to be present in the courtroom at every stage of his trial.\u201d); United States v. Jackson, 923 F.2d 1494, 1496 (11th Cir.1991); United States v. Huff, 512 F.2d 66, 71 (5th Cir.1975) (\u201cThe sentencing is, of course, a critical stage of the proceedings against the accused, at which he is constitutionally entitled to be present and represented by counsel.\u201d) (citing Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 88 S.Ct. 254, 19 L.Ed.2d 336 (1967)); cf. United States v. Turner, 532 F.Supp. 913, 915-16 (N.D.Cal.1982) (not even defendant can waive requirement of presence at sentencing)."},"case_id":11963083,"label":"b"}
{"context":"[P 22] The defendant's right to be present and to speak when his sentence is imposed is constitutionally based.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"25 L.Ed.2d 353, 356","parenthetical":"\"One of the most basic of the rights guaranteed by the Confrontation Clause is the accused's right to be present in the courtroom at every stage of his trial.\"","sentence":"Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 338, 90 S.Ct. 1057, 1058, 25 L.Ed.2d 353, 356, reh\u2019g denied, 398 U.S. 915, 90 S.Ct. 1684, 26 L.Ed.2d 80 (1970) (\u201cOne of the most basic of the rights guaranteed by the Confrontation Clause is the accused\u2019s right to be present in the courtroom at every stage of his trial.\u201d); United States v. Jackson, 923 F.2d 1494, 1496 (11th Cir.1991); United States v. Huff, 512 F.2d 66, 71 (5th Cir.1975) (\u201cThe sentencing is, of course, a critical stage of the proceedings against the accused, at which he is constitutionally entitled to be present and represented by counsel.\u201d) (citing Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 88 S.Ct. 254, 19 L.Ed.2d 336 (1967)); cf. United States v. Turner, 532 F.Supp. 913, 915-16 (N.D.Cal.1982) (not even defendant can waive requirement of presence at sentencing)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"532 F.Supp. 913, 915-16","parenthetical":"not even defendant can waive requirement of presence at sentencing","sentence":"Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 338, 90 S.Ct. 1057, 1058, 25 L.Ed.2d 353, 356, reh\u2019g denied, 398 U.S. 915, 90 S.Ct. 1684, 26 L.Ed.2d 80 (1970) (\u201cOne of the most basic of the rights guaranteed by the Confrontation Clause is the accused\u2019s right to be present in the courtroom at every stage of his trial.\u201d); United States v. Jackson, 923 F.2d 1494, 1496 (11th Cir.1991); United States v. Huff, 512 F.2d 66, 71 (5th Cir.1975) (\u201cThe sentencing is, of course, a critical stage of the proceedings against the accused, at which he is constitutionally entitled to be present and represented by counsel.\u201d) (citing Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 88 S.Ct. 254, 19 L.Ed.2d 336 (1967)); cf. United States v. Turner, 532 F.Supp. 913, 915-16 (N.D.Cal.1982) (not even defendant can waive requirement of presence at sentencing)."},"case_id":11963083,"label":"a"}
{"context":"[P 22] The defendant's right to be present and to speak when his sentence is imposed is constitutionally based.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"One of the most basic of the rights guaranteed by the Confrontation Clause is the accused's right to be present in the courtroom at every stage of his trial.\"","sentence":"Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 338, 90 S.Ct. 1057, 1058, 25 L.Ed.2d 353, 356, reh\u2019g denied, 398 U.S. 915, 90 S.Ct. 1684, 26 L.Ed.2d 80 (1970) (\u201cOne of the most basic of the rights guaranteed by the Confrontation Clause is the accused\u2019s right to be present in the courtroom at every stage of his trial.\u201d); United States v. Jackson, 923 F.2d 1494, 1496 (11th Cir.1991); United States v. Huff, 512 F.2d 66, 71 (5th Cir.1975) (\u201cThe sentencing is, of course, a critical stage of the proceedings against the accused, at which he is constitutionally entitled to be present and represented by counsel.\u201d) (citing Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 88 S.Ct. 254, 19 L.Ed.2d 336 (1967)); cf. United States v. Turner, 532 F.Supp. 913, 915-16 (N.D.Cal.1982) (not even defendant can waive requirement of presence at sentencing)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"532 F.Supp. 913, 915-16","parenthetical":"not even defendant can waive requirement of presence at sentencing","sentence":"Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 338, 90 S.Ct. 1057, 1058, 25 L.Ed.2d 353, 356, reh\u2019g denied, 398 U.S. 915, 90 S.Ct. 1684, 26 L.Ed.2d 80 (1970) (\u201cOne of the most basic of the rights guaranteed by the Confrontation Clause is the accused\u2019s right to be present in the courtroom at every stage of his trial.\u201d); United States v. Jackson, 923 F.2d 1494, 1496 (11th Cir.1991); United States v. Huff, 512 F.2d 66, 71 (5th Cir.1975) (\u201cThe sentencing is, of course, a critical stage of the proceedings against the accused, at which he is constitutionally entitled to be present and represented by counsel.\u201d) (citing Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 88 S.Ct. 254, 19 L.Ed.2d 336 (1967)); cf. United States v. Turner, 532 F.Supp. 913, 915-16 (N.D.Cal.1982) (not even defendant can waive requirement of presence at sentencing)."},"case_id":11963083,"label":"a"}
{"context":"[P 22] The defendant's right to be present and to speak when his sentence is imposed is constitutionally based.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"532 F.Supp. 913, 915-16","parenthetical":"not even defendant can waive requirement of presence at sentencing","sentence":"Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 338, 90 S.Ct. 1057, 1058, 25 L.Ed.2d 353, 356, reh\u2019g denied, 398 U.S. 915, 90 S.Ct. 1684, 26 L.Ed.2d 80 (1970) (\u201cOne of the most basic of the rights guaranteed by the Confrontation Clause is the accused\u2019s right to be present in the courtroom at every stage of his trial.\u201d); United States v. Jackson, 923 F.2d 1494, 1496 (11th Cir.1991); United States v. Huff, 512 F.2d 66, 71 (5th Cir.1975) (\u201cThe sentencing is, of course, a critical stage of the proceedings against the accused, at which he is constitutionally entitled to be present and represented by counsel.\u201d) (citing Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 88 S.Ct. 254, 19 L.Ed.2d 336 (1967)); cf. United States v. Turner, 532 F.Supp. 913, 915-16 (N.D.Cal.1982) (not even defendant can waive requirement of presence at sentencing)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"One of the most basic of the rights guaranteed by the Confrontation Clause is the accused's right to be present in the courtroom at every stage of his trial.\"","sentence":"Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 338, 90 S.Ct. 1057, 1058, 25 L.Ed.2d 353, 356, reh\u2019g denied, 398 U.S. 915, 90 S.Ct. 1684, 26 L.Ed.2d 80 (1970) (\u201cOne of the most basic of the rights guaranteed by the Confrontation Clause is the accused\u2019s right to be present in the courtroom at every stage of his trial.\u201d); United States v. Jackson, 923 F.2d 1494, 1496 (11th Cir.1991); United States v. Huff, 512 F.2d 66, 71 (5th Cir.1975) (\u201cThe sentencing is, of course, a critical stage of the proceedings against the accused, at which he is constitutionally entitled to be present and represented by counsel.\u201d) (citing Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 88 S.Ct. 254, 19 L.Ed.2d 336 (1967)); cf. United States v. Turner, 532 F.Supp. 913, 915-16 (N.D.Cal.1982) (not even defendant can waive requirement of presence at sentencing)."},"case_id":11963083,"label":"b"}
{"context":"[P 22] The defendant's right to be present and to speak when his sentence is imposed is constitutionally based.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"532 F.Supp. 913, 915-16","parenthetical":"not even defendant can waive requirement of presence at sentencing","sentence":"Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 338, 90 S.Ct. 1057, 1058, 25 L.Ed.2d 353, 356, reh\u2019g denied, 398 U.S. 915, 90 S.Ct. 1684, 26 L.Ed.2d 80 (1970) (\u201cOne of the most basic of the rights guaranteed by the Confrontation Clause is the accused\u2019s right to be present in the courtroom at every stage of his trial.\u201d); United States v. Jackson, 923 F.2d 1494, 1496 (11th Cir.1991); United States v. Huff, 512 F.2d 66, 71 (5th Cir.1975) (\u201cThe sentencing is, of course, a critical stage of the proceedings against the accused, at which he is constitutionally entitled to be present and represented by counsel.\u201d) (citing Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 88 S.Ct. 254, 19 L.Ed.2d 336 (1967)); cf. United States v. Turner, 532 F.Supp. 913, 915-16 (N.D.Cal.1982) (not even defendant can waive requirement of presence at sentencing)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"One of the most basic of the rights guaranteed by the Confrontation Clause is the accused's right to be present in the courtroom at every stage of his trial.\"","sentence":"Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 338, 90 S.Ct. 1057, 1058, 25 L.Ed.2d 353, 356, reh\u2019g denied, 398 U.S. 915, 90 S.Ct. 1684, 26 L.Ed.2d 80 (1970) (\u201cOne of the most basic of the rights guaranteed by the Confrontation Clause is the accused\u2019s right to be present in the courtroom at every stage of his trial.\u201d); United States v. Jackson, 923 F.2d 1494, 1496 (11th Cir.1991); United States v. Huff, 512 F.2d 66, 71 (5th Cir.1975) (\u201cThe sentencing is, of course, a critical stage of the proceedings against the accused, at which he is constitutionally entitled to be present and represented by counsel.\u201d) (citing Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 88 S.Ct. 254, 19 L.Ed.2d 336 (1967)); cf. United States v. Turner, 532 F.Supp. 913, 915-16 (N.D.Cal.1982) (not even defendant can waive requirement of presence at sentencing)."},"case_id":11963083,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The instant action was instituted 27 days after the state action. Although defendants argue that the state action has proceeded far into the discovery stage, discovery has just begun and defendants have not yet replied to interrogatories propounded to him. (Dkt. # 8 at 11). While the Court notes that Leaver's deposition has been conducted in the state proceeding, one deposition can hardly be the \"substantial progress\" envisioned by the courts when applying this factor.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"recognizing that sub stantial progress had been made where a state court action had been pending for almost five years and over 100 depositions had been conducted","sentence":"See, e.g., Nakash, 882 F.2d 1411 (recognizing that sub stantial progress had been made where a state court action had been pending for almost five years and over 100 depositions had been conducted); see also American Int'l, 843 F.2d at 1258 (holding that substantial progress had been made where the state court judge had decided seven motions)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"843 F.2d 1258, 1258","parenthetical":"holding that substantial progress had been made where the state court judge had decided seven motions","sentence":"See, e.g., Nakash, 882 F.2d 1411 (recognizing that sub stantial progress had been made where a state court action had been pending for almost five years and over 100 depositions had been conducted); see also American Int'l, 843 F.2d at 1258 (holding that substantial progress had been made where the state court judge had decided seven motions)."},"case_id":958702,"label":"a"}
{"context":"This limitations period begins to run when the alleged discriminatory acts occur, not when a plaintiff allegedly feels their effects. The discriminatory act for the purposes of limitations is the notice to the employee of an adverse employment decision, not the later execution of that decision.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"449 U.S. 258, 258-59","parenthetical":"decision not to offer tenure was the discriminatory act and termination the effect of that decision","sentence":"See Chardon, 454 U.S. at 8-9, 102 S.Ct. at 29-30 (for limitations purposes, the discriminatory act is the decision to terminate, not the termination itself); see also Ricks, 449 U.S. at 258-59, 101 S.Ct. at 504-05 (decision not to offer tenure was the discriminatory act and termination the effect of that decision)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"454 U.S. 8, 8-9","parenthetical":"for limitations purposes, the discriminatory act is the decision to terminate, not the termination itself","sentence":"See Chardon, 454 U.S. at 8-9, 102 S.Ct. at 29-30 (for limitations purposes, the discriminatory act is the decision to terminate, not the termination itself); see also Ricks, 449 U.S. at 258-59, 101 S.Ct. at 504-05 (decision not to offer tenure was the discriminatory act and termination the effect of that decision)."},"case_id":3464845,"label":"b"}
{"context":"This limitations period begins to run when the alleged discriminatory acts occur, not when a plaintiff allegedly feels their effects. The discriminatory act for the purposes of limitations is the notice to the employee of an adverse employment decision, not the later execution of that decision.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"454 U.S. 8, 8-9","parenthetical":"for limitations purposes, the discriminatory act is the decision to terminate, not the termination itself","sentence":"See Chardon, 454 U.S. at 8-9, 102 S.Ct. at 29-30 (for limitations purposes, the discriminatory act is the decision to terminate, not the termination itself); see also Ricks, 449 U.S. at 258-59, 101 S.Ct. at 504-05 (decision not to offer tenure was the discriminatory act and termination the effect of that decision)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"101 S.Ct. 504, 504-05","parenthetical":"decision not to offer tenure was the discriminatory act and termination the effect of that decision","sentence":"See Chardon, 454 U.S. at 8-9, 102 S.Ct. at 29-30 (for limitations purposes, the discriminatory act is the decision to terminate, not the termination itself); see also Ricks, 449 U.S. at 258-59, 101 S.Ct. at 504-05 (decision not to offer tenure was the discriminatory act and termination the effect of that decision)."},"case_id":3464845,"label":"a"}
{"context":"This limitations period begins to run when the alleged discriminatory acts occur, not when a plaintiff allegedly feels their effects. The discriminatory act for the purposes of limitations is the notice to the employee of an adverse employment decision, not the later execution of that decision.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"449 U.S. 258, 258-59","parenthetical":"decision not to offer tenure was the discriminatory act and termination the effect of that decision","sentence":"See Chardon, 454 U.S. at 8-9, 102 S.Ct. at 29-30 (for limitations purposes, the discriminatory act is the decision to terminate, not the termination itself); see also Ricks, 449 U.S. at 258-59, 101 S.Ct. at 504-05 (decision not to offer tenure was the discriminatory act and termination the effect of that decision)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"102 S.Ct. 29, 29-30","parenthetical":"for limitations purposes, the discriminatory act is the decision to terminate, not the termination itself","sentence":"See Chardon, 454 U.S. at 8-9, 102 S.Ct. at 29-30 (for limitations purposes, the discriminatory act is the decision to terminate, not the termination itself); see also Ricks, 449 U.S. at 258-59, 101 S.Ct. at 504-05 (decision not to offer tenure was the discriminatory act and termination the effect of that decision)."},"case_id":3464845,"label":"b"}
{"context":"This limitations period begins to run when the alleged discriminatory acts occur, not when a plaintiff allegedly feels their effects. The discriminatory act for the purposes of limitations is the notice to the employee of an adverse employment decision, not the later execution of that decision.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"102 S.Ct. 29, 29-30","parenthetical":"for limitations purposes, the discriminatory act is the decision to terminate, not the termination itself","sentence":"See Chardon, 454 U.S. at 8-9, 102 S.Ct. at 29-30 (for limitations purposes, the discriminatory act is the decision to terminate, not the termination itself); see also Ricks, 449 U.S. at 258-59, 101 S.Ct. at 504-05 (decision not to offer tenure was the discriminatory act and termination the effect of that decision)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"101 S.Ct. 504, 504-05","parenthetical":"decision not to offer tenure was the discriminatory act and termination the effect of that decision","sentence":"See Chardon, 454 U.S. at 8-9, 102 S.Ct. at 29-30 (for limitations purposes, the discriminatory act is the decision to terminate, not the termination itself); see also Ricks, 449 U.S. at 258-59, 101 S.Ct. at 504-05 (decision not to offer tenure was the discriminatory act and termination the effect of that decision)."},"case_id":3464845,"label":"a"}
{"context":"There, the court found that the defendant's statements, \"in which the defendant sought to deflect attention from himself, and perhaps establish an alibi\" and his \"failure to inquire about his wife[] were appropriate matters for comment and exploration.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"50 Mass. App. Ct. 565, 568","parenthetical":"misleading prearrest statements \"may be properly admitted as evidence of consciousness of guilt where there is other evidence tending to prove the falsity of the statements\"","sentence":"Id. at 773. See Commonwealth v. Hunt, 50 Mass. App. Ct. 565, 568 (2000) (misleading prearrest statements \u201cmay be properly admitted as evidence of consciousness of guilt where there is other evidence tending to prove the falsity of the statements\u201d) (citation omitted)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"918 F.2d 338, 343","parenthetical":"not improper to comment on omission in post-Miranda statement where defendant did not testify at trial","sentence":"See also Bradley v. Meachum, 918 F.2d 338, 343 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1221 (1991) (not improper to comment on omission in post-Miranda statement where defendant did not testify at trial)."},"case_id":65611,"label":"a"}
{"context":"There, the court found that the defendant's statements, \"in which the defendant sought to deflect attention from himself, and perhaps establish an alibi\" and his \"failure to inquire about his wife[] were appropriate matters for comment and exploration.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"not improper to comment on omission in post-Miranda statement where defendant did not testify at trial","sentence":"See also Bradley v. Meachum, 918 F.2d 338, 343 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1221 (1991) (not improper to comment on omission in post-Miranda statement where defendant did not testify at trial)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"50 Mass. App. Ct. 565, 568","parenthetical":"misleading prearrest statements \"may be properly admitted as evidence of consciousness of guilt where there is other evidence tending to prove the falsity of the statements\"","sentence":"Id. at 773. See Commonwealth v. Hunt, 50 Mass. App. Ct. 565, 568 (2000) (misleading prearrest statements \u201cmay be properly admitted as evidence of consciousness of guilt where there is other evidence tending to prove the falsity of the statements\u201d) (citation omitted)."},"case_id":65611,"label":"b"}
{"context":"That is, both the general scheme and the exemption apply equally to religious and secular groups alike. As a result, the statutory exception is neutral and generally applicable because the exception is granted to any organization, religious or secular, that meets the defined category.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"363 Fed.Appx. 56, 56","parenthetical":"\"In the present case, [the scheme] is facially neutral, making no reference to religious practice.\"","sentence":"See Ungar, 363 Fed.Appx. at 56 (\u201cIn the present case, [the scheme] is facially neutral, making no reference to religious practice.\u201d); see also Konikov v. Orange Cnty., 410 F.3d 1317, 1326 (11th Cir.2005) (holding that a law that \u201ctreats religious and nonreligious organizations differently offends the principles of the Free Exercise Clause because it is not neutral or generally applicable.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"410 F.3d 1317, 1326","parenthetical":"holding that a law that \"treats religious and nonreligious organizations differently offends the principles of the Free Exercise Clause because it is not neutral or generally applicable.\"","sentence":"See Ungar, 363 Fed.Appx. at 56 (\u201cIn the present case, [the scheme] is facially neutral, making no reference to religious practice.\u201d); see also Konikov v. Orange Cnty., 410 F.3d 1317, 1326 (11th Cir.2005) (holding that a law that \u201ctreats religious and nonreligious organizations differently offends the principles of the Free Exercise Clause because it is not neutral or generally applicable.\u201d)."},"case_id":5866268,"label":"a"}
{"context":"To the contrary, a contract, if it is supported by consideration, may confer rights and obligations on one party that it does not confer on the other. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has specifically affirmed that principle in the context of arbitration agreements.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"183 F.3d 173, 180","parenthetical":"\"[PJarties to an arbitration agreement need not equally bind each other with respect to an arbitration agreement if they have provided each other with consideration beyond the.promise to arbitrate.\"","sentence":"Harris v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 183 F.3d 173, 180 (3d Cir.1999) (\u201c[PJarties to an arbitration agreement need not equally bind each other with respect to an arbitration agreement if they have provided each other with consideration beyond the.promise to arbitrate.\u201d). Florida courts, too, have ruled that a valid agreement to arbitrate does not require complete mutuality of rights and obligations."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"19 So.3d 1109, 1109","parenthetical":"\"one party's agreement to submit a dispute to arbitration is sufficient consideration to support the other party's agreement to do the same because of the mutuality of obligations that the agreement creates\"","sentence":"See Rocky Creek, 19 So.3d at 1109 (\u201cone party\u2019s agreement to submit a dispute to arbitration is sufficient consideration to support the other party\u2019s agreement to do the same because of the mutuality of obligations that the agreement creates\u201d)."},"case_id":3938926,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Public officials have been convicted for being influenced in the performance of their duties in return for bribes paid to third parties.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"674 F.3d 332, 341-42","parenthetical":"Payments made to a business controlled by a Congressman's wife in exchange for official action constituted bribery.","sentence":"See United States v. Jefferson, 674 F.3d 332, 341-42 (4th Cir.2012) (Payments made to a business controlled by a Congressman\u2019s wife in exchange for official action constituted bribery.); United States v. Siegelman, 640 F.3d 1159, 1165\u2014 66 (11th Cir.2011) (Governor was guilty of federal funds bribery and honest services fraud after exchanging a seat on a state board for a donation to a foundation campaigning for a ballot initiative to establish a lottery to fund education.); cf. United States v. Spano, 421 F.3d 599, 603 (7th Cir.2005) (\u201cA participant in a scheme to defraud is guilty even if he is an altruist and all the benefits of the fraud accrue to other participants ... the public. is deprived of its servants\u2019 honest services no matter who receives the proceeds.\u201d) (internal citations omitted)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"421 F.3d 599, 603","parenthetical":"\"A participant in a scheme to defraud is guilty even if he is an altruist and all the benefits of the fraud accrue to other participants ... the public. is deprived of its servants' honest services no matter who receives the proceeds.\"","sentence":"See United States v. Jefferson, 674 F.3d 332, 341-42 (4th Cir.2012) (Payments made to a business controlled by a Congressman\u2019s wife in exchange for official action constituted bribery.); United States v. Siegelman, 640 F.3d 1159, 1165\u2014 66 (11th Cir.2011) (Governor was guilty of federal funds bribery and honest services fraud after exchanging a seat on a state board for a donation to a foundation campaigning for a ballot initiative to establish a lottery to fund education.); cf. United States v. Spano, 421 F.3d 599, 603 (7th Cir.2005) (\u201cA participant in a scheme to defraud is guilty even if he is an altruist and all the benefits of the fraud accrue to other participants ... the public. is deprived of its servants\u2019 honest services no matter who receives the proceeds.\u201d) (internal citations omitted)."},"case_id":4155825,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Public officials have been convicted for being influenced in the performance of their duties in return for bribes paid to third parties.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"421 F.3d 599, 603","parenthetical":"\"A participant in a scheme to defraud is guilty even if he is an altruist and all the benefits of the fraud accrue to other participants ... the public. is deprived of its servants' honest services no matter who receives the proceeds.\"","sentence":"See United States v. Jefferson, 674 F.3d 332, 341-42 (4th Cir.2012) (Payments made to a business controlled by a Congressman\u2019s wife in exchange for official action constituted bribery.); United States v. Siegelman, 640 F.3d 1159, 1165\u2014 66 (11th Cir.2011) (Governor was guilty of federal funds bribery and honest services fraud after exchanging a seat on a state board for a donation to a foundation campaigning for a ballot initiative to establish a lottery to fund education.); cf. United States v. Spano, 421 F.3d 599, 603 (7th Cir.2005) (\u201cA participant in a scheme to defraud is guilty even if he is an altruist and all the benefits of the fraud accrue to other participants ... the public. is deprived of its servants\u2019 honest services no matter who receives the proceeds.\u201d) (internal citations omitted)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"Governor was guilty of federal funds bribery and honest services fraud after exchanging a seat on a state board for a donation to a foundation campaigning for a ballot initiative to establish a lottery to fund education.","sentence":"See United States v. Jefferson, 674 F.3d 332, 341-42 (4th Cir.2012) (Payments made to a business controlled by a Congressman\u2019s wife in exchange for official action constituted bribery.); United States v. Siegelman, 640 F.3d 1159, 1165\u2014 66 (11th Cir.2011) (Governor was guilty of federal funds bribery and honest services fraud after exchanging a seat on a state board for a donation to a foundation campaigning for a ballot initiative to establish a lottery to fund education.); cf. United States v. Spano, 421 F.3d 599, 603 (7th Cir.2005) (\u201cA participant in a scheme to defraud is guilty even if he is an altruist and all the benefits of the fraud accrue to other participants ... the public. is deprived of its servants\u2019 honest services no matter who receives the proceeds.\u201d) (internal citations omitted)."},"case_id":4155825,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In raising a securities claim under these provisions, a claimant must plead an actionable misstatement with particularity under Rule 9(b). Where allegations concern an omission, the complaint must also plead facts indicating a duty to disclose. The claimant, however, need not plead, nor even prove for that matter, scienter to state a claim for violations of SSSS 12(F) and 12(G).","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"1996 WL 54240, at *3","parenthetical":"\"[S]cienter is not an essential element to an action under the Illinois Blue Sky laws.\"","sentence":"Foster v. Alex, 213 Ill.App.3d 1001, 157 Ill.Dec. 778, 572 N.E.2d 1242, 1245 (1991) (holding that \u201cscienter need not be pled nor proved in a civil case brought under sections 12(F) and 12(G) of the Illinois Securities Act\u201d); see Schwitters v. Tomlinson, 1996 WL 54240, at *3 (N.D.Ill. Feb. 9, 1996) (\u201c[S]cienter is not an essential element to an action under the Illinois Blue Sky laws.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that \"scienter need not be pled nor proved in a civil case brought under sections 12(F) and 12(G) of the Illinois Securities Act\"","sentence":"Foster v. Alex, 213 Ill.App.3d 1001, 157 Ill.Dec. 778, 572 N.E.2d 1242, 1245 (1991) (holding that \u201cscienter need not be pled nor proved in a civil case brought under sections 12(F) and 12(G) of the Illinois Securities Act\u201d); see Schwitters v. Tomlinson, 1996 WL 54240, at *3 (N.D.Ill. Feb. 9, 1996) (\u201c[S]cienter is not an essential element to an action under the Illinois Blue Sky laws.\u201d)."},"case_id":4270812,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In raising a securities claim under these provisions, a claimant must plead an actionable misstatement with particularity under Rule 9(b). Where allegations concern an omission, the complaint must also plead facts indicating a duty to disclose. The claimant, however, need not plead, nor even prove for that matter, scienter to state a claim for violations of SSSS 12(F) and 12(G).","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that scienter is an essential element of a claim alleged under SS 12(1) of the Illinois Security Law","sentence":"But see People v. Whitlow, 89 Ill.2d 322, 60 Ill.Dec. 587, 433 N.E.2d 629, 634 (1982) (holding that scienter is an essential element of a claim alleged under \u00a7 12(1) of the Illinois Security Law)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that \"scienter need not be pled nor proved in a civil case brought under sections 12(F) and 12(G) of the Illinois Securities Act\"","sentence":"Foster v. Alex, 213 Ill.App.3d 1001, 157 Ill.Dec. 778, 572 N.E.2d 1242, 1245 (1991) (holding that \u201cscienter need not be pled nor proved in a civil case brought under sections 12(F) and 12(G) of the Illinois Securities Act\u201d); see Schwitters v. Tomlinson, 1996 WL 54240, at *3 (N.D.Ill. Feb. 9, 1996) (\u201c[S]cienter is not an essential element to an action under the Illinois Blue Sky laws.\u201d)."},"case_id":4270812,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In raising a securities claim under these provisions, a claimant must plead an actionable misstatement with particularity under Rule 9(b). Where allegations concern an omission, the complaint must also plead facts indicating a duty to disclose. The claimant, however, need not plead, nor even prove for that matter, scienter to state a claim for violations of SSSS 12(F) and 12(G).","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that scienter is an essential element of a claim alleged under SS 12(1) of the Illinois Security Law","sentence":"But see People v. Whitlow, 89 Ill.2d 322, 60 Ill.Dec. 587, 433 N.E.2d 629, 634 (1982) (holding that scienter is an essential element of a claim alleged under \u00a7 12(1) of the Illinois Security Law)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that \"scienter need not be pled nor proved in a civil case brought under sections 12(F) and 12(G) of the Illinois Securities Act\"","sentence":"Foster v. Alex, 213 Ill.App.3d 1001, 157 Ill.Dec. 778, 572 N.E.2d 1242, 1245 (1991) (holding that \u201cscienter need not be pled nor proved in a civil case brought under sections 12(F) and 12(G) of the Illinois Securities Act\u201d); see Schwitters v. Tomlinson, 1996 WL 54240, at *3 (N.D.Ill. Feb. 9, 1996) (\u201c[S]cienter is not an essential element to an action under the Illinois Blue Sky laws.\u201d)."},"case_id":4270812,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In raising a securities claim under these provisions, a claimant must plead an actionable misstatement with particularity under Rule 9(b). Where allegations concern an omission, the complaint must also plead facts indicating a duty to disclose. The claimant, however, need not plead, nor even prove for that matter, scienter to state a claim for violations of SSSS 12(F) and 12(G).","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"433 N.E.2d 629, 634","parenthetical":"holding that scienter is an essential element of a claim alleged under SS 12(1) of the Illinois Security Law","sentence":"But see People v. Whitlow, 89 Ill.2d 322, 60 Ill.Dec. 587, 433 N.E.2d 629, 634 (1982) (holding that scienter is an essential element of a claim alleged under \u00a7 12(1) of the Illinois Security Law)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that \"scienter need not be pled nor proved in a civil case brought under sections 12(F) and 12(G) of the Illinois Securities Act\"","sentence":"Foster v. Alex, 213 Ill.App.3d 1001, 157 Ill.Dec. 778, 572 N.E.2d 1242, 1245 (1991) (holding that \u201cscienter need not be pled nor proved in a civil case brought under sections 12(F) and 12(G) of the Illinois Securities Act\u201d); see Schwitters v. Tomlinson, 1996 WL 54240, at *3 (N.D.Ill. Feb. 9, 1996) (\u201c[S]cienter is not an essential element to an action under the Illinois Blue Sky laws.\u201d)."},"case_id":4270812,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In raising a securities claim under these provisions, a claimant must plead an actionable misstatement with particularity under Rule 9(b). Where allegations concern an omission, the complaint must also plead facts indicating a duty to disclose. The claimant, however, need not plead, nor even prove for that matter, scienter to state a claim for violations of SSSS 12(F) and 12(G).","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"1996 WL 54240, at *3","parenthetical":"\"[S]cienter is not an essential element to an action under the Illinois Blue Sky laws.\"","sentence":"Foster v. Alex, 213 Ill.App.3d 1001, 157 Ill.Dec. 778, 572 N.E.2d 1242, 1245 (1991) (holding that \u201cscienter need not be pled nor proved in a civil case brought under sections 12(F) and 12(G) of the Illinois Securities Act\u201d); see Schwitters v. Tomlinson, 1996 WL 54240, at *3 (N.D.Ill. Feb. 9, 1996) (\u201c[S]cienter is not an essential element to an action under the Illinois Blue Sky laws.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that \"scienter need not be pled nor proved in a civil case brought under sections 12(F) and 12(G) of the Illinois Securities Act\"","sentence":"Foster v. Alex, 213 Ill.App.3d 1001, 157 Ill.Dec. 778, 572 N.E.2d 1242, 1245 (1991) (holding that \u201cscienter need not be pled nor proved in a civil case brought under sections 12(F) and 12(G) of the Illinois Securities Act\u201d); see Schwitters v. Tomlinson, 1996 WL 54240, at *3 (N.D.Ill. Feb. 9, 1996) (\u201c[S]cienter is not an essential element to an action under the Illinois Blue Sky laws.\u201d)."},"case_id":4270812,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In raising a securities claim under these provisions, a claimant must plead an actionable misstatement with particularity under Rule 9(b). Where allegations concern an omission, the complaint must also plead facts indicating a duty to disclose. The claimant, however, need not plead, nor even prove for that matter, scienter to state a claim for violations of SSSS 12(F) and 12(G).","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that \"scienter need not be pled nor proved in a civil case brought under sections 12(F) and 12(G) of the Illinois Securities Act\"","sentence":"Foster v. Alex, 213 Ill.App.3d 1001, 157 Ill.Dec. 778, 572 N.E.2d 1242, 1245 (1991) (holding that \u201cscienter need not be pled nor proved in a civil case brought under sections 12(F) and 12(G) of the Illinois Securities Act\u201d); see Schwitters v. Tomlinson, 1996 WL 54240, at *3 (N.D.Ill. Feb. 9, 1996) (\u201c[S]cienter is not an essential element to an action under the Illinois Blue Sky laws.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that scienter is an essential element of a claim alleged under SS 12(1) of the Illinois Security Law","sentence":"But see People v. Whitlow, 89 Ill.2d 322, 60 Ill.Dec. 587, 433 N.E.2d 629, 634 (1982) (holding that scienter is an essential element of a claim alleged under \u00a7 12(1) of the Illinois Security Law)."},"case_id":4270812,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In raising a securities claim under these provisions, a claimant must plead an actionable misstatement with particularity under Rule 9(b). Where allegations concern an omission, the complaint must also plead facts indicating a duty to disclose. The claimant, however, need not plead, nor even prove for that matter, scienter to state a claim for violations of SSSS 12(F) and 12(G).","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that \"scienter need not be pled nor proved in a civil case brought under sections 12(F) and 12(G) of the Illinois Securities Act\"","sentence":"Foster v. Alex, 213 Ill.App.3d 1001, 157 Ill.Dec. 778, 572 N.E.2d 1242, 1245 (1991) (holding that \u201cscienter need not be pled nor proved in a civil case brought under sections 12(F) and 12(G) of the Illinois Securities Act\u201d); see Schwitters v. Tomlinson, 1996 WL 54240, at *3 (N.D.Ill. Feb. 9, 1996) (\u201c[S]cienter is not an essential element to an action under the Illinois Blue Sky laws.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that scienter is an essential element of a claim alleged under SS 12(1) of the Illinois Security Law","sentence":"But see People v. Whitlow, 89 Ill.2d 322, 60 Ill.Dec. 587, 433 N.E.2d 629, 634 (1982) (holding that scienter is an essential element of a claim alleged under \u00a7 12(1) of the Illinois Security Law)."},"case_id":4270812,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In raising a securities claim under these provisions, a claimant must plead an actionable misstatement with particularity under Rule 9(b). Where allegations concern an omission, the complaint must also plead facts indicating a duty to disclose. The claimant, however, need not plead, nor even prove for that matter, scienter to state a claim for violations of SSSS 12(F) and 12(G).","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"433 N.E.2d 629, 634","parenthetical":"holding that scienter is an essential element of a claim alleged under SS 12(1) of the Illinois Security Law","sentence":"But see People v. Whitlow, 89 Ill.2d 322, 60 Ill.Dec. 587, 433 N.E.2d 629, 634 (1982) (holding that scienter is an essential element of a claim alleged under \u00a7 12(1) of the Illinois Security Law)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that \"scienter need not be pled nor proved in a civil case brought under sections 12(F) and 12(G) of the Illinois Securities Act\"","sentence":"Foster v. Alex, 213 Ill.App.3d 1001, 157 Ill.Dec. 778, 572 N.E.2d 1242, 1245 (1991) (holding that \u201cscienter need not be pled nor proved in a civil case brought under sections 12(F) and 12(G) of the Illinois Securities Act\u201d); see Schwitters v. Tomlinson, 1996 WL 54240, at *3 (N.D.Ill. Feb. 9, 1996) (\u201c[S]cienter is not an essential element to an action under the Illinois Blue Sky laws.\u201d)."},"case_id":4270812,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In raising a securities claim under these provisions, a claimant must plead an actionable misstatement with particularity under Rule 9(b). Where allegations concern an omission, the complaint must also plead facts indicating a duty to disclose. The claimant, however, need not plead, nor even prove for that matter, scienter to state a claim for violations of SSSS 12(F) and 12(G).","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"1996 WL 54240, at *3","parenthetical":"\"[S]cienter is not an essential element to an action under the Illinois Blue Sky laws.\"","sentence":"Foster v. Alex, 213 Ill.App.3d 1001, 157 Ill.Dec. 778, 572 N.E.2d 1242, 1245 (1991) (holding that \u201cscienter need not be pled nor proved in a civil case brought under sections 12(F) and 12(G) of the Illinois Securities Act\u201d); see Schwitters v. Tomlinson, 1996 WL 54240, at *3 (N.D.Ill. Feb. 9, 1996) (\u201c[S]cienter is not an essential element to an action under the Illinois Blue Sky laws.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"572 N.E.2d 1242, 1245","parenthetical":"holding that \"scienter need not be pled nor proved in a civil case brought under sections 12(F) and 12(G) of the Illinois Securities Act\"","sentence":"Foster v. Alex, 213 Ill.App.3d 1001, 157 Ill.Dec. 778, 572 N.E.2d 1242, 1245 (1991) (holding that \u201cscienter need not be pled nor proved in a civil case brought under sections 12(F) and 12(G) of the Illinois Securities Act\u201d); see Schwitters v. Tomlinson, 1996 WL 54240, at *3 (N.D.Ill. Feb. 9, 1996) (\u201c[S]cienter is not an essential element to an action under the Illinois Blue Sky laws.\u201d)."},"case_id":4270812,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In raising a securities claim under these provisions, a claimant must plead an actionable misstatement with particularity under Rule 9(b). Where allegations concern an omission, the complaint must also plead facts indicating a duty to disclose. The claimant, however, need not plead, nor even prove for that matter, scienter to state a claim for violations of SSSS 12(F) and 12(G).","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"572 N.E.2d 1242, 1245","parenthetical":"holding that \"scienter need not be pled nor proved in a civil case brought under sections 12(F) and 12(G) of the Illinois Securities Act\"","sentence":"Foster v. Alex, 213 Ill.App.3d 1001, 157 Ill.Dec. 778, 572 N.E.2d 1242, 1245 (1991) (holding that \u201cscienter need not be pled nor proved in a civil case brought under sections 12(F) and 12(G) of the Illinois Securities Act\u201d); see Schwitters v. Tomlinson, 1996 WL 54240, at *3 (N.D.Ill. Feb. 9, 1996) (\u201c[S]cienter is not an essential element to an action under the Illinois Blue Sky laws.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that scienter is an essential element of a claim alleged under SS 12(1) of the Illinois Security Law","sentence":"But see People v. Whitlow, 89 Ill.2d 322, 60 Ill.Dec. 587, 433 N.E.2d 629, 634 (1982) (holding that scienter is an essential element of a claim alleged under \u00a7 12(1) of the Illinois Security Law)."},"case_id":4270812,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In raising a securities claim under these provisions, a claimant must plead an actionable misstatement with particularity under Rule 9(b). Where allegations concern an omission, the complaint must also plead facts indicating a duty to disclose. The claimant, however, need not plead, nor even prove for that matter, scienter to state a claim for violations of SSSS 12(F) and 12(G).","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that scienter is an essential element of a claim alleged under SS 12(1) of the Illinois Security Law","sentence":"But see People v. Whitlow, 89 Ill.2d 322, 60 Ill.Dec. 587, 433 N.E.2d 629, 634 (1982) (holding that scienter is an essential element of a claim alleged under \u00a7 12(1) of the Illinois Security Law)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"572 N.E.2d 1242, 1245","parenthetical":"holding that \"scienter need not be pled nor proved in a civil case brought under sections 12(F) and 12(G) of the Illinois Securities Act\"","sentence":"Foster v. Alex, 213 Ill.App.3d 1001, 157 Ill.Dec. 778, 572 N.E.2d 1242, 1245 (1991) (holding that \u201cscienter need not be pled nor proved in a civil case brought under sections 12(F) and 12(G) of the Illinois Securities Act\u201d); see Schwitters v. Tomlinson, 1996 WL 54240, at *3 (N.D.Ill. Feb. 9, 1996) (\u201c[S]cienter is not an essential element to an action under the Illinois Blue Sky laws.\u201d)."},"case_id":4270812,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In raising a securities claim under these provisions, a claimant must plead an actionable misstatement with particularity under Rule 9(b). Where allegations concern an omission, the complaint must also plead facts indicating a duty to disclose. The claimant, however, need not plead, nor even prove for that matter, scienter to state a claim for violations of SSSS 12(F) and 12(G).","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"433 N.E.2d 629, 634","parenthetical":"holding that scienter is an essential element of a claim alleged under SS 12(1) of the Illinois Security Law","sentence":"But see People v. Whitlow, 89 Ill.2d 322, 60 Ill.Dec. 587, 433 N.E.2d 629, 634 (1982) (holding that scienter is an essential element of a claim alleged under \u00a7 12(1) of the Illinois Security Law)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"572 N.E.2d 1242, 1245","parenthetical":"holding that \"scienter need not be pled nor proved in a civil case brought under sections 12(F) and 12(G) of the Illinois Securities Act\"","sentence":"Foster v. Alex, 213 Ill.App.3d 1001, 157 Ill.Dec. 778, 572 N.E.2d 1242, 1245 (1991) (holding that \u201cscienter need not be pled nor proved in a civil case brought under sections 12(F) and 12(G) of the Illinois Securities Act\u201d); see Schwitters v. Tomlinson, 1996 WL 54240, at *3 (N.D.Ill. Feb. 9, 1996) (\u201c[S]cienter is not an essential element to an action under the Illinois Blue Sky laws.\u201d)."},"case_id":4270812,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In raising a securities claim under these provisions, a claimant must plead an actionable misstatement with particularity under Rule 9(b). Where allegations concern an omission, the complaint must also plead facts indicating a duty to disclose. The claimant, however, need not plead, nor even prove for that matter, scienter to state a claim for violations of SSSS 12(F) and 12(G).","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"1996 WL 54240, at *3","parenthetical":"\"[S]cienter is not an essential element to an action under the Illinois Blue Sky laws.\"","sentence":"Foster v. Alex, 213 Ill.App.3d 1001, 157 Ill.Dec. 778, 572 N.E.2d 1242, 1245 (1991) (holding that \u201cscienter need not be pled nor proved in a civil case brought under sections 12(F) and 12(G) of the Illinois Securities Act\u201d); see Schwitters v. Tomlinson, 1996 WL 54240, at *3 (N.D.Ill. Feb. 9, 1996) (\u201c[S]cienter is not an essential element to an action under the Illinois Blue Sky laws.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that scienter is an essential element of a claim alleged under SS 12(1) of the Illinois Security Law","sentence":"But see People v. Whitlow, 89 Ill.2d 322, 60 Ill.Dec. 587, 433 N.E.2d 629, 634 (1982) (holding that scienter is an essential element of a claim alleged under \u00a7 12(1) of the Illinois Security Law)."},"case_id":4270812,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In raising a securities claim under these provisions, a claimant must plead an actionable misstatement with particularity under Rule 9(b). Where allegations concern an omission, the complaint must also plead facts indicating a duty to disclose. The claimant, however, need not plead, nor even prove for that matter, scienter to state a claim for violations of SSSS 12(F) and 12(G).","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that scienter is an essential element of a claim alleged under SS 12(1) of the Illinois Security Law","sentence":"But see People v. Whitlow, 89 Ill.2d 322, 60 Ill.Dec. 587, 433 N.E.2d 629, 634 (1982) (holding that scienter is an essential element of a claim alleged under \u00a7 12(1) of the Illinois Security Law)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"1996 WL 54240, at *3","parenthetical":"\"[S]cienter is not an essential element to an action under the Illinois Blue Sky laws.\"","sentence":"Foster v. Alex, 213 Ill.App.3d 1001, 157 Ill.Dec. 778, 572 N.E.2d 1242, 1245 (1991) (holding that \u201cscienter need not be pled nor proved in a civil case brought under sections 12(F) and 12(G) of the Illinois Securities Act\u201d); see Schwitters v. Tomlinson, 1996 WL 54240, at *3 (N.D.Ill. Feb. 9, 1996) (\u201c[S]cienter is not an essential element to an action under the Illinois Blue Sky laws.\u201d)."},"case_id":4270812,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In raising a securities claim under these provisions, a claimant must plead an actionable misstatement with particularity under Rule 9(b). Where allegations concern an omission, the complaint must also plead facts indicating a duty to disclose. The claimant, however, need not plead, nor even prove for that matter, scienter to state a claim for violations of SSSS 12(F) and 12(G).","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"433 N.E.2d 629, 634","parenthetical":"holding that scienter is an essential element of a claim alleged under SS 12(1) of the Illinois Security Law","sentence":"But see People v. Whitlow, 89 Ill.2d 322, 60 Ill.Dec. 587, 433 N.E.2d 629, 634 (1982) (holding that scienter is an essential element of a claim alleged under \u00a7 12(1) of the Illinois Security Law)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"1996 WL 54240, at *3","parenthetical":"\"[S]cienter is not an essential element to an action under the Illinois Blue Sky laws.\"","sentence":"Foster v. Alex, 213 Ill.App.3d 1001, 157 Ill.Dec. 778, 572 N.E.2d 1242, 1245 (1991) (holding that \u201cscienter need not be pled nor proved in a civil case brought under sections 12(F) and 12(G) of the Illinois Securities Act\u201d); see Schwitters v. Tomlinson, 1996 WL 54240, at *3 (N.D.Ill. Feb. 9, 1996) (\u201c[S]cienter is not an essential element to an action under the Illinois Blue Sky laws.\u201d)."},"case_id":4270812,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Here, the Court will not stay any claim that has exclusive federal jurisdiction (or any claim based on federal law), and rather, if the Colorado River balancing test mandates, will stay claims based on state law, and subject to concurrent jurisdiction. Claims subject to concurrent jurisdiction are precisely the type contemplated by Colorado River.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"868 F.2d 1115, 1115","parenthetical":"The \"Colorado River doctrine ... applies to claims under the concurrent jurisdiction of the federal and state courts\".","sentence":"See also Minucci, 868 F.2d at 1115 (The \u201cColorado River doctrine ... applies to claims under the concurrent jurisdiction of the federal and state courts\u201d.)"},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"670 F.2d 821, 821","parenthetical":"stating that Colorado River \"is invoked when both the federal and state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over particular claims \"","sentence":"Turf Paradise, 670 F.2d at 821 (stating that Colorado River \u201cis invoked when both the federal and state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over particular claims \u201d) (emphasis added)."},"case_id":3771349,"label":"b"}
{"context":"This Court \"retains the discretion to seek supplemental submissions from the parties if it decides that more information is necessary to determine whether petitioners, in fact, have standing.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"469 F.3d 129, 132","parenthetical":"supplemental briefing sought where agency first challenged standing after panel opinion issued","sentence":"Am. Library Ass\u2019n v. FCC, 401 F.3d 489, 494 (D.C.Cir.2005); see, e.g., Am. Chemistry Council v. Dep\u2019t of Transp., 468 F.3d 810, 815 (D.C.Cir.2006) (\u201c[W]e raised the issue of standing at oral argument and requested supplemental briefing.\u201d); Action on Smoking & Health v. Dep\u2019t of Labor, 100 F.3d 991, 992 (D.C.Cir.1996) (petitioner \u201cfurnished post-argument affidavits at our request\u201d); see also Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. Von Eschenbach, 469 F.3d 129, 132 (D.C.Cir.2006) (supplemental briefing sought where agency first challenged standing after panel opinion issued)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"468 F.3d 810, 815","parenthetical":"\"[W]e raised the issue of standing at oral argument and requested supplemental briefing.\"","sentence":"Am. Library Ass\u2019n v. FCC, 401 F.3d 489, 494 (D.C.Cir.2005); see, e.g., Am. Chemistry Council v. Dep\u2019t of Transp., 468 F.3d 810, 815 (D.C.Cir.2006) (\u201c[W]e raised the issue of standing at oral argument and requested supplemental briefing.\u201d); Action on Smoking & Health v. Dep\u2019t of Labor, 100 F.3d 991, 992 (D.C.Cir.1996) (petitioner \u201cfurnished post-argument affidavits at our request\u201d); see also Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. Von Eschenbach, 469 F.3d 129, 132 (D.C.Cir.2006) (supplemental briefing sought where agency first challenged standing after panel opinion issued)."},"case_id":3485402,"label":"b"}
{"context":"We have sometimes allowed a defendant to preserve a district court error as long as one of his codefendants objected below.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"589 F.2d 1283, 1290","parenthetical":"holding that objection to instructions by codefendant's counsel is sufficient to preserve any error","sentence":"See United States v. White, 589 F.2d 1283, 1290 (5th Cir.1979) (holding that objection to instructions by codefendant\u2019s counsel is sufficient to preserve any error); Love, 472 F.2d at 496 (holding that the failure of one codefendant\u2019s counsel \u201cto move to suppress the evidence or to object to its introduction should be excused because such a motion or objection would have been a useless formality\u201d given fact that other codefendant\u2019s counsel had made motion to suppress); see also United States v. Pardo, 636 F.2d 535, 541 (D.C.Cir.1980) (\u201cWe recognize that in certain situations, it may be redundant and inefficient to require each defendant in a joint trial to stand up individually and make every objection to preserve each error for appeal.\u201d); Cassity, 631 F.2d at 466 (\u201cUnder these circumstances, we hold the remaining appellants did not waive their fourth amendment objections by neglecting to perform the useless and purely formal act of joining Cassity in moving to suppress.\u201d); United States v. Bagby, 451 F.2d 920, 927 (9th Cir.1971) (ruling that objection to instructions by codefendant\u2019s counsel preserves any error); cf. United States v. Alvarez, 584 F.2d 694, 697 (5th Cir.1978) (ruling that since \u201c[t]he trial court had already ruled adversely to defendant\u2019s contention ... there was no need for the defense to make the assuredly futile gesture of repeating its objection\u201d); Lefkowitz, 284 F.2d at 313 n. 1 (ruling that \u201c[w]e do not regard the failure of Dryja\u2019s counsel to except as barring Dryja from seeking reversal for error in the charge; Lefkowitz\u2019s exception called the matter to the judge\u2019s attention and further exception would have been fruitless\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"636 F.2d 535, 541","parenthetical":"\"We recognize that in certain situations, it may be redundant and inefficient to require each defendant in a joint trial to stand up individually and make every objection to preserve each error for appeal.\"","sentence":"See United States v. White, 589 F.2d 1283, 1290 (5th Cir.1979) (holding that objection to instructions by codefendant\u2019s counsel is sufficient to preserve any error); Love, 472 F.2d at 496 (holding that the failure of one codefendant\u2019s counsel \u201cto move to suppress the evidence or to object to its introduction should be excused because such a motion or objection would have been a useless formality\u201d given fact that other codefendant\u2019s counsel had made motion to suppress); see also United States v. Pardo, 636 F.2d 535, 541 (D.C.Cir.1980) (\u201cWe recognize that in certain situations, it may be redundant and inefficient to require each defendant in a joint trial to stand up individually and make every objection to preserve each error for appeal.\u201d); Cassity, 631 F.2d at 466 (\u201cUnder these circumstances, we hold the remaining appellants did not waive their fourth amendment objections by neglecting to perform the useless and purely formal act of joining Cassity in moving to suppress.\u201d); United States v. Bagby, 451 F.2d 920, 927 (9th Cir.1971) (ruling that objection to instructions by codefendant\u2019s counsel preserves any error); cf. United States v. Alvarez, 584 F.2d 694, 697 (5th Cir.1978) (ruling that since \u201c[t]he trial court had already ruled adversely to defendant\u2019s contention ... there was no need for the defense to make the assuredly futile gesture of repeating its objection\u201d); Lefkowitz, 284 F.2d at 313 n. 1 (ruling that \u201c[w]e do not regard the failure of Dryja\u2019s counsel to except as barring Dryja from seeking reversal for error in the charge; Lefkowitz\u2019s exception called the matter to the judge\u2019s attention and further exception would have been fruitless\u201d)."},"case_id":199941,"label":"a"}
{"context":"We have sometimes allowed a defendant to preserve a district court error as long as one of his codefendants objected below.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"589 F.2d 1283, 1290","parenthetical":"holding that objection to instructions by codefendant's counsel is sufficient to preserve any error","sentence":"See United States v. White, 589 F.2d 1283, 1290 (5th Cir.1979) (holding that objection to instructions by codefendant\u2019s counsel is sufficient to preserve any error); Love, 472 F.2d at 496 (holding that the failure of one codefendant\u2019s counsel \u201cto move to suppress the evidence or to object to its introduction should be excused because such a motion or objection would have been a useless formality\u201d given fact that other codefendant\u2019s counsel had made motion to suppress); see also United States v. Pardo, 636 F.2d 535, 541 (D.C.Cir.1980) (\u201cWe recognize that in certain situations, it may be redundant and inefficient to require each defendant in a joint trial to stand up individually and make every objection to preserve each error for appeal.\u201d); Cassity, 631 F.2d at 466 (\u201cUnder these circumstances, we hold the remaining appellants did not waive their fourth amendment objections by neglecting to perform the useless and purely formal act of joining Cassity in moving to suppress.\u201d); United States v. Bagby, 451 F.2d 920, 927 (9th Cir.1971) (ruling that objection to instructions by codefendant\u2019s counsel preserves any error); cf. United States v. Alvarez, 584 F.2d 694, 697 (5th Cir.1978) (ruling that since \u201c[t]he trial court had already ruled adversely to defendant\u2019s contention ... there was no need for the defense to make the assuredly futile gesture of repeating its objection\u201d); Lefkowitz, 284 F.2d at 313 n. 1 (ruling that \u201c[w]e do not regard the failure of Dryja\u2019s counsel to except as barring Dryja from seeking reversal for error in the charge; Lefkowitz\u2019s exception called the matter to the judge\u2019s attention and further exception would have been fruitless\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"631 F.2d 466, 466","parenthetical":"\"Under these circumstances, we hold the remaining appellants did not waive their fourth amendment objections by neglecting to perform the useless and purely formal act of joining Cassity in moving to suppress.\"","sentence":"See United States v. White, 589 F.2d 1283, 1290 (5th Cir.1979) (holding that objection to instructions by codefendant\u2019s counsel is sufficient to preserve any error); Love, 472 F.2d at 496 (holding that the failure of one codefendant\u2019s counsel \u201cto move to suppress the evidence or to object to its introduction should be excused because such a motion or objection would have been a useless formality\u201d given fact that other codefendant\u2019s counsel had made motion to suppress); see also United States v. Pardo, 636 F.2d 535, 541 (D.C.Cir.1980) (\u201cWe recognize that in certain situations, it may be redundant and inefficient to require each defendant in a joint trial to stand up individually and make every objection to preserve each error for appeal.\u201d); Cassity, 631 F.2d at 466 (\u201cUnder these circumstances, we hold the remaining appellants did not waive their fourth amendment objections by neglecting to perform the useless and purely formal act of joining Cassity in moving to suppress.\u201d); United States v. Bagby, 451 F.2d 920, 927 (9th Cir.1971) (ruling that objection to instructions by codefendant\u2019s counsel preserves any error); cf. United States v. Alvarez, 584 F.2d 694, 697 (5th Cir.1978) (ruling that since \u201c[t]he trial court had already ruled adversely to defendant\u2019s contention ... there was no need for the defense to make the assuredly futile gesture of repeating its objection\u201d); Lefkowitz, 284 F.2d at 313 n. 1 (ruling that \u201c[w]e do not regard the failure of Dryja\u2019s counsel to except as barring Dryja from seeking reversal for error in the charge; Lefkowitz\u2019s exception called the matter to the judge\u2019s attention and further exception would have been fruitless\u201d)."},"case_id":199941,"label":"a"}
{"context":"We have sometimes allowed a defendant to preserve a district court error as long as one of his codefendants objected below.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"589 F.2d 1283, 1290","parenthetical":"holding that objection to instructions by codefendant's counsel is sufficient to preserve any error","sentence":"See United States v. White, 589 F.2d 1283, 1290 (5th Cir.1979) (holding that objection to instructions by codefendant\u2019s counsel is sufficient to preserve any error); Love, 472 F.2d at 496 (holding that the failure of one codefendant\u2019s counsel \u201cto move to suppress the evidence or to object to its introduction should be excused because such a motion or objection would have been a useless formality\u201d given fact that other codefendant\u2019s counsel had made motion to suppress); see also United States v. Pardo, 636 F.2d 535, 541 (D.C.Cir.1980) (\u201cWe recognize that in certain situations, it may be redundant and inefficient to require each defendant in a joint trial to stand up individually and make every objection to preserve each error for appeal.\u201d); Cassity, 631 F.2d at 466 (\u201cUnder these circumstances, we hold the remaining appellants did not waive their fourth amendment objections by neglecting to perform the useless and purely formal act of joining Cassity in moving to suppress.\u201d); United States v. Bagby, 451 F.2d 920, 927 (9th Cir.1971) (ruling that objection to instructions by codefendant\u2019s counsel preserves any error); cf. United States v. Alvarez, 584 F.2d 694, 697 (5th Cir.1978) (ruling that since \u201c[t]he trial court had already ruled adversely to defendant\u2019s contention ... there was no need for the defense to make the assuredly futile gesture of repeating its objection\u201d); Lefkowitz, 284 F.2d at 313 n. 1 (ruling that \u201c[w]e do not regard the failure of Dryja\u2019s counsel to except as barring Dryja from seeking reversal for error in the charge; Lefkowitz\u2019s exception called the matter to the judge\u2019s attention and further exception would have been fruitless\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"451 F.2d 920, 927","parenthetical":"ruling that objection to instructions by codefendant's counsel preserves any error","sentence":"See United States v. White, 589 F.2d 1283, 1290 (5th Cir.1979) (holding that objection to instructions by codefendant\u2019s counsel is sufficient to preserve any error); Love, 472 F.2d at 496 (holding that the failure of one codefendant\u2019s counsel \u201cto move to suppress the evidence or to object to its introduction should be excused because such a motion or objection would have been a useless formality\u201d given fact that other codefendant\u2019s counsel had made motion to suppress); see also United States v. Pardo, 636 F.2d 535, 541 (D.C.Cir.1980) (\u201cWe recognize that in certain situations, it may be redundant and inefficient to require each defendant in a joint trial to stand up individually and make every objection to preserve each error for appeal.\u201d); Cassity, 631 F.2d at 466 (\u201cUnder these circumstances, we hold the remaining appellants did not waive their fourth amendment objections by neglecting to perform the useless and purely formal act of joining Cassity in moving to suppress.\u201d); United States v. Bagby, 451 F.2d 920, 927 (9th Cir.1971) (ruling that objection to instructions by codefendant\u2019s counsel preserves any error); cf. United States v. Alvarez, 584 F.2d 694, 697 (5th Cir.1978) (ruling that since \u201c[t]he trial court had already ruled adversely to defendant\u2019s contention ... there was no need for the defense to make the assuredly futile gesture of repeating its objection\u201d); Lefkowitz, 284 F.2d at 313 n. 1 (ruling that \u201c[w]e do not regard the failure of Dryja\u2019s counsel to except as barring Dryja from seeking reversal for error in the charge; Lefkowitz\u2019s exception called the matter to the judge\u2019s attention and further exception would have been fruitless\u201d)."},"case_id":199941,"label":"a"}
{"context":"We have sometimes allowed a defendant to preserve a district court error as long as one of his codefendants objected below.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"589 F.2d 1283, 1290","parenthetical":"holding that objection to instructions by codefendant's counsel is sufficient to preserve any error","sentence":"See United States v. White, 589 F.2d 1283, 1290 (5th Cir.1979) (holding that objection to instructions by codefendant\u2019s counsel is sufficient to preserve any error); Love, 472 F.2d at 496 (holding that the failure of one codefendant\u2019s counsel \u201cto move to suppress the evidence or to object to its introduction should be excused because such a motion or objection would have been a useless formality\u201d given fact that other codefendant\u2019s counsel had made motion to suppress); see also United States v. Pardo, 636 F.2d 535, 541 (D.C.Cir.1980) (\u201cWe recognize that in certain situations, it may be redundant and inefficient to require each defendant in a joint trial to stand up individually and make every objection to preserve each error for appeal.\u201d); Cassity, 631 F.2d at 466 (\u201cUnder these circumstances, we hold the remaining appellants did not waive their fourth amendment objections by neglecting to perform the useless and purely formal act of joining Cassity in moving to suppress.\u201d); United States v. Bagby, 451 F.2d 920, 927 (9th Cir.1971) (ruling that objection to instructions by codefendant\u2019s counsel preserves any error); cf. United States v. Alvarez, 584 F.2d 694, 697 (5th Cir.1978) (ruling that since \u201c[t]he trial court had already ruled adversely to defendant\u2019s contention ... there was no need for the defense to make the assuredly futile gesture of repeating its objection\u201d); Lefkowitz, 284 F.2d at 313 n. 1 (ruling that \u201c[w]e do not regard the failure of Dryja\u2019s counsel to except as barring Dryja from seeking reversal for error in the charge; Lefkowitz\u2019s exception called the matter to the judge\u2019s attention and further exception would have been fruitless\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"584 F.2d 694, 697","parenthetical":"ruling that since \"[t]he trial court had already ruled adversely to defendant's contention ... there was no need for the defense to make the assuredly futile gesture of repeating its objection\"","sentence":"See United States v. White, 589 F.2d 1283, 1290 (5th Cir.1979) (holding that objection to instructions by codefendant\u2019s counsel is sufficient to preserve any error); Love, 472 F.2d at 496 (holding that the failure of one codefendant\u2019s counsel \u201cto move to suppress the evidence or to object to its introduction should be excused because such a motion or objection would have been a useless formality\u201d given fact that other codefendant\u2019s counsel had made motion to suppress); see also United States v. Pardo, 636 F.2d 535, 541 (D.C.Cir.1980) (\u201cWe recognize that in certain situations, it may be redundant and inefficient to require each defendant in a joint trial to stand up individually and make every objection to preserve each error for appeal.\u201d); Cassity, 631 F.2d at 466 (\u201cUnder these circumstances, we hold the remaining appellants did not waive their fourth amendment objections by neglecting to perform the useless and purely formal act of joining Cassity in moving to suppress.\u201d); United States v. Bagby, 451 F.2d 920, 927 (9th Cir.1971) (ruling that objection to instructions by codefendant\u2019s counsel preserves any error); cf. United States v. Alvarez, 584 F.2d 694, 697 (5th Cir.1978) (ruling that since \u201c[t]he trial court had already ruled adversely to defendant\u2019s contention ... there was no need for the defense to make the assuredly futile gesture of repeating its objection\u201d); Lefkowitz, 284 F.2d at 313 n. 1 (ruling that \u201c[w]e do not regard the failure of Dryja\u2019s counsel to except as barring Dryja from seeking reversal for error in the charge; Lefkowitz\u2019s exception called the matter to the judge\u2019s attention and further exception would have been fruitless\u201d)."},"case_id":199941,"label":"a"}
{"context":"We have sometimes allowed a defendant to preserve a district court error as long as one of his codefendants objected below.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"472 F.2d 496, 496","parenthetical":"holding that the failure of one codefendant's counsel \"to move to suppress the evidence or to object to its introduction should be excused because such a motion or objection would have been a useless formality\" given fact that other codefendant's counsel had made motion to suppress","sentence":"See United States v. White, 589 F.2d 1283, 1290 (5th Cir.1979) (holding that objection to instructions by codefendant\u2019s counsel is sufficient to preserve any error); Love, 472 F.2d at 496 (holding that the failure of one codefendant\u2019s counsel \u201cto move to suppress the evidence or to object to its introduction should be excused because such a motion or objection would have been a useless formality\u201d given fact that other codefendant\u2019s counsel had made motion to suppress); see also United States v. Pardo, 636 F.2d 535, 541 (D.C.Cir.1980) (\u201cWe recognize that in certain situations, it may be redundant and inefficient to require each defendant in a joint trial to stand up individually and make every objection to preserve each error for appeal.\u201d); Cassity, 631 F.2d at 466 (\u201cUnder these circumstances, we hold the remaining appellants did not waive their fourth amendment objections by neglecting to perform the useless and purely formal act of joining Cassity in moving to suppress.\u201d); United States v. Bagby, 451 F.2d 920, 927 (9th Cir.1971) (ruling that objection to instructions by codefendant\u2019s counsel preserves any error); cf. United States v. Alvarez, 584 F.2d 694, 697 (5th Cir.1978) (ruling that since \u201c[t]he trial court had already ruled adversely to defendant\u2019s contention ... there was no need for the defense to make the assuredly futile gesture of repeating its objection\u201d); Lefkowitz, 284 F.2d at 313 n. 1 (ruling that \u201c[w]e do not regard the failure of Dryja\u2019s counsel to except as barring Dryja from seeking reversal for error in the charge; Lefkowitz\u2019s exception called the matter to the judge\u2019s attention and further exception would have been fruitless\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"636 F.2d 535, 541","parenthetical":"\"We recognize that in certain situations, it may be redundant and inefficient to require each defendant in a joint trial to stand up individually and make every objection to preserve each error for appeal.\"","sentence":"See United States v. White, 589 F.2d 1283, 1290 (5th Cir.1979) (holding that objection to instructions by codefendant\u2019s counsel is sufficient to preserve any error); Love, 472 F.2d at 496 (holding that the failure of one codefendant\u2019s counsel \u201cto move to suppress the evidence or to object to its introduction should be excused because such a motion or objection would have been a useless formality\u201d given fact that other codefendant\u2019s counsel had made motion to suppress); see also United States v. Pardo, 636 F.2d 535, 541 (D.C.Cir.1980) (\u201cWe recognize that in certain situations, it may be redundant and inefficient to require each defendant in a joint trial to stand up individually and make every objection to preserve each error for appeal.\u201d); Cassity, 631 F.2d at 466 (\u201cUnder these circumstances, we hold the remaining appellants did not waive their fourth amendment objections by neglecting to perform the useless and purely formal act of joining Cassity in moving to suppress.\u201d); United States v. Bagby, 451 F.2d 920, 927 (9th Cir.1971) (ruling that objection to instructions by codefendant\u2019s counsel preserves any error); cf. United States v. Alvarez, 584 F.2d 694, 697 (5th Cir.1978) (ruling that since \u201c[t]he trial court had already ruled adversely to defendant\u2019s contention ... there was no need for the defense to make the assuredly futile gesture of repeating its objection\u201d); Lefkowitz, 284 F.2d at 313 n. 1 (ruling that \u201c[w]e do not regard the failure of Dryja\u2019s counsel to except as barring Dryja from seeking reversal for error in the charge; Lefkowitz\u2019s exception called the matter to the judge\u2019s attention and further exception would have been fruitless\u201d)."},"case_id":199941,"label":"a"}
{"context":"We have sometimes allowed a defendant to preserve a district court error as long as one of his codefendants objected below.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"472 F.2d 496, 496","parenthetical":"holding that the failure of one codefendant's counsel \"to move to suppress the evidence or to object to its introduction should be excused because such a motion or objection would have been a useless formality\" given fact that other codefendant's counsel had made motion to suppress","sentence":"See United States v. White, 589 F.2d 1283, 1290 (5th Cir.1979) (holding that objection to instructions by codefendant\u2019s counsel is sufficient to preserve any error); Love, 472 F.2d at 496 (holding that the failure of one codefendant\u2019s counsel \u201cto move to suppress the evidence or to object to its introduction should be excused because such a motion or objection would have been a useless formality\u201d given fact that other codefendant\u2019s counsel had made motion to suppress); see also United States v. Pardo, 636 F.2d 535, 541 (D.C.Cir.1980) (\u201cWe recognize that in certain situations, it may be redundant and inefficient to require each defendant in a joint trial to stand up individually and make every objection to preserve each error for appeal.\u201d); Cassity, 631 F.2d at 466 (\u201cUnder these circumstances, we hold the remaining appellants did not waive their fourth amendment objections by neglecting to perform the useless and purely formal act of joining Cassity in moving to suppress.\u201d); United States v. Bagby, 451 F.2d 920, 927 (9th Cir.1971) (ruling that objection to instructions by codefendant\u2019s counsel preserves any error); cf. United States v. Alvarez, 584 F.2d 694, 697 (5th Cir.1978) (ruling that since \u201c[t]he trial court had already ruled adversely to defendant\u2019s contention ... there was no need for the defense to make the assuredly futile gesture of repeating its objection\u201d); Lefkowitz, 284 F.2d at 313 n. 1 (ruling that \u201c[w]e do not regard the failure of Dryja\u2019s counsel to except as barring Dryja from seeking reversal for error in the charge; Lefkowitz\u2019s exception called the matter to the judge\u2019s attention and further exception would have been fruitless\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"631 F.2d 466, 466","parenthetical":"\"Under these circumstances, we hold the remaining appellants did not waive their fourth amendment objections by neglecting to perform the useless and purely formal act of joining Cassity in moving to suppress.\"","sentence":"See United States v. White, 589 F.2d 1283, 1290 (5th Cir.1979) (holding that objection to instructions by codefendant\u2019s counsel is sufficient to preserve any error); Love, 472 F.2d at 496 (holding that the failure of one codefendant\u2019s counsel \u201cto move to suppress the evidence or to object to its introduction should be excused because such a motion or objection would have been a useless formality\u201d given fact that other codefendant\u2019s counsel had made motion to suppress); see also United States v. Pardo, 636 F.2d 535, 541 (D.C.Cir.1980) (\u201cWe recognize that in certain situations, it may be redundant and inefficient to require each defendant in a joint trial to stand up individually and make every objection to preserve each error for appeal.\u201d); Cassity, 631 F.2d at 466 (\u201cUnder these circumstances, we hold the remaining appellants did not waive their fourth amendment objections by neglecting to perform the useless and purely formal act of joining Cassity in moving to suppress.\u201d); United States v. Bagby, 451 F.2d 920, 927 (9th Cir.1971) (ruling that objection to instructions by codefendant\u2019s counsel preserves any error); cf. United States v. Alvarez, 584 F.2d 694, 697 (5th Cir.1978) (ruling that since \u201c[t]he trial court had already ruled adversely to defendant\u2019s contention ... there was no need for the defense to make the assuredly futile gesture of repeating its objection\u201d); Lefkowitz, 284 F.2d at 313 n. 1 (ruling that \u201c[w]e do not regard the failure of Dryja\u2019s counsel to except as barring Dryja from seeking reversal for error in the charge; Lefkowitz\u2019s exception called the matter to the judge\u2019s attention and further exception would have been fruitless\u201d)."},"case_id":199941,"label":"a"}
{"context":"We have sometimes allowed a defendant to preserve a district court error as long as one of his codefendants objected below.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"472 F.2d 496, 496","parenthetical":"holding that the failure of one codefendant's counsel \"to move to suppress the evidence or to object to its introduction should be excused because such a motion or objection would have been a useless formality\" given fact that other codefendant's counsel had made motion to suppress","sentence":"See United States v. White, 589 F.2d 1283, 1290 (5th Cir.1979) (holding that objection to instructions by codefendant\u2019s counsel is sufficient to preserve any error); Love, 472 F.2d at 496 (holding that the failure of one codefendant\u2019s counsel \u201cto move to suppress the evidence or to object to its introduction should be excused because such a motion or objection would have been a useless formality\u201d given fact that other codefendant\u2019s counsel had made motion to suppress); see also United States v. Pardo, 636 F.2d 535, 541 (D.C.Cir.1980) (\u201cWe recognize that in certain situations, it may be redundant and inefficient to require each defendant in a joint trial to stand up individually and make every objection to preserve each error for appeal.\u201d); Cassity, 631 F.2d at 466 (\u201cUnder these circumstances, we hold the remaining appellants did not waive their fourth amendment objections by neglecting to perform the useless and purely formal act of joining Cassity in moving to suppress.\u201d); United States v. Bagby, 451 F.2d 920, 927 (9th Cir.1971) (ruling that objection to instructions by codefendant\u2019s counsel preserves any error); cf. United States v. Alvarez, 584 F.2d 694, 697 (5th Cir.1978) (ruling that since \u201c[t]he trial court had already ruled adversely to defendant\u2019s contention ... there was no need for the defense to make the assuredly futile gesture of repeating its objection\u201d); Lefkowitz, 284 F.2d at 313 n. 1 (ruling that \u201c[w]e do not regard the failure of Dryja\u2019s counsel to except as barring Dryja from seeking reversal for error in the charge; Lefkowitz\u2019s exception called the matter to the judge\u2019s attention and further exception would have been fruitless\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"451 F.2d 920, 927","parenthetical":"ruling that objection to instructions by codefendant's counsel preserves any error","sentence":"See United States v. White, 589 F.2d 1283, 1290 (5th Cir.1979) (holding that objection to instructions by codefendant\u2019s counsel is sufficient to preserve any error); Love, 472 F.2d at 496 (holding that the failure of one codefendant\u2019s counsel \u201cto move to suppress the evidence or to object to its introduction should be excused because such a motion or objection would have been a useless formality\u201d given fact that other codefendant\u2019s counsel had made motion to suppress); see also United States v. Pardo, 636 F.2d 535, 541 (D.C.Cir.1980) (\u201cWe recognize that in certain situations, it may be redundant and inefficient to require each defendant in a joint trial to stand up individually and make every objection to preserve each error for appeal.\u201d); Cassity, 631 F.2d at 466 (\u201cUnder these circumstances, we hold the remaining appellants did not waive their fourth amendment objections by neglecting to perform the useless and purely formal act of joining Cassity in moving to suppress.\u201d); United States v. Bagby, 451 F.2d 920, 927 (9th Cir.1971) (ruling that objection to instructions by codefendant\u2019s counsel preserves any error); cf. United States v. Alvarez, 584 F.2d 694, 697 (5th Cir.1978) (ruling that since \u201c[t]he trial court had already ruled adversely to defendant\u2019s contention ... there was no need for the defense to make the assuredly futile gesture of repeating its objection\u201d); Lefkowitz, 284 F.2d at 313 n. 1 (ruling that \u201c[w]e do not regard the failure of Dryja\u2019s counsel to except as barring Dryja from seeking reversal for error in the charge; Lefkowitz\u2019s exception called the matter to the judge\u2019s attention and further exception would have been fruitless\u201d)."},"case_id":199941,"label":"a"}
{"context":"We have sometimes allowed a defendant to preserve a district court error as long as one of his codefendants objected below.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"584 F.2d 694, 697","parenthetical":"ruling that since \"[t]he trial court had already ruled adversely to defendant's contention ... there was no need for the defense to make the assuredly futile gesture of repeating its objection\"","sentence":"See United States v. White, 589 F.2d 1283, 1290 (5th Cir.1979) (holding that objection to instructions by codefendant\u2019s counsel is sufficient to preserve any error); Love, 472 F.2d at 496 (holding that the failure of one codefendant\u2019s counsel \u201cto move to suppress the evidence or to object to its introduction should be excused because such a motion or objection would have been a useless formality\u201d given fact that other codefendant\u2019s counsel had made motion to suppress); see also United States v. Pardo, 636 F.2d 535, 541 (D.C.Cir.1980) (\u201cWe recognize that in certain situations, it may be redundant and inefficient to require each defendant in a joint trial to stand up individually and make every objection to preserve each error for appeal.\u201d); Cassity, 631 F.2d at 466 (\u201cUnder these circumstances, we hold the remaining appellants did not waive their fourth amendment objections by neglecting to perform the useless and purely formal act of joining Cassity in moving to suppress.\u201d); United States v. Bagby, 451 F.2d 920, 927 (9th Cir.1971) (ruling that objection to instructions by codefendant\u2019s counsel preserves any error); cf. United States v. Alvarez, 584 F.2d 694, 697 (5th Cir.1978) (ruling that since \u201c[t]he trial court had already ruled adversely to defendant\u2019s contention ... there was no need for the defense to make the assuredly futile gesture of repeating its objection\u201d); Lefkowitz, 284 F.2d at 313 n. 1 (ruling that \u201c[w]e do not regard the failure of Dryja\u2019s counsel to except as barring Dryja from seeking reversal for error in the charge; Lefkowitz\u2019s exception called the matter to the judge\u2019s attention and further exception would have been fruitless\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"472 F.2d 496, 496","parenthetical":"holding that the failure of one codefendant's counsel \"to move to suppress the evidence or to object to its introduction should be excused because such a motion or objection would have been a useless formality\" given fact that other codefendant's counsel had made motion to suppress","sentence":"See United States v. White, 589 F.2d 1283, 1290 (5th Cir.1979) (holding that objection to instructions by codefendant\u2019s counsel is sufficient to preserve any error); Love, 472 F.2d at 496 (holding that the failure of one codefendant\u2019s counsel \u201cto move to suppress the evidence or to object to its introduction should be excused because such a motion or objection would have been a useless formality\u201d given fact that other codefendant\u2019s counsel had made motion to suppress); see also United States v. Pardo, 636 F.2d 535, 541 (D.C.Cir.1980) (\u201cWe recognize that in certain situations, it may be redundant and inefficient to require each defendant in a joint trial to stand up individually and make every objection to preserve each error for appeal.\u201d); Cassity, 631 F.2d at 466 (\u201cUnder these circumstances, we hold the remaining appellants did not waive their fourth amendment objections by neglecting to perform the useless and purely formal act of joining Cassity in moving to suppress.\u201d); United States v. Bagby, 451 F.2d 920, 927 (9th Cir.1971) (ruling that objection to instructions by codefendant\u2019s counsel preserves any error); cf. United States v. Alvarez, 584 F.2d 694, 697 (5th Cir.1978) (ruling that since \u201c[t]he trial court had already ruled adversely to defendant\u2019s contention ... there was no need for the defense to make the assuredly futile gesture of repeating its objection\u201d); Lefkowitz, 284 F.2d at 313 n. 1 (ruling that \u201c[w]e do not regard the failure of Dryja\u2019s counsel to except as barring Dryja from seeking reversal for error in the charge; Lefkowitz\u2019s exception called the matter to the judge\u2019s attention and further exception would have been fruitless\u201d)."},"case_id":199941,"label":"b"}
{"context":"We have sometimes allowed a defendant to preserve a district court error as long as one of his codefendants objected below.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"636 F.2d 535, 541","parenthetical":"\"We recognize that in certain situations, it may be redundant and inefficient to require each defendant in a joint trial to stand up individually and make every objection to preserve each error for appeal.\"","sentence":"See United States v. White, 589 F.2d 1283, 1290 (5th Cir.1979) (holding that objection to instructions by codefendant\u2019s counsel is sufficient to preserve any error); Love, 472 F.2d at 496 (holding that the failure of one codefendant\u2019s counsel \u201cto move to suppress the evidence or to object to its introduction should be excused because such a motion or objection would have been a useless formality\u201d given fact that other codefendant\u2019s counsel had made motion to suppress); see also United States v. Pardo, 636 F.2d 535, 541 (D.C.Cir.1980) (\u201cWe recognize that in certain situations, it may be redundant and inefficient to require each defendant in a joint trial to stand up individually and make every objection to preserve each error for appeal.\u201d); Cassity, 631 F.2d at 466 (\u201cUnder these circumstances, we hold the remaining appellants did not waive their fourth amendment objections by neglecting to perform the useless and purely formal act of joining Cassity in moving to suppress.\u201d); United States v. Bagby, 451 F.2d 920, 927 (9th Cir.1971) (ruling that objection to instructions by codefendant\u2019s counsel preserves any error); cf. United States v. Alvarez, 584 F.2d 694, 697 (5th Cir.1978) (ruling that since \u201c[t]he trial court had already ruled adversely to defendant\u2019s contention ... there was no need for the defense to make the assuredly futile gesture of repeating its objection\u201d); Lefkowitz, 284 F.2d at 313 n. 1 (ruling that \u201c[w]e do not regard the failure of Dryja\u2019s counsel to except as barring Dryja from seeking reversal for error in the charge; Lefkowitz\u2019s exception called the matter to the judge\u2019s attention and further exception would have been fruitless\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"584 F.2d 694, 697","parenthetical":"ruling that since \"[t]he trial court had already ruled adversely to defendant's contention ... there was no need for the defense to make the assuredly futile gesture of repeating its objection\"","sentence":"See United States v. White, 589 F.2d 1283, 1290 (5th Cir.1979) (holding that objection to instructions by codefendant\u2019s counsel is sufficient to preserve any error); Love, 472 F.2d at 496 (holding that the failure of one codefendant\u2019s counsel \u201cto move to suppress the evidence or to object to its introduction should be excused because such a motion or objection would have been a useless formality\u201d given fact that other codefendant\u2019s counsel had made motion to suppress); see also United States v. Pardo, 636 F.2d 535, 541 (D.C.Cir.1980) (\u201cWe recognize that in certain situations, it may be redundant and inefficient to require each defendant in a joint trial to stand up individually and make every objection to preserve each error for appeal.\u201d); Cassity, 631 F.2d at 466 (\u201cUnder these circumstances, we hold the remaining appellants did not waive their fourth amendment objections by neglecting to perform the useless and purely formal act of joining Cassity in moving to suppress.\u201d); United States v. Bagby, 451 F.2d 920, 927 (9th Cir.1971) (ruling that objection to instructions by codefendant\u2019s counsel preserves any error); cf. United States v. Alvarez, 584 F.2d 694, 697 (5th Cir.1978) (ruling that since \u201c[t]he trial court had already ruled adversely to defendant\u2019s contention ... there was no need for the defense to make the assuredly futile gesture of repeating its objection\u201d); Lefkowitz, 284 F.2d at 313 n. 1 (ruling that \u201c[w]e do not regard the failure of Dryja\u2019s counsel to except as barring Dryja from seeking reversal for error in the charge; Lefkowitz\u2019s exception called the matter to the judge\u2019s attention and further exception would have been fruitless\u201d)."},"case_id":199941,"label":"a"}
{"context":"We have sometimes allowed a defendant to preserve a district court error as long as one of his codefendants objected below.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"584 F.2d 694, 697","parenthetical":"ruling that since \"[t]he trial court had already ruled adversely to defendant's contention ... there was no need for the defense to make the assuredly futile gesture of repeating its objection\"","sentence":"See United States v. White, 589 F.2d 1283, 1290 (5th Cir.1979) (holding that objection to instructions by codefendant\u2019s counsel is sufficient to preserve any error); Love, 472 F.2d at 496 (holding that the failure of one codefendant\u2019s counsel \u201cto move to suppress the evidence or to object to its introduction should be excused because such a motion or objection would have been a useless formality\u201d given fact that other codefendant\u2019s counsel had made motion to suppress); see also United States v. Pardo, 636 F.2d 535, 541 (D.C.Cir.1980) (\u201cWe recognize that in certain situations, it may be redundant and inefficient to require each defendant in a joint trial to stand up individually and make every objection to preserve each error for appeal.\u201d); Cassity, 631 F.2d at 466 (\u201cUnder these circumstances, we hold the remaining appellants did not waive their fourth amendment objections by neglecting to perform the useless and purely formal act of joining Cassity in moving to suppress.\u201d); United States v. Bagby, 451 F.2d 920, 927 (9th Cir.1971) (ruling that objection to instructions by codefendant\u2019s counsel preserves any error); cf. United States v. Alvarez, 584 F.2d 694, 697 (5th Cir.1978) (ruling that since \u201c[t]he trial court had already ruled adversely to defendant\u2019s contention ... there was no need for the defense to make the assuredly futile gesture of repeating its objection\u201d); Lefkowitz, 284 F.2d at 313 n. 1 (ruling that \u201c[w]e do not regard the failure of Dryja\u2019s counsel to except as barring Dryja from seeking reversal for error in the charge; Lefkowitz\u2019s exception called the matter to the judge\u2019s attention and further exception would have been fruitless\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"631 F.2d 466, 466","parenthetical":"\"Under these circumstances, we hold the remaining appellants did not waive their fourth amendment objections by neglecting to perform the useless and purely formal act of joining Cassity in moving to suppress.\"","sentence":"See United States v. White, 589 F.2d 1283, 1290 (5th Cir.1979) (holding that objection to instructions by codefendant\u2019s counsel is sufficient to preserve any error); Love, 472 F.2d at 496 (holding that the failure of one codefendant\u2019s counsel \u201cto move to suppress the evidence or to object to its introduction should be excused because such a motion or objection would have been a useless formality\u201d given fact that other codefendant\u2019s counsel had made motion to suppress); see also United States v. Pardo, 636 F.2d 535, 541 (D.C.Cir.1980) (\u201cWe recognize that in certain situations, it may be redundant and inefficient to require each defendant in a joint trial to stand up individually and make every objection to preserve each error for appeal.\u201d); Cassity, 631 F.2d at 466 (\u201cUnder these circumstances, we hold the remaining appellants did not waive their fourth amendment objections by neglecting to perform the useless and purely formal act of joining Cassity in moving to suppress.\u201d); United States v. Bagby, 451 F.2d 920, 927 (9th Cir.1971) (ruling that objection to instructions by codefendant\u2019s counsel preserves any error); cf. United States v. Alvarez, 584 F.2d 694, 697 (5th Cir.1978) (ruling that since \u201c[t]he trial court had already ruled adversely to defendant\u2019s contention ... there was no need for the defense to make the assuredly futile gesture of repeating its objection\u201d); Lefkowitz, 284 F.2d at 313 n. 1 (ruling that \u201c[w]e do not regard the failure of Dryja\u2019s counsel to except as barring Dryja from seeking reversal for error in the charge; Lefkowitz\u2019s exception called the matter to the judge\u2019s attention and further exception would have been fruitless\u201d)."},"case_id":199941,"label":"b"}
{"context":"We have sometimes allowed a defendant to preserve a district court error as long as one of his codefendants objected below.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"584 F.2d 694, 697","parenthetical":"ruling that since \"[t]he trial court had already ruled adversely to defendant's contention ... there was no need for the defense to make the assuredly futile gesture of repeating its objection\"","sentence":"See United States v. White, 589 F.2d 1283, 1290 (5th Cir.1979) (holding that objection to instructions by codefendant\u2019s counsel is sufficient to preserve any error); Love, 472 F.2d at 496 (holding that the failure of one codefendant\u2019s counsel \u201cto move to suppress the evidence or to object to its introduction should be excused because such a motion or objection would have been a useless formality\u201d given fact that other codefendant\u2019s counsel had made motion to suppress); see also United States v. Pardo, 636 F.2d 535, 541 (D.C.Cir.1980) (\u201cWe recognize that in certain situations, it may be redundant and inefficient to require each defendant in a joint trial to stand up individually and make every objection to preserve each error for appeal.\u201d); Cassity, 631 F.2d at 466 (\u201cUnder these circumstances, we hold the remaining appellants did not waive their fourth amendment objections by neglecting to perform the useless and purely formal act of joining Cassity in moving to suppress.\u201d); United States v. Bagby, 451 F.2d 920, 927 (9th Cir.1971) (ruling that objection to instructions by codefendant\u2019s counsel preserves any error); cf. United States v. Alvarez, 584 F.2d 694, 697 (5th Cir.1978) (ruling that since \u201c[t]he trial court had already ruled adversely to defendant\u2019s contention ... there was no need for the defense to make the assuredly futile gesture of repeating its objection\u201d); Lefkowitz, 284 F.2d at 313 n. 1 (ruling that \u201c[w]e do not regard the failure of Dryja\u2019s counsel to except as barring Dryja from seeking reversal for error in the charge; Lefkowitz\u2019s exception called the matter to the judge\u2019s attention and further exception would have been fruitless\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"451 F.2d 920, 927","parenthetical":"ruling that objection to instructions by codefendant's counsel preserves any error","sentence":"See United States v. White, 589 F.2d 1283, 1290 (5th Cir.1979) (holding that objection to instructions by codefendant\u2019s counsel is sufficient to preserve any error); Love, 472 F.2d at 496 (holding that the failure of one codefendant\u2019s counsel \u201cto move to suppress the evidence or to object to its introduction should be excused because such a motion or objection would have been a useless formality\u201d given fact that other codefendant\u2019s counsel had made motion to suppress); see also United States v. Pardo, 636 F.2d 535, 541 (D.C.Cir.1980) (\u201cWe recognize that in certain situations, it may be redundant and inefficient to require each defendant in a joint trial to stand up individually and make every objection to preserve each error for appeal.\u201d); Cassity, 631 F.2d at 466 (\u201cUnder these circumstances, we hold the remaining appellants did not waive their fourth amendment objections by neglecting to perform the useless and purely formal act of joining Cassity in moving to suppress.\u201d); United States v. Bagby, 451 F.2d 920, 927 (9th Cir.1971) (ruling that objection to instructions by codefendant\u2019s counsel preserves any error); cf. United States v. Alvarez, 584 F.2d 694, 697 (5th Cir.1978) (ruling that since \u201c[t]he trial court had already ruled adversely to defendant\u2019s contention ... there was no need for the defense to make the assuredly futile gesture of repeating its objection\u201d); Lefkowitz, 284 F.2d at 313 n. 1 (ruling that \u201c[w]e do not regard the failure of Dryja\u2019s counsel to except as barring Dryja from seeking reversal for error in the charge; Lefkowitz\u2019s exception called the matter to the judge\u2019s attention and further exception would have been fruitless\u201d)."},"case_id":199941,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Most of the courts which have examined double jeopardy challenges to habitual offender proceedings analyze the question similarly.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"Under Bullington, then, double jeopardy attaches to sentencing proceedings if the process of determining the defendant's punishment was similar to the process of determining guilt.\"","sentence":"See Durosko v. Lewis, 882 F.2d 357, 359 (9th Cir.1989), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S.-, 110 S.Ct. 1930, 109 L.Ed.2d 294 (1990); Nelson v. Lockhart, 828 F.2d 446 (8th Cir.1987), reversed on other grounds, 488 U.S. 33, 109 S.Ct. 285, 102 L.Ed.2d 265 (1988) (\u201cUnder Bullington, then, double jeopardy attaches to sentencing proceedings if the process of determining the defendant\u2019s punishment was similar to the process of determining guilt.\u201d); Briggs v. Procunier, 764 F.2d 368 (5th Cir.1985); Bullard v. Estelle, 665 F.2d 1347, 1359 (5th Cir.1982), vacated on other grounds, 459 U.S. 1139, 103 S.Ct. 776, 74 L.Ed.2d 987 (1983) (\u201cImplicity, (sic) [after Bullington ] enhancement proceedings such as this Texas proceeding, where there are findings of fact similar to the findings in the guilt phase of the trial, are ... within the penumbra [of the double jeopardy clause].\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"contra","identifier":"873 F.2d 144, 148","parenthetical":"finding that double jeopardy does not attach to habitual offender proceedings","sentence":"Contra Denton v. Duckworth, 873 F.2d 144, 148 (7th Cir.1989), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 341, 107 L.Ed.2d 330 (1989) (finding that double jeopardy does not attach to habitual offender proceedings); Baker v. Duckworth, 752 F.2d 302 (7th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1019, 105 S.Ct. 3483, 87 L.Ed.2d 618 (1985); Linam v. Griffin, 685 F.2d 369 (10th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1211, 103 S.Ct. 1207, 75 L.Ed.2d 447 (1983) (same)."},"case_id":7392569,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Most of the courts which have examined double jeopardy challenges to habitual offender proceedings analyze the question similarly.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"Under Bullington, then, double jeopardy attaches to sentencing proceedings if the process of determining the defendant's punishment was similar to the process of determining guilt.\"","sentence":"See Durosko v. Lewis, 882 F.2d 357, 359 (9th Cir.1989), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S.-, 110 S.Ct. 1930, 109 L.Ed.2d 294 (1990); Nelson v. Lockhart, 828 F.2d 446 (8th Cir.1987), reversed on other grounds, 488 U.S. 33, 109 S.Ct. 285, 102 L.Ed.2d 265 (1988) (\u201cUnder Bullington, then, double jeopardy attaches to sentencing proceedings if the process of determining the defendant\u2019s punishment was similar to the process of determining guilt.\u201d); Briggs v. Procunier, 764 F.2d 368 (5th Cir.1985); Bullard v. Estelle, 665 F.2d 1347, 1359 (5th Cir.1982), vacated on other grounds, 459 U.S. 1139, 103 S.Ct. 776, 74 L.Ed.2d 987 (1983) (\u201cImplicity, (sic) [after Bullington ] enhancement proceedings such as this Texas proceeding, where there are findings of fact similar to the findings in the guilt phase of the trial, are ... within the penumbra [of the double jeopardy clause].\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"contra","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding that double jeopardy does not attach to habitual offender proceedings","sentence":"Contra Denton v. Duckworth, 873 F.2d 144, 148 (7th Cir.1989), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 341, 107 L.Ed.2d 330 (1989) (finding that double jeopardy does not attach to habitual offender proceedings); Baker v. Duckworth, 752 F.2d 302 (7th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1019, 105 S.Ct. 3483, 87 L.Ed.2d 618 (1985); Linam v. Griffin, 685 F.2d 369 (10th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1211, 103 S.Ct. 1207, 75 L.Ed.2d 447 (1983) (same)."},"case_id":7392569,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Most of the courts which have examined double jeopardy challenges to habitual offender proceedings analyze the question similarly.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"Under Bullington, then, double jeopardy attaches to sentencing proceedings if the process of determining the defendant's punishment was similar to the process of determining guilt.\"","sentence":"See Durosko v. Lewis, 882 F.2d 357, 359 (9th Cir.1989), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S.-, 110 S.Ct. 1930, 109 L.Ed.2d 294 (1990); Nelson v. Lockhart, 828 F.2d 446 (8th Cir.1987), reversed on other grounds, 488 U.S. 33, 109 S.Ct. 285, 102 L.Ed.2d 265 (1988) (\u201cUnder Bullington, then, double jeopardy attaches to sentencing proceedings if the process of determining the defendant\u2019s punishment was similar to the process of determining guilt.\u201d); Briggs v. Procunier, 764 F.2d 368 (5th Cir.1985); Bullard v. Estelle, 665 F.2d 1347, 1359 (5th Cir.1982), vacated on other grounds, 459 U.S. 1139, 103 S.Ct. 776, 74 L.Ed.2d 987 (1983) (\u201cImplicity, (sic) [after Bullington ] enhancement proceedings such as this Texas proceeding, where there are findings of fact similar to the findings in the guilt phase of the trial, are ... within the penumbra [of the double jeopardy clause].\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"contra","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding that double jeopardy does not attach to habitual offender proceedings","sentence":"Contra Denton v. Duckworth, 873 F.2d 144, 148 (7th Cir.1989), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 341, 107 L.Ed.2d 330 (1989) (finding that double jeopardy does not attach to habitual offender proceedings); Baker v. Duckworth, 752 F.2d 302 (7th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1019, 105 S.Ct. 3483, 87 L.Ed.2d 618 (1985); Linam v. Griffin, 685 F.2d 369 (10th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1211, 103 S.Ct. 1207, 75 L.Ed.2d 447 (1983) (same)."},"case_id":7392569,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Most of the courts which have examined double jeopardy challenges to habitual offender proceedings analyze the question similarly.","citation_a":{"signal":"contra","identifier":"873 F.2d 144, 148","parenthetical":"finding that double jeopardy does not attach to habitual offender proceedings","sentence":"Contra Denton v. Duckworth, 873 F.2d 144, 148 (7th Cir.1989), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 341, 107 L.Ed.2d 330 (1989) (finding that double jeopardy does not attach to habitual offender proceedings); Baker v. Duckworth, 752 F.2d 302 (7th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1019, 105 S.Ct. 3483, 87 L.Ed.2d 618 (1985); Linam v. Griffin, 685 F.2d 369 (10th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1211, 103 S.Ct. 1207, 75 L.Ed.2d 447 (1983) (same)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"Under Bullington, then, double jeopardy attaches to sentencing proceedings if the process of determining the defendant's punishment was similar to the process of determining guilt.\"","sentence":"See Durosko v. Lewis, 882 F.2d 357, 359 (9th Cir.1989), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S.-, 110 S.Ct. 1930, 109 L.Ed.2d 294 (1990); Nelson v. Lockhart, 828 F.2d 446 (8th Cir.1987), reversed on other grounds, 488 U.S. 33, 109 S.Ct. 285, 102 L.Ed.2d 265 (1988) (\u201cUnder Bullington, then, double jeopardy attaches to sentencing proceedings if the process of determining the defendant\u2019s punishment was similar to the process of determining guilt.\u201d); Briggs v. Procunier, 764 F.2d 368 (5th Cir.1985); Bullard v. Estelle, 665 F.2d 1347, 1359 (5th Cir.1982), vacated on other grounds, 459 U.S. 1139, 103 S.Ct. 776, 74 L.Ed.2d 987 (1983) (\u201cImplicity, (sic) [after Bullington ] enhancement proceedings such as this Texas proceeding, where there are findings of fact similar to the findings in the guilt phase of the trial, are ... within the penumbra [of the double jeopardy clause].\u201d)."},"case_id":7392569,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Most of the courts which have examined double jeopardy challenges to habitual offender proceedings analyze the question similarly.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"Under Bullington, then, double jeopardy attaches to sentencing proceedings if the process of determining the defendant's punishment was similar to the process of determining guilt.\"","sentence":"See Durosko v. Lewis, 882 F.2d 357, 359 (9th Cir.1989), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S.-, 110 S.Ct. 1930, 109 L.Ed.2d 294 (1990); Nelson v. Lockhart, 828 F.2d 446 (8th Cir.1987), reversed on other grounds, 488 U.S. 33, 109 S.Ct. 285, 102 L.Ed.2d 265 (1988) (\u201cUnder Bullington, then, double jeopardy attaches to sentencing proceedings if the process of determining the defendant\u2019s punishment was similar to the process of determining guilt.\u201d); Briggs v. Procunier, 764 F.2d 368 (5th Cir.1985); Bullard v. Estelle, 665 F.2d 1347, 1359 (5th Cir.1982), vacated on other grounds, 459 U.S. 1139, 103 S.Ct. 776, 74 L.Ed.2d 987 (1983) (\u201cImplicity, (sic) [after Bullington ] enhancement proceedings such as this Texas proceeding, where there are findings of fact similar to the findings in the guilt phase of the trial, are ... within the penumbra [of the double jeopardy clause].\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"contra","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding that double jeopardy does not attach to habitual offender proceedings","sentence":"Contra Denton v. Duckworth, 873 F.2d 144, 148 (7th Cir.1989), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 341, 107 L.Ed.2d 330 (1989) (finding that double jeopardy does not attach to habitual offender proceedings); Baker v. Duckworth, 752 F.2d 302 (7th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1019, 105 S.Ct. 3483, 87 L.Ed.2d 618 (1985); Linam v. Griffin, 685 F.2d 369 (10th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1211, 103 S.Ct. 1207, 75 L.Ed.2d 447 (1983) (same)."},"case_id":7392569,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Most of the courts which have examined double jeopardy challenges to habitual offender proceedings analyze the question similarly.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"Under Bullington, then, double jeopardy attaches to sentencing proceedings if the process of determining the defendant's punishment was similar to the process of determining guilt.\"","sentence":"See Durosko v. Lewis, 882 F.2d 357, 359 (9th Cir.1989), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S.-, 110 S.Ct. 1930, 109 L.Ed.2d 294 (1990); Nelson v. Lockhart, 828 F.2d 446 (8th Cir.1987), reversed on other grounds, 488 U.S. 33, 109 S.Ct. 285, 102 L.Ed.2d 265 (1988) (\u201cUnder Bullington, then, double jeopardy attaches to sentencing proceedings if the process of determining the defendant\u2019s punishment was similar to the process of determining guilt.\u201d); Briggs v. Procunier, 764 F.2d 368 (5th Cir.1985); Bullard v. Estelle, 665 F.2d 1347, 1359 (5th Cir.1982), vacated on other grounds, 459 U.S. 1139, 103 S.Ct. 776, 74 L.Ed.2d 987 (1983) (\u201cImplicity, (sic) [after Bullington ] enhancement proceedings such as this Texas proceeding, where there are findings of fact similar to the findings in the guilt phase of the trial, are ... within the penumbra [of the double jeopardy clause].\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"contra","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding that double jeopardy does not attach to habitual offender proceedings","sentence":"Contra Denton v. Duckworth, 873 F.2d 144, 148 (7th Cir.1989), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 341, 107 L.Ed.2d 330 (1989) (finding that double jeopardy does not attach to habitual offender proceedings); Baker v. Duckworth, 752 F.2d 302 (7th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1019, 105 S.Ct. 3483, 87 L.Ed.2d 618 (1985); Linam v. Griffin, 685 F.2d 369 (10th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1211, 103 S.Ct. 1207, 75 L.Ed.2d 447 (1983) (same)."},"case_id":7392569,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Most of the courts which have examined double jeopardy challenges to habitual offender proceedings analyze the question similarly.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"Under Bullington, then, double jeopardy attaches to sentencing proceedings if the process of determining the defendant's punishment was similar to the process of determining guilt.\"","sentence":"See Durosko v. Lewis, 882 F.2d 357, 359 (9th Cir.1989), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S.-, 110 S.Ct. 1930, 109 L.Ed.2d 294 (1990); Nelson v. Lockhart, 828 F.2d 446 (8th Cir.1987), reversed on other grounds, 488 U.S. 33, 109 S.Ct. 285, 102 L.Ed.2d 265 (1988) (\u201cUnder Bullington, then, double jeopardy attaches to sentencing proceedings if the process of determining the defendant\u2019s punishment was similar to the process of determining guilt.\u201d); Briggs v. Procunier, 764 F.2d 368 (5th Cir.1985); Bullard v. Estelle, 665 F.2d 1347, 1359 (5th Cir.1982), vacated on other grounds, 459 U.S. 1139, 103 S.Ct. 776, 74 L.Ed.2d 987 (1983) (\u201cImplicity, (sic) [after Bullington ] enhancement proceedings such as this Texas proceeding, where there are findings of fact similar to the findings in the guilt phase of the trial, are ... within the penumbra [of the double jeopardy clause].\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"contra","identifier":"873 F.2d 144, 148","parenthetical":"finding that double jeopardy does not attach to habitual offender proceedings","sentence":"Contra Denton v. Duckworth, 873 F.2d 144, 148 (7th Cir.1989), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 341, 107 L.Ed.2d 330 (1989) (finding that double jeopardy does not attach to habitual offender proceedings); Baker v. Duckworth, 752 F.2d 302 (7th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1019, 105 S.Ct. 3483, 87 L.Ed.2d 618 (1985); Linam v. Griffin, 685 F.2d 369 (10th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1211, 103 S.Ct. 1207, 75 L.Ed.2d 447 (1983) (same)."},"case_id":7392569,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Most of the courts which have examined double jeopardy challenges to habitual offender proceedings analyze the question similarly.","citation_a":{"signal":"contra","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding that double jeopardy does not attach to habitual offender proceedings","sentence":"Contra Denton v. Duckworth, 873 F.2d 144, 148 (7th Cir.1989), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 341, 107 L.Ed.2d 330 (1989) (finding that double jeopardy does not attach to habitual offender proceedings); Baker v. Duckworth, 752 F.2d 302 (7th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1019, 105 S.Ct. 3483, 87 L.Ed.2d 618 (1985); Linam v. Griffin, 685 F.2d 369 (10th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1211, 103 S.Ct. 1207, 75 L.Ed.2d 447 (1983) (same)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"Under Bullington, then, double jeopardy attaches to sentencing proceedings if the process of determining the defendant's punishment was similar to the process of determining guilt.\"","sentence":"See Durosko v. Lewis, 882 F.2d 357, 359 (9th Cir.1989), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S.-, 110 S.Ct. 1930, 109 L.Ed.2d 294 (1990); Nelson v. Lockhart, 828 F.2d 446 (8th Cir.1987), reversed on other grounds, 488 U.S. 33, 109 S.Ct. 285, 102 L.Ed.2d 265 (1988) (\u201cUnder Bullington, then, double jeopardy attaches to sentencing proceedings if the process of determining the defendant\u2019s punishment was similar to the process of determining guilt.\u201d); Briggs v. Procunier, 764 F.2d 368 (5th Cir.1985); Bullard v. Estelle, 665 F.2d 1347, 1359 (5th Cir.1982), vacated on other grounds, 459 U.S. 1139, 103 S.Ct. 776, 74 L.Ed.2d 987 (1983) (\u201cImplicity, (sic) [after Bullington ] enhancement proceedings such as this Texas proceeding, where there are findings of fact similar to the findings in the guilt phase of the trial, are ... within the penumbra [of the double jeopardy clause].\u201d)."},"case_id":7392569,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Most of the courts which have examined double jeopardy challenges to habitual offender proceedings analyze the question similarly.","citation_a":{"signal":"contra","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding that double jeopardy does not attach to habitual offender proceedings","sentence":"Contra Denton v. Duckworth, 873 F.2d 144, 148 (7th Cir.1989), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 341, 107 L.Ed.2d 330 (1989) (finding that double jeopardy does not attach to habitual offender proceedings); Baker v. Duckworth, 752 F.2d 302 (7th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1019, 105 S.Ct. 3483, 87 L.Ed.2d 618 (1985); Linam v. Griffin, 685 F.2d 369 (10th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1211, 103 S.Ct. 1207, 75 L.Ed.2d 447 (1983) (same)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"Under Bullington, then, double jeopardy attaches to sentencing proceedings if the process of determining the defendant's punishment was similar to the process of determining guilt.\"","sentence":"See Durosko v. Lewis, 882 F.2d 357, 359 (9th Cir.1989), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S.-, 110 S.Ct. 1930, 109 L.Ed.2d 294 (1990); Nelson v. Lockhart, 828 F.2d 446 (8th Cir.1987), reversed on other grounds, 488 U.S. 33, 109 S.Ct. 285, 102 L.Ed.2d 265 (1988) (\u201cUnder Bullington, then, double jeopardy attaches to sentencing proceedings if the process of determining the defendant\u2019s punishment was similar to the process of determining guilt.\u201d); Briggs v. Procunier, 764 F.2d 368 (5th Cir.1985); Bullard v. Estelle, 665 F.2d 1347, 1359 (5th Cir.1982), vacated on other grounds, 459 U.S. 1139, 103 S.Ct. 776, 74 L.Ed.2d 987 (1983) (\u201cImplicity, (sic) [after Bullington ] enhancement proceedings such as this Texas proceeding, where there are findings of fact similar to the findings in the guilt phase of the trial, are ... within the penumbra [of the double jeopardy clause].\u201d)."},"case_id":7392569,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Most of the courts which have examined double jeopardy challenges to habitual offender proceedings analyze the question similarly.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"Under Bullington, then, double jeopardy attaches to sentencing proceedings if the process of determining the defendant's punishment was similar to the process of determining guilt.\"","sentence":"See Durosko v. Lewis, 882 F.2d 357, 359 (9th Cir.1989), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S.-, 110 S.Ct. 1930, 109 L.Ed.2d 294 (1990); Nelson v. Lockhart, 828 F.2d 446 (8th Cir.1987), reversed on other grounds, 488 U.S. 33, 109 S.Ct. 285, 102 L.Ed.2d 265 (1988) (\u201cUnder Bullington, then, double jeopardy attaches to sentencing proceedings if the process of determining the defendant\u2019s punishment was similar to the process of determining guilt.\u201d); Briggs v. Procunier, 764 F.2d 368 (5th Cir.1985); Bullard v. Estelle, 665 F.2d 1347, 1359 (5th Cir.1982), vacated on other grounds, 459 U.S. 1139, 103 S.Ct. 776, 74 L.Ed.2d 987 (1983) (\u201cImplicity, (sic) [after Bullington ] enhancement proceedings such as this Texas proceeding, where there are findings of fact similar to the findings in the guilt phase of the trial, are ... within the penumbra [of the double jeopardy clause].\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"contra","identifier":"873 F.2d 144, 148","parenthetical":"finding that double jeopardy does not attach to habitual offender proceedings","sentence":"Contra Denton v. Duckworth, 873 F.2d 144, 148 (7th Cir.1989), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 341, 107 L.Ed.2d 330 (1989) (finding that double jeopardy does not attach to habitual offender proceedings); Baker v. Duckworth, 752 F.2d 302 (7th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1019, 105 S.Ct. 3483, 87 L.Ed.2d 618 (1985); Linam v. Griffin, 685 F.2d 369 (10th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1211, 103 S.Ct. 1207, 75 L.Ed.2d 447 (1983) (same)."},"case_id":7392569,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Most of the courts which have examined double jeopardy challenges to habitual offender proceedings analyze the question similarly.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"Under Bullington, then, double jeopardy attaches to sentencing proceedings if the process of determining the defendant's punishment was similar to the process of determining guilt.\"","sentence":"See Durosko v. Lewis, 882 F.2d 357, 359 (9th Cir.1989), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S.-, 110 S.Ct. 1930, 109 L.Ed.2d 294 (1990); Nelson v. Lockhart, 828 F.2d 446 (8th Cir.1987), reversed on other grounds, 488 U.S. 33, 109 S.Ct. 285, 102 L.Ed.2d 265 (1988) (\u201cUnder Bullington, then, double jeopardy attaches to sentencing proceedings if the process of determining the defendant\u2019s punishment was similar to the process of determining guilt.\u201d); Briggs v. Procunier, 764 F.2d 368 (5th Cir.1985); Bullard v. Estelle, 665 F.2d 1347, 1359 (5th Cir.1982), vacated on other grounds, 459 U.S. 1139, 103 S.Ct. 776, 74 L.Ed.2d 987 (1983) (\u201cImplicity, (sic) [after Bullington ] enhancement proceedings such as this Texas proceeding, where there are findings of fact similar to the findings in the guilt phase of the trial, are ... within the penumbra [of the double jeopardy clause].\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"contra","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding that double jeopardy does not attach to habitual offender proceedings","sentence":"Contra Denton v. Duckworth, 873 F.2d 144, 148 (7th Cir.1989), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 341, 107 L.Ed.2d 330 (1989) (finding that double jeopardy does not attach to habitual offender proceedings); Baker v. Duckworth, 752 F.2d 302 (7th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1019, 105 S.Ct. 3483, 87 L.Ed.2d 618 (1985); Linam v. Griffin, 685 F.2d 369 (10th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1211, 103 S.Ct. 1207, 75 L.Ed.2d 447 (1983) (same)."},"case_id":7392569,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Most of the courts which have examined double jeopardy challenges to habitual offender proceedings analyze the question similarly.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"Under Bullington, then, double jeopardy attaches to sentencing proceedings if the process of determining the defendant's punishment was similar to the process of determining guilt.\"","sentence":"See Durosko v. Lewis, 882 F.2d 357, 359 (9th Cir.1989), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S.-, 110 S.Ct. 1930, 109 L.Ed.2d 294 (1990); Nelson v. Lockhart, 828 F.2d 446 (8th Cir.1987), reversed on other grounds, 488 U.S. 33, 109 S.Ct. 285, 102 L.Ed.2d 265 (1988) (\u201cUnder Bullington, then, double jeopardy attaches to sentencing proceedings if the process of determining the defendant\u2019s punishment was similar to the process of determining guilt.\u201d); Briggs v. Procunier, 764 F.2d 368 (5th Cir.1985); Bullard v. Estelle, 665 F.2d 1347, 1359 (5th Cir.1982), vacated on other grounds, 459 U.S. 1139, 103 S.Ct. 776, 74 L.Ed.2d 987 (1983) (\u201cImplicity, (sic) [after Bullington ] enhancement proceedings such as this Texas proceeding, where there are findings of fact similar to the findings in the guilt phase of the trial, are ... within the penumbra [of the double jeopardy clause].\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"contra","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding that double jeopardy does not attach to habitual offender proceedings","sentence":"Contra Denton v. Duckworth, 873 F.2d 144, 148 (7th Cir.1989), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 341, 107 L.Ed.2d 330 (1989) (finding that double jeopardy does not attach to habitual offender proceedings); Baker v. Duckworth, 752 F.2d 302 (7th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1019, 105 S.Ct. 3483, 87 L.Ed.2d 618 (1985); Linam v. Griffin, 685 F.2d 369 (10th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1211, 103 S.Ct. 1207, 75 L.Ed.2d 447 (1983) (same)."},"case_id":7392569,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Most of the courts which have examined double jeopardy challenges to habitual offender proceedings analyze the question similarly.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"Implicity, (sic) [after Bullington ] enhancement proceedings such as this Texas proceeding, where there are findings of fact similar to the findings in the guilt phase of the trial, are ... within the penumbra [of the double jeopardy clause].\"","sentence":"See Durosko v. Lewis, 882 F.2d 357, 359 (9th Cir.1989), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S.-, 110 S.Ct. 1930, 109 L.Ed.2d 294 (1990); Nelson v. Lockhart, 828 F.2d 446 (8th Cir.1987), reversed on other grounds, 488 U.S. 33, 109 S.Ct. 285, 102 L.Ed.2d 265 (1988) (\u201cUnder Bullington, then, double jeopardy attaches to sentencing proceedings if the process of determining the defendant\u2019s punishment was similar to the process of determining guilt.\u201d); Briggs v. Procunier, 764 F.2d 368 (5th Cir.1985); Bullard v. Estelle, 665 F.2d 1347, 1359 (5th Cir.1982), vacated on other grounds, 459 U.S. 1139, 103 S.Ct. 776, 74 L.Ed.2d 987 (1983) (\u201cImplicity, (sic) [after Bullington ] enhancement proceedings such as this Texas proceeding, where there are findings of fact similar to the findings in the guilt phase of the trial, are ... within the penumbra [of the double jeopardy clause].\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"contra","identifier":"873 F.2d 144, 148","parenthetical":"finding that double jeopardy does not attach to habitual offender proceedings","sentence":"Contra Denton v. Duckworth, 873 F.2d 144, 148 (7th Cir.1989), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 341, 107 L.Ed.2d 330 (1989) (finding that double jeopardy does not attach to habitual offender proceedings); Baker v. Duckworth, 752 F.2d 302 (7th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1019, 105 S.Ct. 3483, 87 L.Ed.2d 618 (1985); Linam v. Griffin, 685 F.2d 369 (10th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1211, 103 S.Ct. 1207, 75 L.Ed.2d 447 (1983) (same)."},"case_id":7392569,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Most of the courts which have examined double jeopardy challenges to habitual offender proceedings analyze the question similarly.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"Implicity, (sic) [after Bullington ] enhancement proceedings such as this Texas proceeding, where there are findings of fact similar to the findings in the guilt phase of the trial, are ... within the penumbra [of the double jeopardy clause].\"","sentence":"See Durosko v. Lewis, 882 F.2d 357, 359 (9th Cir.1989), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S.-, 110 S.Ct. 1930, 109 L.Ed.2d 294 (1990); Nelson v. Lockhart, 828 F.2d 446 (8th Cir.1987), reversed on other grounds, 488 U.S. 33, 109 S.Ct. 285, 102 L.Ed.2d 265 (1988) (\u201cUnder Bullington, then, double jeopardy attaches to sentencing proceedings if the process of determining the defendant\u2019s punishment was similar to the process of determining guilt.\u201d); Briggs v. Procunier, 764 F.2d 368 (5th Cir.1985); Bullard v. Estelle, 665 F.2d 1347, 1359 (5th Cir.1982), vacated on other grounds, 459 U.S. 1139, 103 S.Ct. 776, 74 L.Ed.2d 987 (1983) (\u201cImplicity, (sic) [after Bullington ] enhancement proceedings such as this Texas proceeding, where there are findings of fact similar to the findings in the guilt phase of the trial, are ... within the penumbra [of the double jeopardy clause].\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"contra","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding that double jeopardy does not attach to habitual offender proceedings","sentence":"Contra Denton v. Duckworth, 873 F.2d 144, 148 (7th Cir.1989), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 341, 107 L.Ed.2d 330 (1989) (finding that double jeopardy does not attach to habitual offender proceedings); Baker v. Duckworth, 752 F.2d 302 (7th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1019, 105 S.Ct. 3483, 87 L.Ed.2d 618 (1985); Linam v. Griffin, 685 F.2d 369 (10th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1211, 103 S.Ct. 1207, 75 L.Ed.2d 447 (1983) (same)."},"case_id":7392569,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Most of the courts which have examined double jeopardy challenges to habitual offender proceedings analyze the question similarly.","citation_a":{"signal":"contra","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding that double jeopardy does not attach to habitual offender proceedings","sentence":"Contra Denton v. Duckworth, 873 F.2d 144, 148 (7th Cir.1989), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 341, 107 L.Ed.2d 330 (1989) (finding that double jeopardy does not attach to habitual offender proceedings); Baker v. Duckworth, 752 F.2d 302 (7th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1019, 105 S.Ct. 3483, 87 L.Ed.2d 618 (1985); Linam v. Griffin, 685 F.2d 369 (10th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1211, 103 S.Ct. 1207, 75 L.Ed.2d 447 (1983) (same)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"Implicity, (sic) [after Bullington ] enhancement proceedings such as this Texas proceeding, where there are findings of fact similar to the findings in the guilt phase of the trial, are ... within the penumbra [of the double jeopardy clause].\"","sentence":"See Durosko v. Lewis, 882 F.2d 357, 359 (9th Cir.1989), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S.-, 110 S.Ct. 1930, 109 L.Ed.2d 294 (1990); Nelson v. Lockhart, 828 F.2d 446 (8th Cir.1987), reversed on other grounds, 488 U.S. 33, 109 S.Ct. 285, 102 L.Ed.2d 265 (1988) (\u201cUnder Bullington, then, double jeopardy attaches to sentencing proceedings if the process of determining the defendant\u2019s punishment was similar to the process of determining guilt.\u201d); Briggs v. Procunier, 764 F.2d 368 (5th Cir.1985); Bullard v. Estelle, 665 F.2d 1347, 1359 (5th Cir.1982), vacated on other grounds, 459 U.S. 1139, 103 S.Ct. 776, 74 L.Ed.2d 987 (1983) (\u201cImplicity, (sic) [after Bullington ] enhancement proceedings such as this Texas proceeding, where there are findings of fact similar to the findings in the guilt phase of the trial, are ... within the penumbra [of the double jeopardy clause].\u201d)."},"case_id":7392569,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Most of the courts which have examined double jeopardy challenges to habitual offender proceedings analyze the question similarly.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"Implicity, (sic) [after Bullington ] enhancement proceedings such as this Texas proceeding, where there are findings of fact similar to the findings in the guilt phase of the trial, are ... within the penumbra [of the double jeopardy clause].\"","sentence":"See Durosko v. Lewis, 882 F.2d 357, 359 (9th Cir.1989), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S.-, 110 S.Ct. 1930, 109 L.Ed.2d 294 (1990); Nelson v. Lockhart, 828 F.2d 446 (8th Cir.1987), reversed on other grounds, 488 U.S. 33, 109 S.Ct. 285, 102 L.Ed.2d 265 (1988) (\u201cUnder Bullington, then, double jeopardy attaches to sentencing proceedings if the process of determining the defendant\u2019s punishment was similar to the process of determining guilt.\u201d); Briggs v. Procunier, 764 F.2d 368 (5th Cir.1985); Bullard v. Estelle, 665 F.2d 1347, 1359 (5th Cir.1982), vacated on other grounds, 459 U.S. 1139, 103 S.Ct. 776, 74 L.Ed.2d 987 (1983) (\u201cImplicity, (sic) [after Bullington ] enhancement proceedings such as this Texas proceeding, where there are findings of fact similar to the findings in the guilt phase of the trial, are ... within the penumbra [of the double jeopardy clause].\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"contra","identifier":"873 F.2d 144, 148","parenthetical":"finding that double jeopardy does not attach to habitual offender proceedings","sentence":"Contra Denton v. Duckworth, 873 F.2d 144, 148 (7th Cir.1989), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 341, 107 L.Ed.2d 330 (1989) (finding that double jeopardy does not attach to habitual offender proceedings); Baker v. Duckworth, 752 F.2d 302 (7th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1019, 105 S.Ct. 3483, 87 L.Ed.2d 618 (1985); Linam v. Griffin, 685 F.2d 369 (10th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1211, 103 S.Ct. 1207, 75 L.Ed.2d 447 (1983) (same)."},"case_id":7392569,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Most of the courts which have examined double jeopardy challenges to habitual offender proceedings analyze the question similarly.","citation_a":{"signal":"contra","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding that double jeopardy does not attach to habitual offender proceedings","sentence":"Contra Denton v. Duckworth, 873 F.2d 144, 148 (7th Cir.1989), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 341, 107 L.Ed.2d 330 (1989) (finding that double jeopardy does not attach to habitual offender proceedings); Baker v. Duckworth, 752 F.2d 302 (7th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1019, 105 S.Ct. 3483, 87 L.Ed.2d 618 (1985); Linam v. Griffin, 685 F.2d 369 (10th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1211, 103 S.Ct. 1207, 75 L.Ed.2d 447 (1983) (same)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"Implicity, (sic) [after Bullington ] enhancement proceedings such as this Texas proceeding, where there are findings of fact similar to the findings in the guilt phase of the trial, are ... within the penumbra [of the double jeopardy clause].\"","sentence":"See Durosko v. Lewis, 882 F.2d 357, 359 (9th Cir.1989), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S.-, 110 S.Ct. 1930, 109 L.Ed.2d 294 (1990); Nelson v. Lockhart, 828 F.2d 446 (8th Cir.1987), reversed on other grounds, 488 U.S. 33, 109 S.Ct. 285, 102 L.Ed.2d 265 (1988) (\u201cUnder Bullington, then, double jeopardy attaches to sentencing proceedings if the process of determining the defendant\u2019s punishment was similar to the process of determining guilt.\u201d); Briggs v. Procunier, 764 F.2d 368 (5th Cir.1985); Bullard v. Estelle, 665 F.2d 1347, 1359 (5th Cir.1982), vacated on other grounds, 459 U.S. 1139, 103 S.Ct. 776, 74 L.Ed.2d 987 (1983) (\u201cImplicity, (sic) [after Bullington ] enhancement proceedings such as this Texas proceeding, where there are findings of fact similar to the findings in the guilt phase of the trial, are ... within the penumbra [of the double jeopardy clause].\u201d)."},"case_id":7392569,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Most of the courts which have examined double jeopardy challenges to habitual offender proceedings analyze the question similarly.","citation_a":{"signal":"contra","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding that double jeopardy does not attach to habitual offender proceedings","sentence":"Contra Denton v. Duckworth, 873 F.2d 144, 148 (7th Cir.1989), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 341, 107 L.Ed.2d 330 (1989) (finding that double jeopardy does not attach to habitual offender proceedings); Baker v. Duckworth, 752 F.2d 302 (7th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1019, 105 S.Ct. 3483, 87 L.Ed.2d 618 (1985); Linam v. Griffin, 685 F.2d 369 (10th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1211, 103 S.Ct. 1207, 75 L.Ed.2d 447 (1983) (same)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"Implicity, (sic) [after Bullington ] enhancement proceedings such as this Texas proceeding, where there are findings of fact similar to the findings in the guilt phase of the trial, are ... within the penumbra [of the double jeopardy clause].\"","sentence":"See Durosko v. Lewis, 882 F.2d 357, 359 (9th Cir.1989), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S.-, 110 S.Ct. 1930, 109 L.Ed.2d 294 (1990); Nelson v. Lockhart, 828 F.2d 446 (8th Cir.1987), reversed on other grounds, 488 U.S. 33, 109 S.Ct. 285, 102 L.Ed.2d 265 (1988) (\u201cUnder Bullington, then, double jeopardy attaches to sentencing proceedings if the process of determining the defendant\u2019s punishment was similar to the process of determining guilt.\u201d); Briggs v. Procunier, 764 F.2d 368 (5th Cir.1985); Bullard v. Estelle, 665 F.2d 1347, 1359 (5th Cir.1982), vacated on other grounds, 459 U.S. 1139, 103 S.Ct. 776, 74 L.Ed.2d 987 (1983) (\u201cImplicity, (sic) [after Bullington ] enhancement proceedings such as this Texas proceeding, where there are findings of fact similar to the findings in the guilt phase of the trial, are ... within the penumbra [of the double jeopardy clause].\u201d)."},"case_id":7392569,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Most of the courts which have examined double jeopardy challenges to habitual offender proceedings analyze the question similarly.","citation_a":{"signal":"contra","identifier":"873 F.2d 144, 148","parenthetical":"finding that double jeopardy does not attach to habitual offender proceedings","sentence":"Contra Denton v. Duckworth, 873 F.2d 144, 148 (7th Cir.1989), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 341, 107 L.Ed.2d 330 (1989) (finding that double jeopardy does not attach to habitual offender proceedings); Baker v. Duckworth, 752 F.2d 302 (7th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1019, 105 S.Ct. 3483, 87 L.Ed.2d 618 (1985); Linam v. Griffin, 685 F.2d 369 (10th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1211, 103 S.Ct. 1207, 75 L.Ed.2d 447 (1983) (same)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"Implicity, (sic) [after Bullington ] enhancement proceedings such as this Texas proceeding, where there are findings of fact similar to the findings in the guilt phase of the trial, are ... within the penumbra [of the double jeopardy clause].\"","sentence":"See Durosko v. Lewis, 882 F.2d 357, 359 (9th Cir.1989), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S.-, 110 S.Ct. 1930, 109 L.Ed.2d 294 (1990); Nelson v. Lockhart, 828 F.2d 446 (8th Cir.1987), reversed on other grounds, 488 U.S. 33, 109 S.Ct. 285, 102 L.Ed.2d 265 (1988) (\u201cUnder Bullington, then, double jeopardy attaches to sentencing proceedings if the process of determining the defendant\u2019s punishment was similar to the process of determining guilt.\u201d); Briggs v. Procunier, 764 F.2d 368 (5th Cir.1985); Bullard v. Estelle, 665 F.2d 1347, 1359 (5th Cir.1982), vacated on other grounds, 459 U.S. 1139, 103 S.Ct. 776, 74 L.Ed.2d 987 (1983) (\u201cImplicity, (sic) [after Bullington ] enhancement proceedings such as this Texas proceeding, where there are findings of fact similar to the findings in the guilt phase of the trial, are ... within the penumbra [of the double jeopardy clause].\u201d)."},"case_id":7392569,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Most of the courts which have examined double jeopardy challenges to habitual offender proceedings analyze the question similarly.","citation_a":{"signal":"contra","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding that double jeopardy does not attach to habitual offender proceedings","sentence":"Contra Denton v. Duckworth, 873 F.2d 144, 148 (7th Cir.1989), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 341, 107 L.Ed.2d 330 (1989) (finding that double jeopardy does not attach to habitual offender proceedings); Baker v. Duckworth, 752 F.2d 302 (7th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1019, 105 S.Ct. 3483, 87 L.Ed.2d 618 (1985); Linam v. Griffin, 685 F.2d 369 (10th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1211, 103 S.Ct. 1207, 75 L.Ed.2d 447 (1983) (same)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"Implicity, (sic) [after Bullington ] enhancement proceedings such as this Texas proceeding, where there are findings of fact similar to the findings in the guilt phase of the trial, are ... within the penumbra [of the double jeopardy clause].\"","sentence":"See Durosko v. Lewis, 882 F.2d 357, 359 (9th Cir.1989), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S.-, 110 S.Ct. 1930, 109 L.Ed.2d 294 (1990); Nelson v. Lockhart, 828 F.2d 446 (8th Cir.1987), reversed on other grounds, 488 U.S. 33, 109 S.Ct. 285, 102 L.Ed.2d 265 (1988) (\u201cUnder Bullington, then, double jeopardy attaches to sentencing proceedings if the process of determining the defendant\u2019s punishment was similar to the process of determining guilt.\u201d); Briggs v. Procunier, 764 F.2d 368 (5th Cir.1985); Bullard v. Estelle, 665 F.2d 1347, 1359 (5th Cir.1982), vacated on other grounds, 459 U.S. 1139, 103 S.Ct. 776, 74 L.Ed.2d 987 (1983) (\u201cImplicity, (sic) [after Bullington ] enhancement proceedings such as this Texas proceeding, where there are findings of fact similar to the findings in the guilt phase of the trial, are ... within the penumbra [of the double jeopardy clause].\u201d)."},"case_id":7392569,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Most of the courts which have examined double jeopardy challenges to habitual offender proceedings analyze the question similarly.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"Implicity, (sic) [after Bullington ] enhancement proceedings such as this Texas proceeding, where there are findings of fact similar to the findings in the guilt phase of the trial, are ... within the penumbra [of the double jeopardy clause].\"","sentence":"See Durosko v. Lewis, 882 F.2d 357, 359 (9th Cir.1989), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S.-, 110 S.Ct. 1930, 109 L.Ed.2d 294 (1990); Nelson v. Lockhart, 828 F.2d 446 (8th Cir.1987), reversed on other grounds, 488 U.S. 33, 109 S.Ct. 285, 102 L.Ed.2d 265 (1988) (\u201cUnder Bullington, then, double jeopardy attaches to sentencing proceedings if the process of determining the defendant\u2019s punishment was similar to the process of determining guilt.\u201d); Briggs v. Procunier, 764 F.2d 368 (5th Cir.1985); Bullard v. Estelle, 665 F.2d 1347, 1359 (5th Cir.1982), vacated on other grounds, 459 U.S. 1139, 103 S.Ct. 776, 74 L.Ed.2d 987 (1983) (\u201cImplicity, (sic) [after Bullington ] enhancement proceedings such as this Texas proceeding, where there are findings of fact similar to the findings in the guilt phase of the trial, are ... within the penumbra [of the double jeopardy clause].\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"contra","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding that double jeopardy does not attach to habitual offender proceedings","sentence":"Contra Denton v. Duckworth, 873 F.2d 144, 148 (7th Cir.1989), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 341, 107 L.Ed.2d 330 (1989) (finding that double jeopardy does not attach to habitual offender proceedings); Baker v. Duckworth, 752 F.2d 302 (7th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1019, 105 S.Ct. 3483, 87 L.Ed.2d 618 (1985); Linam v. Griffin, 685 F.2d 369 (10th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1211, 103 S.Ct. 1207, 75 L.Ed.2d 447 (1983) (same)."},"case_id":7392569,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Commercial interest does not warrant disclosure of otherwise private information, such as a name and address list, under FOIA.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"737 F.2d 787, 787","parenthetical":"commercial interest of owner of lodge on scenic river did not outweigh privacy interests of applicants for permits to travel on the river where lodge owner sought names and addresses of permit applicants under FOIA","sentence":"Minnis, 737 F.2d at 787 (commercial interest of owner of lodge on scenic river did not outweigh privacy interests of applicants for permits to travel on the river where lodge owner sought names and addresses of permit applicants under FOIA); see also Wine Hobby U.S.A., Inc. v. United States Internal Revenue Service, 502 F.2d 133, 137 (3rd Cir.1974) (request by distributor of amateur wine-making equipment to obtain names and addresses of all persons who registered with the United States Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms for a permit to produce wine for household use was for a commercial purpose and not subject to disclosure under FOIA)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"502 F.2d 133, 137","parenthetical":"request by distributor of amateur wine-making equipment to obtain names and addresses of all persons who registered with the United States Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms for a permit to produce wine for household use was for a commercial purpose and not subject to disclosure under FOIA","sentence":"Minnis, 737 F.2d at 787 (commercial interest of owner of lodge on scenic river did not outweigh privacy interests of applicants for permits to travel on the river where lodge owner sought names and addresses of permit applicants under FOIA); see also Wine Hobby U.S.A., Inc. v. United States Internal Revenue Service, 502 F.2d 133, 137 (3rd Cir.1974) (request by distributor of amateur wine-making equipment to obtain names and addresses of all persons who registered with the United States Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms for a permit to produce wine for household use was for a commercial purpose and not subject to disclosure under FOIA)."},"case_id":10552182,"label":"a"}
{"context":". As Kamara's claim fails under the pre-IIRIRA abuse of discretion standard, the Court need not reach the government's alternative exhaustion argument for Kamara's failure to appeal his bond determination to the BIA. Several courts, including two in this district, have rejected similar arguments.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"791 F.2d 1351, 1354","parenthetical":"\"The only exhaustion requirement of the [INA] applies to 'orders of deportation or of exclusion' and not to conditions imposed on bonds prior to such order.''","sentence":"No. 95-11218-RGS, slip op. at 6, 1996 WL 622475, at *3 (D.Mass. January 24, 1996) (\"|T]he statutory scheme of the immigration act does not require exhaustion for suits challenging pre-deportation detention.\u201d) (citations omitted); cf. National Ctr. for Immigrants' Rights, Inc. v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 791 F.2d 1351, 1354 (9th Cir.1986), rev'd on other grounds, 481 U.S. 1009, 107 S.Ct. 1881, 95 L.Ed.2d 489 (1987) (\"The only exhaustion requirement of the [INA] applies to 'orders of deportation or of exclusion\u2019 and not to conditions imposed on bonds prior to such order.\u2019\u2019)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"937 F.Supp. 88, 91-92","parenthetical":"holding exhaustion of administrative remedies requirement inapplicable to pre-deportation order bond determinations and that federal court thus retained jurisdiction for review of bond decision despite petitioner's failure to appeal the decision to the BIA","sentence":"See Montero v. Cobb, 937 F.Supp. 88, 91-92 (D.Mass.1996) (holding exhaustion of administrative remedies requirement inapplicable to pre-deportation order bond determinations and that federal court thus retained jurisdiction for review of bond decision despite petitioner\u2019s failure to appeal the decision to the BIA); Moskalev v. District Director, Immigration and Naturalization Serv., Civ.A."},"case_id":1570855,"label":"b"}
{"context":". As Kamara's claim fails under the pre-IIRIRA abuse of discretion standard, the Court need not reach the government's alternative exhaustion argument for Kamara's failure to appeal his bond determination to the BIA. Several courts, including two in this district, have rejected similar arguments.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"937 F.Supp. 88, 91-92","parenthetical":"holding exhaustion of administrative remedies requirement inapplicable to pre-deportation order bond determinations and that federal court thus retained jurisdiction for review of bond decision despite petitioner's failure to appeal the decision to the BIA","sentence":"See Montero v. Cobb, 937 F.Supp. 88, 91-92 (D.Mass.1996) (holding exhaustion of administrative remedies requirement inapplicable to pre-deportation order bond determinations and that federal court thus retained jurisdiction for review of bond decision despite petitioner\u2019s failure to appeal the decision to the BIA); Moskalev v. District Director, Immigration and Naturalization Serv., Civ.A."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"The only exhaustion requirement of the [INA] applies to 'orders of deportation or of exclusion' and not to conditions imposed on bonds prior to such order.''","sentence":"No. 95-11218-RGS, slip op. at 6, 1996 WL 622475, at *3 (D.Mass. January 24, 1996) (\"|T]he statutory scheme of the immigration act does not require exhaustion for suits challenging pre-deportation detention.\u201d) (citations omitted); cf. National Ctr. for Immigrants' Rights, Inc. v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 791 F.2d 1351, 1354 (9th Cir.1986), rev'd on other grounds, 481 U.S. 1009, 107 S.Ct. 1881, 95 L.Ed.2d 489 (1987) (\"The only exhaustion requirement of the [INA] applies to 'orders of deportation or of exclusion\u2019 and not to conditions imposed on bonds prior to such order.\u2019\u2019)."},"case_id":1570855,"label":"a"}
{"context":". As Kamara's claim fails under the pre-IIRIRA abuse of discretion standard, the Court need not reach the government's alternative exhaustion argument for Kamara's failure to appeal his bond determination to the BIA. Several courts, including two in this district, have rejected similar arguments.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"937 F.Supp. 88, 91-92","parenthetical":"holding exhaustion of administrative remedies requirement inapplicable to pre-deportation order bond determinations and that federal court thus retained jurisdiction for review of bond decision despite petitioner's failure to appeal the decision to the BIA","sentence":"See Montero v. Cobb, 937 F.Supp. 88, 91-92 (D.Mass.1996) (holding exhaustion of administrative remedies requirement inapplicable to pre-deportation order bond determinations and that federal court thus retained jurisdiction for review of bond decision despite petitioner\u2019s failure to appeal the decision to the BIA); Moskalev v. District Director, Immigration and Naturalization Serv., Civ.A."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"The only exhaustion requirement of the [INA] applies to 'orders of deportation or of exclusion' and not to conditions imposed on bonds prior to such order.''","sentence":"No. 95-11218-RGS, slip op. at 6, 1996 WL 622475, at *3 (D.Mass. January 24, 1996) (\"|T]he statutory scheme of the immigration act does not require exhaustion for suits challenging pre-deportation detention.\u201d) (citations omitted); cf. National Ctr. for Immigrants' Rights, Inc. v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 791 F.2d 1351, 1354 (9th Cir.1986), rev'd on other grounds, 481 U.S. 1009, 107 S.Ct. 1881, 95 L.Ed.2d 489 (1987) (\"The only exhaustion requirement of the [INA] applies to 'orders of deportation or of exclusion\u2019 and not to conditions imposed on bonds prior to such order.\u2019\u2019)."},"case_id":1570855,"label":"a"}
{"context":". As Kamara's claim fails under the pre-IIRIRA abuse of discretion standard, the Court need not reach the government's alternative exhaustion argument for Kamara's failure to appeal his bond determination to the BIA. Several courts, including two in this district, have rejected similar arguments.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"937 F.Supp. 88, 91-92","parenthetical":"holding exhaustion of administrative remedies requirement inapplicable to pre-deportation order bond determinations and that federal court thus retained jurisdiction for review of bond decision despite petitioner's failure to appeal the decision to the BIA","sentence":"See Montero v. Cobb, 937 F.Supp. 88, 91-92 (D.Mass.1996) (holding exhaustion of administrative remedies requirement inapplicable to pre-deportation order bond determinations and that federal court thus retained jurisdiction for review of bond decision despite petitioner\u2019s failure to appeal the decision to the BIA); Moskalev v. District Director, Immigration and Naturalization Serv., Civ.A."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"The only exhaustion requirement of the [INA] applies to 'orders of deportation or of exclusion' and not to conditions imposed on bonds prior to such order.''","sentence":"No. 95-11218-RGS, slip op. at 6, 1996 WL 622475, at *3 (D.Mass. January 24, 1996) (\"|T]he statutory scheme of the immigration act does not require exhaustion for suits challenging pre-deportation detention.\u201d) (citations omitted); cf. National Ctr. for Immigrants' Rights, Inc. v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 791 F.2d 1351, 1354 (9th Cir.1986), rev'd on other grounds, 481 U.S. 1009, 107 S.Ct. 1881, 95 L.Ed.2d 489 (1987) (\"The only exhaustion requirement of the [INA] applies to 'orders of deportation or of exclusion\u2019 and not to conditions imposed on bonds prior to such order.\u2019\u2019)."},"case_id":1570855,"label":"a"}
{"context":". As Kamara's claim fails under the pre-IIRIRA abuse of discretion standard, the Court need not reach the government's alternative exhaustion argument for Kamara's failure to appeal his bond determination to the BIA. Several courts, including two in this district, have rejected similar arguments.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"1996 WL 622475, at *3","parenthetical":"\"|T]he statutory scheme of the immigration act does not require exhaustion for suits challenging pre-deportation detention.\"","sentence":"No. 95-11218-RGS, slip op. at 6, 1996 WL 622475, at *3 (D.Mass. January 24, 1996) (\"|T]he statutory scheme of the immigration act does not require exhaustion for suits challenging pre-deportation detention.\u201d) (citations omitted); cf. National Ctr. for Immigrants' Rights, Inc. v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 791 F.2d 1351, 1354 (9th Cir.1986), rev'd on other grounds, 481 U.S. 1009, 107 S.Ct. 1881, 95 L.Ed.2d 489 (1987) (\"The only exhaustion requirement of the [INA] applies to 'orders of deportation or of exclusion\u2019 and not to conditions imposed on bonds prior to such order.\u2019\u2019)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"791 F.2d 1351, 1354","parenthetical":"\"The only exhaustion requirement of the [INA] applies to 'orders of deportation or of exclusion' and not to conditions imposed on bonds prior to such order.''","sentence":"No. 95-11218-RGS, slip op. at 6, 1996 WL 622475, at *3 (D.Mass. January 24, 1996) (\"|T]he statutory scheme of the immigration act does not require exhaustion for suits challenging pre-deportation detention.\u201d) (citations omitted); cf. National Ctr. for Immigrants' Rights, Inc. v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 791 F.2d 1351, 1354 (9th Cir.1986), rev'd on other grounds, 481 U.S. 1009, 107 S.Ct. 1881, 95 L.Ed.2d 489 (1987) (\"The only exhaustion requirement of the [INA] applies to 'orders of deportation or of exclusion\u2019 and not to conditions imposed on bonds prior to such order.\u2019\u2019)."},"case_id":1570855,"label":"a"}
{"context":". As Kamara's claim fails under the pre-IIRIRA abuse of discretion standard, the Court need not reach the government's alternative exhaustion argument for Kamara's failure to appeal his bond determination to the BIA. Several courts, including two in this district, have rejected similar arguments.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"1996 WL 622475, at *3","parenthetical":"\"|T]he statutory scheme of the immigration act does not require exhaustion for suits challenging pre-deportation detention.\"","sentence":"No. 95-11218-RGS, slip op. at 6, 1996 WL 622475, at *3 (D.Mass. January 24, 1996) (\"|T]he statutory scheme of the immigration act does not require exhaustion for suits challenging pre-deportation detention.\u201d) (citations omitted); cf. National Ctr. for Immigrants' Rights, Inc. v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 791 F.2d 1351, 1354 (9th Cir.1986), rev'd on other grounds, 481 U.S. 1009, 107 S.Ct. 1881, 95 L.Ed.2d 489 (1987) (\"The only exhaustion requirement of the [INA] applies to 'orders of deportation or of exclusion\u2019 and not to conditions imposed on bonds prior to such order.\u2019\u2019)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"The only exhaustion requirement of the [INA] applies to 'orders of deportation or of exclusion' and not to conditions imposed on bonds prior to such order.''","sentence":"No. 95-11218-RGS, slip op. at 6, 1996 WL 622475, at *3 (D.Mass. January 24, 1996) (\"|T]he statutory scheme of the immigration act does not require exhaustion for suits challenging pre-deportation detention.\u201d) (citations omitted); cf. National Ctr. for Immigrants' Rights, Inc. v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 791 F.2d 1351, 1354 (9th Cir.1986), rev'd on other grounds, 481 U.S. 1009, 107 S.Ct. 1881, 95 L.Ed.2d 489 (1987) (\"The only exhaustion requirement of the [INA] applies to 'orders of deportation or of exclusion\u2019 and not to conditions imposed on bonds prior to such order.\u2019\u2019)."},"case_id":1570855,"label":"a"}
{"context":". As Kamara's claim fails under the pre-IIRIRA abuse of discretion standard, the Court need not reach the government's alternative exhaustion argument for Kamara's failure to appeal his bond determination to the BIA. Several courts, including two in this district, have rejected similar arguments.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"The only exhaustion requirement of the [INA] applies to 'orders of deportation or of exclusion' and not to conditions imposed on bonds prior to such order.''","sentence":"No. 95-11218-RGS, slip op. at 6, 1996 WL 622475, at *3 (D.Mass. January 24, 1996) (\"|T]he statutory scheme of the immigration act does not require exhaustion for suits challenging pre-deportation detention.\u201d) (citations omitted); cf. National Ctr. for Immigrants' Rights, Inc. v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 791 F.2d 1351, 1354 (9th Cir.1986), rev'd on other grounds, 481 U.S. 1009, 107 S.Ct. 1881, 95 L.Ed.2d 489 (1987) (\"The only exhaustion requirement of the [INA] applies to 'orders of deportation or of exclusion\u2019 and not to conditions imposed on bonds prior to such order.\u2019\u2019)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"1996 WL 622475, at *3","parenthetical":"\"|T]he statutory scheme of the immigration act does not require exhaustion for suits challenging pre-deportation detention.\"","sentence":"No. 95-11218-RGS, slip op. at 6, 1996 WL 622475, at *3 (D.Mass. January 24, 1996) (\"|T]he statutory scheme of the immigration act does not require exhaustion for suits challenging pre-deportation detention.\u201d) (citations omitted); cf. National Ctr. for Immigrants' Rights, Inc. v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 791 F.2d 1351, 1354 (9th Cir.1986), rev'd on other grounds, 481 U.S. 1009, 107 S.Ct. 1881, 95 L.Ed.2d 489 (1987) (\"The only exhaustion requirement of the [INA] applies to 'orders of deportation or of exclusion\u2019 and not to conditions imposed on bonds prior to such order.\u2019\u2019)."},"case_id":1570855,"label":"b"}
{"context":". As Kamara's claim fails under the pre-IIRIRA abuse of discretion standard, the Court need not reach the government's alternative exhaustion argument for Kamara's failure to appeal his bond determination to the BIA. Several courts, including two in this district, have rejected similar arguments.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"The only exhaustion requirement of the [INA] applies to 'orders of deportation or of exclusion' and not to conditions imposed on bonds prior to such order.''","sentence":"No. 95-11218-RGS, slip op. at 6, 1996 WL 622475, at *3 (D.Mass. January 24, 1996) (\"|T]he statutory scheme of the immigration act does not require exhaustion for suits challenging pre-deportation detention.\u201d) (citations omitted); cf. National Ctr. for Immigrants' Rights, Inc. v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 791 F.2d 1351, 1354 (9th Cir.1986), rev'd on other grounds, 481 U.S. 1009, 107 S.Ct. 1881, 95 L.Ed.2d 489 (1987) (\"The only exhaustion requirement of the [INA] applies to 'orders of deportation or of exclusion\u2019 and not to conditions imposed on bonds prior to such order.\u2019\u2019)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"1996 WL 622475, at *3","parenthetical":"\"|T]he statutory scheme of the immigration act does not require exhaustion for suits challenging pre-deportation detention.\"","sentence":"No. 95-11218-RGS, slip op. at 6, 1996 WL 622475, at *3 (D.Mass. January 24, 1996) (\"|T]he statutory scheme of the immigration act does not require exhaustion for suits challenging pre-deportation detention.\u201d) (citations omitted); cf. National Ctr. for Immigrants' Rights, Inc. v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 791 F.2d 1351, 1354 (9th Cir.1986), rev'd on other grounds, 481 U.S. 1009, 107 S.Ct. 1881, 95 L.Ed.2d 489 (1987) (\"The only exhaustion requirement of the [INA] applies to 'orders of deportation or of exclusion\u2019 and not to conditions imposed on bonds prior to such order.\u2019\u2019)."},"case_id":1570855,"label":"b"}
{"context":"But Koon admits that he does not know what additives Burlington used in 1975 or 1976, when McKee picked up Burlington's waste, and he has no idea what amount of additive was added. Under these circumstances, Koon's opinion suggests a mere possibility, not a probability, that any cooking water additives used by Burlington contained heavy metals and it cannot serve as the significantly probative evidence that is necessary to withstand a motion for summary judgment.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"866 F.Supp. 1481, 1498","parenthetical":"\"[TJhere must be evidence beyond a witness effectively saying 'anything's possible', because such evidence is not sufficient to support a finding.\"","sentence":"See Sakaria, 8 F.3d at 172-73 (summary judgment should be granted where expert opinion suggests merely a possibility, as opposed to a probability, \u201cprecisely to guard against raw speculation by the fact-finder.\u201d); see also, Dana Corp. v. American Standard, Inc., 866 F.Supp. 1481, 1498 (N.D.Ind.1994) (\u201c[TJhere must be evidence beyond a witness effectively saying \u2018anything\u2019s possible\u2019, because such evidence is not sufficient to support a finding.\u201d). As a result, Textron\u2019s claim rests ultimately on the test results from 1974, but absent evidence indicating those results are typical, they are not significantly probative."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"8 F.3d 172, 172-73","parenthetical":"summary judgment should be granted where expert opinion suggests merely a possibility, as opposed to a probability, \"precisely to guard against raw speculation by the fact-finder.\"","sentence":"See Sakaria, 8 F.3d at 172-73 (summary judgment should be granted where expert opinion suggests merely a possibility, as opposed to a probability, \u201cprecisely to guard against raw speculation by the fact-finder.\u201d); see also, Dana Corp. v. American Standard, Inc., 866 F.Supp. 1481, 1498 (N.D.Ind.1994) (\u201c[TJhere must be evidence beyond a witness effectively saying \u2018anything\u2019s possible\u2019, because such evidence is not sufficient to support a finding.\u201d). As a result, Textron\u2019s claim rests ultimately on the test results from 1974, but absent evidence indicating those results are typical, they are not significantly probative."},"case_id":7840512,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Second, by requiring effluent limitations, which are developed according to ELGs and NSPSs, as a part of a strategy to eliminate the discharge of pollutants and restore and maintain the integrity of the Nation's waters, 33 U.S.C. SS 1251(a), Congress has expressed its view that developing ELGs and NSPSs reduces the risk of the pollution causing the members' injury. Where Congress has expressed the need for specific regulations relating to the environment, that expression supports an inference that there is a causal connection between the lack of those regulations and adverse environmental effects.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"722 F.2d 795, 811-12","parenthetical":"\"[A]s Congress passed the Act partly to provide redress to employers from unfair competition, the suggestion that effective enforcement of the Act will not have this effect directly contravenes the congressional judgment underlying the Act.\"","sentence":"See Nat\u2019l Wildlife Fed\u2019n, 839 F.2d at 708; see also Alaska Ctr. for the Env\u2019t v. Browner, 20 F.3d 981, 984-85 (9th Cir.1994) (noting that plaintiffs could meet the redressability requirement because Congress had already determined the relief they sought was the appropriate means of achieving desired water quality where other methods had faded); cf. Int\u2019l Ladies Garment Workers\u2019 Union v. Donovan, 722 F.2d 795, 811-12 (D.C.Cir.1983) (\u201c[A]s Congress passed the Act partly to provide redress to employers from unfair competition, the suggestion that effective enforcement of the Act will not have this effect directly contravenes the congressional judgment underlying the Act.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"20 F.3d 981, 984-85","parenthetical":"noting that plaintiffs could meet the redressability requirement because Congress had already determined the relief they sought was the appropriate means of achieving desired water quality where other methods had faded","sentence":"See Nat\u2019l Wildlife Fed\u2019n, 839 F.2d at 708; see also Alaska Ctr. for the Env\u2019t v. Browner, 20 F.3d 981, 984-85 (9th Cir.1994) (noting that plaintiffs could meet the redressability requirement because Congress had already determined the relief they sought was the appropriate means of achieving desired water quality where other methods had faded); cf. Int\u2019l Ladies Garment Workers\u2019 Union v. Donovan, 722 F.2d 795, 811-12 (D.C.Cir.1983) (\u201c[A]s Congress passed the Act partly to provide redress to employers from unfair competition, the suggestion that effective enforcement of the Act will not have this effect directly contravenes the congressional judgment underlying the Act.\u201d)."},"case_id":3840321,"label":"b"}
{"context":"\"The ultimate issue is whether ... reasonable officials in the defendants' position at the relevant time could have believed that, in light of what was in the decided case law, that their conduct would be lawful.\" Id. Accepting the allegations in the complaint as true and drawing all inferences in the Browns' favor, a reasonable BCCYS employee could not have believed that a post-deprivation hearing conducted seven weeks after the removal of a child from his parents' home complied with due process.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"141 F.Supp.2d 540, 540-42","parenthetical":"rejecting qualified immunity defense where defendants failed to provide plaintiffs with a prompt and adequate judicial hearing within 72 hours of taking child into protective custody","sentence":"See, e.g., Miller, 174 F.3d at 372 n. 4 (explaining that initiating child custody proceedings by ex parte order is generally constitutional if a prompt post-deprivation hearing is held, and noting Pennsylvania\u2019s 72 hour requirement); see also Patterson, 141 F.Supp.2d at 540-42 (rejecting qualified immunity defense where defendants failed to provide plaintiffs with a prompt and adequate judicial hearing within 72 hours of taking child into protective custody)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"explaining that initiating child custody proceedings by ex parte order is generally constitutional if a prompt post-deprivation hearing is held, and noting Pennsylvania's 72 hour requirement","sentence":"See, e.g., Miller, 174 F.3d at 372 n. 4 (explaining that initiating child custody proceedings by ex parte order is generally constitutional if a prompt post-deprivation hearing is held, and noting Pennsylvania\u2019s 72 hour requirement); see also Patterson, 141 F.Supp.2d at 540-42 (rejecting qualified immunity defense where defendants failed to provide plaintiffs with a prompt and adequate judicial hearing within 72 hours of taking child into protective custody)."},"case_id":808883,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Plaintiffs further argue that RLUIPA's substantial burden provision has a jurisdictional limitation, providing that it can only be applied when the government action affects interstate commerce, is imposed in a pro gram that receives federal funding, or in a circumstance where individualized assessments of the property are involved. (Pis.'","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"734 F.Supp.2d 509, 509","parenthetical":"\"By limiting RLUIPA's scope to cases that present one of these jurisdictional nexuses, Congress alternatively grounded RLUI-PA, depending on the facts of a particular case, in the Spending Clause, the Commerce Clause, and SS 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.\"","sentence":"Opp\u2019n 58 (citing 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 2000cc(a)(2)).) The substantial burden provision is thus grounded as a proper. exercise of Congress\u2019s power under the Spending Clause, Commerce Clause, and \u00a7 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, see WDS II, 504 F.3d at 354 (\u201c[T]he Supreme Court has made plain [that] the satisfaction of [ ] a jurisdictional element ... is sufficient to validate the exercise of congressional power because an interstate commerce nexus must be demonstrated in each case for the statute in question to operate.\u201d); see also Fortress Bible, 734 F.Supp.2d at 509 (\u201cBy limiting RLUIPA\u2019s scope to cases that present one of these jurisdictional nexuses, Congress alternatively grounded RLUI-PA, depending on the facts of a particular case, in the Spending Clause, the Commerce Clause, and \u00a7 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"504 F.3d 354, 354","parenthetical":"\"[T]he Supreme Court has made plain [that] the satisfaction of [ ] a jurisdictional element ... is sufficient to validate the exercise of congressional power because an interstate commerce nexus must be demonstrated in each case for the statute in question to operate.\"","sentence":"Opp\u2019n 58 (citing 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 2000cc(a)(2)).) The substantial burden provision is thus grounded as a proper. exercise of Congress\u2019s power under the Spending Clause, Commerce Clause, and \u00a7 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, see WDS II, 504 F.3d at 354 (\u201c[T]he Supreme Court has made plain [that] the satisfaction of [ ] a jurisdictional element ... is sufficient to validate the exercise of congressional power because an interstate commerce nexus must be demonstrated in each case for the statute in question to operate.\u201d); see also Fortress Bible, 734 F.Supp.2d at 509 (\u201cBy limiting RLUIPA\u2019s scope to cases that present one of these jurisdictional nexuses, Congress alternatively grounded RLUI-PA, depending on the facts of a particular case, in the Spending Clause, the Commerce Clause, and \u00a7 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.\u201d)."},"case_id":4194334,"label":"b"}
{"context":"This determination informs the consideration of the forum non conveniens inquiry. In addition to private and public interest factors, such as Karim receiving medical treatment in the United States, evidence and testimony being easily accessible in this forum, and counsel for both parties being based in this forum, the fact that United States limitation law applies also weighs against dismissal.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"890 F.Supp. 318, 318","parenthetical":"holding that the doctrine of forum non conve-niens did not compel dismissal of related actions for limitation of vessel owners' liability","sentence":"See, e.g., Argonaut P\u2019ship, 1997 WL 45521, at *15 (stating that \u201ccourts have denied forum non conveniens motions where a related action, requiring much of the same evidence, was pending also in the jurisdiction and could not be dismissed\u201d); Maritima Aragua, 823 F.Supp. at 147 (denying a motion to dismiss on the basis of forum non conveniens and stating that the \u201ccrucial factor in the case at bar [was] the presence of the Limitation Proceeding brought by the [shipowners]\u201d); id. at 150-51; see also Am. President Lines, 890 F.Supp. at 318 (holding that the doctrine of forum non conve-niens did not compel dismissal of related actions for limitation of vessel owners\u2019 liability); Geophysical Serv., 590 F.Supp. at 1357, 1361 (finding the Canadian limitation act applicable and dismissing the action on the basis of forum non conveniens)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"1997 WL 45521, at *15","parenthetical":"stating that \"courts have denied forum non conveniens motions where a related action, requiring much of the same evidence, was pending also in the jurisdiction and could not be dismissed\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Argonaut P\u2019ship, 1997 WL 45521, at *15 (stating that \u201ccourts have denied forum non conveniens motions where a related action, requiring much of the same evidence, was pending also in the jurisdiction and could not be dismissed\u201d); Maritima Aragua, 823 F.Supp. at 147 (denying a motion to dismiss on the basis of forum non conveniens and stating that the \u201ccrucial factor in the case at bar [was] the presence of the Limitation Proceeding brought by the [shipowners]\u201d); id. at 150-51; see also Am. President Lines, 890 F.Supp. at 318 (holding that the doctrine of forum non conve-niens did not compel dismissal of related actions for limitation of vessel owners\u2019 liability); Geophysical Serv., 590 F.Supp. at 1357, 1361 (finding the Canadian limitation act applicable and dismissing the action on the basis of forum non conveniens)."},"case_id":9481356,"label":"b"}
{"context":"This determination informs the consideration of the forum non conveniens inquiry. In addition to private and public interest factors, such as Karim receiving medical treatment in the United States, evidence and testimony being easily accessible in this forum, and counsel for both parties being based in this forum, the fact that United States limitation law applies also weighs against dismissal.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"590 F.Supp. 1357, 1357, 1361","parenthetical":"finding the Canadian limitation act applicable and dismissing the action on the basis of forum non conveniens","sentence":"See, e.g., Argonaut P\u2019ship, 1997 WL 45521, at *15 (stating that \u201ccourts have denied forum non conveniens motions where a related action, requiring much of the same evidence, was pending also in the jurisdiction and could not be dismissed\u201d); Maritima Aragua, 823 F.Supp. at 147 (denying a motion to dismiss on the basis of forum non conveniens and stating that the \u201ccrucial factor in the case at bar [was] the presence of the Limitation Proceeding brought by the [shipowners]\u201d); id. at 150-51; see also Am. President Lines, 890 F.Supp. at 318 (holding that the doctrine of forum non conve-niens did not compel dismissal of related actions for limitation of vessel owners\u2019 liability); Geophysical Serv., 590 F.Supp. at 1357, 1361 (finding the Canadian limitation act applicable and dismissing the action on the basis of forum non conveniens)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"1997 WL 45521, at *15","parenthetical":"stating that \"courts have denied forum non conveniens motions where a related action, requiring much of the same evidence, was pending also in the jurisdiction and could not be dismissed\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Argonaut P\u2019ship, 1997 WL 45521, at *15 (stating that \u201ccourts have denied forum non conveniens motions where a related action, requiring much of the same evidence, was pending also in the jurisdiction and could not be dismissed\u201d); Maritima Aragua, 823 F.Supp. at 147 (denying a motion to dismiss on the basis of forum non conveniens and stating that the \u201ccrucial factor in the case at bar [was] the presence of the Limitation Proceeding brought by the [shipowners]\u201d); id. at 150-51; see also Am. President Lines, 890 F.Supp. at 318 (holding that the doctrine of forum non conve-niens did not compel dismissal of related actions for limitation of vessel owners\u2019 liability); Geophysical Serv., 590 F.Supp. at 1357, 1361 (finding the Canadian limitation act applicable and dismissing the action on the basis of forum non conveniens)."},"case_id":9481356,"label":"b"}
{"context":"This determination informs the consideration of the forum non conveniens inquiry. In addition to private and public interest factors, such as Karim receiving medical treatment in the United States, evidence and testimony being easily accessible in this forum, and counsel for both parties being based in this forum, the fact that United States limitation law applies also weighs against dismissal.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"890 F.Supp. 318, 318","parenthetical":"holding that the doctrine of forum non conve-niens did not compel dismissal of related actions for limitation of vessel owners' liability","sentence":"See, e.g., Argonaut P\u2019ship, 1997 WL 45521, at *15 (stating that \u201ccourts have denied forum non conveniens motions where a related action, requiring much of the same evidence, was pending also in the jurisdiction and could not be dismissed\u201d); Maritima Aragua, 823 F.Supp. at 147 (denying a motion to dismiss on the basis of forum non conveniens and stating that the \u201ccrucial factor in the case at bar [was] the presence of the Limitation Proceeding brought by the [shipowners]\u201d); id. at 150-51; see also Am. President Lines, 890 F.Supp. at 318 (holding that the doctrine of forum non conve-niens did not compel dismissal of related actions for limitation of vessel owners\u2019 liability); Geophysical Serv., 590 F.Supp. at 1357, 1361 (finding the Canadian limitation act applicable and dismissing the action on the basis of forum non conveniens)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"823 F.Supp. 147, 147","parenthetical":"denying a motion to dismiss on the basis of forum non conveniens and stating that the \"crucial factor in the case at bar [was] the presence of the Limitation Proceeding brought by the [shipowners]\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Argonaut P\u2019ship, 1997 WL 45521, at *15 (stating that \u201ccourts have denied forum non conveniens motions where a related action, requiring much of the same evidence, was pending also in the jurisdiction and could not be dismissed\u201d); Maritima Aragua, 823 F.Supp. at 147 (denying a motion to dismiss on the basis of forum non conveniens and stating that the \u201ccrucial factor in the case at bar [was] the presence of the Limitation Proceeding brought by the [shipowners]\u201d); id. at 150-51; see also Am. President Lines, 890 F.Supp. at 318 (holding that the doctrine of forum non conve-niens did not compel dismissal of related actions for limitation of vessel owners\u2019 liability); Geophysical Serv., 590 F.Supp. at 1357, 1361 (finding the Canadian limitation act applicable and dismissing the action on the basis of forum non conveniens)."},"case_id":9481356,"label":"b"}
{"context":"This determination informs the consideration of the forum non conveniens inquiry. In addition to private and public interest factors, such as Karim receiving medical treatment in the United States, evidence and testimony being easily accessible in this forum, and counsel for both parties being based in this forum, the fact that United States limitation law applies also weighs against dismissal.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"590 F.Supp. 1357, 1357, 1361","parenthetical":"finding the Canadian limitation act applicable and dismissing the action on the basis of forum non conveniens","sentence":"See, e.g., Argonaut P\u2019ship, 1997 WL 45521, at *15 (stating that \u201ccourts have denied forum non conveniens motions where a related action, requiring much of the same evidence, was pending also in the jurisdiction and could not be dismissed\u201d); Maritima Aragua, 823 F.Supp. at 147 (denying a motion to dismiss on the basis of forum non conveniens and stating that the \u201ccrucial factor in the case at bar [was] the presence of the Limitation Proceeding brought by the [shipowners]\u201d); id. at 150-51; see also Am. President Lines, 890 F.Supp. at 318 (holding that the doctrine of forum non conve-niens did not compel dismissal of related actions for limitation of vessel owners\u2019 liability); Geophysical Serv., 590 F.Supp. at 1357, 1361 (finding the Canadian limitation act applicable and dismissing the action on the basis of forum non conveniens)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"823 F.Supp. 147, 147","parenthetical":"denying a motion to dismiss on the basis of forum non conveniens and stating that the \"crucial factor in the case at bar [was] the presence of the Limitation Proceeding brought by the [shipowners]\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Argonaut P\u2019ship, 1997 WL 45521, at *15 (stating that \u201ccourts have denied forum non conveniens motions where a related action, requiring much of the same evidence, was pending also in the jurisdiction and could not be dismissed\u201d); Maritima Aragua, 823 F.Supp. at 147 (denying a motion to dismiss on the basis of forum non conveniens and stating that the \u201ccrucial factor in the case at bar [was] the presence of the Limitation Proceeding brought by the [shipowners]\u201d); id. at 150-51; see also Am. President Lines, 890 F.Supp. at 318 (holding that the doctrine of forum non conve-niens did not compel dismissal of related actions for limitation of vessel owners\u2019 liability); Geophysical Serv., 590 F.Supp. at 1357, 1361 (finding the Canadian limitation act applicable and dismissing the action on the basis of forum non conveniens)."},"case_id":9481356,"label":"b"}
{"context":". As stated above, Georgia courts have consistently held that, under a quantum meruit theory, a plaintiff must show that the services had value to the recipient.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"267 Ga.App. 264, 265","parenthetical":"\"Proof of 'the reasonable value of services rendered to and accepted by a defendant is an element essential to recovery on a quantum meruit basis.' \"","sentence":"See Watson, 226 Ga.App. at 28, 485 S.E.2d 563 (\u201cUnder O.C.G.A. \u00a7 9-2-7, this Code section provides an action for quantum meruit where services were rendered and materials were furnished, and which were accepted by and valuable to the recipient .... \u201d); see also Diegert v. Cedarbrook Homes, Inc., 267 Ga.App. 264, 265, 599 S.E.2d 211 (2004) (\u201cProof of 'the reasonable value of services rendered to and accepted by a defendant is an element essential to recovery on a quantum meruit basis.' \") (emphasis added) (citation omitted)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"226 Ga.App. 28, 28","parenthetical":"\"Under O.C.G.A. SS 9-2-7, this Code section provides an action for quantum meruit where services were rendered and materials were furnished, and which were accepted by and valuable to the recipient .... \"","sentence":"See Watson, 226 Ga.App. at 28, 485 S.E.2d 563 (\u201cUnder O.C.G.A. \u00a7 9-2-7, this Code section provides an action for quantum meruit where services were rendered and materials were furnished, and which were accepted by and valuable to the recipient .... \u201d); see also Diegert v. Cedarbrook Homes, Inc., 267 Ga.App. 264, 265, 599 S.E.2d 211 (2004) (\u201cProof of 'the reasonable value of services rendered to and accepted by a defendant is an element essential to recovery on a quantum meruit basis.' \") (emphasis added) (citation omitted)."},"case_id":5726540,"label":"b"}
{"context":". As stated above, Georgia courts have consistently held that, under a quantum meruit theory, a plaintiff must show that the services had value to the recipient.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"Proof of 'the reasonable value of services rendered to and accepted by a defendant is an element essential to recovery on a quantum meruit basis.' \"","sentence":"See Watson, 226 Ga.App. at 28, 485 S.E.2d 563 (\u201cUnder O.C.G.A. \u00a7 9-2-7, this Code section provides an action for quantum meruit where services were rendered and materials were furnished, and which were accepted by and valuable to the recipient .... \u201d); see also Diegert v. Cedarbrook Homes, Inc., 267 Ga.App. 264, 265, 599 S.E.2d 211 (2004) (\u201cProof of 'the reasonable value of services rendered to and accepted by a defendant is an element essential to recovery on a quantum meruit basis.' \") (emphasis added) (citation omitted)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"226 Ga.App. 28, 28","parenthetical":"\"Under O.C.G.A. SS 9-2-7, this Code section provides an action for quantum meruit where services were rendered and materials were furnished, and which were accepted by and valuable to the recipient .... \"","sentence":"See Watson, 226 Ga.App. at 28, 485 S.E.2d 563 (\u201cUnder O.C.G.A. \u00a7 9-2-7, this Code section provides an action for quantum meruit where services were rendered and materials were furnished, and which were accepted by and valuable to the recipient .... \u201d); see also Diegert v. Cedarbrook Homes, Inc., 267 Ga.App. 264, 265, 599 S.E.2d 211 (2004) (\u201cProof of 'the reasonable value of services rendered to and accepted by a defendant is an element essential to recovery on a quantum meruit basis.' \") (emphasis added) (citation omitted)."},"case_id":5726540,"label":"b"}
{"context":". As stated above, Georgia courts have consistently held that, under a quantum meruit theory, a plaintiff must show that the services had value to the recipient.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"267 Ga.App. 264, 265","parenthetical":"\"Proof of 'the reasonable value of services rendered to and accepted by a defendant is an element essential to recovery on a quantum meruit basis.' \"","sentence":"See Watson, 226 Ga.App. at 28, 485 S.E.2d 563 (\u201cUnder O.C.G.A. \u00a7 9-2-7, this Code section provides an action for quantum meruit where services were rendered and materials were furnished, and which were accepted by and valuable to the recipient .... \u201d); see also Diegert v. Cedarbrook Homes, Inc., 267 Ga.App. 264, 265, 599 S.E.2d 211 (2004) (\u201cProof of 'the reasonable value of services rendered to and accepted by a defendant is an element essential to recovery on a quantum meruit basis.' \") (emphasis added) (citation omitted)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"Under O.C.G.A. SS 9-2-7, this Code section provides an action for quantum meruit where services were rendered and materials were furnished, and which were accepted by and valuable to the recipient .... \"","sentence":"See Watson, 226 Ga.App. at 28, 485 S.E.2d 563 (\u201cUnder O.C.G.A. \u00a7 9-2-7, this Code section provides an action for quantum meruit where services were rendered and materials were furnished, and which were accepted by and valuable to the recipient .... \u201d); see also Diegert v. Cedarbrook Homes, Inc., 267 Ga.App. 264, 265, 599 S.E.2d 211 (2004) (\u201cProof of 'the reasonable value of services rendered to and accepted by a defendant is an element essential to recovery on a quantum meruit basis.' \") (emphasis added) (citation omitted)."},"case_id":5726540,"label":"b"}
{"context":". As stated above, Georgia courts have consistently held that, under a quantum meruit theory, a plaintiff must show that the services had value to the recipient.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"Proof of 'the reasonable value of services rendered to and accepted by a defendant is an element essential to recovery on a quantum meruit basis.' \"","sentence":"See Watson, 226 Ga.App. at 28, 485 S.E.2d 563 (\u201cUnder O.C.G.A. \u00a7 9-2-7, this Code section provides an action for quantum meruit where services were rendered and materials were furnished, and which were accepted by and valuable to the recipient .... \u201d); see also Diegert v. Cedarbrook Homes, Inc., 267 Ga.App. 264, 265, 599 S.E.2d 211 (2004) (\u201cProof of 'the reasonable value of services rendered to and accepted by a defendant is an element essential to recovery on a quantum meruit basis.' \") (emphasis added) (citation omitted)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"Under O.C.G.A. SS 9-2-7, this Code section provides an action for quantum meruit where services were rendered and materials were furnished, and which were accepted by and valuable to the recipient .... \"","sentence":"See Watson, 226 Ga.App. at 28, 485 S.E.2d 563 (\u201cUnder O.C.G.A. \u00a7 9-2-7, this Code section provides an action for quantum meruit where services were rendered and materials were furnished, and which were accepted by and valuable to the recipient .... \u201d); see also Diegert v. Cedarbrook Homes, Inc., 267 Ga.App. 264, 265, 599 S.E.2d 211 (2004) (\u201cProof of 'the reasonable value of services rendered to and accepted by a defendant is an element essential to recovery on a quantum meruit basis.' \") (emphasis added) (citation omitted)."},"case_id":5726540,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Northrop Corp., Northrop Elecs. Even though it is an Article I tribunal, this Court applies justiciability principles of Article III, including mootness.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"63 Fed.Cl. 204, 209","parenthetical":"dismissing case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because claims asserted in the complaint were moot","sentence":"See, e.g., Schooling v. United States, 63 Fed.Cl. 204, 209 (2004) (dismissing case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because claims asserted in the complaint were moot); CW Gov\u2019t Travel, Inc. v. United States, 46 Fed.Cl. 554, 558 (2000) (citing Zevalkink v. Brown, 102 F.3d 1236, 1243 (Fed.Cir.1996)) (granting motion to dismiss for mootness); see also Anderson v. United States, 344 F.3d 1343, 1350 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (\u201cThe Court of Federal Claims, though an Article I court ... applies the same standing requirements enforced by other federal courts created under Article HI.\u201d))."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"The Court of Federal Claims, though an Article I court ... applies the same standing requirements enforced by other federal courts created under Article HI.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Schooling v. United States, 63 Fed.Cl. 204, 209 (2004) (dismissing case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because claims asserted in the complaint were moot); CW Gov\u2019t Travel, Inc. v. United States, 46 Fed.Cl. 554, 558 (2000) (citing Zevalkink v. Brown, 102 F.3d 1236, 1243 (Fed.Cir.1996)) (granting motion to dismiss for mootness); see also Anderson v. United States, 344 F.3d 1343, 1350 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (\u201cThe Court of Federal Claims, though an Article I court ... applies the same standing requirements enforced by other federal courts created under Article HI.\u201d))."},"case_id":4159318,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Hewlett's malicious prosecution claim likewise fails because prosecutors are immune from a civil suit for damages under section 1983 for initiating a prosecution and presenting the State's case.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"969 F.2d 1454, 1463-64","parenthetical":"decision to initiate a prosecution is at the core of a prosecutor's judicial role","sentence":"See also Kulwicki v. Dawson, 969 F.2d 1454, 1463-64 (3d Cir.1992) (decision to initiate a prosecution is at the core of a prosecutor\u2019s judicial role)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"871 F.2d 343, 343","parenthetical":"prosecutors are absolutely immune from civil liability for activities \"intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process\"","sentence":"See Bartle, 871 F.2d at 343 (prosecutors are absolutely immune from civil liability for activities \u201cintimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process\u201d) (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 96 S.Ct. 984, 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976))."},"case_id":5390646,"label":"b"}
{"context":"First, Littlewind testified that Rayone told him that \"she had something to tell me ... and [that] cops were going to be involved.\" Robertson theorizes that this testimony improperly \"vouched\" for Rayone's testimony that F.S. said, \"He raped me,\" and that it bolstered F.S.'s credibility by suggesting that Robertson had sexually assaulted F.S. As an initial matter, we doubt that this statement was hearsay.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"420 F.3d 788, 788-89","parenthetical":"concluding that statements \"offered to show the reason for police action, rather than to prove the truth of the matter asserted\" are not hearsay","sentence":"See Londondio, 420 F.3d at 788-89 (concluding that statements \u201coffered to show the reason for police action, rather than to prove the truth of the matter asserted\u201d are not hearsay); see also United States v. Running Horse, 175 F.3d 635, 638 (8th Cir.1999) (\u201cPreliminary information concerning the origin of an investigation, admitted only for that purpose, is not hearsay.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"175 F.3d 635, 638","parenthetical":"\"Preliminary information concerning the origin of an investigation, admitted only for that purpose, is not hearsay.\"","sentence":"See Londondio, 420 F.3d at 788-89 (concluding that statements \u201coffered to show the reason for police action, rather than to prove the truth of the matter asserted\u201d are not hearsay); see also United States v. Running Horse, 175 F.3d 635, 638 (8th Cir.1999) (\u201cPreliminary information concerning the origin of an investigation, admitted only for that purpose, is not hearsay.\u201d)."},"case_id":3679518,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Most significantly, Rashid's application asserts that he was subjected to persecution due to his purported efforts to convert poor Muslims to the Christian and Hindu religions. However, at his asylum hearing Rashid testified that as a member of the Awami League, he assisted poor Christian and Hindu children with their subsistence needs, which led to his persecution.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"439 F.3d 1100, 1108","parenthetical":"\"An inconsistency goes to the heart of a claim if it concerns events central to petitioner's version of why he was persecuted and fled.\"","sentence":"See Zamanov v. Holder, 649 F.3d 969, 973 (9th Cir.2011) (holding that \u201cMaterial alterations in the applicant\u2019s account of persecution are sufficient to support an adverse credibility finding\u201d) (citation omitted); see also Singh v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 1100, 1108 (9th Cir.2006) (\u201cAn inconsistency goes to the heart of a claim if it concerns events central to petitioner\u2019s version of why he was persecuted and fled.\u201d) (citation omitted)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"649 F.3d 969, 973","parenthetical":"holding that \"Material alterations in the applicant's account of persecution are sufficient to support an adverse credibility finding\"","sentence":"See Zamanov v. Holder, 649 F.3d 969, 973 (9th Cir.2011) (holding that \u201cMaterial alterations in the applicant\u2019s account of persecution are sufficient to support an adverse credibility finding\u201d) (citation omitted); see also Singh v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 1100, 1108 (9th Cir.2006) (\u201cAn inconsistency goes to the heart of a claim if it concerns events central to petitioner\u2019s version of why he was persecuted and fled.\u201d) (citation omitted)."},"case_id":4259399,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In addition, facilitation of an offense is expressly included as a lesser-included offense under part (c) of the test. We therefore conclude that, under either part (a) or part (c) of the lesser-included offense definition adopted above, facilitation was a lesser-included offense of the charged offense in this case.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"919 S.W.2d 62, 67","parenthetical":"\"We must conclude that virtually every time one is charged with a felony by way of criminal responsibility for the conduct of another, facilitation of the felony would be a lesser included offense.\"","sentence":"Compare Commonwealth v. Day, 983 S.W.2d 505, 509 n. 2 (Ky.1999) (\u201cGenerally, criminal facilitation is a lesser included offense when the defendant is charged with being an accomplice to an offense, not the principal offender.\u201d); Chumbler v. Commonwealth, 905 S.W.2d 488, 499 (Ky.1995); see also State v. Lewis, 919 S.W.2d 62, 67 (Tenn.Crim.App.1995) (\u201cWe must conclude that virtually every time one is charged with a felony by way of criminal responsibility for the conduct of another, facilitation of the felony would be a lesser included offense.\u201d), overruled on other grounds State v. Williams, 977 S.W.2d 101, 106 n. 7 (Tenn.1998)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"Generally, criminal facilitation is a lesser included offense when the defendant is charged with being an accomplice to an offense, not the principal offender.\"","sentence":"Compare Commonwealth v. Day, 983 S.W.2d 505, 509 n. 2 (Ky.1999) (\u201cGenerally, criminal facilitation is a lesser included offense when the defendant is charged with being an accomplice to an offense, not the principal offender.\u201d); Chumbler v. Commonwealth, 905 S.W.2d 488, 499 (Ky.1995); see also State v. Lewis, 919 S.W.2d 62, 67 (Tenn.Crim.App.1995) (\u201cWe must conclude that virtually every time one is charged with a felony by way of criminal responsibility for the conduct of another, facilitation of the felony would be a lesser included offense.\u201d), overruled on other grounds State v. Williams, 977 S.W.2d 101, 106 n. 7 (Tenn.1998)."},"case_id":11645636,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In addition, facilitation of an offense is expressly included as a lesser-included offense under part (c) of the test. We therefore conclude that, under either part (a) or part (c) of the lesser-included offense definition adopted above, facilitation was a lesser-included offense of the charged offense in this case.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"Generally, criminal facilitation is a lesser included offense when the defendant is charged with being an accomplice to an offense, not the principal offender.\"","sentence":"Compare Commonwealth v. Day, 983 S.W.2d 505, 509 n. 2 (Ky.1999) (\u201cGenerally, criminal facilitation is a lesser included offense when the defendant is charged with being an accomplice to an offense, not the principal offender.\u201d); Chumbler v. Commonwealth, 905 S.W.2d 488, 499 (Ky.1995); see also State v. Lewis, 919 S.W.2d 62, 67 (Tenn.Crim.App.1995) (\u201cWe must conclude that virtually every time one is charged with a felony by way of criminal responsibility for the conduct of another, facilitation of the felony would be a lesser included offense.\u201d), overruled on other grounds State v. Williams, 977 S.W.2d 101, 106 n. 7 (Tenn.1998)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"We must conclude that virtually every time one is charged with a felony by way of criminal responsibility for the conduct of another, facilitation of the felony would be a lesser included offense.\"","sentence":"Compare Commonwealth v. Day, 983 S.W.2d 505, 509 n. 2 (Ky.1999) (\u201cGenerally, criminal facilitation is a lesser included offense when the defendant is charged with being an accomplice to an offense, not the principal offender.\u201d); Chumbler v. Commonwealth, 905 S.W.2d 488, 499 (Ky.1995); see also State v. Lewis, 919 S.W.2d 62, 67 (Tenn.Crim.App.1995) (\u201cWe must conclude that virtually every time one is charged with a felony by way of criminal responsibility for the conduct of another, facilitation of the felony would be a lesser included offense.\u201d), overruled on other grounds State v. Williams, 977 S.W.2d 101, 106 n. 7 (Tenn.1998)."},"case_id":11645636,"label":"a"}
{"context":"We conclude that the application of the litigation privilege to a cause of action for abuse of process does not eliminate that cause of action. The litigation privilege, by definition, is limited to actions taken during a judicial proceeding and which are related to the judicial proceeding. Levin, 639 So.2d at 608. Therefore, a claimant may still pursue a claim for an abuse of process when the claim is based on actions taken outside of a judicial proceeding or on actions that are taken during a judicial proceeding but which are unrelated to the judicial proceeding.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that the litigation privilege did not preclude a malicious prosecution claim where the accusatorial statements that led to the plaintiffs arrest were made before the charges against him were filed and were not made during, and were unrelated to, the judicial proceeding","sentence":"See Olson v. Johnson, 961 So.2d 356 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) (holding that the litigation privilege did not preclude a malicious prosecution claim where the accusatorial statements that led to the plaintiffs arrest were made before the charges against him were filed and were not made during, and were unrelated to, the judicial proceeding); see also Montejo v. Martin Mem\u2019l Med. Ctr., Inc., 935 So.2d 1266 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) (holding that the litigation privilege did not prohibit the plaintiffs false imprisonment claim because the confinement did not occur during the course of the judicial proceedings nor in an effort to prosecute or defend the lawsuit)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that the litigation privilege did not prohibit the plaintiffs false imprisonment claim because the confinement did not occur during the course of the judicial proceedings nor in an effort to prosecute or defend the lawsuit","sentence":"See Olson v. Johnson, 961 So.2d 356 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) (holding that the litigation privilege did not preclude a malicious prosecution claim where the accusatorial statements that led to the plaintiffs arrest were made before the charges against him were filed and were not made during, and were unrelated to, the judicial proceeding); see also Montejo v. Martin Mem\u2019l Med. Ctr., Inc., 935 So.2d 1266 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) (holding that the litigation privilege did not prohibit the plaintiffs false imprisonment claim because the confinement did not occur during the course of the judicial proceedings nor in an effort to prosecute or defend the lawsuit)."},"case_id":7009952,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Viewing the allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, we nevertheless hold that Trooper Titus's alleged conduct did not amount to gross negligence as a matter of law. The plaintiffs' allegations that Trooper Titus drove at high speeds on a road congested with traffic in an attempt to apprehend a suspected intoxicated driver do not indicate that he acted with wanton or reckless disregard for the safety of others. Although the complaint states that Trooper Titus did not \"immediately\" activate his emergency equipment and violated police procedures, these somewhat vague allegations do not support the conclusion that he acted with gross negligence.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"312 Md. 367, 367","parenthetical":"as a matter of law, evidence was insufficient to show that the defendant, who was driving under the influence of alcohol, was grossly negligent in the operation of her automobile","sentence":"See also, Nast v. Lockett, supra, 312 Md. at 367, 539 A.2d at 1125 (as a matter of law, evidence was insufficient to show that the defendant, who was driving under the influence of alcohol, was grossly negligent in the operation of her automobile)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"141 Ill.App.3d 351, 353-354, 359-361","parenthetical":"conduct of police officers did not amount to willful or wanton negligence, as a matter of law, where they pursued a vehicle observed driving recklessly without its headlights on at about 9 p.m., where the chase took place over eight miles on an interstate highway and a two-lane road, where the roads were wet but traffic was light to medium, and where the officers were driving substantially over the speed limit","sentence":"See Breck v. Cortez, 141 Ill.App.3d 351, 353-354, 359-361, 95 Ill.Dec. 615, 616-17, 620-21, 490 N.E.2d 88, 89-90, 93-94 (1986) (conduct of police officers did not amount to willful or wanton negligence, as a matter of law, where they pursued a vehicle observed driving recklessly without its headlights on at about 9 p.m., where the chase took place over eight miles on an interstate highway and a two-lane road, where the roads were wet but traffic was light to medium, and where the officers were driving substantially over the speed limit); Bullins v. Schmidt, 322 N.C. 580, 369 S.E.2d 601 (1988) (police officers did not act with conscious or reckless disregard for others when they pursued a car driving erratically at about 1 a.m. over eighteen miles at speeds of up to 100 miles per hour)."},"case_id":2012636,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Viewing the allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, we nevertheless hold that Trooper Titus's alleged conduct did not amount to gross negligence as a matter of law. The plaintiffs' allegations that Trooper Titus drove at high speeds on a road congested with traffic in an attempt to apprehend a suspected intoxicated driver do not indicate that he acted with wanton or reckless disregard for the safety of others. Although the complaint states that Trooper Titus did not \"immediately\" activate his emergency equipment and violated police procedures, these somewhat vague allegations do not support the conclusion that he acted with gross negligence.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"141 Ill.App.3d 351, 353-354, 359-361","parenthetical":"conduct of police officers did not amount to willful or wanton negligence, as a matter of law, where they pursued a vehicle observed driving recklessly without its headlights on at about 9 p.m., where the chase took place over eight miles on an interstate highway and a two-lane road, where the roads were wet but traffic was light to medium, and where the officers were driving substantially over the speed limit","sentence":"See Breck v. Cortez, 141 Ill.App.3d 351, 353-354, 359-361, 95 Ill.Dec. 615, 616-17, 620-21, 490 N.E.2d 88, 89-90, 93-94 (1986) (conduct of police officers did not amount to willful or wanton negligence, as a matter of law, where they pursued a vehicle observed driving recklessly without its headlights on at about 9 p.m., where the chase took place over eight miles on an interstate highway and a two-lane road, where the roads were wet but traffic was light to medium, and where the officers were driving substantially over the speed limit); Bullins v. Schmidt, 322 N.C. 580, 369 S.E.2d 601 (1988) (police officers did not act with conscious or reckless disregard for others when they pursued a car driving erratically at about 1 a.m. over eighteen miles at speeds of up to 100 miles per hour)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"539 A.2d 1125, 1125","parenthetical":"as a matter of law, evidence was insufficient to show that the defendant, who was driving under the influence of alcohol, was grossly negligent in the operation of her automobile","sentence":"See also, Nast v. Lockett, supra, 312 Md. at 367, 539 A.2d at 1125 (as a matter of law, evidence was insufficient to show that the defendant, who was driving under the influence of alcohol, was grossly negligent in the operation of her automobile)."},"case_id":2012636,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Viewing the allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, we nevertheless hold that Trooper Titus's alleged conduct did not amount to gross negligence as a matter of law. The plaintiffs' allegations that Trooper Titus drove at high speeds on a road congested with traffic in an attempt to apprehend a suspected intoxicated driver do not indicate that he acted with wanton or reckless disregard for the safety of others. Although the complaint states that Trooper Titus did not \"immediately\" activate his emergency equipment and violated police procedures, these somewhat vague allegations do not support the conclusion that he acted with gross negligence.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"312 Md. 367, 367","parenthetical":"as a matter of law, evidence was insufficient to show that the defendant, who was driving under the influence of alcohol, was grossly negligent in the operation of her automobile","sentence":"See also, Nast v. Lockett, supra, 312 Md. at 367, 539 A.2d at 1125 (as a matter of law, evidence was insufficient to show that the defendant, who was driving under the influence of alcohol, was grossly negligent in the operation of her automobile)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"95 Ill.Dec. 615, 616-17, 620-21","parenthetical":"conduct of police officers did not amount to willful or wanton negligence, as a matter of law, where they pursued a vehicle observed driving recklessly without its headlights on at about 9 p.m., where the chase took place over eight miles on an interstate highway and a two-lane road, where the roads were wet but traffic was light to medium, and where the officers were driving substantially over the speed limit","sentence":"See Breck v. Cortez, 141 Ill.App.3d 351, 353-354, 359-361, 95 Ill.Dec. 615, 616-17, 620-21, 490 N.E.2d 88, 89-90, 93-94 (1986) (conduct of police officers did not amount to willful or wanton negligence, as a matter of law, where they pursued a vehicle observed driving recklessly without its headlights on at about 9 p.m., where the chase took place over eight miles on an interstate highway and a two-lane road, where the roads were wet but traffic was light to medium, and where the officers were driving substantially over the speed limit); Bullins v. Schmidt, 322 N.C. 580, 369 S.E.2d 601 (1988) (police officers did not act with conscious or reckless disregard for others when they pursued a car driving erratically at about 1 a.m. over eighteen miles at speeds of up to 100 miles per hour)."},"case_id":2012636,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Viewing the allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, we nevertheless hold that Trooper Titus's alleged conduct did not amount to gross negligence as a matter of law. The plaintiffs' allegations that Trooper Titus drove at high speeds on a road congested with traffic in an attempt to apprehend a suspected intoxicated driver do not indicate that he acted with wanton or reckless disregard for the safety of others. Although the complaint states that Trooper Titus did not \"immediately\" activate his emergency equipment and violated police procedures, these somewhat vague allegations do not support the conclusion that he acted with gross negligence.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"539 A.2d 1125, 1125","parenthetical":"as a matter of law, evidence was insufficient to show that the defendant, who was driving under the influence of alcohol, was grossly negligent in the operation of her automobile","sentence":"See also, Nast v. Lockett, supra, 312 Md. at 367, 539 A.2d at 1125 (as a matter of law, evidence was insufficient to show that the defendant, who was driving under the influence of alcohol, was grossly negligent in the operation of her automobile)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"95 Ill.Dec. 615, 616-17, 620-21","parenthetical":"conduct of police officers did not amount to willful or wanton negligence, as a matter of law, where they pursued a vehicle observed driving recklessly without its headlights on at about 9 p.m., where the chase took place over eight miles on an interstate highway and a two-lane road, where the roads were wet but traffic was light to medium, and where the officers were driving substantially over the speed limit","sentence":"See Breck v. Cortez, 141 Ill.App.3d 351, 353-354, 359-361, 95 Ill.Dec. 615, 616-17, 620-21, 490 N.E.2d 88, 89-90, 93-94 (1986) (conduct of police officers did not amount to willful or wanton negligence, as a matter of law, where they pursued a vehicle observed driving recklessly without its headlights on at about 9 p.m., where the chase took place over eight miles on an interstate highway and a two-lane road, where the roads were wet but traffic was light to medium, and where the officers were driving substantially over the speed limit); Bullins v. Schmidt, 322 N.C. 580, 369 S.E.2d 601 (1988) (police officers did not act with conscious or reckless disregard for others when they pursued a car driving erratically at about 1 a.m. over eighteen miles at speeds of up to 100 miles per hour)."},"case_id":2012636,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Viewing the allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, we nevertheless hold that Trooper Titus's alleged conduct did not amount to gross negligence as a matter of law. The plaintiffs' allegations that Trooper Titus drove at high speeds on a road congested with traffic in an attempt to apprehend a suspected intoxicated driver do not indicate that he acted with wanton or reckless disregard for the safety of others. Although the complaint states that Trooper Titus did not \"immediately\" activate his emergency equipment and violated police procedures, these somewhat vague allegations do not support the conclusion that he acted with gross negligence.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"490 N.E.2d 88, 89-90, 93-94","parenthetical":"conduct of police officers did not amount to willful or wanton negligence, as a matter of law, where they pursued a vehicle observed driving recklessly without its headlights on at about 9 p.m., where the chase took place over eight miles on an interstate highway and a two-lane road, where the roads were wet but traffic was light to medium, and where the officers were driving substantially over the speed limit","sentence":"See Breck v. Cortez, 141 Ill.App.3d 351, 353-354, 359-361, 95 Ill.Dec. 615, 616-17, 620-21, 490 N.E.2d 88, 89-90, 93-94 (1986) (conduct of police officers did not amount to willful or wanton negligence, as a matter of law, where they pursued a vehicle observed driving recklessly without its headlights on at about 9 p.m., where the chase took place over eight miles on an interstate highway and a two-lane road, where the roads were wet but traffic was light to medium, and where the officers were driving substantially over the speed limit); Bullins v. Schmidt, 322 N.C. 580, 369 S.E.2d 601 (1988) (police officers did not act with conscious or reckless disregard for others when they pursued a car driving erratically at about 1 a.m. over eighteen miles at speeds of up to 100 miles per hour)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"312 Md. 367, 367","parenthetical":"as a matter of law, evidence was insufficient to show that the defendant, who was driving under the influence of alcohol, was grossly negligent in the operation of her automobile","sentence":"See also, Nast v. Lockett, supra, 312 Md. at 367, 539 A.2d at 1125 (as a matter of law, evidence was insufficient to show that the defendant, who was driving under the influence of alcohol, was grossly negligent in the operation of her automobile)."},"case_id":2012636,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Viewing the allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, we nevertheless hold that Trooper Titus's alleged conduct did not amount to gross negligence as a matter of law. The plaintiffs' allegations that Trooper Titus drove at high speeds on a road congested with traffic in an attempt to apprehend a suspected intoxicated driver do not indicate that he acted with wanton or reckless disregard for the safety of others. Although the complaint states that Trooper Titus did not \"immediately\" activate his emergency equipment and violated police procedures, these somewhat vague allegations do not support the conclusion that he acted with gross negligence.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"490 N.E.2d 88, 89-90, 93-94","parenthetical":"conduct of police officers did not amount to willful or wanton negligence, as a matter of law, where they pursued a vehicle observed driving recklessly without its headlights on at about 9 p.m., where the chase took place over eight miles on an interstate highway and a two-lane road, where the roads were wet but traffic was light to medium, and where the officers were driving substantially over the speed limit","sentence":"See Breck v. Cortez, 141 Ill.App.3d 351, 353-354, 359-361, 95 Ill.Dec. 615, 616-17, 620-21, 490 N.E.2d 88, 89-90, 93-94 (1986) (conduct of police officers did not amount to willful or wanton negligence, as a matter of law, where they pursued a vehicle observed driving recklessly without its headlights on at about 9 p.m., where the chase took place over eight miles on an interstate highway and a two-lane road, where the roads were wet but traffic was light to medium, and where the officers were driving substantially over the speed limit); Bullins v. Schmidt, 322 N.C. 580, 369 S.E.2d 601 (1988) (police officers did not act with conscious or reckless disregard for others when they pursued a car driving erratically at about 1 a.m. over eighteen miles at speeds of up to 100 miles per hour)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"539 A.2d 1125, 1125","parenthetical":"as a matter of law, evidence was insufficient to show that the defendant, who was driving under the influence of alcohol, was grossly negligent in the operation of her automobile","sentence":"See also, Nast v. Lockett, supra, 312 Md. at 367, 539 A.2d at 1125 (as a matter of law, evidence was insufficient to show that the defendant, who was driving under the influence of alcohol, was grossly negligent in the operation of her automobile)."},"case_id":2012636,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Viewing the allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, we nevertheless hold that Trooper Titus's alleged conduct did not amount to gross negligence as a matter of law. The plaintiffs' allegations that Trooper Titus drove at high speeds on a road congested with traffic in an attempt to apprehend a suspected intoxicated driver do not indicate that he acted with wanton or reckless disregard for the safety of others. Although the complaint states that Trooper Titus did not \"immediately\" activate his emergency equipment and violated police procedures, these somewhat vague allegations do not support the conclusion that he acted with gross negligence.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"police officers did not act with conscious or reckless disregard for others when they pursued a car driving erratically at about 1 a.m. over eighteen miles at speeds of up to 100 miles per hour","sentence":"See Breck v. Cortez, 141 Ill.App.3d 351, 353-354, 359-361, 95 Ill.Dec. 615, 616-17, 620-21, 490 N.E.2d 88, 89-90, 93-94 (1986) (conduct of police officers did not amount to willful or wanton negligence, as a matter of law, where they pursued a vehicle observed driving recklessly without its headlights on at about 9 p.m., where the chase took place over eight miles on an interstate highway and a two-lane road, where the roads were wet but traffic was light to medium, and where the officers were driving substantially over the speed limit); Bullins v. Schmidt, 322 N.C. 580, 369 S.E.2d 601 (1988) (police officers did not act with conscious or reckless disregard for others when they pursued a car driving erratically at about 1 a.m. over eighteen miles at speeds of up to 100 miles per hour)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"312 Md. 367, 367","parenthetical":"as a matter of law, evidence was insufficient to show that the defendant, who was driving under the influence of alcohol, was grossly negligent in the operation of her automobile","sentence":"See also, Nast v. Lockett, supra, 312 Md. at 367, 539 A.2d at 1125 (as a matter of law, evidence was insufficient to show that the defendant, who was driving under the influence of alcohol, was grossly negligent in the operation of her automobile)."},"case_id":2012636,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Viewing the allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, we nevertheless hold that Trooper Titus's alleged conduct did not amount to gross negligence as a matter of law. The plaintiffs' allegations that Trooper Titus drove at high speeds on a road congested with traffic in an attempt to apprehend a suspected intoxicated driver do not indicate that he acted with wanton or reckless disregard for the safety of others. Although the complaint states that Trooper Titus did not \"immediately\" activate his emergency equipment and violated police procedures, these somewhat vague allegations do not support the conclusion that he acted with gross negligence.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"539 A.2d 1125, 1125","parenthetical":"as a matter of law, evidence was insufficient to show that the defendant, who was driving under the influence of alcohol, was grossly negligent in the operation of her automobile","sentence":"See also, Nast v. Lockett, supra, 312 Md. at 367, 539 A.2d at 1125 (as a matter of law, evidence was insufficient to show that the defendant, who was driving under the influence of alcohol, was grossly negligent in the operation of her automobile)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"police officers did not act with conscious or reckless disregard for others when they pursued a car driving erratically at about 1 a.m. over eighteen miles at speeds of up to 100 miles per hour","sentence":"See Breck v. Cortez, 141 Ill.App.3d 351, 353-354, 359-361, 95 Ill.Dec. 615, 616-17, 620-21, 490 N.E.2d 88, 89-90, 93-94 (1986) (conduct of police officers did not amount to willful or wanton negligence, as a matter of law, where they pursued a vehicle observed driving recklessly without its headlights on at about 9 p.m., where the chase took place over eight miles on an interstate highway and a two-lane road, where the roads were wet but traffic was light to medium, and where the officers were driving substantially over the speed limit); Bullins v. Schmidt, 322 N.C. 580, 369 S.E.2d 601 (1988) (police officers did not act with conscious or reckless disregard for others when they pursued a car driving erratically at about 1 a.m. over eighteen miles at speeds of up to 100 miles per hour)."},"case_id":2012636,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Viewing the allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, we nevertheless hold that Trooper Titus's alleged conduct did not amount to gross negligence as a matter of law. The plaintiffs' allegations that Trooper Titus drove at high speeds on a road congested with traffic in an attempt to apprehend a suspected intoxicated driver do not indicate that he acted with wanton or reckless disregard for the safety of others. Although the complaint states that Trooper Titus did not \"immediately\" activate his emergency equipment and violated police procedures, these somewhat vague allegations do not support the conclusion that he acted with gross negligence.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"police officers did not act with conscious or reckless disregard for others when they pursued a car driving erratically at about 1 a.m. over eighteen miles at speeds of up to 100 miles per hour","sentence":"See Breck v. Cortez, 141 Ill.App.3d 351, 353-354, 359-361, 95 Ill.Dec. 615, 616-17, 620-21, 490 N.E.2d 88, 89-90, 93-94 (1986) (conduct of police officers did not amount to willful or wanton negligence, as a matter of law, where they pursued a vehicle observed driving recklessly without its headlights on at about 9 p.m., where the chase took place over eight miles on an interstate highway and a two-lane road, where the roads were wet but traffic was light to medium, and where the officers were driving substantially over the speed limit); Bullins v. Schmidt, 322 N.C. 580, 369 S.E.2d 601 (1988) (police officers did not act with conscious or reckless disregard for others when they pursued a car driving erratically at about 1 a.m. over eighteen miles at speeds of up to 100 miles per hour)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"312 Md. 367, 367","parenthetical":"as a matter of law, evidence was insufficient to show that the defendant, who was driving under the influence of alcohol, was grossly negligent in the operation of her automobile","sentence":"See also, Nast v. Lockett, supra, 312 Md. at 367, 539 A.2d at 1125 (as a matter of law, evidence was insufficient to show that the defendant, who was driving under the influence of alcohol, was grossly negligent in the operation of her automobile)."},"case_id":2012636,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Viewing the allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, we nevertheless hold that Trooper Titus's alleged conduct did not amount to gross negligence as a matter of law. The plaintiffs' allegations that Trooper Titus drove at high speeds on a road congested with traffic in an attempt to apprehend a suspected intoxicated driver do not indicate that he acted with wanton or reckless disregard for the safety of others. Although the complaint states that Trooper Titus did not \"immediately\" activate his emergency equipment and violated police procedures, these somewhat vague allegations do not support the conclusion that he acted with gross negligence.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"police officers did not act with conscious or reckless disregard for others when they pursued a car driving erratically at about 1 a.m. over eighteen miles at speeds of up to 100 miles per hour","sentence":"See Breck v. Cortez, 141 Ill.App.3d 351, 353-354, 359-361, 95 Ill.Dec. 615, 616-17, 620-21, 490 N.E.2d 88, 89-90, 93-94 (1986) (conduct of police officers did not amount to willful or wanton negligence, as a matter of law, where they pursued a vehicle observed driving recklessly without its headlights on at about 9 p.m., where the chase took place over eight miles on an interstate highway and a two-lane road, where the roads were wet but traffic was light to medium, and where the officers were driving substantially over the speed limit); Bullins v. Schmidt, 322 N.C. 580, 369 S.E.2d 601 (1988) (police officers did not act with conscious or reckless disregard for others when they pursued a car driving erratically at about 1 a.m. over eighteen miles at speeds of up to 100 miles per hour)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"539 A.2d 1125, 1125","parenthetical":"as a matter of law, evidence was insufficient to show that the defendant, who was driving under the influence of alcohol, was grossly negligent in the operation of her automobile","sentence":"See also, Nast v. Lockett, supra, 312 Md. at 367, 539 A.2d at 1125 (as a matter of law, evidence was insufficient to show that the defendant, who was driving under the influence of alcohol, was grossly negligent in the operation of her automobile)."},"case_id":2012636,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Moreover, AT & T is not entitled to relief under the URAA or the Ohio relocation assistance statute, as Plaintiff has been merely required to shift its telecommunications cable within the boundaries of the easement.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"465 N.E.2d 1343, 1343, 1347","parenthetical":"asserting that the utility was a displaced person and entitled to compensation, as it was required to move an underground pipeline to an entirely new location when the state acquired, to build an interstate highway, the land through which the utility had an easement","sentence":"See Consumers Power Co., 615 F.2d at 1149-50 (explaining that a utility forced to shift its pipes due to federally funded sewage projects was not a displaced person entitled to compensation under the URAA, having lost no right, because it was able to maintain its pipes in the same ground in which they had previously been maintained); cf. Weir, 465 N.E.2d at 1343, 1347 (asserting that the utility was a displaced person and entitled to compensation, as it was required to move an underground pipeline to an entirely new location when the state acquired, to build an interstate highway, the land through which the utility had an easement)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"615 F.2d 1149, 1149-50","parenthetical":"explaining that a utility forced to shift its pipes due to federally funded sewage projects was not a displaced person entitled to compensation under the URAA, having lost no right, because it was able to maintain its pipes in the same ground in which they had previously been maintained","sentence":"See Consumers Power Co., 615 F.2d at 1149-50 (explaining that a utility forced to shift its pipes due to federally funded sewage projects was not a displaced person entitled to compensation under the URAA, having lost no right, because it was able to maintain its pipes in the same ground in which they had previously been maintained); cf. Weir, 465 N.E.2d at 1343, 1347 (asserting that the utility was a displaced person and entitled to compensation, as it was required to move an underground pipeline to an entirely new location when the state acquired, to build an interstate highway, the land through which the utility had an easement)."},"case_id":9040839,"label":"b"}
{"context":"We must identify the relevant forum before we can classify it. Because Bryant seeks access only to the advertising section of each CEN, we treat the advertising section -- not the whole CEN, which the Government suggests -- as the relevant forum.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"In cases in which limited access is sought,\" we \"take[] a more tailored approach to ascertaining the perimeters of a forum\"","sentence":"Id. at 801, 105 S.Ct. 3439 (\u201cIn cases in which limited access is sought,\u201d we \u201ctake[] a more tailored approach to ascertaining the perimeters of a forum\u201d); see Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 300-04, 94 S.Ct. 2714, 41 L.Ed.2d 770 (1974) (plurality) (advertising spaces on city buses, where plaintiff wanted to run political ads, were relevant fora); Perry Educ. Ass\u2019n v. Perry Local Educators\u2019 Ass\u2019n, 460 U.S. 37, 46-47, 103 S.Ct. 948, 74 L.Ed.2d 794 (1983) (where plaintiff wanted to distribute mail to school teachers, school\u2019s internal mail system was relevant forum)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"460 U.S. 37, 46-47","parenthetical":"where plaintiff wanted to distribute mail to school teachers, school's internal mail system was relevant forum","sentence":"Id. at 801, 105 S.Ct. 3439 (\u201cIn cases in which limited access is sought,\u201d we \u201ctake[] a more tailored approach to ascertaining the perimeters of a forum\u201d); see Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 300-04, 94 S.Ct. 2714, 41 L.Ed.2d 770 (1974) (plurality) (advertising spaces on city buses, where plaintiff wanted to run political ads, were relevant fora); Perry Educ. Ass\u2019n v. Perry Local Educators\u2019 Ass\u2019n, 460 U.S. 37, 46-47, 103 S.Ct. 948, 74 L.Ed.2d 794 (1983) (where plaintiff wanted to distribute mail to school teachers, school\u2019s internal mail system was relevant forum)."},"case_id":4030405,"label":"a"}
{"context":"We must identify the relevant forum before we can classify it. Because Bryant seeks access only to the advertising section of each CEN, we treat the advertising section -- not the whole CEN, which the Government suggests -- as the relevant forum.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"In cases in which limited access is sought,\" we \"take[] a more tailored approach to ascertaining the perimeters of a forum\"","sentence":"Id. at 801, 105 S.Ct. 3439 (\u201cIn cases in which limited access is sought,\u201d we \u201ctake[] a more tailored approach to ascertaining the perimeters of a forum\u201d); see Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 300-04, 94 S.Ct. 2714, 41 L.Ed.2d 770 (1974) (plurality) (advertising spaces on city buses, where plaintiff wanted to run political ads, were relevant fora); Perry Educ. Ass\u2019n v. Perry Local Educators\u2019 Ass\u2019n, 460 U.S. 37, 46-47, 103 S.Ct. 948, 74 L.Ed.2d 794 (1983) (where plaintiff wanted to distribute mail to school teachers, school\u2019s internal mail system was relevant forum)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"where plaintiff wanted to distribute mail to school teachers, school's internal mail system was relevant forum","sentence":"Id. at 801, 105 S.Ct. 3439 (\u201cIn cases in which limited access is sought,\u201d we \u201ctake[] a more tailored approach to ascertaining the perimeters of a forum\u201d); see Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 300-04, 94 S.Ct. 2714, 41 L.Ed.2d 770 (1974) (plurality) (advertising spaces on city buses, where plaintiff wanted to run political ads, were relevant fora); Perry Educ. Ass\u2019n v. Perry Local Educators\u2019 Ass\u2019n, 460 U.S. 37, 46-47, 103 S.Ct. 948, 74 L.Ed.2d 794 (1983) (where plaintiff wanted to distribute mail to school teachers, school\u2019s internal mail system was relevant forum)."},"case_id":4030405,"label":"a"}
{"context":"We must identify the relevant forum before we can classify it. Because Bryant seeks access only to the advertising section of each CEN, we treat the advertising section -- not the whole CEN, which the Government suggests -- as the relevant forum.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"In cases in which limited access is sought,\" we \"take[] a more tailored approach to ascertaining the perimeters of a forum\"","sentence":"Id. at 801, 105 S.Ct. 3439 (\u201cIn cases in which limited access is sought,\u201d we \u201ctake[] a more tailored approach to ascertaining the perimeters of a forum\u201d); see Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 300-04, 94 S.Ct. 2714, 41 L.Ed.2d 770 (1974) (plurality) (advertising spaces on city buses, where plaintiff wanted to run political ads, were relevant fora); Perry Educ. Ass\u2019n v. Perry Local Educators\u2019 Ass\u2019n, 460 U.S. 37, 46-47, 103 S.Ct. 948, 74 L.Ed.2d 794 (1983) (where plaintiff wanted to distribute mail to school teachers, school\u2019s internal mail system was relevant forum)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"where plaintiff wanted to distribute mail to school teachers, school's internal mail system was relevant forum","sentence":"Id. at 801, 105 S.Ct. 3439 (\u201cIn cases in which limited access is sought,\u201d we \u201ctake[] a more tailored approach to ascertaining the perimeters of a forum\u201d); see Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 300-04, 94 S.Ct. 2714, 41 L.Ed.2d 770 (1974) (plurality) (advertising spaces on city buses, where plaintiff wanted to run political ads, were relevant fora); Perry Educ. Ass\u2019n v. Perry Local Educators\u2019 Ass\u2019n, 460 U.S. 37, 46-47, 103 S.Ct. 948, 74 L.Ed.2d 794 (1983) (where plaintiff wanted to distribute mail to school teachers, school\u2019s internal mail system was relevant forum)."},"case_id":4030405,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Often in First Amendment retaliation cases, the government is claimed to have retaliated against the plaintiff for her own speech; but the First Amendment may also be violated where the speech that invoked the government's retaliatory response was not made by the plaintiff herself, but rather by a person in a close relationship with the plaintiff, and the government retaliated against the plaintiff for her perceived association with the other person and that person's speech.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"131 S.Ct. 863, 867","parenthetical":"\"We have little difficulty concluding that if [plaintiffs allegations that the defendant terminated his employment in retaliation for his fiancee's filing of a charge with the EEOC] are true, then [the defendant's] firing of [plaintiff] violated Title VII.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Adler v. Pataki, 185 F.3d 35, 45 (2d Cir.1999) (holding that \u201cretaliatory discharge based solely on [protected speech] by one\u2019s spouse is actionable under the First Amendment\u201d); Talley v. Brentwood Union Free Sch. Dist., 2009 WL 1797627, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. June 24, 2009) (Hurley, J.) (citing Adler to uphold claim of retaliation against a daughter for her father\u2019s speech); Cain v. Tigard-Tualatin Sch. Dist. 23J, 262 F.Supp.2d 1120, 1127 (D.Or.2003) (Haggerty, C.J.) (upholding claim that defendant\u2019s retaliatory \u201cconduct was motivated by [plaintiffs] association with his parents\u2019 speech\u201d); Agostino v. Simpson, 2008 WL 4906140, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 17, 2008) (Seibel, J.) (claim \u201calleging that Defendants took adverse action against Plaintiff in retaliation for [his father\u2019s] First Amendment activities\u201d); Serena H. v. Kovarie, 209 F.Supp.2d 453, 458 (E.D.Pa.2002) (Brody, J.) (upholding \u201cFirst Amendment claim [that] [the plaintiff] was retaliated against based upon her mother\u2019s exercise of free speech\u201d); cf. Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, \u2014 U.S.-, 131 S.Ct. 863, 867, 178 L.Ed.2d 694 (2011) (\u201cWe have little difficulty concluding that if [plaintiffs allegations that the defendant terminated his employment in retaliation for his fianc\u00e9e\u2019s filing of a charge with the EEOC] are true, then [the defendant\u2019s] firing of [plaintiff] violated Title VII.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"185 F.3d 35, 45","parenthetical":"holding that \"retaliatory discharge based solely on [protected speech] by one's spouse is actionable under the First Amendment\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Adler v. Pataki, 185 F.3d 35, 45 (2d Cir.1999) (holding that \u201cretaliatory discharge based solely on [protected speech] by one\u2019s spouse is actionable under the First Amendment\u201d); Talley v. Brentwood Union Free Sch. Dist., 2009 WL 1797627, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. June 24, 2009) (Hurley, J.) (citing Adler to uphold claim of retaliation against a daughter for her father\u2019s speech); Cain v. Tigard-Tualatin Sch. Dist. 23J, 262 F.Supp.2d 1120, 1127 (D.Or.2003) (Haggerty, C.J.) (upholding claim that defendant\u2019s retaliatory \u201cconduct was motivated by [plaintiffs] association with his parents\u2019 speech\u201d); Agostino v. Simpson, 2008 WL 4906140, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 17, 2008) (Seibel, J.) (claim \u201calleging that Defendants took adverse action against Plaintiff in retaliation for [his father\u2019s] First Amendment activities\u201d); Serena H. v. Kovarie, 209 F.Supp.2d 453, 458 (E.D.Pa.2002) (Brody, J.) (upholding \u201cFirst Amendment claim [that] [the plaintiff] was retaliated against based upon her mother\u2019s exercise of free speech\u201d); cf. Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, \u2014 U.S.-, 131 S.Ct. 863, 867, 178 L.Ed.2d 694 (2011) (\u201cWe have little difficulty concluding that if [plaintiffs allegations that the defendant terminated his employment in retaliation for his fianc\u00e9e\u2019s filing of a charge with the EEOC] are true, then [the defendant\u2019s] firing of [plaintiff] violated Title VII.\u201d)."},"case_id":4326437,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Often in First Amendment retaliation cases, the government is claimed to have retaliated against the plaintiff for her own speech; but the First Amendment may also be violated where the speech that invoked the government's retaliatory response was not made by the plaintiff herself, but rather by a person in a close relationship with the plaintiff, and the government retaliated against the plaintiff for her perceived association with the other person and that person's speech.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"185 F.3d 35, 45","parenthetical":"holding that \"retaliatory discharge based solely on [protected speech] by one's spouse is actionable under the First Amendment\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Adler v. Pataki, 185 F.3d 35, 45 (2d Cir.1999) (holding that \u201cretaliatory discharge based solely on [protected speech] by one\u2019s spouse is actionable under the First Amendment\u201d); Talley v. Brentwood Union Free Sch. Dist., 2009 WL 1797627, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. June 24, 2009) (Hurley, J.) (citing Adler to uphold claim of retaliation against a daughter for her father\u2019s speech); Cain v. Tigard-Tualatin Sch. Dist. 23J, 262 F.Supp.2d 1120, 1127 (D.Or.2003) (Haggerty, C.J.) (upholding claim that defendant\u2019s retaliatory \u201cconduct was motivated by [plaintiffs] association with his parents\u2019 speech\u201d); Agostino v. Simpson, 2008 WL 4906140, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 17, 2008) (Seibel, J.) (claim \u201calleging that Defendants took adverse action against Plaintiff in retaliation for [his father\u2019s] First Amendment activities\u201d); Serena H. v. Kovarie, 209 F.Supp.2d 453, 458 (E.D.Pa.2002) (Brody, J.) (upholding \u201cFirst Amendment claim [that] [the plaintiff] was retaliated against based upon her mother\u2019s exercise of free speech\u201d); cf. Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, \u2014 U.S.-, 131 S.Ct. 863, 867, 178 L.Ed.2d 694 (2011) (\u201cWe have little difficulty concluding that if [plaintiffs allegations that the defendant terminated his employment in retaliation for his fianc\u00e9e\u2019s filing of a charge with the EEOC] are true, then [the defendant\u2019s] firing of [plaintiff] violated Title VII.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"We have little difficulty concluding that if [plaintiffs allegations that the defendant terminated his employment in retaliation for his fiancee's filing of a charge with the EEOC] are true, then [the defendant's] firing of [plaintiff] violated Title VII.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Adler v. Pataki, 185 F.3d 35, 45 (2d Cir.1999) (holding that \u201cretaliatory discharge based solely on [protected speech] by one\u2019s spouse is actionable under the First Amendment\u201d); Talley v. Brentwood Union Free Sch. Dist., 2009 WL 1797627, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. June 24, 2009) (Hurley, J.) (citing Adler to uphold claim of retaliation against a daughter for her father\u2019s speech); Cain v. Tigard-Tualatin Sch. Dist. 23J, 262 F.Supp.2d 1120, 1127 (D.Or.2003) (Haggerty, C.J.) (upholding claim that defendant\u2019s retaliatory \u201cconduct was motivated by [plaintiffs] association with his parents\u2019 speech\u201d); Agostino v. Simpson, 2008 WL 4906140, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 17, 2008) (Seibel, J.) (claim \u201calleging that Defendants took adverse action against Plaintiff in retaliation for [his father\u2019s] First Amendment activities\u201d); Serena H. v. Kovarie, 209 F.Supp.2d 453, 458 (E.D.Pa.2002) (Brody, J.) (upholding \u201cFirst Amendment claim [that] [the plaintiff] was retaliated against based upon her mother\u2019s exercise of free speech\u201d); cf. Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, \u2014 U.S.-, 131 S.Ct. 863, 867, 178 L.Ed.2d 694 (2011) (\u201cWe have little difficulty concluding that if [plaintiffs allegations that the defendant terminated his employment in retaliation for his fianc\u00e9e\u2019s filing of a charge with the EEOC] are true, then [the defendant\u2019s] firing of [plaintiff] violated Title VII.\u201d)."},"case_id":4326437,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Often in First Amendment retaliation cases, the government is claimed to have retaliated against the plaintiff for her own speech; but the First Amendment may also be violated where the speech that invoked the government's retaliatory response was not made by the plaintiff herself, but rather by a person in a close relationship with the plaintiff, and the government retaliated against the plaintiff for her perceived association with the other person and that person's speech.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"262 F.Supp.2d 1120, 1127","parenthetical":"upholding claim that defendant's retaliatory \"conduct was motivated by [plaintiffs] association with his parents' speech\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Adler v. Pataki, 185 F.3d 35, 45 (2d Cir.1999) (holding that \u201cretaliatory discharge based solely on [protected speech] by one\u2019s spouse is actionable under the First Amendment\u201d); Talley v. Brentwood Union Free Sch. Dist., 2009 WL 1797627, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. June 24, 2009) (Hurley, J.) (citing Adler to uphold claim of retaliation against a daughter for her father\u2019s speech); Cain v. Tigard-Tualatin Sch. Dist. 23J, 262 F.Supp.2d 1120, 1127 (D.Or.2003) (Haggerty, C.J.) (upholding claim that defendant\u2019s retaliatory \u201cconduct was motivated by [plaintiffs] association with his parents\u2019 speech\u201d); Agostino v. Simpson, 2008 WL 4906140, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 17, 2008) (Seibel, J.) (claim \u201calleging that Defendants took adverse action against Plaintiff in retaliation for [his father\u2019s] First Amendment activities\u201d); Serena H. v. Kovarie, 209 F.Supp.2d 453, 458 (E.D.Pa.2002) (Brody, J.) (upholding \u201cFirst Amendment claim [that] [the plaintiff] was retaliated against based upon her mother\u2019s exercise of free speech\u201d); cf. Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, \u2014 U.S.-, 131 S.Ct. 863, 867, 178 L.Ed.2d 694 (2011) (\u201cWe have little difficulty concluding that if [plaintiffs allegations that the defendant terminated his employment in retaliation for his fianc\u00e9e\u2019s filing of a charge with the EEOC] are true, then [the defendant\u2019s] firing of [plaintiff] violated Title VII.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"131 S.Ct. 863, 867","parenthetical":"\"We have little difficulty concluding that if [plaintiffs allegations that the defendant terminated his employment in retaliation for his fiancee's filing of a charge with the EEOC] are true, then [the defendant's] firing of [plaintiff] violated Title VII.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Adler v. Pataki, 185 F.3d 35, 45 (2d Cir.1999) (holding that \u201cretaliatory discharge based solely on [protected speech] by one\u2019s spouse is actionable under the First Amendment\u201d); Talley v. Brentwood Union Free Sch. Dist., 2009 WL 1797627, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. June 24, 2009) (Hurley, J.) (citing Adler to uphold claim of retaliation against a daughter for her father\u2019s speech); Cain v. Tigard-Tualatin Sch. Dist. 23J, 262 F.Supp.2d 1120, 1127 (D.Or.2003) (Haggerty, C.J.) (upholding claim that defendant\u2019s retaliatory \u201cconduct was motivated by [plaintiffs] association with his parents\u2019 speech\u201d); Agostino v. Simpson, 2008 WL 4906140, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 17, 2008) (Seibel, J.) (claim \u201calleging that Defendants took adverse action against Plaintiff in retaliation for [his father\u2019s] First Amendment activities\u201d); Serena H. v. Kovarie, 209 F.Supp.2d 453, 458 (E.D.Pa.2002) (Brody, J.) (upholding \u201cFirst Amendment claim [that] [the plaintiff] was retaliated against based upon her mother\u2019s exercise of free speech\u201d); cf. Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, \u2014 U.S.-, 131 S.Ct. 863, 867, 178 L.Ed.2d 694 (2011) (\u201cWe have little difficulty concluding that if [plaintiffs allegations that the defendant terminated his employment in retaliation for his fianc\u00e9e\u2019s filing of a charge with the EEOC] are true, then [the defendant\u2019s] firing of [plaintiff] violated Title VII.\u201d)."},"case_id":4326437,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Often in First Amendment retaliation cases, the government is claimed to have retaliated against the plaintiff for her own speech; but the First Amendment may also be violated where the speech that invoked the government's retaliatory response was not made by the plaintiff herself, but rather by a person in a close relationship with the plaintiff, and the government retaliated against the plaintiff for her perceived association with the other person and that person's speech.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"262 F.Supp.2d 1120, 1127","parenthetical":"upholding claim that defendant's retaliatory \"conduct was motivated by [plaintiffs] association with his parents' speech\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Adler v. Pataki, 185 F.3d 35, 45 (2d Cir.1999) (holding that \u201cretaliatory discharge based solely on [protected speech] by one\u2019s spouse is actionable under the First Amendment\u201d); Talley v. Brentwood Union Free Sch. Dist., 2009 WL 1797627, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. June 24, 2009) (Hurley, J.) (citing Adler to uphold claim of retaliation against a daughter for her father\u2019s speech); Cain v. Tigard-Tualatin Sch. Dist. 23J, 262 F.Supp.2d 1120, 1127 (D.Or.2003) (Haggerty, C.J.) (upholding claim that defendant\u2019s retaliatory \u201cconduct was motivated by [plaintiffs] association with his parents\u2019 speech\u201d); Agostino v. Simpson, 2008 WL 4906140, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 17, 2008) (Seibel, J.) (claim \u201calleging that Defendants took adverse action against Plaintiff in retaliation for [his father\u2019s] First Amendment activities\u201d); Serena H. v. Kovarie, 209 F.Supp.2d 453, 458 (E.D.Pa.2002) (Brody, J.) (upholding \u201cFirst Amendment claim [that] [the plaintiff] was retaliated against based upon her mother\u2019s exercise of free speech\u201d); cf. Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, \u2014 U.S.-, 131 S.Ct. 863, 867, 178 L.Ed.2d 694 (2011) (\u201cWe have little difficulty concluding that if [plaintiffs allegations that the defendant terminated his employment in retaliation for his fianc\u00e9e\u2019s filing of a charge with the EEOC] are true, then [the defendant\u2019s] firing of [plaintiff] violated Title VII.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"We have little difficulty concluding that if [plaintiffs allegations that the defendant terminated his employment in retaliation for his fiancee's filing of a charge with the EEOC] are true, then [the defendant's] firing of [plaintiff] violated Title VII.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Adler v. Pataki, 185 F.3d 35, 45 (2d Cir.1999) (holding that \u201cretaliatory discharge based solely on [protected speech] by one\u2019s spouse is actionable under the First Amendment\u201d); Talley v. Brentwood Union Free Sch. Dist., 2009 WL 1797627, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. June 24, 2009) (Hurley, J.) (citing Adler to uphold claim of retaliation against a daughter for her father\u2019s speech); Cain v. Tigard-Tualatin Sch. Dist. 23J, 262 F.Supp.2d 1120, 1127 (D.Or.2003) (Haggerty, C.J.) (upholding claim that defendant\u2019s retaliatory \u201cconduct was motivated by [plaintiffs] association with his parents\u2019 speech\u201d); Agostino v. Simpson, 2008 WL 4906140, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 17, 2008) (Seibel, J.) (claim \u201calleging that Defendants took adverse action against Plaintiff in retaliation for [his father\u2019s] First Amendment activities\u201d); Serena H. v. Kovarie, 209 F.Supp.2d 453, 458 (E.D.Pa.2002) (Brody, J.) (upholding \u201cFirst Amendment claim [that] [the plaintiff] was retaliated against based upon her mother\u2019s exercise of free speech\u201d); cf. Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, \u2014 U.S.-, 131 S.Ct. 863, 867, 178 L.Ed.2d 694 (2011) (\u201cWe have little difficulty concluding that if [plaintiffs allegations that the defendant terminated his employment in retaliation for his fianc\u00e9e\u2019s filing of a charge with the EEOC] are true, then [the defendant\u2019s] firing of [plaintiff] violated Title VII.\u201d)."},"case_id":4326437,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Often in First Amendment retaliation cases, the government is claimed to have retaliated against the plaintiff for her own speech; but the First Amendment may also be violated where the speech that invoked the government's retaliatory response was not made by the plaintiff herself, but rather by a person in a close relationship with the plaintiff, and the government retaliated against the plaintiff for her perceived association with the other person and that person's speech.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"131 S.Ct. 863, 867","parenthetical":"\"We have little difficulty concluding that if [plaintiffs allegations that the defendant terminated his employment in retaliation for his fiancee's filing of a charge with the EEOC] are true, then [the defendant's] firing of [plaintiff] violated Title VII.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Adler v. Pataki, 185 F.3d 35, 45 (2d Cir.1999) (holding that \u201cretaliatory discharge based solely on [protected speech] by one\u2019s spouse is actionable under the First Amendment\u201d); Talley v. Brentwood Union Free Sch. Dist., 2009 WL 1797627, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. June 24, 2009) (Hurley, J.) (citing Adler to uphold claim of retaliation against a daughter for her father\u2019s speech); Cain v. Tigard-Tualatin Sch. Dist. 23J, 262 F.Supp.2d 1120, 1127 (D.Or.2003) (Haggerty, C.J.) (upholding claim that defendant\u2019s retaliatory \u201cconduct was motivated by [plaintiffs] association with his parents\u2019 speech\u201d); Agostino v. Simpson, 2008 WL 4906140, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 17, 2008) (Seibel, J.) (claim \u201calleging that Defendants took adverse action against Plaintiff in retaliation for [his father\u2019s] First Amendment activities\u201d); Serena H. v. Kovarie, 209 F.Supp.2d 453, 458 (E.D.Pa.2002) (Brody, J.) (upholding \u201cFirst Amendment claim [that] [the plaintiff] was retaliated against based upon her mother\u2019s exercise of free speech\u201d); cf. Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, \u2014 U.S.-, 131 S.Ct. 863, 867, 178 L.Ed.2d 694 (2011) (\u201cWe have little difficulty concluding that if [plaintiffs allegations that the defendant terminated his employment in retaliation for his fianc\u00e9e\u2019s filing of a charge with the EEOC] are true, then [the defendant\u2019s] firing of [plaintiff] violated Title VII.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"209 F.Supp.2d 453, 458","parenthetical":"upholding \"First Amendment claim [that] [the plaintiff] was retaliated against based upon her mother's exercise of free speech\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Adler v. Pataki, 185 F.3d 35, 45 (2d Cir.1999) (holding that \u201cretaliatory discharge based solely on [protected speech] by one\u2019s spouse is actionable under the First Amendment\u201d); Talley v. Brentwood Union Free Sch. Dist., 2009 WL 1797627, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. June 24, 2009) (Hurley, J.) (citing Adler to uphold claim of retaliation against a daughter for her father\u2019s speech); Cain v. Tigard-Tualatin Sch. Dist. 23J, 262 F.Supp.2d 1120, 1127 (D.Or.2003) (Haggerty, C.J.) (upholding claim that defendant\u2019s retaliatory \u201cconduct was motivated by [plaintiffs] association with his parents\u2019 speech\u201d); Agostino v. Simpson, 2008 WL 4906140, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 17, 2008) (Seibel, J.) (claim \u201calleging that Defendants took adverse action against Plaintiff in retaliation for [his father\u2019s] First Amendment activities\u201d); Serena H. v. Kovarie, 209 F.Supp.2d 453, 458 (E.D.Pa.2002) (Brody, J.) (upholding \u201cFirst Amendment claim [that] [the plaintiff] was retaliated against based upon her mother\u2019s exercise of free speech\u201d); cf. Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, \u2014 U.S.-, 131 S.Ct. 863, 867, 178 L.Ed.2d 694 (2011) (\u201cWe have little difficulty concluding that if [plaintiffs allegations that the defendant terminated his employment in retaliation for his fianc\u00e9e\u2019s filing of a charge with the EEOC] are true, then [the defendant\u2019s] firing of [plaintiff] violated Title VII.\u201d)."},"case_id":4326437,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Often in First Amendment retaliation cases, the government is claimed to have retaliated against the plaintiff for her own speech; but the First Amendment may also be violated where the speech that invoked the government's retaliatory response was not made by the plaintiff herself, but rather by a person in a close relationship with the plaintiff, and the government retaliated against the plaintiff for her perceived association with the other person and that person's speech.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"209 F.Supp.2d 453, 458","parenthetical":"upholding \"First Amendment claim [that] [the plaintiff] was retaliated against based upon her mother's exercise of free speech\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Adler v. Pataki, 185 F.3d 35, 45 (2d Cir.1999) (holding that \u201cretaliatory discharge based solely on [protected speech] by one\u2019s spouse is actionable under the First Amendment\u201d); Talley v. Brentwood Union Free Sch. Dist., 2009 WL 1797627, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. June 24, 2009) (Hurley, J.) (citing Adler to uphold claim of retaliation against a daughter for her father\u2019s speech); Cain v. Tigard-Tualatin Sch. Dist. 23J, 262 F.Supp.2d 1120, 1127 (D.Or.2003) (Haggerty, C.J.) (upholding claim that defendant\u2019s retaliatory \u201cconduct was motivated by [plaintiffs] association with his parents\u2019 speech\u201d); Agostino v. Simpson, 2008 WL 4906140, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 17, 2008) (Seibel, J.) (claim \u201calleging that Defendants took adverse action against Plaintiff in retaliation for [his father\u2019s] First Amendment activities\u201d); Serena H. v. Kovarie, 209 F.Supp.2d 453, 458 (E.D.Pa.2002) (Brody, J.) (upholding \u201cFirst Amendment claim [that] [the plaintiff] was retaliated against based upon her mother\u2019s exercise of free speech\u201d); cf. Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, \u2014 U.S.-, 131 S.Ct. 863, 867, 178 L.Ed.2d 694 (2011) (\u201cWe have little difficulty concluding that if [plaintiffs allegations that the defendant terminated his employment in retaliation for his fianc\u00e9e\u2019s filing of a charge with the EEOC] are true, then [the defendant\u2019s] firing of [plaintiff] violated Title VII.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"We have little difficulty concluding that if [plaintiffs allegations that the defendant terminated his employment in retaliation for his fiancee's filing of a charge with the EEOC] are true, then [the defendant's] firing of [plaintiff] violated Title VII.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Adler v. Pataki, 185 F.3d 35, 45 (2d Cir.1999) (holding that \u201cretaliatory discharge based solely on [protected speech] by one\u2019s spouse is actionable under the First Amendment\u201d); Talley v. Brentwood Union Free Sch. Dist., 2009 WL 1797627, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. June 24, 2009) (Hurley, J.) (citing Adler to uphold claim of retaliation against a daughter for her father\u2019s speech); Cain v. Tigard-Tualatin Sch. Dist. 23J, 262 F.Supp.2d 1120, 1127 (D.Or.2003) (Haggerty, C.J.) (upholding claim that defendant\u2019s retaliatory \u201cconduct was motivated by [plaintiffs] association with his parents\u2019 speech\u201d); Agostino v. Simpson, 2008 WL 4906140, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 17, 2008) (Seibel, J.) (claim \u201calleging that Defendants took adverse action against Plaintiff in retaliation for [his father\u2019s] First Amendment activities\u201d); Serena H. v. Kovarie, 209 F.Supp.2d 453, 458 (E.D.Pa.2002) (Brody, J.) (upholding \u201cFirst Amendment claim [that] [the plaintiff] was retaliated against based upon her mother\u2019s exercise of free speech\u201d); cf. Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, \u2014 U.S.-, 131 S.Ct. 863, 867, 178 L.Ed.2d 694 (2011) (\u201cWe have little difficulty concluding that if [plaintiffs allegations that the defendant terminated his employment in retaliation for his fianc\u00e9e\u2019s filing of a charge with the EEOC] are true, then [the defendant\u2019s] firing of [plaintiff] violated Title VII.\u201d)."},"case_id":4326437,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Nor is \"an official's mere presence when promises are made [sufficient to] establish that he or she possessed actual knowledge that such promises were in fact made.\" Because the ratifying party must manifest her knowing acceptance of the specific contract at issue, ratification cannot be inferred from a plaintiffs prior dealings with the same government agency.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"43 Fed.Cl. 27, 27-28","parenthetical":"\"[P]laintiff has to have evidence of something more than the possibility that [the ratifying official] may have known about the prior [dealings].\"","sentence":"See Henke, 43 Fed.Cl. at 27-28 (\u201c[P]laintiff has to have evidence of something more than the possibility that [the ratifying official] may have known about the prior [dealings].\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"48 Fed.Cl. 495, 504","parenthetical":"\"[A] 'plaintiffs prior experience with the [agency] is not sufficient as proof [of ratification] with respect to the contract at issue.' \"","sentence":"Doe v. United States, 48 Fed.Cl. 495, 504 (2000) (\u201c[A] \u2018plaintiffs prior experience with the [agency] is not sufficient as proof [of ratification] with respect to the contract at issue.\u2019 \u201d) (quoting Henke, 43 Fed.Cl. at 27). This is especially the case where, as here, the ratifying official did not participate in plaintiffs prior dealings with the agency."},"case_id":793498,"label":"b"}
{"context":"To the extent that Miner alleges that the Town is liable for any intentional infliction of emotional distress by Deegan, see Am.Compl. at 13, P 82, such a claim is precluded by Conn.Gen.Stat. SS 52-557n, which provides, that \"a political subdivision of the state shall not be liable for damages to person or property caused by ... [a]cts or omissions of any employee, officer or agent which constitute criminal conduct, fraud, actual malice or willful misconduct ...\" Under Connecticut law, the term \"willfulness\" is synonymous with \"intentional.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"While [courts] have attempted to draw definitional [distinctions] between the terms willful, wanton or reckless, in practice the three terms have been treated as meaning the same thing.\"","sentence":"Bhinder v. Sun Co., 246 Conn. 223, 242 n. 14, 717 A.2d 202 (1998) (\u201cWhile [courts] have attempted to draw definitional [distinctions] between the terms willful, wanton or reckless, in practice the three terms have been treated as meaning the same thing.\u201d), quoting Dubay v. Irish, 207 Conn. 518, 533, 542 A.2d 711 (1988); see also Elliott v. City of Waterbury, 245 Conn. 385, 415, 715 A.2d 27 (1998) (legal concepts of wanton, reckless, willful, intentional and malicious conduct indistinguishable); Bauer v. Waste Management of Connecticut, Inc., 239 Conn. 515, 527, 686 A.2d 481 (1996) (\u201cA willful act is one done intentionally or with reckless disregard of the consequences of one\u2019s conduct.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"245 Conn. 385, 415","parenthetical":"legal concepts of wanton, reckless, willful, intentional and malicious conduct indistinguishable","sentence":"Bhinder v. Sun Co., 246 Conn. 223, 242 n. 14, 717 A.2d 202 (1998) (\u201cWhile [courts] have attempted to draw definitional [distinctions] between the terms willful, wanton or reckless, in practice the three terms have been treated as meaning the same thing.\u201d), quoting Dubay v. Irish, 207 Conn. 518, 533, 542 A.2d 711 (1988); see also Elliott v. City of Waterbury, 245 Conn. 385, 415, 715 A.2d 27 (1998) (legal concepts of wanton, reckless, willful, intentional and malicious conduct indistinguishable); Bauer v. Waste Management of Connecticut, Inc., 239 Conn. 515, 527, 686 A.2d 481 (1996) (\u201cA willful act is one done intentionally or with reckless disregard of the consequences of one\u2019s conduct.\u201d)."},"case_id":11075734,"label":"a"}
{"context":"To the extent that Miner alleges that the Town is liable for any intentional infliction of emotional distress by Deegan, see Am.Compl. at 13, P 82, such a claim is precluded by Conn.Gen.Stat. SS 52-557n, which provides, that \"a political subdivision of the state shall not be liable for damages to person or property caused by ... [a]cts or omissions of any employee, officer or agent which constitute criminal conduct, fraud, actual malice or willful misconduct ...\" Under Connecticut law, the term \"willfulness\" is synonymous with \"intentional.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"legal concepts of wanton, reckless, willful, intentional and malicious conduct indistinguishable","sentence":"Bhinder v. Sun Co., 246 Conn. 223, 242 n. 14, 717 A.2d 202 (1998) (\u201cWhile [courts] have attempted to draw definitional [distinctions] between the terms willful, wanton or reckless, in practice the three terms have been treated as meaning the same thing.\u201d), quoting Dubay v. Irish, 207 Conn. 518, 533, 542 A.2d 711 (1988); see also Elliott v. City of Waterbury, 245 Conn. 385, 415, 715 A.2d 27 (1998) (legal concepts of wanton, reckless, willful, intentional and malicious conduct indistinguishable); Bauer v. Waste Management of Connecticut, Inc., 239 Conn. 515, 527, 686 A.2d 481 (1996) (\u201cA willful act is one done intentionally or with reckless disregard of the consequences of one\u2019s conduct.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"While [courts] have attempted to draw definitional [distinctions] between the terms willful, wanton or reckless, in practice the three terms have been treated as meaning the same thing.\"","sentence":"Bhinder v. Sun Co., 246 Conn. 223, 242 n. 14, 717 A.2d 202 (1998) (\u201cWhile [courts] have attempted to draw definitional [distinctions] between the terms willful, wanton or reckless, in practice the three terms have been treated as meaning the same thing.\u201d), quoting Dubay v. Irish, 207 Conn. 518, 533, 542 A.2d 711 (1988); see also Elliott v. City of Waterbury, 245 Conn. 385, 415, 715 A.2d 27 (1998) (legal concepts of wanton, reckless, willful, intentional and malicious conduct indistinguishable); Bauer v. Waste Management of Connecticut, Inc., 239 Conn. 515, 527, 686 A.2d 481 (1996) (\u201cA willful act is one done intentionally or with reckless disregard of the consequences of one\u2019s conduct.\u201d)."},"case_id":11075734,"label":"b"}
{"context":"To the extent that Miner alleges that the Town is liable for any intentional infliction of emotional distress by Deegan, see Am.Compl. at 13, P 82, such a claim is precluded by Conn.Gen.Stat. SS 52-557n, which provides, that \"a political subdivision of the state shall not be liable for damages to person or property caused by ... [a]cts or omissions of any employee, officer or agent which constitute criminal conduct, fraud, actual malice or willful misconduct ...\" Under Connecticut law, the term \"willfulness\" is synonymous with \"intentional.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"While [courts] have attempted to draw definitional [distinctions] between the terms willful, wanton or reckless, in practice the three terms have been treated as meaning the same thing.\"","sentence":"Bhinder v. Sun Co., 246 Conn. 223, 242 n. 14, 717 A.2d 202 (1998) (\u201cWhile [courts] have attempted to draw definitional [distinctions] between the terms willful, wanton or reckless, in practice the three terms have been treated as meaning the same thing.\u201d), quoting Dubay v. Irish, 207 Conn. 518, 533, 542 A.2d 711 (1988); see also Elliott v. City of Waterbury, 245 Conn. 385, 415, 715 A.2d 27 (1998) (legal concepts of wanton, reckless, willful, intentional and malicious conduct indistinguishable); Bauer v. Waste Management of Connecticut, Inc., 239 Conn. 515, 527, 686 A.2d 481 (1996) (\u201cA willful act is one done intentionally or with reckless disregard of the consequences of one\u2019s conduct.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"239 Conn. 515, 527","parenthetical":"\"A willful act is one done intentionally or with reckless disregard of the consequences of one's conduct.\"","sentence":"Bhinder v. Sun Co., 246 Conn. 223, 242 n. 14, 717 A.2d 202 (1998) (\u201cWhile [courts] have attempted to draw definitional [distinctions] between the terms willful, wanton or reckless, in practice the three terms have been treated as meaning the same thing.\u201d), quoting Dubay v. Irish, 207 Conn. 518, 533, 542 A.2d 711 (1988); see also Elliott v. City of Waterbury, 245 Conn. 385, 415, 715 A.2d 27 (1998) (legal concepts of wanton, reckless, willful, intentional and malicious conduct indistinguishable); Bauer v. Waste Management of Connecticut, Inc., 239 Conn. 515, 527, 686 A.2d 481 (1996) (\u201cA willful act is one done intentionally or with reckless disregard of the consequences of one\u2019s conduct.\u201d)."},"case_id":11075734,"label":"a"}
{"context":"To the extent that Miner alleges that the Town is liable for any intentional infliction of emotional distress by Deegan, see Am.Compl. at 13, P 82, such a claim is precluded by Conn.Gen.Stat. SS 52-557n, which provides, that \"a political subdivision of the state shall not be liable for damages to person or property caused by ... [a]cts or omissions of any employee, officer or agent which constitute criminal conduct, fraud, actual malice or willful misconduct ...\" Under Connecticut law, the term \"willfulness\" is synonymous with \"intentional.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"A willful act is one done intentionally or with reckless disregard of the consequences of one's conduct.\"","sentence":"Bhinder v. Sun Co., 246 Conn. 223, 242 n. 14, 717 A.2d 202 (1998) (\u201cWhile [courts] have attempted to draw definitional [distinctions] between the terms willful, wanton or reckless, in practice the three terms have been treated as meaning the same thing.\u201d), quoting Dubay v. Irish, 207 Conn. 518, 533, 542 A.2d 711 (1988); see also Elliott v. City of Waterbury, 245 Conn. 385, 415, 715 A.2d 27 (1998) (legal concepts of wanton, reckless, willful, intentional and malicious conduct indistinguishable); Bauer v. Waste Management of Connecticut, Inc., 239 Conn. 515, 527, 686 A.2d 481 (1996) (\u201cA willful act is one done intentionally or with reckless disregard of the consequences of one\u2019s conduct.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"While [courts] have attempted to draw definitional [distinctions] between the terms willful, wanton or reckless, in practice the three terms have been treated as meaning the same thing.\"","sentence":"Bhinder v. Sun Co., 246 Conn. 223, 242 n. 14, 717 A.2d 202 (1998) (\u201cWhile [courts] have attempted to draw definitional [distinctions] between the terms willful, wanton or reckless, in practice the three terms have been treated as meaning the same thing.\u201d), quoting Dubay v. Irish, 207 Conn. 518, 533, 542 A.2d 711 (1988); see also Elliott v. City of Waterbury, 245 Conn. 385, 415, 715 A.2d 27 (1998) (legal concepts of wanton, reckless, willful, intentional and malicious conduct indistinguishable); Bauer v. Waste Management of Connecticut, Inc., 239 Conn. 515, 527, 686 A.2d 481 (1996) (\u201cA willful act is one done intentionally or with reckless disregard of the consequences of one\u2019s conduct.\u201d)."},"case_id":11075734,"label":"b"}
{"context":"To the extent that Miner alleges that the Town is liable for any intentional infliction of emotional distress by Deegan, see Am.Compl. at 13, P 82, such a claim is precluded by Conn.Gen.Stat. SS 52-557n, which provides, that \"a political subdivision of the state shall not be liable for damages to person or property caused by ... [a]cts or omissions of any employee, officer or agent which constitute criminal conduct, fraud, actual malice or willful misconduct ...\" Under Connecticut law, the term \"willfulness\" is synonymous with \"intentional.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"While [courts] have attempted to draw definitional [distinctions] between the terms willful, wanton or reckless, in practice the three terms have been treated as meaning the same thing.\"","sentence":"Bhinder v. Sun Co., 246 Conn. 223, 242 n. 14, 717 A.2d 202 (1998) (\u201cWhile [courts] have attempted to draw definitional [distinctions] between the terms willful, wanton or reckless, in practice the three terms have been treated as meaning the same thing.\u201d), quoting Dubay v. Irish, 207 Conn. 518, 533, 542 A.2d 711 (1988); see also Elliott v. City of Waterbury, 245 Conn. 385, 415, 715 A.2d 27 (1998) (legal concepts of wanton, reckless, willful, intentional and malicious conduct indistinguishable); Bauer v. Waste Management of Connecticut, Inc., 239 Conn. 515, 527, 686 A.2d 481 (1996) (\u201cA willful act is one done intentionally or with reckless disregard of the consequences of one\u2019s conduct.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"245 Conn. 385, 415","parenthetical":"legal concepts of wanton, reckless, willful, intentional and malicious conduct indistinguishable","sentence":"Bhinder v. Sun Co., 246 Conn. 223, 242 n. 14, 717 A.2d 202 (1998) (\u201cWhile [courts] have attempted to draw definitional [distinctions] between the terms willful, wanton or reckless, in practice the three terms have been treated as meaning the same thing.\u201d), quoting Dubay v. Irish, 207 Conn. 518, 533, 542 A.2d 711 (1988); see also Elliott v. City of Waterbury, 245 Conn. 385, 415, 715 A.2d 27 (1998) (legal concepts of wanton, reckless, willful, intentional and malicious conduct indistinguishable); Bauer v. Waste Management of Connecticut, Inc., 239 Conn. 515, 527, 686 A.2d 481 (1996) (\u201cA willful act is one done intentionally or with reckless disregard of the consequences of one\u2019s conduct.\u201d)."},"case_id":11075734,"label":"a"}
{"context":"To the extent that Miner alleges that the Town is liable for any intentional infliction of emotional distress by Deegan, see Am.Compl. at 13, P 82, such a claim is precluded by Conn.Gen.Stat. SS 52-557n, which provides, that \"a political subdivision of the state shall not be liable for damages to person or property caused by ... [a]cts or omissions of any employee, officer or agent which constitute criminal conduct, fraud, actual malice or willful misconduct ...\" Under Connecticut law, the term \"willfulness\" is synonymous with \"intentional.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"legal concepts of wanton, reckless, willful, intentional and malicious conduct indistinguishable","sentence":"Bhinder v. Sun Co., 246 Conn. 223, 242 n. 14, 717 A.2d 202 (1998) (\u201cWhile [courts] have attempted to draw definitional [distinctions] between the terms willful, wanton or reckless, in practice the three terms have been treated as meaning the same thing.\u201d), quoting Dubay v. Irish, 207 Conn. 518, 533, 542 A.2d 711 (1988); see also Elliott v. City of Waterbury, 245 Conn. 385, 415, 715 A.2d 27 (1998) (legal concepts of wanton, reckless, willful, intentional and malicious conduct indistinguishable); Bauer v. Waste Management of Connecticut, Inc., 239 Conn. 515, 527, 686 A.2d 481 (1996) (\u201cA willful act is one done intentionally or with reckless disregard of the consequences of one\u2019s conduct.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"While [courts] have attempted to draw definitional [distinctions] between the terms willful, wanton or reckless, in practice the three terms have been treated as meaning the same thing.\"","sentence":"Bhinder v. Sun Co., 246 Conn. 223, 242 n. 14, 717 A.2d 202 (1998) (\u201cWhile [courts] have attempted to draw definitional [distinctions] between the terms willful, wanton or reckless, in practice the three terms have been treated as meaning the same thing.\u201d), quoting Dubay v. Irish, 207 Conn. 518, 533, 542 A.2d 711 (1988); see also Elliott v. City of Waterbury, 245 Conn. 385, 415, 715 A.2d 27 (1998) (legal concepts of wanton, reckless, willful, intentional and malicious conduct indistinguishable); Bauer v. Waste Management of Connecticut, Inc., 239 Conn. 515, 527, 686 A.2d 481 (1996) (\u201cA willful act is one done intentionally or with reckless disregard of the consequences of one\u2019s conduct.\u201d)."},"case_id":11075734,"label":"b"}
{"context":"To the extent that Miner alleges that the Town is liable for any intentional infliction of emotional distress by Deegan, see Am.Compl. at 13, P 82, such a claim is precluded by Conn.Gen.Stat. SS 52-557n, which provides, that \"a political subdivision of the state shall not be liable for damages to person or property caused by ... [a]cts or omissions of any employee, officer or agent which constitute criminal conduct, fraud, actual malice or willful misconduct ...\" Under Connecticut law, the term \"willfulness\" is synonymous with \"intentional.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"While [courts] have attempted to draw definitional [distinctions] between the terms willful, wanton or reckless, in practice the three terms have been treated as meaning the same thing.\"","sentence":"Bhinder v. Sun Co., 246 Conn. 223, 242 n. 14, 717 A.2d 202 (1998) (\u201cWhile [courts] have attempted to draw definitional [distinctions] between the terms willful, wanton or reckless, in practice the three terms have been treated as meaning the same thing.\u201d), quoting Dubay v. Irish, 207 Conn. 518, 533, 542 A.2d 711 (1988); see also Elliott v. City of Waterbury, 245 Conn. 385, 415, 715 A.2d 27 (1998) (legal concepts of wanton, reckless, willful, intentional and malicious conduct indistinguishable); Bauer v. Waste Management of Connecticut, Inc., 239 Conn. 515, 527, 686 A.2d 481 (1996) (\u201cA willful act is one done intentionally or with reckless disregard of the consequences of one\u2019s conduct.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"239 Conn. 515, 527","parenthetical":"\"A willful act is one done intentionally or with reckless disregard of the consequences of one's conduct.\"","sentence":"Bhinder v. Sun Co., 246 Conn. 223, 242 n. 14, 717 A.2d 202 (1998) (\u201cWhile [courts] have attempted to draw definitional [distinctions] between the terms willful, wanton or reckless, in practice the three terms have been treated as meaning the same thing.\u201d), quoting Dubay v. Irish, 207 Conn. 518, 533, 542 A.2d 711 (1988); see also Elliott v. City of Waterbury, 245 Conn. 385, 415, 715 A.2d 27 (1998) (legal concepts of wanton, reckless, willful, intentional and malicious conduct indistinguishable); Bauer v. Waste Management of Connecticut, Inc., 239 Conn. 515, 527, 686 A.2d 481 (1996) (\u201cA willful act is one done intentionally or with reckless disregard of the consequences of one\u2019s conduct.\u201d)."},"case_id":11075734,"label":"a"}
{"context":"To the extent that Miner alleges that the Town is liable for any intentional infliction of emotional distress by Deegan, see Am.Compl. at 13, P 82, such a claim is precluded by Conn.Gen.Stat. SS 52-557n, which provides, that \"a political subdivision of the state shall not be liable for damages to person or property caused by ... [a]cts or omissions of any employee, officer or agent which constitute criminal conduct, fraud, actual malice or willful misconduct ...\" Under Connecticut law, the term \"willfulness\" is synonymous with \"intentional.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"A willful act is one done intentionally or with reckless disregard of the consequences of one's conduct.\"","sentence":"Bhinder v. Sun Co., 246 Conn. 223, 242 n. 14, 717 A.2d 202 (1998) (\u201cWhile [courts] have attempted to draw definitional [distinctions] between the terms willful, wanton or reckless, in practice the three terms have been treated as meaning the same thing.\u201d), quoting Dubay v. Irish, 207 Conn. 518, 533, 542 A.2d 711 (1988); see also Elliott v. City of Waterbury, 245 Conn. 385, 415, 715 A.2d 27 (1998) (legal concepts of wanton, reckless, willful, intentional and malicious conduct indistinguishable); Bauer v. Waste Management of Connecticut, Inc., 239 Conn. 515, 527, 686 A.2d 481 (1996) (\u201cA willful act is one done intentionally or with reckless disregard of the consequences of one\u2019s conduct.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"While [courts] have attempted to draw definitional [distinctions] between the terms willful, wanton or reckless, in practice the three terms have been treated as meaning the same thing.\"","sentence":"Bhinder v. Sun Co., 246 Conn. 223, 242 n. 14, 717 A.2d 202 (1998) (\u201cWhile [courts] have attempted to draw definitional [distinctions] between the terms willful, wanton or reckless, in practice the three terms have been treated as meaning the same thing.\u201d), quoting Dubay v. Irish, 207 Conn. 518, 533, 542 A.2d 711 (1988); see also Elliott v. City of Waterbury, 245 Conn. 385, 415, 715 A.2d 27 (1998) (legal concepts of wanton, reckless, willful, intentional and malicious conduct indistinguishable); Bauer v. Waste Management of Connecticut, Inc., 239 Conn. 515, 527, 686 A.2d 481 (1996) (\u201cA willful act is one done intentionally or with reckless disregard of the consequences of one\u2019s conduct.\u201d)."},"case_id":11075734,"label":"b"}
{"context":"To the extent that Miner alleges that the Town is liable for any intentional infliction of emotional distress by Deegan, see Am.Compl. at 13, P 82, such a claim is precluded by Conn.Gen.Stat. SS 52-557n, which provides, that \"a political subdivision of the state shall not be liable for damages to person or property caused by ... [a]cts or omissions of any employee, officer or agent which constitute criminal conduct, fraud, actual malice or willful misconduct ...\" Under Connecticut law, the term \"willfulness\" is synonymous with \"intentional.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"245 Conn. 385, 415","parenthetical":"legal concepts of wanton, reckless, willful, intentional and malicious conduct indistinguishable","sentence":"Bhinder v. Sun Co., 246 Conn. 223, 242 n. 14, 717 A.2d 202 (1998) (\u201cWhile [courts] have attempted to draw definitional [distinctions] between the terms willful, wanton or reckless, in practice the three terms have been treated as meaning the same thing.\u201d), quoting Dubay v. Irish, 207 Conn. 518, 533, 542 A.2d 711 (1988); see also Elliott v. City of Waterbury, 245 Conn. 385, 415, 715 A.2d 27 (1998) (legal concepts of wanton, reckless, willful, intentional and malicious conduct indistinguishable); Bauer v. Waste Management of Connecticut, Inc., 239 Conn. 515, 527, 686 A.2d 481 (1996) (\u201cA willful act is one done intentionally or with reckless disregard of the consequences of one\u2019s conduct.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"207 Conn. 518, 533","parenthetical":"\"While [courts] have attempted to draw definitional [distinctions] between the terms willful, wanton or reckless, in practice the three terms have been treated as meaning the same thing.\"","sentence":"Bhinder v. Sun Co., 246 Conn. 223, 242 n. 14, 717 A.2d 202 (1998) (\u201cWhile [courts] have attempted to draw definitional [distinctions] between the terms willful, wanton or reckless, in practice the three terms have been treated as meaning the same thing.\u201d), quoting Dubay v. Irish, 207 Conn. 518, 533, 542 A.2d 711 (1988); see also Elliott v. City of Waterbury, 245 Conn. 385, 415, 715 A.2d 27 (1998) (legal concepts of wanton, reckless, willful, intentional and malicious conduct indistinguishable); Bauer v. Waste Management of Connecticut, Inc., 239 Conn. 515, 527, 686 A.2d 481 (1996) (\u201cA willful act is one done intentionally or with reckless disregard of the consequences of one\u2019s conduct.\u201d)."},"case_id":11075734,"label":"b"}
{"context":"To the extent that Miner alleges that the Town is liable for any intentional infliction of emotional distress by Deegan, see Am.Compl. at 13, P 82, such a claim is precluded by Conn.Gen.Stat. SS 52-557n, which provides, that \"a political subdivision of the state shall not be liable for damages to person or property caused by ... [a]cts or omissions of any employee, officer or agent which constitute criminal conduct, fraud, actual malice or willful misconduct ...\" Under Connecticut law, the term \"willfulness\" is synonymous with \"intentional.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"207 Conn. 518, 533","parenthetical":"\"While [courts] have attempted to draw definitional [distinctions] between the terms willful, wanton or reckless, in practice the three terms have been treated as meaning the same thing.\"","sentence":"Bhinder v. Sun Co., 246 Conn. 223, 242 n. 14, 717 A.2d 202 (1998) (\u201cWhile [courts] have attempted to draw definitional [distinctions] between the terms willful, wanton or reckless, in practice the three terms have been treated as meaning the same thing.\u201d), quoting Dubay v. Irish, 207 Conn. 518, 533, 542 A.2d 711 (1988); see also Elliott v. City of Waterbury, 245 Conn. 385, 415, 715 A.2d 27 (1998) (legal concepts of wanton, reckless, willful, intentional and malicious conduct indistinguishable); Bauer v. Waste Management of Connecticut, Inc., 239 Conn. 515, 527, 686 A.2d 481 (1996) (\u201cA willful act is one done intentionally or with reckless disregard of the consequences of one\u2019s conduct.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"legal concepts of wanton, reckless, willful, intentional and malicious conduct indistinguishable","sentence":"Bhinder v. Sun Co., 246 Conn. 223, 242 n. 14, 717 A.2d 202 (1998) (\u201cWhile [courts] have attempted to draw definitional [distinctions] between the terms willful, wanton or reckless, in practice the three terms have been treated as meaning the same thing.\u201d), quoting Dubay v. Irish, 207 Conn. 518, 533, 542 A.2d 711 (1988); see also Elliott v. City of Waterbury, 245 Conn. 385, 415, 715 A.2d 27 (1998) (legal concepts of wanton, reckless, willful, intentional and malicious conduct indistinguishable); Bauer v. Waste Management of Connecticut, Inc., 239 Conn. 515, 527, 686 A.2d 481 (1996) (\u201cA willful act is one done intentionally or with reckless disregard of the consequences of one\u2019s conduct.\u201d)."},"case_id":11075734,"label":"a"}
{"context":"To the extent that Miner alleges that the Town is liable for any intentional infliction of emotional distress by Deegan, see Am.Compl. at 13, P 82, such a claim is precluded by Conn.Gen.Stat. SS 52-557n, which provides, that \"a political subdivision of the state shall not be liable for damages to person or property caused by ... [a]cts or omissions of any employee, officer or agent which constitute criminal conduct, fraud, actual malice or willful misconduct ...\" Under Connecticut law, the term \"willfulness\" is synonymous with \"intentional.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"207 Conn. 518, 533","parenthetical":"\"While [courts] have attempted to draw definitional [distinctions] between the terms willful, wanton or reckless, in practice the three terms have been treated as meaning the same thing.\"","sentence":"Bhinder v. Sun Co., 246 Conn. 223, 242 n. 14, 717 A.2d 202 (1998) (\u201cWhile [courts] have attempted to draw definitional [distinctions] between the terms willful, wanton or reckless, in practice the three terms have been treated as meaning the same thing.\u201d), quoting Dubay v. Irish, 207 Conn. 518, 533, 542 A.2d 711 (1988); see also Elliott v. City of Waterbury, 245 Conn. 385, 415, 715 A.2d 27 (1998) (legal concepts of wanton, reckless, willful, intentional and malicious conduct indistinguishable); Bauer v. Waste Management of Connecticut, Inc., 239 Conn. 515, 527, 686 A.2d 481 (1996) (\u201cA willful act is one done intentionally or with reckless disregard of the consequences of one\u2019s conduct.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"239 Conn. 515, 527","parenthetical":"\"A willful act is one done intentionally or with reckless disregard of the consequences of one's conduct.\"","sentence":"Bhinder v. Sun Co., 246 Conn. 223, 242 n. 14, 717 A.2d 202 (1998) (\u201cWhile [courts] have attempted to draw definitional [distinctions] between the terms willful, wanton or reckless, in practice the three terms have been treated as meaning the same thing.\u201d), quoting Dubay v. Irish, 207 Conn. 518, 533, 542 A.2d 711 (1988); see also Elliott v. City of Waterbury, 245 Conn. 385, 415, 715 A.2d 27 (1998) (legal concepts of wanton, reckless, willful, intentional and malicious conduct indistinguishable); Bauer v. Waste Management of Connecticut, Inc., 239 Conn. 515, 527, 686 A.2d 481 (1996) (\u201cA willful act is one done intentionally or with reckless disregard of the consequences of one\u2019s conduct.\u201d)."},"case_id":11075734,"label":"a"}
{"context":"To the extent that Miner alleges that the Town is liable for any intentional infliction of emotional distress by Deegan, see Am.Compl. at 13, P 82, such a claim is precluded by Conn.Gen.Stat. SS 52-557n, which provides, that \"a political subdivision of the state shall not be liable for damages to person or property caused by ... [a]cts or omissions of any employee, officer or agent which constitute criminal conduct, fraud, actual malice or willful misconduct ...\" Under Connecticut law, the term \"willfulness\" is synonymous with \"intentional.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"207 Conn. 518, 533","parenthetical":"\"While [courts] have attempted to draw definitional [distinctions] between the terms willful, wanton or reckless, in practice the three terms have been treated as meaning the same thing.\"","sentence":"Bhinder v. Sun Co., 246 Conn. 223, 242 n. 14, 717 A.2d 202 (1998) (\u201cWhile [courts] have attempted to draw definitional [distinctions] between the terms willful, wanton or reckless, in practice the three terms have been treated as meaning the same thing.\u201d), quoting Dubay v. Irish, 207 Conn. 518, 533, 542 A.2d 711 (1988); see also Elliott v. City of Waterbury, 245 Conn. 385, 415, 715 A.2d 27 (1998) (legal concepts of wanton, reckless, willful, intentional and malicious conduct indistinguishable); Bauer v. Waste Management of Connecticut, Inc., 239 Conn. 515, 527, 686 A.2d 481 (1996) (\u201cA willful act is one done intentionally or with reckless disregard of the consequences of one\u2019s conduct.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"A willful act is one done intentionally or with reckless disregard of the consequences of one's conduct.\"","sentence":"Bhinder v. Sun Co., 246 Conn. 223, 242 n. 14, 717 A.2d 202 (1998) (\u201cWhile [courts] have attempted to draw definitional [distinctions] between the terms willful, wanton or reckless, in practice the three terms have been treated as meaning the same thing.\u201d), quoting Dubay v. Irish, 207 Conn. 518, 533, 542 A.2d 711 (1988); see also Elliott v. City of Waterbury, 245 Conn. 385, 415, 715 A.2d 27 (1998) (legal concepts of wanton, reckless, willful, intentional and malicious conduct indistinguishable); Bauer v. Waste Management of Connecticut, Inc., 239 Conn. 515, 527, 686 A.2d 481 (1996) (\u201cA willful act is one done intentionally or with reckless disregard of the consequences of one\u2019s conduct.\u201d)."},"case_id":11075734,"label":"a"}
{"context":"To the extent that Miner alleges that the Town is liable for any intentional infliction of emotional distress by Deegan, see Am.Compl. at 13, P 82, such a claim is precluded by Conn.Gen.Stat. SS 52-557n, which provides, that \"a political subdivision of the state shall not be liable for damages to person or property caused by ... [a]cts or omissions of any employee, officer or agent which constitute criminal conduct, fraud, actual malice or willful misconduct ...\" Under Connecticut law, the term \"willfulness\" is synonymous with \"intentional.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"245 Conn. 385, 415","parenthetical":"legal concepts of wanton, reckless, willful, intentional and malicious conduct indistinguishable","sentence":"Bhinder v. Sun Co., 246 Conn. 223, 242 n. 14, 717 A.2d 202 (1998) (\u201cWhile [courts] have attempted to draw definitional [distinctions] between the terms willful, wanton or reckless, in practice the three terms have been treated as meaning the same thing.\u201d), quoting Dubay v. Irish, 207 Conn. 518, 533, 542 A.2d 711 (1988); see also Elliott v. City of Waterbury, 245 Conn. 385, 415, 715 A.2d 27 (1998) (legal concepts of wanton, reckless, willful, intentional and malicious conduct indistinguishable); Bauer v. Waste Management of Connecticut, Inc., 239 Conn. 515, 527, 686 A.2d 481 (1996) (\u201cA willful act is one done intentionally or with reckless disregard of the consequences of one\u2019s conduct.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"While [courts] have attempted to draw definitional [distinctions] between the terms willful, wanton or reckless, in practice the three terms have been treated as meaning the same thing.\"","sentence":"Bhinder v. Sun Co., 246 Conn. 223, 242 n. 14, 717 A.2d 202 (1998) (\u201cWhile [courts] have attempted to draw definitional [distinctions] between the terms willful, wanton or reckless, in practice the three terms have been treated as meaning the same thing.\u201d), quoting Dubay v. Irish, 207 Conn. 518, 533, 542 A.2d 711 (1988); see also Elliott v. City of Waterbury, 245 Conn. 385, 415, 715 A.2d 27 (1998) (legal concepts of wanton, reckless, willful, intentional and malicious conduct indistinguishable); Bauer v. Waste Management of Connecticut, Inc., 239 Conn. 515, 527, 686 A.2d 481 (1996) (\u201cA willful act is one done intentionally or with reckless disregard of the consequences of one\u2019s conduct.\u201d)."},"case_id":11075734,"label":"b"}
{"context":"To the extent that Miner alleges that the Town is liable for any intentional infliction of emotional distress by Deegan, see Am.Compl. at 13, P 82, such a claim is precluded by Conn.Gen.Stat. SS 52-557n, which provides, that \"a political subdivision of the state shall not be liable for damages to person or property caused by ... [a]cts or omissions of any employee, officer or agent which constitute criminal conduct, fraud, actual malice or willful misconduct ...\" Under Connecticut law, the term \"willfulness\" is synonymous with \"intentional.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"While [courts] have attempted to draw definitional [distinctions] between the terms willful, wanton or reckless, in practice the three terms have been treated as meaning the same thing.\"","sentence":"Bhinder v. Sun Co., 246 Conn. 223, 242 n. 14, 717 A.2d 202 (1998) (\u201cWhile [courts] have attempted to draw definitional [distinctions] between the terms willful, wanton or reckless, in practice the three terms have been treated as meaning the same thing.\u201d), quoting Dubay v. Irish, 207 Conn. 518, 533, 542 A.2d 711 (1988); see also Elliott v. City of Waterbury, 245 Conn. 385, 415, 715 A.2d 27 (1998) (legal concepts of wanton, reckless, willful, intentional and malicious conduct indistinguishable); Bauer v. Waste Management of Connecticut, Inc., 239 Conn. 515, 527, 686 A.2d 481 (1996) (\u201cA willful act is one done intentionally or with reckless disregard of the consequences of one\u2019s conduct.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"legal concepts of wanton, reckless, willful, intentional and malicious conduct indistinguishable","sentence":"Bhinder v. Sun Co., 246 Conn. 223, 242 n. 14, 717 A.2d 202 (1998) (\u201cWhile [courts] have attempted to draw definitional [distinctions] between the terms willful, wanton or reckless, in practice the three terms have been treated as meaning the same thing.\u201d), quoting Dubay v. Irish, 207 Conn. 518, 533, 542 A.2d 711 (1988); see also Elliott v. City of Waterbury, 245 Conn. 385, 415, 715 A.2d 27 (1998) (legal concepts of wanton, reckless, willful, intentional and malicious conduct indistinguishable); Bauer v. Waste Management of Connecticut, Inc., 239 Conn. 515, 527, 686 A.2d 481 (1996) (\u201cA willful act is one done intentionally or with reckless disregard of the consequences of one\u2019s conduct.\u201d)."},"case_id":11075734,"label":"a"}
{"context":"To the extent that Miner alleges that the Town is liable for any intentional infliction of emotional distress by Deegan, see Am.Compl. at 13, P 82, such a claim is precluded by Conn.Gen.Stat. SS 52-557n, which provides, that \"a political subdivision of the state shall not be liable for damages to person or property caused by ... [a]cts or omissions of any employee, officer or agent which constitute criminal conduct, fraud, actual malice or willful misconduct ...\" Under Connecticut law, the term \"willfulness\" is synonymous with \"intentional.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"While [courts] have attempted to draw definitional [distinctions] between the terms willful, wanton or reckless, in practice the three terms have been treated as meaning the same thing.\"","sentence":"Bhinder v. Sun Co., 246 Conn. 223, 242 n. 14, 717 A.2d 202 (1998) (\u201cWhile [courts] have attempted to draw definitional [distinctions] between the terms willful, wanton or reckless, in practice the three terms have been treated as meaning the same thing.\u201d), quoting Dubay v. Irish, 207 Conn. 518, 533, 542 A.2d 711 (1988); see also Elliott v. City of Waterbury, 245 Conn. 385, 415, 715 A.2d 27 (1998) (legal concepts of wanton, reckless, willful, intentional and malicious conduct indistinguishable); Bauer v. Waste Management of Connecticut, Inc., 239 Conn. 515, 527, 686 A.2d 481 (1996) (\u201cA willful act is one done intentionally or with reckless disregard of the consequences of one\u2019s conduct.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"239 Conn. 515, 527","parenthetical":"\"A willful act is one done intentionally or with reckless disregard of the consequences of one's conduct.\"","sentence":"Bhinder v. Sun Co., 246 Conn. 223, 242 n. 14, 717 A.2d 202 (1998) (\u201cWhile [courts] have attempted to draw definitional [distinctions] between the terms willful, wanton or reckless, in practice the three terms have been treated as meaning the same thing.\u201d), quoting Dubay v. Irish, 207 Conn. 518, 533, 542 A.2d 711 (1988); see also Elliott v. City of Waterbury, 245 Conn. 385, 415, 715 A.2d 27 (1998) (legal concepts of wanton, reckless, willful, intentional and malicious conduct indistinguishable); Bauer v. Waste Management of Connecticut, Inc., 239 Conn. 515, 527, 686 A.2d 481 (1996) (\u201cA willful act is one done intentionally or with reckless disregard of the consequences of one\u2019s conduct.\u201d)."},"case_id":11075734,"label":"a"}
{"context":"To the extent that Miner alleges that the Town is liable for any intentional infliction of emotional distress by Deegan, see Am.Compl. at 13, P 82, such a claim is precluded by Conn.Gen.Stat. SS 52-557n, which provides, that \"a political subdivision of the state shall not be liable for damages to person or property caused by ... [a]cts or omissions of any employee, officer or agent which constitute criminal conduct, fraud, actual malice or willful misconduct ...\" Under Connecticut law, the term \"willfulness\" is synonymous with \"intentional.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"A willful act is one done intentionally or with reckless disregard of the consequences of one's conduct.\"","sentence":"Bhinder v. Sun Co., 246 Conn. 223, 242 n. 14, 717 A.2d 202 (1998) (\u201cWhile [courts] have attempted to draw definitional [distinctions] between the terms willful, wanton or reckless, in practice the three terms have been treated as meaning the same thing.\u201d), quoting Dubay v. Irish, 207 Conn. 518, 533, 542 A.2d 711 (1988); see also Elliott v. City of Waterbury, 245 Conn. 385, 415, 715 A.2d 27 (1998) (legal concepts of wanton, reckless, willful, intentional and malicious conduct indistinguishable); Bauer v. Waste Management of Connecticut, Inc., 239 Conn. 515, 527, 686 A.2d 481 (1996) (\u201cA willful act is one done intentionally or with reckless disregard of the consequences of one\u2019s conduct.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"While [courts] have attempted to draw definitional [distinctions] between the terms willful, wanton or reckless, in practice the three terms have been treated as meaning the same thing.\"","sentence":"Bhinder v. Sun Co., 246 Conn. 223, 242 n. 14, 717 A.2d 202 (1998) (\u201cWhile [courts] have attempted to draw definitional [distinctions] between the terms willful, wanton or reckless, in practice the three terms have been treated as meaning the same thing.\u201d), quoting Dubay v. Irish, 207 Conn. 518, 533, 542 A.2d 711 (1988); see also Elliott v. City of Waterbury, 245 Conn. 385, 415, 715 A.2d 27 (1998) (legal concepts of wanton, reckless, willful, intentional and malicious conduct indistinguishable); Bauer v. Waste Management of Connecticut, Inc., 239 Conn. 515, 527, 686 A.2d 481 (1996) (\u201cA willful act is one done intentionally or with reckless disregard of the consequences of one\u2019s conduct.\u201d)."},"case_id":11075734,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In any event, even had the tip contained information regarding defendant's future plans to visit the Royal Buffet, this lone detail pales in comparison to the predictive information provided by the confidential informants in the cases cited by the state.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"814 A.2d 330, 330","parenthetical":"concluding that anonymous tip was \"sufficiently detailed, and thereafter corroborated, to warrant an experienced detective to become reasonably suspicious of [the defendant's] behavior\" where \"[t]he tip provided details of where [the defendant] lived, the type of vehicle he would be driving, and the itinerary and alleged purpose of his travel to and from Providence\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Draper, 358 U.S. at 309-10, 79 S.Ct. 329 (tip \u2014 given by an informant who was a paid employee of the Bureau of Narcotics and had provided reliable information in the past \u2014 indicated that the defendant had gone to Chicago the day before and would return to Denver by train either the next day or the day after, accurately described the precise clothing the defendant would be wearing and the tan zipper bag that he would be carrying, and correctly stated that the defendant \u201chabitually\u201d walked very quickly); United States v. Miller, 925 F.2d 695, 697 (4th Cir.1991) (Powell, J.) (informant\u2019s tip indicated that the defendant \u2014 a picture of whom the informant identified \u2014 would be traveling by bus and arriving on one of two days later that week; informant also accurately described the precise clothing that the defendant would be wearing and a tote bag that she would be carrying); cf. Keohane, 814 A.2d at 330 (concluding that anonymous tip was \u201csufficiently detailed, and thereafter corroborated, to warrant an experienced detective to become reasonably suspicious of [the defendant\u2019s] behavior\u201d where \u201c[t]he tip provided details of where [the defendant] lived, the type of vehicle he would be driving, and the itinerary and alleged purpose of his travel to and from Providence\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"358 U.S. 309, 309-10","parenthetical":"tip -- given by an informant who was a paid employee of the Bureau of Narcotics and had provided reliable information in the past -- indicated that the defendant had gone to Chicago the day before and would return to Denver by train either the next day or the day after, accurately described the precise clothing the defendant would be wearing and the tan zipper bag that he would be carrying, and correctly stated that the defendant \"habitually\" walked very quickly","sentence":"See, e.g., Draper, 358 U.S. at 309-10, 79 S.Ct. 329 (tip \u2014 given by an informant who was a paid employee of the Bureau of Narcotics and had provided reliable information in the past \u2014 indicated that the defendant had gone to Chicago the day before and would return to Denver by train either the next day or the day after, accurately described the precise clothing the defendant would be wearing and the tan zipper bag that he would be carrying, and correctly stated that the defendant \u201chabitually\u201d walked very quickly); United States v. Miller, 925 F.2d 695, 697 (4th Cir.1991) (Powell, J.) (informant\u2019s tip indicated that the defendant \u2014 a picture of whom the informant identified \u2014 would be traveling by bus and arriving on one of two days later that week; informant also accurately described the precise clothing that the defendant would be wearing and a tote bag that she would be carrying); cf. Keohane, 814 A.2d at 330 (concluding that anonymous tip was \u201csufficiently detailed, and thereafter corroborated, to warrant an experienced detective to become reasonably suspicious of [the defendant\u2019s] behavior\u201d where \u201c[t]he tip provided details of where [the defendant] lived, the type of vehicle he would be driving, and the itinerary and alleged purpose of his travel to and from Providence\u201d)."},"case_id":6800472,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In any event, even had the tip contained information regarding defendant's future plans to visit the Royal Buffet, this lone detail pales in comparison to the predictive information provided by the confidential informants in the cases cited by the state.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"814 A.2d 330, 330","parenthetical":"concluding that anonymous tip was \"sufficiently detailed, and thereafter corroborated, to warrant an experienced detective to become reasonably suspicious of [the defendant's] behavior\" where \"[t]he tip provided details of where [the defendant] lived, the type of vehicle he would be driving, and the itinerary and alleged purpose of his travel to and from Providence\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Draper, 358 U.S. at 309-10, 79 S.Ct. 329 (tip \u2014 given by an informant who was a paid employee of the Bureau of Narcotics and had provided reliable information in the past \u2014 indicated that the defendant had gone to Chicago the day before and would return to Denver by train either the next day or the day after, accurately described the precise clothing the defendant would be wearing and the tan zipper bag that he would be carrying, and correctly stated that the defendant \u201chabitually\u201d walked very quickly); United States v. Miller, 925 F.2d 695, 697 (4th Cir.1991) (Powell, J.) (informant\u2019s tip indicated that the defendant \u2014 a picture of whom the informant identified \u2014 would be traveling by bus and arriving on one of two days later that week; informant also accurately described the precise clothing that the defendant would be wearing and a tote bag that she would be carrying); cf. Keohane, 814 A.2d at 330 (concluding that anonymous tip was \u201csufficiently detailed, and thereafter corroborated, to warrant an experienced detective to become reasonably suspicious of [the defendant\u2019s] behavior\u201d where \u201c[t]he tip provided details of where [the defendant] lived, the type of vehicle he would be driving, and the itinerary and alleged purpose of his travel to and from Providence\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"tip -- given by an informant who was a paid employee of the Bureau of Narcotics and had provided reliable information in the past -- indicated that the defendant had gone to Chicago the day before and would return to Denver by train either the next day or the day after, accurately described the precise clothing the defendant would be wearing and the tan zipper bag that he would be carrying, and correctly stated that the defendant \"habitually\" walked very quickly","sentence":"See, e.g., Draper, 358 U.S. at 309-10, 79 S.Ct. 329 (tip \u2014 given by an informant who was a paid employee of the Bureau of Narcotics and had provided reliable information in the past \u2014 indicated that the defendant had gone to Chicago the day before and would return to Denver by train either the next day or the day after, accurately described the precise clothing the defendant would be wearing and the tan zipper bag that he would be carrying, and correctly stated that the defendant \u201chabitually\u201d walked very quickly); United States v. Miller, 925 F.2d 695, 697 (4th Cir.1991) (Powell, J.) (informant\u2019s tip indicated that the defendant \u2014 a picture of whom the informant identified \u2014 would be traveling by bus and arriving on one of two days later that week; informant also accurately described the precise clothing that the defendant would be wearing and a tote bag that she would be carrying); cf. Keohane, 814 A.2d at 330 (concluding that anonymous tip was \u201csufficiently detailed, and thereafter corroborated, to warrant an experienced detective to become reasonably suspicious of [the defendant\u2019s] behavior\u201d where \u201c[t]he tip provided details of where [the defendant] lived, the type of vehicle he would be driving, and the itinerary and alleged purpose of his travel to and from Providence\u201d)."},"case_id":6800472,"label":"b"}
{"context":"With respect to Defendant's conflict of interest argument, the Court finds that Defendant has not identified an actual conflict of interest and has failed to explain how simultaneous representation in Makaeff and the present matter might undermine Cohen's ability or counsel's ability to adequately represent the class.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"34 F.Supp.3d 1031, 1046-47","parenthetical":"finding disqualification premature in part because defendants had only raised \"speculative concerns about conflicts of interest between the superior court plaintiffs and the federal Plaintiffs\"","sentence":"See Keilholtz v. Lennox Hearth Prods., 268 F.R.D. 330, 338 (N.D.Cal. 2010) (finding no evidence that the plaintiffs in multiple classes had antagonistic interests and that defendants appeared to be able to satisfy a judgment in both cases); see also Sandoval v. Ali, No. C-13-03230(EDL), 34 F.Supp.3d 1031, 1046-47, 2014 WL 1311776 at *10 (N.D.Cal.2014) (finding disqualification premature in part because defendants had only raised \u201cspeculative concerns about conflicts of interest between the superior court plaintiffs and the federal Plaintiffs\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"268 F.R.D. 330, 338","parenthetical":"finding no evidence that the plaintiffs in multiple classes had antagonistic interests and that defendants appeared to be able to satisfy a judgment in both cases","sentence":"See Keilholtz v. Lennox Hearth Prods., 268 F.R.D. 330, 338 (N.D.Cal. 2010) (finding no evidence that the plaintiffs in multiple classes had antagonistic interests and that defendants appeared to be able to satisfy a judgment in both cases); see also Sandoval v. Ali, No. C-13-03230(EDL), 34 F.Supp.3d 1031, 1046-47, 2014 WL 1311776 at *10 (N.D.Cal.2014) (finding disqualification premature in part because defendants had only raised \u201cspeculative concerns about conflicts of interest between the superior court plaintiffs and the federal Plaintiffs\u201d)."},"case_id":4332242,"label":"b"}
{"context":"With respect to Defendant's conflict of interest argument, the Court finds that Defendant has not identified an actual conflict of interest and has failed to explain how simultaneous representation in Makaeff and the present matter might undermine Cohen's ability or counsel's ability to adequately represent the class.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"268 F.R.D. 330, 338","parenthetical":"finding no evidence that the plaintiffs in multiple classes had antagonistic interests and that defendants appeared to be able to satisfy a judgment in both cases","sentence":"See Keilholtz v. Lennox Hearth Prods., 268 F.R.D. 330, 338 (N.D.Cal. 2010) (finding no evidence that the plaintiffs in multiple classes had antagonistic interests and that defendants appeared to be able to satisfy a judgment in both cases); see also Sandoval v. Ali, No. C-13-03230(EDL), 34 F.Supp.3d 1031, 1046-47, 2014 WL 1311776 at *10 (N.D.Cal.2014) (finding disqualification premature in part because defendants had only raised \u201cspeculative concerns about conflicts of interest between the superior court plaintiffs and the federal Plaintiffs\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"2014 WL 1311776, at *10","parenthetical":"finding disqualification premature in part because defendants had only raised \"speculative concerns about conflicts of interest between the superior court plaintiffs and the federal Plaintiffs\"","sentence":"See Keilholtz v. Lennox Hearth Prods., 268 F.R.D. 330, 338 (N.D.Cal. 2010) (finding no evidence that the plaintiffs in multiple classes had antagonistic interests and that defendants appeared to be able to satisfy a judgment in both cases); see also Sandoval v. Ali, No. C-13-03230(EDL), 34 F.Supp.3d 1031, 1046-47, 2014 WL 1311776 at *10 (N.D.Cal.2014) (finding disqualification premature in part because defendants had only raised \u201cspeculative concerns about conflicts of interest between the superior court plaintiffs and the federal Plaintiffs\u201d)."},"case_id":4332242,"label":"a"}
{"context":"As the court's colloquy with counsel at oral argument made quite clear, the Policy challenged here was constructed to prevent one thing: seasonal holiday displays of a religious character. The absence of an explicit list of permissible subjects upon which discourse is permissible in this nonpublie forum does not mean that there is no \"otherwise includible subject\" for discussion in the forum.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"28 F.3d 1506, 1506-07","parenthetical":"holding that a policy generally encouraging the moral character and development of youth by permitting on school premises the Boy Scouts and Girl Scouts, but not permitting a religious youth organization, violates the First Amendment's prohibition of viewpoint discrimination","sentence":"See also Good News\/Good Sports Club, 28 F.3d at 1506-07 (holding that a policy generally encouraging the moral character and development of youth by permitting on school premises the Boy Scouts and Girl Scouts, but not permitting a religious youth organization, violates the First Amendment\u2019s prohibition of viewpoint discrimination); Searcey v. Crim, 815 F.2d 1389 (11th Cir.1987) (holding that the exclusion of \u201cpeace activists\u201d from \u201ccareer days\u201d when military recruiters were permitted access was viewpoint-based administration); cf. AIDS Action Comm, of Mass., Inc. v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth., 42 F.3d 1, 11-12 (1st Cir.1994) (finding viewpoint discrimination in application of transit authority policy that prohibited the display of AIDS advertisements but allowed the display of sexually explicit movie advertisements)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"42 F.3d 1, 11-12","parenthetical":"finding viewpoint discrimination in application of transit authority policy that prohibited the display of AIDS advertisements but allowed the display of sexually explicit movie advertisements","sentence":"See also Good News\/Good Sports Club, 28 F.3d at 1506-07 (holding that a policy generally encouraging the moral character and development of youth by permitting on school premises the Boy Scouts and Girl Scouts, but not permitting a religious youth organization, violates the First Amendment\u2019s prohibition of viewpoint discrimination); Searcey v. Crim, 815 F.2d 1389 (11th Cir.1987) (holding that the exclusion of \u201cpeace activists\u201d from \u201ccareer days\u201d when military recruiters were permitted access was viewpoint-based administration); cf. AIDS Action Comm, of Mass., Inc. v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth., 42 F.3d 1, 11-12 (1st Cir.1994) (finding viewpoint discrimination in application of transit authority policy that prohibited the display of AIDS advertisements but allowed the display of sexually explicit movie advertisements)."},"case_id":7415112,"label":"a"}
{"context":"As the court's colloquy with counsel at oral argument made quite clear, the Policy challenged here was constructed to prevent one thing: seasonal holiday displays of a religious character. The absence of an explicit list of permissible subjects upon which discourse is permissible in this nonpublie forum does not mean that there is no \"otherwise includible subject\" for discussion in the forum.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"42 F.3d 1, 11-12","parenthetical":"finding viewpoint discrimination in application of transit authority policy that prohibited the display of AIDS advertisements but allowed the display of sexually explicit movie advertisements","sentence":"See also Good News\/Good Sports Club, 28 F.3d at 1506-07 (holding that a policy generally encouraging the moral character and development of youth by permitting on school premises the Boy Scouts and Girl Scouts, but not permitting a religious youth organization, violates the First Amendment\u2019s prohibition of viewpoint discrimination); Searcey v. Crim, 815 F.2d 1389 (11th Cir.1987) (holding that the exclusion of \u201cpeace activists\u201d from \u201ccareer days\u201d when military recruiters were permitted access was viewpoint-based administration); cf. AIDS Action Comm, of Mass., Inc. v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth., 42 F.3d 1, 11-12 (1st Cir.1994) (finding viewpoint discrimination in application of transit authority policy that prohibited the display of AIDS advertisements but allowed the display of sexually explicit movie advertisements)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that the exclusion of \"peace activists\" from \"career days\" when military recruiters were permitted access was viewpoint-based administration","sentence":"See also Good News\/Good Sports Club, 28 F.3d at 1506-07 (holding that a policy generally encouraging the moral character and development of youth by permitting on school premises the Boy Scouts and Girl Scouts, but not permitting a religious youth organization, violates the First Amendment\u2019s prohibition of viewpoint discrimination); Searcey v. Crim, 815 F.2d 1389 (11th Cir.1987) (holding that the exclusion of \u201cpeace activists\u201d from \u201ccareer days\u201d when military recruiters were permitted access was viewpoint-based administration); cf. AIDS Action Comm, of Mass., Inc. v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth., 42 F.3d 1, 11-12 (1st Cir.1994) (finding viewpoint discrimination in application of transit authority policy that prohibited the display of AIDS advertisements but allowed the display of sexually explicit movie advertisements)."},"case_id":7415112,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The MSPB has also recognized that an agency may not base employment actions on conduct that satisfies the conditions of the FMLA but not the agency's more-restrictive standards.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"FMLA leave may not be considered as basis for employment action even if company acts pursuant to uniformly applied policy","sentence":"Cf. George v. Associated Stationers, 932 F.Supp. 1012 (N.D.Ohio 1996)(FMLA leave may not be considered as basis for employment action even if company acts pursuant to uniformly applied policy)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"overturning an agency's suspension of employee for failure to comply with agency's leave-request policy","sentence":"In Gross v. Department of Justice, 77 M.S.P.R. 83 (1997), the Board explained that \u201can agency may not apply a more restrictive leave policy than that provided under the FMLA, and it may not deny an employee leave under the FMLA for failure to follow the agency\u2019s leave procedures.\u201d 77 M.S.P.R. at 87 (overturning an agency\u2019s suspension of employee for failure to comply with agency\u2019s leave-request policy)."},"case_id":535513,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The MSPB has also recognized that an agency may not base employment actions on conduct that satisfies the conditions of the FMLA but not the agency's more-restrictive standards.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"FMLA leave may not be considered as basis for employment action even if company acts pursuant to uniformly applied policy","sentence":"Cf. George v. Associated Stationers, 932 F.Supp. 1012 (N.D.Ohio 1996)(FMLA leave may not be considered as basis for employment action even if company acts pursuant to uniformly applied policy)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"77 M.S.P.R. 87, 87","parenthetical":"overturning an agency's suspension of employee for failure to comply with agency's leave-request policy","sentence":"In Gross v. Department of Justice, 77 M.S.P.R. 83 (1997), the Board explained that \u201can agency may not apply a more restrictive leave policy than that provided under the FMLA, and it may not deny an employee leave under the FMLA for failure to follow the agency\u2019s leave procedures.\u201d 77 M.S.P.R. at 87 (overturning an agency\u2019s suspension of employee for failure to comply with agency\u2019s leave-request policy)."},"case_id":535513,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Having so concluded, we must now turn our attention to whether the warrant's issuance in violation of the nighttime search requirements necessitates suppression of the evidence seized, namely the drugs and other items found in defendant's purse. We recognize that mere ministerial and technical errors in the preparation or execution of search warrants will not, without more, invalidate the warrant.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"756 P.2d 700, 702-03","parenthetical":"violation of \"knock-and-announce\" rule did not require suppression when no one was at home at the time of the search to respond to the knock","sentence":"See, e.g., State v. Buck, 756 P.2d 700, 702-03 (Utah 1988) (violation of \u201cknock-and-announce\u201d rule did not require suppression when no one was at home at the time of the search to respond to the knock)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"suppression may be appropriate for violation of constitution, statute, or administrative regulation","sentence":"Cf. State v. Kirn, 70 Haw. 206, 767 P.2d 1238, 1239-40 (1989) (suppression may be appropriate for violation of constitution, statute, or administrative regulation)."},"case_id":10379770,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Having so concluded, we must now turn our attention to whether the warrant's issuance in violation of the nighttime search requirements necessitates suppression of the evidence seized, namely the drugs and other items found in defendant's purse. We recognize that mere ministerial and technical errors in the preparation or execution of search warrants will not, without more, invalidate the warrant.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"756 P.2d 700, 702-03","parenthetical":"violation of \"knock-and-announce\" rule did not require suppression when no one was at home at the time of the search to respond to the knock","sentence":"See, e.g., State v. Buck, 756 P.2d 700, 702-03 (Utah 1988) (violation of \u201cknock-and-announce\u201d rule did not require suppression when no one was at home at the time of the search to respond to the knock)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"767 P.2d 1238, 1239-40","parenthetical":"suppression may be appropriate for violation of constitution, statute, or administrative regulation","sentence":"Cf. State v. Kirn, 70 Haw. 206, 767 P.2d 1238, 1239-40 (1989) (suppression may be appropriate for violation of constitution, statute, or administrative regulation)."},"case_id":10379770,"label":"a"}
{"context":"As an initial matter, there is no explicit requirement in the substantial continuity test for successor liability that an entity must be a \"purchaser of assets\" to be a successor. However, the Court recognizes that whether a transfer of assets occurred may be relevant to the find ing of substantial continuity when balancing the equities in a particular case or legal context. ERISA appears to be such a legal context.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"452 F.3d 556, 556","parenthetical":"\"Title VII cases do consider the existence of a merger or transfer of assets, and we believe that in some cases consideration of the existence of a merger or transfer of assets is appropriate.\"","sentence":"See Einhorn, 632 F.3d at 99 (holding that \u201ca purchaser of assets may be liable for a seller\u2019s delinquent ERISA fund contributions to vindicate important federal statutory policy where the buyer had notice of the liability prior to the sale and there exists sufficient evidence of continuity of operations between the buyer and seller\u201d (emphasis added)); see also Cobb, 452 F.3d at 556 (\u201cTitle VII cases do consider the existence of a merger or transfer of assets, and we believe that in some cases consideration of the existence of a merger or transfer of assets is appropriate.\u201d) (citation omitted); Korlin v. Chartwell Health Care, Inc., 128 F.Supp.2d 609, 614 (E.D.Mo.2001) (declining to impose successor liability under Title VII on the facts presented without a merger or transfer of assets because the court concluded that, if the cost of liability was not reflected in any purchase price, imposition of successor liability would not be equitable). Accordingly, the Court will consider the nature of the transaction as it relates to the MacMillan factors and the balance of the equities."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"632 F.3d 99, 99","parenthetical":"holding that \"a purchaser of assets may be liable for a seller's delinquent ERISA fund contributions to vindicate important federal statutory policy where the buyer had notice of the liability prior to the sale and there exists sufficient evidence of continuity of operations between the buyer and seller\" (emphasis added","sentence":"See Einhorn, 632 F.3d at 99 (holding that \u201ca purchaser of assets may be liable for a seller\u2019s delinquent ERISA fund contributions to vindicate important federal statutory policy where the buyer had notice of the liability prior to the sale and there exists sufficient evidence of continuity of operations between the buyer and seller\u201d (emphasis added)); see also Cobb, 452 F.3d at 556 (\u201cTitle VII cases do consider the existence of a merger or transfer of assets, and we believe that in some cases consideration of the existence of a merger or transfer of assets is appropriate.\u201d) (citation omitted); Korlin v. Chartwell Health Care, Inc., 128 F.Supp.2d 609, 614 (E.D.Mo.2001) (declining to impose successor liability under Title VII on the facts presented without a merger or transfer of assets because the court concluded that, if the cost of liability was not reflected in any purchase price, imposition of successor liability would not be equitable). Accordingly, the Court will consider the nature of the transaction as it relates to the MacMillan factors and the balance of the equities."},"case_id":4061739,"label":"b"}
{"context":"As an initial matter, there is no explicit requirement in the substantial continuity test for successor liability that an entity must be a \"purchaser of assets\" to be a successor. However, the Court recognizes that whether a transfer of assets occurred may be relevant to the find ing of substantial continuity when balancing the equities in a particular case or legal context. ERISA appears to be such a legal context.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"128 F.Supp.2d 609, 614","parenthetical":"declining to impose successor liability under Title VII on the facts presented without a merger or transfer of assets because the court concluded that, if the cost of liability was not reflected in any purchase price, imposition of successor liability would not be equitable","sentence":"See Einhorn, 632 F.3d at 99 (holding that \u201ca purchaser of assets may be liable for a seller\u2019s delinquent ERISA fund contributions to vindicate important federal statutory policy where the buyer had notice of the liability prior to the sale and there exists sufficient evidence of continuity of operations between the buyer and seller\u201d (emphasis added)); see also Cobb, 452 F.3d at 556 (\u201cTitle VII cases do consider the existence of a merger or transfer of assets, and we believe that in some cases consideration of the existence of a merger or transfer of assets is appropriate.\u201d) (citation omitted); Korlin v. Chartwell Health Care, Inc., 128 F.Supp.2d 609, 614 (E.D.Mo.2001) (declining to impose successor liability under Title VII on the facts presented without a merger or transfer of assets because the court concluded that, if the cost of liability was not reflected in any purchase price, imposition of successor liability would not be equitable). Accordingly, the Court will consider the nature of the transaction as it relates to the MacMillan factors and the balance of the equities."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"632 F.3d 99, 99","parenthetical":"holding that \"a purchaser of assets may be liable for a seller's delinquent ERISA fund contributions to vindicate important federal statutory policy where the buyer had notice of the liability prior to the sale and there exists sufficient evidence of continuity of operations between the buyer and seller\" (emphasis added","sentence":"See Einhorn, 632 F.3d at 99 (holding that \u201ca purchaser of assets may be liable for a seller\u2019s delinquent ERISA fund contributions to vindicate important federal statutory policy where the buyer had notice of the liability prior to the sale and there exists sufficient evidence of continuity of operations between the buyer and seller\u201d (emphasis added)); see also Cobb, 452 F.3d at 556 (\u201cTitle VII cases do consider the existence of a merger or transfer of assets, and we believe that in some cases consideration of the existence of a merger or transfer of assets is appropriate.\u201d) (citation omitted); Korlin v. Chartwell Health Care, Inc., 128 F.Supp.2d 609, 614 (E.D.Mo.2001) (declining to impose successor liability under Title VII on the facts presented without a merger or transfer of assets because the court concluded that, if the cost of liability was not reflected in any purchase price, imposition of successor liability would not be equitable). Accordingly, the Court will consider the nature of the transaction as it relates to the MacMillan factors and the balance of the equities."},"case_id":4061739,"label":"b"}
{"context":"See Fed. R.Civ.P. 72(a). A party failing to appeal a magistrate judge's order in a nondispositive matter to the district court may not raise an objection to it on appeal to a circuit court.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"Because the record indicates that Appellants failed to file objections to [magistrate judge's] order within ten days, any such objection was likely waived.\"","sentence":"See Stemler v. City of Florence, 126 F.3d 856, 866 n. 9 (6th Cir.1997) (failure to challenge magistrate judge's discovery order to district court constitutes waiver of claim on appeal); Simpson v. Lear Astronics Corp., 77 F.3d 1170, 1173-74 (9th Cir.1996) (pro se litigant forfeited right to appellate review of magistrate judge's nondispositive order by not ap pealing that order to the district court); Pagano v. Frank, 983 F.2d 343, 346 (1st Cir.1993) (\"[Wlhen ... a litigant could have tested a magistrate's ruling by bringing it before the district judge, but failed to do so within the allotted ten-day period, he cannot later leapfrog the trial court and appeal the ruling directly to the court of appeals.\u201d); see also ICA Const. Corp. v. Reich, 60 F.3d 1495, 1499 n. 10 (11th Cir.1995) (\"Because the record indicates that Appellants failed to file objections to [magistrate judge's] order within ten days, any such objection was likely waived.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"failure to challenge magistrate judge's discovery order to district court constitutes waiver of claim on appeal","sentence":"See Stemler v. City of Florence, 126 F.3d 856, 866 n. 9 (6th Cir.1997) (failure to challenge magistrate judge's discovery order to district court constitutes waiver of claim on appeal); Simpson v. Lear Astronics Corp., 77 F.3d 1170, 1173-74 (9th Cir.1996) (pro se litigant forfeited right to appellate review of magistrate judge's nondispositive order by not ap pealing that order to the district court); Pagano v. Frank, 983 F.2d 343, 346 (1st Cir.1993) (\"[Wlhen ... a litigant could have tested a magistrate's ruling by bringing it before the district judge, but failed to do so within the allotted ten-day period, he cannot later leapfrog the trial court and appeal the ruling directly to the court of appeals.\u201d); see also ICA Const. Corp. v. Reich, 60 F.3d 1495, 1499 n. 10 (11th Cir.1995) (\"Because the record indicates that Appellants failed to file objections to [magistrate judge's] order within ten days, any such objection was likely waived.\u201d)."},"case_id":9330727,"label":"b"}
{"context":"See Fed. R.Civ.P. 72(a). A party failing to appeal a magistrate judge's order in a nondispositive matter to the district court may not raise an objection to it on appeal to a circuit court.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"77 F.3d 1170, 1173-74","parenthetical":"pro se litigant forfeited right to appellate review of magistrate judge's nondispositive order by not ap pealing that order to the district court","sentence":"See Stemler v. City of Florence, 126 F.3d 856, 866 n. 9 (6th Cir.1997) (failure to challenge magistrate judge's discovery order to district court constitutes waiver of claim on appeal); Simpson v. Lear Astronics Corp., 77 F.3d 1170, 1173-74 (9th Cir.1996) (pro se litigant forfeited right to appellate review of magistrate judge's nondispositive order by not ap pealing that order to the district court); Pagano v. Frank, 983 F.2d 343, 346 (1st Cir.1993) (\"[Wlhen ... a litigant could have tested a magistrate's ruling by bringing it before the district judge, but failed to do so within the allotted ten-day period, he cannot later leapfrog the trial court and appeal the ruling directly to the court of appeals.\u201d); see also ICA Const. Corp. v. Reich, 60 F.3d 1495, 1499 n. 10 (11th Cir.1995) (\"Because the record indicates that Appellants failed to file objections to [magistrate judge's] order within ten days, any such objection was likely waived.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"Because the record indicates that Appellants failed to file objections to [magistrate judge's] order within ten days, any such objection was likely waived.\"","sentence":"See Stemler v. City of Florence, 126 F.3d 856, 866 n. 9 (6th Cir.1997) (failure to challenge magistrate judge's discovery order to district court constitutes waiver of claim on appeal); Simpson v. Lear Astronics Corp., 77 F.3d 1170, 1173-74 (9th Cir.1996) (pro se litigant forfeited right to appellate review of magistrate judge's nondispositive order by not ap pealing that order to the district court); Pagano v. Frank, 983 F.2d 343, 346 (1st Cir.1993) (\"[Wlhen ... a litigant could have tested a magistrate's ruling by bringing it before the district judge, but failed to do so within the allotted ten-day period, he cannot later leapfrog the trial court and appeal the ruling directly to the court of appeals.\u201d); see also ICA Const. Corp. v. Reich, 60 F.3d 1495, 1499 n. 10 (11th Cir.1995) (\"Because the record indicates that Appellants failed to file objections to [magistrate judge's] order within ten days, any such objection was likely waived.\u201d)."},"case_id":9330727,"label":"a"}
{"context":"See Fed. R.Civ.P. 72(a). A party failing to appeal a magistrate judge's order in a nondispositive matter to the district court may not raise an objection to it on appeal to a circuit court.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"983 F.2d 343, 346","parenthetical":"\"[Wlhen ... a litigant could have tested a magistrate's ruling by bringing it before the district judge, but failed to do so within the allotted ten-day period, he cannot later leapfrog the trial court and appeal the ruling directly to the court of appeals.\"","sentence":"See Stemler v. City of Florence, 126 F.3d 856, 866 n. 9 (6th Cir.1997) (failure to challenge magistrate judge's discovery order to district court constitutes waiver of claim on appeal); Simpson v. Lear Astronics Corp., 77 F.3d 1170, 1173-74 (9th Cir.1996) (pro se litigant forfeited right to appellate review of magistrate judge's nondispositive order by not ap pealing that order to the district court); Pagano v. Frank, 983 F.2d 343, 346 (1st Cir.1993) (\"[Wlhen ... a litigant could have tested a magistrate's ruling by bringing it before the district judge, but failed to do so within the allotted ten-day period, he cannot later leapfrog the trial court and appeal the ruling directly to the court of appeals.\u201d); see also ICA Const. Corp. v. Reich, 60 F.3d 1495, 1499 n. 10 (11th Cir.1995) (\"Because the record indicates that Appellants failed to file objections to [magistrate judge's] order within ten days, any such objection was likely waived.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"Because the record indicates that Appellants failed to file objections to [magistrate judge's] order within ten days, any such objection was likely waived.\"","sentence":"See Stemler v. City of Florence, 126 F.3d 856, 866 n. 9 (6th Cir.1997) (failure to challenge magistrate judge's discovery order to district court constitutes waiver of claim on appeal); Simpson v. Lear Astronics Corp., 77 F.3d 1170, 1173-74 (9th Cir.1996) (pro se litigant forfeited right to appellate review of magistrate judge's nondispositive order by not ap pealing that order to the district court); Pagano v. Frank, 983 F.2d 343, 346 (1st Cir.1993) (\"[Wlhen ... a litigant could have tested a magistrate's ruling by bringing it before the district judge, but failed to do so within the allotted ten-day period, he cannot later leapfrog the trial court and appeal the ruling directly to the court of appeals.\u201d); see also ICA Const. Corp. v. Reich, 60 F.3d 1495, 1499 n. 10 (11th Cir.1995) (\"Because the record indicates that Appellants failed to file objections to [magistrate judge's] order within ten days, any such objection was likely waived.\u201d)."},"case_id":9330727,"label":"a"}
{"context":". The majority suggests that this statement merely establishes that back pay often is awarded together with reinstatement. The Title VII cases do not see it this way, for they type back pay as relief more akin to reinstatement than to damages. Additionally, several courts have characterized back pay as specific relief.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"446 U.S. 318, 326","parenthetical":"\"EEOC can secure specific relief, such as hiring or reinstatement, constructive seniority, or damages for backpay\"","sentence":"But see General Tel. Co. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 326, 100 S.Ct. 1698, 1704, 64 L.Ed.2d 319 (1980) (\"EEOC can secure specific relief, such as hiring or reinstatement, constructive seniority, or damages for backpay\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"487 U.S. 893, 893","parenthetical":"\"an equitable action for specific relief -- which may include an order providing for the reinstatement of an employee with backpay\"","sentence":"See Bowen, 487 U.S. at 893, 108 S.Ct. at 2731-32 (\"an equitable action for specific relief \u2014 which may include an order providing for the reinstatement of an employee with backpay\u201d); Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 751, 96 S.Ct. 1251, 1258, 47 L.Ed.2d 444 (1976) (\"the District Court declined, however, to grant the unnamed members of classes 3 and 4 any other specific relief sought, which included an award of backpay\u201d); Riddle v. Cerro Wire & Cable Group, Inc., 902 F.2d 918, 922 (11th Cir. 1990) (\u201c[t]he EEOC\u2019s complaint sought specific relief for Riddle in the form of backpay and promotion\u201d); Ward v. Arkansas State Police, 653 F.2d 346, 348 (8th Cir.1981) (\u201d[t]he consent decree ... established guidelines for back pay and other specific relief\u201d); McClain v. Wagner Elec. Corp., 550 F.2d 1115, 1118 (8th Cir.1977) (\u201cthe settlement ... gave no specific relief such as back pay\u201d); United States v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 354, 378 (8th Cir.1973) (\u201d[t]he Government requests specific relief for individual applicants, including backpay differentials\u201d); City of Fort Smith v. Driggers, 305 Ark. 409, 808 S.W.2d 748, 753 (1991) (the \"complaint sought specific relief in the form of promotion and back pay\u201d); Eureka Teacher\u2019s Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 202 Cal.App.3d 469, 247 Cal.Rptr. 790, 794 (1988) (\"\u2018Back pay clearly is specific monetary relief incidental to the requested orders that appellant be hired and that respondents be enjoined from discriminating against him.\u2019\u201d) (quoting Snipes v. City of Bakersfield, 145 Cal.App.3d 861, 193 Cal.Rptr. 760, 765 (1983))."},"case_id":36488,"label":"b"}
{"context":". The majority suggests that this statement merely establishes that back pay often is awarded together with reinstatement. The Title VII cases do not see it this way, for they type back pay as relief more akin to reinstatement than to damages. Additionally, several courts have characterized back pay as specific relief.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"487 U.S. 893, 893","parenthetical":"\"an equitable action for specific relief -- which may include an order providing for the reinstatement of an employee with backpay\"","sentence":"See Bowen, 487 U.S. at 893, 108 S.Ct. at 2731-32 (\"an equitable action for specific relief \u2014 which may include an order providing for the reinstatement of an employee with backpay\u201d); Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 751, 96 S.Ct. 1251, 1258, 47 L.Ed.2d 444 (1976) (\"the District Court declined, however, to grant the unnamed members of classes 3 and 4 any other specific relief sought, which included an award of backpay\u201d); Riddle v. Cerro Wire & Cable Group, Inc., 902 F.2d 918, 922 (11th Cir. 1990) (\u201c[t]he EEOC\u2019s complaint sought specific relief for Riddle in the form of backpay and promotion\u201d); Ward v. Arkansas State Police, 653 F.2d 346, 348 (8th Cir.1981) (\u201d[t]he consent decree ... established guidelines for back pay and other specific relief\u201d); McClain v. Wagner Elec. Corp., 550 F.2d 1115, 1118 (8th Cir.1977) (\u201cthe settlement ... gave no specific relief such as back pay\u201d); United States v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 354, 378 (8th Cir.1973) (\u201d[t]he Government requests specific relief for individual applicants, including backpay differentials\u201d); City of Fort Smith v. Driggers, 305 Ark. 409, 808 S.W.2d 748, 753 (1991) (the \"complaint sought specific relief in the form of promotion and back pay\u201d); Eureka Teacher\u2019s Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 202 Cal.App.3d 469, 247 Cal.Rptr. 790, 794 (1988) (\"\u2018Back pay clearly is specific monetary relief incidental to the requested orders that appellant be hired and that respondents be enjoined from discriminating against him.\u2019\u201d) (quoting Snipes v. City of Bakersfield, 145 Cal.App.3d 861, 193 Cal.Rptr. 760, 765 (1983))."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"100 S.Ct. 1698, 1704","parenthetical":"\"EEOC can secure specific relief, such as hiring or reinstatement, constructive seniority, or damages for backpay\"","sentence":"But see General Tel. Co. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 326, 100 S.Ct. 1698, 1704, 64 L.Ed.2d 319 (1980) (\"EEOC can secure specific relief, such as hiring or reinstatement, constructive seniority, or damages for backpay\u201d)."},"case_id":36488,"label":"a"}
{"context":". The majority suggests that this statement merely establishes that back pay often is awarded together with reinstatement. The Title VII cases do not see it this way, for they type back pay as relief more akin to reinstatement than to damages. Additionally, several courts have characterized back pay as specific relief.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"EEOC can secure specific relief, such as hiring or reinstatement, constructive seniority, or damages for backpay\"","sentence":"But see General Tel. Co. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 326, 100 S.Ct. 1698, 1704, 64 L.Ed.2d 319 (1980) (\"EEOC can secure specific relief, such as hiring or reinstatement, constructive seniority, or damages for backpay\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"487 U.S. 893, 893","parenthetical":"\"an equitable action for specific relief -- which may include an order providing for the reinstatement of an employee with backpay\"","sentence":"See Bowen, 487 U.S. at 893, 108 S.Ct. at 2731-32 (\"an equitable action for specific relief \u2014 which may include an order providing for the reinstatement of an employee with backpay\u201d); Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 751, 96 S.Ct. 1251, 1258, 47 L.Ed.2d 444 (1976) (\"the District Court declined, however, to grant the unnamed members of classes 3 and 4 any other specific relief sought, which included an award of backpay\u201d); Riddle v. Cerro Wire & Cable Group, Inc., 902 F.2d 918, 922 (11th Cir. 1990) (\u201c[t]he EEOC\u2019s complaint sought specific relief for Riddle in the form of backpay and promotion\u201d); Ward v. Arkansas State Police, 653 F.2d 346, 348 (8th Cir.1981) (\u201d[t]he consent decree ... established guidelines for back pay and other specific relief\u201d); McClain v. Wagner Elec. Corp., 550 F.2d 1115, 1118 (8th Cir.1977) (\u201cthe settlement ... gave no specific relief such as back pay\u201d); United States v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 354, 378 (8th Cir.1973) (\u201d[t]he Government requests specific relief for individual applicants, including backpay differentials\u201d); City of Fort Smith v. Driggers, 305 Ark. 409, 808 S.W.2d 748, 753 (1991) (the \"complaint sought specific relief in the form of promotion and back pay\u201d); Eureka Teacher\u2019s Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 202 Cal.App.3d 469, 247 Cal.Rptr. 790, 794 (1988) (\"\u2018Back pay clearly is specific monetary relief incidental to the requested orders that appellant be hired and that respondents be enjoined from discriminating against him.\u2019\u201d) (quoting Snipes v. City of Bakersfield, 145 Cal.App.3d 861, 193 Cal.Rptr. 760, 765 (1983))."},"case_id":36488,"label":"b"}
{"context":". The majority suggests that this statement merely establishes that back pay often is awarded together with reinstatement. The Title VII cases do not see it this way, for they type back pay as relief more akin to reinstatement than to damages. Additionally, several courts have characterized back pay as specific relief.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"108 S.Ct. 2731, 2731-32","parenthetical":"\"an equitable action for specific relief -- which may include an order providing for the reinstatement of an employee with backpay\"","sentence":"See Bowen, 487 U.S. at 893, 108 S.Ct. at 2731-32 (\"an equitable action for specific relief \u2014 which may include an order providing for the reinstatement of an employee with backpay\u201d); Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 751, 96 S.Ct. 1251, 1258, 47 L.Ed.2d 444 (1976) (\"the District Court declined, however, to grant the unnamed members of classes 3 and 4 any other specific relief sought, which included an award of backpay\u201d); Riddle v. Cerro Wire & Cable Group, Inc., 902 F.2d 918, 922 (11th Cir. 1990) (\u201c[t]he EEOC\u2019s complaint sought specific relief for Riddle in the form of backpay and promotion\u201d); Ward v. Arkansas State Police, 653 F.2d 346, 348 (8th Cir.1981) (\u201d[t]he consent decree ... established guidelines for back pay and other specific relief\u201d); McClain v. Wagner Elec. Corp., 550 F.2d 1115, 1118 (8th Cir.1977) (\u201cthe settlement ... gave no specific relief such as back pay\u201d); United States v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 354, 378 (8th Cir.1973) (\u201d[t]he Government requests specific relief for individual applicants, including backpay differentials\u201d); City of Fort Smith v. Driggers, 305 Ark. 409, 808 S.W.2d 748, 753 (1991) (the \"complaint sought specific relief in the form of promotion and back pay\u201d); Eureka Teacher\u2019s Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 202 Cal.App.3d 469, 247 Cal.Rptr. 790, 794 (1988) (\"\u2018Back pay clearly is specific monetary relief incidental to the requested orders that appellant be hired and that respondents be enjoined from discriminating against him.\u2019\u201d) (quoting Snipes v. City of Bakersfield, 145 Cal.App.3d 861, 193 Cal.Rptr. 760, 765 (1983))."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"446 U.S. 318, 326","parenthetical":"\"EEOC can secure specific relief, such as hiring or reinstatement, constructive seniority, or damages for backpay\"","sentence":"But see General Tel. Co. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 326, 100 S.Ct. 1698, 1704, 64 L.Ed.2d 319 (1980) (\"EEOC can secure specific relief, such as hiring or reinstatement, constructive seniority, or damages for backpay\u201d)."},"case_id":36488,"label":"a"}
{"context":". The majority suggests that this statement merely establishes that back pay often is awarded together with reinstatement. The Title VII cases do not see it this way, for they type back pay as relief more akin to reinstatement than to damages. Additionally, several courts have characterized back pay as specific relief.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"108 S.Ct. 2731, 2731-32","parenthetical":"\"an equitable action for specific relief -- which may include an order providing for the reinstatement of an employee with backpay\"","sentence":"See Bowen, 487 U.S. at 893, 108 S.Ct. at 2731-32 (\"an equitable action for specific relief \u2014 which may include an order providing for the reinstatement of an employee with backpay\u201d); Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 751, 96 S.Ct. 1251, 1258, 47 L.Ed.2d 444 (1976) (\"the District Court declined, however, to grant the unnamed members of classes 3 and 4 any other specific relief sought, which included an award of backpay\u201d); Riddle v. Cerro Wire & Cable Group, Inc., 902 F.2d 918, 922 (11th Cir. 1990) (\u201c[t]he EEOC\u2019s complaint sought specific relief for Riddle in the form of backpay and promotion\u201d); Ward v. Arkansas State Police, 653 F.2d 346, 348 (8th Cir.1981) (\u201d[t]he consent decree ... established guidelines for back pay and other specific relief\u201d); McClain v. Wagner Elec. Corp., 550 F.2d 1115, 1118 (8th Cir.1977) (\u201cthe settlement ... gave no specific relief such as back pay\u201d); United States v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 354, 378 (8th Cir.1973) (\u201d[t]he Government requests specific relief for individual applicants, including backpay differentials\u201d); City of Fort Smith v. Driggers, 305 Ark. 409, 808 S.W.2d 748, 753 (1991) (the \"complaint sought specific relief in the form of promotion and back pay\u201d); Eureka Teacher\u2019s Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 202 Cal.App.3d 469, 247 Cal.Rptr. 790, 794 (1988) (\"\u2018Back pay clearly is specific monetary relief incidental to the requested orders that appellant be hired and that respondents be enjoined from discriminating against him.\u2019\u201d) (quoting Snipes v. City of Bakersfield, 145 Cal.App.3d 861, 193 Cal.Rptr. 760, 765 (1983))."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"100 S.Ct. 1698, 1704","parenthetical":"\"EEOC can secure specific relief, such as hiring or reinstatement, constructive seniority, or damages for backpay\"","sentence":"But see General Tel. Co. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 326, 100 S.Ct. 1698, 1704, 64 L.Ed.2d 319 (1980) (\"EEOC can secure specific relief, such as hiring or reinstatement, constructive seniority, or damages for backpay\u201d)."},"case_id":36488,"label":"a"}
{"context":". The majority suggests that this statement merely establishes that back pay often is awarded together with reinstatement. The Title VII cases do not see it this way, for they type back pay as relief more akin to reinstatement than to damages. Additionally, several courts have characterized back pay as specific relief.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"108 S.Ct. 2731, 2731-32","parenthetical":"\"an equitable action for specific relief -- which may include an order providing for the reinstatement of an employee with backpay\"","sentence":"See Bowen, 487 U.S. at 893, 108 S.Ct. at 2731-32 (\"an equitable action for specific relief \u2014 which may include an order providing for the reinstatement of an employee with backpay\u201d); Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 751, 96 S.Ct. 1251, 1258, 47 L.Ed.2d 444 (1976) (\"the District Court declined, however, to grant the unnamed members of classes 3 and 4 any other specific relief sought, which included an award of backpay\u201d); Riddle v. Cerro Wire & Cable Group, Inc., 902 F.2d 918, 922 (11th Cir. 1990) (\u201c[t]he EEOC\u2019s complaint sought specific relief for Riddle in the form of backpay and promotion\u201d); Ward v. Arkansas State Police, 653 F.2d 346, 348 (8th Cir.1981) (\u201d[t]he consent decree ... established guidelines for back pay and other specific relief\u201d); McClain v. Wagner Elec. Corp., 550 F.2d 1115, 1118 (8th Cir.1977) (\u201cthe settlement ... gave no specific relief such as back pay\u201d); United States v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 354, 378 (8th Cir.1973) (\u201d[t]he Government requests specific relief for individual applicants, including backpay differentials\u201d); City of Fort Smith v. Driggers, 305 Ark. 409, 808 S.W.2d 748, 753 (1991) (the \"complaint sought specific relief in the form of promotion and back pay\u201d); Eureka Teacher\u2019s Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 202 Cal.App.3d 469, 247 Cal.Rptr. 790, 794 (1988) (\"\u2018Back pay clearly is specific monetary relief incidental to the requested orders that appellant be hired and that respondents be enjoined from discriminating against him.\u2019\u201d) (quoting Snipes v. City of Bakersfield, 145 Cal.App.3d 861, 193 Cal.Rptr. 760, 765 (1983))."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"EEOC can secure specific relief, such as hiring or reinstatement, constructive seniority, or damages for backpay\"","sentence":"But see General Tel. Co. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 326, 100 S.Ct. 1698, 1704, 64 L.Ed.2d 319 (1980) (\"EEOC can secure specific relief, such as hiring or reinstatement, constructive seniority, or damages for backpay\u201d)."},"case_id":36488,"label":"a"}
{"context":". The majority suggests that this statement merely establishes that back pay often is awarded together with reinstatement. The Title VII cases do not see it this way, for they type back pay as relief more akin to reinstatement than to damages. Additionally, several courts have characterized back pay as specific relief.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"446 U.S. 318, 326","parenthetical":"\"EEOC can secure specific relief, such as hiring or reinstatement, constructive seniority, or damages for backpay\"","sentence":"But see General Tel. Co. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 326, 100 S.Ct. 1698, 1704, 64 L.Ed.2d 319 (1980) (\"EEOC can secure specific relief, such as hiring or reinstatement, constructive seniority, or damages for backpay\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"424 U.S. 747, 751","parenthetical":"\"the District Court declined, however, to grant the unnamed members of classes 3 and 4 any other specific relief sought, which included an award of backpay\"","sentence":"See Bowen, 487 U.S. at 893, 108 S.Ct. at 2731-32 (\"an equitable action for specific relief \u2014 which may include an order providing for the reinstatement of an employee with backpay\u201d); Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 751, 96 S.Ct. 1251, 1258, 47 L.Ed.2d 444 (1976) (\"the District Court declined, however, to grant the unnamed members of classes 3 and 4 any other specific relief sought, which included an award of backpay\u201d); Riddle v. Cerro Wire & Cable Group, Inc., 902 F.2d 918, 922 (11th Cir. 1990) (\u201c[t]he EEOC\u2019s complaint sought specific relief for Riddle in the form of backpay and promotion\u201d); Ward v. Arkansas State Police, 653 F.2d 346, 348 (8th Cir.1981) (\u201d[t]he consent decree ... established guidelines for back pay and other specific relief\u201d); McClain v. Wagner Elec. Corp., 550 F.2d 1115, 1118 (8th Cir.1977) (\u201cthe settlement ... gave no specific relief such as back pay\u201d); United States v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 354, 378 (8th Cir.1973) (\u201d[t]he Government requests specific relief for individual applicants, including backpay differentials\u201d); City of Fort Smith v. Driggers, 305 Ark. 409, 808 S.W.2d 748, 753 (1991) (the \"complaint sought specific relief in the form of promotion and back pay\u201d); Eureka Teacher\u2019s Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 202 Cal.App.3d 469, 247 Cal.Rptr. 790, 794 (1988) (\"\u2018Back pay clearly is specific monetary relief incidental to the requested orders that appellant be hired and that respondents be enjoined from discriminating against him.\u2019\u201d) (quoting Snipes v. City of Bakersfield, 145 Cal.App.3d 861, 193 Cal.Rptr. 760, 765 (1983))."},"case_id":36488,"label":"b"}
{"context":". The majority suggests that this statement merely establishes that back pay often is awarded together with reinstatement. The Title VII cases do not see it this way, for they type back pay as relief more akin to reinstatement than to damages. Additionally, several courts have characterized back pay as specific relief.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"424 U.S. 747, 751","parenthetical":"\"the District Court declined, however, to grant the unnamed members of classes 3 and 4 any other specific relief sought, which included an award of backpay\"","sentence":"See Bowen, 487 U.S. at 893, 108 S.Ct. at 2731-32 (\"an equitable action for specific relief \u2014 which may include an order providing for the reinstatement of an employee with backpay\u201d); Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 751, 96 S.Ct. 1251, 1258, 47 L.Ed.2d 444 (1976) (\"the District Court declined, however, to grant the unnamed members of classes 3 and 4 any other specific relief sought, which included an award of backpay\u201d); Riddle v. Cerro Wire & Cable Group, Inc., 902 F.2d 918, 922 (11th Cir. 1990) (\u201c[t]he EEOC\u2019s complaint sought specific relief for Riddle in the form of backpay and promotion\u201d); Ward v. Arkansas State Police, 653 F.2d 346, 348 (8th Cir.1981) (\u201d[t]he consent decree ... established guidelines for back pay and other specific relief\u201d); McClain v. Wagner Elec. Corp., 550 F.2d 1115, 1118 (8th Cir.1977) (\u201cthe settlement ... gave no specific relief such as back pay\u201d); United States v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 354, 378 (8th Cir.1973) (\u201d[t]he Government requests specific relief for individual applicants, including backpay differentials\u201d); City of Fort Smith v. Driggers, 305 Ark. 409, 808 S.W.2d 748, 753 (1991) (the \"complaint sought specific relief in the form of promotion and back pay\u201d); Eureka Teacher\u2019s Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 202 Cal.App.3d 469, 247 Cal.Rptr. 790, 794 (1988) (\"\u2018Back pay clearly is specific monetary relief incidental to the requested orders that appellant be hired and that respondents be enjoined from discriminating against him.\u2019\u201d) (quoting Snipes v. City of Bakersfield, 145 Cal.App.3d 861, 193 Cal.Rptr. 760, 765 (1983))."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"100 S.Ct. 1698, 1704","parenthetical":"\"EEOC can secure specific relief, such as hiring or reinstatement, constructive seniority, or damages for backpay\"","sentence":"But see General Tel. Co. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 326, 100 S.Ct. 1698, 1704, 64 L.Ed.2d 319 (1980) (\"EEOC can secure specific relief, such as hiring or reinstatement, constructive seniority, or damages for backpay\u201d)."},"case_id":36488,"label":"a"}
{"context":". The majority suggests that this statement merely establishes that back pay often is awarded together with reinstatement. The Title VII cases do not see it this way, for they type back pay as relief more akin to reinstatement than to damages. Additionally, several courts have characterized back pay as specific relief.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"424 U.S. 747, 751","parenthetical":"\"the District Court declined, however, to grant the unnamed members of classes 3 and 4 any other specific relief sought, which included an award of backpay\"","sentence":"See Bowen, 487 U.S. at 893, 108 S.Ct. at 2731-32 (\"an equitable action for specific relief \u2014 which may include an order providing for the reinstatement of an employee with backpay\u201d); Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 751, 96 S.Ct. 1251, 1258, 47 L.Ed.2d 444 (1976) (\"the District Court declined, however, to grant the unnamed members of classes 3 and 4 any other specific relief sought, which included an award of backpay\u201d); Riddle v. Cerro Wire & Cable Group, Inc., 902 F.2d 918, 922 (11th Cir. 1990) (\u201c[t]he EEOC\u2019s complaint sought specific relief for Riddle in the form of backpay and promotion\u201d); Ward v. Arkansas State Police, 653 F.2d 346, 348 (8th Cir.1981) (\u201d[t]he consent decree ... established guidelines for back pay and other specific relief\u201d); McClain v. Wagner Elec. Corp., 550 F.2d 1115, 1118 (8th Cir.1977) (\u201cthe settlement ... gave no specific relief such as back pay\u201d); United States v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 354, 378 (8th Cir.1973) (\u201d[t]he Government requests specific relief for individual applicants, including backpay differentials\u201d); City of Fort Smith v. Driggers, 305 Ark. 409, 808 S.W.2d 748, 753 (1991) (the \"complaint sought specific relief in the form of promotion and back pay\u201d); Eureka Teacher\u2019s Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 202 Cal.App.3d 469, 247 Cal.Rptr. 790, 794 (1988) (\"\u2018Back pay clearly is specific monetary relief incidental to the requested orders that appellant be hired and that respondents be enjoined from discriminating against him.\u2019\u201d) (quoting Snipes v. City of Bakersfield, 145 Cal.App.3d 861, 193 Cal.Rptr. 760, 765 (1983))."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"EEOC can secure specific relief, such as hiring or reinstatement, constructive seniority, or damages for backpay\"","sentence":"But see General Tel. Co. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 326, 100 S.Ct. 1698, 1704, 64 L.Ed.2d 319 (1980) (\"EEOC can secure specific relief, such as hiring or reinstatement, constructive seniority, or damages for backpay\u201d)."},"case_id":36488,"label":"a"}
{"context":". The majority suggests that this statement merely establishes that back pay often is awarded together with reinstatement. The Title VII cases do not see it this way, for they type back pay as relief more akin to reinstatement than to damages. Additionally, several courts have characterized back pay as specific relief.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"446 U.S. 318, 326","parenthetical":"\"EEOC can secure specific relief, such as hiring or reinstatement, constructive seniority, or damages for backpay\"","sentence":"But see General Tel. Co. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 326, 100 S.Ct. 1698, 1704, 64 L.Ed.2d 319 (1980) (\"EEOC can secure specific relief, such as hiring or reinstatement, constructive seniority, or damages for backpay\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"96 S.Ct. 1251, 1258","parenthetical":"\"the District Court declined, however, to grant the unnamed members of classes 3 and 4 any other specific relief sought, which included an award of backpay\"","sentence":"See Bowen, 487 U.S. at 893, 108 S.Ct. at 2731-32 (\"an equitable action for specific relief \u2014 which may include an order providing for the reinstatement of an employee with backpay\u201d); Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 751, 96 S.Ct. 1251, 1258, 47 L.Ed.2d 444 (1976) (\"the District Court declined, however, to grant the unnamed members of classes 3 and 4 any other specific relief sought, which included an award of backpay\u201d); Riddle v. Cerro Wire & Cable Group, Inc., 902 F.2d 918, 922 (11th Cir. 1990) (\u201c[t]he EEOC\u2019s complaint sought specific relief for Riddle in the form of backpay and promotion\u201d); Ward v. Arkansas State Police, 653 F.2d 346, 348 (8th Cir.1981) (\u201d[t]he consent decree ... established guidelines for back pay and other specific relief\u201d); McClain v. Wagner Elec. Corp., 550 F.2d 1115, 1118 (8th Cir.1977) (\u201cthe settlement ... gave no specific relief such as back pay\u201d); United States v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 354, 378 (8th Cir.1973) (\u201d[t]he Government requests specific relief for individual applicants, including backpay differentials\u201d); City of Fort Smith v. Driggers, 305 Ark. 409, 808 S.W.2d 748, 753 (1991) (the \"complaint sought specific relief in the form of promotion and back pay\u201d); Eureka Teacher\u2019s Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 202 Cal.App.3d 469, 247 Cal.Rptr. 790, 794 (1988) (\"\u2018Back pay clearly is specific monetary relief incidental to the requested orders that appellant be hired and that respondents be enjoined from discriminating against him.\u2019\u201d) (quoting Snipes v. City of Bakersfield, 145 Cal.App.3d 861, 193 Cal.Rptr. 760, 765 (1983))."},"case_id":36488,"label":"b"}
{"context":". The majority suggests that this statement merely establishes that back pay often is awarded together with reinstatement. The Title VII cases do not see it this way, for they type back pay as relief more akin to reinstatement than to damages. Additionally, several courts have characterized back pay as specific relief.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"100 S.Ct. 1698, 1704","parenthetical":"\"EEOC can secure specific relief, such as hiring or reinstatement, constructive seniority, or damages for backpay\"","sentence":"But see General Tel. Co. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 326, 100 S.Ct. 1698, 1704, 64 L.Ed.2d 319 (1980) (\"EEOC can secure specific relief, such as hiring or reinstatement, constructive seniority, or damages for backpay\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"96 S.Ct. 1251, 1258","parenthetical":"\"the District Court declined, however, to grant the unnamed members of classes 3 and 4 any other specific relief sought, which included an award of backpay\"","sentence":"See Bowen, 487 U.S. at 893, 108 S.Ct. at 2731-32 (\"an equitable action for specific relief \u2014 which may include an order providing for the reinstatement of an employee with backpay\u201d); Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 751, 96 S.Ct. 1251, 1258, 47 L.Ed.2d 444 (1976) (\"the District Court declined, however, to grant the unnamed members of classes 3 and 4 any other specific relief sought, which included an award of backpay\u201d); Riddle v. Cerro Wire & Cable Group, Inc., 902 F.2d 918, 922 (11th Cir. 1990) (\u201c[t]he EEOC\u2019s complaint sought specific relief for Riddle in the form of backpay and promotion\u201d); Ward v. Arkansas State Police, 653 F.2d 346, 348 (8th Cir.1981) (\u201d[t]he consent decree ... established guidelines for back pay and other specific relief\u201d); McClain v. Wagner Elec. Corp., 550 F.2d 1115, 1118 (8th Cir.1977) (\u201cthe settlement ... gave no specific relief such as back pay\u201d); United States v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 354, 378 (8th Cir.1973) (\u201d[t]he Government requests specific relief for individual applicants, including backpay differentials\u201d); City of Fort Smith v. Driggers, 305 Ark. 409, 808 S.W.2d 748, 753 (1991) (the \"complaint sought specific relief in the form of promotion and back pay\u201d); Eureka Teacher\u2019s Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 202 Cal.App.3d 469, 247 Cal.Rptr. 790, 794 (1988) (\"\u2018Back pay clearly is specific monetary relief incidental to the requested orders that appellant be hired and that respondents be enjoined from discriminating against him.\u2019\u201d) (quoting Snipes v. City of Bakersfield, 145 Cal.App.3d 861, 193 Cal.Rptr. 760, 765 (1983))."},"case_id":36488,"label":"b"}
{"context":". The majority suggests that this statement merely establishes that back pay often is awarded together with reinstatement. The Title VII cases do not see it this way, for they type back pay as relief more akin to reinstatement than to damages. Additionally, several courts have characterized back pay as specific relief.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"EEOC can secure specific relief, such as hiring or reinstatement, constructive seniority, or damages for backpay\"","sentence":"But see General Tel. Co. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 326, 100 S.Ct. 1698, 1704, 64 L.Ed.2d 319 (1980) (\"EEOC can secure specific relief, such as hiring or reinstatement, constructive seniority, or damages for backpay\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"96 S.Ct. 1251, 1258","parenthetical":"\"the District Court declined, however, to grant the unnamed members of classes 3 and 4 any other specific relief sought, which included an award of backpay\"","sentence":"See Bowen, 487 U.S. at 893, 108 S.Ct. at 2731-32 (\"an equitable action for specific relief \u2014 which may include an order providing for the reinstatement of an employee with backpay\u201d); Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 751, 96 S.Ct. 1251, 1258, 47 L.Ed.2d 444 (1976) (\"the District Court declined, however, to grant the unnamed members of classes 3 and 4 any other specific relief sought, which included an award of backpay\u201d); Riddle v. Cerro Wire & Cable Group, Inc., 902 F.2d 918, 922 (11th Cir. 1990) (\u201c[t]he EEOC\u2019s complaint sought specific relief for Riddle in the form of backpay and promotion\u201d); Ward v. Arkansas State Police, 653 F.2d 346, 348 (8th Cir.1981) (\u201d[t]he consent decree ... established guidelines for back pay and other specific relief\u201d); McClain v. Wagner Elec. Corp., 550 F.2d 1115, 1118 (8th Cir.1977) (\u201cthe settlement ... gave no specific relief such as back pay\u201d); United States v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 354, 378 (8th Cir.1973) (\u201d[t]he Government requests specific relief for individual applicants, including backpay differentials\u201d); City of Fort Smith v. Driggers, 305 Ark. 409, 808 S.W.2d 748, 753 (1991) (the \"complaint sought specific relief in the form of promotion and back pay\u201d); Eureka Teacher\u2019s Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 202 Cal.App.3d 469, 247 Cal.Rptr. 790, 794 (1988) (\"\u2018Back pay clearly is specific monetary relief incidental to the requested orders that appellant be hired and that respondents be enjoined from discriminating against him.\u2019\u201d) (quoting Snipes v. City of Bakersfield, 145 Cal.App.3d 861, 193 Cal.Rptr. 760, 765 (1983))."},"case_id":36488,"label":"b"}
{"context":". The majority suggests that this statement merely establishes that back pay often is awarded together with reinstatement. The Title VII cases do not see it this way, for they type back pay as relief more akin to reinstatement than to damages. Additionally, several courts have characterized back pay as specific relief.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"446 U.S. 318, 326","parenthetical":"\"EEOC can secure specific relief, such as hiring or reinstatement, constructive seniority, or damages for backpay\"","sentence":"But see General Tel. Co. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 326, 100 S.Ct. 1698, 1704, 64 L.Ed.2d 319 (1980) (\"EEOC can secure specific relief, such as hiring or reinstatement, constructive seniority, or damages for backpay\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"the District Court declined, however, to grant the unnamed members of classes 3 and 4 any other specific relief sought, which included an award of backpay\"","sentence":"See Bowen, 487 U.S. at 893, 108 S.Ct. at 2731-32 (\"an equitable action for specific relief \u2014 which may include an order providing for the reinstatement of an employee with backpay\u201d); Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 751, 96 S.Ct. 1251, 1258, 47 L.Ed.2d 444 (1976) (\"the District Court declined, however, to grant the unnamed members of classes 3 and 4 any other specific relief sought, which included an award of backpay\u201d); Riddle v. Cerro Wire & Cable Group, Inc., 902 F.2d 918, 922 (11th Cir. 1990) (\u201c[t]he EEOC\u2019s complaint sought specific relief for Riddle in the form of backpay and promotion\u201d); Ward v. Arkansas State Police, 653 F.2d 346, 348 (8th Cir.1981) (\u201d[t]he consent decree ... established guidelines for back pay and other specific relief\u201d); McClain v. Wagner Elec. Corp., 550 F.2d 1115, 1118 (8th Cir.1977) (\u201cthe settlement ... gave no specific relief such as back pay\u201d); United States v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 354, 378 (8th Cir.1973) (\u201d[t]he Government requests specific relief for individual applicants, including backpay differentials\u201d); City of Fort Smith v. Driggers, 305 Ark. 409, 808 S.W.2d 748, 753 (1991) (the \"complaint sought specific relief in the form of promotion and back pay\u201d); Eureka Teacher\u2019s Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 202 Cal.App.3d 469, 247 Cal.Rptr. 790, 794 (1988) (\"\u2018Back pay clearly is specific monetary relief incidental to the requested orders that appellant be hired and that respondents be enjoined from discriminating against him.\u2019\u201d) (quoting Snipes v. City of Bakersfield, 145 Cal.App.3d 861, 193 Cal.Rptr. 760, 765 (1983))."},"case_id":36488,"label":"b"}
{"context":". The majority suggests that this statement merely establishes that back pay often is awarded together with reinstatement. The Title VII cases do not see it this way, for they type back pay as relief more akin to reinstatement than to damages. Additionally, several courts have characterized back pay as specific relief.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"the District Court declined, however, to grant the unnamed members of classes 3 and 4 any other specific relief sought, which included an award of backpay\"","sentence":"See Bowen, 487 U.S. at 893, 108 S.Ct. at 2731-32 (\"an equitable action for specific relief \u2014 which may include an order providing for the reinstatement of an employee with backpay\u201d); Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 751, 96 S.Ct. 1251, 1258, 47 L.Ed.2d 444 (1976) (\"the District Court declined, however, to grant the unnamed members of classes 3 and 4 any other specific relief sought, which included an award of backpay\u201d); Riddle v. Cerro Wire & Cable Group, Inc., 902 F.2d 918, 922 (11th Cir. 1990) (\u201c[t]he EEOC\u2019s complaint sought specific relief for Riddle in the form of backpay and promotion\u201d); Ward v. Arkansas State Police, 653 F.2d 346, 348 (8th Cir.1981) (\u201d[t]he consent decree ... established guidelines for back pay and other specific relief\u201d); McClain v. Wagner Elec. Corp., 550 F.2d 1115, 1118 (8th Cir.1977) (\u201cthe settlement ... gave no specific relief such as back pay\u201d); United States v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 354, 378 (8th Cir.1973) (\u201d[t]he Government requests specific relief for individual applicants, including backpay differentials\u201d); City of Fort Smith v. Driggers, 305 Ark. 409, 808 S.W.2d 748, 753 (1991) (the \"complaint sought specific relief in the form of promotion and back pay\u201d); Eureka Teacher\u2019s Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 202 Cal.App.3d 469, 247 Cal.Rptr. 790, 794 (1988) (\"\u2018Back pay clearly is specific monetary relief incidental to the requested orders that appellant be hired and that respondents be enjoined from discriminating against him.\u2019\u201d) (quoting Snipes v. City of Bakersfield, 145 Cal.App.3d 861, 193 Cal.Rptr. 760, 765 (1983))."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"100 S.Ct. 1698, 1704","parenthetical":"\"EEOC can secure specific relief, such as hiring or reinstatement, constructive seniority, or damages for backpay\"","sentence":"But see General Tel. Co. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 326, 100 S.Ct. 1698, 1704, 64 L.Ed.2d 319 (1980) (\"EEOC can secure specific relief, such as hiring or reinstatement, constructive seniority, or damages for backpay\u201d)."},"case_id":36488,"label":"a"}
{"context":". The majority suggests that this statement merely establishes that back pay often is awarded together with reinstatement. The Title VII cases do not see it this way, for they type back pay as relief more akin to reinstatement than to damages. Additionally, several courts have characterized back pay as specific relief.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"EEOC can secure specific relief, such as hiring or reinstatement, constructive seniority, or damages for backpay\"","sentence":"But see General Tel. Co. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 326, 100 S.Ct. 1698, 1704, 64 L.Ed.2d 319 (1980) (\"EEOC can secure specific relief, such as hiring or reinstatement, constructive seniority, or damages for backpay\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"the District Court declined, however, to grant the unnamed members of classes 3 and 4 any other specific relief sought, which included an award of backpay\"","sentence":"See Bowen, 487 U.S. at 893, 108 S.Ct. at 2731-32 (\"an equitable action for specific relief \u2014 which may include an order providing for the reinstatement of an employee with backpay\u201d); Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 751, 96 S.Ct. 1251, 1258, 47 L.Ed.2d 444 (1976) (\"the District Court declined, however, to grant the unnamed members of classes 3 and 4 any other specific relief sought, which included an award of backpay\u201d); Riddle v. Cerro Wire & Cable Group, Inc., 902 F.2d 918, 922 (11th Cir. 1990) (\u201c[t]he EEOC\u2019s complaint sought specific relief for Riddle in the form of backpay and promotion\u201d); Ward v. Arkansas State Police, 653 F.2d 346, 348 (8th Cir.1981) (\u201d[t]he consent decree ... established guidelines for back pay and other specific relief\u201d); McClain v. Wagner Elec. Corp., 550 F.2d 1115, 1118 (8th Cir.1977) (\u201cthe settlement ... gave no specific relief such as back pay\u201d); United States v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 354, 378 (8th Cir.1973) (\u201d[t]he Government requests specific relief for individual applicants, including backpay differentials\u201d); City of Fort Smith v. Driggers, 305 Ark. 409, 808 S.W.2d 748, 753 (1991) (the \"complaint sought specific relief in the form of promotion and back pay\u201d); Eureka Teacher\u2019s Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 202 Cal.App.3d 469, 247 Cal.Rptr. 790, 794 (1988) (\"\u2018Back pay clearly is specific monetary relief incidental to the requested orders that appellant be hired and that respondents be enjoined from discriminating against him.\u2019\u201d) (quoting Snipes v. City of Bakersfield, 145 Cal.App.3d 861, 193 Cal.Rptr. 760, 765 (1983))."},"case_id":36488,"label":"b"}
{"context":". The majority suggests that this statement merely establishes that back pay often is awarded together with reinstatement. The Title VII cases do not see it this way, for they type back pay as relief more akin to reinstatement than to damages. Additionally, several courts have characterized back pay as specific relief.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"446 U.S. 318, 326","parenthetical":"\"EEOC can secure specific relief, such as hiring or reinstatement, constructive seniority, or damages for backpay\"","sentence":"But see General Tel. Co. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 326, 100 S.Ct. 1698, 1704, 64 L.Ed.2d 319 (1980) (\"EEOC can secure specific relief, such as hiring or reinstatement, constructive seniority, or damages for backpay\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"902 F.2d 918, 922","parenthetical":"\"[t]he EEOC's complaint sought specific relief for Riddle in the form of backpay and promotion\"","sentence":"See Bowen, 487 U.S. at 893, 108 S.Ct. at 2731-32 (\"an equitable action for specific relief \u2014 which may include an order providing for the reinstatement of an employee with backpay\u201d); Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 751, 96 S.Ct. 1251, 1258, 47 L.Ed.2d 444 (1976) (\"the District Court declined, however, to grant the unnamed members of classes 3 and 4 any other specific relief sought, which included an award of backpay\u201d); Riddle v. Cerro Wire & Cable Group, Inc., 902 F.2d 918, 922 (11th Cir. 1990) (\u201c[t]he EEOC\u2019s complaint sought specific relief for Riddle in the form of backpay and promotion\u201d); Ward v. Arkansas State Police, 653 F.2d 346, 348 (8th Cir.1981) (\u201d[t]he consent decree ... established guidelines for back pay and other specific relief\u201d); McClain v. Wagner Elec. Corp., 550 F.2d 1115, 1118 (8th Cir.1977) (\u201cthe settlement ... gave no specific relief such as back pay\u201d); United States v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 354, 378 (8th Cir.1973) (\u201d[t]he Government requests specific relief for individual applicants, including backpay differentials\u201d); City of Fort Smith v. Driggers, 305 Ark. 409, 808 S.W.2d 748, 753 (1991) (the \"complaint sought specific relief in the form of promotion and back pay\u201d); Eureka Teacher\u2019s Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 202 Cal.App.3d 469, 247 Cal.Rptr. 790, 794 (1988) (\"\u2018Back pay clearly is specific monetary relief incidental to the requested orders that appellant be hired and that respondents be enjoined from discriminating against him.\u2019\u201d) (quoting Snipes v. City of Bakersfield, 145 Cal.App.3d 861, 193 Cal.Rptr. 760, 765 (1983))."},"case_id":36488,"label":"b"}
{"context":". The majority suggests that this statement merely establishes that back pay often is awarded together with reinstatement. The Title VII cases do not see it this way, for they type back pay as relief more akin to reinstatement than to damages. Additionally, several courts have characterized back pay as specific relief.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"902 F.2d 918, 922","parenthetical":"\"[t]he EEOC's complaint sought specific relief for Riddle in the form of backpay and promotion\"","sentence":"See Bowen, 487 U.S. at 893, 108 S.Ct. at 2731-32 (\"an equitable action for specific relief \u2014 which may include an order providing for the reinstatement of an employee with backpay\u201d); Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 751, 96 S.Ct. 1251, 1258, 47 L.Ed.2d 444 (1976) (\"the District Court declined, however, to grant the unnamed members of classes 3 and 4 any other specific relief sought, which included an award of backpay\u201d); Riddle v. Cerro Wire & Cable Group, Inc., 902 F.2d 918, 922 (11th Cir. 1990) (\u201c[t]he EEOC\u2019s complaint sought specific relief for Riddle in the form of backpay and promotion\u201d); Ward v. Arkansas State Police, 653 F.2d 346, 348 (8th Cir.1981) (\u201d[t]he consent decree ... established guidelines for back pay and other specific relief\u201d); McClain v. Wagner Elec. Corp., 550 F.2d 1115, 1118 (8th Cir.1977) (\u201cthe settlement ... gave no specific relief such as back pay\u201d); United States v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 354, 378 (8th Cir.1973) (\u201d[t]he Government requests specific relief for individual applicants, including backpay differentials\u201d); City of Fort Smith v. Driggers, 305 Ark. 409, 808 S.W.2d 748, 753 (1991) (the \"complaint sought specific relief in the form of promotion and back pay\u201d); Eureka Teacher\u2019s Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 202 Cal.App.3d 469, 247 Cal.Rptr. 790, 794 (1988) (\"\u2018Back pay clearly is specific monetary relief incidental to the requested orders that appellant be hired and that respondents be enjoined from discriminating against him.\u2019\u201d) (quoting Snipes v. City of Bakersfield, 145 Cal.App.3d 861, 193 Cal.Rptr. 760, 765 (1983))."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"100 S.Ct. 1698, 1704","parenthetical":"\"EEOC can secure specific relief, such as hiring or reinstatement, constructive seniority, or damages for backpay\"","sentence":"But see General Tel. Co. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 326, 100 S.Ct. 1698, 1704, 64 L.Ed.2d 319 (1980) (\"EEOC can secure specific relief, such as hiring or reinstatement, constructive seniority, or damages for backpay\u201d)."},"case_id":36488,"label":"a"}
{"context":". The majority suggests that this statement merely establishes that back pay often is awarded together with reinstatement. The Title VII cases do not see it this way, for they type back pay as relief more akin to reinstatement than to damages. Additionally, several courts have characterized back pay as specific relief.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"902 F.2d 918, 922","parenthetical":"\"[t]he EEOC's complaint sought specific relief for Riddle in the form of backpay and promotion\"","sentence":"See Bowen, 487 U.S. at 893, 108 S.Ct. at 2731-32 (\"an equitable action for specific relief \u2014 which may include an order providing for the reinstatement of an employee with backpay\u201d); Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 751, 96 S.Ct. 1251, 1258, 47 L.Ed.2d 444 (1976) (\"the District Court declined, however, to grant the unnamed members of classes 3 and 4 any other specific relief sought, which included an award of backpay\u201d); Riddle v. Cerro Wire & Cable Group, Inc., 902 F.2d 918, 922 (11th Cir. 1990) (\u201c[t]he EEOC\u2019s complaint sought specific relief for Riddle in the form of backpay and promotion\u201d); Ward v. Arkansas State Police, 653 F.2d 346, 348 (8th Cir.1981) (\u201d[t]he consent decree ... established guidelines for back pay and other specific relief\u201d); McClain v. Wagner Elec. Corp., 550 F.2d 1115, 1118 (8th Cir.1977) (\u201cthe settlement ... gave no specific relief such as back pay\u201d); United States v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 354, 378 (8th Cir.1973) (\u201d[t]he Government requests specific relief for individual applicants, including backpay differentials\u201d); City of Fort Smith v. Driggers, 305 Ark. 409, 808 S.W.2d 748, 753 (1991) (the \"complaint sought specific relief in the form of promotion and back pay\u201d); Eureka Teacher\u2019s Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 202 Cal.App.3d 469, 247 Cal.Rptr. 790, 794 (1988) (\"\u2018Back pay clearly is specific monetary relief incidental to the requested orders that appellant be hired and that respondents be enjoined from discriminating against him.\u2019\u201d) (quoting Snipes v. City of Bakersfield, 145 Cal.App.3d 861, 193 Cal.Rptr. 760, 765 (1983))."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"EEOC can secure specific relief, such as hiring or reinstatement, constructive seniority, or damages for backpay\"","sentence":"But see General Tel. Co. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 326, 100 S.Ct. 1698, 1704, 64 L.Ed.2d 319 (1980) (\"EEOC can secure specific relief, such as hiring or reinstatement, constructive seniority, or damages for backpay\u201d)."},"case_id":36488,"label":"a"}
{"context":". The majority suggests that this statement merely establishes that back pay often is awarded together with reinstatement. The Title VII cases do not see it this way, for they type back pay as relief more akin to reinstatement than to damages. Additionally, several courts have characterized back pay as specific relief.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"653 F.2d 346, 348","parenthetical":"\"[t]he consent decree ... established guidelines for back pay and other specific relief\"","sentence":"See Bowen, 487 U.S. at 893, 108 S.Ct. at 2731-32 (\"an equitable action for specific relief \u2014 which may include an order providing for the reinstatement of an employee with backpay\u201d); Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 751, 96 S.Ct. 1251, 1258, 47 L.Ed.2d 444 (1976) (\"the District Court declined, however, to grant the unnamed members of classes 3 and 4 any other specific relief sought, which included an award of backpay\u201d); Riddle v. Cerro Wire & Cable Group, Inc., 902 F.2d 918, 922 (11th Cir. 1990) (\u201c[t]he EEOC\u2019s complaint sought specific relief for Riddle in the form of backpay and promotion\u201d); Ward v. Arkansas State Police, 653 F.2d 346, 348 (8th Cir.1981) (\u201d[t]he consent decree ... established guidelines for back pay and other specific relief\u201d); McClain v. Wagner Elec. Corp., 550 F.2d 1115, 1118 (8th Cir.1977) (\u201cthe settlement ... gave no specific relief such as back pay\u201d); United States v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 354, 378 (8th Cir.1973) (\u201d[t]he Government requests specific relief for individual applicants, including backpay differentials\u201d); City of Fort Smith v. Driggers, 305 Ark. 409, 808 S.W.2d 748, 753 (1991) (the \"complaint sought specific relief in the form of promotion and back pay\u201d); Eureka Teacher\u2019s Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 202 Cal.App.3d 469, 247 Cal.Rptr. 790, 794 (1988) (\"\u2018Back pay clearly is specific monetary relief incidental to the requested orders that appellant be hired and that respondents be enjoined from discriminating against him.\u2019\u201d) (quoting Snipes v. City of Bakersfield, 145 Cal.App.3d 861, 193 Cal.Rptr. 760, 765 (1983))."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"446 U.S. 318, 326","parenthetical":"\"EEOC can secure specific relief, such as hiring or reinstatement, constructive seniority, or damages for backpay\"","sentence":"But see General Tel. Co. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 326, 100 S.Ct. 1698, 1704, 64 L.Ed.2d 319 (1980) (\"EEOC can secure specific relief, such as hiring or reinstatement, constructive seniority, or damages for backpay\u201d)."},"case_id":36488,"label":"a"}
{"context":". The majority suggests that this statement merely establishes that back pay often is awarded together with reinstatement. The Title VII cases do not see it this way, for they type back pay as relief more akin to reinstatement than to damages. Additionally, several courts have characterized back pay as specific relief.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"100 S.Ct. 1698, 1704","parenthetical":"\"EEOC can secure specific relief, such as hiring or reinstatement, constructive seniority, or damages for backpay\"","sentence":"But see General Tel. Co. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 326, 100 S.Ct. 1698, 1704, 64 L.Ed.2d 319 (1980) (\"EEOC can secure specific relief, such as hiring or reinstatement, constructive seniority, or damages for backpay\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"653 F.2d 346, 348","parenthetical":"\"[t]he consent decree ... established guidelines for back pay and other specific relief\"","sentence":"See Bowen, 487 U.S. at 893, 108 S.Ct. at 2731-32 (\"an equitable action for specific relief \u2014 which may include an order providing for the reinstatement of an employee with backpay\u201d); Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 751, 96 S.Ct. 1251, 1258, 47 L.Ed.2d 444 (1976) (\"the District Court declined, however, to grant the unnamed members of classes 3 and 4 any other specific relief sought, which included an award of backpay\u201d); Riddle v. Cerro Wire & Cable Group, Inc., 902 F.2d 918, 922 (11th Cir. 1990) (\u201c[t]he EEOC\u2019s complaint sought specific relief for Riddle in the form of backpay and promotion\u201d); Ward v. Arkansas State Police, 653 F.2d 346, 348 (8th Cir.1981) (\u201d[t]he consent decree ... established guidelines for back pay and other specific relief\u201d); McClain v. Wagner Elec. Corp., 550 F.2d 1115, 1118 (8th Cir.1977) (\u201cthe settlement ... gave no specific relief such as back pay\u201d); United States v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 354, 378 (8th Cir.1973) (\u201d[t]he Government requests specific relief for individual applicants, including backpay differentials\u201d); City of Fort Smith v. Driggers, 305 Ark. 409, 808 S.W.2d 748, 753 (1991) (the \"complaint sought specific relief in the form of promotion and back pay\u201d); Eureka Teacher\u2019s Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 202 Cal.App.3d 469, 247 Cal.Rptr. 790, 794 (1988) (\"\u2018Back pay clearly is specific monetary relief incidental to the requested orders that appellant be hired and that respondents be enjoined from discriminating against him.\u2019\u201d) (quoting Snipes v. City of Bakersfield, 145 Cal.App.3d 861, 193 Cal.Rptr. 760, 765 (1983))."},"case_id":36488,"label":"b"}
{"context":". The majority suggests that this statement merely establishes that back pay often is awarded together with reinstatement. The Title VII cases do not see it this way, for they type back pay as relief more akin to reinstatement than to damages. Additionally, several courts have characterized back pay as specific relief.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"653 F.2d 346, 348","parenthetical":"\"[t]he consent decree ... established guidelines for back pay and other specific relief\"","sentence":"See Bowen, 487 U.S. at 893, 108 S.Ct. at 2731-32 (\"an equitable action for specific relief \u2014 which may include an order providing for the reinstatement of an employee with backpay\u201d); Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 751, 96 S.Ct. 1251, 1258, 47 L.Ed.2d 444 (1976) (\"the District Court declined, however, to grant the unnamed members of classes 3 and 4 any other specific relief sought, which included an award of backpay\u201d); Riddle v. Cerro Wire & Cable Group, Inc., 902 F.2d 918, 922 (11th Cir. 1990) (\u201c[t]he EEOC\u2019s complaint sought specific relief for Riddle in the form of backpay and promotion\u201d); Ward v. Arkansas State Police, 653 F.2d 346, 348 (8th Cir.1981) (\u201d[t]he consent decree ... established guidelines for back pay and other specific relief\u201d); McClain v. Wagner Elec. Corp., 550 F.2d 1115, 1118 (8th Cir.1977) (\u201cthe settlement ... gave no specific relief such as back pay\u201d); United States v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 354, 378 (8th Cir.1973) (\u201d[t]he Government requests specific relief for individual applicants, including backpay differentials\u201d); City of Fort Smith v. Driggers, 305 Ark. 409, 808 S.W.2d 748, 753 (1991) (the \"complaint sought specific relief in the form of promotion and back pay\u201d); Eureka Teacher\u2019s Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 202 Cal.App.3d 469, 247 Cal.Rptr. 790, 794 (1988) (\"\u2018Back pay clearly is specific monetary relief incidental to the requested orders that appellant be hired and that respondents be enjoined from discriminating against him.\u2019\u201d) (quoting Snipes v. City of Bakersfield, 145 Cal.App.3d 861, 193 Cal.Rptr. 760, 765 (1983))."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"EEOC can secure specific relief, such as hiring or reinstatement, constructive seniority, or damages for backpay\"","sentence":"But see General Tel. Co. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 326, 100 S.Ct. 1698, 1704, 64 L.Ed.2d 319 (1980) (\"EEOC can secure specific relief, such as hiring or reinstatement, constructive seniority, or damages for backpay\u201d)."},"case_id":36488,"label":"a"}
{"context":". The majority suggests that this statement merely establishes that back pay often is awarded together with reinstatement. The Title VII cases do not see it this way, for they type back pay as relief more akin to reinstatement than to damages. Additionally, several courts have characterized back pay as specific relief.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"446 U.S. 318, 326","parenthetical":"\"EEOC can secure specific relief, such as hiring or reinstatement, constructive seniority, or damages for backpay\"","sentence":"But see General Tel. Co. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 326, 100 S.Ct. 1698, 1704, 64 L.Ed.2d 319 (1980) (\"EEOC can secure specific relief, such as hiring or reinstatement, constructive seniority, or damages for backpay\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"550 F.2d 1115, 1118","parenthetical":"\"the settlement ... gave no specific relief such as back pay\"","sentence":"See Bowen, 487 U.S. at 893, 108 S.Ct. at 2731-32 (\"an equitable action for specific relief \u2014 which may include an order providing for the reinstatement of an employee with backpay\u201d); Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 751, 96 S.Ct. 1251, 1258, 47 L.Ed.2d 444 (1976) (\"the District Court declined, however, to grant the unnamed members of classes 3 and 4 any other specific relief sought, which included an award of backpay\u201d); Riddle v. Cerro Wire & Cable Group, Inc., 902 F.2d 918, 922 (11th Cir. 1990) (\u201c[t]he EEOC\u2019s complaint sought specific relief for Riddle in the form of backpay and promotion\u201d); Ward v. Arkansas State Police, 653 F.2d 346, 348 (8th Cir.1981) (\u201d[t]he consent decree ... established guidelines for back pay and other specific relief\u201d); McClain v. Wagner Elec. Corp., 550 F.2d 1115, 1118 (8th Cir.1977) (\u201cthe settlement ... gave no specific relief such as back pay\u201d); United States v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 354, 378 (8th Cir.1973) (\u201d[t]he Government requests specific relief for individual applicants, including backpay differentials\u201d); City of Fort Smith v. Driggers, 305 Ark. 409, 808 S.W.2d 748, 753 (1991) (the \"complaint sought specific relief in the form of promotion and back pay\u201d); Eureka Teacher\u2019s Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 202 Cal.App.3d 469, 247 Cal.Rptr. 790, 794 (1988) (\"\u2018Back pay clearly is specific monetary relief incidental to the requested orders that appellant be hired and that respondents be enjoined from discriminating against him.\u2019\u201d) (quoting Snipes v. City of Bakersfield, 145 Cal.App.3d 861, 193 Cal.Rptr. 760, 765 (1983))."},"case_id":36488,"label":"b"}
{"context":". The majority suggests that this statement merely establishes that back pay often is awarded together with reinstatement. The Title VII cases do not see it this way, for they type back pay as relief more akin to reinstatement than to damages. Additionally, several courts have characterized back pay as specific relief.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"100 S.Ct. 1698, 1704","parenthetical":"\"EEOC can secure specific relief, such as hiring or reinstatement, constructive seniority, or damages for backpay\"","sentence":"But see General Tel. Co. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 326, 100 S.Ct. 1698, 1704, 64 L.Ed.2d 319 (1980) (\"EEOC can secure specific relief, such as hiring or reinstatement, constructive seniority, or damages for backpay\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"550 F.2d 1115, 1118","parenthetical":"\"the settlement ... gave no specific relief such as back pay\"","sentence":"See Bowen, 487 U.S. at 893, 108 S.Ct. at 2731-32 (\"an equitable action for specific relief \u2014 which may include an order providing for the reinstatement of an employee with backpay\u201d); Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 751, 96 S.Ct. 1251, 1258, 47 L.Ed.2d 444 (1976) (\"the District Court declined, however, to grant the unnamed members of classes 3 and 4 any other specific relief sought, which included an award of backpay\u201d); Riddle v. Cerro Wire & Cable Group, Inc., 902 F.2d 918, 922 (11th Cir. 1990) (\u201c[t]he EEOC\u2019s complaint sought specific relief for Riddle in the form of backpay and promotion\u201d); Ward v. Arkansas State Police, 653 F.2d 346, 348 (8th Cir.1981) (\u201d[t]he consent decree ... established guidelines for back pay and other specific relief\u201d); McClain v. Wagner Elec. Corp., 550 F.2d 1115, 1118 (8th Cir.1977) (\u201cthe settlement ... gave no specific relief such as back pay\u201d); United States v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 354, 378 (8th Cir.1973) (\u201d[t]he Government requests specific relief for individual applicants, including backpay differentials\u201d); City of Fort Smith v. Driggers, 305 Ark. 409, 808 S.W.2d 748, 753 (1991) (the \"complaint sought specific relief in the form of promotion and back pay\u201d); Eureka Teacher\u2019s Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 202 Cal.App.3d 469, 247 Cal.Rptr. 790, 794 (1988) (\"\u2018Back pay clearly is specific monetary relief incidental to the requested orders that appellant be hired and that respondents be enjoined from discriminating against him.\u2019\u201d) (quoting Snipes v. City of Bakersfield, 145 Cal.App.3d 861, 193 Cal.Rptr. 760, 765 (1983))."},"case_id":36488,"label":"b"}
{"context":". The majority suggests that this statement merely establishes that back pay often is awarded together with reinstatement. The Title VII cases do not see it this way, for they type back pay as relief more akin to reinstatement than to damages. Additionally, several courts have characterized back pay as specific relief.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"EEOC can secure specific relief, such as hiring or reinstatement, constructive seniority, or damages for backpay\"","sentence":"But see General Tel. Co. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 326, 100 S.Ct. 1698, 1704, 64 L.Ed.2d 319 (1980) (\"EEOC can secure specific relief, such as hiring or reinstatement, constructive seniority, or damages for backpay\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"550 F.2d 1115, 1118","parenthetical":"\"the settlement ... gave no specific relief such as back pay\"","sentence":"See Bowen, 487 U.S. at 893, 108 S.Ct. at 2731-32 (\"an equitable action for specific relief \u2014 which may include an order providing for the reinstatement of an employee with backpay\u201d); Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 751, 96 S.Ct. 1251, 1258, 47 L.Ed.2d 444 (1976) (\"the District Court declined, however, to grant the unnamed members of classes 3 and 4 any other specific relief sought, which included an award of backpay\u201d); Riddle v. Cerro Wire & Cable Group, Inc., 902 F.2d 918, 922 (11th Cir. 1990) (\u201c[t]he EEOC\u2019s complaint sought specific relief for Riddle in the form of backpay and promotion\u201d); Ward v. Arkansas State Police, 653 F.2d 346, 348 (8th Cir.1981) (\u201d[t]he consent decree ... established guidelines for back pay and other specific relief\u201d); McClain v. Wagner Elec. Corp., 550 F.2d 1115, 1118 (8th Cir.1977) (\u201cthe settlement ... gave no specific relief such as back pay\u201d); United States v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 354, 378 (8th Cir.1973) (\u201d[t]he Government requests specific relief for individual applicants, including backpay differentials\u201d); City of Fort Smith v. Driggers, 305 Ark. 409, 808 S.W.2d 748, 753 (1991) (the \"complaint sought specific relief in the form of promotion and back pay\u201d); Eureka Teacher\u2019s Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 202 Cal.App.3d 469, 247 Cal.Rptr. 790, 794 (1988) (\"\u2018Back pay clearly is specific monetary relief incidental to the requested orders that appellant be hired and that respondents be enjoined from discriminating against him.\u2019\u201d) (quoting Snipes v. City of Bakersfield, 145 Cal.App.3d 861, 193 Cal.Rptr. 760, 765 (1983))."},"case_id":36488,"label":"b"}
{"context":". The majority suggests that this statement merely establishes that back pay often is awarded together with reinstatement. The Title VII cases do not see it this way, for they type back pay as relief more akin to reinstatement than to damages. Additionally, several courts have characterized back pay as specific relief.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"446 U.S. 318, 326","parenthetical":"\"EEOC can secure specific relief, such as hiring or reinstatement, constructive seniority, or damages for backpay\"","sentence":"But see General Tel. Co. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 326, 100 S.Ct. 1698, 1704, 64 L.Ed.2d 319 (1980) (\"EEOC can secure specific relief, such as hiring or reinstatement, constructive seniority, or damages for backpay\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"479 F.2d 354, 378","parenthetical":"\"[t]he Government requests specific relief for individual applicants, including backpay differentials\"","sentence":"See Bowen, 487 U.S. at 893, 108 S.Ct. at 2731-32 (\"an equitable action for specific relief \u2014 which may include an order providing for the reinstatement of an employee with backpay\u201d); Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 751, 96 S.Ct. 1251, 1258, 47 L.Ed.2d 444 (1976) (\"the District Court declined, however, to grant the unnamed members of classes 3 and 4 any other specific relief sought, which included an award of backpay\u201d); Riddle v. Cerro Wire & Cable Group, Inc., 902 F.2d 918, 922 (11th Cir. 1990) (\u201c[t]he EEOC\u2019s complaint sought specific relief for Riddle in the form of backpay and promotion\u201d); Ward v. Arkansas State Police, 653 F.2d 346, 348 (8th Cir.1981) (\u201d[t]he consent decree ... established guidelines for back pay and other specific relief\u201d); McClain v. Wagner Elec. Corp., 550 F.2d 1115, 1118 (8th Cir.1977) (\u201cthe settlement ... gave no specific relief such as back pay\u201d); United States v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 354, 378 (8th Cir.1973) (\u201d[t]he Government requests specific relief for individual applicants, including backpay differentials\u201d); City of Fort Smith v. Driggers, 305 Ark. 409, 808 S.W.2d 748, 753 (1991) (the \"complaint sought specific relief in the form of promotion and back pay\u201d); Eureka Teacher\u2019s Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 202 Cal.App.3d 469, 247 Cal.Rptr. 790, 794 (1988) (\"\u2018Back pay clearly is specific monetary relief incidental to the requested orders that appellant be hired and that respondents be enjoined from discriminating against him.\u2019\u201d) (quoting Snipes v. City of Bakersfield, 145 Cal.App.3d 861, 193 Cal.Rptr. 760, 765 (1983))."},"case_id":36488,"label":"b"}
{"context":". The majority suggests that this statement merely establishes that back pay often is awarded together with reinstatement. The Title VII cases do not see it this way, for they type back pay as relief more akin to reinstatement than to damages. Additionally, several courts have characterized back pay as specific relief.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"479 F.2d 354, 378","parenthetical":"\"[t]he Government requests specific relief for individual applicants, including backpay differentials\"","sentence":"See Bowen, 487 U.S. at 893, 108 S.Ct. at 2731-32 (\"an equitable action for specific relief \u2014 which may include an order providing for the reinstatement of an employee with backpay\u201d); Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 751, 96 S.Ct. 1251, 1258, 47 L.Ed.2d 444 (1976) (\"the District Court declined, however, to grant the unnamed members of classes 3 and 4 any other specific relief sought, which included an award of backpay\u201d); Riddle v. Cerro Wire & Cable Group, Inc., 902 F.2d 918, 922 (11th Cir. 1990) (\u201c[t]he EEOC\u2019s complaint sought specific relief for Riddle in the form of backpay and promotion\u201d); Ward v. Arkansas State Police, 653 F.2d 346, 348 (8th Cir.1981) (\u201d[t]he consent decree ... established guidelines for back pay and other specific relief\u201d); McClain v. Wagner Elec. Corp., 550 F.2d 1115, 1118 (8th Cir.1977) (\u201cthe settlement ... gave no specific relief such as back pay\u201d); United States v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 354, 378 (8th Cir.1973) (\u201d[t]he Government requests specific relief for individual applicants, including backpay differentials\u201d); City of Fort Smith v. Driggers, 305 Ark. 409, 808 S.W.2d 748, 753 (1991) (the \"complaint sought specific relief in the form of promotion and back pay\u201d); Eureka Teacher\u2019s Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 202 Cal.App.3d 469, 247 Cal.Rptr. 790, 794 (1988) (\"\u2018Back pay clearly is specific monetary relief incidental to the requested orders that appellant be hired and that respondents be enjoined from discriminating against him.\u2019\u201d) (quoting Snipes v. City of Bakersfield, 145 Cal.App.3d 861, 193 Cal.Rptr. 760, 765 (1983))."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"100 S.Ct. 1698, 1704","parenthetical":"\"EEOC can secure specific relief, such as hiring or reinstatement, constructive seniority, or damages for backpay\"","sentence":"But see General Tel. Co. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 326, 100 S.Ct. 1698, 1704, 64 L.Ed.2d 319 (1980) (\"EEOC can secure specific relief, such as hiring or reinstatement, constructive seniority, or damages for backpay\u201d)."},"case_id":36488,"label":"a"}
{"context":". The majority suggests that this statement merely establishes that back pay often is awarded together with reinstatement. The Title VII cases do not see it this way, for they type back pay as relief more akin to reinstatement than to damages. Additionally, several courts have characterized back pay as specific relief.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"EEOC can secure specific relief, such as hiring or reinstatement, constructive seniority, or damages for backpay\"","sentence":"But see General Tel. Co. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 326, 100 S.Ct. 1698, 1704, 64 L.Ed.2d 319 (1980) (\"EEOC can secure specific relief, such as hiring or reinstatement, constructive seniority, or damages for backpay\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"479 F.2d 354, 378","parenthetical":"\"[t]he Government requests specific relief for individual applicants, including backpay differentials\"","sentence":"See Bowen, 487 U.S. at 893, 108 S.Ct. at 2731-32 (\"an equitable action for specific relief \u2014 which may include an order providing for the reinstatement of an employee with backpay\u201d); Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 751, 96 S.Ct. 1251, 1258, 47 L.Ed.2d 444 (1976) (\"the District Court declined, however, to grant the unnamed members of classes 3 and 4 any other specific relief sought, which included an award of backpay\u201d); Riddle v. Cerro Wire & Cable Group, Inc., 902 F.2d 918, 922 (11th Cir. 1990) (\u201c[t]he EEOC\u2019s complaint sought specific relief for Riddle in the form of backpay and promotion\u201d); Ward v. Arkansas State Police, 653 F.2d 346, 348 (8th Cir.1981) (\u201d[t]he consent decree ... established guidelines for back pay and other specific relief\u201d); McClain v. Wagner Elec. Corp., 550 F.2d 1115, 1118 (8th Cir.1977) (\u201cthe settlement ... gave no specific relief such as back pay\u201d); United States v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 354, 378 (8th Cir.1973) (\u201d[t]he Government requests specific relief for individual applicants, including backpay differentials\u201d); City of Fort Smith v. Driggers, 305 Ark. 409, 808 S.W.2d 748, 753 (1991) (the \"complaint sought specific relief in the form of promotion and back pay\u201d); Eureka Teacher\u2019s Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 202 Cal.App.3d 469, 247 Cal.Rptr. 790, 794 (1988) (\"\u2018Back pay clearly is specific monetary relief incidental to the requested orders that appellant be hired and that respondents be enjoined from discriminating against him.\u2019\u201d) (quoting Snipes v. City of Bakersfield, 145 Cal.App.3d 861, 193 Cal.Rptr. 760, 765 (1983))."},"case_id":36488,"label":"b"}
{"context":". The majority suggests that this statement merely establishes that back pay often is awarded together with reinstatement. The Title VII cases do not see it this way, for they type back pay as relief more akin to reinstatement than to damages. Additionally, several courts have characterized back pay as specific relief.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"446 U.S. 318, 326","parenthetical":"\"EEOC can secure specific relief, such as hiring or reinstatement, constructive seniority, or damages for backpay\"","sentence":"But see General Tel. Co. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 326, 100 S.Ct. 1698, 1704, 64 L.Ed.2d 319 (1980) (\"EEOC can secure specific relief, such as hiring or reinstatement, constructive seniority, or damages for backpay\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"the \"complaint sought specific relief in the form of promotion and back pay\"","sentence":"See Bowen, 487 U.S. at 893, 108 S.Ct. at 2731-32 (\"an equitable action for specific relief \u2014 which may include an order providing for the reinstatement of an employee with backpay\u201d); Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 751, 96 S.Ct. 1251, 1258, 47 L.Ed.2d 444 (1976) (\"the District Court declined, however, to grant the unnamed members of classes 3 and 4 any other specific relief sought, which included an award of backpay\u201d); Riddle v. Cerro Wire & Cable Group, Inc., 902 F.2d 918, 922 (11th Cir. 1990) (\u201c[t]he EEOC\u2019s complaint sought specific relief for Riddle in the form of backpay and promotion\u201d); Ward v. Arkansas State Police, 653 F.2d 346, 348 (8th Cir.1981) (\u201d[t]he consent decree ... established guidelines for back pay and other specific relief\u201d); McClain v. Wagner Elec. Corp., 550 F.2d 1115, 1118 (8th Cir.1977) (\u201cthe settlement ... gave no specific relief such as back pay\u201d); United States v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 354, 378 (8th Cir.1973) (\u201d[t]he Government requests specific relief for individual applicants, including backpay differentials\u201d); City of Fort Smith v. Driggers, 305 Ark. 409, 808 S.W.2d 748, 753 (1991) (the \"complaint sought specific relief in the form of promotion and back pay\u201d); Eureka Teacher\u2019s Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 202 Cal.App.3d 469, 247 Cal.Rptr. 790, 794 (1988) (\"\u2018Back pay clearly is specific monetary relief incidental to the requested orders that appellant be hired and that respondents be enjoined from discriminating against him.\u2019\u201d) (quoting Snipes v. City of Bakersfield, 145 Cal.App.3d 861, 193 Cal.Rptr. 760, 765 (1983))."},"case_id":36488,"label":"b"}
{"context":". The majority suggests that this statement merely establishes that back pay often is awarded together with reinstatement. The Title VII cases do not see it this way, for they type back pay as relief more akin to reinstatement than to damages. Additionally, several courts have characterized back pay as specific relief.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"100 S.Ct. 1698, 1704","parenthetical":"\"EEOC can secure specific relief, such as hiring or reinstatement, constructive seniority, or damages for backpay\"","sentence":"But see General Tel. Co. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 326, 100 S.Ct. 1698, 1704, 64 L.Ed.2d 319 (1980) (\"EEOC can secure specific relief, such as hiring or reinstatement, constructive seniority, or damages for backpay\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"the \"complaint sought specific relief in the form of promotion and back pay\"","sentence":"See Bowen, 487 U.S. at 893, 108 S.Ct. at 2731-32 (\"an equitable action for specific relief \u2014 which may include an order providing for the reinstatement of an employee with backpay\u201d); Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 751, 96 S.Ct. 1251, 1258, 47 L.Ed.2d 444 (1976) (\"the District Court declined, however, to grant the unnamed members of classes 3 and 4 any other specific relief sought, which included an award of backpay\u201d); Riddle v. Cerro Wire & Cable Group, Inc., 902 F.2d 918, 922 (11th Cir. 1990) (\u201c[t]he EEOC\u2019s complaint sought specific relief for Riddle in the form of backpay and promotion\u201d); Ward v. Arkansas State Police, 653 F.2d 346, 348 (8th Cir.1981) (\u201d[t]he consent decree ... established guidelines for back pay and other specific relief\u201d); McClain v. Wagner Elec. Corp., 550 F.2d 1115, 1118 (8th Cir.1977) (\u201cthe settlement ... gave no specific relief such as back pay\u201d); United States v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 354, 378 (8th Cir.1973) (\u201d[t]he Government requests specific relief for individual applicants, including backpay differentials\u201d); City of Fort Smith v. Driggers, 305 Ark. 409, 808 S.W.2d 748, 753 (1991) (the \"complaint sought specific relief in the form of promotion and back pay\u201d); Eureka Teacher\u2019s Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 202 Cal.App.3d 469, 247 Cal.Rptr. 790, 794 (1988) (\"\u2018Back pay clearly is specific monetary relief incidental to the requested orders that appellant be hired and that respondents be enjoined from discriminating against him.\u2019\u201d) (quoting Snipes v. City of Bakersfield, 145 Cal.App.3d 861, 193 Cal.Rptr. 760, 765 (1983))."},"case_id":36488,"label":"b"}
{"context":". The majority suggests that this statement merely establishes that back pay often is awarded together with reinstatement. The Title VII cases do not see it this way, for they type back pay as relief more akin to reinstatement than to damages. Additionally, several courts have characterized back pay as specific relief.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"the \"complaint sought specific relief in the form of promotion and back pay\"","sentence":"See Bowen, 487 U.S. at 893, 108 S.Ct. at 2731-32 (\"an equitable action for specific relief \u2014 which may include an order providing for the reinstatement of an employee with backpay\u201d); Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 751, 96 S.Ct. 1251, 1258, 47 L.Ed.2d 444 (1976) (\"the District Court declined, however, to grant the unnamed members of classes 3 and 4 any other specific relief sought, which included an award of backpay\u201d); Riddle v. Cerro Wire & Cable Group, Inc., 902 F.2d 918, 922 (11th Cir. 1990) (\u201c[t]he EEOC\u2019s complaint sought specific relief for Riddle in the form of backpay and promotion\u201d); Ward v. Arkansas State Police, 653 F.2d 346, 348 (8th Cir.1981) (\u201d[t]he consent decree ... established guidelines for back pay and other specific relief\u201d); McClain v. Wagner Elec. Corp., 550 F.2d 1115, 1118 (8th Cir.1977) (\u201cthe settlement ... gave no specific relief such as back pay\u201d); United States v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 354, 378 (8th Cir.1973) (\u201d[t]he Government requests specific relief for individual applicants, including backpay differentials\u201d); City of Fort Smith v. Driggers, 305 Ark. 409, 808 S.W.2d 748, 753 (1991) (the \"complaint sought specific relief in the form of promotion and back pay\u201d); Eureka Teacher\u2019s Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 202 Cal.App.3d 469, 247 Cal.Rptr. 790, 794 (1988) (\"\u2018Back pay clearly is specific monetary relief incidental to the requested orders that appellant be hired and that respondents be enjoined from discriminating against him.\u2019\u201d) (quoting Snipes v. City of Bakersfield, 145 Cal.App.3d 861, 193 Cal.Rptr. 760, 765 (1983))."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"EEOC can secure specific relief, such as hiring or reinstatement, constructive seniority, or damages for backpay\"","sentence":"But see General Tel. Co. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 326, 100 S.Ct. 1698, 1704, 64 L.Ed.2d 319 (1980) (\"EEOC can secure specific relief, such as hiring or reinstatement, constructive seniority, or damages for backpay\u201d)."},"case_id":36488,"label":"a"}
{"context":". The majority suggests that this statement merely establishes that back pay often is awarded together with reinstatement. The Title VII cases do not see it this way, for they type back pay as relief more akin to reinstatement than to damages. Additionally, several courts have characterized back pay as specific relief.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"446 U.S. 318, 326","parenthetical":"\"EEOC can secure specific relief, such as hiring or reinstatement, constructive seniority, or damages for backpay\"","sentence":"But see General Tel. Co. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 326, 100 S.Ct. 1698, 1704, 64 L.Ed.2d 319 (1980) (\"EEOC can secure specific relief, such as hiring or reinstatement, constructive seniority, or damages for backpay\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"808 S.W.2d 748, 753","parenthetical":"the \"complaint sought specific relief in the form of promotion and back pay\"","sentence":"See Bowen, 487 U.S. at 893, 108 S.Ct. at 2731-32 (\"an equitable action for specific relief \u2014 which may include an order providing for the reinstatement of an employee with backpay\u201d); Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 751, 96 S.Ct. 1251, 1258, 47 L.Ed.2d 444 (1976) (\"the District Court declined, however, to grant the unnamed members of classes 3 and 4 any other specific relief sought, which included an award of backpay\u201d); Riddle v. Cerro Wire & Cable Group, Inc., 902 F.2d 918, 922 (11th Cir. 1990) (\u201c[t]he EEOC\u2019s complaint sought specific relief for Riddle in the form of backpay and promotion\u201d); Ward v. Arkansas State Police, 653 F.2d 346, 348 (8th Cir.1981) (\u201d[t]he consent decree ... established guidelines for back pay and other specific relief\u201d); McClain v. Wagner Elec. Corp., 550 F.2d 1115, 1118 (8th Cir.1977) (\u201cthe settlement ... gave no specific relief such as back pay\u201d); United States v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 354, 378 (8th Cir.1973) (\u201d[t]he Government requests specific relief for individual applicants, including backpay differentials\u201d); City of Fort Smith v. Driggers, 305 Ark. 409, 808 S.W.2d 748, 753 (1991) (the \"complaint sought specific relief in the form of promotion and back pay\u201d); Eureka Teacher\u2019s Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 202 Cal.App.3d 469, 247 Cal.Rptr. 790, 794 (1988) (\"\u2018Back pay clearly is specific monetary relief incidental to the requested orders that appellant be hired and that respondents be enjoined from discriminating against him.\u2019\u201d) (quoting Snipes v. City of Bakersfield, 145 Cal.App.3d 861, 193 Cal.Rptr. 760, 765 (1983))."},"case_id":36488,"label":"b"}
{"context":". The majority suggests that this statement merely establishes that back pay often is awarded together with reinstatement. The Title VII cases do not see it this way, for they type back pay as relief more akin to reinstatement than to damages. Additionally, several courts have characterized back pay as specific relief.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"808 S.W.2d 748, 753","parenthetical":"the \"complaint sought specific relief in the form of promotion and back pay\"","sentence":"See Bowen, 487 U.S. at 893, 108 S.Ct. at 2731-32 (\"an equitable action for specific relief \u2014 which may include an order providing for the reinstatement of an employee with backpay\u201d); Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 751, 96 S.Ct. 1251, 1258, 47 L.Ed.2d 444 (1976) (\"the District Court declined, however, to grant the unnamed members of classes 3 and 4 any other specific relief sought, which included an award of backpay\u201d); Riddle v. Cerro Wire & Cable Group, Inc., 902 F.2d 918, 922 (11th Cir. 1990) (\u201c[t]he EEOC\u2019s complaint sought specific relief for Riddle in the form of backpay and promotion\u201d); Ward v. Arkansas State Police, 653 F.2d 346, 348 (8th Cir.1981) (\u201d[t]he consent decree ... established guidelines for back pay and other specific relief\u201d); McClain v. Wagner Elec. Corp., 550 F.2d 1115, 1118 (8th Cir.1977) (\u201cthe settlement ... gave no specific relief such as back pay\u201d); United States v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 354, 378 (8th Cir.1973) (\u201d[t]he Government requests specific relief for individual applicants, including backpay differentials\u201d); City of Fort Smith v. Driggers, 305 Ark. 409, 808 S.W.2d 748, 753 (1991) (the \"complaint sought specific relief in the form of promotion and back pay\u201d); Eureka Teacher\u2019s Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 202 Cal.App.3d 469, 247 Cal.Rptr. 790, 794 (1988) (\"\u2018Back pay clearly is specific monetary relief incidental to the requested orders that appellant be hired and that respondents be enjoined from discriminating against him.\u2019\u201d) (quoting Snipes v. City of Bakersfield, 145 Cal.App.3d 861, 193 Cal.Rptr. 760, 765 (1983))."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"100 S.Ct. 1698, 1704","parenthetical":"\"EEOC can secure specific relief, such as hiring or reinstatement, constructive seniority, or damages for backpay\"","sentence":"But see General Tel. Co. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 326, 100 S.Ct. 1698, 1704, 64 L.Ed.2d 319 (1980) (\"EEOC can secure specific relief, such as hiring or reinstatement, constructive seniority, or damages for backpay\u201d)."},"case_id":36488,"label":"a"}
{"context":". The majority suggests that this statement merely establishes that back pay often is awarded together with reinstatement. The Title VII cases do not see it this way, for they type back pay as relief more akin to reinstatement than to damages. Additionally, several courts have characterized back pay as specific relief.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"808 S.W.2d 748, 753","parenthetical":"the \"complaint sought specific relief in the form of promotion and back pay\"","sentence":"See Bowen, 487 U.S. at 893, 108 S.Ct. at 2731-32 (\"an equitable action for specific relief \u2014 which may include an order providing for the reinstatement of an employee with backpay\u201d); Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 751, 96 S.Ct. 1251, 1258, 47 L.Ed.2d 444 (1976) (\"the District Court declined, however, to grant the unnamed members of classes 3 and 4 any other specific relief sought, which included an award of backpay\u201d); Riddle v. Cerro Wire & Cable Group, Inc., 902 F.2d 918, 922 (11th Cir. 1990) (\u201c[t]he EEOC\u2019s complaint sought specific relief for Riddle in the form of backpay and promotion\u201d); Ward v. Arkansas State Police, 653 F.2d 346, 348 (8th Cir.1981) (\u201d[t]he consent decree ... established guidelines for back pay and other specific relief\u201d); McClain v. Wagner Elec. Corp., 550 F.2d 1115, 1118 (8th Cir.1977) (\u201cthe settlement ... gave no specific relief such as back pay\u201d); United States v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 354, 378 (8th Cir.1973) (\u201d[t]he Government requests specific relief for individual applicants, including backpay differentials\u201d); City of Fort Smith v. Driggers, 305 Ark. 409, 808 S.W.2d 748, 753 (1991) (the \"complaint sought specific relief in the form of promotion and back pay\u201d); Eureka Teacher\u2019s Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 202 Cal.App.3d 469, 247 Cal.Rptr. 790, 794 (1988) (\"\u2018Back pay clearly is specific monetary relief incidental to the requested orders that appellant be hired and that respondents be enjoined from discriminating against him.\u2019\u201d) (quoting Snipes v. City of Bakersfield, 145 Cal.App.3d 861, 193 Cal.Rptr. 760, 765 (1983))."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"EEOC can secure specific relief, such as hiring or reinstatement, constructive seniority, or damages for backpay\"","sentence":"But see General Tel. Co. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 326, 100 S.Ct. 1698, 1704, 64 L.Ed.2d 319 (1980) (\"EEOC can secure specific relief, such as hiring or reinstatement, constructive seniority, or damages for backpay\u201d)."},"case_id":36488,"label":"a"}
{"context":". The majority suggests that this statement merely establishes that back pay often is awarded together with reinstatement. The Title VII cases do not see it this way, for they type back pay as relief more akin to reinstatement than to damages. Additionally, several courts have characterized back pay as specific relief.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"446 U.S. 318, 326","parenthetical":"\"EEOC can secure specific relief, such as hiring or reinstatement, constructive seniority, or damages for backpay\"","sentence":"But see General Tel. Co. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 326, 100 S.Ct. 1698, 1704, 64 L.Ed.2d 319 (1980) (\"EEOC can secure specific relief, such as hiring or reinstatement, constructive seniority, or damages for backpay\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"'Back pay clearly is specific monetary relief incidental to the requested orders that appellant be hired and that respondents be enjoined from discriminating against him.'\"","sentence":"See Bowen, 487 U.S. at 893, 108 S.Ct. at 2731-32 (\"an equitable action for specific relief \u2014 which may include an order providing for the reinstatement of an employee with backpay\u201d); Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 751, 96 S.Ct. 1251, 1258, 47 L.Ed.2d 444 (1976) (\"the District Court declined, however, to grant the unnamed members of classes 3 and 4 any other specific relief sought, which included an award of backpay\u201d); Riddle v. Cerro Wire & Cable Group, Inc., 902 F.2d 918, 922 (11th Cir. 1990) (\u201c[t]he EEOC\u2019s complaint sought specific relief for Riddle in the form of backpay and promotion\u201d); Ward v. Arkansas State Police, 653 F.2d 346, 348 (8th Cir.1981) (\u201d[t]he consent decree ... established guidelines for back pay and other specific relief\u201d); McClain v. Wagner Elec. Corp., 550 F.2d 1115, 1118 (8th Cir.1977) (\u201cthe settlement ... gave no specific relief such as back pay\u201d); United States v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 354, 378 (8th Cir.1973) (\u201d[t]he Government requests specific relief for individual applicants, including backpay differentials\u201d); City of Fort Smith v. Driggers, 305 Ark. 409, 808 S.W.2d 748, 753 (1991) (the \"complaint sought specific relief in the form of promotion and back pay\u201d); Eureka Teacher\u2019s Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 202 Cal.App.3d 469, 247 Cal.Rptr. 790, 794 (1988) (\"\u2018Back pay clearly is specific monetary relief incidental to the requested orders that appellant be hired and that respondents be enjoined from discriminating against him.\u2019\u201d) (quoting Snipes v. City of Bakersfield, 145 Cal.App.3d 861, 193 Cal.Rptr. 760, 765 (1983))."},"case_id":36488,"label":"b"}
{"context":". The majority suggests that this statement merely establishes that back pay often is awarded together with reinstatement. The Title VII cases do not see it this way, for they type back pay as relief more akin to reinstatement than to damages. Additionally, several courts have characterized back pay as specific relief.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"'Back pay clearly is specific monetary relief incidental to the requested orders that appellant be hired and that respondents be enjoined from discriminating against him.'\"","sentence":"See Bowen, 487 U.S. at 893, 108 S.Ct. at 2731-32 (\"an equitable action for specific relief \u2014 which may include an order providing for the reinstatement of an employee with backpay\u201d); Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 751, 96 S.Ct. 1251, 1258, 47 L.Ed.2d 444 (1976) (\"the District Court declined, however, to grant the unnamed members of classes 3 and 4 any other specific relief sought, which included an award of backpay\u201d); Riddle v. Cerro Wire & Cable Group, Inc., 902 F.2d 918, 922 (11th Cir. 1990) (\u201c[t]he EEOC\u2019s complaint sought specific relief for Riddle in the form of backpay and promotion\u201d); Ward v. Arkansas State Police, 653 F.2d 346, 348 (8th Cir.1981) (\u201d[t]he consent decree ... established guidelines for back pay and other specific relief\u201d); McClain v. Wagner Elec. Corp., 550 F.2d 1115, 1118 (8th Cir.1977) (\u201cthe settlement ... gave no specific relief such as back pay\u201d); United States v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 354, 378 (8th Cir.1973) (\u201d[t]he Government requests specific relief for individual applicants, including backpay differentials\u201d); City of Fort Smith v. Driggers, 305 Ark. 409, 808 S.W.2d 748, 753 (1991) (the \"complaint sought specific relief in the form of promotion and back pay\u201d); Eureka Teacher\u2019s Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 202 Cal.App.3d 469, 247 Cal.Rptr. 790, 794 (1988) (\"\u2018Back pay clearly is specific monetary relief incidental to the requested orders that appellant be hired and that respondents be enjoined from discriminating against him.\u2019\u201d) (quoting Snipes v. City of Bakersfield, 145 Cal.App.3d 861, 193 Cal.Rptr. 760, 765 (1983))."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"100 S.Ct. 1698, 1704","parenthetical":"\"EEOC can secure specific relief, such as hiring or reinstatement, constructive seniority, or damages for backpay\"","sentence":"But see General Tel. Co. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 326, 100 S.Ct. 1698, 1704, 64 L.Ed.2d 319 (1980) (\"EEOC can secure specific relief, such as hiring or reinstatement, constructive seniority, or damages for backpay\u201d)."},"case_id":36488,"label":"a"}
{"context":". The majority suggests that this statement merely establishes that back pay often is awarded together with reinstatement. The Title VII cases do not see it this way, for they type back pay as relief more akin to reinstatement than to damages. Additionally, several courts have characterized back pay as specific relief.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"EEOC can secure specific relief, such as hiring or reinstatement, constructive seniority, or damages for backpay\"","sentence":"But see General Tel. Co. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 326, 100 S.Ct. 1698, 1704, 64 L.Ed.2d 319 (1980) (\"EEOC can secure specific relief, such as hiring or reinstatement, constructive seniority, or damages for backpay\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"'Back pay clearly is specific monetary relief incidental to the requested orders that appellant be hired and that respondents be enjoined from discriminating against him.'\"","sentence":"See Bowen, 487 U.S. at 893, 108 S.Ct. at 2731-32 (\"an equitable action for specific relief \u2014 which may include an order providing for the reinstatement of an employee with backpay\u201d); Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 751, 96 S.Ct. 1251, 1258, 47 L.Ed.2d 444 (1976) (\"the District Court declined, however, to grant the unnamed members of classes 3 and 4 any other specific relief sought, which included an award of backpay\u201d); Riddle v. Cerro Wire & Cable Group, Inc., 902 F.2d 918, 922 (11th Cir. 1990) (\u201c[t]he EEOC\u2019s complaint sought specific relief for Riddle in the form of backpay and promotion\u201d); Ward v. Arkansas State Police, 653 F.2d 346, 348 (8th Cir.1981) (\u201d[t]he consent decree ... established guidelines for back pay and other specific relief\u201d); McClain v. Wagner Elec. Corp., 550 F.2d 1115, 1118 (8th Cir.1977) (\u201cthe settlement ... gave no specific relief such as back pay\u201d); United States v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 354, 378 (8th Cir.1973) (\u201d[t]he Government requests specific relief for individual applicants, including backpay differentials\u201d); City of Fort Smith v. Driggers, 305 Ark. 409, 808 S.W.2d 748, 753 (1991) (the \"complaint sought specific relief in the form of promotion and back pay\u201d); Eureka Teacher\u2019s Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 202 Cal.App.3d 469, 247 Cal.Rptr. 790, 794 (1988) (\"\u2018Back pay clearly is specific monetary relief incidental to the requested orders that appellant be hired and that respondents be enjoined from discriminating against him.\u2019\u201d) (quoting Snipes v. City of Bakersfield, 145 Cal.App.3d 861, 193 Cal.Rptr. 760, 765 (1983))."},"case_id":36488,"label":"b"}
{"context":". The majority suggests that this statement merely establishes that back pay often is awarded together with reinstatement. The Title VII cases do not see it this way, for they type back pay as relief more akin to reinstatement than to damages. Additionally, several courts have characterized back pay as specific relief.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"247 Cal.Rptr. 790, 794","parenthetical":"\"'Back pay clearly is specific monetary relief incidental to the requested orders that appellant be hired and that respondents be enjoined from discriminating against him.'\"","sentence":"See Bowen, 487 U.S. at 893, 108 S.Ct. at 2731-32 (\"an equitable action for specific relief \u2014 which may include an order providing for the reinstatement of an employee with backpay\u201d); Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 751, 96 S.Ct. 1251, 1258, 47 L.Ed.2d 444 (1976) (\"the District Court declined, however, to grant the unnamed members of classes 3 and 4 any other specific relief sought, which included an award of backpay\u201d); Riddle v. Cerro Wire & Cable Group, Inc., 902 F.2d 918, 922 (11th Cir. 1990) (\u201c[t]he EEOC\u2019s complaint sought specific relief for Riddle in the form of backpay and promotion\u201d); Ward v. Arkansas State Police, 653 F.2d 346, 348 (8th Cir.1981) (\u201d[t]he consent decree ... established guidelines for back pay and other specific relief\u201d); McClain v. Wagner Elec. Corp., 550 F.2d 1115, 1118 (8th Cir.1977) (\u201cthe settlement ... gave no specific relief such as back pay\u201d); United States v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 354, 378 (8th Cir.1973) (\u201d[t]he Government requests specific relief for individual applicants, including backpay differentials\u201d); City of Fort Smith v. Driggers, 305 Ark. 409, 808 S.W.2d 748, 753 (1991) (the \"complaint sought specific relief in the form of promotion and back pay\u201d); Eureka Teacher\u2019s Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 202 Cal.App.3d 469, 247 Cal.Rptr. 790, 794 (1988) (\"\u2018Back pay clearly is specific monetary relief incidental to the requested orders that appellant be hired and that respondents be enjoined from discriminating against him.\u2019\u201d) (quoting Snipes v. City of Bakersfield, 145 Cal.App.3d 861, 193 Cal.Rptr. 760, 765 (1983))."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"446 U.S. 318, 326","parenthetical":"\"EEOC can secure specific relief, such as hiring or reinstatement, constructive seniority, or damages for backpay\"","sentence":"But see General Tel. Co. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 326, 100 S.Ct. 1698, 1704, 64 L.Ed.2d 319 (1980) (\"EEOC can secure specific relief, such as hiring or reinstatement, constructive seniority, or damages for backpay\u201d)."},"case_id":36488,"label":"a"}
{"context":". The majority suggests that this statement merely establishes that back pay often is awarded together with reinstatement. The Title VII cases do not see it this way, for they type back pay as relief more akin to reinstatement than to damages. Additionally, several courts have characterized back pay as specific relief.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"247 Cal.Rptr. 790, 794","parenthetical":"\"'Back pay clearly is specific monetary relief incidental to the requested orders that appellant be hired and that respondents be enjoined from discriminating against him.'\"","sentence":"See Bowen, 487 U.S. at 893, 108 S.Ct. at 2731-32 (\"an equitable action for specific relief \u2014 which may include an order providing for the reinstatement of an employee with backpay\u201d); Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 751, 96 S.Ct. 1251, 1258, 47 L.Ed.2d 444 (1976) (\"the District Court declined, however, to grant the unnamed members of classes 3 and 4 any other specific relief sought, which included an award of backpay\u201d); Riddle v. Cerro Wire & Cable Group, Inc., 902 F.2d 918, 922 (11th Cir. 1990) (\u201c[t]he EEOC\u2019s complaint sought specific relief for Riddle in the form of backpay and promotion\u201d); Ward v. Arkansas State Police, 653 F.2d 346, 348 (8th Cir.1981) (\u201d[t]he consent decree ... established guidelines for back pay and other specific relief\u201d); McClain v. Wagner Elec. Corp., 550 F.2d 1115, 1118 (8th Cir.1977) (\u201cthe settlement ... gave no specific relief such as back pay\u201d); United States v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 354, 378 (8th Cir.1973) (\u201d[t]he Government requests specific relief for individual applicants, including backpay differentials\u201d); City of Fort Smith v. Driggers, 305 Ark. 409, 808 S.W.2d 748, 753 (1991) (the \"complaint sought specific relief in the form of promotion and back pay\u201d); Eureka Teacher\u2019s Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 202 Cal.App.3d 469, 247 Cal.Rptr. 790, 794 (1988) (\"\u2018Back pay clearly is specific monetary relief incidental to the requested orders that appellant be hired and that respondents be enjoined from discriminating against him.\u2019\u201d) (quoting Snipes v. City of Bakersfield, 145 Cal.App.3d 861, 193 Cal.Rptr. 760, 765 (1983))."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"100 S.Ct. 1698, 1704","parenthetical":"\"EEOC can secure specific relief, such as hiring or reinstatement, constructive seniority, or damages for backpay\"","sentence":"But see General Tel. Co. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 326, 100 S.Ct. 1698, 1704, 64 L.Ed.2d 319 (1980) (\"EEOC can secure specific relief, such as hiring or reinstatement, constructive seniority, or damages for backpay\u201d)."},"case_id":36488,"label":"a"}
{"context":". The majority suggests that this statement merely establishes that back pay often is awarded together with reinstatement. The Title VII cases do not see it this way, for they type back pay as relief more akin to reinstatement than to damages. Additionally, several courts have characterized back pay as specific relief.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"247 Cal.Rptr. 790, 794","parenthetical":"\"'Back pay clearly is specific monetary relief incidental to the requested orders that appellant be hired and that respondents be enjoined from discriminating against him.'\"","sentence":"See Bowen, 487 U.S. at 893, 108 S.Ct. at 2731-32 (\"an equitable action for specific relief \u2014 which may include an order providing for the reinstatement of an employee with backpay\u201d); Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 751, 96 S.Ct. 1251, 1258, 47 L.Ed.2d 444 (1976) (\"the District Court declined, however, to grant the unnamed members of classes 3 and 4 any other specific relief sought, which included an award of backpay\u201d); Riddle v. Cerro Wire & Cable Group, Inc., 902 F.2d 918, 922 (11th Cir. 1990) (\u201c[t]he EEOC\u2019s complaint sought specific relief for Riddle in the form of backpay and promotion\u201d); Ward v. Arkansas State Police, 653 F.2d 346, 348 (8th Cir.1981) (\u201d[t]he consent decree ... established guidelines for back pay and other specific relief\u201d); McClain v. Wagner Elec. Corp., 550 F.2d 1115, 1118 (8th Cir.1977) (\u201cthe settlement ... gave no specific relief such as back pay\u201d); United States v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 354, 378 (8th Cir.1973) (\u201d[t]he Government requests specific relief for individual applicants, including backpay differentials\u201d); City of Fort Smith v. Driggers, 305 Ark. 409, 808 S.W.2d 748, 753 (1991) (the \"complaint sought specific relief in the form of promotion and back pay\u201d); Eureka Teacher\u2019s Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 202 Cal.App.3d 469, 247 Cal.Rptr. 790, 794 (1988) (\"\u2018Back pay clearly is specific monetary relief incidental to the requested orders that appellant be hired and that respondents be enjoined from discriminating against him.\u2019\u201d) (quoting Snipes v. City of Bakersfield, 145 Cal.App.3d 861, 193 Cal.Rptr. 760, 765 (1983))."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"EEOC can secure specific relief, such as hiring or reinstatement, constructive seniority, or damages for backpay\"","sentence":"But see General Tel. Co. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 326, 100 S.Ct. 1698, 1704, 64 L.Ed.2d 319 (1980) (\"EEOC can secure specific relief, such as hiring or reinstatement, constructive seniority, or damages for backpay\u201d)."},"case_id":36488,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Other bankruptcy courts have specifically rejected claimed exemptions under that state's trustee process statute in a bankruptcy proceeding.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"stating that a bankruptcy debtor could not use such a statute to expand his exemptions during a bankruptcy proceeding","sentence":"See In re Damast, 136 B.R. 11 (Bankr.D.N.H.1991) (noting that such exemptions are only applicable in the context of trustee process); see also In re Kingsbury, 124 B.R. 146 (Bankr.D.Me.1991) (stating that a bankruptcy debtor could not use such a statute to expand his exemptions during a bankruptcy proceeding) overruled on unrelated grounds by Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz et al., 503 U.S. 638, 112 S.Ct. 1644, 118 L.Ed.2d 280 (1992)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting that such exemptions are only applicable in the context of trustee process","sentence":"See In re Damast, 136 B.R. 11 (Bankr.D.N.H.1991) (noting that such exemptions are only applicable in the context of trustee process); see also In re Kingsbury, 124 B.R. 146 (Bankr.D.Me.1991) (stating that a bankruptcy debtor could not use such a statute to expand his exemptions during a bankruptcy proceeding) overruled on unrelated grounds by Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz et al., 503 U.S. 638, 112 S.Ct. 1644, 118 L.Ed.2d 280 (1992)."},"case_id":9124908,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Other bankruptcy courts have specifically rejected claimed exemptions under that state's trustee process statute in a bankruptcy proceeding.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"stating that a bankruptcy debtor could not use such a statute to expand his exemptions during a bankruptcy proceeding","sentence":"See In re Damast, 136 B.R. 11 (Bankr.D.N.H.1991) (noting that such exemptions are only applicable in the context of trustee process); see also In re Kingsbury, 124 B.R. 146 (Bankr.D.Me.1991) (stating that a bankruptcy debtor could not use such a statute to expand his exemptions during a bankruptcy proceeding) overruled on unrelated grounds by Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz et al., 503 U.S. 638, 112 S.Ct. 1644, 118 L.Ed.2d 280 (1992)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting that such exemptions are only applicable in the context of trustee process","sentence":"See In re Damast, 136 B.R. 11 (Bankr.D.N.H.1991) (noting that such exemptions are only applicable in the context of trustee process); see also In re Kingsbury, 124 B.R. 146 (Bankr.D.Me.1991) (stating that a bankruptcy debtor could not use such a statute to expand his exemptions during a bankruptcy proceeding) overruled on unrelated grounds by Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz et al., 503 U.S. 638, 112 S.Ct. 1644, 118 L.Ed.2d 280 (1992)."},"case_id":9124908,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Other bankruptcy courts have specifically rejected claimed exemptions under that state's trustee process statute in a bankruptcy proceeding.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"stating that a bankruptcy debtor could not use such a statute to expand his exemptions during a bankruptcy proceeding","sentence":"See In re Damast, 136 B.R. 11 (Bankr.D.N.H.1991) (noting that such exemptions are only applicable in the context of trustee process); see also In re Kingsbury, 124 B.R. 146 (Bankr.D.Me.1991) (stating that a bankruptcy debtor could not use such a statute to expand his exemptions during a bankruptcy proceeding) overruled on unrelated grounds by Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz et al., 503 U.S. 638, 112 S.Ct. 1644, 118 L.Ed.2d 280 (1992)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting that such exemptions are only applicable in the context of trustee process","sentence":"See In re Damast, 136 B.R. 11 (Bankr.D.N.H.1991) (noting that such exemptions are only applicable in the context of trustee process); see also In re Kingsbury, 124 B.R. 146 (Bankr.D.Me.1991) (stating that a bankruptcy debtor could not use such a statute to expand his exemptions during a bankruptcy proceeding) overruled on unrelated grounds by Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz et al., 503 U.S. 638, 112 S.Ct. 1644, 118 L.Ed.2d 280 (1992)."},"case_id":9124908,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Other bankruptcy courts have specifically rejected claimed exemptions under that state's trustee process statute in a bankruptcy proceeding.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting that such exemptions are only applicable in the context of trustee process","sentence":"See In re Damast, 136 B.R. 11 (Bankr.D.N.H.1991) (noting that such exemptions are only applicable in the context of trustee process); see also In re Kingsbury, 124 B.R. 146 (Bankr.D.Me.1991) (stating that a bankruptcy debtor could not use such a statute to expand his exemptions during a bankruptcy proceeding) overruled on unrelated grounds by Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz et al., 503 U.S. 638, 112 S.Ct. 1644, 118 L.Ed.2d 280 (1992)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"stating that a bankruptcy debtor could not use such a statute to expand his exemptions during a bankruptcy proceeding","sentence":"See In re Damast, 136 B.R. 11 (Bankr.D.N.H.1991) (noting that such exemptions are only applicable in the context of trustee process); see also In re Kingsbury, 124 B.R. 146 (Bankr.D.Me.1991) (stating that a bankruptcy debtor could not use such a statute to expand his exemptions during a bankruptcy proceeding) overruled on unrelated grounds by Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz et al., 503 U.S. 638, 112 S.Ct. 1644, 118 L.Ed.2d 280 (1992)."},"case_id":9124908,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The administrator alleged in his complaint that Toma had converted Meszaros's property after he had helped move her to Ohio and further converted the property of her Ohio estate following her death. See Winters Natl.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"The title to personal property of a deceased person passes to his personal representative, his executor or administrator, pending the settlement of the estate * * *. \"","sentence":"Bank & Trust Co. v. Riffe (1965), 2 Ohio St.2d 72, 31 O.O.2d 56, 206 N.E.2d 212, paragraph one of the syllabus (\u201cThe title to personal property of a deceased person passes to his personal representative, his executor or administrator, pending the settlement of the estate * * *. \u201d); see, also, Herbruck v. LaJolla Capital (Sept. 27, 2000), Summit App. No. 19586, unreported, 2000 WL 1420282 (nonresident defendant\u2019s actions met requirements of R.C. 2307.382[A][6], where he allegedly committed tortious acts, including conversion, outside Ohio while knowing that stock involved was of an Ohio corporation)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"nonresident defendant's actions met requirements of R.C. 2307.382[A][6], where he allegedly committed tortious acts, including conversion, outside Ohio while knowing that stock involved was of an Ohio corporation","sentence":"Bank & Trust Co. v. Riffe (1965), 2 Ohio St.2d 72, 31 O.O.2d 56, 206 N.E.2d 212, paragraph one of the syllabus (\u201cThe title to personal property of a deceased person passes to his personal representative, his executor or administrator, pending the settlement of the estate * * *. \u201d); see, also, Herbruck v. LaJolla Capital (Sept. 27, 2000), Summit App. No. 19586, unreported, 2000 WL 1420282 (nonresident defendant\u2019s actions met requirements of R.C. 2307.382[A][6], where he allegedly committed tortious acts, including conversion, outside Ohio while knowing that stock involved was of an Ohio corporation)."},"case_id":1287176,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The administrator alleged in his complaint that Toma had converted Meszaros's property after he had helped move her to Ohio and further converted the property of her Ohio estate following her death. See Winters Natl.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"The title to personal property of a deceased person passes to his personal representative, his executor or administrator, pending the settlement of the estate * * *. \"","sentence":"Bank & Trust Co. v. Riffe (1965), 2 Ohio St.2d 72, 31 O.O.2d 56, 206 N.E.2d 212, paragraph one of the syllabus (\u201cThe title to personal property of a deceased person passes to his personal representative, his executor or administrator, pending the settlement of the estate * * *. \u201d); see, also, Herbruck v. LaJolla Capital (Sept. 27, 2000), Summit App. No. 19586, unreported, 2000 WL 1420282 (nonresident defendant\u2019s actions met requirements of R.C. 2307.382[A][6], where he allegedly committed tortious acts, including conversion, outside Ohio while knowing that stock involved was of an Ohio corporation)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"nonresident defendant's actions met requirements of R.C. 2307.382[A][6], where he allegedly committed tortious acts, including conversion, outside Ohio while knowing that stock involved was of an Ohio corporation","sentence":"Bank & Trust Co. v. Riffe (1965), 2 Ohio St.2d 72, 31 O.O.2d 56, 206 N.E.2d 212, paragraph one of the syllabus (\u201cThe title to personal property of a deceased person passes to his personal representative, his executor or administrator, pending the settlement of the estate * * *. \u201d); see, also, Herbruck v. LaJolla Capital (Sept. 27, 2000), Summit App. No. 19586, unreported, 2000 WL 1420282 (nonresident defendant\u2019s actions met requirements of R.C. 2307.382[A][6], where he allegedly committed tortious acts, including conversion, outside Ohio while knowing that stock involved was of an Ohio corporation)."},"case_id":1287176,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The administrator alleged in his complaint that Toma had converted Meszaros's property after he had helped move her to Ohio and further converted the property of her Ohio estate following her death. See Winters Natl.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"nonresident defendant's actions met requirements of R.C. 2307.382[A][6], where he allegedly committed tortious acts, including conversion, outside Ohio while knowing that stock involved was of an Ohio corporation","sentence":"Bank & Trust Co. v. Riffe (1965), 2 Ohio St.2d 72, 31 O.O.2d 56, 206 N.E.2d 212, paragraph one of the syllabus (\u201cThe title to personal property of a deceased person passes to his personal representative, his executor or administrator, pending the settlement of the estate * * *. \u201d); see, also, Herbruck v. LaJolla Capital (Sept. 27, 2000), Summit App. No. 19586, unreported, 2000 WL 1420282 (nonresident defendant\u2019s actions met requirements of R.C. 2307.382[A][6], where he allegedly committed tortious acts, including conversion, outside Ohio while knowing that stock involved was of an Ohio corporation)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"The title to personal property of a deceased person passes to his personal representative, his executor or administrator, pending the settlement of the estate * * *. \"","sentence":"Bank & Trust Co. v. Riffe (1965), 2 Ohio St.2d 72, 31 O.O.2d 56, 206 N.E.2d 212, paragraph one of the syllabus (\u201cThe title to personal property of a deceased person passes to his personal representative, his executor or administrator, pending the settlement of the estate * * *. \u201d); see, also, Herbruck v. LaJolla Capital (Sept. 27, 2000), Summit App. No. 19586, unreported, 2000 WL 1420282 (nonresident defendant\u2019s actions met requirements of R.C. 2307.382[A][6], where he allegedly committed tortious acts, including conversion, outside Ohio while knowing that stock involved was of an Ohio corporation)."},"case_id":1287176,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In this case, the district court's credibility findings regarding Trooper Wade's testimony considerably color the \"reasonable articulable suspicion\" inquiry.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"195 F.3d 258, 265-67","parenthetical":"noting that an officer's credibility must be scrutinized particularly where a pretextual stop is at issue","sentence":"See United States v. Hill, 195 F.3d 258, 265-67 (6th Cir.1999) (noting that an officer\u2019s credibility must be scrutinized particularly where a pretextual stop is at issue); see also United States v. Akram, 165 F.3d 452, 457-60 (6th Cir.1999) (Guy, J., dissenting) (\u201cThe courts have given the police this extraordinary power to make pretextual stops and searches of vehicles, but it is also the responsibility of the courts to make sure the testimony of police officers is given the same critical scrutiny given to a defendant\u2019s testimony.\u201d); United States v. Johnson, 63 F.3d 242, 247 (3d Cir.1995) (\u201c[I]n evaluating the constitutionality of a traffic stop, a court is free to examine ... the officer\u2019s credibility.\u201d); cf. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 481-82, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963) (stating that probable cause determinations shall be made by a neutral magistrate to \u201cinsure that the deliberate, impartial judgment of a judicial officer will be interposed between the citizen and the police, to assess the weight and credibility of the information which the complaining officer adduces as probable cause\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"165 F.3d 452, 457-60","parenthetical":"\"The courts have given the police this extraordinary power to make pretextual stops and searches of vehicles, but it is also the responsibility of the courts to make sure the testimony of police officers is given the same critical scrutiny given to a defendant's testimony.\"","sentence":"See United States v. Hill, 195 F.3d 258, 265-67 (6th Cir.1999) (noting that an officer\u2019s credibility must be scrutinized particularly where a pretextual stop is at issue); see also United States v. Akram, 165 F.3d 452, 457-60 (6th Cir.1999) (Guy, J., dissenting) (\u201cThe courts have given the police this extraordinary power to make pretextual stops and searches of vehicles, but it is also the responsibility of the courts to make sure the testimony of police officers is given the same critical scrutiny given to a defendant\u2019s testimony.\u201d); United States v. Johnson, 63 F.3d 242, 247 (3d Cir.1995) (\u201c[I]n evaluating the constitutionality of a traffic stop, a court is free to examine ... the officer\u2019s credibility.\u201d); cf. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 481-82, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963) (stating that probable cause determinations shall be made by a neutral magistrate to \u201cinsure that the deliberate, impartial judgment of a judicial officer will be interposed between the citizen and the police, to assess the weight and credibility of the information which the complaining officer adduces as probable cause\u201d)."},"case_id":9247381,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In this case, the district court's credibility findings regarding Trooper Wade's testimony considerably color the \"reasonable articulable suspicion\" inquiry.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"63 F.3d 242, 247","parenthetical":"\"[I]n evaluating the constitutionality of a traffic stop, a court is free to examine ... the officer's credibility.\"","sentence":"See United States v. Hill, 195 F.3d 258, 265-67 (6th Cir.1999) (noting that an officer\u2019s credibility must be scrutinized particularly where a pretextual stop is at issue); see also United States v. Akram, 165 F.3d 452, 457-60 (6th Cir.1999) (Guy, J., dissenting) (\u201cThe courts have given the police this extraordinary power to make pretextual stops and searches of vehicles, but it is also the responsibility of the courts to make sure the testimony of police officers is given the same critical scrutiny given to a defendant\u2019s testimony.\u201d); United States v. Johnson, 63 F.3d 242, 247 (3d Cir.1995) (\u201c[I]n evaluating the constitutionality of a traffic stop, a court is free to examine ... the officer\u2019s credibility.\u201d); cf. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 481-82, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963) (stating that probable cause determinations shall be made by a neutral magistrate to \u201cinsure that the deliberate, impartial judgment of a judicial officer will be interposed between the citizen and the police, to assess the weight and credibility of the information which the complaining officer adduces as probable cause\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"195 F.3d 258, 265-67","parenthetical":"noting that an officer's credibility must be scrutinized particularly where a pretextual stop is at issue","sentence":"See United States v. Hill, 195 F.3d 258, 265-67 (6th Cir.1999) (noting that an officer\u2019s credibility must be scrutinized particularly where a pretextual stop is at issue); see also United States v. Akram, 165 F.3d 452, 457-60 (6th Cir.1999) (Guy, J., dissenting) (\u201cThe courts have given the police this extraordinary power to make pretextual stops and searches of vehicles, but it is also the responsibility of the courts to make sure the testimony of police officers is given the same critical scrutiny given to a defendant\u2019s testimony.\u201d); United States v. Johnson, 63 F.3d 242, 247 (3d Cir.1995) (\u201c[I]n evaluating the constitutionality of a traffic stop, a court is free to examine ... the officer\u2019s credibility.\u201d); cf. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 481-82, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963) (stating that probable cause determinations shall be made by a neutral magistrate to \u201cinsure that the deliberate, impartial judgment of a judicial officer will be interposed between the citizen and the police, to assess the weight and credibility of the information which the complaining officer adduces as probable cause\u201d)."},"case_id":9247381,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In this case, the district court's credibility findings regarding Trooper Wade's testimony considerably color the \"reasonable articulable suspicion\" inquiry.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"195 F.3d 258, 265-67","parenthetical":"noting that an officer's credibility must be scrutinized particularly where a pretextual stop is at issue","sentence":"See United States v. Hill, 195 F.3d 258, 265-67 (6th Cir.1999) (noting that an officer\u2019s credibility must be scrutinized particularly where a pretextual stop is at issue); see also United States v. Akram, 165 F.3d 452, 457-60 (6th Cir.1999) (Guy, J., dissenting) (\u201cThe courts have given the police this extraordinary power to make pretextual stops and searches of vehicles, but it is also the responsibility of the courts to make sure the testimony of police officers is given the same critical scrutiny given to a defendant\u2019s testimony.\u201d); United States v. Johnson, 63 F.3d 242, 247 (3d Cir.1995) (\u201c[I]n evaluating the constitutionality of a traffic stop, a court is free to examine ... the officer\u2019s credibility.\u201d); cf. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 481-82, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963) (stating that probable cause determinations shall be made by a neutral magistrate to \u201cinsure that the deliberate, impartial judgment of a judicial officer will be interposed between the citizen and the police, to assess the weight and credibility of the information which the complaining officer adduces as probable cause\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"371 U.S. 471, 481-82","parenthetical":"stating that probable cause determinations shall be made by a neutral magistrate to \"insure that the deliberate, impartial judgment of a judicial officer will be interposed between the citizen and the police, to assess the weight and credibility of the information which the complaining officer adduces as probable cause\"","sentence":"See United States v. Hill, 195 F.3d 258, 265-67 (6th Cir.1999) (noting that an officer\u2019s credibility must be scrutinized particularly where a pretextual stop is at issue); see also United States v. Akram, 165 F.3d 452, 457-60 (6th Cir.1999) (Guy, J., dissenting) (\u201cThe courts have given the police this extraordinary power to make pretextual stops and searches of vehicles, but it is also the responsibility of the courts to make sure the testimony of police officers is given the same critical scrutiny given to a defendant\u2019s testimony.\u201d); United States v. Johnson, 63 F.3d 242, 247 (3d Cir.1995) (\u201c[I]n evaluating the constitutionality of a traffic stop, a court is free to examine ... the officer\u2019s credibility.\u201d); cf. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 481-82, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963) (stating that probable cause determinations shall be made by a neutral magistrate to \u201cinsure that the deliberate, impartial judgment of a judicial officer will be interposed between the citizen and the police, to assess the weight and credibility of the information which the complaining officer adduces as probable cause\u201d)."},"case_id":9247381,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In this case, the district court's credibility findings regarding Trooper Wade's testimony considerably color the \"reasonable articulable suspicion\" inquiry.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"stating that probable cause determinations shall be made by a neutral magistrate to \"insure that the deliberate, impartial judgment of a judicial officer will be interposed between the citizen and the police, to assess the weight and credibility of the information which the complaining officer adduces as probable cause\"","sentence":"See United States v. Hill, 195 F.3d 258, 265-67 (6th Cir.1999) (noting that an officer\u2019s credibility must be scrutinized particularly where a pretextual stop is at issue); see also United States v. Akram, 165 F.3d 452, 457-60 (6th Cir.1999) (Guy, J., dissenting) (\u201cThe courts have given the police this extraordinary power to make pretextual stops and searches of vehicles, but it is also the responsibility of the courts to make sure the testimony of police officers is given the same critical scrutiny given to a defendant\u2019s testimony.\u201d); United States v. Johnson, 63 F.3d 242, 247 (3d Cir.1995) (\u201c[I]n evaluating the constitutionality of a traffic stop, a court is free to examine ... the officer\u2019s credibility.\u201d); cf. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 481-82, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963) (stating that probable cause determinations shall be made by a neutral magistrate to \u201cinsure that the deliberate, impartial judgment of a judicial officer will be interposed between the citizen and the police, to assess the weight and credibility of the information which the complaining officer adduces as probable cause\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"195 F.3d 258, 265-67","parenthetical":"noting that an officer's credibility must be scrutinized particularly where a pretextual stop is at issue","sentence":"See United States v. Hill, 195 F.3d 258, 265-67 (6th Cir.1999) (noting that an officer\u2019s credibility must be scrutinized particularly where a pretextual stop is at issue); see also United States v. Akram, 165 F.3d 452, 457-60 (6th Cir.1999) (Guy, J., dissenting) (\u201cThe courts have given the police this extraordinary power to make pretextual stops and searches of vehicles, but it is also the responsibility of the courts to make sure the testimony of police officers is given the same critical scrutiny given to a defendant\u2019s testimony.\u201d); United States v. Johnson, 63 F.3d 242, 247 (3d Cir.1995) (\u201c[I]n evaluating the constitutionality of a traffic stop, a court is free to examine ... the officer\u2019s credibility.\u201d); cf. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 481-82, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963) (stating that probable cause determinations shall be made by a neutral magistrate to \u201cinsure that the deliberate, impartial judgment of a judicial officer will be interposed between the citizen and the police, to assess the weight and credibility of the information which the complaining officer adduces as probable cause\u201d)."},"case_id":9247381,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In this case, the district court's credibility findings regarding Trooper Wade's testimony considerably color the \"reasonable articulable suspicion\" inquiry.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"195 F.3d 258, 265-67","parenthetical":"noting that an officer's credibility must be scrutinized particularly where a pretextual stop is at issue","sentence":"See United States v. Hill, 195 F.3d 258, 265-67 (6th Cir.1999) (noting that an officer\u2019s credibility must be scrutinized particularly where a pretextual stop is at issue); see also United States v. Akram, 165 F.3d 452, 457-60 (6th Cir.1999) (Guy, J., dissenting) (\u201cThe courts have given the police this extraordinary power to make pretextual stops and searches of vehicles, but it is also the responsibility of the courts to make sure the testimony of police officers is given the same critical scrutiny given to a defendant\u2019s testimony.\u201d); United States v. Johnson, 63 F.3d 242, 247 (3d Cir.1995) (\u201c[I]n evaluating the constitutionality of a traffic stop, a court is free to examine ... the officer\u2019s credibility.\u201d); cf. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 481-82, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963) (stating that probable cause determinations shall be made by a neutral magistrate to \u201cinsure that the deliberate, impartial judgment of a judicial officer will be interposed between the citizen and the police, to assess the weight and credibility of the information which the complaining officer adduces as probable cause\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"stating that probable cause determinations shall be made by a neutral magistrate to \"insure that the deliberate, impartial judgment of a judicial officer will be interposed between the citizen and the police, to assess the weight and credibility of the information which the complaining officer adduces as probable cause\"","sentence":"See United States v. Hill, 195 F.3d 258, 265-67 (6th Cir.1999) (noting that an officer\u2019s credibility must be scrutinized particularly where a pretextual stop is at issue); see also United States v. Akram, 165 F.3d 452, 457-60 (6th Cir.1999) (Guy, J., dissenting) (\u201cThe courts have given the police this extraordinary power to make pretextual stops and searches of vehicles, but it is also the responsibility of the courts to make sure the testimony of police officers is given the same critical scrutiny given to a defendant\u2019s testimony.\u201d); United States v. Johnson, 63 F.3d 242, 247 (3d Cir.1995) (\u201c[I]n evaluating the constitutionality of a traffic stop, a court is free to examine ... the officer\u2019s credibility.\u201d); cf. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 481-82, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963) (stating that probable cause determinations shall be made by a neutral magistrate to \u201cinsure that the deliberate, impartial judgment of a judicial officer will be interposed between the citizen and the police, to assess the weight and credibility of the information which the complaining officer adduces as probable cause\u201d)."},"case_id":9247381,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In this case, the district court's credibility findings regarding Trooper Wade's testimony considerably color the \"reasonable articulable suspicion\" inquiry.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"165 F.3d 452, 457-60","parenthetical":"\"The courts have given the police this extraordinary power to make pretextual stops and searches of vehicles, but it is also the responsibility of the courts to make sure the testimony of police officers is given the same critical scrutiny given to a defendant's testimony.\"","sentence":"See United States v. Hill, 195 F.3d 258, 265-67 (6th Cir.1999) (noting that an officer\u2019s credibility must be scrutinized particularly where a pretextual stop is at issue); see also United States v. Akram, 165 F.3d 452, 457-60 (6th Cir.1999) (Guy, J., dissenting) (\u201cThe courts have given the police this extraordinary power to make pretextual stops and searches of vehicles, but it is also the responsibility of the courts to make sure the testimony of police officers is given the same critical scrutiny given to a defendant\u2019s testimony.\u201d); United States v. Johnson, 63 F.3d 242, 247 (3d Cir.1995) (\u201c[I]n evaluating the constitutionality of a traffic stop, a court is free to examine ... the officer\u2019s credibility.\u201d); cf. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 481-82, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963) (stating that probable cause determinations shall be made by a neutral magistrate to \u201cinsure that the deliberate, impartial judgment of a judicial officer will be interposed between the citizen and the police, to assess the weight and credibility of the information which the complaining officer adduces as probable cause\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"371 U.S. 471, 481-82","parenthetical":"stating that probable cause determinations shall be made by a neutral magistrate to \"insure that the deliberate, impartial judgment of a judicial officer will be interposed between the citizen and the police, to assess the weight and credibility of the information which the complaining officer adduces as probable cause\"","sentence":"See United States v. Hill, 195 F.3d 258, 265-67 (6th Cir.1999) (noting that an officer\u2019s credibility must be scrutinized particularly where a pretextual stop is at issue); see also United States v. Akram, 165 F.3d 452, 457-60 (6th Cir.1999) (Guy, J., dissenting) (\u201cThe courts have given the police this extraordinary power to make pretextual stops and searches of vehicles, but it is also the responsibility of the courts to make sure the testimony of police officers is given the same critical scrutiny given to a defendant\u2019s testimony.\u201d); United States v. Johnson, 63 F.3d 242, 247 (3d Cir.1995) (\u201c[I]n evaluating the constitutionality of a traffic stop, a court is free to examine ... the officer\u2019s credibility.\u201d); cf. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 481-82, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963) (stating that probable cause determinations shall be made by a neutral magistrate to \u201cinsure that the deliberate, impartial judgment of a judicial officer will be interposed between the citizen and the police, to assess the weight and credibility of the information which the complaining officer adduces as probable cause\u201d)."},"case_id":9247381,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In this case, the district court's credibility findings regarding Trooper Wade's testimony considerably color the \"reasonable articulable suspicion\" inquiry.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"165 F.3d 452, 457-60","parenthetical":"\"The courts have given the police this extraordinary power to make pretextual stops and searches of vehicles, but it is also the responsibility of the courts to make sure the testimony of police officers is given the same critical scrutiny given to a defendant's testimony.\"","sentence":"See United States v. Hill, 195 F.3d 258, 265-67 (6th Cir.1999) (noting that an officer\u2019s credibility must be scrutinized particularly where a pretextual stop is at issue); see also United States v. Akram, 165 F.3d 452, 457-60 (6th Cir.1999) (Guy, J., dissenting) (\u201cThe courts have given the police this extraordinary power to make pretextual stops and searches of vehicles, but it is also the responsibility of the courts to make sure the testimony of police officers is given the same critical scrutiny given to a defendant\u2019s testimony.\u201d); United States v. Johnson, 63 F.3d 242, 247 (3d Cir.1995) (\u201c[I]n evaluating the constitutionality of a traffic stop, a court is free to examine ... the officer\u2019s credibility.\u201d); cf. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 481-82, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963) (stating that probable cause determinations shall be made by a neutral magistrate to \u201cinsure that the deliberate, impartial judgment of a judicial officer will be interposed between the citizen and the police, to assess the weight and credibility of the information which the complaining officer adduces as probable cause\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"stating that probable cause determinations shall be made by a neutral magistrate to \"insure that the deliberate, impartial judgment of a judicial officer will be interposed between the citizen and the police, to assess the weight and credibility of the information which the complaining officer adduces as probable cause\"","sentence":"See United States v. Hill, 195 F.3d 258, 265-67 (6th Cir.1999) (noting that an officer\u2019s credibility must be scrutinized particularly where a pretextual stop is at issue); see also United States v. Akram, 165 F.3d 452, 457-60 (6th Cir.1999) (Guy, J., dissenting) (\u201cThe courts have given the police this extraordinary power to make pretextual stops and searches of vehicles, but it is also the responsibility of the courts to make sure the testimony of police officers is given the same critical scrutiny given to a defendant\u2019s testimony.\u201d); United States v. Johnson, 63 F.3d 242, 247 (3d Cir.1995) (\u201c[I]n evaluating the constitutionality of a traffic stop, a court is free to examine ... the officer\u2019s credibility.\u201d); cf. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 481-82, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963) (stating that probable cause determinations shall be made by a neutral magistrate to \u201cinsure that the deliberate, impartial judgment of a judicial officer will be interposed between the citizen and the police, to assess the weight and credibility of the information which the complaining officer adduces as probable cause\u201d)."},"case_id":9247381,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In this case, the district court's credibility findings regarding Trooper Wade's testimony considerably color the \"reasonable articulable suspicion\" inquiry.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"165 F.3d 452, 457-60","parenthetical":"\"The courts have given the police this extraordinary power to make pretextual stops and searches of vehicles, but it is also the responsibility of the courts to make sure the testimony of police officers is given the same critical scrutiny given to a defendant's testimony.\"","sentence":"See United States v. Hill, 195 F.3d 258, 265-67 (6th Cir.1999) (noting that an officer\u2019s credibility must be scrutinized particularly where a pretextual stop is at issue); see also United States v. Akram, 165 F.3d 452, 457-60 (6th Cir.1999) (Guy, J., dissenting) (\u201cThe courts have given the police this extraordinary power to make pretextual stops and searches of vehicles, but it is also the responsibility of the courts to make sure the testimony of police officers is given the same critical scrutiny given to a defendant\u2019s testimony.\u201d); United States v. Johnson, 63 F.3d 242, 247 (3d Cir.1995) (\u201c[I]n evaluating the constitutionality of a traffic stop, a court is free to examine ... the officer\u2019s credibility.\u201d); cf. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 481-82, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963) (stating that probable cause determinations shall be made by a neutral magistrate to \u201cinsure that the deliberate, impartial judgment of a judicial officer will be interposed between the citizen and the police, to assess the weight and credibility of the information which the complaining officer adduces as probable cause\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"stating that probable cause determinations shall be made by a neutral magistrate to \"insure that the deliberate, impartial judgment of a judicial officer will be interposed between the citizen and the police, to assess the weight and credibility of the information which the complaining officer adduces as probable cause\"","sentence":"See United States v. Hill, 195 F.3d 258, 265-67 (6th Cir.1999) (noting that an officer\u2019s credibility must be scrutinized particularly where a pretextual stop is at issue); see also United States v. Akram, 165 F.3d 452, 457-60 (6th Cir.1999) (Guy, J., dissenting) (\u201cThe courts have given the police this extraordinary power to make pretextual stops and searches of vehicles, but it is also the responsibility of the courts to make sure the testimony of police officers is given the same critical scrutiny given to a defendant\u2019s testimony.\u201d); United States v. Johnson, 63 F.3d 242, 247 (3d Cir.1995) (\u201c[I]n evaluating the constitutionality of a traffic stop, a court is free to examine ... the officer\u2019s credibility.\u201d); cf. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 481-82, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963) (stating that probable cause determinations shall be made by a neutral magistrate to \u201cinsure that the deliberate, impartial judgment of a judicial officer will be interposed between the citizen and the police, to assess the weight and credibility of the information which the complaining officer adduces as probable cause\u201d)."},"case_id":9247381,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In this case, the district court's credibility findings regarding Trooper Wade's testimony considerably color the \"reasonable articulable suspicion\" inquiry.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"371 U.S. 471, 481-82","parenthetical":"stating that probable cause determinations shall be made by a neutral magistrate to \"insure that the deliberate, impartial judgment of a judicial officer will be interposed between the citizen and the police, to assess the weight and credibility of the information which the complaining officer adduces as probable cause\"","sentence":"See United States v. Hill, 195 F.3d 258, 265-67 (6th Cir.1999) (noting that an officer\u2019s credibility must be scrutinized particularly where a pretextual stop is at issue); see also United States v. Akram, 165 F.3d 452, 457-60 (6th Cir.1999) (Guy, J., dissenting) (\u201cThe courts have given the police this extraordinary power to make pretextual stops and searches of vehicles, but it is also the responsibility of the courts to make sure the testimony of police officers is given the same critical scrutiny given to a defendant\u2019s testimony.\u201d); United States v. Johnson, 63 F.3d 242, 247 (3d Cir.1995) (\u201c[I]n evaluating the constitutionality of a traffic stop, a court is free to examine ... the officer\u2019s credibility.\u201d); cf. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 481-82, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963) (stating that probable cause determinations shall be made by a neutral magistrate to \u201cinsure that the deliberate, impartial judgment of a judicial officer will be interposed between the citizen and the police, to assess the weight and credibility of the information which the complaining officer adduces as probable cause\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"63 F.3d 242, 247","parenthetical":"\"[I]n evaluating the constitutionality of a traffic stop, a court is free to examine ... the officer's credibility.\"","sentence":"See United States v. Hill, 195 F.3d 258, 265-67 (6th Cir.1999) (noting that an officer\u2019s credibility must be scrutinized particularly where a pretextual stop is at issue); see also United States v. Akram, 165 F.3d 452, 457-60 (6th Cir.1999) (Guy, J., dissenting) (\u201cThe courts have given the police this extraordinary power to make pretextual stops and searches of vehicles, but it is also the responsibility of the courts to make sure the testimony of police officers is given the same critical scrutiny given to a defendant\u2019s testimony.\u201d); United States v. Johnson, 63 F.3d 242, 247 (3d Cir.1995) (\u201c[I]n evaluating the constitutionality of a traffic stop, a court is free to examine ... the officer\u2019s credibility.\u201d); cf. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 481-82, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963) (stating that probable cause determinations shall be made by a neutral magistrate to \u201cinsure that the deliberate, impartial judgment of a judicial officer will be interposed between the citizen and the police, to assess the weight and credibility of the information which the complaining officer adduces as probable cause\u201d)."},"case_id":9247381,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In this case, the district court's credibility findings regarding Trooper Wade's testimony considerably color the \"reasonable articulable suspicion\" inquiry.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"stating that probable cause determinations shall be made by a neutral magistrate to \"insure that the deliberate, impartial judgment of a judicial officer will be interposed between the citizen and the police, to assess the weight and credibility of the information which the complaining officer adduces as probable cause\"","sentence":"See United States v. Hill, 195 F.3d 258, 265-67 (6th Cir.1999) (noting that an officer\u2019s credibility must be scrutinized particularly where a pretextual stop is at issue); see also United States v. Akram, 165 F.3d 452, 457-60 (6th Cir.1999) (Guy, J., dissenting) (\u201cThe courts have given the police this extraordinary power to make pretextual stops and searches of vehicles, but it is also the responsibility of the courts to make sure the testimony of police officers is given the same critical scrutiny given to a defendant\u2019s testimony.\u201d); United States v. Johnson, 63 F.3d 242, 247 (3d Cir.1995) (\u201c[I]n evaluating the constitutionality of a traffic stop, a court is free to examine ... the officer\u2019s credibility.\u201d); cf. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 481-82, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963) (stating that probable cause determinations shall be made by a neutral magistrate to \u201cinsure that the deliberate, impartial judgment of a judicial officer will be interposed between the citizen and the police, to assess the weight and credibility of the information which the complaining officer adduces as probable cause\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"63 F.3d 242, 247","parenthetical":"\"[I]n evaluating the constitutionality of a traffic stop, a court is free to examine ... the officer's credibility.\"","sentence":"See United States v. Hill, 195 F.3d 258, 265-67 (6th Cir.1999) (noting that an officer\u2019s credibility must be scrutinized particularly where a pretextual stop is at issue); see also United States v. Akram, 165 F.3d 452, 457-60 (6th Cir.1999) (Guy, J., dissenting) (\u201cThe courts have given the police this extraordinary power to make pretextual stops and searches of vehicles, but it is also the responsibility of the courts to make sure the testimony of police officers is given the same critical scrutiny given to a defendant\u2019s testimony.\u201d); United States v. Johnson, 63 F.3d 242, 247 (3d Cir.1995) (\u201c[I]n evaluating the constitutionality of a traffic stop, a court is free to examine ... the officer\u2019s credibility.\u201d); cf. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 481-82, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963) (stating that probable cause determinations shall be made by a neutral magistrate to \u201cinsure that the deliberate, impartial judgment of a judicial officer will be interposed between the citizen and the police, to assess the weight and credibility of the information which the complaining officer adduces as probable cause\u201d)."},"case_id":9247381,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In this case, the district court's credibility findings regarding Trooper Wade's testimony considerably color the \"reasonable articulable suspicion\" inquiry.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"stating that probable cause determinations shall be made by a neutral magistrate to \"insure that the deliberate, impartial judgment of a judicial officer will be interposed between the citizen and the police, to assess the weight and credibility of the information which the complaining officer adduces as probable cause\"","sentence":"See United States v. Hill, 195 F.3d 258, 265-67 (6th Cir.1999) (noting that an officer\u2019s credibility must be scrutinized particularly where a pretextual stop is at issue); see also United States v. Akram, 165 F.3d 452, 457-60 (6th Cir.1999) (Guy, J., dissenting) (\u201cThe courts have given the police this extraordinary power to make pretextual stops and searches of vehicles, but it is also the responsibility of the courts to make sure the testimony of police officers is given the same critical scrutiny given to a defendant\u2019s testimony.\u201d); United States v. Johnson, 63 F.3d 242, 247 (3d Cir.1995) (\u201c[I]n evaluating the constitutionality of a traffic stop, a court is free to examine ... the officer\u2019s credibility.\u201d); cf. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 481-82, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963) (stating that probable cause determinations shall be made by a neutral magistrate to \u201cinsure that the deliberate, impartial judgment of a judicial officer will be interposed between the citizen and the police, to assess the weight and credibility of the information which the complaining officer adduces as probable cause\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"63 F.3d 242, 247","parenthetical":"\"[I]n evaluating the constitutionality of a traffic stop, a court is free to examine ... the officer's credibility.\"","sentence":"See United States v. Hill, 195 F.3d 258, 265-67 (6th Cir.1999) (noting that an officer\u2019s credibility must be scrutinized particularly where a pretextual stop is at issue); see also United States v. Akram, 165 F.3d 452, 457-60 (6th Cir.1999) (Guy, J., dissenting) (\u201cThe courts have given the police this extraordinary power to make pretextual stops and searches of vehicles, but it is also the responsibility of the courts to make sure the testimony of police officers is given the same critical scrutiny given to a defendant\u2019s testimony.\u201d); United States v. Johnson, 63 F.3d 242, 247 (3d Cir.1995) (\u201c[I]n evaluating the constitutionality of a traffic stop, a court is free to examine ... the officer\u2019s credibility.\u201d); cf. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 481-82, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963) (stating that probable cause determinations shall be made by a neutral magistrate to \u201cinsure that the deliberate, impartial judgment of a judicial officer will be interposed between the citizen and the police, to assess the weight and credibility of the information which the complaining officer adduces as probable cause\u201d)."},"case_id":9247381,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Local 702 prevailed on the merits in both. Mr. Smart's claim, therefore, fails as a matter of law on that element. We need not reach the question of whether the suits were pursued without probable cause -- the only element that might involve interpretation of the CBA.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"161 F.3d 767, 773","parenthetical":"noting that a district court may pretermit the preemption question when the action is clearly without merit","sentence":"Owen v. Carpenters\u2019 Disk Council, 161 F.3d 767, 773 (4th Cir.1998) (noting that a district court may pretermit the preemption question when the action is clearly without merit); Childers v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 881 F.2d 1259, 1263 (4th Cir.1989) (same); Washington v. Union Carbide Corp., 870 F.2d 957 (4th Cir.1989)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"298 F.3d 284, 290-91","parenthetical":"observing that the question of whether employer's action in prosecuting employee was malicious involved evaluation of whether motive was improper, which, in turn, required interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement","sentence":"Cf. Foy v. Giant Food, Inc., 298 F.3d 284, 290-91 (4th Cir.2002) (observing that the question of whether employer\u2019s action in prosecuting employee was malicious involved evaluation of whether motive was improper, which, in turn, required interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement)."},"case_id":5897181,"label":"a"}
{"context":"These Sixth Amendment responsibilities of counsel to advise of the advantages and disadvantages of a guilty plea are greater than the responsibilities of a court under the Fifth Amendment. Thus, the Padilla Court's unwillingness to apply the direct\/eollateral distinction in the Sixth Amendment context does not demonstrate the Court's intention to do away with that distinction entirely in the Fifth Amendment context.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"635 F.3d 1237, 1240","parenthetical":"noting that in Padilla the Court \"had no occasion to consider the scope of a district court's obligation\" under due process or Rule 11, or \"the continued viability of the distinction between direct and collateral consequences in the due process context\"","sentence":"See United States v. Delgado-Ramos, 635 F.3d 1237, 1240 (9th Cir.2011) (noting that in Padilla the Court \u201chad no occasion to consider the scope of a district court\u2019s obligation\u201d under due process or Rule 11, or \u201cthe continued viability of the distinction between direct and collateral consequences in the due process context\u201d); see also United States v. Nicholson, 676 F.3d 376, 381 n. 3 (4th Cir.2012) (noting that the Court in Padilla did not address district courts\u2019 Rule 11 obligations)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting that the Court in Padilla did not address district courts' Rule 11 obligations","sentence":"See United States v. Delgado-Ramos, 635 F.3d 1237, 1240 (9th Cir.2011) (noting that in Padilla the Court \u201chad no occasion to consider the scope of a district court\u2019s obligation\u201d under due process or Rule 11, or \u201cthe continued viability of the distinction between direct and collateral consequences in the due process context\u201d); see also United States v. Nicholson, 676 F.3d 376, 381 n. 3 (4th Cir.2012) (noting that the Court in Padilla did not address district courts\u2019 Rule 11 obligations)."},"case_id":3491446,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The district court did not clearly err in ruling that the photo identification array was not unduly suggestive. A darker hue or different colored background does not \"in [itself] create an impermissible suggestion that the defendant is the offender.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"168 F.3d 352, 358","parenthetical":"denying challenge to pretrial identification where defendant's \"picture was placed in the center of the array, was darker than the rest, and was the only one in which the eyes were closed.\"","sentence":"United States v. Burdeau, 168 F.3d 352, 358 (9th Cir.1999) (denying challenge to pretrial identification where defendant\u2019s \u201cpicture was placed in the center of the array, was darker than the rest, and was the only one in which the eyes were closed.\u201d); see also United States v. Mathis, 264 F.3d 321, 333 (3d Cir.2001) (holding that \u201cslightly darker\u201d background of defendant\u2019s picture \u201cdid not significantly contribute to the array\u2019s unnecessary suggestiveness\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"264 F.3d 321, 333","parenthetical":"holding that \"slightly darker\" background of defendant's picture \"did not significantly contribute to the array's unnecessary suggestiveness\"","sentence":"United States v. Burdeau, 168 F.3d 352, 358 (9th Cir.1999) (denying challenge to pretrial identification where defendant\u2019s \u201cpicture was placed in the center of the array, was darker than the rest, and was the only one in which the eyes were closed.\u201d); see also United States v. Mathis, 264 F.3d 321, 333 (3d Cir.2001) (holding that \u201cslightly darker\u201d background of defendant\u2019s picture \u201cdid not significantly contribute to the array\u2019s unnecessary suggestiveness\u201d)."},"case_id":4057750,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Furthermore, the court may consider any added meaning that certain conduct might suggest to experienced officers in the field, trained in the observation of criminal activity.\" Based on the totality of facts discovered by Deputy Sheriff Brown during this consensual encounter, I conclude the officer had a reasonable articulable suspicion to continue detaining the defendants for a reasonable period of time to investigate the circumstances and determine if the defendants were engaged in criminal activity.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"206 F.3d 802, 805","parenthetical":"holding presence of a masking odor in vehicle, passenger's nervous behavior, passenger's inability to recall the name of his purport ed daughter-in-law, and vast divergence between passenger's and driver's statements regarding travel accommodations to California justified further detention of the vehicle for investigation of whether a crime was being committed","sentence":"United States v. Foley, 206 F.3d 802, 805 (8th Cir.2000)(holding presence of a masking odor in vehicle, passenger\u2019s nervous behavior, passenger\u2019s inability to recall the name of his purport ed daughter-in-law, and vast divergence between passenger\u2019s and driver\u2019s statements regarding travel accommodations to California justified further detention of the vehicle for investigation of whether a crime was being committed)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"269 F.3d 928, 928","parenthetical":"holding inconsistent information on travel plans \"casts suspicion and doubt on the nature and legitimacy\" of defendants' activity","sentence":"See also, Jones, 269 F.3d at 928 (holding inconsistent information on travel plans \u201ccasts suspicion and doubt on the nature and legitimacy\u201d of defendants\u2019 activity); United States v. Pulliam, 265 F.3d 736, 740 (8th Cir.2001)(inconsistencies in information regarding the trip and the relationship between the driver and passenger justified further detention of the driver while the officer continued to investigate)."},"case_id":3667578,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Furthermore, the court may consider any added meaning that certain conduct might suggest to experienced officers in the field, trained in the observation of criminal activity.\" Based on the totality of facts discovered by Deputy Sheriff Brown during this consensual encounter, I conclude the officer had a reasonable articulable suspicion to continue detaining the defendants for a reasonable period of time to investigate the circumstances and determine if the defendants were engaged in criminal activity.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"206 F.3d 802, 805","parenthetical":"holding presence of a masking odor in vehicle, passenger's nervous behavior, passenger's inability to recall the name of his purport ed daughter-in-law, and vast divergence between passenger's and driver's statements regarding travel accommodations to California justified further detention of the vehicle for investigation of whether a crime was being committed","sentence":"United States v. Foley, 206 F.3d 802, 805 (8th Cir.2000)(holding presence of a masking odor in vehicle, passenger\u2019s nervous behavior, passenger\u2019s inability to recall the name of his purport ed daughter-in-law, and vast divergence between passenger\u2019s and driver\u2019s statements regarding travel accommodations to California justified further detention of the vehicle for investigation of whether a crime was being committed)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"265 F.3d 736, 740","parenthetical":"inconsistencies in information regarding the trip and the relationship between the driver and passenger justified further detention of the driver while the officer continued to investigate","sentence":"See also, Jones, 269 F.3d at 928 (holding inconsistent information on travel plans \u201ccasts suspicion and doubt on the nature and legitimacy\u201d of defendants\u2019 activity); United States v. Pulliam, 265 F.3d 736, 740 (8th Cir.2001)(inconsistencies in information regarding the trip and the relationship between the driver and passenger justified further detention of the driver while the officer continued to investigate)."},"case_id":3667578,"label":"a"}
{"context":"To the extent that the majority opinion can be construed to suggest that counsel's investigation into some aspects of potential mitigation eliminated the need to thoroughly investigate all reasonably available avenues of mitigation--including such things as life-history mitigation and a mental health evaluation (for which the court had already allocated funds, which went unused)--I note that such a proposition is at odds with the holdings of this Court as well as those of the United States Supreme Court.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"clarifying that the standards outlined in Wiggins and Williams are applicable on collateral review notwithstanding that the underlying trial may have occurred before those cases were decided","sentence":"See Commonwealth v. Malloy, 579 Pa. 425, 460, 856 A.2d 767, 788 (2004) (explaining that \u201c \u2018strategic choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable professional judgments supported the limitations on investigation\u2019 \u201d) (quoting Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 2535, 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003)); Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 525, 123 S.Ct. at 2537 (describing counsel\u2019s obligation to discover all reasonably available mitigating evidence); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 396, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1515, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (explaining that counsel has a duty to thoroughly investigate a defendant\u2019s b\u00e1ckground); see also Commonwealth v. Hughes, 581 Pa. 274, 361 n. 56, 865 A.2d 761, 813 n. 56 (2004) (clarifying that the standards outlined in Wiggins and Williams are applicable on collateral review notwithstanding that the underlying trial may have occurred before those cases were decided)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"579 Pa. 425, 460","parenthetical":"explaining that \" 'strategic choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable professional judgments supported the limitations on investigation' \"","sentence":"See Commonwealth v. Malloy, 579 Pa. 425, 460, 856 A.2d 767, 788 (2004) (explaining that \u201c \u2018strategic choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable professional judgments supported the limitations on investigation\u2019 \u201d) (quoting Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 2535, 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003)); Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 525, 123 S.Ct. at 2537 (describing counsel\u2019s obligation to discover all reasonably available mitigating evidence); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 396, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1515, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (explaining that counsel has a duty to thoroughly investigate a defendant\u2019s b\u00e1ckground); see also Commonwealth v. Hughes, 581 Pa. 274, 361 n. 56, 865 A.2d 761, 813 n. 56 (2004) (clarifying that the standards outlined in Wiggins and Williams are applicable on collateral review notwithstanding that the underlying trial may have occurred before those cases were decided)."},"case_id":988463,"label":"b"}
{"context":"To the extent that the majority opinion can be construed to suggest that counsel's investigation into some aspects of potential mitigation eliminated the need to thoroughly investigate all reasonably available avenues of mitigation--including such things as life-history mitigation and a mental health evaluation (for which the court had already allocated funds, which went unused)--I note that such a proposition is at odds with the holdings of this Court as well as those of the United States Supreme Court.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"clarifying that the standards outlined in Wiggins and Williams are applicable on collateral review notwithstanding that the underlying trial may have occurred before those cases were decided","sentence":"See Commonwealth v. Malloy, 579 Pa. 425, 460, 856 A.2d 767, 788 (2004) (explaining that \u201c \u2018strategic choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable professional judgments supported the limitations on investigation\u2019 \u201d) (quoting Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 2535, 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003)); Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 525, 123 S.Ct. at 2537 (describing counsel\u2019s obligation to discover all reasonably available mitigating evidence); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 396, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1515, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (explaining that counsel has a duty to thoroughly investigate a defendant\u2019s b\u00e1ckground); see also Commonwealth v. Hughes, 581 Pa. 274, 361 n. 56, 865 A.2d 761, 813 n. 56 (2004) (clarifying that the standards outlined in Wiggins and Williams are applicable on collateral review notwithstanding that the underlying trial may have occurred before those cases were decided)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"579 Pa. 425, 460","parenthetical":"explaining that \" 'strategic choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable professional judgments supported the limitations on investigation' \"","sentence":"See Commonwealth v. Malloy, 579 Pa. 425, 460, 856 A.2d 767, 788 (2004) (explaining that \u201c \u2018strategic choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable professional judgments supported the limitations on investigation\u2019 \u201d) (quoting Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 2535, 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003)); Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 525, 123 S.Ct. at 2537 (describing counsel\u2019s obligation to discover all reasonably available mitigating evidence); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 396, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1515, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (explaining that counsel has a duty to thoroughly investigate a defendant\u2019s b\u00e1ckground); see also Commonwealth v. Hughes, 581 Pa. 274, 361 n. 56, 865 A.2d 761, 813 n. 56 (2004) (clarifying that the standards outlined in Wiggins and Williams are applicable on collateral review notwithstanding that the underlying trial may have occurred before those cases were decided)."},"case_id":988463,"label":"b"}
{"context":"To the extent that the majority opinion can be construed to suggest that counsel's investigation into some aspects of potential mitigation eliminated the need to thoroughly investigate all reasonably available avenues of mitigation--including such things as life-history mitigation and a mental health evaluation (for which the court had already allocated funds, which went unused)--I note that such a proposition is at odds with the holdings of this Court as well as those of the United States Supreme Court.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"clarifying that the standards outlined in Wiggins and Williams are applicable on collateral review notwithstanding that the underlying trial may have occurred before those cases were decided","sentence":"See Commonwealth v. Malloy, 579 Pa. 425, 460, 856 A.2d 767, 788 (2004) (explaining that \u201c \u2018strategic choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable professional judgments supported the limitations on investigation\u2019 \u201d) (quoting Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 2535, 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003)); Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 525, 123 S.Ct. at 2537 (describing counsel\u2019s obligation to discover all reasonably available mitigating evidence); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 396, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1515, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (explaining that counsel has a duty to thoroughly investigate a defendant\u2019s b\u00e1ckground); see also Commonwealth v. Hughes, 581 Pa. 274, 361 n. 56, 865 A.2d 761, 813 n. 56 (2004) (clarifying that the standards outlined in Wiggins and Williams are applicable on collateral review notwithstanding that the underlying trial may have occurred before those cases were decided)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"856 A.2d 767, 788","parenthetical":"explaining that \" 'strategic choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable professional judgments supported the limitations on investigation' \"","sentence":"See Commonwealth v. Malloy, 579 Pa. 425, 460, 856 A.2d 767, 788 (2004) (explaining that \u201c \u2018strategic choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable professional judgments supported the limitations on investigation\u2019 \u201d) (quoting Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 2535, 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003)); Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 525, 123 S.Ct. at 2537 (describing counsel\u2019s obligation to discover all reasonably available mitigating evidence); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 396, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1515, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (explaining that counsel has a duty to thoroughly investigate a defendant\u2019s b\u00e1ckground); see also Commonwealth v. Hughes, 581 Pa. 274, 361 n. 56, 865 A.2d 761, 813 n. 56 (2004) (clarifying that the standards outlined in Wiggins and Williams are applicable on collateral review notwithstanding that the underlying trial may have occurred before those cases were decided)."},"case_id":988463,"label":"b"}
{"context":"To the extent that the majority opinion can be construed to suggest that counsel's investigation into some aspects of potential mitigation eliminated the need to thoroughly investigate all reasonably available avenues of mitigation--including such things as life-history mitigation and a mental health evaluation (for which the court had already allocated funds, which went unused)--I note that such a proposition is at odds with the holdings of this Court as well as those of the United States Supreme Court.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"clarifying that the standards outlined in Wiggins and Williams are applicable on collateral review notwithstanding that the underlying trial may have occurred before those cases were decided","sentence":"See Commonwealth v. Malloy, 579 Pa. 425, 460, 856 A.2d 767, 788 (2004) (explaining that \u201c \u2018strategic choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable professional judgments supported the limitations on investigation\u2019 \u201d) (quoting Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 2535, 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003)); Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 525, 123 S.Ct. at 2537 (describing counsel\u2019s obligation to discover all reasonably available mitigating evidence); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 396, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1515, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (explaining that counsel has a duty to thoroughly investigate a defendant\u2019s b\u00e1ckground); see also Commonwealth v. Hughes, 581 Pa. 274, 361 n. 56, 865 A.2d 761, 813 n. 56 (2004) (clarifying that the standards outlined in Wiggins and Williams are applicable on collateral review notwithstanding that the underlying trial may have occurred before those cases were decided)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"856 A.2d 767, 788","parenthetical":"explaining that \" 'strategic choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable professional judgments supported the limitations on investigation' \"","sentence":"See Commonwealth v. Malloy, 579 Pa. 425, 460, 856 A.2d 767, 788 (2004) (explaining that \u201c \u2018strategic choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable professional judgments supported the limitations on investigation\u2019 \u201d) (quoting Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 2535, 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003)); Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 525, 123 S.Ct. at 2537 (describing counsel\u2019s obligation to discover all reasonably available mitigating evidence); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 396, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1515, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (explaining that counsel has a duty to thoroughly investigate a defendant\u2019s b\u00e1ckground); see also Commonwealth v. Hughes, 581 Pa. 274, 361 n. 56, 865 A.2d 761, 813 n. 56 (2004) (clarifying that the standards outlined in Wiggins and Williams are applicable on collateral review notwithstanding that the underlying trial may have occurred before those cases were decided)."},"case_id":988463,"label":"b"}
{"context":"To the extent that the majority opinion can be construed to suggest that counsel's investigation into some aspects of potential mitigation eliminated the need to thoroughly investigate all reasonably available avenues of mitigation--including such things as life-history mitigation and a mental health evaluation (for which the court had already allocated funds, which went unused)--I note that such a proposition is at odds with the holdings of this Court as well as those of the United States Supreme Court.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"clarifying that the standards outlined in Wiggins and Williams are applicable on collateral review notwithstanding that the underlying trial may have occurred before those cases were decided","sentence":"See Commonwealth v. Malloy, 579 Pa. 425, 460, 856 A.2d 767, 788 (2004) (explaining that \u201c \u2018strategic choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable professional judgments supported the limitations on investigation\u2019 \u201d) (quoting Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 2535, 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003)); Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 525, 123 S.Ct. at 2537 (describing counsel\u2019s obligation to discover all reasonably available mitigating evidence); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 396, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1515, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (explaining that counsel has a duty to thoroughly investigate a defendant\u2019s b\u00e1ckground); see also Commonwealth v. Hughes, 581 Pa. 274, 361 n. 56, 865 A.2d 761, 813 n. 56 (2004) (clarifying that the standards outlined in Wiggins and Williams are applicable on collateral review notwithstanding that the underlying trial may have occurred before those cases were decided)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"539 U.S. 525, 525","parenthetical":"describing counsel's obligation to discover all reasonably available mitigating evidence","sentence":"See Commonwealth v. Malloy, 579 Pa. 425, 460, 856 A.2d 767, 788 (2004) (explaining that \u201c \u2018strategic choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable professional judgments supported the limitations on investigation\u2019 \u201d) (quoting Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 2535, 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003)); Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 525, 123 S.Ct. at 2537 (describing counsel\u2019s obligation to discover all reasonably available mitigating evidence); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 396, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1515, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (explaining that counsel has a duty to thoroughly investigate a defendant\u2019s b\u00e1ckground); see also Commonwealth v. Hughes, 581 Pa. 274, 361 n. 56, 865 A.2d 761, 813 n. 56 (2004) (clarifying that the standards outlined in Wiggins and Williams are applicable on collateral review notwithstanding that the underlying trial may have occurred before those cases were decided)."},"case_id":988463,"label":"b"}
{"context":"To the extent that the majority opinion can be construed to suggest that counsel's investigation into some aspects of potential mitigation eliminated the need to thoroughly investigate all reasonably available avenues of mitigation--including such things as life-history mitigation and a mental health evaluation (for which the court had already allocated funds, which went unused)--I note that such a proposition is at odds with the holdings of this Court as well as those of the United States Supreme Court.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"539 U.S. 525, 525","parenthetical":"describing counsel's obligation to discover all reasonably available mitigating evidence","sentence":"See Commonwealth v. Malloy, 579 Pa. 425, 460, 856 A.2d 767, 788 (2004) (explaining that \u201c \u2018strategic choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable professional judgments supported the limitations on investigation\u2019 \u201d) (quoting Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 2535, 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003)); Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 525, 123 S.Ct. at 2537 (describing counsel\u2019s obligation to discover all reasonably available mitigating evidence); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 396, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1515, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (explaining that counsel has a duty to thoroughly investigate a defendant\u2019s b\u00e1ckground); see also Commonwealth v. Hughes, 581 Pa. 274, 361 n. 56, 865 A.2d 761, 813 n. 56 (2004) (clarifying that the standards outlined in Wiggins and Williams are applicable on collateral review notwithstanding that the underlying trial may have occurred before those cases were decided)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"clarifying that the standards outlined in Wiggins and Williams are applicable on collateral review notwithstanding that the underlying trial may have occurred before those cases were decided","sentence":"See Commonwealth v. Malloy, 579 Pa. 425, 460, 856 A.2d 767, 788 (2004) (explaining that \u201c \u2018strategic choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable professional judgments supported the limitations on investigation\u2019 \u201d) (quoting Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 2535, 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003)); Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 525, 123 S.Ct. at 2537 (describing counsel\u2019s obligation to discover all reasonably available mitigating evidence); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 396, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1515, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (explaining that counsel has a duty to thoroughly investigate a defendant\u2019s b\u00e1ckground); see also Commonwealth v. Hughes, 581 Pa. 274, 361 n. 56, 865 A.2d 761, 813 n. 56 (2004) (clarifying that the standards outlined in Wiggins and Williams are applicable on collateral review notwithstanding that the underlying trial may have occurred before those cases were decided)."},"case_id":988463,"label":"a"}
{"context":"To the extent that the majority opinion can be construed to suggest that counsel's investigation into some aspects of potential mitigation eliminated the need to thoroughly investigate all reasonably available avenues of mitigation--including such things as life-history mitigation and a mental health evaluation (for which the court had already allocated funds, which went unused)--I note that such a proposition is at odds with the holdings of this Court as well as those of the United States Supreme Court.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"123 S.Ct. 2537, 2537","parenthetical":"describing counsel's obligation to discover all reasonably available mitigating evidence","sentence":"See Commonwealth v. Malloy, 579 Pa. 425, 460, 856 A.2d 767, 788 (2004) (explaining that \u201c \u2018strategic choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable professional judgments supported the limitations on investigation\u2019 \u201d) (quoting Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 2535, 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003)); Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 525, 123 S.Ct. at 2537 (describing counsel\u2019s obligation to discover all reasonably available mitigating evidence); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 396, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1515, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (explaining that counsel has a duty to thoroughly investigate a defendant\u2019s b\u00e1ckground); see also Commonwealth v. Hughes, 581 Pa. 274, 361 n. 56, 865 A.2d 761, 813 n. 56 (2004) (clarifying that the standards outlined in Wiggins and Williams are applicable on collateral review notwithstanding that the underlying trial may have occurred before those cases were decided)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"clarifying that the standards outlined in Wiggins and Williams are applicable on collateral review notwithstanding that the underlying trial may have occurred before those cases were decided","sentence":"See Commonwealth v. Malloy, 579 Pa. 425, 460, 856 A.2d 767, 788 (2004) (explaining that \u201c \u2018strategic choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable professional judgments supported the limitations on investigation\u2019 \u201d) (quoting Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 2535, 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003)); Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 525, 123 S.Ct. at 2537 (describing counsel\u2019s obligation to discover all reasonably available mitigating evidence); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 396, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1515, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (explaining that counsel has a duty to thoroughly investigate a defendant\u2019s b\u00e1ckground); see also Commonwealth v. Hughes, 581 Pa. 274, 361 n. 56, 865 A.2d 761, 813 n. 56 (2004) (clarifying that the standards outlined in Wiggins and Williams are applicable on collateral review notwithstanding that the underlying trial may have occurred before those cases were decided)."},"case_id":988463,"label":"a"}
{"context":"To the extent that the majority opinion can be construed to suggest that counsel's investigation into some aspects of potential mitigation eliminated the need to thoroughly investigate all reasonably available avenues of mitigation--including such things as life-history mitigation and a mental health evaluation (for which the court had already allocated funds, which went unused)--I note that such a proposition is at odds with the holdings of this Court as well as those of the United States Supreme Court.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"clarifying that the standards outlined in Wiggins and Williams are applicable on collateral review notwithstanding that the underlying trial may have occurred before those cases were decided","sentence":"See Commonwealth v. Malloy, 579 Pa. 425, 460, 856 A.2d 767, 788 (2004) (explaining that \u201c \u2018strategic choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable professional judgments supported the limitations on investigation\u2019 \u201d) (quoting Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 2535, 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003)); Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 525, 123 S.Ct. at 2537 (describing counsel\u2019s obligation to discover all reasonably available mitigating evidence); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 396, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1515, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (explaining that counsel has a duty to thoroughly investigate a defendant\u2019s b\u00e1ckground); see also Commonwealth v. Hughes, 581 Pa. 274, 361 n. 56, 865 A.2d 761, 813 n. 56 (2004) (clarifying that the standards outlined in Wiggins and Williams are applicable on collateral review notwithstanding that the underlying trial may have occurred before those cases were decided)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"123 S.Ct. 2537, 2537","parenthetical":"describing counsel's obligation to discover all reasonably available mitigating evidence","sentence":"See Commonwealth v. Malloy, 579 Pa. 425, 460, 856 A.2d 767, 788 (2004) (explaining that \u201c \u2018strategic choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable professional judgments supported the limitations on investigation\u2019 \u201d) (quoting Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 2535, 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003)); Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 525, 123 S.Ct. at 2537 (describing counsel\u2019s obligation to discover all reasonably available mitigating evidence); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 396, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1515, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (explaining that counsel has a duty to thoroughly investigate a defendant\u2019s b\u00e1ckground); see also Commonwealth v. Hughes, 581 Pa. 274, 361 n. 56, 865 A.2d 761, 813 n. 56 (2004) (clarifying that the standards outlined in Wiggins and Williams are applicable on collateral review notwithstanding that the underlying trial may have occurred before those cases were decided)."},"case_id":988463,"label":"b"}
{"context":"To the extent that the majority opinion can be construed to suggest that counsel's investigation into some aspects of potential mitigation eliminated the need to thoroughly investigate all reasonably available avenues of mitigation--including such things as life-history mitigation and a mental health evaluation (for which the court had already allocated funds, which went unused)--I note that such a proposition is at odds with the holdings of this Court as well as those of the United States Supreme Court.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"529 U.S. 362, 396","parenthetical":"explaining that counsel has a duty to thoroughly investigate a defendant's background","sentence":"See Commonwealth v. Malloy, 579 Pa. 425, 460, 856 A.2d 767, 788 (2004) (explaining that \u201c \u2018strategic choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable professional judgments supported the limitations on investigation\u2019 \u201d) (quoting Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 2535, 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003)); Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 525, 123 S.Ct. at 2537 (describing counsel\u2019s obligation to discover all reasonably available mitigating evidence); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 396, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1515, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (explaining that counsel has a duty to thoroughly investigate a defendant\u2019s b\u00e1ckground); see also Commonwealth v. Hughes, 581 Pa. 274, 361 n. 56, 865 A.2d 761, 813 n. 56 (2004) (clarifying that the standards outlined in Wiggins and Williams are applicable on collateral review notwithstanding that the underlying trial may have occurred before those cases were decided)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"clarifying that the standards outlined in Wiggins and Williams are applicable on collateral review notwithstanding that the underlying trial may have occurred before those cases were decided","sentence":"See Commonwealth v. Malloy, 579 Pa. 425, 460, 856 A.2d 767, 788 (2004) (explaining that \u201c \u2018strategic choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable professional judgments supported the limitations on investigation\u2019 \u201d) (quoting Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 2535, 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003)); Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 525, 123 S.Ct. at 2537 (describing counsel\u2019s obligation to discover all reasonably available mitigating evidence); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 396, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1515, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (explaining that counsel has a duty to thoroughly investigate a defendant\u2019s b\u00e1ckground); see also Commonwealth v. Hughes, 581 Pa. 274, 361 n. 56, 865 A.2d 761, 813 n. 56 (2004) (clarifying that the standards outlined in Wiggins and Williams are applicable on collateral review notwithstanding that the underlying trial may have occurred before those cases were decided)."},"case_id":988463,"label":"a"}
{"context":"To the extent that the majority opinion can be construed to suggest that counsel's investigation into some aspects of potential mitigation eliminated the need to thoroughly investigate all reasonably available avenues of mitigation--including such things as life-history mitigation and a mental health evaluation (for which the court had already allocated funds, which went unused)--I note that such a proposition is at odds with the holdings of this Court as well as those of the United States Supreme Court.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"529 U.S. 362, 396","parenthetical":"explaining that counsel has a duty to thoroughly investigate a defendant's background","sentence":"See Commonwealth v. Malloy, 579 Pa. 425, 460, 856 A.2d 767, 788 (2004) (explaining that \u201c \u2018strategic choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable professional judgments supported the limitations on investigation\u2019 \u201d) (quoting Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 2535, 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003)); Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 525, 123 S.Ct. at 2537 (describing counsel\u2019s obligation to discover all reasonably available mitigating evidence); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 396, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1515, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (explaining that counsel has a duty to thoroughly investigate a defendant\u2019s b\u00e1ckground); see also Commonwealth v. Hughes, 581 Pa. 274, 361 n. 56, 865 A.2d 761, 813 n. 56 (2004) (clarifying that the standards outlined in Wiggins and Williams are applicable on collateral review notwithstanding that the underlying trial may have occurred before those cases were decided)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"clarifying that the standards outlined in Wiggins and Williams are applicable on collateral review notwithstanding that the underlying trial may have occurred before those cases were decided","sentence":"See Commonwealth v. Malloy, 579 Pa. 425, 460, 856 A.2d 767, 788 (2004) (explaining that \u201c \u2018strategic choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable professional judgments supported the limitations on investigation\u2019 \u201d) (quoting Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 2535, 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003)); Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 525, 123 S.Ct. at 2537 (describing counsel\u2019s obligation to discover all reasonably available mitigating evidence); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 396, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1515, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (explaining that counsel has a duty to thoroughly investigate a defendant\u2019s b\u00e1ckground); see also Commonwealth v. Hughes, 581 Pa. 274, 361 n. 56, 865 A.2d 761, 813 n. 56 (2004) (clarifying that the standards outlined in Wiggins and Williams are applicable on collateral review notwithstanding that the underlying trial may have occurred before those cases were decided)."},"case_id":988463,"label":"a"}
{"context":"To the extent that the majority opinion can be construed to suggest that counsel's investigation into some aspects of potential mitigation eliminated the need to thoroughly investigate all reasonably available avenues of mitigation--including such things as life-history mitigation and a mental health evaluation (for which the court had already allocated funds, which went unused)--I note that such a proposition is at odds with the holdings of this Court as well as those of the United States Supreme Court.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"120 S.Ct. 1495, 1515","parenthetical":"explaining that counsel has a duty to thoroughly investigate a defendant's background","sentence":"See Commonwealth v. Malloy, 579 Pa. 425, 460, 856 A.2d 767, 788 (2004) (explaining that \u201c \u2018strategic choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable professional judgments supported the limitations on investigation\u2019 \u201d) (quoting Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 2535, 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003)); Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 525, 123 S.Ct. at 2537 (describing counsel\u2019s obligation to discover all reasonably available mitigating evidence); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 396, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1515, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (explaining that counsel has a duty to thoroughly investigate a defendant\u2019s b\u00e1ckground); see also Commonwealth v. Hughes, 581 Pa. 274, 361 n. 56, 865 A.2d 761, 813 n. 56 (2004) (clarifying that the standards outlined in Wiggins and Williams are applicable on collateral review notwithstanding that the underlying trial may have occurred before those cases were decided)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"clarifying that the standards outlined in Wiggins and Williams are applicable on collateral review notwithstanding that the underlying trial may have occurred before those cases were decided","sentence":"See Commonwealth v. Malloy, 579 Pa. 425, 460, 856 A.2d 767, 788 (2004) (explaining that \u201c \u2018strategic choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable professional judgments supported the limitations on investigation\u2019 \u201d) (quoting Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 2535, 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003)); Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 525, 123 S.Ct. at 2537 (describing counsel\u2019s obligation to discover all reasonably available mitigating evidence); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 396, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1515, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (explaining that counsel has a duty to thoroughly investigate a defendant\u2019s b\u00e1ckground); see also Commonwealth v. Hughes, 581 Pa. 274, 361 n. 56, 865 A.2d 761, 813 n. 56 (2004) (clarifying that the standards outlined in Wiggins and Williams are applicable on collateral review notwithstanding that the underlying trial may have occurred before those cases were decided)."},"case_id":988463,"label":"a"}
{"context":"To the extent that the majority opinion can be construed to suggest that counsel's investigation into some aspects of potential mitigation eliminated the need to thoroughly investigate all reasonably available avenues of mitigation--including such things as life-history mitigation and a mental health evaluation (for which the court had already allocated funds, which went unused)--I note that such a proposition is at odds with the holdings of this Court as well as those of the United States Supreme Court.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"clarifying that the standards outlined in Wiggins and Williams are applicable on collateral review notwithstanding that the underlying trial may have occurred before those cases were decided","sentence":"See Commonwealth v. Malloy, 579 Pa. 425, 460, 856 A.2d 767, 788 (2004) (explaining that \u201c \u2018strategic choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable professional judgments supported the limitations on investigation\u2019 \u201d) (quoting Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 2535, 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003)); Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 525, 123 S.Ct. at 2537 (describing counsel\u2019s obligation to discover all reasonably available mitigating evidence); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 396, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1515, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (explaining that counsel has a duty to thoroughly investigate a defendant\u2019s b\u00e1ckground); see also Commonwealth v. Hughes, 581 Pa. 274, 361 n. 56, 865 A.2d 761, 813 n. 56 (2004) (clarifying that the standards outlined in Wiggins and Williams are applicable on collateral review notwithstanding that the underlying trial may have occurred before those cases were decided)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"120 S.Ct. 1495, 1515","parenthetical":"explaining that counsel has a duty to thoroughly investigate a defendant's background","sentence":"See Commonwealth v. Malloy, 579 Pa. 425, 460, 856 A.2d 767, 788 (2004) (explaining that \u201c \u2018strategic choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable professional judgments supported the limitations on investigation\u2019 \u201d) (quoting Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 2535, 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003)); Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 525, 123 S.Ct. at 2537 (describing counsel\u2019s obligation to discover all reasonably available mitigating evidence); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 396, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1515, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (explaining that counsel has a duty to thoroughly investigate a defendant\u2019s b\u00e1ckground); see also Commonwealth v. Hughes, 581 Pa. 274, 361 n. 56, 865 A.2d 761, 813 n. 56 (2004) (clarifying that the standards outlined in Wiggins and Williams are applicable on collateral review notwithstanding that the underlying trial may have occurred before those cases were decided)."},"case_id":988463,"label":"b"}
{"context":"To the extent that the majority opinion can be construed to suggest that counsel's investigation into some aspects of potential mitigation eliminated the need to thoroughly investigate all reasonably available avenues of mitigation--including such things as life-history mitigation and a mental health evaluation (for which the court had already allocated funds, which went unused)--I note that such a proposition is at odds with the holdings of this Court as well as those of the United States Supreme Court.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"clarifying that the standards outlined in Wiggins and Williams are applicable on collateral review notwithstanding that the underlying trial may have occurred before those cases were decided","sentence":"See Commonwealth v. Malloy, 579 Pa. 425, 460, 856 A.2d 767, 788 (2004) (explaining that \u201c \u2018strategic choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable professional judgments supported the limitations on investigation\u2019 \u201d) (quoting Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 2535, 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003)); Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 525, 123 S.Ct. at 2537 (describing counsel\u2019s obligation to discover all reasonably available mitigating evidence); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 396, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1515, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (explaining that counsel has a duty to thoroughly investigate a defendant\u2019s b\u00e1ckground); see also Commonwealth v. Hughes, 581 Pa. 274, 361 n. 56, 865 A.2d 761, 813 n. 56 (2004) (clarifying that the standards outlined in Wiggins and Williams are applicable on collateral review notwithstanding that the underlying trial may have occurred before those cases were decided)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"explaining that counsel has a duty to thoroughly investigate a defendant's background","sentence":"See Commonwealth v. Malloy, 579 Pa. 425, 460, 856 A.2d 767, 788 (2004) (explaining that \u201c \u2018strategic choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable professional judgments supported the limitations on investigation\u2019 \u201d) (quoting Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 2535, 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003)); Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 525, 123 S.Ct. at 2537 (describing counsel\u2019s obligation to discover all reasonably available mitigating evidence); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 396, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1515, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (explaining that counsel has a duty to thoroughly investigate a defendant\u2019s b\u00e1ckground); see also Commonwealth v. Hughes, 581 Pa. 274, 361 n. 56, 865 A.2d 761, 813 n. 56 (2004) (clarifying that the standards outlined in Wiggins and Williams are applicable on collateral review notwithstanding that the underlying trial may have occurred before those cases were decided)."},"case_id":988463,"label":"b"}
{"context":"To the extent that the majority opinion can be construed to suggest that counsel's investigation into some aspects of potential mitigation eliminated the need to thoroughly investigate all reasonably available avenues of mitigation--including such things as life-history mitigation and a mental health evaluation (for which the court had already allocated funds, which went unused)--I note that such a proposition is at odds with the holdings of this Court as well as those of the United States Supreme Court.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"clarifying that the standards outlined in Wiggins and Williams are applicable on collateral review notwithstanding that the underlying trial may have occurred before those cases were decided","sentence":"See Commonwealth v. Malloy, 579 Pa. 425, 460, 856 A.2d 767, 788 (2004) (explaining that \u201c \u2018strategic choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable professional judgments supported the limitations on investigation\u2019 \u201d) (quoting Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 2535, 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003)); Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 525, 123 S.Ct. at 2537 (describing counsel\u2019s obligation to discover all reasonably available mitigating evidence); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 396, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1515, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (explaining that counsel has a duty to thoroughly investigate a defendant\u2019s b\u00e1ckground); see also Commonwealth v. Hughes, 581 Pa. 274, 361 n. 56, 865 A.2d 761, 813 n. 56 (2004) (clarifying that the standards outlined in Wiggins and Williams are applicable on collateral review notwithstanding that the underlying trial may have occurred before those cases were decided)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"explaining that counsel has a duty to thoroughly investigate a defendant's background","sentence":"See Commonwealth v. Malloy, 579 Pa. 425, 460, 856 A.2d 767, 788 (2004) (explaining that \u201c \u2018strategic choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable professional judgments supported the limitations on investigation\u2019 \u201d) (quoting Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 2535, 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003)); Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 525, 123 S.Ct. at 2537 (describing counsel\u2019s obligation to discover all reasonably available mitigating evidence); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 396, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1515, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (explaining that counsel has a duty to thoroughly investigate a defendant\u2019s b\u00e1ckground); see also Commonwealth v. Hughes, 581 Pa. 274, 361 n. 56, 865 A.2d 761, 813 n. 56 (2004) (clarifying that the standards outlined in Wiggins and Williams are applicable on collateral review notwithstanding that the underlying trial may have occurred before those cases were decided)."},"case_id":988463,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Had the alcohol offenses not been dismissed, we would have no hesitation in concluding, beyond a reasonable doubt, that this 28-year-old airman engaged in conduct prejudicial to good order and discipline or discrediting to the service when he plied underage females with alcohol on base, particularly as a prelude to seducing one of them, even though the trial judge did not specifically instruct on that element when defining the assimilated alcohol offenses.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"17 M.J. 207, 216","parenthetical":"implies Article 134 clause one or two lesser-included offense only available when instructed upon","sentence":"But see United States v. Williams, 17 M.J. 207, 216 (C.M.A.1984) (implies Article 134 clause one or two lesser-included offense only available when instructed upon)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"flawed specification prosecuted as violation of U.S.Code supported conviction of included offense of conduct prejudicial to good order and discipline","sentence":"Cf. United States v. Mayo, 12 M.J. 286 (C.M.A.1982) (flawed specification prosecuted as violation of U.S.Code supported conviction of included offense of conduct prejudicial to good order and discipline)."},"case_id":900117,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Such protection is essential to the efficacy of the mission of our military penal institutions. All USDB cadre, including cooks, while performing their USDB duties which include providing for the custody, control, and discipline of USDB inmates, should benefit from this protection.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"927 F.2d 1005, 1008","parenthetical":"holding that \"the district court did not err in instructing the jury that the duties of a federal prison employee, even a food service worker, extend to 'safekeeping, protection and discipline.' \"","sentence":"See United States v. Green, 927 F.2d 1005, 1008 (7th Cir.1991) (holding that \u201cthe district court did not err in instructing the jury that the duties of a federal prison employee, even a food service worker, ext\u00e9nd to \u2018safekeeping, protection and discipline.\u2019 \u201d); but see United States v. Walker, 202 F.3d 181, 190 (3d Cir.2000) (holding that a cook supervisor was not a \u201ccorrections officer\u201d for purposes of the sentence enhancing provisions under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual, \u00a7 3A1.2(b))."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"202 F.3d 181, 190","parenthetical":"holding that a cook supervisor was not a \"corrections officer\" for purposes of the sentence enhancing provisions under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual, SS 3A1.2(b","sentence":"See United States v. Green, 927 F.2d 1005, 1008 (7th Cir.1991) (holding that \u201cthe district court did not err in instructing the jury that the duties of a federal prison employee, even a food service worker, ext\u00e9nd to \u2018safekeeping, protection and discipline.\u2019 \u201d); but see United States v. Walker, 202 F.3d 181, 190 (3d Cir.2000) (holding that a cook supervisor was not a \u201ccorrections officer\u201d for purposes of the sentence enhancing provisions under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual, \u00a7 3A1.2(b))."},"case_id":315125,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The State did not raise the issue of Sonsel's character and the justification theory of self-defense does not inquire into, as an essential element, the character of the victim. Thus, specific instances of Sonsel's conduct were not admissible to prove character.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"533 S.W.2d 27, 29","parenthetical":"in prosecution for murder, it is not admissible to show victim's character by isolated acts","sentence":"See Tex.Penal Code Ann. \u00a7 9.31 (Vernon 1974) (self-defense); Hatley v. State, 533 S.W.2d 27, 29 (Tex.Crim.App.1976) (in prosecution for murder, it is not admissible to show victim\u2019s character by isolated acts); see also Purtell v. State, 761 S.W.2d 360 (Tex.Crim.App.1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1059, 109 S.Ct. 1972, 104 L.Ed.2d 441 (1989) (murder victim\u2019s character was not essential element of capital murder or defense). This point of error is overruled."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"murder victim's character was not essential element of capital murder or defense","sentence":"See Tex.Penal Code Ann. \u00a7 9.31 (Vernon 1974) (self-defense); Hatley v. State, 533 S.W.2d 27, 29 (Tex.Crim.App.1976) (in prosecution for murder, it is not admissible to show victim\u2019s character by isolated acts); see also Purtell v. State, 761 S.W.2d 360 (Tex.Crim.App.1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1059, 109 S.Ct. 1972, 104 L.Ed.2d 441 (1989) (murder victim\u2019s character was not essential element of capital murder or defense). This point of error is overruled."},"case_id":10006579,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The State did not raise the issue of Sonsel's character and the justification theory of self-defense does not inquire into, as an essential element, the character of the victim. Thus, specific instances of Sonsel's conduct were not admissible to prove character.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"murder victim's character was not essential element of capital murder or defense","sentence":"See Tex.Penal Code Ann. \u00a7 9.31 (Vernon 1974) (self-defense); Hatley v. State, 533 S.W.2d 27, 29 (Tex.Crim.App.1976) (in prosecution for murder, it is not admissible to show victim\u2019s character by isolated acts); see also Purtell v. State, 761 S.W.2d 360 (Tex.Crim.App.1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1059, 109 S.Ct. 1972, 104 L.Ed.2d 441 (1989) (murder victim\u2019s character was not essential element of capital murder or defense). This point of error is overruled."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"533 S.W.2d 27, 29","parenthetical":"in prosecution for murder, it is not admissible to show victim's character by isolated acts","sentence":"See Tex.Penal Code Ann. \u00a7 9.31 (Vernon 1974) (self-defense); Hatley v. State, 533 S.W.2d 27, 29 (Tex.Crim.App.1976) (in prosecution for murder, it is not admissible to show victim\u2019s character by isolated acts); see also Purtell v. State, 761 S.W.2d 360 (Tex.Crim.App.1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1059, 109 S.Ct. 1972, 104 L.Ed.2d 441 (1989) (murder victim\u2019s character was not essential element of capital murder or defense). This point of error is overruled."},"case_id":10006579,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The State did not raise the issue of Sonsel's character and the justification theory of self-defense does not inquire into, as an essential element, the character of the victim. Thus, specific instances of Sonsel's conduct were not admissible to prove character.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"murder victim's character was not essential element of capital murder or defense","sentence":"See Tex.Penal Code Ann. \u00a7 9.31 (Vernon 1974) (self-defense); Hatley v. State, 533 S.W.2d 27, 29 (Tex.Crim.App.1976) (in prosecution for murder, it is not admissible to show victim\u2019s character by isolated acts); see also Purtell v. State, 761 S.W.2d 360 (Tex.Crim.App.1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1059, 109 S.Ct. 1972, 104 L.Ed.2d 441 (1989) (murder victim\u2019s character was not essential element of capital murder or defense). This point of error is overruled."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"533 S.W.2d 27, 29","parenthetical":"in prosecution for murder, it is not admissible to show victim's character by isolated acts","sentence":"See Tex.Penal Code Ann. \u00a7 9.31 (Vernon 1974) (self-defense); Hatley v. State, 533 S.W.2d 27, 29 (Tex.Crim.App.1976) (in prosecution for murder, it is not admissible to show victim\u2019s character by isolated acts); see also Purtell v. State, 761 S.W.2d 360 (Tex.Crim.App.1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1059, 109 S.Ct. 1972, 104 L.Ed.2d 441 (1989) (murder victim\u2019s character was not essential element of capital murder or defense). This point of error is overruled."},"case_id":10006579,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The State did not raise the issue of Sonsel's character and the justification theory of self-defense does not inquire into, as an essential element, the character of the victim. Thus, specific instances of Sonsel's conduct were not admissible to prove character.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"murder victim's character was not essential element of capital murder or defense","sentence":"See Tex.Penal Code Ann. \u00a7 9.31 (Vernon 1974) (self-defense); Hatley v. State, 533 S.W.2d 27, 29 (Tex.Crim.App.1976) (in prosecution for murder, it is not admissible to show victim\u2019s character by isolated acts); see also Purtell v. State, 761 S.W.2d 360 (Tex.Crim.App.1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1059, 109 S.Ct. 1972, 104 L.Ed.2d 441 (1989) (murder victim\u2019s character was not essential element of capital murder or defense). This point of error is overruled."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"533 S.W.2d 27, 29","parenthetical":"in prosecution for murder, it is not admissible to show victim's character by isolated acts","sentence":"See Tex.Penal Code Ann. \u00a7 9.31 (Vernon 1974) (self-defense); Hatley v. State, 533 S.W.2d 27, 29 (Tex.Crim.App.1976) (in prosecution for murder, it is not admissible to show victim\u2019s character by isolated acts); see also Purtell v. State, 761 S.W.2d 360 (Tex.Crim.App.1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1059, 109 S.Ct. 1972, 104 L.Ed.2d 441 (1989) (murder victim\u2019s character was not essential element of capital murder or defense). This point of error is overruled."},"case_id":10006579,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Other circuits have rejected \"bare corporate receipt\" as sufficient proof of access, requiring plaintiffs to introduce some evidence that it was \"reasonably possible that the paths of the infringer and the infringed work crossed.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"76 F.3d 579, 583","parenthetical":"requiring a \"close relationship\" for the corporate receipt doctrine to apply","sentence":"Towler v. Sayles, 76 F.3d 579, 583 (4th Cir.1996) (requiring a \u201cclose relationship\u201d for the corporate receipt doctrine to apply); see also Jorgensen v. Epic\/Sony Records, 351 F.3d 46, 48 (2d Cir.2003) (\u201c[B]are corporate receipt ..., without any allegation of a nexus between the recipients and the alleged infringers, is insufficient to raise a triable issue of access.\u201d); Moore, 972 F.2d at 942 (a \u201cbare possibility\u201d of access is not enough; rather, a plaintiff must show that the defendant had a \u201creasonable possibility\u201d of viewing his work)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"351 F.3d 46, 48","parenthetical":"\"[B]are corporate receipt ..., without any allegation of a nexus between the recipients and the alleged infringers, is insufficient to raise a triable issue of access.\"","sentence":"Towler v. Sayles, 76 F.3d 579, 583 (4th Cir.1996) (requiring a \u201cclose relationship\u201d for the corporate receipt doctrine to apply); see also Jorgensen v. Epic\/Sony Records, 351 F.3d 46, 48 (2d Cir.2003) (\u201c[B]are corporate receipt ..., without any allegation of a nexus between the recipients and the alleged infringers, is insufficient to raise a triable issue of access.\u201d); Moore, 972 F.2d at 942 (a \u201cbare possibility\u201d of access is not enough; rather, a plaintiff must show that the defendant had a \u201creasonable possibility\u201d of viewing his work)."},"case_id":3360725,"label":"a"}
{"context":"And the Sixth Circuit was not alone. Other courts of appeals that considered this issue before Davis also limited the good-faith exception to binding appellate precedent.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"332 F.3d 1070, 1075-76","parenthetical":"expressing concern that an extension of the good-faith exception to subsequently overruled case law might be \"an implicit invitation to officers in the field to engage in the tasks -- better left to the judiciary and members of the bar more generally -- of legal research and analysis\"","sentence":"See Davis, 598 F.3d at 1266; United States v. McCane, 573 F.3d 1037, 1045 n. 6 (10th Cir.2009) (applying the good-faith exception because \u201cthe Tenth Circuit jurisprudence supporting the search was settled\u201d); United States v. Jackson, 825 F.2d 853, 866 (5th Cir.1987) (holding that the exclusionary rule \u201cshould not be applied to searches which relied on Fifth Circuit law\u201d that was subsequently overturned); cf. United States v. Real Prop. Located at 15324 Cnty. Highway E., 332 F.3d 1070, 1075-76 (7th Cir.2003) (expressing concern that an extension of the good-faith exception to subsequently overruled case law might be \u201can implicit invitation to officers in the field to engage in the tasks \u2014 better left to the judiciary and members of the bar more generally \u2014 of legal research and analysis\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"applying the good-faith exception because \"the Tenth Circuit jurisprudence supporting the search was settled\"","sentence":"See Davis, 598 F.3d at 1266; United States v. McCane, 573 F.3d 1037, 1045 n. 6 (10th Cir.2009) (applying the good-faith exception because \u201cthe Tenth Circuit jurisprudence supporting the search was settled\u201d); United States v. Jackson, 825 F.2d 853, 866 (5th Cir.1987) (holding that the exclusionary rule \u201cshould not be applied to searches which relied on Fifth Circuit law\u201d that was subsequently overturned); cf. United States v. Real Prop. Located at 15324 Cnty. Highway E., 332 F.3d 1070, 1075-76 (7th Cir.2003) (expressing concern that an extension of the good-faith exception to subsequently overruled case law might be \u201can implicit invitation to officers in the field to engage in the tasks \u2014 better left to the judiciary and members of the bar more generally \u2014 of legal research and analysis\u201d)."},"case_id":3995852,"label":"b"}
{"context":"While not the holding of the case, such language strongly implies that a passing reference to a party's death in a document that was not filed for the purpose of notifying the litigants of the death is not sufficient to start the ninety-day time period set forth in rule 1.260(a)(1). Federal courts hold similarly.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"45 F.R.D. 470, 471","parenthetical":"concluding that statement made in passing during a deposition regarding a defendant's death is not a suggestion of death and explaining that \"[w]hen the consequences to the client of a slightly delayed reaction may be severe and the burden of providing formal notice is slight, insistence on the observance of procedural ritual is justified\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Grandbouche v. Lovell, 913 F.2d 835, 836-37 (10th Cir. 1990) (holding that the ninety-day time period under the federal rule \u201cis not triggered unless a formal suggestion of death is made on the record, regardless of whether the parties have knowledge of a party\u2019s death\u201d and that \u201c[m]ere reference to a party\u2019s death in court proceedings or pleadings is not sufficient to trigger the limitations period for filing a motion for substitution\u201d); United States v. Miller Bros. Constr. Co., 505 F.2d 1031, 1034-35 (10th Cir. 1974) (rejecting argument that formal suggestion of death was unnecessary in order to start the ninety-day time period for filing a motion to substitute); cf. Dolgow v. Anderson, 45 F.R.D. 470, 471 (E.D.N.Y. 1968) (concluding that statement made in passing during a deposition regarding a defendant\u2019s death is not a suggestion of death and explaining that \u201c[w]hen the consequences to the client of a slightly delayed reaction may be severe and the burden of providing formal notice is slight, insistence on the observance of procedural ritual is justified\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"913 F.2d 835, 836-37","parenthetical":"holding that the ninety-day time period under the federal rule \"is not triggered unless a formal suggestion of death is made on the record, regardless of whether the parties have knowledge of a party's death\" and that \"[m]ere reference to a party's death in court proceedings or pleadings is not sufficient to trigger the limitations period for filing a motion for substitution\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Grandbouche v. Lovell, 913 F.2d 835, 836-37 (10th Cir. 1990) (holding that the ninety-day time period under the federal rule \u201cis not triggered unless a formal suggestion of death is made on the record, regardless of whether the parties have knowledge of a party\u2019s death\u201d and that \u201c[m]ere reference to a party\u2019s death in court proceedings or pleadings is not sufficient to trigger the limitations period for filing a motion for substitution\u201d); United States v. Miller Bros. Constr. Co., 505 F.2d 1031, 1034-35 (10th Cir. 1974) (rejecting argument that formal suggestion of death was unnecessary in order to start the ninety-day time period for filing a motion to substitute); cf. Dolgow v. Anderson, 45 F.R.D. 470, 471 (E.D.N.Y. 1968) (concluding that statement made in passing during a deposition regarding a defendant\u2019s death is not a suggestion of death and explaining that \u201c[w]hen the consequences to the client of a slightly delayed reaction may be severe and the burden of providing formal notice is slight, insistence on the observance of procedural ritual is justified\u201d)."},"case_id":12379948,"label":"b"}
{"context":"While not the holding of the case, such language strongly implies that a passing reference to a party's death in a document that was not filed for the purpose of notifying the litigants of the death is not sufficient to start the ninety-day time period set forth in rule 1.260(a)(1). Federal courts hold similarly.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"505 F.2d 1031, 1034-35","parenthetical":"rejecting argument that formal suggestion of death was unnecessary in order to start the ninety-day time period for filing a motion to substitute","sentence":"See, e.g., Grandbouche v. Lovell, 913 F.2d 835, 836-37 (10th Cir. 1990) (holding that the ninety-day time period under the federal rule \u201cis not triggered unless a formal suggestion of death is made on the record, regardless of whether the parties have knowledge of a party\u2019s death\u201d and that \u201c[m]ere reference to a party\u2019s death in court proceedings or pleadings is not sufficient to trigger the limitations period for filing a motion for substitution\u201d); United States v. Miller Bros. Constr. Co., 505 F.2d 1031, 1034-35 (10th Cir. 1974) (rejecting argument that formal suggestion of death was unnecessary in order to start the ninety-day time period for filing a motion to substitute); cf. Dolgow v. Anderson, 45 F.R.D. 470, 471 (E.D.N.Y. 1968) (concluding that statement made in passing during a deposition regarding a defendant\u2019s death is not a suggestion of death and explaining that \u201c[w]hen the consequences to the client of a slightly delayed reaction may be severe and the burden of providing formal notice is slight, insistence on the observance of procedural ritual is justified\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"45 F.R.D. 470, 471","parenthetical":"concluding that statement made in passing during a deposition regarding a defendant's death is not a suggestion of death and explaining that \"[w]hen the consequences to the client of a slightly delayed reaction may be severe and the burden of providing formal notice is slight, insistence on the observance of procedural ritual is justified\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Grandbouche v. Lovell, 913 F.2d 835, 836-37 (10th Cir. 1990) (holding that the ninety-day time period under the federal rule \u201cis not triggered unless a formal suggestion of death is made on the record, regardless of whether the parties have knowledge of a party\u2019s death\u201d and that \u201c[m]ere reference to a party\u2019s death in court proceedings or pleadings is not sufficient to trigger the limitations period for filing a motion for substitution\u201d); United States v. Miller Bros. Constr. Co., 505 F.2d 1031, 1034-35 (10th Cir. 1974) (rejecting argument that formal suggestion of death was unnecessary in order to start the ninety-day time period for filing a motion to substitute); cf. Dolgow v. Anderson, 45 F.R.D. 470, 471 (E.D.N.Y. 1968) (concluding that statement made in passing during a deposition regarding a defendant\u2019s death is not a suggestion of death and explaining that \u201c[w]hen the consequences to the client of a slightly delayed reaction may be severe and the burden of providing formal notice is slight, insistence on the observance of procedural ritual is justified\u201d)."},"case_id":12379948,"label":"a"}
{"context":"However, a party may not raise arguments for the first time in a Rule 28(j) letter. Cramer did not seek permission to file a supplemental brief properly raising the Blakely issue.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[B]ecause [defendant] did not ask to file a brief raising a proper Blakely challenge, we do not consider the matter further.\"","sentence":"See United States v. Lindsey, 389 F.3d 1334, 1336 n. 1 (10th Cir.2004) (refusing to address Blakely issue raised only in Rule 28(j) letter); see also United States v. Maldonado-Ramires, 384 F.3d 1228, 1230 n. 1 (10th Cir.2004) (\"[B]ecause [defendant] did not ask to file a brief raising a proper Blakely challenge, we do not consider the matter further.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"refusing to address Blakely issue raised only in Rule 28(j","sentence":"See United States v. Lindsey, 389 F.3d 1334, 1336 n. 1 (10th Cir.2004) (refusing to address Blakely issue raised only in Rule 28(j) letter); see also United States v. Maldonado-Ramires, 384 F.3d 1228, 1230 n. 1 (10th Cir.2004) (\"[B]ecause [defendant] did not ask to file a brief raising a proper Blakely challenge, we do not consider the matter further.\u201d)."},"case_id":9037257,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Generally, an agency's interpretation of its own ambiguous regulation is \"controlling\" unless \"plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.\" This deference is inappropriate, however, where the interpretation is a novel litigating position \"wholly unsupported by regulations, rulings, or administrative practice.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"519 U.S. 462, 462","parenthetical":"stating that a \"post hoc rationalization\" that does not represent the \"agency's fair and considered judgment on the matter in question\" is not entitled to deference","sentence":"Brown v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 212, 109 S.Ct. 468, 102 L.Ed.2d 493 (1988) (explaining that \u201c[d]eference to what appears to be nothing more than an agency\u2019s convenient litigating position would be entirely inappropriate\u201d); see also Auer, 519 U.S. at 462, 117 S.Ct. 905 (stating that a \u201cpost hoc rationalization\u201d that does not represent the \u201cagency\u2019s fair and considered judgment on the matter in question\u201d is not entitled to deference); Belt, 444 F.3d at 415."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"488 U.S. 204, 212","parenthetical":"explaining that \"[d]eference to what appears to be nothing more than an agency's convenient litigating position would be entirely inappropriate\"","sentence":"Brown v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 212, 109 S.Ct. 468, 102 L.Ed.2d 493 (1988) (explaining that \u201c[d]eference to what appears to be nothing more than an agency\u2019s convenient litigating position would be entirely inappropriate\u201d); see also Auer, 519 U.S. at 462, 117 S.Ct. 905 (stating that a \u201cpost hoc rationalization\u201d that does not represent the \u201cagency\u2019s fair and considered judgment on the matter in question\u201d is not entitled to deference); Belt, 444 F.3d at 415."},"case_id":3700542,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Generally, an agency's interpretation of its own ambiguous regulation is \"controlling\" unless \"plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.\" This deference is inappropriate, however, where the interpretation is a novel litigating position \"wholly unsupported by regulations, rulings, or administrative practice.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"stating that a \"post hoc rationalization\" that does not represent the \"agency's fair and considered judgment on the matter in question\" is not entitled to deference","sentence":"Brown v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 212, 109 S.Ct. 468, 102 L.Ed.2d 493 (1988) (explaining that \u201c[d]eference to what appears to be nothing more than an agency\u2019s convenient litigating position would be entirely inappropriate\u201d); see also Auer, 519 U.S. at 462, 117 S.Ct. 905 (stating that a \u201cpost hoc rationalization\u201d that does not represent the \u201cagency\u2019s fair and considered judgment on the matter in question\u201d is not entitled to deference); Belt, 444 F.3d at 415."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"488 U.S. 204, 212","parenthetical":"explaining that \"[d]eference to what appears to be nothing more than an agency's convenient litigating position would be entirely inappropriate\"","sentence":"Brown v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 212, 109 S.Ct. 468, 102 L.Ed.2d 493 (1988) (explaining that \u201c[d]eference to what appears to be nothing more than an agency\u2019s convenient litigating position would be entirely inappropriate\u201d); see also Auer, 519 U.S. at 462, 117 S.Ct. 905 (stating that a \u201cpost hoc rationalization\u201d that does not represent the \u201cagency\u2019s fair and considered judgment on the matter in question\u201d is not entitled to deference); Belt, 444 F.3d at 415."},"case_id":3700542,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Generally, an agency's interpretation of its own ambiguous regulation is \"controlling\" unless \"plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.\" This deference is inappropriate, however, where the interpretation is a novel litigating position \"wholly unsupported by regulations, rulings, or administrative practice.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"explaining that \"[d]eference to what appears to be nothing more than an agency's convenient litigating position would be entirely inappropriate\"","sentence":"Brown v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 212, 109 S.Ct. 468, 102 L.Ed.2d 493 (1988) (explaining that \u201c[d]eference to what appears to be nothing more than an agency\u2019s convenient litigating position would be entirely inappropriate\u201d); see also Auer, 519 U.S. at 462, 117 S.Ct. 905 (stating that a \u201cpost hoc rationalization\u201d that does not represent the \u201cagency\u2019s fair and considered judgment on the matter in question\u201d is not entitled to deference); Belt, 444 F.3d at 415."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"519 U.S. 462, 462","parenthetical":"stating that a \"post hoc rationalization\" that does not represent the \"agency's fair and considered judgment on the matter in question\" is not entitled to deference","sentence":"Brown v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 212, 109 S.Ct. 468, 102 L.Ed.2d 493 (1988) (explaining that \u201c[d]eference to what appears to be nothing more than an agency\u2019s convenient litigating position would be entirely inappropriate\u201d); see also Auer, 519 U.S. at 462, 117 S.Ct. 905 (stating that a \u201cpost hoc rationalization\u201d that does not represent the \u201cagency\u2019s fair and considered judgment on the matter in question\u201d is not entitled to deference); Belt, 444 F.3d at 415."},"case_id":3700542,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Generally, an agency's interpretation of its own ambiguous regulation is \"controlling\" unless \"plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.\" This deference is inappropriate, however, where the interpretation is a novel litigating position \"wholly unsupported by regulations, rulings, or administrative practice.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"explaining that \"[d]eference to what appears to be nothing more than an agency's convenient litigating position would be entirely inappropriate\"","sentence":"Brown v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 212, 109 S.Ct. 468, 102 L.Ed.2d 493 (1988) (explaining that \u201c[d]eference to what appears to be nothing more than an agency\u2019s convenient litigating position would be entirely inappropriate\u201d); see also Auer, 519 U.S. at 462, 117 S.Ct. 905 (stating that a \u201cpost hoc rationalization\u201d that does not represent the \u201cagency\u2019s fair and considered judgment on the matter in question\u201d is not entitled to deference); Belt, 444 F.3d at 415."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"stating that a \"post hoc rationalization\" that does not represent the \"agency's fair and considered judgment on the matter in question\" is not entitled to deference","sentence":"Brown v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 212, 109 S.Ct. 468, 102 L.Ed.2d 493 (1988) (explaining that \u201c[d]eference to what appears to be nothing more than an agency\u2019s convenient litigating position would be entirely inappropriate\u201d); see also Auer, 519 U.S. at 462, 117 S.Ct. 905 (stating that a \u201cpost hoc rationalization\u201d that does not represent the \u201cagency\u2019s fair and considered judgment on the matter in question\u201d is not entitled to deference); Belt, 444 F.3d at 415."},"case_id":3700542,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Generally, an agency's interpretation of its own ambiguous regulation is \"controlling\" unless \"plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.\" This deference is inappropriate, however, where the interpretation is a novel litigating position \"wholly unsupported by regulations, rulings, or administrative practice.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"519 U.S. 462, 462","parenthetical":"stating that a \"post hoc rationalization\" that does not represent the \"agency's fair and considered judgment on the matter in question\" is not entitled to deference","sentence":"Brown v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 212, 109 S.Ct. 468, 102 L.Ed.2d 493 (1988) (explaining that \u201c[d]eference to what appears to be nothing more than an agency\u2019s convenient litigating position would be entirely inappropriate\u201d); see also Auer, 519 U.S. at 462, 117 S.Ct. 905 (stating that a \u201cpost hoc rationalization\u201d that does not represent the \u201cagency\u2019s fair and considered judgment on the matter in question\u201d is not entitled to deference); Belt, 444 F.3d at 415."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"explaining that \"[d]eference to what appears to be nothing more than an agency's convenient litigating position would be entirely inappropriate\"","sentence":"Brown v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 212, 109 S.Ct. 468, 102 L.Ed.2d 493 (1988) (explaining that \u201c[d]eference to what appears to be nothing more than an agency\u2019s convenient litigating position would be entirely inappropriate\u201d); see also Auer, 519 U.S. at 462, 117 S.Ct. 905 (stating that a \u201cpost hoc rationalization\u201d that does not represent the \u201cagency\u2019s fair and considered judgment on the matter in question\u201d is not entitled to deference); Belt, 444 F.3d at 415."},"case_id":3700542,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Generally, an agency's interpretation of its own ambiguous regulation is \"controlling\" unless \"plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.\" This deference is inappropriate, however, where the interpretation is a novel litigating position \"wholly unsupported by regulations, rulings, or administrative practice.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"stating that a \"post hoc rationalization\" that does not represent the \"agency's fair and considered judgment on the matter in question\" is not entitled to deference","sentence":"Brown v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 212, 109 S.Ct. 468, 102 L.Ed.2d 493 (1988) (explaining that \u201c[d]eference to what appears to be nothing more than an agency\u2019s convenient litigating position would be entirely inappropriate\u201d); see also Auer, 519 U.S. at 462, 117 S.Ct. 905 (stating that a \u201cpost hoc rationalization\u201d that does not represent the \u201cagency\u2019s fair and considered judgment on the matter in question\u201d is not entitled to deference); Belt, 444 F.3d at 415."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"explaining that \"[d]eference to what appears to be nothing more than an agency's convenient litigating position would be entirely inappropriate\"","sentence":"Brown v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 212, 109 S.Ct. 468, 102 L.Ed.2d 493 (1988) (explaining that \u201c[d]eference to what appears to be nothing more than an agency\u2019s convenient litigating position would be entirely inappropriate\u201d); see also Auer, 519 U.S. at 462, 117 S.Ct. 905 (stating that a \u201cpost hoc rationalization\u201d that does not represent the \u201cagency\u2019s fair and considered judgment on the matter in question\u201d is not entitled to deference); Belt, 444 F.3d at 415."},"case_id":3700542,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The first argument is quickly disposed of. First, criminal facilitation in Tennessee requires the government to show that the underlying crime actually occurred.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"1994 WL 51420, at *2","parenthetical":"hold-ing that \"there is no offense of facilitation apart from the specific felony committed by the acts of facilitation\"","sentence":"See Parker, 932 S.W.2d at 951 (holding that, for facilitation of a felony, \u201cthe state must prove the commission of a specified felony and the assistance the accused gave to the person committing the specified felony\u201d)(fodtnote omitted); see also State v. Virges, No. 02C01-9206-CR-00124, 1994 WL 51420, at *2 (Tenn.Cr.App.1994)(hold-ing that \u201cthere is no offense of facilitation apart from the specific felony committed by the acts of facilitation\u201d). The specific felony therefore constitutes \u201can element\u201d that can be examined by the court."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"932 S.W.2d 951, 951","parenthetical":"holding that, for facilitation of a felony, \"the state must prove the commission of a specified felony and the assistance the accused gave to the person committing the specified felony\"","sentence":"See Parker, 932 S.W.2d at 951 (holding that, for facilitation of a felony, \u201cthe state must prove the commission of a specified felony and the assistance the accused gave to the person committing the specified felony\u201d)(fodtnote omitted); see also State v. Virges, No. 02C01-9206-CR-00124, 1994 WL 51420, at *2 (Tenn.Cr.App.1994)(hold-ing that \u201cthere is no offense of facilitation apart from the specific felony committed by the acts of facilitation\u201d). The specific felony therefore constitutes \u201can element\u201d that can be examined by the court."},"case_id":8957203,"label":"b"}
{"context":"We agree with Turnage that the postconviction court's formulation of the second Larrison prong was erroneous insofar as it seemed to focus its inquiry on whether there was sufficient evidence to convict Turnage even without Quantez's testimony. Under the second Larrison prong, the court is to ask whether the petitioner has demonstrated \"that without the [recanting witness's] testimony, the jury might have reached a different conclusion.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"680 N.W.2d 96, 96","parenthetical":"affirming the postconviction court's holding that second prong not met because \"even without [the recanting witness's] testimony, the strength of the other evidence presented at trial was such that the jury would not likely have reached a different conclusion\"","sentence":"Williams, 692 N.W.2d at 896; see also Hooper, 680 N.W.2d at 96 (affirming the postconviction court\u2019s holding that second prong not met because \u201ceven without [the recanting witness\u2019s] testimony, the strength of the other evidence presented at trial was such that the jury would not likely have reached a different conclusion\u201d); cf. Opsahl II, 677 N.W.2d at 424 (holding that second prong was met because of the seven witnesses who testified for the state in a largely circumstantial case, the testimony of five of them was either formally recanted or otherwise called into doubt in postconviction proceedings)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"677 N.W.2d 424, 424","parenthetical":"holding that second prong was met because of the seven witnesses who testified for the state in a largely circumstantial case, the testimony of five of them was either formally recanted or otherwise called into doubt in postconviction proceedings","sentence":"Williams, 692 N.W.2d at 896; see also Hooper, 680 N.W.2d at 96 (affirming the postconviction court\u2019s holding that second prong not met because \u201ceven without [the recanting witness\u2019s] testimony, the strength of the other evidence presented at trial was such that the jury would not likely have reached a different conclusion\u201d); cf. Opsahl II, 677 N.W.2d at 424 (holding that second prong was met because of the seven witnesses who testified for the state in a largely circumstantial case, the testimony of five of them was either formally recanted or otherwise called into doubt in postconviction proceedings)."},"case_id":8329016,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Fourth, Fulwood is entitled to qualified immunity for Redmond's allegation of bias arising from the nature of his crime because there is no clearly established right for parole-eligible prisoners to be treated equally in the parole process regardless of the nature or seriousness of their crimes. Indeed, Parole Commissioners are expected to grant parole only when there is a \"reasonable probability\" that (i) the prisoner \"will live and remain at liberty without violating the law,\" (ii) \"his or her release is not incompatible with the welfare of society,\" and (iii) \"he or she has served the minimum sentence imposed or the prescribed portion of his or her sentence[.]\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"341 Fed.Appx. 173, 174","parenthetical":"\"The District of Columbia's parole regime * * * is entirely discretionary[.]\"","sentence":"See McRae v. Hyman, 667 A.2d 1356, 1357 (D.C. 1995) (\u201cThe District\u2019s parole scheme confers discretion to grant or deny parole[.]\u201d); see also Gooding v. Marberry, 341 Fed.Appx. 173, 174 (7th Cir. 2009) (\u201cThe District of Columbia\u2019s parole regime * * * is entirely discretionary[.]\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"667 A.2d 1356, 1357","parenthetical":"\"The District's parole scheme confers discretion to grant or deny parole[.]\"","sentence":"See McRae v. Hyman, 667 A.2d 1356, 1357 (D.C. 1995) (\u201cThe District\u2019s parole scheme confers discretion to grant or deny parole[.]\u201d); see also Gooding v. Marberry, 341 Fed.Appx. 173, 174 (7th Cir. 2009) (\u201cThe District of Columbia\u2019s parole regime * * * is entirely discretionary[.]\u201d)."},"case_id":12276251,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Nevertheless, plaintiffs claimed inability to work must be substantiated by objective medical evidence. Jackson v. New York City Trans.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"2011 WL 6034462, at *8","parenthetical":"no 90\/180 showing where \"[pjlaintiff did not submit any medical evidence that she [wa]s unable to conduct ordinary activities or must restrict her physical activities in any way.\"","sentence":"Auth., 273 A.D.2d 200, 708 N.Y.S.2d 469, 470 (2000) (\u201c[Pjlaintiffs self-serving affidavit stating that she was unable to return to work ... without a physician\u2019s affidavit substantiating the existence of a medically determined injury which caused the alleged limitation of her activities [i]s insufficient\u201d to make out a 90\/180 claim); see also Tenzen, 2011 WL 6034462 at *8 (no 90\/180 showing where \u201c[pjlaintiff did not submit any medical evidence that she [wa]s unable to conduct ordinary activities or must restrict her physical activities in any way.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[Pjlaintiffs self-serving affidavit stating that she was unable to return to work ... without a physician's affidavit substantiating the existence of a medically determined injury which caused the alleged limitation of her activities [i]s insufficient\" to make out a 90\/180 claim","sentence":"Auth., 273 A.D.2d 200, 708 N.Y.S.2d 469, 470 (2000) (\u201c[Pjlaintiffs self-serving affidavit stating that she was unable to return to work ... without a physician\u2019s affidavit substantiating the existence of a medically determined injury which caused the alleged limitation of her activities [i]s insufficient\u201d to make out a 90\/180 claim); see also Tenzen, 2011 WL 6034462 at *8 (no 90\/180 showing where \u201c[pjlaintiff did not submit any medical evidence that she [wa]s unable to conduct ordinary activities or must restrict her physical activities in any way.\u201d)."},"case_id":4020275,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Nevertheless, plaintiffs claimed inability to work must be substantiated by objective medical evidence. Jackson v. New York City Trans.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"2011 WL 6034462, at *8","parenthetical":"no 90\/180 showing where \"[pjlaintiff did not submit any medical evidence that she [wa]s unable to conduct ordinary activities or must restrict her physical activities in any way.\"","sentence":"Auth., 273 A.D.2d 200, 708 N.Y.S.2d 469, 470 (2000) (\u201c[Pjlaintiffs self-serving affidavit stating that she was unable to return to work ... without a physician\u2019s affidavit substantiating the existence of a medically determined injury which caused the alleged limitation of her activities [i]s insufficient\u201d to make out a 90\/180 claim); see also Tenzen, 2011 WL 6034462 at *8 (no 90\/180 showing where \u201c[pjlaintiff did not submit any medical evidence that she [wa]s unable to conduct ordinary activities or must restrict her physical activities in any way.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"708 N.Y.S.2d 469, 470","parenthetical":"\"[Pjlaintiffs self-serving affidavit stating that she was unable to return to work ... without a physician's affidavit substantiating the existence of a medically determined injury which caused the alleged limitation of her activities [i]s insufficient\" to make out a 90\/180 claim","sentence":"Auth., 273 A.D.2d 200, 708 N.Y.S.2d 469, 470 (2000) (\u201c[Pjlaintiffs self-serving affidavit stating that she was unable to return to work ... without a physician\u2019s affidavit substantiating the existence of a medically determined injury which caused the alleged limitation of her activities [i]s insufficient\u201d to make out a 90\/180 claim); see also Tenzen, 2011 WL 6034462 at *8 (no 90\/180 showing where \u201c[pjlaintiff did not submit any medical evidence that she [wa]s unable to conduct ordinary activities or must restrict her physical activities in any way.\u201d)."},"case_id":4020275,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In general, \"[v]alid contracts are property, whether the obligor be a private individual, a municipality, a state, or the United States.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"327 U.S. 372, 380-81","parenthetical":"holding that plaintiff was entitled to compensation for government's taking of option to renew a lease","sentence":"Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 579, 54 S.Ct. 840, 78 L.Ed. 1434 (1934); see U.S. Tr. Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 19 n.16, 97 S.Ct. 1505, 52 L.Ed.2d 92 (1977) (\u201cContract rights are a form of property and as such may be taken for a public purpose provided that just compensation is paid.\u201d); A&D Auto Sales, Inc. v. United States, 748 F.3d 1142, 1152 (Fed. Cir. 2014); see also United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372, 380-81, 66 S.Ct. 596, 90 L.Ed. 729 (1946) (holding that plaintiff was entitled to compensation for government\u2019s taking of option to renew a lease). Mr. Piszel\u2019s employment contract with Freddie Mac is no exception."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"Contract rights are a form of property and as such may be taken for a public purpose provided that just compensation is paid.\"","sentence":"Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 579, 54 S.Ct. 840, 78 L.Ed. 1434 (1934); see U.S. Tr. Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 19 n.16, 97 S.Ct. 1505, 52 L.Ed.2d 92 (1977) (\u201cContract rights are a form of property and as such may be taken for a public purpose provided that just compensation is paid.\u201d); A&D Auto Sales, Inc. v. United States, 748 F.3d 1142, 1152 (Fed. Cir. 2014); see also United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372, 380-81, 66 S.Ct. 596, 90 L.Ed. 729 (1946) (holding that plaintiff was entitled to compensation for government\u2019s taking of option to renew a lease). Mr. Piszel\u2019s employment contract with Freddie Mac is no exception."},"case_id":4351940,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In general, \"[v]alid contracts are property, whether the obligor be a private individual, a municipality, a state, or the United States.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that plaintiff was entitled to compensation for government's taking of option to renew a lease","sentence":"Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 579, 54 S.Ct. 840, 78 L.Ed. 1434 (1934); see U.S. Tr. Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 19 n.16, 97 S.Ct. 1505, 52 L.Ed.2d 92 (1977) (\u201cContract rights are a form of property and as such may be taken for a public purpose provided that just compensation is paid.\u201d); A&D Auto Sales, Inc. v. United States, 748 F.3d 1142, 1152 (Fed. Cir. 2014); see also United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372, 380-81, 66 S.Ct. 596, 90 L.Ed. 729 (1946) (holding that plaintiff was entitled to compensation for government\u2019s taking of option to renew a lease). Mr. Piszel\u2019s employment contract with Freddie Mac is no exception."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"Contract rights are a form of property and as such may be taken for a public purpose provided that just compensation is paid.\"","sentence":"Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 579, 54 S.Ct. 840, 78 L.Ed. 1434 (1934); see U.S. Tr. Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 19 n.16, 97 S.Ct. 1505, 52 L.Ed.2d 92 (1977) (\u201cContract rights are a form of property and as such may be taken for a public purpose provided that just compensation is paid.\u201d); A&D Auto Sales, Inc. v. United States, 748 F.3d 1142, 1152 (Fed. Cir. 2014); see also United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372, 380-81, 66 S.Ct. 596, 90 L.Ed. 729 (1946) (holding that plaintiff was entitled to compensation for government\u2019s taking of option to renew a lease). Mr. Piszel\u2019s employment contract with Freddie Mac is no exception."},"case_id":4351940,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In general, \"[v]alid contracts are property, whether the obligor be a private individual, a municipality, a state, or the United States.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"Contract rights are a form of property and as such may be taken for a public purpose provided that just compensation is paid.\"","sentence":"Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 579, 54 S.Ct. 840, 78 L.Ed. 1434 (1934); see U.S. Tr. Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 19 n.16, 97 S.Ct. 1505, 52 L.Ed.2d 92 (1977) (\u201cContract rights are a form of property and as such may be taken for a public purpose provided that just compensation is paid.\u201d); A&D Auto Sales, Inc. v. United States, 748 F.3d 1142, 1152 (Fed. Cir. 2014); see also United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372, 380-81, 66 S.Ct. 596, 90 L.Ed. 729 (1946) (holding that plaintiff was entitled to compensation for government\u2019s taking of option to renew a lease). Mr. Piszel\u2019s employment contract with Freddie Mac is no exception."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that plaintiff was entitled to compensation for government's taking of option to renew a lease","sentence":"Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 579, 54 S.Ct. 840, 78 L.Ed. 1434 (1934); see U.S. Tr. Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 19 n.16, 97 S.Ct. 1505, 52 L.Ed.2d 92 (1977) (\u201cContract rights are a form of property and as such may be taken for a public purpose provided that just compensation is paid.\u201d); A&D Auto Sales, Inc. v. United States, 748 F.3d 1142, 1152 (Fed. Cir. 2014); see also United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372, 380-81, 66 S.Ct. 596, 90 L.Ed. 729 (1946) (holding that plaintiff was entitled to compensation for government\u2019s taking of option to renew a lease). Mr. Piszel\u2019s employment contract with Freddie Mac is no exception."},"case_id":4351940,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In general, \"[v]alid contracts are property, whether the obligor be a private individual, a municipality, a state, or the United States.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"327 U.S. 372, 380-81","parenthetical":"holding that plaintiff was entitled to compensation for government's taking of option to renew a lease","sentence":"Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 579, 54 S.Ct. 840, 78 L.Ed. 1434 (1934); see U.S. Tr. Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 19 n.16, 97 S.Ct. 1505, 52 L.Ed.2d 92 (1977) (\u201cContract rights are a form of property and as such may be taken for a public purpose provided that just compensation is paid.\u201d); A&D Auto Sales, Inc. v. United States, 748 F.3d 1142, 1152 (Fed. Cir. 2014); see also United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372, 380-81, 66 S.Ct. 596, 90 L.Ed. 729 (1946) (holding that plaintiff was entitled to compensation for government\u2019s taking of option to renew a lease). Mr. Piszel\u2019s employment contract with Freddie Mac is no exception."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"Contract rights are a form of property and as such may be taken for a public purpose provided that just compensation is paid.\"","sentence":"Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 579, 54 S.Ct. 840, 78 L.Ed. 1434 (1934); see U.S. Tr. Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 19 n.16, 97 S.Ct. 1505, 52 L.Ed.2d 92 (1977) (\u201cContract rights are a form of property and as such may be taken for a public purpose provided that just compensation is paid.\u201d); A&D Auto Sales, Inc. v. United States, 748 F.3d 1142, 1152 (Fed. Cir. 2014); see also United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372, 380-81, 66 S.Ct. 596, 90 L.Ed. 729 (1946) (holding that plaintiff was entitled to compensation for government\u2019s taking of option to renew a lease). Mr. Piszel\u2019s employment contract with Freddie Mac is no exception."},"case_id":4351940,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In general, \"[v]alid contracts are property, whether the obligor be a private individual, a municipality, a state, or the United States.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that plaintiff was entitled to compensation for government's taking of option to renew a lease","sentence":"Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 579, 54 S.Ct. 840, 78 L.Ed. 1434 (1934); see U.S. Tr. Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 19 n.16, 97 S.Ct. 1505, 52 L.Ed.2d 92 (1977) (\u201cContract rights are a form of property and as such may be taken for a public purpose provided that just compensation is paid.\u201d); A&D Auto Sales, Inc. v. United States, 748 F.3d 1142, 1152 (Fed. Cir. 2014); see also United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372, 380-81, 66 S.Ct. 596, 90 L.Ed. 729 (1946) (holding that plaintiff was entitled to compensation for government\u2019s taking of option to renew a lease). Mr. Piszel\u2019s employment contract with Freddie Mac is no exception."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"Contract rights are a form of property and as such may be taken for a public purpose provided that just compensation is paid.\"","sentence":"Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 579, 54 S.Ct. 840, 78 L.Ed. 1434 (1934); see U.S. Tr. Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 19 n.16, 97 S.Ct. 1505, 52 L.Ed.2d 92 (1977) (\u201cContract rights are a form of property and as such may be taken for a public purpose provided that just compensation is paid.\u201d); A&D Auto Sales, Inc. v. United States, 748 F.3d 1142, 1152 (Fed. Cir. 2014); see also United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372, 380-81, 66 S.Ct. 596, 90 L.Ed. 729 (1946) (holding that plaintiff was entitled to compensation for government\u2019s taking of option to renew a lease). Mr. Piszel\u2019s employment contract with Freddie Mac is no exception."},"case_id":4351940,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In general, \"[v]alid contracts are property, whether the obligor be a private individual, a municipality, a state, or the United States.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that plaintiff was entitled to compensation for government's taking of option to renew a lease","sentence":"Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 579, 54 S.Ct. 840, 78 L.Ed. 1434 (1934); see U.S. Tr. Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 19 n.16, 97 S.Ct. 1505, 52 L.Ed.2d 92 (1977) (\u201cContract rights are a form of property and as such may be taken for a public purpose provided that just compensation is paid.\u201d); A&D Auto Sales, Inc. v. United States, 748 F.3d 1142, 1152 (Fed. Cir. 2014); see also United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372, 380-81, 66 S.Ct. 596, 90 L.Ed. 729 (1946) (holding that plaintiff was entitled to compensation for government\u2019s taking of option to renew a lease). Mr. Piszel\u2019s employment contract with Freddie Mac is no exception."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"Contract rights are a form of property and as such may be taken for a public purpose provided that just compensation is paid.\"","sentence":"Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 579, 54 S.Ct. 840, 78 L.Ed. 1434 (1934); see U.S. Tr. Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 19 n.16, 97 S.Ct. 1505, 52 L.Ed.2d 92 (1977) (\u201cContract rights are a form of property and as such may be taken for a public purpose provided that just compensation is paid.\u201d); A&D Auto Sales, Inc. v. United States, 748 F.3d 1142, 1152 (Fed. Cir. 2014); see also United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372, 380-81, 66 S.Ct. 596, 90 L.Ed. 729 (1946) (holding that plaintiff was entitled to compensation for government\u2019s taking of option to renew a lease). Mr. Piszel\u2019s employment contract with Freddie Mac is no exception."},"case_id":4351940,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In general, \"[v]alid contracts are property, whether the obligor be a private individual, a municipality, a state, or the United States.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"Contract rights are a form of property and as such may be taken for a public purpose provided that just compensation is paid.\"","sentence":"Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 579, 54 S.Ct. 840, 78 L.Ed. 1434 (1934); see U.S. Tr. Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 19 n.16, 97 S.Ct. 1505, 52 L.Ed.2d 92 (1977) (\u201cContract rights are a form of property and as such may be taken for a public purpose provided that just compensation is paid.\u201d); A&D Auto Sales, Inc. v. United States, 748 F.3d 1142, 1152 (Fed. Cir. 2014); see also United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372, 380-81, 66 S.Ct. 596, 90 L.Ed. 729 (1946) (holding that plaintiff was entitled to compensation for government\u2019s taking of option to renew a lease). Mr. Piszel\u2019s employment contract with Freddie Mac is no exception."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"327 U.S. 372, 380-81","parenthetical":"holding that plaintiff was entitled to compensation for government's taking of option to renew a lease","sentence":"Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 579, 54 S.Ct. 840, 78 L.Ed. 1434 (1934); see U.S. Tr. Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 19 n.16, 97 S.Ct. 1505, 52 L.Ed.2d 92 (1977) (\u201cContract rights are a form of property and as such may be taken for a public purpose provided that just compensation is paid.\u201d); A&D Auto Sales, Inc. v. United States, 748 F.3d 1142, 1152 (Fed. Cir. 2014); see also United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372, 380-81, 66 S.Ct. 596, 90 L.Ed. 729 (1946) (holding that plaintiff was entitled to compensation for government\u2019s taking of option to renew a lease). Mr. Piszel\u2019s employment contract with Freddie Mac is no exception."},"case_id":4351940,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In general, \"[v]alid contracts are property, whether the obligor be a private individual, a municipality, a state, or the United States.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that plaintiff was entitled to compensation for government's taking of option to renew a lease","sentence":"Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 579, 54 S.Ct. 840, 78 L.Ed. 1434 (1934); see U.S. Tr. Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 19 n.16, 97 S.Ct. 1505, 52 L.Ed.2d 92 (1977) (\u201cContract rights are a form of property and as such may be taken for a public purpose provided that just compensation is paid.\u201d); A&D Auto Sales, Inc. v. United States, 748 F.3d 1142, 1152 (Fed. Cir. 2014); see also United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372, 380-81, 66 S.Ct. 596, 90 L.Ed. 729 (1946) (holding that plaintiff was entitled to compensation for government\u2019s taking of option to renew a lease). Mr. Piszel\u2019s employment contract with Freddie Mac is no exception."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"Contract rights are a form of property and as such may be taken for a public purpose provided that just compensation is paid.\"","sentence":"Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 579, 54 S.Ct. 840, 78 L.Ed. 1434 (1934); see U.S. Tr. Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 19 n.16, 97 S.Ct. 1505, 52 L.Ed.2d 92 (1977) (\u201cContract rights are a form of property and as such may be taken for a public purpose provided that just compensation is paid.\u201d); A&D Auto Sales, Inc. v. United States, 748 F.3d 1142, 1152 (Fed. Cir. 2014); see also United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372, 380-81, 66 S.Ct. 596, 90 L.Ed. 729 (1946) (holding that plaintiff was entitled to compensation for government\u2019s taking of option to renew a lease). Mr. Piszel\u2019s employment contract with Freddie Mac is no exception."},"case_id":4351940,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In general, \"[v]alid contracts are property, whether the obligor be a private individual, a municipality, a state, or the United States.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that plaintiff was entitled to compensation for government's taking of option to renew a lease","sentence":"Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 579, 54 S.Ct. 840, 78 L.Ed. 1434 (1934); see U.S. Tr. Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 19 n.16, 97 S.Ct. 1505, 52 L.Ed.2d 92 (1977) (\u201cContract rights are a form of property and as such may be taken for a public purpose provided that just compensation is paid.\u201d); A&D Auto Sales, Inc. v. United States, 748 F.3d 1142, 1152 (Fed. Cir. 2014); see also United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372, 380-81, 66 S.Ct. 596, 90 L.Ed. 729 (1946) (holding that plaintiff was entitled to compensation for government\u2019s taking of option to renew a lease). Mr. Piszel\u2019s employment contract with Freddie Mac is no exception."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"Contract rights are a form of property and as such may be taken for a public purpose provided that just compensation is paid.\"","sentence":"Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 579, 54 S.Ct. 840, 78 L.Ed. 1434 (1934); see U.S. Tr. Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 19 n.16, 97 S.Ct. 1505, 52 L.Ed.2d 92 (1977) (\u201cContract rights are a form of property and as such may be taken for a public purpose provided that just compensation is paid.\u201d); A&D Auto Sales, Inc. v. United States, 748 F.3d 1142, 1152 (Fed. Cir. 2014); see also United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372, 380-81, 66 S.Ct. 596, 90 L.Ed. 729 (1946) (holding that plaintiff was entitled to compensation for government\u2019s taking of option to renew a lease). Mr. Piszel\u2019s employment contract with Freddie Mac is no exception."},"case_id":4351940,"label":"b"}
{"context":"We do not conclude that the State did not have the burden of proving the requisite culpability, and the judge charged the jury that it did. The difficulty in this case, unlike others, is that we deal facially with a ruling concerning the admissibility of evidence, not with the failure to give a diminished capacity instruction to the jury based on the evidence admitted.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"261 N.J.Super. 169, 178-181","parenthetical":"erroneous instruction harmless because Dr. Rotgers' testimony which included consideration of impact of alcohol did not support finding of diminished capacity as a matter of law","sentence":"See State v. Moore, supra, 122 N.J. at 434-37, 585 A.2d 864 (error in instructions requires reversal); State v. Pitts, 116 N.J. 580, 592, 562 A.2d 1320 (1989) (evidence insufficient to warrant a diminished capacity instruction); State v. Carroll, 242 N.J.Super. 549, 560-61, 577 A.2d 862, certif. denied, 127 N.J. 326, 604 A.2d 600 (1991) (erroneous instruction found to be harmless because of insufficient proofs to support the defense); see also State v. Watson, 261 N.J.Super. 169, 178-181, 618 A.2d 367 (App.Div.1992) (erroneous instruction harmless because Dr. Rotgers\u2019 testimony which included consideration of impact of alcohol did not support finding of diminished capacity as a matter of law)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"242 N.J.Super. 549, 560-61","parenthetical":"erroneous instruction found to be harmless because of insufficient proofs to support the defense","sentence":"See State v. Moore, supra, 122 N.J. at 434-37, 585 A.2d 864 (error in instructions requires reversal); State v. Pitts, 116 N.J. 580, 592, 562 A.2d 1320 (1989) (evidence insufficient to warrant a diminished capacity instruction); State v. Carroll, 242 N.J.Super. 549, 560-61, 577 A.2d 862, certif. denied, 127 N.J. 326, 604 A.2d 600 (1991) (erroneous instruction found to be harmless because of insufficient proofs to support the defense); see also State v. Watson, 261 N.J.Super. 169, 178-181, 618 A.2d 367 (App.Div.1992) (erroneous instruction harmless because Dr. Rotgers\u2019 testimony which included consideration of impact of alcohol did not support finding of diminished capacity as a matter of law)."},"case_id":609717,"label":"b"}
{"context":"We do not conclude that the State did not have the burden of proving the requisite culpability, and the judge charged the jury that it did. The difficulty in this case, unlike others, is that we deal facially with a ruling concerning the admissibility of evidence, not with the failure to give a diminished capacity instruction to the jury based on the evidence admitted.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"erroneous instruction harmless because Dr. Rotgers' testimony which included consideration of impact of alcohol did not support finding of diminished capacity as a matter of law","sentence":"See State v. Moore, supra, 122 N.J. at 434-37, 585 A.2d 864 (error in instructions requires reversal); State v. Pitts, 116 N.J. 580, 592, 562 A.2d 1320 (1989) (evidence insufficient to warrant a diminished capacity instruction); State v. Carroll, 242 N.J.Super. 549, 560-61, 577 A.2d 862, certif. denied, 127 N.J. 326, 604 A.2d 600 (1991) (erroneous instruction found to be harmless because of insufficient proofs to support the defense); see also State v. Watson, 261 N.J.Super. 169, 178-181, 618 A.2d 367 (App.Div.1992) (erroneous instruction harmless because Dr. Rotgers\u2019 testimony which included consideration of impact of alcohol did not support finding of diminished capacity as a matter of law)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"242 N.J.Super. 549, 560-61","parenthetical":"erroneous instruction found to be harmless because of insufficient proofs to support the defense","sentence":"See State v. Moore, supra, 122 N.J. at 434-37, 585 A.2d 864 (error in instructions requires reversal); State v. Pitts, 116 N.J. 580, 592, 562 A.2d 1320 (1989) (evidence insufficient to warrant a diminished capacity instruction); State v. Carroll, 242 N.J.Super. 549, 560-61, 577 A.2d 862, certif. denied, 127 N.J. 326, 604 A.2d 600 (1991) (erroneous instruction found to be harmless because of insufficient proofs to support the defense); see also State v. Watson, 261 N.J.Super. 169, 178-181, 618 A.2d 367 (App.Div.1992) (erroneous instruction harmless because Dr. Rotgers\u2019 testimony which included consideration of impact of alcohol did not support finding of diminished capacity as a matter of law)."},"case_id":609717,"label":"b"}
{"context":"We do not conclude that the State did not have the burden of proving the requisite culpability, and the judge charged the jury that it did. The difficulty in this case, unlike others, is that we deal facially with a ruling concerning the admissibility of evidence, not with the failure to give a diminished capacity instruction to the jury based on the evidence admitted.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"261 N.J.Super. 169, 178-181","parenthetical":"erroneous instruction harmless because Dr. Rotgers' testimony which included consideration of impact of alcohol did not support finding of diminished capacity as a matter of law","sentence":"See State v. Moore, supra, 122 N.J. at 434-37, 585 A.2d 864 (error in instructions requires reversal); State v. Pitts, 116 N.J. 580, 592, 562 A.2d 1320 (1989) (evidence insufficient to warrant a diminished capacity instruction); State v. Carroll, 242 N.J.Super. 549, 560-61, 577 A.2d 862, certif. denied, 127 N.J. 326, 604 A.2d 600 (1991) (erroneous instruction found to be harmless because of insufficient proofs to support the defense); see also State v. Watson, 261 N.J.Super. 169, 178-181, 618 A.2d 367 (App.Div.1992) (erroneous instruction harmless because Dr. Rotgers\u2019 testimony which included consideration of impact of alcohol did not support finding of diminished capacity as a matter of law)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"erroneous instruction found to be harmless because of insufficient proofs to support the defense","sentence":"See State v. Moore, supra, 122 N.J. at 434-37, 585 A.2d 864 (error in instructions requires reversal); State v. Pitts, 116 N.J. 580, 592, 562 A.2d 1320 (1989) (evidence insufficient to warrant a diminished capacity instruction); State v. Carroll, 242 N.J.Super. 549, 560-61, 577 A.2d 862, certif. denied, 127 N.J. 326, 604 A.2d 600 (1991) (erroneous instruction found to be harmless because of insufficient proofs to support the defense); see also State v. Watson, 261 N.J.Super. 169, 178-181, 618 A.2d 367 (App.Div.1992) (erroneous instruction harmless because Dr. Rotgers\u2019 testimony which included consideration of impact of alcohol did not support finding of diminished capacity as a matter of law)."},"case_id":609717,"label":"b"}
{"context":"We do not conclude that the State did not have the burden of proving the requisite culpability, and the judge charged the jury that it did. The difficulty in this case, unlike others, is that we deal facially with a ruling concerning the admissibility of evidence, not with the failure to give a diminished capacity instruction to the jury based on the evidence admitted.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"erroneous instruction harmless because Dr. Rotgers' testimony which included consideration of impact of alcohol did not support finding of diminished capacity as a matter of law","sentence":"See State v. Moore, supra, 122 N.J. at 434-37, 585 A.2d 864 (error in instructions requires reversal); State v. Pitts, 116 N.J. 580, 592, 562 A.2d 1320 (1989) (evidence insufficient to warrant a diminished capacity instruction); State v. Carroll, 242 N.J.Super. 549, 560-61, 577 A.2d 862, certif. denied, 127 N.J. 326, 604 A.2d 600 (1991) (erroneous instruction found to be harmless because of insufficient proofs to support the defense); see also State v. Watson, 261 N.J.Super. 169, 178-181, 618 A.2d 367 (App.Div.1992) (erroneous instruction harmless because Dr. Rotgers\u2019 testimony which included consideration of impact of alcohol did not support finding of diminished capacity as a matter of law)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"erroneous instruction found to be harmless because of insufficient proofs to support the defense","sentence":"See State v. Moore, supra, 122 N.J. at 434-37, 585 A.2d 864 (error in instructions requires reversal); State v. Pitts, 116 N.J. 580, 592, 562 A.2d 1320 (1989) (evidence insufficient to warrant a diminished capacity instruction); State v. Carroll, 242 N.J.Super. 549, 560-61, 577 A.2d 862, certif. denied, 127 N.J. 326, 604 A.2d 600 (1991) (erroneous instruction found to be harmless because of insufficient proofs to support the defense); see also State v. Watson, 261 N.J.Super. 169, 178-181, 618 A.2d 367 (App.Div.1992) (erroneous instruction harmless because Dr. Rotgers\u2019 testimony which included consideration of impact of alcohol did not support finding of diminished capacity as a matter of law)."},"case_id":609717,"label":"b"}
{"context":"We do not conclude that the State did not have the burden of proving the requisite culpability, and the judge charged the jury that it did. The difficulty in this case, unlike others, is that we deal facially with a ruling concerning the admissibility of evidence, not with the failure to give a diminished capacity instruction to the jury based on the evidence admitted.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"261 N.J.Super. 169, 178-181","parenthetical":"erroneous instruction harmless because Dr. Rotgers' testimony which included consideration of impact of alcohol did not support finding of diminished capacity as a matter of law","sentence":"See State v. Moore, supra, 122 N.J. at 434-37, 585 A.2d 864 (error in instructions requires reversal); State v. Pitts, 116 N.J. 580, 592, 562 A.2d 1320 (1989) (evidence insufficient to warrant a diminished capacity instruction); State v. Carroll, 242 N.J.Super. 549, 560-61, 577 A.2d 862, certif. denied, 127 N.J. 326, 604 A.2d 600 (1991) (erroneous instruction found to be harmless because of insufficient proofs to support the defense); see also State v. Watson, 261 N.J.Super. 169, 178-181, 618 A.2d 367 (App.Div.1992) (erroneous instruction harmless because Dr. Rotgers\u2019 testimony which included consideration of impact of alcohol did not support finding of diminished capacity as a matter of law)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"erroneous instruction found to be harmless because of insufficient proofs to support the defense","sentence":"See State v. Moore, supra, 122 N.J. at 434-37, 585 A.2d 864 (error in instructions requires reversal); State v. Pitts, 116 N.J. 580, 592, 562 A.2d 1320 (1989) (evidence insufficient to warrant a diminished capacity instruction); State v. Carroll, 242 N.J.Super. 549, 560-61, 577 A.2d 862, certif. denied, 127 N.J. 326, 604 A.2d 600 (1991) (erroneous instruction found to be harmless because of insufficient proofs to support the defense); see also State v. Watson, 261 N.J.Super. 169, 178-181, 618 A.2d 367 (App.Div.1992) (erroneous instruction harmless because Dr. Rotgers\u2019 testimony which included consideration of impact of alcohol did not support finding of diminished capacity as a matter of law)."},"case_id":609717,"label":"b"}
{"context":"We do not conclude that the State did not have the burden of proving the requisite culpability, and the judge charged the jury that it did. The difficulty in this case, unlike others, is that we deal facially with a ruling concerning the admissibility of evidence, not with the failure to give a diminished capacity instruction to the jury based on the evidence admitted.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"erroneous instruction harmless because Dr. Rotgers' testimony which included consideration of impact of alcohol did not support finding of diminished capacity as a matter of law","sentence":"See State v. Moore, supra, 122 N.J. at 434-37, 585 A.2d 864 (error in instructions requires reversal); State v. Pitts, 116 N.J. 580, 592, 562 A.2d 1320 (1989) (evidence insufficient to warrant a diminished capacity instruction); State v. Carroll, 242 N.J.Super. 549, 560-61, 577 A.2d 862, certif. denied, 127 N.J. 326, 604 A.2d 600 (1991) (erroneous instruction found to be harmless because of insufficient proofs to support the defense); see also State v. Watson, 261 N.J.Super. 169, 178-181, 618 A.2d 367 (App.Div.1992) (erroneous instruction harmless because Dr. Rotgers\u2019 testimony which included consideration of impact of alcohol did not support finding of diminished capacity as a matter of law)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"erroneous instruction found to be harmless because of insufficient proofs to support the defense","sentence":"See State v. Moore, supra, 122 N.J. at 434-37, 585 A.2d 864 (error in instructions requires reversal); State v. Pitts, 116 N.J. 580, 592, 562 A.2d 1320 (1989) (evidence insufficient to warrant a diminished capacity instruction); State v. Carroll, 242 N.J.Super. 549, 560-61, 577 A.2d 862, certif. denied, 127 N.J. 326, 604 A.2d 600 (1991) (erroneous instruction found to be harmless because of insufficient proofs to support the defense); see also State v. Watson, 261 N.J.Super. 169, 178-181, 618 A.2d 367 (App.Div.1992) (erroneous instruction harmless because Dr. Rotgers\u2019 testimony which included consideration of impact of alcohol did not support finding of diminished capacity as a matter of law)."},"case_id":609717,"label":"b"}
{"context":"We do not conclude that the State did not have the burden of proving the requisite culpability, and the judge charged the jury that it did. The difficulty in this case, unlike others, is that we deal facially with a ruling concerning the admissibility of evidence, not with the failure to give a diminished capacity instruction to the jury based on the evidence admitted.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"261 N.J.Super. 169, 178-181","parenthetical":"erroneous instruction harmless because Dr. Rotgers' testimony which included consideration of impact of alcohol did not support finding of diminished capacity as a matter of law","sentence":"See State v. Moore, supra, 122 N.J. at 434-37, 585 A.2d 864 (error in instructions requires reversal); State v. Pitts, 116 N.J. 580, 592, 562 A.2d 1320 (1989) (evidence insufficient to warrant a diminished capacity instruction); State v. Carroll, 242 N.J.Super. 549, 560-61, 577 A.2d 862, certif. denied, 127 N.J. 326, 604 A.2d 600 (1991) (erroneous instruction found to be harmless because of insufficient proofs to support the defense); see also State v. Watson, 261 N.J.Super. 169, 178-181, 618 A.2d 367 (App.Div.1992) (erroneous instruction harmless because Dr. Rotgers\u2019 testimony which included consideration of impact of alcohol did not support finding of diminished capacity as a matter of law)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"erroneous instruction found to be harmless because of insufficient proofs to support the defense","sentence":"See State v. Moore, supra, 122 N.J. at 434-37, 585 A.2d 864 (error in instructions requires reversal); State v. Pitts, 116 N.J. 580, 592, 562 A.2d 1320 (1989) (evidence insufficient to warrant a diminished capacity instruction); State v. Carroll, 242 N.J.Super. 549, 560-61, 577 A.2d 862, certif. denied, 127 N.J. 326, 604 A.2d 600 (1991) (erroneous instruction found to be harmless because of insufficient proofs to support the defense); see also State v. Watson, 261 N.J.Super. 169, 178-181, 618 A.2d 367 (App.Div.1992) (erroneous instruction harmless because Dr. Rotgers\u2019 testimony which included consideration of impact of alcohol did not support finding of diminished capacity as a matter of law)."},"case_id":609717,"label":"b"}
{"context":"We do not conclude that the State did not have the burden of proving the requisite culpability, and the judge charged the jury that it did. The difficulty in this case, unlike others, is that we deal facially with a ruling concerning the admissibility of evidence, not with the failure to give a diminished capacity instruction to the jury based on the evidence admitted.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"erroneous instruction found to be harmless because of insufficient proofs to support the defense","sentence":"See State v. Moore, supra, 122 N.J. at 434-37, 585 A.2d 864 (error in instructions requires reversal); State v. Pitts, 116 N.J. 580, 592, 562 A.2d 1320 (1989) (evidence insufficient to warrant a diminished capacity instruction); State v. Carroll, 242 N.J.Super. 549, 560-61, 577 A.2d 862, certif. denied, 127 N.J. 326, 604 A.2d 600 (1991) (erroneous instruction found to be harmless because of insufficient proofs to support the defense); see also State v. Watson, 261 N.J.Super. 169, 178-181, 618 A.2d 367 (App.Div.1992) (erroneous instruction harmless because Dr. Rotgers\u2019 testimony which included consideration of impact of alcohol did not support finding of diminished capacity as a matter of law)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"erroneous instruction harmless because Dr. Rotgers' testimony which included consideration of impact of alcohol did not support finding of diminished capacity as a matter of law","sentence":"See State v. Moore, supra, 122 N.J. at 434-37, 585 A.2d 864 (error in instructions requires reversal); State v. Pitts, 116 N.J. 580, 592, 562 A.2d 1320 (1989) (evidence insufficient to warrant a diminished capacity instruction); State v. Carroll, 242 N.J.Super. 549, 560-61, 577 A.2d 862, certif. denied, 127 N.J. 326, 604 A.2d 600 (1991) (erroneous instruction found to be harmless because of insufficient proofs to support the defense); see also State v. Watson, 261 N.J.Super. 169, 178-181, 618 A.2d 367 (App.Div.1992) (erroneous instruction harmless because Dr. Rotgers\u2019 testimony which included consideration of impact of alcohol did not support finding of diminished capacity as a matter of law)."},"case_id":609717,"label":"a"}
{"context":"On appeal, San Martin has not made these arguments, and therefore has waived them.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that a party's reference to having made an argument before the district court in the Statement of Facts is not an adequate substitute for elaborating on the merits of the argument on appeal","sentence":"See La Grasta v. First Union Sec., 358 F.3d 840, 847 n. 4 (11th Cir.2004) (holding that a party's reference to having made an argument before the district court in the Statement of Facts is not an adequate substitute for elaborating on the merits of the argument on appeal); Greenbriar, Ltd. v. City of Alabaster, 881 F.2d 1570, 1573 n. 6 (11th Cir.1989) (deeming an issue waived when its only mention in the party\u2019s brief was in the Statement of the Case)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"300 F.3d 1232, 1238","parenthetical":"\"Of the issues for which Isaacs received permission to appeal, he apparently chose to abandon all but eight for purposes of this appeal.\"","sentence":"Isaacs v. Head, 300 F.3d 1232, 1238 (11th Cir.2002) (\u201cOf the issues for which Isaacs received permission to appeal, he apparently chose to abandon all but eight for purposes of this appeal.\u201d); Atkins v. Singletary, 965 F.2d 952, 955 n. 1 (11th Cir.1992) (holding that a habeas petitioner abandons the claims he does not address on appeal). The fact that he discusses the co-defendant's new affidavit in the Statement of Facts is not enough to preserve the issue for appeal."},"case_id":4092151,"label":"b"}
{"context":"On appeal, San Martin has not made these arguments, and therefore has waived them.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"deeming an issue waived when its only mention in the party's brief was in the Statement of the Case","sentence":"See La Grasta v. First Union Sec., 358 F.3d 840, 847 n. 4 (11th Cir.2004) (holding that a party's reference to having made an argument before the district court in the Statement of Facts is not an adequate substitute for elaborating on the merits of the argument on appeal); Greenbriar, Ltd. v. City of Alabaster, 881 F.2d 1570, 1573 n. 6 (11th Cir.1989) (deeming an issue waived when its only mention in the party\u2019s brief was in the Statement of the Case)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"300 F.3d 1232, 1238","parenthetical":"\"Of the issues for which Isaacs received permission to appeal, he apparently chose to abandon all but eight for purposes of this appeal.\"","sentence":"Isaacs v. Head, 300 F.3d 1232, 1238 (11th Cir.2002) (\u201cOf the issues for which Isaacs received permission to appeal, he apparently chose to abandon all but eight for purposes of this appeal.\u201d); Atkins v. Singletary, 965 F.2d 952, 955 n. 1 (11th Cir.1992) (holding that a habeas petitioner abandons the claims he does not address on appeal). The fact that he discusses the co-defendant's new affidavit in the Statement of Facts is not enough to preserve the issue for appeal."},"case_id":4092151,"label":"b"}
{"context":"On appeal, San Martin has not made these arguments, and therefore has waived them.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that a habeas petitioner abandons the claims he does not address on appeal","sentence":"Isaacs v. Head, 300 F.3d 1232, 1238 (11th Cir.2002) (\u201cOf the issues for which Isaacs received permission to appeal, he apparently chose to abandon all but eight for purposes of this appeal.\u201d); Atkins v. Singletary, 965 F.2d 952, 955 n. 1 (11th Cir.1992) (holding that a habeas petitioner abandons the claims he does not address on appeal). The fact that he discusses the co-defendant's new affidavit in the Statement of Facts is not enough to preserve the issue for appeal."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that a party's reference to having made an argument before the district court in the Statement of Facts is not an adequate substitute for elaborating on the merits of the argument on appeal","sentence":"See La Grasta v. First Union Sec., 358 F.3d 840, 847 n. 4 (11th Cir.2004) (holding that a party's reference to having made an argument before the district court in the Statement of Facts is not an adequate substitute for elaborating on the merits of the argument on appeal); Greenbriar, Ltd. v. City of Alabaster, 881 F.2d 1570, 1573 n. 6 (11th Cir.1989) (deeming an issue waived when its only mention in the party\u2019s brief was in the Statement of the Case)."},"case_id":4092151,"label":"a"}
{"context":"On appeal, San Martin has not made these arguments, and therefore has waived them.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"deeming an issue waived when its only mention in the party's brief was in the Statement of the Case","sentence":"See La Grasta v. First Union Sec., 358 F.3d 840, 847 n. 4 (11th Cir.2004) (holding that a party's reference to having made an argument before the district court in the Statement of Facts is not an adequate substitute for elaborating on the merits of the argument on appeal); Greenbriar, Ltd. v. City of Alabaster, 881 F.2d 1570, 1573 n. 6 (11th Cir.1989) (deeming an issue waived when its only mention in the party\u2019s brief was in the Statement of the Case)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that a habeas petitioner abandons the claims he does not address on appeal","sentence":"Isaacs v. Head, 300 F.3d 1232, 1238 (11th Cir.2002) (\u201cOf the issues for which Isaacs received permission to appeal, he apparently chose to abandon all but eight for purposes of this appeal.\u201d); Atkins v. Singletary, 965 F.2d 952, 955 n. 1 (11th Cir.1992) (holding that a habeas petitioner abandons the claims he does not address on appeal). The fact that he discusses the co-defendant's new affidavit in the Statement of Facts is not enough to preserve the issue for appeal."},"case_id":4092151,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The court generally finds this bifurcation plan appropriate, and concludes that the superiority requirement is met. It notes, however, that plaintiffs have not articulated a workable trial plan for the classes they now propose. The court therefore directs plaintiffs to submit a trial plan that explains in detail (1) the subjects that they propose be addressed in separate phases of the trial; (2) the specific ways in which differences among available remedies will be addressed in special verdict forms during the liability phase of the trial; and (3) the specific mechanisms they suggest for handling the damages phase of the trial.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"253 F.3d 1189, 1189","parenthetical":"\"[The] court cannot rely merely on assurances of counsel that any problems with predominance or superiority can be overcome\"","sentence":"See Gartin v. S & M NuTec LLC, 245 F.R.D. 429, 441 (C.D.Cal.2007) (\u201cNeither Plaintiff nor her counsel has provided any suggestions \u2014 much less a plan \u2014 to this Court regarding managing the proposed class action\u201d); see also Zinser, 253 F.3d at 1189 (\u201c[The] court cannot rely merely on assurances of counsel that any problems with predominance or superiority can be overcome\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"245 F.R.D. 429, 441","parenthetical":"\"Neither Plaintiff nor her counsel has provided any suggestions -- much less a plan -- to this Court regarding managing the proposed class action\"","sentence":"See Gartin v. S & M NuTec LLC, 245 F.R.D. 429, 441 (C.D.Cal.2007) (\u201cNeither Plaintiff nor her counsel has provided any suggestions \u2014 much less a plan \u2014 to this Court regarding managing the proposed class action\u201d); see also Zinser, 253 F.3d at 1189 (\u201c[The] court cannot rely merely on assurances of counsel that any problems with predominance or superiority can be overcome\u201d)."},"case_id":4249204,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In Gil, the district court permitted the Government to offer expert testimony that drug traffickers often employ counter-surveillance driving techniques, register cars in others' names, deliver narcotics and cash in public parking lots, and frequently use pagers and public telephones.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"827 F.2d 604, 611-12","parenthetical":"allowing expert testimony regarding the use of apartments as \"stash pads\" for drugs and money","sentence":"Id. at 1421-22. Noting a long line of cases allowing modus operandi testimony, we held that the admission of this testimony was not an abuse of discretion. Id. at 1422; see also United States v. Espinosa, 827 F.2d 604, 611-12 (9th Cir.1987) (allowing expert testimony regarding the use of apartments as \u201cstash pads\u201d for drugs and money); United States v. Patterson, 819 F.2d 1495, 1507 (9th Cir.1987) (allowing expert testimony on how criminal narcotics conspiracies operate); United States v. Maher, 645 F.2d 780, 783 (9th Cir.1981) (per curiam) (permitting expert testimony that defendant\u2019s actions were consistent with the modus operandi of persons transporting drugs and engaging in counter-surveillance); cf. United States v. Boykin, 986 F.2d 270, 275 (8th Cir.1993) (allowing testimony that \u201cthe type of firearms found in [the defendant\u2019s] home, their location, and the fact that they were loaded was significant to their usefulness and availability for use in connection with a drug business\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"986 F.2d 270, 275","parenthetical":"allowing testimony that \"the type of firearms found in [the defendant's] home, their location, and the fact that they were loaded was significant to their usefulness and availability for use in connection with a drug business\"","sentence":"Id. at 1421-22. Noting a long line of cases allowing modus operandi testimony, we held that the admission of this testimony was not an abuse of discretion. Id. at 1422; see also United States v. Espinosa, 827 F.2d 604, 611-12 (9th Cir.1987) (allowing expert testimony regarding the use of apartments as \u201cstash pads\u201d for drugs and money); United States v. Patterson, 819 F.2d 1495, 1507 (9th Cir.1987) (allowing expert testimony on how criminal narcotics conspiracies operate); United States v. Maher, 645 F.2d 780, 783 (9th Cir.1981) (per curiam) (permitting expert testimony that defendant\u2019s actions were consistent with the modus operandi of persons transporting drugs and engaging in counter-surveillance); cf. United States v. Boykin, 986 F.2d 270, 275 (8th Cir.1993) (allowing testimony that \u201cthe type of firearms found in [the defendant\u2019s] home, their location, and the fact that they were loaded was significant to their usefulness and availability for use in connection with a drug business\u201d)."},"case_id":11983595,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In Gil, the district court permitted the Government to offer expert testimony that drug traffickers often employ counter-surveillance driving techniques, register cars in others' names, deliver narcotics and cash in public parking lots, and frequently use pagers and public telephones.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"986 F.2d 270, 275","parenthetical":"allowing testimony that \"the type of firearms found in [the defendant's] home, their location, and the fact that they were loaded was significant to their usefulness and availability for use in connection with a drug business\"","sentence":"Id. at 1421-22. Noting a long line of cases allowing modus operandi testimony, we held that the admission of this testimony was not an abuse of discretion. Id. at 1422; see also United States v. Espinosa, 827 F.2d 604, 611-12 (9th Cir.1987) (allowing expert testimony regarding the use of apartments as \u201cstash pads\u201d for drugs and money); United States v. Patterson, 819 F.2d 1495, 1507 (9th Cir.1987) (allowing expert testimony on how criminal narcotics conspiracies operate); United States v. Maher, 645 F.2d 780, 783 (9th Cir.1981) (per curiam) (permitting expert testimony that defendant\u2019s actions were consistent with the modus operandi of persons transporting drugs and engaging in counter-surveillance); cf. United States v. Boykin, 986 F.2d 270, 275 (8th Cir.1993) (allowing testimony that \u201cthe type of firearms found in [the defendant\u2019s] home, their location, and the fact that they were loaded was significant to their usefulness and availability for use in connection with a drug business\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"645 F.2d 780, 783","parenthetical":"permitting expert testimony that defendant's actions were consistent with the modus operandi of persons transporting drugs and engaging in counter-surveillance","sentence":"Id. at 1421-22. Noting a long line of cases allowing modus operandi testimony, we held that the admission of this testimony was not an abuse of discretion. Id. at 1422; see also United States v. Espinosa, 827 F.2d 604, 611-12 (9th Cir.1987) (allowing expert testimony regarding the use of apartments as \u201cstash pads\u201d for drugs and money); United States v. Patterson, 819 F.2d 1495, 1507 (9th Cir.1987) (allowing expert testimony on how criminal narcotics conspiracies operate); United States v. Maher, 645 F.2d 780, 783 (9th Cir.1981) (per curiam) (permitting expert testimony that defendant\u2019s actions were consistent with the modus operandi of persons transporting drugs and engaging in counter-surveillance); cf. United States v. Boykin, 986 F.2d 270, 275 (8th Cir.1993) (allowing testimony that \u201cthe type of firearms found in [the defendant\u2019s] home, their location, and the fact that they were loaded was significant to their usefulness and availability for use in connection with a drug business\u201d)."},"case_id":11983595,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Second, Koon's opinion is not sufficiently tied to the facts of this case, because he has offered no basis for his opinion that the studies relied upon are sufficiently similar to the households connected to Burlington's waste-water system to merit comparison. Therefore, the Court finds that Koon's testimony is not sufficiently reliable to withstand a motion for summary judgment.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"8 F.3d 172, 172-73","parenthetical":"Summary judgment should be granted where expert opinion suggests merely a possibility, as opposed to a probability, \"precisely to guard against raw speculation by the fact-finder.\"","sentence":"See Sakaria, 8 F.3d at 172-73 (Summary judgment should be granted where expert opinion suggests merely a possibility, as opposed to a probability, \u201cprecisely to guard against raw speculation by the fact-finder.\u201d); see also Daubert, \u2014 U.S. at -, 113 S.Ct. at 2795 (expert knowledge must be more than subjective belief or unsupported speculation)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"113 S.Ct. 2795, 2795","parenthetical":"expert knowledge must be more than subjective belief or unsupported speculation","sentence":"See Sakaria, 8 F.3d at 172-73 (Summary judgment should be granted where expert opinion suggests merely a possibility, as opposed to a probability, \u201cprecisely to guard against raw speculation by the fact-finder.\u201d); see also Daubert, \u2014 U.S. at -, 113 S.Ct. at 2795 (expert knowledge must be more than subjective belief or unsupported speculation)."},"case_id":7840512,"label":"a"}
{"context":"We agree with the trial court that the State derives no unfair advantage nor imposes any unfair detriment on the petitioners by challenging Willey's status as a professional gambler, and thus his standing to contest the constitutionality of the Gambling Winnings Tax as applied to professional gamblers. Given that the interlocutory transfer request was denied by this court, the petitioners cannot show any particular unfair advantage to the State or unfair detriment to themselves in the case before the trial court that resulted from the State challenging Willey's status as a professional gambler, whether or not such a position was inconsistent with the ITS.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"156 N.H. 498, 502-03","parenthetical":"holding that father failed to establish that any unfairness resulted from mother's allegedly inconsistent positions in seeking to modify child support pursuant to statutory right","sentence":"See In the Matter of Carr & Edmunds, 156 N.H. 498, 502-03 (2007) (holding that father failed to establish that any unfairness resulted from mother\u2019s allegedly inconsistent positions in seeking to modify child support pursuant to statutory right); cf. Kelleher v. Marvin Lumber & Cedar Co., 152 N.H. 813, 849 (2005) (holding that defendant would derive an unfair advantage by taking a factual position inconsistent with one taken in an earlier action in which defendant prevailed)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"152 N.H. 813, 849","parenthetical":"holding that defendant would derive an unfair advantage by taking a factual position inconsistent with one taken in an earlier action in which defendant prevailed","sentence":"See In the Matter of Carr & Edmunds, 156 N.H. 498, 502-03 (2007) (holding that father failed to establish that any unfairness resulted from mother\u2019s allegedly inconsistent positions in seeking to modify child support pursuant to statutory right); cf. Kelleher v. Marvin Lumber & Cedar Co., 152 N.H. 813, 849 (2005) (holding that defendant would derive an unfair advantage by taking a factual position inconsistent with one taken in an earlier action in which defendant prevailed)."},"case_id":4341275,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Herring recommended Officer Berry's suspension, and Sgt. Kathleen Mickens recommended Officer Dao's suspension).","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"405 F.3d 405, 414","parenthetical":"the requirement that a plaintiff and his comparable must have dealt with the same supervisor to be similarly situated does not automatically apply in every case","sentence":"See Ercegovich, 154 F.3d at 352 (citing Mitchell, 964 F.2d at 583); cf. Shager v. Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398, 406 (7th Cir.1990) (supervisor providing information to ultimate decision-maker can effectively influence and control that person\u2019s decision); but see McMillan v. Castro, 405 F.3d 405, 414 (6th Cir.2005) (the requirement that a plaintiff and his comparable must have dealt with the same supervisor to be similarly situated does not automatically apply in every case)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"913 F.2d 398, 406","parenthetical":"supervisor providing information to ultimate decision-maker can effectively influence and control that person's decision","sentence":"See Ercegovich, 154 F.3d at 352 (citing Mitchell, 964 F.2d at 583); cf. Shager v. Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398, 406 (7th Cir.1990) (supervisor providing information to ultimate decision-maker can effectively influence and control that person\u2019s decision); but see McMillan v. Castro, 405 F.3d 405, 414 (6th Cir.2005) (the requirement that a plaintiff and his comparable must have dealt with the same supervisor to be similarly situated does not automatically apply in every case)."},"case_id":3562062,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Moreover, we had a difficult time concluding that the reasons for the district court's variance in sentencing Davis, such as age and length of time between the commission of the crime and the sentencing hearing, were compelling enough to support an almost 100% variance. Thus, it is difficult to extract from Davis an idea of how compelling perfectly legitimate reasons must be for a 43% variance or how this court is to review the careful and reasoned decision of the district court.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"449 F.3d 731, 740-41","parenthetical":"\"If the trial court appreciates that the guidelines are advisory, fairly considers the 3553(a","sentence":"See United States v. Buchanan, 449 F.3d 731, 740-41 (6th Cir.2006) (Sutton, J., concurring) (\u201cIf the trial court appreciates that the guidelines are advisory, fairly considers the 3553(a) factors in announcing its sentence and adheres to the other procedural requirements of a reasonable sentence, that should suffice.\u201d)- Furthermore, this court in United States v. Husein, 478 F.3d 318 (6th Cir.2007), upheld a variance as large as the one in Davis based on the individual circumstances of that case, highlighting the fact that the very nature of individualized sentencing makes it difficult for this court, reviewing a well-reasoned decision by a district court with day-to-day expertise in sentencing, to conclude that a sentence is unreasonable merely by looking at the extent of the variance."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"affirming a sentence of probation where the Guidelines called for a sentence of 24 to 36 months in prison based on the specific facts of the case","sentence":"See also United States v. Fuson, 215 Fed.Appx. 468 (6th Cir.2007) (affirming a sentence of probation where the Guidelines called for a sentence of 24 to 36 months in prison based on the specific facts of the case)."},"case_id":3106074,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Moreover, we had a difficult time concluding that the reasons for the district court's variance in sentencing Davis, such as age and length of time between the commission of the crime and the sentencing hearing, were compelling enough to support an almost 100% variance. Thus, it is difficult to extract from Davis an idea of how compelling perfectly legitimate reasons must be for a 43% variance or how this court is to review the careful and reasoned decision of the district court.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"If the trial court appreciates that the guidelines are advisory, fairly considers the 3553(a","sentence":"See United States v. Buchanan, 449 F.3d 731, 740-41 (6th Cir.2006) (Sutton, J., concurring) (\u201cIf the trial court appreciates that the guidelines are advisory, fairly considers the 3553(a) factors in announcing its sentence and adheres to the other procedural requirements of a reasonable sentence, that should suffice.\u201d)- Furthermore, this court in United States v. Husein, 478 F.3d 318 (6th Cir.2007), upheld a variance as large as the one in Davis based on the individual circumstances of that case, highlighting the fact that the very nature of individualized sentencing makes it difficult for this court, reviewing a well-reasoned decision by a district court with day-to-day expertise in sentencing, to conclude that a sentence is unreasonable merely by looking at the extent of the variance."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"affirming a sentence of probation where the Guidelines called for a sentence of 24 to 36 months in prison based on the specific facts of the case","sentence":"See also United States v. Fuson, 215 Fed.Appx. 468 (6th Cir.2007) (affirming a sentence of probation where the Guidelines called for a sentence of 24 to 36 months in prison based on the specific facts of the case)."},"case_id":3106074,"label":"a"}
{"context":"While Plaintiffs substantive due process claim cannot survive, the ease with which PACC Codes and M.C.L. provisions can be conflated -- regardless by whom -- is \"troubling and noteworthy.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"467 Mich. 873, 873","parenthetical":"Michigan Court of Appeals erred by finding defendant's judgment of sentence referred to an incorrect statutory provision because the original judgment \"permissibly referred to the appropriate section of the PACC Code\" instead of the relevant M.C.L. section","sentence":"See People v. Kuchciak, 467 Mich. 873, 873, 651 N.W.2d 67 (2002) (Michigan Court of Appeals erred by finding defendant\u2019s judgment of sentence referred to an incorrect statutory provision because the original judgment \u201cpermissibly referred to the appropriate section of the PACC Code\u201d instead of the relevant M.C.L. section); People v. Bennett, 2012 WL 6604706, at *3 (Mich.Ct.App. Dec. 18, 2012) (remanding to amend the plaintiffs Judgment of Sentence because the PACC Code was entered into the M.C.L. citation box on the Judgment of Sentence); see also Lee Higgins, Prosecutors admit mistake during 2003 conviction of Matthew Freeman, court documents say, AnnArbor.com, March. 2, 2010, available at http:\/\/www. annarbor.com\/news \/mistakes-were-made-during-2003-conviction-of-sexoffenderprosecutors-admit-in-court-filing\/ (detailing defendant\u2019s motion to accurately reflect that he was convicted of Criminal Sexual Conduct in the Fourth Degree for having sexual relations with a minor be cause the prosecutor mistakenly referred to the PACC Code for force\/coercion)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but cf.","identifier":"2004 WL 1335976, at *1","parenthetical":"rejecting defendant's \"claim[] that authorities may misconstrue his conviction\" for resisting and obstructing a police officer with the more serious offense of taking a firearm from a police officer because the PACC Code for the former (750.479-B","sentence":"But cf. People v. Stephens, 2004 WL 1335976, at *1 (Mich.Ct.App. June 15, 2004) (rejecting defendant\u2019s \u201cclaim[] that authorities may misconstrue his conviction\u201d for resisting and obstructing a police officer with the more serious offense of taking a firearm from a police officer because the PACC Code for the former (750.479-B) resembles the M.C.L. citation to the latter (M.C.L. \u00a7 750.479b), noting that \u201cPACC codes are routinely used in pleadings, and the judgment of sentence identifies the charge as \u201cMCL citation\/PACC Code\u201d)."},"case_id":4136795,"label":"a"}
{"context":"While Plaintiffs substantive due process claim cannot survive, the ease with which PACC Codes and M.C.L. provisions can be conflated -- regardless by whom -- is \"troubling and noteworthy.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"Michigan Court of Appeals erred by finding defendant's judgment of sentence referred to an incorrect statutory provision because the original judgment \"permissibly referred to the appropriate section of the PACC Code\" instead of the relevant M.C.L. section","sentence":"See People v. Kuchciak, 467 Mich. 873, 873, 651 N.W.2d 67 (2002) (Michigan Court of Appeals erred by finding defendant\u2019s judgment of sentence referred to an incorrect statutory provision because the original judgment \u201cpermissibly referred to the appropriate section of the PACC Code\u201d instead of the relevant M.C.L. section); People v. Bennett, 2012 WL 6604706, at *3 (Mich.Ct.App. Dec. 18, 2012) (remanding to amend the plaintiffs Judgment of Sentence because the PACC Code was entered into the M.C.L. citation box on the Judgment of Sentence); see also Lee Higgins, Prosecutors admit mistake during 2003 conviction of Matthew Freeman, court documents say, AnnArbor.com, March. 2, 2010, available at http:\/\/www. annarbor.com\/news \/mistakes-were-made-during-2003-conviction-of-sexoffenderprosecutors-admit-in-court-filing\/ (detailing defendant\u2019s motion to accurately reflect that he was convicted of Criminal Sexual Conduct in the Fourth Degree for having sexual relations with a minor be cause the prosecutor mistakenly referred to the PACC Code for force\/coercion)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but cf.","identifier":"2004 WL 1335976, at *1","parenthetical":"rejecting defendant's \"claim[] that authorities may misconstrue his conviction\" for resisting and obstructing a police officer with the more serious offense of taking a firearm from a police officer because the PACC Code for the former (750.479-B","sentence":"But cf. People v. Stephens, 2004 WL 1335976, at *1 (Mich.Ct.App. June 15, 2004) (rejecting defendant\u2019s \u201cclaim[] that authorities may misconstrue his conviction\u201d for resisting and obstructing a police officer with the more serious offense of taking a firearm from a police officer because the PACC Code for the former (750.479-B) resembles the M.C.L. citation to the latter (M.C.L. \u00a7 750.479b), noting that \u201cPACC codes are routinely used in pleadings, and the judgment of sentence identifies the charge as \u201cMCL citation\/PACC Code\u201d)."},"case_id":4136795,"label":"a"}
{"context":"While Plaintiffs substantive due process claim cannot survive, the ease with which PACC Codes and M.C.L. provisions can be conflated -- regardless by whom -- is \"troubling and noteworthy.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"2012 WL 6604706, at *3","parenthetical":"remanding to amend the plaintiffs Judgment of Sentence because the PACC Code was entered into the M.C.L. citation box on the Judgment of Sentence","sentence":"See People v. Kuchciak, 467 Mich. 873, 873, 651 N.W.2d 67 (2002) (Michigan Court of Appeals erred by finding defendant\u2019s judgment of sentence referred to an incorrect statutory provision because the original judgment \u201cpermissibly referred to the appropriate section of the PACC Code\u201d instead of the relevant M.C.L. section); People v. Bennett, 2012 WL 6604706, at *3 (Mich.Ct.App. Dec. 18, 2012) (remanding to amend the plaintiffs Judgment of Sentence because the PACC Code was entered into the M.C.L. citation box on the Judgment of Sentence); see also Lee Higgins, Prosecutors admit mistake during 2003 conviction of Matthew Freeman, court documents say, AnnArbor.com, March. 2, 2010, available at http:\/\/www. annarbor.com\/news \/mistakes-were-made-during-2003-conviction-of-sexoffenderprosecutors-admit-in-court-filing\/ (detailing defendant\u2019s motion to accurately reflect that he was convicted of Criminal Sexual Conduct in the Fourth Degree for having sexual relations with a minor be cause the prosecutor mistakenly referred to the PACC Code for force\/coercion)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but cf.","identifier":"2004 WL 1335976, at *1","parenthetical":"rejecting defendant's \"claim[] that authorities may misconstrue his conviction\" for resisting and obstructing a police officer with the more serious offense of taking a firearm from a police officer because the PACC Code for the former (750.479-B","sentence":"But cf. People v. Stephens, 2004 WL 1335976, at *1 (Mich.Ct.App. June 15, 2004) (rejecting defendant\u2019s \u201cclaim[] that authorities may misconstrue his conviction\u201d for resisting and obstructing a police officer with the more serious offense of taking a firearm from a police officer because the PACC Code for the former (750.479-B) resembles the M.C.L. citation to the latter (M.C.L. \u00a7 750.479b), noting that \u201cPACC codes are routinely used in pleadings, and the judgment of sentence identifies the charge as \u201cMCL citation\/PACC Code\u201d)."},"case_id":4136795,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Albrecht contends that it was error for the court to order summary judgment when the relevance of the April 6 letter was disputed. We disagree. If the only controversy was the legal sufficiency of the April 6 letter, the district court could properly grant summary judgment.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"884 F.2d 69, 73","parenthetical":"upholding a district court's grant of summary judgment which found that a memorandum did not constitute a legally binding contract for the sale of a business","sentence":"See Kaylor v. Crown Zellerbach, Inc., 643 F.2d 1362, 1366 (9th Cir.1981) (Where the only controversy was the legal sufficiency of a letter, the district court was entitled to grant summary judgment as a matter of law that the letter was not a written contract.); see also Arcadian Phosphates, Inc. v. Arcadian Corp., 884 F.2d 69, 73 (2d Cir.1989) (upholding a district court\u2019s grant of summary judgment which found that a memorandum did not constitute a legally binding contract for the sale of a business)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"643 F.2d 1362, 1366","parenthetical":"Where the only controversy was the legal sufficiency of a letter, the district court was entitled to grant summary judgment as a matter of law that the letter was not a written contract.","sentence":"See Kaylor v. Crown Zellerbach, Inc., 643 F.2d 1362, 1366 (9th Cir.1981) (Where the only controversy was the legal sufficiency of a letter, the district court was entitled to grant summary judgment as a matter of law that the letter was not a written contract.); see also Arcadian Phosphates, Inc. v. Arcadian Corp., 884 F.2d 69, 73 (2d Cir.1989) (upholding a district court\u2019s grant of summary judgment which found that a memorandum did not constitute a legally binding contract for the sale of a business)."},"case_id":10524837,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Thus, he argues that Shannon went beyond the gratuitous undertakings described above. First, we note that this is not a case where a person tried to prevent an intoxicated driver from driving; indeed, it is a case where a person assisted the intoxicated in driving. Second, we note that others have held that gratuitous undertakings concerning drivers may result in liability to a party other than the one who injured the third party.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that a motion to strike was improper where defendant assisted a drunk minor in his negligence by driving the drunk minor to his car","sentence":"See Cowart v. Grimaldi, 46 Conn.Supp. 248, 746 A.2d 833 (Conn.Super.1997) (holding that a motion to strike was improper where defendant assisted a drunk minor in his negligence by driving the drunk minor to his car); see also, Claxton v. Hutton, 615 N.E.2d 471, 474 (Ind.Ct.App.1993) (holding that summary judgment was improper because there was a question of fact pertaining to whether a motorist's gratuitous signal to pass was negligent); Thelen v. Spilman, 251 Minn. 89, 86 N.W.2d 700 (1957) (holding that \"[a] driver who, though under no legal duty to do so, voluntarily undertakes to signal a following driver that it is safe to pass is liable in damages for all reasonably foreseeable consequences if in giving the signal he does not exercise reasonable care for the safety of others\"). Jerry's allegations and asserted facts show that Shannon went beyond the actions of the defendants in Hawn and related cases."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"615 N.E.2d 471, 474","parenthetical":"holding that summary judgment was improper because there was a question of fact pertaining to whether a motorist's gratuitous signal to pass was negligent","sentence":"See Cowart v. Grimaldi, 46 Conn.Supp. 248, 746 A.2d 833 (Conn.Super.1997) (holding that a motion to strike was improper where defendant assisted a drunk minor in his negligence by driving the drunk minor to his car); see also, Claxton v. Hutton, 615 N.E.2d 471, 474 (Ind.Ct.App.1993) (holding that summary judgment was improper because there was a question of fact pertaining to whether a motorist's gratuitous signal to pass was negligent); Thelen v. Spilman, 251 Minn. 89, 86 N.W.2d 700 (1957) (holding that \"[a] driver who, though under no legal duty to do so, voluntarily undertakes to signal a following driver that it is safe to pass is liable in damages for all reasonably foreseeable consequences if in giving the signal he does not exercise reasonable care for the safety of others\"). Jerry's allegations and asserted facts show that Shannon went beyond the actions of the defendants in Hawn and related cases."},"case_id":7205918,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Thus, he argues that Shannon went beyond the gratuitous undertakings described above. First, we note that this is not a case where a person tried to prevent an intoxicated driver from driving; indeed, it is a case where a person assisted the intoxicated in driving. Second, we note that others have held that gratuitous undertakings concerning drivers may result in liability to a party other than the one who injured the third party.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that a motion to strike was improper where defendant assisted a drunk minor in his negligence by driving the drunk minor to his car","sentence":"See Cowart v. Grimaldi, 46 Conn.Supp. 248, 746 A.2d 833 (Conn.Super.1997) (holding that a motion to strike was improper where defendant assisted a drunk minor in his negligence by driving the drunk minor to his car); see also, Claxton v. Hutton, 615 N.E.2d 471, 474 (Ind.Ct.App.1993) (holding that summary judgment was improper because there was a question of fact pertaining to whether a motorist's gratuitous signal to pass was negligent); Thelen v. Spilman, 251 Minn. 89, 86 N.W.2d 700 (1957) (holding that \"[a] driver who, though under no legal duty to do so, voluntarily undertakes to signal a following driver that it is safe to pass is liable in damages for all reasonably foreseeable consequences if in giving the signal he does not exercise reasonable care for the safety of others\"). Jerry's allegations and asserted facts show that Shannon went beyond the actions of the defendants in Hawn and related cases."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that \"[a] driver who, though under no legal duty to do so, voluntarily undertakes to signal a following driver that it is safe to pass is liable in damages for all reasonably foreseeable consequences if in giving the signal he does not exercise reasonable care for the safety of others\"","sentence":"See Cowart v. Grimaldi, 46 Conn.Supp. 248, 746 A.2d 833 (Conn.Super.1997) (holding that a motion to strike was improper where defendant assisted a drunk minor in his negligence by driving the drunk minor to his car); see also, Claxton v. Hutton, 615 N.E.2d 471, 474 (Ind.Ct.App.1993) (holding that summary judgment was improper because there was a question of fact pertaining to whether a motorist's gratuitous signal to pass was negligent); Thelen v. Spilman, 251 Minn. 89, 86 N.W.2d 700 (1957) (holding that \"[a] driver who, though under no legal duty to do so, voluntarily undertakes to signal a following driver that it is safe to pass is liable in damages for all reasonably foreseeable consequences if in giving the signal he does not exercise reasonable care for the safety of others\"). Jerry's allegations and asserted facts show that Shannon went beyond the actions of the defendants in Hawn and related cases."},"case_id":7205918,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Thus, he argues that Shannon went beyond the gratuitous undertakings described above. First, we note that this is not a case where a person tried to prevent an intoxicated driver from driving; indeed, it is a case where a person assisted the intoxicated in driving. Second, we note that others have held that gratuitous undertakings concerning drivers may result in liability to a party other than the one who injured the third party.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that \"[a] driver who, though under no legal duty to do so, voluntarily undertakes to signal a following driver that it is safe to pass is liable in damages for all reasonably foreseeable consequences if in giving the signal he does not exercise reasonable care for the safety of others\"","sentence":"See Cowart v. Grimaldi, 46 Conn.Supp. 248, 746 A.2d 833 (Conn.Super.1997) (holding that a motion to strike was improper where defendant assisted a drunk minor in his negligence by driving the drunk minor to his car); see also, Claxton v. Hutton, 615 N.E.2d 471, 474 (Ind.Ct.App.1993) (holding that summary judgment was improper because there was a question of fact pertaining to whether a motorist's gratuitous signal to pass was negligent); Thelen v. Spilman, 251 Minn. 89, 86 N.W.2d 700 (1957) (holding that \"[a] driver who, though under no legal duty to do so, voluntarily undertakes to signal a following driver that it is safe to pass is liable in damages for all reasonably foreseeable consequences if in giving the signal he does not exercise reasonable care for the safety of others\"). Jerry's allegations and asserted facts show that Shannon went beyond the actions of the defendants in Hawn and related cases."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that a motion to strike was improper where defendant assisted a drunk minor in his negligence by driving the drunk minor to his car","sentence":"See Cowart v. Grimaldi, 46 Conn.Supp. 248, 746 A.2d 833 (Conn.Super.1997) (holding that a motion to strike was improper where defendant assisted a drunk minor in his negligence by driving the drunk minor to his car); see also, Claxton v. Hutton, 615 N.E.2d 471, 474 (Ind.Ct.App.1993) (holding that summary judgment was improper because there was a question of fact pertaining to whether a motorist's gratuitous signal to pass was negligent); Thelen v. Spilman, 251 Minn. 89, 86 N.W.2d 700 (1957) (holding that \"[a] driver who, though under no legal duty to do so, voluntarily undertakes to signal a following driver that it is safe to pass is liable in damages for all reasonably foreseeable consequences if in giving the signal he does not exercise reasonable care for the safety of others\"). Jerry's allegations and asserted facts show that Shannon went beyond the actions of the defendants in Hawn and related cases."},"case_id":7205918,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Thus, he argues that Shannon went beyond the gratuitous undertakings described above. First, we note that this is not a case where a person tried to prevent an intoxicated driver from driving; indeed, it is a case where a person assisted the intoxicated in driving. Second, we note that others have held that gratuitous undertakings concerning drivers may result in liability to a party other than the one who injured the third party.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that a motion to strike was improper where defendant assisted a drunk minor in his negligence by driving the drunk minor to his car","sentence":"See Cowart v. Grimaldi, 46 Conn.Supp. 248, 746 A.2d 833 (Conn.Super.1997) (holding that a motion to strike was improper where defendant assisted a drunk minor in his negligence by driving the drunk minor to his car); see also, Claxton v. Hutton, 615 N.E.2d 471, 474 (Ind.Ct.App.1993) (holding that summary judgment was improper because there was a question of fact pertaining to whether a motorist's gratuitous signal to pass was negligent); Thelen v. Spilman, 251 Minn. 89, 86 N.W.2d 700 (1957) (holding that \"[a] driver who, though under no legal duty to do so, voluntarily undertakes to signal a following driver that it is safe to pass is liable in damages for all reasonably foreseeable consequences if in giving the signal he does not exercise reasonable care for the safety of others\"). Jerry's allegations and asserted facts show that Shannon went beyond the actions of the defendants in Hawn and related cases."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"615 N.E.2d 471, 474","parenthetical":"holding that summary judgment was improper because there was a question of fact pertaining to whether a motorist's gratuitous signal to pass was negligent","sentence":"See Cowart v. Grimaldi, 46 Conn.Supp. 248, 746 A.2d 833 (Conn.Super.1997) (holding that a motion to strike was improper where defendant assisted a drunk minor in his negligence by driving the drunk minor to his car); see also, Claxton v. Hutton, 615 N.E.2d 471, 474 (Ind.Ct.App.1993) (holding that summary judgment was improper because there was a question of fact pertaining to whether a motorist's gratuitous signal to pass was negligent); Thelen v. Spilman, 251 Minn. 89, 86 N.W.2d 700 (1957) (holding that \"[a] driver who, though under no legal duty to do so, voluntarily undertakes to signal a following driver that it is safe to pass is liable in damages for all reasonably foreseeable consequences if in giving the signal he does not exercise reasonable care for the safety of others\"). Jerry's allegations and asserted facts show that Shannon went beyond the actions of the defendants in Hawn and related cases."},"case_id":7205918,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Thus, he argues that Shannon went beyond the gratuitous undertakings described above. First, we note that this is not a case where a person tried to prevent an intoxicated driver from driving; indeed, it is a case where a person assisted the intoxicated in driving. Second, we note that others have held that gratuitous undertakings concerning drivers may result in liability to a party other than the one who injured the third party.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that a motion to strike was improper where defendant assisted a drunk minor in his negligence by driving the drunk minor to his car","sentence":"See Cowart v. Grimaldi, 46 Conn.Supp. 248, 746 A.2d 833 (Conn.Super.1997) (holding that a motion to strike was improper where defendant assisted a drunk minor in his negligence by driving the drunk minor to his car); see also, Claxton v. Hutton, 615 N.E.2d 471, 474 (Ind.Ct.App.1993) (holding that summary judgment was improper because there was a question of fact pertaining to whether a motorist's gratuitous signal to pass was negligent); Thelen v. Spilman, 251 Minn. 89, 86 N.W.2d 700 (1957) (holding that \"[a] driver who, though under no legal duty to do so, voluntarily undertakes to signal a following driver that it is safe to pass is liable in damages for all reasonably foreseeable consequences if in giving the signal he does not exercise reasonable care for the safety of others\"). Jerry's allegations and asserted facts show that Shannon went beyond the actions of the defendants in Hawn and related cases."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that \"[a] driver who, though under no legal duty to do so, voluntarily undertakes to signal a following driver that it is safe to pass is liable in damages for all reasonably foreseeable consequences if in giving the signal he does not exercise reasonable care for the safety of others\"","sentence":"See Cowart v. Grimaldi, 46 Conn.Supp. 248, 746 A.2d 833 (Conn.Super.1997) (holding that a motion to strike was improper where defendant assisted a drunk minor in his negligence by driving the drunk minor to his car); see also, Claxton v. Hutton, 615 N.E.2d 471, 474 (Ind.Ct.App.1993) (holding that summary judgment was improper because there was a question of fact pertaining to whether a motorist's gratuitous signal to pass was negligent); Thelen v. Spilman, 251 Minn. 89, 86 N.W.2d 700 (1957) (holding that \"[a] driver who, though under no legal duty to do so, voluntarily undertakes to signal a following driver that it is safe to pass is liable in damages for all reasonably foreseeable consequences if in giving the signal he does not exercise reasonable care for the safety of others\"). Jerry's allegations and asserted facts show that Shannon went beyond the actions of the defendants in Hawn and related cases."},"case_id":7205918,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Thus, he argues that Shannon went beyond the gratuitous undertakings described above. First, we note that this is not a case where a person tried to prevent an intoxicated driver from driving; indeed, it is a case where a person assisted the intoxicated in driving. Second, we note that others have held that gratuitous undertakings concerning drivers may result in liability to a party other than the one who injured the third party.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that \"[a] driver who, though under no legal duty to do so, voluntarily undertakes to signal a following driver that it is safe to pass is liable in damages for all reasonably foreseeable consequences if in giving the signal he does not exercise reasonable care for the safety of others\"","sentence":"See Cowart v. Grimaldi, 46 Conn.Supp. 248, 746 A.2d 833 (Conn.Super.1997) (holding that a motion to strike was improper where defendant assisted a drunk minor in his negligence by driving the drunk minor to his car); see also, Claxton v. Hutton, 615 N.E.2d 471, 474 (Ind.Ct.App.1993) (holding that summary judgment was improper because there was a question of fact pertaining to whether a motorist's gratuitous signal to pass was negligent); Thelen v. Spilman, 251 Minn. 89, 86 N.W.2d 700 (1957) (holding that \"[a] driver who, though under no legal duty to do so, voluntarily undertakes to signal a following driver that it is safe to pass is liable in damages for all reasonably foreseeable consequences if in giving the signal he does not exercise reasonable care for the safety of others\"). Jerry's allegations and asserted facts show that Shannon went beyond the actions of the defendants in Hawn and related cases."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that a motion to strike was improper where defendant assisted a drunk minor in his negligence by driving the drunk minor to his car","sentence":"See Cowart v. Grimaldi, 46 Conn.Supp. 248, 746 A.2d 833 (Conn.Super.1997) (holding that a motion to strike was improper where defendant assisted a drunk minor in his negligence by driving the drunk minor to his car); see also, Claxton v. Hutton, 615 N.E.2d 471, 474 (Ind.Ct.App.1993) (holding that summary judgment was improper because there was a question of fact pertaining to whether a motorist's gratuitous signal to pass was negligent); Thelen v. Spilman, 251 Minn. 89, 86 N.W.2d 700 (1957) (holding that \"[a] driver who, though under no legal duty to do so, voluntarily undertakes to signal a following driver that it is safe to pass is liable in damages for all reasonably foreseeable consequences if in giving the signal he does not exercise reasonable care for the safety of others\"). Jerry's allegations and asserted facts show that Shannon went beyond the actions of the defendants in Hawn and related cases."},"case_id":7205918,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Having considered the Guidelines sentencing range, see 18 U.S.C. SS 3553(a)(4), the Court now turns to the \"other statutory concerns\" it must consider under Booker. The Court may impose a sentence that is within the applicable statutory range yet outside the range suggested by the Guidelines, but it may do so only on the basis of one or more of the factors included in 18 U.S.C. SS 3553(a). Moreover, the Court is obligated to construe the factors in section 3553(a) in a manner that is consistent with other relevant statutory provisions, particularly those that define criminal offenses.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"The meaning of terms on the statute books ought to be determined ... on the basis of which meaning is (1","sentence":"See Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 508, 109 S.Ct. 1981, 104 L.Ed.2d 557 (1989) (explaining that the task of construing the meaning of statutory terms begins with a consideration of \u201cthe extent to which the text of [the statute] answers the question before [the Court],\u201d and where the text is ambiguous, the Court should \u201cseek guidance from legislative history and from the [code\u2019s] overall structure\u201d); see also id. at 528, 109 S.Ct. 1981 (Scalia, J., concurring) (\u201cThe meaning of terms on the statute books ought to be determined ... on the basis of which meaning is (1) most in accord with context and ordinary usage ... and (2) most compatible with the surrounding body of law into which the provision must be integrated ....\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"490 U.S. 504, 508","parenthetical":"explaining that the task of construing the meaning of statutory terms begins with a consideration of \"the extent to which the text of [the statute] answers the question before [the Court],\" and where the text is ambiguous, the Court should \"seek guidance from legislative history and from the [code's] overall structure\"","sentence":"See Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 508, 109 S.Ct. 1981, 104 L.Ed.2d 557 (1989) (explaining that the task of construing the meaning of statutory terms begins with a consideration of \u201cthe extent to which the text of [the statute] answers the question before [the Court],\u201d and where the text is ambiguous, the Court should \u201cseek guidance from legislative history and from the [code\u2019s] overall structure\u201d); see also id. at 528, 109 S.Ct. 1981 (Scalia, J., concurring) (\u201cThe meaning of terms on the statute books ought to be determined ... on the basis of which meaning is (1) most in accord with context and ordinary usage ... and (2) most compatible with the surrounding body of law into which the provision must be integrated ....\u201d)."},"case_id":1001951,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Having considered the Guidelines sentencing range, see 18 U.S.C. SS 3553(a)(4), the Court now turns to the \"other statutory concerns\" it must consider under Booker. The Court may impose a sentence that is within the applicable statutory range yet outside the range suggested by the Guidelines, but it may do so only on the basis of one or more of the factors included in 18 U.S.C. SS 3553(a). Moreover, the Court is obligated to construe the factors in section 3553(a) in a manner that is consistent with other relevant statutory provisions, particularly those that define criminal offenses.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"explaining that the task of construing the meaning of statutory terms begins with a consideration of \"the extent to which the text of [the statute] answers the question before [the Court],\" and where the text is ambiguous, the Court should \"seek guidance from legislative history and from the [code's] overall structure\"","sentence":"See Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 508, 109 S.Ct. 1981, 104 L.Ed.2d 557 (1989) (explaining that the task of construing the meaning of statutory terms begins with a consideration of \u201cthe extent to which the text of [the statute] answers the question before [the Court],\u201d and where the text is ambiguous, the Court should \u201cseek guidance from legislative history and from the [code\u2019s] overall structure\u201d); see also id. at 528, 109 S.Ct. 1981 (Scalia, J., concurring) (\u201cThe meaning of terms on the statute books ought to be determined ... on the basis of which meaning is (1) most in accord with context and ordinary usage ... and (2) most compatible with the surrounding body of law into which the provision must be integrated ....\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"The meaning of terms on the statute books ought to be determined ... on the basis of which meaning is (1","sentence":"See Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 508, 109 S.Ct. 1981, 104 L.Ed.2d 557 (1989) (explaining that the task of construing the meaning of statutory terms begins with a consideration of \u201cthe extent to which the text of [the statute] answers the question before [the Court],\u201d and where the text is ambiguous, the Court should \u201cseek guidance from legislative history and from the [code\u2019s] overall structure\u201d); see also id. at 528, 109 S.Ct. 1981 (Scalia, J., concurring) (\u201cThe meaning of terms on the statute books ought to be determined ... on the basis of which meaning is (1) most in accord with context and ordinary usage ... and (2) most compatible with the surrounding body of law into which the provision must be integrated ....\u201d)."},"case_id":1001951,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Having considered the Guidelines sentencing range, see 18 U.S.C. SS 3553(a)(4), the Court now turns to the \"other statutory concerns\" it must consider under Booker. The Court may impose a sentence that is within the applicable statutory range yet outside the range suggested by the Guidelines, but it may do so only on the basis of one or more of the factors included in 18 U.S.C. SS 3553(a). Moreover, the Court is obligated to construe the factors in section 3553(a) in a manner that is consistent with other relevant statutory provisions, particularly those that define criminal offenses.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"explaining that the task of construing the meaning of statutory terms begins with a consideration of \"the extent to which the text of [the statute] answers the question before [the Court],\" and where the text is ambiguous, the Court should \"seek guidance from legislative history and from the [code's] overall structure\"","sentence":"See Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 508, 109 S.Ct. 1981, 104 L.Ed.2d 557 (1989) (explaining that the task of construing the meaning of statutory terms begins with a consideration of \u201cthe extent to which the text of [the statute] answers the question before [the Court],\u201d and where the text is ambiguous, the Court should \u201cseek guidance from legislative history and from the [code\u2019s] overall structure\u201d); see also id. at 528, 109 S.Ct. 1981 (Scalia, J., concurring) (\u201cThe meaning of terms on the statute books ought to be determined ... on the basis of which meaning is (1) most in accord with context and ordinary usage ... and (2) most compatible with the surrounding body of law into which the provision must be integrated ....\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"The meaning of terms on the statute books ought to be determined ... on the basis of which meaning is (1","sentence":"See Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 508, 109 S.Ct. 1981, 104 L.Ed.2d 557 (1989) (explaining that the task of construing the meaning of statutory terms begins with a consideration of \u201cthe extent to which the text of [the statute] answers the question before [the Court],\u201d and where the text is ambiguous, the Court should \u201cseek guidance from legislative history and from the [code\u2019s] overall structure\u201d); see also id. at 528, 109 S.Ct. 1981 (Scalia, J., concurring) (\u201cThe meaning of terms on the statute books ought to be determined ... on the basis of which meaning is (1) most in accord with context and ordinary usage ... and (2) most compatible with the surrounding body of law into which the provision must be integrated ....\u201d)."},"case_id":1001951,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Appellees' pleading, and the documentary support for the facts alleged therein, were part of the record and placed before the court the facts upon which appellees' motion for summary judgment was based. Accordingly, appellees were not required to submit an additional affidavit supporting their motion for summary judgment.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"22 Md.App. 22, 27","parenthetical":"explaining that \"facts alleged in a pleading are not, by that means alone, before the court as facts for summary judgment\" where they represent \"mere allegations\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Washington Homes, 281 Md. at 718-19, 382 A.2d 555 (holding that the facts as admitted through pleadings and documents placed before the court were sufficient to support a party\u2019s summary judgment motion); Cf. Vanhook v. Merchants Mut. Ins. Co., 22 Md.App. 22, 27, 321 A.2d 540 (1974) (explaining that \u201cfacts alleged in a pleading are not, by that means alone, before the court as facts for summary judgment\u201d where they represent \u201cmere allegations\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"281 Md. 718, 718-19","parenthetical":"holding that the facts as admitted through pleadings and documents placed before the court were sufficient to support a party's summary judgment motion","sentence":"See, e.g., Washington Homes, 281 Md. at 718-19, 382 A.2d 555 (holding that the facts as admitted through pleadings and documents placed before the court were sufficient to support a party\u2019s summary judgment motion); Cf. Vanhook v. Merchants Mut. Ins. Co., 22 Md.App. 22, 27, 321 A.2d 540 (1974) (explaining that \u201cfacts alleged in a pleading are not, by that means alone, before the court as facts for summary judgment\u201d where they represent \u201cmere allegations\u201d)."},"case_id":3963056,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Appellees' pleading, and the documentary support for the facts alleged therein, were part of the record and placed before the court the facts upon which appellees' motion for summary judgment was based. Accordingly, appellees were not required to submit an additional affidavit supporting their motion for summary judgment.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"explaining that \"facts alleged in a pleading are not, by that means alone, before the court as facts for summary judgment\" where they represent \"mere allegations\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Washington Homes, 281 Md. at 718-19, 382 A.2d 555 (holding that the facts as admitted through pleadings and documents placed before the court were sufficient to support a party\u2019s summary judgment motion); Cf. Vanhook v. Merchants Mut. Ins. Co., 22 Md.App. 22, 27, 321 A.2d 540 (1974) (explaining that \u201cfacts alleged in a pleading are not, by that means alone, before the court as facts for summary judgment\u201d where they represent \u201cmere allegations\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"281 Md. 718, 718-19","parenthetical":"holding that the facts as admitted through pleadings and documents placed before the court were sufficient to support a party's summary judgment motion","sentence":"See, e.g., Washington Homes, 281 Md. at 718-19, 382 A.2d 555 (holding that the facts as admitted through pleadings and documents placed before the court were sufficient to support a party\u2019s summary judgment motion); Cf. Vanhook v. Merchants Mut. Ins. Co., 22 Md.App. 22, 27, 321 A.2d 540 (1974) (explaining that \u201cfacts alleged in a pleading are not, by that means alone, before the court as facts for summary judgment\u201d where they represent \u201cmere allegations\u201d)."},"case_id":3963056,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Appellees' pleading, and the documentary support for the facts alleged therein, were part of the record and placed before the court the facts upon which appellees' motion for summary judgment was based. Accordingly, appellees were not required to submit an additional affidavit supporting their motion for summary judgment.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"22 Md.App. 22, 27","parenthetical":"explaining that \"facts alleged in a pleading are not, by that means alone, before the court as facts for summary judgment\" where they represent \"mere allegations\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Washington Homes, 281 Md. at 718-19, 382 A.2d 555 (holding that the facts as admitted through pleadings and documents placed before the court were sufficient to support a party\u2019s summary judgment motion); Cf. Vanhook v. Merchants Mut. Ins. Co., 22 Md.App. 22, 27, 321 A.2d 540 (1974) (explaining that \u201cfacts alleged in a pleading are not, by that means alone, before the court as facts for summary judgment\u201d where they represent \u201cmere allegations\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that the facts as admitted through pleadings and documents placed before the court were sufficient to support a party's summary judgment motion","sentence":"See, e.g., Washington Homes, 281 Md. at 718-19, 382 A.2d 555 (holding that the facts as admitted through pleadings and documents placed before the court were sufficient to support a party\u2019s summary judgment motion); Cf. Vanhook v. Merchants Mut. Ins. Co., 22 Md.App. 22, 27, 321 A.2d 540 (1974) (explaining that \u201cfacts alleged in a pleading are not, by that means alone, before the court as facts for summary judgment\u201d where they represent \u201cmere allegations\u201d)."},"case_id":3963056,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Appellees' pleading, and the documentary support for the facts alleged therein, were part of the record and placed before the court the facts upon which appellees' motion for summary judgment was based. Accordingly, appellees were not required to submit an additional affidavit supporting their motion for summary judgment.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that the facts as admitted through pleadings and documents placed before the court were sufficient to support a party's summary judgment motion","sentence":"See, e.g., Washington Homes, 281 Md. at 718-19, 382 A.2d 555 (holding that the facts as admitted through pleadings and documents placed before the court were sufficient to support a party\u2019s summary judgment motion); Cf. Vanhook v. Merchants Mut. Ins. Co., 22 Md.App. 22, 27, 321 A.2d 540 (1974) (explaining that \u201cfacts alleged in a pleading are not, by that means alone, before the court as facts for summary judgment\u201d where they represent \u201cmere allegations\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"explaining that \"facts alleged in a pleading are not, by that means alone, before the court as facts for summary judgment\" where they represent \"mere allegations\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Washington Homes, 281 Md. at 718-19, 382 A.2d 555 (holding that the facts as admitted through pleadings and documents placed before the court were sufficient to support a party\u2019s summary judgment motion); Cf. Vanhook v. Merchants Mut. Ins. Co., 22 Md.App. 22, 27, 321 A.2d 540 (1974) (explaining that \u201cfacts alleged in a pleading are not, by that means alone, before the court as facts for summary judgment\u201d where they represent \u201cmere allegations\u201d)."},"case_id":3963056,"label":"a"}
{"context":"White also argues that the district court failed to make an explicit finding that the post-September 2005 transactions (that is, the uncharged conduct) constituted relevant conduct for the purposes of loss. We have said that the relevant-conduct determination should be expressly stated by the district court during the hearing. But we have also said that we will not reverse a sentence on this basis \"where it is clear from the record that the district court considered and adopted the facts recited in the presentence report, as well as the government's reasoning concerning the significance of those facts in establishing the defendant's responsibility for uncharged conduct.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"643 F.3d 235, 244-45","parenthetical":"listing cases where we overlooked \"a paucity of explicit findings by the sentencing judge\" because there was \"specific, objective evidence in the record\" that such findings were warranted","sentence":"United States v. Acosta, 85 F.3d 275, 280 (7th Cir.1996) (affirming a sentence where the district court\u2019s relevant conduct finding was \u201cimplicit\u201d); see also United States v. Locke, 643 F.3d 235, 244-45 (7th Cir.2011) (listing cases where we overlooked \u201ca paucity of explicit findings by the sentencing judge\u201d because there was \u201cspecific, objective evidence in the record\u201d that such findings were warranted)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"85 F.3d 275, 280","parenthetical":"affirming a sentence where the district court's relevant conduct finding was \"implicit\"","sentence":"United States v. Acosta, 85 F.3d 275, 280 (7th Cir.1996) (affirming a sentence where the district court\u2019s relevant conduct finding was \u201cimplicit\u201d); see also United States v. Locke, 643 F.3d 235, 244-45 (7th Cir.2011) (listing cases where we overlooked \u201ca paucity of explicit findings by the sentencing judge\u201d because there was \u201cspecific, objective evidence in the record\u201d that such findings were warranted)."},"case_id":3668187,"label":"b"}
{"context":"While the 92-year sentence was a significant upward variance from the recommendation in the PSR, the court specifically noted that the 18 U.S.C. SS 3553(a) factors merited an upward variance because Hebert had abused his position of trust and authority as a police officer to take Bloch's life. And this court as well as other courts have approved of similarly significant upward variances where appropriate.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"598 Fed.Appx. 159, 161-62","parenthetical":"affirming an upward variance to life imprisonment following a conviction for advertising child pornography","sentence":"See, e.g., United States v. Brantley, 537 F.3d 347, 348 (5th Cir.2008) (affirming a sentence of incarceration 253% higher than the top of the Guidelines range); United States v. Smith, 417 F.3d 483, 492-93 (5th Cir.2005) (affirming a sentence of incarceration nearly 300% higher than the top of the Guidelines range); see also United States v. Sebolt, 598 Fed.Appx. 159,161-62 (4th Cir.2015) (per curiam) (unpublished) (affirming an upward variance to life imprisonment following a conviction for advertising child pornography)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"537 F.3d 347, 348","parenthetical":"affirming a sentence of incarceration 253% higher than the top of the Guidelines range","sentence":"See, e.g., United States v. Brantley, 537 F.3d 347, 348 (5th Cir.2008) (affirming a sentence of incarceration 253% higher than the top of the Guidelines range); United States v. Smith, 417 F.3d 483, 492-93 (5th Cir.2005) (affirming a sentence of incarceration nearly 300% higher than the top of the Guidelines range); see also United States v. Sebolt, 598 Fed.Appx. 159,161-62 (4th Cir.2015) (per curiam) (unpublished) (affirming an upward variance to life imprisonment following a conviction for advertising child pornography)."},"case_id":4088089,"label":"b"}
{"context":"While the 92-year sentence was a significant upward variance from the recommendation in the PSR, the court specifically noted that the 18 U.S.C. SS 3553(a) factors merited an upward variance because Hebert had abused his position of trust and authority as a police officer to take Bloch's life. And this court as well as other courts have approved of similarly significant upward variances where appropriate.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"598 Fed.Appx. 159, 161-62","parenthetical":"affirming an upward variance to life imprisonment following a conviction for advertising child pornography","sentence":"See, e.g., United States v. Brantley, 537 F.3d 347, 348 (5th Cir.2008) (affirming a sentence of incarceration 253% higher than the top of the Guidelines range); United States v. Smith, 417 F.3d 483, 492-93 (5th Cir.2005) (affirming a sentence of incarceration nearly 300% higher than the top of the Guidelines range); see also United States v. Sebolt, 598 Fed.Appx. 159,161-62 (4th Cir.2015) (per curiam) (unpublished) (affirming an upward variance to life imprisonment following a conviction for advertising child pornography)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"417 F.3d 483, 492-93","parenthetical":"affirming a sentence of incarceration nearly 300% higher than the top of the Guidelines range","sentence":"See, e.g., United States v. Brantley, 537 F.3d 347, 348 (5th Cir.2008) (affirming a sentence of incarceration 253% higher than the top of the Guidelines range); United States v. Smith, 417 F.3d 483, 492-93 (5th Cir.2005) (affirming a sentence of incarceration nearly 300% higher than the top of the Guidelines range); see also United States v. Sebolt, 598 Fed.Appx. 159,161-62 (4th Cir.2015) (per curiam) (unpublished) (affirming an upward variance to life imprisonment following a conviction for advertising child pornography)."},"case_id":4088089,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Several other jurisdictions share the same view with the Third Circuit.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"564 N. E. 2d 1300, 1305","parenthetical":" holding that lottery winnings were presumptively marital property where it was undisputed that money used to purchase the winning lottery ticket came from earnings of either husband or wife, purchase of ticket occurred during their marriage, and the irrevocable right to receive lottery payments was established during marriage","sentence":"See, e.g., In re Marriage of Mahaffey, 564 N. E. 2d 1300, 1305 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990), ( holding that lottery winnings were presumptively marital property where it was undisputed that money used to purchase the winning lottery ticket came from earnings of either husband or wife, purchase of ticket occurred during their marriage, and the irrevocable right to receive lottery payments was established during marriage); Alston v. Alston, 85 Md. App. 176, 582 A.2d 574 (1990), (held that the husband lottery winnings, occurring prior to termination of marriage were marital property); Smith v. Smith, 557 N.Y.S. 2d 22 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990), (held that lottery winnings are marital property and should be divided equally in a divorce action when both spouses made equal contributions to the marriage even though the winning ticket was acquired solely by husbands' effort); Ullah v. Ullah, 55 N.Y.S. 2d 834, 835 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990), (held that a lottery jackpot won during marriage is marital property and that equal division is appropriate since the jackpot was won as a result of fortuitous circumstances and not the result of either spouse's toil or labor); Giedinghagen v. Giedinghagen, 712 S. W. 2d 711 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (held that marital property encompasses any property including lottery winnings, acquired up to the date of a decree of legal separation or dissolution); See also Dyer v. Dyer, 536 A.2d 453 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) (holding that the trial court had not abused its discretion in determining that a husband's lottery winnings obtained after a fourteen year separation but before divorce were his sole property because the winnings were not acquired during marriage and had no impact on the standard of living of the marital union.)"},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that the trial court had not abused its discretion in determining that a husband's lottery winnings obtained after a fourteen year separation but before divorce were his sole property because the winnings were not acquired during marriage and had no impact on the standard of living of the marital union.","sentence":"See, e.g., In re Marriage of Mahaffey, 564 N. E. 2d 1300, 1305 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990), ( holding that lottery winnings were presumptively marital property where it was undisputed that money used to purchase the winning lottery ticket came from earnings of either husband or wife, purchase of ticket occurred during their marriage, and the irrevocable right to receive lottery payments was established during marriage); Alston v. Alston, 85 Md. App. 176, 582 A.2d 574 (1990), (held that the husband lottery winnings, occurring prior to termination of marriage were marital property); Smith v. Smith, 557 N.Y.S. 2d 22 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990), (held that lottery winnings are marital property and should be divided equally in a divorce action when both spouses made equal contributions to the marriage even though the winning ticket was acquired solely by husbands' effort); Ullah v. Ullah, 55 N.Y.S. 2d 834, 835 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990), (held that a lottery jackpot won during marriage is marital property and that equal division is appropriate since the jackpot was won as a result of fortuitous circumstances and not the result of either spouse's toil or labor); Giedinghagen v. Giedinghagen, 712 S. W. 2d 711 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (held that marital property encompasses any property including lottery winnings, acquired up to the date of a decree of legal separation or dissolution); See also Dyer v. Dyer, 536 A.2d 453 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) (holding that the trial court had not abused its discretion in determining that a husband's lottery winnings obtained after a fourteen year separation but before divorce were his sole property because the winnings were not acquired during marriage and had no impact on the standard of living of the marital union.)"},"case_id":455049,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Several other jurisdictions share the same view with the Third Circuit.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that the trial court had not abused its discretion in determining that a husband's lottery winnings obtained after a fourteen year separation but before divorce were his sole property because the winnings were not acquired during marriage and had no impact on the standard of living of the marital union.","sentence":"See, e.g., In re Marriage of Mahaffey, 564 N. E. 2d 1300, 1305 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990), ( holding that lottery winnings were presumptively marital property where it was undisputed that money used to purchase the winning lottery ticket came from earnings of either husband or wife, purchase of ticket occurred during their marriage, and the irrevocable right to receive lottery payments was established during marriage); Alston v. Alston, 85 Md. App. 176, 582 A.2d 574 (1990), (held that the husband lottery winnings, occurring prior to termination of marriage were marital property); Smith v. Smith, 557 N.Y.S. 2d 22 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990), (held that lottery winnings are marital property and should be divided equally in a divorce action when both spouses made equal contributions to the marriage even though the winning ticket was acquired solely by husbands' effort); Ullah v. Ullah, 55 N.Y.S. 2d 834, 835 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990), (held that a lottery jackpot won during marriage is marital property and that equal division is appropriate since the jackpot was won as a result of fortuitous circumstances and not the result of either spouse's toil or labor); Giedinghagen v. Giedinghagen, 712 S. W. 2d 711 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (held that marital property encompasses any property including lottery winnings, acquired up to the date of a decree of legal separation or dissolution); See also Dyer v. Dyer, 536 A.2d 453 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) (holding that the trial court had not abused its discretion in determining that a husband's lottery winnings obtained after a fourteen year separation but before divorce were his sole property because the winnings were not acquired during marriage and had no impact on the standard of living of the marital union.)"},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"held that the husband lottery winnings, occurring prior to termination of marriage were marital property","sentence":"See, e.g., In re Marriage of Mahaffey, 564 N. E. 2d 1300, 1305 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990), ( holding that lottery winnings were presumptively marital property where it was undisputed that money used to purchase the winning lottery ticket came from earnings of either husband or wife, purchase of ticket occurred during their marriage, and the irrevocable right to receive lottery payments was established during marriage); Alston v. Alston, 85 Md. App. 176, 582 A.2d 574 (1990), (held that the husband lottery winnings, occurring prior to termination of marriage were marital property); Smith v. Smith, 557 N.Y.S. 2d 22 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990), (held that lottery winnings are marital property and should be divided equally in a divorce action when both spouses made equal contributions to the marriage even though the winning ticket was acquired solely by husbands' effort); Ullah v. Ullah, 55 N.Y.S. 2d 834, 835 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990), (held that a lottery jackpot won during marriage is marital property and that equal division is appropriate since the jackpot was won as a result of fortuitous circumstances and not the result of either spouse's toil or labor); Giedinghagen v. Giedinghagen, 712 S. W. 2d 711 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (held that marital property encompasses any property including lottery winnings, acquired up to the date of a decree of legal separation or dissolution); See also Dyer v. Dyer, 536 A.2d 453 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) (holding that the trial court had not abused its discretion in determining that a husband's lottery winnings obtained after a fourteen year separation but before divorce were his sole property because the winnings were not acquired during marriage and had no impact on the standard of living of the marital union.)"},"case_id":455049,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Several other jurisdictions share the same view with the Third Circuit.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"held that the husband lottery winnings, occurring prior to termination of marriage were marital property","sentence":"See, e.g., In re Marriage of Mahaffey, 564 N. E. 2d 1300, 1305 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990), ( holding that lottery winnings were presumptively marital property where it was undisputed that money used to purchase the winning lottery ticket came from earnings of either husband or wife, purchase of ticket occurred during their marriage, and the irrevocable right to receive lottery payments was established during marriage); Alston v. Alston, 85 Md. App. 176, 582 A.2d 574 (1990), (held that the husband lottery winnings, occurring prior to termination of marriage were marital property); Smith v. Smith, 557 N.Y.S. 2d 22 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990), (held that lottery winnings are marital property and should be divided equally in a divorce action when both spouses made equal contributions to the marriage even though the winning ticket was acquired solely by husbands' effort); Ullah v. Ullah, 55 N.Y.S. 2d 834, 835 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990), (held that a lottery jackpot won during marriage is marital property and that equal division is appropriate since the jackpot was won as a result of fortuitous circumstances and not the result of either spouse's toil or labor); Giedinghagen v. Giedinghagen, 712 S. W. 2d 711 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (held that marital property encompasses any property including lottery winnings, acquired up to the date of a decree of legal separation or dissolution); See also Dyer v. Dyer, 536 A.2d 453 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) (holding that the trial court had not abused its discretion in determining that a husband's lottery winnings obtained after a fourteen year separation but before divorce were his sole property because the winnings were not acquired during marriage and had no impact on the standard of living of the marital union.)"},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that the trial court had not abused its discretion in determining that a husband's lottery winnings obtained after a fourteen year separation but before divorce were his sole property because the winnings were not acquired during marriage and had no impact on the standard of living of the marital union.","sentence":"See, e.g., In re Marriage of Mahaffey, 564 N. E. 2d 1300, 1305 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990), ( holding that lottery winnings were presumptively marital property where it was undisputed that money used to purchase the winning lottery ticket came from earnings of either husband or wife, purchase of ticket occurred during their marriage, and the irrevocable right to receive lottery payments was established during marriage); Alston v. Alston, 85 Md. App. 176, 582 A.2d 574 (1990), (held that the husband lottery winnings, occurring prior to termination of marriage were marital property); Smith v. Smith, 557 N.Y.S. 2d 22 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990), (held that lottery winnings are marital property and should be divided equally in a divorce action when both spouses made equal contributions to the marriage even though the winning ticket was acquired solely by husbands' effort); Ullah v. Ullah, 55 N.Y.S. 2d 834, 835 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990), (held that a lottery jackpot won during marriage is marital property and that equal division is appropriate since the jackpot was won as a result of fortuitous circumstances and not the result of either spouse's toil or labor); Giedinghagen v. Giedinghagen, 712 S. W. 2d 711 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (held that marital property encompasses any property including lottery winnings, acquired up to the date of a decree of legal separation or dissolution); See also Dyer v. Dyer, 536 A.2d 453 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) (holding that the trial court had not abused its discretion in determining that a husband's lottery winnings obtained after a fourteen year separation but before divorce were his sole property because the winnings were not acquired during marriage and had no impact on the standard of living of the marital union.)"},"case_id":455049,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Several other jurisdictions share the same view with the Third Circuit.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"held that lottery winnings are marital property and should be divided equally in a divorce action when both spouses made equal contributions to the marriage even though the winning ticket was acquired solely by husbands' effort","sentence":"See, e.g., In re Marriage of Mahaffey, 564 N. E. 2d 1300, 1305 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990), ( holding that lottery winnings were presumptively marital property where it was undisputed that money used to purchase the winning lottery ticket came from earnings of either husband or wife, purchase of ticket occurred during their marriage, and the irrevocable right to receive lottery payments was established during marriage); Alston v. Alston, 85 Md. App. 176, 582 A.2d 574 (1990), (held that the husband lottery winnings, occurring prior to termination of marriage were marital property); Smith v. Smith, 557 N.Y.S. 2d 22 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990), (held that lottery winnings are marital property and should be divided equally in a divorce action when both spouses made equal contributions to the marriage even though the winning ticket was acquired solely by husbands' effort); Ullah v. Ullah, 55 N.Y.S. 2d 834, 835 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990), (held that a lottery jackpot won during marriage is marital property and that equal division is appropriate since the jackpot was won as a result of fortuitous circumstances and not the result of either spouse's toil or labor); Giedinghagen v. Giedinghagen, 712 S. W. 2d 711 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (held that marital property encompasses any property including lottery winnings, acquired up to the date of a decree of legal separation or dissolution); See also Dyer v. Dyer, 536 A.2d 453 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) (holding that the trial court had not abused its discretion in determining that a husband's lottery winnings obtained after a fourteen year separation but before divorce were his sole property because the winnings were not acquired during marriage and had no impact on the standard of living of the marital union.)"},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that the trial court had not abused its discretion in determining that a husband's lottery winnings obtained after a fourteen year separation but before divorce were his sole property because the winnings were not acquired during marriage and had no impact on the standard of living of the marital union.","sentence":"See, e.g., In re Marriage of Mahaffey, 564 N. E. 2d 1300, 1305 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990), ( holding that lottery winnings were presumptively marital property where it was undisputed that money used to purchase the winning lottery ticket came from earnings of either husband or wife, purchase of ticket occurred during their marriage, and the irrevocable right to receive lottery payments was established during marriage); Alston v. Alston, 85 Md. App. 176, 582 A.2d 574 (1990), (held that the husband lottery winnings, occurring prior to termination of marriage were marital property); Smith v. Smith, 557 N.Y.S. 2d 22 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990), (held that lottery winnings are marital property and should be divided equally in a divorce action when both spouses made equal contributions to the marriage even though the winning ticket was acquired solely by husbands' effort); Ullah v. Ullah, 55 N.Y.S. 2d 834, 835 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990), (held that a lottery jackpot won during marriage is marital property and that equal division is appropriate since the jackpot was won as a result of fortuitous circumstances and not the result of either spouse's toil or labor); Giedinghagen v. Giedinghagen, 712 S. W. 2d 711 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (held that marital property encompasses any property including lottery winnings, acquired up to the date of a decree of legal separation or dissolution); See also Dyer v. Dyer, 536 A.2d 453 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) (holding that the trial court had not abused its discretion in determining that a husband's lottery winnings obtained after a fourteen year separation but before divorce were his sole property because the winnings were not acquired during marriage and had no impact on the standard of living of the marital union.)"},"case_id":455049,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Several other jurisdictions share the same view with the Third Circuit.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"55 N.Y.S. 2d 834, 835","parenthetical":"held that a lottery jackpot won during marriage is marital property and that equal division is appropriate since the jackpot was won as a result of fortuitous circumstances and not the result of either spouse's toil or labor","sentence":"See, e.g., In re Marriage of Mahaffey, 564 N. E. 2d 1300, 1305 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990), ( holding that lottery winnings were presumptively marital property where it was undisputed that money used to purchase the winning lottery ticket came from earnings of either husband or wife, purchase of ticket occurred during their marriage, and the irrevocable right to receive lottery payments was established during marriage); Alston v. Alston, 85 Md. App. 176, 582 A.2d 574 (1990), (held that the husband lottery winnings, occurring prior to termination of marriage were marital property); Smith v. Smith, 557 N.Y.S. 2d 22 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990), (held that lottery winnings are marital property and should be divided equally in a divorce action when both spouses made equal contributions to the marriage even though the winning ticket was acquired solely by husbands' effort); Ullah v. Ullah, 55 N.Y.S. 2d 834, 835 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990), (held that a lottery jackpot won during marriage is marital property and that equal division is appropriate since the jackpot was won as a result of fortuitous circumstances and not the result of either spouse's toil or labor); Giedinghagen v. Giedinghagen, 712 S. W. 2d 711 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (held that marital property encompasses any property including lottery winnings, acquired up to the date of a decree of legal separation or dissolution); See also Dyer v. Dyer, 536 A.2d 453 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) (holding that the trial court had not abused its discretion in determining that a husband's lottery winnings obtained after a fourteen year separation but before divorce were his sole property because the winnings were not acquired during marriage and had no impact on the standard of living of the marital union.)"},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that the trial court had not abused its discretion in determining that a husband's lottery winnings obtained after a fourteen year separation but before divorce were his sole property because the winnings were not acquired during marriage and had no impact on the standard of living of the marital union.","sentence":"See, e.g., In re Marriage of Mahaffey, 564 N. E. 2d 1300, 1305 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990), ( holding that lottery winnings were presumptively marital property where it was undisputed that money used to purchase the winning lottery ticket came from earnings of either husband or wife, purchase of ticket occurred during their marriage, and the irrevocable right to receive lottery payments was established during marriage); Alston v. Alston, 85 Md. App. 176, 582 A.2d 574 (1990), (held that the husband lottery winnings, occurring prior to termination of marriage were marital property); Smith v. Smith, 557 N.Y.S. 2d 22 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990), (held that lottery winnings are marital property and should be divided equally in a divorce action when both spouses made equal contributions to the marriage even though the winning ticket was acquired solely by husbands' effort); Ullah v. Ullah, 55 N.Y.S. 2d 834, 835 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990), (held that a lottery jackpot won during marriage is marital property and that equal division is appropriate since the jackpot was won as a result of fortuitous circumstances and not the result of either spouse's toil or labor); Giedinghagen v. Giedinghagen, 712 S. W. 2d 711 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (held that marital property encompasses any property including lottery winnings, acquired up to the date of a decree of legal separation or dissolution); See also Dyer v. Dyer, 536 A.2d 453 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) (holding that the trial court had not abused its discretion in determining that a husband's lottery winnings obtained after a fourteen year separation but before divorce were his sole property because the winnings were not acquired during marriage and had no impact on the standard of living of the marital union.)"},"case_id":455049,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Several other jurisdictions share the same view with the Third Circuit.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that the trial court had not abused its discretion in determining that a husband's lottery winnings obtained after a fourteen year separation but before divorce were his sole property because the winnings were not acquired during marriage and had no impact on the standard of living of the marital union.","sentence":"See, e.g., In re Marriage of Mahaffey, 564 N. E. 2d 1300, 1305 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990), ( holding that lottery winnings were presumptively marital property where it was undisputed that money used to purchase the winning lottery ticket came from earnings of either husband or wife, purchase of ticket occurred during their marriage, and the irrevocable right to receive lottery payments was established during marriage); Alston v. Alston, 85 Md. App. 176, 582 A.2d 574 (1990), (held that the husband lottery winnings, occurring prior to termination of marriage were marital property); Smith v. Smith, 557 N.Y.S. 2d 22 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990), (held that lottery winnings are marital property and should be divided equally in a divorce action when both spouses made equal contributions to the marriage even though the winning ticket was acquired solely by husbands' effort); Ullah v. Ullah, 55 N.Y.S. 2d 834, 835 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990), (held that a lottery jackpot won during marriage is marital property and that equal division is appropriate since the jackpot was won as a result of fortuitous circumstances and not the result of either spouse's toil or labor); Giedinghagen v. Giedinghagen, 712 S. W. 2d 711 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (held that marital property encompasses any property including lottery winnings, acquired up to the date of a decree of legal separation or dissolution); See also Dyer v. Dyer, 536 A.2d 453 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) (holding that the trial court had not abused its discretion in determining that a husband's lottery winnings obtained after a fourteen year separation but before divorce were his sole property because the winnings were not acquired during marriage and had no impact on the standard of living of the marital union.)"},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"held that marital property encompasses any property including lottery winnings, acquired up to the date of a decree of legal separation or dissolution","sentence":"See, e.g., In re Marriage of Mahaffey, 564 N. E. 2d 1300, 1305 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990), ( holding that lottery winnings were presumptively marital property where it was undisputed that money used to purchase the winning lottery ticket came from earnings of either husband or wife, purchase of ticket occurred during their marriage, and the irrevocable right to receive lottery payments was established during marriage); Alston v. Alston, 85 Md. App. 176, 582 A.2d 574 (1990), (held that the husband lottery winnings, occurring prior to termination of marriage were marital property); Smith v. Smith, 557 N.Y.S. 2d 22 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990), (held that lottery winnings are marital property and should be divided equally in a divorce action when both spouses made equal contributions to the marriage even though the winning ticket was acquired solely by husbands' effort); Ullah v. Ullah, 55 N.Y.S. 2d 834, 835 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990), (held that a lottery jackpot won during marriage is marital property and that equal division is appropriate since the jackpot was won as a result of fortuitous circumstances and not the result of either spouse's toil or labor); Giedinghagen v. Giedinghagen, 712 S. W. 2d 711 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (held that marital property encompasses any property including lottery winnings, acquired up to the date of a decree of legal separation or dissolution); See also Dyer v. Dyer, 536 A.2d 453 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) (holding that the trial court had not abused its discretion in determining that a husband's lottery winnings obtained after a fourteen year separation but before divorce were his sole property because the winnings were not acquired during marriage and had no impact on the standard of living of the marital union.)"},"case_id":455049,"label":"b"}
{"context":". Federal circuits that have considered scenarios in which there is a temporal break between invocation and subsequent initiation have uniformly held that there was no Edwards violation.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"848 F.2d 1110, 1112-13","parenthetical":"holding that following his invocation of counsel, FBI Agent handed Mr. Comosona a business card and invited him to call collect if he wanted to talk about incident whereupon Mr. Comosona stated that he wanted to continue the interview constituted initiation by Mr. Comosona within the meaning of Edwards","sentence":"See McKinney v. Ludwick, 649 F.3d 484, 491 (6th Cir.2011) (holding that even if a detective\u2019s statement \u2014 that the case might be prosecuted by the federal government and that Mr. McKinney could face the death penalty \u2014 made to Mr. McKinney post-invocation amounted to interrogation, McKinney\u2019s decision the next morning to flag down the detective from his cell constituted initiation for purposes of Edwards), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 1559, 182 L.Ed.2d 185 (2012); Savino v. Murray, 82 F.3d 593, 599-600 (4th Cir.1996) (stating that a \"defendant who ends police-initiated interrogation by requesting counsel, then specifically calls for an officer with whom to talk about the incident in question, has reinitiated further conversation for Edwards purposes\u201d); United States v. Velasquez, 885 F.2d 1076, 1085-86 (3d Cir.1989) (holding that following her invocation of counsel, Mrs. Velasquez\u2019s request to police officer to get federal investigator because she wanted to speak with him, her subsequent question to the federal investigator (\"What is going to happen\u201d), initiated the conversation and satisfied first step in Bradshaw)', McCree v. Housewright, 689 F.2d 797, 802 (8th Cir.1982) (holding that following his invocation of counsel when Mr. McCree subsequently knocked on his cell door and stated he had something to say, this constituted initiation under Edwards ); see also United States v. Comosona, 848 F.2d 1110, 1112-13 (10th Cir.1988) (holding that following his invocation of counsel, FBI Agent handed Mr. Comosona a business card and invited him to call collect if he wanted to talk about incident whereupon Mr. Comosona stated that he wanted to continue the interview constituted initiation by Mr. Comosona within the meaning of Edwards)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"649 F.3d 484, 491","parenthetical":"holding that even if a detective's statement -- that the case might be prosecuted by the federal government and that Mr. McKinney could face the death penalty -- made to Mr. McKinney post-invocation amounted to interrogation, McKinney's decision the next morning to flag down the detective from his cell constituted initiation for purposes of Edwards","sentence":"See McKinney v. Ludwick, 649 F.3d 484, 491 (6th Cir.2011) (holding that even if a detective\u2019s statement \u2014 that the case might be prosecuted by the federal government and that Mr. McKinney could face the death penalty \u2014 made to Mr. McKinney post-invocation amounted to interrogation, McKinney\u2019s decision the next morning to flag down the detective from his cell constituted initiation for purposes of Edwards), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 1559, 182 L.Ed.2d 185 (2012); Savino v. Murray, 82 F.3d 593, 599-600 (4th Cir.1996) (stating that a \"defendant who ends police-initiated interrogation by requesting counsel, then specifically calls for an officer with whom to talk about the incident in question, has reinitiated further conversation for Edwards purposes\u201d); United States v. Velasquez, 885 F.2d 1076, 1085-86 (3d Cir.1989) (holding that following her invocation of counsel, Mrs. Velasquez\u2019s request to police officer to get federal investigator because she wanted to speak with him, her subsequent question to the federal investigator (\"What is going to happen\u201d), initiated the conversation and satisfied first step in Bradshaw)', McCree v. Housewright, 689 F.2d 797, 802 (8th Cir.1982) (holding that following his invocation of counsel when Mr. McCree subsequently knocked on his cell door and stated he had something to say, this constituted initiation under Edwards ); see also United States v. Comosona, 848 F.2d 1110, 1112-13 (10th Cir.1988) (holding that following his invocation of counsel, FBI Agent handed Mr. Comosona a business card and invited him to call collect if he wanted to talk about incident whereupon Mr. Comosona stated that he wanted to continue the interview constituted initiation by Mr. Comosona within the meaning of Edwards)."},"case_id":4280743,"label":"b"}
{"context":". Federal circuits that have considered scenarios in which there is a temporal break between invocation and subsequent initiation have uniformly held that there was no Edwards violation.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that even if a detective's statement -- that the case might be prosecuted by the federal government and that Mr. McKinney could face the death penalty -- made to Mr. McKinney post-invocation amounted to interrogation, McKinney's decision the next morning to flag down the detective from his cell constituted initiation for purposes of Edwards","sentence":"See McKinney v. Ludwick, 649 F.3d 484, 491 (6th Cir.2011) (holding that even if a detective\u2019s statement \u2014 that the case might be prosecuted by the federal government and that Mr. McKinney could face the death penalty \u2014 made to Mr. McKinney post-invocation amounted to interrogation, McKinney\u2019s decision the next morning to flag down the detective from his cell constituted initiation for purposes of Edwards), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 1559, 182 L.Ed.2d 185 (2012); Savino v. Murray, 82 F.3d 593, 599-600 (4th Cir.1996) (stating that a \"defendant who ends police-initiated interrogation by requesting counsel, then specifically calls for an officer with whom to talk about the incident in question, has reinitiated further conversation for Edwards purposes\u201d); United States v. Velasquez, 885 F.2d 1076, 1085-86 (3d Cir.1989) (holding that following her invocation of counsel, Mrs. Velasquez\u2019s request to police officer to get federal investigator because she wanted to speak with him, her subsequent question to the federal investigator (\"What is going to happen\u201d), initiated the conversation and satisfied first step in Bradshaw)', McCree v. Housewright, 689 F.2d 797, 802 (8th Cir.1982) (holding that following his invocation of counsel when Mr. McCree subsequently knocked on his cell door and stated he had something to say, this constituted initiation under Edwards ); see also United States v. Comosona, 848 F.2d 1110, 1112-13 (10th Cir.1988) (holding that following his invocation of counsel, FBI Agent handed Mr. Comosona a business card and invited him to call collect if he wanted to talk about incident whereupon Mr. Comosona stated that he wanted to continue the interview constituted initiation by Mr. Comosona within the meaning of Edwards)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"848 F.2d 1110, 1112-13","parenthetical":"holding that following his invocation of counsel, FBI Agent handed Mr. Comosona a business card and invited him to call collect if he wanted to talk about incident whereupon Mr. Comosona stated that he wanted to continue the interview constituted initiation by Mr. Comosona within the meaning of Edwards","sentence":"See McKinney v. Ludwick, 649 F.3d 484, 491 (6th Cir.2011) (holding that even if a detective\u2019s statement \u2014 that the case might be prosecuted by the federal government and that Mr. McKinney could face the death penalty \u2014 made to Mr. McKinney post-invocation amounted to interrogation, McKinney\u2019s decision the next morning to flag down the detective from his cell constituted initiation for purposes of Edwards), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 1559, 182 L.Ed.2d 185 (2012); Savino v. Murray, 82 F.3d 593, 599-600 (4th Cir.1996) (stating that a \"defendant who ends police-initiated interrogation by requesting counsel, then specifically calls for an officer with whom to talk about the incident in question, has reinitiated further conversation for Edwards purposes\u201d); United States v. Velasquez, 885 F.2d 1076, 1085-86 (3d Cir.1989) (holding that following her invocation of counsel, Mrs. Velasquez\u2019s request to police officer to get federal investigator because she wanted to speak with him, her subsequent question to the federal investigator (\"What is going to happen\u201d), initiated the conversation and satisfied first step in Bradshaw)', McCree v. Housewright, 689 F.2d 797, 802 (8th Cir.1982) (holding that following his invocation of counsel when Mr. McCree subsequently knocked on his cell door and stated he had something to say, this constituted initiation under Edwards ); see also United States v. Comosona, 848 F.2d 1110, 1112-13 (10th Cir.1988) (holding that following his invocation of counsel, FBI Agent handed Mr. Comosona a business card and invited him to call collect if he wanted to talk about incident whereupon Mr. Comosona stated that he wanted to continue the interview constituted initiation by Mr. Comosona within the meaning of Edwards)."},"case_id":4280743,"label":"a"}
{"context":". Federal circuits that have considered scenarios in which there is a temporal break between invocation and subsequent initiation have uniformly held that there was no Edwards violation.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"848 F.2d 1110, 1112-13","parenthetical":"holding that following his invocation of counsel, FBI Agent handed Mr. Comosona a business card and invited him to call collect if he wanted to talk about incident whereupon Mr. Comosona stated that he wanted to continue the interview constituted initiation by Mr. Comosona within the meaning of Edwards","sentence":"See McKinney v. Ludwick, 649 F.3d 484, 491 (6th Cir.2011) (holding that even if a detective\u2019s statement \u2014 that the case might be prosecuted by the federal government and that Mr. McKinney could face the death penalty \u2014 made to Mr. McKinney post-invocation amounted to interrogation, McKinney\u2019s decision the next morning to flag down the detective from his cell constituted initiation for purposes of Edwards), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 1559, 182 L.Ed.2d 185 (2012); Savino v. Murray, 82 F.3d 593, 599-600 (4th Cir.1996) (stating that a \"defendant who ends police-initiated interrogation by requesting counsel, then specifically calls for an officer with whom to talk about the incident in question, has reinitiated further conversation for Edwards purposes\u201d); United States v. Velasquez, 885 F.2d 1076, 1085-86 (3d Cir.1989) (holding that following her invocation of counsel, Mrs. Velasquez\u2019s request to police officer to get federal investigator because she wanted to speak with him, her subsequent question to the federal investigator (\"What is going to happen\u201d), initiated the conversation and satisfied first step in Bradshaw)', McCree v. Housewright, 689 F.2d 797, 802 (8th Cir.1982) (holding that following his invocation of counsel when Mr. McCree subsequently knocked on his cell door and stated he had something to say, this constituted initiation under Edwards ); see also United States v. Comosona, 848 F.2d 1110, 1112-13 (10th Cir.1988) (holding that following his invocation of counsel, FBI Agent handed Mr. Comosona a business card and invited him to call collect if he wanted to talk about incident whereupon Mr. Comosona stated that he wanted to continue the interview constituted initiation by Mr. Comosona within the meaning of Edwards)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that even if a detective's statement -- that the case might be prosecuted by the federal government and that Mr. McKinney could face the death penalty -- made to Mr. McKinney post-invocation amounted to interrogation, McKinney's decision the next morning to flag down the detective from his cell constituted initiation for purposes of Edwards","sentence":"See McKinney v. Ludwick, 649 F.3d 484, 491 (6th Cir.2011) (holding that even if a detective\u2019s statement \u2014 that the case might be prosecuted by the federal government and that Mr. McKinney could face the death penalty \u2014 made to Mr. McKinney post-invocation amounted to interrogation, McKinney\u2019s decision the next morning to flag down the detective from his cell constituted initiation for purposes of Edwards), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 1559, 182 L.Ed.2d 185 (2012); Savino v. Murray, 82 F.3d 593, 599-600 (4th Cir.1996) (stating that a \"defendant who ends police-initiated interrogation by requesting counsel, then specifically calls for an officer with whom to talk about the incident in question, has reinitiated further conversation for Edwards purposes\u201d); United States v. Velasquez, 885 F.2d 1076, 1085-86 (3d Cir.1989) (holding that following her invocation of counsel, Mrs. Velasquez\u2019s request to police officer to get federal investigator because she wanted to speak with him, her subsequent question to the federal investigator (\"What is going to happen\u201d), initiated the conversation and satisfied first step in Bradshaw)', McCree v. Housewright, 689 F.2d 797, 802 (8th Cir.1982) (holding that following his invocation of counsel when Mr. McCree subsequently knocked on his cell door and stated he had something to say, this constituted initiation under Edwards ); see also United States v. Comosona, 848 F.2d 1110, 1112-13 (10th Cir.1988) (holding that following his invocation of counsel, FBI Agent handed Mr. Comosona a business card and invited him to call collect if he wanted to talk about incident whereupon Mr. Comosona stated that he wanted to continue the interview constituted initiation by Mr. Comosona within the meaning of Edwards)."},"case_id":4280743,"label":"b"}
{"context":". Federal circuits that have considered scenarios in which there is a temporal break between invocation and subsequent initiation have uniformly held that there was no Edwards violation.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"848 F.2d 1110, 1112-13","parenthetical":"holding that following his invocation of counsel, FBI Agent handed Mr. Comosona a business card and invited him to call collect if he wanted to talk about incident whereupon Mr. Comosona stated that he wanted to continue the interview constituted initiation by Mr. Comosona within the meaning of Edwards","sentence":"See McKinney v. Ludwick, 649 F.3d 484, 491 (6th Cir.2011) (holding that even if a detective\u2019s statement \u2014 that the case might be prosecuted by the federal government and that Mr. McKinney could face the death penalty \u2014 made to Mr. McKinney post-invocation amounted to interrogation, McKinney\u2019s decision the next morning to flag down the detective from his cell constituted initiation for purposes of Edwards), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 1559, 182 L.Ed.2d 185 (2012); Savino v. Murray, 82 F.3d 593, 599-600 (4th Cir.1996) (stating that a \"defendant who ends police-initiated interrogation by requesting counsel, then specifically calls for an officer with whom to talk about the incident in question, has reinitiated further conversation for Edwards purposes\u201d); United States v. Velasquez, 885 F.2d 1076, 1085-86 (3d Cir.1989) (holding that following her invocation of counsel, Mrs. Velasquez\u2019s request to police officer to get federal investigator because she wanted to speak with him, her subsequent question to the federal investigator (\"What is going to happen\u201d), initiated the conversation and satisfied first step in Bradshaw)', McCree v. Housewright, 689 F.2d 797, 802 (8th Cir.1982) (holding that following his invocation of counsel when Mr. McCree subsequently knocked on his cell door and stated he had something to say, this constituted initiation under Edwards ); see also United States v. Comosona, 848 F.2d 1110, 1112-13 (10th Cir.1988) (holding that following his invocation of counsel, FBI Agent handed Mr. Comosona a business card and invited him to call collect if he wanted to talk about incident whereupon Mr. Comosona stated that he wanted to continue the interview constituted initiation by Mr. Comosona within the meaning of Edwards)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"82 F.3d 593, 599-600","parenthetical":"stating that a \"defendant who ends police-initiated interrogation by requesting counsel, then specifically calls for an officer with whom to talk about the incident in question, has reinitiated further conversation for Edwards purposes\"","sentence":"See McKinney v. Ludwick, 649 F.3d 484, 491 (6th Cir.2011) (holding that even if a detective\u2019s statement \u2014 that the case might be prosecuted by the federal government and that Mr. McKinney could face the death penalty \u2014 made to Mr. McKinney post-invocation amounted to interrogation, McKinney\u2019s decision the next morning to flag down the detective from his cell constituted initiation for purposes of Edwards), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 1559, 182 L.Ed.2d 185 (2012); Savino v. Murray, 82 F.3d 593, 599-600 (4th Cir.1996) (stating that a \"defendant who ends police-initiated interrogation by requesting counsel, then specifically calls for an officer with whom to talk about the incident in question, has reinitiated further conversation for Edwards purposes\u201d); United States v. Velasquez, 885 F.2d 1076, 1085-86 (3d Cir.1989) (holding that following her invocation of counsel, Mrs. Velasquez\u2019s request to police officer to get federal investigator because she wanted to speak with him, her subsequent question to the federal investigator (\"What is going to happen\u201d), initiated the conversation and satisfied first step in Bradshaw)', McCree v. Housewright, 689 F.2d 797, 802 (8th Cir.1982) (holding that following his invocation of counsel when Mr. McCree subsequently knocked on his cell door and stated he had something to say, this constituted initiation under Edwards ); see also United States v. Comosona, 848 F.2d 1110, 1112-13 (10th Cir.1988) (holding that following his invocation of counsel, FBI Agent handed Mr. Comosona a business card and invited him to call collect if he wanted to talk about incident whereupon Mr. Comosona stated that he wanted to continue the interview constituted initiation by Mr. Comosona within the meaning of Edwards)."},"case_id":4280743,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The court also rejects defendants' argument on the merits because the court is unpersuaded that defendants are entitled to compel arbitration of the MCI business customers' claims on the same basis that they compelled arbitration of the MCI residential customers' claims. In the court's December 1, 2003, memorandum and order, it compelled arbitration of the MCI residential customers' claims on an equitable estoppel \"intertwined claims\" theory.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"279 F.3d 901, 911","parenthetical":"trial court's refusal to apply equitable estoppel is reviewed for abuse of discretion","sentence":"Spaulding v. United Transp. Union, 279 F.3d 901, 911 (10th Cir.) (trial court\u2019s refusal to apply equitable estoppel is reviewed for abuse of discretion), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 816, 123 S.Ct. 84, 154 L.Ed.2d 20 (2002); see, e.g., Grigson v. Creative Artists Agency L.L.C., 210 F.3d 524, 528 (5th Cir.2000) (district court\u2019s decision whether to utilize equitable estoppel principles to compel arbitration is reviewed for abuse of discretion). The court concluded that \u201cnotions of equity and fairness require the court to compel arbitration of plaintiffs\u2019 antitrust claims against the long distance carriers other than their own under the terms of those plaintiffs\u2019 arbitration clauses with their respective long distance carriers.\u201d"},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"210 F.3d 524, 528","parenthetical":"district court's decision whether to utilize equitable estoppel principles to compel arbitration is reviewed for abuse of discretion","sentence":"Spaulding v. United Transp. Union, 279 F.3d 901, 911 (10th Cir.) (trial court\u2019s refusal to apply equitable estoppel is reviewed for abuse of discretion), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 816, 123 S.Ct. 84, 154 L.Ed.2d 20 (2002); see, e.g., Grigson v. Creative Artists Agency L.L.C., 210 F.3d 524, 528 (5th Cir.2000) (district court\u2019s decision whether to utilize equitable estoppel principles to compel arbitration is reviewed for abuse of discretion). The court concluded that \u201cnotions of equity and fairness require the court to compel arbitration of plaintiffs\u2019 antitrust claims against the long distance carriers other than their own under the terms of those plaintiffs\u2019 arbitration clauses with their respective long distance carriers.\u201d"},"case_id":633435,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The court also rejects defendants' argument on the merits because the court is unpersuaded that defendants are entitled to compel arbitration of the MCI business customers' claims on the same basis that they compelled arbitration of the MCI residential customers' claims. In the court's December 1, 2003, memorandum and order, it compelled arbitration of the MCI residential customers' claims on an equitable estoppel \"intertwined claims\" theory.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"210 F.3d 524, 528","parenthetical":"district court's decision whether to utilize equitable estoppel principles to compel arbitration is reviewed for abuse of discretion","sentence":"Spaulding v. United Transp. Union, 279 F.3d 901, 911 (10th Cir.) (trial court\u2019s refusal to apply equitable estoppel is reviewed for abuse of discretion), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 816, 123 S.Ct. 84, 154 L.Ed.2d 20 (2002); see, e.g., Grigson v. Creative Artists Agency L.L.C., 210 F.3d 524, 528 (5th Cir.2000) (district court\u2019s decision whether to utilize equitable estoppel principles to compel arbitration is reviewed for abuse of discretion). The court concluded that \u201cnotions of equity and fairness require the court to compel arbitration of plaintiffs\u2019 antitrust claims against the long distance carriers other than their own under the terms of those plaintiffs\u2019 arbitration clauses with their respective long distance carriers.\u201d"},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"trial court's refusal to apply equitable estoppel is reviewed for abuse of discretion","sentence":"Spaulding v. United Transp. Union, 279 F.3d 901, 911 (10th Cir.) (trial court\u2019s refusal to apply equitable estoppel is reviewed for abuse of discretion), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 816, 123 S.Ct. 84, 154 L.Ed.2d 20 (2002); see, e.g., Grigson v. Creative Artists Agency L.L.C., 210 F.3d 524, 528 (5th Cir.2000) (district court\u2019s decision whether to utilize equitable estoppel principles to compel arbitration is reviewed for abuse of discretion). The court concluded that \u201cnotions of equity and fairness require the court to compel arbitration of plaintiffs\u2019 antitrust claims against the long distance carriers other than their own under the terms of those plaintiffs\u2019 arbitration clauses with their respective long distance carriers.\u201d"},"case_id":633435,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The court also rejects defendants' argument on the merits because the court is unpersuaded that defendants are entitled to compel arbitration of the MCI business customers' claims on the same basis that they compelled arbitration of the MCI residential customers' claims. In the court's December 1, 2003, memorandum and order, it compelled arbitration of the MCI residential customers' claims on an equitable estoppel \"intertwined claims\" theory.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"trial court's refusal to apply equitable estoppel is reviewed for abuse of discretion","sentence":"Spaulding v. United Transp. Union, 279 F.3d 901, 911 (10th Cir.) (trial court\u2019s refusal to apply equitable estoppel is reviewed for abuse of discretion), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 816, 123 S.Ct. 84, 154 L.Ed.2d 20 (2002); see, e.g., Grigson v. Creative Artists Agency L.L.C., 210 F.3d 524, 528 (5th Cir.2000) (district court\u2019s decision whether to utilize equitable estoppel principles to compel arbitration is reviewed for abuse of discretion). The court concluded that \u201cnotions of equity and fairness require the court to compel arbitration of plaintiffs\u2019 antitrust claims against the long distance carriers other than their own under the terms of those plaintiffs\u2019 arbitration clauses with their respective long distance carriers.\u201d"},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"210 F.3d 524, 528","parenthetical":"district court's decision whether to utilize equitable estoppel principles to compel arbitration is reviewed for abuse of discretion","sentence":"Spaulding v. United Transp. Union, 279 F.3d 901, 911 (10th Cir.) (trial court\u2019s refusal to apply equitable estoppel is reviewed for abuse of discretion), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 816, 123 S.Ct. 84, 154 L.Ed.2d 20 (2002); see, e.g., Grigson v. Creative Artists Agency L.L.C., 210 F.3d 524, 528 (5th Cir.2000) (district court\u2019s decision whether to utilize equitable estoppel principles to compel arbitration is reviewed for abuse of discretion). The court concluded that \u201cnotions of equity and fairness require the court to compel arbitration of plaintiffs\u2019 antitrust claims against the long distance carriers other than their own under the terms of those plaintiffs\u2019 arbitration clauses with their respective long distance carriers.\u201d"},"case_id":633435,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The court also rejects defendants' argument on the merits because the court is unpersuaded that defendants are entitled to compel arbitration of the MCI business customers' claims on the same basis that they compelled arbitration of the MCI residential customers' claims. In the court's December 1, 2003, memorandum and order, it compelled arbitration of the MCI residential customers' claims on an equitable estoppel \"intertwined claims\" theory.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"210 F.3d 524, 528","parenthetical":"district court's decision whether to utilize equitable estoppel principles to compel arbitration is reviewed for abuse of discretion","sentence":"Spaulding v. United Transp. Union, 279 F.3d 901, 911 (10th Cir.) (trial court\u2019s refusal to apply equitable estoppel is reviewed for abuse of discretion), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 816, 123 S.Ct. 84, 154 L.Ed.2d 20 (2002); see, e.g., Grigson v. Creative Artists Agency L.L.C., 210 F.3d 524, 528 (5th Cir.2000) (district court\u2019s decision whether to utilize equitable estoppel principles to compel arbitration is reviewed for abuse of discretion). The court concluded that \u201cnotions of equity and fairness require the court to compel arbitration of plaintiffs\u2019 antitrust claims against the long distance carriers other than their own under the terms of those plaintiffs\u2019 arbitration clauses with their respective long distance carriers.\u201d"},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"trial court's refusal to apply equitable estoppel is reviewed for abuse of discretion","sentence":"Spaulding v. United Transp. Union, 279 F.3d 901, 911 (10th Cir.) (trial court\u2019s refusal to apply equitable estoppel is reviewed for abuse of discretion), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 816, 123 S.Ct. 84, 154 L.Ed.2d 20 (2002); see, e.g., Grigson v. Creative Artists Agency L.L.C., 210 F.3d 524, 528 (5th Cir.2000) (district court\u2019s decision whether to utilize equitable estoppel principles to compel arbitration is reviewed for abuse of discretion). The court concluded that \u201cnotions of equity and fairness require the court to compel arbitration of plaintiffs\u2019 antitrust claims against the long distance carriers other than their own under the terms of those plaintiffs\u2019 arbitration clauses with their respective long distance carriers.\u201d"},"case_id":633435,"label":"b"}
{"context":"First, she rejected the opinion because it was not supported by x-rays, MRI studies, CT scans, laboratory findings or \"objective medical findings.\" However, plaintiffs principal alleged disabling condition was fibromyositis, or fibromyalgia. X-rays, MRI studies, CT scans and laboratory tests would not reveal the presence or severity of fibromyalgia, the symptoms of which are entirely subjective.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"172 F.Supp.2d 1087, 1100-01","parenthetical":"holding that the lack of \"hard evidence\" did not supply a good reason for rejecting a treating source physician's assessment where the disability was fibromyalgia","sentence":"See also Dominguese v. Massanari, 172 F.Supp.2d 1087, 1100-01 (E.D.Wis.2001) (holding that the lack of \u201chard evidence\u201d did not supply a good reason for rejecting a treating source physician\u2019s assessment where the disability was fibromyalgia)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"78 F.3d 307, 307","parenthetical":"and the rule of thumb is that the patient must have at least eleven of them to be diagnosed as having fibromyalgia","sentence":"See Sar-chet, 78 F.3d at 307. Those symptoms include \u201c \u2018pain all over,\u2019 fatigue, disturbed sleep, stiffness, and \u2014 the only symptom that discriminates between it and other diseases of a rheumatic character \u2014 multiple tender spots, more precisely eighteen fixed locations on the body (and the rule of thumb is that the patient must have at least eleven of them to be diagnosed as having fibromyalgia) that when pressed firmly cause the patient to flinch.\u201d Id. at 306. Given the nature of the condition, the lack of lack of x-rays, MRI studies, CT scans, laboratory findings or objective medical evidence was not probative of whether the record supported Dr. Misra\u2019s opinion about plaintiffs limitations."},"case_id":9507507,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In addition to providing reliable information on drug dealers in the area, the confidential informant had also previously participated in an uncontrolled buy that led to a guilty plea. This evidence sufficiently established that the confidential informant in this case was reliable.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"659 N.E.2d 119, 119","parenthetical":"\"the record reveals no reason for regarding the informant as reliable. Officer Zirkelbach did not claim that a single conviction had ever resulted from one of this informant's 'tips' \"","sentence":"See Scott v. State, 883 N.E.2d 147 (reliability of informant and trustworthiness of informant\u2019s information may be established where informant has given correct information in the past); cf. Johnson v. State, 659 N.E.2d at 119 (\u201cthe record reveals no reason for regarding the informant as reliable. Officer Zirkelbach did not claim that a single conviction had ever resulted from one of this informant\u2019s \u2018tips\u2019 \u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"reliability of informant and trustworthiness of informant's information may be established where informant has given correct information in the past","sentence":"See Scott v. State, 883 N.E.2d 147 (reliability of informant and trustworthiness of informant\u2019s information may be established where informant has given correct information in the past); cf. Johnson v. State, 659 N.E.2d at 119 (\u201cthe record reveals no reason for regarding the informant as reliable. Officer Zirkelbach did not claim that a single conviction had ever resulted from one of this informant\u2019s \u2018tips\u2019 \u201d)."},"case_id":8181158,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Third, even assuming that the risk contribution doctrine imposed retroactive liability and that judicial decisions in the civil law area were subject to constitutional challenge on retroactivity grounds, the doctrine does not violate either the Due Process or Takings Clause. As to the former, a civil statute that imposes retroactive liability -will be found to violate due process only if it is \"arbitrary and irrational.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"428 U.S. 15, 15","parenthetical":"holding that black lung compensation scheme satisfied due process because it was a \"rational measure to spread the costs of the employee's disabilities to those who have profited from the fruits of their labor\"","sentence":"Usery, 428 U.S. at 15, 96 S.Ct. 2882 (holding that black lung compensation scheme satisfied due process because it was a \u201crational measure to spread the costs of the employee\u2019s disabilities to those who have profited from the fruits of their labor\u201d); see also Central States, SE & SW v. Midwest Motor Express, 181 F.3d 799, 806 (7th Cir.1999) (stating that \u201cwhen a question of retroactivity is involved\u201d the party claiming a due process violation must show that the provision in question is arbitrary and irrational)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"181 F.3d 799, 806","parenthetical":"stating that \"when a question of retroactivity is involved\" the party claiming a due process violation must show that the provision in question is arbitrary and irrational","sentence":"Usery, 428 U.S. at 15, 96 S.Ct. 2882 (holding that black lung compensation scheme satisfied due process because it was a \u201crational measure to spread the costs of the employee\u2019s disabilities to those who have profited from the fruits of their labor\u201d); see also Central States, SE & SW v. Midwest Motor Express, 181 F.3d 799, 806 (7th Cir.1999) (stating that \u201cwhen a question of retroactivity is involved\u201d the party claiming a due process violation must show that the provision in question is arbitrary and irrational)."},"case_id":4255474,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Third, even assuming that the risk contribution doctrine imposed retroactive liability and that judicial decisions in the civil law area were subject to constitutional challenge on retroactivity grounds, the doctrine does not violate either the Due Process or Takings Clause. As to the former, a civil statute that imposes retroactive liability -will be found to violate due process only if it is \"arbitrary and irrational.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that black lung compensation scheme satisfied due process because it was a \"rational measure to spread the costs of the employee's disabilities to those who have profited from the fruits of their labor\"","sentence":"Usery, 428 U.S. at 15, 96 S.Ct. 2882 (holding that black lung compensation scheme satisfied due process because it was a \u201crational measure to spread the costs of the employee\u2019s disabilities to those who have profited from the fruits of their labor\u201d); see also Central States, SE & SW v. Midwest Motor Express, 181 F.3d 799, 806 (7th Cir.1999) (stating that \u201cwhen a question of retroactivity is involved\u201d the party claiming a due process violation must show that the provision in question is arbitrary and irrational)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"181 F.3d 799, 806","parenthetical":"stating that \"when a question of retroactivity is involved\" the party claiming a due process violation must show that the provision in question is arbitrary and irrational","sentence":"Usery, 428 U.S. at 15, 96 S.Ct. 2882 (holding that black lung compensation scheme satisfied due process because it was a \u201crational measure to spread the costs of the employee\u2019s disabilities to those who have profited from the fruits of their labor\u201d); see also Central States, SE & SW v. Midwest Motor Express, 181 F.3d 799, 806 (7th Cir.1999) (stating that \u201cwhen a question of retroactivity is involved\u201d the party claiming a due process violation must show that the provision in question is arbitrary and irrational)."},"case_id":4255474,"label":"a"}
{"context":"As Plaintiffs point out, however, knowledge is not a requirement for a finding of liability in the underlying action. The conduct alleged by ACB could have been found merely negligent or reckless and yet still actionable.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"coverage for trademark infringement not barred as liability for trademark infringement need not be based on willful conduct","sentence":"Palmer v. Truck Ins. Exch., 78 Cal.Rptr.2d 389 (Cal.Ct.App.1998) (coverage for trademark infringement not barred as liability for trademark infringement need not be based on willful conduct); see also Elcom Technologies v. Hartford Ins. Co. of the Midwest, 991 F.Supp. 1294 (D.Utah 1997) (rejecting \u201cknowledge of falsity exclusion argument where the underlying case involved false advertising claims\u201d); Union Ins. Co. v. Knife Co., 897 F.Supp. 1213 (W.D.Ark.1995) (intent is not a required element of trademark infringement thus liability can be found even where the infringement was innocent rather than willful)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"rejecting \"knowledge of falsity exclusion argument where the underlying case involved false advertising claims\"","sentence":"Palmer v. Truck Ins. Exch., 78 Cal.Rptr.2d 389 (Cal.Ct.App.1998) (coverage for trademark infringement not barred as liability for trademark infringement need not be based on willful conduct); see also Elcom Technologies v. Hartford Ins. Co. of the Midwest, 991 F.Supp. 1294 (D.Utah 1997) (rejecting \u201cknowledge of falsity exclusion argument where the underlying case involved false advertising claims\u201d); Union Ins. Co. v. Knife Co., 897 F.Supp. 1213 (W.D.Ark.1995) (intent is not a required element of trademark infringement thus liability can be found even where the infringement was innocent rather than willful)."},"case_id":11579678,"label":"a"}
{"context":"As Plaintiffs point out, however, knowledge is not a requirement for a finding of liability in the underlying action. The conduct alleged by ACB could have been found merely negligent or reckless and yet still actionable.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"coverage for trademark infringement not barred as liability for trademark infringement need not be based on willful conduct","sentence":"Palmer v. Truck Ins. Exch., 78 Cal.Rptr.2d 389 (Cal.Ct.App.1998) (coverage for trademark infringement not barred as liability for trademark infringement need not be based on willful conduct); see also Elcom Technologies v. Hartford Ins. Co. of the Midwest, 991 F.Supp. 1294 (D.Utah 1997) (rejecting \u201cknowledge of falsity exclusion argument where the underlying case involved false advertising claims\u201d); Union Ins. Co. v. Knife Co., 897 F.Supp. 1213 (W.D.Ark.1995) (intent is not a required element of trademark infringement thus liability can be found even where the infringement was innocent rather than willful)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"intent is not a required element of trademark infringement thus liability can be found even where the infringement was innocent rather than willful","sentence":"Palmer v. Truck Ins. Exch., 78 Cal.Rptr.2d 389 (Cal.Ct.App.1998) (coverage for trademark infringement not barred as liability for trademark infringement need not be based on willful conduct); see also Elcom Technologies v. Hartford Ins. Co. of the Midwest, 991 F.Supp. 1294 (D.Utah 1997) (rejecting \u201cknowledge of falsity exclusion argument where the underlying case involved false advertising claims\u201d); Union Ins. Co. v. Knife Co., 897 F.Supp. 1213 (W.D.Ark.1995) (intent is not a required element of trademark infringement thus liability can be found even where the infringement was innocent rather than willful)."},"case_id":11579678,"label":"a"}
{"context":"As an additional preliminary matter, we must determine whether the district court properly considered the additional exhibits submitted by Chase without converting the motion to one for summary judgment. Given that Lobaito knew about and relied on the contents of the additional documents submitted by Chase, such as his Form U5 termination notice and his amended FINRA statement of claim, the district court did not err in failing to convert the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment, as the materials considered were incorporated by reference into the complaint or otherwise integral thereto.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"282 F.3d 147, 152-53","parenthetical":"noting that, where a complaint relies heavily upon the \"terms and effect\" of a document, the doc ument is rendered \"integral\" to the complaint","sentence":"See Rothman v. Gregor, 220 F.3d 81, 88-89 (2d Cir.2000) (noting that the complaint includes \u201cany written instrument attached to it as an exhibit or any statements or documents incorporated in it by reference\u201d and that documents \u201cplaintiffs either possessed or knew about and upon which they relied in bringing the suit\u201d may be incorporated); see also Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 152-53 (2d Cir.2002) (noting that, where a complaint relies heavily upon the \u201cterms and effect\u201d of a document, the doc ument is rendered \u201cintegral\u201d to the complaint)(internal quotation marks omitted)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"220 F.3d 81, 88-89","parenthetical":"noting that the complaint includes \"any written instrument attached to it as an exhibit or any statements or documents incorporated in it by reference\" and that documents \"plaintiffs either possessed or knew about and upon which they relied in bringing the suit\" may be incorporated","sentence":"See Rothman v. Gregor, 220 F.3d 81, 88-89 (2d Cir.2000) (noting that the complaint includes \u201cany written instrument attached to it as an exhibit or any statements or documents incorporated in it by reference\u201d and that documents \u201cplaintiffs either possessed or knew about and upon which they relied in bringing the suit\u201d may be incorporated); see also Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 152-53 (2d Cir.2002) (noting that, where a complaint relies heavily upon the \u201cterms and effect\u201d of a document, the doc ument is rendered \u201cintegral\u201d to the complaint)(internal quotation marks omitted)."},"case_id":4168472,"label":"b"}
{"context":"It is well established \"that when a public employee speaks not as a citizen upon matters of public concern, but instead as an employee upon matters only of personal interest, absent the most unusual circumstances, a federal court is not the appropriate forum in which to review the wisdom of a personnel decision taken by a public agency allegedly in reaction to the employee's behavior.\" \"The mere fact that public monies and government efficiency are related to the subject of a public employee's speech do not, by themselves, qualify that speech as being addressed to a matter of public concern.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"848 F.2d 725, 734","parenthetical":"finding that employee's speech concerning mismanagement is not protected speech","sentence":"Barnes v. McDowell, 848 F.2d 725, 734 (6th Cir.1988) (finding that employee\u2019s speech concerning mismanagement is not protected speech)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"867 F.2d 318, 322","parenthetical":"finding that letters to a supervisor complaining about police chiefs leadership are not protected speech","sentence":"See also Brown v. City of Trenton, 867 F.2d 318, 322 (6th Cir.1989) (finding that letters to a supervisor complaining about police chiefs leadership are not protected speech)."},"case_id":1253554,"label":"a"}
{"context":"For this reason, the Illinois Supreme Court's decision was not contrary to Crane. The Illinois Supreme Court's reading of Crane is consistent with that of the majority of state courts that have considered Crane's effect on the requirements of their states' civil commitment acts.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"74 S.W.3d 789, 792","parenthetical":"jury instruction defining mental disorder must include the language \"causes the individual to have serious difficult in controlling his behavior\" to comport with Crane","sentence":"But see In re Thomas, 74 S.W.3d 789, 792 (Mo.2002) (jury instruction defining mental disorder must include the language \u201ccauses the individual to have serious difficult in controlling his behavior\u201d to comport with Crane); In re Detention of Barnes, 658 N.W.2d 98, 101 (Iowa 2003) (Crane requires a jury instruction specifying serious difficulty in controlling behavior); In re Commitment of W.Z., 173 N.J. 109, 133-34, 801 A.2d 205, 219 (2002) (the state must specifically prove \u201cby clear and convincing evidence that the individual has serious difficulty his or her harmful sexual behavior\u201d); see also Peter Pfaffenroth, The Need for Coherence: States\u2019 Civil Commitment of Sex Offenders in the Wake of Kansas v. Crane, 55 Stan. L.Rev. 2229, 2248 (2003) (arguing that Crane demands a separate lack of control finding); Kenneth W. Gaines, Instruct the Jury: Crane\u2019s \u201cSerious Difficulty\u201d Requirement and Due Process, 56 S.C. L.Rev. 291, 300-01 (2004) (same)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"254 Wis.2d 185, 201-02","parenthetical":"separate finding regarding the individual's serious difficulty in controlling behavior is not necessary for civil commitment","sentence":"See In re Commitment of Laxton, 254 Wis.2d 185, 201-02, 647 N.W.2d 784, 793 (2002) (separate finding regarding the individual\u2019s serious difficulty in controlling behavior is not necessary for civil commitment); Florida v. White, 891 So.2d 502, 509 (Fl.2004) (\u201cCrane does not impose [an element] required for civil commitment or render the Florida standard jury instructions inadequate\u201d); People v. Williams, 31 Cal.4th 757, 774-75, 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 684, 74 P.3d 779, 790 (2003) (Crane \u201cdoes not compel us to hold that further lack-of-control instructions or findings are necessary to support a commitment under the SVPA\u201d); In re Commitment of Almaguer, 117 S.W.3d 500, 504 (Tex.App.2003) (the Crane majority made no mention of the need for a new instruction or even additional jury findings); In re Leon G., 204 Ariz. 15, 22 59 P.3d 779, 786 (2002) (\u201cCrane\u2019s statement that a state must prove \u2018serious difficulty in controlling behavior\u2019 does not re quire express statutory language\u201d)."},"case_id":9015735,"label":"b"}
{"context":"For this reason, the Illinois Supreme Court's decision was not contrary to Crane. The Illinois Supreme Court's reading of Crane is consistent with that of the majority of state courts that have considered Crane's effect on the requirements of their states' civil commitment acts.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"254 Wis.2d 185, 201-02","parenthetical":"separate finding regarding the individual's serious difficulty in controlling behavior is not necessary for civil commitment","sentence":"See In re Commitment of Laxton, 254 Wis.2d 185, 201-02, 647 N.W.2d 784, 793 (2002) (separate finding regarding the individual\u2019s serious difficulty in controlling behavior is not necessary for civil commitment); Florida v. White, 891 So.2d 502, 509 (Fl.2004) (\u201cCrane does not impose [an element] required for civil commitment or render the Florida standard jury instructions inadequate\u201d); People v. Williams, 31 Cal.4th 757, 774-75, 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 684, 74 P.3d 779, 790 (2003) (Crane \u201cdoes not compel us to hold that further lack-of-control instructions or findings are necessary to support a commitment under the SVPA\u201d); In re Commitment of Almaguer, 117 S.W.3d 500, 504 (Tex.App.2003) (the Crane majority made no mention of the need for a new instruction or even additional jury findings); In re Leon G., 204 Ariz. 15, 22 59 P.3d 779, 786 (2002) (\u201cCrane\u2019s statement that a state must prove \u2018serious difficulty in controlling behavior\u2019 does not re quire express statutory language\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"658 N.W.2d 98, 101","parenthetical":"Crane requires a jury instruction specifying serious difficulty in controlling behavior","sentence":"But see In re Thomas, 74 S.W.3d 789, 792 (Mo.2002) (jury instruction defining mental disorder must include the language \u201ccauses the individual to have serious difficult in controlling his behavior\u201d to comport with Crane); In re Detention of Barnes, 658 N.W.2d 98, 101 (Iowa 2003) (Crane requires a jury instruction specifying serious difficulty in controlling behavior); In re Commitment of W.Z., 173 N.J. 109, 133-34, 801 A.2d 205, 219 (2002) (the state must specifically prove \u201cby clear and convincing evidence that the individual has serious difficulty his or her harmful sexual behavior\u201d); see also Peter Pfaffenroth, The Need for Coherence: States\u2019 Civil Commitment of Sex Offenders in the Wake of Kansas v. Crane, 55 Stan. L.Rev. 2229, 2248 (2003) (arguing that Crane demands a separate lack of control finding); Kenneth W. Gaines, Instruct the Jury: Crane\u2019s \u201cSerious Difficulty\u201d Requirement and Due Process, 56 S.C. L.Rev. 291, 300-01 (2004) (same)."},"case_id":9015735,"label":"a"}
{"context":"For this reason, the Illinois Supreme Court's decision was not contrary to Crane. The Illinois Supreme Court's reading of Crane is consistent with that of the majority of state courts that have considered Crane's effect on the requirements of their states' civil commitment acts.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"173 N.J. 109, 133-34","parenthetical":"the state must specifically prove \"by clear and convincing evidence that the individual has serious difficulty his or her harmful sexual behavior\"","sentence":"But see In re Thomas, 74 S.W.3d 789, 792 (Mo.2002) (jury instruction defining mental disorder must include the language \u201ccauses the individual to have serious difficult in controlling his behavior\u201d to comport with Crane); In re Detention of Barnes, 658 N.W.2d 98, 101 (Iowa 2003) (Crane requires a jury instruction specifying serious difficulty in controlling behavior); In re Commitment of W.Z., 173 N.J. 109, 133-34, 801 A.2d 205, 219 (2002) (the state must specifically prove \u201cby clear and convincing evidence that the individual has serious difficulty his or her harmful sexual behavior\u201d); see also Peter Pfaffenroth, The Need for Coherence: States\u2019 Civil Commitment of Sex Offenders in the Wake of Kansas v. Crane, 55 Stan. L.Rev. 2229, 2248 (2003) (arguing that Crane demands a separate lack of control finding); Kenneth W. Gaines, Instruct the Jury: Crane\u2019s \u201cSerious Difficulty\u201d Requirement and Due Process, 56 S.C. L.Rev. 291, 300-01 (2004) (same)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"254 Wis.2d 185, 201-02","parenthetical":"separate finding regarding the individual's serious difficulty in controlling behavior is not necessary for civil commitment","sentence":"See In re Commitment of Laxton, 254 Wis.2d 185, 201-02, 647 N.W.2d 784, 793 (2002) (separate finding regarding the individual\u2019s serious difficulty in controlling behavior is not necessary for civil commitment); Florida v. White, 891 So.2d 502, 509 (Fl.2004) (\u201cCrane does not impose [an element] required for civil commitment or render the Florida standard jury instructions inadequate\u201d); People v. Williams, 31 Cal.4th 757, 774-75, 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 684, 74 P.3d 779, 790 (2003) (Crane \u201cdoes not compel us to hold that further lack-of-control instructions or findings are necessary to support a commitment under the SVPA\u201d); In re Commitment of Almaguer, 117 S.W.3d 500, 504 (Tex.App.2003) (the Crane majority made no mention of the need for a new instruction or even additional jury findings); In re Leon G., 204 Ariz. 15, 22 59 P.3d 779, 786 (2002) (\u201cCrane\u2019s statement that a state must prove \u2018serious difficulty in controlling behavior\u2019 does not re quire express statutory language\u201d)."},"case_id":9015735,"label":"b"}
{"context":"For this reason, the Illinois Supreme Court's decision was not contrary to Crane. The Illinois Supreme Court's reading of Crane is consistent with that of the majority of state courts that have considered Crane's effect on the requirements of their states' civil commitment acts.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"801 A.2d 205, 219","parenthetical":"the state must specifically prove \"by clear and convincing evidence that the individual has serious difficulty his or her harmful sexual behavior\"","sentence":"But see In re Thomas, 74 S.W.3d 789, 792 (Mo.2002) (jury instruction defining mental disorder must include the language \u201ccauses the individual to have serious difficult in controlling his behavior\u201d to comport with Crane); In re Detention of Barnes, 658 N.W.2d 98, 101 (Iowa 2003) (Crane requires a jury instruction specifying serious difficulty in controlling behavior); In re Commitment of W.Z., 173 N.J. 109, 133-34, 801 A.2d 205, 219 (2002) (the state must specifically prove \u201cby clear and convincing evidence that the individual has serious difficulty his or her harmful sexual behavior\u201d); see also Peter Pfaffenroth, The Need for Coherence: States\u2019 Civil Commitment of Sex Offenders in the Wake of Kansas v. Crane, 55 Stan. L.Rev. 2229, 2248 (2003) (arguing that Crane demands a separate lack of control finding); Kenneth W. Gaines, Instruct the Jury: Crane\u2019s \u201cSerious Difficulty\u201d Requirement and Due Process, 56 S.C. L.Rev. 291, 300-01 (2004) (same)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"254 Wis.2d 185, 201-02","parenthetical":"separate finding regarding the individual's serious difficulty in controlling behavior is not necessary for civil commitment","sentence":"See In re Commitment of Laxton, 254 Wis.2d 185, 201-02, 647 N.W.2d 784, 793 (2002) (separate finding regarding the individual\u2019s serious difficulty in controlling behavior is not necessary for civil commitment); Florida v. White, 891 So.2d 502, 509 (Fl.2004) (\u201cCrane does not impose [an element] required for civil commitment or render the Florida standard jury instructions inadequate\u201d); People v. Williams, 31 Cal.4th 757, 774-75, 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 684, 74 P.3d 779, 790 (2003) (Crane \u201cdoes not compel us to hold that further lack-of-control instructions or findings are necessary to support a commitment under the SVPA\u201d); In re Commitment of Almaguer, 117 S.W.3d 500, 504 (Tex.App.2003) (the Crane majority made no mention of the need for a new instruction or even additional jury findings); In re Leon G., 204 Ariz. 15, 22 59 P.3d 779, 786 (2002) (\u201cCrane\u2019s statement that a state must prove \u2018serious difficulty in controlling behavior\u2019 does not re quire express statutory language\u201d)."},"case_id":9015735,"label":"b"}
{"context":"For this reason, the Illinois Supreme Court's decision was not contrary to Crane. The Illinois Supreme Court's reading of Crane is consistent with that of the majority of state courts that have considered Crane's effect on the requirements of their states' civil commitment acts.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"647 N.W.2d 784, 793","parenthetical":"separate finding regarding the individual's serious difficulty in controlling behavior is not necessary for civil commitment","sentence":"See In re Commitment of Laxton, 254 Wis.2d 185, 201-02, 647 N.W.2d 784, 793 (2002) (separate finding regarding the individual\u2019s serious difficulty in controlling behavior is not necessary for civil commitment); Florida v. White, 891 So.2d 502, 509 (Fl.2004) (\u201cCrane does not impose [an element] required for civil commitment or render the Florida standard jury instructions inadequate\u201d); People v. Williams, 31 Cal.4th 757, 774-75, 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 684, 74 P.3d 779, 790 (2003) (Crane \u201cdoes not compel us to hold that further lack-of-control instructions or findings are necessary to support a commitment under the SVPA\u201d); In re Commitment of Almaguer, 117 S.W.3d 500, 504 (Tex.App.2003) (the Crane majority made no mention of the need for a new instruction or even additional jury findings); In re Leon G., 204 Ariz. 15, 22 59 P.3d 779, 786 (2002) (\u201cCrane\u2019s statement that a state must prove \u2018serious difficulty in controlling behavior\u2019 does not re quire express statutory language\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"74 S.W.3d 789, 792","parenthetical":"jury instruction defining mental disorder must include the language \"causes the individual to have serious difficult in controlling his behavior\" to comport with Crane","sentence":"But see In re Thomas, 74 S.W.3d 789, 792 (Mo.2002) (jury instruction defining mental disorder must include the language \u201ccauses the individual to have serious difficult in controlling his behavior\u201d to comport with Crane); In re Detention of Barnes, 658 N.W.2d 98, 101 (Iowa 2003) (Crane requires a jury instruction specifying serious difficulty in controlling behavior); In re Commitment of W.Z., 173 N.J. 109, 133-34, 801 A.2d 205, 219 (2002) (the state must specifically prove \u201cby clear and convincing evidence that the individual has serious difficulty his or her harmful sexual behavior\u201d); see also Peter Pfaffenroth, The Need for Coherence: States\u2019 Civil Commitment of Sex Offenders in the Wake of Kansas v. Crane, 55 Stan. L.Rev. 2229, 2248 (2003) (arguing that Crane demands a separate lack of control finding); Kenneth W. Gaines, Instruct the Jury: Crane\u2019s \u201cSerious Difficulty\u201d Requirement and Due Process, 56 S.C. L.Rev. 291, 300-01 (2004) (same)."},"case_id":9015735,"label":"a"}
{"context":"For this reason, the Illinois Supreme Court's decision was not contrary to Crane. The Illinois Supreme Court's reading of Crane is consistent with that of the majority of state courts that have considered Crane's effect on the requirements of their states' civil commitment acts.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"647 N.W.2d 784, 793","parenthetical":"separate finding regarding the individual's serious difficulty in controlling behavior is not necessary for civil commitment","sentence":"See In re Commitment of Laxton, 254 Wis.2d 185, 201-02, 647 N.W.2d 784, 793 (2002) (separate finding regarding the individual\u2019s serious difficulty in controlling behavior is not necessary for civil commitment); Florida v. White, 891 So.2d 502, 509 (Fl.2004) (\u201cCrane does not impose [an element] required for civil commitment or render the Florida standard jury instructions inadequate\u201d); People v. Williams, 31 Cal.4th 757, 774-75, 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 684, 74 P.3d 779, 790 (2003) (Crane \u201cdoes not compel us to hold that further lack-of-control instructions or findings are necessary to support a commitment under the SVPA\u201d); In re Commitment of Almaguer, 117 S.W.3d 500, 504 (Tex.App.2003) (the Crane majority made no mention of the need for a new instruction or even additional jury findings); In re Leon G., 204 Ariz. 15, 22 59 P.3d 779, 786 (2002) (\u201cCrane\u2019s statement that a state must prove \u2018serious difficulty in controlling behavior\u2019 does not re quire express statutory language\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"658 N.W.2d 98, 101","parenthetical":"Crane requires a jury instruction specifying serious difficulty in controlling behavior","sentence":"But see In re Thomas, 74 S.W.3d 789, 792 (Mo.2002) (jury instruction defining mental disorder must include the language \u201ccauses the individual to have serious difficult in controlling his behavior\u201d to comport with Crane); In re Detention of Barnes, 658 N.W.2d 98, 101 (Iowa 2003) (Crane requires a jury instruction specifying serious difficulty in controlling behavior); In re Commitment of W.Z., 173 N.J. 109, 133-34, 801 A.2d 205, 219 (2002) (the state must specifically prove \u201cby clear and convincing evidence that the individual has serious difficulty his or her harmful sexual behavior\u201d); see also Peter Pfaffenroth, The Need for Coherence: States\u2019 Civil Commitment of Sex Offenders in the Wake of Kansas v. Crane, 55 Stan. L.Rev. 2229, 2248 (2003) (arguing that Crane demands a separate lack of control finding); Kenneth W. Gaines, Instruct the Jury: Crane\u2019s \u201cSerious Difficulty\u201d Requirement and Due Process, 56 S.C. L.Rev. 291, 300-01 (2004) (same)."},"case_id":9015735,"label":"a"}
{"context":"For this reason, the Illinois Supreme Court's decision was not contrary to Crane. The Illinois Supreme Court's reading of Crane is consistent with that of the majority of state courts that have considered Crane's effect on the requirements of their states' civil commitment acts.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"173 N.J. 109, 133-34","parenthetical":"the state must specifically prove \"by clear and convincing evidence that the individual has serious difficulty his or her harmful sexual behavior\"","sentence":"But see In re Thomas, 74 S.W.3d 789, 792 (Mo.2002) (jury instruction defining mental disorder must include the language \u201ccauses the individual to have serious difficult in controlling his behavior\u201d to comport with Crane); In re Detention of Barnes, 658 N.W.2d 98, 101 (Iowa 2003) (Crane requires a jury instruction specifying serious difficulty in controlling behavior); In re Commitment of W.Z., 173 N.J. 109, 133-34, 801 A.2d 205, 219 (2002) (the state must specifically prove \u201cby clear and convincing evidence that the individual has serious difficulty his or her harmful sexual behavior\u201d); see also Peter Pfaffenroth, The Need for Coherence: States\u2019 Civil Commitment of Sex Offenders in the Wake of Kansas v. Crane, 55 Stan. L.Rev. 2229, 2248 (2003) (arguing that Crane demands a separate lack of control finding); Kenneth W. Gaines, Instruct the Jury: Crane\u2019s \u201cSerious Difficulty\u201d Requirement and Due Process, 56 S.C. L.Rev. 291, 300-01 (2004) (same)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"647 N.W.2d 784, 793","parenthetical":"separate finding regarding the individual's serious difficulty in controlling behavior is not necessary for civil commitment","sentence":"See In re Commitment of Laxton, 254 Wis.2d 185, 201-02, 647 N.W.2d 784, 793 (2002) (separate finding regarding the individual\u2019s serious difficulty in controlling behavior is not necessary for civil commitment); Florida v. White, 891 So.2d 502, 509 (Fl.2004) (\u201cCrane does not impose [an element] required for civil commitment or render the Florida standard jury instructions inadequate\u201d); People v. Williams, 31 Cal.4th 757, 774-75, 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 684, 74 P.3d 779, 790 (2003) (Crane \u201cdoes not compel us to hold that further lack-of-control instructions or findings are necessary to support a commitment under the SVPA\u201d); In re Commitment of Almaguer, 117 S.W.3d 500, 504 (Tex.App.2003) (the Crane majority made no mention of the need for a new instruction or even additional jury findings); In re Leon G., 204 Ariz. 15, 22 59 P.3d 779, 786 (2002) (\u201cCrane\u2019s statement that a state must prove \u2018serious difficulty in controlling behavior\u2019 does not re quire express statutory language\u201d)."},"case_id":9015735,"label":"b"}
{"context":"For this reason, the Illinois Supreme Court's decision was not contrary to Crane. The Illinois Supreme Court's reading of Crane is consistent with that of the majority of state courts that have considered Crane's effect on the requirements of their states' civil commitment acts.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"647 N.W.2d 784, 793","parenthetical":"separate finding regarding the individual's serious difficulty in controlling behavior is not necessary for civil commitment","sentence":"See In re Commitment of Laxton, 254 Wis.2d 185, 201-02, 647 N.W.2d 784, 793 (2002) (separate finding regarding the individual\u2019s serious difficulty in controlling behavior is not necessary for civil commitment); Florida v. White, 891 So.2d 502, 509 (Fl.2004) (\u201cCrane does not impose [an element] required for civil commitment or render the Florida standard jury instructions inadequate\u201d); People v. Williams, 31 Cal.4th 757, 774-75, 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 684, 74 P.3d 779, 790 (2003) (Crane \u201cdoes not compel us to hold that further lack-of-control instructions or findings are necessary to support a commitment under the SVPA\u201d); In re Commitment of Almaguer, 117 S.W.3d 500, 504 (Tex.App.2003) (the Crane majority made no mention of the need for a new instruction or even additional jury findings); In re Leon G., 204 Ariz. 15, 22 59 P.3d 779, 786 (2002) (\u201cCrane\u2019s statement that a state must prove \u2018serious difficulty in controlling behavior\u2019 does not re quire express statutory language\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"801 A.2d 205, 219","parenthetical":"the state must specifically prove \"by clear and convincing evidence that the individual has serious difficulty his or her harmful sexual behavior\"","sentence":"But see In re Thomas, 74 S.W.3d 789, 792 (Mo.2002) (jury instruction defining mental disorder must include the language \u201ccauses the individual to have serious difficult in controlling his behavior\u201d to comport with Crane); In re Detention of Barnes, 658 N.W.2d 98, 101 (Iowa 2003) (Crane requires a jury instruction specifying serious difficulty in controlling behavior); In re Commitment of W.Z., 173 N.J. 109, 133-34, 801 A.2d 205, 219 (2002) (the state must specifically prove \u201cby clear and convincing evidence that the individual has serious difficulty his or her harmful sexual behavior\u201d); see also Peter Pfaffenroth, The Need for Coherence: States\u2019 Civil Commitment of Sex Offenders in the Wake of Kansas v. Crane, 55 Stan. L.Rev. 2229, 2248 (2003) (arguing that Crane demands a separate lack of control finding); Kenneth W. Gaines, Instruct the Jury: Crane\u2019s \u201cSerious Difficulty\u201d Requirement and Due Process, 56 S.C. L.Rev. 291, 300-01 (2004) (same)."},"case_id":9015735,"label":"a"}
{"context":"For this reason, the Illinois Supreme Court's decision was not contrary to Crane. The Illinois Supreme Court's reading of Crane is consistent with that of the majority of state courts that have considered Crane's effect on the requirements of their states' civil commitment acts.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"891 So.2d 502, 509","parenthetical":"\"Crane does not impose [an element] required for civil commitment or render the Florida standard jury instructions inadequate\"","sentence":"See In re Commitment of Laxton, 254 Wis.2d 185, 201-02, 647 N.W.2d 784, 793 (2002) (separate finding regarding the individual\u2019s serious difficulty in controlling behavior is not necessary for civil commitment); Florida v. White, 891 So.2d 502, 509 (Fl.2004) (\u201cCrane does not impose [an element] required for civil commitment or render the Florida standard jury instructions inadequate\u201d); People v. Williams, 31 Cal.4th 757, 774-75, 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 684, 74 P.3d 779, 790 (2003) (Crane \u201cdoes not compel us to hold that further lack-of-control instructions or findings are necessary to support a commitment under the SVPA\u201d); In re Commitment of Almaguer, 117 S.W.3d 500, 504 (Tex.App.2003) (the Crane majority made no mention of the need for a new instruction or even additional jury findings); In re Leon G., 204 Ariz. 15, 22 59 P.3d 779, 786 (2002) (\u201cCrane\u2019s statement that a state must prove \u2018serious difficulty in controlling behavior\u2019 does not re quire express statutory language\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"74 S.W.3d 789, 792","parenthetical":"jury instruction defining mental disorder must include the language \"causes the individual to have serious difficult in controlling his behavior\" to comport with Crane","sentence":"But see In re Thomas, 74 S.W.3d 789, 792 (Mo.2002) (jury instruction defining mental disorder must include the language \u201ccauses the individual to have serious difficult in controlling his behavior\u201d to comport with Crane); In re Detention of Barnes, 658 N.W.2d 98, 101 (Iowa 2003) (Crane requires a jury instruction specifying serious difficulty in controlling behavior); In re Commitment of W.Z., 173 N.J. 109, 133-34, 801 A.2d 205, 219 (2002) (the state must specifically prove \u201cby clear and convincing evidence that the individual has serious difficulty his or her harmful sexual behavior\u201d); see also Peter Pfaffenroth, The Need for Coherence: States\u2019 Civil Commitment of Sex Offenders in the Wake of Kansas v. Crane, 55 Stan. L.Rev. 2229, 2248 (2003) (arguing that Crane demands a separate lack of control finding); Kenneth W. Gaines, Instruct the Jury: Crane\u2019s \u201cSerious Difficulty\u201d Requirement and Due Process, 56 S.C. L.Rev. 291, 300-01 (2004) (same)."},"case_id":9015735,"label":"a"}
{"context":"For this reason, the Illinois Supreme Court's decision was not contrary to Crane. The Illinois Supreme Court's reading of Crane is consistent with that of the majority of state courts that have considered Crane's effect on the requirements of their states' civil commitment acts.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"891 So.2d 502, 509","parenthetical":"\"Crane does not impose [an element] required for civil commitment or render the Florida standard jury instructions inadequate\"","sentence":"See In re Commitment of Laxton, 254 Wis.2d 185, 201-02, 647 N.W.2d 784, 793 (2002) (separate finding regarding the individual\u2019s serious difficulty in controlling behavior is not necessary for civil commitment); Florida v. White, 891 So.2d 502, 509 (Fl.2004) (\u201cCrane does not impose [an element] required for civil commitment or render the Florida standard jury instructions inadequate\u201d); People v. Williams, 31 Cal.4th 757, 774-75, 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 684, 74 P.3d 779, 790 (2003) (Crane \u201cdoes not compel us to hold that further lack-of-control instructions or findings are necessary to support a commitment under the SVPA\u201d); In re Commitment of Almaguer, 117 S.W.3d 500, 504 (Tex.App.2003) (the Crane majority made no mention of the need for a new instruction or even additional jury findings); In re Leon G., 204 Ariz. 15, 22 59 P.3d 779, 786 (2002) (\u201cCrane\u2019s statement that a state must prove \u2018serious difficulty in controlling behavior\u2019 does not re quire express statutory language\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"658 N.W.2d 98, 101","parenthetical":"Crane requires a jury instruction specifying serious difficulty in controlling behavior","sentence":"But see In re Thomas, 74 S.W.3d 789, 792 (Mo.2002) (jury instruction defining mental disorder must include the language \u201ccauses the individual to have serious difficult in controlling his behavior\u201d to comport with Crane); In re Detention of Barnes, 658 N.W.2d 98, 101 (Iowa 2003) (Crane requires a jury instruction specifying serious difficulty in controlling behavior); In re Commitment of W.Z., 173 N.J. 109, 133-34, 801 A.2d 205, 219 (2002) (the state must specifically prove \u201cby clear and convincing evidence that the individual has serious difficulty his or her harmful sexual behavior\u201d); see also Peter Pfaffenroth, The Need for Coherence: States\u2019 Civil Commitment of Sex Offenders in the Wake of Kansas v. Crane, 55 Stan. L.Rev. 2229, 2248 (2003) (arguing that Crane demands a separate lack of control finding); Kenneth W. Gaines, Instruct the Jury: Crane\u2019s \u201cSerious Difficulty\u201d Requirement and Due Process, 56 S.C. L.Rev. 291, 300-01 (2004) (same)."},"case_id":9015735,"label":"a"}
{"context":"For this reason, the Illinois Supreme Court's decision was not contrary to Crane. The Illinois Supreme Court's reading of Crane is consistent with that of the majority of state courts that have considered Crane's effect on the requirements of their states' civil commitment acts.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"891 So.2d 502, 509","parenthetical":"\"Crane does not impose [an element] required for civil commitment or render the Florida standard jury instructions inadequate\"","sentence":"See In re Commitment of Laxton, 254 Wis.2d 185, 201-02, 647 N.W.2d 784, 793 (2002) (separate finding regarding the individual\u2019s serious difficulty in controlling behavior is not necessary for civil commitment); Florida v. White, 891 So.2d 502, 509 (Fl.2004) (\u201cCrane does not impose [an element] required for civil commitment or render the Florida standard jury instructions inadequate\u201d); People v. Williams, 31 Cal.4th 757, 774-75, 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 684, 74 P.3d 779, 790 (2003) (Crane \u201cdoes not compel us to hold that further lack-of-control instructions or findings are necessary to support a commitment under the SVPA\u201d); In re Commitment of Almaguer, 117 S.W.3d 500, 504 (Tex.App.2003) (the Crane majority made no mention of the need for a new instruction or even additional jury findings); In re Leon G., 204 Ariz. 15, 22 59 P.3d 779, 786 (2002) (\u201cCrane\u2019s statement that a state must prove \u2018serious difficulty in controlling behavior\u2019 does not re quire express statutory language\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"173 N.J. 109, 133-34","parenthetical":"the state must specifically prove \"by clear and convincing evidence that the individual has serious difficulty his or her harmful sexual behavior\"","sentence":"But see In re Thomas, 74 S.W.3d 789, 792 (Mo.2002) (jury instruction defining mental disorder must include the language \u201ccauses the individual to have serious difficult in controlling his behavior\u201d to comport with Crane); In re Detention of Barnes, 658 N.W.2d 98, 101 (Iowa 2003) (Crane requires a jury instruction specifying serious difficulty in controlling behavior); In re Commitment of W.Z., 173 N.J. 109, 133-34, 801 A.2d 205, 219 (2002) (the state must specifically prove \u201cby clear and convincing evidence that the individual has serious difficulty his or her harmful sexual behavior\u201d); see also Peter Pfaffenroth, The Need for Coherence: States\u2019 Civil Commitment of Sex Offenders in the Wake of Kansas v. Crane, 55 Stan. L.Rev. 2229, 2248 (2003) (arguing that Crane demands a separate lack of control finding); Kenneth W. Gaines, Instruct the Jury: Crane\u2019s \u201cSerious Difficulty\u201d Requirement and Due Process, 56 S.C. L.Rev. 291, 300-01 (2004) (same)."},"case_id":9015735,"label":"a"}
{"context":"For this reason, the Illinois Supreme Court's decision was not contrary to Crane. The Illinois Supreme Court's reading of Crane is consistent with that of the majority of state courts that have considered Crane's effect on the requirements of their states' civil commitment acts.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"891 So.2d 502, 509","parenthetical":"\"Crane does not impose [an element] required for civil commitment or render the Florida standard jury instructions inadequate\"","sentence":"See In re Commitment of Laxton, 254 Wis.2d 185, 201-02, 647 N.W.2d 784, 793 (2002) (separate finding regarding the individual\u2019s serious difficulty in controlling behavior is not necessary for civil commitment); Florida v. White, 891 So.2d 502, 509 (Fl.2004) (\u201cCrane does not impose [an element] required for civil commitment or render the Florida standard jury instructions inadequate\u201d); People v. Williams, 31 Cal.4th 757, 774-75, 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 684, 74 P.3d 779, 790 (2003) (Crane \u201cdoes not compel us to hold that further lack-of-control instructions or findings are necessary to support a commitment under the SVPA\u201d); In re Commitment of Almaguer, 117 S.W.3d 500, 504 (Tex.App.2003) (the Crane majority made no mention of the need for a new instruction or even additional jury findings); In re Leon G., 204 Ariz. 15, 22 59 P.3d 779, 786 (2002) (\u201cCrane\u2019s statement that a state must prove \u2018serious difficulty in controlling behavior\u2019 does not re quire express statutory language\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"801 A.2d 205, 219","parenthetical":"the state must specifically prove \"by clear and convincing evidence that the individual has serious difficulty his or her harmful sexual behavior\"","sentence":"But see In re Thomas, 74 S.W.3d 789, 792 (Mo.2002) (jury instruction defining mental disorder must include the language \u201ccauses the individual to have serious difficult in controlling his behavior\u201d to comport with Crane); In re Detention of Barnes, 658 N.W.2d 98, 101 (Iowa 2003) (Crane requires a jury instruction specifying serious difficulty in controlling behavior); In re Commitment of W.Z., 173 N.J. 109, 133-34, 801 A.2d 205, 219 (2002) (the state must specifically prove \u201cby clear and convincing evidence that the individual has serious difficulty his or her harmful sexual behavior\u201d); see also Peter Pfaffenroth, The Need for Coherence: States\u2019 Civil Commitment of Sex Offenders in the Wake of Kansas v. Crane, 55 Stan. L.Rev. 2229, 2248 (2003) (arguing that Crane demands a separate lack of control finding); Kenneth W. Gaines, Instruct the Jury: Crane\u2019s \u201cSerious Difficulty\u201d Requirement and Due Process, 56 S.C. L.Rev. 291, 300-01 (2004) (same)."},"case_id":9015735,"label":"a"}
{"context":"For this reason, the Illinois Supreme Court's decision was not contrary to Crane. The Illinois Supreme Court's reading of Crane is consistent with that of the majority of state courts that have considered Crane's effect on the requirements of their states' civil commitment acts.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"74 S.W.3d 789, 792","parenthetical":"jury instruction defining mental disorder must include the language \"causes the individual to have serious difficult in controlling his behavior\" to comport with Crane","sentence":"But see In re Thomas, 74 S.W.3d 789, 792 (Mo.2002) (jury instruction defining mental disorder must include the language \u201ccauses the individual to have serious difficult in controlling his behavior\u201d to comport with Crane); In re Detention of Barnes, 658 N.W.2d 98, 101 (Iowa 2003) (Crane requires a jury instruction specifying serious difficulty in controlling behavior); In re Commitment of W.Z., 173 N.J. 109, 133-34, 801 A.2d 205, 219 (2002) (the state must specifically prove \u201cby clear and convincing evidence that the individual has serious difficulty his or her harmful sexual behavior\u201d); see also Peter Pfaffenroth, The Need for Coherence: States\u2019 Civil Commitment of Sex Offenders in the Wake of Kansas v. Crane, 55 Stan. L.Rev. 2229, 2248 (2003) (arguing that Crane demands a separate lack of control finding); Kenneth W. Gaines, Instruct the Jury: Crane\u2019s \u201cSerious Difficulty\u201d Requirement and Due Process, 56 S.C. L.Rev. 291, 300-01 (2004) (same)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"31 Cal.4th 757, 774-75","parenthetical":"Crane \"does not compel us to hold that further lack-of-control instructions or findings are necessary to support a commitment under the SVPA\"","sentence":"See In re Commitment of Laxton, 254 Wis.2d 185, 201-02, 647 N.W.2d 784, 793 (2002) (separate finding regarding the individual\u2019s serious difficulty in controlling behavior is not necessary for civil commitment); Florida v. White, 891 So.2d 502, 509 (Fl.2004) (\u201cCrane does not impose [an element] required for civil commitment or render the Florida standard jury instructions inadequate\u201d); People v. Williams, 31 Cal.4th 757, 774-75, 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 684, 74 P.3d 779, 790 (2003) (Crane \u201cdoes not compel us to hold that further lack-of-control instructions or findings are necessary to support a commitment under the SVPA\u201d); In re Commitment of Almaguer, 117 S.W.3d 500, 504 (Tex.App.2003) (the Crane majority made no mention of the need for a new instruction or even additional jury findings); In re Leon G., 204 Ariz. 15, 22 59 P.3d 779, 786 (2002) (\u201cCrane\u2019s statement that a state must prove \u2018serious difficulty in controlling behavior\u2019 does not re quire express statutory language\u201d)."},"case_id":9015735,"label":"b"}
{"context":"For this reason, the Illinois Supreme Court's decision was not contrary to Crane. The Illinois Supreme Court's reading of Crane is consistent with that of the majority of state courts that have considered Crane's effect on the requirements of their states' civil commitment acts.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"31 Cal.4th 757, 774-75","parenthetical":"Crane \"does not compel us to hold that further lack-of-control instructions or findings are necessary to support a commitment under the SVPA\"","sentence":"See In re Commitment of Laxton, 254 Wis.2d 185, 201-02, 647 N.W.2d 784, 793 (2002) (separate finding regarding the individual\u2019s serious difficulty in controlling behavior is not necessary for civil commitment); Florida v. White, 891 So.2d 502, 509 (Fl.2004) (\u201cCrane does not impose [an element] required for civil commitment or render the Florida standard jury instructions inadequate\u201d); People v. Williams, 31 Cal.4th 757, 774-75, 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 684, 74 P.3d 779, 790 (2003) (Crane \u201cdoes not compel us to hold that further lack-of-control instructions or findings are necessary to support a commitment under the SVPA\u201d); In re Commitment of Almaguer, 117 S.W.3d 500, 504 (Tex.App.2003) (the Crane majority made no mention of the need for a new instruction or even additional jury findings); In re Leon G., 204 Ariz. 15, 22 59 P.3d 779, 786 (2002) (\u201cCrane\u2019s statement that a state must prove \u2018serious difficulty in controlling behavior\u2019 does not re quire express statutory language\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"658 N.W.2d 98, 101","parenthetical":"Crane requires a jury instruction specifying serious difficulty in controlling behavior","sentence":"But see In re Thomas, 74 S.W.3d 789, 792 (Mo.2002) (jury instruction defining mental disorder must include the language \u201ccauses the individual to have serious difficult in controlling his behavior\u201d to comport with Crane); In re Detention of Barnes, 658 N.W.2d 98, 101 (Iowa 2003) (Crane requires a jury instruction specifying serious difficulty in controlling behavior); In re Commitment of W.Z., 173 N.J. 109, 133-34, 801 A.2d 205, 219 (2002) (the state must specifically prove \u201cby clear and convincing evidence that the individual has serious difficulty his or her harmful sexual behavior\u201d); see also Peter Pfaffenroth, The Need for Coherence: States\u2019 Civil Commitment of Sex Offenders in the Wake of Kansas v. Crane, 55 Stan. L.Rev. 2229, 2248 (2003) (arguing that Crane demands a separate lack of control finding); Kenneth W. Gaines, Instruct the Jury: Crane\u2019s \u201cSerious Difficulty\u201d Requirement and Due Process, 56 S.C. L.Rev. 291, 300-01 (2004) (same)."},"case_id":9015735,"label":"a"}
{"context":"For this reason, the Illinois Supreme Court's decision was not contrary to Crane. The Illinois Supreme Court's reading of Crane is consistent with that of the majority of state courts that have considered Crane's effect on the requirements of their states' civil commitment acts.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"173 N.J. 109, 133-34","parenthetical":"the state must specifically prove \"by clear and convincing evidence that the individual has serious difficulty his or her harmful sexual behavior\"","sentence":"But see In re Thomas, 74 S.W.3d 789, 792 (Mo.2002) (jury instruction defining mental disorder must include the language \u201ccauses the individual to have serious difficult in controlling his behavior\u201d to comport with Crane); In re Detention of Barnes, 658 N.W.2d 98, 101 (Iowa 2003) (Crane requires a jury instruction specifying serious difficulty in controlling behavior); In re Commitment of W.Z., 173 N.J. 109, 133-34, 801 A.2d 205, 219 (2002) (the state must specifically prove \u201cby clear and convincing evidence that the individual has serious difficulty his or her harmful sexual behavior\u201d); see also Peter Pfaffenroth, The Need for Coherence: States\u2019 Civil Commitment of Sex Offenders in the Wake of Kansas v. Crane, 55 Stan. L.Rev. 2229, 2248 (2003) (arguing that Crane demands a separate lack of control finding); Kenneth W. Gaines, Instruct the Jury: Crane\u2019s \u201cSerious Difficulty\u201d Requirement and Due Process, 56 S.C. L.Rev. 291, 300-01 (2004) (same)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"31 Cal.4th 757, 774-75","parenthetical":"Crane \"does not compel us to hold that further lack-of-control instructions or findings are necessary to support a commitment under the SVPA\"","sentence":"See In re Commitment of Laxton, 254 Wis.2d 185, 201-02, 647 N.W.2d 784, 793 (2002) (separate finding regarding the individual\u2019s serious difficulty in controlling behavior is not necessary for civil commitment); Florida v. White, 891 So.2d 502, 509 (Fl.2004) (\u201cCrane does not impose [an element] required for civil commitment or render the Florida standard jury instructions inadequate\u201d); People v. Williams, 31 Cal.4th 757, 774-75, 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 684, 74 P.3d 779, 790 (2003) (Crane \u201cdoes not compel us to hold that further lack-of-control instructions or findings are necessary to support a commitment under the SVPA\u201d); In re Commitment of Almaguer, 117 S.W.3d 500, 504 (Tex.App.2003) (the Crane majority made no mention of the need for a new instruction or even additional jury findings); In re Leon G., 204 Ariz. 15, 22 59 P.3d 779, 786 (2002) (\u201cCrane\u2019s statement that a state must prove \u2018serious difficulty in controlling behavior\u2019 does not re quire express statutory language\u201d)."},"case_id":9015735,"label":"b"}
{"context":"For this reason, the Illinois Supreme Court's decision was not contrary to Crane. The Illinois Supreme Court's reading of Crane is consistent with that of the majority of state courts that have considered Crane's effect on the requirements of their states' civil commitment acts.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"801 A.2d 205, 219","parenthetical":"the state must specifically prove \"by clear and convincing evidence that the individual has serious difficulty his or her harmful sexual behavior\"","sentence":"But see In re Thomas, 74 S.W.3d 789, 792 (Mo.2002) (jury instruction defining mental disorder must include the language \u201ccauses the individual to have serious difficult in controlling his behavior\u201d to comport with Crane); In re Detention of Barnes, 658 N.W.2d 98, 101 (Iowa 2003) (Crane requires a jury instruction specifying serious difficulty in controlling behavior); In re Commitment of W.Z., 173 N.J. 109, 133-34, 801 A.2d 205, 219 (2002) (the state must specifically prove \u201cby clear and convincing evidence that the individual has serious difficulty his or her harmful sexual behavior\u201d); see also Peter Pfaffenroth, The Need for Coherence: States\u2019 Civil Commitment of Sex Offenders in the Wake of Kansas v. Crane, 55 Stan. L.Rev. 2229, 2248 (2003) (arguing that Crane demands a separate lack of control finding); Kenneth W. Gaines, Instruct the Jury: Crane\u2019s \u201cSerious Difficulty\u201d Requirement and Due Process, 56 S.C. L.Rev. 291, 300-01 (2004) (same)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"31 Cal.4th 757, 774-75","parenthetical":"Crane \"does not compel us to hold that further lack-of-control instructions or findings are necessary to support a commitment under the SVPA\"","sentence":"See In re Commitment of Laxton, 254 Wis.2d 185, 201-02, 647 N.W.2d 784, 793 (2002) (separate finding regarding the individual\u2019s serious difficulty in controlling behavior is not necessary for civil commitment); Florida v. White, 891 So.2d 502, 509 (Fl.2004) (\u201cCrane does not impose [an element] required for civil commitment or render the Florida standard jury instructions inadequate\u201d); People v. Williams, 31 Cal.4th 757, 774-75, 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 684, 74 P.3d 779, 790 (2003) (Crane \u201cdoes not compel us to hold that further lack-of-control instructions or findings are necessary to support a commitment under the SVPA\u201d); In re Commitment of Almaguer, 117 S.W.3d 500, 504 (Tex.App.2003) (the Crane majority made no mention of the need for a new instruction or even additional jury findings); In re Leon G., 204 Ariz. 15, 22 59 P.3d 779, 786 (2002) (\u201cCrane\u2019s statement that a state must prove \u2018serious difficulty in controlling behavior\u2019 does not re quire express statutory language\u201d)."},"case_id":9015735,"label":"b"}
{"context":"For this reason, the Illinois Supreme Court's decision was not contrary to Crane. The Illinois Supreme Court's reading of Crane is consistent with that of the majority of state courts that have considered Crane's effect on the requirements of their states' civil commitment acts.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"Crane \"does not compel us to hold that further lack-of-control instructions or findings are necessary to support a commitment under the SVPA\"","sentence":"See In re Commitment of Laxton, 254 Wis.2d 185, 201-02, 647 N.W.2d 784, 793 (2002) (separate finding regarding the individual\u2019s serious difficulty in controlling behavior is not necessary for civil commitment); Florida v. White, 891 So.2d 502, 509 (Fl.2004) (\u201cCrane does not impose [an element] required for civil commitment or render the Florida standard jury instructions inadequate\u201d); People v. Williams, 31 Cal.4th 757, 774-75, 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 684, 74 P.3d 779, 790 (2003) (Crane \u201cdoes not compel us to hold that further lack-of-control instructions or findings are necessary to support a commitment under the SVPA\u201d); In re Commitment of Almaguer, 117 S.W.3d 500, 504 (Tex.App.2003) (the Crane majority made no mention of the need for a new instruction or even additional jury findings); In re Leon G., 204 Ariz. 15, 22 59 P.3d 779, 786 (2002) (\u201cCrane\u2019s statement that a state must prove \u2018serious difficulty in controlling behavior\u2019 does not re quire express statutory language\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"74 S.W.3d 789, 792","parenthetical":"jury instruction defining mental disorder must include the language \"causes the individual to have serious difficult in controlling his behavior\" to comport with Crane","sentence":"But see In re Thomas, 74 S.W.3d 789, 792 (Mo.2002) (jury instruction defining mental disorder must include the language \u201ccauses the individual to have serious difficult in controlling his behavior\u201d to comport with Crane); In re Detention of Barnes, 658 N.W.2d 98, 101 (Iowa 2003) (Crane requires a jury instruction specifying serious difficulty in controlling behavior); In re Commitment of W.Z., 173 N.J. 109, 133-34, 801 A.2d 205, 219 (2002) (the state must specifically prove \u201cby clear and convincing evidence that the individual has serious difficulty his or her harmful sexual behavior\u201d); see also Peter Pfaffenroth, The Need for Coherence: States\u2019 Civil Commitment of Sex Offenders in the Wake of Kansas v. Crane, 55 Stan. L.Rev. 2229, 2248 (2003) (arguing that Crane demands a separate lack of control finding); Kenneth W. Gaines, Instruct the Jury: Crane\u2019s \u201cSerious Difficulty\u201d Requirement and Due Process, 56 S.C. L.Rev. 291, 300-01 (2004) (same)."},"case_id":9015735,"label":"a"}
{"context":"For this reason, the Illinois Supreme Court's decision was not contrary to Crane. The Illinois Supreme Court's reading of Crane is consistent with that of the majority of state courts that have considered Crane's effect on the requirements of their states' civil commitment acts.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"658 N.W.2d 98, 101","parenthetical":"Crane requires a jury instruction specifying serious difficulty in controlling behavior","sentence":"But see In re Thomas, 74 S.W.3d 789, 792 (Mo.2002) (jury instruction defining mental disorder must include the language \u201ccauses the individual to have serious difficult in controlling his behavior\u201d to comport with Crane); In re Detention of Barnes, 658 N.W.2d 98, 101 (Iowa 2003) (Crane requires a jury instruction specifying serious difficulty in controlling behavior); In re Commitment of W.Z., 173 N.J. 109, 133-34, 801 A.2d 205, 219 (2002) (the state must specifically prove \u201cby clear and convincing evidence that the individual has serious difficulty his or her harmful sexual behavior\u201d); see also Peter Pfaffenroth, The Need for Coherence: States\u2019 Civil Commitment of Sex Offenders in the Wake of Kansas v. Crane, 55 Stan. L.Rev. 2229, 2248 (2003) (arguing that Crane demands a separate lack of control finding); Kenneth W. Gaines, Instruct the Jury: Crane\u2019s \u201cSerious Difficulty\u201d Requirement and Due Process, 56 S.C. L.Rev. 291, 300-01 (2004) (same)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"Crane \"does not compel us to hold that further lack-of-control instructions or findings are necessary to support a commitment under the SVPA\"","sentence":"See In re Commitment of Laxton, 254 Wis.2d 185, 201-02, 647 N.W.2d 784, 793 (2002) (separate finding regarding the individual\u2019s serious difficulty in controlling behavior is not necessary for civil commitment); Florida v. White, 891 So.2d 502, 509 (Fl.2004) (\u201cCrane does not impose [an element] required for civil commitment or render the Florida standard jury instructions inadequate\u201d); People v. Williams, 31 Cal.4th 757, 774-75, 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 684, 74 P.3d 779, 790 (2003) (Crane \u201cdoes not compel us to hold that further lack-of-control instructions or findings are necessary to support a commitment under the SVPA\u201d); In re Commitment of Almaguer, 117 S.W.3d 500, 504 (Tex.App.2003) (the Crane majority made no mention of the need for a new instruction or even additional jury findings); In re Leon G., 204 Ariz. 15, 22 59 P.3d 779, 786 (2002) (\u201cCrane\u2019s statement that a state must prove \u2018serious difficulty in controlling behavior\u2019 does not re quire express statutory language\u201d)."},"case_id":9015735,"label":"b"}
{"context":"For this reason, the Illinois Supreme Court's decision was not contrary to Crane. The Illinois Supreme Court's reading of Crane is consistent with that of the majority of state courts that have considered Crane's effect on the requirements of their states' civil commitment acts.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"173 N.J. 109, 133-34","parenthetical":"the state must specifically prove \"by clear and convincing evidence that the individual has serious difficulty his or her harmful sexual behavior\"","sentence":"But see In re Thomas, 74 S.W.3d 789, 792 (Mo.2002) (jury instruction defining mental disorder must include the language \u201ccauses the individual to have serious difficult in controlling his behavior\u201d to comport with Crane); In re Detention of Barnes, 658 N.W.2d 98, 101 (Iowa 2003) (Crane requires a jury instruction specifying serious difficulty in controlling behavior); In re Commitment of W.Z., 173 N.J. 109, 133-34, 801 A.2d 205, 219 (2002) (the state must specifically prove \u201cby clear and convincing evidence that the individual has serious difficulty his or her harmful sexual behavior\u201d); see also Peter Pfaffenroth, The Need for Coherence: States\u2019 Civil Commitment of Sex Offenders in the Wake of Kansas v. Crane, 55 Stan. L.Rev. 2229, 2248 (2003) (arguing that Crane demands a separate lack of control finding); Kenneth W. Gaines, Instruct the Jury: Crane\u2019s \u201cSerious Difficulty\u201d Requirement and Due Process, 56 S.C. L.Rev. 291, 300-01 (2004) (same)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"Crane \"does not compel us to hold that further lack-of-control instructions or findings are necessary to support a commitment under the SVPA\"","sentence":"See In re Commitment of Laxton, 254 Wis.2d 185, 201-02, 647 N.W.2d 784, 793 (2002) (separate finding regarding the individual\u2019s serious difficulty in controlling behavior is not necessary for civil commitment); Florida v. White, 891 So.2d 502, 509 (Fl.2004) (\u201cCrane does not impose [an element] required for civil commitment or render the Florida standard jury instructions inadequate\u201d); People v. Williams, 31 Cal.4th 757, 774-75, 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 684, 74 P.3d 779, 790 (2003) (Crane \u201cdoes not compel us to hold that further lack-of-control instructions or findings are necessary to support a commitment under the SVPA\u201d); In re Commitment of Almaguer, 117 S.W.3d 500, 504 (Tex.App.2003) (the Crane majority made no mention of the need for a new instruction or even additional jury findings); In re Leon G., 204 Ariz. 15, 22 59 P.3d 779, 786 (2002) (\u201cCrane\u2019s statement that a state must prove \u2018serious difficulty in controlling behavior\u2019 does not re quire express statutory language\u201d)."},"case_id":9015735,"label":"b"}
{"context":"For this reason, the Illinois Supreme Court's decision was not contrary to Crane. The Illinois Supreme Court's reading of Crane is consistent with that of the majority of state courts that have considered Crane's effect on the requirements of their states' civil commitment acts.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"801 A.2d 205, 219","parenthetical":"the state must specifically prove \"by clear and convincing evidence that the individual has serious difficulty his or her harmful sexual behavior\"","sentence":"But see In re Thomas, 74 S.W.3d 789, 792 (Mo.2002) (jury instruction defining mental disorder must include the language \u201ccauses the individual to have serious difficult in controlling his behavior\u201d to comport with Crane); In re Detention of Barnes, 658 N.W.2d 98, 101 (Iowa 2003) (Crane requires a jury instruction specifying serious difficulty in controlling behavior); In re Commitment of W.Z., 173 N.J. 109, 133-34, 801 A.2d 205, 219 (2002) (the state must specifically prove \u201cby clear and convincing evidence that the individual has serious difficulty his or her harmful sexual behavior\u201d); see also Peter Pfaffenroth, The Need for Coherence: States\u2019 Civil Commitment of Sex Offenders in the Wake of Kansas v. Crane, 55 Stan. L.Rev. 2229, 2248 (2003) (arguing that Crane demands a separate lack of control finding); Kenneth W. Gaines, Instruct the Jury: Crane\u2019s \u201cSerious Difficulty\u201d Requirement and Due Process, 56 S.C. L.Rev. 291, 300-01 (2004) (same)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"Crane \"does not compel us to hold that further lack-of-control instructions or findings are necessary to support a commitment under the SVPA\"","sentence":"See In re Commitment of Laxton, 254 Wis.2d 185, 201-02, 647 N.W.2d 784, 793 (2002) (separate finding regarding the individual\u2019s serious difficulty in controlling behavior is not necessary for civil commitment); Florida v. White, 891 So.2d 502, 509 (Fl.2004) (\u201cCrane does not impose [an element] required for civil commitment or render the Florida standard jury instructions inadequate\u201d); People v. Williams, 31 Cal.4th 757, 774-75, 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 684, 74 P.3d 779, 790 (2003) (Crane \u201cdoes not compel us to hold that further lack-of-control instructions or findings are necessary to support a commitment under the SVPA\u201d); In re Commitment of Almaguer, 117 S.W.3d 500, 504 (Tex.App.2003) (the Crane majority made no mention of the need for a new instruction or even additional jury findings); In re Leon G., 204 Ariz. 15, 22 59 P.3d 779, 786 (2002) (\u201cCrane\u2019s statement that a state must prove \u2018serious difficulty in controlling behavior\u2019 does not re quire express statutory language\u201d)."},"case_id":9015735,"label":"b"}
{"context":"For this reason, the Illinois Supreme Court's decision was not contrary to Crane. The Illinois Supreme Court's reading of Crane is consistent with that of the majority of state courts that have considered Crane's effect on the requirements of their states' civil commitment acts.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"74 P.3d 779, 790","parenthetical":"Crane \"does not compel us to hold that further lack-of-control instructions or findings are necessary to support a commitment under the SVPA\"","sentence":"See In re Commitment of Laxton, 254 Wis.2d 185, 201-02, 647 N.W.2d 784, 793 (2002) (separate finding regarding the individual\u2019s serious difficulty in controlling behavior is not necessary for civil commitment); Florida v. White, 891 So.2d 502, 509 (Fl.2004) (\u201cCrane does not impose [an element] required for civil commitment or render the Florida standard jury instructions inadequate\u201d); People v. Williams, 31 Cal.4th 757, 774-75, 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 684, 74 P.3d 779, 790 (2003) (Crane \u201cdoes not compel us to hold that further lack-of-control instructions or findings are necessary to support a commitment under the SVPA\u201d); In re Commitment of Almaguer, 117 S.W.3d 500, 504 (Tex.App.2003) (the Crane majority made no mention of the need for a new instruction or even additional jury findings); In re Leon G., 204 Ariz. 15, 22 59 P.3d 779, 786 (2002) (\u201cCrane\u2019s statement that a state must prove \u2018serious difficulty in controlling behavior\u2019 does not re quire express statutory language\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"74 S.W.3d 789, 792","parenthetical":"jury instruction defining mental disorder must include the language \"causes the individual to have serious difficult in controlling his behavior\" to comport with Crane","sentence":"But see In re Thomas, 74 S.W.3d 789, 792 (Mo.2002) (jury instruction defining mental disorder must include the language \u201ccauses the individual to have serious difficult in controlling his behavior\u201d to comport with Crane); In re Detention of Barnes, 658 N.W.2d 98, 101 (Iowa 2003) (Crane requires a jury instruction specifying serious difficulty in controlling behavior); In re Commitment of W.Z., 173 N.J. 109, 133-34, 801 A.2d 205, 219 (2002) (the state must specifically prove \u201cby clear and convincing evidence that the individual has serious difficulty his or her harmful sexual behavior\u201d); see also Peter Pfaffenroth, The Need for Coherence: States\u2019 Civil Commitment of Sex Offenders in the Wake of Kansas v. Crane, 55 Stan. L.Rev. 2229, 2248 (2003) (arguing that Crane demands a separate lack of control finding); Kenneth W. Gaines, Instruct the Jury: Crane\u2019s \u201cSerious Difficulty\u201d Requirement and Due Process, 56 S.C. L.Rev. 291, 300-01 (2004) (same)."},"case_id":9015735,"label":"a"}
{"context":"For this reason, the Illinois Supreme Court's decision was not contrary to Crane. The Illinois Supreme Court's reading of Crane is consistent with that of the majority of state courts that have considered Crane's effect on the requirements of their states' civil commitment acts.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"658 N.W.2d 98, 101","parenthetical":"Crane requires a jury instruction specifying serious difficulty in controlling behavior","sentence":"But see In re Thomas, 74 S.W.3d 789, 792 (Mo.2002) (jury instruction defining mental disorder must include the language \u201ccauses the individual to have serious difficult in controlling his behavior\u201d to comport with Crane); In re Detention of Barnes, 658 N.W.2d 98, 101 (Iowa 2003) (Crane requires a jury instruction specifying serious difficulty in controlling behavior); In re Commitment of W.Z., 173 N.J. 109, 133-34, 801 A.2d 205, 219 (2002) (the state must specifically prove \u201cby clear and convincing evidence that the individual has serious difficulty his or her harmful sexual behavior\u201d); see also Peter Pfaffenroth, The Need for Coherence: States\u2019 Civil Commitment of Sex Offenders in the Wake of Kansas v. Crane, 55 Stan. L.Rev. 2229, 2248 (2003) (arguing that Crane demands a separate lack of control finding); Kenneth W. Gaines, Instruct the Jury: Crane\u2019s \u201cSerious Difficulty\u201d Requirement and Due Process, 56 S.C. L.Rev. 291, 300-01 (2004) (same)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"74 P.3d 779, 790","parenthetical":"Crane \"does not compel us to hold that further lack-of-control instructions or findings are necessary to support a commitment under the SVPA\"","sentence":"See In re Commitment of Laxton, 254 Wis.2d 185, 201-02, 647 N.W.2d 784, 793 (2002) (separate finding regarding the individual\u2019s serious difficulty in controlling behavior is not necessary for civil commitment); Florida v. White, 891 So.2d 502, 509 (Fl.2004) (\u201cCrane does not impose [an element] required for civil commitment or render the Florida standard jury instructions inadequate\u201d); People v. Williams, 31 Cal.4th 757, 774-75, 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 684, 74 P.3d 779, 790 (2003) (Crane \u201cdoes not compel us to hold that further lack-of-control instructions or findings are necessary to support a commitment under the SVPA\u201d); In re Commitment of Almaguer, 117 S.W.3d 500, 504 (Tex.App.2003) (the Crane majority made no mention of the need for a new instruction or even additional jury findings); In re Leon G., 204 Ariz. 15, 22 59 P.3d 779, 786 (2002) (\u201cCrane\u2019s statement that a state must prove \u2018serious difficulty in controlling behavior\u2019 does not re quire express statutory language\u201d)."},"case_id":9015735,"label":"b"}
{"context":"For this reason, the Illinois Supreme Court's decision was not contrary to Crane. The Illinois Supreme Court's reading of Crane is consistent with that of the majority of state courts that have considered Crane's effect on the requirements of their states' civil commitment acts.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"74 P.3d 779, 790","parenthetical":"Crane \"does not compel us to hold that further lack-of-control instructions or findings are necessary to support a commitment under the SVPA\"","sentence":"See In re Commitment of Laxton, 254 Wis.2d 185, 201-02, 647 N.W.2d 784, 793 (2002) (separate finding regarding the individual\u2019s serious difficulty in controlling behavior is not necessary for civil commitment); Florida v. White, 891 So.2d 502, 509 (Fl.2004) (\u201cCrane does not impose [an element] required for civil commitment or render the Florida standard jury instructions inadequate\u201d); People v. Williams, 31 Cal.4th 757, 774-75, 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 684, 74 P.3d 779, 790 (2003) (Crane \u201cdoes not compel us to hold that further lack-of-control instructions or findings are necessary to support a commitment under the SVPA\u201d); In re Commitment of Almaguer, 117 S.W.3d 500, 504 (Tex.App.2003) (the Crane majority made no mention of the need for a new instruction or even additional jury findings); In re Leon G., 204 Ariz. 15, 22 59 P.3d 779, 786 (2002) (\u201cCrane\u2019s statement that a state must prove \u2018serious difficulty in controlling behavior\u2019 does not re quire express statutory language\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"173 N.J. 109, 133-34","parenthetical":"the state must specifically prove \"by clear and convincing evidence that the individual has serious difficulty his or her harmful sexual behavior\"","sentence":"But see In re Thomas, 74 S.W.3d 789, 792 (Mo.2002) (jury instruction defining mental disorder must include the language \u201ccauses the individual to have serious difficult in controlling his behavior\u201d to comport with Crane); In re Detention of Barnes, 658 N.W.2d 98, 101 (Iowa 2003) (Crane requires a jury instruction specifying serious difficulty in controlling behavior); In re Commitment of W.Z., 173 N.J. 109, 133-34, 801 A.2d 205, 219 (2002) (the state must specifically prove \u201cby clear and convincing evidence that the individual has serious difficulty his or her harmful sexual behavior\u201d); see also Peter Pfaffenroth, The Need for Coherence: States\u2019 Civil Commitment of Sex Offenders in the Wake of Kansas v. Crane, 55 Stan. L.Rev. 2229, 2248 (2003) (arguing that Crane demands a separate lack of control finding); Kenneth W. Gaines, Instruct the Jury: Crane\u2019s \u201cSerious Difficulty\u201d Requirement and Due Process, 56 S.C. L.Rev. 291, 300-01 (2004) (same)."},"case_id":9015735,"label":"a"}
{"context":"For this reason, the Illinois Supreme Court's decision was not contrary to Crane. The Illinois Supreme Court's reading of Crane is consistent with that of the majority of state courts that have considered Crane's effect on the requirements of their states' civil commitment acts.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"74 P.3d 779, 790","parenthetical":"Crane \"does not compel us to hold that further lack-of-control instructions or findings are necessary to support a commitment under the SVPA\"","sentence":"See In re Commitment of Laxton, 254 Wis.2d 185, 201-02, 647 N.W.2d 784, 793 (2002) (separate finding regarding the individual\u2019s serious difficulty in controlling behavior is not necessary for civil commitment); Florida v. White, 891 So.2d 502, 509 (Fl.2004) (\u201cCrane does not impose [an element] required for civil commitment or render the Florida standard jury instructions inadequate\u201d); People v. Williams, 31 Cal.4th 757, 774-75, 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 684, 74 P.3d 779, 790 (2003) (Crane \u201cdoes not compel us to hold that further lack-of-control instructions or findings are necessary to support a commitment under the SVPA\u201d); In re Commitment of Almaguer, 117 S.W.3d 500, 504 (Tex.App.2003) (the Crane majority made no mention of the need for a new instruction or even additional jury findings); In re Leon G., 204 Ariz. 15, 22 59 P.3d 779, 786 (2002) (\u201cCrane\u2019s statement that a state must prove \u2018serious difficulty in controlling behavior\u2019 does not re quire express statutory language\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"801 A.2d 205, 219","parenthetical":"the state must specifically prove \"by clear and convincing evidence that the individual has serious difficulty his or her harmful sexual behavior\"","sentence":"But see In re Thomas, 74 S.W.3d 789, 792 (Mo.2002) (jury instruction defining mental disorder must include the language \u201ccauses the individual to have serious difficult in controlling his behavior\u201d to comport with Crane); In re Detention of Barnes, 658 N.W.2d 98, 101 (Iowa 2003) (Crane requires a jury instruction specifying serious difficulty in controlling behavior); In re Commitment of W.Z., 173 N.J. 109, 133-34, 801 A.2d 205, 219 (2002) (the state must specifically prove \u201cby clear and convincing evidence that the individual has serious difficulty his or her harmful sexual behavior\u201d); see also Peter Pfaffenroth, The Need for Coherence: States\u2019 Civil Commitment of Sex Offenders in the Wake of Kansas v. Crane, 55 Stan. L.Rev. 2229, 2248 (2003) (arguing that Crane demands a separate lack of control finding); Kenneth W. Gaines, Instruct the Jury: Crane\u2019s \u201cSerious Difficulty\u201d Requirement and Due Process, 56 S.C. L.Rev. 291, 300-01 (2004) (same)."},"case_id":9015735,"label":"a"}
{"context":"For this reason, the Illinois Supreme Court's decision was not contrary to Crane. The Illinois Supreme Court's reading of Crane is consistent with that of the majority of state courts that have considered Crane's effect on the requirements of their states' civil commitment acts.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"74 S.W.3d 789, 792","parenthetical":"jury instruction defining mental disorder must include the language \"causes the individual to have serious difficult in controlling his behavior\" to comport with Crane","sentence":"But see In re Thomas, 74 S.W.3d 789, 792 (Mo.2002) (jury instruction defining mental disorder must include the language \u201ccauses the individual to have serious difficult in controlling his behavior\u201d to comport with Crane); In re Detention of Barnes, 658 N.W.2d 98, 101 (Iowa 2003) (Crane requires a jury instruction specifying serious difficulty in controlling behavior); In re Commitment of W.Z., 173 N.J. 109, 133-34, 801 A.2d 205, 219 (2002) (the state must specifically prove \u201cby clear and convincing evidence that the individual has serious difficulty his or her harmful sexual behavior\u201d); see also Peter Pfaffenroth, The Need for Coherence: States\u2019 Civil Commitment of Sex Offenders in the Wake of Kansas v. Crane, 55 Stan. L.Rev. 2229, 2248 (2003) (arguing that Crane demands a separate lack of control finding); Kenneth W. Gaines, Instruct the Jury: Crane\u2019s \u201cSerious Difficulty\u201d Requirement and Due Process, 56 S.C. L.Rev. 291, 300-01 (2004) (same)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"117 S.W.3d 500, 504","parenthetical":"the Crane majority made no mention of the need for a new instruction or even additional jury findings","sentence":"See In re Commitment of Laxton, 254 Wis.2d 185, 201-02, 647 N.W.2d 784, 793 (2002) (separate finding regarding the individual\u2019s serious difficulty in controlling behavior is not necessary for civil commitment); Florida v. White, 891 So.2d 502, 509 (Fl.2004) (\u201cCrane does not impose [an element] required for civil commitment or render the Florida standard jury instructions inadequate\u201d); People v. Williams, 31 Cal.4th 757, 774-75, 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 684, 74 P.3d 779, 790 (2003) (Crane \u201cdoes not compel us to hold that further lack-of-control instructions or findings are necessary to support a commitment under the SVPA\u201d); In re Commitment of Almaguer, 117 S.W.3d 500, 504 (Tex.App.2003) (the Crane majority made no mention of the need for a new instruction or even additional jury findings); In re Leon G., 204 Ariz. 15, 22 59 P.3d 779, 786 (2002) (\u201cCrane\u2019s statement that a state must prove \u2018serious difficulty in controlling behavior\u2019 does not re quire express statutory language\u201d)."},"case_id":9015735,"label":"b"}
{"context":"For this reason, the Illinois Supreme Court's decision was not contrary to Crane. The Illinois Supreme Court's reading of Crane is consistent with that of the majority of state courts that have considered Crane's effect on the requirements of their states' civil commitment acts.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"117 S.W.3d 500, 504","parenthetical":"the Crane majority made no mention of the need for a new instruction or even additional jury findings","sentence":"See In re Commitment of Laxton, 254 Wis.2d 185, 201-02, 647 N.W.2d 784, 793 (2002) (separate finding regarding the individual\u2019s serious difficulty in controlling behavior is not necessary for civil commitment); Florida v. White, 891 So.2d 502, 509 (Fl.2004) (\u201cCrane does not impose [an element] required for civil commitment or render the Florida standard jury instructions inadequate\u201d); People v. Williams, 31 Cal.4th 757, 774-75, 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 684, 74 P.3d 779, 790 (2003) (Crane \u201cdoes not compel us to hold that further lack-of-control instructions or findings are necessary to support a commitment under the SVPA\u201d); In re Commitment of Almaguer, 117 S.W.3d 500, 504 (Tex.App.2003) (the Crane majority made no mention of the need for a new instruction or even additional jury findings); In re Leon G., 204 Ariz. 15, 22 59 P.3d 779, 786 (2002) (\u201cCrane\u2019s statement that a state must prove \u2018serious difficulty in controlling behavior\u2019 does not re quire express statutory language\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"658 N.W.2d 98, 101","parenthetical":"Crane requires a jury instruction specifying serious difficulty in controlling behavior","sentence":"But see In re Thomas, 74 S.W.3d 789, 792 (Mo.2002) (jury instruction defining mental disorder must include the language \u201ccauses the individual to have serious difficult in controlling his behavior\u201d to comport with Crane); In re Detention of Barnes, 658 N.W.2d 98, 101 (Iowa 2003) (Crane requires a jury instruction specifying serious difficulty in controlling behavior); In re Commitment of W.Z., 173 N.J. 109, 133-34, 801 A.2d 205, 219 (2002) (the state must specifically prove \u201cby clear and convincing evidence that the individual has serious difficulty his or her harmful sexual behavior\u201d); see also Peter Pfaffenroth, The Need for Coherence: States\u2019 Civil Commitment of Sex Offenders in the Wake of Kansas v. Crane, 55 Stan. L.Rev. 2229, 2248 (2003) (arguing that Crane demands a separate lack of control finding); Kenneth W. Gaines, Instruct the Jury: Crane\u2019s \u201cSerious Difficulty\u201d Requirement and Due Process, 56 S.C. L.Rev. 291, 300-01 (2004) (same)."},"case_id":9015735,"label":"a"}
{"context":"For this reason, the Illinois Supreme Court's decision was not contrary to Crane. The Illinois Supreme Court's reading of Crane is consistent with that of the majority of state courts that have considered Crane's effect on the requirements of their states' civil commitment acts.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"173 N.J. 109, 133-34","parenthetical":"the state must specifically prove \"by clear and convincing evidence that the individual has serious difficulty his or her harmful sexual behavior\"","sentence":"But see In re Thomas, 74 S.W.3d 789, 792 (Mo.2002) (jury instruction defining mental disorder must include the language \u201ccauses the individual to have serious difficult in controlling his behavior\u201d to comport with Crane); In re Detention of Barnes, 658 N.W.2d 98, 101 (Iowa 2003) (Crane requires a jury instruction specifying serious difficulty in controlling behavior); In re Commitment of W.Z., 173 N.J. 109, 133-34, 801 A.2d 205, 219 (2002) (the state must specifically prove \u201cby clear and convincing evidence that the individual has serious difficulty his or her harmful sexual behavior\u201d); see also Peter Pfaffenroth, The Need for Coherence: States\u2019 Civil Commitment of Sex Offenders in the Wake of Kansas v. Crane, 55 Stan. L.Rev. 2229, 2248 (2003) (arguing that Crane demands a separate lack of control finding); Kenneth W. Gaines, Instruct the Jury: Crane\u2019s \u201cSerious Difficulty\u201d Requirement and Due Process, 56 S.C. L.Rev. 291, 300-01 (2004) (same)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"117 S.W.3d 500, 504","parenthetical":"the Crane majority made no mention of the need for a new instruction or even additional jury findings","sentence":"See In re Commitment of Laxton, 254 Wis.2d 185, 201-02, 647 N.W.2d 784, 793 (2002) (separate finding regarding the individual\u2019s serious difficulty in controlling behavior is not necessary for civil commitment); Florida v. White, 891 So.2d 502, 509 (Fl.2004) (\u201cCrane does not impose [an element] required for civil commitment or render the Florida standard jury instructions inadequate\u201d); People v. Williams, 31 Cal.4th 757, 774-75, 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 684, 74 P.3d 779, 790 (2003) (Crane \u201cdoes not compel us to hold that further lack-of-control instructions or findings are necessary to support a commitment under the SVPA\u201d); In re Commitment of Almaguer, 117 S.W.3d 500, 504 (Tex.App.2003) (the Crane majority made no mention of the need for a new instruction or even additional jury findings); In re Leon G., 204 Ariz. 15, 22 59 P.3d 779, 786 (2002) (\u201cCrane\u2019s statement that a state must prove \u2018serious difficulty in controlling behavior\u2019 does not re quire express statutory language\u201d)."},"case_id":9015735,"label":"b"}
{"context":"For this reason, the Illinois Supreme Court's decision was not contrary to Crane. The Illinois Supreme Court's reading of Crane is consistent with that of the majority of state courts that have considered Crane's effect on the requirements of their states' civil commitment acts.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"801 A.2d 205, 219","parenthetical":"the state must specifically prove \"by clear and convincing evidence that the individual has serious difficulty his or her harmful sexual behavior\"","sentence":"But see In re Thomas, 74 S.W.3d 789, 792 (Mo.2002) (jury instruction defining mental disorder must include the language \u201ccauses the individual to have serious difficult in controlling his behavior\u201d to comport with Crane); In re Detention of Barnes, 658 N.W.2d 98, 101 (Iowa 2003) (Crane requires a jury instruction specifying serious difficulty in controlling behavior); In re Commitment of W.Z., 173 N.J. 109, 133-34, 801 A.2d 205, 219 (2002) (the state must specifically prove \u201cby clear and convincing evidence that the individual has serious difficulty his or her harmful sexual behavior\u201d); see also Peter Pfaffenroth, The Need for Coherence: States\u2019 Civil Commitment of Sex Offenders in the Wake of Kansas v. Crane, 55 Stan. L.Rev. 2229, 2248 (2003) (arguing that Crane demands a separate lack of control finding); Kenneth W. Gaines, Instruct the Jury: Crane\u2019s \u201cSerious Difficulty\u201d Requirement and Due Process, 56 S.C. L.Rev. 291, 300-01 (2004) (same)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"117 S.W.3d 500, 504","parenthetical":"the Crane majority made no mention of the need for a new instruction or even additional jury findings","sentence":"See In re Commitment of Laxton, 254 Wis.2d 185, 201-02, 647 N.W.2d 784, 793 (2002) (separate finding regarding the individual\u2019s serious difficulty in controlling behavior is not necessary for civil commitment); Florida v. White, 891 So.2d 502, 509 (Fl.2004) (\u201cCrane does not impose [an element] required for civil commitment or render the Florida standard jury instructions inadequate\u201d); People v. Williams, 31 Cal.4th 757, 774-75, 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 684, 74 P.3d 779, 790 (2003) (Crane \u201cdoes not compel us to hold that further lack-of-control instructions or findings are necessary to support a commitment under the SVPA\u201d); In re Commitment of Almaguer, 117 S.W.3d 500, 504 (Tex.App.2003) (the Crane majority made no mention of the need for a new instruction or even additional jury findings); In re Leon G., 204 Ariz. 15, 22 59 P.3d 779, 786 (2002) (\u201cCrane\u2019s statement that a state must prove \u2018serious difficulty in controlling behavior\u2019 does not re quire express statutory language\u201d)."},"case_id":9015735,"label":"b"}
{"context":"For this reason, the Illinois Supreme Court's decision was not contrary to Crane. The Illinois Supreme Court's reading of Crane is consistent with that of the majority of state courts that have considered Crane's effect on the requirements of their states' civil commitment acts.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"74 S.W.3d 789, 792","parenthetical":"jury instruction defining mental disorder must include the language \"causes the individual to have serious difficult in controlling his behavior\" to comport with Crane","sentence":"But see In re Thomas, 74 S.W.3d 789, 792 (Mo.2002) (jury instruction defining mental disorder must include the language \u201ccauses the individual to have serious difficult in controlling his behavior\u201d to comport with Crane); In re Detention of Barnes, 658 N.W.2d 98, 101 (Iowa 2003) (Crane requires a jury instruction specifying serious difficulty in controlling behavior); In re Commitment of W.Z., 173 N.J. 109, 133-34, 801 A.2d 205, 219 (2002) (the state must specifically prove \u201cby clear and convincing evidence that the individual has serious difficulty his or her harmful sexual behavior\u201d); see also Peter Pfaffenroth, The Need for Coherence: States\u2019 Civil Commitment of Sex Offenders in the Wake of Kansas v. Crane, 55 Stan. L.Rev. 2229, 2248 (2003) (arguing that Crane demands a separate lack of control finding); Kenneth W. Gaines, Instruct the Jury: Crane\u2019s \u201cSerious Difficulty\u201d Requirement and Due Process, 56 S.C. L.Rev. 291, 300-01 (2004) (same)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"Crane's statement that a state must prove 'serious difficulty in controlling behavior' does not re quire express statutory language\"","sentence":"See In re Commitment of Laxton, 254 Wis.2d 185, 201-02, 647 N.W.2d 784, 793 (2002) (separate finding regarding the individual\u2019s serious difficulty in controlling behavior is not necessary for civil commitment); Florida v. White, 891 So.2d 502, 509 (Fl.2004) (\u201cCrane does not impose [an element] required for civil commitment or render the Florida standard jury instructions inadequate\u201d); People v. Williams, 31 Cal.4th 757, 774-75, 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 684, 74 P.3d 779, 790 (2003) (Crane \u201cdoes not compel us to hold that further lack-of-control instructions or findings are necessary to support a commitment under the SVPA\u201d); In re Commitment of Almaguer, 117 S.W.3d 500, 504 (Tex.App.2003) (the Crane majority made no mention of the need for a new instruction or even additional jury findings); In re Leon G., 204 Ariz. 15, 22 59 P.3d 779, 786 (2002) (\u201cCrane\u2019s statement that a state must prove \u2018serious difficulty in controlling behavior\u2019 does not re quire express statutory language\u201d)."},"case_id":9015735,"label":"b"}
{"context":"For this reason, the Illinois Supreme Court's decision was not contrary to Crane. The Illinois Supreme Court's reading of Crane is consistent with that of the majority of state courts that have considered Crane's effect on the requirements of their states' civil commitment acts.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"Crane's statement that a state must prove 'serious difficulty in controlling behavior' does not re quire express statutory language\"","sentence":"See In re Commitment of Laxton, 254 Wis.2d 185, 201-02, 647 N.W.2d 784, 793 (2002) (separate finding regarding the individual\u2019s serious difficulty in controlling behavior is not necessary for civil commitment); Florida v. White, 891 So.2d 502, 509 (Fl.2004) (\u201cCrane does not impose [an element] required for civil commitment or render the Florida standard jury instructions inadequate\u201d); People v. Williams, 31 Cal.4th 757, 774-75, 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 684, 74 P.3d 779, 790 (2003) (Crane \u201cdoes not compel us to hold that further lack-of-control instructions or findings are necessary to support a commitment under the SVPA\u201d); In re Commitment of Almaguer, 117 S.W.3d 500, 504 (Tex.App.2003) (the Crane majority made no mention of the need for a new instruction or even additional jury findings); In re Leon G., 204 Ariz. 15, 22 59 P.3d 779, 786 (2002) (\u201cCrane\u2019s statement that a state must prove \u2018serious difficulty in controlling behavior\u2019 does not re quire express statutory language\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"658 N.W.2d 98, 101","parenthetical":"Crane requires a jury instruction specifying serious difficulty in controlling behavior","sentence":"But see In re Thomas, 74 S.W.3d 789, 792 (Mo.2002) (jury instruction defining mental disorder must include the language \u201ccauses the individual to have serious difficult in controlling his behavior\u201d to comport with Crane); In re Detention of Barnes, 658 N.W.2d 98, 101 (Iowa 2003) (Crane requires a jury instruction specifying serious difficulty in controlling behavior); In re Commitment of W.Z., 173 N.J. 109, 133-34, 801 A.2d 205, 219 (2002) (the state must specifically prove \u201cby clear and convincing evidence that the individual has serious difficulty his or her harmful sexual behavior\u201d); see also Peter Pfaffenroth, The Need for Coherence: States\u2019 Civil Commitment of Sex Offenders in the Wake of Kansas v. Crane, 55 Stan. L.Rev. 2229, 2248 (2003) (arguing that Crane demands a separate lack of control finding); Kenneth W. Gaines, Instruct the Jury: Crane\u2019s \u201cSerious Difficulty\u201d Requirement and Due Process, 56 S.C. L.Rev. 291, 300-01 (2004) (same)."},"case_id":9015735,"label":"a"}
{"context":"For this reason, the Illinois Supreme Court's decision was not contrary to Crane. The Illinois Supreme Court's reading of Crane is consistent with that of the majority of state courts that have considered Crane's effect on the requirements of their states' civil commitment acts.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"Crane's statement that a state must prove 'serious difficulty in controlling behavior' does not re quire express statutory language\"","sentence":"See In re Commitment of Laxton, 254 Wis.2d 185, 201-02, 647 N.W.2d 784, 793 (2002) (separate finding regarding the individual\u2019s serious difficulty in controlling behavior is not necessary for civil commitment); Florida v. White, 891 So.2d 502, 509 (Fl.2004) (\u201cCrane does not impose [an element] required for civil commitment or render the Florida standard jury instructions inadequate\u201d); People v. Williams, 31 Cal.4th 757, 774-75, 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 684, 74 P.3d 779, 790 (2003) (Crane \u201cdoes not compel us to hold that further lack-of-control instructions or findings are necessary to support a commitment under the SVPA\u201d); In re Commitment of Almaguer, 117 S.W.3d 500, 504 (Tex.App.2003) (the Crane majority made no mention of the need for a new instruction or even additional jury findings); In re Leon G., 204 Ariz. 15, 22 59 P.3d 779, 786 (2002) (\u201cCrane\u2019s statement that a state must prove \u2018serious difficulty in controlling behavior\u2019 does not re quire express statutory language\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"173 N.J. 109, 133-34","parenthetical":"the state must specifically prove \"by clear and convincing evidence that the individual has serious difficulty his or her harmful sexual behavior\"","sentence":"But see In re Thomas, 74 S.W.3d 789, 792 (Mo.2002) (jury instruction defining mental disorder must include the language \u201ccauses the individual to have serious difficult in controlling his behavior\u201d to comport with Crane); In re Detention of Barnes, 658 N.W.2d 98, 101 (Iowa 2003) (Crane requires a jury instruction specifying serious difficulty in controlling behavior); In re Commitment of W.Z., 173 N.J. 109, 133-34, 801 A.2d 205, 219 (2002) (the state must specifically prove \u201cby clear and convincing evidence that the individual has serious difficulty his or her harmful sexual behavior\u201d); see also Peter Pfaffenroth, The Need for Coherence: States\u2019 Civil Commitment of Sex Offenders in the Wake of Kansas v. Crane, 55 Stan. L.Rev. 2229, 2248 (2003) (arguing that Crane demands a separate lack of control finding); Kenneth W. Gaines, Instruct the Jury: Crane\u2019s \u201cSerious Difficulty\u201d Requirement and Due Process, 56 S.C. L.Rev. 291, 300-01 (2004) (same)."},"case_id":9015735,"label":"a"}
{"context":"For this reason, the Illinois Supreme Court's decision was not contrary to Crane. The Illinois Supreme Court's reading of Crane is consistent with that of the majority of state courts that have considered Crane's effect on the requirements of their states' civil commitment acts.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"801 A.2d 205, 219","parenthetical":"the state must specifically prove \"by clear and convincing evidence that the individual has serious difficulty his or her harmful sexual behavior\"","sentence":"But see In re Thomas, 74 S.W.3d 789, 792 (Mo.2002) (jury instruction defining mental disorder must include the language \u201ccauses the individual to have serious difficult in controlling his behavior\u201d to comport with Crane); In re Detention of Barnes, 658 N.W.2d 98, 101 (Iowa 2003) (Crane requires a jury instruction specifying serious difficulty in controlling behavior); In re Commitment of W.Z., 173 N.J. 109, 133-34, 801 A.2d 205, 219 (2002) (the state must specifically prove \u201cby clear and convincing evidence that the individual has serious difficulty his or her harmful sexual behavior\u201d); see also Peter Pfaffenroth, The Need for Coherence: States\u2019 Civil Commitment of Sex Offenders in the Wake of Kansas v. Crane, 55 Stan. L.Rev. 2229, 2248 (2003) (arguing that Crane demands a separate lack of control finding); Kenneth W. Gaines, Instruct the Jury: Crane\u2019s \u201cSerious Difficulty\u201d Requirement and Due Process, 56 S.C. L.Rev. 291, 300-01 (2004) (same)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"Crane's statement that a state must prove 'serious difficulty in controlling behavior' does not re quire express statutory language\"","sentence":"See In re Commitment of Laxton, 254 Wis.2d 185, 201-02, 647 N.W.2d 784, 793 (2002) (separate finding regarding the individual\u2019s serious difficulty in controlling behavior is not necessary for civil commitment); Florida v. White, 891 So.2d 502, 509 (Fl.2004) (\u201cCrane does not impose [an element] required for civil commitment or render the Florida standard jury instructions inadequate\u201d); People v. Williams, 31 Cal.4th 757, 774-75, 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 684, 74 P.3d 779, 790 (2003) (Crane \u201cdoes not compel us to hold that further lack-of-control instructions or findings are necessary to support a commitment under the SVPA\u201d); In re Commitment of Almaguer, 117 S.W.3d 500, 504 (Tex.App.2003) (the Crane majority made no mention of the need for a new instruction or even additional jury findings); In re Leon G., 204 Ariz. 15, 22 59 P.3d 779, 786 (2002) (\u201cCrane\u2019s statement that a state must prove \u2018serious difficulty in controlling behavior\u2019 does not re quire express statutory language\u201d)."},"case_id":9015735,"label":"b"}
{"context":"For this reason, the Illinois Supreme Court's decision was not contrary to Crane. The Illinois Supreme Court's reading of Crane is consistent with that of the majority of state courts that have considered Crane's effect on the requirements of their states' civil commitment acts.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"59 P.3d 779, 786","parenthetical":"\"Crane's statement that a state must prove 'serious difficulty in controlling behavior' does not re quire express statutory language\"","sentence":"See In re Commitment of Laxton, 254 Wis.2d 185, 201-02, 647 N.W.2d 784, 793 (2002) (separate finding regarding the individual\u2019s serious difficulty in controlling behavior is not necessary for civil commitment); Florida v. White, 891 So.2d 502, 509 (Fl.2004) (\u201cCrane does not impose [an element] required for civil commitment or render the Florida standard jury instructions inadequate\u201d); People v. Williams, 31 Cal.4th 757, 774-75, 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 684, 74 P.3d 779, 790 (2003) (Crane \u201cdoes not compel us to hold that further lack-of-control instructions or findings are necessary to support a commitment under the SVPA\u201d); In re Commitment of Almaguer, 117 S.W.3d 500, 504 (Tex.App.2003) (the Crane majority made no mention of the need for a new instruction or even additional jury findings); In re Leon G., 204 Ariz. 15, 22 59 P.3d 779, 786 (2002) (\u201cCrane\u2019s statement that a state must prove \u2018serious difficulty in controlling behavior\u2019 does not re quire express statutory language\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"74 S.W.3d 789, 792","parenthetical":"jury instruction defining mental disorder must include the language \"causes the individual to have serious difficult in controlling his behavior\" to comport with Crane","sentence":"But see In re Thomas, 74 S.W.3d 789, 792 (Mo.2002) (jury instruction defining mental disorder must include the language \u201ccauses the individual to have serious difficult in controlling his behavior\u201d to comport with Crane); In re Detention of Barnes, 658 N.W.2d 98, 101 (Iowa 2003) (Crane requires a jury instruction specifying serious difficulty in controlling behavior); In re Commitment of W.Z., 173 N.J. 109, 133-34, 801 A.2d 205, 219 (2002) (the state must specifically prove \u201cby clear and convincing evidence that the individual has serious difficulty his or her harmful sexual behavior\u201d); see also Peter Pfaffenroth, The Need for Coherence: States\u2019 Civil Commitment of Sex Offenders in the Wake of Kansas v. Crane, 55 Stan. L.Rev. 2229, 2248 (2003) (arguing that Crane demands a separate lack of control finding); Kenneth W. Gaines, Instruct the Jury: Crane\u2019s \u201cSerious Difficulty\u201d Requirement and Due Process, 56 S.C. L.Rev. 291, 300-01 (2004) (same)."},"case_id":9015735,"label":"a"}
{"context":"For this reason, the Illinois Supreme Court's decision was not contrary to Crane. The Illinois Supreme Court's reading of Crane is consistent with that of the majority of state courts that have considered Crane's effect on the requirements of their states' civil commitment acts.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"658 N.W.2d 98, 101","parenthetical":"Crane requires a jury instruction specifying serious difficulty in controlling behavior","sentence":"But see In re Thomas, 74 S.W.3d 789, 792 (Mo.2002) (jury instruction defining mental disorder must include the language \u201ccauses the individual to have serious difficult in controlling his behavior\u201d to comport with Crane); In re Detention of Barnes, 658 N.W.2d 98, 101 (Iowa 2003) (Crane requires a jury instruction specifying serious difficulty in controlling behavior); In re Commitment of W.Z., 173 N.J. 109, 133-34, 801 A.2d 205, 219 (2002) (the state must specifically prove \u201cby clear and convincing evidence that the individual has serious difficulty his or her harmful sexual behavior\u201d); see also Peter Pfaffenroth, The Need for Coherence: States\u2019 Civil Commitment of Sex Offenders in the Wake of Kansas v. Crane, 55 Stan. L.Rev. 2229, 2248 (2003) (arguing that Crane demands a separate lack of control finding); Kenneth W. Gaines, Instruct the Jury: Crane\u2019s \u201cSerious Difficulty\u201d Requirement and Due Process, 56 S.C. L.Rev. 291, 300-01 (2004) (same)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"59 P.3d 779, 786","parenthetical":"\"Crane's statement that a state must prove 'serious difficulty in controlling behavior' does not re quire express statutory language\"","sentence":"See In re Commitment of Laxton, 254 Wis.2d 185, 201-02, 647 N.W.2d 784, 793 (2002) (separate finding regarding the individual\u2019s serious difficulty in controlling behavior is not necessary for civil commitment); Florida v. White, 891 So.2d 502, 509 (Fl.2004) (\u201cCrane does not impose [an element] required for civil commitment or render the Florida standard jury instructions inadequate\u201d); People v. Williams, 31 Cal.4th 757, 774-75, 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 684, 74 P.3d 779, 790 (2003) (Crane \u201cdoes not compel us to hold that further lack-of-control instructions or findings are necessary to support a commitment under the SVPA\u201d); In re Commitment of Almaguer, 117 S.W.3d 500, 504 (Tex.App.2003) (the Crane majority made no mention of the need for a new instruction or even additional jury findings); In re Leon G., 204 Ariz. 15, 22 59 P.3d 779, 786 (2002) (\u201cCrane\u2019s statement that a state must prove \u2018serious difficulty in controlling behavior\u2019 does not re quire express statutory language\u201d)."},"case_id":9015735,"label":"b"}
{"context":"For this reason, the Illinois Supreme Court's decision was not contrary to Crane. The Illinois Supreme Court's reading of Crane is consistent with that of the majority of state courts that have considered Crane's effect on the requirements of their states' civil commitment acts.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"59 P.3d 779, 786","parenthetical":"\"Crane's statement that a state must prove 'serious difficulty in controlling behavior' does not re quire express statutory language\"","sentence":"See In re Commitment of Laxton, 254 Wis.2d 185, 201-02, 647 N.W.2d 784, 793 (2002) (separate finding regarding the individual\u2019s serious difficulty in controlling behavior is not necessary for civil commitment); Florida v. White, 891 So.2d 502, 509 (Fl.2004) (\u201cCrane does not impose [an element] required for civil commitment or render the Florida standard jury instructions inadequate\u201d); People v. Williams, 31 Cal.4th 757, 774-75, 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 684, 74 P.3d 779, 790 (2003) (Crane \u201cdoes not compel us to hold that further lack-of-control instructions or findings are necessary to support a commitment under the SVPA\u201d); In re Commitment of Almaguer, 117 S.W.3d 500, 504 (Tex.App.2003) (the Crane majority made no mention of the need for a new instruction or even additional jury findings); In re Leon G., 204 Ariz. 15, 22 59 P.3d 779, 786 (2002) (\u201cCrane\u2019s statement that a state must prove \u2018serious difficulty in controlling behavior\u2019 does not re quire express statutory language\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"173 N.J. 109, 133-34","parenthetical":"the state must specifically prove \"by clear and convincing evidence that the individual has serious difficulty his or her harmful sexual behavior\"","sentence":"But see In re Thomas, 74 S.W.3d 789, 792 (Mo.2002) (jury instruction defining mental disorder must include the language \u201ccauses the individual to have serious difficult in controlling his behavior\u201d to comport with Crane); In re Detention of Barnes, 658 N.W.2d 98, 101 (Iowa 2003) (Crane requires a jury instruction specifying serious difficulty in controlling behavior); In re Commitment of W.Z., 173 N.J. 109, 133-34, 801 A.2d 205, 219 (2002) (the state must specifically prove \u201cby clear and convincing evidence that the individual has serious difficulty his or her harmful sexual behavior\u201d); see also Peter Pfaffenroth, The Need for Coherence: States\u2019 Civil Commitment of Sex Offenders in the Wake of Kansas v. Crane, 55 Stan. L.Rev. 2229, 2248 (2003) (arguing that Crane demands a separate lack of control finding); Kenneth W. Gaines, Instruct the Jury: Crane\u2019s \u201cSerious Difficulty\u201d Requirement and Due Process, 56 S.C. L.Rev. 291, 300-01 (2004) (same)."},"case_id":9015735,"label":"a"}
{"context":"For this reason, the Illinois Supreme Court's decision was not contrary to Crane. The Illinois Supreme Court's reading of Crane is consistent with that of the majority of state courts that have considered Crane's effect on the requirements of their states' civil commitment acts.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"801 A.2d 205, 219","parenthetical":"the state must specifically prove \"by clear and convincing evidence that the individual has serious difficulty his or her harmful sexual behavior\"","sentence":"But see In re Thomas, 74 S.W.3d 789, 792 (Mo.2002) (jury instruction defining mental disorder must include the language \u201ccauses the individual to have serious difficult in controlling his behavior\u201d to comport with Crane); In re Detention of Barnes, 658 N.W.2d 98, 101 (Iowa 2003) (Crane requires a jury instruction specifying serious difficulty in controlling behavior); In re Commitment of W.Z., 173 N.J. 109, 133-34, 801 A.2d 205, 219 (2002) (the state must specifically prove \u201cby clear and convincing evidence that the individual has serious difficulty his or her harmful sexual behavior\u201d); see also Peter Pfaffenroth, The Need for Coherence: States\u2019 Civil Commitment of Sex Offenders in the Wake of Kansas v. Crane, 55 Stan. L.Rev. 2229, 2248 (2003) (arguing that Crane demands a separate lack of control finding); Kenneth W. Gaines, Instruct the Jury: Crane\u2019s \u201cSerious Difficulty\u201d Requirement and Due Process, 56 S.C. L.Rev. 291, 300-01 (2004) (same)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"59 P.3d 779, 786","parenthetical":"\"Crane's statement that a state must prove 'serious difficulty in controlling behavior' does not re quire express statutory language\"","sentence":"See In re Commitment of Laxton, 254 Wis.2d 185, 201-02, 647 N.W.2d 784, 793 (2002) (separate finding regarding the individual\u2019s serious difficulty in controlling behavior is not necessary for civil commitment); Florida v. White, 891 So.2d 502, 509 (Fl.2004) (\u201cCrane does not impose [an element] required for civil commitment or render the Florida standard jury instructions inadequate\u201d); People v. Williams, 31 Cal.4th 757, 774-75, 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 684, 74 P.3d 779, 790 (2003) (Crane \u201cdoes not compel us to hold that further lack-of-control instructions or findings are necessary to support a commitment under the SVPA\u201d); In re Commitment of Almaguer, 117 S.W.3d 500, 504 (Tex.App.2003) (the Crane majority made no mention of the need for a new instruction or even additional jury findings); In re Leon G., 204 Ariz. 15, 22 59 P.3d 779, 786 (2002) (\u201cCrane\u2019s statement that a state must prove \u2018serious difficulty in controlling behavior\u2019 does not re quire express statutory language\u201d)."},"case_id":9015735,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In this regard, Plaintiff must identify the materials allegedly omitted from the record with sufficient specificity, as opposed to merely proffering broad categories of documents and data that are \"likely\" to exist as a result of other documents that are included in the administrative record.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"503 F.Supp.2d 369, 369","parenthetical":"finding that the plaintiff failed to overcome the presumption that the administrative record was complete where the plaintiff offered no more than eonelusory allegations that the administrative record lacked unspecified reports, notes of discussions, and other documents that \"must have\" existed in connection with the robust debate concerning the assumptions and analyses underlying the agency action","sentence":"See Blue Ocean, 503 F.Supp.2d at 369 (finding that the plaintiff failed to overcome the presumption that the administrative record was complete where the plaintiff offered no more than eonelusory allegations that the administrative record lacked unspecified reports, notes of discussions, and other documents that \u201cmust have\u201d existed in connection with the robust debate concerning the assumptions and analyses underlying the agency action); see also Franks, 751 F.Supp.2d at 73-74 (finding that the plaintiffs failed to overcome the strong presumption of regularity to which the agency was entitled in compiling its record where the plaintiffs had \u201cnot offered nonspeculative grounds for their belief that the requested documents exist, much less that the [agency] considered them\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"751 F.Supp.2d 73, 73-74","parenthetical":"finding that the plaintiffs failed to overcome the strong presumption of regularity to which the agency was entitled in compiling its record where the plaintiffs had \"not offered nonspeculative grounds for their belief that the requested documents exist, much less that the [agency] considered them\"","sentence":"See Blue Ocean, 503 F.Supp.2d at 369 (finding that the plaintiff failed to overcome the presumption that the administrative record was complete where the plaintiff offered no more than eonelusory allegations that the administrative record lacked unspecified reports, notes of discussions, and other documents that \u201cmust have\u201d existed in connection with the robust debate concerning the assumptions and analyses underlying the agency action); see also Franks, 751 F.Supp.2d at 73-74 (finding that the plaintiffs failed to overcome the strong presumption of regularity to which the agency was entitled in compiling its record where the plaintiffs had \u201cnot offered nonspeculative grounds for their belief that the requested documents exist, much less that the [agency] considered them\u201d)."},"case_id":4124889,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In the wake of Vonn, we have indicated that a contention like the one at issue here--that the district court impermissibly participated in plea negotiations--is not structural error, but rather is subject to plain error review. Other courts have reached the same conclusion.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding that district court's impermissible participation in plea negotiations required plain error analysis in light of Vonn","sentence":"United States v. Ebel, 299 F.3d 187 (3d Cir.2002) (finding that district court\u2019s impermissible participation in plea negotiations required plain error analysis in light of Vonn); United States v. Diaz, 138 F.3d 1359, 1362-63 (11th Cir.1998) (refusing to reverse conviction despite judge\u2019s participation in negotiations because defendant could not show prejudice); see also United States v. Miles, 10 F.3d 1135, 1140-41 (5th Cir.1993) (applying harmless error review to claim that district court participated in plea negotiations)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"10 F.3d 1135, 1140-41","parenthetical":"applying harmless error review to claim that district court participated in plea negotiations","sentence":"United States v. Ebel, 299 F.3d 187 (3d Cir.2002) (finding that district court\u2019s impermissible participation in plea negotiations required plain error analysis in light of Vonn); United States v. Diaz, 138 F.3d 1359, 1362-63 (11th Cir.1998) (refusing to reverse conviction despite judge\u2019s participation in negotiations because defendant could not show prejudice); see also United States v. Miles, 10 F.3d 1135, 1140-41 (5th Cir.1993) (applying harmless error review to claim that district court participated in plea negotiations)."},"case_id":3251323,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In the wake of Vonn, we have indicated that a contention like the one at issue here--that the district court impermissibly participated in plea negotiations--is not structural error, but rather is subject to plain error review. Other courts have reached the same conclusion.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"138 F.3d 1359, 1362-63","parenthetical":"refusing to reverse conviction despite judge's participation in negotiations because defendant could not show prejudice","sentence":"United States v. Ebel, 299 F.3d 187 (3d Cir.2002) (finding that district court\u2019s impermissible participation in plea negotiations required plain error analysis in light of Vonn); United States v. Diaz, 138 F.3d 1359, 1362-63 (11th Cir.1998) (refusing to reverse conviction despite judge\u2019s participation in negotiations because defendant could not show prejudice); see also United States v. Miles, 10 F.3d 1135, 1140-41 (5th Cir.1993) (applying harmless error review to claim that district court participated in plea negotiations)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"10 F.3d 1135, 1140-41","parenthetical":"applying harmless error review to claim that district court participated in plea negotiations","sentence":"United States v. Ebel, 299 F.3d 187 (3d Cir.2002) (finding that district court\u2019s impermissible participation in plea negotiations required plain error analysis in light of Vonn); United States v. Diaz, 138 F.3d 1359, 1362-63 (11th Cir.1998) (refusing to reverse conviction despite judge\u2019s participation in negotiations because defendant could not show prejudice); see also United States v. Miles, 10 F.3d 1135, 1140-41 (5th Cir.1993) (applying harmless error review to claim that district court participated in plea negotiations)."},"case_id":3251323,"label":"a"}
{"context":"As noted above, the indictment charges the defendant with each of the elements of a mail fraud offense. Accordingly, I find that counts 1-3 properly charge a mail fraud offense, even if the defendant could not be properly charged with committing larceny under New York State law.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"58 F.3d 933, 940-41","parenthetical":"suggesting that the mail fraud statute contains no state law predicate violation requirement","sentence":"See Badders v. United States, 240 U.S. 391, 393, 36 S.Ct. 367, 367-68, 60 L.Ed. 706 (1916) (\u201cWhatever the limits to its power, Congress may forbid putting letters into the post office when such acts are done in furtherance of a scheme that it regards as contrary to public policy, whether it can forbid the scheme or not.\u201d); see also United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933, 940-41 (4th Cir.1995) (suggesting that the mail fraud statute contains no state law predicate violation requirement)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"240 U.S. 391, 393","parenthetical":"\"Whatever the limits to its power, Congress may forbid putting letters into the post office when such acts are done in furtherance of a scheme that it regards as contrary to public policy, whether it can forbid the scheme or not.\"","sentence":"See Badders v. United States, 240 U.S. 391, 393, 36 S.Ct. 367, 367-68, 60 L.Ed. 706 (1916) (\u201cWhatever the limits to its power, Congress may forbid putting letters into the post office when such acts are done in furtherance of a scheme that it regards as contrary to public policy, whether it can forbid the scheme or not.\u201d); see also United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933, 940-41 (4th Cir.1995) (suggesting that the mail fraud statute contains no state law predicate violation requirement)."},"case_id":47246,"label":"b"}
{"context":"As noted above, the indictment charges the defendant with each of the elements of a mail fraud offense. Accordingly, I find that counts 1-3 properly charge a mail fraud offense, even if the defendant could not be properly charged with committing larceny under New York State law.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"36 S.Ct. 367, 367-68","parenthetical":"\"Whatever the limits to its power, Congress may forbid putting letters into the post office when such acts are done in furtherance of a scheme that it regards as contrary to public policy, whether it can forbid the scheme or not.\"","sentence":"See Badders v. United States, 240 U.S. 391, 393, 36 S.Ct. 367, 367-68, 60 L.Ed. 706 (1916) (\u201cWhatever the limits to its power, Congress may forbid putting letters into the post office when such acts are done in furtherance of a scheme that it regards as contrary to public policy, whether it can forbid the scheme or not.\u201d); see also United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933, 940-41 (4th Cir.1995) (suggesting that the mail fraud statute contains no state law predicate violation requirement)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"58 F.3d 933, 940-41","parenthetical":"suggesting that the mail fraud statute contains no state law predicate violation requirement","sentence":"See Badders v. United States, 240 U.S. 391, 393, 36 S.Ct. 367, 367-68, 60 L.Ed. 706 (1916) (\u201cWhatever the limits to its power, Congress may forbid putting letters into the post office when such acts are done in furtherance of a scheme that it regards as contrary to public policy, whether it can forbid the scheme or not.\u201d); see also United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933, 940-41 (4th Cir.1995) (suggesting that the mail fraud statute contains no state law predicate violation requirement)."},"case_id":47246,"label":"a"}
{"context":"As noted above, the indictment charges the defendant with each of the elements of a mail fraud offense. Accordingly, I find that counts 1-3 properly charge a mail fraud offense, even if the defendant could not be properly charged with committing larceny under New York State law.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"Whatever the limits to its power, Congress may forbid putting letters into the post office when such acts are done in furtherance of a scheme that it regards as contrary to public policy, whether it can forbid the scheme or not.\"","sentence":"See Badders v. United States, 240 U.S. 391, 393, 36 S.Ct. 367, 367-68, 60 L.Ed. 706 (1916) (\u201cWhatever the limits to its power, Congress may forbid putting letters into the post office when such acts are done in furtherance of a scheme that it regards as contrary to public policy, whether it can forbid the scheme or not.\u201d); see also United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933, 940-41 (4th Cir.1995) (suggesting that the mail fraud statute contains no state law predicate violation requirement)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"58 F.3d 933, 940-41","parenthetical":"suggesting that the mail fraud statute contains no state law predicate violation requirement","sentence":"See Badders v. United States, 240 U.S. 391, 393, 36 S.Ct. 367, 367-68, 60 L.Ed. 706 (1916) (\u201cWhatever the limits to its power, Congress may forbid putting letters into the post office when such acts are done in furtherance of a scheme that it regards as contrary to public policy, whether it can forbid the scheme or not.\u201d); see also United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933, 940-41 (4th Cir.1995) (suggesting that the mail fraud statute contains no state law predicate violation requirement)."},"case_id":47246,"label":"a"}
{"context":"While the court need not grant preAward interest pursuant to statute, if this action is of \"an equitable nature\" the court has discretion to award interest -- and to fix the rate and date from which it will be computed. C.P.L.R. SS 5001(a). Here, the Arbitration Award fixed the fair market value of Finger Lakes' distribution rights. An award of fair market value is an equitable determination.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"70 A.D.3d 445, 445","parenthetical":"\"[T]he legally significant fact is the absence of a provision in the rules [for fee dispute resolution system] prohibiting, rather than the absence of one authorizing, the award of preaward interest.\"","sentence":"See generally Mathias v. Jacobs, 238 F.Supp.2d 556, 576 (S.D.N.Y.2002) (describing \u201cfair market value\u201d under New York law as \u201cfair, economic, just, and equitable value\u201d (quoting In re Board of Water Supply, 277 N.Y. 452, 459, 14 N.E.2d 789, 792 (1938))); see also Garal, 193 Misc.2d at 646, 751 N.Y.S.2d 679 (Section 55-c \u201cis designed to provide a more equitable framework for the business dealings between beer brewers and importers and their wholesalers.\u201d (citing the governor\u2019s bill jacket to the 1996 Amendment)); cf. Levin & Glasser, 70 A.D.3d at 445, 896 N.Y.S.2d 311 (\u201c[T]he legally significant fact is the absence of a provision in the rules [for fee dispute resolution system] prohibiting, rather than the absence of one authorizing, the award of preaward interest.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"193 Misc.2d 646, 646","parenthetical":"Section 55-c \"is designed to provide a more equitable framework for the business dealings between beer brewers and importers and their wholesalers.\" (citing the governor's bill jacket to the 1996 Amendment","sentence":"See generally Mathias v. Jacobs, 238 F.Supp.2d 556, 576 (S.D.N.Y.2002) (describing \u201cfair market value\u201d under New York law as \u201cfair, economic, just, and equitable value\u201d (quoting In re Board of Water Supply, 277 N.Y. 452, 459, 14 N.E.2d 789, 792 (1938))); see also Garal, 193 Misc.2d at 646, 751 N.Y.S.2d 679 (Section 55-c \u201cis designed to provide a more equitable framework for the business dealings between beer brewers and importers and their wholesalers.\u201d (citing the governor\u2019s bill jacket to the 1996 Amendment)); cf. Levin & Glasser, 70 A.D.3d at 445, 896 N.Y.S.2d 311 (\u201c[T]he legally significant fact is the absence of a provision in the rules [for fee dispute resolution system] prohibiting, rather than the absence of one authorizing, the award of preaward interest.\u201d)."},"case_id":4261574,"label":"b"}
{"context":"While the court need not grant preAward interest pursuant to statute, if this action is of \"an equitable nature\" the court has discretion to award interest -- and to fix the rate and date from which it will be computed. C.P.L.R. SS 5001(a). Here, the Arbitration Award fixed the fair market value of Finger Lakes' distribution rights. An award of fair market value is an equitable determination.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[T]he legally significant fact is the absence of a provision in the rules [for fee dispute resolution system] prohibiting, rather than the absence of one authorizing, the award of preaward interest.\"","sentence":"See generally Mathias v. Jacobs, 238 F.Supp.2d 556, 576 (S.D.N.Y.2002) (describing \u201cfair market value\u201d under New York law as \u201cfair, economic, just, and equitable value\u201d (quoting In re Board of Water Supply, 277 N.Y. 452, 459, 14 N.E.2d 789, 792 (1938))); see also Garal, 193 Misc.2d at 646, 751 N.Y.S.2d 679 (Section 55-c \u201cis designed to provide a more equitable framework for the business dealings between beer brewers and importers and their wholesalers.\u201d (citing the governor\u2019s bill jacket to the 1996 Amendment)); cf. Levin & Glasser, 70 A.D.3d at 445, 896 N.Y.S.2d 311 (\u201c[T]he legally significant fact is the absence of a provision in the rules [for fee dispute resolution system] prohibiting, rather than the absence of one authorizing, the award of preaward interest.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"193 Misc.2d 646, 646","parenthetical":"Section 55-c \"is designed to provide a more equitable framework for the business dealings between beer brewers and importers and their wholesalers.\" (citing the governor's bill jacket to the 1996 Amendment","sentence":"See generally Mathias v. Jacobs, 238 F.Supp.2d 556, 576 (S.D.N.Y.2002) (describing \u201cfair market value\u201d under New York law as \u201cfair, economic, just, and equitable value\u201d (quoting In re Board of Water Supply, 277 N.Y. 452, 459, 14 N.E.2d 789, 792 (1938))); see also Garal, 193 Misc.2d at 646, 751 N.Y.S.2d 679 (Section 55-c \u201cis designed to provide a more equitable framework for the business dealings between beer brewers and importers and their wholesalers.\u201d (citing the governor\u2019s bill jacket to the 1996 Amendment)); cf. Levin & Glasser, 70 A.D.3d at 445, 896 N.Y.S.2d 311 (\u201c[T]he legally significant fact is the absence of a provision in the rules [for fee dispute resolution system] prohibiting, rather than the absence of one authorizing, the award of preaward interest.\u201d)."},"case_id":4261574,"label":"b"}
{"context":"While the court need not grant preAward interest pursuant to statute, if this action is of \"an equitable nature\" the court has discretion to award interest -- and to fix the rate and date from which it will be computed. C.P.L.R. SS 5001(a). Here, the Arbitration Award fixed the fair market value of Finger Lakes' distribution rights. An award of fair market value is an equitable determination.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"Section 55-c \"is designed to provide a more equitable framework for the business dealings between beer brewers and importers and their wholesalers.\" (citing the governor's bill jacket to the 1996 Amendment","sentence":"See generally Mathias v. Jacobs, 238 F.Supp.2d 556, 576 (S.D.N.Y.2002) (describing \u201cfair market value\u201d under New York law as \u201cfair, economic, just, and equitable value\u201d (quoting In re Board of Water Supply, 277 N.Y. 452, 459, 14 N.E.2d 789, 792 (1938))); see also Garal, 193 Misc.2d at 646, 751 N.Y.S.2d 679 (Section 55-c \u201cis designed to provide a more equitable framework for the business dealings between beer brewers and importers and their wholesalers.\u201d (citing the governor\u2019s bill jacket to the 1996 Amendment)); cf. Levin & Glasser, 70 A.D.3d at 445, 896 N.Y.S.2d 311 (\u201c[T]he legally significant fact is the absence of a provision in the rules [for fee dispute resolution system] prohibiting, rather than the absence of one authorizing, the award of preaward interest.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"70 A.D.3d 445, 445","parenthetical":"\"[T]he legally significant fact is the absence of a provision in the rules [for fee dispute resolution system] prohibiting, rather than the absence of one authorizing, the award of preaward interest.\"","sentence":"See generally Mathias v. Jacobs, 238 F.Supp.2d 556, 576 (S.D.N.Y.2002) (describing \u201cfair market value\u201d under New York law as \u201cfair, economic, just, and equitable value\u201d (quoting In re Board of Water Supply, 277 N.Y. 452, 459, 14 N.E.2d 789, 792 (1938))); see also Garal, 193 Misc.2d at 646, 751 N.Y.S.2d 679 (Section 55-c \u201cis designed to provide a more equitable framework for the business dealings between beer brewers and importers and their wholesalers.\u201d (citing the governor\u2019s bill jacket to the 1996 Amendment)); cf. Levin & Glasser, 70 A.D.3d at 445, 896 N.Y.S.2d 311 (\u201c[T]he legally significant fact is the absence of a provision in the rules [for fee dispute resolution system] prohibiting, rather than the absence of one authorizing, the award of preaward interest.\u201d)."},"case_id":4261574,"label":"a"}
{"context":"While the court need not grant preAward interest pursuant to statute, if this action is of \"an equitable nature\" the court has discretion to award interest -- and to fix the rate and date from which it will be computed. C.P.L.R. SS 5001(a). Here, the Arbitration Award fixed the fair market value of Finger Lakes' distribution rights. An award of fair market value is an equitable determination.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[T]he legally significant fact is the absence of a provision in the rules [for fee dispute resolution system] prohibiting, rather than the absence of one authorizing, the award of preaward interest.\"","sentence":"See generally Mathias v. Jacobs, 238 F.Supp.2d 556, 576 (S.D.N.Y.2002) (describing \u201cfair market value\u201d under New York law as \u201cfair, economic, just, and equitable value\u201d (quoting In re Board of Water Supply, 277 N.Y. 452, 459, 14 N.E.2d 789, 792 (1938))); see also Garal, 193 Misc.2d at 646, 751 N.Y.S.2d 679 (Section 55-c \u201cis designed to provide a more equitable framework for the business dealings between beer brewers and importers and their wholesalers.\u201d (citing the governor\u2019s bill jacket to the 1996 Amendment)); cf. Levin & Glasser, 70 A.D.3d at 445, 896 N.Y.S.2d 311 (\u201c[T]he legally significant fact is the absence of a provision in the rules [for fee dispute resolution system] prohibiting, rather than the absence of one authorizing, the award of preaward interest.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"Section 55-c \"is designed to provide a more equitable framework for the business dealings between beer brewers and importers and their wholesalers.\" (citing the governor's bill jacket to the 1996 Amendment","sentence":"See generally Mathias v. Jacobs, 238 F.Supp.2d 556, 576 (S.D.N.Y.2002) (describing \u201cfair market value\u201d under New York law as \u201cfair, economic, just, and equitable value\u201d (quoting In re Board of Water Supply, 277 N.Y. 452, 459, 14 N.E.2d 789, 792 (1938))); see also Garal, 193 Misc.2d at 646, 751 N.Y.S.2d 679 (Section 55-c \u201cis designed to provide a more equitable framework for the business dealings between beer brewers and importers and their wholesalers.\u201d (citing the governor\u2019s bill jacket to the 1996 Amendment)); cf. Levin & Glasser, 70 A.D.3d at 445, 896 N.Y.S.2d 311 (\u201c[T]he legally significant fact is the absence of a provision in the rules [for fee dispute resolution system] prohibiting, rather than the absence of one authorizing, the award of preaward interest.\u201d)."},"case_id":4261574,"label":"b"}
{"context":". For example, there are only two reported decisions in the Fifth Circuit specifically addressing the issue of bail in a foreign extradition case.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"314 F.2d 652, 652-653","parenthetical":"rejecting appellant's request for an independent circuit court order admitting him to bail for failure to provide \"special reasons\" warranting \"disturbing the lower court's order\"","sentence":"See Russell, 805 F.2d at 1215 (briefly discussing the special circumstances test and rejecting that special circumstances justified granting bail in the case); see also Jimenez, 314 F.2d at 652-653 (rejecting appellant\u2019s request for an independent circuit court order admitting him to bail for failure to provide \"special reasons\u201d warranting \"disturbing the lower court\u2019s order\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"805 F.2d 1215, 1215","parenthetical":"briefly discussing the special circumstances test and rejecting that special circumstances justified granting bail in the case","sentence":"See Russell, 805 F.2d at 1215 (briefly discussing the special circumstances test and rejecting that special circumstances justified granting bail in the case); see also Jimenez, 314 F.2d at 652-653 (rejecting appellant\u2019s request for an independent circuit court order admitting him to bail for failure to provide \"special reasons\u201d warranting \"disturbing the lower court\u2019s order\u201d)."},"case_id":4182088,"label":"b"}
{"context":". I note that this and other circuits have found \"persecution\" to be an ambiguous term in other asylum cases.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"457 F.3d 217, 220","parenthetical":"finding that the INA does not \"unambiguously explain[] what the word 'persecution' means\" in the economic context","sentence":"See, e.g., Mirzoyan v. Gonzales, 457 F.3d 217, 220 (2d Cir.2006) (per curiam) (finding that the INA does not \u201cunambiguously explain[] what the word 'persecution' means\u201d in the economic context); Corado v. Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 945, 947 (8th Cir.2004) (per curiam) (\"The BIA is entitled to deference in interpreting ambiguous statutory terms such as 'persecution.' \"); cf. Singh v. INS, 134 F.3d 962, 967 (9th Cir.1998) (noting that the INA \"does not define \u2018persecution\u2019 or specify what acts constitute persecution\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"134 F.3d 962, 967","parenthetical":"noting that the INA \"does not define 'persecution' or specify what acts constitute persecution\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Mirzoyan v. Gonzales, 457 F.3d 217, 220 (2d Cir.2006) (per curiam) (finding that the INA does not \u201cunambiguously explain[] what the word 'persecution' means\u201d in the economic context); Corado v. Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 945, 947 (8th Cir.2004) (per curiam) (\"The BIA is entitled to deference in interpreting ambiguous statutory terms such as 'persecution.' \"); cf. Singh v. INS, 134 F.3d 962, 967 (9th Cir.1998) (noting that the INA \"does not define \u2018persecution\u2019 or specify what acts constitute persecution\u201d)."},"case_id":6046993,"label":"a"}
{"context":". I note that this and other circuits have found \"persecution\" to be an ambiguous term in other asylum cases.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"134 F.3d 962, 967","parenthetical":"noting that the INA \"does not define 'persecution' or specify what acts constitute persecution\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Mirzoyan v. Gonzales, 457 F.3d 217, 220 (2d Cir.2006) (per curiam) (finding that the INA does not \u201cunambiguously explain[] what the word 'persecution' means\u201d in the economic context); Corado v. Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 945, 947 (8th Cir.2004) (per curiam) (\"The BIA is entitled to deference in interpreting ambiguous statutory terms such as 'persecution.' \"); cf. Singh v. INS, 134 F.3d 962, 967 (9th Cir.1998) (noting that the INA \"does not define \u2018persecution\u2019 or specify what acts constitute persecution\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"384 F.3d 945, 947","parenthetical":"\"The BIA is entitled to deference in interpreting ambiguous statutory terms such as 'persecution.' \"","sentence":"See, e.g., Mirzoyan v. Gonzales, 457 F.3d 217, 220 (2d Cir.2006) (per curiam) (finding that the INA does not \u201cunambiguously explain[] what the word 'persecution' means\u201d in the economic context); Corado v. Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 945, 947 (8th Cir.2004) (per curiam) (\"The BIA is entitled to deference in interpreting ambiguous statutory terms such as 'persecution.' \"); cf. Singh v. INS, 134 F.3d 962, 967 (9th Cir.1998) (noting that the INA \"does not define \u2018persecution\u2019 or specify what acts constitute persecution\u201d)."},"case_id":6046993,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Indeed, the Complaint itself acknowledges that the videotape is not essential to the litigation of this matter because the events of July 27, 2003, may be recreated through witness testimony. While the destruction of the tape may make it more difficult or costly for Brown to try this case, and may arguably amount to a discovery violation, there is nothing in the Complaint to suggest that the defendants conduct rendered Brown's access to the courts ineffective or meaningless. Brown has therefore failed to allege a violation of her constitutional right to access to the courts.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"536 F.3d 198, 206","parenthetical":"holding that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim for violation of the right to access to the courts based on allegations that the defendants confiscated their litigation materials, absent any allegation that such materials were critical to pursuing the plaintiffs' underlying claims","sentence":"See, e.g., Monroe v. Beard, 536 F.3d 198, 206 (3d Cir. 2008) (holding that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim for violation of the right to access to the courts based on allegations that the defendants confiscated their litigation materials, absent any allegation that such materials were critical to pursuing the plaintiffs\u2019 underlying claims); see also Foster v. City of Lake Jackson, 28 F.3d 425, 430 (5th Cir. 1994) (explaining that the right to access to the courts does not encompass \u201cthe right to proceed free of discovery abuses after filing\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"28 F.3d 425, 430","parenthetical":"explaining that the right to access to the courts does not encompass \"the right to proceed free of discovery abuses after filing\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Monroe v. Beard, 536 F.3d 198, 206 (3d Cir. 2008) (holding that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim for violation of the right to access to the courts based on allegations that the defendants confiscated their litigation materials, absent any allegation that such materials were critical to pursuing the plaintiffs\u2019 underlying claims); see also Foster v. City of Lake Jackson, 28 F.3d 425, 430 (5th Cir. 1994) (explaining that the right to access to the courts does not encompass \u201cthe right to proceed free of discovery abuses after filing\u201d)."},"case_id":3671840,"label":"a"}
{"context":"As might be expected in an area of the law in which so much depends on the factual scenario of the particular case, the holdings of the Kansas cases that address causation are not clearly dispositive of the issue. However, we find that those cases whose facts most closely approximate those of the instant case support the conclusion that the district court improperly granted summary judgment.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"508 P.2d 950, 950-51","parenthetical":"upholding judgment for the plaintiff who was injured in collision with horse on road, finding that trespasser's opening of gate was not intervening cause in light of defendant's failure to lock gate and defendant's knowledge that horses had previously escaped and that trespassers often entered property","sentence":"See Steele, 327 P.2d at 1065 (holding that demurrer improperly granted because dropping bottle of flammable liquid was reasonably probable such that it was not an intervening cause in action against bottle manufacturer); Rowell, 176 P.2d at 597 (holding that demurrer on grounds of intervening act was inappropriate where stadium owner reasonably should have anticipated that glass bottles distributed at sporting event would be pushed or thrown and injure patrons); see also Cooper, 508 P.2d at 950-51 (upholding judgment for the plaintiff who was injured in collision with horse on road, finding that trespasser\u2019s opening of gate was not intervening cause in light of defendant\u2019s failure to lock gate and defendant\u2019s knowledge that horses had previously escaped and that trespassers often entered property); Breising, 477 P.2d at 987 (implying that car repair shop may have been liable to owner of vehicle that was left with keys in ignition and was subsequently stolen, but upholding summary judgment against individual who was injured in an accident with thief)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"327 P.2d 1065, 1065","parenthetical":"holding that demurrer improperly granted because dropping bottle of flammable liquid was reasonably probable such that it was not an intervening cause in action against bottle manufacturer","sentence":"See Steele, 327 P.2d at 1065 (holding that demurrer improperly granted because dropping bottle of flammable liquid was reasonably probable such that it was not an intervening cause in action against bottle manufacturer); Rowell, 176 P.2d at 597 (holding that demurrer on grounds of intervening act was inappropriate where stadium owner reasonably should have anticipated that glass bottles distributed at sporting event would be pushed or thrown and injure patrons); see also Cooper, 508 P.2d at 950-51 (upholding judgment for the plaintiff who was injured in collision with horse on road, finding that trespasser\u2019s opening of gate was not intervening cause in light of defendant\u2019s failure to lock gate and defendant\u2019s knowledge that horses had previously escaped and that trespassers often entered property); Breising, 477 P.2d at 987 (implying that car repair shop may have been liable to owner of vehicle that was left with keys in ignition and was subsequently stolen, but upholding summary judgment against individual who was injured in an accident with thief)."},"case_id":1878697,"label":"b"}
{"context":"As might be expected in an area of the law in which so much depends on the factual scenario of the particular case, the holdings of the Kansas cases that address causation are not clearly dispositive of the issue. However, we find that those cases whose facts most closely approximate those of the instant case support the conclusion that the district court improperly granted summary judgment.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"327 P.2d 1065, 1065","parenthetical":"holding that demurrer improperly granted because dropping bottle of flammable liquid was reasonably probable such that it was not an intervening cause in action against bottle manufacturer","sentence":"See Steele, 327 P.2d at 1065 (holding that demurrer improperly granted because dropping bottle of flammable liquid was reasonably probable such that it was not an intervening cause in action against bottle manufacturer); Rowell, 176 P.2d at 597 (holding that demurrer on grounds of intervening act was inappropriate where stadium owner reasonably should have anticipated that glass bottles distributed at sporting event would be pushed or thrown and injure patrons); see also Cooper, 508 P.2d at 950-51 (upholding judgment for the plaintiff who was injured in collision with horse on road, finding that trespasser\u2019s opening of gate was not intervening cause in light of defendant\u2019s failure to lock gate and defendant\u2019s knowledge that horses had previously escaped and that trespassers often entered property); Breising, 477 P.2d at 987 (implying that car repair shop may have been liable to owner of vehicle that was left with keys in ignition and was subsequently stolen, but upholding summary judgment against individual who was injured in an accident with thief)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"477 P.2d 987, 987","parenthetical":"implying that car repair shop may have been liable to owner of vehicle that was left with keys in ignition and was subsequently stolen, but upholding summary judgment against individual who was injured in an accident with thief","sentence":"See Steele, 327 P.2d at 1065 (holding that demurrer improperly granted because dropping bottle of flammable liquid was reasonably probable such that it was not an intervening cause in action against bottle manufacturer); Rowell, 176 P.2d at 597 (holding that demurrer on grounds of intervening act was inappropriate where stadium owner reasonably should have anticipated that glass bottles distributed at sporting event would be pushed or thrown and injure patrons); see also Cooper, 508 P.2d at 950-51 (upholding judgment for the plaintiff who was injured in collision with horse on road, finding that trespasser\u2019s opening of gate was not intervening cause in light of defendant\u2019s failure to lock gate and defendant\u2019s knowledge that horses had previously escaped and that trespassers often entered property); Breising, 477 P.2d at 987 (implying that car repair shop may have been liable to owner of vehicle that was left with keys in ignition and was subsequently stolen, but upholding summary judgment against individual who was injured in an accident with thief)."},"case_id":1878697,"label":"a"}
{"context":"As might be expected in an area of the law in which so much depends on the factual scenario of the particular case, the holdings of the Kansas cases that address causation are not clearly dispositive of the issue. However, we find that those cases whose facts most closely approximate those of the instant case support the conclusion that the district court improperly granted summary judgment.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"508 P.2d 950, 950-51","parenthetical":"upholding judgment for the plaintiff who was injured in collision with horse on road, finding that trespasser's opening of gate was not intervening cause in light of defendant's failure to lock gate and defendant's knowledge that horses had previously escaped and that trespassers often entered property","sentence":"See Steele, 327 P.2d at 1065 (holding that demurrer improperly granted because dropping bottle of flammable liquid was reasonably probable such that it was not an intervening cause in action against bottle manufacturer); Rowell, 176 P.2d at 597 (holding that demurrer on grounds of intervening act was inappropriate where stadium owner reasonably should have anticipated that glass bottles distributed at sporting event would be pushed or thrown and injure patrons); see also Cooper, 508 P.2d at 950-51 (upholding judgment for the plaintiff who was injured in collision with horse on road, finding that trespasser\u2019s opening of gate was not intervening cause in light of defendant\u2019s failure to lock gate and defendant\u2019s knowledge that horses had previously escaped and that trespassers often entered property); Breising, 477 P.2d at 987 (implying that car repair shop may have been liable to owner of vehicle that was left with keys in ignition and was subsequently stolen, but upholding summary judgment against individual who was injured in an accident with thief)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"176 P.2d 597, 597","parenthetical":"holding that demurrer on grounds of intervening act was inappropriate where stadium owner reasonably should have anticipated that glass bottles distributed at sporting event would be pushed or thrown and injure patrons","sentence":"See Steele, 327 P.2d at 1065 (holding that demurrer improperly granted because dropping bottle of flammable liquid was reasonably probable such that it was not an intervening cause in action against bottle manufacturer); Rowell, 176 P.2d at 597 (holding that demurrer on grounds of intervening act was inappropriate where stadium owner reasonably should have anticipated that glass bottles distributed at sporting event would be pushed or thrown and injure patrons); see also Cooper, 508 P.2d at 950-51 (upholding judgment for the plaintiff who was injured in collision with horse on road, finding that trespasser\u2019s opening of gate was not intervening cause in light of defendant\u2019s failure to lock gate and defendant\u2019s knowledge that horses had previously escaped and that trespassers often entered property); Breising, 477 P.2d at 987 (implying that car repair shop may have been liable to owner of vehicle that was left with keys in ignition and was subsequently stolen, but upholding summary judgment against individual who was injured in an accident with thief)."},"case_id":1878697,"label":"b"}
{"context":"As might be expected in an area of the law in which so much depends on the factual scenario of the particular case, the holdings of the Kansas cases that address causation are not clearly dispositive of the issue. However, we find that those cases whose facts most closely approximate those of the instant case support the conclusion that the district court improperly granted summary judgment.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"477 P.2d 987, 987","parenthetical":"implying that car repair shop may have been liable to owner of vehicle that was left with keys in ignition and was subsequently stolen, but upholding summary judgment against individual who was injured in an accident with thief","sentence":"See Steele, 327 P.2d at 1065 (holding that demurrer improperly granted because dropping bottle of flammable liquid was reasonably probable such that it was not an intervening cause in action against bottle manufacturer); Rowell, 176 P.2d at 597 (holding that demurrer on grounds of intervening act was inappropriate where stadium owner reasonably should have anticipated that glass bottles distributed at sporting event would be pushed or thrown and injure patrons); see also Cooper, 508 P.2d at 950-51 (upholding judgment for the plaintiff who was injured in collision with horse on road, finding that trespasser\u2019s opening of gate was not intervening cause in light of defendant\u2019s failure to lock gate and defendant\u2019s knowledge that horses had previously escaped and that trespassers often entered property); Breising, 477 P.2d at 987 (implying that car repair shop may have been liable to owner of vehicle that was left with keys in ignition and was subsequently stolen, but upholding summary judgment against individual who was injured in an accident with thief)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"176 P.2d 597, 597","parenthetical":"holding that demurrer on grounds of intervening act was inappropriate where stadium owner reasonably should have anticipated that glass bottles distributed at sporting event would be pushed or thrown and injure patrons","sentence":"See Steele, 327 P.2d at 1065 (holding that demurrer improperly granted because dropping bottle of flammable liquid was reasonably probable such that it was not an intervening cause in action against bottle manufacturer); Rowell, 176 P.2d at 597 (holding that demurrer on grounds of intervening act was inappropriate where stadium owner reasonably should have anticipated that glass bottles distributed at sporting event would be pushed or thrown and injure patrons); see also Cooper, 508 P.2d at 950-51 (upholding judgment for the plaintiff who was injured in collision with horse on road, finding that trespasser\u2019s opening of gate was not intervening cause in light of defendant\u2019s failure to lock gate and defendant\u2019s knowledge that horses had previously escaped and that trespassers often entered property); Breising, 477 P.2d at 987 (implying that car repair shop may have been liable to owner of vehicle that was left with keys in ignition and was subsequently stolen, but upholding summary judgment against individual who was injured in an accident with thief)."},"case_id":1878697,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In Hidalgo, the First Circuit assumed for purposes of its decision that an age-discrimination plaintiff had raised a triable issue as to whether the employer's explanation was incorrect, but nevertheless concluded that because the plaintiff had \"offered no evidence that reasonably could be construed to indicate that [the employer] intended to discriminate against him because of his age,\" it was appropriate to grant summary judgment for the defendant. That assumption we think would be inconsistent with Hicks, which makes clear that \"no additional proof of discrimination is required\" as a matter of course once a plaintiff has shown that a jury could reject the employer's proffered explanation.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"75 F.3d 993, 993","parenthetical":"saying that evidence showing the employer's explanation to be false, standing alone, will \"ordinarily\" permit an inference of discrimination","sentence":"Hicks, 509 U.S. at 511, 11S S.Ct. 2742; see also Rothmeier, 85 F.3d at 1333-35 (reading Hicks to reject an approach under which a showing that the defendant\u2019s' proffered explanation is false is presumptively insufficient to show discrimination); Anderson, 13 F.3d at 1123 (same); cf. Rhodes, 75 F.3d at 993 (saying that evidence showing the employer\u2019s explanation to be false, standing alone, will \u201cordinarily\u201d permit an inference of discrimination). Our reading of Hicks also accords with the Supreme Court\u2019s rule, set forth in United States Postal Serv. v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 714 n. 3, 717, 103 S.Ct. 1478, 75 L.Ed.2d 403 (1983), that it is improper to require plaintiffs to produce direct evidence of discriminatory intent in order to prevail at trial."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"85 F.3d 1333, 1333-35","parenthetical":"reading Hicks to reject an approach under which a showing that the defendant's' proffered explanation is false is presumptively insufficient to show discrimination","sentence":"Hicks, 509 U.S. at 511, 11S S.Ct. 2742; see also Rothmeier, 85 F.3d at 1333-35 (reading Hicks to reject an approach under which a showing that the defendant\u2019s' proffered explanation is false is presumptively insufficient to show discrimination); Anderson, 13 F.3d at 1123 (same); cf. Rhodes, 75 F.3d at 993 (saying that evidence showing the employer\u2019s explanation to be false, standing alone, will \u201cordinarily\u201d permit an inference of discrimination). Our reading of Hicks also accords with the Supreme Court\u2019s rule, set forth in United States Postal Serv. v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 714 n. 3, 717, 103 S.Ct. 1478, 75 L.Ed.2d 403 (1983), that it is improper to require plaintiffs to produce direct evidence of discriminatory intent in order to prevail at trial."},"case_id":1567119,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In Hidalgo, the First Circuit assumed for purposes of its decision that an age-discrimination plaintiff had raised a triable issue as to whether the employer's explanation was incorrect, but nevertheless concluded that because the plaintiff had \"offered no evidence that reasonably could be construed to indicate that [the employer] intended to discriminate against him because of his age,\" it was appropriate to grant summary judgment for the defendant. That assumption we think would be inconsistent with Hicks, which makes clear that \"no additional proof of discrimination is required\" as a matter of course once a plaintiff has shown that a jury could reject the employer's proffered explanation.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"saying that evidence showing the employer's explanation to be false, standing alone, will \"ordinarily\" permit an inference of discrimination","sentence":"Hicks, 509 U.S. at 511, 11S S.Ct. 2742; see also Rothmeier, 85 F.3d at 1333-35 (reading Hicks to reject an approach under which a showing that the defendant\u2019s' proffered explanation is false is presumptively insufficient to show discrimination); Anderson, 13 F.3d at 1123 (same); cf. Rhodes, 75 F.3d at 993 (saying that evidence showing the employer\u2019s explanation to be false, standing alone, will \u201cordinarily\u201d permit an inference of discrimination). Our reading of Hicks also accords with the Supreme Court\u2019s rule, set forth in United States Postal Serv. v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 714 n. 3, 717, 103 S.Ct. 1478, 75 L.Ed.2d 403 (1983), that it is improper to require plaintiffs to produce direct evidence of discriminatory intent in order to prevail at trial."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"85 F.3d 1333, 1333-35","parenthetical":"reading Hicks to reject an approach under which a showing that the defendant's' proffered explanation is false is presumptively insufficient to show discrimination","sentence":"Hicks, 509 U.S. at 511, 11S S.Ct. 2742; see also Rothmeier, 85 F.3d at 1333-35 (reading Hicks to reject an approach under which a showing that the defendant\u2019s' proffered explanation is false is presumptively insufficient to show discrimination); Anderson, 13 F.3d at 1123 (same); cf. Rhodes, 75 F.3d at 993 (saying that evidence showing the employer\u2019s explanation to be false, standing alone, will \u201cordinarily\u201d permit an inference of discrimination). Our reading of Hicks also accords with the Supreme Court\u2019s rule, set forth in United States Postal Serv. v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 714 n. 3, 717, 103 S.Ct. 1478, 75 L.Ed.2d 403 (1983), that it is improper to require plaintiffs to produce direct evidence of discriminatory intent in order to prevail at trial."},"case_id":1567119,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In Hidalgo, the First Circuit assumed for purposes of its decision that an age-discrimination plaintiff had raised a triable issue as to whether the employer's explanation was incorrect, but nevertheless concluded that because the plaintiff had \"offered no evidence that reasonably could be construed to indicate that [the employer] intended to discriminate against him because of his age,\" it was appropriate to grant summary judgment for the defendant. That assumption we think would be inconsistent with Hicks, which makes clear that \"no additional proof of discrimination is required\" as a matter of course once a plaintiff has shown that a jury could reject the employer's proffered explanation.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"saying that evidence showing the employer's explanation to be false, standing alone, will \"ordinarily\" permit an inference of discrimination","sentence":"Hicks, 509 U.S. at 511, 11S S.Ct. 2742; see also Rothmeier, 85 F.3d at 1333-35 (reading Hicks to reject an approach under which a showing that the defendant\u2019s' proffered explanation is false is presumptively insufficient to show discrimination); Anderson, 13 F.3d at 1123 (same); cf. Rhodes, 75 F.3d at 993 (saying that evidence showing the employer\u2019s explanation to be false, standing alone, will \u201cordinarily\u201d permit an inference of discrimination). Our reading of Hicks also accords with the Supreme Court\u2019s rule, set forth in United States Postal Serv. v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 714 n. 3, 717, 103 S.Ct. 1478, 75 L.Ed.2d 403 (1983), that it is improper to require plaintiffs to produce direct evidence of discriminatory intent in order to prevail at trial."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"85 F.3d 1333, 1333-35","parenthetical":"reading Hicks to reject an approach under which a showing that the defendant's' proffered explanation is false is presumptively insufficient to show discrimination","sentence":"Hicks, 509 U.S. at 511, 11S S.Ct. 2742; see also Rothmeier, 85 F.3d at 1333-35 (reading Hicks to reject an approach under which a showing that the defendant\u2019s' proffered explanation is false is presumptively insufficient to show discrimination); Anderson, 13 F.3d at 1123 (same); cf. Rhodes, 75 F.3d at 993 (saying that evidence showing the employer\u2019s explanation to be false, standing alone, will \u201cordinarily\u201d permit an inference of discrimination). Our reading of Hicks also accords with the Supreme Court\u2019s rule, set forth in United States Postal Serv. v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 714 n. 3, 717, 103 S.Ct. 1478, 75 L.Ed.2d 403 (1983), that it is improper to require plaintiffs to produce direct evidence of discriminatory intent in order to prevail at trial."},"case_id":1567119,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In Hidalgo, the First Circuit assumed for purposes of its decision that an age-discrimination plaintiff had raised a triable issue as to whether the employer's explanation was incorrect, but nevertheless concluded that because the plaintiff had \"offered no evidence that reasonably could be construed to indicate that [the employer] intended to discriminate against him because of his age,\" it was appropriate to grant summary judgment for the defendant. That assumption we think would be inconsistent with Hicks, which makes clear that \"no additional proof of discrimination is required\" as a matter of course once a plaintiff has shown that a jury could reject the employer's proffered explanation.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"saying that evidence showing the employer's explanation to be false, standing alone, will \"ordinarily\" permit an inference of discrimination","sentence":"Hicks, 509 U.S. at 511, 11S S.Ct. 2742; see also Rothmeier, 85 F.3d at 1333-35 (reading Hicks to reject an approach under which a showing that the defendant\u2019s' proffered explanation is false is presumptively insufficient to show discrimination); Anderson, 13 F.3d at 1123 (same); cf. Rhodes, 75 F.3d at 993 (saying that evidence showing the employer\u2019s explanation to be false, standing alone, will \u201cordinarily\u201d permit an inference of discrimination). Our reading of Hicks also accords with the Supreme Court\u2019s rule, set forth in United States Postal Serv. v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 714 n. 3, 717, 103 S.Ct. 1478, 75 L.Ed.2d 403 (1983), that it is improper to require plaintiffs to produce direct evidence of discriminatory intent in order to prevail at trial."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"85 F.3d 1333, 1333-35","parenthetical":"reading Hicks to reject an approach under which a showing that the defendant's' proffered explanation is false is presumptively insufficient to show discrimination","sentence":"Hicks, 509 U.S. at 511, 11S S.Ct. 2742; see also Rothmeier, 85 F.3d at 1333-35 (reading Hicks to reject an approach under which a showing that the defendant\u2019s' proffered explanation is false is presumptively insufficient to show discrimination); Anderson, 13 F.3d at 1123 (same); cf. Rhodes, 75 F.3d at 993 (saying that evidence showing the employer\u2019s explanation to be false, standing alone, will \u201cordinarily\u201d permit an inference of discrimination). Our reading of Hicks also accords with the Supreme Court\u2019s rule, set forth in United States Postal Serv. v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 714 n. 3, 717, 103 S.Ct. 1478, 75 L.Ed.2d 403 (1983), that it is improper to require plaintiffs to produce direct evidence of discriminatory intent in order to prevail at trial."},"case_id":1567119,"label":"b"}
{"context":"While defense counsel promised alibi evidence during his opening statement, his failure to introduce the wives' testimony does not, in and of itself, constitute constitutionally deficient performance.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"478 F.3d 750, 758-59","parenthetical":"holding the failure to call alibi witnesses promised during opening statement was not ineffective assistance of counsel","sentence":"See Harrison v. Motley, 478 F.3d 750, 758-59 (6th Cir.2007) (holding the failure to call alibi witnesses promised during opening statement was not ineffective assistance of counsel); see also Williams v. Bowersox, 340 F.3d 667, 671-72 (8th Cir.2003) (\u201c[Flailing to present witnesses promised in an opening is not always an error of a constitutional dimension.\u201d); Schlager v. Washington, 113 F.3d 763, 768-70 (7th Cir.1997) (failure to call witness promised during opening statement not ineffective assistance of counsel). Indeed, if such were the rule, it would encourage counsel to perpetuate mistakes made during opening statements."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"340 F.3d 667, 671-72","parenthetical":"\"[Flailing to present witnesses promised in an opening is not always an error of a constitutional dimension.\"","sentence":"See Harrison v. Motley, 478 F.3d 750, 758-59 (6th Cir.2007) (holding the failure to call alibi witnesses promised during opening statement was not ineffective assistance of counsel); see also Williams v. Bowersox, 340 F.3d 667, 671-72 (8th Cir.2003) (\u201c[Flailing to present witnesses promised in an opening is not always an error of a constitutional dimension.\u201d); Schlager v. Washington, 113 F.3d 763, 768-70 (7th Cir.1997) (failure to call witness promised during opening statement not ineffective assistance of counsel). Indeed, if such were the rule, it would encourage counsel to perpetuate mistakes made during opening statements."},"case_id":4055517,"label":"a"}
{"context":"While defense counsel promised alibi evidence during his opening statement, his failure to introduce the wives' testimony does not, in and of itself, constitute constitutionally deficient performance.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"478 F.3d 750, 758-59","parenthetical":"holding the failure to call alibi witnesses promised during opening statement was not ineffective assistance of counsel","sentence":"See Harrison v. Motley, 478 F.3d 750, 758-59 (6th Cir.2007) (holding the failure to call alibi witnesses promised during opening statement was not ineffective assistance of counsel); see also Williams v. Bowersox, 340 F.3d 667, 671-72 (8th Cir.2003) (\u201c[Flailing to present witnesses promised in an opening is not always an error of a constitutional dimension.\u201d); Schlager v. Washington, 113 F.3d 763, 768-70 (7th Cir.1997) (failure to call witness promised during opening statement not ineffective assistance of counsel). Indeed, if such were the rule, it would encourage counsel to perpetuate mistakes made during opening statements."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"113 F.3d 763, 768-70","parenthetical":"failure to call witness promised during opening statement not ineffective assistance of counsel","sentence":"See Harrison v. Motley, 478 F.3d 750, 758-59 (6th Cir.2007) (holding the failure to call alibi witnesses promised during opening statement was not ineffective assistance of counsel); see also Williams v. Bowersox, 340 F.3d 667, 671-72 (8th Cir.2003) (\u201c[Flailing to present witnesses promised in an opening is not always an error of a constitutional dimension.\u201d); Schlager v. Washington, 113 F.3d 763, 768-70 (7th Cir.1997) (failure to call witness promised during opening statement not ineffective assistance of counsel). Indeed, if such were the rule, it would encourage counsel to perpetuate mistakes made during opening statements."},"case_id":4055517,"label":"a"}
{"context":"As the district court explained, the United States is immune from suit for mone tary relief unless a statute waives immunity.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"510 U.S. 471, 475","parenthetical":"\"Absent a waiver, sovereign immunity shields the Federal Government and its agencies from suit.\"","sentence":"FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475, 114 S.Ct. 996, 127 L.Ed.2d 308 (1994) (\u201cAbsent a waiver, sovereign immunity shields the Federal Government and its agencies from suit.\u201d); Block v. North Dakota, 461 U.S. 273, 287, 103 S.Ct. 1811, 75 L.Ed.2d 840 (1983) (the basic rule of federal sovereign immunity is that the United States cannot be sued at all without the consent of Congress). The United States has not given its consent to be sued for alleged violations of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments committed against state prisoners."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"771 F.2d 424, 442","parenthetical":"The United States \"has not waived its sovereign immunity for constitutional torts as such.\"","sentence":"See Martinez v. Winner, 771 F.2d 424, 442 (10th Cir.1985) (The United States \u201chas not waived its sovereign immunity for constitutional torts as such.\u201d). Thus, the district court rightly dismissed Salary\u2019s claim for damages against the United States according to 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1915A(b), which requires a court to dismiss a prisoner complaint that seeks monetary damages from a defendant who is immune from that relief."},"case_id":4174922,"label":"a"}
{"context":"As the district court explained, the United States is immune from suit for mone tary relief unless a statute waives immunity.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"Absent a waiver, sovereign immunity shields the Federal Government and its agencies from suit.\"","sentence":"FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475, 114 S.Ct. 996, 127 L.Ed.2d 308 (1994) (\u201cAbsent a waiver, sovereign immunity shields the Federal Government and its agencies from suit.\u201d); Block v. North Dakota, 461 U.S. 273, 287, 103 S.Ct. 1811, 75 L.Ed.2d 840 (1983) (the basic rule of federal sovereign immunity is that the United States cannot be sued at all without the consent of Congress). The United States has not given its consent to be sued for alleged violations of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments committed against state prisoners."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"771 F.2d 424, 442","parenthetical":"The United States \"has not waived its sovereign immunity for constitutional torts as such.\"","sentence":"See Martinez v. Winner, 771 F.2d 424, 442 (10th Cir.1985) (The United States \u201chas not waived its sovereign immunity for constitutional torts as such.\u201d). Thus, the district court rightly dismissed Salary\u2019s claim for damages against the United States according to 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1915A(b), which requires a court to dismiss a prisoner complaint that seeks monetary damages from a defendant who is immune from that relief."},"case_id":4174922,"label":"a"}
{"context":"As the district court explained, the United States is immune from suit for mone tary relief unless a statute waives immunity.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"Absent a waiver, sovereign immunity shields the Federal Government and its agencies from suit.\"","sentence":"FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475, 114 S.Ct. 996, 127 L.Ed.2d 308 (1994) (\u201cAbsent a waiver, sovereign immunity shields the Federal Government and its agencies from suit.\u201d); Block v. North Dakota, 461 U.S. 273, 287, 103 S.Ct. 1811, 75 L.Ed.2d 840 (1983) (the basic rule of federal sovereign immunity is that the United States cannot be sued at all without the consent of Congress). The United States has not given its consent to be sued for alleged violations of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments committed against state prisoners."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"771 F.2d 424, 442","parenthetical":"The United States \"has not waived its sovereign immunity for constitutional torts as such.\"","sentence":"See Martinez v. Winner, 771 F.2d 424, 442 (10th Cir.1985) (The United States \u201chas not waived its sovereign immunity for constitutional torts as such.\u201d). Thus, the district court rightly dismissed Salary\u2019s claim for damages against the United States according to 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1915A(b), which requires a court to dismiss a prisoner complaint that seeks monetary damages from a defendant who is immune from that relief."},"case_id":4174922,"label":"a"}
{"context":"As the district court explained, the United States is immune from suit for mone tary relief unless a statute waives immunity.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"771 F.2d 424, 442","parenthetical":"The United States \"has not waived its sovereign immunity for constitutional torts as such.\"","sentence":"See Martinez v. Winner, 771 F.2d 424, 442 (10th Cir.1985) (The United States \u201chas not waived its sovereign immunity for constitutional torts as such.\u201d). Thus, the district court rightly dismissed Salary\u2019s claim for damages against the United States according to 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1915A(b), which requires a court to dismiss a prisoner complaint that seeks monetary damages from a defendant who is immune from that relief."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"461 U.S. 273, 287","parenthetical":"the basic rule of federal sovereign immunity is that the United States cannot be sued at all without the consent of Congress","sentence":"FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475, 114 S.Ct. 996, 127 L.Ed.2d 308 (1994) (\u201cAbsent a waiver, sovereign immunity shields the Federal Government and its agencies from suit.\u201d); Block v. North Dakota, 461 U.S. 273, 287, 103 S.Ct. 1811, 75 L.Ed.2d 840 (1983) (the basic rule of federal sovereign immunity is that the United States cannot be sued at all without the consent of Congress). The United States has not given its consent to be sued for alleged violations of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments committed against state prisoners."},"case_id":4174922,"label":"b"}
{"context":"As the district court explained, the United States is immune from suit for mone tary relief unless a statute waives immunity.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"the basic rule of federal sovereign immunity is that the United States cannot be sued at all without the consent of Congress","sentence":"FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475, 114 S.Ct. 996, 127 L.Ed.2d 308 (1994) (\u201cAbsent a waiver, sovereign immunity shields the Federal Government and its agencies from suit.\u201d); Block v. North Dakota, 461 U.S. 273, 287, 103 S.Ct. 1811, 75 L.Ed.2d 840 (1983) (the basic rule of federal sovereign immunity is that the United States cannot be sued at all without the consent of Congress). The United States has not given its consent to be sued for alleged violations of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments committed against state prisoners."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"771 F.2d 424, 442","parenthetical":"The United States \"has not waived its sovereign immunity for constitutional torts as such.\"","sentence":"See Martinez v. Winner, 771 F.2d 424, 442 (10th Cir.1985) (The United States \u201chas not waived its sovereign immunity for constitutional torts as such.\u201d). Thus, the district court rightly dismissed Salary\u2019s claim for damages against the United States according to 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1915A(b), which requires a court to dismiss a prisoner complaint that seeks monetary damages from a defendant who is immune from that relief."},"case_id":4174922,"label":"a"}
{"context":"As the district court explained, the United States is immune from suit for mone tary relief unless a statute waives immunity.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"the basic rule of federal sovereign immunity is that the United States cannot be sued at all without the consent of Congress","sentence":"FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475, 114 S.Ct. 996, 127 L.Ed.2d 308 (1994) (\u201cAbsent a waiver, sovereign immunity shields the Federal Government and its agencies from suit.\u201d); Block v. North Dakota, 461 U.S. 273, 287, 103 S.Ct. 1811, 75 L.Ed.2d 840 (1983) (the basic rule of federal sovereign immunity is that the United States cannot be sued at all without the consent of Congress). The United States has not given its consent to be sued for alleged violations of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments committed against state prisoners."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"771 F.2d 424, 442","parenthetical":"The United States \"has not waived its sovereign immunity for constitutional torts as such.\"","sentence":"See Martinez v. Winner, 771 F.2d 424, 442 (10th Cir.1985) (The United States \u201chas not waived its sovereign immunity for constitutional torts as such.\u201d). Thus, the district court rightly dismissed Salary\u2019s claim for damages against the United States according to 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1915A(b), which requires a court to dismiss a prisoner complaint that seeks monetary damages from a defendant who is immune from that relief."},"case_id":4174922,"label":"a"}
{"context":"That admiralty jurisdiction exists does not automatically assure that the applicable law will be federal, however. Unlike other areas of admiralty law, Congress has not chosen to legislate with regard to marine insurance.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"365 U.S. 731, 742","parenthetical":"\"The application of state law in [Wilburn Boat ] was justified by the Court on the basis of a lack of any provision of maritime law governing the matter there presented.\"","sentence":"See id. at 314, 75 S.Ct. at 370; Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406, 409, 74 S.Ct. 202, 205, 98 L.Ed. 143 (1953) (where federal law provides a defense in an admiralty suit, it controls over state law); see also Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U.S. 731, 742, 81 S.Ct. 886, 894, 6 L.Ed.2d 56 (1961) (\u201cThe application of state law in [Wilburn Boat ] was justified by the Court on the basis of a lack of any provision of maritime law governing the matter there presented.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"346 U.S. 406, 409","parenthetical":"where federal law provides a defense in an admiralty suit, it controls over state law","sentence":"See id. at 314, 75 S.Ct. at 370; Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406, 409, 74 S.Ct. 202, 205, 98 L.Ed. 143 (1953) (where federal law provides a defense in an admiralty suit, it controls over state law); see also Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U.S. 731, 742, 81 S.Ct. 886, 894, 6 L.Ed.2d 56 (1961) (\u201cThe application of state law in [Wilburn Boat ] was justified by the Court on the basis of a lack of any provision of maritime law governing the matter there presented.\u201d)."},"case_id":7407386,"label":"b"}
{"context":"That admiralty jurisdiction exists does not automatically assure that the applicable law will be federal, however. Unlike other areas of admiralty law, Congress has not chosen to legislate with regard to marine insurance.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"346 U.S. 406, 409","parenthetical":"where federal law provides a defense in an admiralty suit, it controls over state law","sentence":"See id. at 314, 75 S.Ct. at 370; Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406, 409, 74 S.Ct. 202, 205, 98 L.Ed. 143 (1953) (where federal law provides a defense in an admiralty suit, it controls over state law); see also Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U.S. 731, 742, 81 S.Ct. 886, 894, 6 L.Ed.2d 56 (1961) (\u201cThe application of state law in [Wilburn Boat ] was justified by the Court on the basis of a lack of any provision of maritime law governing the matter there presented.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"81 S.Ct. 886, 894","parenthetical":"\"The application of state law in [Wilburn Boat ] was justified by the Court on the basis of a lack of any provision of maritime law governing the matter there presented.\"","sentence":"See id. at 314, 75 S.Ct. at 370; Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406, 409, 74 S.Ct. 202, 205, 98 L.Ed. 143 (1953) (where federal law provides a defense in an admiralty suit, it controls over state law); see also Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U.S. 731, 742, 81 S.Ct. 886, 894, 6 L.Ed.2d 56 (1961) (\u201cThe application of state law in [Wilburn Boat ] was justified by the Court on the basis of a lack of any provision of maritime law governing the matter there presented.\u201d)."},"case_id":7407386,"label":"a"}
{"context":"That admiralty jurisdiction exists does not automatically assure that the applicable law will be federal, however. Unlike other areas of admiralty law, Congress has not chosen to legislate with regard to marine insurance.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"The application of state law in [Wilburn Boat ] was justified by the Court on the basis of a lack of any provision of maritime law governing the matter there presented.\"","sentence":"See id. at 314, 75 S.Ct. at 370; Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406, 409, 74 S.Ct. 202, 205, 98 L.Ed. 143 (1953) (where federal law provides a defense in an admiralty suit, it controls over state law); see also Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U.S. 731, 742, 81 S.Ct. 886, 894, 6 L.Ed.2d 56 (1961) (\u201cThe application of state law in [Wilburn Boat ] was justified by the Court on the basis of a lack of any provision of maritime law governing the matter there presented.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"346 U.S. 406, 409","parenthetical":"where federal law provides a defense in an admiralty suit, it controls over state law","sentence":"See id. at 314, 75 S.Ct. at 370; Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406, 409, 74 S.Ct. 202, 205, 98 L.Ed. 143 (1953) (where federal law provides a defense in an admiralty suit, it controls over state law); see also Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U.S. 731, 742, 81 S.Ct. 886, 894, 6 L.Ed.2d 56 (1961) (\u201cThe application of state law in [Wilburn Boat ] was justified by the Court on the basis of a lack of any provision of maritime law governing the matter there presented.\u201d)."},"case_id":7407386,"label":"b"}
{"context":"That admiralty jurisdiction exists does not automatically assure that the applicable law will be federal, however. Unlike other areas of admiralty law, Congress has not chosen to legislate with regard to marine insurance.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"74 S.Ct. 202, 205","parenthetical":"where federal law provides a defense in an admiralty suit, it controls over state law","sentence":"See id. at 314, 75 S.Ct. at 370; Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406, 409, 74 S.Ct. 202, 205, 98 L.Ed. 143 (1953) (where federal law provides a defense in an admiralty suit, it controls over state law); see also Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U.S. 731, 742, 81 S.Ct. 886, 894, 6 L.Ed.2d 56 (1961) (\u201cThe application of state law in [Wilburn Boat ] was justified by the Court on the basis of a lack of any provision of maritime law governing the matter there presented.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"365 U.S. 731, 742","parenthetical":"\"The application of state law in [Wilburn Boat ] was justified by the Court on the basis of a lack of any provision of maritime law governing the matter there presented.\"","sentence":"See id. at 314, 75 S.Ct. at 370; Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406, 409, 74 S.Ct. 202, 205, 98 L.Ed. 143 (1953) (where federal law provides a defense in an admiralty suit, it controls over state law); see also Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U.S. 731, 742, 81 S.Ct. 886, 894, 6 L.Ed.2d 56 (1961) (\u201cThe application of state law in [Wilburn Boat ] was justified by the Court on the basis of a lack of any provision of maritime law governing the matter there presented.\u201d)."},"case_id":7407386,"label":"a"}
{"context":"That admiralty jurisdiction exists does not automatically assure that the applicable law will be federal, however. Unlike other areas of admiralty law, Congress has not chosen to legislate with regard to marine insurance.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"74 S.Ct. 202, 205","parenthetical":"where federal law provides a defense in an admiralty suit, it controls over state law","sentence":"See id. at 314, 75 S.Ct. at 370; Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406, 409, 74 S.Ct. 202, 205, 98 L.Ed. 143 (1953) (where federal law provides a defense in an admiralty suit, it controls over state law); see also Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U.S. 731, 742, 81 S.Ct. 886, 894, 6 L.Ed.2d 56 (1961) (\u201cThe application of state law in [Wilburn Boat ] was justified by the Court on the basis of a lack of any provision of maritime law governing the matter there presented.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"81 S.Ct. 886, 894","parenthetical":"\"The application of state law in [Wilburn Boat ] was justified by the Court on the basis of a lack of any provision of maritime law governing the matter there presented.\"","sentence":"See id. at 314, 75 S.Ct. at 370; Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406, 409, 74 S.Ct. 202, 205, 98 L.Ed. 143 (1953) (where federal law provides a defense in an admiralty suit, it controls over state law); see also Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U.S. 731, 742, 81 S.Ct. 886, 894, 6 L.Ed.2d 56 (1961) (\u201cThe application of state law in [Wilburn Boat ] was justified by the Court on the basis of a lack of any provision of maritime law governing the matter there presented.\u201d)."},"case_id":7407386,"label":"a"}
{"context":"That admiralty jurisdiction exists does not automatically assure that the applicable law will be federal, however. Unlike other areas of admiralty law, Congress has not chosen to legislate with regard to marine insurance.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"74 S.Ct. 202, 205","parenthetical":"where federal law provides a defense in an admiralty suit, it controls over state law","sentence":"See id. at 314, 75 S.Ct. at 370; Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406, 409, 74 S.Ct. 202, 205, 98 L.Ed. 143 (1953) (where federal law provides a defense in an admiralty suit, it controls over state law); see also Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U.S. 731, 742, 81 S.Ct. 886, 894, 6 L.Ed.2d 56 (1961) (\u201cThe application of state law in [Wilburn Boat ] was justified by the Court on the basis of a lack of any provision of maritime law governing the matter there presented.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"The application of state law in [Wilburn Boat ] was justified by the Court on the basis of a lack of any provision of maritime law governing the matter there presented.\"","sentence":"See id. at 314, 75 S.Ct. at 370; Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406, 409, 74 S.Ct. 202, 205, 98 L.Ed. 143 (1953) (where federal law provides a defense in an admiralty suit, it controls over state law); see also Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U.S. 731, 742, 81 S.Ct. 886, 894, 6 L.Ed.2d 56 (1961) (\u201cThe application of state law in [Wilburn Boat ] was justified by the Court on the basis of a lack of any provision of maritime law governing the matter there presented.\u201d)."},"case_id":7407386,"label":"a"}
{"context":"That admiralty jurisdiction exists does not automatically assure that the applicable law will be federal, however. Unlike other areas of admiralty law, Congress has not chosen to legislate with regard to marine insurance.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"365 U.S. 731, 742","parenthetical":"\"The application of state law in [Wilburn Boat ] was justified by the Court on the basis of a lack of any provision of maritime law governing the matter there presented.\"","sentence":"See id. at 314, 75 S.Ct. at 370; Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406, 409, 74 S.Ct. 202, 205, 98 L.Ed. 143 (1953) (where federal law provides a defense in an admiralty suit, it controls over state law); see also Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U.S. 731, 742, 81 S.Ct. 886, 894, 6 L.Ed.2d 56 (1961) (\u201cThe application of state law in [Wilburn Boat ] was justified by the Court on the basis of a lack of any provision of maritime law governing the matter there presented.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"where federal law provides a defense in an admiralty suit, it controls over state law","sentence":"See id. at 314, 75 S.Ct. at 370; Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406, 409, 74 S.Ct. 202, 205, 98 L.Ed. 143 (1953) (where federal law provides a defense in an admiralty suit, it controls over state law); see also Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U.S. 731, 742, 81 S.Ct. 886, 894, 6 L.Ed.2d 56 (1961) (\u201cThe application of state law in [Wilburn Boat ] was justified by the Court on the basis of a lack of any provision of maritime law governing the matter there presented.\u201d)."},"case_id":7407386,"label":"b"}
{"context":"That admiralty jurisdiction exists does not automatically assure that the applicable law will be federal, however. Unlike other areas of admiralty law, Congress has not chosen to legislate with regard to marine insurance.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"where federal law provides a defense in an admiralty suit, it controls over state law","sentence":"See id. at 314, 75 S.Ct. at 370; Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406, 409, 74 S.Ct. 202, 205, 98 L.Ed. 143 (1953) (where federal law provides a defense in an admiralty suit, it controls over state law); see also Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U.S. 731, 742, 81 S.Ct. 886, 894, 6 L.Ed.2d 56 (1961) (\u201cThe application of state law in [Wilburn Boat ] was justified by the Court on the basis of a lack of any provision of maritime law governing the matter there presented.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"81 S.Ct. 886, 894","parenthetical":"\"The application of state law in [Wilburn Boat ] was justified by the Court on the basis of a lack of any provision of maritime law governing the matter there presented.\"","sentence":"See id. at 314, 75 S.Ct. at 370; Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406, 409, 74 S.Ct. 202, 205, 98 L.Ed. 143 (1953) (where federal law provides a defense in an admiralty suit, it controls over state law); see also Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U.S. 731, 742, 81 S.Ct. 886, 894, 6 L.Ed.2d 56 (1961) (\u201cThe application of state law in [Wilburn Boat ] was justified by the Court on the basis of a lack of any provision of maritime law governing the matter there presented.\u201d)."},"case_id":7407386,"label":"a"}
{"context":"That admiralty jurisdiction exists does not automatically assure that the applicable law will be federal, however. Unlike other areas of admiralty law, Congress has not chosen to legislate with regard to marine insurance.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"where federal law provides a defense in an admiralty suit, it controls over state law","sentence":"See id. at 314, 75 S.Ct. at 370; Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406, 409, 74 S.Ct. 202, 205, 98 L.Ed. 143 (1953) (where federal law provides a defense in an admiralty suit, it controls over state law); see also Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U.S. 731, 742, 81 S.Ct. 886, 894, 6 L.Ed.2d 56 (1961) (\u201cThe application of state law in [Wilburn Boat ] was justified by the Court on the basis of a lack of any provision of maritime law governing the matter there presented.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"The application of state law in [Wilburn Boat ] was justified by the Court on the basis of a lack of any provision of maritime law governing the matter there presented.\"","sentence":"See id. at 314, 75 S.Ct. at 370; Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406, 409, 74 S.Ct. 202, 205, 98 L.Ed. 143 (1953) (where federal law provides a defense in an admiralty suit, it controls over state law); see also Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U.S. 731, 742, 81 S.Ct. 886, 894, 6 L.Ed.2d 56 (1961) (\u201cThe application of state law in [Wilburn Boat ] was justified by the Court on the basis of a lack of any provision of maritime law governing the matter there presented.\u201d)."},"case_id":7407386,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Many courts, including the Supreme Court, permit alleged state court violations, ordinarily required to be raised on direct appeal to the state courts to be preserved for federal habeas review, to be admitted for such review through the \"back door\" in the form of a claimed denial of effective assistance of appellate counsel.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"17 F.Supp.2d 242, 244","parenthetical":"denying habeas relief on the basis that the claim that defense counsel failed to challenge elements listed in indictment was not raised on direct appeal and could not subsequently be admitted through the \"back door\" clothed as an ineffective assistance of counsel claim failed to meet Strickland requirements because of the novelty of issue","sentence":"See also Chestaro v. United States, 17 F.Supp.2d 242, 244 (S.D.N.Y.1998) (denying habeas relief on the basis that the claim that defense counsel failed to challenge elements listed in indictment was not raised on direct appeal and could not subsequently be admitted through the \u201cback door\u201d clothed as an ineffective assistance of counsel claim failed to meet Strickland requirements because of the novelty of issue)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"68 F.3d 1518, 1522","parenthetical":"reviewing in the form of an ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim asserted in habeas petition allegation that appellate counsel failed to raise on direct appeal to the state court that jury was improperly instructed on how to apply state law circumstantial evidence rule","sentence":"Kimmelman, supra (permitting Fourth Amendment issue to be evaluated on habe-as review as a Sixth Amendment claim based on appellate counsel\u2019s failure to appeal trial court\u2019s denial of motion to suppress); Holman v. Page, 95 F.3d 481, 482-83 (7th Cir.1996) (same); Bunkley v. Meachum, 68 F.3d 1518, 1522 (2d Cir.1995) (reviewing in the form of an ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim asserted in habeas petition allegation that appellate counsel failed to raise on direct appeal to the state court that jury was improperly instructed on how to apply state law circumstantial evidence rule); Durrive v. United States, 4 F.3d 548, 550 (7th Cir.1993) (observing that in limited circumstances an alleged violation of Fed. R.Crim.P. 32 requiring defendant be provided with copy of presentence report may be subject to federal habeas review within an ineffective assistance of counsel claim)."},"case_id":11117065,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Many courts, including the Supreme Court, permit alleged state court violations, ordinarily required to be raised on direct appeal to the state courts to be preserved for federal habeas review, to be admitted for such review through the \"back door\" in the form of a claimed denial of effective assistance of appellate counsel.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"17 F.Supp.2d 242, 244","parenthetical":"denying habeas relief on the basis that the claim that defense counsel failed to challenge elements listed in indictment was not raised on direct appeal and could not subsequently be admitted through the \"back door\" clothed as an ineffective assistance of counsel claim failed to meet Strickland requirements because of the novelty of issue","sentence":"See also Chestaro v. United States, 17 F.Supp.2d 242, 244 (S.D.N.Y.1998) (denying habeas relief on the basis that the claim that defense counsel failed to challenge elements listed in indictment was not raised on direct appeal and could not subsequently be admitted through the \u201cback door\u201d clothed as an ineffective assistance of counsel claim failed to meet Strickland requirements because of the novelty of issue)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"4 F.3d 548, 550","parenthetical":"observing that in limited circumstances an alleged violation of Fed. R.Crim.P. 32 requiring defendant be provided with copy of presentence report may be subject to federal habeas review within an ineffective assistance of counsel claim","sentence":"Kimmelman, supra (permitting Fourth Amendment issue to be evaluated on habe-as review as a Sixth Amendment claim based on appellate counsel\u2019s failure to appeal trial court\u2019s denial of motion to suppress); Holman v. Page, 95 F.3d 481, 482-83 (7th Cir.1996) (same); Bunkley v. Meachum, 68 F.3d 1518, 1522 (2d Cir.1995) (reviewing in the form of an ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim asserted in habeas petition allegation that appellate counsel failed to raise on direct appeal to the state court that jury was improperly instructed on how to apply state law circumstantial evidence rule); Durrive v. United States, 4 F.3d 548, 550 (7th Cir.1993) (observing that in limited circumstances an alleged violation of Fed. R.Crim.P. 32 requiring defendant be provided with copy of presentence report may be subject to federal habeas review within an ineffective assistance of counsel claim)."},"case_id":11117065,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Defendants agree that plaintiff would have had a claim at common law against the individual defendants. Defendants state in their brief that, \"At common law, plaintiff would have had a claim against the individual defendants in this case -- health care professionals working at OHSU.\" We agree and accept that concession.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"130 Or 461, 478","parenthetical":"\"[I]f the duty is one which the officer owes both to the public and to a private individual, and the private individual is injuriously affected specially, and not as a member of the public, then for such violation the injured party may sue [the officer] for the wrong done.\"","sentence":"See Smothers, 332 Or at 129 (\u201cIt is undisputed that, at the time of the American Revolution, the common law recognized a cause of action for negligence.\u201d); cf. Antin v. Union High School Dist. No. 2, 130 Or 461, 478, 280 P 664 (1929) (\u201c[I]f the duty is one which the officer owes both to the public and to a private individual, and the private individual is injuriously affected specially, and not as a member of the public, then for such violation the injured party may sue [the officer] for the wrong done.\u201d); Mattson v. City of Astoria, 39 Or 577, 579, 65 P 1066 (1901) (citing authority for the proposition that it is settled law that public officers are liable to an individual who sustains special damage as a result of negligence in the ministerial performance of delegated public duties)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"332 Or 129, 129","parenthetical":"\"It is undisputed that, at the time of the American Revolution, the common law recognized a cause of action for negligence.\"","sentence":"See Smothers, 332 Or at 129 (\u201cIt is undisputed that, at the time of the American Revolution, the common law recognized a cause of action for negligence.\u201d); cf. Antin v. Union High School Dist. No. 2, 130 Or 461, 478, 280 P 664 (1929) (\u201c[I]f the duty is one which the officer owes both to the public and to a private individual, and the private individual is injuriously affected specially, and not as a member of the public, then for such violation the injured party may sue [the officer] for the wrong done.\u201d); Mattson v. City of Astoria, 39 Or 577, 579, 65 P 1066 (1901) (citing authority for the proposition that it is settled law that public officers are liable to an individual who sustains special damage as a result of negligence in the ministerial performance of delegated public duties)."},"case_id":3827627,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Defendants agree that plaintiff would have had a claim at common law against the individual defendants. Defendants state in their brief that, \"At common law, plaintiff would have had a claim against the individual defendants in this case -- health care professionals working at OHSU.\" We agree and accept that concession.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"332 Or 129, 129","parenthetical":"\"It is undisputed that, at the time of the American Revolution, the common law recognized a cause of action for negligence.\"","sentence":"See Smothers, 332 Or at 129 (\u201cIt is undisputed that, at the time of the American Revolution, the common law recognized a cause of action for negligence.\u201d); cf. Antin v. Union High School Dist. No. 2, 130 Or 461, 478, 280 P 664 (1929) (\u201c[I]f the duty is one which the officer owes both to the public and to a private individual, and the private individual is injuriously affected specially, and not as a member of the public, then for such violation the injured party may sue [the officer] for the wrong done.\u201d); Mattson v. City of Astoria, 39 Or 577, 579, 65 P 1066 (1901) (citing authority for the proposition that it is settled law that public officers are liable to an individual who sustains special damage as a result of negligence in the ministerial performance of delegated public duties)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[I]f the duty is one which the officer owes both to the public and to a private individual, and the private individual is injuriously affected specially, and not as a member of the public, then for such violation the injured party may sue [the officer] for the wrong done.\"","sentence":"See Smothers, 332 Or at 129 (\u201cIt is undisputed that, at the time of the American Revolution, the common law recognized a cause of action for negligence.\u201d); cf. Antin v. Union High School Dist. No. 2, 130 Or 461, 478, 280 P 664 (1929) (\u201c[I]f the duty is one which the officer owes both to the public and to a private individual, and the private individual is injuriously affected specially, and not as a member of the public, then for such violation the injured party may sue [the officer] for the wrong done.\u201d); Mattson v. City of Astoria, 39 Or 577, 579, 65 P 1066 (1901) (citing authority for the proposition that it is settled law that public officers are liable to an individual who sustains special damage as a result of negligence in the ministerial performance of delegated public duties)."},"case_id":3827627,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Confessions made after advisement and waiver of Miranda warnings are \"likely voluntary.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[C]ases in which a defendant can make a colorable argument that a self-incriminating statement was 'compelled' despite the fact that the law enforcement authorities adhered to the dictates of Miranda are rare.\"","sentence":"DeWeaver v. Runnels, 556 F.3d 995, 1003 (9th Cir.2009) (citing Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 608-09, 124 S.Ct. 2601, 159 L.Ed.2d 643 (2004) (\u201c[G]iving the warnings and getting a waiver has generally produced a virtual ticket of admissibility.\u201d)); see also Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 433 n. 20,104 S.Ct. 3138, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984) (\u201c[C]ases in which a defendant can make a colorable argument that a self-incriminating statement was \u2018compelled\u2019 despite the fact that the law enforcement authorities adhered to the dictates of Miranda are rare.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"542 U.S. 600, 608-09","parenthetical":"\"[G]iving the warnings and getting a waiver has generally produced a virtual ticket of admissibility.\"","sentence":"DeWeaver v. Runnels, 556 F.3d 995, 1003 (9th Cir.2009) (citing Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 608-09, 124 S.Ct. 2601, 159 L.Ed.2d 643 (2004) (\u201c[G]iving the warnings and getting a waiver has generally produced a virtual ticket of admissibility.\u201d)); see also Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 433 n. 20,104 S.Ct. 3138, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984) (\u201c[C]ases in which a defendant can make a colorable argument that a self-incriminating statement was \u2018compelled\u2019 despite the fact that the law enforcement authorities adhered to the dictates of Miranda are rare.\u201d)."},"case_id":4016666,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Confessions made after advisement and waiver of Miranda warnings are \"likely voluntary.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"542 U.S. 600, 608-09","parenthetical":"\"[G]iving the warnings and getting a waiver has generally produced a virtual ticket of admissibility.\"","sentence":"DeWeaver v. Runnels, 556 F.3d 995, 1003 (9th Cir.2009) (citing Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 608-09, 124 S.Ct. 2601, 159 L.Ed.2d 643 (2004) (\u201c[G]iving the warnings and getting a waiver has generally produced a virtual ticket of admissibility.\u201d)); see also Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 433 n. 20,104 S.Ct. 3138, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984) (\u201c[C]ases in which a defendant can make a colorable argument that a self-incriminating statement was \u2018compelled\u2019 despite the fact that the law enforcement authorities adhered to the dictates of Miranda are rare.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[C]ases in which a defendant can make a colorable argument that a self-incriminating statement was 'compelled' despite the fact that the law enforcement authorities adhered to the dictates of Miranda are rare.\"","sentence":"DeWeaver v. Runnels, 556 F.3d 995, 1003 (9th Cir.2009) (citing Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 608-09, 124 S.Ct. 2601, 159 L.Ed.2d 643 (2004) (\u201c[G]iving the warnings and getting a waiver has generally produced a virtual ticket of admissibility.\u201d)); see also Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 433 n. 20,104 S.Ct. 3138, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984) (\u201c[C]ases in which a defendant can make a colorable argument that a self-incriminating statement was \u2018compelled\u2019 despite the fact that the law enforcement authorities adhered to the dictates of Miranda are rare.\u201d)."},"case_id":4016666,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Confessions made after advisement and waiver of Miranda warnings are \"likely voluntary.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[C]ases in which a defendant can make a colorable argument that a self-incriminating statement was 'compelled' despite the fact that the law enforcement authorities adhered to the dictates of Miranda are rare.\"","sentence":"DeWeaver v. Runnels, 556 F.3d 995, 1003 (9th Cir.2009) (citing Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 608-09, 124 S.Ct. 2601, 159 L.Ed.2d 643 (2004) (\u201c[G]iving the warnings and getting a waiver has generally produced a virtual ticket of admissibility.\u201d)); see also Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 433 n. 20,104 S.Ct. 3138, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984) (\u201c[C]ases in which a defendant can make a colorable argument that a self-incriminating statement was \u2018compelled\u2019 despite the fact that the law enforcement authorities adhered to the dictates of Miranda are rare.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"542 U.S. 600, 608-09","parenthetical":"\"[G]iving the warnings and getting a waiver has generally produced a virtual ticket of admissibility.\"","sentence":"DeWeaver v. Runnels, 556 F.3d 995, 1003 (9th Cir.2009) (citing Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 608-09, 124 S.Ct. 2601, 159 L.Ed.2d 643 (2004) (\u201c[G]iving the warnings and getting a waiver has generally produced a virtual ticket of admissibility.\u201d)); see also Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 433 n. 20,104 S.Ct. 3138, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984) (\u201c[C]ases in which a defendant can make a colorable argument that a self-incriminating statement was \u2018compelled\u2019 despite the fact that the law enforcement authorities adhered to the dictates of Miranda are rare.\u201d)."},"case_id":4016666,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Confessions made after advisement and waiver of Miranda warnings are \"likely voluntary.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[G]iving the warnings and getting a waiver has generally produced a virtual ticket of admissibility.\"","sentence":"DeWeaver v. Runnels, 556 F.3d 995, 1003 (9th Cir.2009) (citing Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 608-09, 124 S.Ct. 2601, 159 L.Ed.2d 643 (2004) (\u201c[G]iving the warnings and getting a waiver has generally produced a virtual ticket of admissibility.\u201d)); see also Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 433 n. 20,104 S.Ct. 3138, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984) (\u201c[C]ases in which a defendant can make a colorable argument that a self-incriminating statement was \u2018compelled\u2019 despite the fact that the law enforcement authorities adhered to the dictates of Miranda are rare.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[C]ases in which a defendant can make a colorable argument that a self-incriminating statement was 'compelled' despite the fact that the law enforcement authorities adhered to the dictates of Miranda are rare.\"","sentence":"DeWeaver v. Runnels, 556 F.3d 995, 1003 (9th Cir.2009) (citing Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 608-09, 124 S.Ct. 2601, 159 L.Ed.2d 643 (2004) (\u201c[G]iving the warnings and getting a waiver has generally produced a virtual ticket of admissibility.\u201d)); see also Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 433 n. 20,104 S.Ct. 3138, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984) (\u201c[C]ases in which a defendant can make a colorable argument that a self-incriminating statement was \u2018compelled\u2019 despite the fact that the law enforcement authorities adhered to the dictates of Miranda are rare.\u201d)."},"case_id":4016666,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Confessions made after advisement and waiver of Miranda warnings are \"likely voluntary.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[C]ases in which a defendant can make a colorable argument that a self-incriminating statement was 'compelled' despite the fact that the law enforcement authorities adhered to the dictates of Miranda are rare.\"","sentence":"DeWeaver v. Runnels, 556 F.3d 995, 1003 (9th Cir.2009) (citing Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 608-09, 124 S.Ct. 2601, 159 L.Ed.2d 643 (2004) (\u201c[G]iving the warnings and getting a waiver has generally produced a virtual ticket of admissibility.\u201d)); see also Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 433 n. 20,104 S.Ct. 3138, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984) (\u201c[C]ases in which a defendant can make a colorable argument that a self-incriminating statement was \u2018compelled\u2019 despite the fact that the law enforcement authorities adhered to the dictates of Miranda are rare.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[G]iving the warnings and getting a waiver has generally produced a virtual ticket of admissibility.\"","sentence":"DeWeaver v. Runnels, 556 F.3d 995, 1003 (9th Cir.2009) (citing Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 608-09, 124 S.Ct. 2601, 159 L.Ed.2d 643 (2004) (\u201c[G]iving the warnings and getting a waiver has generally produced a virtual ticket of admissibility.\u201d)); see also Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 433 n. 20,104 S.Ct. 3138, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984) (\u201c[C]ases in which a defendant can make a colorable argument that a self-incriminating statement was \u2018compelled\u2019 despite the fact that the law enforcement authorities adhered to the dictates of Miranda are rare.\u201d)."},"case_id":4016666,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Confessions made after advisement and waiver of Miranda warnings are \"likely voluntary.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[C]ases in which a defendant can make a colorable argument that a self-incriminating statement was 'compelled' despite the fact that the law enforcement authorities adhered to the dictates of Miranda are rare.\"","sentence":"DeWeaver v. Runnels, 556 F.3d 995, 1003 (9th Cir.2009) (citing Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 608-09, 124 S.Ct. 2601, 159 L.Ed.2d 643 (2004) (\u201c[G]iving the warnings and getting a waiver has generally produced a virtual ticket of admissibility.\u201d)); see also Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 433 n. 20,104 S.Ct. 3138, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984) (\u201c[C]ases in which a defendant can make a colorable argument that a self-incriminating statement was \u2018compelled\u2019 despite the fact that the law enforcement authorities adhered to the dictates of Miranda are rare.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[G]iving the warnings and getting a waiver has generally produced a virtual ticket of admissibility.\"","sentence":"DeWeaver v. Runnels, 556 F.3d 995, 1003 (9th Cir.2009) (citing Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 608-09, 124 S.Ct. 2601, 159 L.Ed.2d 643 (2004) (\u201c[G]iving the warnings and getting a waiver has generally produced a virtual ticket of admissibility.\u201d)); see also Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 433 n. 20,104 S.Ct. 3138, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984) (\u201c[C]ases in which a defendant can make a colorable argument that a self-incriminating statement was \u2018compelled\u2019 despite the fact that the law enforcement authorities adhered to the dictates of Miranda are rare.\u201d)."},"case_id":4016666,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Confessions made after advisement and waiver of Miranda warnings are \"likely voluntary.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[C]ases in which a defendant can make a colorable argument that a self-incriminating statement was 'compelled' despite the fact that the law enforcement authorities adhered to the dictates of Miranda are rare.\"","sentence":"DeWeaver v. Runnels, 556 F.3d 995, 1003 (9th Cir.2009) (citing Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 608-09, 124 S.Ct. 2601, 159 L.Ed.2d 643 (2004) (\u201c[G]iving the warnings and getting a waiver has generally produced a virtual ticket of admissibility.\u201d)); see also Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 433 n. 20,104 S.Ct. 3138, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984) (\u201c[C]ases in which a defendant can make a colorable argument that a self-incriminating statement was \u2018compelled\u2019 despite the fact that the law enforcement authorities adhered to the dictates of Miranda are rare.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[G]iving the warnings and getting a waiver has generally produced a virtual ticket of admissibility.\"","sentence":"DeWeaver v. Runnels, 556 F.3d 995, 1003 (9th Cir.2009) (citing Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 608-09, 124 S.Ct. 2601, 159 L.Ed.2d 643 (2004) (\u201c[G]iving the warnings and getting a waiver has generally produced a virtual ticket of admissibility.\u201d)); see also Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 433 n. 20,104 S.Ct. 3138, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984) (\u201c[C]ases in which a defendant can make a colorable argument that a self-incriminating statement was \u2018compelled\u2019 despite the fact that the law enforcement authorities adhered to the dictates of Miranda are rare.\u201d)."},"case_id":4016666,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Confessions made after advisement and waiver of Miranda warnings are \"likely voluntary.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[C]ases in which a defendant can make a colorable argument that a self-incriminating statement was 'compelled' despite the fact that the law enforcement authorities adhered to the dictates of Miranda are rare.\"","sentence":"DeWeaver v. Runnels, 556 F.3d 995, 1003 (9th Cir.2009) (citing Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 608-09, 124 S.Ct. 2601, 159 L.Ed.2d 643 (2004) (\u201c[G]iving the warnings and getting a waiver has generally produced a virtual ticket of admissibility.\u201d)); see also Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 433 n. 20,104 S.Ct. 3138, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984) (\u201c[C]ases in which a defendant can make a colorable argument that a self-incriminating statement was \u2018compelled\u2019 despite the fact that the law enforcement authorities adhered to the dictates of Miranda are rare.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[G]iving the warnings and getting a waiver has generally produced a virtual ticket of admissibility.\"","sentence":"DeWeaver v. Runnels, 556 F.3d 995, 1003 (9th Cir.2009) (citing Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 608-09, 124 S.Ct. 2601, 159 L.Ed.2d 643 (2004) (\u201c[G]iving the warnings and getting a waiver has generally produced a virtual ticket of admissibility.\u201d)); see also Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 433 n. 20,104 S.Ct. 3138, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984) (\u201c[C]ases in which a defendant can make a colorable argument that a self-incriminating statement was \u2018compelled\u2019 despite the fact that the law enforcement authorities adhered to the dictates of Miranda are rare.\u201d)."},"case_id":4016666,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Confessions made after advisement and waiver of Miranda warnings are \"likely voluntary.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[G]iving the warnings and getting a waiver has generally produced a virtual ticket of admissibility.\"","sentence":"DeWeaver v. Runnels, 556 F.3d 995, 1003 (9th Cir.2009) (citing Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 608-09, 124 S.Ct. 2601, 159 L.Ed.2d 643 (2004) (\u201c[G]iving the warnings and getting a waiver has generally produced a virtual ticket of admissibility.\u201d)); see also Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 433 n. 20,104 S.Ct. 3138, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984) (\u201c[C]ases in which a defendant can make a colorable argument that a self-incriminating statement was \u2018compelled\u2019 despite the fact that the law enforcement authorities adhered to the dictates of Miranda are rare.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[C]ases in which a defendant can make a colorable argument that a self-incriminating statement was 'compelled' despite the fact that the law enforcement authorities adhered to the dictates of Miranda are rare.\"","sentence":"DeWeaver v. Runnels, 556 F.3d 995, 1003 (9th Cir.2009) (citing Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 608-09, 124 S.Ct. 2601, 159 L.Ed.2d 643 (2004) (\u201c[G]iving the warnings and getting a waiver has generally produced a virtual ticket of admissibility.\u201d)); see also Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 433 n. 20,104 S.Ct. 3138, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984) (\u201c[C]ases in which a defendant can make a colorable argument that a self-incriminating statement was \u2018compelled\u2019 despite the fact that the law enforcement authorities adhered to the dictates of Miranda are rare.\u201d)."},"case_id":4016666,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Section 766.206(2) limits liability to \"all attorney's fees ... incurred during the investigation and evaluation of the claim.\" Here the court has tacked on fees for litigating the issue of presuit noncompliance, as well as for litigating the amount of fees to be awarded. Under the plain text of the statute, however, the liability is only for the narrow purpose specified and therefore the amount awarded should have been limited to those incurred \"during the investigation and evaluation.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that fees may be awarded for litigating amount of fees only where language of statute supports such conclusion","sentence":"See Kukral v. Mekras, 679 So.2d 278, 281 (Fla.1996) (\u201cThese provisions for sanctions focus on the presuit period during \u2018the investigation and evaluation of the claim\u2019 and apparently contemplate the imposition of sanctions for the expense and effort that one party may have unnecessarily caused the other to incur during that presuit period.\u201d); see also State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Palma, 629 So.2d 830 (Fla.1993) (holding that fees may be awarded for litigating amount of fees only where language of statute supports such conclusion)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"679 So.2d 278, 281","parenthetical":"\"These provisions for sanctions focus on the presuit period during 'the investigation and evaluation of the claim' and apparently contemplate the imposition of sanctions for the expense and effort that one party may have unnecessarily caused the other to incur during that presuit period.\"","sentence":"See Kukral v. Mekras, 679 So.2d 278, 281 (Fla.1996) (\u201cThese provisions for sanctions focus on the presuit period during \u2018the investigation and evaluation of the claim\u2019 and apparently contemplate the imposition of sanctions for the expense and effort that one party may have unnecessarily caused the other to incur during that presuit period.\u201d); see also State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Palma, 629 So.2d 830 (Fla.1993) (holding that fees may be awarded for litigating amount of fees only where language of statute supports such conclusion)."},"case_id":11139765,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The actual and punitive damages are based on the same conduct. We need not look at the state's standard for awarding punitive damages because the jury already found that Scarborough's, conduct in the underlying malicious prosecution claim, for which the punitive damages were also awarded, was willful and malicious.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"139 B.R. 468, 468","parenthetical":"applying In re Miera and holding punitive damages nondischargeable where actual damages were nondis-chargeable without looking at specific jury instructions for punitive damages","sentence":"See In re Miera, 926 F.2d at 745 (holding that punitive damages, which are based on the same underlying action justifying nondischarge-ability of compensatory damages, are likewise nondischargeable); see also Schoor, 139 B.R. at 468 (applying In re Miera and holding punitive damages nondischargeable where actual damages were nondis-chargeable without looking at specific jury instructions for punitive damages)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"926 F.2d 745, 745","parenthetical":"holding that punitive damages, which are based on the same underlying action justifying nondischarge-ability of compensatory damages, are likewise nondischargeable","sentence":"See In re Miera, 926 F.2d at 745 (holding that punitive damages, which are based on the same underlying action justifying nondischarge-ability of compensatory damages, are likewise nondischargeable); see also Schoor, 139 B.R. at 468 (applying In re Miera and holding punitive damages nondischargeable where actual damages were nondis-chargeable without looking at specific jury instructions for punitive damages)."},"case_id":11636729,"label":"b"}
{"context":"SDCL 22 -- 1--2(53) defines victim as \"any * natural person against whom the defendant in a criminal prosecution has committed or attempted to commit a crime[.]\" (Emphasis added.) Under the facts of this case, Sully County is not a victim, entitled to restitution based upon this definition.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"2001 S.D. 50, \u00b6 10","parenthetical":"holding county does not fit statutory definition of victim, under restitution statutes","sentence":"State v. Ryyth, 2001 S.D. 50, \u00b6 10, 626 N.W.2d 290, 292 (holding county does not fit statutory definition of victim, under restitution statutes); see also State v. Sprecher, 2000 S.D. 17, \u00b6\u00b6 7-9, 606 N.W.2d 138, 139 (denying payment to county for, costs of abating public nuisance because county, under the facts of the case, was not a victim entitled to restitution); State v. Garnett, 488 N.W.2d 695, 698 (S.D.1992); State v. No Neck, 458 N.W.2d 364, 365 (S.D.1990)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"2000 S.D. 17, \u00b6\u00b6 7-9","parenthetical":"denying payment to county for, costs of abating public nuisance because county, under the facts of the case, was not a victim entitled to restitution","sentence":"State v. Ryyth, 2001 S.D. 50, \u00b6 10, 626 N.W.2d 290, 292 (holding county does not fit statutory definition of victim, under restitution statutes); see also State v. Sprecher, 2000 S.D. 17, \u00b6\u00b6 7-9, 606 N.W.2d 138, 139 (denying payment to county for, costs of abating public nuisance because county, under the facts of the case, was not a victim entitled to restitution); State v. Garnett, 488 N.W.2d 695, 698 (S.D.1992); State v. No Neck, 458 N.W.2d 364, 365 (S.D.1990)."},"case_id":6808585,"label":"a"}
{"context":"SDCL 22 -- 1--2(53) defines victim as \"any * natural person against whom the defendant in a criminal prosecution has committed or attempted to commit a crime[.]\" (Emphasis added.) Under the facts of this case, Sully County is not a victim, entitled to restitution based upon this definition.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"606 N.W.2d 138, 139","parenthetical":"denying payment to county for, costs of abating public nuisance because county, under the facts of the case, was not a victim entitled to restitution","sentence":"State v. Ryyth, 2001 S.D. 50, \u00b6 10, 626 N.W.2d 290, 292 (holding county does not fit statutory definition of victim, under restitution statutes); see also State v. Sprecher, 2000 S.D. 17, \u00b6\u00b6 7-9, 606 N.W.2d 138, 139 (denying payment to county for, costs of abating public nuisance because county, under the facts of the case, was not a victim entitled to restitution); State v. Garnett, 488 N.W.2d 695, 698 (S.D.1992); State v. No Neck, 458 N.W.2d 364, 365 (S.D.1990)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"2001 S.D. 50, \u00b6 10","parenthetical":"holding county does not fit statutory definition of victim, under restitution statutes","sentence":"State v. Ryyth, 2001 S.D. 50, \u00b6 10, 626 N.W.2d 290, 292 (holding county does not fit statutory definition of victim, under restitution statutes); see also State v. Sprecher, 2000 S.D. 17, \u00b6\u00b6 7-9, 606 N.W.2d 138, 139 (denying payment to county for, costs of abating public nuisance because county, under the facts of the case, was not a victim entitled to restitution); State v. Garnett, 488 N.W.2d 695, 698 (S.D.1992); State v. No Neck, 458 N.W.2d 364, 365 (S.D.1990)."},"case_id":6808585,"label":"b"}
{"context":"SDCL 22 -- 1--2(53) defines victim as \"any * natural person against whom the defendant in a criminal prosecution has committed or attempted to commit a crime[.]\" (Emphasis added.) Under the facts of this case, Sully County is not a victim, entitled to restitution based upon this definition.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"626 N.W.2d 290, 292","parenthetical":"holding county does not fit statutory definition of victim, under restitution statutes","sentence":"State v. Ryyth, 2001 S.D. 50, \u00b6 10, 626 N.W.2d 290, 292 (holding county does not fit statutory definition of victim, under restitution statutes); see also State v. Sprecher, 2000 S.D. 17, \u00b6\u00b6 7-9, 606 N.W.2d 138, 139 (denying payment to county for, costs of abating public nuisance because county, under the facts of the case, was not a victim entitled to restitution); State v. Garnett, 488 N.W.2d 695, 698 (S.D.1992); State v. No Neck, 458 N.W.2d 364, 365 (S.D.1990)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"2000 S.D. 17, \u00b6\u00b6 7-9","parenthetical":"denying payment to county for, costs of abating public nuisance because county, under the facts of the case, was not a victim entitled to restitution","sentence":"State v. Ryyth, 2001 S.D. 50, \u00b6 10, 626 N.W.2d 290, 292 (holding county does not fit statutory definition of victim, under restitution statutes); see also State v. Sprecher, 2000 S.D. 17, \u00b6\u00b6 7-9, 606 N.W.2d 138, 139 (denying payment to county for, costs of abating public nuisance because county, under the facts of the case, was not a victim entitled to restitution); State v. Garnett, 488 N.W.2d 695, 698 (S.D.1992); State v. No Neck, 458 N.W.2d 364, 365 (S.D.1990)."},"case_id":6808585,"label":"a"}
{"context":"SDCL 22 -- 1--2(53) defines victim as \"any * natural person against whom the defendant in a criminal prosecution has committed or attempted to commit a crime[.]\" (Emphasis added.) Under the facts of this case, Sully County is not a victim, entitled to restitution based upon this definition.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"626 N.W.2d 290, 292","parenthetical":"holding county does not fit statutory definition of victim, under restitution statutes","sentence":"State v. Ryyth, 2001 S.D. 50, \u00b6 10, 626 N.W.2d 290, 292 (holding county does not fit statutory definition of victim, under restitution statutes); see also State v. Sprecher, 2000 S.D. 17, \u00b6\u00b6 7-9, 606 N.W.2d 138, 139 (denying payment to county for, costs of abating public nuisance because county, under the facts of the case, was not a victim entitled to restitution); State v. Garnett, 488 N.W.2d 695, 698 (S.D.1992); State v. No Neck, 458 N.W.2d 364, 365 (S.D.1990)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"606 N.W.2d 138, 139","parenthetical":"denying payment to county for, costs of abating public nuisance because county, under the facts of the case, was not a victim entitled to restitution","sentence":"State v. Ryyth, 2001 S.D. 50, \u00b6 10, 626 N.W.2d 290, 292 (holding county does not fit statutory definition of victim, under restitution statutes); see also State v. Sprecher, 2000 S.D. 17, \u00b6\u00b6 7-9, 606 N.W.2d 138, 139 (denying payment to county for, costs of abating public nuisance because county, under the facts of the case, was not a victim entitled to restitution); State v. Garnett, 488 N.W.2d 695, 698 (S.D.1992); State v. No Neck, 458 N.W.2d 364, 365 (S.D.1990)."},"case_id":6808585,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The language in the challenged indictment tracks the legislative language used in and cites directly to OCGA SS 16-6-5 (a). And, the crime charged in and of itself alerted Marshall to the fact that he was being accused of acting with the intent of engaging in illicit sexual conduct with a minor: Chapter 6 of Title 16 of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated is entitled, \"Sexual Offenses,\" and OCGA SS 16-6-5 (a) proscribes the \"solicitation of a minor to engage in sexual conduct or conduct which, by its nature, is a sexual offense against a minor.\" (Citation and punctuation omitted.)","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"201 Ga. App. 614, 616","parenthetical":"in the context of child molestation, \"the word [\"indecent\"] would alert a defendant that he or she was being charged with committing an unlawful act with a lustful intent against a child\"","sentence":"Cf. Hammock v. State, 201 Ga. App. 614, 616 (1) (b) (411 SE2d 743) (1991) (in the context of child molestation, \u201cthe word [\u201cindecent\u201d] would alert a defendant that he or she was being charged with committing an unlawful act with a lustful intent against a child\u201d); Chapman v. State, 170 Ga. App. 779, 780 (1) (318 SE2d 213) (1984) (in the context of child molestation, defining \u201cimmoral or indecent acts\u201d as \u201cacts which offend against the public\u2019s sense of propriety as well as to afford protection to a child\u2019s body in those cases where the act or acts are more suggestive of sexually oriented misconduct than simply assaultive in nature\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"226 Ga. App. 779, 780","parenthetical":"noting that OCGA SS 16-6-5, among other statutes located in Chapter 6, \"were enacted as part of a general legislative scheme to protect children under the age of 16 from physical and psychological damage resulting from sexual exploitation\"","sentence":"See also State v. Vines, 226 Ga. App. 779, 780 (487 SE2d 521) (1997) (noting that OCGA \u00a7 16-6-5, among other statutes located in Chapter 6, \u201cwere enacted as part of a general legislative scheme to protect children under the age of 16 from physical and psychological damage resulting from sexual exploitation\u201d), rev\u2019d on other grounds, Vines v. State, 269 Ga. 438 (499 SE2d 630) (1998)."},"case_id":12147995,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The language in the challenged indictment tracks the legislative language used in and cites directly to OCGA SS 16-6-5 (a). And, the crime charged in and of itself alerted Marshall to the fact that he was being accused of acting with the intent of engaging in illicit sexual conduct with a minor: Chapter 6 of Title 16 of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated is entitled, \"Sexual Offenses,\" and OCGA SS 16-6-5 (a) proscribes the \"solicitation of a minor to engage in sexual conduct or conduct which, by its nature, is a sexual offense against a minor.\" (Citation and punctuation omitted.)","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"226 Ga. App. 779, 780","parenthetical":"noting that OCGA SS 16-6-5, among other statutes located in Chapter 6, \"were enacted as part of a general legislative scheme to protect children under the age of 16 from physical and psychological damage resulting from sexual exploitation\"","sentence":"See also State v. Vines, 226 Ga. App. 779, 780 (487 SE2d 521) (1997) (noting that OCGA \u00a7 16-6-5, among other statutes located in Chapter 6, \u201cwere enacted as part of a general legislative scheme to protect children under the age of 16 from physical and psychological damage resulting from sexual exploitation\u201d), rev\u2019d on other grounds, Vines v. State, 269 Ga. 438 (499 SE2d 630) (1998)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"170 Ga. App. 779, 780","parenthetical":"in the context of child molestation, defining \"immoral or indecent acts\" as \"acts which offend against the public's sense of propriety as well as to afford protection to a child's body in those cases where the act or acts are more suggestive of sexually oriented misconduct than simply assaultive in nature\"","sentence":"Cf. Hammock v. State, 201 Ga. App. 614, 616 (1) (b) (411 SE2d 743) (1991) (in the context of child molestation, \u201cthe word [\u201cindecent\u201d] would alert a defendant that he or she was being charged with committing an unlawful act with a lustful intent against a child\u201d); Chapman v. State, 170 Ga. App. 779, 780 (1) (318 SE2d 213) (1984) (in the context of child molestation, defining \u201cimmoral or indecent acts\u201d as \u201cacts which offend against the public\u2019s sense of propriety as well as to afford protection to a child\u2019s body in those cases where the act or acts are more suggestive of sexually oriented misconduct than simply assaultive in nature\u201d)."},"case_id":12147995,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The language in the challenged indictment tracks the legislative language used in and cites directly to OCGA SS 16-6-5 (a). And, the crime charged in and of itself alerted Marshall to the fact that he was being accused of acting with the intent of engaging in illicit sexual conduct with a minor: Chapter 6 of Title 16 of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated is entitled, \"Sexual Offenses,\" and OCGA SS 16-6-5 (a) proscribes the \"solicitation of a minor to engage in sexual conduct or conduct which, by its nature, is a sexual offense against a minor.\" (Citation and punctuation omitted.)","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"201 Ga. App. 614, 616","parenthetical":"in the context of child molestation, \"the word [\"indecent\"] would alert a defendant that he or she was being charged with committing an unlawful act with a lustful intent against a child\"","sentence":"Cf. Hammock v. State, 201 Ga. App. 614, 616 (1) (b) (411 SE2d 743) (1991) (in the context of child molestation, \u201cthe word [\u201cindecent\u201d] would alert a defendant that he or she was being charged with committing an unlawful act with a lustful intent against a child\u201d); Chapman v. State, 170 Ga. App. 779, 780 (1) (318 SE2d 213) (1984) (in the context of child molestation, defining \u201cimmoral or indecent acts\u201d as \u201cacts which offend against the public\u2019s sense of propriety as well as to afford protection to a child\u2019s body in those cases where the act or acts are more suggestive of sexually oriented misconduct than simply assaultive in nature\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting that OCGA SS 16-6-5, among other statutes located in Chapter 6, \"were enacted as part of a general legislative scheme to protect children under the age of 16 from physical and psychological damage resulting from sexual exploitation\"","sentence":"See also State v. Vines, 226 Ga. App. 779, 780 (487 SE2d 521) (1997) (noting that OCGA \u00a7 16-6-5, among other statutes located in Chapter 6, \u201cwere enacted as part of a general legislative scheme to protect children under the age of 16 from physical and psychological damage resulting from sexual exploitation\u201d), rev\u2019d on other grounds, Vines v. State, 269 Ga. 438 (499 SE2d 630) (1998)."},"case_id":12147995,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The language in the challenged indictment tracks the legislative language used in and cites directly to OCGA SS 16-6-5 (a). And, the crime charged in and of itself alerted Marshall to the fact that he was being accused of acting with the intent of engaging in illicit sexual conduct with a minor: Chapter 6 of Title 16 of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated is entitled, \"Sexual Offenses,\" and OCGA SS 16-6-5 (a) proscribes the \"solicitation of a minor to engage in sexual conduct or conduct which, by its nature, is a sexual offense against a minor.\" (Citation and punctuation omitted.)","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting that OCGA SS 16-6-5, among other statutes located in Chapter 6, \"were enacted as part of a general legislative scheme to protect children under the age of 16 from physical and psychological damage resulting from sexual exploitation\"","sentence":"See also State v. Vines, 226 Ga. App. 779, 780 (487 SE2d 521) (1997) (noting that OCGA \u00a7 16-6-5, among other statutes located in Chapter 6, \u201cwere enacted as part of a general legislative scheme to protect children under the age of 16 from physical and psychological damage resulting from sexual exploitation\u201d), rev\u2019d on other grounds, Vines v. State, 269 Ga. 438 (499 SE2d 630) (1998)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"170 Ga. App. 779, 780","parenthetical":"in the context of child molestation, defining \"immoral or indecent acts\" as \"acts which offend against the public's sense of propriety as well as to afford protection to a child's body in those cases where the act or acts are more suggestive of sexually oriented misconduct than simply assaultive in nature\"","sentence":"Cf. Hammock v. State, 201 Ga. App. 614, 616 (1) (b) (411 SE2d 743) (1991) (in the context of child molestation, \u201cthe word [\u201cindecent\u201d] would alert a defendant that he or she was being charged with committing an unlawful act with a lustful intent against a child\u201d); Chapman v. State, 170 Ga. App. 779, 780 (1) (318 SE2d 213) (1984) (in the context of child molestation, defining \u201cimmoral or indecent acts\u201d as \u201cacts which offend against the public\u2019s sense of propriety as well as to afford protection to a child\u2019s body in those cases where the act or acts are more suggestive of sexually oriented misconduct than simply assaultive in nature\u201d)."},"case_id":12147995,"label":"a"}
{"context":"There is nothing to suggest in the treatment or amplification of \"Go November\" that the voter featured at the end is casting the dispositive vote, while \"Swing Vote\" revolves around the premise that Bud's vote will determine the outcome of the election. Therefore, though both works conclude with a single voter casting a ballot, the expression of that idea is very different.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"3 F.3d 656, 663","parenthetical":"\"a copyright does not protect an idea, but only the expression of an idea\"","sentence":"See Williams, 84 F.3d at 590 (\u201ceven those scenes that appear similar in their abstract description prove to be quite dissimilar once examined in any detail\u201d); see also Kregos v. Assoc. Press, 3 F.3d 656, 663 (2d Cir.1993) (\u201ca copyright does not protect an idea, but only the expression of an idea\u201d); Chase-Riboud v. Dreamworks, Inc., 987 F.Supp. 1222, 1232 (C.D.Cal.1997) (in denying plaintiffs motion for a preliminary injunction, court determined that story endings that both \u201clink[ed] [protagonistas return to Africa with a voice traveling back across the Atlantic to a symbol of the Civil War\u201d were most likely not substantially similar because \u201cthe expression of the[ ] ideas [wa]s different\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"84 F.3d 590, 590","parenthetical":"\"even those scenes that appear similar in their abstract description prove to be quite dissimilar once examined in any detail\"","sentence":"See Williams, 84 F.3d at 590 (\u201ceven those scenes that appear similar in their abstract description prove to be quite dissimilar once examined in any detail\u201d); see also Kregos v. Assoc. Press, 3 F.3d 656, 663 (2d Cir.1993) (\u201ca copyright does not protect an idea, but only the expression of an idea\u201d); Chase-Riboud v. Dreamworks, Inc., 987 F.Supp. 1222, 1232 (C.D.Cal.1997) (in denying plaintiffs motion for a preliminary injunction, court determined that story endings that both \u201clink[ed] [protagonistas return to Africa with a voice traveling back across the Atlantic to a symbol of the Civil War\u201d were most likely not substantially similar because \u201cthe expression of the[ ] ideas [wa]s different\u201d)."},"case_id":4219470,"label":"b"}
{"context":"There is nothing to suggest in the treatment or amplification of \"Go November\" that the voter featured at the end is casting the dispositive vote, while \"Swing Vote\" revolves around the premise that Bud's vote will determine the outcome of the election. Therefore, though both works conclude with a single voter casting a ballot, the expression of that idea is very different.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"84 F.3d 590, 590","parenthetical":"\"even those scenes that appear similar in their abstract description prove to be quite dissimilar once examined in any detail\"","sentence":"See Williams, 84 F.3d at 590 (\u201ceven those scenes that appear similar in their abstract description prove to be quite dissimilar once examined in any detail\u201d); see also Kregos v. Assoc. Press, 3 F.3d 656, 663 (2d Cir.1993) (\u201ca copyright does not protect an idea, but only the expression of an idea\u201d); Chase-Riboud v. Dreamworks, Inc., 987 F.Supp. 1222, 1232 (C.D.Cal.1997) (in denying plaintiffs motion for a preliminary injunction, court determined that story endings that both \u201clink[ed] [protagonistas return to Africa with a voice traveling back across the Atlantic to a symbol of the Civil War\u201d were most likely not substantially similar because \u201cthe expression of the[ ] ideas [wa]s different\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"987 F.Supp. 1222, 1232","parenthetical":"in denying plaintiffs motion for a preliminary injunction, court determined that story endings that both \"link[ed] [protagonistas return to Africa with a voice traveling back across the Atlantic to a symbol of the Civil War\" were most likely not substantially similar because \"the expression of the[ ] ideas [wa]s different\"","sentence":"See Williams, 84 F.3d at 590 (\u201ceven those scenes that appear similar in their abstract description prove to be quite dissimilar once examined in any detail\u201d); see also Kregos v. Assoc. Press, 3 F.3d 656, 663 (2d Cir.1993) (\u201ca copyright does not protect an idea, but only the expression of an idea\u201d); Chase-Riboud v. Dreamworks, Inc., 987 F.Supp. 1222, 1232 (C.D.Cal.1997) (in denying plaintiffs motion for a preliminary injunction, court determined that story endings that both \u201clink[ed] [protagonistas return to Africa with a voice traveling back across the Atlantic to a symbol of the Civil War\u201d were most likely not substantially similar because \u201cthe expression of the[ ] ideas [wa]s different\u201d)."},"case_id":4219470,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Although citing the Frye general acceptance standard, our primary concern in Mack was with the unreliability of memories produced while under hypnosis. First, a novel scientific technique must be generally accepted in the relevant scientific community, and second, the particular evidence derived from that test must have a foundation that is scientifically reliable.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"486 N.W.2d 407, 419-20","parenthetical":"affirming the district court's admission of expert testimony based on DNA test results because the principles underlying forensic DNA testing are generally accepted, and the laboratory complied with the appropriate standards and controls, thus rendering the results legally reliable","sentence":"See State v. Anderson, 379 N.W.2d 70, 79 (Minn.1985) (holding that graphology \u201cis accorded a low measure of scientific reliability in predicting character or state of mind and is not generally accepted in the scientific fields of psychology and psychiatry\u201d); see also State v. Jobe, 486 N.W.2d 407, 419-20 (Minn.1992) (affirming the district court\u2019s admission of expert testimony based on DNA test results because the principles underlying forensic DNA testing are generally accepted, and the laboratory complied with the appropriate standards and controls, thus rendering the results legally reliable); State v. Moore, 458 N.W.2d 90, 97-98 (Minn.1990) (affirming the district court\u2019s admission of expert testimony on blood spatter interpretation where the district court determined that the theory was generally accepted and the theory\u2019s application was legally reliable)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"379 N.W.2d 70, 79","parenthetical":"holding that graphology \"is accorded a low measure of scientific reliability in predicting character or state of mind and is not generally accepted in the scientific fields of psychology and psychiatry\"","sentence":"See State v. Anderson, 379 N.W.2d 70, 79 (Minn.1985) (holding that graphology \u201cis accorded a low measure of scientific reliability in predicting character or state of mind and is not generally accepted in the scientific fields of psychology and psychiatry\u201d); see also State v. Jobe, 486 N.W.2d 407, 419-20 (Minn.1992) (affirming the district court\u2019s admission of expert testimony based on DNA test results because the principles underlying forensic DNA testing are generally accepted, and the laboratory complied with the appropriate standards and controls, thus rendering the results legally reliable); State v. Moore, 458 N.W.2d 90, 97-98 (Minn.1990) (affirming the district court\u2019s admission of expert testimony on blood spatter interpretation where the district court determined that the theory was generally accepted and the theory\u2019s application was legally reliable)."},"case_id":10769909,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Although citing the Frye general acceptance standard, our primary concern in Mack was with the unreliability of memories produced while under hypnosis. First, a novel scientific technique must be generally accepted in the relevant scientific community, and second, the particular evidence derived from that test must have a foundation that is scientifically reliable.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"458 N.W.2d 90, 97-98","parenthetical":"affirming the district court's admission of expert testimony on blood spatter interpretation where the district court determined that the theory was generally accepted and the theory's application was legally reliable","sentence":"See State v. Anderson, 379 N.W.2d 70, 79 (Minn.1985) (holding that graphology \u201cis accorded a low measure of scientific reliability in predicting character or state of mind and is not generally accepted in the scientific fields of psychology and psychiatry\u201d); see also State v. Jobe, 486 N.W.2d 407, 419-20 (Minn.1992) (affirming the district court\u2019s admission of expert testimony based on DNA test results because the principles underlying forensic DNA testing are generally accepted, and the laboratory complied with the appropriate standards and controls, thus rendering the results legally reliable); State v. Moore, 458 N.W.2d 90, 97-98 (Minn.1990) (affirming the district court\u2019s admission of expert testimony on blood spatter interpretation where the district court determined that the theory was generally accepted and the theory\u2019s application was legally reliable)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"379 N.W.2d 70, 79","parenthetical":"holding that graphology \"is accorded a low measure of scientific reliability in predicting character or state of mind and is not generally accepted in the scientific fields of psychology and psychiatry\"","sentence":"See State v. Anderson, 379 N.W.2d 70, 79 (Minn.1985) (holding that graphology \u201cis accorded a low measure of scientific reliability in predicting character or state of mind and is not generally accepted in the scientific fields of psychology and psychiatry\u201d); see also State v. Jobe, 486 N.W.2d 407, 419-20 (Minn.1992) (affirming the district court\u2019s admission of expert testimony based on DNA test results because the principles underlying forensic DNA testing are generally accepted, and the laboratory complied with the appropriate standards and controls, thus rendering the results legally reliable); State v. Moore, 458 N.W.2d 90, 97-98 (Minn.1990) (affirming the district court\u2019s admission of expert testimony on blood spatter interpretation where the district court determined that the theory was generally accepted and the theory\u2019s application was legally reliable)."},"case_id":10769909,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Against this backdrop, we begin with Certified Question No. 1 and determine whether Conwed may seek payment from Union Carbide for compensation that may eventually be payable to employees who have settled workers' compensation claims subject to reopening if their conditions should worsen. Union Carbide has acknowledged that \"[t]o the extent there are any cases where Conwed has paid claimants but not fully settled the existing injury,\" Conwed can recover future \"payable\" benefits for those workers if Conwed can provide sufficient evidence of the benefits it will have to pay. Based on our prior case law, we conclude that this is the correct result.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"310 N.W.2d 91, 95","parenthetical":"holding that employer's insurer who provided workers' compensation benefits to employee but did not consent to employee's settlement with third-party tortfeasor may \"maintain an action for payments that become payable in the future\"","sentence":"See Aetna Life & Cas. v. Anderson, 310 N.W.2d 91, 95 (Minn.1981) (holding that employer\u2019s insurer who provided workers\u2019 compensation benefits to employee but did not consent to employee\u2019s settlement with third-party tortfeasor may \u201cmaintain an action for payments that become payable in the future\u201d); see also Wilken v. Int\u2019l Harvester, 363 N.W.2d 763, 767-68 (Minn.1985) (holding that a trial court should calculate an employer\u2019s contribution due for the third party\u2019s future payments by using affidavits and other evidence to determine a lump sum amount and reduce the amount to its present value as of the date of the contribution judgment); Metro. Milk Co. v. Minneapolis St. Ry., 149 Minn. 181, 184, 183 N.W. 830, 831 (1921) (\u201cThe employer is not required to wait until all payments due to the employ[ee] or the dependent have been made and then sue at law.\u201d). Thus, to the extent Certified Question No. 1 asks whether, under Minn.Stat. \u00a7 176.061, Conwed may recover for benefits it has paid or expects to pay following settlements for existing claims based on existing illnesses that may worsen, we answer it in the affirmative."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"363 N.W.2d 763, 767-68","parenthetical":"holding that a trial court should calculate an employer's contribution due for the third party's future payments by using affidavits and other evidence to determine a lump sum amount and reduce the amount to its present value as of the date of the contribution judgment","sentence":"See Aetna Life & Cas. v. Anderson, 310 N.W.2d 91, 95 (Minn.1981) (holding that employer\u2019s insurer who provided workers\u2019 compensation benefits to employee but did not consent to employee\u2019s settlement with third-party tortfeasor may \u201cmaintain an action for payments that become payable in the future\u201d); see also Wilken v. Int\u2019l Harvester, 363 N.W.2d 763, 767-68 (Minn.1985) (holding that a trial court should calculate an employer\u2019s contribution due for the third party\u2019s future payments by using affidavits and other evidence to determine a lump sum amount and reduce the amount to its present value as of the date of the contribution judgment); Metro. Milk Co. v. Minneapolis St. Ry., 149 Minn. 181, 184, 183 N.W. 830, 831 (1921) (\u201cThe employer is not required to wait until all payments due to the employ[ee] or the dependent have been made and then sue at law.\u201d). Thus, to the extent Certified Question No. 1 asks whether, under Minn.Stat. \u00a7 176.061, Conwed may recover for benefits it has paid or expects to pay following settlements for existing claims based on existing illnesses that may worsen, we answer it in the affirmative."},"case_id":9486581,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Against this backdrop, we begin with Certified Question No. 1 and determine whether Conwed may seek payment from Union Carbide for compensation that may eventually be payable to employees who have settled workers' compensation claims subject to reopening if their conditions should worsen. Union Carbide has acknowledged that \"[t]o the extent there are any cases where Conwed has paid claimants but not fully settled the existing injury,\" Conwed can recover future \"payable\" benefits for those workers if Conwed can provide sufficient evidence of the benefits it will have to pay. Based on our prior case law, we conclude that this is the correct result.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"310 N.W.2d 91, 95","parenthetical":"holding that employer's insurer who provided workers' compensation benefits to employee but did not consent to employee's settlement with third-party tortfeasor may \"maintain an action for payments that become payable in the future\"","sentence":"See Aetna Life & Cas. v. Anderson, 310 N.W.2d 91, 95 (Minn.1981) (holding that employer\u2019s insurer who provided workers\u2019 compensation benefits to employee but did not consent to employee\u2019s settlement with third-party tortfeasor may \u201cmaintain an action for payments that become payable in the future\u201d); see also Wilken v. Int\u2019l Harvester, 363 N.W.2d 763, 767-68 (Minn.1985) (holding that a trial court should calculate an employer\u2019s contribution due for the third party\u2019s future payments by using affidavits and other evidence to determine a lump sum amount and reduce the amount to its present value as of the date of the contribution judgment); Metro. Milk Co. v. Minneapolis St. Ry., 149 Minn. 181, 184, 183 N.W. 830, 831 (1921) (\u201cThe employer is not required to wait until all payments due to the employ[ee] or the dependent have been made and then sue at law.\u201d). Thus, to the extent Certified Question No. 1 asks whether, under Minn.Stat. \u00a7 176.061, Conwed may recover for benefits it has paid or expects to pay following settlements for existing claims based on existing illnesses that may worsen, we answer it in the affirmative."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"149 Minn. 181, 184","parenthetical":"\"The employer is not required to wait until all payments due to the employ[ee] or the dependent have been made and then sue at law.\"","sentence":"See Aetna Life & Cas. v. Anderson, 310 N.W.2d 91, 95 (Minn.1981) (holding that employer\u2019s insurer who provided workers\u2019 compensation benefits to employee but did not consent to employee\u2019s settlement with third-party tortfeasor may \u201cmaintain an action for payments that become payable in the future\u201d); see also Wilken v. Int\u2019l Harvester, 363 N.W.2d 763, 767-68 (Minn.1985) (holding that a trial court should calculate an employer\u2019s contribution due for the third party\u2019s future payments by using affidavits and other evidence to determine a lump sum amount and reduce the amount to its present value as of the date of the contribution judgment); Metro. Milk Co. v. Minneapolis St. Ry., 149 Minn. 181, 184, 183 N.W. 830, 831 (1921) (\u201cThe employer is not required to wait until all payments due to the employ[ee] or the dependent have been made and then sue at law.\u201d). Thus, to the extent Certified Question No. 1 asks whether, under Minn.Stat. \u00a7 176.061, Conwed may recover for benefits it has paid or expects to pay following settlements for existing claims based on existing illnesses that may worsen, we answer it in the affirmative."},"case_id":9486581,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Against this backdrop, we begin with Certified Question No. 1 and determine whether Conwed may seek payment from Union Carbide for compensation that may eventually be payable to employees who have settled workers' compensation claims subject to reopening if their conditions should worsen. Union Carbide has acknowledged that \"[t]o the extent there are any cases where Conwed has paid claimants but not fully settled the existing injury,\" Conwed can recover future \"payable\" benefits for those workers if Conwed can provide sufficient evidence of the benefits it will have to pay. Based on our prior case law, we conclude that this is the correct result.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"183 N.W. 830, 831","parenthetical":"\"The employer is not required to wait until all payments due to the employ[ee] or the dependent have been made and then sue at law.\"","sentence":"See Aetna Life & Cas. v. Anderson, 310 N.W.2d 91, 95 (Minn.1981) (holding that employer\u2019s insurer who provided workers\u2019 compensation benefits to employee but did not consent to employee\u2019s settlement with third-party tortfeasor may \u201cmaintain an action for payments that become payable in the future\u201d); see also Wilken v. Int\u2019l Harvester, 363 N.W.2d 763, 767-68 (Minn.1985) (holding that a trial court should calculate an employer\u2019s contribution due for the third party\u2019s future payments by using affidavits and other evidence to determine a lump sum amount and reduce the amount to its present value as of the date of the contribution judgment); Metro. Milk Co. v. Minneapolis St. Ry., 149 Minn. 181, 184, 183 N.W. 830, 831 (1921) (\u201cThe employer is not required to wait until all payments due to the employ[ee] or the dependent have been made and then sue at law.\u201d). Thus, to the extent Certified Question No. 1 asks whether, under Minn.Stat. \u00a7 176.061, Conwed may recover for benefits it has paid or expects to pay following settlements for existing claims based on existing illnesses that may worsen, we answer it in the affirmative."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"310 N.W.2d 91, 95","parenthetical":"holding that employer's insurer who provided workers' compensation benefits to employee but did not consent to employee's settlement with third-party tortfeasor may \"maintain an action for payments that become payable in the future\"","sentence":"See Aetna Life & Cas. v. Anderson, 310 N.W.2d 91, 95 (Minn.1981) (holding that employer\u2019s insurer who provided workers\u2019 compensation benefits to employee but did not consent to employee\u2019s settlement with third-party tortfeasor may \u201cmaintain an action for payments that become payable in the future\u201d); see also Wilken v. Int\u2019l Harvester, 363 N.W.2d 763, 767-68 (Minn.1985) (holding that a trial court should calculate an employer\u2019s contribution due for the third party\u2019s future payments by using affidavits and other evidence to determine a lump sum amount and reduce the amount to its present value as of the date of the contribution judgment); Metro. Milk Co. v. Minneapolis St. Ry., 149 Minn. 181, 184, 183 N.W. 830, 831 (1921) (\u201cThe employer is not required to wait until all payments due to the employ[ee] or the dependent have been made and then sue at law.\u201d). Thus, to the extent Certified Question No. 1 asks whether, under Minn.Stat. \u00a7 176.061, Conwed may recover for benefits it has paid or expects to pay following settlements for existing claims based on existing illnesses that may worsen, we answer it in the affirmative."},"case_id":9486581,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Under Georgia's civil RICO provision, defendants can only recover for injuries incurred as a result of predicate acts directed towards themselves, as opposed to predicate acts directed towards third parties.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"257 Ga.App. 429, 430","parenthetical":"upholding dismissal of RICO claim based on predicate acts that were not directed towards plaintiff","sentence":"Nicholson v. Windham, 257 Ga.App. 429, 430, 571 S.E.2d 466, 468 (2002) (upholding dismissal of RICO claim based on predicate acts that were not directed towards plaintiff)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"177 Ga.App. 707, 709","parenthetical":"holding that plaintiffs \"must allege 'and can only recover to the extent that [they have] been injured ... by the conduct constituting the violation ' \"","sentence":"See also Waldschmidt v. Crosa, 177 Ga.App. 707, 709, 340 S.E.2d 664, 666 (1986) (holding that plaintiffs \u201cmust allege \u2018and can only recover to the extent that [they have] been injured ... by the conduct constituting the violation \u2019 \u201d) (emphasis in original) (quoting Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 105 S.Ct. 3275, 87 L.Ed.2d 346 (1985))."},"case_id":3688517,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Under Georgia's civil RICO provision, defendants can only recover for injuries incurred as a result of predicate acts directed towards themselves, as opposed to predicate acts directed towards third parties.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"340 S.E.2d 664, 666","parenthetical":"holding that plaintiffs \"must allege 'and can only recover to the extent that [they have] been injured ... by the conduct constituting the violation ' \"","sentence":"See also Waldschmidt v. Crosa, 177 Ga.App. 707, 709, 340 S.E.2d 664, 666 (1986) (holding that plaintiffs \u201cmust allege \u2018and can only recover to the extent that [they have] been injured ... by the conduct constituting the violation \u2019 \u201d) (emphasis in original) (quoting Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 105 S.Ct. 3275, 87 L.Ed.2d 346 (1985))."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"257 Ga.App. 429, 430","parenthetical":"upholding dismissal of RICO claim based on predicate acts that were not directed towards plaintiff","sentence":"Nicholson v. Windham, 257 Ga.App. 429, 430, 571 S.E.2d 466, 468 (2002) (upholding dismissal of RICO claim based on predicate acts that were not directed towards plaintiff)."},"case_id":3688517,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Under Georgia's civil RICO provision, defendants can only recover for injuries incurred as a result of predicate acts directed towards themselves, as opposed to predicate acts directed towards third parties.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"177 Ga.App. 707, 709","parenthetical":"holding that plaintiffs \"must allege 'and can only recover to the extent that [they have] been injured ... by the conduct constituting the violation ' \"","sentence":"See also Waldschmidt v. Crosa, 177 Ga.App. 707, 709, 340 S.E.2d 664, 666 (1986) (holding that plaintiffs \u201cmust allege \u2018and can only recover to the extent that [they have] been injured ... by the conduct constituting the violation \u2019 \u201d) (emphasis in original) (quoting Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 105 S.Ct. 3275, 87 L.Ed.2d 346 (1985))."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"571 S.E.2d 466, 468","parenthetical":"upholding dismissal of RICO claim based on predicate acts that were not directed towards plaintiff","sentence":"Nicholson v. Windham, 257 Ga.App. 429, 430, 571 S.E.2d 466, 468 (2002) (upholding dismissal of RICO claim based on predicate acts that were not directed towards plaintiff)."},"case_id":3688517,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Under Georgia's civil RICO provision, defendants can only recover for injuries incurred as a result of predicate acts directed towards themselves, as opposed to predicate acts directed towards third parties.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"340 S.E.2d 664, 666","parenthetical":"holding that plaintiffs \"must allege 'and can only recover to the extent that [they have] been injured ... by the conduct constituting the violation ' \"","sentence":"See also Waldschmidt v. Crosa, 177 Ga.App. 707, 709, 340 S.E.2d 664, 666 (1986) (holding that plaintiffs \u201cmust allege \u2018and can only recover to the extent that [they have] been injured ... by the conduct constituting the violation \u2019 \u201d) (emphasis in original) (quoting Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 105 S.Ct. 3275, 87 L.Ed.2d 346 (1985))."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"571 S.E.2d 466, 468","parenthetical":"upholding dismissal of RICO claim based on predicate acts that were not directed towards plaintiff","sentence":"Nicholson v. Windham, 257 Ga.App. 429, 430, 571 S.E.2d 466, 468 (2002) (upholding dismissal of RICO claim based on predicate acts that were not directed towards plaintiff)."},"case_id":3688517,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Likewise, we express no opinion on the seemingly novel question of whether a criminal prosecution, dismissed solely because of a time bar, is determined in a plaintiffs favor for purposes of the constitutional tort of malicious prosecution. The Restatement indicates it is a favorable determination for purposes of the common law tort, but no opinions have been found which so hold. Restatement (Second) of Torts SS 659(d) (1977) (proceedings terminate in plaintiffs favor where indictment quashed).","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"dismissal on basis of statute of limitations not favorable termination for defendant within context of a malicious prosecution claim","sentence":"But see Lackner v. LaCroix, 25 Cal.3d 747, 159 Cal.Rptr. 693, 602 P.2d 393 (1979) (dismissal on basis of statute of limitations not favorable termination for defendant within context of a malicious prosecution claim)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"489 Pa. 603, 616","parenthetical":"suggesting, under Pennsylvania criminal procedure, motion to quash proper vehicle for terminating untimely criminal prosecution","sentence":"See also Commonwealth v. Bestwick, 489 Pa. 603, 616, 414 A.2d 1373, 1379 (1980) (suggesting, under Pennsylvania criminal procedure, motion to quash proper vehicle for terminating untimely criminal prosecution)."},"case_id":1778243,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Likewise, we express no opinion on the seemingly novel question of whether a criminal prosecution, dismissed solely because of a time bar, is determined in a plaintiffs favor for purposes of the constitutional tort of malicious prosecution. The Restatement indicates it is a favorable determination for purposes of the common law tort, but no opinions have been found which so hold. Restatement (Second) of Torts SS 659(d) (1977) (proceedings terminate in plaintiffs favor where indictment quashed).","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"dismissal on basis of statute of limitations not favorable termination for defendant within context of a malicious prosecution claim","sentence":"But see Lackner v. LaCroix, 25 Cal.3d 747, 159 Cal.Rptr. 693, 602 P.2d 393 (1979) (dismissal on basis of statute of limitations not favorable termination for defendant within context of a malicious prosecution claim)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"489 Pa. 603, 616","parenthetical":"suggesting, under Pennsylvania criminal procedure, motion to quash proper vehicle for terminating untimely criminal prosecution","sentence":"See also Commonwealth v. Bestwick, 489 Pa. 603, 616, 414 A.2d 1373, 1379 (1980) (suggesting, under Pennsylvania criminal procedure, motion to quash proper vehicle for terminating untimely criminal prosecution)."},"case_id":1778243,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Likewise, we express no opinion on the seemingly novel question of whether a criminal prosecution, dismissed solely because of a time bar, is determined in a plaintiffs favor for purposes of the constitutional tort of malicious prosecution. The Restatement indicates it is a favorable determination for purposes of the common law tort, but no opinions have been found which so hold. Restatement (Second) of Torts SS 659(d) (1977) (proceedings terminate in plaintiffs favor where indictment quashed).","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"489 Pa. 603, 616","parenthetical":"suggesting, under Pennsylvania criminal procedure, motion to quash proper vehicle for terminating untimely criminal prosecution","sentence":"See also Commonwealth v. Bestwick, 489 Pa. 603, 616, 414 A.2d 1373, 1379 (1980) (suggesting, under Pennsylvania criminal procedure, motion to quash proper vehicle for terminating untimely criminal prosecution)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"dismissal on basis of statute of limitations not favorable termination for defendant within context of a malicious prosecution claim","sentence":"But see Lackner v. LaCroix, 25 Cal.3d 747, 159 Cal.Rptr. 693, 602 P.2d 393 (1979) (dismissal on basis of statute of limitations not favorable termination for defendant within context of a malicious prosecution claim)."},"case_id":1778243,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Likewise, we express no opinion on the seemingly novel question of whether a criminal prosecution, dismissed solely because of a time bar, is determined in a plaintiffs favor for purposes of the constitutional tort of malicious prosecution. The Restatement indicates it is a favorable determination for purposes of the common law tort, but no opinions have been found which so hold. Restatement (Second) of Torts SS 659(d) (1977) (proceedings terminate in plaintiffs favor where indictment quashed).","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"dismissal on basis of statute of limitations not favorable termination for defendant within context of a malicious prosecution claim","sentence":"But see Lackner v. LaCroix, 25 Cal.3d 747, 159 Cal.Rptr. 693, 602 P.2d 393 (1979) (dismissal on basis of statute of limitations not favorable termination for defendant within context of a malicious prosecution claim)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"414 A.2d 1373, 1379","parenthetical":"suggesting, under Pennsylvania criminal procedure, motion to quash proper vehicle for terminating untimely criminal prosecution","sentence":"See also Commonwealth v. Bestwick, 489 Pa. 603, 616, 414 A.2d 1373, 1379 (1980) (suggesting, under Pennsylvania criminal procedure, motion to quash proper vehicle for terminating untimely criminal prosecution)."},"case_id":1778243,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Likewise, we express no opinion on the seemingly novel question of whether a criminal prosecution, dismissed solely because of a time bar, is determined in a plaintiffs favor for purposes of the constitutional tort of malicious prosecution. The Restatement indicates it is a favorable determination for purposes of the common law tort, but no opinions have been found which so hold. Restatement (Second) of Torts SS 659(d) (1977) (proceedings terminate in plaintiffs favor where indictment quashed).","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"414 A.2d 1373, 1379","parenthetical":"suggesting, under Pennsylvania criminal procedure, motion to quash proper vehicle for terminating untimely criminal prosecution","sentence":"See also Commonwealth v. Bestwick, 489 Pa. 603, 616, 414 A.2d 1373, 1379 (1980) (suggesting, under Pennsylvania criminal procedure, motion to quash proper vehicle for terminating untimely criminal prosecution)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"dismissal on basis of statute of limitations not favorable termination for defendant within context of a malicious prosecution claim","sentence":"But see Lackner v. LaCroix, 25 Cal.3d 747, 159 Cal.Rptr. 693, 602 P.2d 393 (1979) (dismissal on basis of statute of limitations not favorable termination for defendant within context of a malicious prosecution claim)."},"case_id":1778243,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Likewise, we express no opinion on the seemingly novel question of whether a criminal prosecution, dismissed solely because of a time bar, is determined in a plaintiffs favor for purposes of the constitutional tort of malicious prosecution. The Restatement indicates it is a favorable determination for purposes of the common law tort, but no opinions have been found which so hold. Restatement (Second) of Torts SS 659(d) (1977) (proceedings terminate in plaintiffs favor where indictment quashed).","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"dismissal on basis of statute of limitations not favorable termination for defendant within context of a malicious prosecution claim","sentence":"But see Lackner v. LaCroix, 25 Cal.3d 747, 159 Cal.Rptr. 693, 602 P.2d 393 (1979) (dismissal on basis of statute of limitations not favorable termination for defendant within context of a malicious prosecution claim)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"414 A.2d 1373, 1379","parenthetical":"suggesting, under Pennsylvania criminal procedure, motion to quash proper vehicle for terminating untimely criminal prosecution","sentence":"See also Commonwealth v. Bestwick, 489 Pa. 603, 616, 414 A.2d 1373, 1379 (1980) (suggesting, under Pennsylvania criminal procedure, motion to quash proper vehicle for terminating untimely criminal prosecution)."},"case_id":1778243,"label":"b"}
{"context":"At trial, the Trustee sought to avoid the $9,000,000 transfer as a preferential transfer under 11 U.S.C. SS 547(b). (See Court's Order of September 23, 2011, at 22). \"To succeed in a preference action, a trustee must show, inter alia, that the debtor was insolvent at the time of the contested transaction.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"138 B.R. 260, 262-63","parenthetical":"\"As the alleged transfers occurred more than 90 days prior to the filing of [the debtor's] petition, there is no presumption of insolvency.\"","sentence":"In re DAK Indus., Inc., 170 F.3d 1197, 1199 (9th Cir.1999) (italics in original). Given that the transfer occurred more than 90 days before Flashcom filed for bankruptcy, (see AF at \u00b6 40) (transfer occurred on February 23, 2000); (see Court\u2019s Order of September 23, 2011, at 22) (Flashcom filed for bankruptcy on December 8, 2000), there is no presumption of insolvency, and the Trustee had the burden of proving insolvency at trial. See 11 U.S.C. \u00a7 547(f) (\u201c[T]he debtor is presumed to have been insolvent on and during the 90 days immediately preceding the date of the filing of the petition.\u201d); \u00a7 547(g) (\u201cThe trustee has the burden of proving the avoidability of a transfer under subsection (b) of this section[.]\u201d); In re EECO Inc., 138 B.R. 260, 262-63 (Bankr.C.D.Cal.1992) (\u201cAs the alleged transfers occurred more than 90 days prior to the filing of [the debtor\u2019s] petition, there is no presumption of insolvency.\u201d). A finding of insolvency is reviewed for clear error."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"218 F.3d 1070, 1073","parenthetical":"\"Findings of fact, such as the finding of insolvency, are reviewed for clear error.\"","sentence":"See In re Kaypro, 218 F.3d 1070, 1073 (9th Cir.2000) (\u201cFindings of fact, such as the finding of insolvency, are reviewed for clear error.\u201d)."},"case_id":3668171,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Stokes's argument fails for two reasons. First, this court has previously stated that the maximum penalty for those who fall within the ACCA is life imprisonment.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"511 U.S. 485, 487","parenthetical":"stating that the ACCA \"raises the penalty for possession of a firearm by a felon ... to a mandatory minimum sentence of 15 years and a maximum of life in prison without parole\"","sentence":"See United States v. Weems, 322 F.3d 18, 26 (1st Cir.2003) (stating that the maximum sentence under the ACCA is life imprisonment); see also Custis v. United States, 511 U.S. 485, 487, 114 S.Ct. 1732, 128 L.Ed.2d 517 (1994) (stating that the ACCA \u201craises the penalty for possession of a firearm by a felon ... to a mandatory minimum sentence of 15 years and a maximum of life in prison without parole\u201d); United States v. Mack, 229 F.3d 226, 229 n. 4 (3d Cir.2000) (stating that the ACCA \u201cspecifies no maximum term of imprisonment [but] has been construed to authorize a life term\u201d); United States v. Brame, 997 F.2d 1426, 1428 (11th Cir.1993) (same); United States v. Guerrero, 5 F.3d 868, 874 n. 12 (5th Cir.1993) (same); United States v. Wolak, 923 F.2d 1193, 1199 (6th Cir.1991) (same); United States v. Carey, 898 F.2d 642, 644 (8th Cir.1990) (same); United States v. Blannon, 836 F.2d 843, 845 (4th Cir.1988) (same)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"322 F.3d 18, 26","parenthetical":"stating that the maximum sentence under the ACCA is life imprisonment","sentence":"See United States v. Weems, 322 F.3d 18, 26 (1st Cir.2003) (stating that the maximum sentence under the ACCA is life imprisonment); see also Custis v. United States, 511 U.S. 485, 487, 114 S.Ct. 1732, 128 L.Ed.2d 517 (1994) (stating that the ACCA \u201craises the penalty for possession of a firearm by a felon ... to a mandatory minimum sentence of 15 years and a maximum of life in prison without parole\u201d); United States v. Mack, 229 F.3d 226, 229 n. 4 (3d Cir.2000) (stating that the ACCA \u201cspecifies no maximum term of imprisonment [but] has been construed to authorize a life term\u201d); United States v. Brame, 997 F.2d 1426, 1428 (11th Cir.1993) (same); United States v. Guerrero, 5 F.3d 868, 874 n. 12 (5th Cir.1993) (same); United States v. Wolak, 923 F.2d 1193, 1199 (6th Cir.1991) (same); United States v. Carey, 898 F.2d 642, 644 (8th Cir.1990) (same); United States v. Blannon, 836 F.2d 843, 845 (4th Cir.1988) (same)."},"case_id":9146305,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Stokes's argument fails for two reasons. First, this court has previously stated that the maximum penalty for those who fall within the ACCA is life imprisonment.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"322 F.3d 18, 26","parenthetical":"stating that the maximum sentence under the ACCA is life imprisonment","sentence":"See United States v. Weems, 322 F.3d 18, 26 (1st Cir.2003) (stating that the maximum sentence under the ACCA is life imprisonment); see also Custis v. United States, 511 U.S. 485, 487, 114 S.Ct. 1732, 128 L.Ed.2d 517 (1994) (stating that the ACCA \u201craises the penalty for possession of a firearm by a felon ... to a mandatory minimum sentence of 15 years and a maximum of life in prison without parole\u201d); United States v. Mack, 229 F.3d 226, 229 n. 4 (3d Cir.2000) (stating that the ACCA \u201cspecifies no maximum term of imprisonment [but] has been construed to authorize a life term\u201d); United States v. Brame, 997 F.2d 1426, 1428 (11th Cir.1993) (same); United States v. Guerrero, 5 F.3d 868, 874 n. 12 (5th Cir.1993) (same); United States v. Wolak, 923 F.2d 1193, 1199 (6th Cir.1991) (same); United States v. Carey, 898 F.2d 642, 644 (8th Cir.1990) (same); United States v. Blannon, 836 F.2d 843, 845 (4th Cir.1988) (same)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"stating that the ACCA \"raises the penalty for possession of a firearm by a felon ... to a mandatory minimum sentence of 15 years and a maximum of life in prison without parole\"","sentence":"See United States v. Weems, 322 F.3d 18, 26 (1st Cir.2003) (stating that the maximum sentence under the ACCA is life imprisonment); see also Custis v. United States, 511 U.S. 485, 487, 114 S.Ct. 1732, 128 L.Ed.2d 517 (1994) (stating that the ACCA \u201craises the penalty for possession of a firearm by a felon ... to a mandatory minimum sentence of 15 years and a maximum of life in prison without parole\u201d); United States v. Mack, 229 F.3d 226, 229 n. 4 (3d Cir.2000) (stating that the ACCA \u201cspecifies no maximum term of imprisonment [but] has been construed to authorize a life term\u201d); United States v. Brame, 997 F.2d 1426, 1428 (11th Cir.1993) (same); United States v. Guerrero, 5 F.3d 868, 874 n. 12 (5th Cir.1993) (same); United States v. Wolak, 923 F.2d 1193, 1199 (6th Cir.1991) (same); United States v. Carey, 898 F.2d 642, 644 (8th Cir.1990) (same); United States v. Blannon, 836 F.2d 843, 845 (4th Cir.1988) (same)."},"case_id":9146305,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Stokes's argument fails for two reasons. First, this court has previously stated that the maximum penalty for those who fall within the ACCA is life imprisonment.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"322 F.3d 18, 26","parenthetical":"stating that the maximum sentence under the ACCA is life imprisonment","sentence":"See United States v. Weems, 322 F.3d 18, 26 (1st Cir.2003) (stating that the maximum sentence under the ACCA is life imprisonment); see also Custis v. United States, 511 U.S. 485, 487, 114 S.Ct. 1732, 128 L.Ed.2d 517 (1994) (stating that the ACCA \u201craises the penalty for possession of a firearm by a felon ... to a mandatory minimum sentence of 15 years and a maximum of life in prison without parole\u201d); United States v. Mack, 229 F.3d 226, 229 n. 4 (3d Cir.2000) (stating that the ACCA \u201cspecifies no maximum term of imprisonment [but] has been construed to authorize a life term\u201d); United States v. Brame, 997 F.2d 1426, 1428 (11th Cir.1993) (same); United States v. Guerrero, 5 F.3d 868, 874 n. 12 (5th Cir.1993) (same); United States v. Wolak, 923 F.2d 1193, 1199 (6th Cir.1991) (same); United States v. Carey, 898 F.2d 642, 644 (8th Cir.1990) (same); United States v. Blannon, 836 F.2d 843, 845 (4th Cir.1988) (same)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"stating that the ACCA \"raises the penalty for possession of a firearm by a felon ... to a mandatory minimum sentence of 15 years and a maximum of life in prison without parole\"","sentence":"See United States v. Weems, 322 F.3d 18, 26 (1st Cir.2003) (stating that the maximum sentence under the ACCA is life imprisonment); see also Custis v. United States, 511 U.S. 485, 487, 114 S.Ct. 1732, 128 L.Ed.2d 517 (1994) (stating that the ACCA \u201craises the penalty for possession of a firearm by a felon ... to a mandatory minimum sentence of 15 years and a maximum of life in prison without parole\u201d); United States v. Mack, 229 F.3d 226, 229 n. 4 (3d Cir.2000) (stating that the ACCA \u201cspecifies no maximum term of imprisonment [but] has been construed to authorize a life term\u201d); United States v. Brame, 997 F.2d 1426, 1428 (11th Cir.1993) (same); United States v. Guerrero, 5 F.3d 868, 874 n. 12 (5th Cir.1993) (same); United States v. Wolak, 923 F.2d 1193, 1199 (6th Cir.1991) (same); United States v. Carey, 898 F.2d 642, 644 (8th Cir.1990) (same); United States v. Blannon, 836 F.2d 843, 845 (4th Cir.1988) (same)."},"case_id":9146305,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Stokes's argument fails for two reasons. First, this court has previously stated that the maximum penalty for those who fall within the ACCA is life imprisonment.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"stating that the ACCA \"specifies no maximum term of imprisonment [but] has been construed to authorize a life term\"","sentence":"See United States v. Weems, 322 F.3d 18, 26 (1st Cir.2003) (stating that the maximum sentence under the ACCA is life imprisonment); see also Custis v. United States, 511 U.S. 485, 487, 114 S.Ct. 1732, 128 L.Ed.2d 517 (1994) (stating that the ACCA \u201craises the penalty for possession of a firearm by a felon ... to a mandatory minimum sentence of 15 years and a maximum of life in prison without parole\u201d); United States v. Mack, 229 F.3d 226, 229 n. 4 (3d Cir.2000) (stating that the ACCA \u201cspecifies no maximum term of imprisonment [but] has been construed to authorize a life term\u201d); United States v. Brame, 997 F.2d 1426, 1428 (11th Cir.1993) (same); United States v. Guerrero, 5 F.3d 868, 874 n. 12 (5th Cir.1993) (same); United States v. Wolak, 923 F.2d 1193, 1199 (6th Cir.1991) (same); United States v. Carey, 898 F.2d 642, 644 (8th Cir.1990) (same); United States v. Blannon, 836 F.2d 843, 845 (4th Cir.1988) (same)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"322 F.3d 18, 26","parenthetical":"stating that the maximum sentence under the ACCA is life imprisonment","sentence":"See United States v. Weems, 322 F.3d 18, 26 (1st Cir.2003) (stating that the maximum sentence under the ACCA is life imprisonment); see also Custis v. United States, 511 U.S. 485, 487, 114 S.Ct. 1732, 128 L.Ed.2d 517 (1994) (stating that the ACCA \u201craises the penalty for possession of a firearm by a felon ... to a mandatory minimum sentence of 15 years and a maximum of life in prison without parole\u201d); United States v. Mack, 229 F.3d 226, 229 n. 4 (3d Cir.2000) (stating that the ACCA \u201cspecifies no maximum term of imprisonment [but] has been construed to authorize a life term\u201d); United States v. Brame, 997 F.2d 1426, 1428 (11th Cir.1993) (same); United States v. Guerrero, 5 F.3d 868, 874 n. 12 (5th Cir.1993) (same); United States v. Wolak, 923 F.2d 1193, 1199 (6th Cir.1991) (same); United States v. Carey, 898 F.2d 642, 644 (8th Cir.1990) (same); United States v. Blannon, 836 F.2d 843, 845 (4th Cir.1988) (same)."},"case_id":9146305,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The whole purpose of the apportionment formula is to identify in-state commerce and not, as the majority seems to suggest, to simply reduce the tax burden to a level that in all likelihood does not overstep constitutional bounds. Thus, the proper inquiry is whether the apportioned tax base fairly represents the in-state business activity of a taxpayer and not whether the actual dollar amount of the assessed tax adequately represents in-state activity irrespective of the constitutionality of the apportionment factor.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"429 U.S. 318, 331","parenthetical":"discriminatory character of the challenged provisions was demonstrated by the fact that they \"foreclose tax-neutral decisions\" about where to transact business","sentence":"See Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 265, 104 S.Ct. 3049, 82 L.Ed.2d 200 (1984) (where tax has differential impact on in-state and out-of-state activities, the determination of constitutionality does not depend upon whether one focuses upon the benefited or the burdened); cf. Boston Stock Exchange v. State Tax Comm\u2019n, 429 U.S. 318, 331, 97 S.Ct. 599, 50 L.Ed.2d 514 (1977) (discriminatory character of the challenged provisions was demonstrated by the fact that they \u201cforeclose tax-neutral decisions\u201d about where to transact business)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"468 U.S. 263, 265","parenthetical":"where tax has differential impact on in-state and out-of-state activities, the determination of constitutionality does not depend upon whether one focuses upon the benefited or the burdened","sentence":"See Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 265, 104 S.Ct. 3049, 82 L.Ed.2d 200 (1984) (where tax has differential impact on in-state and out-of-state activities, the determination of constitutionality does not depend upon whether one focuses upon the benefited or the burdened); cf. Boston Stock Exchange v. State Tax Comm\u2019n, 429 U.S. 318, 331, 97 S.Ct. 599, 50 L.Ed.2d 514 (1977) (discriminatory character of the challenged provisions was demonstrated by the fact that they \u201cforeclose tax-neutral decisions\u201d about where to transact business)."},"case_id":11365275,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The whole purpose of the apportionment formula is to identify in-state commerce and not, as the majority seems to suggest, to simply reduce the tax burden to a level that in all likelihood does not overstep constitutional bounds. Thus, the proper inquiry is whether the apportioned tax base fairly represents the in-state business activity of a taxpayer and not whether the actual dollar amount of the assessed tax adequately represents in-state activity irrespective of the constitutionality of the apportionment factor.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"discriminatory character of the challenged provisions was demonstrated by the fact that they \"foreclose tax-neutral decisions\" about where to transact business","sentence":"See Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 265, 104 S.Ct. 3049, 82 L.Ed.2d 200 (1984) (where tax has differential impact on in-state and out-of-state activities, the determination of constitutionality does not depend upon whether one focuses upon the benefited or the burdened); cf. Boston Stock Exchange v. State Tax Comm\u2019n, 429 U.S. 318, 331, 97 S.Ct. 599, 50 L.Ed.2d 514 (1977) (discriminatory character of the challenged provisions was demonstrated by the fact that they \u201cforeclose tax-neutral decisions\u201d about where to transact business)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"468 U.S. 263, 265","parenthetical":"where tax has differential impact on in-state and out-of-state activities, the determination of constitutionality does not depend upon whether one focuses upon the benefited or the burdened","sentence":"See Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 265, 104 S.Ct. 3049, 82 L.Ed.2d 200 (1984) (where tax has differential impact on in-state and out-of-state activities, the determination of constitutionality does not depend upon whether one focuses upon the benefited or the burdened); cf. Boston Stock Exchange v. State Tax Comm\u2019n, 429 U.S. 318, 331, 97 S.Ct. 599, 50 L.Ed.2d 514 (1977) (discriminatory character of the challenged provisions was demonstrated by the fact that they \u201cforeclose tax-neutral decisions\u201d about where to transact business)."},"case_id":11365275,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The whole purpose of the apportionment formula is to identify in-state commerce and not, as the majority seems to suggest, to simply reduce the tax burden to a level that in all likelihood does not overstep constitutional bounds. Thus, the proper inquiry is whether the apportioned tax base fairly represents the in-state business activity of a taxpayer and not whether the actual dollar amount of the assessed tax adequately represents in-state activity irrespective of the constitutionality of the apportionment factor.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"468 U.S. 263, 265","parenthetical":"where tax has differential impact on in-state and out-of-state activities, the determination of constitutionality does not depend upon whether one focuses upon the benefited or the burdened","sentence":"See Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 265, 104 S.Ct. 3049, 82 L.Ed.2d 200 (1984) (where tax has differential impact on in-state and out-of-state activities, the determination of constitutionality does not depend upon whether one focuses upon the benefited or the burdened); cf. Boston Stock Exchange v. State Tax Comm\u2019n, 429 U.S. 318, 331, 97 S.Ct. 599, 50 L.Ed.2d 514 (1977) (discriminatory character of the challenged provisions was demonstrated by the fact that they \u201cforeclose tax-neutral decisions\u201d about where to transact business)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"discriminatory character of the challenged provisions was demonstrated by the fact that they \"foreclose tax-neutral decisions\" about where to transact business","sentence":"See Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 265, 104 S.Ct. 3049, 82 L.Ed.2d 200 (1984) (where tax has differential impact on in-state and out-of-state activities, the determination of constitutionality does not depend upon whether one focuses upon the benefited or the burdened); cf. Boston Stock Exchange v. State Tax Comm\u2019n, 429 U.S. 318, 331, 97 S.Ct. 599, 50 L.Ed.2d 514 (1977) (discriminatory character of the challenged provisions was demonstrated by the fact that they \u201cforeclose tax-neutral decisions\u201d about where to transact business)."},"case_id":11365275,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The whole purpose of the apportionment formula is to identify in-state commerce and not, as the majority seems to suggest, to simply reduce the tax burden to a level that in all likelihood does not overstep constitutional bounds. Thus, the proper inquiry is whether the apportioned tax base fairly represents the in-state business activity of a taxpayer and not whether the actual dollar amount of the assessed tax adequately represents in-state activity irrespective of the constitutionality of the apportionment factor.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"429 U.S. 318, 331","parenthetical":"discriminatory character of the challenged provisions was demonstrated by the fact that they \"foreclose tax-neutral decisions\" about where to transact business","sentence":"See Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 265, 104 S.Ct. 3049, 82 L.Ed.2d 200 (1984) (where tax has differential impact on in-state and out-of-state activities, the determination of constitutionality does not depend upon whether one focuses upon the benefited or the burdened); cf. Boston Stock Exchange v. State Tax Comm\u2019n, 429 U.S. 318, 331, 97 S.Ct. 599, 50 L.Ed.2d 514 (1977) (discriminatory character of the challenged provisions was demonstrated by the fact that they \u201cforeclose tax-neutral decisions\u201d about where to transact business)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"where tax has differential impact on in-state and out-of-state activities, the determination of constitutionality does not depend upon whether one focuses upon the benefited or the burdened","sentence":"See Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 265, 104 S.Ct. 3049, 82 L.Ed.2d 200 (1984) (where tax has differential impact on in-state and out-of-state activities, the determination of constitutionality does not depend upon whether one focuses upon the benefited or the burdened); cf. Boston Stock Exchange v. State Tax Comm\u2019n, 429 U.S. 318, 331, 97 S.Ct. 599, 50 L.Ed.2d 514 (1977) (discriminatory character of the challenged provisions was demonstrated by the fact that they \u201cforeclose tax-neutral decisions\u201d about where to transact business)."},"case_id":11365275,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The whole purpose of the apportionment formula is to identify in-state commerce and not, as the majority seems to suggest, to simply reduce the tax burden to a level that in all likelihood does not overstep constitutional bounds. Thus, the proper inquiry is whether the apportioned tax base fairly represents the in-state business activity of a taxpayer and not whether the actual dollar amount of the assessed tax adequately represents in-state activity irrespective of the constitutionality of the apportionment factor.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"discriminatory character of the challenged provisions was demonstrated by the fact that they \"foreclose tax-neutral decisions\" about where to transact business","sentence":"See Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 265, 104 S.Ct. 3049, 82 L.Ed.2d 200 (1984) (where tax has differential impact on in-state and out-of-state activities, the determination of constitutionality does not depend upon whether one focuses upon the benefited or the burdened); cf. Boston Stock Exchange v. State Tax Comm\u2019n, 429 U.S. 318, 331, 97 S.Ct. 599, 50 L.Ed.2d 514 (1977) (discriminatory character of the challenged provisions was demonstrated by the fact that they \u201cforeclose tax-neutral decisions\u201d about where to transact business)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"where tax has differential impact on in-state and out-of-state activities, the determination of constitutionality does not depend upon whether one focuses upon the benefited or the burdened","sentence":"See Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 265, 104 S.Ct. 3049, 82 L.Ed.2d 200 (1984) (where tax has differential impact on in-state and out-of-state activities, the determination of constitutionality does not depend upon whether one focuses upon the benefited or the burdened); cf. Boston Stock Exchange v. State Tax Comm\u2019n, 429 U.S. 318, 331, 97 S.Ct. 599, 50 L.Ed.2d 514 (1977) (discriminatory character of the challenged provisions was demonstrated by the fact that they \u201cforeclose tax-neutral decisions\u201d about where to transact business)."},"case_id":11365275,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The whole purpose of the apportionment formula is to identify in-state commerce and not, as the majority seems to suggest, to simply reduce the tax burden to a level that in all likelihood does not overstep constitutional bounds. Thus, the proper inquiry is whether the apportioned tax base fairly represents the in-state business activity of a taxpayer and not whether the actual dollar amount of the assessed tax adequately represents in-state activity irrespective of the constitutionality of the apportionment factor.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"discriminatory character of the challenged provisions was demonstrated by the fact that they \"foreclose tax-neutral decisions\" about where to transact business","sentence":"See Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 265, 104 S.Ct. 3049, 82 L.Ed.2d 200 (1984) (where tax has differential impact on in-state and out-of-state activities, the determination of constitutionality does not depend upon whether one focuses upon the benefited or the burdened); cf. Boston Stock Exchange v. State Tax Comm\u2019n, 429 U.S. 318, 331, 97 S.Ct. 599, 50 L.Ed.2d 514 (1977) (discriminatory character of the challenged provisions was demonstrated by the fact that they \u201cforeclose tax-neutral decisions\u201d about where to transact business)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"where tax has differential impact on in-state and out-of-state activities, the determination of constitutionality does not depend upon whether one focuses upon the benefited or the burdened","sentence":"See Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 265, 104 S.Ct. 3049, 82 L.Ed.2d 200 (1984) (where tax has differential impact on in-state and out-of-state activities, the determination of constitutionality does not depend upon whether one focuses upon the benefited or the burdened); cf. Boston Stock Exchange v. State Tax Comm\u2019n, 429 U.S. 318, 331, 97 S.Ct. 599, 50 L.Ed.2d 514 (1977) (discriminatory character of the challenged provisions was demonstrated by the fact that they \u201cforeclose tax-neutral decisions\u201d about where to transact business)."},"case_id":11365275,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The whole purpose of the apportionment formula is to identify in-state commerce and not, as the majority seems to suggest, to simply reduce the tax burden to a level that in all likelihood does not overstep constitutional bounds. Thus, the proper inquiry is whether the apportioned tax base fairly represents the in-state business activity of a taxpayer and not whether the actual dollar amount of the assessed tax adequately represents in-state activity irrespective of the constitutionality of the apportionment factor.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"where tax has differential impact on in-state and out-of-state activities, the determination of constitutionality does not depend upon whether one focuses upon the benefited or the burdened","sentence":"See Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 265, 104 S.Ct. 3049, 82 L.Ed.2d 200 (1984) (where tax has differential impact on in-state and out-of-state activities, the determination of constitutionality does not depend upon whether one focuses upon the benefited or the burdened); cf. Boston Stock Exchange v. State Tax Comm\u2019n, 429 U.S. 318, 331, 97 S.Ct. 599, 50 L.Ed.2d 514 (1977) (discriminatory character of the challenged provisions was demonstrated by the fact that they \u201cforeclose tax-neutral decisions\u201d about where to transact business)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"429 U.S. 318, 331","parenthetical":"discriminatory character of the challenged provisions was demonstrated by the fact that they \"foreclose tax-neutral decisions\" about where to transact business","sentence":"See Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 265, 104 S.Ct. 3049, 82 L.Ed.2d 200 (1984) (where tax has differential impact on in-state and out-of-state activities, the determination of constitutionality does not depend upon whether one focuses upon the benefited or the burdened); cf. Boston Stock Exchange v. State Tax Comm\u2019n, 429 U.S. 318, 331, 97 S.Ct. 599, 50 L.Ed.2d 514 (1977) (discriminatory character of the challenged provisions was demonstrated by the fact that they \u201cforeclose tax-neutral decisions\u201d about where to transact business)."},"case_id":11365275,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The whole purpose of the apportionment formula is to identify in-state commerce and not, as the majority seems to suggest, to simply reduce the tax burden to a level that in all likelihood does not overstep constitutional bounds. Thus, the proper inquiry is whether the apportioned tax base fairly represents the in-state business activity of a taxpayer and not whether the actual dollar amount of the assessed tax adequately represents in-state activity irrespective of the constitutionality of the apportionment factor.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"discriminatory character of the challenged provisions was demonstrated by the fact that they \"foreclose tax-neutral decisions\" about where to transact business","sentence":"See Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 265, 104 S.Ct. 3049, 82 L.Ed.2d 200 (1984) (where tax has differential impact on in-state and out-of-state activities, the determination of constitutionality does not depend upon whether one focuses upon the benefited or the burdened); cf. Boston Stock Exchange v. State Tax Comm\u2019n, 429 U.S. 318, 331, 97 S.Ct. 599, 50 L.Ed.2d 514 (1977) (discriminatory character of the challenged provisions was demonstrated by the fact that they \u201cforeclose tax-neutral decisions\u201d about where to transact business)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"where tax has differential impact on in-state and out-of-state activities, the determination of constitutionality does not depend upon whether one focuses upon the benefited or the burdened","sentence":"See Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 265, 104 S.Ct. 3049, 82 L.Ed.2d 200 (1984) (where tax has differential impact on in-state and out-of-state activities, the determination of constitutionality does not depend upon whether one focuses upon the benefited or the burdened); cf. Boston Stock Exchange v. State Tax Comm\u2019n, 429 U.S. 318, 331, 97 S.Ct. 599, 50 L.Ed.2d 514 (1977) (discriminatory character of the challenged provisions was demonstrated by the fact that they \u201cforeclose tax-neutral decisions\u201d about where to transact business)."},"case_id":11365275,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The whole purpose of the apportionment formula is to identify in-state commerce and not, as the majority seems to suggest, to simply reduce the tax burden to a level that in all likelihood does not overstep constitutional bounds. Thus, the proper inquiry is whether the apportioned tax base fairly represents the in-state business activity of a taxpayer and not whether the actual dollar amount of the assessed tax adequately represents in-state activity irrespective of the constitutionality of the apportionment factor.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"where tax has differential impact on in-state and out-of-state activities, the determination of constitutionality does not depend upon whether one focuses upon the benefited or the burdened","sentence":"See Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 265, 104 S.Ct. 3049, 82 L.Ed.2d 200 (1984) (where tax has differential impact on in-state and out-of-state activities, the determination of constitutionality does not depend upon whether one focuses upon the benefited or the burdened); cf. Boston Stock Exchange v. State Tax Comm\u2019n, 429 U.S. 318, 331, 97 S.Ct. 599, 50 L.Ed.2d 514 (1977) (discriminatory character of the challenged provisions was demonstrated by the fact that they \u201cforeclose tax-neutral decisions\u201d about where to transact business)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"discriminatory character of the challenged provisions was demonstrated by the fact that they \"foreclose tax-neutral decisions\" about where to transact business","sentence":"See Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 265, 104 S.Ct. 3049, 82 L.Ed.2d 200 (1984) (where tax has differential impact on in-state and out-of-state activities, the determination of constitutionality does not depend upon whether one focuses upon the benefited or the burdened); cf. Boston Stock Exchange v. State Tax Comm\u2019n, 429 U.S. 318, 331, 97 S.Ct. 599, 50 L.Ed.2d 514 (1977) (discriminatory character of the challenged provisions was demonstrated by the fact that they \u201cforeclose tax-neutral decisions\u201d about where to transact business)."},"case_id":11365275,"label":"a"}
{"context":"R.E.R. alleges he continues to suffer severe mental and emotional distress as a result of the minister's actions, which \"imposed upon [him] the difficulties of dealing with spousal guilt, depression, unhappiness, and low self-esteem\" and led to poor work performance, the termination of his employment, an unprofitable career change, and related medical expenses. Because these losses flow from the alienation of his former wife's affections, they generally are no longer recoverable because the legislature has outlawed heart balm actions.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"819 P.2d 714, 716","parenthetical":"finding a suit for intentional infliction of emotional distress was barred because the plaintiff basically sued the defendant for \"wil-fully taking away her husband\" and stating the legislature immunized that conduct from tort liability","sentence":"See Destefano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275, 278, 288 (Colo.1988) (finding claims for mental pain and suffering, based on theories of negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress, \u201cplainly set forth claims for alienation of affections and criminal conversation\u201d); Gasper v. Lighthouse, Inc., 73 Md.App. 367, 533 A.2d 1358, 1360-61 (1987) (barring claims for breach of contract and fiduciary duty because the \u201cbasis of the action was the destruction of the marriage and the injuries allegedly arising from it\u201d), cert. denied, 311 Md. 718, 537 A.2d 272 (1988); Nicholson v. Han, 12 Mich.App. 35, 162 N.W.2d 313, 317 (1968) (concluding the plaintiff could not maintain his action for breach of contract because the claimed damages, pain and suffering, demonstrated his reliance on a prohibited tort theory); Strock v. Pressnell, 38 Ohio St.3d 207, 527 N.E.2d 1235, 1242-43 (1988) (declining to consider an intentional infliction of emotional distress action, in which the plaintiff sought damages for \u201canguish, shock, nervousness, and depression,\u201d because the abolition of claims for alienation of affections was intended to preclude these allegations); see also Wilson v. Still, 819 P.2d 714, 716 (Okla.1991) (finding a suit for intentional infliction of emotional distress was barred because the plaintiff basically sued the defendant for \u201cwil-fully taking away her husband\u201d and stating the legislature immunized that conduct from tort liability)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"763 P.2d 275, 278, 288","parenthetical":"finding claims for mental pain and suffering, based on theories of negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress, \"plainly set forth claims for alienation of affections and criminal conversation\"","sentence":"See Destefano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275, 278, 288 (Colo.1988) (finding claims for mental pain and suffering, based on theories of negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress, \u201cplainly set forth claims for alienation of affections and criminal conversation\u201d); Gasper v. Lighthouse, Inc., 73 Md.App. 367, 533 A.2d 1358, 1360-61 (1987) (barring claims for breach of contract and fiduciary duty because the \u201cbasis of the action was the destruction of the marriage and the injuries allegedly arising from it\u201d), cert. denied, 311 Md. 718, 537 A.2d 272 (1988); Nicholson v. Han, 12 Mich.App. 35, 162 N.W.2d 313, 317 (1968) (concluding the plaintiff could not maintain his action for breach of contract because the claimed damages, pain and suffering, demonstrated his reliance on a prohibited tort theory); Strock v. Pressnell, 38 Ohio St.3d 207, 527 N.E.2d 1235, 1242-43 (1988) (declining to consider an intentional infliction of emotional distress action, in which the plaintiff sought damages for \u201canguish, shock, nervousness, and depression,\u201d because the abolition of claims for alienation of affections was intended to preclude these allegations); see also Wilson v. Still, 819 P.2d 714, 716 (Okla.1991) (finding a suit for intentional infliction of emotional distress was barred because the plaintiff basically sued the defendant for \u201cwil-fully taking away her husband\u201d and stating the legislature immunized that conduct from tort liability)."},"case_id":10694671,"label":"b"}
{"context":"R.E.R. alleges he continues to suffer severe mental and emotional distress as a result of the minister's actions, which \"imposed upon [him] the difficulties of dealing with spousal guilt, depression, unhappiness, and low self-esteem\" and led to poor work performance, the termination of his employment, an unprofitable career change, and related medical expenses. Because these losses flow from the alienation of his former wife's affections, they generally are no longer recoverable because the legislature has outlawed heart balm actions.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"763 P.2d 275, 278, 288","parenthetical":"finding claims for mental pain and suffering, based on theories of negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress, \"plainly set forth claims for alienation of affections and criminal conversation\"","sentence":"See Destefano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275, 278, 288 (Colo.1988) (finding claims for mental pain and suffering, based on theories of negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress, \u201cplainly set forth claims for alienation of affections and criminal conversation\u201d); Gasper v. Lighthouse, Inc., 73 Md.App. 367, 533 A.2d 1358, 1360-61 (1987) (barring claims for breach of contract and fiduciary duty because the \u201cbasis of the action was the destruction of the marriage and the injuries allegedly arising from it\u201d), cert. denied, 311 Md. 718, 537 A.2d 272 (1988); Nicholson v. Han, 12 Mich.App. 35, 162 N.W.2d 313, 317 (1968) (concluding the plaintiff could not maintain his action for breach of contract because the claimed damages, pain and suffering, demonstrated his reliance on a prohibited tort theory); Strock v. Pressnell, 38 Ohio St.3d 207, 527 N.E.2d 1235, 1242-43 (1988) (declining to consider an intentional infliction of emotional distress action, in which the plaintiff sought damages for \u201canguish, shock, nervousness, and depression,\u201d because the abolition of claims for alienation of affections was intended to preclude these allegations); see also Wilson v. Still, 819 P.2d 714, 716 (Okla.1991) (finding a suit for intentional infliction of emotional distress was barred because the plaintiff basically sued the defendant for \u201cwil-fully taking away her husband\u201d and stating the legislature immunized that conduct from tort liability)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding a plaintiff could proceed on a claim alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress because the alleged losses were different from those for seduction, but also stating plaintiffs previously suing for seduction could recover for damage to character and reputation as well as for mental anguish and pecuniary losses","sentence":"But see Erickson v. Christenson, 99 Or.App. 104, 781 P.2d 383, 385-86 (1989) (holding a plaintiff could proceed on a claim alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress because the alleged losses were different from those for seduction, but also stating plaintiffs previously suing for seduction could recover for damage to character and reputation as well as for mental anguish and pecuniary losses), appeal dismissed, 311 Or. 266, 817 P.2d 758 (1991)."},"case_id":10694671,"label":"a"}
{"context":"R.E.R. alleges he continues to suffer severe mental and emotional distress as a result of the minister's actions, which \"imposed upon [him] the difficulties of dealing with spousal guilt, depression, unhappiness, and low self-esteem\" and led to poor work performance, the termination of his employment, an unprofitable career change, and related medical expenses. Because these losses flow from the alienation of his former wife's affections, they generally are no longer recoverable because the legislature has outlawed heart balm actions.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"781 P.2d 383, 385-86","parenthetical":"holding a plaintiff could proceed on a claim alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress because the alleged losses were different from those for seduction, but also stating plaintiffs previously suing for seduction could recover for damage to character and reputation as well as for mental anguish and pecuniary losses","sentence":"But see Erickson v. Christenson, 99 Or.App. 104, 781 P.2d 383, 385-86 (1989) (holding a plaintiff could proceed on a claim alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress because the alleged losses were different from those for seduction, but also stating plaintiffs previously suing for seduction could recover for damage to character and reputation as well as for mental anguish and pecuniary losses), appeal dismissed, 311 Or. 266, 817 P.2d 758 (1991)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"763 P.2d 275, 278, 288","parenthetical":"finding claims for mental pain and suffering, based on theories of negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress, \"plainly set forth claims for alienation of affections and criminal conversation\"","sentence":"See Destefano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275, 278, 288 (Colo.1988) (finding claims for mental pain and suffering, based on theories of negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress, \u201cplainly set forth claims for alienation of affections and criminal conversation\u201d); Gasper v. Lighthouse, Inc., 73 Md.App. 367, 533 A.2d 1358, 1360-61 (1987) (barring claims for breach of contract and fiduciary duty because the \u201cbasis of the action was the destruction of the marriage and the injuries allegedly arising from it\u201d), cert. denied, 311 Md. 718, 537 A.2d 272 (1988); Nicholson v. Han, 12 Mich.App. 35, 162 N.W.2d 313, 317 (1968) (concluding the plaintiff could not maintain his action for breach of contract because the claimed damages, pain and suffering, demonstrated his reliance on a prohibited tort theory); Strock v. Pressnell, 38 Ohio St.3d 207, 527 N.E.2d 1235, 1242-43 (1988) (declining to consider an intentional infliction of emotional distress action, in which the plaintiff sought damages for \u201canguish, shock, nervousness, and depression,\u201d because the abolition of claims for alienation of affections was intended to preclude these allegations); see also Wilson v. Still, 819 P.2d 714, 716 (Okla.1991) (finding a suit for intentional infliction of emotional distress was barred because the plaintiff basically sued the defendant for \u201cwil-fully taking away her husband\u201d and stating the legislature immunized that conduct from tort liability)."},"case_id":10694671,"label":"b"}
{"context":"R.E.R. alleges he continues to suffer severe mental and emotional distress as a result of the minister's actions, which \"imposed upon [him] the difficulties of dealing with spousal guilt, depression, unhappiness, and low self-esteem\" and led to poor work performance, the termination of his employment, an unprofitable career change, and related medical expenses. Because these losses flow from the alienation of his former wife's affections, they generally are no longer recoverable because the legislature has outlawed heart balm actions.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding a plaintiff could proceed on a claim alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress because the alleged losses were different from those for seduction, but also stating plaintiffs previously suing for seduction could recover for damage to character and reputation as well as for mental anguish and pecuniary losses","sentence":"But see Erickson v. Christenson, 99 Or.App. 104, 781 P.2d 383, 385-86 (1989) (holding a plaintiff could proceed on a claim alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress because the alleged losses were different from those for seduction, but also stating plaintiffs previously suing for seduction could recover for damage to character and reputation as well as for mental anguish and pecuniary losses), appeal dismissed, 311 Or. 266, 817 P.2d 758 (1991)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"763 P.2d 275, 278, 288","parenthetical":"finding claims for mental pain and suffering, based on theories of negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress, \"plainly set forth claims for alienation of affections and criminal conversation\"","sentence":"See Destefano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275, 278, 288 (Colo.1988) (finding claims for mental pain and suffering, based on theories of negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress, \u201cplainly set forth claims for alienation of affections and criminal conversation\u201d); Gasper v. Lighthouse, Inc., 73 Md.App. 367, 533 A.2d 1358, 1360-61 (1987) (barring claims for breach of contract and fiduciary duty because the \u201cbasis of the action was the destruction of the marriage and the injuries allegedly arising from it\u201d), cert. denied, 311 Md. 718, 537 A.2d 272 (1988); Nicholson v. Han, 12 Mich.App. 35, 162 N.W.2d 313, 317 (1968) (concluding the plaintiff could not maintain his action for breach of contract because the claimed damages, pain and suffering, demonstrated his reliance on a prohibited tort theory); Strock v. Pressnell, 38 Ohio St.3d 207, 527 N.E.2d 1235, 1242-43 (1988) (declining to consider an intentional infliction of emotional distress action, in which the plaintiff sought damages for \u201canguish, shock, nervousness, and depression,\u201d because the abolition of claims for alienation of affections was intended to preclude these allegations); see also Wilson v. Still, 819 P.2d 714, 716 (Okla.1991) (finding a suit for intentional infliction of emotional distress was barred because the plaintiff basically sued the defendant for \u201cwil-fully taking away her husband\u201d and stating the legislature immunized that conduct from tort liability)."},"case_id":10694671,"label":"b"}
{"context":"R.E.R. alleges he continues to suffer severe mental and emotional distress as a result of the minister's actions, which \"imposed upon [him] the difficulties of dealing with spousal guilt, depression, unhappiness, and low self-esteem\" and led to poor work performance, the termination of his employment, an unprofitable career change, and related medical expenses. Because these losses flow from the alienation of his former wife's affections, they generally are no longer recoverable because the legislature has outlawed heart balm actions.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"763 P.2d 275, 278, 288","parenthetical":"finding claims for mental pain and suffering, based on theories of negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress, \"plainly set forth claims for alienation of affections and criminal conversation\"","sentence":"See Destefano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275, 278, 288 (Colo.1988) (finding claims for mental pain and suffering, based on theories of negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress, \u201cplainly set forth claims for alienation of affections and criminal conversation\u201d); Gasper v. Lighthouse, Inc., 73 Md.App. 367, 533 A.2d 1358, 1360-61 (1987) (barring claims for breach of contract and fiduciary duty because the \u201cbasis of the action was the destruction of the marriage and the injuries allegedly arising from it\u201d), cert. denied, 311 Md. 718, 537 A.2d 272 (1988); Nicholson v. Han, 12 Mich.App. 35, 162 N.W.2d 313, 317 (1968) (concluding the plaintiff could not maintain his action for breach of contract because the claimed damages, pain and suffering, demonstrated his reliance on a prohibited tort theory); Strock v. Pressnell, 38 Ohio St.3d 207, 527 N.E.2d 1235, 1242-43 (1988) (declining to consider an intentional infliction of emotional distress action, in which the plaintiff sought damages for \u201canguish, shock, nervousness, and depression,\u201d because the abolition of claims for alienation of affections was intended to preclude these allegations); see also Wilson v. Still, 819 P.2d 714, 716 (Okla.1991) (finding a suit for intentional infliction of emotional distress was barred because the plaintiff basically sued the defendant for \u201cwil-fully taking away her husband\u201d and stating the legislature immunized that conduct from tort liability)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding a plaintiff could proceed on a claim alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress because the alleged losses were different from those for seduction, but also stating plaintiffs previously suing for seduction could recover for damage to character and reputation as well as for mental anguish and pecuniary losses","sentence":"But see Erickson v. Christenson, 99 Or.App. 104, 781 P.2d 383, 385-86 (1989) (holding a plaintiff could proceed on a claim alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress because the alleged losses were different from those for seduction, but also stating plaintiffs previously suing for seduction could recover for damage to character and reputation as well as for mental anguish and pecuniary losses), appeal dismissed, 311 Or. 266, 817 P.2d 758 (1991)."},"case_id":10694671,"label":"a"}
{"context":"R.E.R. alleges he continues to suffer severe mental and emotional distress as a result of the minister's actions, which \"imposed upon [him] the difficulties of dealing with spousal guilt, depression, unhappiness, and low self-esteem\" and led to poor work performance, the termination of his employment, an unprofitable career change, and related medical expenses. Because these losses flow from the alienation of his former wife's affections, they generally are no longer recoverable because the legislature has outlawed heart balm actions.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"819 P.2d 714, 716","parenthetical":"finding a suit for intentional infliction of emotional distress was barred because the plaintiff basically sued the defendant for \"wil-fully taking away her husband\" and stating the legislature immunized that conduct from tort liability","sentence":"See Destefano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275, 278, 288 (Colo.1988) (finding claims for mental pain and suffering, based on theories of negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress, \u201cplainly set forth claims for alienation of affections and criminal conversation\u201d); Gasper v. Lighthouse, Inc., 73 Md.App. 367, 533 A.2d 1358, 1360-61 (1987) (barring claims for breach of contract and fiduciary duty because the \u201cbasis of the action was the destruction of the marriage and the injuries allegedly arising from it\u201d), cert. denied, 311 Md. 718, 537 A.2d 272 (1988); Nicholson v. Han, 12 Mich.App. 35, 162 N.W.2d 313, 317 (1968) (concluding the plaintiff could not maintain his action for breach of contract because the claimed damages, pain and suffering, demonstrated his reliance on a prohibited tort theory); Strock v. Pressnell, 38 Ohio St.3d 207, 527 N.E.2d 1235, 1242-43 (1988) (declining to consider an intentional infliction of emotional distress action, in which the plaintiff sought damages for \u201canguish, shock, nervousness, and depression,\u201d because the abolition of claims for alienation of affections was intended to preclude these allegations); see also Wilson v. Still, 819 P.2d 714, 716 (Okla.1991) (finding a suit for intentional infliction of emotional distress was barred because the plaintiff basically sued the defendant for \u201cwil-fully taking away her husband\u201d and stating the legislature immunized that conduct from tort liability)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"barring claims for breach of contract and fiduciary duty because the \"basis of the action was the destruction of the marriage and the injuries allegedly arising from it\"","sentence":"See Destefano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275, 278, 288 (Colo.1988) (finding claims for mental pain and suffering, based on theories of negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress, \u201cplainly set forth claims for alienation of affections and criminal conversation\u201d); Gasper v. Lighthouse, Inc., 73 Md.App. 367, 533 A.2d 1358, 1360-61 (1987) (barring claims for breach of contract and fiduciary duty because the \u201cbasis of the action was the destruction of the marriage and the injuries allegedly arising from it\u201d), cert. denied, 311 Md. 718, 537 A.2d 272 (1988); Nicholson v. Han, 12 Mich.App. 35, 162 N.W.2d 313, 317 (1968) (concluding the plaintiff could not maintain his action for breach of contract because the claimed damages, pain and suffering, demonstrated his reliance on a prohibited tort theory); Strock v. Pressnell, 38 Ohio St.3d 207, 527 N.E.2d 1235, 1242-43 (1988) (declining to consider an intentional infliction of emotional distress action, in which the plaintiff sought damages for \u201canguish, shock, nervousness, and depression,\u201d because the abolition of claims for alienation of affections was intended to preclude these allegations); see also Wilson v. Still, 819 P.2d 714, 716 (Okla.1991) (finding a suit for intentional infliction of emotional distress was barred because the plaintiff basically sued the defendant for \u201cwil-fully taking away her husband\u201d and stating the legislature immunized that conduct from tort liability)."},"case_id":10694671,"label":"b"}
{"context":"R.E.R. alleges he continues to suffer severe mental and emotional distress as a result of the minister's actions, which \"imposed upon [him] the difficulties of dealing with spousal guilt, depression, unhappiness, and low self-esteem\" and led to poor work performance, the termination of his employment, an unprofitable career change, and related medical expenses. Because these losses flow from the alienation of his former wife's affections, they generally are no longer recoverable because the legislature has outlawed heart balm actions.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding a plaintiff could proceed on a claim alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress because the alleged losses were different from those for seduction, but also stating plaintiffs previously suing for seduction could recover for damage to character and reputation as well as for mental anguish and pecuniary losses","sentence":"But see Erickson v. Christenson, 99 Or.App. 104, 781 P.2d 383, 385-86 (1989) (holding a plaintiff could proceed on a claim alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress because the alleged losses were different from those for seduction, but also stating plaintiffs previously suing for seduction could recover for damage to character and reputation as well as for mental anguish and pecuniary losses), appeal dismissed, 311 Or. 266, 817 P.2d 758 (1991)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"barring claims for breach of contract and fiduciary duty because the \"basis of the action was the destruction of the marriage and the injuries allegedly arising from it\"","sentence":"See Destefano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275, 278, 288 (Colo.1988) (finding claims for mental pain and suffering, based on theories of negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress, \u201cplainly set forth claims for alienation of affections and criminal conversation\u201d); Gasper v. Lighthouse, Inc., 73 Md.App. 367, 533 A.2d 1358, 1360-61 (1987) (barring claims for breach of contract and fiduciary duty because the \u201cbasis of the action was the destruction of the marriage and the injuries allegedly arising from it\u201d), cert. denied, 311 Md. 718, 537 A.2d 272 (1988); Nicholson v. Han, 12 Mich.App. 35, 162 N.W.2d 313, 317 (1968) (concluding the plaintiff could not maintain his action for breach of contract because the claimed damages, pain and suffering, demonstrated his reliance on a prohibited tort theory); Strock v. Pressnell, 38 Ohio St.3d 207, 527 N.E.2d 1235, 1242-43 (1988) (declining to consider an intentional infliction of emotional distress action, in which the plaintiff sought damages for \u201canguish, shock, nervousness, and depression,\u201d because the abolition of claims for alienation of affections was intended to preclude these allegations); see also Wilson v. Still, 819 P.2d 714, 716 (Okla.1991) (finding a suit for intentional infliction of emotional distress was barred because the plaintiff basically sued the defendant for \u201cwil-fully taking away her husband\u201d and stating the legislature immunized that conduct from tort liability)."},"case_id":10694671,"label":"b"}
{"context":"R.E.R. alleges he continues to suffer severe mental and emotional distress as a result of the minister's actions, which \"imposed upon [him] the difficulties of dealing with spousal guilt, depression, unhappiness, and low self-esteem\" and led to poor work performance, the termination of his employment, an unprofitable career change, and related medical expenses. Because these losses flow from the alienation of his former wife's affections, they generally are no longer recoverable because the legislature has outlawed heart balm actions.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"781 P.2d 383, 385-86","parenthetical":"holding a plaintiff could proceed on a claim alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress because the alleged losses were different from those for seduction, but also stating plaintiffs previously suing for seduction could recover for damage to character and reputation as well as for mental anguish and pecuniary losses","sentence":"But see Erickson v. Christenson, 99 Or.App. 104, 781 P.2d 383, 385-86 (1989) (holding a plaintiff could proceed on a claim alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress because the alleged losses were different from those for seduction, but also stating plaintiffs previously suing for seduction could recover for damage to character and reputation as well as for mental anguish and pecuniary losses), appeal dismissed, 311 Or. 266, 817 P.2d 758 (1991)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"barring claims for breach of contract and fiduciary duty because the \"basis of the action was the destruction of the marriage and the injuries allegedly arising from it\"","sentence":"See Destefano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275, 278, 288 (Colo.1988) (finding claims for mental pain and suffering, based on theories of negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress, \u201cplainly set forth claims for alienation of affections and criminal conversation\u201d); Gasper v. Lighthouse, Inc., 73 Md.App. 367, 533 A.2d 1358, 1360-61 (1987) (barring claims for breach of contract and fiduciary duty because the \u201cbasis of the action was the destruction of the marriage and the injuries allegedly arising from it\u201d), cert. denied, 311 Md. 718, 537 A.2d 272 (1988); Nicholson v. Han, 12 Mich.App. 35, 162 N.W.2d 313, 317 (1968) (concluding the plaintiff could not maintain his action for breach of contract because the claimed damages, pain and suffering, demonstrated his reliance on a prohibited tort theory); Strock v. Pressnell, 38 Ohio St.3d 207, 527 N.E.2d 1235, 1242-43 (1988) (declining to consider an intentional infliction of emotional distress action, in which the plaintiff sought damages for \u201canguish, shock, nervousness, and depression,\u201d because the abolition of claims for alienation of affections was intended to preclude these allegations); see also Wilson v. Still, 819 P.2d 714, 716 (Okla.1991) (finding a suit for intentional infliction of emotional distress was barred because the plaintiff basically sued the defendant for \u201cwil-fully taking away her husband\u201d and stating the legislature immunized that conduct from tort liability)."},"case_id":10694671,"label":"b"}
{"context":"R.E.R. alleges he continues to suffer severe mental and emotional distress as a result of the minister's actions, which \"imposed upon [him] the difficulties of dealing with spousal guilt, depression, unhappiness, and low self-esteem\" and led to poor work performance, the termination of his employment, an unprofitable career change, and related medical expenses. Because these losses flow from the alienation of his former wife's affections, they generally are no longer recoverable because the legislature has outlawed heart balm actions.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding a plaintiff could proceed on a claim alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress because the alleged losses were different from those for seduction, but also stating plaintiffs previously suing for seduction could recover for damage to character and reputation as well as for mental anguish and pecuniary losses","sentence":"But see Erickson v. Christenson, 99 Or.App. 104, 781 P.2d 383, 385-86 (1989) (holding a plaintiff could proceed on a claim alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress because the alleged losses were different from those for seduction, but also stating plaintiffs previously suing for seduction could recover for damage to character and reputation as well as for mental anguish and pecuniary losses), appeal dismissed, 311 Or. 266, 817 P.2d 758 (1991)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"barring claims for breach of contract and fiduciary duty because the \"basis of the action was the destruction of the marriage and the injuries allegedly arising from it\"","sentence":"See Destefano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275, 278, 288 (Colo.1988) (finding claims for mental pain and suffering, based on theories of negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress, \u201cplainly set forth claims for alienation of affections and criminal conversation\u201d); Gasper v. Lighthouse, Inc., 73 Md.App. 367, 533 A.2d 1358, 1360-61 (1987) (barring claims for breach of contract and fiduciary duty because the \u201cbasis of the action was the destruction of the marriage and the injuries allegedly arising from it\u201d), cert. denied, 311 Md. 718, 537 A.2d 272 (1988); Nicholson v. Han, 12 Mich.App. 35, 162 N.W.2d 313, 317 (1968) (concluding the plaintiff could not maintain his action for breach of contract because the claimed damages, pain and suffering, demonstrated his reliance on a prohibited tort theory); Strock v. Pressnell, 38 Ohio St.3d 207, 527 N.E.2d 1235, 1242-43 (1988) (declining to consider an intentional infliction of emotional distress action, in which the plaintiff sought damages for \u201canguish, shock, nervousness, and depression,\u201d because the abolition of claims for alienation of affections was intended to preclude these allegations); see also Wilson v. Still, 819 P.2d 714, 716 (Okla.1991) (finding a suit for intentional infliction of emotional distress was barred because the plaintiff basically sued the defendant for \u201cwil-fully taking away her husband\u201d and stating the legislature immunized that conduct from tort liability)."},"case_id":10694671,"label":"b"}
{"context":"R.E.R. alleges he continues to suffer severe mental and emotional distress as a result of the minister's actions, which \"imposed upon [him] the difficulties of dealing with spousal guilt, depression, unhappiness, and low self-esteem\" and led to poor work performance, the termination of his employment, an unprofitable career change, and related medical expenses. Because these losses flow from the alienation of his former wife's affections, they generally are no longer recoverable because the legislature has outlawed heart balm actions.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding a plaintiff could proceed on a claim alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress because the alleged losses were different from those for seduction, but also stating plaintiffs previously suing for seduction could recover for damage to character and reputation as well as for mental anguish and pecuniary losses","sentence":"But see Erickson v. Christenson, 99 Or.App. 104, 781 P.2d 383, 385-86 (1989) (holding a plaintiff could proceed on a claim alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress because the alleged losses were different from those for seduction, but also stating plaintiffs previously suing for seduction could recover for damage to character and reputation as well as for mental anguish and pecuniary losses), appeal dismissed, 311 Or. 266, 817 P.2d 758 (1991)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"barring claims for breach of contract and fiduciary duty because the \"basis of the action was the destruction of the marriage and the injuries allegedly arising from it\"","sentence":"See Destefano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275, 278, 288 (Colo.1988) (finding claims for mental pain and suffering, based on theories of negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress, \u201cplainly set forth claims for alienation of affections and criminal conversation\u201d); Gasper v. Lighthouse, Inc., 73 Md.App. 367, 533 A.2d 1358, 1360-61 (1987) (barring claims for breach of contract and fiduciary duty because the \u201cbasis of the action was the destruction of the marriage and the injuries allegedly arising from it\u201d), cert. denied, 311 Md. 718, 537 A.2d 272 (1988); Nicholson v. Han, 12 Mich.App. 35, 162 N.W.2d 313, 317 (1968) (concluding the plaintiff could not maintain his action for breach of contract because the claimed damages, pain and suffering, demonstrated his reliance on a prohibited tort theory); Strock v. Pressnell, 38 Ohio St.3d 207, 527 N.E.2d 1235, 1242-43 (1988) (declining to consider an intentional infliction of emotional distress action, in which the plaintiff sought damages for \u201canguish, shock, nervousness, and depression,\u201d because the abolition of claims for alienation of affections was intended to preclude these allegations); see also Wilson v. Still, 819 P.2d 714, 716 (Okla.1991) (finding a suit for intentional infliction of emotional distress was barred because the plaintiff basically sued the defendant for \u201cwil-fully taking away her husband\u201d and stating the legislature immunized that conduct from tort liability)."},"case_id":10694671,"label":"b"}
{"context":"R.E.R. alleges he continues to suffer severe mental and emotional distress as a result of the minister's actions, which \"imposed upon [him] the difficulties of dealing with spousal guilt, depression, unhappiness, and low self-esteem\" and led to poor work performance, the termination of his employment, an unprofitable career change, and related medical expenses. Because these losses flow from the alienation of his former wife's affections, they generally are no longer recoverable because the legislature has outlawed heart balm actions.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"819 P.2d 714, 716","parenthetical":"finding a suit for intentional infliction of emotional distress was barred because the plaintiff basically sued the defendant for \"wil-fully taking away her husband\" and stating the legislature immunized that conduct from tort liability","sentence":"See Destefano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275, 278, 288 (Colo.1988) (finding claims for mental pain and suffering, based on theories of negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress, \u201cplainly set forth claims for alienation of affections and criminal conversation\u201d); Gasper v. Lighthouse, Inc., 73 Md.App. 367, 533 A.2d 1358, 1360-61 (1987) (barring claims for breach of contract and fiduciary duty because the \u201cbasis of the action was the destruction of the marriage and the injuries allegedly arising from it\u201d), cert. denied, 311 Md. 718, 537 A.2d 272 (1988); Nicholson v. Han, 12 Mich.App. 35, 162 N.W.2d 313, 317 (1968) (concluding the plaintiff could not maintain his action for breach of contract because the claimed damages, pain and suffering, demonstrated his reliance on a prohibited tort theory); Strock v. Pressnell, 38 Ohio St.3d 207, 527 N.E.2d 1235, 1242-43 (1988) (declining to consider an intentional infliction of emotional distress action, in which the plaintiff sought damages for \u201canguish, shock, nervousness, and depression,\u201d because the abolition of claims for alienation of affections was intended to preclude these allegations); see also Wilson v. Still, 819 P.2d 714, 716 (Okla.1991) (finding a suit for intentional infliction of emotional distress was barred because the plaintiff basically sued the defendant for \u201cwil-fully taking away her husband\u201d and stating the legislature immunized that conduct from tort liability)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"533 A.2d 1358, 1360-61","parenthetical":"barring claims for breach of contract and fiduciary duty because the \"basis of the action was the destruction of the marriage and the injuries allegedly arising from it\"","sentence":"See Destefano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275, 278, 288 (Colo.1988) (finding claims for mental pain and suffering, based on theories of negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress, \u201cplainly set forth claims for alienation of affections and criminal conversation\u201d); Gasper v. Lighthouse, Inc., 73 Md.App. 367, 533 A.2d 1358, 1360-61 (1987) (barring claims for breach of contract and fiduciary duty because the \u201cbasis of the action was the destruction of the marriage and the injuries allegedly arising from it\u201d), cert. denied, 311 Md. 718, 537 A.2d 272 (1988); Nicholson v. Han, 12 Mich.App. 35, 162 N.W.2d 313, 317 (1968) (concluding the plaintiff could not maintain his action for breach of contract because the claimed damages, pain and suffering, demonstrated his reliance on a prohibited tort theory); Strock v. Pressnell, 38 Ohio St.3d 207, 527 N.E.2d 1235, 1242-43 (1988) (declining to consider an intentional infliction of emotional distress action, in which the plaintiff sought damages for \u201canguish, shock, nervousness, and depression,\u201d because the abolition of claims for alienation of affections was intended to preclude these allegations); see also Wilson v. Still, 819 P.2d 714, 716 (Okla.1991) (finding a suit for intentional infliction of emotional distress was barred because the plaintiff basically sued the defendant for \u201cwil-fully taking away her husband\u201d and stating the legislature immunized that conduct from tort liability)."},"case_id":10694671,"label":"b"}
{"context":"R.E.R. alleges he continues to suffer severe mental and emotional distress as a result of the minister's actions, which \"imposed upon [him] the difficulties of dealing with spousal guilt, depression, unhappiness, and low self-esteem\" and led to poor work performance, the termination of his employment, an unprofitable career change, and related medical expenses. Because these losses flow from the alienation of his former wife's affections, they generally are no longer recoverable because the legislature has outlawed heart balm actions.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding a plaintiff could proceed on a claim alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress because the alleged losses were different from those for seduction, but also stating plaintiffs previously suing for seduction could recover for damage to character and reputation as well as for mental anguish and pecuniary losses","sentence":"But see Erickson v. Christenson, 99 Or.App. 104, 781 P.2d 383, 385-86 (1989) (holding a plaintiff could proceed on a claim alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress because the alleged losses were different from those for seduction, but also stating plaintiffs previously suing for seduction could recover for damage to character and reputation as well as for mental anguish and pecuniary losses), appeal dismissed, 311 Or. 266, 817 P.2d 758 (1991)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"533 A.2d 1358, 1360-61","parenthetical":"barring claims for breach of contract and fiduciary duty because the \"basis of the action was the destruction of the marriage and the injuries allegedly arising from it\"","sentence":"See Destefano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275, 278, 288 (Colo.1988) (finding claims for mental pain and suffering, based on theories of negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress, \u201cplainly set forth claims for alienation of affections and criminal conversation\u201d); Gasper v. Lighthouse, Inc., 73 Md.App. 367, 533 A.2d 1358, 1360-61 (1987) (barring claims for breach of contract and fiduciary duty because the \u201cbasis of the action was the destruction of the marriage and the injuries allegedly arising from it\u201d), cert. denied, 311 Md. 718, 537 A.2d 272 (1988); Nicholson v. Han, 12 Mich.App. 35, 162 N.W.2d 313, 317 (1968) (concluding the plaintiff could not maintain his action for breach of contract because the claimed damages, pain and suffering, demonstrated his reliance on a prohibited tort theory); Strock v. Pressnell, 38 Ohio St.3d 207, 527 N.E.2d 1235, 1242-43 (1988) (declining to consider an intentional infliction of emotional distress action, in which the plaintiff sought damages for \u201canguish, shock, nervousness, and depression,\u201d because the abolition of claims for alienation of affections was intended to preclude these allegations); see also Wilson v. Still, 819 P.2d 714, 716 (Okla.1991) (finding a suit for intentional infliction of emotional distress was barred because the plaintiff basically sued the defendant for \u201cwil-fully taking away her husband\u201d and stating the legislature immunized that conduct from tort liability)."},"case_id":10694671,"label":"b"}
{"context":"R.E.R. alleges he continues to suffer severe mental and emotional distress as a result of the minister's actions, which \"imposed upon [him] the difficulties of dealing with spousal guilt, depression, unhappiness, and low self-esteem\" and led to poor work performance, the termination of his employment, an unprofitable career change, and related medical expenses. Because these losses flow from the alienation of his former wife's affections, they generally are no longer recoverable because the legislature has outlawed heart balm actions.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"533 A.2d 1358, 1360-61","parenthetical":"barring claims for breach of contract and fiduciary duty because the \"basis of the action was the destruction of the marriage and the injuries allegedly arising from it\"","sentence":"See Destefano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275, 278, 288 (Colo.1988) (finding claims for mental pain and suffering, based on theories of negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress, \u201cplainly set forth claims for alienation of affections and criminal conversation\u201d); Gasper v. Lighthouse, Inc., 73 Md.App. 367, 533 A.2d 1358, 1360-61 (1987) (barring claims for breach of contract and fiduciary duty because the \u201cbasis of the action was the destruction of the marriage and the injuries allegedly arising from it\u201d), cert. denied, 311 Md. 718, 537 A.2d 272 (1988); Nicholson v. Han, 12 Mich.App. 35, 162 N.W.2d 313, 317 (1968) (concluding the plaintiff could not maintain his action for breach of contract because the claimed damages, pain and suffering, demonstrated his reliance on a prohibited tort theory); Strock v. Pressnell, 38 Ohio St.3d 207, 527 N.E.2d 1235, 1242-43 (1988) (declining to consider an intentional infliction of emotional distress action, in which the plaintiff sought damages for \u201canguish, shock, nervousness, and depression,\u201d because the abolition of claims for alienation of affections was intended to preclude these allegations); see also Wilson v. Still, 819 P.2d 714, 716 (Okla.1991) (finding a suit for intentional infliction of emotional distress was barred because the plaintiff basically sued the defendant for \u201cwil-fully taking away her husband\u201d and stating the legislature immunized that conduct from tort liability)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"781 P.2d 383, 385-86","parenthetical":"holding a plaintiff could proceed on a claim alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress because the alleged losses were different from those for seduction, but also stating plaintiffs previously suing for seduction could recover for damage to character and reputation as well as for mental anguish and pecuniary losses","sentence":"But see Erickson v. Christenson, 99 Or.App. 104, 781 P.2d 383, 385-86 (1989) (holding a plaintiff could proceed on a claim alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress because the alleged losses were different from those for seduction, but also stating plaintiffs previously suing for seduction could recover for damage to character and reputation as well as for mental anguish and pecuniary losses), appeal dismissed, 311 Or. 266, 817 P.2d 758 (1991)."},"case_id":10694671,"label":"a"}
{"context":"R.E.R. alleges he continues to suffer severe mental and emotional distress as a result of the minister's actions, which \"imposed upon [him] the difficulties of dealing with spousal guilt, depression, unhappiness, and low self-esteem\" and led to poor work performance, the termination of his employment, an unprofitable career change, and related medical expenses. Because these losses flow from the alienation of his former wife's affections, they generally are no longer recoverable because the legislature has outlawed heart balm actions.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding a plaintiff could proceed on a claim alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress because the alleged losses were different from those for seduction, but also stating plaintiffs previously suing for seduction could recover for damage to character and reputation as well as for mental anguish and pecuniary losses","sentence":"But see Erickson v. Christenson, 99 Or.App. 104, 781 P.2d 383, 385-86 (1989) (holding a plaintiff could proceed on a claim alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress because the alleged losses were different from those for seduction, but also stating plaintiffs previously suing for seduction could recover for damage to character and reputation as well as for mental anguish and pecuniary losses), appeal dismissed, 311 Or. 266, 817 P.2d 758 (1991)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"533 A.2d 1358, 1360-61","parenthetical":"barring claims for breach of contract and fiduciary duty because the \"basis of the action was the destruction of the marriage and the injuries allegedly arising from it\"","sentence":"See Destefano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275, 278, 288 (Colo.1988) (finding claims for mental pain and suffering, based on theories of negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress, \u201cplainly set forth claims for alienation of affections and criminal conversation\u201d); Gasper v. Lighthouse, Inc., 73 Md.App. 367, 533 A.2d 1358, 1360-61 (1987) (barring claims for breach of contract and fiduciary duty because the \u201cbasis of the action was the destruction of the marriage and the injuries allegedly arising from it\u201d), cert. denied, 311 Md. 718, 537 A.2d 272 (1988); Nicholson v. Han, 12 Mich.App. 35, 162 N.W.2d 313, 317 (1968) (concluding the plaintiff could not maintain his action for breach of contract because the claimed damages, pain and suffering, demonstrated his reliance on a prohibited tort theory); Strock v. Pressnell, 38 Ohio St.3d 207, 527 N.E.2d 1235, 1242-43 (1988) (declining to consider an intentional infliction of emotional distress action, in which the plaintiff sought damages for \u201canguish, shock, nervousness, and depression,\u201d because the abolition of claims for alienation of affections was intended to preclude these allegations); see also Wilson v. Still, 819 P.2d 714, 716 (Okla.1991) (finding a suit for intentional infliction of emotional distress was barred because the plaintiff basically sued the defendant for \u201cwil-fully taking away her husband\u201d and stating the legislature immunized that conduct from tort liability)."},"case_id":10694671,"label":"b"}
{"context":"R.E.R. alleges he continues to suffer severe mental and emotional distress as a result of the minister's actions, which \"imposed upon [him] the difficulties of dealing with spousal guilt, depression, unhappiness, and low self-esteem\" and led to poor work performance, the termination of his employment, an unprofitable career change, and related medical expenses. Because these losses flow from the alienation of his former wife's affections, they generally are no longer recoverable because the legislature has outlawed heart balm actions.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"533 A.2d 1358, 1360-61","parenthetical":"barring claims for breach of contract and fiduciary duty because the \"basis of the action was the destruction of the marriage and the injuries allegedly arising from it\"","sentence":"See Destefano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275, 278, 288 (Colo.1988) (finding claims for mental pain and suffering, based on theories of negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress, \u201cplainly set forth claims for alienation of affections and criminal conversation\u201d); Gasper v. Lighthouse, Inc., 73 Md.App. 367, 533 A.2d 1358, 1360-61 (1987) (barring claims for breach of contract and fiduciary duty because the \u201cbasis of the action was the destruction of the marriage and the injuries allegedly arising from it\u201d), cert. denied, 311 Md. 718, 537 A.2d 272 (1988); Nicholson v. Han, 12 Mich.App. 35, 162 N.W.2d 313, 317 (1968) (concluding the plaintiff could not maintain his action for breach of contract because the claimed damages, pain and suffering, demonstrated his reliance on a prohibited tort theory); Strock v. Pressnell, 38 Ohio St.3d 207, 527 N.E.2d 1235, 1242-43 (1988) (declining to consider an intentional infliction of emotional distress action, in which the plaintiff sought damages for \u201canguish, shock, nervousness, and depression,\u201d because the abolition of claims for alienation of affections was intended to preclude these allegations); see also Wilson v. Still, 819 P.2d 714, 716 (Okla.1991) (finding a suit for intentional infliction of emotional distress was barred because the plaintiff basically sued the defendant for \u201cwil-fully taking away her husband\u201d and stating the legislature immunized that conduct from tort liability)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding a plaintiff could proceed on a claim alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress because the alleged losses were different from those for seduction, but also stating plaintiffs previously suing for seduction could recover for damage to character and reputation as well as for mental anguish and pecuniary losses","sentence":"But see Erickson v. Christenson, 99 Or.App. 104, 781 P.2d 383, 385-86 (1989) (holding a plaintiff could proceed on a claim alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress because the alleged losses were different from those for seduction, but also stating plaintiffs previously suing for seduction could recover for damage to character and reputation as well as for mental anguish and pecuniary losses), appeal dismissed, 311 Or. 266, 817 P.2d 758 (1991)."},"case_id":10694671,"label":"a"}
{"context":"R.E.R. alleges he continues to suffer severe mental and emotional distress as a result of the minister's actions, which \"imposed upon [him] the difficulties of dealing with spousal guilt, depression, unhappiness, and low self-esteem\" and led to poor work performance, the termination of his employment, an unprofitable career change, and related medical expenses. Because these losses flow from the alienation of his former wife's affections, they generally are no longer recoverable because the legislature has outlawed heart balm actions.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"barring claims for breach of contract and fiduciary duty because the \"basis of the action was the destruction of the marriage and the injuries allegedly arising from it\"","sentence":"See Destefano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275, 278, 288 (Colo.1988) (finding claims for mental pain and suffering, based on theories of negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress, \u201cplainly set forth claims for alienation of affections and criminal conversation\u201d); Gasper v. Lighthouse, Inc., 73 Md.App. 367, 533 A.2d 1358, 1360-61 (1987) (barring claims for breach of contract and fiduciary duty because the \u201cbasis of the action was the destruction of the marriage and the injuries allegedly arising from it\u201d), cert. denied, 311 Md. 718, 537 A.2d 272 (1988); Nicholson v. Han, 12 Mich.App. 35, 162 N.W.2d 313, 317 (1968) (concluding the plaintiff could not maintain his action for breach of contract because the claimed damages, pain and suffering, demonstrated his reliance on a prohibited tort theory); Strock v. Pressnell, 38 Ohio St.3d 207, 527 N.E.2d 1235, 1242-43 (1988) (declining to consider an intentional infliction of emotional distress action, in which the plaintiff sought damages for \u201canguish, shock, nervousness, and depression,\u201d because the abolition of claims for alienation of affections was intended to preclude these allegations); see also Wilson v. Still, 819 P.2d 714, 716 (Okla.1991) (finding a suit for intentional infliction of emotional distress was barred because the plaintiff basically sued the defendant for \u201cwil-fully taking away her husband\u201d and stating the legislature immunized that conduct from tort liability)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"819 P.2d 714, 716","parenthetical":"finding a suit for intentional infliction of emotional distress was barred because the plaintiff basically sued the defendant for \"wil-fully taking away her husband\" and stating the legislature immunized that conduct from tort liability","sentence":"See Destefano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275, 278, 288 (Colo.1988) (finding claims for mental pain and suffering, based on theories of negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress, \u201cplainly set forth claims for alienation of affections and criminal conversation\u201d); Gasper v. Lighthouse, Inc., 73 Md.App. 367, 533 A.2d 1358, 1360-61 (1987) (barring claims for breach of contract and fiduciary duty because the \u201cbasis of the action was the destruction of the marriage and the injuries allegedly arising from it\u201d), cert. denied, 311 Md. 718, 537 A.2d 272 (1988); Nicholson v. Han, 12 Mich.App. 35, 162 N.W.2d 313, 317 (1968) (concluding the plaintiff could not maintain his action for breach of contract because the claimed damages, pain and suffering, demonstrated his reliance on a prohibited tort theory); Strock v. Pressnell, 38 Ohio St.3d 207, 527 N.E.2d 1235, 1242-43 (1988) (declining to consider an intentional infliction of emotional distress action, in which the plaintiff sought damages for \u201canguish, shock, nervousness, and depression,\u201d because the abolition of claims for alienation of affections was intended to preclude these allegations); see also Wilson v. Still, 819 P.2d 714, 716 (Okla.1991) (finding a suit for intentional infliction of emotional distress was barred because the plaintiff basically sued the defendant for \u201cwil-fully taking away her husband\u201d and stating the legislature immunized that conduct from tort liability)."},"case_id":10694671,"label":"a"}
{"context":"R.E.R. alleges he continues to suffer severe mental and emotional distress as a result of the minister's actions, which \"imposed upon [him] the difficulties of dealing with spousal guilt, depression, unhappiness, and low self-esteem\" and led to poor work performance, the termination of his employment, an unprofitable career change, and related medical expenses. Because these losses flow from the alienation of his former wife's affections, they generally are no longer recoverable because the legislature has outlawed heart balm actions.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding a plaintiff could proceed on a claim alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress because the alleged losses were different from those for seduction, but also stating plaintiffs previously suing for seduction could recover for damage to character and reputation as well as for mental anguish and pecuniary losses","sentence":"But see Erickson v. Christenson, 99 Or.App. 104, 781 P.2d 383, 385-86 (1989) (holding a plaintiff could proceed on a claim alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress because the alleged losses were different from those for seduction, but also stating plaintiffs previously suing for seduction could recover for damage to character and reputation as well as for mental anguish and pecuniary losses), appeal dismissed, 311 Or. 266, 817 P.2d 758 (1991)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"barring claims for breach of contract and fiduciary duty because the \"basis of the action was the destruction of the marriage and the injuries allegedly arising from it\"","sentence":"See Destefano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275, 278, 288 (Colo.1988) (finding claims for mental pain and suffering, based on theories of negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress, \u201cplainly set forth claims for alienation of affections and criminal conversation\u201d); Gasper v. Lighthouse, Inc., 73 Md.App. 367, 533 A.2d 1358, 1360-61 (1987) (barring claims for breach of contract and fiduciary duty because the \u201cbasis of the action was the destruction of the marriage and the injuries allegedly arising from it\u201d), cert. denied, 311 Md. 718, 537 A.2d 272 (1988); Nicholson v. Han, 12 Mich.App. 35, 162 N.W.2d 313, 317 (1968) (concluding the plaintiff could not maintain his action for breach of contract because the claimed damages, pain and suffering, demonstrated his reliance on a prohibited tort theory); Strock v. Pressnell, 38 Ohio St.3d 207, 527 N.E.2d 1235, 1242-43 (1988) (declining to consider an intentional infliction of emotional distress action, in which the plaintiff sought damages for \u201canguish, shock, nervousness, and depression,\u201d because the abolition of claims for alienation of affections was intended to preclude these allegations); see also Wilson v. Still, 819 P.2d 714, 716 (Okla.1991) (finding a suit for intentional infliction of emotional distress was barred because the plaintiff basically sued the defendant for \u201cwil-fully taking away her husband\u201d and stating the legislature immunized that conduct from tort liability)."},"case_id":10694671,"label":"b"}
{"context":"R.E.R. alleges he continues to suffer severe mental and emotional distress as a result of the minister's actions, which \"imposed upon [him] the difficulties of dealing with spousal guilt, depression, unhappiness, and low self-esteem\" and led to poor work performance, the termination of his employment, an unprofitable career change, and related medical expenses. Because these losses flow from the alienation of his former wife's affections, they generally are no longer recoverable because the legislature has outlawed heart balm actions.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"781 P.2d 383, 385-86","parenthetical":"holding a plaintiff could proceed on a claim alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress because the alleged losses were different from those for seduction, but also stating plaintiffs previously suing for seduction could recover for damage to character and reputation as well as for mental anguish and pecuniary losses","sentence":"But see Erickson v. Christenson, 99 Or.App. 104, 781 P.2d 383, 385-86 (1989) (holding a plaintiff could proceed on a claim alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress because the alleged losses were different from those for seduction, but also stating plaintiffs previously suing for seduction could recover for damage to character and reputation as well as for mental anguish and pecuniary losses), appeal dismissed, 311 Or. 266, 817 P.2d 758 (1991)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"barring claims for breach of contract and fiduciary duty because the \"basis of the action was the destruction of the marriage and the injuries allegedly arising from it\"","sentence":"See Destefano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275, 278, 288 (Colo.1988) (finding claims for mental pain and suffering, based on theories of negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress, \u201cplainly set forth claims for alienation of affections and criminal conversation\u201d); Gasper v. Lighthouse, Inc., 73 Md.App. 367, 533 A.2d 1358, 1360-61 (1987) (barring claims for breach of contract and fiduciary duty because the \u201cbasis of the action was the destruction of the marriage and the injuries allegedly arising from it\u201d), cert. denied, 311 Md. 718, 537 A.2d 272 (1988); Nicholson v. Han, 12 Mich.App. 35, 162 N.W.2d 313, 317 (1968) (concluding the plaintiff could not maintain his action for breach of contract because the claimed damages, pain and suffering, demonstrated his reliance on a prohibited tort theory); Strock v. Pressnell, 38 Ohio St.3d 207, 527 N.E.2d 1235, 1242-43 (1988) (declining to consider an intentional infliction of emotional distress action, in which the plaintiff sought damages for \u201canguish, shock, nervousness, and depression,\u201d because the abolition of claims for alienation of affections was intended to preclude these allegations); see also Wilson v. Still, 819 P.2d 714, 716 (Okla.1991) (finding a suit for intentional infliction of emotional distress was barred because the plaintiff basically sued the defendant for \u201cwil-fully taking away her husband\u201d and stating the legislature immunized that conduct from tort liability)."},"case_id":10694671,"label":"b"}
{"context":"R.E.R. alleges he continues to suffer severe mental and emotional distress as a result of the minister's actions, which \"imposed upon [him] the difficulties of dealing with spousal guilt, depression, unhappiness, and low self-esteem\" and led to poor work performance, the termination of his employment, an unprofitable career change, and related medical expenses. Because these losses flow from the alienation of his former wife's affections, they generally are no longer recoverable because the legislature has outlawed heart balm actions.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"barring claims for breach of contract and fiduciary duty because the \"basis of the action was the destruction of the marriage and the injuries allegedly arising from it\"","sentence":"See Destefano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275, 278, 288 (Colo.1988) (finding claims for mental pain and suffering, based on theories of negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress, \u201cplainly set forth claims for alienation of affections and criminal conversation\u201d); Gasper v. Lighthouse, Inc., 73 Md.App. 367, 533 A.2d 1358, 1360-61 (1987) (barring claims for breach of contract and fiduciary duty because the \u201cbasis of the action was the destruction of the marriage and the injuries allegedly arising from it\u201d), cert. denied, 311 Md. 718, 537 A.2d 272 (1988); Nicholson v. Han, 12 Mich.App. 35, 162 N.W.2d 313, 317 (1968) (concluding the plaintiff could not maintain his action for breach of contract because the claimed damages, pain and suffering, demonstrated his reliance on a prohibited tort theory); Strock v. Pressnell, 38 Ohio St.3d 207, 527 N.E.2d 1235, 1242-43 (1988) (declining to consider an intentional infliction of emotional distress action, in which the plaintiff sought damages for \u201canguish, shock, nervousness, and depression,\u201d because the abolition of claims for alienation of affections was intended to preclude these allegations); see also Wilson v. Still, 819 P.2d 714, 716 (Okla.1991) (finding a suit for intentional infliction of emotional distress was barred because the plaintiff basically sued the defendant for \u201cwil-fully taking away her husband\u201d and stating the legislature immunized that conduct from tort liability)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding a plaintiff could proceed on a claim alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress because the alleged losses were different from those for seduction, but also stating plaintiffs previously suing for seduction could recover for damage to character and reputation as well as for mental anguish and pecuniary losses","sentence":"But see Erickson v. Christenson, 99 Or.App. 104, 781 P.2d 383, 385-86 (1989) (holding a plaintiff could proceed on a claim alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress because the alleged losses were different from those for seduction, but also stating plaintiffs previously suing for seduction could recover for damage to character and reputation as well as for mental anguish and pecuniary losses), appeal dismissed, 311 Or. 266, 817 P.2d 758 (1991)."},"case_id":10694671,"label":"a"}
{"context":"R.E.R. alleges he continues to suffer severe mental and emotional distress as a result of the minister's actions, which \"imposed upon [him] the difficulties of dealing with spousal guilt, depression, unhappiness, and low self-esteem\" and led to poor work performance, the termination of his employment, an unprofitable career change, and related medical expenses. Because these losses flow from the alienation of his former wife's affections, they generally are no longer recoverable because the legislature has outlawed heart balm actions.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding a plaintiff could proceed on a claim alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress because the alleged losses were different from those for seduction, but also stating plaintiffs previously suing for seduction could recover for damage to character and reputation as well as for mental anguish and pecuniary losses","sentence":"But see Erickson v. Christenson, 99 Or.App. 104, 781 P.2d 383, 385-86 (1989) (holding a plaintiff could proceed on a claim alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress because the alleged losses were different from those for seduction, but also stating plaintiffs previously suing for seduction could recover for damage to character and reputation as well as for mental anguish and pecuniary losses), appeal dismissed, 311 Or. 266, 817 P.2d 758 (1991)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"barring claims for breach of contract and fiduciary duty because the \"basis of the action was the destruction of the marriage and the injuries allegedly arising from it\"","sentence":"See Destefano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275, 278, 288 (Colo.1988) (finding claims for mental pain and suffering, based on theories of negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress, \u201cplainly set forth claims for alienation of affections and criminal conversation\u201d); Gasper v. Lighthouse, Inc., 73 Md.App. 367, 533 A.2d 1358, 1360-61 (1987) (barring claims for breach of contract and fiduciary duty because the \u201cbasis of the action was the destruction of the marriage and the injuries allegedly arising from it\u201d), cert. denied, 311 Md. 718, 537 A.2d 272 (1988); Nicholson v. Han, 12 Mich.App. 35, 162 N.W.2d 313, 317 (1968) (concluding the plaintiff could not maintain his action for breach of contract because the claimed damages, pain and suffering, demonstrated his reliance on a prohibited tort theory); Strock v. Pressnell, 38 Ohio St.3d 207, 527 N.E.2d 1235, 1242-43 (1988) (declining to consider an intentional infliction of emotional distress action, in which the plaintiff sought damages for \u201canguish, shock, nervousness, and depression,\u201d because the abolition of claims for alienation of affections was intended to preclude these allegations); see also Wilson v. Still, 819 P.2d 714, 716 (Okla.1991) (finding a suit for intentional infliction of emotional distress was barred because the plaintiff basically sued the defendant for \u201cwil-fully taking away her husband\u201d and stating the legislature immunized that conduct from tort liability)."},"case_id":10694671,"label":"b"}
{"context":"R.E.R. alleges he continues to suffer severe mental and emotional distress as a result of the minister's actions, which \"imposed upon [him] the difficulties of dealing with spousal guilt, depression, unhappiness, and low self-esteem\" and led to poor work performance, the termination of his employment, an unprofitable career change, and related medical expenses. Because these losses flow from the alienation of his former wife's affections, they generally are no longer recoverable because the legislature has outlawed heart balm actions.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"barring claims for breach of contract and fiduciary duty because the \"basis of the action was the destruction of the marriage and the injuries allegedly arising from it\"","sentence":"See Destefano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275, 278, 288 (Colo.1988) (finding claims for mental pain and suffering, based on theories of negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress, \u201cplainly set forth claims for alienation of affections and criminal conversation\u201d); Gasper v. Lighthouse, Inc., 73 Md.App. 367, 533 A.2d 1358, 1360-61 (1987) (barring claims for breach of contract and fiduciary duty because the \u201cbasis of the action was the destruction of the marriage and the injuries allegedly arising from it\u201d), cert. denied, 311 Md. 718, 537 A.2d 272 (1988); Nicholson v. Han, 12 Mich.App. 35, 162 N.W.2d 313, 317 (1968) (concluding the plaintiff could not maintain his action for breach of contract because the claimed damages, pain and suffering, demonstrated his reliance on a prohibited tort theory); Strock v. Pressnell, 38 Ohio St.3d 207, 527 N.E.2d 1235, 1242-43 (1988) (declining to consider an intentional infliction of emotional distress action, in which the plaintiff sought damages for \u201canguish, shock, nervousness, and depression,\u201d because the abolition of claims for alienation of affections was intended to preclude these allegations); see also Wilson v. Still, 819 P.2d 714, 716 (Okla.1991) (finding a suit for intentional infliction of emotional distress was barred because the plaintiff basically sued the defendant for \u201cwil-fully taking away her husband\u201d and stating the legislature immunized that conduct from tort liability)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"819 P.2d 714, 716","parenthetical":"finding a suit for intentional infliction of emotional distress was barred because the plaintiff basically sued the defendant for \"wil-fully taking away her husband\" and stating the legislature immunized that conduct from tort liability","sentence":"See Destefano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275, 278, 288 (Colo.1988) (finding claims for mental pain and suffering, based on theories of negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress, \u201cplainly set forth claims for alienation of affections and criminal conversation\u201d); Gasper v. Lighthouse, Inc., 73 Md.App. 367, 533 A.2d 1358, 1360-61 (1987) (barring claims for breach of contract and fiduciary duty because the \u201cbasis of the action was the destruction of the marriage and the injuries allegedly arising from it\u201d), cert. denied, 311 Md. 718, 537 A.2d 272 (1988); Nicholson v. Han, 12 Mich.App. 35, 162 N.W.2d 313, 317 (1968) (concluding the plaintiff could not maintain his action for breach of contract because the claimed damages, pain and suffering, demonstrated his reliance on a prohibited tort theory); Strock v. Pressnell, 38 Ohio St.3d 207, 527 N.E.2d 1235, 1242-43 (1988) (declining to consider an intentional infliction of emotional distress action, in which the plaintiff sought damages for \u201canguish, shock, nervousness, and depression,\u201d because the abolition of claims for alienation of affections was intended to preclude these allegations); see also Wilson v. Still, 819 P.2d 714, 716 (Okla.1991) (finding a suit for intentional infliction of emotional distress was barred because the plaintiff basically sued the defendant for \u201cwil-fully taking away her husband\u201d and stating the legislature immunized that conduct from tort liability)."},"case_id":10694671,"label":"a"}
{"context":"R.E.R. alleges he continues to suffer severe mental and emotional distress as a result of the minister's actions, which \"imposed upon [him] the difficulties of dealing with spousal guilt, depression, unhappiness, and low self-esteem\" and led to poor work performance, the termination of his employment, an unprofitable career change, and related medical expenses. Because these losses flow from the alienation of his former wife's affections, they generally are no longer recoverable because the legislature has outlawed heart balm actions.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding a plaintiff could proceed on a claim alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress because the alleged losses were different from those for seduction, but also stating plaintiffs previously suing for seduction could recover for damage to character and reputation as well as for mental anguish and pecuniary losses","sentence":"But see Erickson v. Christenson, 99 Or.App. 104, 781 P.2d 383, 385-86 (1989) (holding a plaintiff could proceed on a claim alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress because the alleged losses were different from those for seduction, but also stating plaintiffs previously suing for seduction could recover for damage to character and reputation as well as for mental anguish and pecuniary losses), appeal dismissed, 311 Or. 266, 817 P.2d 758 (1991)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"barring claims for breach of contract and fiduciary duty because the \"basis of the action was the destruction of the marriage and the injuries allegedly arising from it\"","sentence":"See Destefano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275, 278, 288 (Colo.1988) (finding claims for mental pain and suffering, based on theories of negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress, \u201cplainly set forth claims for alienation of affections and criminal conversation\u201d); Gasper v. Lighthouse, Inc., 73 Md.App. 367, 533 A.2d 1358, 1360-61 (1987) (barring claims for breach of contract and fiduciary duty because the \u201cbasis of the action was the destruction of the marriage and the injuries allegedly arising from it\u201d), cert. denied, 311 Md. 718, 537 A.2d 272 (1988); Nicholson v. Han, 12 Mich.App. 35, 162 N.W.2d 313, 317 (1968) (concluding the plaintiff could not maintain his action for breach of contract because the claimed damages, pain and suffering, demonstrated his reliance on a prohibited tort theory); Strock v. Pressnell, 38 Ohio St.3d 207, 527 N.E.2d 1235, 1242-43 (1988) (declining to consider an intentional infliction of emotional distress action, in which the plaintiff sought damages for \u201canguish, shock, nervousness, and depression,\u201d because the abolition of claims for alienation of affections was intended to preclude these allegations); see also Wilson v. Still, 819 P.2d 714, 716 (Okla.1991) (finding a suit for intentional infliction of emotional distress was barred because the plaintiff basically sued the defendant for \u201cwil-fully taking away her husband\u201d and stating the legislature immunized that conduct from tort liability)."},"case_id":10694671,"label":"b"}
{"context":"R.E.R. alleges he continues to suffer severe mental and emotional distress as a result of the minister's actions, which \"imposed upon [him] the difficulties of dealing with spousal guilt, depression, unhappiness, and low self-esteem\" and led to poor work performance, the termination of his employment, an unprofitable career change, and related medical expenses. Because these losses flow from the alienation of his former wife's affections, they generally are no longer recoverable because the legislature has outlawed heart balm actions.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"barring claims for breach of contract and fiduciary duty because the \"basis of the action was the destruction of the marriage and the injuries allegedly arising from it\"","sentence":"See Destefano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275, 278, 288 (Colo.1988) (finding claims for mental pain and suffering, based on theories of negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress, \u201cplainly set forth claims for alienation of affections and criminal conversation\u201d); Gasper v. Lighthouse, Inc., 73 Md.App. 367, 533 A.2d 1358, 1360-61 (1987) (barring claims for breach of contract and fiduciary duty because the \u201cbasis of the action was the destruction of the marriage and the injuries allegedly arising from it\u201d), cert. denied, 311 Md. 718, 537 A.2d 272 (1988); Nicholson v. Han, 12 Mich.App. 35, 162 N.W.2d 313, 317 (1968) (concluding the plaintiff could not maintain his action for breach of contract because the claimed damages, pain and suffering, demonstrated his reliance on a prohibited tort theory); Strock v. Pressnell, 38 Ohio St.3d 207, 527 N.E.2d 1235, 1242-43 (1988) (declining to consider an intentional infliction of emotional distress action, in which the plaintiff sought damages for \u201canguish, shock, nervousness, and depression,\u201d because the abolition of claims for alienation of affections was intended to preclude these allegations); see also Wilson v. Still, 819 P.2d 714, 716 (Okla.1991) (finding a suit for intentional infliction of emotional distress was barred because the plaintiff basically sued the defendant for \u201cwil-fully taking away her husband\u201d and stating the legislature immunized that conduct from tort liability)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"781 P.2d 383, 385-86","parenthetical":"holding a plaintiff could proceed on a claim alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress because the alleged losses were different from those for seduction, but also stating plaintiffs previously suing for seduction could recover for damage to character and reputation as well as for mental anguish and pecuniary losses","sentence":"But see Erickson v. Christenson, 99 Or.App. 104, 781 P.2d 383, 385-86 (1989) (holding a plaintiff could proceed on a claim alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress because the alleged losses were different from those for seduction, but also stating plaintiffs previously suing for seduction could recover for damage to character and reputation as well as for mental anguish and pecuniary losses), appeal dismissed, 311 Or. 266, 817 P.2d 758 (1991)."},"case_id":10694671,"label":"a"}
{"context":"R.E.R. alleges he continues to suffer severe mental and emotional distress as a result of the minister's actions, which \"imposed upon [him] the difficulties of dealing with spousal guilt, depression, unhappiness, and low self-esteem\" and led to poor work performance, the termination of his employment, an unprofitable career change, and related medical expenses. Because these losses flow from the alienation of his former wife's affections, they generally are no longer recoverable because the legislature has outlawed heart balm actions.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"barring claims for breach of contract and fiduciary duty because the \"basis of the action was the destruction of the marriage and the injuries allegedly arising from it\"","sentence":"See Destefano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275, 278, 288 (Colo.1988) (finding claims for mental pain and suffering, based on theories of negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress, \u201cplainly set forth claims for alienation of affections and criminal conversation\u201d); Gasper v. Lighthouse, Inc., 73 Md.App. 367, 533 A.2d 1358, 1360-61 (1987) (barring claims for breach of contract and fiduciary duty because the \u201cbasis of the action was the destruction of the marriage and the injuries allegedly arising from it\u201d), cert. denied, 311 Md. 718, 537 A.2d 272 (1988); Nicholson v. Han, 12 Mich.App. 35, 162 N.W.2d 313, 317 (1968) (concluding the plaintiff could not maintain his action for breach of contract because the claimed damages, pain and suffering, demonstrated his reliance on a prohibited tort theory); Strock v. Pressnell, 38 Ohio St.3d 207, 527 N.E.2d 1235, 1242-43 (1988) (declining to consider an intentional infliction of emotional distress action, in which the plaintiff sought damages for \u201canguish, shock, nervousness, and depression,\u201d because the abolition of claims for alienation of affections was intended to preclude these allegations); see also Wilson v. Still, 819 P.2d 714, 716 (Okla.1991) (finding a suit for intentional infliction of emotional distress was barred because the plaintiff basically sued the defendant for \u201cwil-fully taking away her husband\u201d and stating the legislature immunized that conduct from tort liability)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding a plaintiff could proceed on a claim alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress because the alleged losses were different from those for seduction, but also stating plaintiffs previously suing for seduction could recover for damage to character and reputation as well as for mental anguish and pecuniary losses","sentence":"But see Erickson v. Christenson, 99 Or.App. 104, 781 P.2d 383, 385-86 (1989) (holding a plaintiff could proceed on a claim alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress because the alleged losses were different from those for seduction, but also stating plaintiffs previously suing for seduction could recover for damage to character and reputation as well as for mental anguish and pecuniary losses), appeal dismissed, 311 Or. 266, 817 P.2d 758 (1991)."},"case_id":10694671,"label":"a"}
{"context":"R.E.R. alleges he continues to suffer severe mental and emotional distress as a result of the minister's actions, which \"imposed upon [him] the difficulties of dealing with spousal guilt, depression, unhappiness, and low self-esteem\" and led to poor work performance, the termination of his employment, an unprofitable career change, and related medical expenses. Because these losses flow from the alienation of his former wife's affections, they generally are no longer recoverable because the legislature has outlawed heart balm actions.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"barring claims for breach of contract and fiduciary duty because the \"basis of the action was the destruction of the marriage and the injuries allegedly arising from it\"","sentence":"See Destefano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275, 278, 288 (Colo.1988) (finding claims for mental pain and suffering, based on theories of negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress, \u201cplainly set forth claims for alienation of affections and criminal conversation\u201d); Gasper v. Lighthouse, Inc., 73 Md.App. 367, 533 A.2d 1358, 1360-61 (1987) (barring claims for breach of contract and fiduciary duty because the \u201cbasis of the action was the destruction of the marriage and the injuries allegedly arising from it\u201d), cert. denied, 311 Md. 718, 537 A.2d 272 (1988); Nicholson v. Han, 12 Mich.App. 35, 162 N.W.2d 313, 317 (1968) (concluding the plaintiff could not maintain his action for breach of contract because the claimed damages, pain and suffering, demonstrated his reliance on a prohibited tort theory); Strock v. Pressnell, 38 Ohio St.3d 207, 527 N.E.2d 1235, 1242-43 (1988) (declining to consider an intentional infliction of emotional distress action, in which the plaintiff sought damages for \u201canguish, shock, nervousness, and depression,\u201d because the abolition of claims for alienation of affections was intended to preclude these allegations); see also Wilson v. Still, 819 P.2d 714, 716 (Okla.1991) (finding a suit for intentional infliction of emotional distress was barred because the plaintiff basically sued the defendant for \u201cwil-fully taking away her husband\u201d and stating the legislature immunized that conduct from tort liability)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding a plaintiff could proceed on a claim alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress because the alleged losses were different from those for seduction, but also stating plaintiffs previously suing for seduction could recover for damage to character and reputation as well as for mental anguish and pecuniary losses","sentence":"But see Erickson v. Christenson, 99 Or.App. 104, 781 P.2d 383, 385-86 (1989) (holding a plaintiff could proceed on a claim alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress because the alleged losses were different from those for seduction, but also stating plaintiffs previously suing for seduction could recover for damage to character and reputation as well as for mental anguish and pecuniary losses), appeal dismissed, 311 Or. 266, 817 P.2d 758 (1991)."},"case_id":10694671,"label":"a"}
{"context":"R.E.R. alleges he continues to suffer severe mental and emotional distress as a result of the minister's actions, which \"imposed upon [him] the difficulties of dealing with spousal guilt, depression, unhappiness, and low self-esteem\" and led to poor work performance, the termination of his employment, an unprofitable career change, and related medical expenses. Because these losses flow from the alienation of his former wife's affections, they generally are no longer recoverable because the legislature has outlawed heart balm actions.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"819 P.2d 714, 716","parenthetical":"finding a suit for intentional infliction of emotional distress was barred because the plaintiff basically sued the defendant for \"wil-fully taking away her husband\" and stating the legislature immunized that conduct from tort liability","sentence":"See Destefano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275, 278, 288 (Colo.1988) (finding claims for mental pain and suffering, based on theories of negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress, \u201cplainly set forth claims for alienation of affections and criminal conversation\u201d); Gasper v. Lighthouse, Inc., 73 Md.App. 367, 533 A.2d 1358, 1360-61 (1987) (barring claims for breach of contract and fiduciary duty because the \u201cbasis of the action was the destruction of the marriage and the injuries allegedly arising from it\u201d), cert. denied, 311 Md. 718, 537 A.2d 272 (1988); Nicholson v. Han, 12 Mich.App. 35, 162 N.W.2d 313, 317 (1968) (concluding the plaintiff could not maintain his action for breach of contract because the claimed damages, pain and suffering, demonstrated his reliance on a prohibited tort theory); Strock v. Pressnell, 38 Ohio St.3d 207, 527 N.E.2d 1235, 1242-43 (1988) (declining to consider an intentional infliction of emotional distress action, in which the plaintiff sought damages for \u201canguish, shock, nervousness, and depression,\u201d because the abolition of claims for alienation of affections was intended to preclude these allegations); see also Wilson v. Still, 819 P.2d 714, 716 (Okla.1991) (finding a suit for intentional infliction of emotional distress was barred because the plaintiff basically sued the defendant for \u201cwil-fully taking away her husband\u201d and stating the legislature immunized that conduct from tort liability)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"concluding the plaintiff could not maintain his action for breach of contract because the claimed damages, pain and suffering, demonstrated his reliance on a prohibited tort theory","sentence":"See Destefano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275, 278, 288 (Colo.1988) (finding claims for mental pain and suffering, based on theories of negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress, \u201cplainly set forth claims for alienation of affections and criminal conversation\u201d); Gasper v. Lighthouse, Inc., 73 Md.App. 367, 533 A.2d 1358, 1360-61 (1987) (barring claims for breach of contract and fiduciary duty because the \u201cbasis of the action was the destruction of the marriage and the injuries allegedly arising from it\u201d), cert. denied, 311 Md. 718, 537 A.2d 272 (1988); Nicholson v. Han, 12 Mich.App. 35, 162 N.W.2d 313, 317 (1968) (concluding the plaintiff could not maintain his action for breach of contract because the claimed damages, pain and suffering, demonstrated his reliance on a prohibited tort theory); Strock v. Pressnell, 38 Ohio St.3d 207, 527 N.E.2d 1235, 1242-43 (1988) (declining to consider an intentional infliction of emotional distress action, in which the plaintiff sought damages for \u201canguish, shock, nervousness, and depression,\u201d because the abolition of claims for alienation of affections was intended to preclude these allegations); see also Wilson v. Still, 819 P.2d 714, 716 (Okla.1991) (finding a suit for intentional infliction of emotional distress was barred because the plaintiff basically sued the defendant for \u201cwil-fully taking away her husband\u201d and stating the legislature immunized that conduct from tort liability)."},"case_id":10694671,"label":"b"}
{"context":"R.E.R. alleges he continues to suffer severe mental and emotional distress as a result of the minister's actions, which \"imposed upon [him] the difficulties of dealing with spousal guilt, depression, unhappiness, and low self-esteem\" and led to poor work performance, the termination of his employment, an unprofitable career change, and related medical expenses. Because these losses flow from the alienation of his former wife's affections, they generally are no longer recoverable because the legislature has outlawed heart balm actions.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding a plaintiff could proceed on a claim alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress because the alleged losses were different from those for seduction, but also stating plaintiffs previously suing for seduction could recover for damage to character and reputation as well as for mental anguish and pecuniary losses","sentence":"But see Erickson v. Christenson, 99 Or.App. 104, 781 P.2d 383, 385-86 (1989) (holding a plaintiff could proceed on a claim alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress because the alleged losses were different from those for seduction, but also stating plaintiffs previously suing for seduction could recover for damage to character and reputation as well as for mental anguish and pecuniary losses), appeal dismissed, 311 Or. 266, 817 P.2d 758 (1991)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"concluding the plaintiff could not maintain his action for breach of contract because the claimed damages, pain and suffering, demonstrated his reliance on a prohibited tort theory","sentence":"See Destefano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275, 278, 288 (Colo.1988) (finding claims for mental pain and suffering, based on theories of negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress, \u201cplainly set forth claims for alienation of affections and criminal conversation\u201d); Gasper v. Lighthouse, Inc., 73 Md.App. 367, 533 A.2d 1358, 1360-61 (1987) (barring claims for breach of contract and fiduciary duty because the \u201cbasis of the action was the destruction of the marriage and the injuries allegedly arising from it\u201d), cert. denied, 311 Md. 718, 537 A.2d 272 (1988); Nicholson v. Han, 12 Mich.App. 35, 162 N.W.2d 313, 317 (1968) (concluding the plaintiff could not maintain his action for breach of contract because the claimed damages, pain and suffering, demonstrated his reliance on a prohibited tort theory); Strock v. Pressnell, 38 Ohio St.3d 207, 527 N.E.2d 1235, 1242-43 (1988) (declining to consider an intentional infliction of emotional distress action, in which the plaintiff sought damages for \u201canguish, shock, nervousness, and depression,\u201d because the abolition of claims for alienation of affections was intended to preclude these allegations); see also Wilson v. Still, 819 P.2d 714, 716 (Okla.1991) (finding a suit for intentional infliction of emotional distress was barred because the plaintiff basically sued the defendant for \u201cwil-fully taking away her husband\u201d and stating the legislature immunized that conduct from tort liability)."},"case_id":10694671,"label":"b"}
{"context":"R.E.R. alleges he continues to suffer severe mental and emotional distress as a result of the minister's actions, which \"imposed upon [him] the difficulties of dealing with spousal guilt, depression, unhappiness, and low self-esteem\" and led to poor work performance, the termination of his employment, an unprofitable career change, and related medical expenses. Because these losses flow from the alienation of his former wife's affections, they generally are no longer recoverable because the legislature has outlawed heart balm actions.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"concluding the plaintiff could not maintain his action for breach of contract because the claimed damages, pain and suffering, demonstrated his reliance on a prohibited tort theory","sentence":"See Destefano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275, 278, 288 (Colo.1988) (finding claims for mental pain and suffering, based on theories of negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress, \u201cplainly set forth claims for alienation of affections and criminal conversation\u201d); Gasper v. Lighthouse, Inc., 73 Md.App. 367, 533 A.2d 1358, 1360-61 (1987) (barring claims for breach of contract and fiduciary duty because the \u201cbasis of the action was the destruction of the marriage and the injuries allegedly arising from it\u201d), cert. denied, 311 Md. 718, 537 A.2d 272 (1988); Nicholson v. Han, 12 Mich.App. 35, 162 N.W.2d 313, 317 (1968) (concluding the plaintiff could not maintain his action for breach of contract because the claimed damages, pain and suffering, demonstrated his reliance on a prohibited tort theory); Strock v. Pressnell, 38 Ohio St.3d 207, 527 N.E.2d 1235, 1242-43 (1988) (declining to consider an intentional infliction of emotional distress action, in which the plaintiff sought damages for \u201canguish, shock, nervousness, and depression,\u201d because the abolition of claims for alienation of affections was intended to preclude these allegations); see also Wilson v. Still, 819 P.2d 714, 716 (Okla.1991) (finding a suit for intentional infliction of emotional distress was barred because the plaintiff basically sued the defendant for \u201cwil-fully taking away her husband\u201d and stating the legislature immunized that conduct from tort liability)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"781 P.2d 383, 385-86","parenthetical":"holding a plaintiff could proceed on a claim alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress because the alleged losses were different from those for seduction, but also stating plaintiffs previously suing for seduction could recover for damage to character and reputation as well as for mental anguish and pecuniary losses","sentence":"But see Erickson v. Christenson, 99 Or.App. 104, 781 P.2d 383, 385-86 (1989) (holding a plaintiff could proceed on a claim alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress because the alleged losses were different from those for seduction, but also stating plaintiffs previously suing for seduction could recover for damage to character and reputation as well as for mental anguish and pecuniary losses), appeal dismissed, 311 Or. 266, 817 P.2d 758 (1991)."},"case_id":10694671,"label":"a"}
{"context":"R.E.R. alleges he continues to suffer severe mental and emotional distress as a result of the minister's actions, which \"imposed upon [him] the difficulties of dealing with spousal guilt, depression, unhappiness, and low self-esteem\" and led to poor work performance, the termination of his employment, an unprofitable career change, and related medical expenses. Because these losses flow from the alienation of his former wife's affections, they generally are no longer recoverable because the legislature has outlawed heart balm actions.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"concluding the plaintiff could not maintain his action for breach of contract because the claimed damages, pain and suffering, demonstrated his reliance on a prohibited tort theory","sentence":"See Destefano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275, 278, 288 (Colo.1988) (finding claims for mental pain and suffering, based on theories of negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress, \u201cplainly set forth claims for alienation of affections and criminal conversation\u201d); Gasper v. Lighthouse, Inc., 73 Md.App. 367, 533 A.2d 1358, 1360-61 (1987) (barring claims for breach of contract and fiduciary duty because the \u201cbasis of the action was the destruction of the marriage and the injuries allegedly arising from it\u201d), cert. denied, 311 Md. 718, 537 A.2d 272 (1988); Nicholson v. Han, 12 Mich.App. 35, 162 N.W.2d 313, 317 (1968) (concluding the plaintiff could not maintain his action for breach of contract because the claimed damages, pain and suffering, demonstrated his reliance on a prohibited tort theory); Strock v. Pressnell, 38 Ohio St.3d 207, 527 N.E.2d 1235, 1242-43 (1988) (declining to consider an intentional infliction of emotional distress action, in which the plaintiff sought damages for \u201canguish, shock, nervousness, and depression,\u201d because the abolition of claims for alienation of affections was intended to preclude these allegations); see also Wilson v. Still, 819 P.2d 714, 716 (Okla.1991) (finding a suit for intentional infliction of emotional distress was barred because the plaintiff basically sued the defendant for \u201cwil-fully taking away her husband\u201d and stating the legislature immunized that conduct from tort liability)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding a plaintiff could proceed on a claim alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress because the alleged losses were different from those for seduction, but also stating plaintiffs previously suing for seduction could recover for damage to character and reputation as well as for mental anguish and pecuniary losses","sentence":"But see Erickson v. Christenson, 99 Or.App. 104, 781 P.2d 383, 385-86 (1989) (holding a plaintiff could proceed on a claim alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress because the alleged losses were different from those for seduction, but also stating plaintiffs previously suing for seduction could recover for damage to character and reputation as well as for mental anguish and pecuniary losses), appeal dismissed, 311 Or. 266, 817 P.2d 758 (1991)."},"case_id":10694671,"label":"a"}
{"context":"R.E.R. alleges he continues to suffer severe mental and emotional distress as a result of the minister's actions, which \"imposed upon [him] the difficulties of dealing with spousal guilt, depression, unhappiness, and low self-esteem\" and led to poor work performance, the termination of his employment, an unprofitable career change, and related medical expenses. Because these losses flow from the alienation of his former wife's affections, they generally are no longer recoverable because the legislature has outlawed heart balm actions.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"concluding the plaintiff could not maintain his action for breach of contract because the claimed damages, pain and suffering, demonstrated his reliance on a prohibited tort theory","sentence":"See Destefano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275, 278, 288 (Colo.1988) (finding claims for mental pain and suffering, based on theories of negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress, \u201cplainly set forth claims for alienation of affections and criminal conversation\u201d); Gasper v. Lighthouse, Inc., 73 Md.App. 367, 533 A.2d 1358, 1360-61 (1987) (barring claims for breach of contract and fiduciary duty because the \u201cbasis of the action was the destruction of the marriage and the injuries allegedly arising from it\u201d), cert. denied, 311 Md. 718, 537 A.2d 272 (1988); Nicholson v. Han, 12 Mich.App. 35, 162 N.W.2d 313, 317 (1968) (concluding the plaintiff could not maintain his action for breach of contract because the claimed damages, pain and suffering, demonstrated his reliance on a prohibited tort theory); Strock v. Pressnell, 38 Ohio St.3d 207, 527 N.E.2d 1235, 1242-43 (1988) (declining to consider an intentional infliction of emotional distress action, in which the plaintiff sought damages for \u201canguish, shock, nervousness, and depression,\u201d because the abolition of claims for alienation of affections was intended to preclude these allegations); see also Wilson v. Still, 819 P.2d 714, 716 (Okla.1991) (finding a suit for intentional infliction of emotional distress was barred because the plaintiff basically sued the defendant for \u201cwil-fully taking away her husband\u201d and stating the legislature immunized that conduct from tort liability)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding a plaintiff could proceed on a claim alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress because the alleged losses were different from those for seduction, but also stating plaintiffs previously suing for seduction could recover for damage to character and reputation as well as for mental anguish and pecuniary losses","sentence":"But see Erickson v. Christenson, 99 Or.App. 104, 781 P.2d 383, 385-86 (1989) (holding a plaintiff could proceed on a claim alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress because the alleged losses were different from those for seduction, but also stating plaintiffs previously suing for seduction could recover for damage to character and reputation as well as for mental anguish and pecuniary losses), appeal dismissed, 311 Or. 266, 817 P.2d 758 (1991)."},"case_id":10694671,"label":"a"}
{"context":"R.E.R. alleges he continues to suffer severe mental and emotional distress as a result of the minister's actions, which \"imposed upon [him] the difficulties of dealing with spousal guilt, depression, unhappiness, and low self-esteem\" and led to poor work performance, the termination of his employment, an unprofitable career change, and related medical expenses. Because these losses flow from the alienation of his former wife's affections, they generally are no longer recoverable because the legislature has outlawed heart balm actions.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"819 P.2d 714, 716","parenthetical":"finding a suit for intentional infliction of emotional distress was barred because the plaintiff basically sued the defendant for \"wil-fully taking away her husband\" and stating the legislature immunized that conduct from tort liability","sentence":"See Destefano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275, 278, 288 (Colo.1988) (finding claims for mental pain and suffering, based on theories of negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress, \u201cplainly set forth claims for alienation of affections and criminal conversation\u201d); Gasper v. Lighthouse, Inc., 73 Md.App. 367, 533 A.2d 1358, 1360-61 (1987) (barring claims for breach of contract and fiduciary duty because the \u201cbasis of the action was the destruction of the marriage and the injuries allegedly arising from it\u201d), cert. denied, 311 Md. 718, 537 A.2d 272 (1988); Nicholson v. Han, 12 Mich.App. 35, 162 N.W.2d 313, 317 (1968) (concluding the plaintiff could not maintain his action for breach of contract because the claimed damages, pain and suffering, demonstrated his reliance on a prohibited tort theory); Strock v. Pressnell, 38 Ohio St.3d 207, 527 N.E.2d 1235, 1242-43 (1988) (declining to consider an intentional infliction of emotional distress action, in which the plaintiff sought damages for \u201canguish, shock, nervousness, and depression,\u201d because the abolition of claims for alienation of affections was intended to preclude these allegations); see also Wilson v. Still, 819 P.2d 714, 716 (Okla.1991) (finding a suit for intentional infliction of emotional distress was barred because the plaintiff basically sued the defendant for \u201cwil-fully taking away her husband\u201d and stating the legislature immunized that conduct from tort liability)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"162 N.W.2d 313, 317","parenthetical":"concluding the plaintiff could not maintain his action for breach of contract because the claimed damages, pain and suffering, demonstrated his reliance on a prohibited tort theory","sentence":"See Destefano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275, 278, 288 (Colo.1988) (finding claims for mental pain and suffering, based on theories of negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress, \u201cplainly set forth claims for alienation of affections and criminal conversation\u201d); Gasper v. Lighthouse, Inc., 73 Md.App. 367, 533 A.2d 1358, 1360-61 (1987) (barring claims for breach of contract and fiduciary duty because the \u201cbasis of the action was the destruction of the marriage and the injuries allegedly arising from it\u201d), cert. denied, 311 Md. 718, 537 A.2d 272 (1988); Nicholson v. Han, 12 Mich.App. 35, 162 N.W.2d 313, 317 (1968) (concluding the plaintiff could not maintain his action for breach of contract because the claimed damages, pain and suffering, demonstrated his reliance on a prohibited tort theory); Strock v. Pressnell, 38 Ohio St.3d 207, 527 N.E.2d 1235, 1242-43 (1988) (declining to consider an intentional infliction of emotional distress action, in which the plaintiff sought damages for \u201canguish, shock, nervousness, and depression,\u201d because the abolition of claims for alienation of affections was intended to preclude these allegations); see also Wilson v. Still, 819 P.2d 714, 716 (Okla.1991) (finding a suit for intentional infliction of emotional distress was barred because the plaintiff basically sued the defendant for \u201cwil-fully taking away her husband\u201d and stating the legislature immunized that conduct from tort liability)."},"case_id":10694671,"label":"b"}
{"context":"R.E.R. alleges he continues to suffer severe mental and emotional distress as a result of the minister's actions, which \"imposed upon [him] the difficulties of dealing with spousal guilt, depression, unhappiness, and low self-esteem\" and led to poor work performance, the termination of his employment, an unprofitable career change, and related medical expenses. Because these losses flow from the alienation of his former wife's affections, they generally are no longer recoverable because the legislature has outlawed heart balm actions.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding a plaintiff could proceed on a claim alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress because the alleged losses were different from those for seduction, but also stating plaintiffs previously suing for seduction could recover for damage to character and reputation as well as for mental anguish and pecuniary losses","sentence":"But see Erickson v. Christenson, 99 Or.App. 104, 781 P.2d 383, 385-86 (1989) (holding a plaintiff could proceed on a claim alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress because the alleged losses were different from those for seduction, but also stating plaintiffs previously suing for seduction could recover for damage to character and reputation as well as for mental anguish and pecuniary losses), appeal dismissed, 311 Or. 266, 817 P.2d 758 (1991)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"162 N.W.2d 313, 317","parenthetical":"concluding the plaintiff could not maintain his action for breach of contract because the claimed damages, pain and suffering, demonstrated his reliance on a prohibited tort theory","sentence":"See Destefano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275, 278, 288 (Colo.1988) (finding claims for mental pain and suffering, based on theories of negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress, \u201cplainly set forth claims for alienation of affections and criminal conversation\u201d); Gasper v. Lighthouse, Inc., 73 Md.App. 367, 533 A.2d 1358, 1360-61 (1987) (barring claims for breach of contract and fiduciary duty because the \u201cbasis of the action was the destruction of the marriage and the injuries allegedly arising from it\u201d), cert. denied, 311 Md. 718, 537 A.2d 272 (1988); Nicholson v. Han, 12 Mich.App. 35, 162 N.W.2d 313, 317 (1968) (concluding the plaintiff could not maintain his action for breach of contract because the claimed damages, pain and suffering, demonstrated his reliance on a prohibited tort theory); Strock v. Pressnell, 38 Ohio St.3d 207, 527 N.E.2d 1235, 1242-43 (1988) (declining to consider an intentional infliction of emotional distress action, in which the plaintiff sought damages for \u201canguish, shock, nervousness, and depression,\u201d because the abolition of claims for alienation of affections was intended to preclude these allegations); see also Wilson v. Still, 819 P.2d 714, 716 (Okla.1991) (finding a suit for intentional infliction of emotional distress was barred because the plaintiff basically sued the defendant for \u201cwil-fully taking away her husband\u201d and stating the legislature immunized that conduct from tort liability)."},"case_id":10694671,"label":"b"}
{"context":"R.E.R. alleges he continues to suffer severe mental and emotional distress as a result of the minister's actions, which \"imposed upon [him] the difficulties of dealing with spousal guilt, depression, unhappiness, and low self-esteem\" and led to poor work performance, the termination of his employment, an unprofitable career change, and related medical expenses. Because these losses flow from the alienation of his former wife's affections, they generally are no longer recoverable because the legislature has outlawed heart balm actions.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"781 P.2d 383, 385-86","parenthetical":"holding a plaintiff could proceed on a claim alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress because the alleged losses were different from those for seduction, but also stating plaintiffs previously suing for seduction could recover for damage to character and reputation as well as for mental anguish and pecuniary losses","sentence":"But see Erickson v. Christenson, 99 Or.App. 104, 781 P.2d 383, 385-86 (1989) (holding a plaintiff could proceed on a claim alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress because the alleged losses were different from those for seduction, but also stating plaintiffs previously suing for seduction could recover for damage to character and reputation as well as for mental anguish and pecuniary losses), appeal dismissed, 311 Or. 266, 817 P.2d 758 (1991)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"162 N.W.2d 313, 317","parenthetical":"concluding the plaintiff could not maintain his action for breach of contract because the claimed damages, pain and suffering, demonstrated his reliance on a prohibited tort theory","sentence":"See Destefano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275, 278, 288 (Colo.1988) (finding claims for mental pain and suffering, based on theories of negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress, \u201cplainly set forth claims for alienation of affections and criminal conversation\u201d); Gasper v. Lighthouse, Inc., 73 Md.App. 367, 533 A.2d 1358, 1360-61 (1987) (barring claims for breach of contract and fiduciary duty because the \u201cbasis of the action was the destruction of the marriage and the injuries allegedly arising from it\u201d), cert. denied, 311 Md. 718, 537 A.2d 272 (1988); Nicholson v. Han, 12 Mich.App. 35, 162 N.W.2d 313, 317 (1968) (concluding the plaintiff could not maintain his action for breach of contract because the claimed damages, pain and suffering, demonstrated his reliance on a prohibited tort theory); Strock v. Pressnell, 38 Ohio St.3d 207, 527 N.E.2d 1235, 1242-43 (1988) (declining to consider an intentional infliction of emotional distress action, in which the plaintiff sought damages for \u201canguish, shock, nervousness, and depression,\u201d because the abolition of claims for alienation of affections was intended to preclude these allegations); see also Wilson v. Still, 819 P.2d 714, 716 (Okla.1991) (finding a suit for intentional infliction of emotional distress was barred because the plaintiff basically sued the defendant for \u201cwil-fully taking away her husband\u201d and stating the legislature immunized that conduct from tort liability)."},"case_id":10694671,"label":"b"}
{"context":"R.E.R. alleges he continues to suffer severe mental and emotional distress as a result of the minister's actions, which \"imposed upon [him] the difficulties of dealing with spousal guilt, depression, unhappiness, and low self-esteem\" and led to poor work performance, the termination of his employment, an unprofitable career change, and related medical expenses. Because these losses flow from the alienation of his former wife's affections, they generally are no longer recoverable because the legislature has outlawed heart balm actions.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"162 N.W.2d 313, 317","parenthetical":"concluding the plaintiff could not maintain his action for breach of contract because the claimed damages, pain and suffering, demonstrated his reliance on a prohibited tort theory","sentence":"See Destefano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275, 278, 288 (Colo.1988) (finding claims for mental pain and suffering, based on theories of negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress, \u201cplainly set forth claims for alienation of affections and criminal conversation\u201d); Gasper v. Lighthouse, Inc., 73 Md.App. 367, 533 A.2d 1358, 1360-61 (1987) (barring claims for breach of contract and fiduciary duty because the \u201cbasis of the action was the destruction of the marriage and the injuries allegedly arising from it\u201d), cert. denied, 311 Md. 718, 537 A.2d 272 (1988); Nicholson v. Han, 12 Mich.App. 35, 162 N.W.2d 313, 317 (1968) (concluding the plaintiff could not maintain his action for breach of contract because the claimed damages, pain and suffering, demonstrated his reliance on a prohibited tort theory); Strock v. Pressnell, 38 Ohio St.3d 207, 527 N.E.2d 1235, 1242-43 (1988) (declining to consider an intentional infliction of emotional distress action, in which the plaintiff sought damages for \u201canguish, shock, nervousness, and depression,\u201d because the abolition of claims for alienation of affections was intended to preclude these allegations); see also Wilson v. Still, 819 P.2d 714, 716 (Okla.1991) (finding a suit for intentional infliction of emotional distress was barred because the plaintiff basically sued the defendant for \u201cwil-fully taking away her husband\u201d and stating the legislature immunized that conduct from tort liability)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding a plaintiff could proceed on a claim alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress because the alleged losses were different from those for seduction, but also stating plaintiffs previously suing for seduction could recover for damage to character and reputation as well as for mental anguish and pecuniary losses","sentence":"But see Erickson v. Christenson, 99 Or.App. 104, 781 P.2d 383, 385-86 (1989) (holding a plaintiff could proceed on a claim alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress because the alleged losses were different from those for seduction, but also stating plaintiffs previously suing for seduction could recover for damage to character and reputation as well as for mental anguish and pecuniary losses), appeal dismissed, 311 Or. 266, 817 P.2d 758 (1991)."},"case_id":10694671,"label":"a"}
{"context":"R.E.R. alleges he continues to suffer severe mental and emotional distress as a result of the minister's actions, which \"imposed upon [him] the difficulties of dealing with spousal guilt, depression, unhappiness, and low self-esteem\" and led to poor work performance, the termination of his employment, an unprofitable career change, and related medical expenses. Because these losses flow from the alienation of his former wife's affections, they generally are no longer recoverable because the legislature has outlawed heart balm actions.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding a plaintiff could proceed on a claim alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress because the alleged losses were different from those for seduction, but also stating plaintiffs previously suing for seduction could recover for damage to character and reputation as well as for mental anguish and pecuniary losses","sentence":"But see Erickson v. Christenson, 99 Or.App. 104, 781 P.2d 383, 385-86 (1989) (holding a plaintiff could proceed on a claim alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress because the alleged losses were different from those for seduction, but also stating plaintiffs previously suing for seduction could recover for damage to character and reputation as well as for mental anguish and pecuniary losses), appeal dismissed, 311 Or. 266, 817 P.2d 758 (1991)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"162 N.W.2d 313, 317","parenthetical":"concluding the plaintiff could not maintain his action for breach of contract because the claimed damages, pain and suffering, demonstrated his reliance on a prohibited tort theory","sentence":"See Destefano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275, 278, 288 (Colo.1988) (finding claims for mental pain and suffering, based on theories of negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress, \u201cplainly set forth claims for alienation of affections and criminal conversation\u201d); Gasper v. Lighthouse, Inc., 73 Md.App. 367, 533 A.2d 1358, 1360-61 (1987) (barring claims for breach of contract and fiduciary duty because the \u201cbasis of the action was the destruction of the marriage and the injuries allegedly arising from it\u201d), cert. denied, 311 Md. 718, 537 A.2d 272 (1988); Nicholson v. Han, 12 Mich.App. 35, 162 N.W.2d 313, 317 (1968) (concluding the plaintiff could not maintain his action for breach of contract because the claimed damages, pain and suffering, demonstrated his reliance on a prohibited tort theory); Strock v. Pressnell, 38 Ohio St.3d 207, 527 N.E.2d 1235, 1242-43 (1988) (declining to consider an intentional infliction of emotional distress action, in which the plaintiff sought damages for \u201canguish, shock, nervousness, and depression,\u201d because the abolition of claims for alienation of affections was intended to preclude these allegations); see also Wilson v. Still, 819 P.2d 714, 716 (Okla.1991) (finding a suit for intentional infliction of emotional distress was barred because the plaintiff basically sued the defendant for \u201cwil-fully taking away her husband\u201d and stating the legislature immunized that conduct from tort liability)."},"case_id":10694671,"label":"b"}
{"context":"R.E.R. alleges he continues to suffer severe mental and emotional distress as a result of the minister's actions, which \"imposed upon [him] the difficulties of dealing with spousal guilt, depression, unhappiness, and low self-esteem\" and led to poor work performance, the termination of his employment, an unprofitable career change, and related medical expenses. Because these losses flow from the alienation of his former wife's affections, they generally are no longer recoverable because the legislature has outlawed heart balm actions.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"819 P.2d 714, 716","parenthetical":"finding a suit for intentional infliction of emotional distress was barred because the plaintiff basically sued the defendant for \"wil-fully taking away her husband\" and stating the legislature immunized that conduct from tort liability","sentence":"See Destefano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275, 278, 288 (Colo.1988) (finding claims for mental pain and suffering, based on theories of negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress, \u201cplainly set forth claims for alienation of affections and criminal conversation\u201d); Gasper v. Lighthouse, Inc., 73 Md.App. 367, 533 A.2d 1358, 1360-61 (1987) (barring claims for breach of contract and fiduciary duty because the \u201cbasis of the action was the destruction of the marriage and the injuries allegedly arising from it\u201d), cert. denied, 311 Md. 718, 537 A.2d 272 (1988); Nicholson v. Han, 12 Mich.App. 35, 162 N.W.2d 313, 317 (1968) (concluding the plaintiff could not maintain his action for breach of contract because the claimed damages, pain and suffering, demonstrated his reliance on a prohibited tort theory); Strock v. Pressnell, 38 Ohio St.3d 207, 527 N.E.2d 1235, 1242-43 (1988) (declining to consider an intentional infliction of emotional distress action, in which the plaintiff sought damages for \u201canguish, shock, nervousness, and depression,\u201d because the abolition of claims for alienation of affections was intended to preclude these allegations); see also Wilson v. Still, 819 P.2d 714, 716 (Okla.1991) (finding a suit for intentional infliction of emotional distress was barred because the plaintiff basically sued the defendant for \u201cwil-fully taking away her husband\u201d and stating the legislature immunized that conduct from tort liability)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"declining to consider an intentional infliction of emotional distress action, in which the plaintiff sought damages for \"anguish, shock, nervousness, and depression,\" because the abolition of claims for alienation of affections was intended to preclude these allegations","sentence":"See Destefano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275, 278, 288 (Colo.1988) (finding claims for mental pain and suffering, based on theories of negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress, \u201cplainly set forth claims for alienation of affections and criminal conversation\u201d); Gasper v. Lighthouse, Inc., 73 Md.App. 367, 533 A.2d 1358, 1360-61 (1987) (barring claims for breach of contract and fiduciary duty because the \u201cbasis of the action was the destruction of the marriage and the injuries allegedly arising from it\u201d), cert. denied, 311 Md. 718, 537 A.2d 272 (1988); Nicholson v. Han, 12 Mich.App. 35, 162 N.W.2d 313, 317 (1968) (concluding the plaintiff could not maintain his action for breach of contract because the claimed damages, pain and suffering, demonstrated his reliance on a prohibited tort theory); Strock v. Pressnell, 38 Ohio St.3d 207, 527 N.E.2d 1235, 1242-43 (1988) (declining to consider an intentional infliction of emotional distress action, in which the plaintiff sought damages for \u201canguish, shock, nervousness, and depression,\u201d because the abolition of claims for alienation of affections was intended to preclude these allegations); see also Wilson v. Still, 819 P.2d 714, 716 (Okla.1991) (finding a suit for intentional infliction of emotional distress was barred because the plaintiff basically sued the defendant for \u201cwil-fully taking away her husband\u201d and stating the legislature immunized that conduct from tort liability)."},"case_id":10694671,"label":"b"}
{"context":"R.E.R. alleges he continues to suffer severe mental and emotional distress as a result of the minister's actions, which \"imposed upon [him] the difficulties of dealing with spousal guilt, depression, unhappiness, and low self-esteem\" and led to poor work performance, the termination of his employment, an unprofitable career change, and related medical expenses. Because these losses flow from the alienation of his former wife's affections, they generally are no longer recoverable because the legislature has outlawed heart balm actions.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding a plaintiff could proceed on a claim alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress because the alleged losses were different from those for seduction, but also stating plaintiffs previously suing for seduction could recover for damage to character and reputation as well as for mental anguish and pecuniary losses","sentence":"But see Erickson v. Christenson, 99 Or.App. 104, 781 P.2d 383, 385-86 (1989) (holding a plaintiff could proceed on a claim alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress because the alleged losses were different from those for seduction, but also stating plaintiffs previously suing for seduction could recover for damage to character and reputation as well as for mental anguish and pecuniary losses), appeal dismissed, 311 Or. 266, 817 P.2d 758 (1991)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"declining to consider an intentional infliction of emotional distress action, in which the plaintiff sought damages for \"anguish, shock, nervousness, and depression,\" because the abolition of claims for alienation of affections was intended to preclude these allegations","sentence":"See Destefano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275, 278, 288 (Colo.1988) (finding claims for mental pain and suffering, based on theories of negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress, \u201cplainly set forth claims for alienation of affections and criminal conversation\u201d); Gasper v. Lighthouse, Inc., 73 Md.App. 367, 533 A.2d 1358, 1360-61 (1987) (barring claims for breach of contract and fiduciary duty because the \u201cbasis of the action was the destruction of the marriage and the injuries allegedly arising from it\u201d), cert. denied, 311 Md. 718, 537 A.2d 272 (1988); Nicholson v. Han, 12 Mich.App. 35, 162 N.W.2d 313, 317 (1968) (concluding the plaintiff could not maintain his action for breach of contract because the claimed damages, pain and suffering, demonstrated his reliance on a prohibited tort theory); Strock v. Pressnell, 38 Ohio St.3d 207, 527 N.E.2d 1235, 1242-43 (1988) (declining to consider an intentional infliction of emotional distress action, in which the plaintiff sought damages for \u201canguish, shock, nervousness, and depression,\u201d because the abolition of claims for alienation of affections was intended to preclude these allegations); see also Wilson v. Still, 819 P.2d 714, 716 (Okla.1991) (finding a suit for intentional infliction of emotional distress was barred because the plaintiff basically sued the defendant for \u201cwil-fully taking away her husband\u201d and stating the legislature immunized that conduct from tort liability)."},"case_id":10694671,"label":"b"}
{"context":"R.E.R. alleges he continues to suffer severe mental and emotional distress as a result of the minister's actions, which \"imposed upon [him] the difficulties of dealing with spousal guilt, depression, unhappiness, and low self-esteem\" and led to poor work performance, the termination of his employment, an unprofitable career change, and related medical expenses. Because these losses flow from the alienation of his former wife's affections, they generally are no longer recoverable because the legislature has outlawed heart balm actions.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"781 P.2d 383, 385-86","parenthetical":"holding a plaintiff could proceed on a claim alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress because the alleged losses were different from those for seduction, but also stating plaintiffs previously suing for seduction could recover for damage to character and reputation as well as for mental anguish and pecuniary losses","sentence":"But see Erickson v. Christenson, 99 Or.App. 104, 781 P.2d 383, 385-86 (1989) (holding a plaintiff could proceed on a claim alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress because the alleged losses were different from those for seduction, but also stating plaintiffs previously suing for seduction could recover for damage to character and reputation as well as for mental anguish and pecuniary losses), appeal dismissed, 311 Or. 266, 817 P.2d 758 (1991)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"declining to consider an intentional infliction of emotional distress action, in which the plaintiff sought damages for \"anguish, shock, nervousness, and depression,\" because the abolition of claims for alienation of affections was intended to preclude these allegations","sentence":"See Destefano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275, 278, 288 (Colo.1988) (finding claims for mental pain and suffering, based on theories of negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress, \u201cplainly set forth claims for alienation of affections and criminal conversation\u201d); Gasper v. Lighthouse, Inc., 73 Md.App. 367, 533 A.2d 1358, 1360-61 (1987) (barring claims for breach of contract and fiduciary duty because the \u201cbasis of the action was the destruction of the marriage and the injuries allegedly arising from it\u201d), cert. denied, 311 Md. 718, 537 A.2d 272 (1988); Nicholson v. Han, 12 Mich.App. 35, 162 N.W.2d 313, 317 (1968) (concluding the plaintiff could not maintain his action for breach of contract because the claimed damages, pain and suffering, demonstrated his reliance on a prohibited tort theory); Strock v. Pressnell, 38 Ohio St.3d 207, 527 N.E.2d 1235, 1242-43 (1988) (declining to consider an intentional infliction of emotional distress action, in which the plaintiff sought damages for \u201canguish, shock, nervousness, and depression,\u201d because the abolition of claims for alienation of affections was intended to preclude these allegations); see also Wilson v. Still, 819 P.2d 714, 716 (Okla.1991) (finding a suit for intentional infliction of emotional distress was barred because the plaintiff basically sued the defendant for \u201cwil-fully taking away her husband\u201d and stating the legislature immunized that conduct from tort liability)."},"case_id":10694671,"label":"b"}
{"context":"R.E.R. alleges he continues to suffer severe mental and emotional distress as a result of the minister's actions, which \"imposed upon [him] the difficulties of dealing with spousal guilt, depression, unhappiness, and low self-esteem\" and led to poor work performance, the termination of his employment, an unprofitable career change, and related medical expenses. Because these losses flow from the alienation of his former wife's affections, they generally are no longer recoverable because the legislature has outlawed heart balm actions.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding a plaintiff could proceed on a claim alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress because the alleged losses were different from those for seduction, but also stating plaintiffs previously suing for seduction could recover for damage to character and reputation as well as for mental anguish and pecuniary losses","sentence":"But see Erickson v. Christenson, 99 Or.App. 104, 781 P.2d 383, 385-86 (1989) (holding a plaintiff could proceed on a claim alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress because the alleged losses were different from those for seduction, but also stating plaintiffs previously suing for seduction could recover for damage to character and reputation as well as for mental anguish and pecuniary losses), appeal dismissed, 311 Or. 266, 817 P.2d 758 (1991)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"declining to consider an intentional infliction of emotional distress action, in which the plaintiff sought damages for \"anguish, shock, nervousness, and depression,\" because the abolition of claims for alienation of affections was intended to preclude these allegations","sentence":"See Destefano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275, 278, 288 (Colo.1988) (finding claims for mental pain and suffering, based on theories of negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress, \u201cplainly set forth claims for alienation of affections and criminal conversation\u201d); Gasper v. Lighthouse, Inc., 73 Md.App. 367, 533 A.2d 1358, 1360-61 (1987) (barring claims for breach of contract and fiduciary duty because the \u201cbasis of the action was the destruction of the marriage and the injuries allegedly arising from it\u201d), cert. denied, 311 Md. 718, 537 A.2d 272 (1988); Nicholson v. Han, 12 Mich.App. 35, 162 N.W.2d 313, 317 (1968) (concluding the plaintiff could not maintain his action for breach of contract because the claimed damages, pain and suffering, demonstrated his reliance on a prohibited tort theory); Strock v. Pressnell, 38 Ohio St.3d 207, 527 N.E.2d 1235, 1242-43 (1988) (declining to consider an intentional infliction of emotional distress action, in which the plaintiff sought damages for \u201canguish, shock, nervousness, and depression,\u201d because the abolition of claims for alienation of affections was intended to preclude these allegations); see also Wilson v. Still, 819 P.2d 714, 716 (Okla.1991) (finding a suit for intentional infliction of emotional distress was barred because the plaintiff basically sued the defendant for \u201cwil-fully taking away her husband\u201d and stating the legislature immunized that conduct from tort liability)."},"case_id":10694671,"label":"b"}
{"context":"R.E.R. alleges he continues to suffer severe mental and emotional distress as a result of the minister's actions, which \"imposed upon [him] the difficulties of dealing with spousal guilt, depression, unhappiness, and low self-esteem\" and led to poor work performance, the termination of his employment, an unprofitable career change, and related medical expenses. Because these losses flow from the alienation of his former wife's affections, they generally are no longer recoverable because the legislature has outlawed heart balm actions.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"declining to consider an intentional infliction of emotional distress action, in which the plaintiff sought damages for \"anguish, shock, nervousness, and depression,\" because the abolition of claims for alienation of affections was intended to preclude these allegations","sentence":"See Destefano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275, 278, 288 (Colo.1988) (finding claims for mental pain and suffering, based on theories of negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress, \u201cplainly set forth claims for alienation of affections and criminal conversation\u201d); Gasper v. Lighthouse, Inc., 73 Md.App. 367, 533 A.2d 1358, 1360-61 (1987) (barring claims for breach of contract and fiduciary duty because the \u201cbasis of the action was the destruction of the marriage and the injuries allegedly arising from it\u201d), cert. denied, 311 Md. 718, 537 A.2d 272 (1988); Nicholson v. Han, 12 Mich.App. 35, 162 N.W.2d 313, 317 (1968) (concluding the plaintiff could not maintain his action for breach of contract because the claimed damages, pain and suffering, demonstrated his reliance on a prohibited tort theory); Strock v. Pressnell, 38 Ohio St.3d 207, 527 N.E.2d 1235, 1242-43 (1988) (declining to consider an intentional infliction of emotional distress action, in which the plaintiff sought damages for \u201canguish, shock, nervousness, and depression,\u201d because the abolition of claims for alienation of affections was intended to preclude these allegations); see also Wilson v. Still, 819 P.2d 714, 716 (Okla.1991) (finding a suit for intentional infliction of emotional distress was barred because the plaintiff basically sued the defendant for \u201cwil-fully taking away her husband\u201d and stating the legislature immunized that conduct from tort liability)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding a plaintiff could proceed on a claim alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress because the alleged losses were different from those for seduction, but also stating plaintiffs previously suing for seduction could recover for damage to character and reputation as well as for mental anguish and pecuniary losses","sentence":"But see Erickson v. Christenson, 99 Or.App. 104, 781 P.2d 383, 385-86 (1989) (holding a plaintiff could proceed on a claim alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress because the alleged losses were different from those for seduction, but also stating plaintiffs previously suing for seduction could recover for damage to character and reputation as well as for mental anguish and pecuniary losses), appeal dismissed, 311 Or. 266, 817 P.2d 758 (1991)."},"case_id":10694671,"label":"a"}
{"context":"R.E.R. alleges he continues to suffer severe mental and emotional distress as a result of the minister's actions, which \"imposed upon [him] the difficulties of dealing with spousal guilt, depression, unhappiness, and low self-esteem\" and led to poor work performance, the termination of his employment, an unprofitable career change, and related medical expenses. Because these losses flow from the alienation of his former wife's affections, they generally are no longer recoverable because the legislature has outlawed heart balm actions.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"527 N.E.2d 1235, 1242-43","parenthetical":"declining to consider an intentional infliction of emotional distress action, in which the plaintiff sought damages for \"anguish, shock, nervousness, and depression,\" because the abolition of claims for alienation of affections was intended to preclude these allegations","sentence":"See Destefano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275, 278, 288 (Colo.1988) (finding claims for mental pain and suffering, based on theories of negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress, \u201cplainly set forth claims for alienation of affections and criminal conversation\u201d); Gasper v. Lighthouse, Inc., 73 Md.App. 367, 533 A.2d 1358, 1360-61 (1987) (barring claims for breach of contract and fiduciary duty because the \u201cbasis of the action was the destruction of the marriage and the injuries allegedly arising from it\u201d), cert. denied, 311 Md. 718, 537 A.2d 272 (1988); Nicholson v. Han, 12 Mich.App. 35, 162 N.W.2d 313, 317 (1968) (concluding the plaintiff could not maintain his action for breach of contract because the claimed damages, pain and suffering, demonstrated his reliance on a prohibited tort theory); Strock v. Pressnell, 38 Ohio St.3d 207, 527 N.E.2d 1235, 1242-43 (1988) (declining to consider an intentional infliction of emotional distress action, in which the plaintiff sought damages for \u201canguish, shock, nervousness, and depression,\u201d because the abolition of claims for alienation of affections was intended to preclude these allegations); see also Wilson v. Still, 819 P.2d 714, 716 (Okla.1991) (finding a suit for intentional infliction of emotional distress was barred because the plaintiff basically sued the defendant for \u201cwil-fully taking away her husband\u201d and stating the legislature immunized that conduct from tort liability)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"819 P.2d 714, 716","parenthetical":"finding a suit for intentional infliction of emotional distress was barred because the plaintiff basically sued the defendant for \"wil-fully taking away her husband\" and stating the legislature immunized that conduct from tort liability","sentence":"See Destefano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275, 278, 288 (Colo.1988) (finding claims for mental pain and suffering, based on theories of negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress, \u201cplainly set forth claims for alienation of affections and criminal conversation\u201d); Gasper v. Lighthouse, Inc., 73 Md.App. 367, 533 A.2d 1358, 1360-61 (1987) (barring claims for breach of contract and fiduciary duty because the \u201cbasis of the action was the destruction of the marriage and the injuries allegedly arising from it\u201d), cert. denied, 311 Md. 718, 537 A.2d 272 (1988); Nicholson v. Han, 12 Mich.App. 35, 162 N.W.2d 313, 317 (1968) (concluding the plaintiff could not maintain his action for breach of contract because the claimed damages, pain and suffering, demonstrated his reliance on a prohibited tort theory); Strock v. Pressnell, 38 Ohio St.3d 207, 527 N.E.2d 1235, 1242-43 (1988) (declining to consider an intentional infliction of emotional distress action, in which the plaintiff sought damages for \u201canguish, shock, nervousness, and depression,\u201d because the abolition of claims for alienation of affections was intended to preclude these allegations); see also Wilson v. Still, 819 P.2d 714, 716 (Okla.1991) (finding a suit for intentional infliction of emotional distress was barred because the plaintiff basically sued the defendant for \u201cwil-fully taking away her husband\u201d and stating the legislature immunized that conduct from tort liability)."},"case_id":10694671,"label":"a"}
{"context":"R.E.R. alleges he continues to suffer severe mental and emotional distress as a result of the minister's actions, which \"imposed upon [him] the difficulties of dealing with spousal guilt, depression, unhappiness, and low self-esteem\" and led to poor work performance, the termination of his employment, an unprofitable career change, and related medical expenses. Because these losses flow from the alienation of his former wife's affections, they generally are no longer recoverable because the legislature has outlawed heart balm actions.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding a plaintiff could proceed on a claim alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress because the alleged losses were different from those for seduction, but also stating plaintiffs previously suing for seduction could recover for damage to character and reputation as well as for mental anguish and pecuniary losses","sentence":"But see Erickson v. Christenson, 99 Or.App. 104, 781 P.2d 383, 385-86 (1989) (holding a plaintiff could proceed on a claim alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress because the alleged losses were different from those for seduction, but also stating plaintiffs previously suing for seduction could recover for damage to character and reputation as well as for mental anguish and pecuniary losses), appeal dismissed, 311 Or. 266, 817 P.2d 758 (1991)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"527 N.E.2d 1235, 1242-43","parenthetical":"declining to consider an intentional infliction of emotional distress action, in which the plaintiff sought damages for \"anguish, shock, nervousness, and depression,\" because the abolition of claims for alienation of affections was intended to preclude these allegations","sentence":"See Destefano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275, 278, 288 (Colo.1988) (finding claims for mental pain and suffering, based on theories of negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress, \u201cplainly set forth claims for alienation of affections and criminal conversation\u201d); Gasper v. Lighthouse, Inc., 73 Md.App. 367, 533 A.2d 1358, 1360-61 (1987) (barring claims for breach of contract and fiduciary duty because the \u201cbasis of the action was the destruction of the marriage and the injuries allegedly arising from it\u201d), cert. denied, 311 Md. 718, 537 A.2d 272 (1988); Nicholson v. Han, 12 Mich.App. 35, 162 N.W.2d 313, 317 (1968) (concluding the plaintiff could not maintain his action for breach of contract because the claimed damages, pain and suffering, demonstrated his reliance on a prohibited tort theory); Strock v. Pressnell, 38 Ohio St.3d 207, 527 N.E.2d 1235, 1242-43 (1988) (declining to consider an intentional infliction of emotional distress action, in which the plaintiff sought damages for \u201canguish, shock, nervousness, and depression,\u201d because the abolition of claims for alienation of affections was intended to preclude these allegations); see also Wilson v. Still, 819 P.2d 714, 716 (Okla.1991) (finding a suit for intentional infliction of emotional distress was barred because the plaintiff basically sued the defendant for \u201cwil-fully taking away her husband\u201d and stating the legislature immunized that conduct from tort liability)."},"case_id":10694671,"label":"b"}
{"context":"R.E.R. alleges he continues to suffer severe mental and emotional distress as a result of the minister's actions, which \"imposed upon [him] the difficulties of dealing with spousal guilt, depression, unhappiness, and low self-esteem\" and led to poor work performance, the termination of his employment, an unprofitable career change, and related medical expenses. Because these losses flow from the alienation of his former wife's affections, they generally are no longer recoverable because the legislature has outlawed heart balm actions.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"527 N.E.2d 1235, 1242-43","parenthetical":"declining to consider an intentional infliction of emotional distress action, in which the plaintiff sought damages for \"anguish, shock, nervousness, and depression,\" because the abolition of claims for alienation of affections was intended to preclude these allegations","sentence":"See Destefano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275, 278, 288 (Colo.1988) (finding claims for mental pain and suffering, based on theories of negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress, \u201cplainly set forth claims for alienation of affections and criminal conversation\u201d); Gasper v. Lighthouse, Inc., 73 Md.App. 367, 533 A.2d 1358, 1360-61 (1987) (barring claims for breach of contract and fiduciary duty because the \u201cbasis of the action was the destruction of the marriage and the injuries allegedly arising from it\u201d), cert. denied, 311 Md. 718, 537 A.2d 272 (1988); Nicholson v. Han, 12 Mich.App. 35, 162 N.W.2d 313, 317 (1968) (concluding the plaintiff could not maintain his action for breach of contract because the claimed damages, pain and suffering, demonstrated his reliance on a prohibited tort theory); Strock v. Pressnell, 38 Ohio St.3d 207, 527 N.E.2d 1235, 1242-43 (1988) (declining to consider an intentional infliction of emotional distress action, in which the plaintiff sought damages for \u201canguish, shock, nervousness, and depression,\u201d because the abolition of claims for alienation of affections was intended to preclude these allegations); see also Wilson v. Still, 819 P.2d 714, 716 (Okla.1991) (finding a suit for intentional infliction of emotional distress was barred because the plaintiff basically sued the defendant for \u201cwil-fully taking away her husband\u201d and stating the legislature immunized that conduct from tort liability)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"781 P.2d 383, 385-86","parenthetical":"holding a plaintiff could proceed on a claim alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress because the alleged losses were different from those for seduction, but also stating plaintiffs previously suing for seduction could recover for damage to character and reputation as well as for mental anguish and pecuniary losses","sentence":"But see Erickson v. Christenson, 99 Or.App. 104, 781 P.2d 383, 385-86 (1989) (holding a plaintiff could proceed on a claim alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress because the alleged losses were different from those for seduction, but also stating plaintiffs previously suing for seduction could recover for damage to character and reputation as well as for mental anguish and pecuniary losses), appeal dismissed, 311 Or. 266, 817 P.2d 758 (1991)."},"case_id":10694671,"label":"a"}
{"context":"R.E.R. alleges he continues to suffer severe mental and emotional distress as a result of the minister's actions, which \"imposed upon [him] the difficulties of dealing with spousal guilt, depression, unhappiness, and low self-esteem\" and led to poor work performance, the termination of his employment, an unprofitable career change, and related medical expenses. Because these losses flow from the alienation of his former wife's affections, they generally are no longer recoverable because the legislature has outlawed heart balm actions.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"527 N.E.2d 1235, 1242-43","parenthetical":"declining to consider an intentional infliction of emotional distress action, in which the plaintiff sought damages for \"anguish, shock, nervousness, and depression,\" because the abolition of claims for alienation of affections was intended to preclude these allegations","sentence":"See Destefano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275, 278, 288 (Colo.1988) (finding claims for mental pain and suffering, based on theories of negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress, \u201cplainly set forth claims for alienation of affections and criminal conversation\u201d); Gasper v. Lighthouse, Inc., 73 Md.App. 367, 533 A.2d 1358, 1360-61 (1987) (barring claims for breach of contract and fiduciary duty because the \u201cbasis of the action was the destruction of the marriage and the injuries allegedly arising from it\u201d), cert. denied, 311 Md. 718, 537 A.2d 272 (1988); Nicholson v. Han, 12 Mich.App. 35, 162 N.W.2d 313, 317 (1968) (concluding the plaintiff could not maintain his action for breach of contract because the claimed damages, pain and suffering, demonstrated his reliance on a prohibited tort theory); Strock v. Pressnell, 38 Ohio St.3d 207, 527 N.E.2d 1235, 1242-43 (1988) (declining to consider an intentional infliction of emotional distress action, in which the plaintiff sought damages for \u201canguish, shock, nervousness, and depression,\u201d because the abolition of claims for alienation of affections was intended to preclude these allegations); see also Wilson v. Still, 819 P.2d 714, 716 (Okla.1991) (finding a suit for intentional infliction of emotional distress was barred because the plaintiff basically sued the defendant for \u201cwil-fully taking away her husband\u201d and stating the legislature immunized that conduct from tort liability)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding a plaintiff could proceed on a claim alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress because the alleged losses were different from those for seduction, but also stating plaintiffs previously suing for seduction could recover for damage to character and reputation as well as for mental anguish and pecuniary losses","sentence":"But see Erickson v. Christenson, 99 Or.App. 104, 781 P.2d 383, 385-86 (1989) (holding a plaintiff could proceed on a claim alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress because the alleged losses were different from those for seduction, but also stating plaintiffs previously suing for seduction could recover for damage to character and reputation as well as for mental anguish and pecuniary losses), appeal dismissed, 311 Or. 266, 817 P.2d 758 (1991)."},"case_id":10694671,"label":"a"}
{"context":"R.E.R. alleges he continues to suffer severe mental and emotional distress as a result of the minister's actions, which \"imposed upon [him] the difficulties of dealing with spousal guilt, depression, unhappiness, and low self-esteem\" and led to poor work performance, the termination of his employment, an unprofitable career change, and related medical expenses. Because these losses flow from the alienation of his former wife's affections, they generally are no longer recoverable because the legislature has outlawed heart balm actions.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"527 N.E.2d 1235, 1242-43","parenthetical":"declining to consider an intentional infliction of emotional distress action, in which the plaintiff sought damages for \"anguish, shock, nervousness, and depression,\" because the abolition of claims for alienation of affections was intended to preclude these allegations","sentence":"See Destefano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275, 278, 288 (Colo.1988) (finding claims for mental pain and suffering, based on theories of negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress, \u201cplainly set forth claims for alienation of affections and criminal conversation\u201d); Gasper v. Lighthouse, Inc., 73 Md.App. 367, 533 A.2d 1358, 1360-61 (1987) (barring claims for breach of contract and fiduciary duty because the \u201cbasis of the action was the destruction of the marriage and the injuries allegedly arising from it\u201d), cert. denied, 311 Md. 718, 537 A.2d 272 (1988); Nicholson v. Han, 12 Mich.App. 35, 162 N.W.2d 313, 317 (1968) (concluding the plaintiff could not maintain his action for breach of contract because the claimed damages, pain and suffering, demonstrated his reliance on a prohibited tort theory); Strock v. Pressnell, 38 Ohio St.3d 207, 527 N.E.2d 1235, 1242-43 (1988) (declining to consider an intentional infliction of emotional distress action, in which the plaintiff sought damages for \u201canguish, shock, nervousness, and depression,\u201d because the abolition of claims for alienation of affections was intended to preclude these allegations); see also Wilson v. Still, 819 P.2d 714, 716 (Okla.1991) (finding a suit for intentional infliction of emotional distress was barred because the plaintiff basically sued the defendant for \u201cwil-fully taking away her husband\u201d and stating the legislature immunized that conduct from tort liability)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding a plaintiff could proceed on a claim alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress because the alleged losses were different from those for seduction, but also stating plaintiffs previously suing for seduction could recover for damage to character and reputation as well as for mental anguish and pecuniary losses","sentence":"But see Erickson v. Christenson, 99 Or.App. 104, 781 P.2d 383, 385-86 (1989) (holding a plaintiff could proceed on a claim alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress because the alleged losses were different from those for seduction, but also stating plaintiffs previously suing for seduction could recover for damage to character and reputation as well as for mental anguish and pecuniary losses), appeal dismissed, 311 Or. 266, 817 P.2d 758 (1991)."},"case_id":10694671,"label":"a"}
{"context":"R.E.R. alleges he continues to suffer severe mental and emotional distress as a result of the minister's actions, which \"imposed upon [him] the difficulties of dealing with spousal guilt, depression, unhappiness, and low self-esteem\" and led to poor work performance, the termination of his employment, an unprofitable career change, and related medical expenses. Because these losses flow from the alienation of his former wife's affections, they generally are no longer recoverable because the legislature has outlawed heart balm actions.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"819 P.2d 714, 716","parenthetical":"finding a suit for intentional infliction of emotional distress was barred because the plaintiff basically sued the defendant for \"wil-fully taking away her husband\" and stating the legislature immunized that conduct from tort liability","sentence":"See Destefano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275, 278, 288 (Colo.1988) (finding claims for mental pain and suffering, based on theories of negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress, \u201cplainly set forth claims for alienation of affections and criminal conversation\u201d); Gasper v. Lighthouse, Inc., 73 Md.App. 367, 533 A.2d 1358, 1360-61 (1987) (barring claims for breach of contract and fiduciary duty because the \u201cbasis of the action was the destruction of the marriage and the injuries allegedly arising from it\u201d), cert. denied, 311 Md. 718, 537 A.2d 272 (1988); Nicholson v. Han, 12 Mich.App. 35, 162 N.W.2d 313, 317 (1968) (concluding the plaintiff could not maintain his action for breach of contract because the claimed damages, pain and suffering, demonstrated his reliance on a prohibited tort theory); Strock v. Pressnell, 38 Ohio St.3d 207, 527 N.E.2d 1235, 1242-43 (1988) (declining to consider an intentional infliction of emotional distress action, in which the plaintiff sought damages for \u201canguish, shock, nervousness, and depression,\u201d because the abolition of claims for alienation of affections was intended to preclude these allegations); see also Wilson v. Still, 819 P.2d 714, 716 (Okla.1991) (finding a suit for intentional infliction of emotional distress was barred because the plaintiff basically sued the defendant for \u201cwil-fully taking away her husband\u201d and stating the legislature immunized that conduct from tort liability)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding a plaintiff could proceed on a claim alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress because the alleged losses were different from those for seduction, but also stating plaintiffs previously suing for seduction could recover for damage to character and reputation as well as for mental anguish and pecuniary losses","sentence":"But see Erickson v. Christenson, 99 Or.App. 104, 781 P.2d 383, 385-86 (1989) (holding a plaintiff could proceed on a claim alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress because the alleged losses were different from those for seduction, but also stating plaintiffs previously suing for seduction could recover for damage to character and reputation as well as for mental anguish and pecuniary losses), appeal dismissed, 311 Or. 266, 817 P.2d 758 (1991)."},"case_id":10694671,"label":"a"}
{"context":"R.E.R. alleges he continues to suffer severe mental and emotional distress as a result of the minister's actions, which \"imposed upon [him] the difficulties of dealing with spousal guilt, depression, unhappiness, and low self-esteem\" and led to poor work performance, the termination of his employment, an unprofitable career change, and related medical expenses. Because these losses flow from the alienation of his former wife's affections, they generally are no longer recoverable because the legislature has outlawed heart balm actions.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"781 P.2d 383, 385-86","parenthetical":"holding a plaintiff could proceed on a claim alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress because the alleged losses were different from those for seduction, but also stating plaintiffs previously suing for seduction could recover for damage to character and reputation as well as for mental anguish and pecuniary losses","sentence":"But see Erickson v. Christenson, 99 Or.App. 104, 781 P.2d 383, 385-86 (1989) (holding a plaintiff could proceed on a claim alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress because the alleged losses were different from those for seduction, but also stating plaintiffs previously suing for seduction could recover for damage to character and reputation as well as for mental anguish and pecuniary losses), appeal dismissed, 311 Or. 266, 817 P.2d 758 (1991)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"819 P.2d 714, 716","parenthetical":"finding a suit for intentional infliction of emotional distress was barred because the plaintiff basically sued the defendant for \"wil-fully taking away her husband\" and stating the legislature immunized that conduct from tort liability","sentence":"See Destefano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275, 278, 288 (Colo.1988) (finding claims for mental pain and suffering, based on theories of negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress, \u201cplainly set forth claims for alienation of affections and criminal conversation\u201d); Gasper v. Lighthouse, Inc., 73 Md.App. 367, 533 A.2d 1358, 1360-61 (1987) (barring claims for breach of contract and fiduciary duty because the \u201cbasis of the action was the destruction of the marriage and the injuries allegedly arising from it\u201d), cert. denied, 311 Md. 718, 537 A.2d 272 (1988); Nicholson v. Han, 12 Mich.App. 35, 162 N.W.2d 313, 317 (1968) (concluding the plaintiff could not maintain his action for breach of contract because the claimed damages, pain and suffering, demonstrated his reliance on a prohibited tort theory); Strock v. Pressnell, 38 Ohio St.3d 207, 527 N.E.2d 1235, 1242-43 (1988) (declining to consider an intentional infliction of emotional distress action, in which the plaintiff sought damages for \u201canguish, shock, nervousness, and depression,\u201d because the abolition of claims for alienation of affections was intended to preclude these allegations); see also Wilson v. Still, 819 P.2d 714, 716 (Okla.1991) (finding a suit for intentional infliction of emotional distress was barred because the plaintiff basically sued the defendant for \u201cwil-fully taking away her husband\u201d and stating the legislature immunized that conduct from tort liability)."},"case_id":10694671,"label":"b"}
{"context":"R.E.R. alleges he continues to suffer severe mental and emotional distress as a result of the minister's actions, which \"imposed upon [him] the difficulties of dealing with spousal guilt, depression, unhappiness, and low self-esteem\" and led to poor work performance, the termination of his employment, an unprofitable career change, and related medical expenses. Because these losses flow from the alienation of his former wife's affections, they generally are no longer recoverable because the legislature has outlawed heart balm actions.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding a plaintiff could proceed on a claim alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress because the alleged losses were different from those for seduction, but also stating plaintiffs previously suing for seduction could recover for damage to character and reputation as well as for mental anguish and pecuniary losses","sentence":"But see Erickson v. Christenson, 99 Or.App. 104, 781 P.2d 383, 385-86 (1989) (holding a plaintiff could proceed on a claim alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress because the alleged losses were different from those for seduction, but also stating plaintiffs previously suing for seduction could recover for damage to character and reputation as well as for mental anguish and pecuniary losses), appeal dismissed, 311 Or. 266, 817 P.2d 758 (1991)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"819 P.2d 714, 716","parenthetical":"finding a suit for intentional infliction of emotional distress was barred because the plaintiff basically sued the defendant for \"wil-fully taking away her husband\" and stating the legislature immunized that conduct from tort liability","sentence":"See Destefano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275, 278, 288 (Colo.1988) (finding claims for mental pain and suffering, based on theories of negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress, \u201cplainly set forth claims for alienation of affections and criminal conversation\u201d); Gasper v. Lighthouse, Inc., 73 Md.App. 367, 533 A.2d 1358, 1360-61 (1987) (barring claims for breach of contract and fiduciary duty because the \u201cbasis of the action was the destruction of the marriage and the injuries allegedly arising from it\u201d), cert. denied, 311 Md. 718, 537 A.2d 272 (1988); Nicholson v. Han, 12 Mich.App. 35, 162 N.W.2d 313, 317 (1968) (concluding the plaintiff could not maintain his action for breach of contract because the claimed damages, pain and suffering, demonstrated his reliance on a prohibited tort theory); Strock v. Pressnell, 38 Ohio St.3d 207, 527 N.E.2d 1235, 1242-43 (1988) (declining to consider an intentional infliction of emotional distress action, in which the plaintiff sought damages for \u201canguish, shock, nervousness, and depression,\u201d because the abolition of claims for alienation of affections was intended to preclude these allegations); see also Wilson v. Still, 819 P.2d 714, 716 (Okla.1991) (finding a suit for intentional infliction of emotional distress was barred because the plaintiff basically sued the defendant for \u201cwil-fully taking away her husband\u201d and stating the legislature immunized that conduct from tort liability)."},"case_id":10694671,"label":"b"}
{"context":"R.E.R. alleges he continues to suffer severe mental and emotional distress as a result of the minister's actions, which \"imposed upon [him] the difficulties of dealing with spousal guilt, depression, unhappiness, and low self-esteem\" and led to poor work performance, the termination of his employment, an unprofitable career change, and related medical expenses. Because these losses flow from the alienation of his former wife's affections, they generally are no longer recoverable because the legislature has outlawed heart balm actions.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding a plaintiff could proceed on a claim alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress because the alleged losses were different from those for seduction, but also stating plaintiffs previously suing for seduction could recover for damage to character and reputation as well as for mental anguish and pecuniary losses","sentence":"But see Erickson v. Christenson, 99 Or.App. 104, 781 P.2d 383, 385-86 (1989) (holding a plaintiff could proceed on a claim alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress because the alleged losses were different from those for seduction, but also stating plaintiffs previously suing for seduction could recover for damage to character and reputation as well as for mental anguish and pecuniary losses), appeal dismissed, 311 Or. 266, 817 P.2d 758 (1991)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"819 P.2d 714, 716","parenthetical":"finding a suit for intentional infliction of emotional distress was barred because the plaintiff basically sued the defendant for \"wil-fully taking away her husband\" and stating the legislature immunized that conduct from tort liability","sentence":"See Destefano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275, 278, 288 (Colo.1988) (finding claims for mental pain and suffering, based on theories of negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress, \u201cplainly set forth claims for alienation of affections and criminal conversation\u201d); Gasper v. Lighthouse, Inc., 73 Md.App. 367, 533 A.2d 1358, 1360-61 (1987) (barring claims for breach of contract and fiduciary duty because the \u201cbasis of the action was the destruction of the marriage and the injuries allegedly arising from it\u201d), cert. denied, 311 Md. 718, 537 A.2d 272 (1988); Nicholson v. Han, 12 Mich.App. 35, 162 N.W.2d 313, 317 (1968) (concluding the plaintiff could not maintain his action for breach of contract because the claimed damages, pain and suffering, demonstrated his reliance on a prohibited tort theory); Strock v. Pressnell, 38 Ohio St.3d 207, 527 N.E.2d 1235, 1242-43 (1988) (declining to consider an intentional infliction of emotional distress action, in which the plaintiff sought damages for \u201canguish, shock, nervousness, and depression,\u201d because the abolition of claims for alienation of affections was intended to preclude these allegations); see also Wilson v. Still, 819 P.2d 714, 716 (Okla.1991) (finding a suit for intentional infliction of emotional distress was barred because the plaintiff basically sued the defendant for \u201cwil-fully taking away her husband\u201d and stating the legislature immunized that conduct from tort liability)."},"case_id":10694671,"label":"b"}
{"context":"However, the trial court's determination that APD demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that Drayton \"is likely to physically injure others if allowed to remain at liberty\" is based entirely upon the expert opinions, which relied heavily upon the unproven allegations from 1998 and 1999. Because the experts' determinations were based on faulty premises, we find the trial court's order was not based on competent substantial evidence.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"852 So.2d 335, 336","parenthetical":"noting the lack of conflicting evidence and finding an involuntary admission order was supported by competent substantial evidence because the experts did not rely on improperly admitted records in forming their opinions","sentence":"See Kimbrough v. State, 852 So.2d 335, 336 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003) (noting the lack of conflicting evidence and finding an involuntary admission order was supported by competent substantial evidence because the experts did not rely on improperly admitted records in forming their opinions); see also In re Commitment of A.E.F., 377 N.J.Super. 473, 873 A.2d 604, 614 (2005) (\u201c[Significant state action, such as [involuntary] commitment, cannot and should not be based on unproven allegations of misconduct.\u201d). We also note that the experts\u2019 observations dating back to 2003 do not provide competent substantial evidence supporting the order for Drayton\u2019s involuntary admission."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[Significant state action, such as [involuntary] commitment, cannot and should not be based on unproven allegations of misconduct.\"","sentence":"See Kimbrough v. State, 852 So.2d 335, 336 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003) (noting the lack of conflicting evidence and finding an involuntary admission order was supported by competent substantial evidence because the experts did not rely on improperly admitted records in forming their opinions); see also In re Commitment of A.E.F., 377 N.J.Super. 473, 873 A.2d 604, 614 (2005) (\u201c[Significant state action, such as [involuntary] commitment, cannot and should not be based on unproven allegations of misconduct.\u201d). We also note that the experts\u2019 observations dating back to 2003 do not provide competent substantial evidence supporting the order for Drayton\u2019s involuntary admission."},"case_id":7047103,"label":"a"}
{"context":"However, the trial court's determination that APD demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that Drayton \"is likely to physically injure others if allowed to remain at liberty\" is based entirely upon the expert opinions, which relied heavily upon the unproven allegations from 1998 and 1999. Because the experts' determinations were based on faulty premises, we find the trial court's order was not based on competent substantial evidence.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"873 A.2d 604, 614","parenthetical":"\"[Significant state action, such as [involuntary] commitment, cannot and should not be based on unproven allegations of misconduct.\"","sentence":"See Kimbrough v. State, 852 So.2d 335, 336 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003) (noting the lack of conflicting evidence and finding an involuntary admission order was supported by competent substantial evidence because the experts did not rely on improperly admitted records in forming their opinions); see also In re Commitment of A.E.F., 377 N.J.Super. 473, 873 A.2d 604, 614 (2005) (\u201c[Significant state action, such as [involuntary] commitment, cannot and should not be based on unproven allegations of misconduct.\u201d). We also note that the experts\u2019 observations dating back to 2003 do not provide competent substantial evidence supporting the order for Drayton\u2019s involuntary admission."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"852 So.2d 335, 336","parenthetical":"noting the lack of conflicting evidence and finding an involuntary admission order was supported by competent substantial evidence because the experts did not rely on improperly admitted records in forming their opinions","sentence":"See Kimbrough v. State, 852 So.2d 335, 336 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003) (noting the lack of conflicting evidence and finding an involuntary admission order was supported by competent substantial evidence because the experts did not rely on improperly admitted records in forming their opinions); see also In re Commitment of A.E.F., 377 N.J.Super. 473, 873 A.2d 604, 614 (2005) (\u201c[Significant state action, such as [involuntary] commitment, cannot and should not be based on unproven allegations of misconduct.\u201d). We also note that the experts\u2019 observations dating back to 2003 do not provide competent substantial evidence supporting the order for Drayton\u2019s involuntary admission."},"case_id":7047103,"label":"b"}
{"context":"However, the trial court's determination that APD demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that Drayton \"is likely to physically injure others if allowed to remain at liberty\" is based entirely upon the expert opinions, which relied heavily upon the unproven allegations from 1998 and 1999. Because the experts' determinations were based on faulty premises, we find the trial court's order was not based on competent substantial evidence.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"852 So.2d 335, 336","parenthetical":"noting the lack of conflicting evidence and finding an involuntary admission order was supported by competent substantial evidence because the experts did not rely on improperly admitted records in forming their opinions","sentence":"See Kimbrough v. State, 852 So.2d 335, 336 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003) (noting the lack of conflicting evidence and finding an involuntary admission order was supported by competent substantial evidence because the experts did not rely on improperly admitted records in forming their opinions); see also In re Commitment of A.E.F., 377 N.J.Super. 473, 873 A.2d 604, 614 (2005) (\u201c[Significant state action, such as [involuntary] commitment, cannot and should not be based on unproven allegations of misconduct.\u201d). We also note that the experts\u2019 observations dating back to 2003 do not provide competent substantial evidence supporting the order for Drayton\u2019s involuntary admission."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"concluding that a six-month-old report from a mental health expert was too stale to be relevant to an adjudication of incompetency","sentence":"Cf. In re Commitment of Reilly, 970 So.2d 453 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) (concluding that a six-month-old report from a mental health expert was too stale to be relevant to an adjudication of incompetency). Because the trial court\u2019s findings were not supported by competent substantial evidence, we reverse the order for Drayton\u2019s involuntary commitment to APD and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion."},"case_id":7047103,"label":"a"}
{"context":"However, the trial court's determination that APD demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that Drayton \"is likely to physically injure others if allowed to remain at liberty\" is based entirely upon the expert opinions, which relied heavily upon the unproven allegations from 1998 and 1999. Because the experts' determinations were based on faulty premises, we find the trial court's order was not based on competent substantial evidence.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"concluding that a six-month-old report from a mental health expert was too stale to be relevant to an adjudication of incompetency","sentence":"Cf. In re Commitment of Reilly, 970 So.2d 453 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) (concluding that a six-month-old report from a mental health expert was too stale to be relevant to an adjudication of incompetency). Because the trial court\u2019s findings were not supported by competent substantial evidence, we reverse the order for Drayton\u2019s involuntary commitment to APD and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[Significant state action, such as [involuntary] commitment, cannot and should not be based on unproven allegations of misconduct.\"","sentence":"See Kimbrough v. State, 852 So.2d 335, 336 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003) (noting the lack of conflicting evidence and finding an involuntary admission order was supported by competent substantial evidence because the experts did not rely on improperly admitted records in forming their opinions); see also In re Commitment of A.E.F., 377 N.J.Super. 473, 873 A.2d 604, 614 (2005) (\u201c[Significant state action, such as [involuntary] commitment, cannot and should not be based on unproven allegations of misconduct.\u201d). We also note that the experts\u2019 observations dating back to 2003 do not provide competent substantial evidence supporting the order for Drayton\u2019s involuntary admission."},"case_id":7047103,"label":"b"}
{"context":"However, the trial court's determination that APD demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that Drayton \"is likely to physically injure others if allowed to remain at liberty\" is based entirely upon the expert opinions, which relied heavily upon the unproven allegations from 1998 and 1999. Because the experts' determinations were based on faulty premises, we find the trial court's order was not based on competent substantial evidence.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"873 A.2d 604, 614","parenthetical":"\"[Significant state action, such as [involuntary] commitment, cannot and should not be based on unproven allegations of misconduct.\"","sentence":"See Kimbrough v. State, 852 So.2d 335, 336 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003) (noting the lack of conflicting evidence and finding an involuntary admission order was supported by competent substantial evidence because the experts did not rely on improperly admitted records in forming their opinions); see also In re Commitment of A.E.F., 377 N.J.Super. 473, 873 A.2d 604, 614 (2005) (\u201c[Significant state action, such as [involuntary] commitment, cannot and should not be based on unproven allegations of misconduct.\u201d). We also note that the experts\u2019 observations dating back to 2003 do not provide competent substantial evidence supporting the order for Drayton\u2019s involuntary admission."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"concluding that a six-month-old report from a mental health expert was too stale to be relevant to an adjudication of incompetency","sentence":"Cf. In re Commitment of Reilly, 970 So.2d 453 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) (concluding that a six-month-old report from a mental health expert was too stale to be relevant to an adjudication of incompetency). Because the trial court\u2019s findings were not supported by competent substantial evidence, we reverse the order for Drayton\u2019s involuntary commitment to APD and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion."},"case_id":7047103,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Plaintiff misunderstands the special relationship exception to the economic loss doctrine. The underlying purpose of the special relationship exception is to define particular \"circumstances in which a party has a duty of care to avoid imposing economic losses on third parties.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"225 Cal.App.4th 1318, 1340","parenthetical":"holding that RV repair company which repaired RV for owner did not have a duty to manufacturer of hydraulic components","sentence":"Mega RV Corp. v. HWH Corp., 225 Cal.App.4th 1318, 1340, 170 Cal.Rptr.3d 861 (2014), as modified on denial of reh\u2019g (May 20, 2014) (holding that RV repair company which repaired RV for owner did not have a duty to manufacturer of hydraulic components); see also J\u2019Aire Corp. v. Gregory, 24 Cal.3d 799, 157 Cal.Rptr. 407, 598 P.2d 60 (1979) (delineating the special relationship exception and holding that airport restaurant had special relationship with contractor who contracted with airport operator to renovate the airport, allowing restaurant to recover lost profits arising from construction delays caused by contractor); Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal.2d 647, 648-51, 320 P.2d 16 (1958) (holding that a decedent\u2019s intended beneficiary had a special relationship with the notary public who had prepared a defective will)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"delineating the special relationship exception and holding that airport restaurant had special relationship with contractor who contracted with airport operator to renovate the airport, allowing restaurant to recover lost profits arising from construction delays caused by contractor","sentence":"Mega RV Corp. v. HWH Corp., 225 Cal.App.4th 1318, 1340, 170 Cal.Rptr.3d 861 (2014), as modified on denial of reh\u2019g (May 20, 2014) (holding that RV repair company which repaired RV for owner did not have a duty to manufacturer of hydraulic components); see also J\u2019Aire Corp. v. Gregory, 24 Cal.3d 799, 157 Cal.Rptr. 407, 598 P.2d 60 (1979) (delineating the special relationship exception and holding that airport restaurant had special relationship with contractor who contracted with airport operator to renovate the airport, allowing restaurant to recover lost profits arising from construction delays caused by contractor); Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal.2d 647, 648-51, 320 P.2d 16 (1958) (holding that a decedent\u2019s intended beneficiary had a special relationship with the notary public who had prepared a defective will)."},"case_id":12271985,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Plaintiff misunderstands the special relationship exception to the economic loss doctrine. The underlying purpose of the special relationship exception is to define particular \"circumstances in which a party has a duty of care to avoid imposing economic losses on third parties.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"delineating the special relationship exception and holding that airport restaurant had special relationship with contractor who contracted with airport operator to renovate the airport, allowing restaurant to recover lost profits arising from construction delays caused by contractor","sentence":"Mega RV Corp. v. HWH Corp., 225 Cal.App.4th 1318, 1340, 170 Cal.Rptr.3d 861 (2014), as modified on denial of reh\u2019g (May 20, 2014) (holding that RV repair company which repaired RV for owner did not have a duty to manufacturer of hydraulic components); see also J\u2019Aire Corp. v. Gregory, 24 Cal.3d 799, 157 Cal.Rptr. 407, 598 P.2d 60 (1979) (delineating the special relationship exception and holding that airport restaurant had special relationship with contractor who contracted with airport operator to renovate the airport, allowing restaurant to recover lost profits arising from construction delays caused by contractor); Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal.2d 647, 648-51, 320 P.2d 16 (1958) (holding that a decedent\u2019s intended beneficiary had a special relationship with the notary public who had prepared a defective will)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"225 Cal.App.4th 1318, 1340","parenthetical":"holding that RV repair company which repaired RV for owner did not have a duty to manufacturer of hydraulic components","sentence":"Mega RV Corp. v. HWH Corp., 225 Cal.App.4th 1318, 1340, 170 Cal.Rptr.3d 861 (2014), as modified on denial of reh\u2019g (May 20, 2014) (holding that RV repair company which repaired RV for owner did not have a duty to manufacturer of hydraulic components); see also J\u2019Aire Corp. v. Gregory, 24 Cal.3d 799, 157 Cal.Rptr. 407, 598 P.2d 60 (1979) (delineating the special relationship exception and holding that airport restaurant had special relationship with contractor who contracted with airport operator to renovate the airport, allowing restaurant to recover lost profits arising from construction delays caused by contractor); Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal.2d 647, 648-51, 320 P.2d 16 (1958) (holding that a decedent\u2019s intended beneficiary had a special relationship with the notary public who had prepared a defective will)."},"case_id":12271985,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Plaintiff misunderstands the special relationship exception to the economic loss doctrine. The underlying purpose of the special relationship exception is to define particular \"circumstances in which a party has a duty of care to avoid imposing economic losses on third parties.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"delineating the special relationship exception and holding that airport restaurant had special relationship with contractor who contracted with airport operator to renovate the airport, allowing restaurant to recover lost profits arising from construction delays caused by contractor","sentence":"Mega RV Corp. v. HWH Corp., 225 Cal.App.4th 1318, 1340, 170 Cal.Rptr.3d 861 (2014), as modified on denial of reh\u2019g (May 20, 2014) (holding that RV repair company which repaired RV for owner did not have a duty to manufacturer of hydraulic components); see also J\u2019Aire Corp. v. Gregory, 24 Cal.3d 799, 157 Cal.Rptr. 407, 598 P.2d 60 (1979) (delineating the special relationship exception and holding that airport restaurant had special relationship with contractor who contracted with airport operator to renovate the airport, allowing restaurant to recover lost profits arising from construction delays caused by contractor); Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal.2d 647, 648-51, 320 P.2d 16 (1958) (holding that a decedent\u2019s intended beneficiary had a special relationship with the notary public who had prepared a defective will)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"225 Cal.App.4th 1318, 1340","parenthetical":"holding that RV repair company which repaired RV for owner did not have a duty to manufacturer of hydraulic components","sentence":"Mega RV Corp. v. HWH Corp., 225 Cal.App.4th 1318, 1340, 170 Cal.Rptr.3d 861 (2014), as modified on denial of reh\u2019g (May 20, 2014) (holding that RV repair company which repaired RV for owner did not have a duty to manufacturer of hydraulic components); see also J\u2019Aire Corp. v. Gregory, 24 Cal.3d 799, 157 Cal.Rptr. 407, 598 P.2d 60 (1979) (delineating the special relationship exception and holding that airport restaurant had special relationship with contractor who contracted with airport operator to renovate the airport, allowing restaurant to recover lost profits arising from construction delays caused by contractor); Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal.2d 647, 648-51, 320 P.2d 16 (1958) (holding that a decedent\u2019s intended beneficiary had a special relationship with the notary public who had prepared a defective will)."},"case_id":12271985,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Plaintiff misunderstands the special relationship exception to the economic loss doctrine. The underlying purpose of the special relationship exception is to define particular \"circumstances in which a party has a duty of care to avoid imposing economic losses on third parties.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"225 Cal.App.4th 1318, 1340","parenthetical":"holding that RV repair company which repaired RV for owner did not have a duty to manufacturer of hydraulic components","sentence":"Mega RV Corp. v. HWH Corp., 225 Cal.App.4th 1318, 1340, 170 Cal.Rptr.3d 861 (2014), as modified on denial of reh\u2019g (May 20, 2014) (holding that RV repair company which repaired RV for owner did not have a duty to manufacturer of hydraulic components); see also J\u2019Aire Corp. v. Gregory, 24 Cal.3d 799, 157 Cal.Rptr. 407, 598 P.2d 60 (1979) (delineating the special relationship exception and holding that airport restaurant had special relationship with contractor who contracted with airport operator to renovate the airport, allowing restaurant to recover lost profits arising from construction delays caused by contractor); Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal.2d 647, 648-51, 320 P.2d 16 (1958) (holding that a decedent\u2019s intended beneficiary had a special relationship with the notary public who had prepared a defective will)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"49 Cal.2d 647, 648-51","parenthetical":"holding that a decedent's intended beneficiary had a special relationship with the notary public who had prepared a defective will","sentence":"Mega RV Corp. v. HWH Corp., 225 Cal.App.4th 1318, 1340, 170 Cal.Rptr.3d 861 (2014), as modified on denial of reh\u2019g (May 20, 2014) (holding that RV repair company which repaired RV for owner did not have a duty to manufacturer of hydraulic components); see also J\u2019Aire Corp. v. Gregory, 24 Cal.3d 799, 157 Cal.Rptr. 407, 598 P.2d 60 (1979) (delineating the special relationship exception and holding that airport restaurant had special relationship with contractor who contracted with airport operator to renovate the airport, allowing restaurant to recover lost profits arising from construction delays caused by contractor); Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal.2d 647, 648-51, 320 P.2d 16 (1958) (holding that a decedent\u2019s intended beneficiary had a special relationship with the notary public who had prepared a defective will)."},"case_id":12271985,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Plaintiff misunderstands the special relationship exception to the economic loss doctrine. The underlying purpose of the special relationship exception is to define particular \"circumstances in which a party has a duty of care to avoid imposing economic losses on third parties.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that a decedent's intended beneficiary had a special relationship with the notary public who had prepared a defective will","sentence":"Mega RV Corp. v. HWH Corp., 225 Cal.App.4th 1318, 1340, 170 Cal.Rptr.3d 861 (2014), as modified on denial of reh\u2019g (May 20, 2014) (holding that RV repair company which repaired RV for owner did not have a duty to manufacturer of hydraulic components); see also J\u2019Aire Corp. v. Gregory, 24 Cal.3d 799, 157 Cal.Rptr. 407, 598 P.2d 60 (1979) (delineating the special relationship exception and holding that airport restaurant had special relationship with contractor who contracted with airport operator to renovate the airport, allowing restaurant to recover lost profits arising from construction delays caused by contractor); Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal.2d 647, 648-51, 320 P.2d 16 (1958) (holding that a decedent\u2019s intended beneficiary had a special relationship with the notary public who had prepared a defective will)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"225 Cal.App.4th 1318, 1340","parenthetical":"holding that RV repair company which repaired RV for owner did not have a duty to manufacturer of hydraulic components","sentence":"Mega RV Corp. v. HWH Corp., 225 Cal.App.4th 1318, 1340, 170 Cal.Rptr.3d 861 (2014), as modified on denial of reh\u2019g (May 20, 2014) (holding that RV repair company which repaired RV for owner did not have a duty to manufacturer of hydraulic components); see also J\u2019Aire Corp. v. Gregory, 24 Cal.3d 799, 157 Cal.Rptr. 407, 598 P.2d 60 (1979) (delineating the special relationship exception and holding that airport restaurant had special relationship with contractor who contracted with airport operator to renovate the airport, allowing restaurant to recover lost profits arising from construction delays caused by contractor); Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal.2d 647, 648-51, 320 P.2d 16 (1958) (holding that a decedent\u2019s intended beneficiary had a special relationship with the notary public who had prepared a defective will)."},"case_id":12271985,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Plaintiff misunderstands the special relationship exception to the economic loss doctrine. The underlying purpose of the special relationship exception is to define particular \"circumstances in which a party has a duty of care to avoid imposing economic losses on third parties.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"delineating the special relationship exception and holding that airport restaurant had special relationship with contractor who contracted with airport operator to renovate the airport, allowing restaurant to recover lost profits arising from construction delays caused by contractor","sentence":"Mega RV Corp. v. HWH Corp., 225 Cal.App.4th 1318, 1340, 170 Cal.Rptr.3d 861 (2014), as modified on denial of reh\u2019g (May 20, 2014) (holding that RV repair company which repaired RV for owner did not have a duty to manufacturer of hydraulic components); see also J\u2019Aire Corp. v. Gregory, 24 Cal.3d 799, 157 Cal.Rptr. 407, 598 P.2d 60 (1979) (delineating the special relationship exception and holding that airport restaurant had special relationship with contractor who contracted with airport operator to renovate the airport, allowing restaurant to recover lost profits arising from construction delays caused by contractor); Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal.2d 647, 648-51, 320 P.2d 16 (1958) (holding that a decedent\u2019s intended beneficiary had a special relationship with the notary public who had prepared a defective will)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that RV repair company which repaired RV for owner did not have a duty to manufacturer of hydraulic components","sentence":"Mega RV Corp. v. HWH Corp., 225 Cal.App.4th 1318, 1340, 170 Cal.Rptr.3d 861 (2014), as modified on denial of reh\u2019g (May 20, 2014) (holding that RV repair company which repaired RV for owner did not have a duty to manufacturer of hydraulic components); see also J\u2019Aire Corp. v. Gregory, 24 Cal.3d 799, 157 Cal.Rptr. 407, 598 P.2d 60 (1979) (delineating the special relationship exception and holding that airport restaurant had special relationship with contractor who contracted with airport operator to renovate the airport, allowing restaurant to recover lost profits arising from construction delays caused by contractor); Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal.2d 647, 648-51, 320 P.2d 16 (1958) (holding that a decedent\u2019s intended beneficiary had a special relationship with the notary public who had prepared a defective will)."},"case_id":12271985,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Plaintiff misunderstands the special relationship exception to the economic loss doctrine. The underlying purpose of the special relationship exception is to define particular \"circumstances in which a party has a duty of care to avoid imposing economic losses on third parties.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"delineating the special relationship exception and holding that airport restaurant had special relationship with contractor who contracted with airport operator to renovate the airport, allowing restaurant to recover lost profits arising from construction delays caused by contractor","sentence":"Mega RV Corp. v. HWH Corp., 225 Cal.App.4th 1318, 1340, 170 Cal.Rptr.3d 861 (2014), as modified on denial of reh\u2019g (May 20, 2014) (holding that RV repair company which repaired RV for owner did not have a duty to manufacturer of hydraulic components); see also J\u2019Aire Corp. v. Gregory, 24 Cal.3d 799, 157 Cal.Rptr. 407, 598 P.2d 60 (1979) (delineating the special relationship exception and holding that airport restaurant had special relationship with contractor who contracted with airport operator to renovate the airport, allowing restaurant to recover lost profits arising from construction delays caused by contractor); Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal.2d 647, 648-51, 320 P.2d 16 (1958) (holding that a decedent\u2019s intended beneficiary had a special relationship with the notary public who had prepared a defective will)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that RV repair company which repaired RV for owner did not have a duty to manufacturer of hydraulic components","sentence":"Mega RV Corp. v. HWH Corp., 225 Cal.App.4th 1318, 1340, 170 Cal.Rptr.3d 861 (2014), as modified on denial of reh\u2019g (May 20, 2014) (holding that RV repair company which repaired RV for owner did not have a duty to manufacturer of hydraulic components); see also J\u2019Aire Corp. v. Gregory, 24 Cal.3d 799, 157 Cal.Rptr. 407, 598 P.2d 60 (1979) (delineating the special relationship exception and holding that airport restaurant had special relationship with contractor who contracted with airport operator to renovate the airport, allowing restaurant to recover lost profits arising from construction delays caused by contractor); Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal.2d 647, 648-51, 320 P.2d 16 (1958) (holding that a decedent\u2019s intended beneficiary had a special relationship with the notary public who had prepared a defective will)."},"case_id":12271985,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Plaintiff misunderstands the special relationship exception to the economic loss doctrine. The underlying purpose of the special relationship exception is to define particular \"circumstances in which a party has a duty of care to avoid imposing economic losses on third parties.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that RV repair company which repaired RV for owner did not have a duty to manufacturer of hydraulic components","sentence":"Mega RV Corp. v. HWH Corp., 225 Cal.App.4th 1318, 1340, 170 Cal.Rptr.3d 861 (2014), as modified on denial of reh\u2019g (May 20, 2014) (holding that RV repair company which repaired RV for owner did not have a duty to manufacturer of hydraulic components); see also J\u2019Aire Corp. v. Gregory, 24 Cal.3d 799, 157 Cal.Rptr. 407, 598 P.2d 60 (1979) (delineating the special relationship exception and holding that airport restaurant had special relationship with contractor who contracted with airport operator to renovate the airport, allowing restaurant to recover lost profits arising from construction delays caused by contractor); Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal.2d 647, 648-51, 320 P.2d 16 (1958) (holding that a decedent\u2019s intended beneficiary had a special relationship with the notary public who had prepared a defective will)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"delineating the special relationship exception and holding that airport restaurant had special relationship with contractor who contracted with airport operator to renovate the airport, allowing restaurant to recover lost profits arising from construction delays caused by contractor","sentence":"Mega RV Corp. v. HWH Corp., 225 Cal.App.4th 1318, 1340, 170 Cal.Rptr.3d 861 (2014), as modified on denial of reh\u2019g (May 20, 2014) (holding that RV repair company which repaired RV for owner did not have a duty to manufacturer of hydraulic components); see also J\u2019Aire Corp. v. Gregory, 24 Cal.3d 799, 157 Cal.Rptr. 407, 598 P.2d 60 (1979) (delineating the special relationship exception and holding that airport restaurant had special relationship with contractor who contracted with airport operator to renovate the airport, allowing restaurant to recover lost profits arising from construction delays caused by contractor); Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal.2d 647, 648-51, 320 P.2d 16 (1958) (holding that a decedent\u2019s intended beneficiary had a special relationship with the notary public who had prepared a defective will)."},"case_id":12271985,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Plaintiff misunderstands the special relationship exception to the economic loss doctrine. The underlying purpose of the special relationship exception is to define particular \"circumstances in which a party has a duty of care to avoid imposing economic losses on third parties.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"49 Cal.2d 647, 648-51","parenthetical":"holding that a decedent's intended beneficiary had a special relationship with the notary public who had prepared a defective will","sentence":"Mega RV Corp. v. HWH Corp., 225 Cal.App.4th 1318, 1340, 170 Cal.Rptr.3d 861 (2014), as modified on denial of reh\u2019g (May 20, 2014) (holding that RV repair company which repaired RV for owner did not have a duty to manufacturer of hydraulic components); see also J\u2019Aire Corp. v. Gregory, 24 Cal.3d 799, 157 Cal.Rptr. 407, 598 P.2d 60 (1979) (delineating the special relationship exception and holding that airport restaurant had special relationship with contractor who contracted with airport operator to renovate the airport, allowing restaurant to recover lost profits arising from construction delays caused by contractor); Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal.2d 647, 648-51, 320 P.2d 16 (1958) (holding that a decedent\u2019s intended beneficiary had a special relationship with the notary public who had prepared a defective will)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that RV repair company which repaired RV for owner did not have a duty to manufacturer of hydraulic components","sentence":"Mega RV Corp. v. HWH Corp., 225 Cal.App.4th 1318, 1340, 170 Cal.Rptr.3d 861 (2014), as modified on denial of reh\u2019g (May 20, 2014) (holding that RV repair company which repaired RV for owner did not have a duty to manufacturer of hydraulic components); see also J\u2019Aire Corp. v. Gregory, 24 Cal.3d 799, 157 Cal.Rptr. 407, 598 P.2d 60 (1979) (delineating the special relationship exception and holding that airport restaurant had special relationship with contractor who contracted with airport operator to renovate the airport, allowing restaurant to recover lost profits arising from construction delays caused by contractor); Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal.2d 647, 648-51, 320 P.2d 16 (1958) (holding that a decedent\u2019s intended beneficiary had a special relationship with the notary public who had prepared a defective will)."},"case_id":12271985,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Plaintiff misunderstands the special relationship exception to the economic loss doctrine. The underlying purpose of the special relationship exception is to define particular \"circumstances in which a party has a duty of care to avoid imposing economic losses on third parties.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that a decedent's intended beneficiary had a special relationship with the notary public who had prepared a defective will","sentence":"Mega RV Corp. v. HWH Corp., 225 Cal.App.4th 1318, 1340, 170 Cal.Rptr.3d 861 (2014), as modified on denial of reh\u2019g (May 20, 2014) (holding that RV repair company which repaired RV for owner did not have a duty to manufacturer of hydraulic components); see also J\u2019Aire Corp. v. Gregory, 24 Cal.3d 799, 157 Cal.Rptr. 407, 598 P.2d 60 (1979) (delineating the special relationship exception and holding that airport restaurant had special relationship with contractor who contracted with airport operator to renovate the airport, allowing restaurant to recover lost profits arising from construction delays caused by contractor); Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal.2d 647, 648-51, 320 P.2d 16 (1958) (holding that a decedent\u2019s intended beneficiary had a special relationship with the notary public who had prepared a defective will)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that RV repair company which repaired RV for owner did not have a duty to manufacturer of hydraulic components","sentence":"Mega RV Corp. v. HWH Corp., 225 Cal.App.4th 1318, 1340, 170 Cal.Rptr.3d 861 (2014), as modified on denial of reh\u2019g (May 20, 2014) (holding that RV repair company which repaired RV for owner did not have a duty to manufacturer of hydraulic components); see also J\u2019Aire Corp. v. Gregory, 24 Cal.3d 799, 157 Cal.Rptr. 407, 598 P.2d 60 (1979) (delineating the special relationship exception and holding that airport restaurant had special relationship with contractor who contracted with airport operator to renovate the airport, allowing restaurant to recover lost profits arising from construction delays caused by contractor); Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal.2d 647, 648-51, 320 P.2d 16 (1958) (holding that a decedent\u2019s intended beneficiary had a special relationship with the notary public who had prepared a defective will)."},"case_id":12271985,"label":"b"}
{"context":"We disagree. Mr. Abernathy is correct that, under the law-of-the-case doctrine, courts ordinarily would refuse to reconsider arguments presented in a SS 2255 motion that were raised and adjudicated on direct appeal.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"406 F.3d 505, 511","parenthetical":"declining to reconsider an argument raised in a SS 2255 motion that was addressed on direct appeal","sentence":"See Davis, 417 U.S. at 342, 94 S.Ct. 2298 (noting that the law-of-the-case doctrine typically precludes consideration of issues in a \u00a7 2255 proceeding that were previously decided on direct appeal); United States v. Irving, 665 F.3d 1184, 1192-93 (10th Cir.2011) (declining to reconsider an argument raised in a \u00a7 2255 motion that was addressed on direct appeal); United States v. LaHue, 261 F.3d 993, 1010-11 (10th Cir.2001) (\u201cThe law of the case doctrine posits that when a court decides upon a rule of law, that decision should continue to govern the same issues in subsequent stages in the same case.\u201d (quoting United States v. Alvarez, 142 F.3d 1243, 1247 (10th Cir.1998)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also United States v. Davis, 406 F.3d 505, 511 (8th Cir.2005) (declining to reconsider an argument raised in a \u00a7 2255 motion that was addressed on direct appeal); Dall v. United States, 957 F.2d 571, 572 (8th Cir.1992) (per curiam) (\u201c[CJlaims which were raised and decided on direct appeal cannot be relitigated on a motion to vacate pursuant to 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2255.\u201d (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Shabazz, 657 F.2d 189, 190 (8th Cir.1981) (per curiam)) (internal quotation marks omitted))."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"417 U.S. 342, 342","parenthetical":"noting that the law-of-the-case doctrine typically precludes consideration of issues in a SS 2255 proceeding that were previously decided on direct appeal","sentence":"See Davis, 417 U.S. at 342, 94 S.Ct. 2298 (noting that the law-of-the-case doctrine typically precludes consideration of issues in a \u00a7 2255 proceeding that were previously decided on direct appeal); United States v. Irving, 665 F.3d 1184, 1192-93 (10th Cir.2011) (declining to reconsider an argument raised in a \u00a7 2255 motion that was addressed on direct appeal); United States v. LaHue, 261 F.3d 993, 1010-11 (10th Cir.2001) (\u201cThe law of the case doctrine posits that when a court decides upon a rule of law, that decision should continue to govern the same issues in subsequent stages in the same case.\u201d (quoting United States v. Alvarez, 142 F.3d 1243, 1247 (10th Cir.1998)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also United States v. Davis, 406 F.3d 505, 511 (8th Cir.2005) (declining to reconsider an argument raised in a \u00a7 2255 motion that was addressed on direct appeal); Dall v. United States, 957 F.2d 571, 572 (8th Cir.1992) (per curiam) (\u201c[CJlaims which were raised and decided on direct appeal cannot be relitigated on a motion to vacate pursuant to 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2255.\u201d (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Shabazz, 657 F.2d 189, 190 (8th Cir.1981) (per curiam)) (internal quotation marks omitted))."},"case_id":3560062,"label":"b"}
{"context":"We disagree. Mr. Abernathy is correct that, under the law-of-the-case doctrine, courts ordinarily would refuse to reconsider arguments presented in a SS 2255 motion that were raised and adjudicated on direct appeal.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"406 F.3d 505, 511","parenthetical":"declining to reconsider an argument raised in a SS 2255 motion that was addressed on direct appeal","sentence":"See Davis, 417 U.S. at 342, 94 S.Ct. 2298 (noting that the law-of-the-case doctrine typically precludes consideration of issues in a \u00a7 2255 proceeding that were previously decided on direct appeal); United States v. Irving, 665 F.3d 1184, 1192-93 (10th Cir.2011) (declining to reconsider an argument raised in a \u00a7 2255 motion that was addressed on direct appeal); United States v. LaHue, 261 F.3d 993, 1010-11 (10th Cir.2001) (\u201cThe law of the case doctrine posits that when a court decides upon a rule of law, that decision should continue to govern the same issues in subsequent stages in the same case.\u201d (quoting United States v. Alvarez, 142 F.3d 1243, 1247 (10th Cir.1998)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also United States v. Davis, 406 F.3d 505, 511 (8th Cir.2005) (declining to reconsider an argument raised in a \u00a7 2255 motion that was addressed on direct appeal); Dall v. United States, 957 F.2d 571, 572 (8th Cir.1992) (per curiam) (\u201c[CJlaims which were raised and decided on direct appeal cannot be relitigated on a motion to vacate pursuant to 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2255.\u201d (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Shabazz, 657 F.2d 189, 190 (8th Cir.1981) (per curiam)) (internal quotation marks omitted))."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting that the law-of-the-case doctrine typically precludes consideration of issues in a SS 2255 proceeding that were previously decided on direct appeal","sentence":"See Davis, 417 U.S. at 342, 94 S.Ct. 2298 (noting that the law-of-the-case doctrine typically precludes consideration of issues in a \u00a7 2255 proceeding that were previously decided on direct appeal); United States v. Irving, 665 F.3d 1184, 1192-93 (10th Cir.2011) (declining to reconsider an argument raised in a \u00a7 2255 motion that was addressed on direct appeal); United States v. LaHue, 261 F.3d 993, 1010-11 (10th Cir.2001) (\u201cThe law of the case doctrine posits that when a court decides upon a rule of law, that decision should continue to govern the same issues in subsequent stages in the same case.\u201d (quoting United States v. Alvarez, 142 F.3d 1243, 1247 (10th Cir.1998)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also United States v. Davis, 406 F.3d 505, 511 (8th Cir.2005) (declining to reconsider an argument raised in a \u00a7 2255 motion that was addressed on direct appeal); Dall v. United States, 957 F.2d 571, 572 (8th Cir.1992) (per curiam) (\u201c[CJlaims which were raised and decided on direct appeal cannot be relitigated on a motion to vacate pursuant to 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2255.\u201d (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Shabazz, 657 F.2d 189, 190 (8th Cir.1981) (per curiam)) (internal quotation marks omitted))."},"case_id":3560062,"label":"b"}
{"context":"We disagree. Mr. Abernathy is correct that, under the law-of-the-case doctrine, courts ordinarily would refuse to reconsider arguments presented in a SS 2255 motion that were raised and adjudicated on direct appeal.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"665 F.3d 1184, 1192-93","parenthetical":"declining to reconsider an argument raised in a SS 2255 motion that was addressed on direct appeal","sentence":"See Davis, 417 U.S. at 342, 94 S.Ct. 2298 (noting that the law-of-the-case doctrine typically precludes consideration of issues in a \u00a7 2255 proceeding that were previously decided on direct appeal); United States v. Irving, 665 F.3d 1184, 1192-93 (10th Cir.2011) (declining to reconsider an argument raised in a \u00a7 2255 motion that was addressed on direct appeal); United States v. LaHue, 261 F.3d 993, 1010-11 (10th Cir.2001) (\u201cThe law of the case doctrine posits that when a court decides upon a rule of law, that decision should continue to govern the same issues in subsequent stages in the same case.\u201d (quoting United States v. Alvarez, 142 F.3d 1243, 1247 (10th Cir.1998)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also United States v. Davis, 406 F.3d 505, 511 (8th Cir.2005) (declining to reconsider an argument raised in a \u00a7 2255 motion that was addressed on direct appeal); Dall v. United States, 957 F.2d 571, 572 (8th Cir.1992) (per curiam) (\u201c[CJlaims which were raised and decided on direct appeal cannot be relitigated on a motion to vacate pursuant to 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2255.\u201d (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Shabazz, 657 F.2d 189, 190 (8th Cir.1981) (per curiam)) (internal quotation marks omitted))."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"406 F.3d 505, 511","parenthetical":"declining to reconsider an argument raised in a SS 2255 motion that was addressed on direct appeal","sentence":"See Davis, 417 U.S. at 342, 94 S.Ct. 2298 (noting that the law-of-the-case doctrine typically precludes consideration of issues in a \u00a7 2255 proceeding that were previously decided on direct appeal); United States v. Irving, 665 F.3d 1184, 1192-93 (10th Cir.2011) (declining to reconsider an argument raised in a \u00a7 2255 motion that was addressed on direct appeal); United States v. LaHue, 261 F.3d 993, 1010-11 (10th Cir.2001) (\u201cThe law of the case doctrine posits that when a court decides upon a rule of law, that decision should continue to govern the same issues in subsequent stages in the same case.\u201d (quoting United States v. Alvarez, 142 F.3d 1243, 1247 (10th Cir.1998)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also United States v. Davis, 406 F.3d 505, 511 (8th Cir.2005) (declining to reconsider an argument raised in a \u00a7 2255 motion that was addressed on direct appeal); Dall v. United States, 957 F.2d 571, 572 (8th Cir.1992) (per curiam) (\u201c[CJlaims which were raised and decided on direct appeal cannot be relitigated on a motion to vacate pursuant to 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2255.\u201d (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Shabazz, 657 F.2d 189, 190 (8th Cir.1981) (per curiam)) (internal quotation marks omitted))."},"case_id":3560062,"label":"a"}
{"context":"At trial, the jury found that the deputies engaged in malicious conduct with intent to harm, including using Tasers on sensitive body parts and on unconscious individuals. These findings support Plaintiffs Eighth Amendment claims.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"503 U.S. 1, 6-7","parenthetical":"holding that malicious or sadistic use of force with intent to harm violates the Eighth Amendment","sentence":"See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6-7, 112 S.Ct. 995, 999, 117 L.Ed.2d 156, 165 (1992) (holding that malicious or sadistic use of force with intent to harm violates the Eighth Amendment); see also Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320-21, 106 S.Ct. 1078, 1084-1085, 89 L.Ed.2d 251, 261-62 (1986) (finding that, in the context of a prison disturbance, an Eighth Amendment violation turns on \u201cwhether force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"475 U.S. 312, 320-21","parenthetical":"finding that, in the context of a prison disturbance, an Eighth Amendment violation turns on \"whether force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm\"","sentence":"See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6-7, 112 S.Ct. 995, 999, 117 L.Ed.2d 156, 165 (1992) (holding that malicious or sadistic use of force with intent to harm violates the Eighth Amendment); see also Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320-21, 106 S.Ct. 1078, 1084-1085, 89 L.Ed.2d 251, 261-62 (1986) (finding that, in the context of a prison disturbance, an Eighth Amendment violation turns on \u201cwhether force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm\u201d)."},"case_id":4337888,"label":"a"}
{"context":"At trial, the jury found that the deputies engaged in malicious conduct with intent to harm, including using Tasers on sensitive body parts and on unconscious individuals. These findings support Plaintiffs Eighth Amendment claims.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"106 S.Ct. 1078, 1084-1085","parenthetical":"finding that, in the context of a prison disturbance, an Eighth Amendment violation turns on \"whether force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm\"","sentence":"See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6-7, 112 S.Ct. 995, 999, 117 L.Ed.2d 156, 165 (1992) (holding that malicious or sadistic use of force with intent to harm violates the Eighth Amendment); see also Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320-21, 106 S.Ct. 1078, 1084-1085, 89 L.Ed.2d 251, 261-62 (1986) (finding that, in the context of a prison disturbance, an Eighth Amendment violation turns on \u201cwhether force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"503 U.S. 1, 6-7","parenthetical":"holding that malicious or sadistic use of force with intent to harm violates the Eighth Amendment","sentence":"See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6-7, 112 S.Ct. 995, 999, 117 L.Ed.2d 156, 165 (1992) (holding that malicious or sadistic use of force with intent to harm violates the Eighth Amendment); see also Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320-21, 106 S.Ct. 1078, 1084-1085, 89 L.Ed.2d 251, 261-62 (1986) (finding that, in the context of a prison disturbance, an Eighth Amendment violation turns on \u201cwhether force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm\u201d)."},"case_id":4337888,"label":"b"}
{"context":"At trial, the jury found that the deputies engaged in malicious conduct with intent to harm, including using Tasers on sensitive body parts and on unconscious individuals. These findings support Plaintiffs Eighth Amendment claims.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"503 U.S. 1, 6-7","parenthetical":"holding that malicious or sadistic use of force with intent to harm violates the Eighth Amendment","sentence":"See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6-7, 112 S.Ct. 995, 999, 117 L.Ed.2d 156, 165 (1992) (holding that malicious or sadistic use of force with intent to harm violates the Eighth Amendment); see also Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320-21, 106 S.Ct. 1078, 1084-1085, 89 L.Ed.2d 251, 261-62 (1986) (finding that, in the context of a prison disturbance, an Eighth Amendment violation turns on \u201cwhether force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"89 L.Ed.2d 251, 261-62","parenthetical":"finding that, in the context of a prison disturbance, an Eighth Amendment violation turns on \"whether force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm\"","sentence":"See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6-7, 112 S.Ct. 995, 999, 117 L.Ed.2d 156, 165 (1992) (holding that malicious or sadistic use of force with intent to harm violates the Eighth Amendment); see also Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320-21, 106 S.Ct. 1078, 1084-1085, 89 L.Ed.2d 251, 261-62 (1986) (finding that, in the context of a prison disturbance, an Eighth Amendment violation turns on \u201cwhether force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm\u201d)."},"case_id":4337888,"label":"a"}
{"context":"At trial, the jury found that the deputies engaged in malicious conduct with intent to harm, including using Tasers on sensitive body parts and on unconscious individuals. These findings support Plaintiffs Eighth Amendment claims.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"112 S.Ct. 995, 999","parenthetical":"holding that malicious or sadistic use of force with intent to harm violates the Eighth Amendment","sentence":"See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6-7, 112 S.Ct. 995, 999, 117 L.Ed.2d 156, 165 (1992) (holding that malicious or sadistic use of force with intent to harm violates the Eighth Amendment); see also Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320-21, 106 S.Ct. 1078, 1084-1085, 89 L.Ed.2d 251, 261-62 (1986) (finding that, in the context of a prison disturbance, an Eighth Amendment violation turns on \u201cwhether force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"475 U.S. 312, 320-21","parenthetical":"finding that, in the context of a prison disturbance, an Eighth Amendment violation turns on \"whether force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm\"","sentence":"See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6-7, 112 S.Ct. 995, 999, 117 L.Ed.2d 156, 165 (1992) (holding that malicious or sadistic use of force with intent to harm violates the Eighth Amendment); see also Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320-21, 106 S.Ct. 1078, 1084-1085, 89 L.Ed.2d 251, 261-62 (1986) (finding that, in the context of a prison disturbance, an Eighth Amendment violation turns on \u201cwhether force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm\u201d)."},"case_id":4337888,"label":"a"}
{"context":"At trial, the jury found that the deputies engaged in malicious conduct with intent to harm, including using Tasers on sensitive body parts and on unconscious individuals. These findings support Plaintiffs Eighth Amendment claims.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"106 S.Ct. 1078, 1084-1085","parenthetical":"finding that, in the context of a prison disturbance, an Eighth Amendment violation turns on \"whether force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm\"","sentence":"See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6-7, 112 S.Ct. 995, 999, 117 L.Ed.2d 156, 165 (1992) (holding that malicious or sadistic use of force with intent to harm violates the Eighth Amendment); see also Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320-21, 106 S.Ct. 1078, 1084-1085, 89 L.Ed.2d 251, 261-62 (1986) (finding that, in the context of a prison disturbance, an Eighth Amendment violation turns on \u201cwhether force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"112 S.Ct. 995, 999","parenthetical":"holding that malicious or sadistic use of force with intent to harm violates the Eighth Amendment","sentence":"See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6-7, 112 S.Ct. 995, 999, 117 L.Ed.2d 156, 165 (1992) (holding that malicious or sadistic use of force with intent to harm violates the Eighth Amendment); see also Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320-21, 106 S.Ct. 1078, 1084-1085, 89 L.Ed.2d 251, 261-62 (1986) (finding that, in the context of a prison disturbance, an Eighth Amendment violation turns on \u201cwhether force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm\u201d)."},"case_id":4337888,"label":"b"}
{"context":"At trial, the jury found that the deputies engaged in malicious conduct with intent to harm, including using Tasers on sensitive body parts and on unconscious individuals. These findings support Plaintiffs Eighth Amendment claims.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"89 L.Ed.2d 251, 261-62","parenthetical":"finding that, in the context of a prison disturbance, an Eighth Amendment violation turns on \"whether force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm\"","sentence":"See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6-7, 112 S.Ct. 995, 999, 117 L.Ed.2d 156, 165 (1992) (holding that malicious or sadistic use of force with intent to harm violates the Eighth Amendment); see also Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320-21, 106 S.Ct. 1078, 1084-1085, 89 L.Ed.2d 251, 261-62 (1986) (finding that, in the context of a prison disturbance, an Eighth Amendment violation turns on \u201cwhether force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"112 S.Ct. 995, 999","parenthetical":"holding that malicious or sadistic use of force with intent to harm violates the Eighth Amendment","sentence":"See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6-7, 112 S.Ct. 995, 999, 117 L.Ed.2d 156, 165 (1992) (holding that malicious or sadistic use of force with intent to harm violates the Eighth Amendment); see also Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320-21, 106 S.Ct. 1078, 1084-1085, 89 L.Ed.2d 251, 261-62 (1986) (finding that, in the context of a prison disturbance, an Eighth Amendment violation turns on \u201cwhether force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm\u201d)."},"case_id":4337888,"label":"b"}
{"context":"At trial, the jury found that the deputies engaged in malicious conduct with intent to harm, including using Tasers on sensitive body parts and on unconscious individuals. These findings support Plaintiffs Eighth Amendment claims.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"475 U.S. 312, 320-21","parenthetical":"finding that, in the context of a prison disturbance, an Eighth Amendment violation turns on \"whether force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm\"","sentence":"See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6-7, 112 S.Ct. 995, 999, 117 L.Ed.2d 156, 165 (1992) (holding that malicious or sadistic use of force with intent to harm violates the Eighth Amendment); see also Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320-21, 106 S.Ct. 1078, 1084-1085, 89 L.Ed.2d 251, 261-62 (1986) (finding that, in the context of a prison disturbance, an Eighth Amendment violation turns on \u201cwhether force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"117 L.Ed.2d 156, 165","parenthetical":"holding that malicious or sadistic use of force with intent to harm violates the Eighth Amendment","sentence":"See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6-7, 112 S.Ct. 995, 999, 117 L.Ed.2d 156, 165 (1992) (holding that malicious or sadistic use of force with intent to harm violates the Eighth Amendment); see also Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320-21, 106 S.Ct. 1078, 1084-1085, 89 L.Ed.2d 251, 261-62 (1986) (finding that, in the context of a prison disturbance, an Eighth Amendment violation turns on \u201cwhether force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm\u201d)."},"case_id":4337888,"label":"b"}
{"context":"At trial, the jury found that the deputies engaged in malicious conduct with intent to harm, including using Tasers on sensitive body parts and on unconscious individuals. These findings support Plaintiffs Eighth Amendment claims.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"117 L.Ed.2d 156, 165","parenthetical":"holding that malicious or sadistic use of force with intent to harm violates the Eighth Amendment","sentence":"See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6-7, 112 S.Ct. 995, 999, 117 L.Ed.2d 156, 165 (1992) (holding that malicious or sadistic use of force with intent to harm violates the Eighth Amendment); see also Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320-21, 106 S.Ct. 1078, 1084-1085, 89 L.Ed.2d 251, 261-62 (1986) (finding that, in the context of a prison disturbance, an Eighth Amendment violation turns on \u201cwhether force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"106 S.Ct. 1078, 1084-1085","parenthetical":"finding that, in the context of a prison disturbance, an Eighth Amendment violation turns on \"whether force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm\"","sentence":"See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6-7, 112 S.Ct. 995, 999, 117 L.Ed.2d 156, 165 (1992) (holding that malicious or sadistic use of force with intent to harm violates the Eighth Amendment); see also Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320-21, 106 S.Ct. 1078, 1084-1085, 89 L.Ed.2d 251, 261-62 (1986) (finding that, in the context of a prison disturbance, an Eighth Amendment violation turns on \u201cwhether force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm\u201d)."},"case_id":4337888,"label":"a"}
{"context":"At trial, the jury found that the deputies engaged in malicious conduct with intent to harm, including using Tasers on sensitive body parts and on unconscious individuals. These findings support Plaintiffs Eighth Amendment claims.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"117 L.Ed.2d 156, 165","parenthetical":"holding that malicious or sadistic use of force with intent to harm violates the Eighth Amendment","sentence":"See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6-7, 112 S.Ct. 995, 999, 117 L.Ed.2d 156, 165 (1992) (holding that malicious or sadistic use of force with intent to harm violates the Eighth Amendment); see also Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320-21, 106 S.Ct. 1078, 1084-1085, 89 L.Ed.2d 251, 261-62 (1986) (finding that, in the context of a prison disturbance, an Eighth Amendment violation turns on \u201cwhether force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"89 L.Ed.2d 251, 261-62","parenthetical":"finding that, in the context of a prison disturbance, an Eighth Amendment violation turns on \"whether force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm\"","sentence":"See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6-7, 112 S.Ct. 995, 999, 117 L.Ed.2d 156, 165 (1992) (holding that malicious or sadistic use of force with intent to harm violates the Eighth Amendment); see also Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320-21, 106 S.Ct. 1078, 1084-1085, 89 L.Ed.2d 251, 261-62 (1986) (finding that, in the context of a prison disturbance, an Eighth Amendment violation turns on \u201cwhether force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm\u201d)."},"case_id":4337888,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Other courts have concluded that English-only notices put defendants on inquiry notice and place a burden on the defendants to have the notices interpreted to discern their meaning.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"rule placing burden of diligence and further inquiry on non-English speaking individual served with a notice in English does not violate due process","sentence":"See Soberal-Perez v. Heckler, 717 F.2d 36 (2d Cir.1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 929, 104 S.Ct. 1713, 80 L.Ed.2d 186 (1984)(rule placing burden of diligence and further inquiry on non-English speaking individual served with a notice in English does not violate due process); Commonwealth v. Olivo, 369 Mass. 62, 337 N.E.2d 904 (Mass.1975)(English-only notices of condemnation did not violate due process or equal protection and defendants were on inquiry notice to find out their meaning)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"requirements of reasonable notice satisfied when notice is sent in English","sentence":"See also Alfonso v. Board of Review, 89 N.J. 41, 444 A.2d 1076 (1982), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 459 U.S. 806, 103 S.Ct. 30, 74 L.Ed.2d 45 (1982)(requirements of reasonable notice satisfied when notice is sent in English)."},"case_id":11582016,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Other courts have concluded that English-only notices put defendants on inquiry notice and place a burden on the defendants to have the notices interpreted to discern their meaning.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"requirements of reasonable notice satisfied when notice is sent in English","sentence":"See also Alfonso v. Board of Review, 89 N.J. 41, 444 A.2d 1076 (1982), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 459 U.S. 806, 103 S.Ct. 30, 74 L.Ed.2d 45 (1982)(requirements of reasonable notice satisfied when notice is sent in English)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"rule placing burden of diligence and further inquiry on non-English speaking individual served with a notice in English does not violate due process","sentence":"See Soberal-Perez v. Heckler, 717 F.2d 36 (2d Cir.1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 929, 104 S.Ct. 1713, 80 L.Ed.2d 186 (1984)(rule placing burden of diligence and further inquiry on non-English speaking individual served with a notice in English does not violate due process); Commonwealth v. Olivo, 369 Mass. 62, 337 N.E.2d 904 (Mass.1975)(English-only notices of condemnation did not violate due process or equal protection and defendants were on inquiry notice to find out their meaning)."},"case_id":11582016,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Other courts have concluded that English-only notices put defendants on inquiry notice and place a burden on the defendants to have the notices interpreted to discern their meaning.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"rule placing burden of diligence and further inquiry on non-English speaking individual served with a notice in English does not violate due process","sentence":"See Soberal-Perez v. Heckler, 717 F.2d 36 (2d Cir.1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 929, 104 S.Ct. 1713, 80 L.Ed.2d 186 (1984)(rule placing burden of diligence and further inquiry on non-English speaking individual served with a notice in English does not violate due process); Commonwealth v. Olivo, 369 Mass. 62, 337 N.E.2d 904 (Mass.1975)(English-only notices of condemnation did not violate due process or equal protection and defendants were on inquiry notice to find out their meaning)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"requirements of reasonable notice satisfied when notice is sent in English","sentence":"See also Alfonso v. Board of Review, 89 N.J. 41, 444 A.2d 1076 (1982), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 459 U.S. 806, 103 S.Ct. 30, 74 L.Ed.2d 45 (1982)(requirements of reasonable notice satisfied when notice is sent in English)."},"case_id":11582016,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Other courts have concluded that English-only notices put defendants on inquiry notice and place a burden on the defendants to have the notices interpreted to discern their meaning.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"rule placing burden of diligence and further inquiry on non-English speaking individual served with a notice in English does not violate due process","sentence":"See Soberal-Perez v. Heckler, 717 F.2d 36 (2d Cir.1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 929, 104 S.Ct. 1713, 80 L.Ed.2d 186 (1984)(rule placing burden of diligence and further inquiry on non-English speaking individual served with a notice in English does not violate due process); Commonwealth v. Olivo, 369 Mass. 62, 337 N.E.2d 904 (Mass.1975)(English-only notices of condemnation did not violate due process or equal protection and defendants were on inquiry notice to find out their meaning)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"requirements of reasonable notice satisfied when notice is sent in English","sentence":"See also Alfonso v. Board of Review, 89 N.J. 41, 444 A.2d 1076 (1982), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 459 U.S. 806, 103 S.Ct. 30, 74 L.Ed.2d 45 (1982)(requirements of reasonable notice satisfied when notice is sent in English)."},"case_id":11582016,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Other courts have concluded that English-only notices put defendants on inquiry notice and place a burden on the defendants to have the notices interpreted to discern their meaning.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"requirements of reasonable notice satisfied when notice is sent in English","sentence":"See also Alfonso v. Board of Review, 89 N.J. 41, 444 A.2d 1076 (1982), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 459 U.S. 806, 103 S.Ct. 30, 74 L.Ed.2d 45 (1982)(requirements of reasonable notice satisfied when notice is sent in English)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"rule placing burden of diligence and further inquiry on non-English speaking individual served with a notice in English does not violate due process","sentence":"See Soberal-Perez v. Heckler, 717 F.2d 36 (2d Cir.1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 929, 104 S.Ct. 1713, 80 L.Ed.2d 186 (1984)(rule placing burden of diligence and further inquiry on non-English speaking individual served with a notice in English does not violate due process); Commonwealth v. Olivo, 369 Mass. 62, 337 N.E.2d 904 (Mass.1975)(English-only notices of condemnation did not violate due process or equal protection and defendants were on inquiry notice to find out their meaning)."},"case_id":11582016,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Other courts have concluded that English-only notices put defendants on inquiry notice and place a burden on the defendants to have the notices interpreted to discern their meaning.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"rule placing burden of diligence and further inquiry on non-English speaking individual served with a notice in English does not violate due process","sentence":"See Soberal-Perez v. Heckler, 717 F.2d 36 (2d Cir.1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 929, 104 S.Ct. 1713, 80 L.Ed.2d 186 (1984)(rule placing burden of diligence and further inquiry on non-English speaking individual served with a notice in English does not violate due process); Commonwealth v. Olivo, 369 Mass. 62, 337 N.E.2d 904 (Mass.1975)(English-only notices of condemnation did not violate due process or equal protection and defendants were on inquiry notice to find out their meaning)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"requirements of reasonable notice satisfied when notice is sent in English","sentence":"See also Alfonso v. Board of Review, 89 N.J. 41, 444 A.2d 1076 (1982), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 459 U.S. 806, 103 S.Ct. 30, 74 L.Ed.2d 45 (1982)(requirements of reasonable notice satisfied when notice is sent in English)."},"case_id":11582016,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Other courts have concluded that English-only notices put defendants on inquiry notice and place a burden on the defendants to have the notices interpreted to discern their meaning.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"rule placing burden of diligence and further inquiry on non-English speaking individual served with a notice in English does not violate due process","sentence":"See Soberal-Perez v. Heckler, 717 F.2d 36 (2d Cir.1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 929, 104 S.Ct. 1713, 80 L.Ed.2d 186 (1984)(rule placing burden of diligence and further inquiry on non-English speaking individual served with a notice in English does not violate due process); Commonwealth v. Olivo, 369 Mass. 62, 337 N.E.2d 904 (Mass.1975)(English-only notices of condemnation did not violate due process or equal protection and defendants were on inquiry notice to find out their meaning)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"requirements of reasonable notice satisfied when notice is sent in English","sentence":"See also Alfonso v. Board of Review, 89 N.J. 41, 444 A.2d 1076 (1982), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 459 U.S. 806, 103 S.Ct. 30, 74 L.Ed.2d 45 (1982)(requirements of reasonable notice satisfied when notice is sent in English)."},"case_id":11582016,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Other courts have concluded that English-only notices put defendants on inquiry notice and place a burden on the defendants to have the notices interpreted to discern their meaning.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"rule placing burden of diligence and further inquiry on non-English speaking individual served with a notice in English does not violate due process","sentence":"See Soberal-Perez v. Heckler, 717 F.2d 36 (2d Cir.1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 929, 104 S.Ct. 1713, 80 L.Ed.2d 186 (1984)(rule placing burden of diligence and further inquiry on non-English speaking individual served with a notice in English does not violate due process); Commonwealth v. Olivo, 369 Mass. 62, 337 N.E.2d 904 (Mass.1975)(English-only notices of condemnation did not violate due process or equal protection and defendants were on inquiry notice to find out their meaning)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"requirements of reasonable notice satisfied when notice is sent in English","sentence":"See also Alfonso v. Board of Review, 89 N.J. 41, 444 A.2d 1076 (1982), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 459 U.S. 806, 103 S.Ct. 30, 74 L.Ed.2d 45 (1982)(requirements of reasonable notice satisfied when notice is sent in English)."},"case_id":11582016,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Other courts have concluded that English-only notices put defendants on inquiry notice and place a burden on the defendants to have the notices interpreted to discern their meaning.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"requirements of reasonable notice satisfied when notice is sent in English","sentence":"See also Alfonso v. Board of Review, 89 N.J. 41, 444 A.2d 1076 (1982), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 459 U.S. 806, 103 S.Ct. 30, 74 L.Ed.2d 45 (1982)(requirements of reasonable notice satisfied when notice is sent in English)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"rule placing burden of diligence and further inquiry on non-English speaking individual served with a notice in English does not violate due process","sentence":"See Soberal-Perez v. Heckler, 717 F.2d 36 (2d Cir.1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 929, 104 S.Ct. 1713, 80 L.Ed.2d 186 (1984)(rule placing burden of diligence and further inquiry on non-English speaking individual served with a notice in English does not violate due process); Commonwealth v. Olivo, 369 Mass. 62, 337 N.E.2d 904 (Mass.1975)(English-only notices of condemnation did not violate due process or equal protection and defendants were on inquiry notice to find out their meaning)."},"case_id":11582016,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Other courts have concluded that English-only notices put defendants on inquiry notice and place a burden on the defendants to have the notices interpreted to discern their meaning.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"rule placing burden of diligence and further inquiry on non-English speaking individual served with a notice in English does not violate due process","sentence":"See Soberal-Perez v. Heckler, 717 F.2d 36 (2d Cir.1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 929, 104 S.Ct. 1713, 80 L.Ed.2d 186 (1984)(rule placing burden of diligence and further inquiry on non-English speaking individual served with a notice in English does not violate due process); Commonwealth v. Olivo, 369 Mass. 62, 337 N.E.2d 904 (Mass.1975)(English-only notices of condemnation did not violate due process or equal protection and defendants were on inquiry notice to find out their meaning)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"requirements of reasonable notice satisfied when notice is sent in English","sentence":"See also Alfonso v. Board of Review, 89 N.J. 41, 444 A.2d 1076 (1982), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 459 U.S. 806, 103 S.Ct. 30, 74 L.Ed.2d 45 (1982)(requirements of reasonable notice satisfied when notice is sent in English)."},"case_id":11582016,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Other courts have concluded that English-only notices put defendants on inquiry notice and place a burden on the defendants to have the notices interpreted to discern their meaning.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"rule placing burden of diligence and further inquiry on non-English speaking individual served with a notice in English does not violate due process","sentence":"See Soberal-Perez v. Heckler, 717 F.2d 36 (2d Cir.1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 929, 104 S.Ct. 1713, 80 L.Ed.2d 186 (1984)(rule placing burden of diligence and further inquiry on non-English speaking individual served with a notice in English does not violate due process); Commonwealth v. Olivo, 369 Mass. 62, 337 N.E.2d 904 (Mass.1975)(English-only notices of condemnation did not violate due process or equal protection and defendants were on inquiry notice to find out their meaning)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"requirements of reasonable notice satisfied when notice is sent in English","sentence":"See also Alfonso v. Board of Review, 89 N.J. 41, 444 A.2d 1076 (1982), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 459 U.S. 806, 103 S.Ct. 30, 74 L.Ed.2d 45 (1982)(requirements of reasonable notice satisfied when notice is sent in English)."},"case_id":11582016,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Other courts have concluded that English-only notices put defendants on inquiry notice and place a burden on the defendants to have the notices interpreted to discern their meaning.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"rule placing burden of diligence and further inquiry on non-English speaking individual served with a notice in English does not violate due process","sentence":"See Soberal-Perez v. Heckler, 717 F.2d 36 (2d Cir.1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 929, 104 S.Ct. 1713, 80 L.Ed.2d 186 (1984)(rule placing burden of diligence and further inquiry on non-English speaking individual served with a notice in English does not violate due process); Commonwealth v. Olivo, 369 Mass. 62, 337 N.E.2d 904 (Mass.1975)(English-only notices of condemnation did not violate due process or equal protection and defendants were on inquiry notice to find out their meaning)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"requirements of reasonable notice satisfied when notice is sent in English","sentence":"See also Alfonso v. Board of Review, 89 N.J. 41, 444 A.2d 1076 (1982), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 459 U.S. 806, 103 S.Ct. 30, 74 L.Ed.2d 45 (1982)(requirements of reasonable notice satisfied when notice is sent in English)."},"case_id":11582016,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Other courts have concluded that English-only notices put defendants on inquiry notice and place a burden on the defendants to have the notices interpreted to discern their meaning.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"rule placing burden of diligence and further inquiry on non-English speaking individual served with a notice in English does not violate due process","sentence":"See Soberal-Perez v. Heckler, 717 F.2d 36 (2d Cir.1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 929, 104 S.Ct. 1713, 80 L.Ed.2d 186 (1984)(rule placing burden of diligence and further inquiry on non-English speaking individual served with a notice in English does not violate due process); Commonwealth v. Olivo, 369 Mass. 62, 337 N.E.2d 904 (Mass.1975)(English-only notices of condemnation did not violate due process or equal protection and defendants were on inquiry notice to find out their meaning)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"requirements of reasonable notice satisfied when notice is sent in English","sentence":"See also Alfonso v. Board of Review, 89 N.J. 41, 444 A.2d 1076 (1982), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 459 U.S. 806, 103 S.Ct. 30, 74 L.Ed.2d 45 (1982)(requirements of reasonable notice satisfied when notice is sent in English)."},"case_id":11582016,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Other courts have concluded that English-only notices put defendants on inquiry notice and place a burden on the defendants to have the notices interpreted to discern their meaning.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"requirements of reasonable notice satisfied when notice is sent in English","sentence":"See also Alfonso v. Board of Review, 89 N.J. 41, 444 A.2d 1076 (1982), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 459 U.S. 806, 103 S.Ct. 30, 74 L.Ed.2d 45 (1982)(requirements of reasonable notice satisfied when notice is sent in English)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"rule placing burden of diligence and further inquiry on non-English speaking individual served with a notice in English does not violate due process","sentence":"See Soberal-Perez v. Heckler, 717 F.2d 36 (2d Cir.1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 929, 104 S.Ct. 1713, 80 L.Ed.2d 186 (1984)(rule placing burden of diligence and further inquiry on non-English speaking individual served with a notice in English does not violate due process); Commonwealth v. Olivo, 369 Mass. 62, 337 N.E.2d 904 (Mass.1975)(English-only notices of condemnation did not violate due process or equal protection and defendants were on inquiry notice to find out their meaning)."},"case_id":11582016,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Other courts have concluded that English-only notices put defendants on inquiry notice and place a burden on the defendants to have the notices interpreted to discern their meaning.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"requirements of reasonable notice satisfied when notice is sent in English","sentence":"See also Alfonso v. Board of Review, 89 N.J. 41, 444 A.2d 1076 (1982), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 459 U.S. 806, 103 S.Ct. 30, 74 L.Ed.2d 45 (1982)(requirements of reasonable notice satisfied when notice is sent in English)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"rule placing burden of diligence and further inquiry on non-English speaking individual served with a notice in English does not violate due process","sentence":"See Soberal-Perez v. Heckler, 717 F.2d 36 (2d Cir.1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 929, 104 S.Ct. 1713, 80 L.Ed.2d 186 (1984)(rule placing burden of diligence and further inquiry on non-English speaking individual served with a notice in English does not violate due process); Commonwealth v. Olivo, 369 Mass. 62, 337 N.E.2d 904 (Mass.1975)(English-only notices of condemnation did not violate due process or equal protection and defendants were on inquiry notice to find out their meaning)."},"case_id":11582016,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Other courts have concluded that English-only notices put defendants on inquiry notice and place a burden on the defendants to have the notices interpreted to discern their meaning.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"rule placing burden of diligence and further inquiry on non-English speaking individual served with a notice in English does not violate due process","sentence":"See Soberal-Perez v. Heckler, 717 F.2d 36 (2d Cir.1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 929, 104 S.Ct. 1713, 80 L.Ed.2d 186 (1984)(rule placing burden of diligence and further inquiry on non-English speaking individual served with a notice in English does not violate due process); Commonwealth v. Olivo, 369 Mass. 62, 337 N.E.2d 904 (Mass.1975)(English-only notices of condemnation did not violate due process or equal protection and defendants were on inquiry notice to find out their meaning)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"requirements of reasonable notice satisfied when notice is sent in English","sentence":"See also Alfonso v. Board of Review, 89 N.J. 41, 444 A.2d 1076 (1982), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 459 U.S. 806, 103 S.Ct. 30, 74 L.Ed.2d 45 (1982)(requirements of reasonable notice satisfied when notice is sent in English)."},"case_id":11582016,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Other courts have concluded that English-only notices put defendants on inquiry notice and place a burden on the defendants to have the notices interpreted to discern their meaning.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"rule placing burden of diligence and further inquiry on non-English speaking individual served with a notice in English does not violate due process","sentence":"See Soberal-Perez v. Heckler, 717 F.2d 36 (2d Cir.1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 929, 104 S.Ct. 1713, 80 L.Ed.2d 186 (1984)(rule placing burden of diligence and further inquiry on non-English speaking individual served with a notice in English does not violate due process); Commonwealth v. Olivo, 369 Mass. 62, 337 N.E.2d 904 (Mass.1975)(English-only notices of condemnation did not violate due process or equal protection and defendants were on inquiry notice to find out their meaning)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"requirements of reasonable notice satisfied when notice is sent in English","sentence":"See also Alfonso v. Board of Review, 89 N.J. 41, 444 A.2d 1076 (1982), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 459 U.S. 806, 103 S.Ct. 30, 74 L.Ed.2d 45 (1982)(requirements of reasonable notice satisfied when notice is sent in English)."},"case_id":11582016,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Other courts have concluded that English-only notices put defendants on inquiry notice and place a burden on the defendants to have the notices interpreted to discern their meaning.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"rule placing burden of diligence and further inquiry on non-English speaking individual served with a notice in English does not violate due process","sentence":"See Soberal-Perez v. Heckler, 717 F.2d 36 (2d Cir.1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 929, 104 S.Ct. 1713, 80 L.Ed.2d 186 (1984)(rule placing burden of diligence and further inquiry on non-English speaking individual served with a notice in English does not violate due process); Commonwealth v. Olivo, 369 Mass. 62, 337 N.E.2d 904 (Mass.1975)(English-only notices of condemnation did not violate due process or equal protection and defendants were on inquiry notice to find out their meaning)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"requirements of reasonable notice satisfied when notice is sent in English","sentence":"See also Alfonso v. Board of Review, 89 N.J. 41, 444 A.2d 1076 (1982), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 459 U.S. 806, 103 S.Ct. 30, 74 L.Ed.2d 45 (1982)(requirements of reasonable notice satisfied when notice is sent in English)."},"case_id":11582016,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Other courts have concluded that English-only notices put defendants on inquiry notice and place a burden on the defendants to have the notices interpreted to discern their meaning.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"rule placing burden of diligence and further inquiry on non-English speaking individual served with a notice in English does not violate due process","sentence":"See Soberal-Perez v. Heckler, 717 F.2d 36 (2d Cir.1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 929, 104 S.Ct. 1713, 80 L.Ed.2d 186 (1984)(rule placing burden of diligence and further inquiry on non-English speaking individual served with a notice in English does not violate due process); Commonwealth v. Olivo, 369 Mass. 62, 337 N.E.2d 904 (Mass.1975)(English-only notices of condemnation did not violate due process or equal protection and defendants were on inquiry notice to find out their meaning)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"requirements of reasonable notice satisfied when notice is sent in English","sentence":"See also Alfonso v. Board of Review, 89 N.J. 41, 444 A.2d 1076 (1982), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 459 U.S. 806, 103 S.Ct. 30, 74 L.Ed.2d 45 (1982)(requirements of reasonable notice satisfied when notice is sent in English)."},"case_id":11582016,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Other courts have concluded that English-only notices put defendants on inquiry notice and place a burden on the defendants to have the notices interpreted to discern their meaning.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"rule placing burden of diligence and further inquiry on non-English speaking individual served with a notice in English does not violate due process","sentence":"See Soberal-Perez v. Heckler, 717 F.2d 36 (2d Cir.1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 929, 104 S.Ct. 1713, 80 L.Ed.2d 186 (1984)(rule placing burden of diligence and further inquiry on non-English speaking individual served with a notice in English does not violate due process); Commonwealth v. Olivo, 369 Mass. 62, 337 N.E.2d 904 (Mass.1975)(English-only notices of condemnation did not violate due process or equal protection and defendants were on inquiry notice to find out their meaning)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"requirements of reasonable notice satisfied when notice is sent in English","sentence":"See also Alfonso v. Board of Review, 89 N.J. 41, 444 A.2d 1076 (1982), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 459 U.S. 806, 103 S.Ct. 30, 74 L.Ed.2d 45 (1982)(requirements of reasonable notice satisfied when notice is sent in English)."},"case_id":11582016,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Other courts have concluded that English-only notices put defendants on inquiry notice and place a burden on the defendants to have the notices interpreted to discern their meaning.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"requirements of reasonable notice satisfied when notice is sent in English","sentence":"See also Alfonso v. Board of Review, 89 N.J. 41, 444 A.2d 1076 (1982), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 459 U.S. 806, 103 S.Ct. 30, 74 L.Ed.2d 45 (1982)(requirements of reasonable notice satisfied when notice is sent in English)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"English-only notices of condemnation did not violate due process or equal protection and defendants were on inquiry notice to find out their meaning","sentence":"See Soberal-Perez v. Heckler, 717 F.2d 36 (2d Cir.1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 929, 104 S.Ct. 1713, 80 L.Ed.2d 186 (1984)(rule placing burden of diligence and further inquiry on non-English speaking individual served with a notice in English does not violate due process); Commonwealth v. Olivo, 369 Mass. 62, 337 N.E.2d 904 (Mass.1975)(English-only notices of condemnation did not violate due process or equal protection and defendants were on inquiry notice to find out their meaning)."},"case_id":11582016,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Other courts have concluded that English-only notices put defendants on inquiry notice and place a burden on the defendants to have the notices interpreted to discern their meaning.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"requirements of reasonable notice satisfied when notice is sent in English","sentence":"See also Alfonso v. Board of Review, 89 N.J. 41, 444 A.2d 1076 (1982), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 459 U.S. 806, 103 S.Ct. 30, 74 L.Ed.2d 45 (1982)(requirements of reasonable notice satisfied when notice is sent in English)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"English-only notices of condemnation did not violate due process or equal protection and defendants were on inquiry notice to find out their meaning","sentence":"See Soberal-Perez v. Heckler, 717 F.2d 36 (2d Cir.1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 929, 104 S.Ct. 1713, 80 L.Ed.2d 186 (1984)(rule placing burden of diligence and further inquiry on non-English speaking individual served with a notice in English does not violate due process); Commonwealth v. Olivo, 369 Mass. 62, 337 N.E.2d 904 (Mass.1975)(English-only notices of condemnation did not violate due process or equal protection and defendants were on inquiry notice to find out their meaning)."},"case_id":11582016,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Other courts have concluded that English-only notices put defendants on inquiry notice and place a burden on the defendants to have the notices interpreted to discern their meaning.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"English-only notices of condemnation did not violate due process or equal protection and defendants were on inquiry notice to find out their meaning","sentence":"See Soberal-Perez v. Heckler, 717 F.2d 36 (2d Cir.1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 929, 104 S.Ct. 1713, 80 L.Ed.2d 186 (1984)(rule placing burden of diligence and further inquiry on non-English speaking individual served with a notice in English does not violate due process); Commonwealth v. Olivo, 369 Mass. 62, 337 N.E.2d 904 (Mass.1975)(English-only notices of condemnation did not violate due process or equal protection and defendants were on inquiry notice to find out their meaning)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"requirements of reasonable notice satisfied when notice is sent in English","sentence":"See also Alfonso v. Board of Review, 89 N.J. 41, 444 A.2d 1076 (1982), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 459 U.S. 806, 103 S.Ct. 30, 74 L.Ed.2d 45 (1982)(requirements of reasonable notice satisfied when notice is sent in English)."},"case_id":11582016,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Other courts have concluded that English-only notices put defendants on inquiry notice and place a burden on the defendants to have the notices interpreted to discern their meaning.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"requirements of reasonable notice satisfied when notice is sent in English","sentence":"See also Alfonso v. Board of Review, 89 N.J. 41, 444 A.2d 1076 (1982), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 459 U.S. 806, 103 S.Ct. 30, 74 L.Ed.2d 45 (1982)(requirements of reasonable notice satisfied when notice is sent in English)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"English-only notices of condemnation did not violate due process or equal protection and defendants were on inquiry notice to find out their meaning","sentence":"See Soberal-Perez v. Heckler, 717 F.2d 36 (2d Cir.1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 929, 104 S.Ct. 1713, 80 L.Ed.2d 186 (1984)(rule placing burden of diligence and further inquiry on non-English speaking individual served with a notice in English does not violate due process); Commonwealth v. Olivo, 369 Mass. 62, 337 N.E.2d 904 (Mass.1975)(English-only notices of condemnation did not violate due process or equal protection and defendants were on inquiry notice to find out their meaning)."},"case_id":11582016,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Other courts have concluded that English-only notices put defendants on inquiry notice and place a burden on the defendants to have the notices interpreted to discern their meaning.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"English-only notices of condemnation did not violate due process or equal protection and defendants were on inquiry notice to find out their meaning","sentence":"See Soberal-Perez v. Heckler, 717 F.2d 36 (2d Cir.1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 929, 104 S.Ct. 1713, 80 L.Ed.2d 186 (1984)(rule placing burden of diligence and further inquiry on non-English speaking individual served with a notice in English does not violate due process); Commonwealth v. Olivo, 369 Mass. 62, 337 N.E.2d 904 (Mass.1975)(English-only notices of condemnation did not violate due process or equal protection and defendants were on inquiry notice to find out their meaning)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"requirements of reasonable notice satisfied when notice is sent in English","sentence":"See also Alfonso v. Board of Review, 89 N.J. 41, 444 A.2d 1076 (1982), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 459 U.S. 806, 103 S.Ct. 30, 74 L.Ed.2d 45 (1982)(requirements of reasonable notice satisfied when notice is sent in English)."},"case_id":11582016,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Other courts have concluded that English-only notices put defendants on inquiry notice and place a burden on the defendants to have the notices interpreted to discern their meaning.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"requirements of reasonable notice satisfied when notice is sent in English","sentence":"See also Alfonso v. Board of Review, 89 N.J. 41, 444 A.2d 1076 (1982), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 459 U.S. 806, 103 S.Ct. 30, 74 L.Ed.2d 45 (1982)(requirements of reasonable notice satisfied when notice is sent in English)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"English-only notices of condemnation did not violate due process or equal protection and defendants were on inquiry notice to find out their meaning","sentence":"See Soberal-Perez v. Heckler, 717 F.2d 36 (2d Cir.1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 929, 104 S.Ct. 1713, 80 L.Ed.2d 186 (1984)(rule placing burden of diligence and further inquiry on non-English speaking individual served with a notice in English does not violate due process); Commonwealth v. Olivo, 369 Mass. 62, 337 N.E.2d 904 (Mass.1975)(English-only notices of condemnation did not violate due process or equal protection and defendants were on inquiry notice to find out their meaning)."},"case_id":11582016,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Other courts have concluded that English-only notices put defendants on inquiry notice and place a burden on the defendants to have the notices interpreted to discern their meaning.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"English-only notices of condemnation did not violate due process or equal protection and defendants were on inquiry notice to find out their meaning","sentence":"See Soberal-Perez v. Heckler, 717 F.2d 36 (2d Cir.1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 929, 104 S.Ct. 1713, 80 L.Ed.2d 186 (1984)(rule placing burden of diligence and further inquiry on non-English speaking individual served with a notice in English does not violate due process); Commonwealth v. Olivo, 369 Mass. 62, 337 N.E.2d 904 (Mass.1975)(English-only notices of condemnation did not violate due process or equal protection and defendants were on inquiry notice to find out their meaning)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"requirements of reasonable notice satisfied when notice is sent in English","sentence":"See also Alfonso v. Board of Review, 89 N.J. 41, 444 A.2d 1076 (1982), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 459 U.S. 806, 103 S.Ct. 30, 74 L.Ed.2d 45 (1982)(requirements of reasonable notice satisfied when notice is sent in English)."},"case_id":11582016,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Other courts have concluded that English-only notices put defendants on inquiry notice and place a burden on the defendants to have the notices interpreted to discern their meaning.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"English-only notices of condemnation did not violate due process or equal protection and defendants were on inquiry notice to find out their meaning","sentence":"See Soberal-Perez v. Heckler, 717 F.2d 36 (2d Cir.1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 929, 104 S.Ct. 1713, 80 L.Ed.2d 186 (1984)(rule placing burden of diligence and further inquiry on non-English speaking individual served with a notice in English does not violate due process); Commonwealth v. Olivo, 369 Mass. 62, 337 N.E.2d 904 (Mass.1975)(English-only notices of condemnation did not violate due process or equal protection and defendants were on inquiry notice to find out their meaning)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"requirements of reasonable notice satisfied when notice is sent in English","sentence":"See also Alfonso v. Board of Review, 89 N.J. 41, 444 A.2d 1076 (1982), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 459 U.S. 806, 103 S.Ct. 30, 74 L.Ed.2d 45 (1982)(requirements of reasonable notice satisfied when notice is sent in English)."},"case_id":11582016,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Other courts have concluded that English-only notices put defendants on inquiry notice and place a burden on the defendants to have the notices interpreted to discern their meaning.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"requirements of reasonable notice satisfied when notice is sent in English","sentence":"See also Alfonso v. Board of Review, 89 N.J. 41, 444 A.2d 1076 (1982), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 459 U.S. 806, 103 S.Ct. 30, 74 L.Ed.2d 45 (1982)(requirements of reasonable notice satisfied when notice is sent in English)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"English-only notices of condemnation did not violate due process or equal protection and defendants were on inquiry notice to find out their meaning","sentence":"See Soberal-Perez v. Heckler, 717 F.2d 36 (2d Cir.1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 929, 104 S.Ct. 1713, 80 L.Ed.2d 186 (1984)(rule placing burden of diligence and further inquiry on non-English speaking individual served with a notice in English does not violate due process); Commonwealth v. Olivo, 369 Mass. 62, 337 N.E.2d 904 (Mass.1975)(English-only notices of condemnation did not violate due process or equal protection and defendants were on inquiry notice to find out their meaning)."},"case_id":11582016,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Other courts have concluded that English-only notices put defendants on inquiry notice and place a burden on the defendants to have the notices interpreted to discern their meaning.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"requirements of reasonable notice satisfied when notice is sent in English","sentence":"See also Alfonso v. Board of Review, 89 N.J. 41, 444 A.2d 1076 (1982), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 459 U.S. 806, 103 S.Ct. 30, 74 L.Ed.2d 45 (1982)(requirements of reasonable notice satisfied when notice is sent in English)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"English-only notices of condemnation did not violate due process or equal protection and defendants were on inquiry notice to find out their meaning","sentence":"See Soberal-Perez v. Heckler, 717 F.2d 36 (2d Cir.1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 929, 104 S.Ct. 1713, 80 L.Ed.2d 186 (1984)(rule placing burden of diligence and further inquiry on non-English speaking individual served with a notice in English does not violate due process); Commonwealth v. Olivo, 369 Mass. 62, 337 N.E.2d 904 (Mass.1975)(English-only notices of condemnation did not violate due process or equal protection and defendants were on inquiry notice to find out their meaning)."},"case_id":11582016,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Similarly, in the case of a promissory note or debt cancellation, the amount of the note or debt can be adjusted to take into account the amount of tax liability. But where, as here, there is a repossession of a business or enforcement of creditor's rights under a security agreement, and nothing more, there is no source from which to withhold purchase money.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"585 S.W.2d 580, 580-82","parenthetical":"bank held to be successor when it chose to purchase the store instead of foreclosing on its security interest","sentence":"See State v. Standard Oil Co., 39 Ohio St.2d 41, 45-46, 313 N.E.2d 838, 841 (1974) (foreclosure of defaulting debtor\u2019s property by a creditor holding a perfected security interest in such property was not a \u201csale\u201d within the meaning of successor liability statute); but see Woods, 585 S.W.2d at 580-82 (bank held to be successor when it chose to purchase the store instead of foreclosing on its security interest)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"39 Ohio St.2d 41, 45-46","parenthetical":"foreclosure of defaulting debtor's property by a creditor holding a perfected security interest in such property was not a \"sale\" within the meaning of successor liability statute","sentence":"See State v. Standard Oil Co., 39 Ohio St.2d 41, 45-46, 313 N.E.2d 838, 841 (1974) (foreclosure of defaulting debtor\u2019s property by a creditor holding a perfected security interest in such property was not a \u201csale\u201d within the meaning of successor liability statute); but see Woods, 585 S.W.2d at 580-82 (bank held to be successor when it chose to purchase the store instead of foreclosing on its security interest)."},"case_id":8926316,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Similarly, in the case of a promissory note or debt cancellation, the amount of the note or debt can be adjusted to take into account the amount of tax liability. But where, as here, there is a repossession of a business or enforcement of creditor's rights under a security agreement, and nothing more, there is no source from which to withhold purchase money.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"313 N.E.2d 838, 841","parenthetical":"foreclosure of defaulting debtor's property by a creditor holding a perfected security interest in such property was not a \"sale\" within the meaning of successor liability statute","sentence":"See State v. Standard Oil Co., 39 Ohio St.2d 41, 45-46, 313 N.E.2d 838, 841 (1974) (foreclosure of defaulting debtor\u2019s property by a creditor holding a perfected security interest in such property was not a \u201csale\u201d within the meaning of successor liability statute); but see Woods, 585 S.W.2d at 580-82 (bank held to be successor when it chose to purchase the store instead of foreclosing on its security interest)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"585 S.W.2d 580, 580-82","parenthetical":"bank held to be successor when it chose to purchase the store instead of foreclosing on its security interest","sentence":"See State v. Standard Oil Co., 39 Ohio St.2d 41, 45-46, 313 N.E.2d 838, 841 (1974) (foreclosure of defaulting debtor\u2019s property by a creditor holding a perfected security interest in such property was not a \u201csale\u201d within the meaning of successor liability statute); but see Woods, 585 S.W.2d at 580-82 (bank held to be successor when it chose to purchase the store instead of foreclosing on its security interest)."},"case_id":8926316,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In Maryland v. Craig, the Supreme Court has held that the \"use of the one-way closed circuit television procedure, where necessary to further an important state interest, does not impinge upon the truth-seeking or symbolic purposes of the Confrontation Clause.\" The Supreme Court also explained that \"if the State makes an adequate showing of necessity, the state interest in protecting child witnesses from the trauma of testifying in a child abuse case is sufficiently important to justify the use of a special procedure that permits a child witness in such cases to testify at trial against a defendant in the absence of face-to-face confrontation with the defendant.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that the Confrontation Clause does not categorically prohibit a child witness in a sexual abuse case from testifying against a defendant at trial outside defendant's physical presence by means of one-way closed circuit television","sentence":"Id. at 855, 110 S.Ct. 3157 (holding that the Confrontation Clause does not categorically prohibit a child witness in a sexual abuse case from testifying against a defendant at trial outside defendant\u2019s physical presence by means of one-way closed circuit television); see also Jelinek v. Costello, 247 F.Supp.2d 212, 240 (E.D.N.Y.2003) (holding that a state court\u2019s decision to use a two-way, closed circuit television during testimony of a child witness was reasonable); see generally N.Y.Crim."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"247 F.Supp.2d 212, 240","parenthetical":"holding that a state court's decision to use a two-way, closed circuit television during testimony of a child witness was reasonable","sentence":"Id. at 855, 110 S.Ct. 3157 (holding that the Confrontation Clause does not categorically prohibit a child witness in a sexual abuse case from testifying against a defendant at trial outside defendant\u2019s physical presence by means of one-way closed circuit television); see also Jelinek v. Costello, 247 F.Supp.2d 212, 240 (E.D.N.Y.2003) (holding that a state court\u2019s decision to use a two-way, closed circuit television during testimony of a child witness was reasonable); see generally N.Y.Crim."},"case_id":8941903,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Additionally, Indiana courts have repeatedly held that drafting or preparing legal instruments- is generally considered practicing law. See State ex rel. Ind. State.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"848 N.E.2d 668, 673","parenthetical":"\"Drafting and preparing testamentary and trust documents is clearly the practice of law.\"","sentence":"Bar Ass\u2019n v. Northouse, 848 N.E.2d 668, 673 (Ind.2006) (\u201cDrafting and preparing testamentary and trust documents is clearly the practice of law.\u201d); see also State ex rel. Ind. State Bar Ass\u2019n v. Diaz, 838 N.E.2d 433, 444 (Ind.2005) (preparation of immigration documents and drafting contracts, pleadings, and a will, constituted unauthorized practice of law); State ex rel. Ind. State Bar Ass\u2019n v. Ind. Real Estate Ass\u2019n, 244 Ind. 214, 220, 191 N.E.2d 711, 715 (1963) (filling in blanks of legal instruments, prepared by attorneys, is considered unauthorized practice of law when doing so involves considerations of significant legal consequences). ' ."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"838 N.E.2d 433, 444","parenthetical":"preparation of immigration documents and drafting contracts, pleadings, and a will, constituted unauthorized practice of law","sentence":"Bar Ass\u2019n v. Northouse, 848 N.E.2d 668, 673 (Ind.2006) (\u201cDrafting and preparing testamentary and trust documents is clearly the practice of law.\u201d); see also State ex rel. Ind. State Bar Ass\u2019n v. Diaz, 838 N.E.2d 433, 444 (Ind.2005) (preparation of immigration documents and drafting contracts, pleadings, and a will, constituted unauthorized practice of law); State ex rel. Ind. State Bar Ass\u2019n v. Ind. Real Estate Ass\u2019n, 244 Ind. 214, 220, 191 N.E.2d 711, 715 (1963) (filling in blanks of legal instruments, prepared by attorneys, is considered unauthorized practice of law when doing so involves considerations of significant legal consequences). ' ."},"case_id":6783929,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Additionally, Indiana courts have repeatedly held that drafting or preparing legal instruments- is generally considered practicing law. See State ex rel. Ind. State.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"244 Ind. 214, 220","parenthetical":"filling in blanks of legal instruments, prepared by attorneys, is considered unauthorized practice of law when doing so involves considerations of significant legal consequences","sentence":"Bar Ass\u2019n v. Northouse, 848 N.E.2d 668, 673 (Ind.2006) (\u201cDrafting and preparing testamentary and trust documents is clearly the practice of law.\u201d); see also State ex rel. Ind. State Bar Ass\u2019n v. Diaz, 838 N.E.2d 433, 444 (Ind.2005) (preparation of immigration documents and drafting contracts, pleadings, and a will, constituted unauthorized practice of law); State ex rel. Ind. State Bar Ass\u2019n v. Ind. Real Estate Ass\u2019n, 244 Ind. 214, 220, 191 N.E.2d 711, 715 (1963) (filling in blanks of legal instruments, prepared by attorneys, is considered unauthorized practice of law when doing so involves considerations of significant legal consequences). ' ."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"848 N.E.2d 668, 673","parenthetical":"\"Drafting and preparing testamentary and trust documents is clearly the practice of law.\"","sentence":"Bar Ass\u2019n v. Northouse, 848 N.E.2d 668, 673 (Ind.2006) (\u201cDrafting and preparing testamentary and trust documents is clearly the practice of law.\u201d); see also State ex rel. Ind. State Bar Ass\u2019n v. Diaz, 838 N.E.2d 433, 444 (Ind.2005) (preparation of immigration documents and drafting contracts, pleadings, and a will, constituted unauthorized practice of law); State ex rel. Ind. State Bar Ass\u2019n v. Ind. Real Estate Ass\u2019n, 244 Ind. 214, 220, 191 N.E.2d 711, 715 (1963) (filling in blanks of legal instruments, prepared by attorneys, is considered unauthorized practice of law when doing so involves considerations of significant legal consequences). ' ."},"case_id":6783929,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Additionally, Indiana courts have repeatedly held that drafting or preparing legal instruments- is generally considered practicing law. See State ex rel. Ind. State.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"848 N.E.2d 668, 673","parenthetical":"\"Drafting and preparing testamentary and trust documents is clearly the practice of law.\"","sentence":"Bar Ass\u2019n v. Northouse, 848 N.E.2d 668, 673 (Ind.2006) (\u201cDrafting and preparing testamentary and trust documents is clearly the practice of law.\u201d); see also State ex rel. Ind. State Bar Ass\u2019n v. Diaz, 838 N.E.2d 433, 444 (Ind.2005) (preparation of immigration documents and drafting contracts, pleadings, and a will, constituted unauthorized practice of law); State ex rel. Ind. State Bar Ass\u2019n v. Ind. Real Estate Ass\u2019n, 244 Ind. 214, 220, 191 N.E.2d 711, 715 (1963) (filling in blanks of legal instruments, prepared by attorneys, is considered unauthorized practice of law when doing so involves considerations of significant legal consequences). ' ."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"191 N.E.2d 711, 715","parenthetical":"filling in blanks of legal instruments, prepared by attorneys, is considered unauthorized practice of law when doing so involves considerations of significant legal consequences","sentence":"Bar Ass\u2019n v. Northouse, 848 N.E.2d 668, 673 (Ind.2006) (\u201cDrafting and preparing testamentary and trust documents is clearly the practice of law.\u201d); see also State ex rel. Ind. State Bar Ass\u2019n v. Diaz, 838 N.E.2d 433, 444 (Ind.2005) (preparation of immigration documents and drafting contracts, pleadings, and a will, constituted unauthorized practice of law); State ex rel. Ind. State Bar Ass\u2019n v. Ind. Real Estate Ass\u2019n, 244 Ind. 214, 220, 191 N.E.2d 711, 715 (1963) (filling in blanks of legal instruments, prepared by attorneys, is considered unauthorized practice of law when doing so involves considerations of significant legal consequences). ' ."},"case_id":6783929,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Appellee concedes the error but contends that the issue is not cognizable on direct appeal in light of appellant's failure to contemporaneously object to the mistake at the sentencing hearing. We disagree. Sentencing errors, not involving a factual dispute, which produce an illegal sentence and are apparent from the record may be raised on appeal without a contemporaneous objection.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"points improperly added to the guidelines scoresheet because defendant was not under legal constraint when origi nal offense occurred and because there was no supporting evidence for the scoring of victim injury involved factual matters not determinable from the record on appeal","sentence":"See also, Dailey v. State, 488 So.2d 532 (Fla.1986) (points improperly added to the guidelines scoresheet because defendant was not under legal constraint when origi nal offense occurred and because there was no supporting evidence for the scoring of victim injury involved factual matters not determinable from the record on appeal)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"trial court's failure to make affirmative findings before imposing adult sanctions on juvenile was apparent from the record","sentence":"State v. Rhoden, 448 So.2d 1013 (Fla.1984) (trial court\u2019s failure to make affirmative findings before imposing adult sanctions on juvenile was apparent from the record); Walker v. State, 462 So.2d 452 (Fla.1985) (trial court\u2019s failure to make findings of fact before sentencing defendant as a habitual offender was apparent from the record); State v. Snow, 462 So.2d 455 (Fla.1985) (trial court\u2019s alleged failure to state with individual particularity reasons for retention of jurisdiction over one-third of defendant\u2019s sentence was determinable from the record); State v. Whitfield, 487 So.2d 1045 (Fla.1986) (points improperly added to scoresheet for victim injury was apparent from the record because the defendant had been convicted of aggravated assault, a crime not involving victim injury); Knight v. State, 501 So.2d 150 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987) (trial court\u2019s error in departing from the sentencing guidelines without giving clear and convincing reasons was apparent from the record)."},"case_id":7593491,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Appellee concedes the error but contends that the issue is not cognizable on direct appeal in light of appellant's failure to contemporaneously object to the mistake at the sentencing hearing. We disagree. Sentencing errors, not involving a factual dispute, which produce an illegal sentence and are apparent from the record may be raised on appeal without a contemporaneous objection.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"trial court's failure to make findings of fact before sentencing defendant as a habitual offender was apparent from the record","sentence":"State v. Rhoden, 448 So.2d 1013 (Fla.1984) (trial court\u2019s failure to make affirmative findings before imposing adult sanctions on juvenile was apparent from the record); Walker v. State, 462 So.2d 452 (Fla.1985) (trial court\u2019s failure to make findings of fact before sentencing defendant as a habitual offender was apparent from the record); State v. Snow, 462 So.2d 455 (Fla.1985) (trial court\u2019s alleged failure to state with individual particularity reasons for retention of jurisdiction over one-third of defendant\u2019s sentence was determinable from the record); State v. Whitfield, 487 So.2d 1045 (Fla.1986) (points improperly added to scoresheet for victim injury was apparent from the record because the defendant had been convicted of aggravated assault, a crime not involving victim injury); Knight v. State, 501 So.2d 150 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987) (trial court\u2019s error in departing from the sentencing guidelines without giving clear and convincing reasons was apparent from the record)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"points improperly added to the guidelines scoresheet because defendant was not under legal constraint when origi nal offense occurred and because there was no supporting evidence for the scoring of victim injury involved factual matters not determinable from the record on appeal","sentence":"See also, Dailey v. State, 488 So.2d 532 (Fla.1986) (points improperly added to the guidelines scoresheet because defendant was not under legal constraint when origi nal offense occurred and because there was no supporting evidence for the scoring of victim injury involved factual matters not determinable from the record on appeal)."},"case_id":7593491,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Appellee concedes the error but contends that the issue is not cognizable on direct appeal in light of appellant's failure to contemporaneously object to the mistake at the sentencing hearing. We disagree. Sentencing errors, not involving a factual dispute, which produce an illegal sentence and are apparent from the record may be raised on appeal without a contemporaneous objection.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"points improperly added to the guidelines scoresheet because defendant was not under legal constraint when origi nal offense occurred and because there was no supporting evidence for the scoring of victim injury involved factual matters not determinable from the record on appeal","sentence":"See also, Dailey v. State, 488 So.2d 532 (Fla.1986) (points improperly added to the guidelines scoresheet because defendant was not under legal constraint when origi nal offense occurred and because there was no supporting evidence for the scoring of victim injury involved factual matters not determinable from the record on appeal)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"trial court's alleged failure to state with individual particularity reasons for retention of jurisdiction over one-third of defendant's sentence was determinable from the record","sentence":"State v. Rhoden, 448 So.2d 1013 (Fla.1984) (trial court\u2019s failure to make affirmative findings before imposing adult sanctions on juvenile was apparent from the record); Walker v. State, 462 So.2d 452 (Fla.1985) (trial court\u2019s failure to make findings of fact before sentencing defendant as a habitual offender was apparent from the record); State v. Snow, 462 So.2d 455 (Fla.1985) (trial court\u2019s alleged failure to state with individual particularity reasons for retention of jurisdiction over one-third of defendant\u2019s sentence was determinable from the record); State v. Whitfield, 487 So.2d 1045 (Fla.1986) (points improperly added to scoresheet for victim injury was apparent from the record because the defendant had been convicted of aggravated assault, a crime not involving victim injury); Knight v. State, 501 So.2d 150 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987) (trial court\u2019s error in departing from the sentencing guidelines without giving clear and convincing reasons was apparent from the record)."},"case_id":7593491,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Appellee concedes the error but contends that the issue is not cognizable on direct appeal in light of appellant's failure to contemporaneously object to the mistake at the sentencing hearing. We disagree. Sentencing errors, not involving a factual dispute, which produce an illegal sentence and are apparent from the record may be raised on appeal without a contemporaneous objection.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"points improperly added to the guidelines scoresheet because defendant was not under legal constraint when origi nal offense occurred and because there was no supporting evidence for the scoring of victim injury involved factual matters not determinable from the record on appeal","sentence":"See also, Dailey v. State, 488 So.2d 532 (Fla.1986) (points improperly added to the guidelines scoresheet because defendant was not under legal constraint when origi nal offense occurred and because there was no supporting evidence for the scoring of victim injury involved factual matters not determinable from the record on appeal)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"points improperly added to scoresheet for victim injury was apparent from the record because the defendant had been convicted of aggravated assault, a crime not involving victim injury","sentence":"State v. Rhoden, 448 So.2d 1013 (Fla.1984) (trial court\u2019s failure to make affirmative findings before imposing adult sanctions on juvenile was apparent from the record); Walker v. State, 462 So.2d 452 (Fla.1985) (trial court\u2019s failure to make findings of fact before sentencing defendant as a habitual offender was apparent from the record); State v. Snow, 462 So.2d 455 (Fla.1985) (trial court\u2019s alleged failure to state with individual particularity reasons for retention of jurisdiction over one-third of defendant\u2019s sentence was determinable from the record); State v. Whitfield, 487 So.2d 1045 (Fla.1986) (points improperly added to scoresheet for victim injury was apparent from the record because the defendant had been convicted of aggravated assault, a crime not involving victim injury); Knight v. State, 501 So.2d 150 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987) (trial court\u2019s error in departing from the sentencing guidelines without giving clear and convincing reasons was apparent from the record)."},"case_id":7593491,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Appellee concedes the error but contends that the issue is not cognizable on direct appeal in light of appellant's failure to contemporaneously object to the mistake at the sentencing hearing. We disagree. Sentencing errors, not involving a factual dispute, which produce an illegal sentence and are apparent from the record may be raised on appeal without a contemporaneous objection.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"points improperly added to the guidelines scoresheet because defendant was not under legal constraint when origi nal offense occurred and because there was no supporting evidence for the scoring of victim injury involved factual matters not determinable from the record on appeal","sentence":"See also, Dailey v. State, 488 So.2d 532 (Fla.1986) (points improperly added to the guidelines scoresheet because defendant was not under legal constraint when origi nal offense occurred and because there was no supporting evidence for the scoring of victim injury involved factual matters not determinable from the record on appeal)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"trial court's error in departing from the sentencing guidelines without giving clear and convincing reasons was apparent from the record","sentence":"State v. Rhoden, 448 So.2d 1013 (Fla.1984) (trial court\u2019s failure to make affirmative findings before imposing adult sanctions on juvenile was apparent from the record); Walker v. State, 462 So.2d 452 (Fla.1985) (trial court\u2019s failure to make findings of fact before sentencing defendant as a habitual offender was apparent from the record); State v. Snow, 462 So.2d 455 (Fla.1985) (trial court\u2019s alleged failure to state with individual particularity reasons for retention of jurisdiction over one-third of defendant\u2019s sentence was determinable from the record); State v. Whitfield, 487 So.2d 1045 (Fla.1986) (points improperly added to scoresheet for victim injury was apparent from the record because the defendant had been convicted of aggravated assault, a crime not involving victim injury); Knight v. State, 501 So.2d 150 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987) (trial court\u2019s error in departing from the sentencing guidelines without giving clear and convincing reasons was apparent from the record)."},"case_id":7593491,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The fact that the \"violation\" in this case may have been minor in nature is of no legal consequence for \"[i]f an officer has probable cause to believe that an individual has committed even a very minor criminal offense in his presence, he may, without violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest the offender.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"532 U.S. 318, 354","parenthetical":"police officer authorized to arrest driver where neither she nor her children were wearing seat belts","sentence":"Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (police officer authorized to arrest driver where neither she nor her children were wearing seat belts); see Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 771, 121 S.Ct. 1876, 149 L.Ed.2d 994 (2001) (police officer authorized to arrest driver for speeding); New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 118, 106 S.Ct. 960, 89 L.Ed.2d 81 (1986) (formal arrest permissible for a traffic offense under New York law); United States v. Scopo, 19 F.3d 777, 781-782 (2d Cir.) (probable cause to stop and arrest driver where police officers observed driver\u2019s failure to signal while changing lanes), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 877, 115 S.Ct. 207, 130 L.Ed.2d 136 (1994)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"475 U.S. 106, 118","parenthetical":"formal arrest permissible for a traffic offense under New York law","sentence":"Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (police officer authorized to arrest driver where neither she nor her children were wearing seat belts); see Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 771, 121 S.Ct. 1876, 149 L.Ed.2d 994 (2001) (police officer authorized to arrest driver for speeding); New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 118, 106 S.Ct. 960, 89 L.Ed.2d 81 (1986) (formal arrest permissible for a traffic offense under New York law); United States v. Scopo, 19 F.3d 777, 781-782 (2d Cir.) (probable cause to stop and arrest driver where police officers observed driver\u2019s failure to signal while changing lanes), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 877, 115 S.Ct. 207, 130 L.Ed.2d 136 (1994)."},"case_id":3531825,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The fact that the \"violation\" in this case may have been minor in nature is of no legal consequence for \"[i]f an officer has probable cause to believe that an individual has committed even a very minor criminal offense in his presence, he may, without violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest the offender.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"532 U.S. 318, 354","parenthetical":"police officer authorized to arrest driver where neither she nor her children were wearing seat belts","sentence":"Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (police officer authorized to arrest driver where neither she nor her children were wearing seat belts); see Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 771, 121 S.Ct. 1876, 149 L.Ed.2d 994 (2001) (police officer authorized to arrest driver for speeding); New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 118, 106 S.Ct. 960, 89 L.Ed.2d 81 (1986) (formal arrest permissible for a traffic offense under New York law); United States v. Scopo, 19 F.3d 777, 781-782 (2d Cir.) (probable cause to stop and arrest driver where police officers observed driver\u2019s failure to signal while changing lanes), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 877, 115 S.Ct. 207, 130 L.Ed.2d 136 (1994)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"formal arrest permissible for a traffic offense under New York law","sentence":"Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (police officer authorized to arrest driver where neither she nor her children were wearing seat belts); see Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 771, 121 S.Ct. 1876, 149 L.Ed.2d 994 (2001) (police officer authorized to arrest driver for speeding); New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 118, 106 S.Ct. 960, 89 L.Ed.2d 81 (1986) (formal arrest permissible for a traffic offense under New York law); United States v. Scopo, 19 F.3d 777, 781-782 (2d Cir.) (probable cause to stop and arrest driver where police officers observed driver\u2019s failure to signal while changing lanes), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 877, 115 S.Ct. 207, 130 L.Ed.2d 136 (1994)."},"case_id":3531825,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The fact that the \"violation\" in this case may have been minor in nature is of no legal consequence for \"[i]f an officer has probable cause to believe that an individual has committed even a very minor criminal offense in his presence, he may, without violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest the offender.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"532 U.S. 318, 354","parenthetical":"police officer authorized to arrest driver where neither she nor her children were wearing seat belts","sentence":"Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (police officer authorized to arrest driver where neither she nor her children were wearing seat belts); see Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 771, 121 S.Ct. 1876, 149 L.Ed.2d 994 (2001) (police officer authorized to arrest driver for speeding); New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 118, 106 S.Ct. 960, 89 L.Ed.2d 81 (1986) (formal arrest permissible for a traffic offense under New York law); United States v. Scopo, 19 F.3d 777, 781-782 (2d Cir.) (probable cause to stop and arrest driver where police officers observed driver\u2019s failure to signal while changing lanes), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 877, 115 S.Ct. 207, 130 L.Ed.2d 136 (1994)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"formal arrest permissible for a traffic offense under New York law","sentence":"Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (police officer authorized to arrest driver where neither she nor her children were wearing seat belts); see Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 771, 121 S.Ct. 1876, 149 L.Ed.2d 994 (2001) (police officer authorized to arrest driver for speeding); New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 118, 106 S.Ct. 960, 89 L.Ed.2d 81 (1986) (formal arrest permissible for a traffic offense under New York law); United States v. Scopo, 19 F.3d 777, 781-782 (2d Cir.) (probable cause to stop and arrest driver where police officers observed driver\u2019s failure to signal while changing lanes), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 877, 115 S.Ct. 207, 130 L.Ed.2d 136 (1994)."},"case_id":3531825,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The fact that the \"violation\" in this case may have been minor in nature is of no legal consequence for \"[i]f an officer has probable cause to believe that an individual has committed even a very minor criminal offense in his presence, he may, without violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest the offender.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"532 U.S. 318, 354","parenthetical":"police officer authorized to arrest driver where neither she nor her children were wearing seat belts","sentence":"Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (police officer authorized to arrest driver where neither she nor her children were wearing seat belts); see Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 771, 121 S.Ct. 1876, 149 L.Ed.2d 994 (2001) (police officer authorized to arrest driver for speeding); New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 118, 106 S.Ct. 960, 89 L.Ed.2d 81 (1986) (formal arrest permissible for a traffic offense under New York law); United States v. Scopo, 19 F.3d 777, 781-782 (2d Cir.) (probable cause to stop and arrest driver where police officers observed driver\u2019s failure to signal while changing lanes), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 877, 115 S.Ct. 207, 130 L.Ed.2d 136 (1994)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"19 F.3d 777, 781-782","parenthetical":"probable cause to stop and arrest driver where police officers observed driver's failure to signal while changing lanes","sentence":"Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (police officer authorized to arrest driver where neither she nor her children were wearing seat belts); see Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 771, 121 S.Ct. 1876, 149 L.Ed.2d 994 (2001) (police officer authorized to arrest driver for speeding); New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 118, 106 S.Ct. 960, 89 L.Ed.2d 81 (1986) (formal arrest permissible for a traffic offense under New York law); United States v. Scopo, 19 F.3d 777, 781-782 (2d Cir.) (probable cause to stop and arrest driver where police officers observed driver\u2019s failure to signal while changing lanes), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 877, 115 S.Ct. 207, 130 L.Ed.2d 136 (1994)."},"case_id":3531825,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The fact that the \"violation\" in this case may have been minor in nature is of no legal consequence for \"[i]f an officer has probable cause to believe that an individual has committed even a very minor criminal offense in his presence, he may, without violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest the offender.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"probable cause to stop and arrest driver where police officers observed driver's failure to signal while changing lanes","sentence":"Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (police officer authorized to arrest driver where neither she nor her children were wearing seat belts); see Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 771, 121 S.Ct. 1876, 149 L.Ed.2d 994 (2001) (police officer authorized to arrest driver for speeding); New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 118, 106 S.Ct. 960, 89 L.Ed.2d 81 (1986) (formal arrest permissible for a traffic offense under New York law); United States v. Scopo, 19 F.3d 777, 781-782 (2d Cir.) (probable cause to stop and arrest driver where police officers observed driver\u2019s failure to signal while changing lanes), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 877, 115 S.Ct. 207, 130 L.Ed.2d 136 (1994)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"532 U.S. 318, 354","parenthetical":"police officer authorized to arrest driver where neither she nor her children were wearing seat belts","sentence":"Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (police officer authorized to arrest driver where neither she nor her children were wearing seat belts); see Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 771, 121 S.Ct. 1876, 149 L.Ed.2d 994 (2001) (police officer authorized to arrest driver for speeding); New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 118, 106 S.Ct. 960, 89 L.Ed.2d 81 (1986) (formal arrest permissible for a traffic offense under New York law); United States v. Scopo, 19 F.3d 777, 781-782 (2d Cir.) (probable cause to stop and arrest driver where police officers observed driver\u2019s failure to signal while changing lanes), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 877, 115 S.Ct. 207, 130 L.Ed.2d 136 (1994)."},"case_id":3531825,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The fact that the \"violation\" in this case may have been minor in nature is of no legal consequence for \"[i]f an officer has probable cause to believe that an individual has committed even a very minor criminal offense in his presence, he may, without violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest the offender.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"probable cause to stop and arrest driver where police officers observed driver's failure to signal while changing lanes","sentence":"Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (police officer authorized to arrest driver where neither she nor her children were wearing seat belts); see Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 771, 121 S.Ct. 1876, 149 L.Ed.2d 994 (2001) (police officer authorized to arrest driver for speeding); New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 118, 106 S.Ct. 960, 89 L.Ed.2d 81 (1986) (formal arrest permissible for a traffic offense under New York law); United States v. Scopo, 19 F.3d 777, 781-782 (2d Cir.) (probable cause to stop and arrest driver where police officers observed driver\u2019s failure to signal while changing lanes), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 877, 115 S.Ct. 207, 130 L.Ed.2d 136 (1994)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"532 U.S. 318, 354","parenthetical":"police officer authorized to arrest driver where neither she nor her children were wearing seat belts","sentence":"Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (police officer authorized to arrest driver where neither she nor her children were wearing seat belts); see Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 771, 121 S.Ct. 1876, 149 L.Ed.2d 994 (2001) (police officer authorized to arrest driver for speeding); New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 118, 106 S.Ct. 960, 89 L.Ed.2d 81 (1986) (formal arrest permissible for a traffic offense under New York law); United States v. Scopo, 19 F.3d 777, 781-782 (2d Cir.) (probable cause to stop and arrest driver where police officers observed driver\u2019s failure to signal while changing lanes), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 877, 115 S.Ct. 207, 130 L.Ed.2d 136 (1994)."},"case_id":3531825,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The fact that the \"violation\" in this case may have been minor in nature is of no legal consequence for \"[i]f an officer has probable cause to believe that an individual has committed even a very minor criminal offense in his presence, he may, without violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest the offender.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"532 U.S. 318, 354","parenthetical":"police officer authorized to arrest driver where neither she nor her children were wearing seat belts","sentence":"Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (police officer authorized to arrest driver where neither she nor her children were wearing seat belts); see Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 771, 121 S.Ct. 1876, 149 L.Ed.2d 994 (2001) (police officer authorized to arrest driver for speeding); New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 118, 106 S.Ct. 960, 89 L.Ed.2d 81 (1986) (formal arrest permissible for a traffic offense under New York law); United States v. Scopo, 19 F.3d 777, 781-782 (2d Cir.) (probable cause to stop and arrest driver where police officers observed driver\u2019s failure to signal while changing lanes), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 877, 115 S.Ct. 207, 130 L.Ed.2d 136 (1994)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"probable cause to stop and arrest driver where police officers observed driver's failure to signal while changing lanes","sentence":"Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (police officer authorized to arrest driver where neither she nor her children were wearing seat belts); see Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 771, 121 S.Ct. 1876, 149 L.Ed.2d 994 (2001) (police officer authorized to arrest driver for speeding); New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 118, 106 S.Ct. 960, 89 L.Ed.2d 81 (1986) (formal arrest permissible for a traffic offense under New York law); United States v. Scopo, 19 F.3d 777, 781-782 (2d Cir.) (probable cause to stop and arrest driver where police officers observed driver\u2019s failure to signal while changing lanes), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 877, 115 S.Ct. 207, 130 L.Ed.2d 136 (1994)."},"case_id":3531825,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The fact that the \"violation\" in this case may have been minor in nature is of no legal consequence for \"[i]f an officer has probable cause to believe that an individual has committed even a very minor criminal offense in his presence, he may, without violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest the offender.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"475 U.S. 106, 118","parenthetical":"formal arrest permissible for a traffic offense under New York law","sentence":"Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (police officer authorized to arrest driver where neither she nor her children were wearing seat belts); see Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 771, 121 S.Ct. 1876, 149 L.Ed.2d 994 (2001) (police officer authorized to arrest driver for speeding); New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 118, 106 S.Ct. 960, 89 L.Ed.2d 81 (1986) (formal arrest permissible for a traffic offense under New York law); United States v. Scopo, 19 F.3d 777, 781-782 (2d Cir.) (probable cause to stop and arrest driver where police officers observed driver\u2019s failure to signal while changing lanes), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 877, 115 S.Ct. 207, 130 L.Ed.2d 136 (1994)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"police officer authorized to arrest driver where neither she nor her children were wearing seat belts","sentence":"Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (police officer authorized to arrest driver where neither she nor her children were wearing seat belts); see Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 771, 121 S.Ct. 1876, 149 L.Ed.2d 994 (2001) (police officer authorized to arrest driver for speeding); New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 118, 106 S.Ct. 960, 89 L.Ed.2d 81 (1986) (formal arrest permissible for a traffic offense under New York law); United States v. Scopo, 19 F.3d 777, 781-782 (2d Cir.) (probable cause to stop and arrest driver where police officers observed driver\u2019s failure to signal while changing lanes), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 877, 115 S.Ct. 207, 130 L.Ed.2d 136 (1994)."},"case_id":3531825,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The fact that the \"violation\" in this case may have been minor in nature is of no legal consequence for \"[i]f an officer has probable cause to believe that an individual has committed even a very minor criminal offense in his presence, he may, without violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest the offender.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"formal arrest permissible for a traffic offense under New York law","sentence":"Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (police officer authorized to arrest driver where neither she nor her children were wearing seat belts); see Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 771, 121 S.Ct. 1876, 149 L.Ed.2d 994 (2001) (police officer authorized to arrest driver for speeding); New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 118, 106 S.Ct. 960, 89 L.Ed.2d 81 (1986) (formal arrest permissible for a traffic offense under New York law); United States v. Scopo, 19 F.3d 777, 781-782 (2d Cir.) (probable cause to stop and arrest driver where police officers observed driver\u2019s failure to signal while changing lanes), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 877, 115 S.Ct. 207, 130 L.Ed.2d 136 (1994)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"police officer authorized to arrest driver where neither she nor her children were wearing seat belts","sentence":"Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (police officer authorized to arrest driver where neither she nor her children were wearing seat belts); see Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 771, 121 S.Ct. 1876, 149 L.Ed.2d 994 (2001) (police officer authorized to arrest driver for speeding); New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 118, 106 S.Ct. 960, 89 L.Ed.2d 81 (1986) (formal arrest permissible for a traffic offense under New York law); United States v. Scopo, 19 F.3d 777, 781-782 (2d Cir.) (probable cause to stop and arrest driver where police officers observed driver\u2019s failure to signal while changing lanes), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 877, 115 S.Ct. 207, 130 L.Ed.2d 136 (1994)."},"case_id":3531825,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The fact that the \"violation\" in this case may have been minor in nature is of no legal consequence for \"[i]f an officer has probable cause to believe that an individual has committed even a very minor criminal offense in his presence, he may, without violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest the offender.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"formal arrest permissible for a traffic offense under New York law","sentence":"Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (police officer authorized to arrest driver where neither she nor her children were wearing seat belts); see Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 771, 121 S.Ct. 1876, 149 L.Ed.2d 994 (2001) (police officer authorized to arrest driver for speeding); New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 118, 106 S.Ct. 960, 89 L.Ed.2d 81 (1986) (formal arrest permissible for a traffic offense under New York law); United States v. Scopo, 19 F.3d 777, 781-782 (2d Cir.) (probable cause to stop and arrest driver where police officers observed driver\u2019s failure to signal while changing lanes), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 877, 115 S.Ct. 207, 130 L.Ed.2d 136 (1994)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"police officer authorized to arrest driver where neither she nor her children were wearing seat belts","sentence":"Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (police officer authorized to arrest driver where neither she nor her children were wearing seat belts); see Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 771, 121 S.Ct. 1876, 149 L.Ed.2d 994 (2001) (police officer authorized to arrest driver for speeding); New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 118, 106 S.Ct. 960, 89 L.Ed.2d 81 (1986) (formal arrest permissible for a traffic offense under New York law); United States v. Scopo, 19 F.3d 777, 781-782 (2d Cir.) (probable cause to stop and arrest driver where police officers observed driver\u2019s failure to signal while changing lanes), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 877, 115 S.Ct. 207, 130 L.Ed.2d 136 (1994)."},"case_id":3531825,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The fact that the \"violation\" in this case may have been minor in nature is of no legal consequence for \"[i]f an officer has probable cause to believe that an individual has committed even a very minor criminal offense in his presence, he may, without violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest the offender.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"19 F.3d 777, 781-782","parenthetical":"probable cause to stop and arrest driver where police officers observed driver's failure to signal while changing lanes","sentence":"Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (police officer authorized to arrest driver where neither she nor her children were wearing seat belts); see Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 771, 121 S.Ct. 1876, 149 L.Ed.2d 994 (2001) (police officer authorized to arrest driver for speeding); New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 118, 106 S.Ct. 960, 89 L.Ed.2d 81 (1986) (formal arrest permissible for a traffic offense under New York law); United States v. Scopo, 19 F.3d 777, 781-782 (2d Cir.) (probable cause to stop and arrest driver where police officers observed driver\u2019s failure to signal while changing lanes), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 877, 115 S.Ct. 207, 130 L.Ed.2d 136 (1994)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"police officer authorized to arrest driver where neither she nor her children were wearing seat belts","sentence":"Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (police officer authorized to arrest driver where neither she nor her children were wearing seat belts); see Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 771, 121 S.Ct. 1876, 149 L.Ed.2d 994 (2001) (police officer authorized to arrest driver for speeding); New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 118, 106 S.Ct. 960, 89 L.Ed.2d 81 (1986) (formal arrest permissible for a traffic offense under New York law); United States v. Scopo, 19 F.3d 777, 781-782 (2d Cir.) (probable cause to stop and arrest driver where police officers observed driver\u2019s failure to signal while changing lanes), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 877, 115 S.Ct. 207, 130 L.Ed.2d 136 (1994)."},"case_id":3531825,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The fact that the \"violation\" in this case may have been minor in nature is of no legal consequence for \"[i]f an officer has probable cause to believe that an individual has committed even a very minor criminal offense in his presence, he may, without violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest the offender.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"probable cause to stop and arrest driver where police officers observed driver's failure to signal while changing lanes","sentence":"Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (police officer authorized to arrest driver where neither she nor her children were wearing seat belts); see Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 771, 121 S.Ct. 1876, 149 L.Ed.2d 994 (2001) (police officer authorized to arrest driver for speeding); New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 118, 106 S.Ct. 960, 89 L.Ed.2d 81 (1986) (formal arrest permissible for a traffic offense under New York law); United States v. Scopo, 19 F.3d 777, 781-782 (2d Cir.) (probable cause to stop and arrest driver where police officers observed driver\u2019s failure to signal while changing lanes), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 877, 115 S.Ct. 207, 130 L.Ed.2d 136 (1994)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"police officer authorized to arrest driver where neither she nor her children were wearing seat belts","sentence":"Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (police officer authorized to arrest driver where neither she nor her children were wearing seat belts); see Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 771, 121 S.Ct. 1876, 149 L.Ed.2d 994 (2001) (police officer authorized to arrest driver for speeding); New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 118, 106 S.Ct. 960, 89 L.Ed.2d 81 (1986) (formal arrest permissible for a traffic offense under New York law); United States v. Scopo, 19 F.3d 777, 781-782 (2d Cir.) (probable cause to stop and arrest driver where police officers observed driver\u2019s failure to signal while changing lanes), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 877, 115 S.Ct. 207, 130 L.Ed.2d 136 (1994)."},"case_id":3531825,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The fact that the \"violation\" in this case may have been minor in nature is of no legal consequence for \"[i]f an officer has probable cause to believe that an individual has committed even a very minor criminal offense in his presence, he may, without violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest the offender.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"police officer authorized to arrest driver where neither she nor her children were wearing seat belts","sentence":"Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (police officer authorized to arrest driver where neither she nor her children were wearing seat belts); see Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 771, 121 S.Ct. 1876, 149 L.Ed.2d 994 (2001) (police officer authorized to arrest driver for speeding); New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 118, 106 S.Ct. 960, 89 L.Ed.2d 81 (1986) (formal arrest permissible for a traffic offense under New York law); United States v. Scopo, 19 F.3d 777, 781-782 (2d Cir.) (probable cause to stop and arrest driver where police officers observed driver\u2019s failure to signal while changing lanes), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 877, 115 S.Ct. 207, 130 L.Ed.2d 136 (1994)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"probable cause to stop and arrest driver where police officers observed driver's failure to signal while changing lanes","sentence":"Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (police officer authorized to arrest driver where neither she nor her children were wearing seat belts); see Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 771, 121 S.Ct. 1876, 149 L.Ed.2d 994 (2001) (police officer authorized to arrest driver for speeding); New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 118, 106 S.Ct. 960, 89 L.Ed.2d 81 (1986) (formal arrest permissible for a traffic offense under New York law); United States v. Scopo, 19 F.3d 777, 781-782 (2d Cir.) (probable cause to stop and arrest driver where police officers observed driver\u2019s failure to signal while changing lanes), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 877, 115 S.Ct. 207, 130 L.Ed.2d 136 (1994)."},"case_id":3531825,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The fact that the \"violation\" in this case may have been minor in nature is of no legal consequence for \"[i]f an officer has probable cause to believe that an individual has committed even a very minor criminal offense in his presence, he may, without violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest the offender.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"police officer authorized to arrest driver where neither she nor her children were wearing seat belts","sentence":"Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (police officer authorized to arrest driver where neither she nor her children were wearing seat belts); see Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 771, 121 S.Ct. 1876, 149 L.Ed.2d 994 (2001) (police officer authorized to arrest driver for speeding); New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 118, 106 S.Ct. 960, 89 L.Ed.2d 81 (1986) (formal arrest permissible for a traffic offense under New York law); United States v. Scopo, 19 F.3d 777, 781-782 (2d Cir.) (probable cause to stop and arrest driver where police officers observed driver\u2019s failure to signal while changing lanes), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 877, 115 S.Ct. 207, 130 L.Ed.2d 136 (1994)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"probable cause to stop and arrest driver where police officers observed driver's failure to signal while changing lanes","sentence":"Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (police officer authorized to arrest driver where neither she nor her children were wearing seat belts); see Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 771, 121 S.Ct. 1876, 149 L.Ed.2d 994 (2001) (police officer authorized to arrest driver for speeding); New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 118, 106 S.Ct. 960, 89 L.Ed.2d 81 (1986) (formal arrest permissible for a traffic offense under New York law); United States v. Scopo, 19 F.3d 777, 781-782 (2d Cir.) (probable cause to stop and arrest driver where police officers observed driver\u2019s failure to signal while changing lanes), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 877, 115 S.Ct. 207, 130 L.Ed.2d 136 (1994)."},"case_id":3531825,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The fact that the \"violation\" in this case may have been minor in nature is of no legal consequence for \"[i]f an officer has probable cause to believe that an individual has committed even a very minor criminal offense in his presence, he may, without violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest the offender.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"police officer authorized to arrest driver where neither she nor her children were wearing seat belts","sentence":"Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (police officer authorized to arrest driver where neither she nor her children were wearing seat belts); see Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 771, 121 S.Ct. 1876, 149 L.Ed.2d 994 (2001) (police officer authorized to arrest driver for speeding); New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 118, 106 S.Ct. 960, 89 L.Ed.2d 81 (1986) (formal arrest permissible for a traffic offense under New York law); United States v. Scopo, 19 F.3d 777, 781-782 (2d Cir.) (probable cause to stop and arrest driver where police officers observed driver\u2019s failure to signal while changing lanes), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 877, 115 S.Ct. 207, 130 L.Ed.2d 136 (1994)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"475 U.S. 106, 118","parenthetical":"formal arrest permissible for a traffic offense under New York law","sentence":"Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (police officer authorized to arrest driver where neither she nor her children were wearing seat belts); see Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 771, 121 S.Ct. 1876, 149 L.Ed.2d 994 (2001) (police officer authorized to arrest driver for speeding); New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 118, 106 S.Ct. 960, 89 L.Ed.2d 81 (1986) (formal arrest permissible for a traffic offense under New York law); United States v. Scopo, 19 F.3d 777, 781-782 (2d Cir.) (probable cause to stop and arrest driver where police officers observed driver\u2019s failure to signal while changing lanes), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 877, 115 S.Ct. 207, 130 L.Ed.2d 136 (1994)."},"case_id":3531825,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The fact that the \"violation\" in this case may have been minor in nature is of no legal consequence for \"[i]f an officer has probable cause to believe that an individual has committed even a very minor criminal offense in his presence, he may, without violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest the offender.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"police officer authorized to arrest driver where neither she nor her children were wearing seat belts","sentence":"Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (police officer authorized to arrest driver where neither she nor her children were wearing seat belts); see Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 771, 121 S.Ct. 1876, 149 L.Ed.2d 994 (2001) (police officer authorized to arrest driver for speeding); New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 118, 106 S.Ct. 960, 89 L.Ed.2d 81 (1986) (formal arrest permissible for a traffic offense under New York law); United States v. Scopo, 19 F.3d 777, 781-782 (2d Cir.) (probable cause to stop and arrest driver where police officers observed driver\u2019s failure to signal while changing lanes), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 877, 115 S.Ct. 207, 130 L.Ed.2d 136 (1994)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"formal arrest permissible for a traffic offense under New York law","sentence":"Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (police officer authorized to arrest driver where neither she nor her children were wearing seat belts); see Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 771, 121 S.Ct. 1876, 149 L.Ed.2d 994 (2001) (police officer authorized to arrest driver for speeding); New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 118, 106 S.Ct. 960, 89 L.Ed.2d 81 (1986) (formal arrest permissible for a traffic offense under New York law); United States v. Scopo, 19 F.3d 777, 781-782 (2d Cir.) (probable cause to stop and arrest driver where police officers observed driver\u2019s failure to signal while changing lanes), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 877, 115 S.Ct. 207, 130 L.Ed.2d 136 (1994)."},"case_id":3531825,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The fact that the \"violation\" in this case may have been minor in nature is of no legal consequence for \"[i]f an officer has probable cause to believe that an individual has committed even a very minor criminal offense in his presence, he may, without violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest the offender.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"police officer authorized to arrest driver where neither she nor her children were wearing seat belts","sentence":"Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (police officer authorized to arrest driver where neither she nor her children were wearing seat belts); see Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 771, 121 S.Ct. 1876, 149 L.Ed.2d 994 (2001) (police officer authorized to arrest driver for speeding); New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 118, 106 S.Ct. 960, 89 L.Ed.2d 81 (1986) (formal arrest permissible for a traffic offense under New York law); United States v. Scopo, 19 F.3d 777, 781-782 (2d Cir.) (probable cause to stop and arrest driver where police officers observed driver\u2019s failure to signal while changing lanes), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 877, 115 S.Ct. 207, 130 L.Ed.2d 136 (1994)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"formal arrest permissible for a traffic offense under New York law","sentence":"Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (police officer authorized to arrest driver where neither she nor her children were wearing seat belts); see Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 771, 121 S.Ct. 1876, 149 L.Ed.2d 994 (2001) (police officer authorized to arrest driver for speeding); New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 118, 106 S.Ct. 960, 89 L.Ed.2d 81 (1986) (formal arrest permissible for a traffic offense under New York law); United States v. Scopo, 19 F.3d 777, 781-782 (2d Cir.) (probable cause to stop and arrest driver where police officers observed driver\u2019s failure to signal while changing lanes), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 877, 115 S.Ct. 207, 130 L.Ed.2d 136 (1994)."},"case_id":3531825,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The fact that the \"violation\" in this case may have been minor in nature is of no legal consequence for \"[i]f an officer has probable cause to believe that an individual has committed even a very minor criminal offense in his presence, he may, without violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest the offender.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"19 F.3d 777, 781-782","parenthetical":"probable cause to stop and arrest driver where police officers observed driver's failure to signal while changing lanes","sentence":"Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (police officer authorized to arrest driver where neither she nor her children were wearing seat belts); see Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 771, 121 S.Ct. 1876, 149 L.Ed.2d 994 (2001) (police officer authorized to arrest driver for speeding); New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 118, 106 S.Ct. 960, 89 L.Ed.2d 81 (1986) (formal arrest permissible for a traffic offense under New York law); United States v. Scopo, 19 F.3d 777, 781-782 (2d Cir.) (probable cause to stop and arrest driver where police officers observed driver\u2019s failure to signal while changing lanes), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 877, 115 S.Ct. 207, 130 L.Ed.2d 136 (1994)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"police officer authorized to arrest driver where neither she nor her children were wearing seat belts","sentence":"Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (police officer authorized to arrest driver where neither she nor her children were wearing seat belts); see Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 771, 121 S.Ct. 1876, 149 L.Ed.2d 994 (2001) (police officer authorized to arrest driver for speeding); New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 118, 106 S.Ct. 960, 89 L.Ed.2d 81 (1986) (formal arrest permissible for a traffic offense under New York law); United States v. Scopo, 19 F.3d 777, 781-782 (2d Cir.) (probable cause to stop and arrest driver where police officers observed driver\u2019s failure to signal while changing lanes), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 877, 115 S.Ct. 207, 130 L.Ed.2d 136 (1994)."},"case_id":3531825,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The fact that the \"violation\" in this case may have been minor in nature is of no legal consequence for \"[i]f an officer has probable cause to believe that an individual has committed even a very minor criminal offense in his presence, he may, without violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest the offender.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"probable cause to stop and arrest driver where police officers observed driver's failure to signal while changing lanes","sentence":"Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (police officer authorized to arrest driver where neither she nor her children were wearing seat belts); see Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 771, 121 S.Ct. 1876, 149 L.Ed.2d 994 (2001) (police officer authorized to arrest driver for speeding); New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 118, 106 S.Ct. 960, 89 L.Ed.2d 81 (1986) (formal arrest permissible for a traffic offense under New York law); United States v. Scopo, 19 F.3d 777, 781-782 (2d Cir.) (probable cause to stop and arrest driver where police officers observed driver\u2019s failure to signal while changing lanes), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 877, 115 S.Ct. 207, 130 L.Ed.2d 136 (1994)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"police officer authorized to arrest driver where neither she nor her children were wearing seat belts","sentence":"Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (police officer authorized to arrest driver where neither she nor her children were wearing seat belts); see Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 771, 121 S.Ct. 1876, 149 L.Ed.2d 994 (2001) (police officer authorized to arrest driver for speeding); New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 118, 106 S.Ct. 960, 89 L.Ed.2d 81 (1986) (formal arrest permissible for a traffic offense under New York law); United States v. Scopo, 19 F.3d 777, 781-782 (2d Cir.) (probable cause to stop and arrest driver where police officers observed driver\u2019s failure to signal while changing lanes), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 877, 115 S.Ct. 207, 130 L.Ed.2d 136 (1994)."},"case_id":3531825,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The fact that the \"violation\" in this case may have been minor in nature is of no legal consequence for \"[i]f an officer has probable cause to believe that an individual has committed even a very minor criminal offense in his presence, he may, without violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest the offender.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"police officer authorized to arrest driver where neither she nor her children were wearing seat belts","sentence":"Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (police officer authorized to arrest driver where neither she nor her children were wearing seat belts); see Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 771, 121 S.Ct. 1876, 149 L.Ed.2d 994 (2001) (police officer authorized to arrest driver for speeding); New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 118, 106 S.Ct. 960, 89 L.Ed.2d 81 (1986) (formal arrest permissible for a traffic offense under New York law); United States v. Scopo, 19 F.3d 777, 781-782 (2d Cir.) (probable cause to stop and arrest driver where police officers observed driver\u2019s failure to signal while changing lanes), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 877, 115 S.Ct. 207, 130 L.Ed.2d 136 (1994)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"probable cause to stop and arrest driver where police officers observed driver's failure to signal while changing lanes","sentence":"Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (police officer authorized to arrest driver where neither she nor her children were wearing seat belts); see Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 771, 121 S.Ct. 1876, 149 L.Ed.2d 994 (2001) (police officer authorized to arrest driver for speeding); New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 118, 106 S.Ct. 960, 89 L.Ed.2d 81 (1986) (formal arrest permissible for a traffic offense under New York law); United States v. Scopo, 19 F.3d 777, 781-782 (2d Cir.) (probable cause to stop and arrest driver where police officers observed driver\u2019s failure to signal while changing lanes), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 877, 115 S.Ct. 207, 130 L.Ed.2d 136 (1994)."},"case_id":3531825,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The fact that the \"violation\" in this case may have been minor in nature is of no legal consequence for \"[i]f an officer has probable cause to believe that an individual has committed even a very minor criminal offense in his presence, he may, without violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest the offender.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"probable cause to stop and arrest driver where police officers observed driver's failure to signal while changing lanes","sentence":"Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (police officer authorized to arrest driver where neither she nor her children were wearing seat belts); see Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 771, 121 S.Ct. 1876, 149 L.Ed.2d 994 (2001) (police officer authorized to arrest driver for speeding); New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 118, 106 S.Ct. 960, 89 L.Ed.2d 81 (1986) (formal arrest permissible for a traffic offense under New York law); United States v. Scopo, 19 F.3d 777, 781-782 (2d Cir.) (probable cause to stop and arrest driver where police officers observed driver\u2019s failure to signal while changing lanes), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 877, 115 S.Ct. 207, 130 L.Ed.2d 136 (1994)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"police officer authorized to arrest driver where neither she nor her children were wearing seat belts","sentence":"Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (police officer authorized to arrest driver where neither she nor her children were wearing seat belts); see Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 771, 121 S.Ct. 1876, 149 L.Ed.2d 994 (2001) (police officer authorized to arrest driver for speeding); New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 118, 106 S.Ct. 960, 89 L.Ed.2d 81 (1986) (formal arrest permissible for a traffic offense under New York law); United States v. Scopo, 19 F.3d 777, 781-782 (2d Cir.) (probable cause to stop and arrest driver where police officers observed driver\u2019s failure to signal while changing lanes), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 877, 115 S.Ct. 207, 130 L.Ed.2d 136 (1994)."},"case_id":3531825,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Montero's complaint raised four claims, two of which alleged Jones Act negligence, one of which alleged unseaworthiness, and one of which asserted a cause of action for maintenance and cure. But for Montero's service on the vessel, none of those claims would have been viable.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"657 F.3d 1220, 1220-21","parenthetical":"holding that claims arising under the Jones Act and allegations of \"unseaworthiness\" and \"maintenance and cure\" \"are dependent on [the plaintiffs] status as a seaman employed by the cruise line and the rights that she derives from that employment status\"","sentence":"See Doe, 657 F.3d at 1220-21 (holding that claims arising under the Jones Act and allegations of \u201cunseaworthiness\u201d and \u201cmaintenance and cure\u201d \u201care dependent on [the plaintiffs] status as a seaman employed by the cruise line and the rights that she derives from that employment status\u201d); see also O\u2019Boyle v. United States, 993 F.2d 211, 213 (11th Cir.1993) (\u201c[I]n order to recover damages under the Jones Act, [a plaintiff] must have the status of a seaman.\u201d); Hurst v. Pilings & Structures, Inc., 896 F.2d 504, 505 (11th Cir.1990) (\u201cThe Jones Act permits a seaman injured in the course of employment to bring an action against his employer for damages.\u201d); Offshore Co. v. Robison, 266 F.2d 769, 781 (5th Cir.1959) (\u201cThe admiralty doctrine of absolute liability for unseaworthiness is based on protection of seamen who sign articles for a voyage and are then under the absolute control of a master with power to order seamen to do the ship\u2019s work in any weather, under any conditions, using such equipment as may be furnished by the shipowner.\u201d); Flores v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 47 F.3d 1120, 1122-23 (11th Cir.1995) (\u201cMaintenance and cure is a remedy with roots in the medieval sea codes; it is a remedy designed to protect seamen from the perils of living and working at sea.\u201d). Because none of Montero\u2019s claims would be viable if he had not served as an employee on one of Carnival\u2019s cruise ships, this dispute arises out of his service on the vessel and falls within the scope of the arbitration clause."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"993 F.2d 211, 213","parenthetical":"\"[I]n order to recover damages under the Jones Act, [a plaintiff] must have the status of a seaman.\"","sentence":"See Doe, 657 F.3d at 1220-21 (holding that claims arising under the Jones Act and allegations of \u201cunseaworthiness\u201d and \u201cmaintenance and cure\u201d \u201care dependent on [the plaintiffs] status as a seaman employed by the cruise line and the rights that she derives from that employment status\u201d); see also O\u2019Boyle v. United States, 993 F.2d 211, 213 (11th Cir.1993) (\u201c[I]n order to recover damages under the Jones Act, [a plaintiff] must have the status of a seaman.\u201d); Hurst v. Pilings & Structures, Inc., 896 F.2d 504, 505 (11th Cir.1990) (\u201cThe Jones Act permits a seaman injured in the course of employment to bring an action against his employer for damages.\u201d); Offshore Co. v. Robison, 266 F.2d 769, 781 (5th Cir.1959) (\u201cThe admiralty doctrine of absolute liability for unseaworthiness is based on protection of seamen who sign articles for a voyage and are then under the absolute control of a master with power to order seamen to do the ship\u2019s work in any weather, under any conditions, using such equipment as may be furnished by the shipowner.\u201d); Flores v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 47 F.3d 1120, 1122-23 (11th Cir.1995) (\u201cMaintenance and cure is a remedy with roots in the medieval sea codes; it is a remedy designed to protect seamen from the perils of living and working at sea.\u201d). Because none of Montero\u2019s claims would be viable if he had not served as an employee on one of Carnival\u2019s cruise ships, this dispute arises out of his service on the vessel and falls within the scope of the arbitration clause."},"case_id":4158524,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Montero's complaint raised four claims, two of which alleged Jones Act negligence, one of which alleged unseaworthiness, and one of which asserted a cause of action for maintenance and cure. But for Montero's service on the vessel, none of those claims would have been viable.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"896 F.2d 504, 505","parenthetical":"\"The Jones Act permits a seaman injured in the course of employment to bring an action against his employer for damages.\"","sentence":"See Doe, 657 F.3d at 1220-21 (holding that claims arising under the Jones Act and allegations of \u201cunseaworthiness\u201d and \u201cmaintenance and cure\u201d \u201care dependent on [the plaintiffs] status as a seaman employed by the cruise line and the rights that she derives from that employment status\u201d); see also O\u2019Boyle v. United States, 993 F.2d 211, 213 (11th Cir.1993) (\u201c[I]n order to recover damages under the Jones Act, [a plaintiff] must have the status of a seaman.\u201d); Hurst v. Pilings & Structures, Inc., 896 F.2d 504, 505 (11th Cir.1990) (\u201cThe Jones Act permits a seaman injured in the course of employment to bring an action against his employer for damages.\u201d); Offshore Co. v. Robison, 266 F.2d 769, 781 (5th Cir.1959) (\u201cThe admiralty doctrine of absolute liability for unseaworthiness is based on protection of seamen who sign articles for a voyage and are then under the absolute control of a master with power to order seamen to do the ship\u2019s work in any weather, under any conditions, using such equipment as may be furnished by the shipowner.\u201d); Flores v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 47 F.3d 1120, 1122-23 (11th Cir.1995) (\u201cMaintenance and cure is a remedy with roots in the medieval sea codes; it is a remedy designed to protect seamen from the perils of living and working at sea.\u201d). Because none of Montero\u2019s claims would be viable if he had not served as an employee on one of Carnival\u2019s cruise ships, this dispute arises out of his service on the vessel and falls within the scope of the arbitration clause."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"657 F.3d 1220, 1220-21","parenthetical":"holding that claims arising under the Jones Act and allegations of \"unseaworthiness\" and \"maintenance and cure\" \"are dependent on [the plaintiffs] status as a seaman employed by the cruise line and the rights that she derives from that employment status\"","sentence":"See Doe, 657 F.3d at 1220-21 (holding that claims arising under the Jones Act and allegations of \u201cunseaworthiness\u201d and \u201cmaintenance and cure\u201d \u201care dependent on [the plaintiffs] status as a seaman employed by the cruise line and the rights that she derives from that employment status\u201d); see also O\u2019Boyle v. United States, 993 F.2d 211, 213 (11th Cir.1993) (\u201c[I]n order to recover damages under the Jones Act, [a plaintiff] must have the status of a seaman.\u201d); Hurst v. Pilings & Structures, Inc., 896 F.2d 504, 505 (11th Cir.1990) (\u201cThe Jones Act permits a seaman injured in the course of employment to bring an action against his employer for damages.\u201d); Offshore Co. v. Robison, 266 F.2d 769, 781 (5th Cir.1959) (\u201cThe admiralty doctrine of absolute liability for unseaworthiness is based on protection of seamen who sign articles for a voyage and are then under the absolute control of a master with power to order seamen to do the ship\u2019s work in any weather, under any conditions, using such equipment as may be furnished by the shipowner.\u201d); Flores v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 47 F.3d 1120, 1122-23 (11th Cir.1995) (\u201cMaintenance and cure is a remedy with roots in the medieval sea codes; it is a remedy designed to protect seamen from the perils of living and working at sea.\u201d). Because none of Montero\u2019s claims would be viable if he had not served as an employee on one of Carnival\u2019s cruise ships, this dispute arises out of his service on the vessel and falls within the scope of the arbitration clause."},"case_id":4158524,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Montero's complaint raised four claims, two of which alleged Jones Act negligence, one of which alleged unseaworthiness, and one of which asserted a cause of action for maintenance and cure. But for Montero's service on the vessel, none of those claims would have been viable.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"266 F.2d 769, 781","parenthetical":"\"The admiralty doctrine of absolute liability for unseaworthiness is based on protection of seamen who sign articles for a voyage and are then under the absolute control of a master with power to order seamen to do the ship's work in any weather, under any conditions, using such equipment as may be furnished by the shipowner.\"","sentence":"See Doe, 657 F.3d at 1220-21 (holding that claims arising under the Jones Act and allegations of \u201cunseaworthiness\u201d and \u201cmaintenance and cure\u201d \u201care dependent on [the plaintiffs] status as a seaman employed by the cruise line and the rights that she derives from that employment status\u201d); see also O\u2019Boyle v. United States, 993 F.2d 211, 213 (11th Cir.1993) (\u201c[I]n order to recover damages under the Jones Act, [a plaintiff] must have the status of a seaman.\u201d); Hurst v. Pilings & Structures, Inc., 896 F.2d 504, 505 (11th Cir.1990) (\u201cThe Jones Act permits a seaman injured in the course of employment to bring an action against his employer for damages.\u201d); Offshore Co. v. Robison, 266 F.2d 769, 781 (5th Cir.1959) (\u201cThe admiralty doctrine of absolute liability for unseaworthiness is based on protection of seamen who sign articles for a voyage and are then under the absolute control of a master with power to order seamen to do the ship\u2019s work in any weather, under any conditions, using such equipment as may be furnished by the shipowner.\u201d); Flores v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 47 F.3d 1120, 1122-23 (11th Cir.1995) (\u201cMaintenance and cure is a remedy with roots in the medieval sea codes; it is a remedy designed to protect seamen from the perils of living and working at sea.\u201d). Because none of Montero\u2019s claims would be viable if he had not served as an employee on one of Carnival\u2019s cruise ships, this dispute arises out of his service on the vessel and falls within the scope of the arbitration clause."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"657 F.3d 1220, 1220-21","parenthetical":"holding that claims arising under the Jones Act and allegations of \"unseaworthiness\" and \"maintenance and cure\" \"are dependent on [the plaintiffs] status as a seaman employed by the cruise line and the rights that she derives from that employment status\"","sentence":"See Doe, 657 F.3d at 1220-21 (holding that claims arising under the Jones Act and allegations of \u201cunseaworthiness\u201d and \u201cmaintenance and cure\u201d \u201care dependent on [the plaintiffs] status as a seaman employed by the cruise line and the rights that she derives from that employment status\u201d); see also O\u2019Boyle v. United States, 993 F.2d 211, 213 (11th Cir.1993) (\u201c[I]n order to recover damages under the Jones Act, [a plaintiff] must have the status of a seaman.\u201d); Hurst v. Pilings & Structures, Inc., 896 F.2d 504, 505 (11th Cir.1990) (\u201cThe Jones Act permits a seaman injured in the course of employment to bring an action against his employer for damages.\u201d); Offshore Co. v. Robison, 266 F.2d 769, 781 (5th Cir.1959) (\u201cThe admiralty doctrine of absolute liability for unseaworthiness is based on protection of seamen who sign articles for a voyage and are then under the absolute control of a master with power to order seamen to do the ship\u2019s work in any weather, under any conditions, using such equipment as may be furnished by the shipowner.\u201d); Flores v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 47 F.3d 1120, 1122-23 (11th Cir.1995) (\u201cMaintenance and cure is a remedy with roots in the medieval sea codes; it is a remedy designed to protect seamen from the perils of living and working at sea.\u201d). Because none of Montero\u2019s claims would be viable if he had not served as an employee on one of Carnival\u2019s cruise ships, this dispute arises out of his service on the vessel and falls within the scope of the arbitration clause."},"case_id":4158524,"label":"b"}
{"context":"We begin by acknowledging that the Due Process Clause generally provides constitutional protection for parental rights. Indeed, the Supreme Court has stated that \"the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects the fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"336 F.3d 1194, 1203","parenthetical":"\"It is not implausible to think that rights invoked here -- the right to refuse a medical exam and the parent's right to control the upbringing, including the medical care, of a child -- fall within [the Due Process Clause's] sphere of protected liberty.\"","sentence":"See Dubbs v. Head Start, Inc., 336 F.3d 1194, 1203 (10th Cir. 2003) (\u201cIt is not implausible to think that rights invoked here \u2014 the right to refuse a medical exam and the parent\u2019s right to control the upbringing, including the medical care, of a child \u2014 fall within [the Due Process Clause\u2019s] sphere of protected liberty.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"530 U.S. 57, 66","parenthetical":"'We express no opinion on whether such a right [to direct a child's medical care] might exist within the context of general familial rights.\"","sentence":"Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000). Furthermore, although we have never specifically recognized or defined the scope of a parent\u2019s right to direct her child\u2019s medical care, see Roska v. Peterson, 328 F.3d 1230, 1247 n. 14 (10th Cir.2003) (\u2018We express no opinion on whether such a right [to direct a child\u2019s medical care] might exist within the context of general familial rights.\u201d), we do not doubt that a parent\u2019s general right to make decisions concerning the care of her child includes, to some extent, a more specific right to make decisions about the child\u2019s medical care."},"case_id":4227431,"label":"b"}
{"context":"We begin by acknowledging that the Due Process Clause generally provides constitutional protection for parental rights. Indeed, the Supreme Court has stated that \"the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects the fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"336 F.3d 1194, 1203","parenthetical":"\"It is not implausible to think that rights invoked here -- the right to refuse a medical exam and the parent's right to control the upbringing, including the medical care, of a child -- fall within [the Due Process Clause's] sphere of protected liberty.\"","sentence":"See Dubbs v. Head Start, Inc., 336 F.3d 1194, 1203 (10th Cir. 2003) (\u201cIt is not implausible to think that rights invoked here \u2014 the right to refuse a medical exam and the parent\u2019s right to control the upbringing, including the medical care, of a child \u2014 fall within [the Due Process Clause\u2019s] sphere of protected liberty.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"'We express no opinion on whether such a right [to direct a child's medical care] might exist within the context of general familial rights.\"","sentence":"Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000). Furthermore, although we have never specifically recognized or defined the scope of a parent\u2019s right to direct her child\u2019s medical care, see Roska v. Peterson, 328 F.3d 1230, 1247 n. 14 (10th Cir.2003) (\u2018We express no opinion on whether such a right [to direct a child\u2019s medical care] might exist within the context of general familial rights.\u201d), we do not doubt that a parent\u2019s general right to make decisions concerning the care of her child includes, to some extent, a more specific right to make decisions about the child\u2019s medical care."},"case_id":4227431,"label":"b"}
{"context":"We begin by acknowledging that the Due Process Clause generally provides constitutional protection for parental rights. Indeed, the Supreme Court has stated that \"the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects the fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"'We express no opinion on whether such a right [to direct a child's medical care] might exist within the context of general familial rights.\"","sentence":"Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000). Furthermore, although we have never specifically recognized or defined the scope of a parent\u2019s right to direct her child\u2019s medical care, see Roska v. Peterson, 328 F.3d 1230, 1247 n. 14 (10th Cir.2003) (\u2018We express no opinion on whether such a right [to direct a child\u2019s medical care] might exist within the context of general familial rights.\u201d), we do not doubt that a parent\u2019s general right to make decisions concerning the care of her child includes, to some extent, a more specific right to make decisions about the child\u2019s medical care."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"336 F.3d 1194, 1203","parenthetical":"\"It is not implausible to think that rights invoked here -- the right to refuse a medical exam and the parent's right to control the upbringing, including the medical care, of a child -- fall within [the Due Process Clause's] sphere of protected liberty.\"","sentence":"See Dubbs v. Head Start, Inc., 336 F.3d 1194, 1203 (10th Cir. 2003) (\u201cIt is not implausible to think that rights invoked here \u2014 the right to refuse a medical exam and the parent\u2019s right to control the upbringing, including the medical care, of a child \u2014 fall within [the Due Process Clause\u2019s] sphere of protected liberty.\u201d)."},"case_id":4227431,"label":"a"}
{"context":"We begin by acknowledging that the Due Process Clause generally provides constitutional protection for parental rights. Indeed, the Supreme Court has stated that \"the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects the fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"'We express no opinion on whether such a right [to direct a child's medical care] might exist within the context of general familial rights.\"","sentence":"Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000). Furthermore, although we have never specifically recognized or defined the scope of a parent\u2019s right to direct her child\u2019s medical care, see Roska v. Peterson, 328 F.3d 1230, 1247 n. 14 (10th Cir.2003) (\u2018We express no opinion on whether such a right [to direct a child\u2019s medical care] might exist within the context of general familial rights.\u201d), we do not doubt that a parent\u2019s general right to make decisions concerning the care of her child includes, to some extent, a more specific right to make decisions about the child\u2019s medical care."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"336 F.3d 1194, 1203","parenthetical":"\"It is not implausible to think that rights invoked here -- the right to refuse a medical exam and the parent's right to control the upbringing, including the medical care, of a child -- fall within [the Due Process Clause's] sphere of protected liberty.\"","sentence":"See Dubbs v. Head Start, Inc., 336 F.3d 1194, 1203 (10th Cir. 2003) (\u201cIt is not implausible to think that rights invoked here \u2014 the right to refuse a medical exam and the parent\u2019s right to control the upbringing, including the medical care, of a child \u2014 fall within [the Due Process Clause\u2019s] sphere of protected liberty.\u201d)."},"case_id":4227431,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The Globe also argues that it has a \"common law right of access\" to the documents submitted to the court for its ruling on the discovery motions. There is a long-standing presumption in the common law that the public may inspect judicial records.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"773 F.2d 1340, 1340","parenthetical":"trial court's \"eminently reasonable action\" unquestionably lawful \"[i]n the absence of some overriding constitutional command to provide access\"","sentence":"Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. at 599, 98 S.Ct. at 1312; In re Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, 773 F.2d at 1340 (trial court\u2019s \u201ceminently reasonable action\u201d unquestionably lawful \u201c[i]n the absence of some overriding constitutional command to provide access\u201d); cf. McCoy v. Providence Journal Co., 190 F.2d at 765 (\u201c[traditionally, courts have exercised the power to impound their records when circumstances warranted such action\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"190 F.2d 765, 765","parenthetical":"\"[traditionally, courts have exercised the power to impound their records when circumstances warranted such action\"","sentence":"Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. at 599, 98 S.Ct. at 1312; In re Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, 773 F.2d at 1340 (trial court\u2019s \u201ceminently reasonable action\u201d unquestionably lawful \u201c[i]n the absence of some overriding constitutional command to provide access\u201d); cf. McCoy v. Providence Journal Co., 190 F.2d at 765 (\u201c[traditionally, courts have exercised the power to impound their records when circumstances warranted such action\u201d)."},"case_id":1111437,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The trial court record fails to establish how Juror 016's marital or parental status would have had any bearing on her ability to serve as a juror in a case involving prosecution for crack cocaine possession, and the prosecutor failed to offer any such explanation. Further, the record shows that the prosecutor did not strike Juror 015, a white juror who possessed the same objective characteristics as Juror 016: both were single, employed females with no children who responded to the court's questions in the same manner, thereby revealing the pretextual nature of this justification.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"335 F.3d 965, 969","parenthetical":"\"Peremptory challenges cannot be lawful ly exercised against potential jurors of one gender unless potential jurors of another gender with comparable characteristics are also challenged.\"","sentence":"See United States v. Alanis, 335 F.3d 965, 969 (9th Cir.2003) (\u201cPeremptory challenges cannot be lawful ly exercised against potential jurors of one gender unless potential jurors of another gender with comparable characteristics are also challenged.\u201d); Lewis, 321 F.3d at 832-33 (\u201c[A] comparative analysis of D.F. with empaneled jurors reveals that a finding of pretext was warranted.\u201d); McClain, 217 F.3d at 1221-22 (holding that where a non-black juror with no prior jury experience was empaneled, the proffered reason for striking a black juror for lack of jury experience was not genuine and therefore was pretextual); cf. Miller-El, 537 U.S. 322, 123 S.Ct. at 1043, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (noting the fact that \u201cthree of the State\u2019s proffered race-neutral rationales for striking African-American jurors pertained just as well to some white jurors who were not challenged\u201d showed that the strikes \u201cmight have been selective and based on racial considerations\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting the fact that \"three of the State's proffered race-neutral rationales for striking African-American jurors pertained just as well to some white jurors who were not challenged\" showed that the strikes \"might have been selective and based on racial considerations\"","sentence":"See United States v. Alanis, 335 F.3d 965, 969 (9th Cir.2003) (\u201cPeremptory challenges cannot be lawful ly exercised against potential jurors of one gender unless potential jurors of another gender with comparable characteristics are also challenged.\u201d); Lewis, 321 F.3d at 832-33 (\u201c[A] comparative analysis of D.F. with empaneled jurors reveals that a finding of pretext was warranted.\u201d); McClain, 217 F.3d at 1221-22 (holding that where a non-black juror with no prior jury experience was empaneled, the proffered reason for striking a black juror for lack of jury experience was not genuine and therefore was pretextual); cf. Miller-El, 537 U.S. 322, 123 S.Ct. at 1043, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (noting the fact that \u201cthree of the State\u2019s proffered race-neutral rationales for striking African-American jurors pertained just as well to some white jurors who were not challenged\u201d showed that the strikes \u201cmight have been selective and based on racial considerations\u201d)."},"case_id":9071398,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The trial court record fails to establish how Juror 016's marital or parental status would have had any bearing on her ability to serve as a juror in a case involving prosecution for crack cocaine possession, and the prosecutor failed to offer any such explanation. Further, the record shows that the prosecutor did not strike Juror 015, a white juror who possessed the same objective characteristics as Juror 016: both were single, employed females with no children who responded to the court's questions in the same manner, thereby revealing the pretextual nature of this justification.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"335 F.3d 965, 969","parenthetical":"\"Peremptory challenges cannot be lawful ly exercised against potential jurors of one gender unless potential jurors of another gender with comparable characteristics are also challenged.\"","sentence":"See United States v. Alanis, 335 F.3d 965, 969 (9th Cir.2003) (\u201cPeremptory challenges cannot be lawful ly exercised against potential jurors of one gender unless potential jurors of another gender with comparable characteristics are also challenged.\u201d); Lewis, 321 F.3d at 832-33 (\u201c[A] comparative analysis of D.F. with empaneled jurors reveals that a finding of pretext was warranted.\u201d); McClain, 217 F.3d at 1221-22 (holding that where a non-black juror with no prior jury experience was empaneled, the proffered reason for striking a black juror for lack of jury experience was not genuine and therefore was pretextual); cf. Miller-El, 537 U.S. 322, 123 S.Ct. at 1043, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (noting the fact that \u201cthree of the State\u2019s proffered race-neutral rationales for striking African-American jurors pertained just as well to some white jurors who were not challenged\u201d showed that the strikes \u201cmight have been selective and based on racial considerations\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"123 S.Ct. 1043, 1043","parenthetical":"noting the fact that \"three of the State's proffered race-neutral rationales for striking African-American jurors pertained just as well to some white jurors who were not challenged\" showed that the strikes \"might have been selective and based on racial considerations\"","sentence":"See United States v. Alanis, 335 F.3d 965, 969 (9th Cir.2003) (\u201cPeremptory challenges cannot be lawful ly exercised against potential jurors of one gender unless potential jurors of another gender with comparable characteristics are also challenged.\u201d); Lewis, 321 F.3d at 832-33 (\u201c[A] comparative analysis of D.F. with empaneled jurors reveals that a finding of pretext was warranted.\u201d); McClain, 217 F.3d at 1221-22 (holding that where a non-black juror with no prior jury experience was empaneled, the proffered reason for striking a black juror for lack of jury experience was not genuine and therefore was pretextual); cf. Miller-El, 537 U.S. 322, 123 S.Ct. at 1043, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (noting the fact that \u201cthree of the State\u2019s proffered race-neutral rationales for striking African-American jurors pertained just as well to some white jurors who were not challenged\u201d showed that the strikes \u201cmight have been selective and based on racial considerations\u201d)."},"case_id":9071398,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The trial court record fails to establish how Juror 016's marital or parental status would have had any bearing on her ability to serve as a juror in a case involving prosecution for crack cocaine possession, and the prosecutor failed to offer any such explanation. Further, the record shows that the prosecutor did not strike Juror 015, a white juror who possessed the same objective characteristics as Juror 016: both were single, employed females with no children who responded to the court's questions in the same manner, thereby revealing the pretextual nature of this justification.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"335 F.3d 965, 969","parenthetical":"\"Peremptory challenges cannot be lawful ly exercised against potential jurors of one gender unless potential jurors of another gender with comparable characteristics are also challenged.\"","sentence":"See United States v. Alanis, 335 F.3d 965, 969 (9th Cir.2003) (\u201cPeremptory challenges cannot be lawful ly exercised against potential jurors of one gender unless potential jurors of another gender with comparable characteristics are also challenged.\u201d); Lewis, 321 F.3d at 832-33 (\u201c[A] comparative analysis of D.F. with empaneled jurors reveals that a finding of pretext was warranted.\u201d); McClain, 217 F.3d at 1221-22 (holding that where a non-black juror with no prior jury experience was empaneled, the proffered reason for striking a black juror for lack of jury experience was not genuine and therefore was pretextual); cf. Miller-El, 537 U.S. 322, 123 S.Ct. at 1043, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (noting the fact that \u201cthree of the State\u2019s proffered race-neutral rationales for striking African-American jurors pertained just as well to some white jurors who were not challenged\u201d showed that the strikes \u201cmight have been selective and based on racial considerations\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting the fact that \"three of the State's proffered race-neutral rationales for striking African-American jurors pertained just as well to some white jurors who were not challenged\" showed that the strikes \"might have been selective and based on racial considerations\"","sentence":"See United States v. Alanis, 335 F.3d 965, 969 (9th Cir.2003) (\u201cPeremptory challenges cannot be lawful ly exercised against potential jurors of one gender unless potential jurors of another gender with comparable characteristics are also challenged.\u201d); Lewis, 321 F.3d at 832-33 (\u201c[A] comparative analysis of D.F. with empaneled jurors reveals that a finding of pretext was warranted.\u201d); McClain, 217 F.3d at 1221-22 (holding that where a non-black juror with no prior jury experience was empaneled, the proffered reason for striking a black juror for lack of jury experience was not genuine and therefore was pretextual); cf. Miller-El, 537 U.S. 322, 123 S.Ct. at 1043, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (noting the fact that \u201cthree of the State\u2019s proffered race-neutral rationales for striking African-American jurors pertained just as well to some white jurors who were not challenged\u201d showed that the strikes \u201cmight have been selective and based on racial considerations\u201d)."},"case_id":9071398,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The trial court record fails to establish how Juror 016's marital or parental status would have had any bearing on her ability to serve as a juror in a case involving prosecution for crack cocaine possession, and the prosecutor failed to offer any such explanation. Further, the record shows that the prosecutor did not strike Juror 015, a white juror who possessed the same objective characteristics as Juror 016: both were single, employed females with no children who responded to the court's questions in the same manner, thereby revealing the pretextual nature of this justification.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting the fact that \"three of the State's proffered race-neutral rationales for striking African-American jurors pertained just as well to some white jurors who were not challenged\" showed that the strikes \"might have been selective and based on racial considerations\"","sentence":"See United States v. Alanis, 335 F.3d 965, 969 (9th Cir.2003) (\u201cPeremptory challenges cannot be lawful ly exercised against potential jurors of one gender unless potential jurors of another gender with comparable characteristics are also challenged.\u201d); Lewis, 321 F.3d at 832-33 (\u201c[A] comparative analysis of D.F. with empaneled jurors reveals that a finding of pretext was warranted.\u201d); McClain, 217 F.3d at 1221-22 (holding that where a non-black juror with no prior jury experience was empaneled, the proffered reason for striking a black juror for lack of jury experience was not genuine and therefore was pretextual); cf. Miller-El, 537 U.S. 322, 123 S.Ct. at 1043, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (noting the fact that \u201cthree of the State\u2019s proffered race-neutral rationales for striking African-American jurors pertained just as well to some white jurors who were not challenged\u201d showed that the strikes \u201cmight have been selective and based on racial considerations\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"321 F.3d 832, 832-33","parenthetical":"\"[A] comparative analysis of D.F. with empaneled jurors reveals that a finding of pretext was warranted.\"","sentence":"See United States v. Alanis, 335 F.3d 965, 969 (9th Cir.2003) (\u201cPeremptory challenges cannot be lawful ly exercised against potential jurors of one gender unless potential jurors of another gender with comparable characteristics are also challenged.\u201d); Lewis, 321 F.3d at 832-33 (\u201c[A] comparative analysis of D.F. with empaneled jurors reveals that a finding of pretext was warranted.\u201d); McClain, 217 F.3d at 1221-22 (holding that where a non-black juror with no prior jury experience was empaneled, the proffered reason for striking a black juror for lack of jury experience was not genuine and therefore was pretextual); cf. Miller-El, 537 U.S. 322, 123 S.Ct. at 1043, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (noting the fact that \u201cthree of the State\u2019s proffered race-neutral rationales for striking African-American jurors pertained just as well to some white jurors who were not challenged\u201d showed that the strikes \u201cmight have been selective and based on racial considerations\u201d)."},"case_id":9071398,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The trial court record fails to establish how Juror 016's marital or parental status would have had any bearing on her ability to serve as a juror in a case involving prosecution for crack cocaine possession, and the prosecutor failed to offer any such explanation. Further, the record shows that the prosecutor did not strike Juror 015, a white juror who possessed the same objective characteristics as Juror 016: both were single, employed females with no children who responded to the court's questions in the same manner, thereby revealing the pretextual nature of this justification.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"123 S.Ct. 1043, 1043","parenthetical":"noting the fact that \"three of the State's proffered race-neutral rationales for striking African-American jurors pertained just as well to some white jurors who were not challenged\" showed that the strikes \"might have been selective and based on racial considerations\"","sentence":"See United States v. Alanis, 335 F.3d 965, 969 (9th Cir.2003) (\u201cPeremptory challenges cannot be lawful ly exercised against potential jurors of one gender unless potential jurors of another gender with comparable characteristics are also challenged.\u201d); Lewis, 321 F.3d at 832-33 (\u201c[A] comparative analysis of D.F. with empaneled jurors reveals that a finding of pretext was warranted.\u201d); McClain, 217 F.3d at 1221-22 (holding that where a non-black juror with no prior jury experience was empaneled, the proffered reason for striking a black juror for lack of jury experience was not genuine and therefore was pretextual); cf. Miller-El, 537 U.S. 322, 123 S.Ct. at 1043, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (noting the fact that \u201cthree of the State\u2019s proffered race-neutral rationales for striking African-American jurors pertained just as well to some white jurors who were not challenged\u201d showed that the strikes \u201cmight have been selective and based on racial considerations\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"321 F.3d 832, 832-33","parenthetical":"\"[A] comparative analysis of D.F. with empaneled jurors reveals that a finding of pretext was warranted.\"","sentence":"See United States v. Alanis, 335 F.3d 965, 969 (9th Cir.2003) (\u201cPeremptory challenges cannot be lawful ly exercised against potential jurors of one gender unless potential jurors of another gender with comparable characteristics are also challenged.\u201d); Lewis, 321 F.3d at 832-33 (\u201c[A] comparative analysis of D.F. with empaneled jurors reveals that a finding of pretext was warranted.\u201d); McClain, 217 F.3d at 1221-22 (holding that where a non-black juror with no prior jury experience was empaneled, the proffered reason for striking a black juror for lack of jury experience was not genuine and therefore was pretextual); cf. Miller-El, 537 U.S. 322, 123 S.Ct. at 1043, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (noting the fact that \u201cthree of the State\u2019s proffered race-neutral rationales for striking African-American jurors pertained just as well to some white jurors who were not challenged\u201d showed that the strikes \u201cmight have been selective and based on racial considerations\u201d)."},"case_id":9071398,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The trial court record fails to establish how Juror 016's marital or parental status would have had any bearing on her ability to serve as a juror in a case involving prosecution for crack cocaine possession, and the prosecutor failed to offer any such explanation. Further, the record shows that the prosecutor did not strike Juror 015, a white juror who possessed the same objective characteristics as Juror 016: both were single, employed females with no children who responded to the court's questions in the same manner, thereby revealing the pretextual nature of this justification.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"321 F.3d 832, 832-33","parenthetical":"\"[A] comparative analysis of D.F. with empaneled jurors reveals that a finding of pretext was warranted.\"","sentence":"See United States v. Alanis, 335 F.3d 965, 969 (9th Cir.2003) (\u201cPeremptory challenges cannot be lawful ly exercised against potential jurors of one gender unless potential jurors of another gender with comparable characteristics are also challenged.\u201d); Lewis, 321 F.3d at 832-33 (\u201c[A] comparative analysis of D.F. with empaneled jurors reveals that a finding of pretext was warranted.\u201d); McClain, 217 F.3d at 1221-22 (holding that where a non-black juror with no prior jury experience was empaneled, the proffered reason for striking a black juror for lack of jury experience was not genuine and therefore was pretextual); cf. Miller-El, 537 U.S. 322, 123 S.Ct. at 1043, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (noting the fact that \u201cthree of the State\u2019s proffered race-neutral rationales for striking African-American jurors pertained just as well to some white jurors who were not challenged\u201d showed that the strikes \u201cmight have been selective and based on racial considerations\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting the fact that \"three of the State's proffered race-neutral rationales for striking African-American jurors pertained just as well to some white jurors who were not challenged\" showed that the strikes \"might have been selective and based on racial considerations\"","sentence":"See United States v. Alanis, 335 F.3d 965, 969 (9th Cir.2003) (\u201cPeremptory challenges cannot be lawful ly exercised against potential jurors of one gender unless potential jurors of another gender with comparable characteristics are also challenged.\u201d); Lewis, 321 F.3d at 832-33 (\u201c[A] comparative analysis of D.F. with empaneled jurors reveals that a finding of pretext was warranted.\u201d); McClain, 217 F.3d at 1221-22 (holding that where a non-black juror with no prior jury experience was empaneled, the proffered reason for striking a black juror for lack of jury experience was not genuine and therefore was pretextual); cf. Miller-El, 537 U.S. 322, 123 S.Ct. at 1043, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (noting the fact that \u201cthree of the State\u2019s proffered race-neutral rationales for striking African-American jurors pertained just as well to some white jurors who were not challenged\u201d showed that the strikes \u201cmight have been selective and based on racial considerations\u201d)."},"case_id":9071398,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The trial court record fails to establish how Juror 016's marital or parental status would have had any bearing on her ability to serve as a juror in a case involving prosecution for crack cocaine possession, and the prosecutor failed to offer any such explanation. Further, the record shows that the prosecutor did not strike Juror 015, a white juror who possessed the same objective characteristics as Juror 016: both were single, employed females with no children who responded to the court's questions in the same manner, thereby revealing the pretextual nature of this justification.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting the fact that \"three of the State's proffered race-neutral rationales for striking African-American jurors pertained just as well to some white jurors who were not challenged\" showed that the strikes \"might have been selective and based on racial considerations\"","sentence":"See United States v. Alanis, 335 F.3d 965, 969 (9th Cir.2003) (\u201cPeremptory challenges cannot be lawful ly exercised against potential jurors of one gender unless potential jurors of another gender with comparable characteristics are also challenged.\u201d); Lewis, 321 F.3d at 832-33 (\u201c[A] comparative analysis of D.F. with empaneled jurors reveals that a finding of pretext was warranted.\u201d); McClain, 217 F.3d at 1221-22 (holding that where a non-black juror with no prior jury experience was empaneled, the proffered reason for striking a black juror for lack of jury experience was not genuine and therefore was pretextual); cf. Miller-El, 537 U.S. 322, 123 S.Ct. at 1043, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (noting the fact that \u201cthree of the State\u2019s proffered race-neutral rationales for striking African-American jurors pertained just as well to some white jurors who were not challenged\u201d showed that the strikes \u201cmight have been selective and based on racial considerations\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"217 F.3d 1221, 1221-22","parenthetical":"holding that where a non-black juror with no prior jury experience was empaneled, the proffered reason for striking a black juror for lack of jury experience was not genuine and therefore was pretextual","sentence":"See United States v. Alanis, 335 F.3d 965, 969 (9th Cir.2003) (\u201cPeremptory challenges cannot be lawful ly exercised against potential jurors of one gender unless potential jurors of another gender with comparable characteristics are also challenged.\u201d); Lewis, 321 F.3d at 832-33 (\u201c[A] comparative analysis of D.F. with empaneled jurors reveals that a finding of pretext was warranted.\u201d); McClain, 217 F.3d at 1221-22 (holding that where a non-black juror with no prior jury experience was empaneled, the proffered reason for striking a black juror for lack of jury experience was not genuine and therefore was pretextual); cf. Miller-El, 537 U.S. 322, 123 S.Ct. at 1043, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (noting the fact that \u201cthree of the State\u2019s proffered race-neutral rationales for striking African-American jurors pertained just as well to some white jurors who were not challenged\u201d showed that the strikes \u201cmight have been selective and based on racial considerations\u201d)."},"case_id":9071398,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The trial court record fails to establish how Juror 016's marital or parental status would have had any bearing on her ability to serve as a juror in a case involving prosecution for crack cocaine possession, and the prosecutor failed to offer any such explanation. Further, the record shows that the prosecutor did not strike Juror 015, a white juror who possessed the same objective characteristics as Juror 016: both were single, employed females with no children who responded to the court's questions in the same manner, thereby revealing the pretextual nature of this justification.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"123 S.Ct. 1043, 1043","parenthetical":"noting the fact that \"three of the State's proffered race-neutral rationales for striking African-American jurors pertained just as well to some white jurors who were not challenged\" showed that the strikes \"might have been selective and based on racial considerations\"","sentence":"See United States v. Alanis, 335 F.3d 965, 969 (9th Cir.2003) (\u201cPeremptory challenges cannot be lawful ly exercised against potential jurors of one gender unless potential jurors of another gender with comparable characteristics are also challenged.\u201d); Lewis, 321 F.3d at 832-33 (\u201c[A] comparative analysis of D.F. with empaneled jurors reveals that a finding of pretext was warranted.\u201d); McClain, 217 F.3d at 1221-22 (holding that where a non-black juror with no prior jury experience was empaneled, the proffered reason for striking a black juror for lack of jury experience was not genuine and therefore was pretextual); cf. Miller-El, 537 U.S. 322, 123 S.Ct. at 1043, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (noting the fact that \u201cthree of the State\u2019s proffered race-neutral rationales for striking African-American jurors pertained just as well to some white jurors who were not challenged\u201d showed that the strikes \u201cmight have been selective and based on racial considerations\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"217 F.3d 1221, 1221-22","parenthetical":"holding that where a non-black juror with no prior jury experience was empaneled, the proffered reason for striking a black juror for lack of jury experience was not genuine and therefore was pretextual","sentence":"See United States v. Alanis, 335 F.3d 965, 969 (9th Cir.2003) (\u201cPeremptory challenges cannot be lawful ly exercised against potential jurors of one gender unless potential jurors of another gender with comparable characteristics are also challenged.\u201d); Lewis, 321 F.3d at 832-33 (\u201c[A] comparative analysis of D.F. with empaneled jurors reveals that a finding of pretext was warranted.\u201d); McClain, 217 F.3d at 1221-22 (holding that where a non-black juror with no prior jury experience was empaneled, the proffered reason for striking a black juror for lack of jury experience was not genuine and therefore was pretextual); cf. Miller-El, 537 U.S. 322, 123 S.Ct. at 1043, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (noting the fact that \u201cthree of the State\u2019s proffered race-neutral rationales for striking African-American jurors pertained just as well to some white jurors who were not challenged\u201d showed that the strikes \u201cmight have been selective and based on racial considerations\u201d)."},"case_id":9071398,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The trial court record fails to establish how Juror 016's marital or parental status would have had any bearing on her ability to serve as a juror in a case involving prosecution for crack cocaine possession, and the prosecutor failed to offer any such explanation. Further, the record shows that the prosecutor did not strike Juror 015, a white juror who possessed the same objective characteristics as Juror 016: both were single, employed females with no children who responded to the court's questions in the same manner, thereby revealing the pretextual nature of this justification.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting the fact that \"three of the State's proffered race-neutral rationales for striking African-American jurors pertained just as well to some white jurors who were not challenged\" showed that the strikes \"might have been selective and based on racial considerations\"","sentence":"See United States v. Alanis, 335 F.3d 965, 969 (9th Cir.2003) (\u201cPeremptory challenges cannot be lawful ly exercised against potential jurors of one gender unless potential jurors of another gender with comparable characteristics are also challenged.\u201d); Lewis, 321 F.3d at 832-33 (\u201c[A] comparative analysis of D.F. with empaneled jurors reveals that a finding of pretext was warranted.\u201d); McClain, 217 F.3d at 1221-22 (holding that where a non-black juror with no prior jury experience was empaneled, the proffered reason for striking a black juror for lack of jury experience was not genuine and therefore was pretextual); cf. Miller-El, 537 U.S. 322, 123 S.Ct. at 1043, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (noting the fact that \u201cthree of the State\u2019s proffered race-neutral rationales for striking African-American jurors pertained just as well to some white jurors who were not challenged\u201d showed that the strikes \u201cmight have been selective and based on racial considerations\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"217 F.3d 1221, 1221-22","parenthetical":"holding that where a non-black juror with no prior jury experience was empaneled, the proffered reason for striking a black juror for lack of jury experience was not genuine and therefore was pretextual","sentence":"See United States v. Alanis, 335 F.3d 965, 969 (9th Cir.2003) (\u201cPeremptory challenges cannot be lawful ly exercised against potential jurors of one gender unless potential jurors of another gender with comparable characteristics are also challenged.\u201d); Lewis, 321 F.3d at 832-33 (\u201c[A] comparative analysis of D.F. with empaneled jurors reveals that a finding of pretext was warranted.\u201d); McClain, 217 F.3d at 1221-22 (holding that where a non-black juror with no prior jury experience was empaneled, the proffered reason for striking a black juror for lack of jury experience was not genuine and therefore was pretextual); cf. Miller-El, 537 U.S. 322, 123 S.Ct. at 1043, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (noting the fact that \u201cthree of the State\u2019s proffered race-neutral rationales for striking African-American jurors pertained just as well to some white jurors who were not challenged\u201d showed that the strikes \u201cmight have been selective and based on racial considerations\u201d)."},"case_id":9071398,"label":"b"}
{"context":"They are invested with large discretion to model their judgments to fit the exigencies of the particular case.\"). Moreover, the cost of additional procedures and the details of their implementation are matters peculiarly suited to the experience of the district court and the knowledge of the parties.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"197 F.3d 41, 57","parenthetical":"noting that a district court has \"broad equitable discretion to apportion remedial costs\" in desegregation cases","sentence":"See Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 97 n. 33, 92 S.Ct. 1983 (\u201cLeeway remains to develop a form of hearing that will minimize unnecessary cost and delay while preserving the fairness and effectiveness of the hearing .... \u201d); cf. United States v. City of Yonkers, 197 F.3d 41, 57 (2d Cir.1999) (noting that a district court has \u201cbroad equitable discretion to apportion remedial costs\u201d in desegregation cases)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"Leeway remains to develop a form of hearing that will minimize unnecessary cost and delay while preserving the fairness and effectiveness of the hearing .... \"","sentence":"See Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 97 n. 33, 92 S.Ct. 1983 (\u201cLeeway remains to develop a form of hearing that will minimize unnecessary cost and delay while preserving the fairness and effectiveness of the hearing .... \u201d); cf. United States v. City of Yonkers, 197 F.3d 41, 57 (2d Cir.1999) (noting that a district court has \u201cbroad equitable discretion to apportion remedial costs\u201d in desegregation cases)."},"case_id":11437531,"label":"b"}
{"context":"They are invested with large discretion to model their judgments to fit the exigencies of the particular case.\"). Moreover, the cost of additional procedures and the details of their implementation are matters peculiarly suited to the experience of the district court and the knowledge of the parties.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"Leeway remains to develop a form of hearing that will minimize unnecessary cost and delay while preserving the fairness and effectiveness of the hearing .... \"","sentence":"See Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 97 n. 33, 92 S.Ct. 1983 (\u201cLeeway remains to develop a form of hearing that will minimize unnecessary cost and delay while preserving the fairness and effectiveness of the hearing .... \u201d); cf. United States v. City of Yonkers, 197 F.3d 41, 57 (2d Cir.1999) (noting that a district court has \u201cbroad equitable discretion to apportion remedial costs\u201d in desegregation cases)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"197 F.3d 41, 57","parenthetical":"noting that a district court has \"broad equitable discretion to apportion remedial costs\" in desegregation cases","sentence":"See Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 97 n. 33, 92 S.Ct. 1983 (\u201cLeeway remains to develop a form of hearing that will minimize unnecessary cost and delay while preserving the fairness and effectiveness of the hearing .... \u201d); cf. United States v. City of Yonkers, 197 F.3d 41, 57 (2d Cir.1999) (noting that a district court has \u201cbroad equitable discretion to apportion remedial costs\u201d in desegregation cases)."},"case_id":11437531,"label":"a"}
{"context":". The appellant's assignment of error challenges only the validity of the initial seizure and does not independently contest what happened afterward. Additionally, to the extent that he attempts in the argument portion of his brief to contest the officer's act of ordering him to return to his vehicle, this argument is without merit.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"551 U.S. 249, 258","parenthetical":"holding that it is \"reasonable ... that a police officer at the scene of ... [an] investigation will not let people move around in ways that could jeopardize his safety\" and discussing the various ways an officer may limit such movement","sentence":"See, e.g., Alston v. Commonwealth, 40 Va.App. 728, 733-35, 741-43, 581 S.E.2d 245, 248, 252-53 (2003) (holding that officers detaining a driver who parked and exited his car quickly as they approached in their patrol vehicle did not violate his Fourth Amendment rights by requiring him to \"get back in his car before questioning him\u201d); see also Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 258, 127 S.Ct. 2400, 2407, 168 L.Ed.2d 132 (2007) (holding that it is \"reasonable ... that a police officer at the scene of ... [an] investigation will not let people move around in ways that could jeopardize his safety\u201d and discussing the various ways an officer may limit such movement)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"40 Va.App. 728, 733-35, 741-43","parenthetical":"holding that officers detaining a driver who parked and exited his car quickly as they approached in their patrol vehicle did not violate his Fourth Amendment rights by requiring him to \"get back in his car before questioning him\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Alston v. Commonwealth, 40 Va.App. 728, 733-35, 741-43, 581 S.E.2d 245, 248, 252-53 (2003) (holding that officers detaining a driver who parked and exited his car quickly as they approached in their patrol vehicle did not violate his Fourth Amendment rights by requiring him to \"get back in his car before questioning him\u201d); see also Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 258, 127 S.Ct. 2400, 2407, 168 L.Ed.2d 132 (2007) (holding that it is \"reasonable ... that a police officer at the scene of ... [an] investigation will not let people move around in ways that could jeopardize his safety\u201d and discussing the various ways an officer may limit such movement)."},"case_id":12278897,"label":"b"}
{"context":". The appellant's assignment of error challenges only the validity of the initial seizure and does not independently contest what happened afterward. Additionally, to the extent that he attempts in the argument portion of his brief to contest the officer's act of ordering him to return to his vehicle, this argument is without merit.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"127 S.Ct. 2400, 2407","parenthetical":"holding that it is \"reasonable ... that a police officer at the scene of ... [an] investigation will not let people move around in ways that could jeopardize his safety\" and discussing the various ways an officer may limit such movement","sentence":"See, e.g., Alston v. Commonwealth, 40 Va.App. 728, 733-35, 741-43, 581 S.E.2d 245, 248, 252-53 (2003) (holding that officers detaining a driver who parked and exited his car quickly as they approached in their patrol vehicle did not violate his Fourth Amendment rights by requiring him to \"get back in his car before questioning him\u201d); see also Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 258, 127 S.Ct. 2400, 2407, 168 L.Ed.2d 132 (2007) (holding that it is \"reasonable ... that a police officer at the scene of ... [an] investigation will not let people move around in ways that could jeopardize his safety\u201d and discussing the various ways an officer may limit such movement)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"40 Va.App. 728, 733-35, 741-43","parenthetical":"holding that officers detaining a driver who parked and exited his car quickly as they approached in their patrol vehicle did not violate his Fourth Amendment rights by requiring him to \"get back in his car before questioning him\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Alston v. Commonwealth, 40 Va.App. 728, 733-35, 741-43, 581 S.E.2d 245, 248, 252-53 (2003) (holding that officers detaining a driver who parked and exited his car quickly as they approached in their patrol vehicle did not violate his Fourth Amendment rights by requiring him to \"get back in his car before questioning him\u201d); see also Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 258, 127 S.Ct. 2400, 2407, 168 L.Ed.2d 132 (2007) (holding that it is \"reasonable ... that a police officer at the scene of ... [an] investigation will not let people move around in ways that could jeopardize his safety\u201d and discussing the various ways an officer may limit such movement)."},"case_id":12278897,"label":"b"}
{"context":". The appellant's assignment of error challenges only the validity of the initial seizure and does not independently contest what happened afterward. Additionally, to the extent that he attempts in the argument portion of his brief to contest the officer's act of ordering him to return to his vehicle, this argument is without merit.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"40 Va.App. 728, 733-35, 741-43","parenthetical":"holding that officers detaining a driver who parked and exited his car quickly as they approached in their patrol vehicle did not violate his Fourth Amendment rights by requiring him to \"get back in his car before questioning him\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Alston v. Commonwealth, 40 Va.App. 728, 733-35, 741-43, 581 S.E.2d 245, 248, 252-53 (2003) (holding that officers detaining a driver who parked and exited his car quickly as they approached in their patrol vehicle did not violate his Fourth Amendment rights by requiring him to \"get back in his car before questioning him\u201d); see also Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 258, 127 S.Ct. 2400, 2407, 168 L.Ed.2d 132 (2007) (holding that it is \"reasonable ... that a police officer at the scene of ... [an] investigation will not let people move around in ways that could jeopardize his safety\u201d and discussing the various ways an officer may limit such movement)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that it is \"reasonable ... that a police officer at the scene of ... [an] investigation will not let people move around in ways that could jeopardize his safety\" and discussing the various ways an officer may limit such movement","sentence":"See, e.g., Alston v. Commonwealth, 40 Va.App. 728, 733-35, 741-43, 581 S.E.2d 245, 248, 252-53 (2003) (holding that officers detaining a driver who parked and exited his car quickly as they approached in their patrol vehicle did not violate his Fourth Amendment rights by requiring him to \"get back in his car before questioning him\u201d); see also Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 258, 127 S.Ct. 2400, 2407, 168 L.Ed.2d 132 (2007) (holding that it is \"reasonable ... that a police officer at the scene of ... [an] investigation will not let people move around in ways that could jeopardize his safety\u201d and discussing the various ways an officer may limit such movement)."},"case_id":12278897,"label":"a"}
{"context":". The appellant's assignment of error challenges only the validity of the initial seizure and does not independently contest what happened afterward. Additionally, to the extent that he attempts in the argument portion of his brief to contest the officer's act of ordering him to return to his vehicle, this argument is without merit.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"551 U.S. 249, 258","parenthetical":"holding that it is \"reasonable ... that a police officer at the scene of ... [an] investigation will not let people move around in ways that could jeopardize his safety\" and discussing the various ways an officer may limit such movement","sentence":"See, e.g., Alston v. Commonwealth, 40 Va.App. 728, 733-35, 741-43, 581 S.E.2d 245, 248, 252-53 (2003) (holding that officers detaining a driver who parked and exited his car quickly as they approached in their patrol vehicle did not violate his Fourth Amendment rights by requiring him to \"get back in his car before questioning him\u201d); see also Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 258, 127 S.Ct. 2400, 2407, 168 L.Ed.2d 132 (2007) (holding that it is \"reasonable ... that a police officer at the scene of ... [an] investigation will not let people move around in ways that could jeopardize his safety\u201d and discussing the various ways an officer may limit such movement)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"581 S.E.2d 245, 248, 252-53","parenthetical":"holding that officers detaining a driver who parked and exited his car quickly as they approached in their patrol vehicle did not violate his Fourth Amendment rights by requiring him to \"get back in his car before questioning him\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Alston v. Commonwealth, 40 Va.App. 728, 733-35, 741-43, 581 S.E.2d 245, 248, 252-53 (2003) (holding that officers detaining a driver who parked and exited his car quickly as they approached in their patrol vehicle did not violate his Fourth Amendment rights by requiring him to \"get back in his car before questioning him\u201d); see also Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 258, 127 S.Ct. 2400, 2407, 168 L.Ed.2d 132 (2007) (holding that it is \"reasonable ... that a police officer at the scene of ... [an] investigation will not let people move around in ways that could jeopardize his safety\u201d and discussing the various ways an officer may limit such movement)."},"case_id":12278897,"label":"b"}
{"context":". The appellant's assignment of error challenges only the validity of the initial seizure and does not independently contest what happened afterward. Additionally, to the extent that he attempts in the argument portion of his brief to contest the officer's act of ordering him to return to his vehicle, this argument is without merit.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"581 S.E.2d 245, 248, 252-53","parenthetical":"holding that officers detaining a driver who parked and exited his car quickly as they approached in their patrol vehicle did not violate his Fourth Amendment rights by requiring him to \"get back in his car before questioning him\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Alston v. Commonwealth, 40 Va.App. 728, 733-35, 741-43, 581 S.E.2d 245, 248, 252-53 (2003) (holding that officers detaining a driver who parked and exited his car quickly as they approached in their patrol vehicle did not violate his Fourth Amendment rights by requiring him to \"get back in his car before questioning him\u201d); see also Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 258, 127 S.Ct. 2400, 2407, 168 L.Ed.2d 132 (2007) (holding that it is \"reasonable ... that a police officer at the scene of ... [an] investigation will not let people move around in ways that could jeopardize his safety\u201d and discussing the various ways an officer may limit such movement)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"127 S.Ct. 2400, 2407","parenthetical":"holding that it is \"reasonable ... that a police officer at the scene of ... [an] investigation will not let people move around in ways that could jeopardize his safety\" and discussing the various ways an officer may limit such movement","sentence":"See, e.g., Alston v. Commonwealth, 40 Va.App. 728, 733-35, 741-43, 581 S.E.2d 245, 248, 252-53 (2003) (holding that officers detaining a driver who parked and exited his car quickly as they approached in their patrol vehicle did not violate his Fourth Amendment rights by requiring him to \"get back in his car before questioning him\u201d); see also Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 258, 127 S.Ct. 2400, 2407, 168 L.Ed.2d 132 (2007) (holding that it is \"reasonable ... that a police officer at the scene of ... [an] investigation will not let people move around in ways that could jeopardize his safety\u201d and discussing the various ways an officer may limit such movement)."},"case_id":12278897,"label":"a"}
{"context":". The appellant's assignment of error challenges only the validity of the initial seizure and does not independently contest what happened afterward. Additionally, to the extent that he attempts in the argument portion of his brief to contest the officer's act of ordering him to return to his vehicle, this argument is without merit.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that it is \"reasonable ... that a police officer at the scene of ... [an] investigation will not let people move around in ways that could jeopardize his safety\" and discussing the various ways an officer may limit such movement","sentence":"See, e.g., Alston v. Commonwealth, 40 Va.App. 728, 733-35, 741-43, 581 S.E.2d 245, 248, 252-53 (2003) (holding that officers detaining a driver who parked and exited his car quickly as they approached in their patrol vehicle did not violate his Fourth Amendment rights by requiring him to \"get back in his car before questioning him\u201d); see also Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 258, 127 S.Ct. 2400, 2407, 168 L.Ed.2d 132 (2007) (holding that it is \"reasonable ... that a police officer at the scene of ... [an] investigation will not let people move around in ways that could jeopardize his safety\u201d and discussing the various ways an officer may limit such movement)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"581 S.E.2d 245, 248, 252-53","parenthetical":"holding that officers detaining a driver who parked and exited his car quickly as they approached in their patrol vehicle did not violate his Fourth Amendment rights by requiring him to \"get back in his car before questioning him\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Alston v. Commonwealth, 40 Va.App. 728, 733-35, 741-43, 581 S.E.2d 245, 248, 252-53 (2003) (holding that officers detaining a driver who parked and exited his car quickly as they approached in their patrol vehicle did not violate his Fourth Amendment rights by requiring him to \"get back in his car before questioning him\u201d); see also Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 258, 127 S.Ct. 2400, 2407, 168 L.Ed.2d 132 (2007) (holding that it is \"reasonable ... that a police officer at the scene of ... [an] investigation will not let people move around in ways that could jeopardize his safety\u201d and discussing the various ways an officer may limit such movement)."},"case_id":12278897,"label":"b"}
{"context":"We review de novo Washington's claim that the sentencing court improperly penalized him for invoking his constitutional right against self-incrimination.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"805 N.W.2d 391, 393","parenthetical":"reviewing de novo claim sentence was result of \"judicial vindictiveness\"","sentence":"See State v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 801 N.W.2d 518, 517 (Iowa 2011) (reviewing evidence de novo on claimed violation of Fifth Amendment); see also State v. Harrington, 805 N.W.2d 391, 393 (Iowa 2011) (reviewing de novo claim sentence was result of \u201cjudicial vindictiveness\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"801 N.W.2d 518, 517","parenthetical":"reviewing evidence de novo on claimed violation of Fifth Amendment","sentence":"See State v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 801 N.W.2d 518, 517 (Iowa 2011) (reviewing evidence de novo on claimed violation of Fifth Amendment); see also State v. Harrington, 805 N.W.2d 391, 393 (Iowa 2011) (reviewing de novo claim sentence was result of \u201cjudicial vindictiveness\u201d)."},"case_id":7064248,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The question of whether the State can constitutionally require appellant to register is central to the review of his conviction, because the existence of a legal duty to register is a necessary element of failing to register under CP 2010 SS 11-721. Section 11-721 expressly states that sex offenders must provide accurate information and notice \"as required\" by \"this subtitle\" and various sections therein.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that one essential element of the crime of \"failing to notify the appropriate sheriff of a sex offender's change of address\" is that \"the defendant is a 'person required ... to register' \"","sentence":"See United States v. Gould, 568 F.3d 459, 470 (4th Cir.2009) (\u201cAs noted above, the elements of a SORNA failure to register offense ... are that the defendant (1) was required to register....\u201d), cert. denied, 559 U.S. 974, 130 S.Ct. 1686, 176 L.Ed.2d 186 (2010); see also State v. Abshire, 363 N.C. 322, 677 S.E.2d 444, 449 (2009) (holding that one essential element of the crime of \u201cfailing to notify the appropriate sheriff of a sex offender\u2019s change of address\u201d is that \u201cthe defendant is a \u2018person required ... to register\u2019 \u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"568 F.3d 459, 470","parenthetical":"\"As noted above, the elements of a SORNA failure to register offense ... are that the defendant (1","sentence":"See United States v. Gould, 568 F.3d 459, 470 (4th Cir.2009) (\u201cAs noted above, the elements of a SORNA failure to register offense ... are that the defendant (1) was required to register....\u201d), cert. denied, 559 U.S. 974, 130 S.Ct. 1686, 176 L.Ed.2d 186 (2010); see also State v. Abshire, 363 N.C. 322, 677 S.E.2d 444, 449 (2009) (holding that one essential element of the crime of \u201cfailing to notify the appropriate sheriff of a sex offender\u2019s change of address\u201d is that \u201cthe defendant is a \u2018person required ... to register\u2019 \u201d)."},"case_id":4025586,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The question of whether the State can constitutionally require appellant to register is central to the review of his conviction, because the existence of a legal duty to register is a necessary element of failing to register under CP 2010 SS 11-721. Section 11-721 expressly states that sex offenders must provide accurate information and notice \"as required\" by \"this subtitle\" and various sections therein.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"677 S.E.2d 444, 449","parenthetical":"holding that one essential element of the crime of \"failing to notify the appropriate sheriff of a sex offender's change of address\" is that \"the defendant is a 'person required ... to register' \"","sentence":"See United States v. Gould, 568 F.3d 459, 470 (4th Cir.2009) (\u201cAs noted above, the elements of a SORNA failure to register offense ... are that the defendant (1) was required to register....\u201d), cert. denied, 559 U.S. 974, 130 S.Ct. 1686, 176 L.Ed.2d 186 (2010); see also State v. Abshire, 363 N.C. 322, 677 S.E.2d 444, 449 (2009) (holding that one essential element of the crime of \u201cfailing to notify the appropriate sheriff of a sex offender\u2019s change of address\u201d is that \u201cthe defendant is a \u2018person required ... to register\u2019 \u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"568 F.3d 459, 470","parenthetical":"\"As noted above, the elements of a SORNA failure to register offense ... are that the defendant (1","sentence":"See United States v. Gould, 568 F.3d 459, 470 (4th Cir.2009) (\u201cAs noted above, the elements of a SORNA failure to register offense ... are that the defendant (1) was required to register....\u201d), cert. denied, 559 U.S. 974, 130 S.Ct. 1686, 176 L.Ed.2d 186 (2010); see also State v. Abshire, 363 N.C. 322, 677 S.E.2d 444, 449 (2009) (holding that one essential element of the crime of \u201cfailing to notify the appropriate sheriff of a sex offender\u2019s change of address\u201d is that \u201cthe defendant is a \u2018person required ... to register\u2019 \u201d)."},"case_id":4025586,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The question of whether the State can constitutionally require appellant to register is central to the review of his conviction, because the existence of a legal duty to register is a necessary element of failing to register under CP 2010 SS 11-721. Section 11-721 expressly states that sex offenders must provide accurate information and notice \"as required\" by \"this subtitle\" and various sections therein.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that one essential element of the crime of \"failing to notify the appropriate sheriff of a sex offender's change of address\" is that \"the defendant is a 'person required ... to register' \"","sentence":"See United States v. Gould, 568 F.3d 459, 470 (4th Cir.2009) (\u201cAs noted above, the elements of a SORNA failure to register offense ... are that the defendant (1) was required to register....\u201d), cert. denied, 559 U.S. 974, 130 S.Ct. 1686, 176 L.Ed.2d 186 (2010); see also State v. Abshire, 363 N.C. 322, 677 S.E.2d 444, 449 (2009) (holding that one essential element of the crime of \u201cfailing to notify the appropriate sheriff of a sex offender\u2019s change of address\u201d is that \u201cthe defendant is a \u2018person required ... to register\u2019 \u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"As noted above, the elements of a SORNA failure to register offense ... are that the defendant (1","sentence":"See United States v. Gould, 568 F.3d 459, 470 (4th Cir.2009) (\u201cAs noted above, the elements of a SORNA failure to register offense ... are that the defendant (1) was required to register....\u201d), cert. denied, 559 U.S. 974, 130 S.Ct. 1686, 176 L.Ed.2d 186 (2010); see also State v. Abshire, 363 N.C. 322, 677 S.E.2d 444, 449 (2009) (holding that one essential element of the crime of \u201cfailing to notify the appropriate sheriff of a sex offender\u2019s change of address\u201d is that \u201cthe defendant is a \u2018person required ... to register\u2019 \u201d)."},"case_id":4025586,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The question of whether the State can constitutionally require appellant to register is central to the review of his conviction, because the existence of a legal duty to register is a necessary element of failing to register under CP 2010 SS 11-721. Section 11-721 expressly states that sex offenders must provide accurate information and notice \"as required\" by \"this subtitle\" and various sections therein.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"As noted above, the elements of a SORNA failure to register offense ... are that the defendant (1","sentence":"See United States v. Gould, 568 F.3d 459, 470 (4th Cir.2009) (\u201cAs noted above, the elements of a SORNA failure to register offense ... are that the defendant (1) was required to register....\u201d), cert. denied, 559 U.S. 974, 130 S.Ct. 1686, 176 L.Ed.2d 186 (2010); see also State v. Abshire, 363 N.C. 322, 677 S.E.2d 444, 449 (2009) (holding that one essential element of the crime of \u201cfailing to notify the appropriate sheriff of a sex offender\u2019s change of address\u201d is that \u201cthe defendant is a \u2018person required ... to register\u2019 \u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"677 S.E.2d 444, 449","parenthetical":"holding that one essential element of the crime of \"failing to notify the appropriate sheriff of a sex offender's change of address\" is that \"the defendant is a 'person required ... to register' \"","sentence":"See United States v. Gould, 568 F.3d 459, 470 (4th Cir.2009) (\u201cAs noted above, the elements of a SORNA failure to register offense ... are that the defendant (1) was required to register....\u201d), cert. denied, 559 U.S. 974, 130 S.Ct. 1686, 176 L.Ed.2d 186 (2010); see also State v. Abshire, 363 N.C. 322, 677 S.E.2d 444, 449 (2009) (holding that one essential element of the crime of \u201cfailing to notify the appropriate sheriff of a sex offender\u2019s change of address\u201d is that \u201cthe defendant is a \u2018person required ... to register\u2019 \u201d)."},"case_id":4025586,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The question of whether the State can constitutionally require appellant to register is central to the review of his conviction, because the existence of a legal duty to register is a necessary element of failing to register under CP 2010 SS 11-721. Section 11-721 expressly states that sex offenders must provide accurate information and notice \"as required\" by \"this subtitle\" and various sections therein.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"As noted above, the elements of a SORNA failure to register offense ... are that the defendant (1","sentence":"See United States v. Gould, 568 F.3d 459, 470 (4th Cir.2009) (\u201cAs noted above, the elements of a SORNA failure to register offense ... are that the defendant (1) was required to register....\u201d), cert. denied, 559 U.S. 974, 130 S.Ct. 1686, 176 L.Ed.2d 186 (2010); see also State v. Abshire, 363 N.C. 322, 677 S.E.2d 444, 449 (2009) (holding that one essential element of the crime of \u201cfailing to notify the appropriate sheriff of a sex offender\u2019s change of address\u201d is that \u201cthe defendant is a \u2018person required ... to register\u2019 \u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that one essential element of the crime of \"failing to notify the appropriate sheriff of a sex offender's change of address\" is that \"the defendant is a 'person required ... to register' \"","sentence":"See United States v. Gould, 568 F.3d 459, 470 (4th Cir.2009) (\u201cAs noted above, the elements of a SORNA failure to register offense ... are that the defendant (1) was required to register....\u201d), cert. denied, 559 U.S. 974, 130 S.Ct. 1686, 176 L.Ed.2d 186 (2010); see also State v. Abshire, 363 N.C. 322, 677 S.E.2d 444, 449 (2009) (holding that one essential element of the crime of \u201cfailing to notify the appropriate sheriff of a sex offender\u2019s change of address\u201d is that \u201cthe defendant is a \u2018person required ... to register\u2019 \u201d)."},"case_id":4025586,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The question of whether the State can constitutionally require appellant to register is central to the review of his conviction, because the existence of a legal duty to register is a necessary element of failing to register under CP 2010 SS 11-721. Section 11-721 expressly states that sex offenders must provide accurate information and notice \"as required\" by \"this subtitle\" and various sections therein.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"As noted above, the elements of a SORNA failure to register offense ... are that the defendant (1","sentence":"See United States v. Gould, 568 F.3d 459, 470 (4th Cir.2009) (\u201cAs noted above, the elements of a SORNA failure to register offense ... are that the defendant (1) was required to register....\u201d), cert. denied, 559 U.S. 974, 130 S.Ct. 1686, 176 L.Ed.2d 186 (2010); see also State v. Abshire, 363 N.C. 322, 677 S.E.2d 444, 449 (2009) (holding that one essential element of the crime of \u201cfailing to notify the appropriate sheriff of a sex offender\u2019s change of address\u201d is that \u201cthe defendant is a \u2018person required ... to register\u2019 \u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"677 S.E.2d 444, 449","parenthetical":"holding that one essential element of the crime of \"failing to notify the appropriate sheriff of a sex offender's change of address\" is that \"the defendant is a 'person required ... to register' \"","sentence":"See United States v. Gould, 568 F.3d 459, 470 (4th Cir.2009) (\u201cAs noted above, the elements of a SORNA failure to register offense ... are that the defendant (1) was required to register....\u201d), cert. denied, 559 U.S. 974, 130 S.Ct. 1686, 176 L.Ed.2d 186 (2010); see also State v. Abshire, 363 N.C. 322, 677 S.E.2d 444, 449 (2009) (holding that one essential element of the crime of \u201cfailing to notify the appropriate sheriff of a sex offender\u2019s change of address\u201d is that \u201cthe defendant is a \u2018person required ... to register\u2019 \u201d)."},"case_id":4025586,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The question of whether the State can constitutionally require appellant to register is central to the review of his conviction, because the existence of a legal duty to register is a necessary element of failing to register under CP 2010 SS 11-721. Section 11-721 expressly states that sex offenders must provide accurate information and notice \"as required\" by \"this subtitle\" and various sections therein.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"As noted above, the elements of a SORNA failure to register offense ... are that the defendant (1","sentence":"See United States v. Gould, 568 F.3d 459, 470 (4th Cir.2009) (\u201cAs noted above, the elements of a SORNA failure to register offense ... are that the defendant (1) was required to register....\u201d), cert. denied, 559 U.S. 974, 130 S.Ct. 1686, 176 L.Ed.2d 186 (2010); see also State v. Abshire, 363 N.C. 322, 677 S.E.2d 444, 449 (2009) (holding that one essential element of the crime of \u201cfailing to notify the appropriate sheriff of a sex offender\u2019s change of address\u201d is that \u201cthe defendant is a \u2018person required ... to register\u2019 \u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that one essential element of the crime of \"failing to notify the appropriate sheriff of a sex offender's change of address\" is that \"the defendant is a 'person required ... to register' \"","sentence":"See United States v. Gould, 568 F.3d 459, 470 (4th Cir.2009) (\u201cAs noted above, the elements of a SORNA failure to register offense ... are that the defendant (1) was required to register....\u201d), cert. denied, 559 U.S. 974, 130 S.Ct. 1686, 176 L.Ed.2d 186 (2010); see also State v. Abshire, 363 N.C. 322, 677 S.E.2d 444, 449 (2009) (holding that one essential element of the crime of \u201cfailing to notify the appropriate sheriff of a sex offender\u2019s change of address\u201d is that \u201cthe defendant is a \u2018person required ... to register\u2019 \u201d)."},"case_id":4025586,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The question of whether the State can constitutionally require appellant to register is central to the review of his conviction, because the existence of a legal duty to register is a necessary element of failing to register under CP 2010 SS 11-721. Section 11-721 expressly states that sex offenders must provide accurate information and notice \"as required\" by \"this subtitle\" and various sections therein.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"As noted above, the elements of a SORNA failure to register offense ... are that the defendant (1","sentence":"See United States v. Gould, 568 F.3d 459, 470 (4th Cir.2009) (\u201cAs noted above, the elements of a SORNA failure to register offense ... are that the defendant (1) was required to register....\u201d), cert. denied, 559 U.S. 974, 130 S.Ct. 1686, 176 L.Ed.2d 186 (2010); see also State v. Abshire, 363 N.C. 322, 677 S.E.2d 444, 449 (2009) (holding that one essential element of the crime of \u201cfailing to notify the appropriate sheriff of a sex offender\u2019s change of address\u201d is that \u201cthe defendant is a \u2018person required ... to register\u2019 \u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"677 S.E.2d 444, 449","parenthetical":"holding that one essential element of the crime of \"failing to notify the appropriate sheriff of a sex offender's change of address\" is that \"the defendant is a 'person required ... to register' \"","sentence":"See United States v. Gould, 568 F.3d 459, 470 (4th Cir.2009) (\u201cAs noted above, the elements of a SORNA failure to register offense ... are that the defendant (1) was required to register....\u201d), cert. denied, 559 U.S. 974, 130 S.Ct. 1686, 176 L.Ed.2d 186 (2010); see also State v. Abshire, 363 N.C. 322, 677 S.E.2d 444, 449 (2009) (holding that one essential element of the crime of \u201cfailing to notify the appropriate sheriff of a sex offender\u2019s change of address\u201d is that \u201cthe defendant is a \u2018person required ... to register\u2019 \u201d)."},"case_id":4025586,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The main concern with permitting the Juvenile Court to charge juveniles in CHONS proceedings is \"bootstrapping,\" which occurs when a CHONS juvenile is elevated to delinquent status by virtue of the failure to comply with CHINS conditions (status offenses). See Rothgerber, The Bootstrapping of Status Offenders: A Vicious Practice, 1 Ky. Children's Rights J. 1, 3 (1991). Jurisdictions which have recognized the inherent power of contempt generally have limited that power to circumstances when all less restrictive options have failed in order to prevent bootstrapping.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"statute provides that juveniles may be held in contempt and placed in secure detention as permissible alternative","sentence":"See, e.g., L.A.M. v. State, 547 P.2d 827 (Alaska 1976); In re Michael G., 44 Cal. 3d 283 (1988); In re J.E.S., 817 P.2d 508 (Colo. 1991); G.S. v. State, 709 So. 2d 122 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (statute provides that juveniles may be held in contempt and placed in secure detention as permissible alternative); In re G.B., 88 Ill. 2d 36 (1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 963 (1982); In re B.L., 688 N.E.2d 1311 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997); State ex rel. L.E.A. v. Hammergren, 294 N.W.2d 705 (Minn. 1980); In re M.S., 73 N.J. 238 (1977); In re Jones, 59 N.C. App. 547 (1982); In re Darlene C., 278 S.C. 664 (1983); In re D.L.D., 110 Wis. 2d 168 (1983)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"statute restricting use of contempt for truancy to second or subsequent offenses is proper legislative restriction of court's inherent contempt power","sentence":"But see In re Aaron D., 214 Wis. 2d 56 (Ct. App. 1997) (statute restricting use of contempt for truancy to second or subsequent offenses is proper legislative restriction of court\u2019s inherent contempt power)."},"case_id":142800,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The main concern with permitting the Juvenile Court to charge juveniles in CHONS proceedings is \"bootstrapping,\" which occurs when a CHONS juvenile is elevated to delinquent status by virtue of the failure to comply with CHINS conditions (status offenses). See Rothgerber, The Bootstrapping of Status Offenders: A Vicious Practice, 1 Ky. Children's Rights J. 1, 3 (1991). Jurisdictions which have recognized the inherent power of contempt generally have limited that power to circumstances when all less restrictive options have failed in order to prevent bootstrapping.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"contempt power in child protection cases is beyond court's discretion because it is inconsistent with statute and policy to decriminalize status offenses","sentence":"Cf. In re Ann M., 309 Md. 564 (1987) (contempt power in child protection cases is beyond court\u2019s discretion because it is inconsistent with statute and policy to decriminalize status offenses)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"statute provides that juveniles may be held in contempt and placed in secure detention as permissible alternative","sentence":"See, e.g., L.A.M. v. State, 547 P.2d 827 (Alaska 1976); In re Michael G., 44 Cal. 3d 283 (1988); In re J.E.S., 817 P.2d 508 (Colo. 1991); G.S. v. State, 709 So. 2d 122 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (statute provides that juveniles may be held in contempt and placed in secure detention as permissible alternative); In re G.B., 88 Ill. 2d 36 (1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 963 (1982); In re B.L., 688 N.E.2d 1311 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997); State ex rel. L.E.A. v. Hammergren, 294 N.W.2d 705 (Minn. 1980); In re M.S., 73 N.J. 238 (1977); In re Jones, 59 N.C. App. 547 (1982); In re Darlene C., 278 S.C. 664 (1983); In re D.L.D., 110 Wis. 2d 168 (1983)."},"case_id":142800,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In any event, we do not view the language of section 4-9-620 as dearly authorizing the \"definite term\" to extend beyond the terms of the outgoing council members. Therefore, it does not fall within Newman's exception to the prohibition against binding successor governing bodies.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"324 S.C. 241, 241","parenthetical":"\"Newman allows an exception, however, where the enabling legislation dearly authorizes the local governing body to make a contract extending beyond its members' own terms.\" (emphasis added","sentence":"See Cowart II, 324 S.C. at 241, 478 S.E.2d at 838 (\u201cNewman allows an exception, however, where the enabling legislation dearly authorizes the local governing body to make a contract extending beyond its members\u2019 own terms.\u201d (emphasis added)); see also 16 Jade St., LLC v. R. Design Const. Co., 398 S.C. 338, 343, 728 S.E.2d 448, 450 (2012), reh\u2019g granted (May 7, 2012) (holding that if a statute is in derogation of a common law right, it must be strictly construed and not extended in application beyond clear legislative intent); Doe v. Marion, 361 S.C. 463, 473, 605 S.E.2d 556, 561 (Ct.App.2004), aff'd, 373 S.C. 390, 645 S.E.2d 245 (2007) (\u201c[A]ny legislation [that] is in derogation of common law must be strictly construed and not extended in application beyond clear legislative intent.\u201d); id."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"398 S.C. 338, 343","parenthetical":"holding that if a statute is in derogation of a common law right, it must be strictly construed and not extended in application beyond clear legislative intent","sentence":"See Cowart II, 324 S.C. at 241, 478 S.E.2d at 838 (\u201cNewman allows an exception, however, where the enabling legislation dearly authorizes the local governing body to make a contract extending beyond its members\u2019 own terms.\u201d (emphasis added)); see also 16 Jade St., LLC v. R. Design Const. Co., 398 S.C. 338, 343, 728 S.E.2d 448, 450 (2012), reh\u2019g granted (May 7, 2012) (holding that if a statute is in derogation of a common law right, it must be strictly construed and not extended in application beyond clear legislative intent); Doe v. Marion, 361 S.C. 463, 473, 605 S.E.2d 556, 561 (Ct.App.2004), aff'd, 373 S.C. 390, 645 S.E.2d 245 (2007) (\u201c[A]ny legislation [that] is in derogation of common law must be strictly construed and not extended in application beyond clear legislative intent.\u201d); id."},"case_id":7335689,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In any event, we do not view the language of section 4-9-620 as dearly authorizing the \"definite term\" to extend beyond the terms of the outgoing council members. Therefore, it does not fall within Newman's exception to the prohibition against binding successor governing bodies.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"728 S.E.2d 448, 450","parenthetical":"holding that if a statute is in derogation of a common law right, it must be strictly construed and not extended in application beyond clear legislative intent","sentence":"See Cowart II, 324 S.C. at 241, 478 S.E.2d at 838 (\u201cNewman allows an exception, however, where the enabling legislation dearly authorizes the local governing body to make a contract extending beyond its members\u2019 own terms.\u201d (emphasis added)); see also 16 Jade St., LLC v. R. Design Const. Co., 398 S.C. 338, 343, 728 S.E.2d 448, 450 (2012), reh\u2019g granted (May 7, 2012) (holding that if a statute is in derogation of a common law right, it must be strictly construed and not extended in application beyond clear legislative intent); Doe v. Marion, 361 S.C. 463, 473, 605 S.E.2d 556, 561 (Ct.App.2004), aff'd, 373 S.C. 390, 645 S.E.2d 245 (2007) (\u201c[A]ny legislation [that] is in derogation of common law must be strictly construed and not extended in application beyond clear legislative intent.\u201d); id."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"324 S.C. 241, 241","parenthetical":"\"Newman allows an exception, however, where the enabling legislation dearly authorizes the local governing body to make a contract extending beyond its members' own terms.\" (emphasis added","sentence":"See Cowart II, 324 S.C. at 241, 478 S.E.2d at 838 (\u201cNewman allows an exception, however, where the enabling legislation dearly authorizes the local governing body to make a contract extending beyond its members\u2019 own terms.\u201d (emphasis added)); see also 16 Jade St., LLC v. R. Design Const. Co., 398 S.C. 338, 343, 728 S.E.2d 448, 450 (2012), reh\u2019g granted (May 7, 2012) (holding that if a statute is in derogation of a common law right, it must be strictly construed and not extended in application beyond clear legislative intent); Doe v. Marion, 361 S.C. 463, 473, 605 S.E.2d 556, 561 (Ct.App.2004), aff'd, 373 S.C. 390, 645 S.E.2d 245 (2007) (\u201c[A]ny legislation [that] is in derogation of common law must be strictly construed and not extended in application beyond clear legislative intent.\u201d); id."},"case_id":7335689,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In any event, we do not view the language of section 4-9-620 as dearly authorizing the \"definite term\" to extend beyond the terms of the outgoing council members. Therefore, it does not fall within Newman's exception to the prohibition against binding successor governing bodies.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"361 S.C. 463, 473","parenthetical":"\"[A]ny legislation [that] is in derogation of common law must be strictly construed and not extended in application beyond clear legislative intent.\"","sentence":"See Cowart II, 324 S.C. at 241, 478 S.E.2d at 838 (\u201cNewman allows an exception, however, where the enabling legislation dearly authorizes the local governing body to make a contract extending beyond its members\u2019 own terms.\u201d (emphasis added)); see also 16 Jade St., LLC v. R. Design Const. Co., 398 S.C. 338, 343, 728 S.E.2d 448, 450 (2012), reh\u2019g granted (May 7, 2012) (holding that if a statute is in derogation of a common law right, it must be strictly construed and not extended in application beyond clear legislative intent); Doe v. Marion, 361 S.C. 463, 473, 605 S.E.2d 556, 561 (Ct.App.2004), aff'd, 373 S.C. 390, 645 S.E.2d 245 (2007) (\u201c[A]ny legislation [that] is in derogation of common law must be strictly construed and not extended in application beyond clear legislative intent.\u201d); id."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"324 S.C. 241, 241","parenthetical":"\"Newman allows an exception, however, where the enabling legislation dearly authorizes the local governing body to make a contract extending beyond its members' own terms.\" (emphasis added","sentence":"See Cowart II, 324 S.C. at 241, 478 S.E.2d at 838 (\u201cNewman allows an exception, however, where the enabling legislation dearly authorizes the local governing body to make a contract extending beyond its members\u2019 own terms.\u201d (emphasis added)); see also 16 Jade St., LLC v. R. Design Const. Co., 398 S.C. 338, 343, 728 S.E.2d 448, 450 (2012), reh\u2019g granted (May 7, 2012) (holding that if a statute is in derogation of a common law right, it must be strictly construed and not extended in application beyond clear legislative intent); Doe v. Marion, 361 S.C. 463, 473, 605 S.E.2d 556, 561 (Ct.App.2004), aff'd, 373 S.C. 390, 645 S.E.2d 245 (2007) (\u201c[A]ny legislation [that] is in derogation of common law must be strictly construed and not extended in application beyond clear legislative intent.\u201d); id."},"case_id":7335689,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In any event, we do not view the language of section 4-9-620 as dearly authorizing the \"definite term\" to extend beyond the terms of the outgoing council members. Therefore, it does not fall within Newman's exception to the prohibition against binding successor governing bodies.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"324 S.C. 241, 241","parenthetical":"\"Newman allows an exception, however, where the enabling legislation dearly authorizes the local governing body to make a contract extending beyond its members' own terms.\" (emphasis added","sentence":"See Cowart II, 324 S.C. at 241, 478 S.E.2d at 838 (\u201cNewman allows an exception, however, where the enabling legislation dearly authorizes the local governing body to make a contract extending beyond its members\u2019 own terms.\u201d (emphasis added)); see also 16 Jade St., LLC v. R. Design Const. Co., 398 S.C. 338, 343, 728 S.E.2d 448, 450 (2012), reh\u2019g granted (May 7, 2012) (holding that if a statute is in derogation of a common law right, it must be strictly construed and not extended in application beyond clear legislative intent); Doe v. Marion, 361 S.C. 463, 473, 605 S.E.2d 556, 561 (Ct.App.2004), aff'd, 373 S.C. 390, 645 S.E.2d 245 (2007) (\u201c[A]ny legislation [that] is in derogation of common law must be strictly construed and not extended in application beyond clear legislative intent.\u201d); id."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"605 S.E.2d 556, 561","parenthetical":"\"[A]ny legislation [that] is in derogation of common law must be strictly construed and not extended in application beyond clear legislative intent.\"","sentence":"See Cowart II, 324 S.C. at 241, 478 S.E.2d at 838 (\u201cNewman allows an exception, however, where the enabling legislation dearly authorizes the local governing body to make a contract extending beyond its members\u2019 own terms.\u201d (emphasis added)); see also 16 Jade St., LLC v. R. Design Const. Co., 398 S.C. 338, 343, 728 S.E.2d 448, 450 (2012), reh\u2019g granted (May 7, 2012) (holding that if a statute is in derogation of a common law right, it must be strictly construed and not extended in application beyond clear legislative intent); Doe v. Marion, 361 S.C. 463, 473, 605 S.E.2d 556, 561 (Ct.App.2004), aff'd, 373 S.C. 390, 645 S.E.2d 245 (2007) (\u201c[A]ny legislation [that] is in derogation of common law must be strictly construed and not extended in application beyond clear legislative intent.\u201d); id."},"case_id":7335689,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In any event, we do not view the language of section 4-9-620 as dearly authorizing the \"definite term\" to extend beyond the terms of the outgoing council members. Therefore, it does not fall within Newman's exception to the prohibition against binding successor governing bodies.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"324 S.C. 241, 241","parenthetical":"\"Newman allows an exception, however, where the enabling legislation dearly authorizes the local governing body to make a contract extending beyond its members' own terms.\" (emphasis added","sentence":"See Cowart II, 324 S.C. at 241, 478 S.E.2d at 838 (\u201cNewman allows an exception, however, where the enabling legislation dearly authorizes the local governing body to make a contract extending beyond its members\u2019 own terms.\u201d (emphasis added)); see also 16 Jade St., LLC v. R. Design Const. Co., 398 S.C. 338, 343, 728 S.E.2d 448, 450 (2012), reh\u2019g granted (May 7, 2012) (holding that if a statute is in derogation of a common law right, it must be strictly construed and not extended in application beyond clear legislative intent); Doe v. Marion, 361 S.C. 463, 473, 605 S.E.2d 556, 561 (Ct.App.2004), aff'd, 373 S.C. 390, 645 S.E.2d 245 (2007) (\u201c[A]ny legislation [that] is in derogation of common law must be strictly construed and not extended in application beyond clear legislative intent.\u201d); id."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[A]ny legislation [that] is in derogation of common law must be strictly construed and not extended in application beyond clear legislative intent.\"","sentence":"See Cowart II, 324 S.C. at 241, 478 S.E.2d at 838 (\u201cNewman allows an exception, however, where the enabling legislation dearly authorizes the local governing body to make a contract extending beyond its members\u2019 own terms.\u201d (emphasis added)); see also 16 Jade St., LLC v. R. Design Const. Co., 398 S.C. 338, 343, 728 S.E.2d 448, 450 (2012), reh\u2019g granted (May 7, 2012) (holding that if a statute is in derogation of a common law right, it must be strictly construed and not extended in application beyond clear legislative intent); Doe v. Marion, 361 S.C. 463, 473, 605 S.E.2d 556, 561 (Ct.App.2004), aff'd, 373 S.C. 390, 645 S.E.2d 245 (2007) (\u201c[A]ny legislation [that] is in derogation of common law must be strictly construed and not extended in application beyond clear legislative intent.\u201d); id."},"case_id":7335689,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In any event, we do not view the language of section 4-9-620 as dearly authorizing the \"definite term\" to extend beyond the terms of the outgoing council members. Therefore, it does not fall within Newman's exception to the prohibition against binding successor governing bodies.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[A]ny legislation [that] is in derogation of common law must be strictly construed and not extended in application beyond clear legislative intent.\"","sentence":"See Cowart II, 324 S.C. at 241, 478 S.E.2d at 838 (\u201cNewman allows an exception, however, where the enabling legislation dearly authorizes the local governing body to make a contract extending beyond its members\u2019 own terms.\u201d (emphasis added)); see also 16 Jade St., LLC v. R. Design Const. Co., 398 S.C. 338, 343, 728 S.E.2d 448, 450 (2012), reh\u2019g granted (May 7, 2012) (holding that if a statute is in derogation of a common law right, it must be strictly construed and not extended in application beyond clear legislative intent); Doe v. Marion, 361 S.C. 463, 473, 605 S.E.2d 556, 561 (Ct.App.2004), aff'd, 373 S.C. 390, 645 S.E.2d 245 (2007) (\u201c[A]ny legislation [that] is in derogation of common law must be strictly construed and not extended in application beyond clear legislative intent.\u201d); id."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"324 S.C. 241, 241","parenthetical":"\"Newman allows an exception, however, where the enabling legislation dearly authorizes the local governing body to make a contract extending beyond its members' own terms.\" (emphasis added","sentence":"See Cowart II, 324 S.C. at 241, 478 S.E.2d at 838 (\u201cNewman allows an exception, however, where the enabling legislation dearly authorizes the local governing body to make a contract extending beyond its members\u2019 own terms.\u201d (emphasis added)); see also 16 Jade St., LLC v. R. Design Const. Co., 398 S.C. 338, 343, 728 S.E.2d 448, 450 (2012), reh\u2019g granted (May 7, 2012) (holding that if a statute is in derogation of a common law right, it must be strictly construed and not extended in application beyond clear legislative intent); Doe v. Marion, 361 S.C. 463, 473, 605 S.E.2d 556, 561 (Ct.App.2004), aff'd, 373 S.C. 390, 645 S.E.2d 245 (2007) (\u201c[A]ny legislation [that] is in derogation of common law must be strictly construed and not extended in application beyond clear legislative intent.\u201d); id."},"case_id":7335689,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In any event, we do not view the language of section 4-9-620 as dearly authorizing the \"definite term\" to extend beyond the terms of the outgoing council members. Therefore, it does not fall within Newman's exception to the prohibition against binding successor governing bodies.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"398 S.C. 338, 343","parenthetical":"holding that if a statute is in derogation of a common law right, it must be strictly construed and not extended in application beyond clear legislative intent","sentence":"See Cowart II, 324 S.C. at 241, 478 S.E.2d at 838 (\u201cNewman allows an exception, however, where the enabling legislation dearly authorizes the local governing body to make a contract extending beyond its members\u2019 own terms.\u201d (emphasis added)); see also 16 Jade St., LLC v. R. Design Const. Co., 398 S.C. 338, 343, 728 S.E.2d 448, 450 (2012), reh\u2019g granted (May 7, 2012) (holding that if a statute is in derogation of a common law right, it must be strictly construed and not extended in application beyond clear legislative intent); Doe v. Marion, 361 S.C. 463, 473, 605 S.E.2d 556, 561 (Ct.App.2004), aff'd, 373 S.C. 390, 645 S.E.2d 245 (2007) (\u201c[A]ny legislation [that] is in derogation of common law must be strictly construed and not extended in application beyond clear legislative intent.\u201d); id."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"478 S.E.2d 838, 838","parenthetical":"\"Newman allows an exception, however, where the enabling legislation dearly authorizes the local governing body to make a contract extending beyond its members' own terms.\" (emphasis added","sentence":"See Cowart II, 324 S.C. at 241, 478 S.E.2d at 838 (\u201cNewman allows an exception, however, where the enabling legislation dearly authorizes the local governing body to make a contract extending beyond its members\u2019 own terms.\u201d (emphasis added)); see also 16 Jade St., LLC v. R. Design Const. Co., 398 S.C. 338, 343, 728 S.E.2d 448, 450 (2012), reh\u2019g granted (May 7, 2012) (holding that if a statute is in derogation of a common law right, it must be strictly construed and not extended in application beyond clear legislative intent); Doe v. Marion, 361 S.C. 463, 473, 605 S.E.2d 556, 561 (Ct.App.2004), aff'd, 373 S.C. 390, 645 S.E.2d 245 (2007) (\u201c[A]ny legislation [that] is in derogation of common law must be strictly construed and not extended in application beyond clear legislative intent.\u201d); id."},"case_id":7335689,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In any event, we do not view the language of section 4-9-620 as dearly authorizing the \"definite term\" to extend beyond the terms of the outgoing council members. Therefore, it does not fall within Newman's exception to the prohibition against binding successor governing bodies.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"478 S.E.2d 838, 838","parenthetical":"\"Newman allows an exception, however, where the enabling legislation dearly authorizes the local governing body to make a contract extending beyond its members' own terms.\" (emphasis added","sentence":"See Cowart II, 324 S.C. at 241, 478 S.E.2d at 838 (\u201cNewman allows an exception, however, where the enabling legislation dearly authorizes the local governing body to make a contract extending beyond its members\u2019 own terms.\u201d (emphasis added)); see also 16 Jade St., LLC v. R. Design Const. Co., 398 S.C. 338, 343, 728 S.E.2d 448, 450 (2012), reh\u2019g granted (May 7, 2012) (holding that if a statute is in derogation of a common law right, it must be strictly construed and not extended in application beyond clear legislative intent); Doe v. Marion, 361 S.C. 463, 473, 605 S.E.2d 556, 561 (Ct.App.2004), aff'd, 373 S.C. 390, 645 S.E.2d 245 (2007) (\u201c[A]ny legislation [that] is in derogation of common law must be strictly construed and not extended in application beyond clear legislative intent.\u201d); id."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"728 S.E.2d 448, 450","parenthetical":"holding that if a statute is in derogation of a common law right, it must be strictly construed and not extended in application beyond clear legislative intent","sentence":"See Cowart II, 324 S.C. at 241, 478 S.E.2d at 838 (\u201cNewman allows an exception, however, where the enabling legislation dearly authorizes the local governing body to make a contract extending beyond its members\u2019 own terms.\u201d (emphasis added)); see also 16 Jade St., LLC v. R. Design Const. Co., 398 S.C. 338, 343, 728 S.E.2d 448, 450 (2012), reh\u2019g granted (May 7, 2012) (holding that if a statute is in derogation of a common law right, it must be strictly construed and not extended in application beyond clear legislative intent); Doe v. Marion, 361 S.C. 463, 473, 605 S.E.2d 556, 561 (Ct.App.2004), aff'd, 373 S.C. 390, 645 S.E.2d 245 (2007) (\u201c[A]ny legislation [that] is in derogation of common law must be strictly construed and not extended in application beyond clear legislative intent.\u201d); id."},"case_id":7335689,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In any event, we do not view the language of section 4-9-620 as dearly authorizing the \"definite term\" to extend beyond the terms of the outgoing council members. Therefore, it does not fall within Newman's exception to the prohibition against binding successor governing bodies.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"361 S.C. 463, 473","parenthetical":"\"[A]ny legislation [that] is in derogation of common law must be strictly construed and not extended in application beyond clear legislative intent.\"","sentence":"See Cowart II, 324 S.C. at 241, 478 S.E.2d at 838 (\u201cNewman allows an exception, however, where the enabling legislation dearly authorizes the local governing body to make a contract extending beyond its members\u2019 own terms.\u201d (emphasis added)); see also 16 Jade St., LLC v. R. Design Const. Co., 398 S.C. 338, 343, 728 S.E.2d 448, 450 (2012), reh\u2019g granted (May 7, 2012) (holding that if a statute is in derogation of a common law right, it must be strictly construed and not extended in application beyond clear legislative intent); Doe v. Marion, 361 S.C. 463, 473, 605 S.E.2d 556, 561 (Ct.App.2004), aff'd, 373 S.C. 390, 645 S.E.2d 245 (2007) (\u201c[A]ny legislation [that] is in derogation of common law must be strictly construed and not extended in application beyond clear legislative intent.\u201d); id."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"478 S.E.2d 838, 838","parenthetical":"\"Newman allows an exception, however, where the enabling legislation dearly authorizes the local governing body to make a contract extending beyond its members' own terms.\" (emphasis added","sentence":"See Cowart II, 324 S.C. at 241, 478 S.E.2d at 838 (\u201cNewman allows an exception, however, where the enabling legislation dearly authorizes the local governing body to make a contract extending beyond its members\u2019 own terms.\u201d (emphasis added)); see also 16 Jade St., LLC v. R. Design Const. Co., 398 S.C. 338, 343, 728 S.E.2d 448, 450 (2012), reh\u2019g granted (May 7, 2012) (holding that if a statute is in derogation of a common law right, it must be strictly construed and not extended in application beyond clear legislative intent); Doe v. Marion, 361 S.C. 463, 473, 605 S.E.2d 556, 561 (Ct.App.2004), aff'd, 373 S.C. 390, 645 S.E.2d 245 (2007) (\u201c[A]ny legislation [that] is in derogation of common law must be strictly construed and not extended in application beyond clear legislative intent.\u201d); id."},"case_id":7335689,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In any event, we do not view the language of section 4-9-620 as dearly authorizing the \"definite term\" to extend beyond the terms of the outgoing council members. Therefore, it does not fall within Newman's exception to the prohibition against binding successor governing bodies.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"605 S.E.2d 556, 561","parenthetical":"\"[A]ny legislation [that] is in derogation of common law must be strictly construed and not extended in application beyond clear legislative intent.\"","sentence":"See Cowart II, 324 S.C. at 241, 478 S.E.2d at 838 (\u201cNewman allows an exception, however, where the enabling legislation dearly authorizes the local governing body to make a contract extending beyond its members\u2019 own terms.\u201d (emphasis added)); see also 16 Jade St., LLC v. R. Design Const. Co., 398 S.C. 338, 343, 728 S.E.2d 448, 450 (2012), reh\u2019g granted (May 7, 2012) (holding that if a statute is in derogation of a common law right, it must be strictly construed and not extended in application beyond clear legislative intent); Doe v. Marion, 361 S.C. 463, 473, 605 S.E.2d 556, 561 (Ct.App.2004), aff'd, 373 S.C. 390, 645 S.E.2d 245 (2007) (\u201c[A]ny legislation [that] is in derogation of common law must be strictly construed and not extended in application beyond clear legislative intent.\u201d); id."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"478 S.E.2d 838, 838","parenthetical":"\"Newman allows an exception, however, where the enabling legislation dearly authorizes the local governing body to make a contract extending beyond its members' own terms.\" (emphasis added","sentence":"See Cowart II, 324 S.C. at 241, 478 S.E.2d at 838 (\u201cNewman allows an exception, however, where the enabling legislation dearly authorizes the local governing body to make a contract extending beyond its members\u2019 own terms.\u201d (emphasis added)); see also 16 Jade St., LLC v. R. Design Const. Co., 398 S.C. 338, 343, 728 S.E.2d 448, 450 (2012), reh\u2019g granted (May 7, 2012) (holding that if a statute is in derogation of a common law right, it must be strictly construed and not extended in application beyond clear legislative intent); Doe v. Marion, 361 S.C. 463, 473, 605 S.E.2d 556, 561 (Ct.App.2004), aff'd, 373 S.C. 390, 645 S.E.2d 245 (2007) (\u201c[A]ny legislation [that] is in derogation of common law must be strictly construed and not extended in application beyond clear legislative intent.\u201d); id."},"case_id":7335689,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In any event, we do not view the language of section 4-9-620 as dearly authorizing the \"definite term\" to extend beyond the terms of the outgoing council members. Therefore, it does not fall within Newman's exception to the prohibition against binding successor governing bodies.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[A]ny legislation [that] is in derogation of common law must be strictly construed and not extended in application beyond clear legislative intent.\"","sentence":"See Cowart II, 324 S.C. at 241, 478 S.E.2d at 838 (\u201cNewman allows an exception, however, where the enabling legislation dearly authorizes the local governing body to make a contract extending beyond its members\u2019 own terms.\u201d (emphasis added)); see also 16 Jade St., LLC v. R. Design Const. Co., 398 S.C. 338, 343, 728 S.E.2d 448, 450 (2012), reh\u2019g granted (May 7, 2012) (holding that if a statute is in derogation of a common law right, it must be strictly construed and not extended in application beyond clear legislative intent); Doe v. Marion, 361 S.C. 463, 473, 605 S.E.2d 556, 561 (Ct.App.2004), aff'd, 373 S.C. 390, 645 S.E.2d 245 (2007) (\u201c[A]ny legislation [that] is in derogation of common law must be strictly construed and not extended in application beyond clear legislative intent.\u201d); id."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"478 S.E.2d 838, 838","parenthetical":"\"Newman allows an exception, however, where the enabling legislation dearly authorizes the local governing body to make a contract extending beyond its members' own terms.\" (emphasis added","sentence":"See Cowart II, 324 S.C. at 241, 478 S.E.2d at 838 (\u201cNewman allows an exception, however, where the enabling legislation dearly authorizes the local governing body to make a contract extending beyond its members\u2019 own terms.\u201d (emphasis added)); see also 16 Jade St., LLC v. R. Design Const. Co., 398 S.C. 338, 343, 728 S.E.2d 448, 450 (2012), reh\u2019g granted (May 7, 2012) (holding that if a statute is in derogation of a common law right, it must be strictly construed and not extended in application beyond clear legislative intent); Doe v. Marion, 361 S.C. 463, 473, 605 S.E.2d 556, 561 (Ct.App.2004), aff'd, 373 S.C. 390, 645 S.E.2d 245 (2007) (\u201c[A]ny legislation [that] is in derogation of common law must be strictly construed and not extended in application beyond clear legislative intent.\u201d); id."},"case_id":7335689,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In any event, we do not view the language of section 4-9-620 as dearly authorizing the \"definite term\" to extend beyond the terms of the outgoing council members. Therefore, it does not fall within Newman's exception to the prohibition against binding successor governing bodies.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"478 S.E.2d 838, 838","parenthetical":"\"Newman allows an exception, however, where the enabling legislation dearly authorizes the local governing body to make a contract extending beyond its members' own terms.\" (emphasis added","sentence":"See Cowart II, 324 S.C. at 241, 478 S.E.2d at 838 (\u201cNewman allows an exception, however, where the enabling legislation dearly authorizes the local governing body to make a contract extending beyond its members\u2019 own terms.\u201d (emphasis added)); see also 16 Jade St., LLC v. R. Design Const. Co., 398 S.C. 338, 343, 728 S.E.2d 448, 450 (2012), reh\u2019g granted (May 7, 2012) (holding that if a statute is in derogation of a common law right, it must be strictly construed and not extended in application beyond clear legislative intent); Doe v. Marion, 361 S.C. 463, 473, 605 S.E.2d 556, 561 (Ct.App.2004), aff'd, 373 S.C. 390, 645 S.E.2d 245 (2007) (\u201c[A]ny legislation [that] is in derogation of common law must be strictly construed and not extended in application beyond clear legislative intent.\u201d); id."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[A]ny legislation [that] is in derogation of common law must be strictly construed and not extended in application beyond clear legislative intent.\"","sentence":"See Cowart II, 324 S.C. at 241, 478 S.E.2d at 838 (\u201cNewman allows an exception, however, where the enabling legislation dearly authorizes the local governing body to make a contract extending beyond its members\u2019 own terms.\u201d (emphasis added)); see also 16 Jade St., LLC v. R. Design Const. Co., 398 S.C. 338, 343, 728 S.E.2d 448, 450 (2012), reh\u2019g granted (May 7, 2012) (holding that if a statute is in derogation of a common law right, it must be strictly construed and not extended in application beyond clear legislative intent); Doe v. Marion, 361 S.C. 463, 473, 605 S.E.2d 556, 561 (Ct.App.2004), aff'd, 373 S.C. 390, 645 S.E.2d 245 (2007) (\u201c[A]ny legislation [that] is in derogation of common law must be strictly construed and not extended in application beyond clear legislative intent.\u201d); id."},"case_id":7335689,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only that a complaint contain a short and plain statement of the claims demonstrating that the pleader is entitled to relief.- The Court notes that there is not an abundance of precedent substantively analyzing the adequacy of pleading that data was in electronic storage for purposes of the SCA. However, the courts that have addressed the issue, albeit obliquely, have sustained claims containing somewhat vague allegations regarding electronic storage.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"2009 WL 1329123, at *4","parenthetical":"finding plaintiff adequately pled a violation of the SCA where plaintiff alleged that defendant \"accessed [plaintiffs] protected computer and, without authorization, obtained an electronic communication ... while it was in electronic storage\"","sentence":"See Devine, 729 F.Supp.2d at 1028 (\u201c[w]here, as here, a plaintiff pleads that it stores electronic communications on its own systems, and that a defendant intentionally and without authorization got hold of those stored communications through the plaintiffs electronic facilities, the plaintiff states a claim under \u00a7 2701 of the SCA.\u201d); see also Bloomington-Normal Seating Comp., Inc. v. Albritton, No. 09-1073, 2009 WL 1329123, at *4 (C.D.Ill. May 13, 2009) (finding plaintiff adequately pled a violation of the SCA where plaintiff alleged that defendant \u201caccessed [plaintiffs] protected computer and, without authorization, obtained an electronic communication ... while it was in electronic storage\u201d) (internal quotation marks omitted)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"729 F.Supp.2d 1028, 1028","parenthetical":"\"[w]here, as here, a plaintiff pleads that it stores electronic communications on its own systems, and that a defendant intentionally and without authorization got hold of those stored communications through the plaintiffs electronic facilities, the plaintiff states a claim under SS 2701 of the SCA.\"","sentence":"See Devine, 729 F.Supp.2d at 1028 (\u201c[w]here, as here, a plaintiff pleads that it stores electronic communications on its own systems, and that a defendant intentionally and without authorization got hold of those stored communications through the plaintiffs electronic facilities, the plaintiff states a claim under \u00a7 2701 of the SCA.\u201d); see also Bloomington-Normal Seating Comp., Inc. v. Albritton, No. 09-1073, 2009 WL 1329123, at *4 (C.D.Ill. May 13, 2009) (finding plaintiff adequately pled a violation of the SCA where plaintiff alleged that defendant \u201caccessed [plaintiffs] protected computer and, without authorization, obtained an electronic communication ... while it was in electronic storage\u201d) (internal quotation marks omitted)."},"case_id":4230827,"label":"b"}
{"context":"For example, the Supreme Court has held that the crimes of receiving a firearm and possessing a firearm, although listed in different statutes, constitute the same crime for double jeopardy purposes. Howev er, the court has also held that the commission of a substantive crime and conspiracy to commit that crime are different offenses for double jeopardy.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding. that conviction of and punishment for both the underlying predicate offense and continuing criminal enterprise does not violate double jeopardy","sentence":"But see Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773, 105 S.Ct. 2407, 85 L.Ed.2d 764 (1985)(holding. that conviction of and punishment for both the underlying predicate offense and continuing criminal enterprise does not violate double jeopardy)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"128 F.3d 966, 971-72","parenthetical":"holding that convictions for the crimes of conspiracy and continuing criminal enterprise violate double jeopardy","sentence":"See also United States v. Avery, 128 F.3d 966, 971-72 (6th Cir.1997)(holding that convictions for the crimes of conspiracy and continuing criminal enterprise violate double jeopardy)."},"case_id":11215536,"label":"b"}
{"context":"For example, the Supreme Court has held that the crimes of receiving a firearm and possessing a firearm, although listed in different statutes, constitute the same crime for double jeopardy purposes. Howev er, the court has also held that the commission of a substantive crime and conspiracy to commit that crime are different offenses for double jeopardy.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding. that conviction of and punishment for both the underlying predicate offense and continuing criminal enterprise does not violate double jeopardy","sentence":"But see Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773, 105 S.Ct. 2407, 85 L.Ed.2d 764 (1985)(holding. that conviction of and punishment for both the underlying predicate offense and continuing criminal enterprise does not violate double jeopardy)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"128 F.3d 966, 971-72","parenthetical":"holding that convictions for the crimes of conspiracy and continuing criminal enterprise violate double jeopardy","sentence":"See also United States v. Avery, 128 F.3d 966, 971-72 (6th Cir.1997)(holding that convictions for the crimes of conspiracy and continuing criminal enterprise violate double jeopardy)."},"case_id":11215536,"label":"b"}
{"context":"For example, the Supreme Court has held that the crimes of receiving a firearm and possessing a firearm, although listed in different statutes, constitute the same crime for double jeopardy purposes. Howev er, the court has also held that the commission of a substantive crime and conspiracy to commit that crime are different offenses for double jeopardy.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding. that conviction of and punishment for both the underlying predicate offense and continuing criminal enterprise does not violate double jeopardy","sentence":"But see Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773, 105 S.Ct. 2407, 85 L.Ed.2d 764 (1985)(holding. that conviction of and punishment for both the underlying predicate offense and continuing criminal enterprise does not violate double jeopardy)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"128 F.3d 966, 971-72","parenthetical":"holding that convictions for the crimes of conspiracy and continuing criminal enterprise violate double jeopardy","sentence":"See also United States v. Avery, 128 F.3d 966, 971-72 (6th Cir.1997)(holding that convictions for the crimes of conspiracy and continuing criminal enterprise violate double jeopardy)."},"case_id":11215536,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The family court was required to weigh the probative value of Arakawa's threatening statements against the potential for prejudice, but was not required to enter written findings if the weighing was adequate.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"70 Haw. 509, 518","parenthetical":"overturned Rule 404(b) admission where record did not indicate a weighing had been made","sentence":"See United States v. Sangrey, 586 F.2d 1312 (9th Cir.1978) (refused to require a recitation of Rule 403 formula on the record as a prerequisite to a Rule 404(b) admission, if it was clear from the record that an adequate weighing had been made); see also State v. Pinero, 70 Haw. 509, 518, 778 P.2d 704, 711 (1989) (overturned Rule 404(b) admission where record did not indicate a weighing had been made)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"refused to require a recitation of Rule 403 formula on the record as a prerequisite to a Rule 404(b","sentence":"See United States v. Sangrey, 586 F.2d 1312 (9th Cir.1978) (refused to require a recitation of Rule 403 formula on the record as a prerequisite to a Rule 404(b) admission, if it was clear from the record that an adequate weighing had been made); see also State v. Pinero, 70 Haw. 509, 518, 778 P.2d 704, 711 (1989) (overturned Rule 404(b) admission where record did not indicate a weighing had been made)."},"case_id":12258931,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The family court was required to weigh the probative value of Arakawa's threatening statements against the potential for prejudice, but was not required to enter written findings if the weighing was adequate.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"778 P.2d 704, 711","parenthetical":"overturned Rule 404(b) admission where record did not indicate a weighing had been made","sentence":"See United States v. Sangrey, 586 F.2d 1312 (9th Cir.1978) (refused to require a recitation of Rule 403 formula on the record as a prerequisite to a Rule 404(b) admission, if it was clear from the record that an adequate weighing had been made); see also State v. Pinero, 70 Haw. 509, 518, 778 P.2d 704, 711 (1989) (overturned Rule 404(b) admission where record did not indicate a weighing had been made)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"refused to require a recitation of Rule 403 formula on the record as a prerequisite to a Rule 404(b","sentence":"See United States v. Sangrey, 586 F.2d 1312 (9th Cir.1978) (refused to require a recitation of Rule 403 formula on the record as a prerequisite to a Rule 404(b) admission, if it was clear from the record that an adequate weighing had been made); see also State v. Pinero, 70 Haw. 509, 518, 778 P.2d 704, 711 (1989) (overturned Rule 404(b) admission where record did not indicate a weighing had been made)."},"case_id":12258931,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In Yellow, the District of Kansas confronted nearly the same lack-of-process issue presently before this court. The court held that \"[s]o long as the defect in removal procedure does not involve a lack of federal subject matter jurisdiction, there is no reason why either State or Federal courts, or the parties, should be subject to the burdens of shuttling a case between two courts that each have subject matter jurisdiction.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"194 F.3d 1077, 1077-79","parenthetical":"defendant's failure to file notice of removal within the thirty-day period necessitated remand upon plaintiffs motion","sentence":"Id. at 1217; see Huffman, 194 F.3d at 1077-79 (defendant\u2019s failure to file notice of removal within the thirty-day period necessitated remand upon plaintiffs motion); see also Cornwall v. Robinson, 654 F.2d 685, 686-87 (10th Cir.1981) (finding that remand was appropriate when the notice was defective because a co-defendant had not joined the notice of removal). Last, the court found that the sole objective sought by Congress when it amended the removal statutes was to force the parties to raise objections promptly so procedural defects cannot later be used to prejudice the other party in court. Yellow, 406 F.Supp.2d at 1219. The defendant in Yellow, like the defendants here, failed to attach process to its notice of removal. Id. at 1214. In denying remand, the court stated that the failure to attach process was inadvertent and trivial and \u201cdid not unduly burden the court or reflect the complete failure to follow the removal procedure that typically leads to remand orders...."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"654 F.2d 685, 686-87","parenthetical":"finding that remand was appropriate when the notice was defective because a co-defendant had not joined the notice of removal","sentence":"Id. at 1217; see Huffman, 194 F.3d at 1077-79 (defendant\u2019s failure to file notice of removal within the thirty-day period necessitated remand upon plaintiffs motion); see also Cornwall v. Robinson, 654 F.2d 685, 686-87 (10th Cir.1981) (finding that remand was appropriate when the notice was defective because a co-defendant had not joined the notice of removal). Last, the court found that the sole objective sought by Congress when it amended the removal statutes was to force the parties to raise objections promptly so procedural defects cannot later be used to prejudice the other party in court. Yellow, 406 F.Supp.2d at 1219. The defendant in Yellow, like the defendants here, failed to attach process to its notice of removal. Id. at 1214. In denying remand, the court stated that the failure to attach process was inadvertent and trivial and \u201cdid not unduly burden the court or reflect the complete failure to follow the removal procedure that typically leads to remand orders...."},"case_id":4243847,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In Yellow, the District of Kansas confronted nearly the same lack-of-process issue presently before this court. The court held that \"[s]o long as the defect in removal procedure does not involve a lack of federal subject matter jurisdiction, there is no reason why either State or Federal courts, or the parties, should be subject to the burdens of shuttling a case between two courts that each have subject matter jurisdiction.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"406 F.Supp.2d 1219, 1219","parenthetical":"finding that remand was appropriate when the notice was defective because a co-defendant had not joined the notice of removal","sentence":"Id. at 1217; see Huffman, 194 F.3d at 1077-79 (defendant\u2019s failure to file notice of removal within the thirty-day period necessitated remand upon plaintiffs motion); see also Cornwall v. Robinson, 654 F.2d 685, 686-87 (10th Cir.1981) (finding that remand was appropriate when the notice was defective because a co-defendant had not joined the notice of removal). Last, the court found that the sole objective sought by Congress when it amended the removal statutes was to force the parties to raise objections promptly so procedural defects cannot later be used to prejudice the other party in court. Yellow, 406 F.Supp.2d at 1219. The defendant in Yellow, like the defendants here, failed to attach process to its notice of removal. Id. at 1214. In denying remand, the court stated that the failure to attach process was inadvertent and trivial and \u201cdid not unduly burden the court or reflect the complete failure to follow the removal procedure that typically leads to remand orders...."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"194 F.3d 1077, 1077-79","parenthetical":"defendant's failure to file notice of removal within the thirty-day period necessitated remand upon plaintiffs motion","sentence":"Id. at 1217; see Huffman, 194 F.3d at 1077-79 (defendant\u2019s failure to file notice of removal within the thirty-day period necessitated remand upon plaintiffs motion); see also Cornwall v. Robinson, 654 F.2d 685, 686-87 (10th Cir.1981) (finding that remand was appropriate when the notice was defective because a co-defendant had not joined the notice of removal). Last, the court found that the sole objective sought by Congress when it amended the removal statutes was to force the parties to raise objections promptly so procedural defects cannot later be used to prejudice the other party in court. Yellow, 406 F.Supp.2d at 1219. The defendant in Yellow, like the defendants here, failed to attach process to its notice of removal. Id. at 1214. In denying remand, the court stated that the failure to attach process was inadvertent and trivial and \u201cdid not unduly burden the court or reflect the complete failure to follow the removal procedure that typically leads to remand orders...."},"case_id":4243847,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The question before this Court is whether non-signatories to a CBA can invoke SS 301 preemption as a defense to a plaintiffs state law claims. Several courts have held that they can.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"878 F.Supp. 1054, 1056-57","parenthetical":"holding that plaintiffs state law claim against a non-signatory, to the CBA was preempted by SS 301","sentence":"See also Golden v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., 878 F.Supp. 1054, 1056-57 (E.D.Mich.1995) (holding that plaintiffs state law claim against a non-signatory, to the CBA was preempted by \u00a7 301). Plaintiff has cited to no authority to the contrary."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"section 301 can preempt claims against non-signatories to a collective bargaining agreement\"","sentence":"See Covenant Coal, 977 F.2d at 899-900; Dashields v. Robertson, No. 99-1124, 2000 WL 564024, at *2 n. 8 (4th Cir. May 10, 2000) (\u201csection 301 can preempt claims against non-signatories to a collective bargaining agreement\u201d); Mullins v. International Union of Operating Eng\u2019rs Local No. 77, 214 F.Supp.2d 655, 668 (E.D.Va.2002)(holding that \u00a7 301 preempts state claims against non-signatories where interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement is required for resolution)."},"case_id":3932118,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The question before this Court is whether non-signatories to a CBA can invoke SS 301 preemption as a defense to a plaintiffs state law claims. Several courts have held that they can.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"214 F.Supp.2d 655, 668","parenthetical":"holding that SS 301 preempts state claims against non-signatories where interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement is required for resolution","sentence":"See Covenant Coal, 977 F.2d at 899-900; Dashields v. Robertson, No. 99-1124, 2000 WL 564024, at *2 n. 8 (4th Cir. May 10, 2000) (\u201csection 301 can preempt claims against non-signatories to a collective bargaining agreement\u201d); Mullins v. International Union of Operating Eng\u2019rs Local No. 77, 214 F.Supp.2d 655, 668 (E.D.Va.2002)(holding that \u00a7 301 preempts state claims against non-signatories where interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement is required for resolution)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"878 F.Supp. 1054, 1056-57","parenthetical":"holding that plaintiffs state law claim against a non-signatory, to the CBA was preempted by SS 301","sentence":"See also Golden v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., 878 F.Supp. 1054, 1056-57 (E.D.Mich.1995) (holding that plaintiffs state law claim against a non-signatory, to the CBA was preempted by \u00a7 301). Plaintiff has cited to no authority to the contrary."},"case_id":3932118,"label":"a"}
{"context":"We find defendant waived any challenge to the amended trial information by failing to object to the amendment and by consenting to it. Defendant waived any objection to the trial information by failing to raise it earlier pursuant to Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 10(2)(b) (defenses and objections based on defects in the information must be raised before trial).","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"284 N.W.2d 239, 241","parenthetical":"objection that information was signed by assistant attorney general rather than county attorney was waived where not raised within time limitations of rule 10(2)(b","sentence":"See State v. Hobson, 284 N.W.2d 239, 241 (Iowa 1979) (objection that information was signed by assistant attorney general rather than county attorney was waived where not raised within time limitations of rule 10(2)(b)); State v. Fortunski, 200 Iowa 406, 407-08, 204 N.W. 401, 401 (1925) (objections to defects in trial information were waived by defendant\u2019s failure, prior to plea, to move to set aside information); cf. State v. Japone, 202 Iowa 450, 456, 209 N.W. 468, 471 (1926) (where the trial is conducted as though the amendment requested had been made, the objection that there was no formal amendment to an information will be deemed waived)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"202 Iowa 450, 456","parenthetical":"where the trial is conducted as though the amendment requested had been made, the objection that there was no formal amendment to an information will be deemed waived","sentence":"See State v. Hobson, 284 N.W.2d 239, 241 (Iowa 1979) (objection that information was signed by assistant attorney general rather than county attorney was waived where not raised within time limitations of rule 10(2)(b)); State v. Fortunski, 200 Iowa 406, 407-08, 204 N.W. 401, 401 (1925) (objections to defects in trial information were waived by defendant\u2019s failure, prior to plea, to move to set aside information); cf. State v. Japone, 202 Iowa 450, 456, 209 N.W. 468, 471 (1926) (where the trial is conducted as though the amendment requested had been made, the objection that there was no formal amendment to an information will be deemed waived)."},"case_id":11813234,"label":"a"}
{"context":"We find defendant waived any challenge to the amended trial information by failing to object to the amendment and by consenting to it. Defendant waived any objection to the trial information by failing to raise it earlier pursuant to Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 10(2)(b) (defenses and objections based on defects in the information must be raised before trial).","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"209 N.W. 468, 471","parenthetical":"where the trial is conducted as though the amendment requested had been made, the objection that there was no formal amendment to an information will be deemed waived","sentence":"See State v. Hobson, 284 N.W.2d 239, 241 (Iowa 1979) (objection that information was signed by assistant attorney general rather than county attorney was waived where not raised within time limitations of rule 10(2)(b)); State v. Fortunski, 200 Iowa 406, 407-08, 204 N.W. 401, 401 (1925) (objections to defects in trial information were waived by defendant\u2019s failure, prior to plea, to move to set aside information); cf. State v. Japone, 202 Iowa 450, 456, 209 N.W. 468, 471 (1926) (where the trial is conducted as though the amendment requested had been made, the objection that there was no formal amendment to an information will be deemed waived)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"284 N.W.2d 239, 241","parenthetical":"objection that information was signed by assistant attorney general rather than county attorney was waived where not raised within time limitations of rule 10(2)(b","sentence":"See State v. Hobson, 284 N.W.2d 239, 241 (Iowa 1979) (objection that information was signed by assistant attorney general rather than county attorney was waived where not raised within time limitations of rule 10(2)(b)); State v. Fortunski, 200 Iowa 406, 407-08, 204 N.W. 401, 401 (1925) (objections to defects in trial information were waived by defendant\u2019s failure, prior to plea, to move to set aside information); cf. State v. Japone, 202 Iowa 450, 456, 209 N.W. 468, 471 (1926) (where the trial is conducted as though the amendment requested had been made, the objection that there was no formal amendment to an information will be deemed waived)."},"case_id":11813234,"label":"b"}
{"context":"We find defendant waived any challenge to the amended trial information by failing to object to the amendment and by consenting to it. Defendant waived any objection to the trial information by failing to raise it earlier pursuant to Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 10(2)(b) (defenses and objections based on defects in the information must be raised before trial).","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"202 Iowa 450, 456","parenthetical":"where the trial is conducted as though the amendment requested had been made, the objection that there was no formal amendment to an information will be deemed waived","sentence":"See State v. Hobson, 284 N.W.2d 239, 241 (Iowa 1979) (objection that information was signed by assistant attorney general rather than county attorney was waived where not raised within time limitations of rule 10(2)(b)); State v. Fortunski, 200 Iowa 406, 407-08, 204 N.W. 401, 401 (1925) (objections to defects in trial information were waived by defendant\u2019s failure, prior to plea, to move to set aside information); cf. State v. Japone, 202 Iowa 450, 456, 209 N.W. 468, 471 (1926) (where the trial is conducted as though the amendment requested had been made, the objection that there was no formal amendment to an information will be deemed waived)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"200 Iowa 406, 407-08","parenthetical":"objections to defects in trial information were waived by defendant's failure, prior to plea, to move to set aside information","sentence":"See State v. Hobson, 284 N.W.2d 239, 241 (Iowa 1979) (objection that information was signed by assistant attorney general rather than county attorney was waived where not raised within time limitations of rule 10(2)(b)); State v. Fortunski, 200 Iowa 406, 407-08, 204 N.W. 401, 401 (1925) (objections to defects in trial information were waived by defendant\u2019s failure, prior to plea, to move to set aside information); cf. State v. Japone, 202 Iowa 450, 456, 209 N.W. 468, 471 (1926) (where the trial is conducted as though the amendment requested had been made, the objection that there was no formal amendment to an information will be deemed waived)."},"case_id":11813234,"label":"b"}
{"context":"We find defendant waived any challenge to the amended trial information by failing to object to the amendment and by consenting to it. Defendant waived any objection to the trial information by failing to raise it earlier pursuant to Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 10(2)(b) (defenses and objections based on defects in the information must be raised before trial).","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"200 Iowa 406, 407-08","parenthetical":"objections to defects in trial information were waived by defendant's failure, prior to plea, to move to set aside information","sentence":"See State v. Hobson, 284 N.W.2d 239, 241 (Iowa 1979) (objection that information was signed by assistant attorney general rather than county attorney was waived where not raised within time limitations of rule 10(2)(b)); State v. Fortunski, 200 Iowa 406, 407-08, 204 N.W. 401, 401 (1925) (objections to defects in trial information were waived by defendant\u2019s failure, prior to plea, to move to set aside information); cf. State v. Japone, 202 Iowa 450, 456, 209 N.W. 468, 471 (1926) (where the trial is conducted as though the amendment requested had been made, the objection that there was no formal amendment to an information will be deemed waived)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"209 N.W. 468, 471","parenthetical":"where the trial is conducted as though the amendment requested had been made, the objection that there was no formal amendment to an information will be deemed waived","sentence":"See State v. Hobson, 284 N.W.2d 239, 241 (Iowa 1979) (objection that information was signed by assistant attorney general rather than county attorney was waived where not raised within time limitations of rule 10(2)(b)); State v. Fortunski, 200 Iowa 406, 407-08, 204 N.W. 401, 401 (1925) (objections to defects in trial information were waived by defendant\u2019s failure, prior to plea, to move to set aside information); cf. State v. Japone, 202 Iowa 450, 456, 209 N.W. 468, 471 (1926) (where the trial is conducted as though the amendment requested had been made, the objection that there was no formal amendment to an information will be deemed waived)."},"case_id":11813234,"label":"a"}
{"context":"We find defendant waived any challenge to the amended trial information by failing to object to the amendment and by consenting to it. Defendant waived any objection to the trial information by failing to raise it earlier pursuant to Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 10(2)(b) (defenses and objections based on defects in the information must be raised before trial).","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"202 Iowa 450, 456","parenthetical":"where the trial is conducted as though the amendment requested had been made, the objection that there was no formal amendment to an information will be deemed waived","sentence":"See State v. Hobson, 284 N.W.2d 239, 241 (Iowa 1979) (objection that information was signed by assistant attorney general rather than county attorney was waived where not raised within time limitations of rule 10(2)(b)); State v. Fortunski, 200 Iowa 406, 407-08, 204 N.W. 401, 401 (1925) (objections to defects in trial information were waived by defendant\u2019s failure, prior to plea, to move to set aside information); cf. State v. Japone, 202 Iowa 450, 456, 209 N.W. 468, 471 (1926) (where the trial is conducted as though the amendment requested had been made, the objection that there was no formal amendment to an information will be deemed waived)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"204 N.W. 401, 401","parenthetical":"objections to defects in trial information were waived by defendant's failure, prior to plea, to move to set aside information","sentence":"See State v. Hobson, 284 N.W.2d 239, 241 (Iowa 1979) (objection that information was signed by assistant attorney general rather than county attorney was waived where not raised within time limitations of rule 10(2)(b)); State v. Fortunski, 200 Iowa 406, 407-08, 204 N.W. 401, 401 (1925) (objections to defects in trial information were waived by defendant\u2019s failure, prior to plea, to move to set aside information); cf. State v. Japone, 202 Iowa 450, 456, 209 N.W. 468, 471 (1926) (where the trial is conducted as though the amendment requested had been made, the objection that there was no formal amendment to an information will be deemed waived)."},"case_id":11813234,"label":"b"}
{"context":"We find defendant waived any challenge to the amended trial information by failing to object to the amendment and by consenting to it. Defendant waived any objection to the trial information by failing to raise it earlier pursuant to Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 10(2)(b) (defenses and objections based on defects in the information must be raised before trial).","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"204 N.W. 401, 401","parenthetical":"objections to defects in trial information were waived by defendant's failure, prior to plea, to move to set aside information","sentence":"See State v. Hobson, 284 N.W.2d 239, 241 (Iowa 1979) (objection that information was signed by assistant attorney general rather than county attorney was waived where not raised within time limitations of rule 10(2)(b)); State v. Fortunski, 200 Iowa 406, 407-08, 204 N.W. 401, 401 (1925) (objections to defects in trial information were waived by defendant\u2019s failure, prior to plea, to move to set aside information); cf. State v. Japone, 202 Iowa 450, 456, 209 N.W. 468, 471 (1926) (where the trial is conducted as though the amendment requested had been made, the objection that there was no formal amendment to an information will be deemed waived)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"209 N.W. 468, 471","parenthetical":"where the trial is conducted as though the amendment requested had been made, the objection that there was no formal amendment to an information will be deemed waived","sentence":"See State v. Hobson, 284 N.W.2d 239, 241 (Iowa 1979) (objection that information was signed by assistant attorney general rather than county attorney was waived where not raised within time limitations of rule 10(2)(b)); State v. Fortunski, 200 Iowa 406, 407-08, 204 N.W. 401, 401 (1925) (objections to defects in trial information were waived by defendant\u2019s failure, prior to plea, to move to set aside information); cf. State v. Japone, 202 Iowa 450, 456, 209 N.W. 468, 471 (1926) (where the trial is conducted as though the amendment requested had been made, the objection that there was no formal amendment to an information will be deemed waived)."},"case_id":11813234,"label":"a"}
{"context":"It instructs that \"words or phrases that have acquired a technical or particular meaning, whether by legislative definition or otherwise, shall be construed accordingly.\" PROC. art. 37.07(3)(a) (Vernon Supp. 1994).","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"843 S.W.2d 525, 525","parenthetical":"explaining that the legislature's use of the term \"including\" in amending Article 37.07(3)(a) rendered the list following it nonexclusive","sentence":"Pursuant to \u00a7 311.005(13), we established that the list following \u201cincluding\u201d in Article 37.07(3)(a) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure was not exclusive as to the evidence admissible at the sentencing phase of trial, as long as it was relevant to sentencing. Grunsfeld, 843 S.W.2d at 525 (explaining that the legislature\u2019s use of the term \u201cincluding\u201d in amending Article 37.07(3)(a) rendered the list following it nonexclusive); see also Beasley v. State, 902 S.W.2d at 456-57 (holding that evidence concerning the activities of a gang, to which the appellant belonged, was admissible under Article 37.07(3)(a) because matters relevant to sentencing were not limited to \u201cthe prior criminal record of the defendant, his general reputation and his character\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"902 S.W.2d 456, 456-57","parenthetical":"holding that evidence concerning the activities of a gang, to which the appellant belonged, was admissible under Article 37.07(3)(a) because matters relevant to sentencing were not limited to \"the prior criminal record of the defendant, his general reputation and his character\"","sentence":"Pursuant to \u00a7 311.005(13), we established that the list following \u201cincluding\u201d in Article 37.07(3)(a) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure was not exclusive as to the evidence admissible at the sentencing phase of trial, as long as it was relevant to sentencing. Grunsfeld, 843 S.W.2d at 525 (explaining that the legislature\u2019s use of the term \u201cincluding\u201d in amending Article 37.07(3)(a) rendered the list following it nonexclusive); see also Beasley v. State, 902 S.W.2d at 456-57 (holding that evidence concerning the activities of a gang, to which the appellant belonged, was admissible under Article 37.07(3)(a) because matters relevant to sentencing were not limited to \u201cthe prior criminal record of the defendant, his general reputation and his character\u201d)."},"case_id":8430745,"label":"a"}
{"context":"JPMorgan's delay in seeking injunctive relief has neither disadvantaged Plaintiffs nor altered the outcome of this proceeding.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"552 F.3d 1212, 1212","parenthetical":"finding that the delay in seeking the injunction had not disadvantaged the other party's interests","sentence":"See RoDa Drilling Co., 552 F.3d at 1212 (finding that the delay in seeking the injunction had not disadvantaged the other party\u2019s interests); see also Kan. Health Care Ass\u2019n, Inc., 31 F.3d at 1543-44 (finding that the delay in that instance did not alter the outcome of the proceedings)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"31 F.3d 1543, 1543-44","parenthetical":"finding that the delay in that instance did not alter the outcome of the proceedings","sentence":"See RoDa Drilling Co., 552 F.3d at 1212 (finding that the delay in seeking the injunction had not disadvantaged the other party\u2019s interests); see also Kan. Health Care Ass\u2019n, Inc., 31 F.3d at 1543-44 (finding that the delay in that instance did not alter the outcome of the proceedings)."},"case_id":4002194,"label":"a"}
{"context":"First, the test in Colorado for whether a plaintiff has standing to challenge overbreadth is similar to the test for over-breadth itself. Second, the Colorado doctrine of standing to challenge overbreadth has become more complex than the overbreadth doctrine.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"458 U.S. 747, 769","parenthetical":"\"we have allowed persons to attack overly broad statutes even though the conduct of the person making the attack is clearly unprotected\"","sentence":"See also New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 769, 102 S.Ct. 3348, 3361, 73 L.Ed.2d 1113 (1982) (\"we have allowed persons to attack overly broad statutes even though the conduct of the person making the attack is clearly unprotected\") (emphasis added)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"197 Colo. 175, 179","parenthetical":"reserving facial over-breadth challenges to \"those defendants whose speech is at the fringes of that activity which the statute is designed to regulate. Those defendants whose speech is central to the interests which the statute seeks to protect and is clearly of a type regulated by the statute in question, cannot attack the statute as overbroad. They must demonstrate that the statute is unconstitutional as applied to them.\"","sentence":"Compare People v. Weeks, 197 Colo. 175, 179, 591 P.2d 91, 94 (1979) (reserving facial over-breadth challenges to \"those defendants whose speech is at the fringes of that activity which the statute is designed to regulate. Those defendants whose speech is central to the interests which the statute seeks to protect and is clearly of a type regulated by the statute in question, cannot attack the statute as overbroad. They must demonstrate that the statute is unconstitutional as applied to them.\u201d) (citing Broadrick; Bolles v. People, 189 Colo. 394, 541 P.2d 80 (1975)); People v. McBurney, 750 P.2d 916, 918 (Colo.1988) (quoting Weeks, 197 Colo, at 179, 591 P.2d at 94); People v. Bridges, 620 P.2d 1, 5 (Colo.1980) (quoting Weeks, 197 Colo. at 179, 591 P.2d at 94) with People v. 735 East Colfax, Inc., 697 P.2d 348, 356 n. 11 (Colo.1985) (arguing that Weeks and Bridges may not be consistent with the holdings in Broadrick and Bolles); Marco Lounge, Inc. v. City of Federal Heights, 625 P.2d 982, 986 n. 5 (Colo.1981) (arguing that Bridges and Weeks may not be consistent with Broadrick and Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 95 S.Ct. 2222, 44 L.Ed.2d 600 (1975), as well as with Bolles)."},"case_id":10377965,"label":"b"}
{"context":"First, the test in Colorado for whether a plaintiff has standing to challenge overbreadth is similar to the test for over-breadth itself. Second, the Colorado doctrine of standing to challenge overbreadth has become more complex than the overbreadth doctrine.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"102 S.Ct. 3348, 3361","parenthetical":"\"we have allowed persons to attack overly broad statutes even though the conduct of the person making the attack is clearly unprotected\"","sentence":"See also New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 769, 102 S.Ct. 3348, 3361, 73 L.Ed.2d 1113 (1982) (\"we have allowed persons to attack overly broad statutes even though the conduct of the person making the attack is clearly unprotected\") (emphasis added)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"197 Colo. 175, 179","parenthetical":"reserving facial over-breadth challenges to \"those defendants whose speech is at the fringes of that activity which the statute is designed to regulate. Those defendants whose speech is central to the interests which the statute seeks to protect and is clearly of a type regulated by the statute in question, cannot attack the statute as overbroad. They must demonstrate that the statute is unconstitutional as applied to them.\"","sentence":"Compare People v. Weeks, 197 Colo. 175, 179, 591 P.2d 91, 94 (1979) (reserving facial over-breadth challenges to \"those defendants whose speech is at the fringes of that activity which the statute is designed to regulate. Those defendants whose speech is central to the interests which the statute seeks to protect and is clearly of a type regulated by the statute in question, cannot attack the statute as overbroad. They must demonstrate that the statute is unconstitutional as applied to them.\u201d) (citing Broadrick; Bolles v. People, 189 Colo. 394, 541 P.2d 80 (1975)); People v. McBurney, 750 P.2d 916, 918 (Colo.1988) (quoting Weeks, 197 Colo, at 179, 591 P.2d at 94); People v. Bridges, 620 P.2d 1, 5 (Colo.1980) (quoting Weeks, 197 Colo. at 179, 591 P.2d at 94) with People v. 735 East Colfax, Inc., 697 P.2d 348, 356 n. 11 (Colo.1985) (arguing that Weeks and Bridges may not be consistent with the holdings in Broadrick and Bolles); Marco Lounge, Inc. v. City of Federal Heights, 625 P.2d 982, 986 n. 5 (Colo.1981) (arguing that Bridges and Weeks may not be consistent with Broadrick and Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 95 S.Ct. 2222, 44 L.Ed.2d 600 (1975), as well as with Bolles)."},"case_id":10377965,"label":"b"}
{"context":"First, the test in Colorado for whether a plaintiff has standing to challenge overbreadth is similar to the test for over-breadth itself. Second, the Colorado doctrine of standing to challenge overbreadth has become more complex than the overbreadth doctrine.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"197 Colo. 175, 179","parenthetical":"reserving facial over-breadth challenges to \"those defendants whose speech is at the fringes of that activity which the statute is designed to regulate. Those defendants whose speech is central to the interests which the statute seeks to protect and is clearly of a type regulated by the statute in question, cannot attack the statute as overbroad. They must demonstrate that the statute is unconstitutional as applied to them.\"","sentence":"Compare People v. Weeks, 197 Colo. 175, 179, 591 P.2d 91, 94 (1979) (reserving facial over-breadth challenges to \"those defendants whose speech is at the fringes of that activity which the statute is designed to regulate. Those defendants whose speech is central to the interests which the statute seeks to protect and is clearly of a type regulated by the statute in question, cannot attack the statute as overbroad. They must demonstrate that the statute is unconstitutional as applied to them.\u201d) (citing Broadrick; Bolles v. People, 189 Colo. 394, 541 P.2d 80 (1975)); People v. McBurney, 750 P.2d 916, 918 (Colo.1988) (quoting Weeks, 197 Colo, at 179, 591 P.2d at 94); People v. Bridges, 620 P.2d 1, 5 (Colo.1980) (quoting Weeks, 197 Colo. at 179, 591 P.2d at 94) with People v. 735 East Colfax, Inc., 697 P.2d 348, 356 n. 11 (Colo.1985) (arguing that Weeks and Bridges may not be consistent with the holdings in Broadrick and Bolles); Marco Lounge, Inc. v. City of Federal Heights, 625 P.2d 982, 986 n. 5 (Colo.1981) (arguing that Bridges and Weeks may not be consistent with Broadrick and Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 95 S.Ct. 2222, 44 L.Ed.2d 600 (1975), as well as with Bolles)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"we have allowed persons to attack overly broad statutes even though the conduct of the person making the attack is clearly unprotected\"","sentence":"See also New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 769, 102 S.Ct. 3348, 3361, 73 L.Ed.2d 1113 (1982) (\"we have allowed persons to attack overly broad statutes even though the conduct of the person making the attack is clearly unprotected\") (emphasis added)."},"case_id":10377965,"label":"a"}
{"context":"First, the test in Colorado for whether a plaintiff has standing to challenge overbreadth is similar to the test for over-breadth itself. Second, the Colorado doctrine of standing to challenge overbreadth has become more complex than the overbreadth doctrine.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"458 U.S. 747, 769","parenthetical":"\"we have allowed persons to attack overly broad statutes even though the conduct of the person making the attack is clearly unprotected\"","sentence":"See also New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 769, 102 S.Ct. 3348, 3361, 73 L.Ed.2d 1113 (1982) (\"we have allowed persons to attack overly broad statutes even though the conduct of the person making the attack is clearly unprotected\") (emphasis added)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"591 P.2d 91, 94","parenthetical":"reserving facial over-breadth challenges to \"those defendants whose speech is at the fringes of that activity which the statute is designed to regulate. Those defendants whose speech is central to the interests which the statute seeks to protect and is clearly of a type regulated by the statute in question, cannot attack the statute as overbroad. They must demonstrate that the statute is unconstitutional as applied to them.\"","sentence":"Compare People v. Weeks, 197 Colo. 175, 179, 591 P.2d 91, 94 (1979) (reserving facial over-breadth challenges to \"those defendants whose speech is at the fringes of that activity which the statute is designed to regulate. Those defendants whose speech is central to the interests which the statute seeks to protect and is clearly of a type regulated by the statute in question, cannot attack the statute as overbroad. They must demonstrate that the statute is unconstitutional as applied to them.\u201d) (citing Broadrick; Bolles v. People, 189 Colo. 394, 541 P.2d 80 (1975)); People v. McBurney, 750 P.2d 916, 918 (Colo.1988) (quoting Weeks, 197 Colo, at 179, 591 P.2d at 94); People v. Bridges, 620 P.2d 1, 5 (Colo.1980) (quoting Weeks, 197 Colo. at 179, 591 P.2d at 94) with People v. 735 East Colfax, Inc., 697 P.2d 348, 356 n. 11 (Colo.1985) (arguing that Weeks and Bridges may not be consistent with the holdings in Broadrick and Bolles); Marco Lounge, Inc. v. City of Federal Heights, 625 P.2d 982, 986 n. 5 (Colo.1981) (arguing that Bridges and Weeks may not be consistent with Broadrick and Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 95 S.Ct. 2222, 44 L.Ed.2d 600 (1975), as well as with Bolles)."},"case_id":10377965,"label":"b"}
{"context":"First, the test in Colorado for whether a plaintiff has standing to challenge overbreadth is similar to the test for over-breadth itself. Second, the Colorado doctrine of standing to challenge overbreadth has become more complex than the overbreadth doctrine.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"591 P.2d 91, 94","parenthetical":"reserving facial over-breadth challenges to \"those defendants whose speech is at the fringes of that activity which the statute is designed to regulate. Those defendants whose speech is central to the interests which the statute seeks to protect and is clearly of a type regulated by the statute in question, cannot attack the statute as overbroad. They must demonstrate that the statute is unconstitutional as applied to them.\"","sentence":"Compare People v. Weeks, 197 Colo. 175, 179, 591 P.2d 91, 94 (1979) (reserving facial over-breadth challenges to \"those defendants whose speech is at the fringes of that activity which the statute is designed to regulate. Those defendants whose speech is central to the interests which the statute seeks to protect and is clearly of a type regulated by the statute in question, cannot attack the statute as overbroad. They must demonstrate that the statute is unconstitutional as applied to them.\u201d) (citing Broadrick; Bolles v. People, 189 Colo. 394, 541 P.2d 80 (1975)); People v. McBurney, 750 P.2d 916, 918 (Colo.1988) (quoting Weeks, 197 Colo, at 179, 591 P.2d at 94); People v. Bridges, 620 P.2d 1, 5 (Colo.1980) (quoting Weeks, 197 Colo. at 179, 591 P.2d at 94) with People v. 735 East Colfax, Inc., 697 P.2d 348, 356 n. 11 (Colo.1985) (arguing that Weeks and Bridges may not be consistent with the holdings in Broadrick and Bolles); Marco Lounge, Inc. v. City of Federal Heights, 625 P.2d 982, 986 n. 5 (Colo.1981) (arguing that Bridges and Weeks may not be consistent with Broadrick and Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 95 S.Ct. 2222, 44 L.Ed.2d 600 (1975), as well as with Bolles)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"102 S.Ct. 3348, 3361","parenthetical":"\"we have allowed persons to attack overly broad statutes even though the conduct of the person making the attack is clearly unprotected\"","sentence":"See also New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 769, 102 S.Ct. 3348, 3361, 73 L.Ed.2d 1113 (1982) (\"we have allowed persons to attack overly broad statutes even though the conduct of the person making the attack is clearly unprotected\") (emphasis added)."},"case_id":10377965,"label":"a"}
{"context":"First, the test in Colorado for whether a plaintiff has standing to challenge overbreadth is similar to the test for over-breadth itself. Second, the Colorado doctrine of standing to challenge overbreadth has become more complex than the overbreadth doctrine.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"we have allowed persons to attack overly broad statutes even though the conduct of the person making the attack is clearly unprotected\"","sentence":"See also New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 769, 102 S.Ct. 3348, 3361, 73 L.Ed.2d 1113 (1982) (\"we have allowed persons to attack overly broad statutes even though the conduct of the person making the attack is clearly unprotected\") (emphasis added)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"591 P.2d 91, 94","parenthetical":"reserving facial over-breadth challenges to \"those defendants whose speech is at the fringes of that activity which the statute is designed to regulate. Those defendants whose speech is central to the interests which the statute seeks to protect and is clearly of a type regulated by the statute in question, cannot attack the statute as overbroad. They must demonstrate that the statute is unconstitutional as applied to them.\"","sentence":"Compare People v. Weeks, 197 Colo. 175, 179, 591 P.2d 91, 94 (1979) (reserving facial over-breadth challenges to \"those defendants whose speech is at the fringes of that activity which the statute is designed to regulate. Those defendants whose speech is central to the interests which the statute seeks to protect and is clearly of a type regulated by the statute in question, cannot attack the statute as overbroad. They must demonstrate that the statute is unconstitutional as applied to them.\u201d) (citing Broadrick; Bolles v. People, 189 Colo. 394, 541 P.2d 80 (1975)); People v. McBurney, 750 P.2d 916, 918 (Colo.1988) (quoting Weeks, 197 Colo, at 179, 591 P.2d at 94); People v. Bridges, 620 P.2d 1, 5 (Colo.1980) (quoting Weeks, 197 Colo. at 179, 591 P.2d at 94) with People v. 735 East Colfax, Inc., 697 P.2d 348, 356 n. 11 (Colo.1985) (arguing that Weeks and Bridges may not be consistent with the holdings in Broadrick and Bolles); Marco Lounge, Inc. v. City of Federal Heights, 625 P.2d 982, 986 n. 5 (Colo.1981) (arguing that Bridges and Weeks may not be consistent with Broadrick and Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 95 S.Ct. 2222, 44 L.Ed.2d 600 (1975), as well as with Bolles)."},"case_id":10377965,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Furthermore, Plaintiff is clearly the \"prevailing party\" in this case. The Court granted Plaintiff summary judgment, found him disabled, and ordered the award of social security benefits.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding that a \"material alteration\" of the parties occurs when the plaintiff becomes entitled to enforce a judgment","sentence":"See also id. at 113, 113 S.Ct. 566 (finding that a \u201cmaterial alteration\u201d of the parties occurs when the plaintiff becomes entitled to enforce a judgment)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"506 U.S. 103, 111-112","parenthetical":"\"[A] plaintiff 'prevails' when actual relief on the merits of his claim materially alters the legal relationship between the parties by modifying the defendant's behavior in a way that directly benefits the plaintiff.\"","sentence":"See Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 111-112, 113 S.Ct. 566, 121 L.Ed.2d 494 (1992) (\u201c[A] plaintiff \u2018prevails\u2019 when actual relief on the merits of his claim materially alters the legal relationship between the parties by modifying the defendant\u2019s behavior in a way that directly benefits the plaintiff.\u201d)."},"case_id":8959689,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Furthermore, Plaintiff is clearly the \"prevailing party\" in this case. The Court granted Plaintiff summary judgment, found him disabled, and ordered the award of social security benefits.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding that a \"material alteration\" of the parties occurs when the plaintiff becomes entitled to enforce a judgment","sentence":"See also id. at 113, 113 S.Ct. 566 (finding that a \u201cmaterial alteration\u201d of the parties occurs when the plaintiff becomes entitled to enforce a judgment)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[A] plaintiff 'prevails' when actual relief on the merits of his claim materially alters the legal relationship between the parties by modifying the defendant's behavior in a way that directly benefits the plaintiff.\"","sentence":"See Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 111-112, 113 S.Ct. 566, 121 L.Ed.2d 494 (1992) (\u201c[A] plaintiff \u2018prevails\u2019 when actual relief on the merits of his claim materially alters the legal relationship between the parties by modifying the defendant\u2019s behavior in a way that directly benefits the plaintiff.\u201d)."},"case_id":8959689,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Furthermore, Plaintiff is clearly the \"prevailing party\" in this case. The Court granted Plaintiff summary judgment, found him disabled, and ordered the award of social security benefits.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding that a \"material alteration\" of the parties occurs when the plaintiff becomes entitled to enforce a judgment","sentence":"See also id. at 113, 113 S.Ct. 566 (finding that a \u201cmaterial alteration\u201d of the parties occurs when the plaintiff becomes entitled to enforce a judgment)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[A] plaintiff 'prevails' when actual relief on the merits of his claim materially alters the legal relationship between the parties by modifying the defendant's behavior in a way that directly benefits the plaintiff.\"","sentence":"See Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 111-112, 113 S.Ct. 566, 121 L.Ed.2d 494 (1992) (\u201c[A] plaintiff \u2018prevails\u2019 when actual relief on the merits of his claim materially alters the legal relationship between the parties by modifying the defendant\u2019s behavior in a way that directly benefits the plaintiff.\u201d)."},"case_id":8959689,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Nor had they received an anonymous report suggesting a need for emergency action. Fernandes had not given police evasive answers or implausible explanations of his conduct.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"517 U.S. 813, 813","parenthetical":"police stop for a traffic violation can lead to a search for evidence of far more serious illegal activity","sentence":"See Whren, 517 U.S. at 813, 116 S.Ct. 1769 (police stop for a traffic violation can lead to a search for evidence of far more serious illegal activity)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"543 U.S. 146, 155-156","parenthetical":"individual suspected of impersonating a police officer gave inconsistent and implausible explanations for car modifications, a police radio scanner, and a pair of handcuffs","sentence":"Compare Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 155-156, 125 S.Ct. 588, 160 L.Ed.2d 537 (2004) (individual suspected of impersonating a police officer gave inconsistent and implausible explanations for car modifications, a police radio scanner, and a pair of handcuffs). Finally, the detectives did not observe any offense being committed, even one of a minor or technical nature, that would justify a stop and arrest."},"case_id":4011998,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Nor had they received an anonymous report suggesting a need for emergency action. Fernandes had not given police evasive answers or implausible explanations of his conduct.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"police stop for a traffic violation can lead to a search for evidence of far more serious illegal activity","sentence":"See Whren, 517 U.S. at 813, 116 S.Ct. 1769 (police stop for a traffic violation can lead to a search for evidence of far more serious illegal activity)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"543 U.S. 146, 155-156","parenthetical":"individual suspected of impersonating a police officer gave inconsistent and implausible explanations for car modifications, a police radio scanner, and a pair of handcuffs","sentence":"Compare Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 155-156, 125 S.Ct. 588, 160 L.Ed.2d 537 (2004) (individual suspected of impersonating a police officer gave inconsistent and implausible explanations for car modifications, a police radio scanner, and a pair of handcuffs). Finally, the detectives did not observe any offense being committed, even one of a minor or technical nature, that would justify a stop and arrest."},"case_id":4011998,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Nor had they received an anonymous report suggesting a need for emergency action. Fernandes had not given police evasive answers or implausible explanations of his conduct.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"individual suspected of impersonating a police officer gave inconsistent and implausible explanations for car modifications, a police radio scanner, and a pair of handcuffs","sentence":"Compare Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 155-156, 125 S.Ct. 588, 160 L.Ed.2d 537 (2004) (individual suspected of impersonating a police officer gave inconsistent and implausible explanations for car modifications, a police radio scanner, and a pair of handcuffs). Finally, the detectives did not observe any offense being committed, even one of a minor or technical nature, that would justify a stop and arrest."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"517 U.S. 813, 813","parenthetical":"police stop for a traffic violation can lead to a search for evidence of far more serious illegal activity","sentence":"See Whren, 517 U.S. at 813, 116 S.Ct. 1769 (police stop for a traffic violation can lead to a search for evidence of far more serious illegal activity)."},"case_id":4011998,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Nor had they received an anonymous report suggesting a need for emergency action. Fernandes had not given police evasive answers or implausible explanations of his conduct.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"police stop for a traffic violation can lead to a search for evidence of far more serious illegal activity","sentence":"See Whren, 517 U.S. at 813, 116 S.Ct. 1769 (police stop for a traffic violation can lead to a search for evidence of far more serious illegal activity)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"individual suspected of impersonating a police officer gave inconsistent and implausible explanations for car modifications, a police radio scanner, and a pair of handcuffs","sentence":"Compare Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 155-156, 125 S.Ct. 588, 160 L.Ed.2d 537 (2004) (individual suspected of impersonating a police officer gave inconsistent and implausible explanations for car modifications, a police radio scanner, and a pair of handcuffs). Finally, the detectives did not observe any offense being committed, even one of a minor or technical nature, that would justify a stop and arrest."},"case_id":4011998,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Nor had they received an anonymous report suggesting a need for emergency action. Fernandes had not given police evasive answers or implausible explanations of his conduct.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"517 U.S. 813, 813","parenthetical":"police stop for a traffic violation can lead to a search for evidence of far more serious illegal activity","sentence":"See Whren, 517 U.S. at 813, 116 S.Ct. 1769 (police stop for a traffic violation can lead to a search for evidence of far more serious illegal activity)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"individual suspected of impersonating a police officer gave inconsistent and implausible explanations for car modifications, a police radio scanner, and a pair of handcuffs","sentence":"Compare Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 155-156, 125 S.Ct. 588, 160 L.Ed.2d 537 (2004) (individual suspected of impersonating a police officer gave inconsistent and implausible explanations for car modifications, a police radio scanner, and a pair of handcuffs). Finally, the detectives did not observe any offense being committed, even one of a minor or technical nature, that would justify a stop and arrest."},"case_id":4011998,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Nor had they received an anonymous report suggesting a need for emergency action. Fernandes had not given police evasive answers or implausible explanations of his conduct.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"individual suspected of impersonating a police officer gave inconsistent and implausible explanations for car modifications, a police radio scanner, and a pair of handcuffs","sentence":"Compare Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 155-156, 125 S.Ct. 588, 160 L.Ed.2d 537 (2004) (individual suspected of impersonating a police officer gave inconsistent and implausible explanations for car modifications, a police radio scanner, and a pair of handcuffs). Finally, the detectives did not observe any offense being committed, even one of a minor or technical nature, that would justify a stop and arrest."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"police stop for a traffic violation can lead to a search for evidence of far more serious illegal activity","sentence":"See Whren, 517 U.S. at 813, 116 S.Ct. 1769 (police stop for a traffic violation can lead to a search for evidence of far more serious illegal activity)."},"case_id":4011998,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Supp. SJ at 13-18. As a matter of law, however, when a tenant \"merely retains the keys to the premises,\" the tenant does not become a holdover tenant. See Restatement (Second) of Prop.: Landlord & Tenant SS 14.2, Reporter's Note to Section 14.2, Note 6 (1977). If a tenant retains the keys to the premises, the court must examine the circumstances in their totality, looking to other factors to determine if the tenant should be deemed a holdover tenant.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that even though the tenant retained the keys, the tenant was not a holdover tenant because the tenant provided the landlord with notice he was moving out and the tenant had actually moved out","sentence":"See Hoopes v. Prudential Ins. Co., 48 Ill.App.3d 146, 6 Ill.Dec. 167, 362 N.E.2d 802, 805 (Ct.1977) (holding that even though the tenant retained the keys, the tenant was not a holdover tenant because the tenant provided the landlord with notice he was moving out and the tenant had actually moved out); see also Four \u201cS\u201d Alliance, Inc. v. Am. Nat\u2019l Bank & Trust Co., 104 Ill.App.3d 636, 60 Ill.Dec. 314, 432 N.E.2d 1213, 1217-18 (Ct.1982) (holding that the tenant was not a holdover tenant, despite retaining keys, because the tenant recognized the termination of the tenancy, relinquished possession of the premises and the landlord was able to gain access to the property); Brennan v. City of New York, 80 A.D. 251, 253, 80 N.Y.S. 247 (N.Y.App.Div.1903) (holding that where the landlord was aware the tenant had moved out, a tenant who attached a lock to the door and accidentally retained the keys to the lock was not a holdover tenant)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that the tenant was not a holdover tenant, despite retaining keys, because the tenant recognized the termination of the tenancy, relinquished possession of the premises and the landlord was able to gain access to the property","sentence":"See Hoopes v. Prudential Ins. Co., 48 Ill.App.3d 146, 6 Ill.Dec. 167, 362 N.E.2d 802, 805 (Ct.1977) (holding that even though the tenant retained the keys, the tenant was not a holdover tenant because the tenant provided the landlord with notice he was moving out and the tenant had actually moved out); see also Four \u201cS\u201d Alliance, Inc. v. Am. Nat\u2019l Bank & Trust Co., 104 Ill.App.3d 636, 60 Ill.Dec. 314, 432 N.E.2d 1213, 1217-18 (Ct.1982) (holding that the tenant was not a holdover tenant, despite retaining keys, because the tenant recognized the termination of the tenancy, relinquished possession of the premises and the landlord was able to gain access to the property); Brennan v. City of New York, 80 A.D. 251, 253, 80 N.Y.S. 247 (N.Y.App.Div.1903) (holding that where the landlord was aware the tenant had moved out, a tenant who attached a lock to the door and accidentally retained the keys to the lock was not a holdover tenant)."},"case_id":3567156,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Supp. SJ at 13-18. As a matter of law, however, when a tenant \"merely retains the keys to the premises,\" the tenant does not become a holdover tenant. See Restatement (Second) of Prop.: Landlord & Tenant SS 14.2, Reporter's Note to Section 14.2, Note 6 (1977). If a tenant retains the keys to the premises, the court must examine the circumstances in their totality, looking to other factors to determine if the tenant should be deemed a holdover tenant.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that the tenant was not a holdover tenant, despite retaining keys, because the tenant recognized the termination of the tenancy, relinquished possession of the premises and the landlord was able to gain access to the property","sentence":"See Hoopes v. Prudential Ins. Co., 48 Ill.App.3d 146, 6 Ill.Dec. 167, 362 N.E.2d 802, 805 (Ct.1977) (holding that even though the tenant retained the keys, the tenant was not a holdover tenant because the tenant provided the landlord with notice he was moving out and the tenant had actually moved out); see also Four \u201cS\u201d Alliance, Inc. v. Am. Nat\u2019l Bank & Trust Co., 104 Ill.App.3d 636, 60 Ill.Dec. 314, 432 N.E.2d 1213, 1217-18 (Ct.1982) (holding that the tenant was not a holdover tenant, despite retaining keys, because the tenant recognized the termination of the tenancy, relinquished possession of the premises and the landlord was able to gain access to the property); Brennan v. City of New York, 80 A.D. 251, 253, 80 N.Y.S. 247 (N.Y.App.Div.1903) (holding that where the landlord was aware the tenant had moved out, a tenant who attached a lock to the door and accidentally retained the keys to the lock was not a holdover tenant)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that even though the tenant retained the keys, the tenant was not a holdover tenant because the tenant provided the landlord with notice he was moving out and the tenant had actually moved out","sentence":"See Hoopes v. Prudential Ins. Co., 48 Ill.App.3d 146, 6 Ill.Dec. 167, 362 N.E.2d 802, 805 (Ct.1977) (holding that even though the tenant retained the keys, the tenant was not a holdover tenant because the tenant provided the landlord with notice he was moving out and the tenant had actually moved out); see also Four \u201cS\u201d Alliance, Inc. v. Am. Nat\u2019l Bank & Trust Co., 104 Ill.App.3d 636, 60 Ill.Dec. 314, 432 N.E.2d 1213, 1217-18 (Ct.1982) (holding that the tenant was not a holdover tenant, despite retaining keys, because the tenant recognized the termination of the tenancy, relinquished possession of the premises and the landlord was able to gain access to the property); Brennan v. City of New York, 80 A.D. 251, 253, 80 N.Y.S. 247 (N.Y.App.Div.1903) (holding that where the landlord was aware the tenant had moved out, a tenant who attached a lock to the door and accidentally retained the keys to the lock was not a holdover tenant)."},"case_id":3567156,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Supp. SJ at 13-18. As a matter of law, however, when a tenant \"merely retains the keys to the premises,\" the tenant does not become a holdover tenant. See Restatement (Second) of Prop.: Landlord & Tenant SS 14.2, Reporter's Note to Section 14.2, Note 6 (1977). If a tenant retains the keys to the premises, the court must examine the circumstances in their totality, looking to other factors to determine if the tenant should be deemed a holdover tenant.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that even though the tenant retained the keys, the tenant was not a holdover tenant because the tenant provided the landlord with notice he was moving out and the tenant had actually moved out","sentence":"See Hoopes v. Prudential Ins. Co., 48 Ill.App.3d 146, 6 Ill.Dec. 167, 362 N.E.2d 802, 805 (Ct.1977) (holding that even though the tenant retained the keys, the tenant was not a holdover tenant because the tenant provided the landlord with notice he was moving out and the tenant had actually moved out); see also Four \u201cS\u201d Alliance, Inc. v. Am. Nat\u2019l Bank & Trust Co., 104 Ill.App.3d 636, 60 Ill.Dec. 314, 432 N.E.2d 1213, 1217-18 (Ct.1982) (holding that the tenant was not a holdover tenant, despite retaining keys, because the tenant recognized the termination of the tenancy, relinquished possession of the premises and the landlord was able to gain access to the property); Brennan v. City of New York, 80 A.D. 251, 253, 80 N.Y.S. 247 (N.Y.App.Div.1903) (holding that where the landlord was aware the tenant had moved out, a tenant who attached a lock to the door and accidentally retained the keys to the lock was not a holdover tenant)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"432 N.E.2d 1213, 1217-18","parenthetical":"holding that the tenant was not a holdover tenant, despite retaining keys, because the tenant recognized the termination of the tenancy, relinquished possession of the premises and the landlord was able to gain access to the property","sentence":"See Hoopes v. Prudential Ins. Co., 48 Ill.App.3d 146, 6 Ill.Dec. 167, 362 N.E.2d 802, 805 (Ct.1977) (holding that even though the tenant retained the keys, the tenant was not a holdover tenant because the tenant provided the landlord with notice he was moving out and the tenant had actually moved out); see also Four \u201cS\u201d Alliance, Inc. v. Am. Nat\u2019l Bank & Trust Co., 104 Ill.App.3d 636, 60 Ill.Dec. 314, 432 N.E.2d 1213, 1217-18 (Ct.1982) (holding that the tenant was not a holdover tenant, despite retaining keys, because the tenant recognized the termination of the tenancy, relinquished possession of the premises and the landlord was able to gain access to the property); Brennan v. City of New York, 80 A.D. 251, 253, 80 N.Y.S. 247 (N.Y.App.Div.1903) (holding that where the landlord was aware the tenant had moved out, a tenant who attached a lock to the door and accidentally retained the keys to the lock was not a holdover tenant)."},"case_id":3567156,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Supp. SJ at 13-18. As a matter of law, however, when a tenant \"merely retains the keys to the premises,\" the tenant does not become a holdover tenant. See Restatement (Second) of Prop.: Landlord & Tenant SS 14.2, Reporter's Note to Section 14.2, Note 6 (1977). If a tenant retains the keys to the premises, the court must examine the circumstances in their totality, looking to other factors to determine if the tenant should be deemed a holdover tenant.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that even though the tenant retained the keys, the tenant was not a holdover tenant because the tenant provided the landlord with notice he was moving out and the tenant had actually moved out","sentence":"See Hoopes v. Prudential Ins. Co., 48 Ill.App.3d 146, 6 Ill.Dec. 167, 362 N.E.2d 802, 805 (Ct.1977) (holding that even though the tenant retained the keys, the tenant was not a holdover tenant because the tenant provided the landlord with notice he was moving out and the tenant had actually moved out); see also Four \u201cS\u201d Alliance, Inc. v. Am. Nat\u2019l Bank & Trust Co., 104 Ill.App.3d 636, 60 Ill.Dec. 314, 432 N.E.2d 1213, 1217-18 (Ct.1982) (holding that the tenant was not a holdover tenant, despite retaining keys, because the tenant recognized the termination of the tenancy, relinquished possession of the premises and the landlord was able to gain access to the property); Brennan v. City of New York, 80 A.D. 251, 253, 80 N.Y.S. 247 (N.Y.App.Div.1903) (holding that where the landlord was aware the tenant had moved out, a tenant who attached a lock to the door and accidentally retained the keys to the lock was not a holdover tenant)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"80 A.D. 251, 253","parenthetical":"holding that where the landlord was aware the tenant had moved out, a tenant who attached a lock to the door and accidentally retained the keys to the lock was not a holdover tenant","sentence":"See Hoopes v. Prudential Ins. Co., 48 Ill.App.3d 146, 6 Ill.Dec. 167, 362 N.E.2d 802, 805 (Ct.1977) (holding that even though the tenant retained the keys, the tenant was not a holdover tenant because the tenant provided the landlord with notice he was moving out and the tenant had actually moved out); see also Four \u201cS\u201d Alliance, Inc. v. Am. Nat\u2019l Bank & Trust Co., 104 Ill.App.3d 636, 60 Ill.Dec. 314, 432 N.E.2d 1213, 1217-18 (Ct.1982) (holding that the tenant was not a holdover tenant, despite retaining keys, because the tenant recognized the termination of the tenancy, relinquished possession of the premises and the landlord was able to gain access to the property); Brennan v. City of New York, 80 A.D. 251, 253, 80 N.Y.S. 247 (N.Y.App.Div.1903) (holding that where the landlord was aware the tenant had moved out, a tenant who attached a lock to the door and accidentally retained the keys to the lock was not a holdover tenant)."},"case_id":3567156,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Supp. SJ at 13-18. As a matter of law, however, when a tenant \"merely retains the keys to the premises,\" the tenant does not become a holdover tenant. See Restatement (Second) of Prop.: Landlord & Tenant SS 14.2, Reporter's Note to Section 14.2, Note 6 (1977). If a tenant retains the keys to the premises, the court must examine the circumstances in their totality, looking to other factors to determine if the tenant should be deemed a holdover tenant.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that where the landlord was aware the tenant had moved out, a tenant who attached a lock to the door and accidentally retained the keys to the lock was not a holdover tenant","sentence":"See Hoopes v. Prudential Ins. Co., 48 Ill.App.3d 146, 6 Ill.Dec. 167, 362 N.E.2d 802, 805 (Ct.1977) (holding that even though the tenant retained the keys, the tenant was not a holdover tenant because the tenant provided the landlord with notice he was moving out and the tenant had actually moved out); see also Four \u201cS\u201d Alliance, Inc. v. Am. Nat\u2019l Bank & Trust Co., 104 Ill.App.3d 636, 60 Ill.Dec. 314, 432 N.E.2d 1213, 1217-18 (Ct.1982) (holding that the tenant was not a holdover tenant, despite retaining keys, because the tenant recognized the termination of the tenancy, relinquished possession of the premises and the landlord was able to gain access to the property); Brennan v. City of New York, 80 A.D. 251, 253, 80 N.Y.S. 247 (N.Y.App.Div.1903) (holding that where the landlord was aware the tenant had moved out, a tenant who attached a lock to the door and accidentally retained the keys to the lock was not a holdover tenant)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that even though the tenant retained the keys, the tenant was not a holdover tenant because the tenant provided the landlord with notice he was moving out and the tenant had actually moved out","sentence":"See Hoopes v. Prudential Ins. Co., 48 Ill.App.3d 146, 6 Ill.Dec. 167, 362 N.E.2d 802, 805 (Ct.1977) (holding that even though the tenant retained the keys, the tenant was not a holdover tenant because the tenant provided the landlord with notice he was moving out and the tenant had actually moved out); see also Four \u201cS\u201d Alliance, Inc. v. Am. Nat\u2019l Bank & Trust Co., 104 Ill.App.3d 636, 60 Ill.Dec. 314, 432 N.E.2d 1213, 1217-18 (Ct.1982) (holding that the tenant was not a holdover tenant, despite retaining keys, because the tenant recognized the termination of the tenancy, relinquished possession of the premises and the landlord was able to gain access to the property); Brennan v. City of New York, 80 A.D. 251, 253, 80 N.Y.S. 247 (N.Y.App.Div.1903) (holding that where the landlord was aware the tenant had moved out, a tenant who attached a lock to the door and accidentally retained the keys to the lock was not a holdover tenant)."},"case_id":3567156,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Supp. SJ at 13-18. As a matter of law, however, when a tenant \"merely retains the keys to the premises,\" the tenant does not become a holdover tenant. See Restatement (Second) of Prop.: Landlord & Tenant SS 14.2, Reporter's Note to Section 14.2, Note 6 (1977). If a tenant retains the keys to the premises, the court must examine the circumstances in their totality, looking to other factors to determine if the tenant should be deemed a holdover tenant.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that the tenant was not a holdover tenant, despite retaining keys, because the tenant recognized the termination of the tenancy, relinquished possession of the premises and the landlord was able to gain access to the property","sentence":"See Hoopes v. Prudential Ins. Co., 48 Ill.App.3d 146, 6 Ill.Dec. 167, 362 N.E.2d 802, 805 (Ct.1977) (holding that even though the tenant retained the keys, the tenant was not a holdover tenant because the tenant provided the landlord with notice he was moving out and the tenant had actually moved out); see also Four \u201cS\u201d Alliance, Inc. v. Am. Nat\u2019l Bank & Trust Co., 104 Ill.App.3d 636, 60 Ill.Dec. 314, 432 N.E.2d 1213, 1217-18 (Ct.1982) (holding that the tenant was not a holdover tenant, despite retaining keys, because the tenant recognized the termination of the tenancy, relinquished possession of the premises and the landlord was able to gain access to the property); Brennan v. City of New York, 80 A.D. 251, 253, 80 N.Y.S. 247 (N.Y.App.Div.1903) (holding that where the landlord was aware the tenant had moved out, a tenant who attached a lock to the door and accidentally retained the keys to the lock was not a holdover tenant)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that even though the tenant retained the keys, the tenant was not a holdover tenant because the tenant provided the landlord with notice he was moving out and the tenant had actually moved out","sentence":"See Hoopes v. Prudential Ins. Co., 48 Ill.App.3d 146, 6 Ill.Dec. 167, 362 N.E.2d 802, 805 (Ct.1977) (holding that even though the tenant retained the keys, the tenant was not a holdover tenant because the tenant provided the landlord with notice he was moving out and the tenant had actually moved out); see also Four \u201cS\u201d Alliance, Inc. v. Am. Nat\u2019l Bank & Trust Co., 104 Ill.App.3d 636, 60 Ill.Dec. 314, 432 N.E.2d 1213, 1217-18 (Ct.1982) (holding that the tenant was not a holdover tenant, despite retaining keys, because the tenant recognized the termination of the tenancy, relinquished possession of the premises and the landlord was able to gain access to the property); Brennan v. City of New York, 80 A.D. 251, 253, 80 N.Y.S. 247 (N.Y.App.Div.1903) (holding that where the landlord was aware the tenant had moved out, a tenant who attached a lock to the door and accidentally retained the keys to the lock was not a holdover tenant)."},"case_id":3567156,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Supp. SJ at 13-18. As a matter of law, however, when a tenant \"merely retains the keys to the premises,\" the tenant does not become a holdover tenant. See Restatement (Second) of Prop.: Landlord & Tenant SS 14.2, Reporter's Note to Section 14.2, Note 6 (1977). If a tenant retains the keys to the premises, the court must examine the circumstances in their totality, looking to other factors to determine if the tenant should be deemed a holdover tenant.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that the tenant was not a holdover tenant, despite retaining keys, because the tenant recognized the termination of the tenancy, relinquished possession of the premises and the landlord was able to gain access to the property","sentence":"See Hoopes v. Prudential Ins. Co., 48 Ill.App.3d 146, 6 Ill.Dec. 167, 362 N.E.2d 802, 805 (Ct.1977) (holding that even though the tenant retained the keys, the tenant was not a holdover tenant because the tenant provided the landlord with notice he was moving out and the tenant had actually moved out); see also Four \u201cS\u201d Alliance, Inc. v. Am. Nat\u2019l Bank & Trust Co., 104 Ill.App.3d 636, 60 Ill.Dec. 314, 432 N.E.2d 1213, 1217-18 (Ct.1982) (holding that the tenant was not a holdover tenant, despite retaining keys, because the tenant recognized the termination of the tenancy, relinquished possession of the premises and the landlord was able to gain access to the property); Brennan v. City of New York, 80 A.D. 251, 253, 80 N.Y.S. 247 (N.Y.App.Div.1903) (holding that where the landlord was aware the tenant had moved out, a tenant who attached a lock to the door and accidentally retained the keys to the lock was not a holdover tenant)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that even though the tenant retained the keys, the tenant was not a holdover tenant because the tenant provided the landlord with notice he was moving out and the tenant had actually moved out","sentence":"See Hoopes v. Prudential Ins. Co., 48 Ill.App.3d 146, 6 Ill.Dec. 167, 362 N.E.2d 802, 805 (Ct.1977) (holding that even though the tenant retained the keys, the tenant was not a holdover tenant because the tenant provided the landlord with notice he was moving out and the tenant had actually moved out); see also Four \u201cS\u201d Alliance, Inc. v. Am. Nat\u2019l Bank & Trust Co., 104 Ill.App.3d 636, 60 Ill.Dec. 314, 432 N.E.2d 1213, 1217-18 (Ct.1982) (holding that the tenant was not a holdover tenant, despite retaining keys, because the tenant recognized the termination of the tenancy, relinquished possession of the premises and the landlord was able to gain access to the property); Brennan v. City of New York, 80 A.D. 251, 253, 80 N.Y.S. 247 (N.Y.App.Div.1903) (holding that where the landlord was aware the tenant had moved out, a tenant who attached a lock to the door and accidentally retained the keys to the lock was not a holdover tenant)."},"case_id":3567156,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Supp. SJ at 13-18. As a matter of law, however, when a tenant \"merely retains the keys to the premises,\" the tenant does not become a holdover tenant. See Restatement (Second) of Prop.: Landlord & Tenant SS 14.2, Reporter's Note to Section 14.2, Note 6 (1977). If a tenant retains the keys to the premises, the court must examine the circumstances in their totality, looking to other factors to determine if the tenant should be deemed a holdover tenant.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that even though the tenant retained the keys, the tenant was not a holdover tenant because the tenant provided the landlord with notice he was moving out and the tenant had actually moved out","sentence":"See Hoopes v. Prudential Ins. Co., 48 Ill.App.3d 146, 6 Ill.Dec. 167, 362 N.E.2d 802, 805 (Ct.1977) (holding that even though the tenant retained the keys, the tenant was not a holdover tenant because the tenant provided the landlord with notice he was moving out and the tenant had actually moved out); see also Four \u201cS\u201d Alliance, Inc. v. Am. Nat\u2019l Bank & Trust Co., 104 Ill.App.3d 636, 60 Ill.Dec. 314, 432 N.E.2d 1213, 1217-18 (Ct.1982) (holding that the tenant was not a holdover tenant, despite retaining keys, because the tenant recognized the termination of the tenancy, relinquished possession of the premises and the landlord was able to gain access to the property); Brennan v. City of New York, 80 A.D. 251, 253, 80 N.Y.S. 247 (N.Y.App.Div.1903) (holding that where the landlord was aware the tenant had moved out, a tenant who attached a lock to the door and accidentally retained the keys to the lock was not a holdover tenant)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"432 N.E.2d 1213, 1217-18","parenthetical":"holding that the tenant was not a holdover tenant, despite retaining keys, because the tenant recognized the termination of the tenancy, relinquished possession of the premises and the landlord was able to gain access to the property","sentence":"See Hoopes v. Prudential Ins. Co., 48 Ill.App.3d 146, 6 Ill.Dec. 167, 362 N.E.2d 802, 805 (Ct.1977) (holding that even though the tenant retained the keys, the tenant was not a holdover tenant because the tenant provided the landlord with notice he was moving out and the tenant had actually moved out); see also Four \u201cS\u201d Alliance, Inc. v. Am. Nat\u2019l Bank & Trust Co., 104 Ill.App.3d 636, 60 Ill.Dec. 314, 432 N.E.2d 1213, 1217-18 (Ct.1982) (holding that the tenant was not a holdover tenant, despite retaining keys, because the tenant recognized the termination of the tenancy, relinquished possession of the premises and the landlord was able to gain access to the property); Brennan v. City of New York, 80 A.D. 251, 253, 80 N.Y.S. 247 (N.Y.App.Div.1903) (holding that where the landlord was aware the tenant had moved out, a tenant who attached a lock to the door and accidentally retained the keys to the lock was not a holdover tenant)."},"case_id":3567156,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Supp. SJ at 13-18. As a matter of law, however, when a tenant \"merely retains the keys to the premises,\" the tenant does not become a holdover tenant. See Restatement (Second) of Prop.: Landlord & Tenant SS 14.2, Reporter's Note to Section 14.2, Note 6 (1977). If a tenant retains the keys to the premises, the court must examine the circumstances in their totality, looking to other factors to determine if the tenant should be deemed a holdover tenant.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"80 A.D. 251, 253","parenthetical":"holding that where the landlord was aware the tenant had moved out, a tenant who attached a lock to the door and accidentally retained the keys to the lock was not a holdover tenant","sentence":"See Hoopes v. Prudential Ins. Co., 48 Ill.App.3d 146, 6 Ill.Dec. 167, 362 N.E.2d 802, 805 (Ct.1977) (holding that even though the tenant retained the keys, the tenant was not a holdover tenant because the tenant provided the landlord with notice he was moving out and the tenant had actually moved out); see also Four \u201cS\u201d Alliance, Inc. v. Am. Nat\u2019l Bank & Trust Co., 104 Ill.App.3d 636, 60 Ill.Dec. 314, 432 N.E.2d 1213, 1217-18 (Ct.1982) (holding that the tenant was not a holdover tenant, despite retaining keys, because the tenant recognized the termination of the tenancy, relinquished possession of the premises and the landlord was able to gain access to the property); Brennan v. City of New York, 80 A.D. 251, 253, 80 N.Y.S. 247 (N.Y.App.Div.1903) (holding that where the landlord was aware the tenant had moved out, a tenant who attached a lock to the door and accidentally retained the keys to the lock was not a holdover tenant)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that even though the tenant retained the keys, the tenant was not a holdover tenant because the tenant provided the landlord with notice he was moving out and the tenant had actually moved out","sentence":"See Hoopes v. Prudential Ins. Co., 48 Ill.App.3d 146, 6 Ill.Dec. 167, 362 N.E.2d 802, 805 (Ct.1977) (holding that even though the tenant retained the keys, the tenant was not a holdover tenant because the tenant provided the landlord with notice he was moving out and the tenant had actually moved out); see also Four \u201cS\u201d Alliance, Inc. v. Am. Nat\u2019l Bank & Trust Co., 104 Ill.App.3d 636, 60 Ill.Dec. 314, 432 N.E.2d 1213, 1217-18 (Ct.1982) (holding that the tenant was not a holdover tenant, despite retaining keys, because the tenant recognized the termination of the tenancy, relinquished possession of the premises and the landlord was able to gain access to the property); Brennan v. City of New York, 80 A.D. 251, 253, 80 N.Y.S. 247 (N.Y.App.Div.1903) (holding that where the landlord was aware the tenant had moved out, a tenant who attached a lock to the door and accidentally retained the keys to the lock was not a holdover tenant)."},"case_id":3567156,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Supp. SJ at 13-18. As a matter of law, however, when a tenant \"merely retains the keys to the premises,\" the tenant does not become a holdover tenant. See Restatement (Second) of Prop.: Landlord & Tenant SS 14.2, Reporter's Note to Section 14.2, Note 6 (1977). If a tenant retains the keys to the premises, the court must examine the circumstances in their totality, looking to other factors to determine if the tenant should be deemed a holdover tenant.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that where the landlord was aware the tenant had moved out, a tenant who attached a lock to the door and accidentally retained the keys to the lock was not a holdover tenant","sentence":"See Hoopes v. Prudential Ins. Co., 48 Ill.App.3d 146, 6 Ill.Dec. 167, 362 N.E.2d 802, 805 (Ct.1977) (holding that even though the tenant retained the keys, the tenant was not a holdover tenant because the tenant provided the landlord with notice he was moving out and the tenant had actually moved out); see also Four \u201cS\u201d Alliance, Inc. v. Am. Nat\u2019l Bank & Trust Co., 104 Ill.App.3d 636, 60 Ill.Dec. 314, 432 N.E.2d 1213, 1217-18 (Ct.1982) (holding that the tenant was not a holdover tenant, despite retaining keys, because the tenant recognized the termination of the tenancy, relinquished possession of the premises and the landlord was able to gain access to the property); Brennan v. City of New York, 80 A.D. 251, 253, 80 N.Y.S. 247 (N.Y.App.Div.1903) (holding that where the landlord was aware the tenant had moved out, a tenant who attached a lock to the door and accidentally retained the keys to the lock was not a holdover tenant)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that even though the tenant retained the keys, the tenant was not a holdover tenant because the tenant provided the landlord with notice he was moving out and the tenant had actually moved out","sentence":"See Hoopes v. Prudential Ins. Co., 48 Ill.App.3d 146, 6 Ill.Dec. 167, 362 N.E.2d 802, 805 (Ct.1977) (holding that even though the tenant retained the keys, the tenant was not a holdover tenant because the tenant provided the landlord with notice he was moving out and the tenant had actually moved out); see also Four \u201cS\u201d Alliance, Inc. v. Am. Nat\u2019l Bank & Trust Co., 104 Ill.App.3d 636, 60 Ill.Dec. 314, 432 N.E.2d 1213, 1217-18 (Ct.1982) (holding that the tenant was not a holdover tenant, despite retaining keys, because the tenant recognized the termination of the tenancy, relinquished possession of the premises and the landlord was able to gain access to the property); Brennan v. City of New York, 80 A.D. 251, 253, 80 N.Y.S. 247 (N.Y.App.Div.1903) (holding that where the landlord was aware the tenant had moved out, a tenant who attached a lock to the door and accidentally retained the keys to the lock was not a holdover tenant)."},"case_id":3567156,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Supp. SJ at 13-18. As a matter of law, however, when a tenant \"merely retains the keys to the premises,\" the tenant does not become a holdover tenant. See Restatement (Second) of Prop.: Landlord & Tenant SS 14.2, Reporter's Note to Section 14.2, Note 6 (1977). If a tenant retains the keys to the premises, the court must examine the circumstances in their totality, looking to other factors to determine if the tenant should be deemed a holdover tenant.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"362 N.E.2d 802, 805","parenthetical":"holding that even though the tenant retained the keys, the tenant was not a holdover tenant because the tenant provided the landlord with notice he was moving out and the tenant had actually moved out","sentence":"See Hoopes v. Prudential Ins. Co., 48 Ill.App.3d 146, 6 Ill.Dec. 167, 362 N.E.2d 802, 805 (Ct.1977) (holding that even though the tenant retained the keys, the tenant was not a holdover tenant because the tenant provided the landlord with notice he was moving out and the tenant had actually moved out); see also Four \u201cS\u201d Alliance, Inc. v. Am. Nat\u2019l Bank & Trust Co., 104 Ill.App.3d 636, 60 Ill.Dec. 314, 432 N.E.2d 1213, 1217-18 (Ct.1982) (holding that the tenant was not a holdover tenant, despite retaining keys, because the tenant recognized the termination of the tenancy, relinquished possession of the premises and the landlord was able to gain access to the property); Brennan v. City of New York, 80 A.D. 251, 253, 80 N.Y.S. 247 (N.Y.App.Div.1903) (holding that where the landlord was aware the tenant had moved out, a tenant who attached a lock to the door and accidentally retained the keys to the lock was not a holdover tenant)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that the tenant was not a holdover tenant, despite retaining keys, because the tenant recognized the termination of the tenancy, relinquished possession of the premises and the landlord was able to gain access to the property","sentence":"See Hoopes v. Prudential Ins. Co., 48 Ill.App.3d 146, 6 Ill.Dec. 167, 362 N.E.2d 802, 805 (Ct.1977) (holding that even though the tenant retained the keys, the tenant was not a holdover tenant because the tenant provided the landlord with notice he was moving out and the tenant had actually moved out); see also Four \u201cS\u201d Alliance, Inc. v. Am. Nat\u2019l Bank & Trust Co., 104 Ill.App.3d 636, 60 Ill.Dec. 314, 432 N.E.2d 1213, 1217-18 (Ct.1982) (holding that the tenant was not a holdover tenant, despite retaining keys, because the tenant recognized the termination of the tenancy, relinquished possession of the premises and the landlord was able to gain access to the property); Brennan v. City of New York, 80 A.D. 251, 253, 80 N.Y.S. 247 (N.Y.App.Div.1903) (holding that where the landlord was aware the tenant had moved out, a tenant who attached a lock to the door and accidentally retained the keys to the lock was not a holdover tenant)."},"case_id":3567156,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Supp. SJ at 13-18. As a matter of law, however, when a tenant \"merely retains the keys to the premises,\" the tenant does not become a holdover tenant. See Restatement (Second) of Prop.: Landlord & Tenant SS 14.2, Reporter's Note to Section 14.2, Note 6 (1977). If a tenant retains the keys to the premises, the court must examine the circumstances in their totality, looking to other factors to determine if the tenant should be deemed a holdover tenant.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"362 N.E.2d 802, 805","parenthetical":"holding that even though the tenant retained the keys, the tenant was not a holdover tenant because the tenant provided the landlord with notice he was moving out and the tenant had actually moved out","sentence":"See Hoopes v. Prudential Ins. Co., 48 Ill.App.3d 146, 6 Ill.Dec. 167, 362 N.E.2d 802, 805 (Ct.1977) (holding that even though the tenant retained the keys, the tenant was not a holdover tenant because the tenant provided the landlord with notice he was moving out and the tenant had actually moved out); see also Four \u201cS\u201d Alliance, Inc. v. Am. Nat\u2019l Bank & Trust Co., 104 Ill.App.3d 636, 60 Ill.Dec. 314, 432 N.E.2d 1213, 1217-18 (Ct.1982) (holding that the tenant was not a holdover tenant, despite retaining keys, because the tenant recognized the termination of the tenancy, relinquished possession of the premises and the landlord was able to gain access to the property); Brennan v. City of New York, 80 A.D. 251, 253, 80 N.Y.S. 247 (N.Y.App.Div.1903) (holding that where the landlord was aware the tenant had moved out, a tenant who attached a lock to the door and accidentally retained the keys to the lock was not a holdover tenant)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that the tenant was not a holdover tenant, despite retaining keys, because the tenant recognized the termination of the tenancy, relinquished possession of the premises and the landlord was able to gain access to the property","sentence":"See Hoopes v. Prudential Ins. Co., 48 Ill.App.3d 146, 6 Ill.Dec. 167, 362 N.E.2d 802, 805 (Ct.1977) (holding that even though the tenant retained the keys, the tenant was not a holdover tenant because the tenant provided the landlord with notice he was moving out and the tenant had actually moved out); see also Four \u201cS\u201d Alliance, Inc. v. Am. Nat\u2019l Bank & Trust Co., 104 Ill.App.3d 636, 60 Ill.Dec. 314, 432 N.E.2d 1213, 1217-18 (Ct.1982) (holding that the tenant was not a holdover tenant, despite retaining keys, because the tenant recognized the termination of the tenancy, relinquished possession of the premises and the landlord was able to gain access to the property); Brennan v. City of New York, 80 A.D. 251, 253, 80 N.Y.S. 247 (N.Y.App.Div.1903) (holding that where the landlord was aware the tenant had moved out, a tenant who attached a lock to the door and accidentally retained the keys to the lock was not a holdover tenant)."},"case_id":3567156,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Supp. SJ at 13-18. As a matter of law, however, when a tenant \"merely retains the keys to the premises,\" the tenant does not become a holdover tenant. See Restatement (Second) of Prop.: Landlord & Tenant SS 14.2, Reporter's Note to Section 14.2, Note 6 (1977). If a tenant retains the keys to the premises, the court must examine the circumstances in their totality, looking to other factors to determine if the tenant should be deemed a holdover tenant.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"362 N.E.2d 802, 805","parenthetical":"holding that even though the tenant retained the keys, the tenant was not a holdover tenant because the tenant provided the landlord with notice he was moving out and the tenant had actually moved out","sentence":"See Hoopes v. Prudential Ins. Co., 48 Ill.App.3d 146, 6 Ill.Dec. 167, 362 N.E.2d 802, 805 (Ct.1977) (holding that even though the tenant retained the keys, the tenant was not a holdover tenant because the tenant provided the landlord with notice he was moving out and the tenant had actually moved out); see also Four \u201cS\u201d Alliance, Inc. v. Am. Nat\u2019l Bank & Trust Co., 104 Ill.App.3d 636, 60 Ill.Dec. 314, 432 N.E.2d 1213, 1217-18 (Ct.1982) (holding that the tenant was not a holdover tenant, despite retaining keys, because the tenant recognized the termination of the tenancy, relinquished possession of the premises and the landlord was able to gain access to the property); Brennan v. City of New York, 80 A.D. 251, 253, 80 N.Y.S. 247 (N.Y.App.Div.1903) (holding that where the landlord was aware the tenant had moved out, a tenant who attached a lock to the door and accidentally retained the keys to the lock was not a holdover tenant)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"432 N.E.2d 1213, 1217-18","parenthetical":"holding that the tenant was not a holdover tenant, despite retaining keys, because the tenant recognized the termination of the tenancy, relinquished possession of the premises and the landlord was able to gain access to the property","sentence":"See Hoopes v. Prudential Ins. Co., 48 Ill.App.3d 146, 6 Ill.Dec. 167, 362 N.E.2d 802, 805 (Ct.1977) (holding that even though the tenant retained the keys, the tenant was not a holdover tenant because the tenant provided the landlord with notice he was moving out and the tenant had actually moved out); see also Four \u201cS\u201d Alliance, Inc. v. Am. Nat\u2019l Bank & Trust Co., 104 Ill.App.3d 636, 60 Ill.Dec. 314, 432 N.E.2d 1213, 1217-18 (Ct.1982) (holding that the tenant was not a holdover tenant, despite retaining keys, because the tenant recognized the termination of the tenancy, relinquished possession of the premises and the landlord was able to gain access to the property); Brennan v. City of New York, 80 A.D. 251, 253, 80 N.Y.S. 247 (N.Y.App.Div.1903) (holding that where the landlord was aware the tenant had moved out, a tenant who attached a lock to the door and accidentally retained the keys to the lock was not a holdover tenant)."},"case_id":3567156,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Supp. SJ at 13-18. As a matter of law, however, when a tenant \"merely retains the keys to the premises,\" the tenant does not become a holdover tenant. See Restatement (Second) of Prop.: Landlord & Tenant SS 14.2, Reporter's Note to Section 14.2, Note 6 (1977). If a tenant retains the keys to the premises, the court must examine the circumstances in their totality, looking to other factors to determine if the tenant should be deemed a holdover tenant.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"362 N.E.2d 802, 805","parenthetical":"holding that even though the tenant retained the keys, the tenant was not a holdover tenant because the tenant provided the landlord with notice he was moving out and the tenant had actually moved out","sentence":"See Hoopes v. Prudential Ins. Co., 48 Ill.App.3d 146, 6 Ill.Dec. 167, 362 N.E.2d 802, 805 (Ct.1977) (holding that even though the tenant retained the keys, the tenant was not a holdover tenant because the tenant provided the landlord with notice he was moving out and the tenant had actually moved out); see also Four \u201cS\u201d Alliance, Inc. v. Am. Nat\u2019l Bank & Trust Co., 104 Ill.App.3d 636, 60 Ill.Dec. 314, 432 N.E.2d 1213, 1217-18 (Ct.1982) (holding that the tenant was not a holdover tenant, despite retaining keys, because the tenant recognized the termination of the tenancy, relinquished possession of the premises and the landlord was able to gain access to the property); Brennan v. City of New York, 80 A.D. 251, 253, 80 N.Y.S. 247 (N.Y.App.Div.1903) (holding that where the landlord was aware the tenant had moved out, a tenant who attached a lock to the door and accidentally retained the keys to the lock was not a holdover tenant)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"80 A.D. 251, 253","parenthetical":"holding that where the landlord was aware the tenant had moved out, a tenant who attached a lock to the door and accidentally retained the keys to the lock was not a holdover tenant","sentence":"See Hoopes v. Prudential Ins. Co., 48 Ill.App.3d 146, 6 Ill.Dec. 167, 362 N.E.2d 802, 805 (Ct.1977) (holding that even though the tenant retained the keys, the tenant was not a holdover tenant because the tenant provided the landlord with notice he was moving out and the tenant had actually moved out); see also Four \u201cS\u201d Alliance, Inc. v. Am. Nat\u2019l Bank & Trust Co., 104 Ill.App.3d 636, 60 Ill.Dec. 314, 432 N.E.2d 1213, 1217-18 (Ct.1982) (holding that the tenant was not a holdover tenant, despite retaining keys, because the tenant recognized the termination of the tenancy, relinquished possession of the premises and the landlord was able to gain access to the property); Brennan v. City of New York, 80 A.D. 251, 253, 80 N.Y.S. 247 (N.Y.App.Div.1903) (holding that where the landlord was aware the tenant had moved out, a tenant who attached a lock to the door and accidentally retained the keys to the lock was not a holdover tenant)."},"case_id":3567156,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Supp. SJ at 13-18. As a matter of law, however, when a tenant \"merely retains the keys to the premises,\" the tenant does not become a holdover tenant. See Restatement (Second) of Prop.: Landlord & Tenant SS 14.2, Reporter's Note to Section 14.2, Note 6 (1977). If a tenant retains the keys to the premises, the court must examine the circumstances in their totality, looking to other factors to determine if the tenant should be deemed a holdover tenant.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that where the landlord was aware the tenant had moved out, a tenant who attached a lock to the door and accidentally retained the keys to the lock was not a holdover tenant","sentence":"See Hoopes v. Prudential Ins. Co., 48 Ill.App.3d 146, 6 Ill.Dec. 167, 362 N.E.2d 802, 805 (Ct.1977) (holding that even though the tenant retained the keys, the tenant was not a holdover tenant because the tenant provided the landlord with notice he was moving out and the tenant had actually moved out); see also Four \u201cS\u201d Alliance, Inc. v. Am. Nat\u2019l Bank & Trust Co., 104 Ill.App.3d 636, 60 Ill.Dec. 314, 432 N.E.2d 1213, 1217-18 (Ct.1982) (holding that the tenant was not a holdover tenant, despite retaining keys, because the tenant recognized the termination of the tenancy, relinquished possession of the premises and the landlord was able to gain access to the property); Brennan v. City of New York, 80 A.D. 251, 253, 80 N.Y.S. 247 (N.Y.App.Div.1903) (holding that where the landlord was aware the tenant had moved out, a tenant who attached a lock to the door and accidentally retained the keys to the lock was not a holdover tenant)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"362 N.E.2d 802, 805","parenthetical":"holding that even though the tenant retained the keys, the tenant was not a holdover tenant because the tenant provided the landlord with notice he was moving out and the tenant had actually moved out","sentence":"See Hoopes v. Prudential Ins. Co., 48 Ill.App.3d 146, 6 Ill.Dec. 167, 362 N.E.2d 802, 805 (Ct.1977) (holding that even though the tenant retained the keys, the tenant was not a holdover tenant because the tenant provided the landlord with notice he was moving out and the tenant had actually moved out); see also Four \u201cS\u201d Alliance, Inc. v. Am. Nat\u2019l Bank & Trust Co., 104 Ill.App.3d 636, 60 Ill.Dec. 314, 432 N.E.2d 1213, 1217-18 (Ct.1982) (holding that the tenant was not a holdover tenant, despite retaining keys, because the tenant recognized the termination of the tenancy, relinquished possession of the premises and the landlord was able to gain access to the property); Brennan v. City of New York, 80 A.D. 251, 253, 80 N.Y.S. 247 (N.Y.App.Div.1903) (holding that where the landlord was aware the tenant had moved out, a tenant who attached a lock to the door and accidentally retained the keys to the lock was not a holdover tenant)."},"case_id":3567156,"label":"b"}
{"context":"[P 10] This Court has also recognized that city police officers have jurisdiction to stop vehicles and arrest individuals outside of their geographical jurisdiction when responding to requests from another law enforcement agency for aid and assistance.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"530 N.W.2d 328, 330","parenthetical":"holding that although officer's observation and stop of the defendant's vehicle occurred outside of the officer's geographical jurisdiction, the officer still had jurisdiction where the officer was requested by a state trooper to stop the suspect's vehicle","sentence":"See State v. Graven, 530 N.W.2d 328, 330 (N.D.1995) (holding that although officer\u2019s observation and stop of the defendant\u2019s vehicle occurred outside of the officer\u2019s geographical jurisdiction, the officer still had jurisdiction where the officer was requested by a state trooper to stop the suspect\u2019s vehicle)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"1998 ND App 2, \u00b6 12","parenthetical":"holding peace officer who responded to a request from another law enforcement agency for assistance had authority to complete the investigation and make an arrest","sentence":"See also N.D.C.C. \u00a7 44-08-20(3) (stating, \u201cPeace officers employed by a law enforcement agency within the state have the power of a peace officer ... [w]hen responding to requests from other law enforcement agencies or officers for aid and assistance.\u201d); Mead v. North Dakota Dep\u2019t of Transp., 1998 ND App 2, \u00b6 12, 581 N.W.2d 145 (holding peace officer who responded to a request from another law enforcement agency for assistance had authority to complete the investigation and make an arrest). There is no evidence Officer O\u2019Donnell requested authorization to make an extra-territorial stop."},"case_id":8352316,"label":"a"}
{"context":"[P 10] This Court has also recognized that city police officers have jurisdiction to stop vehicles and arrest individuals outside of their geographical jurisdiction when responding to requests from another law enforcement agency for aid and assistance.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"530 N.W.2d 328, 330","parenthetical":"holding that although officer's observation and stop of the defendant's vehicle occurred outside of the officer's geographical jurisdiction, the officer still had jurisdiction where the officer was requested by a state trooper to stop the suspect's vehicle","sentence":"See State v. Graven, 530 N.W.2d 328, 330 (N.D.1995) (holding that although officer\u2019s observation and stop of the defendant\u2019s vehicle occurred outside of the officer\u2019s geographical jurisdiction, the officer still had jurisdiction where the officer was requested by a state trooper to stop the suspect\u2019s vehicle)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding peace officer who responded to a request from another law enforcement agency for assistance had authority to complete the investigation and make an arrest","sentence":"See also N.D.C.C. \u00a7 44-08-20(3) (stating, \u201cPeace officers employed by a law enforcement agency within the state have the power of a peace officer ... [w]hen responding to requests from other law enforcement agencies or officers for aid and assistance.\u201d); Mead v. North Dakota Dep\u2019t of Transp., 1998 ND App 2, \u00b6 12, 581 N.W.2d 145 (holding peace officer who responded to a request from another law enforcement agency for assistance had authority to complete the investigation and make an arrest). There is no evidence Officer O\u2019Donnell requested authorization to make an extra-territorial stop."},"case_id":8352316,"label":"a"}
{"context":"P 28. The trial court made no findings as to whether Howe and Lalime were negligent in their preparation of the deeds, whether this negligence was a proximate cause of the errors in the deeds, and whether and to what extent Therrien's actions contributed to these errors. Therefore, we must reverse and remand the Paragraph 7 portion of the liability determination to allow the court to make the appropriate factual findings.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"489 S.E.2d 552, 555","parenthetical":"upholding summary judgment on claim for contribution or indemnity against attorney to the extent that plaintiffs liability was based on his own fraud and willful conversion, but remanding on other parts of claim that may have been caused by attorney's actions","sentence":"See Crawford v. Johnson, 489 S.E.2d 552, 555 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997) (upholding summary judgment on claim for contribution or indemnity against attorney to the extent that plaintiffs liability was based on his own fraud and willful conversion, but remanding on other parts of claim that may have been caused by attorney's actions); see also Carr v. Peerless Ins. Co., 168 Vt. 465, 476, 724 A.2d 454, 461 (1998) (\u201cSummary judgment is inappropriate if there is a disputed issue of material fact.\u201d); Berlin Dev. Assocs. v. Dep\u2019t of Soc. Welfare, 142 Vt. 107, 112, 453 A.2d 397, 400-01 (1982) (recognizing propriety of granting partial summary judgment pursuant to V.R.C.P. 56(d) as method for dealing with complex litigation)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"168 Vt. 465, 476","parenthetical":"\"Summary judgment is inappropriate if there is a disputed issue of material fact.\"","sentence":"See Crawford v. Johnson, 489 S.E.2d 552, 555 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997) (upholding summary judgment on claim for contribution or indemnity against attorney to the extent that plaintiffs liability was based on his own fraud and willful conversion, but remanding on other parts of claim that may have been caused by attorney's actions); see also Carr v. Peerless Ins. Co., 168 Vt. 465, 476, 724 A.2d 454, 461 (1998) (\u201cSummary judgment is inappropriate if there is a disputed issue of material fact.\u201d); Berlin Dev. Assocs. v. Dep\u2019t of Soc. Welfare, 142 Vt. 107, 112, 453 A.2d 397, 400-01 (1982) (recognizing propriety of granting partial summary judgment pursuant to V.R.C.P. 56(d) as method for dealing with complex litigation)."},"case_id":2196343,"label":"a"}
{"context":"P 28. The trial court made no findings as to whether Howe and Lalime were negligent in their preparation of the deeds, whether this negligence was a proximate cause of the errors in the deeds, and whether and to what extent Therrien's actions contributed to these errors. Therefore, we must reverse and remand the Paragraph 7 portion of the liability determination to allow the court to make the appropriate factual findings.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"724 A.2d 454, 461","parenthetical":"\"Summary judgment is inappropriate if there is a disputed issue of material fact.\"","sentence":"See Crawford v. Johnson, 489 S.E.2d 552, 555 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997) (upholding summary judgment on claim for contribution or indemnity against attorney to the extent that plaintiffs liability was based on his own fraud and willful conversion, but remanding on other parts of claim that may have been caused by attorney's actions); see also Carr v. Peerless Ins. Co., 168 Vt. 465, 476, 724 A.2d 454, 461 (1998) (\u201cSummary judgment is inappropriate if there is a disputed issue of material fact.\u201d); Berlin Dev. Assocs. v. Dep\u2019t of Soc. Welfare, 142 Vt. 107, 112, 453 A.2d 397, 400-01 (1982) (recognizing propriety of granting partial summary judgment pursuant to V.R.C.P. 56(d) as method for dealing with complex litigation)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"489 S.E.2d 552, 555","parenthetical":"upholding summary judgment on claim for contribution or indemnity against attorney to the extent that plaintiffs liability was based on his own fraud and willful conversion, but remanding on other parts of claim that may have been caused by attorney's actions","sentence":"See Crawford v. Johnson, 489 S.E.2d 552, 555 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997) (upholding summary judgment on claim for contribution or indemnity against attorney to the extent that plaintiffs liability was based on his own fraud and willful conversion, but remanding on other parts of claim that may have been caused by attorney's actions); see also Carr v. Peerless Ins. Co., 168 Vt. 465, 476, 724 A.2d 454, 461 (1998) (\u201cSummary judgment is inappropriate if there is a disputed issue of material fact.\u201d); Berlin Dev. Assocs. v. Dep\u2019t of Soc. Welfare, 142 Vt. 107, 112, 453 A.2d 397, 400-01 (1982) (recognizing propriety of granting partial summary judgment pursuant to V.R.C.P. 56(d) as method for dealing with complex litigation)."},"case_id":2196343,"label":"b"}
{"context":"P 28. The trial court made no findings as to whether Howe and Lalime were negligent in their preparation of the deeds, whether this negligence was a proximate cause of the errors in the deeds, and whether and to what extent Therrien's actions contributed to these errors. Therefore, we must reverse and remand the Paragraph 7 portion of the liability determination to allow the court to make the appropriate factual findings.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"489 S.E.2d 552, 555","parenthetical":"upholding summary judgment on claim for contribution or indemnity against attorney to the extent that plaintiffs liability was based on his own fraud and willful conversion, but remanding on other parts of claim that may have been caused by attorney's actions","sentence":"See Crawford v. Johnson, 489 S.E.2d 552, 555 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997) (upholding summary judgment on claim for contribution or indemnity against attorney to the extent that plaintiffs liability was based on his own fraud and willful conversion, but remanding on other parts of claim that may have been caused by attorney's actions); see also Carr v. Peerless Ins. Co., 168 Vt. 465, 476, 724 A.2d 454, 461 (1998) (\u201cSummary judgment is inappropriate if there is a disputed issue of material fact.\u201d); Berlin Dev. Assocs. v. Dep\u2019t of Soc. Welfare, 142 Vt. 107, 112, 453 A.2d 397, 400-01 (1982) (recognizing propriety of granting partial summary judgment pursuant to V.R.C.P. 56(d) as method for dealing with complex litigation)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"142 Vt. 107, 112","parenthetical":"recognizing propriety of granting partial summary judgment pursuant to V.R.C.P. 56(d) as method for dealing with complex litigation","sentence":"See Crawford v. Johnson, 489 S.E.2d 552, 555 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997) (upholding summary judgment on claim for contribution or indemnity against attorney to the extent that plaintiffs liability was based on his own fraud and willful conversion, but remanding on other parts of claim that may have been caused by attorney's actions); see also Carr v. Peerless Ins. Co., 168 Vt. 465, 476, 724 A.2d 454, 461 (1998) (\u201cSummary judgment is inappropriate if there is a disputed issue of material fact.\u201d); Berlin Dev. Assocs. v. Dep\u2019t of Soc. Welfare, 142 Vt. 107, 112, 453 A.2d 397, 400-01 (1982) (recognizing propriety of granting partial summary judgment pursuant to V.R.C.P. 56(d) as method for dealing with complex litigation)."},"case_id":2196343,"label":"a"}
{"context":"P 28. The trial court made no findings as to whether Howe and Lalime were negligent in their preparation of the deeds, whether this negligence was a proximate cause of the errors in the deeds, and whether and to what extent Therrien's actions contributed to these errors. Therefore, we must reverse and remand the Paragraph 7 portion of the liability determination to allow the court to make the appropriate factual findings.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"489 S.E.2d 552, 555","parenthetical":"upholding summary judgment on claim for contribution or indemnity against attorney to the extent that plaintiffs liability was based on his own fraud and willful conversion, but remanding on other parts of claim that may have been caused by attorney's actions","sentence":"See Crawford v. Johnson, 489 S.E.2d 552, 555 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997) (upholding summary judgment on claim for contribution or indemnity against attorney to the extent that plaintiffs liability was based on his own fraud and willful conversion, but remanding on other parts of claim that may have been caused by attorney's actions); see also Carr v. Peerless Ins. Co., 168 Vt. 465, 476, 724 A.2d 454, 461 (1998) (\u201cSummary judgment is inappropriate if there is a disputed issue of material fact.\u201d); Berlin Dev. Assocs. v. Dep\u2019t of Soc. Welfare, 142 Vt. 107, 112, 453 A.2d 397, 400-01 (1982) (recognizing propriety of granting partial summary judgment pursuant to V.R.C.P. 56(d) as method for dealing with complex litigation)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"453 A.2d 397, 400-01","parenthetical":"recognizing propriety of granting partial summary judgment pursuant to V.R.C.P. 56(d) as method for dealing with complex litigation","sentence":"See Crawford v. Johnson, 489 S.E.2d 552, 555 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997) (upholding summary judgment on claim for contribution or indemnity against attorney to the extent that plaintiffs liability was based on his own fraud and willful conversion, but remanding on other parts of claim that may have been caused by attorney's actions); see also Carr v. Peerless Ins. Co., 168 Vt. 465, 476, 724 A.2d 454, 461 (1998) (\u201cSummary judgment is inappropriate if there is a disputed issue of material fact.\u201d); Berlin Dev. Assocs. v. Dep\u2019t of Soc. Welfare, 142 Vt. 107, 112, 453 A.2d 397, 400-01 (1982) (recognizing propriety of granting partial summary judgment pursuant to V.R.C.P. 56(d) as method for dealing with complex litigation)."},"case_id":2196343,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In contrast, Texas and Missouri courts have rejected the nondelegable duty doctrine in connection with care provided by emergency room physicians.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"refusing to apply nondelegable duty doctrine to hold hospital liable for the negligent acts of a radiologist, an independent contractor","sentence":"Baptist Mem\u2019l Hosp. System v. Sampson, 969 S.W.2d 945, 949 (Tex.1998) (finding it unnecessary to adopt nondelegable duty doctrine for malpractice by emergency room physicians because the patient may sue the negligent physician, and sue the hospital for violation of any duties owed directly to patients); Kelly v. St Luke\u2019s Hospital of Kansas City, 826 S.W.2d 391 (Mo.Ct.App.1992) (declining to apply nondelegable duty because it was not in statutes or regulations, and practice of medicine in emergency room is not an inherently dangerous activity); see also Estates of Milliron v. Francke, 243 Mont. 200, 793 P.2d 824, 827 (1990) (refusing to apply nondelegable duty doctrine to hold hospital liable for the negligent acts of a radiologist, an independent contractor)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"969 S.W.2d 945, 949","parenthetical":"finding it unnecessary to adopt nondelegable duty doctrine for malpractice by emergency room physicians because the patient may sue the negligent physician, and sue the hospital for violation of any duties owed directly to patients","sentence":"Baptist Mem\u2019l Hosp. System v. Sampson, 969 S.W.2d 945, 949 (Tex.1998) (finding it unnecessary to adopt nondelegable duty doctrine for malpractice by emergency room physicians because the patient may sue the negligent physician, and sue the hospital for violation of any duties owed directly to patients); Kelly v. St Luke\u2019s Hospital of Kansas City, 826 S.W.2d 391 (Mo.Ct.App.1992) (declining to apply nondelegable duty because it was not in statutes or regulations, and practice of medicine in emergency room is not an inherently dangerous activity); see also Estates of Milliron v. Francke, 243 Mont. 200, 793 P.2d 824, 827 (1990) (refusing to apply nondelegable duty doctrine to hold hospital liable for the negligent acts of a radiologist, an independent contractor)."},"case_id":240797,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In contrast, Texas and Missouri courts have rejected the nondelegable duty doctrine in connection with care provided by emergency room physicians.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"969 S.W.2d 945, 949","parenthetical":"finding it unnecessary to adopt nondelegable duty doctrine for malpractice by emergency room physicians because the patient may sue the negligent physician, and sue the hospital for violation of any duties owed directly to patients","sentence":"Baptist Mem\u2019l Hosp. System v. Sampson, 969 S.W.2d 945, 949 (Tex.1998) (finding it unnecessary to adopt nondelegable duty doctrine for malpractice by emergency room physicians because the patient may sue the negligent physician, and sue the hospital for violation of any duties owed directly to patients); Kelly v. St Luke\u2019s Hospital of Kansas City, 826 S.W.2d 391 (Mo.Ct.App.1992) (declining to apply nondelegable duty because it was not in statutes or regulations, and practice of medicine in emergency room is not an inherently dangerous activity); see also Estates of Milliron v. Francke, 243 Mont. 200, 793 P.2d 824, 827 (1990) (refusing to apply nondelegable duty doctrine to hold hospital liable for the negligent acts of a radiologist, an independent contractor)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"793 P.2d 824, 827","parenthetical":"refusing to apply nondelegable duty doctrine to hold hospital liable for the negligent acts of a radiologist, an independent contractor","sentence":"Baptist Mem\u2019l Hosp. System v. Sampson, 969 S.W.2d 945, 949 (Tex.1998) (finding it unnecessary to adopt nondelegable duty doctrine for malpractice by emergency room physicians because the patient may sue the negligent physician, and sue the hospital for violation of any duties owed directly to patients); Kelly v. St Luke\u2019s Hospital of Kansas City, 826 S.W.2d 391 (Mo.Ct.App.1992) (declining to apply nondelegable duty because it was not in statutes or regulations, and practice of medicine in emergency room is not an inherently dangerous activity); see also Estates of Milliron v. Francke, 243 Mont. 200, 793 P.2d 824, 827 (1990) (refusing to apply nondelegable duty doctrine to hold hospital liable for the negligent acts of a radiologist, an independent contractor)."},"case_id":240797,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In contrast, Texas and Missouri courts have rejected the nondelegable duty doctrine in connection with care provided by emergency room physicians.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"declining to apply nondelegable duty because it was not in statutes or regulations, and practice of medicine in emergency room is not an inherently dangerous activity","sentence":"Baptist Mem\u2019l Hosp. System v. Sampson, 969 S.W.2d 945, 949 (Tex.1998) (finding it unnecessary to adopt nondelegable duty doctrine for malpractice by emergency room physicians because the patient may sue the negligent physician, and sue the hospital for violation of any duties owed directly to patients); Kelly v. St Luke\u2019s Hospital of Kansas City, 826 S.W.2d 391 (Mo.Ct.App.1992) (declining to apply nondelegable duty because it was not in statutes or regulations, and practice of medicine in emergency room is not an inherently dangerous activity); see also Estates of Milliron v. Francke, 243 Mont. 200, 793 P.2d 824, 827 (1990) (refusing to apply nondelegable duty doctrine to hold hospital liable for the negligent acts of a radiologist, an independent contractor)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"refusing to apply nondelegable duty doctrine to hold hospital liable for the negligent acts of a radiologist, an independent contractor","sentence":"Baptist Mem\u2019l Hosp. System v. Sampson, 969 S.W.2d 945, 949 (Tex.1998) (finding it unnecessary to adopt nondelegable duty doctrine for malpractice by emergency room physicians because the patient may sue the negligent physician, and sue the hospital for violation of any duties owed directly to patients); Kelly v. St Luke\u2019s Hospital of Kansas City, 826 S.W.2d 391 (Mo.Ct.App.1992) (declining to apply nondelegable duty because it was not in statutes or regulations, and practice of medicine in emergency room is not an inherently dangerous activity); see also Estates of Milliron v. Francke, 243 Mont. 200, 793 P.2d 824, 827 (1990) (refusing to apply nondelegable duty doctrine to hold hospital liable for the negligent acts of a radiologist, an independent contractor)."},"case_id":240797,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In contrast, Texas and Missouri courts have rejected the nondelegable duty doctrine in connection with care provided by emergency room physicians.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"793 P.2d 824, 827","parenthetical":"refusing to apply nondelegable duty doctrine to hold hospital liable for the negligent acts of a radiologist, an independent contractor","sentence":"Baptist Mem\u2019l Hosp. System v. Sampson, 969 S.W.2d 945, 949 (Tex.1998) (finding it unnecessary to adopt nondelegable duty doctrine for malpractice by emergency room physicians because the patient may sue the negligent physician, and sue the hospital for violation of any duties owed directly to patients); Kelly v. St Luke\u2019s Hospital of Kansas City, 826 S.W.2d 391 (Mo.Ct.App.1992) (declining to apply nondelegable duty because it was not in statutes or regulations, and practice of medicine in emergency room is not an inherently dangerous activity); see also Estates of Milliron v. Francke, 243 Mont. 200, 793 P.2d 824, 827 (1990) (refusing to apply nondelegable duty doctrine to hold hospital liable for the negligent acts of a radiologist, an independent contractor)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"declining to apply nondelegable duty because it was not in statutes or regulations, and practice of medicine in emergency room is not an inherently dangerous activity","sentence":"Baptist Mem\u2019l Hosp. System v. Sampson, 969 S.W.2d 945, 949 (Tex.1998) (finding it unnecessary to adopt nondelegable duty doctrine for malpractice by emergency room physicians because the patient may sue the negligent physician, and sue the hospital for violation of any duties owed directly to patients); Kelly v. St Luke\u2019s Hospital of Kansas City, 826 S.W.2d 391 (Mo.Ct.App.1992) (declining to apply nondelegable duty because it was not in statutes or regulations, and practice of medicine in emergency room is not an inherently dangerous activity); see also Estates of Milliron v. Francke, 243 Mont. 200, 793 P.2d 824, 827 (1990) (refusing to apply nondelegable duty doctrine to hold hospital liable for the negligent acts of a radiologist, an independent contractor)."},"case_id":240797,"label":"b"}
{"context":"There is nothing, however, about that disclosure that is any more incriminating or revealing than what could be gleaned from the activation of a pen register or from physical surveillance. Moreover, outside of the home it is doubtful that the tracking of a cell phone has any Fourth Amendment implication whatsoever.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"442 U.S. 735, 744-745","parenthetical":"a phone subscriber has no reasonable expectation of privacy in the numbers he or she dials through telephone company switching equipment","sentence":"See Karo, 468 U.S. at 713-720, 104 S.Ct. 3296 (distinguishing the unlawful warrantless monitoring of beeper signals that disclose information about a private dwelling from information that could be obtained from public observation); United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 282, 103 S.Ct. 1081, 75 L.Ed.2d 55 (1983) (no warrant is required when law enforcement monitors the signals of a concealed beeper transported along a public highway); cf. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744-745, 99 S.Ct. 2577, 61 L.Ed.2d 220 (1979) (a phone subscriber has no reasonable expectation of privacy in the numbers he or she dials through telephone company switching equipment)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"468 U.S. 713, 713-720","parenthetical":"distinguishing the unlawful warrantless monitoring of beeper signals that disclose information about a private dwelling from information that could be obtained from public observation","sentence":"See Karo, 468 U.S. at 713-720, 104 S.Ct. 3296 (distinguishing the unlawful warrantless monitoring of beeper signals that disclose information about a private dwelling from information that could be obtained from public observation); United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 282, 103 S.Ct. 1081, 75 L.Ed.2d 55 (1983) (no warrant is required when law enforcement monitors the signals of a concealed beeper transported along a public highway); cf. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744-745, 99 S.Ct. 2577, 61 L.Ed.2d 220 (1979) (a phone subscriber has no reasonable expectation of privacy in the numbers he or she dials through telephone company switching equipment)."},"case_id":3690444,"label":"b"}
{"context":"There is nothing, however, about that disclosure that is any more incriminating or revealing than what could be gleaned from the activation of a pen register or from physical surveillance. Moreover, outside of the home it is doubtful that the tracking of a cell phone has any Fourth Amendment implication whatsoever.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"468 U.S. 713, 713-720","parenthetical":"distinguishing the unlawful warrantless monitoring of beeper signals that disclose information about a private dwelling from information that could be obtained from public observation","sentence":"See Karo, 468 U.S. at 713-720, 104 S.Ct. 3296 (distinguishing the unlawful warrantless monitoring of beeper signals that disclose information about a private dwelling from information that could be obtained from public observation); United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 282, 103 S.Ct. 1081, 75 L.Ed.2d 55 (1983) (no warrant is required when law enforcement monitors the signals of a concealed beeper transported along a public highway); cf. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744-745, 99 S.Ct. 2577, 61 L.Ed.2d 220 (1979) (a phone subscriber has no reasonable expectation of privacy in the numbers he or she dials through telephone company switching equipment)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"a phone subscriber has no reasonable expectation of privacy in the numbers he or she dials through telephone company switching equipment","sentence":"See Karo, 468 U.S. at 713-720, 104 S.Ct. 3296 (distinguishing the unlawful warrantless monitoring of beeper signals that disclose information about a private dwelling from information that could be obtained from public observation); United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 282, 103 S.Ct. 1081, 75 L.Ed.2d 55 (1983) (no warrant is required when law enforcement monitors the signals of a concealed beeper transported along a public highway); cf. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744-745, 99 S.Ct. 2577, 61 L.Ed.2d 220 (1979) (a phone subscriber has no reasonable expectation of privacy in the numbers he or she dials through telephone company switching equipment)."},"case_id":3690444,"label":"a"}
{"context":"There is nothing, however, about that disclosure that is any more incriminating or revealing than what could be gleaned from the activation of a pen register or from physical surveillance. Moreover, outside of the home it is doubtful that the tracking of a cell phone has any Fourth Amendment implication whatsoever.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"a phone subscriber has no reasonable expectation of privacy in the numbers he or she dials through telephone company switching equipment","sentence":"See Karo, 468 U.S. at 713-720, 104 S.Ct. 3296 (distinguishing the unlawful warrantless monitoring of beeper signals that disclose information about a private dwelling from information that could be obtained from public observation); United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 282, 103 S.Ct. 1081, 75 L.Ed.2d 55 (1983) (no warrant is required when law enforcement monitors the signals of a concealed beeper transported along a public highway); cf. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744-745, 99 S.Ct. 2577, 61 L.Ed.2d 220 (1979) (a phone subscriber has no reasonable expectation of privacy in the numbers he or she dials through telephone company switching equipment)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"468 U.S. 713, 713-720","parenthetical":"distinguishing the unlawful warrantless monitoring of beeper signals that disclose information about a private dwelling from information that could be obtained from public observation","sentence":"See Karo, 468 U.S. at 713-720, 104 S.Ct. 3296 (distinguishing the unlawful warrantless monitoring of beeper signals that disclose information about a private dwelling from information that could be obtained from public observation); United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 282, 103 S.Ct. 1081, 75 L.Ed.2d 55 (1983) (no warrant is required when law enforcement monitors the signals of a concealed beeper transported along a public highway); cf. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744-745, 99 S.Ct. 2577, 61 L.Ed.2d 220 (1979) (a phone subscriber has no reasonable expectation of privacy in the numbers he or she dials through telephone company switching equipment)."},"case_id":3690444,"label":"b"}
{"context":"There is nothing, however, about that disclosure that is any more incriminating or revealing than what could be gleaned from the activation of a pen register or from physical surveillance. Moreover, outside of the home it is doubtful that the tracking of a cell phone has any Fourth Amendment implication whatsoever.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"distinguishing the unlawful warrantless monitoring of beeper signals that disclose information about a private dwelling from information that could be obtained from public observation","sentence":"See Karo, 468 U.S. at 713-720, 104 S.Ct. 3296 (distinguishing the unlawful warrantless monitoring of beeper signals that disclose information about a private dwelling from information that could be obtained from public observation); United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 282, 103 S.Ct. 1081, 75 L.Ed.2d 55 (1983) (no warrant is required when law enforcement monitors the signals of a concealed beeper transported along a public highway); cf. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744-745, 99 S.Ct. 2577, 61 L.Ed.2d 220 (1979) (a phone subscriber has no reasonable expectation of privacy in the numbers he or she dials through telephone company switching equipment)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"442 U.S. 735, 744-745","parenthetical":"a phone subscriber has no reasonable expectation of privacy in the numbers he or she dials through telephone company switching equipment","sentence":"See Karo, 468 U.S. at 713-720, 104 S.Ct. 3296 (distinguishing the unlawful warrantless monitoring of beeper signals that disclose information about a private dwelling from information that could be obtained from public observation); United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 282, 103 S.Ct. 1081, 75 L.Ed.2d 55 (1983) (no warrant is required when law enforcement monitors the signals of a concealed beeper transported along a public highway); cf. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744-745, 99 S.Ct. 2577, 61 L.Ed.2d 220 (1979) (a phone subscriber has no reasonable expectation of privacy in the numbers he or she dials through telephone company switching equipment)."},"case_id":3690444,"label":"a"}
{"context":"There is nothing, however, about that disclosure that is any more incriminating or revealing than what could be gleaned from the activation of a pen register or from physical surveillance. Moreover, outside of the home it is doubtful that the tracking of a cell phone has any Fourth Amendment implication whatsoever.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"distinguishing the unlawful warrantless monitoring of beeper signals that disclose information about a private dwelling from information that could be obtained from public observation","sentence":"See Karo, 468 U.S. at 713-720, 104 S.Ct. 3296 (distinguishing the unlawful warrantless monitoring of beeper signals that disclose information about a private dwelling from information that could be obtained from public observation); United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 282, 103 S.Ct. 1081, 75 L.Ed.2d 55 (1983) (no warrant is required when law enforcement monitors the signals of a concealed beeper transported along a public highway); cf. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744-745, 99 S.Ct. 2577, 61 L.Ed.2d 220 (1979) (a phone subscriber has no reasonable expectation of privacy in the numbers he or she dials through telephone company switching equipment)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"a phone subscriber has no reasonable expectation of privacy in the numbers he or she dials through telephone company switching equipment","sentence":"See Karo, 468 U.S. at 713-720, 104 S.Ct. 3296 (distinguishing the unlawful warrantless monitoring of beeper signals that disclose information about a private dwelling from information that could be obtained from public observation); United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 282, 103 S.Ct. 1081, 75 L.Ed.2d 55 (1983) (no warrant is required when law enforcement monitors the signals of a concealed beeper transported along a public highway); cf. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744-745, 99 S.Ct. 2577, 61 L.Ed.2d 220 (1979) (a phone subscriber has no reasonable expectation of privacy in the numbers he or she dials through telephone company switching equipment)."},"case_id":3690444,"label":"a"}
{"context":"There is nothing, however, about that disclosure that is any more incriminating or revealing than what could be gleaned from the activation of a pen register or from physical surveillance. Moreover, outside of the home it is doubtful that the tracking of a cell phone has any Fourth Amendment implication whatsoever.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"distinguishing the unlawful warrantless monitoring of beeper signals that disclose information about a private dwelling from information that could be obtained from public observation","sentence":"See Karo, 468 U.S. at 713-720, 104 S.Ct. 3296 (distinguishing the unlawful warrantless monitoring of beeper signals that disclose information about a private dwelling from information that could be obtained from public observation); United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 282, 103 S.Ct. 1081, 75 L.Ed.2d 55 (1983) (no warrant is required when law enforcement monitors the signals of a concealed beeper transported along a public highway); cf. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744-745, 99 S.Ct. 2577, 61 L.Ed.2d 220 (1979) (a phone subscriber has no reasonable expectation of privacy in the numbers he or she dials through telephone company switching equipment)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"a phone subscriber has no reasonable expectation of privacy in the numbers he or she dials through telephone company switching equipment","sentence":"See Karo, 468 U.S. at 713-720, 104 S.Ct. 3296 (distinguishing the unlawful warrantless monitoring of beeper signals that disclose information about a private dwelling from information that could be obtained from public observation); United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 282, 103 S.Ct. 1081, 75 L.Ed.2d 55 (1983) (no warrant is required when law enforcement monitors the signals of a concealed beeper transported along a public highway); cf. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744-745, 99 S.Ct. 2577, 61 L.Ed.2d 220 (1979) (a phone subscriber has no reasonable expectation of privacy in the numbers he or she dials through telephone company switching equipment)."},"case_id":3690444,"label":"a"}
{"context":"There is nothing, however, about that disclosure that is any more incriminating or revealing than what could be gleaned from the activation of a pen register or from physical surveillance. Moreover, outside of the home it is doubtful that the tracking of a cell phone has any Fourth Amendment implication whatsoever.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"460 U.S. 276, 282","parenthetical":"no warrant is required when law enforcement monitors the signals of a concealed beeper transported along a public highway","sentence":"See Karo, 468 U.S. at 713-720, 104 S.Ct. 3296 (distinguishing the unlawful warrantless monitoring of beeper signals that disclose information about a private dwelling from information that could be obtained from public observation); United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 282, 103 S.Ct. 1081, 75 L.Ed.2d 55 (1983) (no warrant is required when law enforcement monitors the signals of a concealed beeper transported along a public highway); cf. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744-745, 99 S.Ct. 2577, 61 L.Ed.2d 220 (1979) (a phone subscriber has no reasonable expectation of privacy in the numbers he or she dials through telephone company switching equipment)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"442 U.S. 735, 744-745","parenthetical":"a phone subscriber has no reasonable expectation of privacy in the numbers he or she dials through telephone company switching equipment","sentence":"See Karo, 468 U.S. at 713-720, 104 S.Ct. 3296 (distinguishing the unlawful warrantless monitoring of beeper signals that disclose information about a private dwelling from information that could be obtained from public observation); United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 282, 103 S.Ct. 1081, 75 L.Ed.2d 55 (1983) (no warrant is required when law enforcement monitors the signals of a concealed beeper transported along a public highway); cf. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744-745, 99 S.Ct. 2577, 61 L.Ed.2d 220 (1979) (a phone subscriber has no reasonable expectation of privacy in the numbers he or she dials through telephone company switching equipment)."},"case_id":3690444,"label":"a"}
{"context":"There is nothing, however, about that disclosure that is any more incriminating or revealing than what could be gleaned from the activation of a pen register or from physical surveillance. Moreover, outside of the home it is doubtful that the tracking of a cell phone has any Fourth Amendment implication whatsoever.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"a phone subscriber has no reasonable expectation of privacy in the numbers he or she dials through telephone company switching equipment","sentence":"See Karo, 468 U.S. at 713-720, 104 S.Ct. 3296 (distinguishing the unlawful warrantless monitoring of beeper signals that disclose information about a private dwelling from information that could be obtained from public observation); United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 282, 103 S.Ct. 1081, 75 L.Ed.2d 55 (1983) (no warrant is required when law enforcement monitors the signals of a concealed beeper transported along a public highway); cf. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744-745, 99 S.Ct. 2577, 61 L.Ed.2d 220 (1979) (a phone subscriber has no reasonable expectation of privacy in the numbers he or she dials through telephone company switching equipment)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"460 U.S. 276, 282","parenthetical":"no warrant is required when law enforcement monitors the signals of a concealed beeper transported along a public highway","sentence":"See Karo, 468 U.S. at 713-720, 104 S.Ct. 3296 (distinguishing the unlawful warrantless monitoring of beeper signals that disclose information about a private dwelling from information that could be obtained from public observation); United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 282, 103 S.Ct. 1081, 75 L.Ed.2d 55 (1983) (no warrant is required when law enforcement monitors the signals of a concealed beeper transported along a public highway); cf. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744-745, 99 S.Ct. 2577, 61 L.Ed.2d 220 (1979) (a phone subscriber has no reasonable expectation of privacy in the numbers he or she dials through telephone company switching equipment)."},"case_id":3690444,"label":"b"}
{"context":"There is nothing, however, about that disclosure that is any more incriminating or revealing than what could be gleaned from the activation of a pen register or from physical surveillance. Moreover, outside of the home it is doubtful that the tracking of a cell phone has any Fourth Amendment implication whatsoever.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"a phone subscriber has no reasonable expectation of privacy in the numbers he or she dials through telephone company switching equipment","sentence":"See Karo, 468 U.S. at 713-720, 104 S.Ct. 3296 (distinguishing the unlawful warrantless monitoring of beeper signals that disclose information about a private dwelling from information that could be obtained from public observation); United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 282, 103 S.Ct. 1081, 75 L.Ed.2d 55 (1983) (no warrant is required when law enforcement monitors the signals of a concealed beeper transported along a public highway); cf. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744-745, 99 S.Ct. 2577, 61 L.Ed.2d 220 (1979) (a phone subscriber has no reasonable expectation of privacy in the numbers he or she dials through telephone company switching equipment)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"460 U.S. 276, 282","parenthetical":"no warrant is required when law enforcement monitors the signals of a concealed beeper transported along a public highway","sentence":"See Karo, 468 U.S. at 713-720, 104 S.Ct. 3296 (distinguishing the unlawful warrantless monitoring of beeper signals that disclose information about a private dwelling from information that could be obtained from public observation); United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 282, 103 S.Ct. 1081, 75 L.Ed.2d 55 (1983) (no warrant is required when law enforcement monitors the signals of a concealed beeper transported along a public highway); cf. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744-745, 99 S.Ct. 2577, 61 L.Ed.2d 220 (1979) (a phone subscriber has no reasonable expectation of privacy in the numbers he or she dials through telephone company switching equipment)."},"case_id":3690444,"label":"b"}
{"context":"There is nothing, however, about that disclosure that is any more incriminating or revealing than what could be gleaned from the activation of a pen register or from physical surveillance. Moreover, outside of the home it is doubtful that the tracking of a cell phone has any Fourth Amendment implication whatsoever.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"no warrant is required when law enforcement monitors the signals of a concealed beeper transported along a public highway","sentence":"See Karo, 468 U.S. at 713-720, 104 S.Ct. 3296 (distinguishing the unlawful warrantless monitoring of beeper signals that disclose information about a private dwelling from information that could be obtained from public observation); United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 282, 103 S.Ct. 1081, 75 L.Ed.2d 55 (1983) (no warrant is required when law enforcement monitors the signals of a concealed beeper transported along a public highway); cf. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744-745, 99 S.Ct. 2577, 61 L.Ed.2d 220 (1979) (a phone subscriber has no reasonable expectation of privacy in the numbers he or she dials through telephone company switching equipment)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"442 U.S. 735, 744-745","parenthetical":"a phone subscriber has no reasonable expectation of privacy in the numbers he or she dials through telephone company switching equipment","sentence":"See Karo, 468 U.S. at 713-720, 104 S.Ct. 3296 (distinguishing the unlawful warrantless monitoring of beeper signals that disclose information about a private dwelling from information that could be obtained from public observation); United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 282, 103 S.Ct. 1081, 75 L.Ed.2d 55 (1983) (no warrant is required when law enforcement monitors the signals of a concealed beeper transported along a public highway); cf. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744-745, 99 S.Ct. 2577, 61 L.Ed.2d 220 (1979) (a phone subscriber has no reasonable expectation of privacy in the numbers he or she dials through telephone company switching equipment)."},"case_id":3690444,"label":"a"}
{"context":"There is nothing, however, about that disclosure that is any more incriminating or revealing than what could be gleaned from the activation of a pen register or from physical surveillance. Moreover, outside of the home it is doubtful that the tracking of a cell phone has any Fourth Amendment implication whatsoever.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"no warrant is required when law enforcement monitors the signals of a concealed beeper transported along a public highway","sentence":"See Karo, 468 U.S. at 713-720, 104 S.Ct. 3296 (distinguishing the unlawful warrantless monitoring of beeper signals that disclose information about a private dwelling from information that could be obtained from public observation); United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 282, 103 S.Ct. 1081, 75 L.Ed.2d 55 (1983) (no warrant is required when law enforcement monitors the signals of a concealed beeper transported along a public highway); cf. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744-745, 99 S.Ct. 2577, 61 L.Ed.2d 220 (1979) (a phone subscriber has no reasonable expectation of privacy in the numbers he or she dials through telephone company switching equipment)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"a phone subscriber has no reasonable expectation of privacy in the numbers he or she dials through telephone company switching equipment","sentence":"See Karo, 468 U.S. at 713-720, 104 S.Ct. 3296 (distinguishing the unlawful warrantless monitoring of beeper signals that disclose information about a private dwelling from information that could be obtained from public observation); United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 282, 103 S.Ct. 1081, 75 L.Ed.2d 55 (1983) (no warrant is required when law enforcement monitors the signals of a concealed beeper transported along a public highway); cf. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744-745, 99 S.Ct. 2577, 61 L.Ed.2d 220 (1979) (a phone subscriber has no reasonable expectation of privacy in the numbers he or she dials through telephone company switching equipment)."},"case_id":3690444,"label":"a"}
{"context":"There is nothing, however, about that disclosure that is any more incriminating or revealing than what could be gleaned from the activation of a pen register or from physical surveillance. Moreover, outside of the home it is doubtful that the tracking of a cell phone has any Fourth Amendment implication whatsoever.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"no warrant is required when law enforcement monitors the signals of a concealed beeper transported along a public highway","sentence":"See Karo, 468 U.S. at 713-720, 104 S.Ct. 3296 (distinguishing the unlawful warrantless monitoring of beeper signals that disclose information about a private dwelling from information that could be obtained from public observation); United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 282, 103 S.Ct. 1081, 75 L.Ed.2d 55 (1983) (no warrant is required when law enforcement monitors the signals of a concealed beeper transported along a public highway); cf. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744-745, 99 S.Ct. 2577, 61 L.Ed.2d 220 (1979) (a phone subscriber has no reasonable expectation of privacy in the numbers he or she dials through telephone company switching equipment)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"a phone subscriber has no reasonable expectation of privacy in the numbers he or she dials through telephone company switching equipment","sentence":"See Karo, 468 U.S. at 713-720, 104 S.Ct. 3296 (distinguishing the unlawful warrantless monitoring of beeper signals that disclose information about a private dwelling from information that could be obtained from public observation); United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 282, 103 S.Ct. 1081, 75 L.Ed.2d 55 (1983) (no warrant is required when law enforcement monitors the signals of a concealed beeper transported along a public highway); cf. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744-745, 99 S.Ct. 2577, 61 L.Ed.2d 220 (1979) (a phone subscriber has no reasonable expectation of privacy in the numbers he or she dials through telephone company switching equipment)."},"case_id":3690444,"label":"a"}
{"context":"There is nothing, however, about that disclosure that is any more incriminating or revealing than what could be gleaned from the activation of a pen register or from physical surveillance. Moreover, outside of the home it is doubtful that the tracking of a cell phone has any Fourth Amendment implication whatsoever.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"442 U.S. 735, 744-745","parenthetical":"a phone subscriber has no reasonable expectation of privacy in the numbers he or she dials through telephone company switching equipment","sentence":"See Karo, 468 U.S. at 713-720, 104 S.Ct. 3296 (distinguishing the unlawful warrantless monitoring of beeper signals that disclose information about a private dwelling from information that could be obtained from public observation); United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 282, 103 S.Ct. 1081, 75 L.Ed.2d 55 (1983) (no warrant is required when law enforcement monitors the signals of a concealed beeper transported along a public highway); cf. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744-745, 99 S.Ct. 2577, 61 L.Ed.2d 220 (1979) (a phone subscriber has no reasonable expectation of privacy in the numbers he or she dials through telephone company switching equipment)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"no warrant is required when law enforcement monitors the signals of a concealed beeper transported along a public highway","sentence":"See Karo, 468 U.S. at 713-720, 104 S.Ct. 3296 (distinguishing the unlawful warrantless monitoring of beeper signals that disclose information about a private dwelling from information that could be obtained from public observation); United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 282, 103 S.Ct. 1081, 75 L.Ed.2d 55 (1983) (no warrant is required when law enforcement monitors the signals of a concealed beeper transported along a public highway); cf. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744-745, 99 S.Ct. 2577, 61 L.Ed.2d 220 (1979) (a phone subscriber has no reasonable expectation of privacy in the numbers he or she dials through telephone company switching equipment)."},"case_id":3690444,"label":"b"}
{"context":"There is nothing, however, about that disclosure that is any more incriminating or revealing than what could be gleaned from the activation of a pen register or from physical surveillance. Moreover, outside of the home it is doubtful that the tracking of a cell phone has any Fourth Amendment implication whatsoever.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"a phone subscriber has no reasonable expectation of privacy in the numbers he or she dials through telephone company switching equipment","sentence":"See Karo, 468 U.S. at 713-720, 104 S.Ct. 3296 (distinguishing the unlawful warrantless monitoring of beeper signals that disclose information about a private dwelling from information that could be obtained from public observation); United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 282, 103 S.Ct. 1081, 75 L.Ed.2d 55 (1983) (no warrant is required when law enforcement monitors the signals of a concealed beeper transported along a public highway); cf. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744-745, 99 S.Ct. 2577, 61 L.Ed.2d 220 (1979) (a phone subscriber has no reasonable expectation of privacy in the numbers he or she dials through telephone company switching equipment)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"no warrant is required when law enforcement monitors the signals of a concealed beeper transported along a public highway","sentence":"See Karo, 468 U.S. at 713-720, 104 S.Ct. 3296 (distinguishing the unlawful warrantless monitoring of beeper signals that disclose information about a private dwelling from information that could be obtained from public observation); United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 282, 103 S.Ct. 1081, 75 L.Ed.2d 55 (1983) (no warrant is required when law enforcement monitors the signals of a concealed beeper transported along a public highway); cf. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744-745, 99 S.Ct. 2577, 61 L.Ed.2d 220 (1979) (a phone subscriber has no reasonable expectation of privacy in the numbers he or she dials through telephone company switching equipment)."},"case_id":3690444,"label":"b"}
{"context":"There is nothing, however, about that disclosure that is any more incriminating or revealing than what could be gleaned from the activation of a pen register or from physical surveillance. Moreover, outside of the home it is doubtful that the tracking of a cell phone has any Fourth Amendment implication whatsoever.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"no warrant is required when law enforcement monitors the signals of a concealed beeper transported along a public highway","sentence":"See Karo, 468 U.S. at 713-720, 104 S.Ct. 3296 (distinguishing the unlawful warrantless monitoring of beeper signals that disclose information about a private dwelling from information that could be obtained from public observation); United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 282, 103 S.Ct. 1081, 75 L.Ed.2d 55 (1983) (no warrant is required when law enforcement monitors the signals of a concealed beeper transported along a public highway); cf. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744-745, 99 S.Ct. 2577, 61 L.Ed.2d 220 (1979) (a phone subscriber has no reasonable expectation of privacy in the numbers he or she dials through telephone company switching equipment)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"a phone subscriber has no reasonable expectation of privacy in the numbers he or she dials through telephone company switching equipment","sentence":"See Karo, 468 U.S. at 713-720, 104 S.Ct. 3296 (distinguishing the unlawful warrantless monitoring of beeper signals that disclose information about a private dwelling from information that could be obtained from public observation); United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 282, 103 S.Ct. 1081, 75 L.Ed.2d 55 (1983) (no warrant is required when law enforcement monitors the signals of a concealed beeper transported along a public highway); cf. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744-745, 99 S.Ct. 2577, 61 L.Ed.2d 220 (1979) (a phone subscriber has no reasonable expectation of privacy in the numbers he or she dials through telephone company switching equipment)."},"case_id":3690444,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The district court properly dismissed the action because Davis did not complete the Nevada Department of Corrections prison grievance process prior to filing suit.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"548 U.S. 81, 93-95","parenthetical":"holding that \"proper exhaustion\" under SS 1997e(a) is mandatory and requires adherence to administrative procedural rules","sentence":"See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 93-95, 126 S.Ct. 2378, 165 L.Ed.2d 368 (2006) (holding that \u201cproper exhaustion\u201d under \u00a7 1997e(a) is mandatory and requires adherence to administrative procedural rules); see also Griffin v. Arpaio, 557 F.3d 1117, 1120-21 (9th Cir.2009) (concluding that inmate grievance cannot serve to exhaust administrative remedies where it fails to \u201c \u2018alert[ ] the prison to the nature of the wrong for which redress is sought\u2019 \u201d) (citation omitted)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"557 F.3d 1117, 1120-21","parenthetical":"concluding that inmate grievance cannot serve to exhaust administrative remedies where it fails to \" 'alert[ ] the prison to the nature of the wrong for which redress is sought' \"","sentence":"See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 93-95, 126 S.Ct. 2378, 165 L.Ed.2d 368 (2006) (holding that \u201cproper exhaustion\u201d under \u00a7 1997e(a) is mandatory and requires adherence to administrative procedural rules); see also Griffin v. Arpaio, 557 F.3d 1117, 1120-21 (9th Cir.2009) (concluding that inmate grievance cannot serve to exhaust administrative remedies where it fails to \u201c \u2018alert[ ] the prison to the nature of the wrong for which redress is sought\u2019 \u201d) (citation omitted)."},"case_id":5771494,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The district court properly dismissed the action because Davis did not complete the Nevada Department of Corrections prison grievance process prior to filing suit.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"557 F.3d 1117, 1120-21","parenthetical":"concluding that inmate grievance cannot serve to exhaust administrative remedies where it fails to \" 'alert[ ] the prison to the nature of the wrong for which redress is sought' \"","sentence":"See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 93-95, 126 S.Ct. 2378, 165 L.Ed.2d 368 (2006) (holding that \u201cproper exhaustion\u201d under \u00a7 1997e(a) is mandatory and requires adherence to administrative procedural rules); see also Griffin v. Arpaio, 557 F.3d 1117, 1120-21 (9th Cir.2009) (concluding that inmate grievance cannot serve to exhaust administrative remedies where it fails to \u201c \u2018alert[ ] the prison to the nature of the wrong for which redress is sought\u2019 \u201d) (citation omitted)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that \"proper exhaustion\" under SS 1997e(a) is mandatory and requires adherence to administrative procedural rules","sentence":"See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 93-95, 126 S.Ct. 2378, 165 L.Ed.2d 368 (2006) (holding that \u201cproper exhaustion\u201d under \u00a7 1997e(a) is mandatory and requires adherence to administrative procedural rules); see also Griffin v. Arpaio, 557 F.3d 1117, 1120-21 (9th Cir.2009) (concluding that inmate grievance cannot serve to exhaust administrative remedies where it fails to \u201c \u2018alert[ ] the prison to the nature of the wrong for which redress is sought\u2019 \u201d) (citation omitted)."},"case_id":5771494,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The district court properly dismissed the action because Davis did not complete the Nevada Department of Corrections prison grievance process prior to filing suit.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that \"proper exhaustion\" under SS 1997e(a) is mandatory and requires adherence to administrative procedural rules","sentence":"See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 93-95, 126 S.Ct. 2378, 165 L.Ed.2d 368 (2006) (holding that \u201cproper exhaustion\u201d under \u00a7 1997e(a) is mandatory and requires adherence to administrative procedural rules); see also Griffin v. Arpaio, 557 F.3d 1117, 1120-21 (9th Cir.2009) (concluding that inmate grievance cannot serve to exhaust administrative remedies where it fails to \u201c \u2018alert[ ] the prison to the nature of the wrong for which redress is sought\u2019 \u201d) (citation omitted)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"557 F.3d 1117, 1120-21","parenthetical":"concluding that inmate grievance cannot serve to exhaust administrative remedies where it fails to \" 'alert[ ] the prison to the nature of the wrong for which redress is sought' \"","sentence":"See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 93-95, 126 S.Ct. 2378, 165 L.Ed.2d 368 (2006) (holding that \u201cproper exhaustion\u201d under \u00a7 1997e(a) is mandatory and requires adherence to administrative procedural rules); see also Griffin v. Arpaio, 557 F.3d 1117, 1120-21 (9th Cir.2009) (concluding that inmate grievance cannot serve to exhaust administrative remedies where it fails to \u201c \u2018alert[ ] the prison to the nature of the wrong for which redress is sought\u2019 \u201d) (citation omitted)."},"case_id":5771494,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Rather, Walsh asked the court to keep Good Stuff in the case based on a negligence theory of liability, which the court ultimately rejected based on the economic-loss rule. In short, with respect to Good Stuff, Walsh made the tactical decision to abandon his contractual claims and instead rely on a negligence claim of liability. He now seeks to backtrack from that strategy by claiming on appeal that the trial court erred in not addressing his ratification theory -- even though he pointedly did not challenge the trial court's ruling below in his motion to clarify. On this record, we decline to consider the argument.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"164 Vt. 312, 320","parenthetical":"stating that party sufficiently apprised trial court of its claim of error and adequately preserved the claim for review on appeal by filing motion to amend","sentence":"See Beyel v. Degan, 142 Vt. 617, 619, 458 A.2d 1137, 1138 (1983) (stating that party who fails to object to trial court ruling and proceeds to trial cannot later claim error in ruling on appeal); cf. Pinewood Manor, Inc. v. Vt. Agency of Transp., 164 Vt. 312, 320, 668 A.2d 653, 659 (1995) (stating that party sufficiently apprised trial court of its claim of error and adequately preserved the claim for review on appeal by filing motion to amend)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"142 Vt. 617, 619","parenthetical":"stating that party who fails to object to trial court ruling and proceeds to trial cannot later claim error in ruling on appeal","sentence":"See Beyel v. Degan, 142 Vt. 617, 619, 458 A.2d 1137, 1138 (1983) (stating that party who fails to object to trial court ruling and proceeds to trial cannot later claim error in ruling on appeal); cf. Pinewood Manor, Inc. v. Vt. Agency of Transp., 164 Vt. 312, 320, 668 A.2d 653, 659 (1995) (stating that party sufficiently apprised trial court of its claim of error and adequately preserved the claim for review on appeal by filing motion to amend)."},"case_id":4167875,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Rather, Walsh asked the court to keep Good Stuff in the case based on a negligence theory of liability, which the court ultimately rejected based on the economic-loss rule. In short, with respect to Good Stuff, Walsh made the tactical decision to abandon his contractual claims and instead rely on a negligence claim of liability. He now seeks to backtrack from that strategy by claiming on appeal that the trial court erred in not addressing his ratification theory -- even though he pointedly did not challenge the trial court's ruling below in his motion to clarify. On this record, we decline to consider the argument.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"142 Vt. 617, 619","parenthetical":"stating that party who fails to object to trial court ruling and proceeds to trial cannot later claim error in ruling on appeal","sentence":"See Beyel v. Degan, 142 Vt. 617, 619, 458 A.2d 1137, 1138 (1983) (stating that party who fails to object to trial court ruling and proceeds to trial cannot later claim error in ruling on appeal); cf. Pinewood Manor, Inc. v. Vt. Agency of Transp., 164 Vt. 312, 320, 668 A.2d 653, 659 (1995) (stating that party sufficiently apprised trial court of its claim of error and adequately preserved the claim for review on appeal by filing motion to amend)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"668 A.2d 653, 659","parenthetical":"stating that party sufficiently apprised trial court of its claim of error and adequately preserved the claim for review on appeal by filing motion to amend","sentence":"See Beyel v. Degan, 142 Vt. 617, 619, 458 A.2d 1137, 1138 (1983) (stating that party who fails to object to trial court ruling and proceeds to trial cannot later claim error in ruling on appeal); cf. Pinewood Manor, Inc. v. Vt. Agency of Transp., 164 Vt. 312, 320, 668 A.2d 653, 659 (1995) (stating that party sufficiently apprised trial court of its claim of error and adequately preserved the claim for review on appeal by filing motion to amend)."},"case_id":4167875,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Rather, Walsh asked the court to keep Good Stuff in the case based on a negligence theory of liability, which the court ultimately rejected based on the economic-loss rule. In short, with respect to Good Stuff, Walsh made the tactical decision to abandon his contractual claims and instead rely on a negligence claim of liability. He now seeks to backtrack from that strategy by claiming on appeal that the trial court erred in not addressing his ratification theory -- even though he pointedly did not challenge the trial court's ruling below in his motion to clarify. On this record, we decline to consider the argument.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"164 Vt. 312, 320","parenthetical":"stating that party sufficiently apprised trial court of its claim of error and adequately preserved the claim for review on appeal by filing motion to amend","sentence":"See Beyel v. Degan, 142 Vt. 617, 619, 458 A.2d 1137, 1138 (1983) (stating that party who fails to object to trial court ruling and proceeds to trial cannot later claim error in ruling on appeal); cf. Pinewood Manor, Inc. v. Vt. Agency of Transp., 164 Vt. 312, 320, 668 A.2d 653, 659 (1995) (stating that party sufficiently apprised trial court of its claim of error and adequately preserved the claim for review on appeal by filing motion to amend)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"458 A.2d 1137, 1138","parenthetical":"stating that party who fails to object to trial court ruling and proceeds to trial cannot later claim error in ruling on appeal","sentence":"See Beyel v. Degan, 142 Vt. 617, 619, 458 A.2d 1137, 1138 (1983) (stating that party who fails to object to trial court ruling and proceeds to trial cannot later claim error in ruling on appeal); cf. Pinewood Manor, Inc. v. Vt. Agency of Transp., 164 Vt. 312, 320, 668 A.2d 653, 659 (1995) (stating that party sufficiently apprised trial court of its claim of error and adequately preserved the claim for review on appeal by filing motion to amend)."},"case_id":4167875,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Rather, Walsh asked the court to keep Good Stuff in the case based on a negligence theory of liability, which the court ultimately rejected based on the economic-loss rule. In short, with respect to Good Stuff, Walsh made the tactical decision to abandon his contractual claims and instead rely on a negligence claim of liability. He now seeks to backtrack from that strategy by claiming on appeal that the trial court erred in not addressing his ratification theory -- even though he pointedly did not challenge the trial court's ruling below in his motion to clarify. On this record, we decline to consider the argument.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"668 A.2d 653, 659","parenthetical":"stating that party sufficiently apprised trial court of its claim of error and adequately preserved the claim for review on appeal by filing motion to amend","sentence":"See Beyel v. Degan, 142 Vt. 617, 619, 458 A.2d 1137, 1138 (1983) (stating that party who fails to object to trial court ruling and proceeds to trial cannot later claim error in ruling on appeal); cf. Pinewood Manor, Inc. v. Vt. Agency of Transp., 164 Vt. 312, 320, 668 A.2d 653, 659 (1995) (stating that party sufficiently apprised trial court of its claim of error and adequately preserved the claim for review on appeal by filing motion to amend)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"458 A.2d 1137, 1138","parenthetical":"stating that party who fails to object to trial court ruling and proceeds to trial cannot later claim error in ruling on appeal","sentence":"See Beyel v. Degan, 142 Vt. 617, 619, 458 A.2d 1137, 1138 (1983) (stating that party who fails to object to trial court ruling and proceeds to trial cannot later claim error in ruling on appeal); cf. Pinewood Manor, Inc. v. Vt. Agency of Transp., 164 Vt. 312, 320, 668 A.2d 653, 659 (1995) (stating that party sufficiently apprised trial court of its claim of error and adequately preserved the claim for review on appeal by filing motion to amend)."},"case_id":4167875,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Before the Government is put to its burden of showing that an improper contact by an outsider with the jury is harmless, however, a defendant must first establish that an ex parte communication occurred.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"727 F.2d 643, 646","parenthetical":"holding that the defendant bears the burden of proving outside contact with the jury","sentence":"See Owen v. Duckworth, 727 F.2d 643, 646 (7th Cir.1984)(holding that the defendant bears the burden of proving outside contact with the jury); see also United States v. Wilson, 715 F.2d 1164, 1172 (7th Cir.1983)(holding that while \u201cprivate communications between jurors and others are presumptively prejudicial[,][t]here can be no prejudice ,.. in the absence of any such communication.\u201d); see also United States v. Heater, 63 F.3d 311, 321 (4th Cir.1995)(holding that the defendant bears the initial burden of demonstrating that the improper juror contact occurred, and only if the contact is established must the Government demonstrate absence of prejudice). The moving defendant must meet this burden by a preponderance of the evidence."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"715 F.2d 1164, 1172","parenthetical":"holding that while \"private communications between jurors and others are presumptively prejudicial[,][t]here can be no prejudice ,.. in the absence of any such communication.\"","sentence":"See Owen v. Duckworth, 727 F.2d 643, 646 (7th Cir.1984)(holding that the defendant bears the burden of proving outside contact with the jury); see also United States v. Wilson, 715 F.2d 1164, 1172 (7th Cir.1983)(holding that while \u201cprivate communications between jurors and others are presumptively prejudicial[,][t]here can be no prejudice ,.. in the absence of any such communication.\u201d); see also United States v. Heater, 63 F.3d 311, 321 (4th Cir.1995)(holding that the defendant bears the initial burden of demonstrating that the improper juror contact occurred, and only if the contact is established must the Government demonstrate absence of prejudice). The moving defendant must meet this burden by a preponderance of the evidence."},"case_id":11240715,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Before the Government is put to its burden of showing that an improper contact by an outsider with the jury is harmless, however, a defendant must first establish that an ex parte communication occurred.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"63 F.3d 311, 321","parenthetical":"holding that the defendant bears the initial burden of demonstrating that the improper juror contact occurred, and only if the contact is established must the Government demonstrate absence of prejudice","sentence":"See Owen v. Duckworth, 727 F.2d 643, 646 (7th Cir.1984)(holding that the defendant bears the burden of proving outside contact with the jury); see also United States v. Wilson, 715 F.2d 1164, 1172 (7th Cir.1983)(holding that while \u201cprivate communications between jurors and others are presumptively prejudicial[,][t]here can be no prejudice ,.. in the absence of any such communication.\u201d); see also United States v. Heater, 63 F.3d 311, 321 (4th Cir.1995)(holding that the defendant bears the initial burden of demonstrating that the improper juror contact occurred, and only if the contact is established must the Government demonstrate absence of prejudice). The moving defendant must meet this burden by a preponderance of the evidence."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"727 F.2d 643, 646","parenthetical":"holding that the defendant bears the burden of proving outside contact with the jury","sentence":"See Owen v. Duckworth, 727 F.2d 643, 646 (7th Cir.1984)(holding that the defendant bears the burden of proving outside contact with the jury); see also United States v. Wilson, 715 F.2d 1164, 1172 (7th Cir.1983)(holding that while \u201cprivate communications between jurors and others are presumptively prejudicial[,][t]here can be no prejudice ,.. in the absence of any such communication.\u201d); see also United States v. Heater, 63 F.3d 311, 321 (4th Cir.1995)(holding that the defendant bears the initial burden of demonstrating that the improper juror contact occurred, and only if the contact is established must the Government demonstrate absence of prejudice). The moving defendant must meet this burden by a preponderance of the evidence."},"case_id":11240715,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Before the Government is put to its burden of showing that an improper contact by an outsider with the jury is harmless, however, a defendant must first establish that an ex parte communication occurred.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"727 F.2d 643, 646","parenthetical":"holding that the defendant bears the burden of proving outside contact with the jury","sentence":"See Owen v. Duckworth, 727 F.2d 643, 646 (7th Cir.1984)(holding that the defendant bears the burden of proving outside contact with the jury); see also United States v. Wilson, 715 F.2d 1164, 1172 (7th Cir.1983)(holding that while \u201cprivate communications between jurors and others are presumptively prejudicial[,][t]here can be no prejudice ,.. in the absence of any such communication.\u201d); see also United States v. Heater, 63 F.3d 311, 321 (4th Cir.1995)(holding that the defendant bears the initial burden of demonstrating that the improper juror contact occurred, and only if the contact is established must the Government demonstrate absence of prejudice). The moving defendant must meet this burden by a preponderance of the evidence."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"945 F.2d 806, 811","parenthetical":"holding that the defendant must show that \"improper communication of extrinsic information had likely occurred.\"","sentence":"United States v. Caro-Quintero, 769 F.Supp. 1564, 1580 (C.D.Cal.1991); see also United States v. Tarpley, 945 F.2d 806, 811 (5th Cir.1991)(holding that the defendant must show that \u201cimproper communication of extrinsic information had likely occurred.\u201d); see also United States v. Cousins, 842 F.2d 1245, 1247 (11th C3r.l988)(holding that a defendant must make a \u201ccolorable showing\u201d that an ex parte communication occurred)."},"case_id":11240715,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Before the Government is put to its burden of showing that an improper contact by an outsider with the jury is harmless, however, a defendant must first establish that an ex parte communication occurred.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"842 F.2d 1245, 1247","parenthetical":"holding that a defendant must make a \"colorable showing\" that an ex parte communication occurred","sentence":"United States v. Caro-Quintero, 769 F.Supp. 1564, 1580 (C.D.Cal.1991); see also United States v. Tarpley, 945 F.2d 806, 811 (5th Cir.1991)(holding that the defendant must show that \u201cimproper communication of extrinsic information had likely occurred.\u201d); see also United States v. Cousins, 842 F.2d 1245, 1247 (11th C3r.l988)(holding that a defendant must make a \u201ccolorable showing\u201d that an ex parte communication occurred)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"727 F.2d 643, 646","parenthetical":"holding that the defendant bears the burden of proving outside contact with the jury","sentence":"See Owen v. Duckworth, 727 F.2d 643, 646 (7th Cir.1984)(holding that the defendant bears the burden of proving outside contact with the jury); see also United States v. Wilson, 715 F.2d 1164, 1172 (7th Cir.1983)(holding that while \u201cprivate communications between jurors and others are presumptively prejudicial[,][t]here can be no prejudice ,.. in the absence of any such communication.\u201d); see also United States v. Heater, 63 F.3d 311, 321 (4th Cir.1995)(holding that the defendant bears the initial burden of demonstrating that the improper juror contact occurred, and only if the contact is established must the Government demonstrate absence of prejudice). The moving defendant must meet this burden by a preponderance of the evidence."},"case_id":11240715,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Although the Miller court did not determine whether the detention of the defendant, i.e., the Terry stop, was valid, it did determine that the extraterritorial officers' investigation did not violate the provisions of the Connecticut constitution. We further note that the decision in Miller is consistent with other decisions by Connecticut courts that have found that an officer's extraterritorial conduct did not violate the provisions of the United States constitution and the Connecticut constitution.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"Connecticut police officer may obtain evidence outside this state after lawful arrest in Connecticut","sentence":"See, e.g., State v. Kuskowski, 200 Conn. 82, 510 A.2d 172 (1986) (Brookfield police officer investigated parked car in neighboring town of Bridgewater and defendant was arrested by state police, after investigation by Brookfield police officers, for crimes of criminal possession of cocaine and possession of cocaine with intent to sell); see also State v. Stevens, 224 Conn. 730, 620 A.2d 789 (1993) (Connecticut police officer may obtain evidence outside this state after lawful arrest in Connecticut); State v. Pierce, supra, 67 Conn. App. 634; State v. Andrews, 33 Conn. App. 590, 637 A.2d 787, cert. denied, 229 Conn. 908, 640 A.2d 121 (1994)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"Brookfield police officer investigated parked car in neighboring town of Bridgewater and defendant was arrested by state police, after investigation by Brookfield police officers, for crimes of criminal possession of cocaine and possession of cocaine with intent to sell","sentence":"See, e.g., State v. Kuskowski, 200 Conn. 82, 510 A.2d 172 (1986) (Brookfield police officer investigated parked car in neighboring town of Bridgewater and defendant was arrested by state police, after investigation by Brookfield police officers, for crimes of criminal possession of cocaine and possession of cocaine with intent to sell); see also State v. Stevens, 224 Conn. 730, 620 A.2d 789 (1993) (Connecticut police officer may obtain evidence outside this state after lawful arrest in Connecticut); State v. Pierce, supra, 67 Conn. App. 634; State v. Andrews, 33 Conn. App. 590, 637 A.2d 787, cert. denied, 229 Conn. 908, 640 A.2d 121 (1994)."},"case_id":1274521,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Although the Miller court did not determine whether the detention of the defendant, i.e., the Terry stop, was valid, it did determine that the extraterritorial officers' investigation did not violate the provisions of the Connecticut constitution. We further note that the decision in Miller is consistent with other decisions by Connecticut courts that have found that an officer's extraterritorial conduct did not violate the provisions of the United States constitution and the Connecticut constitution.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"Brookfield police officer investigated parked car in neighboring town of Bridgewater and defendant was arrested by state police, after investigation by Brookfield police officers, for crimes of criminal possession of cocaine and possession of cocaine with intent to sell","sentence":"See, e.g., State v. Kuskowski, 200 Conn. 82, 510 A.2d 172 (1986) (Brookfield police officer investigated parked car in neighboring town of Bridgewater and defendant was arrested by state police, after investigation by Brookfield police officers, for crimes of criminal possession of cocaine and possession of cocaine with intent to sell); see also State v. Stevens, 224 Conn. 730, 620 A.2d 789 (1993) (Connecticut police officer may obtain evidence outside this state after lawful arrest in Connecticut); State v. Pierce, supra, 67 Conn. App. 634; State v. Andrews, 33 Conn. App. 590, 637 A.2d 787, cert. denied, 229 Conn. 908, 640 A.2d 121 (1994)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"Connecticut police officer may obtain evidence outside this state after lawful arrest in Connecticut","sentence":"See, e.g., State v. Kuskowski, 200 Conn. 82, 510 A.2d 172 (1986) (Brookfield police officer investigated parked car in neighboring town of Bridgewater and defendant was arrested by state police, after investigation by Brookfield police officers, for crimes of criminal possession of cocaine and possession of cocaine with intent to sell); see also State v. Stevens, 224 Conn. 730, 620 A.2d 789 (1993) (Connecticut police officer may obtain evidence outside this state after lawful arrest in Connecticut); State v. Pierce, supra, 67 Conn. App. 634; State v. Andrews, 33 Conn. App. 590, 637 A.2d 787, cert. denied, 229 Conn. 908, 640 A.2d 121 (1994)."},"case_id":1274521,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Although the Miller court did not determine whether the detention of the defendant, i.e., the Terry stop, was valid, it did determine that the extraterritorial officers' investigation did not violate the provisions of the Connecticut constitution. We further note that the decision in Miller is consistent with other decisions by Connecticut courts that have found that an officer's extraterritorial conduct did not violate the provisions of the United States constitution and the Connecticut constitution.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"Brookfield police officer investigated parked car in neighboring town of Bridgewater and defendant was arrested by state police, after investigation by Brookfield police officers, for crimes of criminal possession of cocaine and possession of cocaine with intent to sell","sentence":"See, e.g., State v. Kuskowski, 200 Conn. 82, 510 A.2d 172 (1986) (Brookfield police officer investigated parked car in neighboring town of Bridgewater and defendant was arrested by state police, after investigation by Brookfield police officers, for crimes of criminal possession of cocaine and possession of cocaine with intent to sell); see also State v. Stevens, 224 Conn. 730, 620 A.2d 789 (1993) (Connecticut police officer may obtain evidence outside this state after lawful arrest in Connecticut); State v. Pierce, supra, 67 Conn. App. 634; State v. Andrews, 33 Conn. App. 590, 637 A.2d 787, cert. denied, 229 Conn. 908, 640 A.2d 121 (1994)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"Connecticut police officer may obtain evidence outside this state after lawful arrest in Connecticut","sentence":"See, e.g., State v. Kuskowski, 200 Conn. 82, 510 A.2d 172 (1986) (Brookfield police officer investigated parked car in neighboring town of Bridgewater and defendant was arrested by state police, after investigation by Brookfield police officers, for crimes of criminal possession of cocaine and possession of cocaine with intent to sell); see also State v. Stevens, 224 Conn. 730, 620 A.2d 789 (1993) (Connecticut police officer may obtain evidence outside this state after lawful arrest in Connecticut); State v. Pierce, supra, 67 Conn. App. 634; State v. Andrews, 33 Conn. App. 590, 637 A.2d 787, cert. denied, 229 Conn. 908, 640 A.2d 121 (1994)."},"case_id":1274521,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Although the Miller court did not determine whether the detention of the defendant, i.e., the Terry stop, was valid, it did determine that the extraterritorial officers' investigation did not violate the provisions of the Connecticut constitution. We further note that the decision in Miller is consistent with other decisions by Connecticut courts that have found that an officer's extraterritorial conduct did not violate the provisions of the United States constitution and the Connecticut constitution.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"Connecticut police officer may obtain evidence outside this state after lawful arrest in Connecticut","sentence":"See, e.g., State v. Kuskowski, 200 Conn. 82, 510 A.2d 172 (1986) (Brookfield police officer investigated parked car in neighboring town of Bridgewater and defendant was arrested by state police, after investigation by Brookfield police officers, for crimes of criminal possession of cocaine and possession of cocaine with intent to sell); see also State v. Stevens, 224 Conn. 730, 620 A.2d 789 (1993) (Connecticut police officer may obtain evidence outside this state after lawful arrest in Connecticut); State v. Pierce, supra, 67 Conn. App. 634; State v. Andrews, 33 Conn. App. 590, 637 A.2d 787, cert. denied, 229 Conn. 908, 640 A.2d 121 (1994)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"Brookfield police officer investigated parked car in neighboring town of Bridgewater and defendant was arrested by state police, after investigation by Brookfield police officers, for crimes of criminal possession of cocaine and possession of cocaine with intent to sell","sentence":"See, e.g., State v. Kuskowski, 200 Conn. 82, 510 A.2d 172 (1986) (Brookfield police officer investigated parked car in neighboring town of Bridgewater and defendant was arrested by state police, after investigation by Brookfield police officers, for crimes of criminal possession of cocaine and possession of cocaine with intent to sell); see also State v. Stevens, 224 Conn. 730, 620 A.2d 789 (1993) (Connecticut police officer may obtain evidence outside this state after lawful arrest in Connecticut); State v. Pierce, supra, 67 Conn. App. 634; State v. Andrews, 33 Conn. App. 590, 637 A.2d 787, cert. denied, 229 Conn. 908, 640 A.2d 121 (1994)."},"case_id":1274521,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The court concludes that the 180-day requirement in 29 C.F.R. SS 1613.281(b) is better viewed as a condition precedent rather than as a jurisdictional prerequisite.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"889 F.2d 1481, 1488","parenthetical":"leaves open the question of whether a right-to-sue letter is a jurisdictional prerequisite or a condition precedent","sentence":"Cf Pinkard v. Pullman-Standard, 678 F.2d 1211, 1215 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1105, 103 S.Ct. 729, 74 L.Ed.2d 954 (1983) (holding that the receipt of a right-to-sue letter in a Title VII claim is a condition precedent rather than a jurisdictional prerequisite); see also Puckett v. Tennessee Eastman Co., 889 F.2d 1481, 1488 (6th Cir.1989) (leaves open the question of whether a right-to-sue letter is a jurisdictional prerequisite or a condition precedent)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that the receipt of a right-to-sue letter in a Title VII claim is a condition precedent rather than a jurisdictional prerequisite","sentence":"Cf Pinkard v. Pullman-Standard, 678 F.2d 1211, 1215 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1105, 103 S.Ct. 729, 74 L.Ed.2d 954 (1983) (holding that the receipt of a right-to-sue letter in a Title VII claim is a condition precedent rather than a jurisdictional prerequisite); see also Puckett v. Tennessee Eastman Co., 889 F.2d 1481, 1488 (6th Cir.1989) (leaves open the question of whether a right-to-sue letter is a jurisdictional prerequisite or a condition precedent)."},"case_id":3719144,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The court concludes that the 180-day requirement in 29 C.F.R. SS 1613.281(b) is better viewed as a condition precedent rather than as a jurisdictional prerequisite.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that the receipt of a right-to-sue letter in a Title VII claim is a condition precedent rather than a jurisdictional prerequisite","sentence":"Cf Pinkard v. Pullman-Standard, 678 F.2d 1211, 1215 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1105, 103 S.Ct. 729, 74 L.Ed.2d 954 (1983) (holding that the receipt of a right-to-sue letter in a Title VII claim is a condition precedent rather than a jurisdictional prerequisite); see also Puckett v. Tennessee Eastman Co., 889 F.2d 1481, 1488 (6th Cir.1989) (leaves open the question of whether a right-to-sue letter is a jurisdictional prerequisite or a condition precedent)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"889 F.2d 1481, 1488","parenthetical":"leaves open the question of whether a right-to-sue letter is a jurisdictional prerequisite or a condition precedent","sentence":"Cf Pinkard v. Pullman-Standard, 678 F.2d 1211, 1215 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1105, 103 S.Ct. 729, 74 L.Ed.2d 954 (1983) (holding that the receipt of a right-to-sue letter in a Title VII claim is a condition precedent rather than a jurisdictional prerequisite); see also Puckett v. Tennessee Eastman Co., 889 F.2d 1481, 1488 (6th Cir.1989) (leaves open the question of whether a right-to-sue letter is a jurisdictional prerequisite or a condition precedent)."},"case_id":3719144,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The court concludes that the 180-day requirement in 29 C.F.R. SS 1613.281(b) is better viewed as a condition precedent rather than as a jurisdictional prerequisite.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that the receipt of a right-to-sue letter in a Title VII claim is a condition precedent rather than a jurisdictional prerequisite","sentence":"Cf Pinkard v. Pullman-Standard, 678 F.2d 1211, 1215 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1105, 103 S.Ct. 729, 74 L.Ed.2d 954 (1983) (holding that the receipt of a right-to-sue letter in a Title VII claim is a condition precedent rather than a jurisdictional prerequisite); see also Puckett v. Tennessee Eastman Co., 889 F.2d 1481, 1488 (6th Cir.1989) (leaves open the question of whether a right-to-sue letter is a jurisdictional prerequisite or a condition precedent)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"889 F.2d 1481, 1488","parenthetical":"leaves open the question of whether a right-to-sue letter is a jurisdictional prerequisite or a condition precedent","sentence":"Cf Pinkard v. Pullman-Standard, 678 F.2d 1211, 1215 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1105, 103 S.Ct. 729, 74 L.Ed.2d 954 (1983) (holding that the receipt of a right-to-sue letter in a Title VII claim is a condition precedent rather than a jurisdictional prerequisite); see also Puckett v. Tennessee Eastman Co., 889 F.2d 1481, 1488 (6th Cir.1989) (leaves open the question of whether a right-to-sue letter is a jurisdictional prerequisite or a condition precedent)."},"case_id":3719144,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Similarly, even where parties to a contract expressly characterize the contrac tual relationship as a trust, courts will look to the substance of the relationship rather than to the language chosen to express it, to determine whether a fiduciary relationship exists. Thus, Justice Cardozo observed, \"It is not enough that by the very act of wrongdoing out of which the debt arose, the bankrupt has become chargeable as a trustee ex maleficio. He must have been a trustee before the wrong and without reference thereto.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"trust receipt,\" evidencing security for a transaction consisting of borrowing and lending money did not give rise to a fiduciary relationship so as to bar discharge of debt in bankruptcy","sentence":"See also Bloomingdale v. Dreher, 31 F.2d 93 (3d Cir.1929) (\u201ctrust receipt,\u201d evidencing security for a transaction consisting of borrowing and lending money did not give rise to a fiduciary relationship so as to bar discharge of debt in bankruptcy); In re Miles, 5 B.R. 458 (Bkrtcy.E.D.Va.1980) (where the \u201cmagic words,\u201d \u201cin trust\u201d did not suffice to bring a financing agreement with a security interest in all the debtor\u2019s inventory, equipment and assets within the purview of a fiduciary relationship as contemplated by 11 U.S.C. \u00a7 523(a)(4))."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"293 U.S. 328, at 333","parenthetical":"holding that a mortgagor in possession is not a fiduciary of the mortgagee within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Act, even though the mortgagor has obligated himself to keep the security intact","sentence":"David v. Aetna Acceptance Co., 293 U.S. 328, at 333, 55 S.Ct. 151, at 153, 79 L.Ed. 393 (1934) (holding that a mortgagor in possession is not a fiduciary of the mortgagee within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Act, even though the mortgagor has obligated himself to keep the security intact)."},"case_id":6111203,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Similarly, even where parties to a contract expressly characterize the contrac tual relationship as a trust, courts will look to the substance of the relationship rather than to the language chosen to express it, to determine whether a fiduciary relationship exists. Thus, Justice Cardozo observed, \"It is not enough that by the very act of wrongdoing out of which the debt arose, the bankrupt has become chargeable as a trustee ex maleficio. He must have been a trustee before the wrong and without reference thereto.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"where the \"magic words,\" \"in trust\" did not suffice to bring a financing agreement with a security interest in all the debtor's inventory, equipment and assets within the purview of a fiduciary relationship as contemplated by 11 U.S.C. SS 523(a","sentence":"See also Bloomingdale v. Dreher, 31 F.2d 93 (3d Cir.1929) (\u201ctrust receipt,\u201d evidencing security for a transaction consisting of borrowing and lending money did not give rise to a fiduciary relationship so as to bar discharge of debt in bankruptcy); In re Miles, 5 B.R. 458 (Bkrtcy.E.D.Va.1980) (where the \u201cmagic words,\u201d \u201cin trust\u201d did not suffice to bring a financing agreement with a security interest in all the debtor\u2019s inventory, equipment and assets within the purview of a fiduciary relationship as contemplated by 11 U.S.C. \u00a7 523(a)(4))."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"293 U.S. 328, at 333","parenthetical":"holding that a mortgagor in possession is not a fiduciary of the mortgagee within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Act, even though the mortgagor has obligated himself to keep the security intact","sentence":"David v. Aetna Acceptance Co., 293 U.S. 328, at 333, 55 S.Ct. 151, at 153, 79 L.Ed. 393 (1934) (holding that a mortgagor in possession is not a fiduciary of the mortgagee within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Act, even though the mortgagor has obligated himself to keep the security intact)."},"case_id":6111203,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Similarly, even where parties to a contract expressly characterize the contrac tual relationship as a trust, courts will look to the substance of the relationship rather than to the language chosen to express it, to determine whether a fiduciary relationship exists. Thus, Justice Cardozo observed, \"It is not enough that by the very act of wrongdoing out of which the debt arose, the bankrupt has become chargeable as a trustee ex maleficio. He must have been a trustee before the wrong and without reference thereto.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"55 S.Ct. 151, at 153","parenthetical":"holding that a mortgagor in possession is not a fiduciary of the mortgagee within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Act, even though the mortgagor has obligated himself to keep the security intact","sentence":"David v. Aetna Acceptance Co., 293 U.S. 328, at 333, 55 S.Ct. 151, at 153, 79 L.Ed. 393 (1934) (holding that a mortgagor in possession is not a fiduciary of the mortgagee within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Act, even though the mortgagor has obligated himself to keep the security intact)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"trust receipt,\" evidencing security for a transaction consisting of borrowing and lending money did not give rise to a fiduciary relationship so as to bar discharge of debt in bankruptcy","sentence":"See also Bloomingdale v. Dreher, 31 F.2d 93 (3d Cir.1929) (\u201ctrust receipt,\u201d evidencing security for a transaction consisting of borrowing and lending money did not give rise to a fiduciary relationship so as to bar discharge of debt in bankruptcy); In re Miles, 5 B.R. 458 (Bkrtcy.E.D.Va.1980) (where the \u201cmagic words,\u201d \u201cin trust\u201d did not suffice to bring a financing agreement with a security interest in all the debtor\u2019s inventory, equipment and assets within the purview of a fiduciary relationship as contemplated by 11 U.S.C. \u00a7 523(a)(4))."},"case_id":6111203,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Similarly, even where parties to a contract expressly characterize the contrac tual relationship as a trust, courts will look to the substance of the relationship rather than to the language chosen to express it, to determine whether a fiduciary relationship exists. Thus, Justice Cardozo observed, \"It is not enough that by the very act of wrongdoing out of which the debt arose, the bankrupt has become chargeable as a trustee ex maleficio. He must have been a trustee before the wrong and without reference thereto.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"55 S.Ct. 151, at 153","parenthetical":"holding that a mortgagor in possession is not a fiduciary of the mortgagee within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Act, even though the mortgagor has obligated himself to keep the security intact","sentence":"David v. Aetna Acceptance Co., 293 U.S. 328, at 333, 55 S.Ct. 151, at 153, 79 L.Ed. 393 (1934) (holding that a mortgagor in possession is not a fiduciary of the mortgagee within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Act, even though the mortgagor has obligated himself to keep the security intact)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"where the \"magic words,\" \"in trust\" did not suffice to bring a financing agreement with a security interest in all the debtor's inventory, equipment and assets within the purview of a fiduciary relationship as contemplated by 11 U.S.C. SS 523(a","sentence":"See also Bloomingdale v. Dreher, 31 F.2d 93 (3d Cir.1929) (\u201ctrust receipt,\u201d evidencing security for a transaction consisting of borrowing and lending money did not give rise to a fiduciary relationship so as to bar discharge of debt in bankruptcy); In re Miles, 5 B.R. 458 (Bkrtcy.E.D.Va.1980) (where the \u201cmagic words,\u201d \u201cin trust\u201d did not suffice to bring a financing agreement with a security interest in all the debtor\u2019s inventory, equipment and assets within the purview of a fiduciary relationship as contemplated by 11 U.S.C. \u00a7 523(a)(4))."},"case_id":6111203,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Similarly, even where parties to a contract expressly characterize the contrac tual relationship as a trust, courts will look to the substance of the relationship rather than to the language chosen to express it, to determine whether a fiduciary relationship exists. Thus, Justice Cardozo observed, \"It is not enough that by the very act of wrongdoing out of which the debt arose, the bankrupt has become chargeable as a trustee ex maleficio. He must have been a trustee before the wrong and without reference thereto.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that a mortgagor in possession is not a fiduciary of the mortgagee within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Act, even though the mortgagor has obligated himself to keep the security intact","sentence":"David v. Aetna Acceptance Co., 293 U.S. 328, at 333, 55 S.Ct. 151, at 153, 79 L.Ed. 393 (1934) (holding that a mortgagor in possession is not a fiduciary of the mortgagee within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Act, even though the mortgagor has obligated himself to keep the security intact)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"trust receipt,\" evidencing security for a transaction consisting of borrowing and lending money did not give rise to a fiduciary relationship so as to bar discharge of debt in bankruptcy","sentence":"See also Bloomingdale v. Dreher, 31 F.2d 93 (3d Cir.1929) (\u201ctrust receipt,\u201d evidencing security for a transaction consisting of borrowing and lending money did not give rise to a fiduciary relationship so as to bar discharge of debt in bankruptcy); In re Miles, 5 B.R. 458 (Bkrtcy.E.D.Va.1980) (where the \u201cmagic words,\u201d \u201cin trust\u201d did not suffice to bring a financing agreement with a security interest in all the debtor\u2019s inventory, equipment and assets within the purview of a fiduciary relationship as contemplated by 11 U.S.C. \u00a7 523(a)(4))."},"case_id":6111203,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Similarly, even where parties to a contract expressly characterize the contrac tual relationship as a trust, courts will look to the substance of the relationship rather than to the language chosen to express it, to determine whether a fiduciary relationship exists. Thus, Justice Cardozo observed, \"It is not enough that by the very act of wrongdoing out of which the debt arose, the bankrupt has become chargeable as a trustee ex maleficio. He must have been a trustee before the wrong and without reference thereto.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that a mortgagor in possession is not a fiduciary of the mortgagee within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Act, even though the mortgagor has obligated himself to keep the security intact","sentence":"David v. Aetna Acceptance Co., 293 U.S. 328, at 333, 55 S.Ct. 151, at 153, 79 L.Ed. 393 (1934) (holding that a mortgagor in possession is not a fiduciary of the mortgagee within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Act, even though the mortgagor has obligated himself to keep the security intact)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"where the \"magic words,\" \"in trust\" did not suffice to bring a financing agreement with a security interest in all the debtor's inventory, equipment and assets within the purview of a fiduciary relationship as contemplated by 11 U.S.C. SS 523(a","sentence":"See also Bloomingdale v. Dreher, 31 F.2d 93 (3d Cir.1929) (\u201ctrust receipt,\u201d evidencing security for a transaction consisting of borrowing and lending money did not give rise to a fiduciary relationship so as to bar discharge of debt in bankruptcy); In re Miles, 5 B.R. 458 (Bkrtcy.E.D.Va.1980) (where the \u201cmagic words,\u201d \u201cin trust\u201d did not suffice to bring a financing agreement with a security interest in all the debtor\u2019s inventory, equipment and assets within the purview of a fiduciary relationship as contemplated by 11 U.S.C. \u00a7 523(a)(4))."},"case_id":6111203,"label":"a"}
{"context":"We find that the one book rule does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause as applied to a series of grouped offenses like Vidal's. In so holding, we make explicit what has long been implicit in the case law of this circuit.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"617 F.3d 612, 626-28","parenthetical":"\"We conclude that the one-book rule set forth in SS 1B1.11(b","sentence":"United States v. Kumar, 617 F.3d 612, 626-28 (2d Cir.2010) (\u201cWe conclude that the one-book rule set forth in \u00a7 1B1.11(b)(3) does not violate the Ex Post Facto clause when applied to the sentencing of offenses committed both before and after the publication of a revised version of the Guidelines.\u201d) (emphasis omitted); United States v. Duane, 533 F.3d 441, 449 (6th Cir.2008) (\u201c[Wjhere, as here, offenses grouped together for sentencing purposes were committed before and after an amended version of the Guidelines went into effect, the use of the amended version of the Guidelines does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause.\u201d); United States v. Sullivan, 255 F.3d 1256, 1262-63 (10th Cir.2001) (same); United States v. Vivit, 214 F.3d 908, 918-19 (7th Cir.2000) (\u201c[Wje believe that the enactment of the grouping rules provides fair notice such that the application of \u00a7\u00a7 lBl.ll(b)(3) and 3D1.2 does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause.\u201d); United States v. Lewis, 235 F.3d 215, 218 (4th Cir.2000) (\u201c[I]t was not \u00a7 1B1.11(b)(3) that disadvantaged Lewis, but rather her decision to commit further acts of tax evasion after the effective date of the 1993 guidelines.\u201d); United States v. Kimler, 167 F.3d 889, 893-95 (5th Cir.1999) (\u201c[A] defendant has notice that the version of the sentencing guidelines in effect at the time he committed the last of a series of grouped offenses will apply to the entire group.\u201d); United States v. Bailey, 123 F.3d 1381, 1404-07 (11th Cir.1997) (same); United States v. Cooper, 35 F.3d 1248, 1250-53 (8th Cir.1994), vacated, 514 U.S. 1094, 115 S.Ct. 1820, 131 L.Ed.2d 742 (1995), reinstated, 63 F.3d 761, 762 (8th Cir.1995) (per curiam) (same)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"109 F.3d 539, 546-47","parenthetical":"finding ex post facto violation where district court applied revised Guidelines to all five mail fraud counts, only one of which involved conduct committed after the amendment","sentence":"But see United States v. Ortland, 109 F.3d 539, 546-47 (9th Cir.1997) (finding ex post facto violation where district court applied revised Guidelines to all five mail fraud counts, only one of which involved conduct committed after the amendment)."},"case_id":3727676,"label":"a"}
{"context":"We find that the one book rule does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause as applied to a series of grouped offenses like Vidal's. In so holding, we make explicit what has long been implicit in the case law of this circuit.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"533 F.3d 441, 449","parenthetical":"\"[Wjhere, as here, offenses grouped together for sentencing purposes were committed before and after an amended version of the Guidelines went into effect, the use of the amended version of the Guidelines does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause.\"","sentence":"United States v. Kumar, 617 F.3d 612, 626-28 (2d Cir.2010) (\u201cWe conclude that the one-book rule set forth in \u00a7 1B1.11(b)(3) does not violate the Ex Post Facto clause when applied to the sentencing of offenses committed both before and after the publication of a revised version of the Guidelines.\u201d) (emphasis omitted); United States v. Duane, 533 F.3d 441, 449 (6th Cir.2008) (\u201c[Wjhere, as here, offenses grouped together for sentencing purposes were committed before and after an amended version of the Guidelines went into effect, the use of the amended version of the Guidelines does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause.\u201d); United States v. Sullivan, 255 F.3d 1256, 1262-63 (10th Cir.2001) (same); United States v. Vivit, 214 F.3d 908, 918-19 (7th Cir.2000) (\u201c[Wje believe that the enactment of the grouping rules provides fair notice such that the application of \u00a7\u00a7 lBl.ll(b)(3) and 3D1.2 does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause.\u201d); United States v. Lewis, 235 F.3d 215, 218 (4th Cir.2000) (\u201c[I]t was not \u00a7 1B1.11(b)(3) that disadvantaged Lewis, but rather her decision to commit further acts of tax evasion after the effective date of the 1993 guidelines.\u201d); United States v. Kimler, 167 F.3d 889, 893-95 (5th Cir.1999) (\u201c[A] defendant has notice that the version of the sentencing guidelines in effect at the time he committed the last of a series of grouped offenses will apply to the entire group.\u201d); United States v. Bailey, 123 F.3d 1381, 1404-07 (11th Cir.1997) (same); United States v. Cooper, 35 F.3d 1248, 1250-53 (8th Cir.1994), vacated, 514 U.S. 1094, 115 S.Ct. 1820, 131 L.Ed.2d 742 (1995), reinstated, 63 F.3d 761, 762 (8th Cir.1995) (per curiam) (same)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"109 F.3d 539, 546-47","parenthetical":"finding ex post facto violation where district court applied revised Guidelines to all five mail fraud counts, only one of which involved conduct committed after the amendment","sentence":"But see United States v. Ortland, 109 F.3d 539, 546-47 (9th Cir.1997) (finding ex post facto violation where district court applied revised Guidelines to all five mail fraud counts, only one of which involved conduct committed after the amendment)."},"case_id":3727676,"label":"a"}
{"context":"We find that the one book rule does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause as applied to a series of grouped offenses like Vidal's. In so holding, we make explicit what has long been implicit in the case law of this circuit.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"109 F.3d 539, 546-47","parenthetical":"finding ex post facto violation where district court applied revised Guidelines to all five mail fraud counts, only one of which involved conduct committed after the amendment","sentence":"But see United States v. Ortland, 109 F.3d 539, 546-47 (9th Cir.1997) (finding ex post facto violation where district court applied revised Guidelines to all five mail fraud counts, only one of which involved conduct committed after the amendment)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"214 F.3d 908, 918-19","parenthetical":"\"[Wje believe that the enactment of the grouping rules provides fair notice such that the application of SSSS lBl.ll(b","sentence":"United States v. Kumar, 617 F.3d 612, 626-28 (2d Cir.2010) (\u201cWe conclude that the one-book rule set forth in \u00a7 1B1.11(b)(3) does not violate the Ex Post Facto clause when applied to the sentencing of offenses committed both before and after the publication of a revised version of the Guidelines.\u201d) (emphasis omitted); United States v. Duane, 533 F.3d 441, 449 (6th Cir.2008) (\u201c[Wjhere, as here, offenses grouped together for sentencing purposes were committed before and after an amended version of the Guidelines went into effect, the use of the amended version of the Guidelines does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause.\u201d); United States v. Sullivan, 255 F.3d 1256, 1262-63 (10th Cir.2001) (same); United States v. Vivit, 214 F.3d 908, 918-19 (7th Cir.2000) (\u201c[Wje believe that the enactment of the grouping rules provides fair notice such that the application of \u00a7\u00a7 lBl.ll(b)(3) and 3D1.2 does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause.\u201d); United States v. Lewis, 235 F.3d 215, 218 (4th Cir.2000) (\u201c[I]t was not \u00a7 1B1.11(b)(3) that disadvantaged Lewis, but rather her decision to commit further acts of tax evasion after the effective date of the 1993 guidelines.\u201d); United States v. Kimler, 167 F.3d 889, 893-95 (5th Cir.1999) (\u201c[A] defendant has notice that the version of the sentencing guidelines in effect at the time he committed the last of a series of grouped offenses will apply to the entire group.\u201d); United States v. Bailey, 123 F.3d 1381, 1404-07 (11th Cir.1997) (same); United States v. Cooper, 35 F.3d 1248, 1250-53 (8th Cir.1994), vacated, 514 U.S. 1094, 115 S.Ct. 1820, 131 L.Ed.2d 742 (1995), reinstated, 63 F.3d 761, 762 (8th Cir.1995) (per curiam) (same)."},"case_id":3727676,"label":"b"}
{"context":"We find that the one book rule does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause as applied to a series of grouped offenses like Vidal's. In so holding, we make explicit what has long been implicit in the case law of this circuit.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"167 F.3d 889, 893-95","parenthetical":"\"[A] defendant has notice that the version of the sentencing guidelines in effect at the time he committed the last of a series of grouped offenses will apply to the entire group.\"","sentence":"United States v. Kumar, 617 F.3d 612, 626-28 (2d Cir.2010) (\u201cWe conclude that the one-book rule set forth in \u00a7 1B1.11(b)(3) does not violate the Ex Post Facto clause when applied to the sentencing of offenses committed both before and after the publication of a revised version of the Guidelines.\u201d) (emphasis omitted); United States v. Duane, 533 F.3d 441, 449 (6th Cir.2008) (\u201c[Wjhere, as here, offenses grouped together for sentencing purposes were committed before and after an amended version of the Guidelines went into effect, the use of the amended version of the Guidelines does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause.\u201d); United States v. Sullivan, 255 F.3d 1256, 1262-63 (10th Cir.2001) (same); United States v. Vivit, 214 F.3d 908, 918-19 (7th Cir.2000) (\u201c[Wje believe that the enactment of the grouping rules provides fair notice such that the application of \u00a7\u00a7 lBl.ll(b)(3) and 3D1.2 does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause.\u201d); United States v. Lewis, 235 F.3d 215, 218 (4th Cir.2000) (\u201c[I]t was not \u00a7 1B1.11(b)(3) that disadvantaged Lewis, but rather her decision to commit further acts of tax evasion after the effective date of the 1993 guidelines.\u201d); United States v. Kimler, 167 F.3d 889, 893-95 (5th Cir.1999) (\u201c[A] defendant has notice that the version of the sentencing guidelines in effect at the time he committed the last of a series of grouped offenses will apply to the entire group.\u201d); United States v. Bailey, 123 F.3d 1381, 1404-07 (11th Cir.1997) (same); United States v. Cooper, 35 F.3d 1248, 1250-53 (8th Cir.1994), vacated, 514 U.S. 1094, 115 S.Ct. 1820, 131 L.Ed.2d 742 (1995), reinstated, 63 F.3d 761, 762 (8th Cir.1995) (per curiam) (same)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"109 F.3d 539, 546-47","parenthetical":"finding ex post facto violation where district court applied revised Guidelines to all five mail fraud counts, only one of which involved conduct committed after the amendment","sentence":"But see United States v. Ortland, 109 F.3d 539, 546-47 (9th Cir.1997) (finding ex post facto violation where district court applied revised Guidelines to all five mail fraud counts, only one of which involved conduct committed after the amendment)."},"case_id":3727676,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In this case, CCS Fitness appears to have argued from the start that its \"reciprocating member\" ought to carry its ordinary meaning and that the scope of this ordinary meaning encompasses the multi-component, curved structure used by the accused exercise machines.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"888 F.2d 815, 818","parenthetical":"\"That an appellant's arguments had been ineptly presented to a trial court does not in itself preclude a reversal by this court if the record unequivocally establishes that the appealed judgment resulted from clear and reversible legal error.\"","sentence":"See Interactive Gift Express, 256 F.3d at 1347, 59 USPQ2d at 1419; cf. Senmed, Inc. v. Richardr-Allan Med. Indus., Inc., 888 F.2d 815, 818, 12 USPQ2d 1508, 1511 (Fed.Cir.1989) (\u201cThat an appellant\u2019s arguments had been ineptly presented to a trial court does not in itself preclude a reversal by this court if the record unequivocally establishes that the appealed judgment resulted from clear and reversible legal error.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"256 F.3d 1347, 1347","parenthetical":"e.g., by adding a discussion about \"Alternatives A and B\"","sentence":"See Interactive Gift Express, 256 F.3d at 1347, 59 USPQ2d at 1419. Indeed, the district court itself indicated that CCS Fitness focused on this same argument during summary judgment, which further shows that neither Life Fitness nor the district court lacked notice or an opportunity to address the arguments now presented on appeal. See Finnigan Corp., 180 F.3d at 1362-63, 51 USPQ2d at 1007. That CCS Fitness may have elaborated upon the argument it initially made to the district court (e.g., by adding a discussion about \u201cAlternatives A and B\u201d) does not undermine this conclusion."},"case_id":9441924,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In this case, CCS Fitness appears to have argued from the start that its \"reciprocating member\" ought to carry its ordinary meaning and that the scope of this ordinary meaning encompasses the multi-component, curved structure used by the accused exercise machines.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"180 F.3d 1362, 1362-63","parenthetical":"e.g., by adding a discussion about \"Alternatives A and B\"","sentence":"See Interactive Gift Express, 256 F.3d at 1347, 59 USPQ2d at 1419. Indeed, the district court itself indicated that CCS Fitness focused on this same argument during summary judgment, which further shows that neither Life Fitness nor the district court lacked notice or an opportunity to address the arguments now presented on appeal. See Finnigan Corp., 180 F.3d at 1362-63, 51 USPQ2d at 1007. That CCS Fitness may have elaborated upon the argument it initially made to the district court (e.g., by adding a discussion about \u201cAlternatives A and B\u201d) does not undermine this conclusion."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"888 F.2d 815, 818","parenthetical":"\"That an appellant's arguments had been ineptly presented to a trial court does not in itself preclude a reversal by this court if the record unequivocally establishes that the appealed judgment resulted from clear and reversible legal error.\"","sentence":"See Interactive Gift Express, 256 F.3d at 1347, 59 USPQ2d at 1419; cf. Senmed, Inc. v. Richardr-Allan Med. Indus., Inc., 888 F.2d 815, 818, 12 USPQ2d 1508, 1511 (Fed.Cir.1989) (\u201cThat an appellant\u2019s arguments had been ineptly presented to a trial court does not in itself preclude a reversal by this court if the record unequivocally establishes that the appealed judgment resulted from clear and reversible legal error.\u201d)."},"case_id":9441924,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Nor has Codding-ton's counsel done so on appeal. Quite to the contrary and to his credit, he candidly acknowledges that no case law supports the requirement of a written waiver. Br. for Appellee at 48. And Supreme Court precedent regarding the standard for effective assistance of counsel has long resisted such unyielding rules in this area.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"528 U.S. 470, 480","parenthetical":"\"We ... reject a bright-line rule that counsel must always consult with the defendant regarding an appeal.\"","sentence":"See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 696, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) (\u201cMost important, in adjudicating a claim of actual ineffectiveness of counsel, a court should keep in mind that the principles we have stated do not establish mechanical rules.\u201d); see also Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 480, 120 S.Ct. 1029, 145 L.Ed.2d 985 (2000) (\u201cWe ... reject a bright-line rule that counsel must always consult with the defendant regarding an appeal.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"466 U.S. 668, 696","parenthetical":"\"Most important, in adjudicating a claim of actual ineffectiveness of counsel, a court should keep in mind that the principles we have stated do not establish mechanical rules.\"","sentence":"See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 696, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) (\u201cMost important, in adjudicating a claim of actual ineffectiveness of counsel, a court should keep in mind that the principles we have stated do not establish mechanical rules.\u201d); see also Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 480, 120 S.Ct. 1029, 145 L.Ed.2d 985 (2000) (\u201cWe ... reject a bright-line rule that counsel must always consult with the defendant regarding an appeal.\u201d)."},"case_id":168694,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Nor has Codding-ton's counsel done so on appeal. Quite to the contrary and to his credit, he candidly acknowledges that no case law supports the requirement of a written waiver. Br. for Appellee at 48. And Supreme Court precedent regarding the standard for effective assistance of counsel has long resisted such unyielding rules in this area.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"466 U.S. 668, 696","parenthetical":"\"Most important, in adjudicating a claim of actual ineffectiveness of counsel, a court should keep in mind that the principles we have stated do not establish mechanical rules.\"","sentence":"See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 696, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) (\u201cMost important, in adjudicating a claim of actual ineffectiveness of counsel, a court should keep in mind that the principles we have stated do not establish mechanical rules.\u201d); see also Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 480, 120 S.Ct. 1029, 145 L.Ed.2d 985 (2000) (\u201cWe ... reject a bright-line rule that counsel must always consult with the defendant regarding an appeal.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"We ... reject a bright-line rule that counsel must always consult with the defendant regarding an appeal.\"","sentence":"See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 696, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) (\u201cMost important, in adjudicating a claim of actual ineffectiveness of counsel, a court should keep in mind that the principles we have stated do not establish mechanical rules.\u201d); see also Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 480, 120 S.Ct. 1029, 145 L.Ed.2d 985 (2000) (\u201cWe ... reject a bright-line rule that counsel must always consult with the defendant regarding an appeal.\u201d)."},"case_id":168694,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Nor has Codding-ton's counsel done so on appeal. Quite to the contrary and to his credit, he candidly acknowledges that no case law supports the requirement of a written waiver. Br. for Appellee at 48. And Supreme Court precedent regarding the standard for effective assistance of counsel has long resisted such unyielding rules in this area.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"466 U.S. 668, 696","parenthetical":"\"Most important, in adjudicating a claim of actual ineffectiveness of counsel, a court should keep in mind that the principles we have stated do not establish mechanical rules.\"","sentence":"See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 696, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) (\u201cMost important, in adjudicating a claim of actual ineffectiveness of counsel, a court should keep in mind that the principles we have stated do not establish mechanical rules.\u201d); see also Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 480, 120 S.Ct. 1029, 145 L.Ed.2d 985 (2000) (\u201cWe ... reject a bright-line rule that counsel must always consult with the defendant regarding an appeal.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"We ... reject a bright-line rule that counsel must always consult with the defendant regarding an appeal.\"","sentence":"See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 696, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) (\u201cMost important, in adjudicating a claim of actual ineffectiveness of counsel, a court should keep in mind that the principles we have stated do not establish mechanical rules.\u201d); see also Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 480, 120 S.Ct. 1029, 145 L.Ed.2d 985 (2000) (\u201cWe ... reject a bright-line rule that counsel must always consult with the defendant regarding an appeal.\u201d)."},"case_id":168694,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Nor has Codding-ton's counsel done so on appeal. Quite to the contrary and to his credit, he candidly acknowledges that no case law supports the requirement of a written waiver. Br. for Appellee at 48. And Supreme Court precedent regarding the standard for effective assistance of counsel has long resisted such unyielding rules in this area.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"528 U.S. 470, 480","parenthetical":"\"We ... reject a bright-line rule that counsel must always consult with the defendant regarding an appeal.\"","sentence":"See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 696, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) (\u201cMost important, in adjudicating a claim of actual ineffectiveness of counsel, a court should keep in mind that the principles we have stated do not establish mechanical rules.\u201d); see also Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 480, 120 S.Ct. 1029, 145 L.Ed.2d 985 (2000) (\u201cWe ... reject a bright-line rule that counsel must always consult with the defendant regarding an appeal.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"Most important, in adjudicating a claim of actual ineffectiveness of counsel, a court should keep in mind that the principles we have stated do not establish mechanical rules.\"","sentence":"See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 696, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) (\u201cMost important, in adjudicating a claim of actual ineffectiveness of counsel, a court should keep in mind that the principles we have stated do not establish mechanical rules.\u201d); see also Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 480, 120 S.Ct. 1029, 145 L.Ed.2d 985 (2000) (\u201cWe ... reject a bright-line rule that counsel must always consult with the defendant regarding an appeal.\u201d)."},"case_id":168694,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Nor has Codding-ton's counsel done so on appeal. Quite to the contrary and to his credit, he candidly acknowledges that no case law supports the requirement of a written waiver. Br. for Appellee at 48. And Supreme Court precedent regarding the standard for effective assistance of counsel has long resisted such unyielding rules in this area.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"We ... reject a bright-line rule that counsel must always consult with the defendant regarding an appeal.\"","sentence":"See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 696, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) (\u201cMost important, in adjudicating a claim of actual ineffectiveness of counsel, a court should keep in mind that the principles we have stated do not establish mechanical rules.\u201d); see also Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 480, 120 S.Ct. 1029, 145 L.Ed.2d 985 (2000) (\u201cWe ... reject a bright-line rule that counsel must always consult with the defendant regarding an appeal.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"Most important, in adjudicating a claim of actual ineffectiveness of counsel, a court should keep in mind that the principles we have stated do not establish mechanical rules.\"","sentence":"See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 696, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) (\u201cMost important, in adjudicating a claim of actual ineffectiveness of counsel, a court should keep in mind that the principles we have stated do not establish mechanical rules.\u201d); see also Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 480, 120 S.Ct. 1029, 145 L.Ed.2d 985 (2000) (\u201cWe ... reject a bright-line rule that counsel must always consult with the defendant regarding an appeal.\u201d)."},"case_id":168694,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Nor has Codding-ton's counsel done so on appeal. Quite to the contrary and to his credit, he candidly acknowledges that no case law supports the requirement of a written waiver. Br. for Appellee at 48. And Supreme Court precedent regarding the standard for effective assistance of counsel has long resisted such unyielding rules in this area.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"We ... reject a bright-line rule that counsel must always consult with the defendant regarding an appeal.\"","sentence":"See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 696, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) (\u201cMost important, in adjudicating a claim of actual ineffectiveness of counsel, a court should keep in mind that the principles we have stated do not establish mechanical rules.\u201d); see also Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 480, 120 S.Ct. 1029, 145 L.Ed.2d 985 (2000) (\u201cWe ... reject a bright-line rule that counsel must always consult with the defendant regarding an appeal.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"Most important, in adjudicating a claim of actual ineffectiveness of counsel, a court should keep in mind that the principles we have stated do not establish mechanical rules.\"","sentence":"See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 696, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) (\u201cMost important, in adjudicating a claim of actual ineffectiveness of counsel, a court should keep in mind that the principles we have stated do not establish mechanical rules.\u201d); see also Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 480, 120 S.Ct. 1029, 145 L.Ed.2d 985 (2000) (\u201cWe ... reject a bright-line rule that counsel must always consult with the defendant regarding an appeal.\u201d)."},"case_id":168694,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Nor has Codding-ton's counsel done so on appeal. Quite to the contrary and to his credit, he candidly acknowledges that no case law supports the requirement of a written waiver. Br. for Appellee at 48. And Supreme Court precedent regarding the standard for effective assistance of counsel has long resisted such unyielding rules in this area.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"Most important, in adjudicating a claim of actual ineffectiveness of counsel, a court should keep in mind that the principles we have stated do not establish mechanical rules.\"","sentence":"See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 696, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) (\u201cMost important, in adjudicating a claim of actual ineffectiveness of counsel, a court should keep in mind that the principles we have stated do not establish mechanical rules.\u201d); see also Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 480, 120 S.Ct. 1029, 145 L.Ed.2d 985 (2000) (\u201cWe ... reject a bright-line rule that counsel must always consult with the defendant regarding an appeal.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"528 U.S. 470, 480","parenthetical":"\"We ... reject a bright-line rule that counsel must always consult with the defendant regarding an appeal.\"","sentence":"See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 696, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) (\u201cMost important, in adjudicating a claim of actual ineffectiveness of counsel, a court should keep in mind that the principles we have stated do not establish mechanical rules.\u201d); see also Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 480, 120 S.Ct. 1029, 145 L.Ed.2d 985 (2000) (\u201cWe ... reject a bright-line rule that counsel must always consult with the defendant regarding an appeal.\u201d)."},"case_id":168694,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Nor has Codding-ton's counsel done so on appeal. Quite to the contrary and to his credit, he candidly acknowledges that no case law supports the requirement of a written waiver. Br. for Appellee at 48. And Supreme Court precedent regarding the standard for effective assistance of counsel has long resisted such unyielding rules in this area.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"Most important, in adjudicating a claim of actual ineffectiveness of counsel, a court should keep in mind that the principles we have stated do not establish mechanical rules.\"","sentence":"See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 696, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) (\u201cMost important, in adjudicating a claim of actual ineffectiveness of counsel, a court should keep in mind that the principles we have stated do not establish mechanical rules.\u201d); see also Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 480, 120 S.Ct. 1029, 145 L.Ed.2d 985 (2000) (\u201cWe ... reject a bright-line rule that counsel must always consult with the defendant regarding an appeal.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"We ... reject a bright-line rule that counsel must always consult with the defendant regarding an appeal.\"","sentence":"See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 696, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) (\u201cMost important, in adjudicating a claim of actual ineffectiveness of counsel, a court should keep in mind that the principles we have stated do not establish mechanical rules.\u201d); see also Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 480, 120 S.Ct. 1029, 145 L.Ed.2d 985 (2000) (\u201cWe ... reject a bright-line rule that counsel must always consult with the defendant regarding an appeal.\u201d)."},"case_id":168694,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Nor has Codding-ton's counsel done so on appeal. Quite to the contrary and to his credit, he candidly acknowledges that no case law supports the requirement of a written waiver. Br. for Appellee at 48. And Supreme Court precedent regarding the standard for effective assistance of counsel has long resisted such unyielding rules in this area.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"Most important, in adjudicating a claim of actual ineffectiveness of counsel, a court should keep in mind that the principles we have stated do not establish mechanical rules.\"","sentence":"See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 696, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) (\u201cMost important, in adjudicating a claim of actual ineffectiveness of counsel, a court should keep in mind that the principles we have stated do not establish mechanical rules.\u201d); see also Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 480, 120 S.Ct. 1029, 145 L.Ed.2d 985 (2000) (\u201cWe ... reject a bright-line rule that counsel must always consult with the defendant regarding an appeal.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"We ... reject a bright-line rule that counsel must always consult with the defendant regarding an appeal.\"","sentence":"See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 696, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) (\u201cMost important, in adjudicating a claim of actual ineffectiveness of counsel, a court should keep in mind that the principles we have stated do not establish mechanical rules.\u201d); see also Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 480, 120 S.Ct. 1029, 145 L.Ed.2d 985 (2000) (\u201cWe ... reject a bright-line rule that counsel must always consult with the defendant regarding an appeal.\u201d)."},"case_id":168694,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The diseovery rule applies on a categorical basis to injuries that are both inherently undiscoverable and objectively verifiable. When applicable, the discovery rule \"defers the accrual of the cause of action until the injury was or could have been reasonably discovered.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"356 S.W.3d 929, 929-30","parenthetical":"declining to apply the discovery rule to inheritance claims of adopted children","sentence":"Shell Oil Co., 356 S.W.3d at 929-30. As we have observed, \u201cTexas courts have refused to apply the discovery rule to claims arising out of probate proceedings in most instances ... even in the face of allegations of fraud.\u201d Little, 943 S.W.2d at 420 (declining to apply the discovery rule to inheritance claims of adopted children); see Frost Nat\u2019l Bank, 315 S.W.3d at 497 (\u201c[W]e hold that the discovery rule does not apply to ... bill of review claims to set aside probate judgments\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"315 S.W.3d 497, 497","parenthetical":"\"[W]e hold that the discovery rule does not apply to ... bill of review claims to set aside probate judgments\"","sentence":"Shell Oil Co., 356 S.W.3d at 929-30. As we have observed, \u201cTexas courts have refused to apply the discovery rule to claims arising out of probate proceedings in most instances ... even in the face of allegations of fraud.\u201d Little, 943 S.W.2d at 420 (declining to apply the discovery rule to inheritance claims of adopted children); see Frost Nat\u2019l Bank, 315 S.W.3d at 497 (\u201c[W]e hold that the discovery rule does not apply to ... bill of review claims to set aside probate judgments\u201d)."},"case_id":6857138,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The diseovery rule applies on a categorical basis to injuries that are both inherently undiscoverable and objectively verifiable. When applicable, the discovery rule \"defers the accrual of the cause of action until the injury was or could have been reasonably discovered.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"315 S.W.3d 497, 497","parenthetical":"\"[W]e hold that the discovery rule does not apply to ... bill of review claims to set aside probate judgments\"","sentence":"Shell Oil Co., 356 S.W.3d at 929-30. As we have observed, \u201cTexas courts have refused to apply the discovery rule to claims arising out of probate proceedings in most instances ... even in the face of allegations of fraud.\u201d Little, 943 S.W.2d at 420 (declining to apply the discovery rule to inheritance claims of adopted children); see Frost Nat\u2019l Bank, 315 S.W.3d at 497 (\u201c[W]e hold that the discovery rule does not apply to ... bill of review claims to set aside probate judgments\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"943 S.W.2d 420, 420","parenthetical":"declining to apply the discovery rule to inheritance claims of adopted children","sentence":"Shell Oil Co., 356 S.W.3d at 929-30. As we have observed, \u201cTexas courts have refused to apply the discovery rule to claims arising out of probate proceedings in most instances ... even in the face of allegations of fraud.\u201d Little, 943 S.W.2d at 420 (declining to apply the discovery rule to inheritance claims of adopted children); see Frost Nat\u2019l Bank, 315 S.W.3d at 497 (\u201c[W]e hold that the discovery rule does not apply to ... bill of review claims to set aside probate judgments\u201d)."},"case_id":6857138,"label":"b"}
{"context":"To address this inequity, Congress passed the Retirement Equity Act of 1984 (\"REA\"), Pub.L. The REA amended ERISA to recognize an express exception to the broad anti-alienation provisions where a QDRO exists. 29 U.S.C. SS 1056(d)(3)(A). The purpose of the REA was \"primarily to safeguard the financial security of widows and divorcees.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"486 U.S. 825, 838-89","parenthetical":"stating that \" 'primary focus'alienation of plan benefits for spouses seeking enforcement of domestic support orders.\"","sentence":"Ablamis, 937 F.2d at 1453; Mack- ey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Serv., Inc., 486 U.S. 825, 838-89, 108 S.Ct. 2182, 100 L.Ed.2d 836 (1988) (stating that \u201c \u2018primary focus\u2019alienation of plan benefits for spouses seeking enforcement of domestic support orders.\u201d); see also In re Gendreau, 122 F.3d 815, 817 (9th Cir.1997) (same); Metropolitan Life v. Wheaton, 42 F.3d 1080, 1083 (7th Cir.1994) (\u201cThe draftsmen of the Retirement Equity Act were concerned with the financial security of the spouses and other survivors of employees who died enrolled in ERISA plans.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"42 F.3d 1080, 1083","parenthetical":"\"The draftsmen of the Retirement Equity Act were concerned with the financial security of the spouses and other survivors of employees who died enrolled in ERISA plans.\"","sentence":"Ablamis, 937 F.2d at 1453; Mack- ey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Serv., Inc., 486 U.S. 825, 838-89, 108 S.Ct. 2182, 100 L.Ed.2d 836 (1988) (stating that \u201c \u2018primary focus\u2019alienation of plan benefits for spouses seeking enforcement of domestic support orders.\u201d); see also In re Gendreau, 122 F.3d 815, 817 (9th Cir.1997) (same); Metropolitan Life v. Wheaton, 42 F.3d 1080, 1083 (7th Cir.1994) (\u201cThe draftsmen of the Retirement Equity Act were concerned with the financial security of the spouses and other survivors of employees who died enrolled in ERISA plans.\u201d)."},"case_id":11663633,"label":"a"}
{"context":"To address this inequity, Congress passed the Retirement Equity Act of 1984 (\"REA\"), Pub.L. The REA amended ERISA to recognize an express exception to the broad anti-alienation provisions where a QDRO exists. 29 U.S.C. SS 1056(d)(3)(A). The purpose of the REA was \"primarily to safeguard the financial security of widows and divorcees.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"42 F.3d 1080, 1083","parenthetical":"\"The draftsmen of the Retirement Equity Act were concerned with the financial security of the spouses and other survivors of employees who died enrolled in ERISA plans.\"","sentence":"Ablamis, 937 F.2d at 1453; Mack- ey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Serv., Inc., 486 U.S. 825, 838-89, 108 S.Ct. 2182, 100 L.Ed.2d 836 (1988) (stating that \u201c \u2018primary focus\u2019alienation of plan benefits for spouses seeking enforcement of domestic support orders.\u201d); see also In re Gendreau, 122 F.3d 815, 817 (9th Cir.1997) (same); Metropolitan Life v. Wheaton, 42 F.3d 1080, 1083 (7th Cir.1994) (\u201cThe draftsmen of the Retirement Equity Act were concerned with the financial security of the spouses and other survivors of employees who died enrolled in ERISA plans.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"stating that \" 'primary focus'alienation of plan benefits for spouses seeking enforcement of domestic support orders.\"","sentence":"Ablamis, 937 F.2d at 1453; Mack- ey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Serv., Inc., 486 U.S. 825, 838-89, 108 S.Ct. 2182, 100 L.Ed.2d 836 (1988) (stating that \u201c \u2018primary focus\u2019alienation of plan benefits for spouses seeking enforcement of domestic support orders.\u201d); see also In re Gendreau, 122 F.3d 815, 817 (9th Cir.1997) (same); Metropolitan Life v. Wheaton, 42 F.3d 1080, 1083 (7th Cir.1994) (\u201cThe draftsmen of the Retirement Equity Act were concerned with the financial security of the spouses and other survivors of employees who died enrolled in ERISA plans.\u201d)."},"case_id":11663633,"label":"b"}
{"context":"To address this inequity, Congress passed the Retirement Equity Act of 1984 (\"REA\"), Pub.L. The REA amended ERISA to recognize an express exception to the broad anti-alienation provisions where a QDRO exists. 29 U.S.C. SS 1056(d)(3)(A). The purpose of the REA was \"primarily to safeguard the financial security of widows and divorcees.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"42 F.3d 1080, 1083","parenthetical":"\"The draftsmen of the Retirement Equity Act were concerned with the financial security of the spouses and other survivors of employees who died enrolled in ERISA plans.\"","sentence":"Ablamis, 937 F.2d at 1453; Mack- ey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Serv., Inc., 486 U.S. 825, 838-89, 108 S.Ct. 2182, 100 L.Ed.2d 836 (1988) (stating that \u201c \u2018primary focus\u2019alienation of plan benefits for spouses seeking enforcement of domestic support orders.\u201d); see also In re Gendreau, 122 F.3d 815, 817 (9th Cir.1997) (same); Metropolitan Life v. Wheaton, 42 F.3d 1080, 1083 (7th Cir.1994) (\u201cThe draftsmen of the Retirement Equity Act were concerned with the financial security of the spouses and other survivors of employees who died enrolled in ERISA plans.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"stating that \" 'primary focus'alienation of plan benefits for spouses seeking enforcement of domestic support orders.\"","sentence":"Ablamis, 937 F.2d at 1453; Mack- ey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Serv., Inc., 486 U.S. 825, 838-89, 108 S.Ct. 2182, 100 L.Ed.2d 836 (1988) (stating that \u201c \u2018primary focus\u2019alienation of plan benefits for spouses seeking enforcement of domestic support orders.\u201d); see also In re Gendreau, 122 F.3d 815, 817 (9th Cir.1997) (same); Metropolitan Life v. Wheaton, 42 F.3d 1080, 1083 (7th Cir.1994) (\u201cThe draftsmen of the Retirement Equity Act were concerned with the financial security of the spouses and other survivors of employees who died enrolled in ERISA plans.\u201d)."},"case_id":11663633,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The question that remains is what level of \"nexus,\" \"bond,\" \"link,\" or \"connection\" is necessary. We conclude that a claim is \"based upon\" events in the United States if those events establish a legal element of the claim.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"830 F.2d 1018, 1023","parenthetical":"stating, \"In determining whether the commercial activities exception applies, the courts focus only on those specific acts that form the basis of the suit\"","sentence":"See Callejo v. Bancomer, S.A., 764 F.2d 1101, 1109 (5th Cir.1985) (stating that \u201cthe emphasis should be on the elements of the cause of action itself\u201d in determining jurisdiction under the Immunities Act); Gilson v. Republic of Ireland, 682 F.2d 1022, 1027 n. 22 (D.C.Cir.1982) (stating that jurisdiction would be present if the plaintiff could show conduct in the United States that would be \u201can element of the cause of action under whatever law governs his claims\u201d); see also Joseph v. Office of the Consulate General, 830 F.2d 1018,1023 (,9th Cir.1987) (stating, \u201cIn determining whether the commercial activities exception applies, the courts focus only on those specific acts that form the basis of the suit\u201d) (emphasis original), cert. denied 485 U.S. 905,108 S.Ct. 1077, 99 L.Ed.2d 236 (1988)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"764 F.2d 1101, 1109","parenthetical":"stating that \"the emphasis should be on the elements of the cause of action itself\" in determining jurisdiction under the Immunities Act","sentence":"See Callejo v. Bancomer, S.A., 764 F.2d 1101, 1109 (5th Cir.1985) (stating that \u201cthe emphasis should be on the elements of the cause of action itself\u201d in determining jurisdiction under the Immunities Act); Gilson v. Republic of Ireland, 682 F.2d 1022, 1027 n. 22 (D.C.Cir.1982) (stating that jurisdiction would be present if the plaintiff could show conduct in the United States that would be \u201can element of the cause of action under whatever law governs his claims\u201d); see also Joseph v. Office of the Consulate General, 830 F.2d 1018,1023 (,9th Cir.1987) (stating, \u201cIn determining whether the commercial activities exception applies, the courts focus only on those specific acts that form the basis of the suit\u201d) (emphasis original), cert. denied 485 U.S. 905,108 S.Ct. 1077, 99 L.Ed.2d 236 (1988)."},"case_id":10540947,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The question that remains is what level of \"nexus,\" \"bond,\" \"link,\" or \"connection\" is necessary. We conclude that a claim is \"based upon\" events in the United States if those events establish a legal element of the claim.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"764 F.2d 1101, 1109","parenthetical":"stating that \"the emphasis should be on the elements of the cause of action itself\" in determining jurisdiction under the Immunities Act","sentence":"See Callejo v. Bancomer, S.A., 764 F.2d 1101, 1109 (5th Cir.1985) (stating that \u201cthe emphasis should be on the elements of the cause of action itself\u201d in determining jurisdiction under the Immunities Act); Gilson v. Republic of Ireland, 682 F.2d 1022, 1027 n. 22 (D.C.Cir.1982) (stating that jurisdiction would be present if the plaintiff could show conduct in the United States that would be \u201can element of the cause of action under whatever law governs his claims\u201d); see also Joseph v. Office of the Consulate General, 830 F.2d 1018,1023 (,9th Cir.1987) (stating, \u201cIn determining whether the commercial activities exception applies, the courts focus only on those specific acts that form the basis of the suit\u201d) (emphasis original), cert. denied 485 U.S. 905,108 S.Ct. 1077, 99 L.Ed.2d 236 (1988)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"stating, \"In determining whether the commercial activities exception applies, the courts focus only on those specific acts that form the basis of the suit\"","sentence":"See Callejo v. Bancomer, S.A., 764 F.2d 1101, 1109 (5th Cir.1985) (stating that \u201cthe emphasis should be on the elements of the cause of action itself\u201d in determining jurisdiction under the Immunities Act); Gilson v. Republic of Ireland, 682 F.2d 1022, 1027 n. 22 (D.C.Cir.1982) (stating that jurisdiction would be present if the plaintiff could show conduct in the United States that would be \u201can element of the cause of action under whatever law governs his claims\u201d); see also Joseph v. Office of the Consulate General, 830 F.2d 1018,1023 (,9th Cir.1987) (stating, \u201cIn determining whether the commercial activities exception applies, the courts focus only on those specific acts that form the basis of the suit\u201d) (emphasis original), cert. denied 485 U.S. 905,108 S.Ct. 1077, 99 L.Ed.2d 236 (1988)."},"case_id":10540947,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The question that remains is what level of \"nexus,\" \"bond,\" \"link,\" or \"connection\" is necessary. We conclude that a claim is \"based upon\" events in the United States if those events establish a legal element of the claim.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"stating, \"In determining whether the commercial activities exception applies, the courts focus only on those specific acts that form the basis of the suit\"","sentence":"See Callejo v. Bancomer, S.A., 764 F.2d 1101, 1109 (5th Cir.1985) (stating that \u201cthe emphasis should be on the elements of the cause of action itself\u201d in determining jurisdiction under the Immunities Act); Gilson v. Republic of Ireland, 682 F.2d 1022, 1027 n. 22 (D.C.Cir.1982) (stating that jurisdiction would be present if the plaintiff could show conduct in the United States that would be \u201can element of the cause of action under whatever law governs his claims\u201d); see also Joseph v. Office of the Consulate General, 830 F.2d 1018,1023 (,9th Cir.1987) (stating, \u201cIn determining whether the commercial activities exception applies, the courts focus only on those specific acts that form the basis of the suit\u201d) (emphasis original), cert. denied 485 U.S. 905,108 S.Ct. 1077, 99 L.Ed.2d 236 (1988)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"764 F.2d 1101, 1109","parenthetical":"stating that \"the emphasis should be on the elements of the cause of action itself\" in determining jurisdiction under the Immunities Act","sentence":"See Callejo v. Bancomer, S.A., 764 F.2d 1101, 1109 (5th Cir.1985) (stating that \u201cthe emphasis should be on the elements of the cause of action itself\u201d in determining jurisdiction under the Immunities Act); Gilson v. Republic of Ireland, 682 F.2d 1022, 1027 n. 22 (D.C.Cir.1982) (stating that jurisdiction would be present if the plaintiff could show conduct in the United States that would be \u201can element of the cause of action under whatever law governs his claims\u201d); see also Joseph v. Office of the Consulate General, 830 F.2d 1018,1023 (,9th Cir.1987) (stating, \u201cIn determining whether the commercial activities exception applies, the courts focus only on those specific acts that form the basis of the suit\u201d) (emphasis original), cert. denied 485 U.S. 905,108 S.Ct. 1077, 99 L.Ed.2d 236 (1988)."},"case_id":10540947,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The question that remains is what level of \"nexus,\" \"bond,\" \"link,\" or \"connection\" is necessary. We conclude that a claim is \"based upon\" events in the United States if those events establish a legal element of the claim.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"stating, \"In determining whether the commercial activities exception applies, the courts focus only on those specific acts that form the basis of the suit\"","sentence":"See Callejo v. Bancomer, S.A., 764 F.2d 1101, 1109 (5th Cir.1985) (stating that \u201cthe emphasis should be on the elements of the cause of action itself\u201d in determining jurisdiction under the Immunities Act); Gilson v. Republic of Ireland, 682 F.2d 1022, 1027 n. 22 (D.C.Cir.1982) (stating that jurisdiction would be present if the plaintiff could show conduct in the United States that would be \u201can element of the cause of action under whatever law governs his claims\u201d); see also Joseph v. Office of the Consulate General, 830 F.2d 1018,1023 (,9th Cir.1987) (stating, \u201cIn determining whether the commercial activities exception applies, the courts focus only on those specific acts that form the basis of the suit\u201d) (emphasis original), cert. denied 485 U.S. 905,108 S.Ct. 1077, 99 L.Ed.2d 236 (1988)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"764 F.2d 1101, 1109","parenthetical":"stating that \"the emphasis should be on the elements of the cause of action itself\" in determining jurisdiction under the Immunities Act","sentence":"See Callejo v. Bancomer, S.A., 764 F.2d 1101, 1109 (5th Cir.1985) (stating that \u201cthe emphasis should be on the elements of the cause of action itself\u201d in determining jurisdiction under the Immunities Act); Gilson v. Republic of Ireland, 682 F.2d 1022, 1027 n. 22 (D.C.Cir.1982) (stating that jurisdiction would be present if the plaintiff could show conduct in the United States that would be \u201can element of the cause of action under whatever law governs his claims\u201d); see also Joseph v. Office of the Consulate General, 830 F.2d 1018,1023 (,9th Cir.1987) (stating, \u201cIn determining whether the commercial activities exception applies, the courts focus only on those specific acts that form the basis of the suit\u201d) (emphasis original), cert. denied 485 U.S. 905,108 S.Ct. 1077, 99 L.Ed.2d 236 (1988)."},"case_id":10540947,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The question that remains is what level of \"nexus,\" \"bond,\" \"link,\" or \"connection\" is necessary. We conclude that a claim is \"based upon\" events in the United States if those events establish a legal element of the claim.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"830 F.2d 1018, 1023","parenthetical":"stating, \"In determining whether the commercial activities exception applies, the courts focus only on those specific acts that form the basis of the suit\"","sentence":"See Callejo v. Bancomer, S.A., 764 F.2d 1101, 1109 (5th Cir.1985) (stating that \u201cthe emphasis should be on the elements of the cause of action itself\u201d in determining jurisdiction under the Immunities Act); Gilson v. Republic of Ireland, 682 F.2d 1022, 1027 n. 22 (D.C.Cir.1982) (stating that jurisdiction would be present if the plaintiff could show conduct in the United States that would be \u201can element of the cause of action under whatever law governs his claims\u201d); see also Joseph v. Office of the Consulate General, 830 F.2d 1018,1023 (,9th Cir.1987) (stating, \u201cIn determining whether the commercial activities exception applies, the courts focus only on those specific acts that form the basis of the suit\u201d) (emphasis original), cert. denied 485 U.S. 905,108 S.Ct. 1077, 99 L.Ed.2d 236 (1988)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"stating that jurisdiction would be present if the plaintiff could show conduct in the United States that would be \"an element of the cause of action under whatever law governs his claims\"","sentence":"See Callejo v. Bancomer, S.A., 764 F.2d 1101, 1109 (5th Cir.1985) (stating that \u201cthe emphasis should be on the elements of the cause of action itself\u201d in determining jurisdiction under the Immunities Act); Gilson v. Republic of Ireland, 682 F.2d 1022, 1027 n. 22 (D.C.Cir.1982) (stating that jurisdiction would be present if the plaintiff could show conduct in the United States that would be \u201can element of the cause of action under whatever law governs his claims\u201d); see also Joseph v. Office of the Consulate General, 830 F.2d 1018,1023 (,9th Cir.1987) (stating, \u201cIn determining whether the commercial activities exception applies, the courts focus only on those specific acts that form the basis of the suit\u201d) (emphasis original), cert. denied 485 U.S. 905,108 S.Ct. 1077, 99 L.Ed.2d 236 (1988)."},"case_id":10540947,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The question that remains is what level of \"nexus,\" \"bond,\" \"link,\" or \"connection\" is necessary. We conclude that a claim is \"based upon\" events in the United States if those events establish a legal element of the claim.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"stating, \"In determining whether the commercial activities exception applies, the courts focus only on those specific acts that form the basis of the suit\"","sentence":"See Callejo v. Bancomer, S.A., 764 F.2d 1101, 1109 (5th Cir.1985) (stating that \u201cthe emphasis should be on the elements of the cause of action itself\u201d in determining jurisdiction under the Immunities Act); Gilson v. Republic of Ireland, 682 F.2d 1022, 1027 n. 22 (D.C.Cir.1982) (stating that jurisdiction would be present if the plaintiff could show conduct in the United States that would be \u201can element of the cause of action under whatever law governs his claims\u201d); see also Joseph v. Office of the Consulate General, 830 F.2d 1018,1023 (,9th Cir.1987) (stating, \u201cIn determining whether the commercial activities exception applies, the courts focus only on those specific acts that form the basis of the suit\u201d) (emphasis original), cert. denied 485 U.S. 905,108 S.Ct. 1077, 99 L.Ed.2d 236 (1988)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"stating that jurisdiction would be present if the plaintiff could show conduct in the United States that would be \"an element of the cause of action under whatever law governs his claims\"","sentence":"See Callejo v. Bancomer, S.A., 764 F.2d 1101, 1109 (5th Cir.1985) (stating that \u201cthe emphasis should be on the elements of the cause of action itself\u201d in determining jurisdiction under the Immunities Act); Gilson v. Republic of Ireland, 682 F.2d 1022, 1027 n. 22 (D.C.Cir.1982) (stating that jurisdiction would be present if the plaintiff could show conduct in the United States that would be \u201can element of the cause of action under whatever law governs his claims\u201d); see also Joseph v. Office of the Consulate General, 830 F.2d 1018,1023 (,9th Cir.1987) (stating, \u201cIn determining whether the commercial activities exception applies, the courts focus only on those specific acts that form the basis of the suit\u201d) (emphasis original), cert. denied 485 U.S. 905,108 S.Ct. 1077, 99 L.Ed.2d 236 (1988)."},"case_id":10540947,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The question that remains is what level of \"nexus,\" \"bond,\" \"link,\" or \"connection\" is necessary. We conclude that a claim is \"based upon\" events in the United States if those events establish a legal element of the claim.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"stating that jurisdiction would be present if the plaintiff could show conduct in the United States that would be \"an element of the cause of action under whatever law governs his claims\"","sentence":"See Callejo v. Bancomer, S.A., 764 F.2d 1101, 1109 (5th Cir.1985) (stating that \u201cthe emphasis should be on the elements of the cause of action itself\u201d in determining jurisdiction under the Immunities Act); Gilson v. Republic of Ireland, 682 F.2d 1022, 1027 n. 22 (D.C.Cir.1982) (stating that jurisdiction would be present if the plaintiff could show conduct in the United States that would be \u201can element of the cause of action under whatever law governs his claims\u201d); see also Joseph v. Office of the Consulate General, 830 F.2d 1018,1023 (,9th Cir.1987) (stating, \u201cIn determining whether the commercial activities exception applies, the courts focus only on those specific acts that form the basis of the suit\u201d) (emphasis original), cert. denied 485 U.S. 905,108 S.Ct. 1077, 99 L.Ed.2d 236 (1988)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"stating, \"In determining whether the commercial activities exception applies, the courts focus only on those specific acts that form the basis of the suit\"","sentence":"See Callejo v. Bancomer, S.A., 764 F.2d 1101, 1109 (5th Cir.1985) (stating that \u201cthe emphasis should be on the elements of the cause of action itself\u201d in determining jurisdiction under the Immunities Act); Gilson v. Republic of Ireland, 682 F.2d 1022, 1027 n. 22 (D.C.Cir.1982) (stating that jurisdiction would be present if the plaintiff could show conduct in the United States that would be \u201can element of the cause of action under whatever law governs his claims\u201d); see also Joseph v. Office of the Consulate General, 830 F.2d 1018,1023 (,9th Cir.1987) (stating, \u201cIn determining whether the commercial activities exception applies, the courts focus only on those specific acts that form the basis of the suit\u201d) (emphasis original), cert. denied 485 U.S. 905,108 S.Ct. 1077, 99 L.Ed.2d 236 (1988)."},"case_id":10540947,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The question that remains is what level of \"nexus,\" \"bond,\" \"link,\" or \"connection\" is necessary. We conclude that a claim is \"based upon\" events in the United States if those events establish a legal element of the claim.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"stating that jurisdiction would be present if the plaintiff could show conduct in the United States that would be \"an element of the cause of action under whatever law governs his claims\"","sentence":"See Callejo v. Bancomer, S.A., 764 F.2d 1101, 1109 (5th Cir.1985) (stating that \u201cthe emphasis should be on the elements of the cause of action itself\u201d in determining jurisdiction under the Immunities Act); Gilson v. Republic of Ireland, 682 F.2d 1022, 1027 n. 22 (D.C.Cir.1982) (stating that jurisdiction would be present if the plaintiff could show conduct in the United States that would be \u201can element of the cause of action under whatever law governs his claims\u201d); see also Joseph v. Office of the Consulate General, 830 F.2d 1018,1023 (,9th Cir.1987) (stating, \u201cIn determining whether the commercial activities exception applies, the courts focus only on those specific acts that form the basis of the suit\u201d) (emphasis original), cert. denied 485 U.S. 905,108 S.Ct. 1077, 99 L.Ed.2d 236 (1988)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"stating, \"In determining whether the commercial activities exception applies, the courts focus only on those specific acts that form the basis of the suit\"","sentence":"See Callejo v. Bancomer, S.A., 764 F.2d 1101, 1109 (5th Cir.1985) (stating that \u201cthe emphasis should be on the elements of the cause of action itself\u201d in determining jurisdiction under the Immunities Act); Gilson v. Republic of Ireland, 682 F.2d 1022, 1027 n. 22 (D.C.Cir.1982) (stating that jurisdiction would be present if the plaintiff could show conduct in the United States that would be \u201can element of the cause of action under whatever law governs his claims\u201d); see also Joseph v. Office of the Consulate General, 830 F.2d 1018,1023 (,9th Cir.1987) (stating, \u201cIn determining whether the commercial activities exception applies, the courts focus only on those specific acts that form the basis of the suit\u201d) (emphasis original), cert. denied 485 U.S. 905,108 S.Ct. 1077, 99 L.Ed.2d 236 (1988)."},"case_id":10540947,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Whether or not a defendant waived an error is a mixed question of law and fact, requiring review of factual findings for abuse of discretion and de novo review of legal conclusions. On the other hand, a party may waive an alleged error during trial, for example, by expressly stating that the party is not arguing about it.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"415 F.3d 436, 452","parenthetical":"habeas petitioners waived an issue by failing to brief it adequately, where their entire argument consisted of a case citation, without explanation of how the cited decision should apply to their case, and they failed to mention that the opinion they cited had been overruled","sentence":"See Beeks, 224 F.3d at 747. Similarly, numerous courts, including the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, have held, in criminal and habeas cases, that a party waives an issue for post-trial relief by failing to brief that issue or failing to do so adequately. See, e.g., Sweet v. Delo, 125 F.3d 1144, 1159 (8th Cir.1997) (a habeas petitioner \u201cwaived [a] claim by failing to argue it with any specificity whatsoever\u201d), cert, denied sub nom. Sweet v. Bowersox, 523 U.S. 1010, 118 S.Ct. 1197, 140 L.Ed.2d 326 (1998); United States v. Bonilla-Mungia, 422 F.3d 316, 319 & n. 1 (5th Cir.2005) (citing cases from the Fifth Circuit and other circuits in which the court held that the government had waived an argument by failing to brief it post-trial); see also Salazar-Regino v. Trominski, 415 F.3d 436, 452 (5th Cir.2005) (habeas petitioners waived an issue by failing to brief it adequately, where their entire argument consisted of a case citation, without explanation of how the cited decision should apply to their case, and they failed to mention that the opinion they cited had been overruled); Ramirez v. Debs-Elias, 407 F.3d 444, 447 & n. 3 (1st Cir.2005) (to avoid waiver, a party must brief an issue in more than a \u201cperfunctory manner,\u201d citing United States v. Bongiomo, 106 F.3d 1027, 1034 (1st Cir.1997))."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"224 F.3d 747, 747","parenthetical":"a habeas petitioner \"waived [a] claim by failing to argue it with any specificity whatsoever\"","sentence":"See Beeks, 224 F.3d at 747. Similarly, numerous courts, including the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, have held, in criminal and habeas cases, that a party waives an issue for post-trial relief by failing to brief that issue or failing to do so adequately. See, e.g., Sweet v. Delo, 125 F.3d 1144, 1159 (8th Cir.1997) (a habeas petitioner \u201cwaived [a] claim by failing to argue it with any specificity whatsoever\u201d), cert, denied sub nom. Sweet v. Bowersox, 523 U.S. 1010, 118 S.Ct. 1197, 140 L.Ed.2d 326 (1998); United States v. Bonilla-Mungia, 422 F.3d 316, 319 & n. 1 (5th Cir.2005) (citing cases from the Fifth Circuit and other circuits in which the court held that the government had waived an argument by failing to brief it post-trial); see also Salazar-Regino v. Trominski, 415 F.3d 436, 452 (5th Cir.2005) (habeas petitioners waived an issue by failing to brief it adequately, where their entire argument consisted of a case citation, without explanation of how the cited decision should apply to their case, and they failed to mention that the opinion they cited had been overruled); Ramirez v. Debs-Elias, 407 F.3d 444, 447 & n. 3 (1st Cir.2005) (to avoid waiver, a party must brief an issue in more than a \u201cperfunctory manner,\u201d citing United States v. Bongiomo, 106 F.3d 1027, 1034 (1st Cir.1997))."},"case_id":884580,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Whether or not a defendant waived an error is a mixed question of law and fact, requiring review of factual findings for abuse of discretion and de novo review of legal conclusions. On the other hand, a party may waive an alleged error during trial, for example, by expressly stating that the party is not arguing about it.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"125 F.3d 1144, 1159","parenthetical":"a habeas petitioner \"waived [a] claim by failing to argue it with any specificity whatsoever\"","sentence":"See Beeks, 224 F.3d at 747. Similarly, numerous courts, including the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, have held, in criminal and habeas cases, that a party waives an issue for post-trial relief by failing to brief that issue or failing to do so adequately. See, e.g., Sweet v. Delo, 125 F.3d 1144, 1159 (8th Cir.1997) (a habeas petitioner \u201cwaived [a] claim by failing to argue it with any specificity whatsoever\u201d), cert, denied sub nom. Sweet v. Bowersox, 523 U.S. 1010, 118 S.Ct. 1197, 140 L.Ed.2d 326 (1998); United States v. Bonilla-Mungia, 422 F.3d 316, 319 & n. 1 (5th Cir.2005) (citing cases from the Fifth Circuit and other circuits in which the court held that the government had waived an argument by failing to brief it post-trial); see also Salazar-Regino v. Trominski, 415 F.3d 436, 452 (5th Cir.2005) (habeas petitioners waived an issue by failing to brief it adequately, where their entire argument consisted of a case citation, without explanation of how the cited decision should apply to their case, and they failed to mention that the opinion they cited had been overruled); Ramirez v. Debs-Elias, 407 F.3d 444, 447 & n. 3 (1st Cir.2005) (to avoid waiver, a party must brief an issue in more than a \u201cperfunctory manner,\u201d citing United States v. Bongiomo, 106 F.3d 1027, 1034 (1st Cir.1997))."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"415 F.3d 436, 452","parenthetical":"habeas petitioners waived an issue by failing to brief it adequately, where their entire argument consisted of a case citation, without explanation of how the cited decision should apply to their case, and they failed to mention that the opinion they cited had been overruled","sentence":"See Beeks, 224 F.3d at 747. Similarly, numerous courts, including the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, have held, in criminal and habeas cases, that a party waives an issue for post-trial relief by failing to brief that issue or failing to do so adequately. See, e.g., Sweet v. Delo, 125 F.3d 1144, 1159 (8th Cir.1997) (a habeas petitioner \u201cwaived [a] claim by failing to argue it with any specificity whatsoever\u201d), cert, denied sub nom. Sweet v. Bowersox, 523 U.S. 1010, 118 S.Ct. 1197, 140 L.Ed.2d 326 (1998); United States v. Bonilla-Mungia, 422 F.3d 316, 319 & n. 1 (5th Cir.2005) (citing cases from the Fifth Circuit and other circuits in which the court held that the government had waived an argument by failing to brief it post-trial); see also Salazar-Regino v. Trominski, 415 F.3d 436, 452 (5th Cir.2005) (habeas petitioners waived an issue by failing to brief it adequately, where their entire argument consisted of a case citation, without explanation of how the cited decision should apply to their case, and they failed to mention that the opinion they cited had been overruled); Ramirez v. Debs-Elias, 407 F.3d 444, 447 & n. 3 (1st Cir.2005) (to avoid waiver, a party must brief an issue in more than a \u201cperfunctory manner,\u201d citing United States v. Bongiomo, 106 F.3d 1027, 1034 (1st Cir.1997))."},"case_id":884580,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Whether or not a defendant waived an error is a mixed question of law and fact, requiring review of factual findings for abuse of discretion and de novo review of legal conclusions. On the other hand, a party may waive an alleged error during trial, for example, by expressly stating that the party is not arguing about it.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"a habeas petitioner \"waived [a] claim by failing to argue it with any specificity whatsoever\"","sentence":"See Beeks, 224 F.3d at 747. Similarly, numerous courts, including the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, have held, in criminal and habeas cases, that a party waives an issue for post-trial relief by failing to brief that issue or failing to do so adequately. See, e.g., Sweet v. Delo, 125 F.3d 1144, 1159 (8th Cir.1997) (a habeas petitioner \u201cwaived [a] claim by failing to argue it with any specificity whatsoever\u201d), cert, denied sub nom. Sweet v. Bowersox, 523 U.S. 1010, 118 S.Ct. 1197, 140 L.Ed.2d 326 (1998); United States v. Bonilla-Mungia, 422 F.3d 316, 319 & n. 1 (5th Cir.2005) (citing cases from the Fifth Circuit and other circuits in which the court held that the government had waived an argument by failing to brief it post-trial); see also Salazar-Regino v. Trominski, 415 F.3d 436, 452 (5th Cir.2005) (habeas petitioners waived an issue by failing to brief it adequately, where their entire argument consisted of a case citation, without explanation of how the cited decision should apply to their case, and they failed to mention that the opinion they cited had been overruled); Ramirez v. Debs-Elias, 407 F.3d 444, 447 & n. 3 (1st Cir.2005) (to avoid waiver, a party must brief an issue in more than a \u201cperfunctory manner,\u201d citing United States v. Bongiomo, 106 F.3d 1027, 1034 (1st Cir.1997))."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"415 F.3d 436, 452","parenthetical":"habeas petitioners waived an issue by failing to brief it adequately, where their entire argument consisted of a case citation, without explanation of how the cited decision should apply to their case, and they failed to mention that the opinion they cited had been overruled","sentence":"See Beeks, 224 F.3d at 747. Similarly, numerous courts, including the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, have held, in criminal and habeas cases, that a party waives an issue for post-trial relief by failing to brief that issue or failing to do so adequately. See, e.g., Sweet v. Delo, 125 F.3d 1144, 1159 (8th Cir.1997) (a habeas petitioner \u201cwaived [a] claim by failing to argue it with any specificity whatsoever\u201d), cert, denied sub nom. Sweet v. Bowersox, 523 U.S. 1010, 118 S.Ct. 1197, 140 L.Ed.2d 326 (1998); United States v. Bonilla-Mungia, 422 F.3d 316, 319 & n. 1 (5th Cir.2005) (citing cases from the Fifth Circuit and other circuits in which the court held that the government had waived an argument by failing to brief it post-trial); see also Salazar-Regino v. Trominski, 415 F.3d 436, 452 (5th Cir.2005) (habeas petitioners waived an issue by failing to brief it adequately, where their entire argument consisted of a case citation, without explanation of how the cited decision should apply to their case, and they failed to mention that the opinion they cited had been overruled); Ramirez v. Debs-Elias, 407 F.3d 444, 447 & n. 3 (1st Cir.2005) (to avoid waiver, a party must brief an issue in more than a \u201cperfunctory manner,\u201d citing United States v. Bongiomo, 106 F.3d 1027, 1034 (1st Cir.1997))."},"case_id":884580,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Whether or not a defendant waived an error is a mixed question of law and fact, requiring review of factual findings for abuse of discretion and de novo review of legal conclusions. On the other hand, a party may waive an alleged error during trial, for example, by expressly stating that the party is not arguing about it.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"a habeas petitioner \"waived [a] claim by failing to argue it with any specificity whatsoever\"","sentence":"See Beeks, 224 F.3d at 747. Similarly, numerous courts, including the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, have held, in criminal and habeas cases, that a party waives an issue for post-trial relief by failing to brief that issue or failing to do so adequately. See, e.g., Sweet v. Delo, 125 F.3d 1144, 1159 (8th Cir.1997) (a habeas petitioner \u201cwaived [a] claim by failing to argue it with any specificity whatsoever\u201d), cert, denied sub nom. Sweet v. Bowersox, 523 U.S. 1010, 118 S.Ct. 1197, 140 L.Ed.2d 326 (1998); United States v. Bonilla-Mungia, 422 F.3d 316, 319 & n. 1 (5th Cir.2005) (citing cases from the Fifth Circuit and other circuits in which the court held that the government had waived an argument by failing to brief it post-trial); see also Salazar-Regino v. Trominski, 415 F.3d 436, 452 (5th Cir.2005) (habeas petitioners waived an issue by failing to brief it adequately, where their entire argument consisted of a case citation, without explanation of how the cited decision should apply to their case, and they failed to mention that the opinion they cited had been overruled); Ramirez v. Debs-Elias, 407 F.3d 444, 447 & n. 3 (1st Cir.2005) (to avoid waiver, a party must brief an issue in more than a \u201cperfunctory manner,\u201d citing United States v. Bongiomo, 106 F.3d 1027, 1034 (1st Cir.1997))."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"415 F.3d 436, 452","parenthetical":"habeas petitioners waived an issue by failing to brief it adequately, where their entire argument consisted of a case citation, without explanation of how the cited decision should apply to their case, and they failed to mention that the opinion they cited had been overruled","sentence":"See Beeks, 224 F.3d at 747. Similarly, numerous courts, including the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, have held, in criminal and habeas cases, that a party waives an issue for post-trial relief by failing to brief that issue or failing to do so adequately. See, e.g., Sweet v. Delo, 125 F.3d 1144, 1159 (8th Cir.1997) (a habeas petitioner \u201cwaived [a] claim by failing to argue it with any specificity whatsoever\u201d), cert, denied sub nom. Sweet v. Bowersox, 523 U.S. 1010, 118 S.Ct. 1197, 140 L.Ed.2d 326 (1998); United States v. Bonilla-Mungia, 422 F.3d 316, 319 & n. 1 (5th Cir.2005) (citing cases from the Fifth Circuit and other circuits in which the court held that the government had waived an argument by failing to brief it post-trial); see also Salazar-Regino v. Trominski, 415 F.3d 436, 452 (5th Cir.2005) (habeas petitioners waived an issue by failing to brief it adequately, where their entire argument consisted of a case citation, without explanation of how the cited decision should apply to their case, and they failed to mention that the opinion they cited had been overruled); Ramirez v. Debs-Elias, 407 F.3d 444, 447 & n. 3 (1st Cir.2005) (to avoid waiver, a party must brief an issue in more than a \u201cperfunctory manner,\u201d citing United States v. Bongiomo, 106 F.3d 1027, 1034 (1st Cir.1997))."},"case_id":884580,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Whether or not a defendant waived an error is a mixed question of law and fact, requiring review of factual findings for abuse of discretion and de novo review of legal conclusions. On the other hand, a party may waive an alleged error during trial, for example, by expressly stating that the party is not arguing about it.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"415 F.3d 436, 452","parenthetical":"habeas petitioners waived an issue by failing to brief it adequately, where their entire argument consisted of a case citation, without explanation of how the cited decision should apply to their case, and they failed to mention that the opinion they cited had been overruled","sentence":"See Beeks, 224 F.3d at 747. Similarly, numerous courts, including the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, have held, in criminal and habeas cases, that a party waives an issue for post-trial relief by failing to brief that issue or failing to do so adequately. See, e.g., Sweet v. Delo, 125 F.3d 1144, 1159 (8th Cir.1997) (a habeas petitioner \u201cwaived [a] claim by failing to argue it with any specificity whatsoever\u201d), cert, denied sub nom. Sweet v. Bowersox, 523 U.S. 1010, 118 S.Ct. 1197, 140 L.Ed.2d 326 (1998); United States v. Bonilla-Mungia, 422 F.3d 316, 319 & n. 1 (5th Cir.2005) (citing cases from the Fifth Circuit and other circuits in which the court held that the government had waived an argument by failing to brief it post-trial); see also Salazar-Regino v. Trominski, 415 F.3d 436, 452 (5th Cir.2005) (habeas petitioners waived an issue by failing to brief it adequately, where their entire argument consisted of a case citation, without explanation of how the cited decision should apply to their case, and they failed to mention that the opinion they cited had been overruled); Ramirez v. Debs-Elias, 407 F.3d 444, 447 & n. 3 (1st Cir.2005) (to avoid waiver, a party must brief an issue in more than a \u201cperfunctory manner,\u201d citing United States v. Bongiomo, 106 F.3d 1027, 1034 (1st Cir.1997))."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"a habeas petitioner \"waived [a] claim by failing to argue it with any specificity whatsoever\"","sentence":"See Beeks, 224 F.3d at 747. Similarly, numerous courts, including the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, have held, in criminal and habeas cases, that a party waives an issue for post-trial relief by failing to brief that issue or failing to do so adequately. See, e.g., Sweet v. Delo, 125 F.3d 1144, 1159 (8th Cir.1997) (a habeas petitioner \u201cwaived [a] claim by failing to argue it with any specificity whatsoever\u201d), cert, denied sub nom. Sweet v. Bowersox, 523 U.S. 1010, 118 S.Ct. 1197, 140 L.Ed.2d 326 (1998); United States v. Bonilla-Mungia, 422 F.3d 316, 319 & n. 1 (5th Cir.2005) (citing cases from the Fifth Circuit and other circuits in which the court held that the government had waived an argument by failing to brief it post-trial); see also Salazar-Regino v. Trominski, 415 F.3d 436, 452 (5th Cir.2005) (habeas petitioners waived an issue by failing to brief it adequately, where their entire argument consisted of a case citation, without explanation of how the cited decision should apply to their case, and they failed to mention that the opinion they cited had been overruled); Ramirez v. Debs-Elias, 407 F.3d 444, 447 & n. 3 (1st Cir.2005) (to avoid waiver, a party must brief an issue in more than a \u201cperfunctory manner,\u201d citing United States v. Bongiomo, 106 F.3d 1027, 1034 (1st Cir.1997))."},"case_id":884580,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Supp. Opp'n, at 17), there is no evidence that Asbury expressed this intention to MBUSA at or near the time it executed the Acknowledgment. The email is also irrelevant and not competent extrinsic evidence because, although intent determines the meaning of a contract, Cal. Civ. Code SSSS 1636, 1638, California recognizes the objective theory of contracts, under which \"[i]t is the objective intent, as evidenced by the words of the contract, rather than the subjective intent of one of the parties, that controls interpretation.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"It is the outward expression of the agreement, rather than a party's unexpressed intention, which the court will enforce.\"","sentence":"Berman v. Bromberg, 56 Cal.App.4th 936, 948, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 777 (1997) (citations and quotes omitted); Winet, 4 Cal.App.4th at 1166 n. 3, 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 554 (observing that evidence of subjective intent is not \u201ccompetent extrinsic evidence, because evidence of undisclosed subjective intent of the parties is irrelevant to determining the meaning of contractual language\u201d); see also id. at 1166, 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 554 (\u201cIt is the outward expression of the agreement, rather than a party\u2019s unexpressed intention, which the court will enforce.\u201d); Founding Members, 109 Cal.App.4th at 956, 135 Cal.Rptr.2d 505 (\u201cThe parties\u2019 undisclosed intent or understanding is irrelevant to contract interpretation.\u201d)"},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"observing that evidence of subjective intent is not \"competent extrinsic evidence, because evidence of undisclosed subjective intent of the parties is irrelevant to determining the meaning of contractual language\"","sentence":"Berman v. Bromberg, 56 Cal.App.4th 936, 948, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 777 (1997) (citations and quotes omitted); Winet, 4 Cal.App.4th at 1166 n. 3, 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 554 (observing that evidence of subjective intent is not \u201ccompetent extrinsic evidence, because evidence of undisclosed subjective intent of the parties is irrelevant to determining the meaning of contractual language\u201d); see also id. at 1166, 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 554 (\u201cIt is the outward expression of the agreement, rather than a party\u2019s unexpressed intention, which the court will enforce.\u201d); Founding Members, 109 Cal.App.4th at 956, 135 Cal.Rptr.2d 505 (\u201cThe parties\u2019 undisclosed intent or understanding is irrelevant to contract interpretation.\u201d)"},"case_id":3553946,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Supp. Opp'n, at 17), there is no evidence that Asbury expressed this intention to MBUSA at or near the time it executed the Acknowledgment. The email is also irrelevant and not competent extrinsic evidence because, although intent determines the meaning of a contract, Cal. Civ. Code SSSS 1636, 1638, California recognizes the objective theory of contracts, under which \"[i]t is the objective intent, as evidenced by the words of the contract, rather than the subjective intent of one of the parties, that controls interpretation.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"109 Cal.App.4th 956, 956","parenthetical":"\"The parties' undisclosed intent or understanding is irrelevant to contract interpretation.\"","sentence":"Berman v. Bromberg, 56 Cal.App.4th 936, 948, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 777 (1997) (citations and quotes omitted); Winet, 4 Cal.App.4th at 1166 n. 3, 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 554 (observing that evidence of subjective intent is not \u201ccompetent extrinsic evidence, because evidence of undisclosed subjective intent of the parties is irrelevant to determining the meaning of contractual language\u201d); see also id. at 1166, 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 554 (\u201cIt is the outward expression of the agreement, rather than a party\u2019s unexpressed intention, which the court will enforce.\u201d); Founding Members, 109 Cal.App.4th at 956, 135 Cal.Rptr.2d 505 (\u201cThe parties\u2019 undisclosed intent or understanding is irrelevant to contract interpretation.\u201d)"},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"observing that evidence of subjective intent is not \"competent extrinsic evidence, because evidence of undisclosed subjective intent of the parties is irrelevant to determining the meaning of contractual language\"","sentence":"Berman v. Bromberg, 56 Cal.App.4th 936, 948, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 777 (1997) (citations and quotes omitted); Winet, 4 Cal.App.4th at 1166 n. 3, 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 554 (observing that evidence of subjective intent is not \u201ccompetent extrinsic evidence, because evidence of undisclosed subjective intent of the parties is irrelevant to determining the meaning of contractual language\u201d); see also id. at 1166, 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 554 (\u201cIt is the outward expression of the agreement, rather than a party\u2019s unexpressed intention, which the court will enforce.\u201d); Founding Members, 109 Cal.App.4th at 956, 135 Cal.Rptr.2d 505 (\u201cThe parties\u2019 undisclosed intent or understanding is irrelevant to contract interpretation.\u201d)"},"case_id":3553946,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Supp. Opp'n, at 17), there is no evidence that Asbury expressed this intention to MBUSA at or near the time it executed the Acknowledgment. The email is also irrelevant and not competent extrinsic evidence because, although intent determines the meaning of a contract, Cal. Civ. Code SSSS 1636, 1638, California recognizes the objective theory of contracts, under which \"[i]t is the objective intent, as evidenced by the words of the contract, rather than the subjective intent of one of the parties, that controls interpretation.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"The parties' undisclosed intent or understanding is irrelevant to contract interpretation.\"","sentence":"Berman v. Bromberg, 56 Cal.App.4th 936, 948, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 777 (1997) (citations and quotes omitted); Winet, 4 Cal.App.4th at 1166 n. 3, 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 554 (observing that evidence of subjective intent is not \u201ccompetent extrinsic evidence, because evidence of undisclosed subjective intent of the parties is irrelevant to determining the meaning of contractual language\u201d); see also id. at 1166, 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 554 (\u201cIt is the outward expression of the agreement, rather than a party\u2019s unexpressed intention, which the court will enforce.\u201d); Founding Members, 109 Cal.App.4th at 956, 135 Cal.Rptr.2d 505 (\u201cThe parties\u2019 undisclosed intent or understanding is irrelevant to contract interpretation.\u201d)"},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"observing that evidence of subjective intent is not \"competent extrinsic evidence, because evidence of undisclosed subjective intent of the parties is irrelevant to determining the meaning of contractual language\"","sentence":"Berman v. Bromberg, 56 Cal.App.4th 936, 948, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 777 (1997) (citations and quotes omitted); Winet, 4 Cal.App.4th at 1166 n. 3, 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 554 (observing that evidence of subjective intent is not \u201ccompetent extrinsic evidence, because evidence of undisclosed subjective intent of the parties is irrelevant to determining the meaning of contractual language\u201d); see also id. at 1166, 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 554 (\u201cIt is the outward expression of the agreement, rather than a party\u2019s unexpressed intention, which the court will enforce.\u201d); Founding Members, 109 Cal.App.4th at 956, 135 Cal.Rptr.2d 505 (\u201cThe parties\u2019 undisclosed intent or understanding is irrelevant to contract interpretation.\u201d)"},"case_id":3553946,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Supp. Opp'n, at 17), there is no evidence that Asbury expressed this intention to MBUSA at or near the time it executed the Acknowledgment. The email is also irrelevant and not competent extrinsic evidence because, although intent determines the meaning of a contract, Cal. Civ. Code SSSS 1636, 1638, California recognizes the objective theory of contracts, under which \"[i]t is the objective intent, as evidenced by the words of the contract, rather than the subjective intent of one of the parties, that controls interpretation.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"It is the outward expression of the agreement, rather than a party's unexpressed intention, which the court will enforce.\"","sentence":"Berman v. Bromberg, 56 Cal.App.4th 936, 948, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 777 (1997) (citations and quotes omitted); Winet, 4 Cal.App.4th at 1166 n. 3, 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 554 (observing that evidence of subjective intent is not \u201ccompetent extrinsic evidence, because evidence of undisclosed subjective intent of the parties is irrelevant to determining the meaning of contractual language\u201d); see also id. at 1166, 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 554 (\u201cIt is the outward expression of the agreement, rather than a party\u2019s unexpressed intention, which the court will enforce.\u201d); Founding Members, 109 Cal.App.4th at 956, 135 Cal.Rptr.2d 505 (\u201cThe parties\u2019 undisclosed intent or understanding is irrelevant to contract interpretation.\u201d)"},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"observing that evidence of subjective intent is not \"competent extrinsic evidence, because evidence of undisclosed subjective intent of the parties is irrelevant to determining the meaning of contractual language\"","sentence":"Berman v. Bromberg, 56 Cal.App.4th 936, 948, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 777 (1997) (citations and quotes omitted); Winet, 4 Cal.App.4th at 1166 n. 3, 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 554 (observing that evidence of subjective intent is not \u201ccompetent extrinsic evidence, because evidence of undisclosed subjective intent of the parties is irrelevant to determining the meaning of contractual language\u201d); see also id. at 1166, 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 554 (\u201cIt is the outward expression of the agreement, rather than a party\u2019s unexpressed intention, which the court will enforce.\u201d); Founding Members, 109 Cal.App.4th at 956, 135 Cal.Rptr.2d 505 (\u201cThe parties\u2019 undisclosed intent or understanding is irrelevant to contract interpretation.\u201d)"},"case_id":3553946,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Supp. Opp'n, at 17), there is no evidence that Asbury expressed this intention to MBUSA at or near the time it executed the Acknowledgment. The email is also irrelevant and not competent extrinsic evidence because, although intent determines the meaning of a contract, Cal. Civ. Code SSSS 1636, 1638, California recognizes the objective theory of contracts, under which \"[i]t is the objective intent, as evidenced by the words of the contract, rather than the subjective intent of one of the parties, that controls interpretation.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"109 Cal.App.4th 956, 956","parenthetical":"\"The parties' undisclosed intent or understanding is irrelevant to contract interpretation.\"","sentence":"Berman v. Bromberg, 56 Cal.App.4th 936, 948, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 777 (1997) (citations and quotes omitted); Winet, 4 Cal.App.4th at 1166 n. 3, 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 554 (observing that evidence of subjective intent is not \u201ccompetent extrinsic evidence, because evidence of undisclosed subjective intent of the parties is irrelevant to determining the meaning of contractual language\u201d); see also id. at 1166, 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 554 (\u201cIt is the outward expression of the agreement, rather than a party\u2019s unexpressed intention, which the court will enforce.\u201d); Founding Members, 109 Cal.App.4th at 956, 135 Cal.Rptr.2d 505 (\u201cThe parties\u2019 undisclosed intent or understanding is irrelevant to contract interpretation.\u201d)"},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"observing that evidence of subjective intent is not \"competent extrinsic evidence, because evidence of undisclosed subjective intent of the parties is irrelevant to determining the meaning of contractual language\"","sentence":"Berman v. Bromberg, 56 Cal.App.4th 936, 948, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 777 (1997) (citations and quotes omitted); Winet, 4 Cal.App.4th at 1166 n. 3, 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 554 (observing that evidence of subjective intent is not \u201ccompetent extrinsic evidence, because evidence of undisclosed subjective intent of the parties is irrelevant to determining the meaning of contractual language\u201d); see also id. at 1166, 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 554 (\u201cIt is the outward expression of the agreement, rather than a party\u2019s unexpressed intention, which the court will enforce.\u201d); Founding Members, 109 Cal.App.4th at 956, 135 Cal.Rptr.2d 505 (\u201cThe parties\u2019 undisclosed intent or understanding is irrelevant to contract interpretation.\u201d)"},"case_id":3553946,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Supp. Opp'n, at 17), there is no evidence that Asbury expressed this intention to MBUSA at or near the time it executed the Acknowledgment. The email is also irrelevant and not competent extrinsic evidence because, although intent determines the meaning of a contract, Cal. Civ. Code SSSS 1636, 1638, California recognizes the objective theory of contracts, under which \"[i]t is the objective intent, as evidenced by the words of the contract, rather than the subjective intent of one of the parties, that controls interpretation.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"The parties' undisclosed intent or understanding is irrelevant to contract interpretation.\"","sentence":"Berman v. Bromberg, 56 Cal.App.4th 936, 948, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 777 (1997) (citations and quotes omitted); Winet, 4 Cal.App.4th at 1166 n. 3, 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 554 (observing that evidence of subjective intent is not \u201ccompetent extrinsic evidence, because evidence of undisclosed subjective intent of the parties is irrelevant to determining the meaning of contractual language\u201d); see also id. at 1166, 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 554 (\u201cIt is the outward expression of the agreement, rather than a party\u2019s unexpressed intention, which the court will enforce.\u201d); Founding Members, 109 Cal.App.4th at 956, 135 Cal.Rptr.2d 505 (\u201cThe parties\u2019 undisclosed intent or understanding is irrelevant to contract interpretation.\u201d)"},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"observing that evidence of subjective intent is not \"competent extrinsic evidence, because evidence of undisclosed subjective intent of the parties is irrelevant to determining the meaning of contractual language\"","sentence":"Berman v. Bromberg, 56 Cal.App.4th 936, 948, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 777 (1997) (citations and quotes omitted); Winet, 4 Cal.App.4th at 1166 n. 3, 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 554 (observing that evidence of subjective intent is not \u201ccompetent extrinsic evidence, because evidence of undisclosed subjective intent of the parties is irrelevant to determining the meaning of contractual language\u201d); see also id. at 1166, 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 554 (\u201cIt is the outward expression of the agreement, rather than a party\u2019s unexpressed intention, which the court will enforce.\u201d); Founding Members, 109 Cal.App.4th at 956, 135 Cal.Rptr.2d 505 (\u201cThe parties\u2019 undisclosed intent or understanding is irrelevant to contract interpretation.\u201d)"},"case_id":3553946,"label":"b"}
{"context":"We agreed with the referee that this was a selfish motive. We expressly noted that but for the significant mitigation in that case, the sanction would have been disbarment.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"603 So.2d 502, 503","parenthetical":"disbarring an attorney based on a conviction for attempting to evade or defeat tax in violation of federal law","sentence":"Id. at 561 (citing Fla. Bar v. Smith, 650 So.2d 980, 981-82 (Fla.1995) (suspending an attorney for three years for tax evasion and other misconduct where the attorney had underre-ported his income due to financial pressures and an inability to pay the full tax owed, but recognizing that the Court will not \u201chesitate[] to disbar attorneys who knowingly and willfully engage in the felonious conduct of filing or assisting in filing fraudulent income tax returns\u201d); Fla. Bar v. Nedick, 603 So.2d 502, 503 (Fla.1992) (disbarring an attorney based on a conviction for attempting to evade or defeat tax in violation of federal law)); see also Fla. Bar v. Weed, 559 So.2d 1094, 1096 (Fla. 1990) (suspending an attorney for three years for, among other things, failing to file income tax returns for four years, and recognizing that a failure to file tax returns amounts to engaging in illegal conduct involving moral turpitude); Fla. Bar v. Hosner, 536 So.2d 188, 188 (Fla.1989) (disbarring an attorney after he was convicted of mail fraud and felony charges of assisting in the preparation of false income tax returns)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"559 So.2d 1094, 1096","parenthetical":"suspending an attorney for three years for, among other things, failing to file income tax returns for four years, and recognizing that a failure to file tax returns amounts to engaging in illegal conduct involving moral turpitude","sentence":"Id. at 561 (citing Fla. Bar v. Smith, 650 So.2d 980, 981-82 (Fla.1995) (suspending an attorney for three years for tax evasion and other misconduct where the attorney had underre-ported his income due to financial pressures and an inability to pay the full tax owed, but recognizing that the Court will not \u201chesitate[] to disbar attorneys who knowingly and willfully engage in the felonious conduct of filing or assisting in filing fraudulent income tax returns\u201d); Fla. Bar v. Nedick, 603 So.2d 502, 503 (Fla.1992) (disbarring an attorney based on a conviction for attempting to evade or defeat tax in violation of federal law)); see also Fla. Bar v. Weed, 559 So.2d 1094, 1096 (Fla. 1990) (suspending an attorney for three years for, among other things, failing to file income tax returns for four years, and recognizing that a failure to file tax returns amounts to engaging in illegal conduct involving moral turpitude); Fla. Bar v. Hosner, 536 So.2d 188, 188 (Fla.1989) (disbarring an attorney after he was convicted of mail fraud and felony charges of assisting in the preparation of false income tax returns)."},"case_id":7037766,"label":"a"}
{"context":"We agreed with the referee that this was a selfish motive. We expressly noted that but for the significant mitigation in that case, the sanction would have been disbarment.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"603 So.2d 502, 503","parenthetical":"disbarring an attorney based on a conviction for attempting to evade or defeat tax in violation of federal law","sentence":"Id. at 561 (citing Fla. Bar v. Smith, 650 So.2d 980, 981-82 (Fla.1995) (suspending an attorney for three years for tax evasion and other misconduct where the attorney had underre-ported his income due to financial pressures and an inability to pay the full tax owed, but recognizing that the Court will not \u201chesitate[] to disbar attorneys who knowingly and willfully engage in the felonious conduct of filing or assisting in filing fraudulent income tax returns\u201d); Fla. Bar v. Nedick, 603 So.2d 502, 503 (Fla.1992) (disbarring an attorney based on a conviction for attempting to evade or defeat tax in violation of federal law)); see also Fla. Bar v. Weed, 559 So.2d 1094, 1096 (Fla. 1990) (suspending an attorney for three years for, among other things, failing to file income tax returns for four years, and recognizing that a failure to file tax returns amounts to engaging in illegal conduct involving moral turpitude); Fla. Bar v. Hosner, 536 So.2d 188, 188 (Fla.1989) (disbarring an attorney after he was convicted of mail fraud and felony charges of assisting in the preparation of false income tax returns)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"536 So.2d 188, 188","parenthetical":"disbarring an attorney after he was convicted of mail fraud and felony charges of assisting in the preparation of false income tax returns","sentence":"Id. at 561 (citing Fla. Bar v. Smith, 650 So.2d 980, 981-82 (Fla.1995) (suspending an attorney for three years for tax evasion and other misconduct where the attorney had underre-ported his income due to financial pressures and an inability to pay the full tax owed, but recognizing that the Court will not \u201chesitate[] to disbar attorneys who knowingly and willfully engage in the felonious conduct of filing or assisting in filing fraudulent income tax returns\u201d); Fla. Bar v. Nedick, 603 So.2d 502, 503 (Fla.1992) (disbarring an attorney based on a conviction for attempting to evade or defeat tax in violation of federal law)); see also Fla. Bar v. Weed, 559 So.2d 1094, 1096 (Fla. 1990) (suspending an attorney for three years for, among other things, failing to file income tax returns for four years, and recognizing that a failure to file tax returns amounts to engaging in illegal conduct involving moral turpitude); Fla. Bar v. Hosner, 536 So.2d 188, 188 (Fla.1989) (disbarring an attorney after he was convicted of mail fraud and felony charges of assisting in the preparation of false income tax returns)."},"case_id":7037766,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The purpose of including such a certification on the form is to provide a \"record\" that the warnings were given, as \"[ajbsent a record that the court provided the advisement required by [SS 29D], the defendant shall be presumed not to have received the required advisement.\" G.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"46 Mass. App. Ct. 928, 929","parenthetical":"notation on docket that defendant advised of \"alien rights\" constituted sufficient \"record\" that SS 29D warnings administered","sentence":"L. c. 278, \u00a7 29D. See Commonwealth v. Podoprigora, 46 Mass. App. Ct. 928, 929 (1999) (notation on docket that defendant advised of \u201calien rights\u201d constituted sufficient \u201crecord\u201d that \u00a7 29D warnings administered)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"429 Mass. 556, 557-558","parenthetical":"notation on docket that guilty plea accepted \"after hearing,\" combined with evidence that \"standard colloquy\" included alien warnings, constituted sufficient \"record\" that warnings given","sentence":"See also Commonwealth v. Pryce, 429 Mass. 556, 557-558 (1999) (notation on docket that guilty plea accepted \u201cafter hearing,\u201d combined with evidence that \u201cstandard colloquy\u201d included alien warnings, constituted sufficient \u201crecord\u201d that warnings given)."},"case_id":734987,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In determining whether a sentence violates the \"vertical proportionality\" requirement, \"[t]he relevant comparison for purposes of Article I, section 16, is between the actual sentence imposed for the defendant's offense and the maximum sentence allowed by law for the greater offense.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"243 Or App 535, 541-42","parenthetical":"concluding that a penalty was unconstitutionally disproportionate where the defendant's \"acts in committing sexual abuse in the second degree necessarily [were] less severe than the same acts would have been if [the] defendant's victims had been younger,\" but the penalty for the defendant's crimes was \"greater than the potential penalty for the same acts against younger victims\"","sentence":"State v. Barajas, 254 Or App 106, 111, 292 P3d 636 (2012), rev den, 353 Or 747 (2013) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted); see State v. Dobash, 210 Or App 145, 147, 149 P3d 1235 (2006) (determining whether the imposition of a sentence for a lesser offense is greater than that available for a more serious offense \u201crequires a comparison between the actual sentence imposed and the maximum sentence allowable by law for the greater offense\u201d (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted)); Koch, 169 Or App at 227 (\u201cUnder Article I, section 16, we compare the actual sentence imposed to the maximum sentence allowed by law for the greater offense to evaluate a disproportionality challenge.\u201d); cf. State v. Simonson, 243 Or App 535, 541-42, 259 P3d 962 (2011), rev den, 353 Or 788 (2013) (concluding that a penalty was unconstitutionally disproportionate where the defendant\u2019s \u201cacts in committing sexual abuse in the second degree necessarily [were] less severe than the same acts would have been if [the] defendant\u2019s victims had been younger,\u201d but the penalty for the defendant\u2019s crimes was \u201cgreater than the potential penalty for the same acts against younger victims\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"169 Or App 227, 227","parenthetical":"\"Under Article I, section 16, we compare the actual sentence imposed to the maximum sentence allowed by law for the greater offense to evaluate a disproportionality challenge.\"","sentence":"State v. Barajas, 254 Or App 106, 111, 292 P3d 636 (2012), rev den, 353 Or 747 (2013) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted); see State v. Dobash, 210 Or App 145, 147, 149 P3d 1235 (2006) (determining whether the imposition of a sentence for a lesser offense is greater than that available for a more serious offense \u201crequires a comparison between the actual sentence imposed and the maximum sentence allowable by law for the greater offense\u201d (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted)); Koch, 169 Or App at 227 (\u201cUnder Article I, section 16, we compare the actual sentence imposed to the maximum sentence allowed by law for the greater offense to evaluate a disproportionality challenge.\u201d); cf. State v. Simonson, 243 Or App 535, 541-42, 259 P3d 962 (2011), rev den, 353 Or 788 (2013) (concluding that a penalty was unconstitutionally disproportionate where the defendant\u2019s \u201cacts in committing sexual abuse in the second degree necessarily [were] less severe than the same acts would have been if [the] defendant\u2019s victims had been younger,\u201d but the penalty for the defendant\u2019s crimes was \u201cgreater than the potential penalty for the same acts against younger victims\u201d)."},"case_id":4252949,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In determining whether a sentence violates the \"vertical proportionality\" requirement, \"[t]he relevant comparison for purposes of Article I, section 16, is between the actual sentence imposed for the defendant's offense and the maximum sentence allowed by law for the greater offense.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"concluding that a penalty was unconstitutionally disproportionate where the defendant's \"acts in committing sexual abuse in the second degree necessarily [were] less severe than the same acts would have been if [the] defendant's victims had been younger,\" but the penalty for the defendant's crimes was \"greater than the potential penalty for the same acts against younger victims\"","sentence":"State v. Barajas, 254 Or App 106, 111, 292 P3d 636 (2012), rev den, 353 Or 747 (2013) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted); see State v. Dobash, 210 Or App 145, 147, 149 P3d 1235 (2006) (determining whether the imposition of a sentence for a lesser offense is greater than that available for a more serious offense \u201crequires a comparison between the actual sentence imposed and the maximum sentence allowable by law for the greater offense\u201d (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted)); Koch, 169 Or App at 227 (\u201cUnder Article I, section 16, we compare the actual sentence imposed to the maximum sentence allowed by law for the greater offense to evaluate a disproportionality challenge.\u201d); cf. State v. Simonson, 243 Or App 535, 541-42, 259 P3d 962 (2011), rev den, 353 Or 788 (2013) (concluding that a penalty was unconstitutionally disproportionate where the defendant\u2019s \u201cacts in committing sexual abuse in the second degree necessarily [were] less severe than the same acts would have been if [the] defendant\u2019s victims had been younger,\u201d but the penalty for the defendant\u2019s crimes was \u201cgreater than the potential penalty for the same acts against younger victims\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"169 Or App 227, 227","parenthetical":"\"Under Article I, section 16, we compare the actual sentence imposed to the maximum sentence allowed by law for the greater offense to evaluate a disproportionality challenge.\"","sentence":"State v. Barajas, 254 Or App 106, 111, 292 P3d 636 (2012), rev den, 353 Or 747 (2013) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted); see State v. Dobash, 210 Or App 145, 147, 149 P3d 1235 (2006) (determining whether the imposition of a sentence for a lesser offense is greater than that available for a more serious offense \u201crequires a comparison between the actual sentence imposed and the maximum sentence allowable by law for the greater offense\u201d (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted)); Koch, 169 Or App at 227 (\u201cUnder Article I, section 16, we compare the actual sentence imposed to the maximum sentence allowed by law for the greater offense to evaluate a disproportionality challenge.\u201d); cf. State v. Simonson, 243 Or App 535, 541-42, 259 P3d 962 (2011), rev den, 353 Or 788 (2013) (concluding that a penalty was unconstitutionally disproportionate where the defendant\u2019s \u201cacts in committing sexual abuse in the second degree necessarily [were] less severe than the same acts would have been if [the] defendant\u2019s victims had been younger,\u201d but the penalty for the defendant\u2019s crimes was \u201cgreater than the potential penalty for the same acts against younger victims\u201d)."},"case_id":4252949,"label":"b"}
{"context":". The family court found the prenuptial agreement was valid and enforceable, and Wife does not appeal that ruling.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"364 S.C. 256, 270","parenthetical":"finding the family court possessed jurisdiction to determine whether the premarital agreement was valid and enforceable","sentence":"See Hardee v. Hardee, 355 S.C. 382, 389, 585 S.E.2d 501, 504 (2003) (stating that when determining whether a prenuptial agreement should be enforced, a court must consider \u201c(1) Was the agreement obtained through fraud, duress, or mistake, or through misrepresentation or nondisclosure of material facts? (2) Is the agreement unconscionable? (3) Have the facts and circumstances changed since the agreement was executed, so as to make its enforcement unfair and unreasonable?\"); see also Holler v. Holler, 364 S.C. 256, 270, 612 S.E.2d 469, 477 (2005) (finding the family court possessed jurisdiction to determine whether the premarital agreement was valid and enforceable)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"355 S.C. 382, 389","parenthetical":"stating that when determining whether a prenuptial agreement should be enforced, a court must consider \"(1) Was the agreement obtained through fraud, duress, or mistake, or through misrepresentation or nondisclosure of material facts? (2","sentence":"See Hardee v. Hardee, 355 S.C. 382, 389, 585 S.E.2d 501, 504 (2003) (stating that when determining whether a prenuptial agreement should be enforced, a court must consider \u201c(1) Was the agreement obtained through fraud, duress, or mistake, or through misrepresentation or nondisclosure of material facts? (2) Is the agreement unconscionable? (3) Have the facts and circumstances changed since the agreement was executed, so as to make its enforcement unfair and unreasonable?\"); see also Holler v. Holler, 364 S.C. 256, 270, 612 S.E.2d 469, 477 (2005) (finding the family court possessed jurisdiction to determine whether the premarital agreement was valid and enforceable)."},"case_id":4161477,"label":"b"}
{"context":". The family court found the prenuptial agreement was valid and enforceable, and Wife does not appeal that ruling.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"612 S.E.2d 469, 477","parenthetical":"finding the family court possessed jurisdiction to determine whether the premarital agreement was valid and enforceable","sentence":"See Hardee v. Hardee, 355 S.C. 382, 389, 585 S.E.2d 501, 504 (2003) (stating that when determining whether a prenuptial agreement should be enforced, a court must consider \u201c(1) Was the agreement obtained through fraud, duress, or mistake, or through misrepresentation or nondisclosure of material facts? (2) Is the agreement unconscionable? (3) Have the facts and circumstances changed since the agreement was executed, so as to make its enforcement unfair and unreasonable?\"); see also Holler v. Holler, 364 S.C. 256, 270, 612 S.E.2d 469, 477 (2005) (finding the family court possessed jurisdiction to determine whether the premarital agreement was valid and enforceable)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"355 S.C. 382, 389","parenthetical":"stating that when determining whether a prenuptial agreement should be enforced, a court must consider \"(1) Was the agreement obtained through fraud, duress, or mistake, or through misrepresentation or nondisclosure of material facts? (2","sentence":"See Hardee v. Hardee, 355 S.C. 382, 389, 585 S.E.2d 501, 504 (2003) (stating that when determining whether a prenuptial agreement should be enforced, a court must consider \u201c(1) Was the agreement obtained through fraud, duress, or mistake, or through misrepresentation or nondisclosure of material facts? (2) Is the agreement unconscionable? (3) Have the facts and circumstances changed since the agreement was executed, so as to make its enforcement unfair and unreasonable?\"); see also Holler v. Holler, 364 S.C. 256, 270, 612 S.E.2d 469, 477 (2005) (finding the family court possessed jurisdiction to determine whether the premarital agreement was valid and enforceable)."},"case_id":4161477,"label":"b"}
{"context":". The family court found the prenuptial agreement was valid and enforceable, and Wife does not appeal that ruling.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"585 S.E.2d 501, 504","parenthetical":"stating that when determining whether a prenuptial agreement should be enforced, a court must consider \"(1) Was the agreement obtained through fraud, duress, or mistake, or through misrepresentation or nondisclosure of material facts? (2) Is the agreement unconscionable? (3","sentence":"See Hardee v. Hardee, 355 S.C. 382, 389, 585 S.E.2d 501, 504 (2003) (stating that when determining whether a prenuptial agreement should be enforced, a court must consider \u201c(1) Was the agreement obtained through fraud, duress, or mistake, or through misrepresentation or nondisclosure of material facts? (2) Is the agreement unconscionable? (3) Have the facts and circumstances changed since the agreement was executed, so as to make its enforcement unfair and unreasonable?\"); see also Holler v. Holler, 364 S.C. 256, 270, 612 S.E.2d 469, 477 (2005) (finding the family court possessed jurisdiction to determine whether the premarital agreement was valid and enforceable)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"364 S.C. 256, 270","parenthetical":"finding the family court possessed jurisdiction to determine whether the premarital agreement was valid and enforceable","sentence":"See Hardee v. Hardee, 355 S.C. 382, 389, 585 S.E.2d 501, 504 (2003) (stating that when determining whether a prenuptial agreement should be enforced, a court must consider \u201c(1) Was the agreement obtained through fraud, duress, or mistake, or through misrepresentation or nondisclosure of material facts? (2) Is the agreement unconscionable? (3) Have the facts and circumstances changed since the agreement was executed, so as to make its enforcement unfair and unreasonable?\"); see also Holler v. Holler, 364 S.C. 256, 270, 612 S.E.2d 469, 477 (2005) (finding the family court possessed jurisdiction to determine whether the premarital agreement was valid and enforceable)."},"case_id":4161477,"label":"a"}
{"context":". The family court found the prenuptial agreement was valid and enforceable, and Wife does not appeal that ruling.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"585 S.E.2d 501, 504","parenthetical":"stating that when determining whether a prenuptial agreement should be enforced, a court must consider \"(1) Was the agreement obtained through fraud, duress, or mistake, or through misrepresentation or nondisclosure of material facts? (2) Is the agreement unconscionable? (3","sentence":"See Hardee v. Hardee, 355 S.C. 382, 389, 585 S.E.2d 501, 504 (2003) (stating that when determining whether a prenuptial agreement should be enforced, a court must consider \u201c(1) Was the agreement obtained through fraud, duress, or mistake, or through misrepresentation or nondisclosure of material facts? (2) Is the agreement unconscionable? (3) Have the facts and circumstances changed since the agreement was executed, so as to make its enforcement unfair and unreasonable?\"); see also Holler v. Holler, 364 S.C. 256, 270, 612 S.E.2d 469, 477 (2005) (finding the family court possessed jurisdiction to determine whether the premarital agreement was valid and enforceable)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"612 S.E.2d 469, 477","parenthetical":"finding the family court possessed jurisdiction to determine whether the premarital agreement was valid and enforceable","sentence":"See Hardee v. Hardee, 355 S.C. 382, 389, 585 S.E.2d 501, 504 (2003) (stating that when determining whether a prenuptial agreement should be enforced, a court must consider \u201c(1) Was the agreement obtained through fraud, duress, or mistake, or through misrepresentation or nondisclosure of material facts? (2) Is the agreement unconscionable? (3) Have the facts and circumstances changed since the agreement was executed, so as to make its enforcement unfair and unreasonable?\"); see also Holler v. Holler, 364 S.C. 256, 270, 612 S.E.2d 469, 477 (2005) (finding the family court possessed jurisdiction to determine whether the premarital agreement was valid and enforceable)."},"case_id":4161477,"label":"a"}
{"context":"We conclude that the appeal waiver is enforceable and applicable to the issue raised in this appeal, based in part on Storm's own statements at his change-of-plea hearing.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"114 F.3d 699, 703","parenthetical":"noting that a defendant's representations made during a plea hearing are presumed to be true","sentence":"See United States v. Scott, 627 F.3d 702, 704 (8th Cir. 2010) (reviewing de novo the validity and applicability of an appeal waiver); United States v. Andis, 333 F.3d 886, 889-92 (8th Cir.) (en banc) (discussing enforcement of appeal waivers), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 997, 124 S.Ct. 501, 157 L.Ed.2d 398 (2003); see also Nguyen v. United States, 114 F.3d 699, 703 (8th Cir. 1997) (noting that a defendant\u2019s representations made during a plea hearing are presumed to be true)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"627 F.3d 702, 704","parenthetical":"reviewing de novo the validity and applicability of an appeal waiver","sentence":"See United States v. Scott, 627 F.3d 702, 704 (8th Cir. 2010) (reviewing de novo the validity and applicability of an appeal waiver); United States v. Andis, 333 F.3d 886, 889-92 (8th Cir.) (en banc) (discussing enforcement of appeal waivers), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 997, 124 S.Ct. 501, 157 L.Ed.2d 398 (2003); see also Nguyen v. United States, 114 F.3d 699, 703 (8th Cir. 1997) (noting that a defendant\u2019s representations made during a plea hearing are presumed to be true)."},"case_id":12395311,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Further, the cases suggest that the owner maintains an ongoing responsibility to provide maintenance and cure despite the government's provision of free medical care. If the owner, for example, discovers that a seaman is not receiving proper care at a public facility the owner is obligated to pay for his treatment elsewhere.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"where Public Health Service hospital too far away, seaman entitled to emergency private hospitalization","sentence":"1B Benedict on Admiralty \u00a7 49, at 4-47 (7th ed. 1983); see also Kratzer v. Capital Marine Supply, Inc., 645 F.2d 477, 482 (5th Cir. 1981) (seaman entitled to private care where Public Health Service Hospital was unsuccessful in treating back injury); Keiser v. American President Lines, Ltd., 384 F.Supp. 554 (S.D.N.Y.1974) (shipowner required to reimburse seaman for private medical care where Public Health Service failed to diagnose seaman\u2019s injury); Williams v. United States, 133 F.Supp. 319 (E.D.Va.), aff'd, 228 F.2d 129 (4th Cir.1955), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 986, 76 S.Ct. 1054, 100 L.Ed. 1499 (1956) (owner would be responsible for moving seaman to different .mental hospital if he were notified that care at state facility was inadequate; dictum); cf. Diaz v. Gulf Oil Corp., 237 F.Supp. 261 (S.D.N.Y.1965) (where Public Health Service hospital too far away, seaman entitled to emergency private hospitalization)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"645 F.2d 477, 482","parenthetical":"seaman entitled to private care where Public Health Service Hospital was unsuccessful in treating back injury","sentence":"1B Benedict on Admiralty \u00a7 49, at 4-47 (7th ed. 1983); see also Kratzer v. Capital Marine Supply, Inc., 645 F.2d 477, 482 (5th Cir. 1981) (seaman entitled to private care where Public Health Service Hospital was unsuccessful in treating back injury); Keiser v. American President Lines, Ltd., 384 F.Supp. 554 (S.D.N.Y.1974) (shipowner required to reimburse seaman for private medical care where Public Health Service failed to diagnose seaman\u2019s injury); Williams v. United States, 133 F.Supp. 319 (E.D.Va.), aff'd, 228 F.2d 129 (4th Cir.1955), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 986, 76 S.Ct. 1054, 100 L.Ed. 1499 (1956) (owner would be responsible for moving seaman to different .mental hospital if he were notified that care at state facility was inadequate; dictum); cf. Diaz v. Gulf Oil Corp., 237 F.Supp. 261 (S.D.N.Y.1965) (where Public Health Service hospital too far away, seaman entitled to emergency private hospitalization)."},"case_id":638766,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Further, the cases suggest that the owner maintains an ongoing responsibility to provide maintenance and cure despite the government's provision of free medical care. If the owner, for example, discovers that a seaman is not receiving proper care at a public facility the owner is obligated to pay for his treatment elsewhere.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"where Public Health Service hospital too far away, seaman entitled to emergency private hospitalization","sentence":"1B Benedict on Admiralty \u00a7 49, at 4-47 (7th ed. 1983); see also Kratzer v. Capital Marine Supply, Inc., 645 F.2d 477, 482 (5th Cir. 1981) (seaman entitled to private care where Public Health Service Hospital was unsuccessful in treating back injury); Keiser v. American President Lines, Ltd., 384 F.Supp. 554 (S.D.N.Y.1974) (shipowner required to reimburse seaman for private medical care where Public Health Service failed to diagnose seaman\u2019s injury); Williams v. United States, 133 F.Supp. 319 (E.D.Va.), aff'd, 228 F.2d 129 (4th Cir.1955), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 986, 76 S.Ct. 1054, 100 L.Ed. 1499 (1956) (owner would be responsible for moving seaman to different .mental hospital if he were notified that care at state facility was inadequate; dictum); cf. Diaz v. Gulf Oil Corp., 237 F.Supp. 261 (S.D.N.Y.1965) (where Public Health Service hospital too far away, seaman entitled to emergency private hospitalization)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"shipowner required to reimburse seaman for private medical care where Public Health Service failed to diagnose seaman's injury","sentence":"1B Benedict on Admiralty \u00a7 49, at 4-47 (7th ed. 1983); see also Kratzer v. Capital Marine Supply, Inc., 645 F.2d 477, 482 (5th Cir. 1981) (seaman entitled to private care where Public Health Service Hospital was unsuccessful in treating back injury); Keiser v. American President Lines, Ltd., 384 F.Supp. 554 (S.D.N.Y.1974) (shipowner required to reimburse seaman for private medical care where Public Health Service failed to diagnose seaman\u2019s injury); Williams v. United States, 133 F.Supp. 319 (E.D.Va.), aff'd, 228 F.2d 129 (4th Cir.1955), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 986, 76 S.Ct. 1054, 100 L.Ed. 1499 (1956) (owner would be responsible for moving seaman to different .mental hospital if he were notified that care at state facility was inadequate; dictum); cf. Diaz v. Gulf Oil Corp., 237 F.Supp. 261 (S.D.N.Y.1965) (where Public Health Service hospital too far away, seaman entitled to emergency private hospitalization)."},"case_id":638766,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The answer is clear. Edwards and its progeny teach that once the right to counsel has been invoked \"subsequent incriminating statements made without [the defendant's] attorney present [violate] the rights secured to the defendant by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"470 U.S. 51, 52","parenthetical":"interrogation subsequent to a request for counsel violates Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments","sentence":"Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1043, 103 S.Ct. 2830, 2833, 77 L.Ed.2d 405 (1983) (emphasis added); See Shea v. Louisiana, 470 U.S. 51, 52, 105 S.Ct. 1065, 1066, 84 L.Ed.2d 38 (1985) (interrogation subsequent to a request for counsel violates Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"111 S.Ct. 489, 489","parenthetical":"valid waiver cannot be established by showing that defendant responded to further questions","sentence":"See also Minnick, 111 S.Ct. at 489 (valid waiver cannot be established by showing that defendant responded to further questions)."},"case_id":10381123,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The answer is clear. Edwards and its progeny teach that once the right to counsel has been invoked \"subsequent incriminating statements made without [the defendant's] attorney present [violate] the rights secured to the defendant by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"111 S.Ct. 489, 489","parenthetical":"valid waiver cannot be established by showing that defendant responded to further questions","sentence":"See also Minnick, 111 S.Ct. at 489 (valid waiver cannot be established by showing that defendant responded to further questions)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"105 S.Ct. 1065, 1066","parenthetical":"interrogation subsequent to a request for counsel violates Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments","sentence":"Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1043, 103 S.Ct. 2830, 2833, 77 L.Ed.2d 405 (1983) (emphasis added); See Shea v. Louisiana, 470 U.S. 51, 52, 105 S.Ct. 1065, 1066, 84 L.Ed.2d 38 (1985) (interrogation subsequent to a request for counsel violates Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments)."},"case_id":10381123,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The answer is clear. Edwards and its progeny teach that once the right to counsel has been invoked \"subsequent incriminating statements made without [the defendant's] attorney present [violate] the rights secured to the defendant by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"interrogation subsequent to a request for counsel violates Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments","sentence":"Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1043, 103 S.Ct. 2830, 2833, 77 L.Ed.2d 405 (1983) (emphasis added); See Shea v. Louisiana, 470 U.S. 51, 52, 105 S.Ct. 1065, 1066, 84 L.Ed.2d 38 (1985) (interrogation subsequent to a request for counsel violates Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"111 S.Ct. 489, 489","parenthetical":"valid waiver cannot be established by showing that defendant responded to further questions","sentence":"See also Minnick, 111 S.Ct. at 489 (valid waiver cannot be established by showing that defendant responded to further questions)."},"case_id":10381123,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In this case, we have before the court not a mere standard form UCC statement, but several documents from which the FDIC urge us to find \"evidence of an agreement\". As pointed out by the FDIC, the composite document rule is the rule in most circuits which have addressed this question.","citation_a":{"signal":"contra","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"some grant language is necessary to \"create or provide security\"","sentence":"Contra Shelton v. Erwin, 472 F.2d 1118 (10th Cir.1973) (some grant language is necessary to \u201ccreate or provide security\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"a well reasoned opinion which surveys and attempts to reconcile the existing law on the subject","sentence":"Matter of Miller, 545 F.2d 916 (5th Cir.1977); Matter of Numeric Corp., 485 F.2d 1328 (1st Cir.1973); Matter of Bolinger Corporation, 614 F.2d 924 (3rd Cir.1980) (a well reasoned opinion which surveys and attempts to reconcile the existing law on the subject); Matter of Wambach, 484 F.2d 572 (7th Cir.1973); In re Amex Protein Development Corp., 504 F.2d 1056 (9th Cir.1974)."},"case_id":6477643,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The state court's journal entry for the plea hearing simply states that Thornton pleaded guilty to Count II of the information: burglary, in violation of Kan. Stat. Ann. SS 21-3715 (1992); the entry for the sentencing hearing adds nothing substantive to the journal entry for the plea hearing. To the extent these are \"comparable judicial records,\" they are unable to provide the necessary information to determine whether Thornton pleaded guilty to generic burglary.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"544 U.S. 26, 26","parenthetical":"including \"comparable judi cial records\" as documents to be utilized in determining whether a conviction qualifies under the ACCA","sentence":"See Shepard, 544 U.S. at 26, 125 S.Ct. 1254 (including \u201ccomparable judi cial records\u201d as documents to be utilized in determining whether a conviction qualifies under the ACCA); see also Forrest, 611 F.3d at 913 (holding that the district court did not err in finding the record sufficient to conclude prior conviction qualified as a violent felony for purposes of the ACCA, as the evidence was sufficient to conclude the criminal action charged in one court was the basis for a judgment against the defendant in a different court)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"611 F.3d 913, 913","parenthetical":"holding that the district court did not err in finding the record sufficient to conclude prior conviction qualified as a violent felony for purposes of the ACCA, as the evidence was sufficient to conclude the criminal action charged in one court was the basis for a judgment against the defendant in a different court","sentence":"See Shepard, 544 U.S. at 26, 125 S.Ct. 1254 (including \u201ccomparable judi cial records\u201d as documents to be utilized in determining whether a conviction qualifies under the ACCA); see also Forrest, 611 F.3d at 913 (holding that the district court did not err in finding the record sufficient to conclude prior conviction qualified as a violent felony for purposes of the ACCA, as the evidence was sufficient to conclude the criminal action charged in one court was the basis for a judgment against the defendant in a different court)."},"case_id":4200292,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The state court's journal entry for the plea hearing simply states that Thornton pleaded guilty to Count II of the information: burglary, in violation of Kan. Stat. Ann. SS 21-3715 (1992); the entry for the sentencing hearing adds nothing substantive to the journal entry for the plea hearing. To the extent these are \"comparable judicial records,\" they are unable to provide the necessary information to determine whether Thornton pleaded guilty to generic burglary.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"including \"comparable judi cial records\" as documents to be utilized in determining whether a conviction qualifies under the ACCA","sentence":"See Shepard, 544 U.S. at 26, 125 S.Ct. 1254 (including \u201ccomparable judi cial records\u201d as documents to be utilized in determining whether a conviction qualifies under the ACCA); see also Forrest, 611 F.3d at 913 (holding that the district court did not err in finding the record sufficient to conclude prior conviction qualified as a violent felony for purposes of the ACCA, as the evidence was sufficient to conclude the criminal action charged in one court was the basis for a judgment against the defendant in a different court)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"611 F.3d 913, 913","parenthetical":"holding that the district court did not err in finding the record sufficient to conclude prior conviction qualified as a violent felony for purposes of the ACCA, as the evidence was sufficient to conclude the criminal action charged in one court was the basis for a judgment against the defendant in a different court","sentence":"See Shepard, 544 U.S. at 26, 125 S.Ct. 1254 (including \u201ccomparable judi cial records\u201d as documents to be utilized in determining whether a conviction qualifies under the ACCA); see also Forrest, 611 F.3d at 913 (holding that the district court did not err in finding the record sufficient to conclude prior conviction qualified as a violent felony for purposes of the ACCA, as the evidence was sufficient to conclude the criminal action charged in one court was the basis for a judgment against the defendant in a different court)."},"case_id":4200292,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Appellants first argue that the District Court wrongly dismissed their claim alleging that IBEW and Local 5 infringed their union rights under the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA) by denying them the equal rights and privileges guaranteed by 29 U.S.C. SS 411. However, SS 411 only guarantees rights to union \"members.\" When a union's constitution gives the local union the discretion to accept or deny membership to applicants, unsuccessful applicants have not fulfilled the requirements for membership, and thus are not members of the local union.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"644 F.Supp. 507, 509","parenthetical":"\"The mere application for membership, which is subject to approval as prescribed by the Unions' constitution, does not constitute membership or result in any vested right.\"","sentence":"See Bullock v. Sweeney, 644 F.Supp. 507, 509 (N.D.Cal.1986) (\u201cThe mere application for membership, which is subject to approval as prescribed by the Unions\u2019 constitution, does not constitute membership or result in any vested right.\u201d); cf. Hughes v. Local No. 11 of Int\u2019l Ass\u2019n of Bridge, Structural and Ornamental Ironworkers, 287 F.2d 810, 816 (3d Cir.1961) (explaining \u201cthis case may be distinguished from the ordinary case of an application for membership in a voluntary association on the ground that there was not in this case a reservation of power by the organization to refuse membership, in its discretion, to those who have fulfilled its standard membership requirements\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"287 F.2d 810, 816","parenthetical":"explaining \"this case may be distinguished from the ordinary case of an application for membership in a voluntary association on the ground that there was not in this case a reservation of power by the organization to refuse membership, in its discretion, to those who have fulfilled its standard membership requirements\"","sentence":"See Bullock v. Sweeney, 644 F.Supp. 507, 509 (N.D.Cal.1986) (\u201cThe mere application for membership, which is subject to approval as prescribed by the Unions\u2019 constitution, does not constitute membership or result in any vested right.\u201d); cf. Hughes v. Local No. 11 of Int\u2019l Ass\u2019n of Bridge, Structural and Ornamental Ironworkers, 287 F.2d 810, 816 (3d Cir.1961) (explaining \u201cthis case may be distinguished from the ordinary case of an application for membership in a voluntary association on the ground that there was not in this case a reservation of power by the organization to refuse membership, in its discretion, to those who have fulfilled its standard membership requirements\u201d)."},"case_id":3814297,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Plaintiffs declaration is insufficient to create a triable issue. Plaintiff has not identified one other African-American who, allegedly, has not been promoted on account of race, nor has Plaintiff pointed to any evidence which suggests that, for promotions, African-Americans are disproportionately affected when compared to other racial groups.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"525 F.3d 916, 921","parenthetical":"affirming grant of summary judgment in favor of the employer on a disparate impact claim, stating that plaintiff \"presented evidence that the BIA's policy affected some Indian employees, but he presented no evidence that the failure to provide actual and timely notice disproportionately affected Indians more than other racial groups.\"","sentence":"See Pottenger v. Potlatch Corp., 329 F.3d 740, 749 (9th Cir.2003) (\u201cSummary judgment is appropriate when statistics do not support a disparate impact analysis\u201d); see also Lawrence v. Dep\u2019t of Interior, 525 F.3d 916, 921 (9th Cir.2008) (affirming grant of summary judgment in favor of the employer on a disparate impact claim, stating that plaintiff \u201cpresented evidence that the BIA\u2019s policy affected some Indian employees, but he presented no evidence that the failure to provide actual and timely notice disproportionately affected Indians more than other racial groups.\u201d); Paige v. California, 291 F.3d 1141, 1145 (9th Cir.2002) (recognizing that \u201c[sjtatistical evidence is used to demonstrate how a particular employment practice causes a protected minority group to be under represented in a specific area of employment (for example, hiring or promotion)\u201d and stating that the \u201cstatistical analysis must show a disparity that is sufficiently substantial\u201d) (internal quotation marks omitted)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"329 F.3d 740, 749","parenthetical":"\"Summary judgment is appropriate when statistics do not support a disparate impact analysis\"","sentence":"See Pottenger v. Potlatch Corp., 329 F.3d 740, 749 (9th Cir.2003) (\u201cSummary judgment is appropriate when statistics do not support a disparate impact analysis\u201d); see also Lawrence v. Dep\u2019t of Interior, 525 F.3d 916, 921 (9th Cir.2008) (affirming grant of summary judgment in favor of the employer on a disparate impact claim, stating that plaintiff \u201cpresented evidence that the BIA\u2019s policy affected some Indian employees, but he presented no evidence that the failure to provide actual and timely notice disproportionately affected Indians more than other racial groups.\u201d); Paige v. California, 291 F.3d 1141, 1145 (9th Cir.2002) (recognizing that \u201c[sjtatistical evidence is used to demonstrate how a particular employment practice causes a protected minority group to be under represented in a specific area of employment (for example, hiring or promotion)\u201d and stating that the \u201cstatistical analysis must show a disparity that is sufficiently substantial\u201d) (internal quotation marks omitted)."},"case_id":4230836,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Plaintiffs declaration is insufficient to create a triable issue. Plaintiff has not identified one other African-American who, allegedly, has not been promoted on account of race, nor has Plaintiff pointed to any evidence which suggests that, for promotions, African-Americans are disproportionately affected when compared to other racial groups.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"291 F.3d 1141, 1145","parenthetical":"recognizing that \"[sjtatistical evidence is used to demonstrate how a particular employment practice causes a protected minority group to be under represented in a specific area of employment (for example, hiring or promotion","sentence":"See Pottenger v. Potlatch Corp., 329 F.3d 740, 749 (9th Cir.2003) (\u201cSummary judgment is appropriate when statistics do not support a disparate impact analysis\u201d); see also Lawrence v. Dep\u2019t of Interior, 525 F.3d 916, 921 (9th Cir.2008) (affirming grant of summary judgment in favor of the employer on a disparate impact claim, stating that plaintiff \u201cpresented evidence that the BIA\u2019s policy affected some Indian employees, but he presented no evidence that the failure to provide actual and timely notice disproportionately affected Indians more than other racial groups.\u201d); Paige v. California, 291 F.3d 1141, 1145 (9th Cir.2002) (recognizing that \u201c[sjtatistical evidence is used to demonstrate how a particular employment practice causes a protected minority group to be under represented in a specific area of employment (for example, hiring or promotion)\u201d and stating that the \u201cstatistical analysis must show a disparity that is sufficiently substantial\u201d) (internal quotation marks omitted)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"329 F.3d 740, 749","parenthetical":"\"Summary judgment is appropriate when statistics do not support a disparate impact analysis\"","sentence":"See Pottenger v. Potlatch Corp., 329 F.3d 740, 749 (9th Cir.2003) (\u201cSummary judgment is appropriate when statistics do not support a disparate impact analysis\u201d); see also Lawrence v. Dep\u2019t of Interior, 525 F.3d 916, 921 (9th Cir.2008) (affirming grant of summary judgment in favor of the employer on a disparate impact claim, stating that plaintiff \u201cpresented evidence that the BIA\u2019s policy affected some Indian employees, but he presented no evidence that the failure to provide actual and timely notice disproportionately affected Indians more than other racial groups.\u201d); Paige v. California, 291 F.3d 1141, 1145 (9th Cir.2002) (recognizing that \u201c[sjtatistical evidence is used to demonstrate how a particular employment practice causes a protected minority group to be under represented in a specific area of employment (for example, hiring or promotion)\u201d and stating that the \u201cstatistical analysis must show a disparity that is sufficiently substantial\u201d) (internal quotation marks omitted)."},"case_id":4230836,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The Ninth Circuit, however, has not left the trial judge without guidance in determining whether a plaintiff has met the \"reasonable person\" test. The Watson panel stated the generally accepted proposition that \"a 'single isolated instance' of employment discrimination is insufficient as a matter of law to support a finding of constructive discharge.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that the mere fact of discrimination sans aggravating factors would not sustain a constructive discharge action","sentence":"Watson, 823 F.2d at 361, citing, Nolan, 686 F.2d at 813-14 (held that evidence of four incidents of differential treatment over two years was sufficient to create a genuine issue of fact for trial); Satterwhite, 744 at 1381-82 (\u201ccourts which have considered the question [of constructive discharge] are reluctant to predicate a finding of constructive discharge solely on the fact of employment discrimination.\u201d); see also, Clark v. Marsh, 665 F.2d 1168 (D.C.Cir.1981) (holding that the mere fact of discrimination sans aggravating factors would not sustain a constructive discharge action)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"823 F.2d 361, 361","parenthetical":"held that evidence of four incidents of differential treatment over two years was sufficient to create a genuine issue of fact for trial","sentence":"Watson, 823 F.2d at 361, citing, Nolan, 686 F.2d at 813-14 (held that evidence of four incidents of differential treatment over two years was sufficient to create a genuine issue of fact for trial); Satterwhite, 744 at 1381-82 (\u201ccourts which have considered the question [of constructive discharge] are reluctant to predicate a finding of constructive discharge solely on the fact of employment discrimination.\u201d); see also, Clark v. Marsh, 665 F.2d 1168 (D.C.Cir.1981) (holding that the mere fact of discrimination sans aggravating factors would not sustain a constructive discharge action)."},"case_id":7389940,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The Ninth Circuit, however, has not left the trial judge without guidance in determining whether a plaintiff has met the \"reasonable person\" test. The Watson panel stated the generally accepted proposition that \"a 'single isolated instance' of employment discrimination is insufficient as a matter of law to support a finding of constructive discharge.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that the mere fact of discrimination sans aggravating factors would not sustain a constructive discharge action","sentence":"Watson, 823 F.2d at 361, citing, Nolan, 686 F.2d at 813-14 (held that evidence of four incidents of differential treatment over two years was sufficient to create a genuine issue of fact for trial); Satterwhite, 744 at 1381-82 (\u201ccourts which have considered the question [of constructive discharge] are reluctant to predicate a finding of constructive discharge solely on the fact of employment discrimination.\u201d); see also, Clark v. Marsh, 665 F.2d 1168 (D.C.Cir.1981) (holding that the mere fact of discrimination sans aggravating factors would not sustain a constructive discharge action)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"686 F.2d 813, 813-14","parenthetical":"held that evidence of four incidents of differential treatment over two years was sufficient to create a genuine issue of fact for trial","sentence":"Watson, 823 F.2d at 361, citing, Nolan, 686 F.2d at 813-14 (held that evidence of four incidents of differential treatment over two years was sufficient to create a genuine issue of fact for trial); Satterwhite, 744 at 1381-82 (\u201ccourts which have considered the question [of constructive discharge] are reluctant to predicate a finding of constructive discharge solely on the fact of employment discrimination.\u201d); see also, Clark v. Marsh, 665 F.2d 1168 (D.C.Cir.1981) (holding that the mere fact of discrimination sans aggravating factors would not sustain a constructive discharge action)."},"case_id":7389940,"label":"b"}
{"context":"P 29 Freeney also contends the amended indictment violated the Sixth Amendment. As noted above, the touchstone of the Sixth Amendment notice requirement is whether the defendant had actual notice of the charge, from either the indictment or other sources.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"252 F.3d 1289, 1298","parenthetical":"\"Even an inadequate indictment satisfies due process if the defendant has actual notice, so that she suffers no prejudice.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Stephens, 59 F.3d at 934-36 (failure of indictment to charge felony murder did not violate Sixth Amendment notice requirement when defendant \u201chad five days of actual notice [before closing arguments] of the prosecution\u2019s intention to rely on a felony-murder theory\u201d); see also Sheppard, 909 F.2d at 1237; cf. United States v. Odom, 252 F.3d 1289, 1298 (11th Cir.2001) (\u201cEven an inadequate indictment satisfies due process if the defendant has actual notice, so that she suffers no prejudice.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"59 F.3d 934, 934-36","parenthetical":"failure of indictment to charge felony murder did not violate Sixth Amendment notice requirement when defendant \"had five days of actual notice [before closing arguments] of the prosecution's intention to rely on a felony-murder theory\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Stephens, 59 F.3d at 934-36 (failure of indictment to charge felony murder did not violate Sixth Amendment notice requirement when defendant \u201chad five days of actual notice [before closing arguments] of the prosecution\u2019s intention to rely on a felony-murder theory\u201d); see also Sheppard, 909 F.2d at 1237; cf. United States v. Odom, 252 F.3d 1289, 1298 (11th Cir.2001) (\u201cEven an inadequate indictment satisfies due process if the defendant has actual notice, so that she suffers no prejudice.\u201d)."},"case_id":4050747,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The reasonable-doubt standard has become incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Since the Federal courts have clarified their \"reasonable-likelihood\" test for reviewing jury instructions, we have persisted in looking for possible misunderstandings by reasonable jurors.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"418 Mass. 76, 84-85","parenthetical":"post- Victor case finding that a judge's misstatement of burden of proof \"could not have\" been misunderstood","sentence":"Commonwealth v. Grant, 418 Mass. 76, 84-85 (1994) (post- Victor case finding that a judge\u2019s misstatement of burden of proof \u201ccould not have\u201d been misunderstood)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"post-Victor case finding that judge's instructions could not have been read as suggesting improper standard of proof","sentence":"Cf. Commonwealth v. Gagliardi, 418 Mass. 562, 571 n.4 (1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 753 (1995) (post-Victor case finding that judge\u2019s instructions could not have been read as suggesting improper standard of proof). Our case law is more favorable to a criminal defendant than the Federal standard."},"case_id":890091,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The reasonable-doubt standard has become incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Since the Federal courts have clarified their \"reasonable-likelihood\" test for reviewing jury instructions, we have persisted in looking for possible misunderstandings by reasonable jurors.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"418 Mass. 76, 84-85","parenthetical":"post- Victor case finding that a judge's misstatement of burden of proof \"could not have\" been misunderstood","sentence":"Commonwealth v. Grant, 418 Mass. 76, 84-85 (1994) (post- Victor case finding that a judge\u2019s misstatement of burden of proof \u201ccould not have\u201d been misunderstood)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"post-Victor case finding that judge's instructions could not have been read as suggesting improper standard of proof","sentence":"Cf. Commonwealth v. Gagliardi, 418 Mass. 562, 571 n.4 (1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 753 (1995) (post-Victor case finding that judge\u2019s instructions could not have been read as suggesting improper standard of proof). Our case law is more favorable to a criminal defendant than the Federal standard."},"case_id":890091,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The automatic stay does not apply to prevent acts to collect claims that a bankruptcy court has determined to be non-dischargeable under section 523(a)(8).","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"a creditor who obtains a section 523 judgment of nondischargeability may proceed with execution on non-estate property without obtaining relief from the automatic stay","sentence":"See In re Watson, 78 B.R. 232 (9th Cir. BAP 1987) (a creditor who obtains a section 523 judgment of nondischargeability may proceed with execution on non-estate property without obtaining relief from the automatic stay); see also Johnson v. Edinboro State College, 728 F.2d 163 (3d Cir.1984) (bankruptcy court could not order the college to turn over to the debtor his diploma and a copy of the transcript after bankruptcy court determined that a debt for an outstanding student loan was nondischargeable under \u00a7 523(a)(8)). Where, however, the debt is merely presumed to be nondis-chargeable under section 523(a)(8), but the bankruptcy court has not yet determined that the debt is nondischargeable, policy reasons compel the application of a different rule."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"bankruptcy court could not order the college to turn over to the debtor his diploma and a copy of the transcript after bankruptcy court determined that a debt for an outstanding student loan was nondischargeable under SS 523(a","sentence":"See In re Watson, 78 B.R. 232 (9th Cir. BAP 1987) (a creditor who obtains a section 523 judgment of nondischargeability may proceed with execution on non-estate property without obtaining relief from the automatic stay); see also Johnson v. Edinboro State College, 728 F.2d 163 (3d Cir.1984) (bankruptcy court could not order the college to turn over to the debtor his diploma and a copy of the transcript after bankruptcy court determined that a debt for an outstanding student loan was nondischargeable under \u00a7 523(a)(8)). Where, however, the debt is merely presumed to be nondis-chargeable under section 523(a)(8), but the bankruptcy court has not yet determined that the debt is nondischargeable, policy reasons compel the application of a different rule."},"case_id":6101637,"label":"a"}
{"context":"According to settled principles, a third party, with standing to do so, may validly consent to the search of a closed container, even though the actual owner of the container has a heightened expectation of privacy in its contents.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"433 U.S. 1, 13","parenthetical":"\"[A] person's expectations of privacy in personal luggage are substantially greater than in an automobile.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 740, 89 S.Ct. 1420, 1425, 22 L.Ed.2d 684 (1969) (cousin had authority to consent to search of the defendant\u2019s duffel bag, wMch both men used and wMch had been left in the cousin\u2019s home); United States v. Ladell, 127 F.3d 622, 624 (7th Cir.1997) (holding that a mother could consent to a search of her adult son\u2019s bedroom, including a closed duffle bag stored in between the mattresses on the bed); United States v. Richardson, 562 F.2d 476 (7th Cir. 1977) (holding that a woman can consent to a search of a bedroom, shared by herself and the man she lived with, including the closet); see also Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 253, 111 S.Ct. 1801, 1805, 114 L.Ed.2d 297 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (stating that, \u201can individual has a heightened expectation of privacy in the contents of a closed container\u201d); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 13, 97 S.Ct. 2476, 2484, 53 L.Ed.2d 538 (1977) (\u201c[A] person\u2019s expectations of privacy in personal luggage are substantially greater than in an automobile.\u201d). But, consent to search a private container, such as a smtcase or backpack, is only effective if given by someone \u201cwith common authority over or other sufficient relationsMp to the ... effects sought to be inspected.\u201d Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171, 94 S.Ct. at 993. Common authority \u201crests ... on mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access or control for most purposes.\u201d"},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"394 U.S. 731, 740","parenthetical":"cousin had authority to consent to search of the defendant's duffel bag, wMch both men used and wMch had been left in the cousin's home","sentence":"See, e.g., Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 740, 89 S.Ct. 1420, 1425, 22 L.Ed.2d 684 (1969) (cousin had authority to consent to search of the defendant\u2019s duffel bag, wMch both men used and wMch had been left in the cousin\u2019s home); United States v. Ladell, 127 F.3d 622, 624 (7th Cir.1997) (holding that a mother could consent to a search of her adult son\u2019s bedroom, including a closed duffle bag stored in between the mattresses on the bed); United States v. Richardson, 562 F.2d 476 (7th Cir. 1977) (holding that a woman can consent to a search of a bedroom, shared by herself and the man she lived with, including the closet); see also Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 253, 111 S.Ct. 1801, 1805, 114 L.Ed.2d 297 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (stating that, \u201can individual has a heightened expectation of privacy in the contents of a closed container\u201d); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 13, 97 S.Ct. 2476, 2484, 53 L.Ed.2d 538 (1977) (\u201c[A] person\u2019s expectations of privacy in personal luggage are substantially greater than in an automobile.\u201d). But, consent to search a private container, such as a smtcase or backpack, is only effective if given by someone \u201cwith common authority over or other sufficient relationsMp to the ... effects sought to be inspected.\u201d Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171, 94 S.Ct. at 993. Common authority \u201crests ... on mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access or control for most purposes.\u201d"},"case_id":3068231,"label":"b"}
{"context":"According to settled principles, a third party, with standing to do so, may validly consent to the search of a closed container, even though the actual owner of the container has a heightened expectation of privacy in its contents.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"394 U.S. 731, 740","parenthetical":"cousin had authority to consent to search of the defendant's duffel bag, wMch both men used and wMch had been left in the cousin's home","sentence":"See, e.g., Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 740, 89 S.Ct. 1420, 1425, 22 L.Ed.2d 684 (1969) (cousin had authority to consent to search of the defendant\u2019s duffel bag, wMch both men used and wMch had been left in the cousin\u2019s home); United States v. Ladell, 127 F.3d 622, 624 (7th Cir.1997) (holding that a mother could consent to a search of her adult son\u2019s bedroom, including a closed duffle bag stored in between the mattresses on the bed); United States v. Richardson, 562 F.2d 476 (7th Cir. 1977) (holding that a woman can consent to a search of a bedroom, shared by herself and the man she lived with, including the closet); see also Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 253, 111 S.Ct. 1801, 1805, 114 L.Ed.2d 297 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (stating that, \u201can individual has a heightened expectation of privacy in the contents of a closed container\u201d); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 13, 97 S.Ct. 2476, 2484, 53 L.Ed.2d 538 (1977) (\u201c[A] person\u2019s expectations of privacy in personal luggage are substantially greater than in an automobile.\u201d). But, consent to search a private container, such as a smtcase or backpack, is only effective if given by someone \u201cwith common authority over or other sufficient relationsMp to the ... effects sought to be inspected.\u201d Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171, 94 S.Ct. at 993. Common authority \u201crests ... on mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access or control for most purposes.\u201d"},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"97 S.Ct. 2476, 2484","parenthetical":"\"[A] person's expectations of privacy in personal luggage are substantially greater than in an automobile.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 740, 89 S.Ct. 1420, 1425, 22 L.Ed.2d 684 (1969) (cousin had authority to consent to search of the defendant\u2019s duffel bag, wMch both men used and wMch had been left in the cousin\u2019s home); United States v. Ladell, 127 F.3d 622, 624 (7th Cir.1997) (holding that a mother could consent to a search of her adult son\u2019s bedroom, including a closed duffle bag stored in between the mattresses on the bed); United States v. Richardson, 562 F.2d 476 (7th Cir. 1977) (holding that a woman can consent to a search of a bedroom, shared by herself and the man she lived with, including the closet); see also Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 253, 111 S.Ct. 1801, 1805, 114 L.Ed.2d 297 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (stating that, \u201can individual has a heightened expectation of privacy in the contents of a closed container\u201d); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 13, 97 S.Ct. 2476, 2484, 53 L.Ed.2d 538 (1977) (\u201c[A] person\u2019s expectations of privacy in personal luggage are substantially greater than in an automobile.\u201d). But, consent to search a private container, such as a smtcase or backpack, is only effective if given by someone \u201cwith common authority over or other sufficient relationsMp to the ... effects sought to be inspected.\u201d Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171, 94 S.Ct. at 993. Common authority \u201crests ... on mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access or control for most purposes.\u201d"},"case_id":3068231,"label":"a"}
{"context":"According to settled principles, a third party, with standing to do so, may validly consent to the search of a closed container, even though the actual owner of the container has a heightened expectation of privacy in its contents.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[A] person's expectations of privacy in personal luggage are substantially greater than in an automobile.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 740, 89 S.Ct. 1420, 1425, 22 L.Ed.2d 684 (1969) (cousin had authority to consent to search of the defendant\u2019s duffel bag, wMch both men used and wMch had been left in the cousin\u2019s home); United States v. Ladell, 127 F.3d 622, 624 (7th Cir.1997) (holding that a mother could consent to a search of her adult son\u2019s bedroom, including a closed duffle bag stored in between the mattresses on the bed); United States v. Richardson, 562 F.2d 476 (7th Cir. 1977) (holding that a woman can consent to a search of a bedroom, shared by herself and the man she lived with, including the closet); see also Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 253, 111 S.Ct. 1801, 1805, 114 L.Ed.2d 297 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (stating that, \u201can individual has a heightened expectation of privacy in the contents of a closed container\u201d); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 13, 97 S.Ct. 2476, 2484, 53 L.Ed.2d 538 (1977) (\u201c[A] person\u2019s expectations of privacy in personal luggage are substantially greater than in an automobile.\u201d). But, consent to search a private container, such as a smtcase or backpack, is only effective if given by someone \u201cwith common authority over or other sufficient relationsMp to the ... effects sought to be inspected.\u201d Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171, 94 S.Ct. at 993. Common authority \u201crests ... on mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access or control for most purposes.\u201d"},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"394 U.S. 731, 740","parenthetical":"cousin had authority to consent to search of the defendant's duffel bag, wMch both men used and wMch had been left in the cousin's home","sentence":"See, e.g., Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 740, 89 S.Ct. 1420, 1425, 22 L.Ed.2d 684 (1969) (cousin had authority to consent to search of the defendant\u2019s duffel bag, wMch both men used and wMch had been left in the cousin\u2019s home); United States v. Ladell, 127 F.3d 622, 624 (7th Cir.1997) (holding that a mother could consent to a search of her adult son\u2019s bedroom, including a closed duffle bag stored in between the mattresses on the bed); United States v. Richardson, 562 F.2d 476 (7th Cir. 1977) (holding that a woman can consent to a search of a bedroom, shared by herself and the man she lived with, including the closet); see also Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 253, 111 S.Ct. 1801, 1805, 114 L.Ed.2d 297 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (stating that, \u201can individual has a heightened expectation of privacy in the contents of a closed container\u201d); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 13, 97 S.Ct. 2476, 2484, 53 L.Ed.2d 538 (1977) (\u201c[A] person\u2019s expectations of privacy in personal luggage are substantially greater than in an automobile.\u201d). But, consent to search a private container, such as a smtcase or backpack, is only effective if given by someone \u201cwith common authority over or other sufficient relationsMp to the ... effects sought to be inspected.\u201d Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171, 94 S.Ct. at 993. Common authority \u201crests ... on mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access or control for most purposes.\u201d"},"case_id":3068231,"label":"b"}
{"context":"According to settled principles, a third party, with standing to do so, may validly consent to the search of a closed container, even though the actual owner of the container has a heightened expectation of privacy in its contents.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"415 U.S. 171, 171","parenthetical":"\"[A] person's expectations of privacy in personal luggage are substantially greater than in an automobile.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 740, 89 S.Ct. 1420, 1425, 22 L.Ed.2d 684 (1969) (cousin had authority to consent to search of the defendant\u2019s duffel bag, wMch both men used and wMch had been left in the cousin\u2019s home); United States v. Ladell, 127 F.3d 622, 624 (7th Cir.1997) (holding that a mother could consent to a search of her adult son\u2019s bedroom, including a closed duffle bag stored in between the mattresses on the bed); United States v. Richardson, 562 F.2d 476 (7th Cir. 1977) (holding that a woman can consent to a search of a bedroom, shared by herself and the man she lived with, including the closet); see also Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 253, 111 S.Ct. 1801, 1805, 114 L.Ed.2d 297 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (stating that, \u201can individual has a heightened expectation of privacy in the contents of a closed container\u201d); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 13, 97 S.Ct. 2476, 2484, 53 L.Ed.2d 538 (1977) (\u201c[A] person\u2019s expectations of privacy in personal luggage are substantially greater than in an automobile.\u201d). But, consent to search a private container, such as a smtcase or backpack, is only effective if given by someone \u201cwith common authority over or other sufficient relationsMp to the ... effects sought to be inspected.\u201d Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171, 94 S.Ct. at 993. Common authority \u201crests ... on mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access or control for most purposes.\u201d"},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"394 U.S. 731, 740","parenthetical":"cousin had authority to consent to search of the defendant's duffel bag, wMch both men used and wMch had been left in the cousin's home","sentence":"See, e.g., Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 740, 89 S.Ct. 1420, 1425, 22 L.Ed.2d 684 (1969) (cousin had authority to consent to search of the defendant\u2019s duffel bag, wMch both men used and wMch had been left in the cousin\u2019s home); United States v. Ladell, 127 F.3d 622, 624 (7th Cir.1997) (holding that a mother could consent to a search of her adult son\u2019s bedroom, including a closed duffle bag stored in between the mattresses on the bed); United States v. Richardson, 562 F.2d 476 (7th Cir. 1977) (holding that a woman can consent to a search of a bedroom, shared by herself and the man she lived with, including the closet); see also Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 253, 111 S.Ct. 1801, 1805, 114 L.Ed.2d 297 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (stating that, \u201can individual has a heightened expectation of privacy in the contents of a closed container\u201d); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 13, 97 S.Ct. 2476, 2484, 53 L.Ed.2d 538 (1977) (\u201c[A] person\u2019s expectations of privacy in personal luggage are substantially greater than in an automobile.\u201d). But, consent to search a private container, such as a smtcase or backpack, is only effective if given by someone \u201cwith common authority over or other sufficient relationsMp to the ... effects sought to be inspected.\u201d Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171, 94 S.Ct. at 993. Common authority \u201crests ... on mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access or control for most purposes.\u201d"},"case_id":3068231,"label":"b"}
{"context":"According to settled principles, a third party, with standing to do so, may validly consent to the search of a closed container, even though the actual owner of the container has a heightened expectation of privacy in its contents.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"394 U.S. 731, 740","parenthetical":"cousin had authority to consent to search of the defendant's duffel bag, wMch both men used and wMch had been left in the cousin's home","sentence":"See, e.g., Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 740, 89 S.Ct. 1420, 1425, 22 L.Ed.2d 684 (1969) (cousin had authority to consent to search of the defendant\u2019s duffel bag, wMch both men used and wMch had been left in the cousin\u2019s home); United States v. Ladell, 127 F.3d 622, 624 (7th Cir.1997) (holding that a mother could consent to a search of her adult son\u2019s bedroom, including a closed duffle bag stored in between the mattresses on the bed); United States v. Richardson, 562 F.2d 476 (7th Cir. 1977) (holding that a woman can consent to a search of a bedroom, shared by herself and the man she lived with, including the closet); see also Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 253, 111 S.Ct. 1801, 1805, 114 L.Ed.2d 297 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (stating that, \u201can individual has a heightened expectation of privacy in the contents of a closed container\u201d); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 13, 97 S.Ct. 2476, 2484, 53 L.Ed.2d 538 (1977) (\u201c[A] person\u2019s expectations of privacy in personal luggage are substantially greater than in an automobile.\u201d). But, consent to search a private container, such as a smtcase or backpack, is only effective if given by someone \u201cwith common authority over or other sufficient relationsMp to the ... effects sought to be inspected.\u201d Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171, 94 S.Ct. at 993. Common authority \u201crests ... on mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access or control for most purposes.\u201d"},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"94 S.Ct. 993, 993","parenthetical":"\"[A] person's expectations of privacy in personal luggage are substantially greater than in an automobile.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 740, 89 S.Ct. 1420, 1425, 22 L.Ed.2d 684 (1969) (cousin had authority to consent to search of the defendant\u2019s duffel bag, wMch both men used and wMch had been left in the cousin\u2019s home); United States v. Ladell, 127 F.3d 622, 624 (7th Cir.1997) (holding that a mother could consent to a search of her adult son\u2019s bedroom, including a closed duffle bag stored in between the mattresses on the bed); United States v. Richardson, 562 F.2d 476 (7th Cir. 1977) (holding that a woman can consent to a search of a bedroom, shared by herself and the man she lived with, including the closet); see also Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 253, 111 S.Ct. 1801, 1805, 114 L.Ed.2d 297 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (stating that, \u201can individual has a heightened expectation of privacy in the contents of a closed container\u201d); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 13, 97 S.Ct. 2476, 2484, 53 L.Ed.2d 538 (1977) (\u201c[A] person\u2019s expectations of privacy in personal luggage are substantially greater than in an automobile.\u201d). But, consent to search a private container, such as a smtcase or backpack, is only effective if given by someone \u201cwith common authority over or other sufficient relationsMp to the ... effects sought to be inspected.\u201d Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171, 94 S.Ct. at 993. Common authority \u201crests ... on mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access or control for most purposes.\u201d"},"case_id":3068231,"label":"a"}
{"context":"According to settled principles, a third party, with standing to do so, may validly consent to the search of a closed container, even though the actual owner of the container has a heightened expectation of privacy in its contents.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"433 U.S. 1, 13","parenthetical":"\"[A] person's expectations of privacy in personal luggage are substantially greater than in an automobile.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 740, 89 S.Ct. 1420, 1425, 22 L.Ed.2d 684 (1969) (cousin had authority to consent to search of the defendant\u2019s duffel bag, wMch both men used and wMch had been left in the cousin\u2019s home); United States v. Ladell, 127 F.3d 622, 624 (7th Cir.1997) (holding that a mother could consent to a search of her adult son\u2019s bedroom, including a closed duffle bag stored in between the mattresses on the bed); United States v. Richardson, 562 F.2d 476 (7th Cir. 1977) (holding that a woman can consent to a search of a bedroom, shared by herself and the man she lived with, including the closet); see also Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 253, 111 S.Ct. 1801, 1805, 114 L.Ed.2d 297 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (stating that, \u201can individual has a heightened expectation of privacy in the contents of a closed container\u201d); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 13, 97 S.Ct. 2476, 2484, 53 L.Ed.2d 538 (1977) (\u201c[A] person\u2019s expectations of privacy in personal luggage are substantially greater than in an automobile.\u201d). But, consent to search a private container, such as a smtcase or backpack, is only effective if given by someone \u201cwith common authority over or other sufficient relationsMp to the ... effects sought to be inspected.\u201d Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171, 94 S.Ct. at 993. Common authority \u201crests ... on mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access or control for most purposes.\u201d"},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"89 S.Ct. 1420, 1425","parenthetical":"cousin had authority to consent to search of the defendant's duffel bag, wMch both men used and wMch had been left in the cousin's home","sentence":"See, e.g., Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 740, 89 S.Ct. 1420, 1425, 22 L.Ed.2d 684 (1969) (cousin had authority to consent to search of the defendant\u2019s duffel bag, wMch both men used and wMch had been left in the cousin\u2019s home); United States v. Ladell, 127 F.3d 622, 624 (7th Cir.1997) (holding that a mother could consent to a search of her adult son\u2019s bedroom, including a closed duffle bag stored in between the mattresses on the bed); United States v. Richardson, 562 F.2d 476 (7th Cir. 1977) (holding that a woman can consent to a search of a bedroom, shared by herself and the man she lived with, including the closet); see also Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 253, 111 S.Ct. 1801, 1805, 114 L.Ed.2d 297 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (stating that, \u201can individual has a heightened expectation of privacy in the contents of a closed container\u201d); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 13, 97 S.Ct. 2476, 2484, 53 L.Ed.2d 538 (1977) (\u201c[A] person\u2019s expectations of privacy in personal luggage are substantially greater than in an automobile.\u201d). But, consent to search a private container, such as a smtcase or backpack, is only effective if given by someone \u201cwith common authority over or other sufficient relationsMp to the ... effects sought to be inspected.\u201d Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171, 94 S.Ct. at 993. Common authority \u201crests ... on mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access or control for most purposes.\u201d"},"case_id":3068231,"label":"b"}
{"context":"According to settled principles, a third party, with standing to do so, may validly consent to the search of a closed container, even though the actual owner of the container has a heightened expectation of privacy in its contents.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"89 S.Ct. 1420, 1425","parenthetical":"cousin had authority to consent to search of the defendant's duffel bag, wMch both men used and wMch had been left in the cousin's home","sentence":"See, e.g., Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 740, 89 S.Ct. 1420, 1425, 22 L.Ed.2d 684 (1969) (cousin had authority to consent to search of the defendant\u2019s duffel bag, wMch both men used and wMch had been left in the cousin\u2019s home); United States v. Ladell, 127 F.3d 622, 624 (7th Cir.1997) (holding that a mother could consent to a search of her adult son\u2019s bedroom, including a closed duffle bag stored in between the mattresses on the bed); United States v. Richardson, 562 F.2d 476 (7th Cir. 1977) (holding that a woman can consent to a search of a bedroom, shared by herself and the man she lived with, including the closet); see also Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 253, 111 S.Ct. 1801, 1805, 114 L.Ed.2d 297 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (stating that, \u201can individual has a heightened expectation of privacy in the contents of a closed container\u201d); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 13, 97 S.Ct. 2476, 2484, 53 L.Ed.2d 538 (1977) (\u201c[A] person\u2019s expectations of privacy in personal luggage are substantially greater than in an automobile.\u201d). But, consent to search a private container, such as a smtcase or backpack, is only effective if given by someone \u201cwith common authority over or other sufficient relationsMp to the ... effects sought to be inspected.\u201d Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171, 94 S.Ct. at 993. Common authority \u201crests ... on mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access or control for most purposes.\u201d"},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"97 S.Ct. 2476, 2484","parenthetical":"\"[A] person's expectations of privacy in personal luggage are substantially greater than in an automobile.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 740, 89 S.Ct. 1420, 1425, 22 L.Ed.2d 684 (1969) (cousin had authority to consent to search of the defendant\u2019s duffel bag, wMch both men used and wMch had been left in the cousin\u2019s home); United States v. Ladell, 127 F.3d 622, 624 (7th Cir.1997) (holding that a mother could consent to a search of her adult son\u2019s bedroom, including a closed duffle bag stored in between the mattresses on the bed); United States v. Richardson, 562 F.2d 476 (7th Cir. 1977) (holding that a woman can consent to a search of a bedroom, shared by herself and the man she lived with, including the closet); see also Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 253, 111 S.Ct. 1801, 1805, 114 L.Ed.2d 297 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (stating that, \u201can individual has a heightened expectation of privacy in the contents of a closed container\u201d); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 13, 97 S.Ct. 2476, 2484, 53 L.Ed.2d 538 (1977) (\u201c[A] person\u2019s expectations of privacy in personal luggage are substantially greater than in an automobile.\u201d). But, consent to search a private container, such as a smtcase or backpack, is only effective if given by someone \u201cwith common authority over or other sufficient relationsMp to the ... effects sought to be inspected.\u201d Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171, 94 S.Ct. at 993. Common authority \u201crests ... on mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access or control for most purposes.\u201d"},"case_id":3068231,"label":"a"}
{"context":"According to settled principles, a third party, with standing to do so, may validly consent to the search of a closed container, even though the actual owner of the container has a heightened expectation of privacy in its contents.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"89 S.Ct. 1420, 1425","parenthetical":"cousin had authority to consent to search of the defendant's duffel bag, wMch both men used and wMch had been left in the cousin's home","sentence":"See, e.g., Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 740, 89 S.Ct. 1420, 1425, 22 L.Ed.2d 684 (1969) (cousin had authority to consent to search of the defendant\u2019s duffel bag, wMch both men used and wMch had been left in the cousin\u2019s home); United States v. Ladell, 127 F.3d 622, 624 (7th Cir.1997) (holding that a mother could consent to a search of her adult son\u2019s bedroom, including a closed duffle bag stored in between the mattresses on the bed); United States v. Richardson, 562 F.2d 476 (7th Cir. 1977) (holding that a woman can consent to a search of a bedroom, shared by herself and the man she lived with, including the closet); see also Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 253, 111 S.Ct. 1801, 1805, 114 L.Ed.2d 297 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (stating that, \u201can individual has a heightened expectation of privacy in the contents of a closed container\u201d); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 13, 97 S.Ct. 2476, 2484, 53 L.Ed.2d 538 (1977) (\u201c[A] person\u2019s expectations of privacy in personal luggage are substantially greater than in an automobile.\u201d). But, consent to search a private container, such as a smtcase or backpack, is only effective if given by someone \u201cwith common authority over or other sufficient relationsMp to the ... effects sought to be inspected.\u201d Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171, 94 S.Ct. at 993. Common authority \u201crests ... on mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access or control for most purposes.\u201d"},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[A] person's expectations of privacy in personal luggage are substantially greater than in an automobile.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 740, 89 S.Ct. 1420, 1425, 22 L.Ed.2d 684 (1969) (cousin had authority to consent to search of the defendant\u2019s duffel bag, wMch both men used and wMch had been left in the cousin\u2019s home); United States v. Ladell, 127 F.3d 622, 624 (7th Cir.1997) (holding that a mother could consent to a search of her adult son\u2019s bedroom, including a closed duffle bag stored in between the mattresses on the bed); United States v. Richardson, 562 F.2d 476 (7th Cir. 1977) (holding that a woman can consent to a search of a bedroom, shared by herself and the man she lived with, including the closet); see also Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 253, 111 S.Ct. 1801, 1805, 114 L.Ed.2d 297 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (stating that, \u201can individual has a heightened expectation of privacy in the contents of a closed container\u201d); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 13, 97 S.Ct. 2476, 2484, 53 L.Ed.2d 538 (1977) (\u201c[A] person\u2019s expectations of privacy in personal luggage are substantially greater than in an automobile.\u201d). But, consent to search a private container, such as a smtcase or backpack, is only effective if given by someone \u201cwith common authority over or other sufficient relationsMp to the ... effects sought to be inspected.\u201d Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171, 94 S.Ct. at 993. Common authority \u201crests ... on mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access or control for most purposes.\u201d"},"case_id":3068231,"label":"a"}
{"context":"According to settled principles, a third party, with standing to do so, may validly consent to the search of a closed container, even though the actual owner of the container has a heightened expectation of privacy in its contents.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"89 S.Ct. 1420, 1425","parenthetical":"cousin had authority to consent to search of the defendant's duffel bag, wMch both men used and wMch had been left in the cousin's home","sentence":"See, e.g., Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 740, 89 S.Ct. 1420, 1425, 22 L.Ed.2d 684 (1969) (cousin had authority to consent to search of the defendant\u2019s duffel bag, wMch both men used and wMch had been left in the cousin\u2019s home); United States v. Ladell, 127 F.3d 622, 624 (7th Cir.1997) (holding that a mother could consent to a search of her adult son\u2019s bedroom, including a closed duffle bag stored in between the mattresses on the bed); United States v. Richardson, 562 F.2d 476 (7th Cir. 1977) (holding that a woman can consent to a search of a bedroom, shared by herself and the man she lived with, including the closet); see also Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 253, 111 S.Ct. 1801, 1805, 114 L.Ed.2d 297 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (stating that, \u201can individual has a heightened expectation of privacy in the contents of a closed container\u201d); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 13, 97 S.Ct. 2476, 2484, 53 L.Ed.2d 538 (1977) (\u201c[A] person\u2019s expectations of privacy in personal luggage are substantially greater than in an automobile.\u201d). But, consent to search a private container, such as a smtcase or backpack, is only effective if given by someone \u201cwith common authority over or other sufficient relationsMp to the ... effects sought to be inspected.\u201d Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171, 94 S.Ct. at 993. Common authority \u201crests ... on mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access or control for most purposes.\u201d"},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"415 U.S. 171, 171","parenthetical":"\"[A] person's expectations of privacy in personal luggage are substantially greater than in an automobile.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 740, 89 S.Ct. 1420, 1425, 22 L.Ed.2d 684 (1969) (cousin had authority to consent to search of the defendant\u2019s duffel bag, wMch both men used and wMch had been left in the cousin\u2019s home); United States v. Ladell, 127 F.3d 622, 624 (7th Cir.1997) (holding that a mother could consent to a search of her adult son\u2019s bedroom, including a closed duffle bag stored in between the mattresses on the bed); United States v. Richardson, 562 F.2d 476 (7th Cir. 1977) (holding that a woman can consent to a search of a bedroom, shared by herself and the man she lived with, including the closet); see also Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 253, 111 S.Ct. 1801, 1805, 114 L.Ed.2d 297 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (stating that, \u201can individual has a heightened expectation of privacy in the contents of a closed container\u201d); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 13, 97 S.Ct. 2476, 2484, 53 L.Ed.2d 538 (1977) (\u201c[A] person\u2019s expectations of privacy in personal luggage are substantially greater than in an automobile.\u201d). But, consent to search a private container, such as a smtcase or backpack, is only effective if given by someone \u201cwith common authority over or other sufficient relationsMp to the ... effects sought to be inspected.\u201d Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171, 94 S.Ct. at 993. Common authority \u201crests ... on mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access or control for most purposes.\u201d"},"case_id":3068231,"label":"a"}
{"context":"According to settled principles, a third party, with standing to do so, may validly consent to the search of a closed container, even though the actual owner of the container has a heightened expectation of privacy in its contents.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"94 S.Ct. 993, 993","parenthetical":"\"[A] person's expectations of privacy in personal luggage are substantially greater than in an automobile.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 740, 89 S.Ct. 1420, 1425, 22 L.Ed.2d 684 (1969) (cousin had authority to consent to search of the defendant\u2019s duffel bag, wMch both men used and wMch had been left in the cousin\u2019s home); United States v. Ladell, 127 F.3d 622, 624 (7th Cir.1997) (holding that a mother could consent to a search of her adult son\u2019s bedroom, including a closed duffle bag stored in between the mattresses on the bed); United States v. Richardson, 562 F.2d 476 (7th Cir. 1977) (holding that a woman can consent to a search of a bedroom, shared by herself and the man she lived with, including the closet); see also Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 253, 111 S.Ct. 1801, 1805, 114 L.Ed.2d 297 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (stating that, \u201can individual has a heightened expectation of privacy in the contents of a closed container\u201d); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 13, 97 S.Ct. 2476, 2484, 53 L.Ed.2d 538 (1977) (\u201c[A] person\u2019s expectations of privacy in personal luggage are substantially greater than in an automobile.\u201d). But, consent to search a private container, such as a smtcase or backpack, is only effective if given by someone \u201cwith common authority over or other sufficient relationsMp to the ... effects sought to be inspected.\u201d Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171, 94 S.Ct. at 993. Common authority \u201crests ... on mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access or control for most purposes.\u201d"},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"89 S.Ct. 1420, 1425","parenthetical":"cousin had authority to consent to search of the defendant's duffel bag, wMch both men used and wMch had been left in the cousin's home","sentence":"See, e.g., Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 740, 89 S.Ct. 1420, 1425, 22 L.Ed.2d 684 (1969) (cousin had authority to consent to search of the defendant\u2019s duffel bag, wMch both men used and wMch had been left in the cousin\u2019s home); United States v. Ladell, 127 F.3d 622, 624 (7th Cir.1997) (holding that a mother could consent to a search of her adult son\u2019s bedroom, including a closed duffle bag stored in between the mattresses on the bed); United States v. Richardson, 562 F.2d 476 (7th Cir. 1977) (holding that a woman can consent to a search of a bedroom, shared by herself and the man she lived with, including the closet); see also Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 253, 111 S.Ct. 1801, 1805, 114 L.Ed.2d 297 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (stating that, \u201can individual has a heightened expectation of privacy in the contents of a closed container\u201d); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 13, 97 S.Ct. 2476, 2484, 53 L.Ed.2d 538 (1977) (\u201c[A] person\u2019s expectations of privacy in personal luggage are substantially greater than in an automobile.\u201d). But, consent to search a private container, such as a smtcase or backpack, is only effective if given by someone \u201cwith common authority over or other sufficient relationsMp to the ... effects sought to be inspected.\u201d Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171, 94 S.Ct. at 993. Common authority \u201crests ... on mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access or control for most purposes.\u201d"},"case_id":3068231,"label":"b"}
{"context":"According to settled principles, a third party, with standing to do so, may validly consent to the search of a closed container, even though the actual owner of the container has a heightened expectation of privacy in its contents.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"433 U.S. 1, 13","parenthetical":"\"[A] person's expectations of privacy in personal luggage are substantially greater than in an automobile.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 740, 89 S.Ct. 1420, 1425, 22 L.Ed.2d 684 (1969) (cousin had authority to consent to search of the defendant\u2019s duffel bag, wMch both men used and wMch had been left in the cousin\u2019s home); United States v. Ladell, 127 F.3d 622, 624 (7th Cir.1997) (holding that a mother could consent to a search of her adult son\u2019s bedroom, including a closed duffle bag stored in between the mattresses on the bed); United States v. Richardson, 562 F.2d 476 (7th Cir. 1977) (holding that a woman can consent to a search of a bedroom, shared by herself and the man she lived with, including the closet); see also Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 253, 111 S.Ct. 1801, 1805, 114 L.Ed.2d 297 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (stating that, \u201can individual has a heightened expectation of privacy in the contents of a closed container\u201d); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 13, 97 S.Ct. 2476, 2484, 53 L.Ed.2d 538 (1977) (\u201c[A] person\u2019s expectations of privacy in personal luggage are substantially greater than in an automobile.\u201d). But, consent to search a private container, such as a smtcase or backpack, is only effective if given by someone \u201cwith common authority over or other sufficient relationsMp to the ... effects sought to be inspected.\u201d Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171, 94 S.Ct. at 993. Common authority \u201crests ... on mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access or control for most purposes.\u201d"},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"cousin had authority to consent to search of the defendant's duffel bag, wMch both men used and wMch had been left in the cousin's home","sentence":"See, e.g., Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 740, 89 S.Ct. 1420, 1425, 22 L.Ed.2d 684 (1969) (cousin had authority to consent to search of the defendant\u2019s duffel bag, wMch both men used and wMch had been left in the cousin\u2019s home); United States v. Ladell, 127 F.3d 622, 624 (7th Cir.1997) (holding that a mother could consent to a search of her adult son\u2019s bedroom, including a closed duffle bag stored in between the mattresses on the bed); United States v. Richardson, 562 F.2d 476 (7th Cir. 1977) (holding that a woman can consent to a search of a bedroom, shared by herself and the man she lived with, including the closet); see also Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 253, 111 S.Ct. 1801, 1805, 114 L.Ed.2d 297 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (stating that, \u201can individual has a heightened expectation of privacy in the contents of a closed container\u201d); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 13, 97 S.Ct. 2476, 2484, 53 L.Ed.2d 538 (1977) (\u201c[A] person\u2019s expectations of privacy in personal luggage are substantially greater than in an automobile.\u201d). But, consent to search a private container, such as a smtcase or backpack, is only effective if given by someone \u201cwith common authority over or other sufficient relationsMp to the ... effects sought to be inspected.\u201d Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171, 94 S.Ct. at 993. Common authority \u201crests ... on mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access or control for most purposes.\u201d"},"case_id":3068231,"label":"b"}
{"context":"According to settled principles, a third party, with standing to do so, may validly consent to the search of a closed container, even though the actual owner of the container has a heightened expectation of privacy in its contents.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"cousin had authority to consent to search of the defendant's duffel bag, wMch both men used and wMch had been left in the cousin's home","sentence":"See, e.g., Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 740, 89 S.Ct. 1420, 1425, 22 L.Ed.2d 684 (1969) (cousin had authority to consent to search of the defendant\u2019s duffel bag, wMch both men used and wMch had been left in the cousin\u2019s home); United States v. Ladell, 127 F.3d 622, 624 (7th Cir.1997) (holding that a mother could consent to a search of her adult son\u2019s bedroom, including a closed duffle bag stored in between the mattresses on the bed); United States v. Richardson, 562 F.2d 476 (7th Cir. 1977) (holding that a woman can consent to a search of a bedroom, shared by herself and the man she lived with, including the closet); see also Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 253, 111 S.Ct. 1801, 1805, 114 L.Ed.2d 297 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (stating that, \u201can individual has a heightened expectation of privacy in the contents of a closed container\u201d); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 13, 97 S.Ct. 2476, 2484, 53 L.Ed.2d 538 (1977) (\u201c[A] person\u2019s expectations of privacy in personal luggage are substantially greater than in an automobile.\u201d). But, consent to search a private container, such as a smtcase or backpack, is only effective if given by someone \u201cwith common authority over or other sufficient relationsMp to the ... effects sought to be inspected.\u201d Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171, 94 S.Ct. at 993. Common authority \u201crests ... on mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access or control for most purposes.\u201d"},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"97 S.Ct. 2476, 2484","parenthetical":"\"[A] person's expectations of privacy in personal luggage are substantially greater than in an automobile.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 740, 89 S.Ct. 1420, 1425, 22 L.Ed.2d 684 (1969) (cousin had authority to consent to search of the defendant\u2019s duffel bag, wMch both men used and wMch had been left in the cousin\u2019s home); United States v. Ladell, 127 F.3d 622, 624 (7th Cir.1997) (holding that a mother could consent to a search of her adult son\u2019s bedroom, including a closed duffle bag stored in between the mattresses on the bed); United States v. Richardson, 562 F.2d 476 (7th Cir. 1977) (holding that a woman can consent to a search of a bedroom, shared by herself and the man she lived with, including the closet); see also Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 253, 111 S.Ct. 1801, 1805, 114 L.Ed.2d 297 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (stating that, \u201can individual has a heightened expectation of privacy in the contents of a closed container\u201d); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 13, 97 S.Ct. 2476, 2484, 53 L.Ed.2d 538 (1977) (\u201c[A] person\u2019s expectations of privacy in personal luggage are substantially greater than in an automobile.\u201d). But, consent to search a private container, such as a smtcase or backpack, is only effective if given by someone \u201cwith common authority over or other sufficient relationsMp to the ... effects sought to be inspected.\u201d Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171, 94 S.Ct. at 993. Common authority \u201crests ... on mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access or control for most purposes.\u201d"},"case_id":3068231,"label":"a"}
{"context":"According to settled principles, a third party, with standing to do so, may validly consent to the search of a closed container, even though the actual owner of the container has a heightened expectation of privacy in its contents.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"cousin had authority to consent to search of the defendant's duffel bag, wMch both men used and wMch had been left in the cousin's home","sentence":"See, e.g., Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 740, 89 S.Ct. 1420, 1425, 22 L.Ed.2d 684 (1969) (cousin had authority to consent to search of the defendant\u2019s duffel bag, wMch both men used and wMch had been left in the cousin\u2019s home); United States v. Ladell, 127 F.3d 622, 624 (7th Cir.1997) (holding that a mother could consent to a search of her adult son\u2019s bedroom, including a closed duffle bag stored in between the mattresses on the bed); United States v. Richardson, 562 F.2d 476 (7th Cir. 1977) (holding that a woman can consent to a search of a bedroom, shared by herself and the man she lived with, including the closet); see also Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 253, 111 S.Ct. 1801, 1805, 114 L.Ed.2d 297 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (stating that, \u201can individual has a heightened expectation of privacy in the contents of a closed container\u201d); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 13, 97 S.Ct. 2476, 2484, 53 L.Ed.2d 538 (1977) (\u201c[A] person\u2019s expectations of privacy in personal luggage are substantially greater than in an automobile.\u201d). But, consent to search a private container, such as a smtcase or backpack, is only effective if given by someone \u201cwith common authority over or other sufficient relationsMp to the ... effects sought to be inspected.\u201d Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171, 94 S.Ct. at 993. Common authority \u201crests ... on mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access or control for most purposes.\u201d"},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[A] person's expectations of privacy in personal luggage are substantially greater than in an automobile.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 740, 89 S.Ct. 1420, 1425, 22 L.Ed.2d 684 (1969) (cousin had authority to consent to search of the defendant\u2019s duffel bag, wMch both men used and wMch had been left in the cousin\u2019s home); United States v. Ladell, 127 F.3d 622, 624 (7th Cir.1997) (holding that a mother could consent to a search of her adult son\u2019s bedroom, including a closed duffle bag stored in between the mattresses on the bed); United States v. Richardson, 562 F.2d 476 (7th Cir. 1977) (holding that a woman can consent to a search of a bedroom, shared by herself and the man she lived with, including the closet); see also Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 253, 111 S.Ct. 1801, 1805, 114 L.Ed.2d 297 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (stating that, \u201can individual has a heightened expectation of privacy in the contents of a closed container\u201d); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 13, 97 S.Ct. 2476, 2484, 53 L.Ed.2d 538 (1977) (\u201c[A] person\u2019s expectations of privacy in personal luggage are substantially greater than in an automobile.\u201d). But, consent to search a private container, such as a smtcase or backpack, is only effective if given by someone \u201cwith common authority over or other sufficient relationsMp to the ... effects sought to be inspected.\u201d Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171, 94 S.Ct. at 993. Common authority \u201crests ... on mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access or control for most purposes.\u201d"},"case_id":3068231,"label":"a"}
{"context":"According to settled principles, a third party, with standing to do so, may validly consent to the search of a closed container, even though the actual owner of the container has a heightened expectation of privacy in its contents.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"415 U.S. 171, 171","parenthetical":"\"[A] person's expectations of privacy in personal luggage are substantially greater than in an automobile.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 740, 89 S.Ct. 1420, 1425, 22 L.Ed.2d 684 (1969) (cousin had authority to consent to search of the defendant\u2019s duffel bag, wMch both men used and wMch had been left in the cousin\u2019s home); United States v. Ladell, 127 F.3d 622, 624 (7th Cir.1997) (holding that a mother could consent to a search of her adult son\u2019s bedroom, including a closed duffle bag stored in between the mattresses on the bed); United States v. Richardson, 562 F.2d 476 (7th Cir. 1977) (holding that a woman can consent to a search of a bedroom, shared by herself and the man she lived with, including the closet); see also Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 253, 111 S.Ct. 1801, 1805, 114 L.Ed.2d 297 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (stating that, \u201can individual has a heightened expectation of privacy in the contents of a closed container\u201d); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 13, 97 S.Ct. 2476, 2484, 53 L.Ed.2d 538 (1977) (\u201c[A] person\u2019s expectations of privacy in personal luggage are substantially greater than in an automobile.\u201d). But, consent to search a private container, such as a smtcase or backpack, is only effective if given by someone \u201cwith common authority over or other sufficient relationsMp to the ... effects sought to be inspected.\u201d Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171, 94 S.Ct. at 993. Common authority \u201crests ... on mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access or control for most purposes.\u201d"},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"cousin had authority to consent to search of the defendant's duffel bag, wMch both men used and wMch had been left in the cousin's home","sentence":"See, e.g., Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 740, 89 S.Ct. 1420, 1425, 22 L.Ed.2d 684 (1969) (cousin had authority to consent to search of the defendant\u2019s duffel bag, wMch both men used and wMch had been left in the cousin\u2019s home); United States v. Ladell, 127 F.3d 622, 624 (7th Cir.1997) (holding that a mother could consent to a search of her adult son\u2019s bedroom, including a closed duffle bag stored in between the mattresses on the bed); United States v. Richardson, 562 F.2d 476 (7th Cir. 1977) (holding that a woman can consent to a search of a bedroom, shared by herself and the man she lived with, including the closet); see also Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 253, 111 S.Ct. 1801, 1805, 114 L.Ed.2d 297 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (stating that, \u201can individual has a heightened expectation of privacy in the contents of a closed container\u201d); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 13, 97 S.Ct. 2476, 2484, 53 L.Ed.2d 538 (1977) (\u201c[A] person\u2019s expectations of privacy in personal luggage are substantially greater than in an automobile.\u201d). But, consent to search a private container, such as a smtcase or backpack, is only effective if given by someone \u201cwith common authority over or other sufficient relationsMp to the ... effects sought to be inspected.\u201d Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171, 94 S.Ct. at 993. Common authority \u201crests ... on mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access or control for most purposes.\u201d"},"case_id":3068231,"label":"b"}
{"context":"According to settled principles, a third party, with standing to do so, may validly consent to the search of a closed container, even though the actual owner of the container has a heightened expectation of privacy in its contents.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"cousin had authority to consent to search of the defendant's duffel bag, wMch both men used and wMch had been left in the cousin's home","sentence":"See, e.g., Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 740, 89 S.Ct. 1420, 1425, 22 L.Ed.2d 684 (1969) (cousin had authority to consent to search of the defendant\u2019s duffel bag, wMch both men used and wMch had been left in the cousin\u2019s home); United States v. Ladell, 127 F.3d 622, 624 (7th Cir.1997) (holding that a mother could consent to a search of her adult son\u2019s bedroom, including a closed duffle bag stored in between the mattresses on the bed); United States v. Richardson, 562 F.2d 476 (7th Cir. 1977) (holding that a woman can consent to a search of a bedroom, shared by herself and the man she lived with, including the closet); see also Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 253, 111 S.Ct. 1801, 1805, 114 L.Ed.2d 297 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (stating that, \u201can individual has a heightened expectation of privacy in the contents of a closed container\u201d); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 13, 97 S.Ct. 2476, 2484, 53 L.Ed.2d 538 (1977) (\u201c[A] person\u2019s expectations of privacy in personal luggage are substantially greater than in an automobile.\u201d). But, consent to search a private container, such as a smtcase or backpack, is only effective if given by someone \u201cwith common authority over or other sufficient relationsMp to the ... effects sought to be inspected.\u201d Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171, 94 S.Ct. at 993. Common authority \u201crests ... on mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access or control for most purposes.\u201d"},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"94 S.Ct. 993, 993","parenthetical":"\"[A] person's expectations of privacy in personal luggage are substantially greater than in an automobile.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 740, 89 S.Ct. 1420, 1425, 22 L.Ed.2d 684 (1969) (cousin had authority to consent to search of the defendant\u2019s duffel bag, wMch both men used and wMch had been left in the cousin\u2019s home); United States v. Ladell, 127 F.3d 622, 624 (7th Cir.1997) (holding that a mother could consent to a search of her adult son\u2019s bedroom, including a closed duffle bag stored in between the mattresses on the bed); United States v. Richardson, 562 F.2d 476 (7th Cir. 1977) (holding that a woman can consent to a search of a bedroom, shared by herself and the man she lived with, including the closet); see also Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 253, 111 S.Ct. 1801, 1805, 114 L.Ed.2d 297 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (stating that, \u201can individual has a heightened expectation of privacy in the contents of a closed container\u201d); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 13, 97 S.Ct. 2476, 2484, 53 L.Ed.2d 538 (1977) (\u201c[A] person\u2019s expectations of privacy in personal luggage are substantially greater than in an automobile.\u201d). But, consent to search a private container, such as a smtcase or backpack, is only effective if given by someone \u201cwith common authority over or other sufficient relationsMp to the ... effects sought to be inspected.\u201d Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171, 94 S.Ct. at 993. Common authority \u201crests ... on mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access or control for most purposes.\u201d"},"case_id":3068231,"label":"a"}
{"context":"According to settled principles, a third party, with standing to do so, may validly consent to the search of a closed container, even though the actual owner of the container has a heightened expectation of privacy in its contents.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"127 F.3d 622, 624","parenthetical":"holding that a mother could consent to a search of her adult son's bedroom, including a closed duffle bag stored in between the mattresses on the bed","sentence":"See, e.g., Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 740, 89 S.Ct. 1420, 1425, 22 L.Ed.2d 684 (1969) (cousin had authority to consent to search of the defendant\u2019s duffel bag, wMch both men used and wMch had been left in the cousin\u2019s home); United States v. Ladell, 127 F.3d 622, 624 (7th Cir.1997) (holding that a mother could consent to a search of her adult son\u2019s bedroom, including a closed duffle bag stored in between the mattresses on the bed); United States v. Richardson, 562 F.2d 476 (7th Cir. 1977) (holding that a woman can consent to a search of a bedroom, shared by herself and the man she lived with, including the closet); see also Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 253, 111 S.Ct. 1801, 1805, 114 L.Ed.2d 297 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (stating that, \u201can individual has a heightened expectation of privacy in the contents of a closed container\u201d); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 13, 97 S.Ct. 2476, 2484, 53 L.Ed.2d 538 (1977) (\u201c[A] person\u2019s expectations of privacy in personal luggage are substantially greater than in an automobile.\u201d). But, consent to search a private container, such as a smtcase or backpack, is only effective if given by someone \u201cwith common authority over or other sufficient relationsMp to the ... effects sought to be inspected.\u201d Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171, 94 S.Ct. at 993. Common authority \u201crests ... on mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access or control for most purposes.\u201d"},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"433 U.S. 1, 13","parenthetical":"\"[A] person's expectations of privacy in personal luggage are substantially greater than in an automobile.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 740, 89 S.Ct. 1420, 1425, 22 L.Ed.2d 684 (1969) (cousin had authority to consent to search of the defendant\u2019s duffel bag, wMch both men used and wMch had been left in the cousin\u2019s home); United States v. Ladell, 127 F.3d 622, 624 (7th Cir.1997) (holding that a mother could consent to a search of her adult son\u2019s bedroom, including a closed duffle bag stored in between the mattresses on the bed); United States v. Richardson, 562 F.2d 476 (7th Cir. 1977) (holding that a woman can consent to a search of a bedroom, shared by herself and the man she lived with, including the closet); see also Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 253, 111 S.Ct. 1801, 1805, 114 L.Ed.2d 297 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (stating that, \u201can individual has a heightened expectation of privacy in the contents of a closed container\u201d); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 13, 97 S.Ct. 2476, 2484, 53 L.Ed.2d 538 (1977) (\u201c[A] person\u2019s expectations of privacy in personal luggage are substantially greater than in an automobile.\u201d). But, consent to search a private container, such as a smtcase or backpack, is only effective if given by someone \u201cwith common authority over or other sufficient relationsMp to the ... effects sought to be inspected.\u201d Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171, 94 S.Ct. at 993. Common authority \u201crests ... on mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access or control for most purposes.\u201d"},"case_id":3068231,"label":"a"}
{"context":"According to settled principles, a third party, with standing to do so, may validly consent to the search of a closed container, even though the actual owner of the container has a heightened expectation of privacy in its contents.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"97 S.Ct. 2476, 2484","parenthetical":"\"[A] person's expectations of privacy in personal luggage are substantially greater than in an automobile.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 740, 89 S.Ct. 1420, 1425, 22 L.Ed.2d 684 (1969) (cousin had authority to consent to search of the defendant\u2019s duffel bag, wMch both men used and wMch had been left in the cousin\u2019s home); United States v. Ladell, 127 F.3d 622, 624 (7th Cir.1997) (holding that a mother could consent to a search of her adult son\u2019s bedroom, including a closed duffle bag stored in between the mattresses on the bed); United States v. Richardson, 562 F.2d 476 (7th Cir. 1977) (holding that a woman can consent to a search of a bedroom, shared by herself and the man she lived with, including the closet); see also Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 253, 111 S.Ct. 1801, 1805, 114 L.Ed.2d 297 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (stating that, \u201can individual has a heightened expectation of privacy in the contents of a closed container\u201d); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 13, 97 S.Ct. 2476, 2484, 53 L.Ed.2d 538 (1977) (\u201c[A] person\u2019s expectations of privacy in personal luggage are substantially greater than in an automobile.\u201d). But, consent to search a private container, such as a smtcase or backpack, is only effective if given by someone \u201cwith common authority over or other sufficient relationsMp to the ... effects sought to be inspected.\u201d Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171, 94 S.Ct. at 993. Common authority \u201crests ... on mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access or control for most purposes.\u201d"},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"127 F.3d 622, 624","parenthetical":"holding that a mother could consent to a search of her adult son's bedroom, including a closed duffle bag stored in between the mattresses on the bed","sentence":"See, e.g., Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 740, 89 S.Ct. 1420, 1425, 22 L.Ed.2d 684 (1969) (cousin had authority to consent to search of the defendant\u2019s duffel bag, wMch both men used and wMch had been left in the cousin\u2019s home); United States v. Ladell, 127 F.3d 622, 624 (7th Cir.1997) (holding that a mother could consent to a search of her adult son\u2019s bedroom, including a closed duffle bag stored in between the mattresses on the bed); United States v. Richardson, 562 F.2d 476 (7th Cir. 1977) (holding that a woman can consent to a search of a bedroom, shared by herself and the man she lived with, including the closet); see also Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 253, 111 S.Ct. 1801, 1805, 114 L.Ed.2d 297 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (stating that, \u201can individual has a heightened expectation of privacy in the contents of a closed container\u201d); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 13, 97 S.Ct. 2476, 2484, 53 L.Ed.2d 538 (1977) (\u201c[A] person\u2019s expectations of privacy in personal luggage are substantially greater than in an automobile.\u201d). But, consent to search a private container, such as a smtcase or backpack, is only effective if given by someone \u201cwith common authority over or other sufficient relationsMp to the ... effects sought to be inspected.\u201d Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171, 94 S.Ct. at 993. Common authority \u201crests ... on mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access or control for most purposes.\u201d"},"case_id":3068231,"label":"b"}
{"context":"According to settled principles, a third party, with standing to do so, may validly consent to the search of a closed container, even though the actual owner of the container has a heightened expectation of privacy in its contents.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"127 F.3d 622, 624","parenthetical":"holding that a mother could consent to a search of her adult son's bedroom, including a closed duffle bag stored in between the mattresses on the bed","sentence":"See, e.g., Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 740, 89 S.Ct. 1420, 1425, 22 L.Ed.2d 684 (1969) (cousin had authority to consent to search of the defendant\u2019s duffel bag, wMch both men used and wMch had been left in the cousin\u2019s home); United States v. Ladell, 127 F.3d 622, 624 (7th Cir.1997) (holding that a mother could consent to a search of her adult son\u2019s bedroom, including a closed duffle bag stored in between the mattresses on the bed); United States v. Richardson, 562 F.2d 476 (7th Cir. 1977) (holding that a woman can consent to a search of a bedroom, shared by herself and the man she lived with, including the closet); see also Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 253, 111 S.Ct. 1801, 1805, 114 L.Ed.2d 297 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (stating that, \u201can individual has a heightened expectation of privacy in the contents of a closed container\u201d); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 13, 97 S.Ct. 2476, 2484, 53 L.Ed.2d 538 (1977) (\u201c[A] person\u2019s expectations of privacy in personal luggage are substantially greater than in an automobile.\u201d). But, consent to search a private container, such as a smtcase or backpack, is only effective if given by someone \u201cwith common authority over or other sufficient relationsMp to the ... effects sought to be inspected.\u201d Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171, 94 S.Ct. at 993. Common authority \u201crests ... on mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access or control for most purposes.\u201d"},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[A] person's expectations of privacy in personal luggage are substantially greater than in an automobile.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 740, 89 S.Ct. 1420, 1425, 22 L.Ed.2d 684 (1969) (cousin had authority to consent to search of the defendant\u2019s duffel bag, wMch both men used and wMch had been left in the cousin\u2019s home); United States v. Ladell, 127 F.3d 622, 624 (7th Cir.1997) (holding that a mother could consent to a search of her adult son\u2019s bedroom, including a closed duffle bag stored in between the mattresses on the bed); United States v. Richardson, 562 F.2d 476 (7th Cir. 1977) (holding that a woman can consent to a search of a bedroom, shared by herself and the man she lived with, including the closet); see also Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 253, 111 S.Ct. 1801, 1805, 114 L.Ed.2d 297 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (stating that, \u201can individual has a heightened expectation of privacy in the contents of a closed container\u201d); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 13, 97 S.Ct. 2476, 2484, 53 L.Ed.2d 538 (1977) (\u201c[A] person\u2019s expectations of privacy in personal luggage are substantially greater than in an automobile.\u201d). But, consent to search a private container, such as a smtcase or backpack, is only effective if given by someone \u201cwith common authority over or other sufficient relationsMp to the ... effects sought to be inspected.\u201d Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171, 94 S.Ct. at 993. Common authority \u201crests ... on mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access or control for most purposes.\u201d"},"case_id":3068231,"label":"a"}
{"context":"According to settled principles, a third party, with standing to do so, may validly consent to the search of a closed container, even though the actual owner of the container has a heightened expectation of privacy in its contents.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"127 F.3d 622, 624","parenthetical":"holding that a mother could consent to a search of her adult son's bedroom, including a closed duffle bag stored in between the mattresses on the bed","sentence":"See, e.g., Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 740, 89 S.Ct. 1420, 1425, 22 L.Ed.2d 684 (1969) (cousin had authority to consent to search of the defendant\u2019s duffel bag, wMch both men used and wMch had been left in the cousin\u2019s home); United States v. Ladell, 127 F.3d 622, 624 (7th Cir.1997) (holding that a mother could consent to a search of her adult son\u2019s bedroom, including a closed duffle bag stored in between the mattresses on the bed); United States v. Richardson, 562 F.2d 476 (7th Cir. 1977) (holding that a woman can consent to a search of a bedroom, shared by herself and the man she lived with, including the closet); see also Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 253, 111 S.Ct. 1801, 1805, 114 L.Ed.2d 297 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (stating that, \u201can individual has a heightened expectation of privacy in the contents of a closed container\u201d); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 13, 97 S.Ct. 2476, 2484, 53 L.Ed.2d 538 (1977) (\u201c[A] person\u2019s expectations of privacy in personal luggage are substantially greater than in an automobile.\u201d). But, consent to search a private container, such as a smtcase or backpack, is only effective if given by someone \u201cwith common authority over or other sufficient relationsMp to the ... effects sought to be inspected.\u201d Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171, 94 S.Ct. at 993. Common authority \u201crests ... on mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access or control for most purposes.\u201d"},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"415 U.S. 171, 171","parenthetical":"\"[A] person's expectations of privacy in personal luggage are substantially greater than in an automobile.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 740, 89 S.Ct. 1420, 1425, 22 L.Ed.2d 684 (1969) (cousin had authority to consent to search of the defendant\u2019s duffel bag, wMch both men used and wMch had been left in the cousin\u2019s home); United States v. Ladell, 127 F.3d 622, 624 (7th Cir.1997) (holding that a mother could consent to a search of her adult son\u2019s bedroom, including a closed duffle bag stored in between the mattresses on the bed); United States v. Richardson, 562 F.2d 476 (7th Cir. 1977) (holding that a woman can consent to a search of a bedroom, shared by herself and the man she lived with, including the closet); see also Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 253, 111 S.Ct. 1801, 1805, 114 L.Ed.2d 297 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (stating that, \u201can individual has a heightened expectation of privacy in the contents of a closed container\u201d); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 13, 97 S.Ct. 2476, 2484, 53 L.Ed.2d 538 (1977) (\u201c[A] person\u2019s expectations of privacy in personal luggage are substantially greater than in an automobile.\u201d). But, consent to search a private container, such as a smtcase or backpack, is only effective if given by someone \u201cwith common authority over or other sufficient relationsMp to the ... effects sought to be inspected.\u201d Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171, 94 S.Ct. at 993. Common authority \u201crests ... on mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access or control for most purposes.\u201d"},"case_id":3068231,"label":"a"}
{"context":"According to settled principles, a third party, with standing to do so, may validly consent to the search of a closed container, even though the actual owner of the container has a heightened expectation of privacy in its contents.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"127 F.3d 622, 624","parenthetical":"holding that a mother could consent to a search of her adult son's bedroom, including a closed duffle bag stored in between the mattresses on the bed","sentence":"See, e.g., Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 740, 89 S.Ct. 1420, 1425, 22 L.Ed.2d 684 (1969) (cousin had authority to consent to search of the defendant\u2019s duffel bag, wMch both men used and wMch had been left in the cousin\u2019s home); United States v. Ladell, 127 F.3d 622, 624 (7th Cir.1997) (holding that a mother could consent to a search of her adult son\u2019s bedroom, including a closed duffle bag stored in between the mattresses on the bed); United States v. Richardson, 562 F.2d 476 (7th Cir. 1977) (holding that a woman can consent to a search of a bedroom, shared by herself and the man she lived with, including the closet); see also Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 253, 111 S.Ct. 1801, 1805, 114 L.Ed.2d 297 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (stating that, \u201can individual has a heightened expectation of privacy in the contents of a closed container\u201d); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 13, 97 S.Ct. 2476, 2484, 53 L.Ed.2d 538 (1977) (\u201c[A] person\u2019s expectations of privacy in personal luggage are substantially greater than in an automobile.\u201d). But, consent to search a private container, such as a smtcase or backpack, is only effective if given by someone \u201cwith common authority over or other sufficient relationsMp to the ... effects sought to be inspected.\u201d Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171, 94 S.Ct. at 993. Common authority \u201crests ... on mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access or control for most purposes.\u201d"},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"94 S.Ct. 993, 993","parenthetical":"\"[A] person's expectations of privacy in personal luggage are substantially greater than in an automobile.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 740, 89 S.Ct. 1420, 1425, 22 L.Ed.2d 684 (1969) (cousin had authority to consent to search of the defendant\u2019s duffel bag, wMch both men used and wMch had been left in the cousin\u2019s home); United States v. Ladell, 127 F.3d 622, 624 (7th Cir.1997) (holding that a mother could consent to a search of her adult son\u2019s bedroom, including a closed duffle bag stored in between the mattresses on the bed); United States v. Richardson, 562 F.2d 476 (7th Cir. 1977) (holding that a woman can consent to a search of a bedroom, shared by herself and the man she lived with, including the closet); see also Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 253, 111 S.Ct. 1801, 1805, 114 L.Ed.2d 297 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (stating that, \u201can individual has a heightened expectation of privacy in the contents of a closed container\u201d); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 13, 97 S.Ct. 2476, 2484, 53 L.Ed.2d 538 (1977) (\u201c[A] person\u2019s expectations of privacy in personal luggage are substantially greater than in an automobile.\u201d). But, consent to search a private container, such as a smtcase or backpack, is only effective if given by someone \u201cwith common authority over or other sufficient relationsMp to the ... effects sought to be inspected.\u201d Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171, 94 S.Ct. at 993. Common authority \u201crests ... on mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access or control for most purposes.\u201d"},"case_id":3068231,"label":"a"}
{"context":"According to settled principles, a third party, with standing to do so, may validly consent to the search of a closed container, even though the actual owner of the container has a heightened expectation of privacy in its contents.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that a woman can consent to a search of a bedroom, shared by herself and the man she lived with, including the closet","sentence":"See, e.g., Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 740, 89 S.Ct. 1420, 1425, 22 L.Ed.2d 684 (1969) (cousin had authority to consent to search of the defendant\u2019s duffel bag, wMch both men used and wMch had been left in the cousin\u2019s home); United States v. Ladell, 127 F.3d 622, 624 (7th Cir.1997) (holding that a mother could consent to a search of her adult son\u2019s bedroom, including a closed duffle bag stored in between the mattresses on the bed); United States v. Richardson, 562 F.2d 476 (7th Cir. 1977) (holding that a woman can consent to a search of a bedroom, shared by herself and the man she lived with, including the closet); see also Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 253, 111 S.Ct. 1801, 1805, 114 L.Ed.2d 297 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (stating that, \u201can individual has a heightened expectation of privacy in the contents of a closed container\u201d); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 13, 97 S.Ct. 2476, 2484, 53 L.Ed.2d 538 (1977) (\u201c[A] person\u2019s expectations of privacy in personal luggage are substantially greater than in an automobile.\u201d). But, consent to search a private container, such as a smtcase or backpack, is only effective if given by someone \u201cwith common authority over or other sufficient relationsMp to the ... effects sought to be inspected.\u201d Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171, 94 S.Ct. at 993. Common authority \u201crests ... on mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access or control for most purposes.\u201d"},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"433 U.S. 1, 13","parenthetical":"\"[A] person's expectations of privacy in personal luggage are substantially greater than in an automobile.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 740, 89 S.Ct. 1420, 1425, 22 L.Ed.2d 684 (1969) (cousin had authority to consent to search of the defendant\u2019s duffel bag, wMch both men used and wMch had been left in the cousin\u2019s home); United States v. Ladell, 127 F.3d 622, 624 (7th Cir.1997) (holding that a mother could consent to a search of her adult son\u2019s bedroom, including a closed duffle bag stored in between the mattresses on the bed); United States v. Richardson, 562 F.2d 476 (7th Cir. 1977) (holding that a woman can consent to a search of a bedroom, shared by herself and the man she lived with, including the closet); see also Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 253, 111 S.Ct. 1801, 1805, 114 L.Ed.2d 297 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (stating that, \u201can individual has a heightened expectation of privacy in the contents of a closed container\u201d); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 13, 97 S.Ct. 2476, 2484, 53 L.Ed.2d 538 (1977) (\u201c[A] person\u2019s expectations of privacy in personal luggage are substantially greater than in an automobile.\u201d). But, consent to search a private container, such as a smtcase or backpack, is only effective if given by someone \u201cwith common authority over or other sufficient relationsMp to the ... effects sought to be inspected.\u201d Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171, 94 S.Ct. at 993. Common authority \u201crests ... on mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access or control for most purposes.\u201d"},"case_id":3068231,"label":"a"}
{"context":"According to settled principles, a third party, with standing to do so, may validly consent to the search of a closed container, even though the actual owner of the container has a heightened expectation of privacy in its contents.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that a woman can consent to a search of a bedroom, shared by herself and the man she lived with, including the closet","sentence":"See, e.g., Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 740, 89 S.Ct. 1420, 1425, 22 L.Ed.2d 684 (1969) (cousin had authority to consent to search of the defendant\u2019s duffel bag, wMch both men used and wMch had been left in the cousin\u2019s home); United States v. Ladell, 127 F.3d 622, 624 (7th Cir.1997) (holding that a mother could consent to a search of her adult son\u2019s bedroom, including a closed duffle bag stored in between the mattresses on the bed); United States v. Richardson, 562 F.2d 476 (7th Cir. 1977) (holding that a woman can consent to a search of a bedroom, shared by herself and the man she lived with, including the closet); see also Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 253, 111 S.Ct. 1801, 1805, 114 L.Ed.2d 297 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (stating that, \u201can individual has a heightened expectation of privacy in the contents of a closed container\u201d); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 13, 97 S.Ct. 2476, 2484, 53 L.Ed.2d 538 (1977) (\u201c[A] person\u2019s expectations of privacy in personal luggage are substantially greater than in an automobile.\u201d). But, consent to search a private container, such as a smtcase or backpack, is only effective if given by someone \u201cwith common authority over or other sufficient relationsMp to the ... effects sought to be inspected.\u201d Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171, 94 S.Ct. at 993. Common authority \u201crests ... on mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access or control for most purposes.\u201d"},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"97 S.Ct. 2476, 2484","parenthetical":"\"[A] person's expectations of privacy in personal luggage are substantially greater than in an automobile.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 740, 89 S.Ct. 1420, 1425, 22 L.Ed.2d 684 (1969) (cousin had authority to consent to search of the defendant\u2019s duffel bag, wMch both men used and wMch had been left in the cousin\u2019s home); United States v. Ladell, 127 F.3d 622, 624 (7th Cir.1997) (holding that a mother could consent to a search of her adult son\u2019s bedroom, including a closed duffle bag stored in between the mattresses on the bed); United States v. Richardson, 562 F.2d 476 (7th Cir. 1977) (holding that a woman can consent to a search of a bedroom, shared by herself and the man she lived with, including the closet); see also Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 253, 111 S.Ct. 1801, 1805, 114 L.Ed.2d 297 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (stating that, \u201can individual has a heightened expectation of privacy in the contents of a closed container\u201d); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 13, 97 S.Ct. 2476, 2484, 53 L.Ed.2d 538 (1977) (\u201c[A] person\u2019s expectations of privacy in personal luggage are substantially greater than in an automobile.\u201d). But, consent to search a private container, such as a smtcase or backpack, is only effective if given by someone \u201cwith common authority over or other sufficient relationsMp to the ... effects sought to be inspected.\u201d Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171, 94 S.Ct. at 993. Common authority \u201crests ... on mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access or control for most purposes.\u201d"},"case_id":3068231,"label":"a"}
{"context":"According to settled principles, a third party, with standing to do so, may validly consent to the search of a closed container, even though the actual owner of the container has a heightened expectation of privacy in its contents.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[A] person's expectations of privacy in personal luggage are substantially greater than in an automobile.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 740, 89 S.Ct. 1420, 1425, 22 L.Ed.2d 684 (1969) (cousin had authority to consent to search of the defendant\u2019s duffel bag, wMch both men used and wMch had been left in the cousin\u2019s home); United States v. Ladell, 127 F.3d 622, 624 (7th Cir.1997) (holding that a mother could consent to a search of her adult son\u2019s bedroom, including a closed duffle bag stored in between the mattresses on the bed); United States v. Richardson, 562 F.2d 476 (7th Cir. 1977) (holding that a woman can consent to a search of a bedroom, shared by herself and the man she lived with, including the closet); see also Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 253, 111 S.Ct. 1801, 1805, 114 L.Ed.2d 297 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (stating that, \u201can individual has a heightened expectation of privacy in the contents of a closed container\u201d); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 13, 97 S.Ct. 2476, 2484, 53 L.Ed.2d 538 (1977) (\u201c[A] person\u2019s expectations of privacy in personal luggage are substantially greater than in an automobile.\u201d). But, consent to search a private container, such as a smtcase or backpack, is only effective if given by someone \u201cwith common authority over or other sufficient relationsMp to the ... effects sought to be inspected.\u201d Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171, 94 S.Ct. at 993. Common authority \u201crests ... on mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access or control for most purposes.\u201d"},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that a woman can consent to a search of a bedroom, shared by herself and the man she lived with, including the closet","sentence":"See, e.g., Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 740, 89 S.Ct. 1420, 1425, 22 L.Ed.2d 684 (1969) (cousin had authority to consent to search of the defendant\u2019s duffel bag, wMch both men used and wMch had been left in the cousin\u2019s home); United States v. Ladell, 127 F.3d 622, 624 (7th Cir.1997) (holding that a mother could consent to a search of her adult son\u2019s bedroom, including a closed duffle bag stored in between the mattresses on the bed); United States v. Richardson, 562 F.2d 476 (7th Cir. 1977) (holding that a woman can consent to a search of a bedroom, shared by herself and the man she lived with, including the closet); see also Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 253, 111 S.Ct. 1801, 1805, 114 L.Ed.2d 297 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (stating that, \u201can individual has a heightened expectation of privacy in the contents of a closed container\u201d); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 13, 97 S.Ct. 2476, 2484, 53 L.Ed.2d 538 (1977) (\u201c[A] person\u2019s expectations of privacy in personal luggage are substantially greater than in an automobile.\u201d). But, consent to search a private container, such as a smtcase or backpack, is only effective if given by someone \u201cwith common authority over or other sufficient relationsMp to the ... effects sought to be inspected.\u201d Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171, 94 S.Ct. at 993. Common authority \u201crests ... on mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access or control for most purposes.\u201d"},"case_id":3068231,"label":"b"}
{"context":"According to settled principles, a third party, with standing to do so, may validly consent to the search of a closed container, even though the actual owner of the container has a heightened expectation of privacy in its contents.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that a woman can consent to a search of a bedroom, shared by herself and the man she lived with, including the closet","sentence":"See, e.g., Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 740, 89 S.Ct. 1420, 1425, 22 L.Ed.2d 684 (1969) (cousin had authority to consent to search of the defendant\u2019s duffel bag, wMch both men used and wMch had been left in the cousin\u2019s home); United States v. Ladell, 127 F.3d 622, 624 (7th Cir.1997) (holding that a mother could consent to a search of her adult son\u2019s bedroom, including a closed duffle bag stored in between the mattresses on the bed); United States v. Richardson, 562 F.2d 476 (7th Cir. 1977) (holding that a woman can consent to a search of a bedroom, shared by herself and the man she lived with, including the closet); see also Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 253, 111 S.Ct. 1801, 1805, 114 L.Ed.2d 297 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (stating that, \u201can individual has a heightened expectation of privacy in the contents of a closed container\u201d); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 13, 97 S.Ct. 2476, 2484, 53 L.Ed.2d 538 (1977) (\u201c[A] person\u2019s expectations of privacy in personal luggage are substantially greater than in an automobile.\u201d). But, consent to search a private container, such as a smtcase or backpack, is only effective if given by someone \u201cwith common authority over or other sufficient relationsMp to the ... effects sought to be inspected.\u201d Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171, 94 S.Ct. at 993. Common authority \u201crests ... on mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access or control for most purposes.\u201d"},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"415 U.S. 171, 171","parenthetical":"\"[A] person's expectations of privacy in personal luggage are substantially greater than in an automobile.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 740, 89 S.Ct. 1420, 1425, 22 L.Ed.2d 684 (1969) (cousin had authority to consent to search of the defendant\u2019s duffel bag, wMch both men used and wMch had been left in the cousin\u2019s home); United States v. Ladell, 127 F.3d 622, 624 (7th Cir.1997) (holding that a mother could consent to a search of her adult son\u2019s bedroom, including a closed duffle bag stored in between the mattresses on the bed); United States v. Richardson, 562 F.2d 476 (7th Cir. 1977) (holding that a woman can consent to a search of a bedroom, shared by herself and the man she lived with, including the closet); see also Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 253, 111 S.Ct. 1801, 1805, 114 L.Ed.2d 297 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (stating that, \u201can individual has a heightened expectation of privacy in the contents of a closed container\u201d); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 13, 97 S.Ct. 2476, 2484, 53 L.Ed.2d 538 (1977) (\u201c[A] person\u2019s expectations of privacy in personal luggage are substantially greater than in an automobile.\u201d). But, consent to search a private container, such as a smtcase or backpack, is only effective if given by someone \u201cwith common authority over or other sufficient relationsMp to the ... effects sought to be inspected.\u201d Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171, 94 S.Ct. at 993. Common authority \u201crests ... on mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access or control for most purposes.\u201d"},"case_id":3068231,"label":"a"}
{"context":"According to settled principles, a third party, with standing to do so, may validly consent to the search of a closed container, even though the actual owner of the container has a heightened expectation of privacy in its contents.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"94 S.Ct. 993, 993","parenthetical":"\"[A] person's expectations of privacy in personal luggage are substantially greater than in an automobile.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 740, 89 S.Ct. 1420, 1425, 22 L.Ed.2d 684 (1969) (cousin had authority to consent to search of the defendant\u2019s duffel bag, wMch both men used and wMch had been left in the cousin\u2019s home); United States v. Ladell, 127 F.3d 622, 624 (7th Cir.1997) (holding that a mother could consent to a search of her adult son\u2019s bedroom, including a closed duffle bag stored in between the mattresses on the bed); United States v. Richardson, 562 F.2d 476 (7th Cir. 1977) (holding that a woman can consent to a search of a bedroom, shared by herself and the man she lived with, including the closet); see also Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 253, 111 S.Ct. 1801, 1805, 114 L.Ed.2d 297 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (stating that, \u201can individual has a heightened expectation of privacy in the contents of a closed container\u201d); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 13, 97 S.Ct. 2476, 2484, 53 L.Ed.2d 538 (1977) (\u201c[A] person\u2019s expectations of privacy in personal luggage are substantially greater than in an automobile.\u201d). But, consent to search a private container, such as a smtcase or backpack, is only effective if given by someone \u201cwith common authority over or other sufficient relationsMp to the ... effects sought to be inspected.\u201d Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171, 94 S.Ct. at 993. Common authority \u201crests ... on mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access or control for most purposes.\u201d"},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that a woman can consent to a search of a bedroom, shared by herself and the man she lived with, including the closet","sentence":"See, e.g., Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 740, 89 S.Ct. 1420, 1425, 22 L.Ed.2d 684 (1969) (cousin had authority to consent to search of the defendant\u2019s duffel bag, wMch both men used and wMch had been left in the cousin\u2019s home); United States v. Ladell, 127 F.3d 622, 624 (7th Cir.1997) (holding that a mother could consent to a search of her adult son\u2019s bedroom, including a closed duffle bag stored in between the mattresses on the bed); United States v. Richardson, 562 F.2d 476 (7th Cir. 1977) (holding that a woman can consent to a search of a bedroom, shared by herself and the man she lived with, including the closet); see also Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 253, 111 S.Ct. 1801, 1805, 114 L.Ed.2d 297 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (stating that, \u201can individual has a heightened expectation of privacy in the contents of a closed container\u201d); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 13, 97 S.Ct. 2476, 2484, 53 L.Ed.2d 538 (1977) (\u201c[A] person\u2019s expectations of privacy in personal luggage are substantially greater than in an automobile.\u201d). But, consent to search a private container, such as a smtcase or backpack, is only effective if given by someone \u201cwith common authority over or other sufficient relationsMp to the ... effects sought to be inspected.\u201d Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171, 94 S.Ct. at 993. Common authority \u201crests ... on mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access or control for most purposes.\u201d"},"case_id":3068231,"label":"b"}
{"context":"If the relief sought is prospective in nature, it is proper \"notwithstanding a direct and substantial impact on the state treasury.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"433 U.S. 267, 289","parenthetical":"finding an injunctive relief order to be proper despite its explicit requirement that the state bear one half of the cost of developing a comprehensive educational program","sentence":"Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 289, 97 S.Ct. 2749, 53 L.Ed.2d 745 (1977) (finding an injunctive relief order to be proper despite its explicit requirement that the state bear one half of the cost of developing a comprehensive educational program); see also Papasan v. Attain, 478 U.S. 265, 281-82, 106 S.Ct. 2932, 92 L.Ed.2d 209 (1986) (declining to dismiss on Eleventh Amendment grounds plaintiffs\u2019 claim challenging the state\u2019s unequal allocation of resources to state school districts, even though remedying the disparity \u201cmight require the expenditure of state funds\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"478 U.S. 265, 281-82","parenthetical":"declining to dismiss on Eleventh Amendment grounds plaintiffs' claim challenging the state's unequal allocation of resources to state school districts, even though remedying the disparity \"might require the expenditure of state funds\"","sentence":"Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 289, 97 S.Ct. 2749, 53 L.Ed.2d 745 (1977) (finding an injunctive relief order to be proper despite its explicit requirement that the state bear one half of the cost of developing a comprehensive educational program); see also Papasan v. Attain, 478 U.S. 265, 281-82, 106 S.Ct. 2932, 92 L.Ed.2d 209 (1986) (declining to dismiss on Eleventh Amendment grounds plaintiffs\u2019 claim challenging the state\u2019s unequal allocation of resources to state school districts, even though remedying the disparity \u201cmight require the expenditure of state funds\u201d)."},"case_id":12133278,"label":"a"}
{"context":"If the relief sought is prospective in nature, it is proper \"notwithstanding a direct and substantial impact on the state treasury.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"433 U.S. 267, 289","parenthetical":"finding an injunctive relief order to be proper despite its explicit requirement that the state bear one half of the cost of developing a comprehensive educational program","sentence":"Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 289, 97 S.Ct. 2749, 53 L.Ed.2d 745 (1977) (finding an injunctive relief order to be proper despite its explicit requirement that the state bear one half of the cost of developing a comprehensive educational program); see also Papasan v. Attain, 478 U.S. 265, 281-82, 106 S.Ct. 2932, 92 L.Ed.2d 209 (1986) (declining to dismiss on Eleventh Amendment grounds plaintiffs\u2019 claim challenging the state\u2019s unequal allocation of resources to state school districts, even though remedying the disparity \u201cmight require the expenditure of state funds\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"declining to dismiss on Eleventh Amendment grounds plaintiffs' claim challenging the state's unequal allocation of resources to state school districts, even though remedying the disparity \"might require the expenditure of state funds\"","sentence":"Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 289, 97 S.Ct. 2749, 53 L.Ed.2d 745 (1977) (finding an injunctive relief order to be proper despite its explicit requirement that the state bear one half of the cost of developing a comprehensive educational program); see also Papasan v. Attain, 478 U.S. 265, 281-82, 106 S.Ct. 2932, 92 L.Ed.2d 209 (1986) (declining to dismiss on Eleventh Amendment grounds plaintiffs\u2019 claim challenging the state\u2019s unequal allocation of resources to state school districts, even though remedying the disparity \u201cmight require the expenditure of state funds\u201d)."},"case_id":12133278,"label":"a"}
{"context":"If the relief sought is prospective in nature, it is proper \"notwithstanding a direct and substantial impact on the state treasury.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"declining to dismiss on Eleventh Amendment grounds plaintiffs' claim challenging the state's unequal allocation of resources to state school districts, even though remedying the disparity \"might require the expenditure of state funds\"","sentence":"Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 289, 97 S.Ct. 2749, 53 L.Ed.2d 745 (1977) (finding an injunctive relief order to be proper despite its explicit requirement that the state bear one half of the cost of developing a comprehensive educational program); see also Papasan v. Attain, 478 U.S. 265, 281-82, 106 S.Ct. 2932, 92 L.Ed.2d 209 (1986) (declining to dismiss on Eleventh Amendment grounds plaintiffs\u2019 claim challenging the state\u2019s unequal allocation of resources to state school districts, even though remedying the disparity \u201cmight require the expenditure of state funds\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"433 U.S. 267, 289","parenthetical":"finding an injunctive relief order to be proper despite its explicit requirement that the state bear one half of the cost of developing a comprehensive educational program","sentence":"Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 289, 97 S.Ct. 2749, 53 L.Ed.2d 745 (1977) (finding an injunctive relief order to be proper despite its explicit requirement that the state bear one half of the cost of developing a comprehensive educational program); see also Papasan v. Attain, 478 U.S. 265, 281-82, 106 S.Ct. 2932, 92 L.Ed.2d 209 (1986) (declining to dismiss on Eleventh Amendment grounds plaintiffs\u2019 claim challenging the state\u2019s unequal allocation of resources to state school districts, even though remedying the disparity \u201cmight require the expenditure of state funds\u201d)."},"case_id":12133278,"label":"b"}
{"context":"If the relief sought is prospective in nature, it is proper \"notwithstanding a direct and substantial impact on the state treasury.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"478 U.S. 265, 281-82","parenthetical":"declining to dismiss on Eleventh Amendment grounds plaintiffs' claim challenging the state's unequal allocation of resources to state school districts, even though remedying the disparity \"might require the expenditure of state funds\"","sentence":"Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 289, 97 S.Ct. 2749, 53 L.Ed.2d 745 (1977) (finding an injunctive relief order to be proper despite its explicit requirement that the state bear one half of the cost of developing a comprehensive educational program); see also Papasan v. Attain, 478 U.S. 265, 281-82, 106 S.Ct. 2932, 92 L.Ed.2d 209 (1986) (declining to dismiss on Eleventh Amendment grounds plaintiffs\u2019 claim challenging the state\u2019s unequal allocation of resources to state school districts, even though remedying the disparity \u201cmight require the expenditure of state funds\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding an injunctive relief order to be proper despite its explicit requirement that the state bear one half of the cost of developing a comprehensive educational program","sentence":"Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 289, 97 S.Ct. 2749, 53 L.Ed.2d 745 (1977) (finding an injunctive relief order to be proper despite its explicit requirement that the state bear one half of the cost of developing a comprehensive educational program); see also Papasan v. Attain, 478 U.S. 265, 281-82, 106 S.Ct. 2932, 92 L.Ed.2d 209 (1986) (declining to dismiss on Eleventh Amendment grounds plaintiffs\u2019 claim challenging the state\u2019s unequal allocation of resources to state school districts, even though remedying the disparity \u201cmight require the expenditure of state funds\u201d)."},"case_id":12133278,"label":"b"}
{"context":"If the relief sought is prospective in nature, it is proper \"notwithstanding a direct and substantial impact on the state treasury.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"declining to dismiss on Eleventh Amendment grounds plaintiffs' claim challenging the state's unequal allocation of resources to state school districts, even though remedying the disparity \"might require the expenditure of state funds\"","sentence":"Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 289, 97 S.Ct. 2749, 53 L.Ed.2d 745 (1977) (finding an injunctive relief order to be proper despite its explicit requirement that the state bear one half of the cost of developing a comprehensive educational program); see also Papasan v. Attain, 478 U.S. 265, 281-82, 106 S.Ct. 2932, 92 L.Ed.2d 209 (1986) (declining to dismiss on Eleventh Amendment grounds plaintiffs\u2019 claim challenging the state\u2019s unequal allocation of resources to state school districts, even though remedying the disparity \u201cmight require the expenditure of state funds\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding an injunctive relief order to be proper despite its explicit requirement that the state bear one half of the cost of developing a comprehensive educational program","sentence":"Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 289, 97 S.Ct. 2749, 53 L.Ed.2d 745 (1977) (finding an injunctive relief order to be proper despite its explicit requirement that the state bear one half of the cost of developing a comprehensive educational program); see also Papasan v. Attain, 478 U.S. 265, 281-82, 106 S.Ct. 2932, 92 L.Ed.2d 209 (1986) (declining to dismiss on Eleventh Amendment grounds plaintiffs\u2019 claim challenging the state\u2019s unequal allocation of resources to state school districts, even though remedying the disparity \u201cmight require the expenditure of state funds\u201d)."},"case_id":12133278,"label":"b"}
{"context":"If the relief sought is prospective in nature, it is proper \"notwithstanding a direct and substantial impact on the state treasury.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"declining to dismiss on Eleventh Amendment grounds plaintiffs' claim challenging the state's unequal allocation of resources to state school districts, even though remedying the disparity \"might require the expenditure of state funds\"","sentence":"Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 289, 97 S.Ct. 2749, 53 L.Ed.2d 745 (1977) (finding an injunctive relief order to be proper despite its explicit requirement that the state bear one half of the cost of developing a comprehensive educational program); see also Papasan v. Attain, 478 U.S. 265, 281-82, 106 S.Ct. 2932, 92 L.Ed.2d 209 (1986) (declining to dismiss on Eleventh Amendment grounds plaintiffs\u2019 claim challenging the state\u2019s unequal allocation of resources to state school districts, even though remedying the disparity \u201cmight require the expenditure of state funds\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding an injunctive relief order to be proper despite its explicit requirement that the state bear one half of the cost of developing a comprehensive educational program","sentence":"Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 289, 97 S.Ct. 2749, 53 L.Ed.2d 745 (1977) (finding an injunctive relief order to be proper despite its explicit requirement that the state bear one half of the cost of developing a comprehensive educational program); see also Papasan v. Attain, 478 U.S. 265, 281-82, 106 S.Ct. 2932, 92 L.Ed.2d 209 (1986) (declining to dismiss on Eleventh Amendment grounds plaintiffs\u2019 claim challenging the state\u2019s unequal allocation of resources to state school districts, even though remedying the disparity \u201cmight require the expenditure of state funds\u201d)."},"case_id":12133278,"label":"b"}
{"context":"If the relief sought is prospective in nature, it is proper \"notwithstanding a direct and substantial impact on the state treasury.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding an injunctive relief order to be proper despite its explicit requirement that the state bear one half of the cost of developing a comprehensive educational program","sentence":"Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 289, 97 S.Ct. 2749, 53 L.Ed.2d 745 (1977) (finding an injunctive relief order to be proper despite its explicit requirement that the state bear one half of the cost of developing a comprehensive educational program); see also Papasan v. Attain, 478 U.S. 265, 281-82, 106 S.Ct. 2932, 92 L.Ed.2d 209 (1986) (declining to dismiss on Eleventh Amendment grounds plaintiffs\u2019 claim challenging the state\u2019s unequal allocation of resources to state school districts, even though remedying the disparity \u201cmight require the expenditure of state funds\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"478 U.S. 265, 281-82","parenthetical":"declining to dismiss on Eleventh Amendment grounds plaintiffs' claim challenging the state's unequal allocation of resources to state school districts, even though remedying the disparity \"might require the expenditure of state funds\"","sentence":"Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 289, 97 S.Ct. 2749, 53 L.Ed.2d 745 (1977) (finding an injunctive relief order to be proper despite its explicit requirement that the state bear one half of the cost of developing a comprehensive educational program); see also Papasan v. Attain, 478 U.S. 265, 281-82, 106 S.Ct. 2932, 92 L.Ed.2d 209 (1986) (declining to dismiss on Eleventh Amendment grounds plaintiffs\u2019 claim challenging the state\u2019s unequal allocation of resources to state school districts, even though remedying the disparity \u201cmight require the expenditure of state funds\u201d)."},"case_id":12133278,"label":"a"}
{"context":"If the relief sought is prospective in nature, it is proper \"notwithstanding a direct and substantial impact on the state treasury.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding an injunctive relief order to be proper despite its explicit requirement that the state bear one half of the cost of developing a comprehensive educational program","sentence":"Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 289, 97 S.Ct. 2749, 53 L.Ed.2d 745 (1977) (finding an injunctive relief order to be proper despite its explicit requirement that the state bear one half of the cost of developing a comprehensive educational program); see also Papasan v. Attain, 478 U.S. 265, 281-82, 106 S.Ct. 2932, 92 L.Ed.2d 209 (1986) (declining to dismiss on Eleventh Amendment grounds plaintiffs\u2019 claim challenging the state\u2019s unequal allocation of resources to state school districts, even though remedying the disparity \u201cmight require the expenditure of state funds\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"declining to dismiss on Eleventh Amendment grounds plaintiffs' claim challenging the state's unequal allocation of resources to state school districts, even though remedying the disparity \"might require the expenditure of state funds\"","sentence":"Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 289, 97 S.Ct. 2749, 53 L.Ed.2d 745 (1977) (finding an injunctive relief order to be proper despite its explicit requirement that the state bear one half of the cost of developing a comprehensive educational program); see also Papasan v. Attain, 478 U.S. 265, 281-82, 106 S.Ct. 2932, 92 L.Ed.2d 209 (1986) (declining to dismiss on Eleventh Amendment grounds plaintiffs\u2019 claim challenging the state\u2019s unequal allocation of resources to state school districts, even though remedying the disparity \u201cmight require the expenditure of state funds\u201d)."},"case_id":12133278,"label":"a"}
{"context":"If the relief sought is prospective in nature, it is proper \"notwithstanding a direct and substantial impact on the state treasury.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding an injunctive relief order to be proper despite its explicit requirement that the state bear one half of the cost of developing a comprehensive educational program","sentence":"Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 289, 97 S.Ct. 2749, 53 L.Ed.2d 745 (1977) (finding an injunctive relief order to be proper despite its explicit requirement that the state bear one half of the cost of developing a comprehensive educational program); see also Papasan v. Attain, 478 U.S. 265, 281-82, 106 S.Ct. 2932, 92 L.Ed.2d 209 (1986) (declining to dismiss on Eleventh Amendment grounds plaintiffs\u2019 claim challenging the state\u2019s unequal allocation of resources to state school districts, even though remedying the disparity \u201cmight require the expenditure of state funds\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"declining to dismiss on Eleventh Amendment grounds plaintiffs' claim challenging the state's unequal allocation of resources to state school districts, even though remedying the disparity \"might require the expenditure of state funds\"","sentence":"Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 289, 97 S.Ct. 2749, 53 L.Ed.2d 745 (1977) (finding an injunctive relief order to be proper despite its explicit requirement that the state bear one half of the cost of developing a comprehensive educational program); see also Papasan v. Attain, 478 U.S. 265, 281-82, 106 S.Ct. 2932, 92 L.Ed.2d 209 (1986) (declining to dismiss on Eleventh Amendment grounds plaintiffs\u2019 claim challenging the state\u2019s unequal allocation of resources to state school districts, even though remedying the disparity \u201cmight require the expenditure of state funds\u201d)."},"case_id":12133278,"label":"a"}
{"context":"As noted in Vaughn, a principal also can be liable for physical torts committed by an agent if the principal hada nondelegable duty of care or was negligent in hiring, instructing, or supervising the agent. In that circumstance, the principal's liability is direct, not vicarious, however.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"273 Or 273, 282","parenthetical":"hospital has potential independent tort liability for negligent acts of physicians based on hospital's own negligence in hiring and supervising staff","sentence":"See, e.g., Sprinkle v. Lemley, 243 Or 521, 528-31, 414 P2d 797 (1966) (physicians who diagnose and treat patient in concert can be liable for each other\u2019s negligence); Moulton v. Huckleberry, 150 Or 538, 549, 46 P2d 589 (1935) (physician who refers patient to another can be hable for negligence of other physician if that physician is an employee, partner, or agent of the referring physician, or if the referral was itself negligent); Wemett v. Mount, 134 Or 305, 315, 292 P 93 (1930) (physician partners in the practice of medicine are liable for each other\u2019s negligence); see also Huffaker v. Bailey, 273 Or 273, 282, 540 P2d 1398 (hospital has potential independent tort liability for negligent acts of physicians based on hospital\u2019s own negligence in hiring and supervising staff)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"243 Or 521, 528-31","parenthetical":"physicians who diagnose and treat patient in concert can be liable for each other's negligence","sentence":"See, e.g., Sprinkle v. Lemley, 243 Or 521, 528-31, 414 P2d 797 (1966) (physicians who diagnose and treat patient in concert can be liable for each other\u2019s negligence); Moulton v. Huckleberry, 150 Or 538, 549, 46 P2d 589 (1935) (physician who refers patient to another can be hable for negligence of other physician if that physician is an employee, partner, or agent of the referring physician, or if the referral was itself negligent); Wemett v. Mount, 134 Or 305, 315, 292 P 93 (1930) (physician partners in the practice of medicine are liable for each other\u2019s negligence); see also Huffaker v. Bailey, 273 Or 273, 282, 540 P2d 1398 (hospital has potential independent tort liability for negligent acts of physicians based on hospital\u2019s own negligence in hiring and supervising staff)."},"case_id":3674988,"label":"b"}
{"context":"As noted in Vaughn, a principal also can be liable for physical torts committed by an agent if the principal hada nondelegable duty of care or was negligent in hiring, instructing, or supervising the agent. In that circumstance, the principal's liability is direct, not vicarious, however.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"150 Or 538, 549","parenthetical":"physician who refers patient to another can be hable for negligence of other physician if that physician is an employee, partner, or agent of the referring physician, or if the referral was itself negligent","sentence":"See, e.g., Sprinkle v. Lemley, 243 Or 521, 528-31, 414 P2d 797 (1966) (physicians who diagnose and treat patient in concert can be liable for each other\u2019s negligence); Moulton v. Huckleberry, 150 Or 538, 549, 46 P2d 589 (1935) (physician who refers patient to another can be hable for negligence of other physician if that physician is an employee, partner, or agent of the referring physician, or if the referral was itself negligent); Wemett v. Mount, 134 Or 305, 315, 292 P 93 (1930) (physician partners in the practice of medicine are liable for each other\u2019s negligence); see also Huffaker v. Bailey, 273 Or 273, 282, 540 P2d 1398 (hospital has potential independent tort liability for negligent acts of physicians based on hospital\u2019s own negligence in hiring and supervising staff)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"273 Or 273, 282","parenthetical":"hospital has potential independent tort liability for negligent acts of physicians based on hospital's own negligence in hiring and supervising staff","sentence":"See, e.g., Sprinkle v. Lemley, 243 Or 521, 528-31, 414 P2d 797 (1966) (physicians who diagnose and treat patient in concert can be liable for each other\u2019s negligence); Moulton v. Huckleberry, 150 Or 538, 549, 46 P2d 589 (1935) (physician who refers patient to another can be hable for negligence of other physician if that physician is an employee, partner, or agent of the referring physician, or if the referral was itself negligent); Wemett v. Mount, 134 Or 305, 315, 292 P 93 (1930) (physician partners in the practice of medicine are liable for each other\u2019s negligence); see also Huffaker v. Bailey, 273 Or 273, 282, 540 P2d 1398 (hospital has potential independent tort liability for negligent acts of physicians based on hospital\u2019s own negligence in hiring and supervising staff)."},"case_id":3674988,"label":"a"}
{"context":"As noted in Vaughn, a principal also can be liable for physical torts committed by an agent if the principal hada nondelegable duty of care or was negligent in hiring, instructing, or supervising the agent. In that circumstance, the principal's liability is direct, not vicarious, however.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"134 Or 305, 315","parenthetical":"physician partners in the practice of medicine are liable for each other's negligence","sentence":"See, e.g., Sprinkle v. Lemley, 243 Or 521, 528-31, 414 P2d 797 (1966) (physicians who diagnose and treat patient in concert can be liable for each other\u2019s negligence); Moulton v. Huckleberry, 150 Or 538, 549, 46 P2d 589 (1935) (physician who refers patient to another can be hable for negligence of other physician if that physician is an employee, partner, or agent of the referring physician, or if the referral was itself negligent); Wemett v. Mount, 134 Or 305, 315, 292 P 93 (1930) (physician partners in the practice of medicine are liable for each other\u2019s negligence); see also Huffaker v. Bailey, 273 Or 273, 282, 540 P2d 1398 (hospital has potential independent tort liability for negligent acts of physicians based on hospital\u2019s own negligence in hiring and supervising staff)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"273 Or 273, 282","parenthetical":"hospital has potential independent tort liability for negligent acts of physicians based on hospital's own negligence in hiring and supervising staff","sentence":"See, e.g., Sprinkle v. Lemley, 243 Or 521, 528-31, 414 P2d 797 (1966) (physicians who diagnose and treat patient in concert can be liable for each other\u2019s negligence); Moulton v. Huckleberry, 150 Or 538, 549, 46 P2d 589 (1935) (physician who refers patient to another can be hable for negligence of other physician if that physician is an employee, partner, or agent of the referring physician, or if the referral was itself negligent); Wemett v. Mount, 134 Or 305, 315, 292 P 93 (1930) (physician partners in the practice of medicine are liable for each other\u2019s negligence); see also Huffaker v. Bailey, 273 Or 273, 282, 540 P2d 1398 (hospital has potential independent tort liability for negligent acts of physicians based on hospital\u2019s own negligence in hiring and supervising staff)."},"case_id":3674988,"label":"a"}
{"context":"As noted in Vaughn, a principal also can be liable for physical torts committed by an agent if the principal hada nondelegable duty of care or was negligent in hiring, instructing, or supervising the agent. In that circumstance, the principal's liability is direct, not vicarious, however.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"physician partners in the practice of medicine are liable for each other's negligence","sentence":"See, e.g., Sprinkle v. Lemley, 243 Or 521, 528-31, 414 P2d 797 (1966) (physicians who diagnose and treat patient in concert can be liable for each other\u2019s negligence); Moulton v. Huckleberry, 150 Or 538, 549, 46 P2d 589 (1935) (physician who refers patient to another can be hable for negligence of other physician if that physician is an employee, partner, or agent of the referring physician, or if the referral was itself negligent); Wemett v. Mount, 134 Or 305, 315, 292 P 93 (1930) (physician partners in the practice of medicine are liable for each other\u2019s negligence); see also Huffaker v. Bailey, 273 Or 273, 282, 540 P2d 1398 (hospital has potential independent tort liability for negligent acts of physicians based on hospital\u2019s own negligence in hiring and supervising staff)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"273 Or 273, 282","parenthetical":"hospital has potential independent tort liability for negligent acts of physicians based on hospital's own negligence in hiring and supervising staff","sentence":"See, e.g., Sprinkle v. Lemley, 243 Or 521, 528-31, 414 P2d 797 (1966) (physicians who diagnose and treat patient in concert can be liable for each other\u2019s negligence); Moulton v. Huckleberry, 150 Or 538, 549, 46 P2d 589 (1935) (physician who refers patient to another can be hable for negligence of other physician if that physician is an employee, partner, or agent of the referring physician, or if the referral was itself negligent); Wemett v. Mount, 134 Or 305, 315, 292 P 93 (1930) (physician partners in the practice of medicine are liable for each other\u2019s negligence); see also Huffaker v. Bailey, 273 Or 273, 282, 540 P2d 1398 (hospital has potential independent tort liability for negligent acts of physicians based on hospital\u2019s own negligence in hiring and supervising staff)."},"case_id":3674988,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Finally, our case law does not compel the conclusion that Kiggundu suffered mistreatment but not persecution.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"916 F.2d 1260, 1260","parenthetical":"finding that detainment, periodic searches, and arrests were not past persecution","sentence":"Compare Soumahoro v. Gonzales, 415 F.3d 732, 737-38 (7th Cir.2005) (suggesting imprisonment for two weeks, regular beatings, denial of adequate food and water, and loss of job may constitute persecution), Diallo v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 687, 697-98 (7th Cir.2004) (six months\u2019 unlawful imprisonment, hard labor, physical torture, and expulsion from country consistent with past persecution), and Bace v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 1133, 1138 (7th Cir.2003) (finding compelling case of persecution based on physical mistreatment over a month-long period, the assault of a family member, and threats), with Prela v. Ashcroft, 394 F.3d 515, 518 (7th Cir.2005) (being \u201cinterrogated at various times by the police, detained for twenty-four hours, harassed for money, and beaten, causing an injury to his hands\u201d does not compel a finding of persecution), Dandan v. Ashcroft, 339 F.3d 567, 573-74 (7th Cir.2003) (finding that three-day detention, a lack of food, and beatings causing facial trauma did not compel finding of persecution), and Zalega, 916 F.2d at 1260 (finding that detainment, periodic searches, and arrests were not past persecution)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"425 F.3d 417, 420","parenthetical":"IJ's opinion resting entirely on unsupported adverse credibility determination vacated because IJ did not determine whether petitioners fell within protected group","sentence":"See Tabaku, 425 F.3d 417, 420 (IJ\u2019s opinion resting entirely on unsupported adverse credibility determination vacated because IJ did not determine whether petitioners fell within protected group); see also Singh v. Gonzales, 404 F.3d 1024, 1028 (7th Cir.2005) (observing harmless error analysis applies to immigration cases)."},"case_id":1591410,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Because the limits on money given to support clear electoral advocacy bear a substantial relationship to the governmental purpose of preventing corruption and the appearance thereof, and only marginally burden speech, these limits are constitutional. Indeed, the Supreme Court has upheld limits on \"contributions\" defined much more broadly than the term in the North Carolina Act.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"424 U.S. 23, 23-35","parenthetical":"upholding limit on \"contributions\" defined as \"[fjunds provided to a candidate or political party or campaign committee either directly or indirectly through an intermediary!","sentence":"See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 23-35, 96 S.Ct. 612 (upholding limit on \u201ccontributions\u201d defined as \u201c[fjunds provided to a candidate or political party or campaign committee either directly or indirectly through an intermediary!), or] dollars given to another person or organization that are earmarked for political purposes,\u201d 424 U.S. at 24 n. 24, 96 S.Ct. 612); McConnell, 540 U.S. at 170, 124 S.Ct. 619 (upholding contribution caps for a \u201cpublic communication that promotes or attacks a clearly defined candidate\u201d); see also Fed. Election Comm\u2019n v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 123 S.Ct. 2200, 156 L.Ed.2d 179 (2003) (upholding a ban on any contributions from NCRL\u2019s general treasury)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"upholding a ban on any contributions from NCRL's general treasury","sentence":"See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 23-35, 96 S.Ct. 612 (upholding limit on \u201ccontributions\u201d defined as \u201c[fjunds provided to a candidate or political party or campaign committee either directly or indirectly through an intermediary!), or] dollars given to another person or organization that are earmarked for political purposes,\u201d 424 U.S. at 24 n. 24, 96 S.Ct. 612); McConnell, 540 U.S. at 170, 124 S.Ct. 619 (upholding contribution caps for a \u201cpublic communication that promotes or attacks a clearly defined candidate\u201d); see also Fed. Election Comm\u2019n v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 123 S.Ct. 2200, 156 L.Ed.2d 179 (2003) (upholding a ban on any contributions from NCRL\u2019s general treasury)."},"case_id":3582474,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Because the limits on money given to support clear electoral advocacy bear a substantial relationship to the governmental purpose of preventing corruption and the appearance thereof, and only marginally burden speech, these limits are constitutional. Indeed, the Supreme Court has upheld limits on \"contributions\" defined much more broadly than the term in the North Carolina Act.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"upholding a ban on any contributions from NCRL's general treasury","sentence":"See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 23-35, 96 S.Ct. 612 (upholding limit on \u201ccontributions\u201d defined as \u201c[fjunds provided to a candidate or political party or campaign committee either directly or indirectly through an intermediary!), or] dollars given to another person or organization that are earmarked for political purposes,\u201d 424 U.S. at 24 n. 24, 96 S.Ct. 612); McConnell, 540 U.S. at 170, 124 S.Ct. 619 (upholding contribution caps for a \u201cpublic communication that promotes or attacks a clearly defined candidate\u201d); see also Fed. Election Comm\u2019n v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 123 S.Ct. 2200, 156 L.Ed.2d 179 (2003) (upholding a ban on any contributions from NCRL\u2019s general treasury)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"424 U.S. 23, 23-35","parenthetical":"upholding limit on \"contributions\" defined as \"[fjunds provided to a candidate or political party or campaign committee either directly or indirectly through an intermediary!","sentence":"See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 23-35, 96 S.Ct. 612 (upholding limit on \u201ccontributions\u201d defined as \u201c[fjunds provided to a candidate or political party or campaign committee either directly or indirectly through an intermediary!), or] dollars given to another person or organization that are earmarked for political purposes,\u201d 424 U.S. at 24 n. 24, 96 S.Ct. 612); McConnell, 540 U.S. at 170, 124 S.Ct. 619 (upholding contribution caps for a \u201cpublic communication that promotes or attacks a clearly defined candidate\u201d); see also Fed. Election Comm\u2019n v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 123 S.Ct. 2200, 156 L.Ed.2d 179 (2003) (upholding a ban on any contributions from NCRL\u2019s general treasury)."},"case_id":3582474,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Because the limits on money given to support clear electoral advocacy bear a substantial relationship to the governmental purpose of preventing corruption and the appearance thereof, and only marginally burden speech, these limits are constitutional. Indeed, the Supreme Court has upheld limits on \"contributions\" defined much more broadly than the term in the North Carolina Act.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"upholding a ban on any contributions from NCRL's general treasury","sentence":"See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 23-35, 96 S.Ct. 612 (upholding limit on \u201ccontributions\u201d defined as \u201c[fjunds provided to a candidate or political party or campaign committee either directly or indirectly through an intermediary!), or] dollars given to another person or organization that are earmarked for political purposes,\u201d 424 U.S. at 24 n. 24, 96 S.Ct. 612); McConnell, 540 U.S. at 170, 124 S.Ct. 619 (upholding contribution caps for a \u201cpublic communication that promotes or attacks a clearly defined candidate\u201d); see also Fed. Election Comm\u2019n v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 123 S.Ct. 2200, 156 L.Ed.2d 179 (2003) (upholding a ban on any contributions from NCRL\u2019s general treasury)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"424 U.S. 23, 23-35","parenthetical":"upholding limit on \"contributions\" defined as \"[fjunds provided to a candidate or political party or campaign committee either directly or indirectly through an intermediary!","sentence":"See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 23-35, 96 S.Ct. 612 (upholding limit on \u201ccontributions\u201d defined as \u201c[fjunds provided to a candidate or political party or campaign committee either directly or indirectly through an intermediary!), or] dollars given to another person or organization that are earmarked for political purposes,\u201d 424 U.S. at 24 n. 24, 96 S.Ct. 612); McConnell, 540 U.S. at 170, 124 S.Ct. 619 (upholding contribution caps for a \u201cpublic communication that promotes or attacks a clearly defined candidate\u201d); see also Fed. Election Comm\u2019n v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 123 S.Ct. 2200, 156 L.Ed.2d 179 (2003) (upholding a ban on any contributions from NCRL\u2019s general treasury)."},"case_id":3582474,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Because the limits on money given to support clear electoral advocacy bear a substantial relationship to the governmental purpose of preventing corruption and the appearance thereof, and only marginally burden speech, these limits are constitutional. Indeed, the Supreme Court has upheld limits on \"contributions\" defined much more broadly than the term in the North Carolina Act.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"upholding limit on \"contributions\" defined as \"[fjunds provided to a candidate or political party or campaign committee either directly or indirectly through an intermediary!","sentence":"See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 23-35, 96 S.Ct. 612 (upholding limit on \u201ccontributions\u201d defined as \u201c[fjunds provided to a candidate or political party or campaign committee either directly or indirectly through an intermediary!), or] dollars given to another person or organization that are earmarked for political purposes,\u201d 424 U.S. at 24 n. 24, 96 S.Ct. 612); McConnell, 540 U.S. at 170, 124 S.Ct. 619 (upholding contribution caps for a \u201cpublic communication that promotes or attacks a clearly defined candidate\u201d); see also Fed. Election Comm\u2019n v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 123 S.Ct. 2200, 156 L.Ed.2d 179 (2003) (upholding a ban on any contributions from NCRL\u2019s general treasury)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"upholding a ban on any contributions from NCRL's general treasury","sentence":"See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 23-35, 96 S.Ct. 612 (upholding limit on \u201ccontributions\u201d defined as \u201c[fjunds provided to a candidate or political party or campaign committee either directly or indirectly through an intermediary!), or] dollars given to another person or organization that are earmarked for political purposes,\u201d 424 U.S. at 24 n. 24, 96 S.Ct. 612); McConnell, 540 U.S. at 170, 124 S.Ct. 619 (upholding contribution caps for a \u201cpublic communication that promotes or attacks a clearly defined candidate\u201d); see also Fed. Election Comm\u2019n v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 123 S.Ct. 2200, 156 L.Ed.2d 179 (2003) (upholding a ban on any contributions from NCRL\u2019s general treasury)."},"case_id":3582474,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Because the limits on money given to support clear electoral advocacy bear a substantial relationship to the governmental purpose of preventing corruption and the appearance thereof, and only marginally burden speech, these limits are constitutional. Indeed, the Supreme Court has upheld limits on \"contributions\" defined much more broadly than the term in the North Carolina Act.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"upholding a ban on any contributions from NCRL's general treasury","sentence":"See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 23-35, 96 S.Ct. 612 (upholding limit on \u201ccontributions\u201d defined as \u201c[fjunds provided to a candidate or political party or campaign committee either directly or indirectly through an intermediary!), or] dollars given to another person or organization that are earmarked for political purposes,\u201d 424 U.S. at 24 n. 24, 96 S.Ct. 612); McConnell, 540 U.S. at 170, 124 S.Ct. 619 (upholding contribution caps for a \u201cpublic communication that promotes or attacks a clearly defined candidate\u201d); see also Fed. Election Comm\u2019n v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 123 S.Ct. 2200, 156 L.Ed.2d 179 (2003) (upholding a ban on any contributions from NCRL\u2019s general treasury)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"upholding limit on \"contributions\" defined as \"[fjunds provided to a candidate or political party or campaign committee either directly or indirectly through an intermediary!","sentence":"See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 23-35, 96 S.Ct. 612 (upholding limit on \u201ccontributions\u201d defined as \u201c[fjunds provided to a candidate or political party or campaign committee either directly or indirectly through an intermediary!), or] dollars given to another person or organization that are earmarked for political purposes,\u201d 424 U.S. at 24 n. 24, 96 S.Ct. 612); McConnell, 540 U.S. at 170, 124 S.Ct. 619 (upholding contribution caps for a \u201cpublic communication that promotes or attacks a clearly defined candidate\u201d); see also Fed. Election Comm\u2019n v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 123 S.Ct. 2200, 156 L.Ed.2d 179 (2003) (upholding a ban on any contributions from NCRL\u2019s general treasury)."},"case_id":3582474,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Because the limits on money given to support clear electoral advocacy bear a substantial relationship to the governmental purpose of preventing corruption and the appearance thereof, and only marginally burden speech, these limits are constitutional. Indeed, the Supreme Court has upheld limits on \"contributions\" defined much more broadly than the term in the North Carolina Act.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"upholding limit on \"contributions\" defined as \"[fjunds provided to a candidate or political party or campaign committee either directly or indirectly through an intermediary!","sentence":"See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 23-35, 96 S.Ct. 612 (upholding limit on \u201ccontributions\u201d defined as \u201c[fjunds provided to a candidate or political party or campaign committee either directly or indirectly through an intermediary!), or] dollars given to another person or organization that are earmarked for political purposes,\u201d 424 U.S. at 24 n. 24, 96 S.Ct. 612); McConnell, 540 U.S. at 170, 124 S.Ct. 619 (upholding contribution caps for a \u201cpublic communication that promotes or attacks a clearly defined candidate\u201d); see also Fed. Election Comm\u2019n v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 123 S.Ct. 2200, 156 L.Ed.2d 179 (2003) (upholding a ban on any contributions from NCRL\u2019s general treasury)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"upholding a ban on any contributions from NCRL's general treasury","sentence":"See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 23-35, 96 S.Ct. 612 (upholding limit on \u201ccontributions\u201d defined as \u201c[fjunds provided to a candidate or political party or campaign committee either directly or indirectly through an intermediary!), or] dollars given to another person or organization that are earmarked for political purposes,\u201d 424 U.S. at 24 n. 24, 96 S.Ct. 612); McConnell, 540 U.S. at 170, 124 S.Ct. 619 (upholding contribution caps for a \u201cpublic communication that promotes or attacks a clearly defined candidate\u201d); see also Fed. Election Comm\u2019n v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 123 S.Ct. 2200, 156 L.Ed.2d 179 (2003) (upholding a ban on any contributions from NCRL\u2019s general treasury)."},"case_id":3582474,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Because the limits on money given to support clear electoral advocacy bear a substantial relationship to the governmental purpose of preventing corruption and the appearance thereof, and only marginally burden speech, these limits are constitutional. Indeed, the Supreme Court has upheld limits on \"contributions\" defined much more broadly than the term in the North Carolina Act.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"upholding limit on \"contributions\" defined as \"[fjunds provided to a candidate or political party or campaign committee either directly or indirectly through an intermediary!","sentence":"See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 23-35, 96 S.Ct. 612 (upholding limit on \u201ccontributions\u201d defined as \u201c[fjunds provided to a candidate or political party or campaign committee either directly or indirectly through an intermediary!), or] dollars given to another person or organization that are earmarked for political purposes,\u201d 424 U.S. at 24 n. 24, 96 S.Ct. 612); McConnell, 540 U.S. at 170, 124 S.Ct. 619 (upholding contribution caps for a \u201cpublic communication that promotes or attacks a clearly defined candidate\u201d); see also Fed. Election Comm\u2019n v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 123 S.Ct. 2200, 156 L.Ed.2d 179 (2003) (upholding a ban on any contributions from NCRL\u2019s general treasury)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"upholding a ban on any contributions from NCRL's general treasury","sentence":"See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 23-35, 96 S.Ct. 612 (upholding limit on \u201ccontributions\u201d defined as \u201c[fjunds provided to a candidate or political party or campaign committee either directly or indirectly through an intermediary!), or] dollars given to another person or organization that are earmarked for political purposes,\u201d 424 U.S. at 24 n. 24, 96 S.Ct. 612); McConnell, 540 U.S. at 170, 124 S.Ct. 619 (upholding contribution caps for a \u201cpublic communication that promotes or attacks a clearly defined candidate\u201d); see also Fed. Election Comm\u2019n v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 123 S.Ct. 2200, 156 L.Ed.2d 179 (2003) (upholding a ban on any contributions from NCRL\u2019s general treasury)."},"case_id":3582474,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Because the limits on money given to support clear electoral advocacy bear a substantial relationship to the governmental purpose of preventing corruption and the appearance thereof, and only marginally burden speech, these limits are constitutional. Indeed, the Supreme Court has upheld limits on \"contributions\" defined much more broadly than the term in the North Carolina Act.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"upholding limit on \"contributions\" defined as \"[fjunds provided to a candidate or political party or campaign committee either directly or indirectly through an intermediary!","sentence":"See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 23-35, 96 S.Ct. 612 (upholding limit on \u201ccontributions\u201d defined as \u201c[fjunds provided to a candidate or political party or campaign committee either directly or indirectly through an intermediary!), or] dollars given to another person or organization that are earmarked for political purposes,\u201d 424 U.S. at 24 n. 24, 96 S.Ct. 612); McConnell, 540 U.S. at 170, 124 S.Ct. 619 (upholding contribution caps for a \u201cpublic communication that promotes or attacks a clearly defined candidate\u201d); see also Fed. Election Comm\u2019n v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 123 S.Ct. 2200, 156 L.Ed.2d 179 (2003) (upholding a ban on any contributions from NCRL\u2019s general treasury)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"upholding a ban on any contributions from NCRL's general treasury","sentence":"See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 23-35, 96 S.Ct. 612 (upholding limit on \u201ccontributions\u201d defined as \u201c[fjunds provided to a candidate or political party or campaign committee either directly or indirectly through an intermediary!), or] dollars given to another person or organization that are earmarked for political purposes,\u201d 424 U.S. at 24 n. 24, 96 S.Ct. 612); McConnell, 540 U.S. at 170, 124 S.Ct. 619 (upholding contribution caps for a \u201cpublic communication that promotes or attacks a clearly defined candidate\u201d); see also Fed. Election Comm\u2019n v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 123 S.Ct. 2200, 156 L.Ed.2d 179 (2003) (upholding a ban on any contributions from NCRL\u2019s general treasury)."},"case_id":3582474,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Because the limits on money given to support clear electoral advocacy bear a substantial relationship to the governmental purpose of preventing corruption and the appearance thereof, and only marginally burden speech, these limits are constitutional. Indeed, the Supreme Court has upheld limits on \"contributions\" defined much more broadly than the term in the North Carolina Act.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"upholding a ban on any contributions from NCRL's general treasury","sentence":"See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 23-35, 96 S.Ct. 612 (upholding limit on \u201ccontributions\u201d defined as \u201c[fjunds provided to a candidate or political party or campaign committee either directly or indirectly through an intermediary!), or] dollars given to another person or organization that are earmarked for political purposes,\u201d 424 U.S. at 24 n. 24, 96 S.Ct. 612); McConnell, 540 U.S. at 170, 124 S.Ct. 619 (upholding contribution caps for a \u201cpublic communication that promotes or attacks a clearly defined candidate\u201d); see also Fed. Election Comm\u2019n v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 123 S.Ct. 2200, 156 L.Ed.2d 179 (2003) (upholding a ban on any contributions from NCRL\u2019s general treasury)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"upholding limit on \"contributions\" defined as \"[fjunds provided to a candidate or political party or campaign committee either directly or indirectly through an intermediary!","sentence":"See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 23-35, 96 S.Ct. 612 (upholding limit on \u201ccontributions\u201d defined as \u201c[fjunds provided to a candidate or political party or campaign committee either directly or indirectly through an intermediary!), or] dollars given to another person or organization that are earmarked for political purposes,\u201d 424 U.S. at 24 n. 24, 96 S.Ct. 612); McConnell, 540 U.S. at 170, 124 S.Ct. 619 (upholding contribution caps for a \u201cpublic communication that promotes or attacks a clearly defined candidate\u201d); see also Fed. Election Comm\u2019n v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 123 S.Ct. 2200, 156 L.Ed.2d 179 (2003) (upholding a ban on any contributions from NCRL\u2019s general treasury)."},"case_id":3582474,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Because the limits on money given to support clear electoral advocacy bear a substantial relationship to the governmental purpose of preventing corruption and the appearance thereof, and only marginally burden speech, these limits are constitutional. Indeed, the Supreme Court has upheld limits on \"contributions\" defined much more broadly than the term in the North Carolina Act.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"upholding limit on \"contributions\" defined as \"[fjunds provided to a candidate or political party or campaign committee either directly or indirectly through an intermediary!","sentence":"See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 23-35, 96 S.Ct. 612 (upholding limit on \u201ccontributions\u201d defined as \u201c[fjunds provided to a candidate or political party or campaign committee either directly or indirectly through an intermediary!), or] dollars given to another person or organization that are earmarked for political purposes,\u201d 424 U.S. at 24 n. 24, 96 S.Ct. 612); McConnell, 540 U.S. at 170, 124 S.Ct. 619 (upholding contribution caps for a \u201cpublic communication that promotes or attacks a clearly defined candidate\u201d); see also Fed. Election Comm\u2019n v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 123 S.Ct. 2200, 156 L.Ed.2d 179 (2003) (upholding a ban on any contributions from NCRL\u2019s general treasury)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"upholding a ban on any contributions from NCRL's general treasury","sentence":"See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 23-35, 96 S.Ct. 612 (upholding limit on \u201ccontributions\u201d defined as \u201c[fjunds provided to a candidate or political party or campaign committee either directly or indirectly through an intermediary!), or] dollars given to another person or organization that are earmarked for political purposes,\u201d 424 U.S. at 24 n. 24, 96 S.Ct. 612); McConnell, 540 U.S. at 170, 124 S.Ct. 619 (upholding contribution caps for a \u201cpublic communication that promotes or attacks a clearly defined candidate\u201d); see also Fed. Election Comm\u2019n v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 123 S.Ct. 2200, 156 L.Ed.2d 179 (2003) (upholding a ban on any contributions from NCRL\u2019s general treasury)."},"case_id":3582474,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Because the limits on money given to support clear electoral advocacy bear a substantial relationship to the governmental purpose of preventing corruption and the appearance thereof, and only marginally burden speech, these limits are constitutional. Indeed, the Supreme Court has upheld limits on \"contributions\" defined much more broadly than the term in the North Carolina Act.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"upholding limit on \"contributions\" defined as \"[fjunds provided to a candidate or political party or campaign committee either directly or indirectly through an intermediary!","sentence":"See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 23-35, 96 S.Ct. 612 (upholding limit on \u201ccontributions\u201d defined as \u201c[fjunds provided to a candidate or political party or campaign committee either directly or indirectly through an intermediary!), or] dollars given to another person or organization that are earmarked for political purposes,\u201d 424 U.S. at 24 n. 24, 96 S.Ct. 612); McConnell, 540 U.S. at 170, 124 S.Ct. 619 (upholding contribution caps for a \u201cpublic communication that promotes or attacks a clearly defined candidate\u201d); see also Fed. Election Comm\u2019n v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 123 S.Ct. 2200, 156 L.Ed.2d 179 (2003) (upholding a ban on any contributions from NCRL\u2019s general treasury)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"upholding a ban on any contributions from NCRL's general treasury","sentence":"See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 23-35, 96 S.Ct. 612 (upholding limit on \u201ccontributions\u201d defined as \u201c[fjunds provided to a candidate or political party or campaign committee either directly or indirectly through an intermediary!), or] dollars given to another person or organization that are earmarked for political purposes,\u201d 424 U.S. at 24 n. 24, 96 S.Ct. 612); McConnell, 540 U.S. at 170, 124 S.Ct. 619 (upholding contribution caps for a \u201cpublic communication that promotes or attacks a clearly defined candidate\u201d); see also Fed. Election Comm\u2019n v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 123 S.Ct. 2200, 156 L.Ed.2d 179 (2003) (upholding a ban on any contributions from NCRL\u2019s general treasury)."},"case_id":3582474,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Because the limits on money given to support clear electoral advocacy bear a substantial relationship to the governmental purpose of preventing corruption and the appearance thereof, and only marginally burden speech, these limits are constitutional. Indeed, the Supreme Court has upheld limits on \"contributions\" defined much more broadly than the term in the North Carolina Act.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"upholding limit on \"contributions\" defined as \"[fjunds provided to a candidate or political party or campaign committee either directly or indirectly through an intermediary!","sentence":"See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 23-35, 96 S.Ct. 612 (upholding limit on \u201ccontributions\u201d defined as \u201c[fjunds provided to a candidate or political party or campaign committee either directly or indirectly through an intermediary!), or] dollars given to another person or organization that are earmarked for political purposes,\u201d 424 U.S. at 24 n. 24, 96 S.Ct. 612); McConnell, 540 U.S. at 170, 124 S.Ct. 619 (upholding contribution caps for a \u201cpublic communication that promotes or attacks a clearly defined candidate\u201d); see also Fed. Election Comm\u2019n v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 123 S.Ct. 2200, 156 L.Ed.2d 179 (2003) (upholding a ban on any contributions from NCRL\u2019s general treasury)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"upholding a ban on any contributions from NCRL's general treasury","sentence":"See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 23-35, 96 S.Ct. 612 (upholding limit on \u201ccontributions\u201d defined as \u201c[fjunds provided to a candidate or political party or campaign committee either directly or indirectly through an intermediary!), or] dollars given to another person or organization that are earmarked for political purposes,\u201d 424 U.S. at 24 n. 24, 96 S.Ct. 612); McConnell, 540 U.S. at 170, 124 S.Ct. 619 (upholding contribution caps for a \u201cpublic communication that promotes or attacks a clearly defined candidate\u201d); see also Fed. Election Comm\u2019n v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 123 S.Ct. 2200, 156 L.Ed.2d 179 (2003) (upholding a ban on any contributions from NCRL\u2019s general treasury)."},"case_id":3582474,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Because the limits on money given to support clear electoral advocacy bear a substantial relationship to the governmental purpose of preventing corruption and the appearance thereof, and only marginally burden speech, these limits are constitutional. Indeed, the Supreme Court has upheld limits on \"contributions\" defined much more broadly than the term in the North Carolina Act.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"540 U.S. 170, 170","parenthetical":"upholding contribution caps for a \"public communication that promotes or attacks a clearly defined candidate\"","sentence":"See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 23-35, 96 S.Ct. 612 (upholding limit on \u201ccontributions\u201d defined as \u201c[fjunds provided to a candidate or political party or campaign committee either directly or indirectly through an intermediary!), or] dollars given to another person or organization that are earmarked for political purposes,\u201d 424 U.S. at 24 n. 24, 96 S.Ct. 612); McConnell, 540 U.S. at 170, 124 S.Ct. 619 (upholding contribution caps for a \u201cpublic communication that promotes or attacks a clearly defined candidate\u201d); see also Fed. Election Comm\u2019n v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 123 S.Ct. 2200, 156 L.Ed.2d 179 (2003) (upholding a ban on any contributions from NCRL\u2019s general treasury)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"upholding a ban on any contributions from NCRL's general treasury","sentence":"See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 23-35, 96 S.Ct. 612 (upholding limit on \u201ccontributions\u201d defined as \u201c[fjunds provided to a candidate or political party or campaign committee either directly or indirectly through an intermediary!), or] dollars given to another person or organization that are earmarked for political purposes,\u201d 424 U.S. at 24 n. 24, 96 S.Ct. 612); McConnell, 540 U.S. at 170, 124 S.Ct. 619 (upholding contribution caps for a \u201cpublic communication that promotes or attacks a clearly defined candidate\u201d); see also Fed. Election Comm\u2019n v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 123 S.Ct. 2200, 156 L.Ed.2d 179 (2003) (upholding a ban on any contributions from NCRL\u2019s general treasury)."},"case_id":3582474,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Because the limits on money given to support clear electoral advocacy bear a substantial relationship to the governmental purpose of preventing corruption and the appearance thereof, and only marginally burden speech, these limits are constitutional. Indeed, the Supreme Court has upheld limits on \"contributions\" defined much more broadly than the term in the North Carolina Act.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"540 U.S. 170, 170","parenthetical":"upholding contribution caps for a \"public communication that promotes or attacks a clearly defined candidate\"","sentence":"See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 23-35, 96 S.Ct. 612 (upholding limit on \u201ccontributions\u201d defined as \u201c[fjunds provided to a candidate or political party or campaign committee either directly or indirectly through an intermediary!), or] dollars given to another person or organization that are earmarked for political purposes,\u201d 424 U.S. at 24 n. 24, 96 S.Ct. 612); McConnell, 540 U.S. at 170, 124 S.Ct. 619 (upholding contribution caps for a \u201cpublic communication that promotes or attacks a clearly defined candidate\u201d); see also Fed. Election Comm\u2019n v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 123 S.Ct. 2200, 156 L.Ed.2d 179 (2003) (upholding a ban on any contributions from NCRL\u2019s general treasury)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"upholding a ban on any contributions from NCRL's general treasury","sentence":"See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 23-35, 96 S.Ct. 612 (upholding limit on \u201ccontributions\u201d defined as \u201c[fjunds provided to a candidate or political party or campaign committee either directly or indirectly through an intermediary!), or] dollars given to another person or organization that are earmarked for political purposes,\u201d 424 U.S. at 24 n. 24, 96 S.Ct. 612); McConnell, 540 U.S. at 170, 124 S.Ct. 619 (upholding contribution caps for a \u201cpublic communication that promotes or attacks a clearly defined candidate\u201d); see also Fed. Election Comm\u2019n v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 123 S.Ct. 2200, 156 L.Ed.2d 179 (2003) (upholding a ban on any contributions from NCRL\u2019s general treasury)."},"case_id":3582474,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Because the limits on money given to support clear electoral advocacy bear a substantial relationship to the governmental purpose of preventing corruption and the appearance thereof, and only marginally burden speech, these limits are constitutional. Indeed, the Supreme Court has upheld limits on \"contributions\" defined much more broadly than the term in the North Carolina Act.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"upholding a ban on any contributions from NCRL's general treasury","sentence":"See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 23-35, 96 S.Ct. 612 (upholding limit on \u201ccontributions\u201d defined as \u201c[fjunds provided to a candidate or political party or campaign committee either directly or indirectly through an intermediary!), or] dollars given to another person or organization that are earmarked for political purposes,\u201d 424 U.S. at 24 n. 24, 96 S.Ct. 612); McConnell, 540 U.S. at 170, 124 S.Ct. 619 (upholding contribution caps for a \u201cpublic communication that promotes or attacks a clearly defined candidate\u201d); see also Fed. Election Comm\u2019n v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 123 S.Ct. 2200, 156 L.Ed.2d 179 (2003) (upholding a ban on any contributions from NCRL\u2019s general treasury)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"540 U.S. 170, 170","parenthetical":"upholding contribution caps for a \"public communication that promotes or attacks a clearly defined candidate\"","sentence":"See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 23-35, 96 S.Ct. 612 (upholding limit on \u201ccontributions\u201d defined as \u201c[fjunds provided to a candidate or political party or campaign committee either directly or indirectly through an intermediary!), or] dollars given to another person or organization that are earmarked for political purposes,\u201d 424 U.S. at 24 n. 24, 96 S.Ct. 612); McConnell, 540 U.S. at 170, 124 S.Ct. 619 (upholding contribution caps for a \u201cpublic communication that promotes or attacks a clearly defined candidate\u201d); see also Fed. Election Comm\u2019n v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 123 S.Ct. 2200, 156 L.Ed.2d 179 (2003) (upholding a ban on any contributions from NCRL\u2019s general treasury)."},"case_id":3582474,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Because the limits on money given to support clear electoral advocacy bear a substantial relationship to the governmental purpose of preventing corruption and the appearance thereof, and only marginally burden speech, these limits are constitutional. Indeed, the Supreme Court has upheld limits on \"contributions\" defined much more broadly than the term in the North Carolina Act.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"upholding contribution caps for a \"public communication that promotes or attacks a clearly defined candidate\"","sentence":"See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 23-35, 96 S.Ct. 612 (upholding limit on \u201ccontributions\u201d defined as \u201c[fjunds provided to a candidate or political party or campaign committee either directly or indirectly through an intermediary!), or] dollars given to another person or organization that are earmarked for political purposes,\u201d 424 U.S. at 24 n. 24, 96 S.Ct. 612); McConnell, 540 U.S. at 170, 124 S.Ct. 619 (upholding contribution caps for a \u201cpublic communication that promotes or attacks a clearly defined candidate\u201d); see also Fed. Election Comm\u2019n v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 123 S.Ct. 2200, 156 L.Ed.2d 179 (2003) (upholding a ban on any contributions from NCRL\u2019s general treasury)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"upholding a ban on any contributions from NCRL's general treasury","sentence":"See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 23-35, 96 S.Ct. 612 (upholding limit on \u201ccontributions\u201d defined as \u201c[fjunds provided to a candidate or political party or campaign committee either directly or indirectly through an intermediary!), or] dollars given to another person or organization that are earmarked for political purposes,\u201d 424 U.S. at 24 n. 24, 96 S.Ct. 612); McConnell, 540 U.S. at 170, 124 S.Ct. 619 (upholding contribution caps for a \u201cpublic communication that promotes or attacks a clearly defined candidate\u201d); see also Fed. Election Comm\u2019n v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 123 S.Ct. 2200, 156 L.Ed.2d 179 (2003) (upholding a ban on any contributions from NCRL\u2019s general treasury)."},"case_id":3582474,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Because the limits on money given to support clear electoral advocacy bear a substantial relationship to the governmental purpose of preventing corruption and the appearance thereof, and only marginally burden speech, these limits are constitutional. Indeed, the Supreme Court has upheld limits on \"contributions\" defined much more broadly than the term in the North Carolina Act.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"upholding a ban on any contributions from NCRL's general treasury","sentence":"See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 23-35, 96 S.Ct. 612 (upholding limit on \u201ccontributions\u201d defined as \u201c[fjunds provided to a candidate or political party or campaign committee either directly or indirectly through an intermediary!), or] dollars given to another person or organization that are earmarked for political purposes,\u201d 424 U.S. at 24 n. 24, 96 S.Ct. 612); McConnell, 540 U.S. at 170, 124 S.Ct. 619 (upholding contribution caps for a \u201cpublic communication that promotes or attacks a clearly defined candidate\u201d); see also Fed. Election Comm\u2019n v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 123 S.Ct. 2200, 156 L.Ed.2d 179 (2003) (upholding a ban on any contributions from NCRL\u2019s general treasury)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"upholding contribution caps for a \"public communication that promotes or attacks a clearly defined candidate\"","sentence":"See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 23-35, 96 S.Ct. 612 (upholding limit on \u201ccontributions\u201d defined as \u201c[fjunds provided to a candidate or political party or campaign committee either directly or indirectly through an intermediary!), or] dollars given to another person or organization that are earmarked for political purposes,\u201d 424 U.S. at 24 n. 24, 96 S.Ct. 612); McConnell, 540 U.S. at 170, 124 S.Ct. 619 (upholding contribution caps for a \u201cpublic communication that promotes or attacks a clearly defined candidate\u201d); see also Fed. Election Comm\u2019n v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 123 S.Ct. 2200, 156 L.Ed.2d 179 (2003) (upholding a ban on any contributions from NCRL\u2019s general treasury)."},"case_id":3582474,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Because the limits on money given to support clear electoral advocacy bear a substantial relationship to the governmental purpose of preventing corruption and the appearance thereof, and only marginally burden speech, these limits are constitutional. Indeed, the Supreme Court has upheld limits on \"contributions\" defined much more broadly than the term in the North Carolina Act.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"upholding a ban on any contributions from NCRL's general treasury","sentence":"See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 23-35, 96 S.Ct. 612 (upholding limit on \u201ccontributions\u201d defined as \u201c[fjunds provided to a candidate or political party or campaign committee either directly or indirectly through an intermediary!), or] dollars given to another person or organization that are earmarked for political purposes,\u201d 424 U.S. at 24 n. 24, 96 S.Ct. 612); McConnell, 540 U.S. at 170, 124 S.Ct. 619 (upholding contribution caps for a \u201cpublic communication that promotes or attacks a clearly defined candidate\u201d); see also Fed. Election Comm\u2019n v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 123 S.Ct. 2200, 156 L.Ed.2d 179 (2003) (upholding a ban on any contributions from NCRL\u2019s general treasury)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"upholding contribution caps for a \"public communication that promotes or attacks a clearly defined candidate\"","sentence":"See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 23-35, 96 S.Ct. 612 (upholding limit on \u201ccontributions\u201d defined as \u201c[fjunds provided to a candidate or political party or campaign committee either directly or indirectly through an intermediary!), or] dollars given to another person or organization that are earmarked for political purposes,\u201d 424 U.S. at 24 n. 24, 96 S.Ct. 612); McConnell, 540 U.S. at 170, 124 S.Ct. 619 (upholding contribution caps for a \u201cpublic communication that promotes or attacks a clearly defined candidate\u201d); see also Fed. Election Comm\u2019n v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 123 S.Ct. 2200, 156 L.Ed.2d 179 (2003) (upholding a ban on any contributions from NCRL\u2019s general treasury)."},"case_id":3582474,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Appel-lees' Br. 32 & n.9. Although this raises certain policy concerns, Congress is better suited to address them by revising the estoppel provisions for CBM review should it see fit. Thus, we leave the soundness of exempting the government from the estop-pel provision to Congress, as precedent demands.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"496 U.S. 414, 434","parenthetical":"\"[T]his Court has never upheld an assertion of estoppel against the' Government by a claimant seeking public funds\"","sentence":"See Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410, 419, 91 S.Ct. 423, 27 L.Ed.2d 498 (1971) (\u201c[Hit is for Congress, not this Court, to rewrite the statute.\u201d); see also Office of Pers. Mgmt. v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 434, 110 S.Ct. 2465, 110 L.Ed.2d 387 (1990) (\u201c[T]his Court has never upheld an assertion of estoppel against the' Government by a claimant seeking public funds\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"400 U.S. 410, 419","parenthetical":"\"[Hit is for Congress, not this Court, to rewrite the statute.\"","sentence":"See Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410, 419, 91 S.Ct. 423, 27 L.Ed.2d 498 (1971) (\u201c[Hit is for Congress, not this Court, to rewrite the statute.\u201d); see also Office of Pers. Mgmt. v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 434, 110 S.Ct. 2465, 110 L.Ed.2d 387 (1990) (\u201c[T]his Court has never upheld an assertion of estoppel against the' Government by a claimant seeking public funds\u201d)."},"case_id":12267304,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Appel-lees' Br. 32 & n.9. Although this raises certain policy concerns, Congress is better suited to address them by revising the estoppel provisions for CBM review should it see fit. Thus, we leave the soundness of exempting the government from the estop-pel provision to Congress, as precedent demands.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"400 U.S. 410, 419","parenthetical":"\"[Hit is for Congress, not this Court, to rewrite the statute.\"","sentence":"See Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410, 419, 91 S.Ct. 423, 27 L.Ed.2d 498 (1971) (\u201c[Hit is for Congress, not this Court, to rewrite the statute.\u201d); see also Office of Pers. Mgmt. v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 434, 110 S.Ct. 2465, 110 L.Ed.2d 387 (1990) (\u201c[T]his Court has never upheld an assertion of estoppel against the' Government by a claimant seeking public funds\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[T]his Court has never upheld an assertion of estoppel against the' Government by a claimant seeking public funds\"","sentence":"See Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410, 419, 91 S.Ct. 423, 27 L.Ed.2d 498 (1971) (\u201c[Hit is for Congress, not this Court, to rewrite the statute.\u201d); see also Office of Pers. Mgmt. v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 434, 110 S.Ct. 2465, 110 L.Ed.2d 387 (1990) (\u201c[T]his Court has never upheld an assertion of estoppel against the' Government by a claimant seeking public funds\u201d)."},"case_id":12267304,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Appel-lees' Br. 32 & n.9. Although this raises certain policy concerns, Congress is better suited to address them by revising the estoppel provisions for CBM review should it see fit. Thus, we leave the soundness of exempting the government from the estop-pel provision to Congress, as precedent demands.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"400 U.S. 410, 419","parenthetical":"\"[Hit is for Congress, not this Court, to rewrite the statute.\"","sentence":"See Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410, 419, 91 S.Ct. 423, 27 L.Ed.2d 498 (1971) (\u201c[Hit is for Congress, not this Court, to rewrite the statute.\u201d); see also Office of Pers. Mgmt. v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 434, 110 S.Ct. 2465, 110 L.Ed.2d 387 (1990) (\u201c[T]his Court has never upheld an assertion of estoppel against the' Government by a claimant seeking public funds\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[T]his Court has never upheld an assertion of estoppel against the' Government by a claimant seeking public funds\"","sentence":"See Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410, 419, 91 S.Ct. 423, 27 L.Ed.2d 498 (1971) (\u201c[Hit is for Congress, not this Court, to rewrite the statute.\u201d); see also Office of Pers. Mgmt. v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 434, 110 S.Ct. 2465, 110 L.Ed.2d 387 (1990) (\u201c[T]his Court has never upheld an assertion of estoppel against the' Government by a claimant seeking public funds\u201d)."},"case_id":12267304,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Appel-lees' Br. 32 & n.9. Although this raises certain policy concerns, Congress is better suited to address them by revising the estoppel provisions for CBM review should it see fit. Thus, we leave the soundness of exempting the government from the estop-pel provision to Congress, as precedent demands.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[Hit is for Congress, not this Court, to rewrite the statute.\"","sentence":"See Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410, 419, 91 S.Ct. 423, 27 L.Ed.2d 498 (1971) (\u201c[Hit is for Congress, not this Court, to rewrite the statute.\u201d); see also Office of Pers. Mgmt. v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 434, 110 S.Ct. 2465, 110 L.Ed.2d 387 (1990) (\u201c[T]his Court has never upheld an assertion of estoppel against the' Government by a claimant seeking public funds\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"496 U.S. 414, 434","parenthetical":"\"[T]his Court has never upheld an assertion of estoppel against the' Government by a claimant seeking public funds\"","sentence":"See Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410, 419, 91 S.Ct. 423, 27 L.Ed.2d 498 (1971) (\u201c[Hit is for Congress, not this Court, to rewrite the statute.\u201d); see also Office of Pers. Mgmt. v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 434, 110 S.Ct. 2465, 110 L.Ed.2d 387 (1990) (\u201c[T]his Court has never upheld an assertion of estoppel against the' Government by a claimant seeking public funds\u201d)."},"case_id":12267304,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Appel-lees' Br. 32 & n.9. Although this raises certain policy concerns, Congress is better suited to address them by revising the estoppel provisions for CBM review should it see fit. Thus, we leave the soundness of exempting the government from the estop-pel provision to Congress, as precedent demands.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[Hit is for Congress, not this Court, to rewrite the statute.\"","sentence":"See Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410, 419, 91 S.Ct. 423, 27 L.Ed.2d 498 (1971) (\u201c[Hit is for Congress, not this Court, to rewrite the statute.\u201d); see also Office of Pers. Mgmt. v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 434, 110 S.Ct. 2465, 110 L.Ed.2d 387 (1990) (\u201c[T]his Court has never upheld an assertion of estoppel against the' Government by a claimant seeking public funds\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[T]his Court has never upheld an assertion of estoppel against the' Government by a claimant seeking public funds\"","sentence":"See Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410, 419, 91 S.Ct. 423, 27 L.Ed.2d 498 (1971) (\u201c[Hit is for Congress, not this Court, to rewrite the statute.\u201d); see also Office of Pers. Mgmt. v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 434, 110 S.Ct. 2465, 110 L.Ed.2d 387 (1990) (\u201c[T]his Court has never upheld an assertion of estoppel against the' Government by a claimant seeking public funds\u201d)."},"case_id":12267304,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Appel-lees' Br. 32 & n.9. Although this raises certain policy concerns, Congress is better suited to address them by revising the estoppel provisions for CBM review should it see fit. Thus, we leave the soundness of exempting the government from the estop-pel provision to Congress, as precedent demands.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[Hit is for Congress, not this Court, to rewrite the statute.\"","sentence":"See Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410, 419, 91 S.Ct. 423, 27 L.Ed.2d 498 (1971) (\u201c[Hit is for Congress, not this Court, to rewrite the statute.\u201d); see also Office of Pers. Mgmt. v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 434, 110 S.Ct. 2465, 110 L.Ed.2d 387 (1990) (\u201c[T]his Court has never upheld an assertion of estoppel against the' Government by a claimant seeking public funds\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[T]his Court has never upheld an assertion of estoppel against the' Government by a claimant seeking public funds\"","sentence":"See Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410, 419, 91 S.Ct. 423, 27 L.Ed.2d 498 (1971) (\u201c[Hit is for Congress, not this Court, to rewrite the statute.\u201d); see also Office of Pers. Mgmt. v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 434, 110 S.Ct. 2465, 110 L.Ed.2d 387 (1990) (\u201c[T]his Court has never upheld an assertion of estoppel against the' Government by a claimant seeking public funds\u201d)."},"case_id":12267304,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Appel-lees' Br. 32 & n.9. Although this raises certain policy concerns, Congress is better suited to address them by revising the estoppel provisions for CBM review should it see fit. Thus, we leave the soundness of exempting the government from the estop-pel provision to Congress, as precedent demands.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"496 U.S. 414, 434","parenthetical":"\"[T]his Court has never upheld an assertion of estoppel against the' Government by a claimant seeking public funds\"","sentence":"See Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410, 419, 91 S.Ct. 423, 27 L.Ed.2d 498 (1971) (\u201c[Hit is for Congress, not this Court, to rewrite the statute.\u201d); see also Office of Pers. Mgmt. v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 434, 110 S.Ct. 2465, 110 L.Ed.2d 387 (1990) (\u201c[T]his Court has never upheld an assertion of estoppel against the' Government by a claimant seeking public funds\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[Hit is for Congress, not this Court, to rewrite the statute.\"","sentence":"See Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410, 419, 91 S.Ct. 423, 27 L.Ed.2d 498 (1971) (\u201c[Hit is for Congress, not this Court, to rewrite the statute.\u201d); see also Office of Pers. Mgmt. v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 434, 110 S.Ct. 2465, 110 L.Ed.2d 387 (1990) (\u201c[T]his Court has never upheld an assertion of estoppel against the' Government by a claimant seeking public funds\u201d)."},"case_id":12267304,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Appel-lees' Br. 32 & n.9. Although this raises certain policy concerns, Congress is better suited to address them by revising the estoppel provisions for CBM review should it see fit. Thus, we leave the soundness of exempting the government from the estop-pel provision to Congress, as precedent demands.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[Hit is for Congress, not this Court, to rewrite the statute.\"","sentence":"See Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410, 419, 91 S.Ct. 423, 27 L.Ed.2d 498 (1971) (\u201c[Hit is for Congress, not this Court, to rewrite the statute.\u201d); see also Office of Pers. Mgmt. v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 434, 110 S.Ct. 2465, 110 L.Ed.2d 387 (1990) (\u201c[T]his Court has never upheld an assertion of estoppel against the' Government by a claimant seeking public funds\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[T]his Court has never upheld an assertion of estoppel against the' Government by a claimant seeking public funds\"","sentence":"See Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410, 419, 91 S.Ct. 423, 27 L.Ed.2d 498 (1971) (\u201c[Hit is for Congress, not this Court, to rewrite the statute.\u201d); see also Office of Pers. Mgmt. v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 434, 110 S.Ct. 2465, 110 L.Ed.2d 387 (1990) (\u201c[T]his Court has never upheld an assertion of estoppel against the' Government by a claimant seeking public funds\u201d)."},"case_id":12267304,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Appel-lees' Br. 32 & n.9. Although this raises certain policy concerns, Congress is better suited to address them by revising the estoppel provisions for CBM review should it see fit. Thus, we leave the soundness of exempting the government from the estop-pel provision to Congress, as precedent demands.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[Hit is for Congress, not this Court, to rewrite the statute.\"","sentence":"See Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410, 419, 91 S.Ct. 423, 27 L.Ed.2d 498 (1971) (\u201c[Hit is for Congress, not this Court, to rewrite the statute.\u201d); see also Office of Pers. Mgmt. v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 434, 110 S.Ct. 2465, 110 L.Ed.2d 387 (1990) (\u201c[T]his Court has never upheld an assertion of estoppel against the' Government by a claimant seeking public funds\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[T]his Court has never upheld an assertion of estoppel against the' Government by a claimant seeking public funds\"","sentence":"See Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410, 419, 91 S.Ct. 423, 27 L.Ed.2d 498 (1971) (\u201c[Hit is for Congress, not this Court, to rewrite the statute.\u201d); see also Office of Pers. Mgmt. v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 434, 110 S.Ct. 2465, 110 L.Ed.2d 387 (1990) (\u201c[T]his Court has never upheld an assertion of estoppel against the' Government by a claimant seeking public funds\u201d)."},"case_id":12267304,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In the instant case, by contrast, defense counsel established outside of the presence of the jury that Padilla had several larceny convictions for shoplifting and that he had taken elusive action to avoid detection. The district court did not err, having looked beyond the elements of the offense to the underlying facts, in determining that the circumstances of Padilla's larceny convictions did not involve falsity or deceit such as to fall within the ambit of Rule 609(a)(2).","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"906 F.2d 597, 603","parenthetical":"\"[Cjrimes such as theft, robbery, or shoplifting do not involve 'dishonesty or false statement' within the meaning of Rule 609(a","sentence":"See United States v. Hayes, 553 F.2d 824, 827 (2d Cir.1977) (noting that \u201ccrimes of force, such as armed robbery or assault, or crimes of stealth, such as burglary or petit larceny, do not come within\u201d Rule 609(a)(2) (internal citations omitted)); cf. United States v. Sellers, 906 F.2d 597, 603 (11th Cir.1990) (\u201c[Cjrimes such as theft, robbery, or shoplifting do not involve \u2018dishonesty or false statement\u2019 within the meaning of Rule 609(a)(2).\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"553 F.2d 824, 827","parenthetical":"noting that \"crimes of force, such as armed robbery or assault, or crimes of stealth, such as burglary or petit larceny, do not come within\" Rule 609(a","sentence":"See United States v. Hayes, 553 F.2d 824, 827 (2d Cir.1977) (noting that \u201ccrimes of force, such as armed robbery or assault, or crimes of stealth, such as burglary or petit larceny, do not come within\u201d Rule 609(a)(2) (internal citations omitted)); cf. United States v. Sellers, 906 F.2d 597, 603 (11th Cir.1990) (\u201c[Cjrimes such as theft, robbery, or shoplifting do not involve \u2018dishonesty or false statement\u2019 within the meaning of Rule 609(a)(2).\u201d)."},"case_id":1594264,"label":"b"}
{"context":"'Waiver requires a defendant to intentionally surrender a known right.\" As we have previously explained, a non-specific question like \"Anything else?\" does not direct the defendant to any specific issue, so a negative answer does not intentionally surrender a known right.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"775 F.3d 882, 885-86","parenthetical":"\"In this case, the district court's generic inquiry of 'anything further?' did not serve the specific purpose we had in mind in Garcia-Segura.\"","sentence":"United States v. Morris, 775 F.3d 882, 885-86 (7th Cir. 2015) (\u201cIn this case, the district court\u2019s generic inquiry of \u2018anything further?\u2019 did not serve the specific purpose we had in mind in Garcia-Segura.\u201d); see also Speed, 811 F.3d at 857 (\u201c[W]e never intended [in Garcia-Segurd\\ to imply that a general \u2018anything else?\u2019 results in the waiver of a specific right.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"811 F.3d 857, 857","parenthetical":"\"[W]e never intended [in Garcia-Segurd\\ to imply that a general 'anything else?' results in the waiver of a specific right.\"","sentence":"United States v. Morris, 775 F.3d 882, 885-86 (7th Cir. 2015) (\u201cIn this case, the district court\u2019s generic inquiry of \u2018anything further?\u2019 did not serve the specific purpose we had in mind in Garcia-Segura.\u201d); see also Speed, 811 F.3d at 857 (\u201c[W]e never intended [in Garcia-Segurd\\ to imply that a general \u2018anything else?\u2019 results in the waiver of a specific right.\u201d)."},"case_id":4323744,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In this case, however, the absence of similarities rendered the collateral crime evidence irrelevant to the charges for which McCain was being tried. Other than the type of drug involved, there were no similarities between McCain's mere personal possession of a baggie with methamphetamine residue and the charges that he trafficked and conspired to traffic in a large quantity of the substance.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"624 So.2d 826, 827","parenthetical":"distinguishing sentencing options available for drug users but not drug traffickers and noting that \"[t]he personal acquisition and consumption of illegal drugs differs sharply ... from the peddling of such drugs for profit\"","sentence":"See Hill v. State, 624 So.2d 826, 827 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993) (distinguishing sentencing options available for drug users but not drug traffickers and noting that \u201c[t]he personal acquisition and consumption of illegal drugs differs sharply ... from the peddling of such drugs for profit\u201d); cf. United States v. Glen-Archila, 677 F.2d 809, 816 (11th Cir.1982) (\u201cFor evidence of an extrinsic act to be admissible as proof of intent ..., it must require the same intent as the charged offense.... \u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"677 F.2d 809, 816","parenthetical":"\"For evidence of an extrinsic act to be admissible as proof of intent ..., it must require the same intent as the charged offense.... \"","sentence":"See Hill v. State, 624 So.2d 826, 827 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993) (distinguishing sentencing options available for drug users but not drug traffickers and noting that \u201c[t]he personal acquisition and consumption of illegal drugs differs sharply ... from the peddling of such drugs for profit\u201d); cf. United States v. Glen-Archila, 677 F.2d 809, 816 (11th Cir.1982) (\u201cFor evidence of an extrinsic act to be admissible as proof of intent ..., it must require the same intent as the charged offense.... \u201d)."},"case_id":8201016,"label":"a"}
{"context":". Several jurisdictions have limited tortious interference claims arising out of the preparation of a will to instances where a will contest is not available or, if available, would not provide adequate relief to the injured party.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"describing an \"emerging majority of case law\" that limits intentional interference claims to when an adequate remedy does not exist in probate court","sentence":"See Wilson v. Fritschy, 132 N.M. 785, 55 P.3d 997, 1001-02 (App.2002) (describing an \"emerging majority of case law\u201d that limits intentional interference claims to when an adequate remedy does not exist in probate court); see also Jackson v. Kelly, 345 Ark. 151, 44 S.W.3d 328, 331-34 (2001) (declining to apply the tort because adequate relief was available to the injured party in the probate court); DeWitt v. Duce, 408 So.2d 216, 218 (Fla. 1981); In re Estate of Ellis, 236 I11.2d 45, 337 Ill.Dec. 678, 923 N.E.2d 237, 241-42 (2009); Minton v. Sackett, 671 N.E.2d 160, 162 (Ind.Ct.App.1996); McMullin v. Borgers, 761 S.W.2d 718, 719-20 (Mo.Ct.App.1988); Garruto v. Cannici, 397 N.J.Super. 231, 936 A.2d 1015, 1021-22 (App.Div.2007) (declining to address the issue of whether the tort was recognized in New Jersey but noting that adequate relief was available to the injured party in the probate court and the tort therefore could not apply)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"declining to apply the tort because adequate relief was available to the injured party in the probate court","sentence":"See Wilson v. Fritschy, 132 N.M. 785, 55 P.3d 997, 1001-02 (App.2002) (describing an \"emerging majority of case law\u201d that limits intentional interference claims to when an adequate remedy does not exist in probate court); see also Jackson v. Kelly, 345 Ark. 151, 44 S.W.3d 328, 331-34 (2001) (declining to apply the tort because adequate relief was available to the injured party in the probate court); DeWitt v. Duce, 408 So.2d 216, 218 (Fla. 1981); In re Estate of Ellis, 236 I11.2d 45, 337 Ill.Dec. 678, 923 N.E.2d 237, 241-42 (2009); Minton v. Sackett, 671 N.E.2d 160, 162 (Ind.Ct.App.1996); McMullin v. Borgers, 761 S.W.2d 718, 719-20 (Mo.Ct.App.1988); Garruto v. Cannici, 397 N.J.Super. 231, 936 A.2d 1015, 1021-22 (App.Div.2007) (declining to address the issue of whether the tort was recognized in New Jersey but noting that adequate relief was available to the injured party in the probate court and the tort therefore could not apply)."},"case_id":7286245,"label":"a"}
{"context":". Several jurisdictions have limited tortious interference claims arising out of the preparation of a will to instances where a will contest is not available or, if available, would not provide adequate relief to the injured party.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"describing an \"emerging majority of case law\" that limits intentional interference claims to when an adequate remedy does not exist in probate court","sentence":"See Wilson v. Fritschy, 132 N.M. 785, 55 P.3d 997, 1001-02 (App.2002) (describing an \"emerging majority of case law\u201d that limits intentional interference claims to when an adequate remedy does not exist in probate court); see also Jackson v. Kelly, 345 Ark. 151, 44 S.W.3d 328, 331-34 (2001) (declining to apply the tort because adequate relief was available to the injured party in the probate court); DeWitt v. Duce, 408 So.2d 216, 218 (Fla. 1981); In re Estate of Ellis, 236 I11.2d 45, 337 Ill.Dec. 678, 923 N.E.2d 237, 241-42 (2009); Minton v. Sackett, 671 N.E.2d 160, 162 (Ind.Ct.App.1996); McMullin v. Borgers, 761 S.W.2d 718, 719-20 (Mo.Ct.App.1988); Garruto v. Cannici, 397 N.J.Super. 231, 936 A.2d 1015, 1021-22 (App.Div.2007) (declining to address the issue of whether the tort was recognized in New Jersey but noting that adequate relief was available to the injured party in the probate court and the tort therefore could not apply)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"44 S.W.3d 328, 331-34","parenthetical":"declining to apply the tort because adequate relief was available to the injured party in the probate court","sentence":"See Wilson v. Fritschy, 132 N.M. 785, 55 P.3d 997, 1001-02 (App.2002) (describing an \"emerging majority of case law\u201d that limits intentional interference claims to when an adequate remedy does not exist in probate court); see also Jackson v. Kelly, 345 Ark. 151, 44 S.W.3d 328, 331-34 (2001) (declining to apply the tort because adequate relief was available to the injured party in the probate court); DeWitt v. Duce, 408 So.2d 216, 218 (Fla. 1981); In re Estate of Ellis, 236 I11.2d 45, 337 Ill.Dec. 678, 923 N.E.2d 237, 241-42 (2009); Minton v. Sackett, 671 N.E.2d 160, 162 (Ind.Ct.App.1996); McMullin v. Borgers, 761 S.W.2d 718, 719-20 (Mo.Ct.App.1988); Garruto v. Cannici, 397 N.J.Super. 231, 936 A.2d 1015, 1021-22 (App.Div.2007) (declining to address the issue of whether the tort was recognized in New Jersey but noting that adequate relief was available to the injured party in the probate court and the tort therefore could not apply)."},"case_id":7286245,"label":"a"}
{"context":". Several jurisdictions have limited tortious interference claims arising out of the preparation of a will to instances where a will contest is not available or, if available, would not provide adequate relief to the injured party.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"describing an \"emerging majority of case law\" that limits intentional interference claims to when an adequate remedy does not exist in probate court","sentence":"See Wilson v. Fritschy, 132 N.M. 785, 55 P.3d 997, 1001-02 (App.2002) (describing an \"emerging majority of case law\u201d that limits intentional interference claims to when an adequate remedy does not exist in probate court); see also Jackson v. Kelly, 345 Ark. 151, 44 S.W.3d 328, 331-34 (2001) (declining to apply the tort because adequate relief was available to the injured party in the probate court); DeWitt v. Duce, 408 So.2d 216, 218 (Fla. 1981); In re Estate of Ellis, 236 I11.2d 45, 337 Ill.Dec. 678, 923 N.E.2d 237, 241-42 (2009); Minton v. Sackett, 671 N.E.2d 160, 162 (Ind.Ct.App.1996); McMullin v. Borgers, 761 S.W.2d 718, 719-20 (Mo.Ct.App.1988); Garruto v. Cannici, 397 N.J.Super. 231, 936 A.2d 1015, 1021-22 (App.Div.2007) (declining to address the issue of whether the tort was recognized in New Jersey but noting that adequate relief was available to the injured party in the probate court and the tort therefore could not apply)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"declining to address the issue of whether the tort was recognized in New Jersey but noting that adequate relief was available to the injured party in the probate court and the tort therefore could not apply","sentence":"See Wilson v. Fritschy, 132 N.M. 785, 55 P.3d 997, 1001-02 (App.2002) (describing an \"emerging majority of case law\u201d that limits intentional interference claims to when an adequate remedy does not exist in probate court); see also Jackson v. Kelly, 345 Ark. 151, 44 S.W.3d 328, 331-34 (2001) (declining to apply the tort because adequate relief was available to the injured party in the probate court); DeWitt v. Duce, 408 So.2d 216, 218 (Fla. 1981); In re Estate of Ellis, 236 I11.2d 45, 337 Ill.Dec. 678, 923 N.E.2d 237, 241-42 (2009); Minton v. Sackett, 671 N.E.2d 160, 162 (Ind.Ct.App.1996); McMullin v. Borgers, 761 S.W.2d 718, 719-20 (Mo.Ct.App.1988); Garruto v. Cannici, 397 N.J.Super. 231, 936 A.2d 1015, 1021-22 (App.Div.2007) (declining to address the issue of whether the tort was recognized in New Jersey but noting that adequate relief was available to the injured party in the probate court and the tort therefore could not apply)."},"case_id":7286245,"label":"a"}
{"context":". Several jurisdictions have limited tortious interference claims arising out of the preparation of a will to instances where a will contest is not available or, if available, would not provide adequate relief to the injured party.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"936 A.2d 1015, 1021-22","parenthetical":"declining to address the issue of whether the tort was recognized in New Jersey but noting that adequate relief was available to the injured party in the probate court and the tort therefore could not apply","sentence":"See Wilson v. Fritschy, 132 N.M. 785, 55 P.3d 997, 1001-02 (App.2002) (describing an \"emerging majority of case law\u201d that limits intentional interference claims to when an adequate remedy does not exist in probate court); see also Jackson v. Kelly, 345 Ark. 151, 44 S.W.3d 328, 331-34 (2001) (declining to apply the tort because adequate relief was available to the injured party in the probate court); DeWitt v. Duce, 408 So.2d 216, 218 (Fla. 1981); In re Estate of Ellis, 236 I11.2d 45, 337 Ill.Dec. 678, 923 N.E.2d 237, 241-42 (2009); Minton v. Sackett, 671 N.E.2d 160, 162 (Ind.Ct.App.1996); McMullin v. Borgers, 761 S.W.2d 718, 719-20 (Mo.Ct.App.1988); Garruto v. Cannici, 397 N.J.Super. 231, 936 A.2d 1015, 1021-22 (App.Div.2007) (declining to address the issue of whether the tort was recognized in New Jersey but noting that adequate relief was available to the injured party in the probate court and the tort therefore could not apply)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"describing an \"emerging majority of case law\" that limits intentional interference claims to when an adequate remedy does not exist in probate court","sentence":"See Wilson v. Fritschy, 132 N.M. 785, 55 P.3d 997, 1001-02 (App.2002) (describing an \"emerging majority of case law\u201d that limits intentional interference claims to when an adequate remedy does not exist in probate court); see also Jackson v. Kelly, 345 Ark. 151, 44 S.W.3d 328, 331-34 (2001) (declining to apply the tort because adequate relief was available to the injured party in the probate court); DeWitt v. Duce, 408 So.2d 216, 218 (Fla. 1981); In re Estate of Ellis, 236 I11.2d 45, 337 Ill.Dec. 678, 923 N.E.2d 237, 241-42 (2009); Minton v. Sackett, 671 N.E.2d 160, 162 (Ind.Ct.App.1996); McMullin v. Borgers, 761 S.W.2d 718, 719-20 (Mo.Ct.App.1988); Garruto v. Cannici, 397 N.J.Super. 231, 936 A.2d 1015, 1021-22 (App.Div.2007) (declining to address the issue of whether the tort was recognized in New Jersey but noting that adequate relief was available to the injured party in the probate court and the tort therefore could not apply)."},"case_id":7286245,"label":"b"}
{"context":". Several jurisdictions have limited tortious interference claims arising out of the preparation of a will to instances where a will contest is not available or, if available, would not provide adequate relief to the injured party.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"declining to apply the tort because adequate relief was available to the injured party in the probate court","sentence":"See Wilson v. Fritschy, 132 N.M. 785, 55 P.3d 997, 1001-02 (App.2002) (describing an \"emerging majority of case law\u201d that limits intentional interference claims to when an adequate remedy does not exist in probate court); see also Jackson v. Kelly, 345 Ark. 151, 44 S.W.3d 328, 331-34 (2001) (declining to apply the tort because adequate relief was available to the injured party in the probate court); DeWitt v. Duce, 408 So.2d 216, 218 (Fla. 1981); In re Estate of Ellis, 236 I11.2d 45, 337 Ill.Dec. 678, 923 N.E.2d 237, 241-42 (2009); Minton v. Sackett, 671 N.E.2d 160, 162 (Ind.Ct.App.1996); McMullin v. Borgers, 761 S.W.2d 718, 719-20 (Mo.Ct.App.1988); Garruto v. Cannici, 397 N.J.Super. 231, 936 A.2d 1015, 1021-22 (App.Div.2007) (declining to address the issue of whether the tort was recognized in New Jersey but noting that adequate relief was available to the injured party in the probate court and the tort therefore could not apply)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"55 P.3d 997, 1001-02","parenthetical":"describing an \"emerging majority of case law\" that limits intentional interference claims to when an adequate remedy does not exist in probate court","sentence":"See Wilson v. Fritschy, 132 N.M. 785, 55 P.3d 997, 1001-02 (App.2002) (describing an \"emerging majority of case law\u201d that limits intentional interference claims to when an adequate remedy does not exist in probate court); see also Jackson v. Kelly, 345 Ark. 151, 44 S.W.3d 328, 331-34 (2001) (declining to apply the tort because adequate relief was available to the injured party in the probate court); DeWitt v. Duce, 408 So.2d 216, 218 (Fla. 1981); In re Estate of Ellis, 236 I11.2d 45, 337 Ill.Dec. 678, 923 N.E.2d 237, 241-42 (2009); Minton v. Sackett, 671 N.E.2d 160, 162 (Ind.Ct.App.1996); McMullin v. Borgers, 761 S.W.2d 718, 719-20 (Mo.Ct.App.1988); Garruto v. Cannici, 397 N.J.Super. 231, 936 A.2d 1015, 1021-22 (App.Div.2007) (declining to address the issue of whether the tort was recognized in New Jersey but noting that adequate relief was available to the injured party in the probate court and the tort therefore could not apply)."},"case_id":7286245,"label":"b"}
{"context":". Several jurisdictions have limited tortious interference claims arising out of the preparation of a will to instances where a will contest is not available or, if available, would not provide adequate relief to the injured party.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"44 S.W.3d 328, 331-34","parenthetical":"declining to apply the tort because adequate relief was available to the injured party in the probate court","sentence":"See Wilson v. Fritschy, 132 N.M. 785, 55 P.3d 997, 1001-02 (App.2002) (describing an \"emerging majority of case law\u201d that limits intentional interference claims to when an adequate remedy does not exist in probate court); see also Jackson v. Kelly, 345 Ark. 151, 44 S.W.3d 328, 331-34 (2001) (declining to apply the tort because adequate relief was available to the injured party in the probate court); DeWitt v. Duce, 408 So.2d 216, 218 (Fla. 1981); In re Estate of Ellis, 236 I11.2d 45, 337 Ill.Dec. 678, 923 N.E.2d 237, 241-42 (2009); Minton v. Sackett, 671 N.E.2d 160, 162 (Ind.Ct.App.1996); McMullin v. Borgers, 761 S.W.2d 718, 719-20 (Mo.Ct.App.1988); Garruto v. Cannici, 397 N.J.Super. 231, 936 A.2d 1015, 1021-22 (App.Div.2007) (declining to address the issue of whether the tort was recognized in New Jersey but noting that adequate relief was available to the injured party in the probate court and the tort therefore could not apply)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"55 P.3d 997, 1001-02","parenthetical":"describing an \"emerging majority of case law\" that limits intentional interference claims to when an adequate remedy does not exist in probate court","sentence":"See Wilson v. Fritschy, 132 N.M. 785, 55 P.3d 997, 1001-02 (App.2002) (describing an \"emerging majority of case law\u201d that limits intentional interference claims to when an adequate remedy does not exist in probate court); see also Jackson v. Kelly, 345 Ark. 151, 44 S.W.3d 328, 331-34 (2001) (declining to apply the tort because adequate relief was available to the injured party in the probate court); DeWitt v. Duce, 408 So.2d 216, 218 (Fla. 1981); In re Estate of Ellis, 236 I11.2d 45, 337 Ill.Dec. 678, 923 N.E.2d 237, 241-42 (2009); Minton v. Sackett, 671 N.E.2d 160, 162 (Ind.Ct.App.1996); McMullin v. Borgers, 761 S.W.2d 718, 719-20 (Mo.Ct.App.1988); Garruto v. Cannici, 397 N.J.Super. 231, 936 A.2d 1015, 1021-22 (App.Div.2007) (declining to address the issue of whether the tort was recognized in New Jersey but noting that adequate relief was available to the injured party in the probate court and the tort therefore could not apply)."},"case_id":7286245,"label":"b"}
{"context":". Several jurisdictions have limited tortious interference claims arising out of the preparation of a will to instances where a will contest is not available or, if available, would not provide adequate relief to the injured party.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"55 P.3d 997, 1001-02","parenthetical":"describing an \"emerging majority of case law\" that limits intentional interference claims to when an adequate remedy does not exist in probate court","sentence":"See Wilson v. Fritschy, 132 N.M. 785, 55 P.3d 997, 1001-02 (App.2002) (describing an \"emerging majority of case law\u201d that limits intentional interference claims to when an adequate remedy does not exist in probate court); see also Jackson v. Kelly, 345 Ark. 151, 44 S.W.3d 328, 331-34 (2001) (declining to apply the tort because adequate relief was available to the injured party in the probate court); DeWitt v. Duce, 408 So.2d 216, 218 (Fla. 1981); In re Estate of Ellis, 236 I11.2d 45, 337 Ill.Dec. 678, 923 N.E.2d 237, 241-42 (2009); Minton v. Sackett, 671 N.E.2d 160, 162 (Ind.Ct.App.1996); McMullin v. Borgers, 761 S.W.2d 718, 719-20 (Mo.Ct.App.1988); Garruto v. Cannici, 397 N.J.Super. 231, 936 A.2d 1015, 1021-22 (App.Div.2007) (declining to address the issue of whether the tort was recognized in New Jersey but noting that adequate relief was available to the injured party in the probate court and the tort therefore could not apply)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"declining to address the issue of whether the tort was recognized in New Jersey but noting that adequate relief was available to the injured party in the probate court and the tort therefore could not apply","sentence":"See Wilson v. Fritschy, 132 N.M. 785, 55 P.3d 997, 1001-02 (App.2002) (describing an \"emerging majority of case law\u201d that limits intentional interference claims to when an adequate remedy does not exist in probate court); see also Jackson v. Kelly, 345 Ark. 151, 44 S.W.3d 328, 331-34 (2001) (declining to apply the tort because adequate relief was available to the injured party in the probate court); DeWitt v. Duce, 408 So.2d 216, 218 (Fla. 1981); In re Estate of Ellis, 236 I11.2d 45, 337 Ill.Dec. 678, 923 N.E.2d 237, 241-42 (2009); Minton v. Sackett, 671 N.E.2d 160, 162 (Ind.Ct.App.1996); McMullin v. Borgers, 761 S.W.2d 718, 719-20 (Mo.Ct.App.1988); Garruto v. Cannici, 397 N.J.Super. 231, 936 A.2d 1015, 1021-22 (App.Div.2007) (declining to address the issue of whether the tort was recognized in New Jersey but noting that adequate relief was available to the injured party in the probate court and the tort therefore could not apply)."},"case_id":7286245,"label":"a"}
{"context":". Several jurisdictions have limited tortious interference claims arising out of the preparation of a will to instances where a will contest is not available or, if available, would not provide adequate relief to the injured party.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"55 P.3d 997, 1001-02","parenthetical":"describing an \"emerging majority of case law\" that limits intentional interference claims to when an adequate remedy does not exist in probate court","sentence":"See Wilson v. Fritschy, 132 N.M. 785, 55 P.3d 997, 1001-02 (App.2002) (describing an \"emerging majority of case law\u201d that limits intentional interference claims to when an adequate remedy does not exist in probate court); see also Jackson v. Kelly, 345 Ark. 151, 44 S.W.3d 328, 331-34 (2001) (declining to apply the tort because adequate relief was available to the injured party in the probate court); DeWitt v. Duce, 408 So.2d 216, 218 (Fla. 1981); In re Estate of Ellis, 236 I11.2d 45, 337 Ill.Dec. 678, 923 N.E.2d 237, 241-42 (2009); Minton v. Sackett, 671 N.E.2d 160, 162 (Ind.Ct.App.1996); McMullin v. Borgers, 761 S.W.2d 718, 719-20 (Mo.Ct.App.1988); Garruto v. Cannici, 397 N.J.Super. 231, 936 A.2d 1015, 1021-22 (App.Div.2007) (declining to address the issue of whether the tort was recognized in New Jersey but noting that adequate relief was available to the injured party in the probate court and the tort therefore could not apply)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"936 A.2d 1015, 1021-22","parenthetical":"declining to address the issue of whether the tort was recognized in New Jersey but noting that adequate relief was available to the injured party in the probate court and the tort therefore could not apply","sentence":"See Wilson v. Fritschy, 132 N.M. 785, 55 P.3d 997, 1001-02 (App.2002) (describing an \"emerging majority of case law\u201d that limits intentional interference claims to when an adequate remedy does not exist in probate court); see also Jackson v. Kelly, 345 Ark. 151, 44 S.W.3d 328, 331-34 (2001) (declining to apply the tort because adequate relief was available to the injured party in the probate court); DeWitt v. Duce, 408 So.2d 216, 218 (Fla. 1981); In re Estate of Ellis, 236 I11.2d 45, 337 Ill.Dec. 678, 923 N.E.2d 237, 241-42 (2009); Minton v. Sackett, 671 N.E.2d 160, 162 (Ind.Ct.App.1996); McMullin v. Borgers, 761 S.W.2d 718, 719-20 (Mo.Ct.App.1988); Garruto v. Cannici, 397 N.J.Super. 231, 936 A.2d 1015, 1021-22 (App.Div.2007) (declining to address the issue of whether the tort was recognized in New Jersey but noting that adequate relief was available to the injured party in the probate court and the tort therefore could not apply)."},"case_id":7286245,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Last, to the extent that plaintiff is alleging that his right to privacy or association was violated because the conversations of plaintiffs wife and daughter were recorded, the uncontroverted evidence establishes that the conversations were taped by George, who was not employed by the city and was not acting at the direction of anyone. Therefore, plaintiffs claim must fail.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"877 F.2d 705, 706-07","parenthetical":"holding that individuals could not maintain action against private citizens and law enforcement officers who intercepted individuals' cordless telephone conversations, as users of cordless telephone did not have justifiable expectation of privacy for their conversations","sentence":"See Tyler v. Berodt, 877 F.2d 705, 706-07 (8th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1022, 110 S.Ct. 723, 107 L.Ed.2d 743 (1990) (holding that individuals could not maintain action against private citizens and law enforcement officers who intercepted individuals\u2019 cordless telephone conversations, as users of cordless telephone did not have justifiable expectation of privacy for their conversations); State v. King, 873 S.W.2d 905, 909 (Mo.Ct.App.1994); see also Madewell v. Roberts, 909 F.2d 1203, 1208 (8th Cir.1990) (holding that liability under \u00a7 1983 requires a causal link to, and direct responsibility for, the deprivation of rights). The uncontradicted evidence shows that the defendants had a legitimate, good faith belief that plaintiff, with his family, was engaging in improper conduct by conspiring to bribe the Chief of Police. Terminating him for this reason did not violate his constitutional rights."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"909 F.2d 1203, 1208","parenthetical":"holding that liability under SS 1983 requires a causal link to, and direct responsibility for, the deprivation of rights","sentence":"See Tyler v. Berodt, 877 F.2d 705, 706-07 (8th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1022, 110 S.Ct. 723, 107 L.Ed.2d 743 (1990) (holding that individuals could not maintain action against private citizens and law enforcement officers who intercepted individuals\u2019 cordless telephone conversations, as users of cordless telephone did not have justifiable expectation of privacy for their conversations); State v. King, 873 S.W.2d 905, 909 (Mo.Ct.App.1994); see also Madewell v. Roberts, 909 F.2d 1203, 1208 (8th Cir.1990) (holding that liability under \u00a7 1983 requires a causal link to, and direct responsibility for, the deprivation of rights). The uncontradicted evidence shows that the defendants had a legitimate, good faith belief that plaintiff, with his family, was engaging in improper conduct by conspiring to bribe the Chief of Police. Terminating him for this reason did not violate his constitutional rights."},"case_id":841877,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Last, to the extent that plaintiff is alleging that his right to privacy or association was violated because the conversations of plaintiffs wife and daughter were recorded, the uncontroverted evidence establishes that the conversations were taped by George, who was not employed by the city and was not acting at the direction of anyone. Therefore, plaintiffs claim must fail.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that individuals could not maintain action against private citizens and law enforcement officers who intercepted individuals' cordless telephone conversations, as users of cordless telephone did not have justifiable expectation of privacy for their conversations","sentence":"See Tyler v. Berodt, 877 F.2d 705, 706-07 (8th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1022, 110 S.Ct. 723, 107 L.Ed.2d 743 (1990) (holding that individuals could not maintain action against private citizens and law enforcement officers who intercepted individuals\u2019 cordless telephone conversations, as users of cordless telephone did not have justifiable expectation of privacy for their conversations); State v. King, 873 S.W.2d 905, 909 (Mo.Ct.App.1994); see also Madewell v. Roberts, 909 F.2d 1203, 1208 (8th Cir.1990) (holding that liability under \u00a7 1983 requires a causal link to, and direct responsibility for, the deprivation of rights). The uncontradicted evidence shows that the defendants had a legitimate, good faith belief that plaintiff, with his family, was engaging in improper conduct by conspiring to bribe the Chief of Police. Terminating him for this reason did not violate his constitutional rights."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"909 F.2d 1203, 1208","parenthetical":"holding that liability under SS 1983 requires a causal link to, and direct responsibility for, the deprivation of rights","sentence":"See Tyler v. Berodt, 877 F.2d 705, 706-07 (8th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1022, 110 S.Ct. 723, 107 L.Ed.2d 743 (1990) (holding that individuals could not maintain action against private citizens and law enforcement officers who intercepted individuals\u2019 cordless telephone conversations, as users of cordless telephone did not have justifiable expectation of privacy for their conversations); State v. King, 873 S.W.2d 905, 909 (Mo.Ct.App.1994); see also Madewell v. Roberts, 909 F.2d 1203, 1208 (8th Cir.1990) (holding that liability under \u00a7 1983 requires a causal link to, and direct responsibility for, the deprivation of rights). The uncontradicted evidence shows that the defendants had a legitimate, good faith belief that plaintiff, with his family, was engaging in improper conduct by conspiring to bribe the Chief of Police. Terminating him for this reason did not violate his constitutional rights."},"case_id":841877,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Last, to the extent that plaintiff is alleging that his right to privacy or association was violated because the conversations of plaintiffs wife and daughter were recorded, the uncontroverted evidence establishes that the conversations were taped by George, who was not employed by the city and was not acting at the direction of anyone. Therefore, plaintiffs claim must fail.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that individuals could not maintain action against private citizens and law enforcement officers who intercepted individuals' cordless telephone conversations, as users of cordless telephone did not have justifiable expectation of privacy for their conversations","sentence":"See Tyler v. Berodt, 877 F.2d 705, 706-07 (8th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1022, 110 S.Ct. 723, 107 L.Ed.2d 743 (1990) (holding that individuals could not maintain action against private citizens and law enforcement officers who intercepted individuals\u2019 cordless telephone conversations, as users of cordless telephone did not have justifiable expectation of privacy for their conversations); State v. King, 873 S.W.2d 905, 909 (Mo.Ct.App.1994); see also Madewell v. Roberts, 909 F.2d 1203, 1208 (8th Cir.1990) (holding that liability under \u00a7 1983 requires a causal link to, and direct responsibility for, the deprivation of rights). The uncontradicted evidence shows that the defendants had a legitimate, good faith belief that plaintiff, with his family, was engaging in improper conduct by conspiring to bribe the Chief of Police. Terminating him for this reason did not violate his constitutional rights."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"909 F.2d 1203, 1208","parenthetical":"holding that liability under SS 1983 requires a causal link to, and direct responsibility for, the deprivation of rights","sentence":"See Tyler v. Berodt, 877 F.2d 705, 706-07 (8th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1022, 110 S.Ct. 723, 107 L.Ed.2d 743 (1990) (holding that individuals could not maintain action against private citizens and law enforcement officers who intercepted individuals\u2019 cordless telephone conversations, as users of cordless telephone did not have justifiable expectation of privacy for their conversations); State v. King, 873 S.W.2d 905, 909 (Mo.Ct.App.1994); see also Madewell v. Roberts, 909 F.2d 1203, 1208 (8th Cir.1990) (holding that liability under \u00a7 1983 requires a causal link to, and direct responsibility for, the deprivation of rights). The uncontradicted evidence shows that the defendants had a legitimate, good faith belief that plaintiff, with his family, was engaging in improper conduct by conspiring to bribe the Chief of Police. Terminating him for this reason did not violate his constitutional rights."},"case_id":841877,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Last, to the extent that plaintiff is alleging that his right to privacy or association was violated because the conversations of plaintiffs wife and daughter were recorded, the uncontroverted evidence establishes that the conversations were taped by George, who was not employed by the city and was not acting at the direction of anyone. Therefore, plaintiffs claim must fail.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"909 F.2d 1203, 1208","parenthetical":"holding that liability under SS 1983 requires a causal link to, and direct responsibility for, the deprivation of rights","sentence":"See Tyler v. Berodt, 877 F.2d 705, 706-07 (8th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1022, 110 S.Ct. 723, 107 L.Ed.2d 743 (1990) (holding that individuals could not maintain action against private citizens and law enforcement officers who intercepted individuals\u2019 cordless telephone conversations, as users of cordless telephone did not have justifiable expectation of privacy for their conversations); State v. King, 873 S.W.2d 905, 909 (Mo.Ct.App.1994); see also Madewell v. Roberts, 909 F.2d 1203, 1208 (8th Cir.1990) (holding that liability under \u00a7 1983 requires a causal link to, and direct responsibility for, the deprivation of rights). The uncontradicted evidence shows that the defendants had a legitimate, good faith belief that plaintiff, with his family, was engaging in improper conduct by conspiring to bribe the Chief of Police. Terminating him for this reason did not violate his constitutional rights."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that individuals could not maintain action against private citizens and law enforcement officers who intercepted individuals' cordless telephone conversations, as users of cordless telephone did not have justifiable expectation of privacy for their conversations","sentence":"See Tyler v. Berodt, 877 F.2d 705, 706-07 (8th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1022, 110 S.Ct. 723, 107 L.Ed.2d 743 (1990) (holding that individuals could not maintain action against private citizens and law enforcement officers who intercepted individuals\u2019 cordless telephone conversations, as users of cordless telephone did not have justifiable expectation of privacy for their conversations); State v. King, 873 S.W.2d 905, 909 (Mo.Ct.App.1994); see also Madewell v. Roberts, 909 F.2d 1203, 1208 (8th Cir.1990) (holding that liability under \u00a7 1983 requires a causal link to, and direct responsibility for, the deprivation of rights). The uncontradicted evidence shows that the defendants had a legitimate, good faith belief that plaintiff, with his family, was engaging in improper conduct by conspiring to bribe the Chief of Police. Terminating him for this reason did not violate his constitutional rights."},"case_id":841877,"label":"b"}
{"context":"We have also acknowledged that zoning is unlikely to be a fertile ground for inverse condemnation claims.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"324 Ga.App. 476, 479","parenthetical":"\"While the theory ofinverse condemnation arises out of the eminent domain paragraph of the Georgia Constitution,... it is not synonymous with a claim attacking the constitutionality of an existing zoning ordinance following the denial of an application to rezone.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Alexander v. DeKalb County, 264 Ga. 362, 363 (444 SE2d 743) (1994), overruled on other grounds by In re Crane, 253 Ga. 667 (324 SE2d 443) (1985); Mayor & Aldermen of the City of Savannah, 267 Ga. at 174 (assuming, only arguendo, that inverse condemnation is an available remedy in rezoning cases); see also City of Tybee Island v. Live Oak Group, 324 Ga.App. 476, 479 (751 SE2d 123) (2013) (\u201cWhile the theory ofinverse condemnation arises out of the eminent domain paragraph of the Georgia Constitution,... it is not synonymous with a claim attacking the constitutionality of an existing zoning ordinance following the denial of an application to rezone.\u201d). Indeed the majority in the seminal Penn Central case rejected zoning regulations as a likely source of inverse condemnation."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"267 Ga. 174, 174","parenthetical":"assuming, only arguendo, that inverse condemnation is an available remedy in rezoning cases","sentence":"See, e.g., Alexander v. DeKalb County, 264 Ga. 362, 363 (444 SE2d 743) (1994), overruled on other grounds by In re Crane, 253 Ga. 667 (324 SE2d 443) (1985); Mayor & Aldermen of the City of Savannah, 267 Ga. at 174 (assuming, only arguendo, that inverse condemnation is an available remedy in rezoning cases); see also City of Tybee Island v. Live Oak Group, 324 Ga.App. 476, 479 (751 SE2d 123) (2013) (\u201cWhile the theory ofinverse condemnation arises out of the eminent domain paragraph of the Georgia Constitution,... it is not synonymous with a claim attacking the constitutionality of an existing zoning ordinance following the denial of an application to rezone.\u201d). Indeed the majority in the seminal Penn Central case rejected zoning regulations as a likely source of inverse condemnation."},"case_id":12456591,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The manner of the annexation usually is not decisive but only one of several factors to be taken into account in determining whether the article loses its character as personalty and becomes a part of the realty. Furthermore, the property was used by Bankrupt in its business, and Minnesota is committed to the \"trade fixtures\" rule which permits trade fixtures to be removed no matter how permanently attached, so long as such removal does not result in material and permanent injury to the freehold.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"gasoline pumps, storage tanks, electric motors, etc. on gasoline station premises held not to be realty","sentence":"Moffat v. White, 203 Minn. 47, 279 N.W. 732 (1938) (gasoline pumps, storage tanks, electric motors, etc. on gasoline station premises held not to be realty); Northwestern Lumber & Wrecking Co. v. Parker, 125 Minn. 107, 145 N.W. 964 (1914) (boiler set upon permanent foundation, smoke pipe through building wall connecting boiler to smoke stack outside, engine bolted to engine bed supported by braces on another floor, steam heat\u2014 radiator heating system on two floors connected to boiler with usual plumbing apparatus in building, held not to be fixtures under the trade fixtures doctrine)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"metal cages, marble railings, office partitions, steel vault doors, steel safe deposit boxes, mahogany booths, all electric fixtures, exhaust ventilating fans, wooden cabinets in savings and loan office, held not to be realty under trade fixtures doctrine","sentence":"See also Bee Bldg. Co. v. Daniel, 57 F.2d 59 (8th Cir.1932) (metal cages, marble railings, office partitions, steel vault doors, steel safe deposit boxes, mahogany booths, all electric fixtures, exhaust ventilating fans, wooden cabinets in savings and loan office, held not to be realty under trade fixtures doctrine); 4 Collier, Bankruptcy (14th Ed.) ff 70.20, p. 1157. There is no record evidence of any material and permanent injury to the freehold."},"case_id":811073,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The manner of the annexation usually is not decisive but only one of several factors to be taken into account in determining whether the article loses its character as personalty and becomes a part of the realty. Furthermore, the property was used by Bankrupt in its business, and Minnesota is committed to the \"trade fixtures\" rule which permits trade fixtures to be removed no matter how permanently attached, so long as such removal does not result in material and permanent injury to the freehold.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"gasoline pumps, storage tanks, electric motors, etc. on gasoline station premises held not to be realty","sentence":"Moffat v. White, 203 Minn. 47, 279 N.W. 732 (1938) (gasoline pumps, storage tanks, electric motors, etc. on gasoline station premises held not to be realty); Northwestern Lumber & Wrecking Co. v. Parker, 125 Minn. 107, 145 N.W. 964 (1914) (boiler set upon permanent foundation, smoke pipe through building wall connecting boiler to smoke stack outside, engine bolted to engine bed supported by braces on another floor, steam heat\u2014 radiator heating system on two floors connected to boiler with usual plumbing apparatus in building, held not to be fixtures under the trade fixtures doctrine)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"metal cages, marble railings, office partitions, steel vault doors, steel safe deposit boxes, mahogany booths, all electric fixtures, exhaust ventilating fans, wooden cabinets in savings and loan office, held not to be realty under trade fixtures doctrine","sentence":"See also Bee Bldg. Co. v. Daniel, 57 F.2d 59 (8th Cir.1932) (metal cages, marble railings, office partitions, steel vault doors, steel safe deposit boxes, mahogany booths, all electric fixtures, exhaust ventilating fans, wooden cabinets in savings and loan office, held not to be realty under trade fixtures doctrine); 4 Collier, Bankruptcy (14th Ed.) ff 70.20, p. 1157. There is no record evidence of any material and permanent injury to the freehold."},"case_id":811073,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The manner of the annexation usually is not decisive but only one of several factors to be taken into account in determining whether the article loses its character as personalty and becomes a part of the realty. Furthermore, the property was used by Bankrupt in its business, and Minnesota is committed to the \"trade fixtures\" rule which permits trade fixtures to be removed no matter how permanently attached, so long as such removal does not result in material and permanent injury to the freehold.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"boiler set upon permanent foundation, smoke pipe through building wall connecting boiler to smoke stack outside, engine bolted to engine bed supported by braces on another floor, steam heat-- radiator heating system on two floors connected to boiler with usual plumbing apparatus in building, held not to be fixtures under the trade fixtures doctrine","sentence":"Moffat v. White, 203 Minn. 47, 279 N.W. 732 (1938) (gasoline pumps, storage tanks, electric motors, etc. on gasoline station premises held not to be realty); Northwestern Lumber & Wrecking Co. v. Parker, 125 Minn. 107, 145 N.W. 964 (1914) (boiler set upon permanent foundation, smoke pipe through building wall connecting boiler to smoke stack outside, engine bolted to engine bed supported by braces on another floor, steam heat\u2014 radiator heating system on two floors connected to boiler with usual plumbing apparatus in building, held not to be fixtures under the trade fixtures doctrine)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"metal cages, marble railings, office partitions, steel vault doors, steel safe deposit boxes, mahogany booths, all electric fixtures, exhaust ventilating fans, wooden cabinets in savings and loan office, held not to be realty under trade fixtures doctrine","sentence":"See also Bee Bldg. Co. v. Daniel, 57 F.2d 59 (8th Cir.1932) (metal cages, marble railings, office partitions, steel vault doors, steel safe deposit boxes, mahogany booths, all electric fixtures, exhaust ventilating fans, wooden cabinets in savings and loan office, held not to be realty under trade fixtures doctrine); 4 Collier, Bankruptcy (14th Ed.) ff 70.20, p. 1157. There is no record evidence of any material and permanent injury to the freehold."},"case_id":811073,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The manner of the annexation usually is not decisive but only one of several factors to be taken into account in determining whether the article loses its character as personalty and becomes a part of the realty. Furthermore, the property was used by Bankrupt in its business, and Minnesota is committed to the \"trade fixtures\" rule which permits trade fixtures to be removed no matter how permanently attached, so long as such removal does not result in material and permanent injury to the freehold.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"boiler set upon permanent foundation, smoke pipe through building wall connecting boiler to smoke stack outside, engine bolted to engine bed supported by braces on another floor, steam heat-- radiator heating system on two floors connected to boiler with usual plumbing apparatus in building, held not to be fixtures under the trade fixtures doctrine","sentence":"Moffat v. White, 203 Minn. 47, 279 N.W. 732 (1938) (gasoline pumps, storage tanks, electric motors, etc. on gasoline station premises held not to be realty); Northwestern Lumber & Wrecking Co. v. Parker, 125 Minn. 107, 145 N.W. 964 (1914) (boiler set upon permanent foundation, smoke pipe through building wall connecting boiler to smoke stack outside, engine bolted to engine bed supported by braces on another floor, steam heat\u2014 radiator heating system on two floors connected to boiler with usual plumbing apparatus in building, held not to be fixtures under the trade fixtures doctrine)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"metal cages, marble railings, office partitions, steel vault doors, steel safe deposit boxes, mahogany booths, all electric fixtures, exhaust ventilating fans, wooden cabinets in savings and loan office, held not to be realty under trade fixtures doctrine","sentence":"See also Bee Bldg. Co. v. Daniel, 57 F.2d 59 (8th Cir.1932) (metal cages, marble railings, office partitions, steel vault doors, steel safe deposit boxes, mahogany booths, all electric fixtures, exhaust ventilating fans, wooden cabinets in savings and loan office, held not to be realty under trade fixtures doctrine); 4 Collier, Bankruptcy (14th Ed.) ff 70.20, p. 1157. There is no record evidence of any material and permanent injury to the freehold."},"case_id":811073,"label":"a"}
{"context":". At oral argument in this court, the state conceded that Mangum's prior conviction technically was an element of the prohibited possessor charge under A.R.S. SSSS 13 -- 3101 (A)(6)(d) and 13-3102(A)(4).","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"707 P.2d 355, 359","parenthetical":"under Colorado's prohibited possessor statute, \"the defendant's prior conviction is an element of the crime which the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt\"","sentence":"See People v. Quintana, 707 P.2d 355, 359 (Colo.1985) (under Colorado\u2019s prohibited possessor statute, \"the defendant's prior conviction is an element of the crime which the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt\u201d); see also State v. Portsche, 258 Neb. 926, 606 N.W.2d 794, 796 (2000) (under Nebraska\u2019s prohibited possessor statute, prior conviction constituted \"material element of being a convicted felon\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"under Nebraska's prohibited possessor statute, prior conviction constituted \"material element of being a convicted felon\"","sentence":"See People v. Quintana, 707 P.2d 355, 359 (Colo.1985) (under Colorado\u2019s prohibited possessor statute, \"the defendant's prior conviction is an element of the crime which the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt\u201d); see also State v. Portsche, 258 Neb. 926, 606 N.W.2d 794, 796 (2000) (under Nebraska\u2019s prohibited possessor statute, prior conviction constituted \"material element of being a convicted felon\u201d)."},"case_id":3998359,"label":"a"}
{"context":". At oral argument in this court, the state conceded that Mangum's prior conviction technically was an element of the prohibited possessor charge under A.R.S. SSSS 13 -- 3101 (A)(6)(d) and 13-3102(A)(4).","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"707 P.2d 355, 359","parenthetical":"under Colorado's prohibited possessor statute, \"the defendant's prior conviction is an element of the crime which the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt\"","sentence":"See People v. Quintana, 707 P.2d 355, 359 (Colo.1985) (under Colorado\u2019s prohibited possessor statute, \"the defendant's prior conviction is an element of the crime which the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt\u201d); see also State v. Portsche, 258 Neb. 926, 606 N.W.2d 794, 796 (2000) (under Nebraska\u2019s prohibited possessor statute, prior conviction constituted \"material element of being a convicted felon\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"606 N.W.2d 794, 796","parenthetical":"under Nebraska's prohibited possessor statute, prior conviction constituted \"material element of being a convicted felon\"","sentence":"See People v. Quintana, 707 P.2d 355, 359 (Colo.1985) (under Colorado\u2019s prohibited possessor statute, \"the defendant's prior conviction is an element of the crime which the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt\u201d); see also State v. Portsche, 258 Neb. 926, 606 N.W.2d 794, 796 (2000) (under Nebraska\u2019s prohibited possessor statute, prior conviction constituted \"material element of being a convicted felon\u201d)."},"case_id":3998359,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In the course of our discussion of the trial court's inherent authority to effectuate its prior judgments more than four months after judgment has been rendered, we also expressly noted that \"courts have inherent power to change or modify their own injunctions that is not limited by SS 52-212a . . . .\" (Citation omitted.)","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"common law vests courts with continuing jurisdiction to modify their injunctions more than four months after judgment has been rendered","sentence":"Id., 242 n.11, citing Adams v. Vaill, 158 Conn. 478, 482, 262 A.2d 169 (1969) (\u201c[i]t cannot be doubted that courts have inherent power to change or modify their own injunctions [when] circumstances or pertinent law have so changed as to make it equitable to do so\u201d); see also O\u2019Leary v. Industrial Park Corp., 211 Conn. 648, 652-53 n.2, 560 A.2d 968 (1989) (common law vests courts with continuing jurisdiction to modify their injunctions more than four months after judgment has been rendered)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"158 Conn. 478, 482","parenthetical":"\"[i]t cannot be doubted that courts have inherent power to change or modify their own injunctions [when] circumstances or pertinent law have so changed as to make it equitable to do so\"","sentence":"Id., 242 n.11, citing Adams v. Vaill, 158 Conn. 478, 482, 262 A.2d 169 (1969) (\u201c[i]t cannot be doubted that courts have inherent power to change or modify their own injunctions [when] circumstances or pertinent law have so changed as to make it equitable to do so\u201d); see also O\u2019Leary v. Industrial Park Corp., 211 Conn. 648, 652-53 n.2, 560 A.2d 968 (1989) (common law vests courts with continuing jurisdiction to modify their injunctions more than four months after judgment has been rendered)."},"case_id":3991121,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In the course of our discussion of the trial court's inherent authority to effectuate its prior judgments more than four months after judgment has been rendered, we also expressly noted that \"courts have inherent power to change or modify their own injunctions that is not limited by SS 52-212a . . . .\" (Citation omitted.)","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"common law vests courts with continuing jurisdiction to modify their injunctions more than four months after judgment has been rendered","sentence":"Id., 242 n.11, citing Adams v. Vaill, 158 Conn. 478, 482, 262 A.2d 169 (1969) (\u201c[i]t cannot be doubted that courts have inherent power to change or modify their own injunctions [when] circumstances or pertinent law have so changed as to make it equitable to do so\u201d); see also O\u2019Leary v. Industrial Park Corp., 211 Conn. 648, 652-53 n.2, 560 A.2d 968 (1989) (common law vests courts with continuing jurisdiction to modify their injunctions more than four months after judgment has been rendered)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"158 Conn. 478, 482","parenthetical":"\"[i]t cannot be doubted that courts have inherent power to change or modify their own injunctions [when] circumstances or pertinent law have so changed as to make it equitable to do so\"","sentence":"Id., 242 n.11, citing Adams v. Vaill, 158 Conn. 478, 482, 262 A.2d 169 (1969) (\u201c[i]t cannot be doubted that courts have inherent power to change or modify their own injunctions [when] circumstances or pertinent law have so changed as to make it equitable to do so\u201d); see also O\u2019Leary v. Industrial Park Corp., 211 Conn. 648, 652-53 n.2, 560 A.2d 968 (1989) (common law vests courts with continuing jurisdiction to modify their injunctions more than four months after judgment has been rendered)."},"case_id":3991121,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In the course of our discussion of the trial court's inherent authority to effectuate its prior judgments more than four months after judgment has been rendered, we also expressly noted that \"courts have inherent power to change or modify their own injunctions that is not limited by SS 52-212a . . . .\" (Citation omitted.)","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[i]t cannot be doubted that courts have inherent power to change or modify their own injunctions [when] circumstances or pertinent law have so changed as to make it equitable to do so\"","sentence":"Id., 242 n.11, citing Adams v. Vaill, 158 Conn. 478, 482, 262 A.2d 169 (1969) (\u201c[i]t cannot be doubted that courts have inherent power to change or modify their own injunctions [when] circumstances or pertinent law have so changed as to make it equitable to do so\u201d); see also O\u2019Leary v. Industrial Park Corp., 211 Conn. 648, 652-53 n.2, 560 A.2d 968 (1989) (common law vests courts with continuing jurisdiction to modify their injunctions more than four months after judgment has been rendered)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"common law vests courts with continuing jurisdiction to modify their injunctions more than four months after judgment has been rendered","sentence":"Id., 242 n.11, citing Adams v. Vaill, 158 Conn. 478, 482, 262 A.2d 169 (1969) (\u201c[i]t cannot be doubted that courts have inherent power to change or modify their own injunctions [when] circumstances or pertinent law have so changed as to make it equitable to do so\u201d); see also O\u2019Leary v. Industrial Park Corp., 211 Conn. 648, 652-53 n.2, 560 A.2d 968 (1989) (common law vests courts with continuing jurisdiction to modify their injunctions more than four months after judgment has been rendered)."},"case_id":3991121,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In the course of our discussion of the trial court's inherent authority to effectuate its prior judgments more than four months after judgment has been rendered, we also expressly noted that \"courts have inherent power to change or modify their own injunctions that is not limited by SS 52-212a . . . .\" (Citation omitted.)","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[i]t cannot be doubted that courts have inherent power to change or modify their own injunctions [when] circumstances or pertinent law have so changed as to make it equitable to do so\"","sentence":"Id., 242 n.11, citing Adams v. Vaill, 158 Conn. 478, 482, 262 A.2d 169 (1969) (\u201c[i]t cannot be doubted that courts have inherent power to change or modify their own injunctions [when] circumstances or pertinent law have so changed as to make it equitable to do so\u201d); see also O\u2019Leary v. Industrial Park Corp., 211 Conn. 648, 652-53 n.2, 560 A.2d 968 (1989) (common law vests courts with continuing jurisdiction to modify their injunctions more than four months after judgment has been rendered)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"common law vests courts with continuing jurisdiction to modify their injunctions more than four months after judgment has been rendered","sentence":"Id., 242 n.11, citing Adams v. Vaill, 158 Conn. 478, 482, 262 A.2d 169 (1969) (\u201c[i]t cannot be doubted that courts have inherent power to change or modify their own injunctions [when] circumstances or pertinent law have so changed as to make it equitable to do so\u201d); see also O\u2019Leary v. Industrial Park Corp., 211 Conn. 648, 652-53 n.2, 560 A.2d 968 (1989) (common law vests courts with continuing jurisdiction to modify their injunctions more than four months after judgment has been rendered)."},"case_id":3991121,"label":"a"}
{"context":"\"A treating physician's opinion does not deserve controlling weight when it is nothing more than a conclusory statement.\" Moreover, checking a box on a form, without more, cannot amount to substantial evidence.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"710 F.2d 1334, 1341","parenthetical":"\"Because of the interpretive problems inherent in the use of forms such as the physical capacities checklist, our Court has held that while these forms are admissible, they are entitled to little weight and do not constitute \"substantial evidence\" on the record as a whole.\"","sentence":"O\u2019Leary v. Schweiker, 710 F.2d 1334, 1341 (8th Cir.1983) (\u201cBecause of the interpretive problems inherent in the use of forms such as the physical capacities checklist, our Court has held that while these forms are admissible, they are entitled to little weight and do not constitute \u201csubstantial evidence\u201d on the record as a whole.\u201d) (citations omitted); see also Swigert v. Astrue, 226 Fed.Appx. 628 (8th Cir.2007) (\u201cA treating physician\u2019s checkmarks on an MSS form may be discounted if they are contradicted by other objective medical evidence in the record.\u201d) (citations omitted)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"A treating physician's checkmarks on an MSS form may be discounted if they are contradicted by other objective medical evidence in the record.\"","sentence":"O\u2019Leary v. Schweiker, 710 F.2d 1334, 1341 (8th Cir.1983) (\u201cBecause of the interpretive problems inherent in the use of forms such as the physical capacities checklist, our Court has held that while these forms are admissible, they are entitled to little weight and do not constitute \u201csubstantial evidence\u201d on the record as a whole.\u201d) (citations omitted); see also Swigert v. Astrue, 226 Fed.Appx. 628 (8th Cir.2007) (\u201cA treating physician\u2019s checkmarks on an MSS form may be discounted if they are contradicted by other objective medical evidence in the record.\u201d) (citations omitted)."},"case_id":3893794,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Yet, under the bankruptcy court's reading of Section 5, an employer could prevent the creation of a trust simply by refusing to segregate the funds resulting from the tax withholdings. Nothing in Section 5 indicates that the Massachusetts Legislature wanted the debtor's whim to dictate the extent of protection afforded the Commonwealth's treasury, and I decline to interpret the statute as condoning such an anomalous result.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"385 Mass. 91, 100","parenthetical":"\"A statute should not be read in a manner that defeats its intended utility.\"","sentence":"See Simon v. Solomon, 385 Mass. 91, 100, 431 N.E.2d 556 (1982) (\u201cA statute should not be read in a manner that defeats its intended utility.\u201d); Manning v. Boston Redevelopment Auth., 400 Mass. 444, 453, 509 N.E.2d 1173 (1987) (\u201cA statute ... should not be construed in a way that produces absurd or unreasonable results when a sensible construction is readily available.\u201d); see also Begier, 496 U.S. at 61, 110 S.Ct. at 2264 (refusing to construe Section 7501 to permit an employer to avoid the creation of a trust simply by refusing to segregate funds)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"496 U.S. 61, 61","parenthetical":"refusing to construe Section 7501 to permit an employer to avoid the creation of a trust simply by refusing to segregate funds","sentence":"See Simon v. Solomon, 385 Mass. 91, 100, 431 N.E.2d 556 (1982) (\u201cA statute should not be read in a manner that defeats its intended utility.\u201d); Manning v. Boston Redevelopment Auth., 400 Mass. 444, 453, 509 N.E.2d 1173 (1987) (\u201cA statute ... should not be construed in a way that produces absurd or unreasonable results when a sensible construction is readily available.\u201d); see also Begier, 496 U.S. at 61, 110 S.Ct. at 2264 (refusing to construe Section 7501 to permit an employer to avoid the creation of a trust simply by refusing to segregate funds)."},"case_id":6521783,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Yet, under the bankruptcy court's reading of Section 5, an employer could prevent the creation of a trust simply by refusing to segregate the funds resulting from the tax withholdings. Nothing in Section 5 indicates that the Massachusetts Legislature wanted the debtor's whim to dictate the extent of protection afforded the Commonwealth's treasury, and I decline to interpret the statute as condoning such an anomalous result.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"385 Mass. 91, 100","parenthetical":"\"A statute should not be read in a manner that defeats its intended utility.\"","sentence":"See Simon v. Solomon, 385 Mass. 91, 100, 431 N.E.2d 556 (1982) (\u201cA statute should not be read in a manner that defeats its intended utility.\u201d); Manning v. Boston Redevelopment Auth., 400 Mass. 444, 453, 509 N.E.2d 1173 (1987) (\u201cA statute ... should not be construed in a way that produces absurd or unreasonable results when a sensible construction is readily available.\u201d); see also Begier, 496 U.S. at 61, 110 S.Ct. at 2264 (refusing to construe Section 7501 to permit an employer to avoid the creation of a trust simply by refusing to segregate funds)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"110 S.Ct. 2264, 2264","parenthetical":"refusing to construe Section 7501 to permit an employer to avoid the creation of a trust simply by refusing to segregate funds","sentence":"See Simon v. Solomon, 385 Mass. 91, 100, 431 N.E.2d 556 (1982) (\u201cA statute should not be read in a manner that defeats its intended utility.\u201d); Manning v. Boston Redevelopment Auth., 400 Mass. 444, 453, 509 N.E.2d 1173 (1987) (\u201cA statute ... should not be construed in a way that produces absurd or unreasonable results when a sensible construction is readily available.\u201d); see also Begier, 496 U.S. at 61, 110 S.Ct. at 2264 (refusing to construe Section 7501 to permit an employer to avoid the creation of a trust simply by refusing to segregate funds)."},"case_id":6521783,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Yet, under the bankruptcy court's reading of Section 5, an employer could prevent the creation of a trust simply by refusing to segregate the funds resulting from the tax withholdings. Nothing in Section 5 indicates that the Massachusetts Legislature wanted the debtor's whim to dictate the extent of protection afforded the Commonwealth's treasury, and I decline to interpret the statute as condoning such an anomalous result.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"A statute should not be read in a manner that defeats its intended utility.\"","sentence":"See Simon v. Solomon, 385 Mass. 91, 100, 431 N.E.2d 556 (1982) (\u201cA statute should not be read in a manner that defeats its intended utility.\u201d); Manning v. Boston Redevelopment Auth., 400 Mass. 444, 453, 509 N.E.2d 1173 (1987) (\u201cA statute ... should not be construed in a way that produces absurd or unreasonable results when a sensible construction is readily available.\u201d); see also Begier, 496 U.S. at 61, 110 S.Ct. at 2264 (refusing to construe Section 7501 to permit an employer to avoid the creation of a trust simply by refusing to segregate funds)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"496 U.S. 61, 61","parenthetical":"refusing to construe Section 7501 to permit an employer to avoid the creation of a trust simply by refusing to segregate funds","sentence":"See Simon v. Solomon, 385 Mass. 91, 100, 431 N.E.2d 556 (1982) (\u201cA statute should not be read in a manner that defeats its intended utility.\u201d); Manning v. Boston Redevelopment Auth., 400 Mass. 444, 453, 509 N.E.2d 1173 (1987) (\u201cA statute ... should not be construed in a way that produces absurd or unreasonable results when a sensible construction is readily available.\u201d); see also Begier, 496 U.S. at 61, 110 S.Ct. at 2264 (refusing to construe Section 7501 to permit an employer to avoid the creation of a trust simply by refusing to segregate funds)."},"case_id":6521783,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Yet, under the bankruptcy court's reading of Section 5, an employer could prevent the creation of a trust simply by refusing to segregate the funds resulting from the tax withholdings. Nothing in Section 5 indicates that the Massachusetts Legislature wanted the debtor's whim to dictate the extent of protection afforded the Commonwealth's treasury, and I decline to interpret the statute as condoning such an anomalous result.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"110 S.Ct. 2264, 2264","parenthetical":"refusing to construe Section 7501 to permit an employer to avoid the creation of a trust simply by refusing to segregate funds","sentence":"See Simon v. Solomon, 385 Mass. 91, 100, 431 N.E.2d 556 (1982) (\u201cA statute should not be read in a manner that defeats its intended utility.\u201d); Manning v. Boston Redevelopment Auth., 400 Mass. 444, 453, 509 N.E.2d 1173 (1987) (\u201cA statute ... should not be construed in a way that produces absurd or unreasonable results when a sensible construction is readily available.\u201d); see also Begier, 496 U.S. at 61, 110 S.Ct. at 2264 (refusing to construe Section 7501 to permit an employer to avoid the creation of a trust simply by refusing to segregate funds)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"A statute should not be read in a manner that defeats its intended utility.\"","sentence":"See Simon v. Solomon, 385 Mass. 91, 100, 431 N.E.2d 556 (1982) (\u201cA statute should not be read in a manner that defeats its intended utility.\u201d); Manning v. Boston Redevelopment Auth., 400 Mass. 444, 453, 509 N.E.2d 1173 (1987) (\u201cA statute ... should not be construed in a way that produces absurd or unreasonable results when a sensible construction is readily available.\u201d); see also Begier, 496 U.S. at 61, 110 S.Ct. at 2264 (refusing to construe Section 7501 to permit an employer to avoid the creation of a trust simply by refusing to segregate funds)."},"case_id":6521783,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Yet, under the bankruptcy court's reading of Section 5, an employer could prevent the creation of a trust simply by refusing to segregate the funds resulting from the tax withholdings. Nothing in Section 5 indicates that the Massachusetts Legislature wanted the debtor's whim to dictate the extent of protection afforded the Commonwealth's treasury, and I decline to interpret the statute as condoning such an anomalous result.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"400 Mass. 444, 453","parenthetical":"\"A statute ... should not be construed in a way that produces absurd or unreasonable results when a sensible construction is readily available.\"","sentence":"See Simon v. Solomon, 385 Mass. 91, 100, 431 N.E.2d 556 (1982) (\u201cA statute should not be read in a manner that defeats its intended utility.\u201d); Manning v. Boston Redevelopment Auth., 400 Mass. 444, 453, 509 N.E.2d 1173 (1987) (\u201cA statute ... should not be construed in a way that produces absurd or unreasonable results when a sensible construction is readily available.\u201d); see also Begier, 496 U.S. at 61, 110 S.Ct. at 2264 (refusing to construe Section 7501 to permit an employer to avoid the creation of a trust simply by refusing to segregate funds)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"496 U.S. 61, 61","parenthetical":"refusing to construe Section 7501 to permit an employer to avoid the creation of a trust simply by refusing to segregate funds","sentence":"See Simon v. Solomon, 385 Mass. 91, 100, 431 N.E.2d 556 (1982) (\u201cA statute should not be read in a manner that defeats its intended utility.\u201d); Manning v. Boston Redevelopment Auth., 400 Mass. 444, 453, 509 N.E.2d 1173 (1987) (\u201cA statute ... should not be construed in a way that produces absurd or unreasonable results when a sensible construction is readily available.\u201d); see also Begier, 496 U.S. at 61, 110 S.Ct. at 2264 (refusing to construe Section 7501 to permit an employer to avoid the creation of a trust simply by refusing to segregate funds)."},"case_id":6521783,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Yet, under the bankruptcy court's reading of Section 5, an employer could prevent the creation of a trust simply by refusing to segregate the funds resulting from the tax withholdings. Nothing in Section 5 indicates that the Massachusetts Legislature wanted the debtor's whim to dictate the extent of protection afforded the Commonwealth's treasury, and I decline to interpret the statute as condoning such an anomalous result.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"110 S.Ct. 2264, 2264","parenthetical":"refusing to construe Section 7501 to permit an employer to avoid the creation of a trust simply by refusing to segregate funds","sentence":"See Simon v. Solomon, 385 Mass. 91, 100, 431 N.E.2d 556 (1982) (\u201cA statute should not be read in a manner that defeats its intended utility.\u201d); Manning v. Boston Redevelopment Auth., 400 Mass. 444, 453, 509 N.E.2d 1173 (1987) (\u201cA statute ... should not be construed in a way that produces absurd or unreasonable results when a sensible construction is readily available.\u201d); see also Begier, 496 U.S. at 61, 110 S.Ct. at 2264 (refusing to construe Section 7501 to permit an employer to avoid the creation of a trust simply by refusing to segregate funds)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"400 Mass. 444, 453","parenthetical":"\"A statute ... should not be construed in a way that produces absurd or unreasonable results when a sensible construction is readily available.\"","sentence":"See Simon v. Solomon, 385 Mass. 91, 100, 431 N.E.2d 556 (1982) (\u201cA statute should not be read in a manner that defeats its intended utility.\u201d); Manning v. Boston Redevelopment Auth., 400 Mass. 444, 453, 509 N.E.2d 1173 (1987) (\u201cA statute ... should not be construed in a way that produces absurd or unreasonable results when a sensible construction is readily available.\u201d); see also Begier, 496 U.S. at 61, 110 S.Ct. at 2264 (refusing to construe Section 7501 to permit an employer to avoid the creation of a trust simply by refusing to segregate funds)."},"case_id":6521783,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Yet, under the bankruptcy court's reading of Section 5, an employer could prevent the creation of a trust simply by refusing to segregate the funds resulting from the tax withholdings. Nothing in Section 5 indicates that the Massachusetts Legislature wanted the debtor's whim to dictate the extent of protection afforded the Commonwealth's treasury, and I decline to interpret the statute as condoning such an anomalous result.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"A statute ... should not be construed in a way that produces absurd or unreasonable results when a sensible construction is readily available.\"","sentence":"See Simon v. Solomon, 385 Mass. 91, 100, 431 N.E.2d 556 (1982) (\u201cA statute should not be read in a manner that defeats its intended utility.\u201d); Manning v. Boston Redevelopment Auth., 400 Mass. 444, 453, 509 N.E.2d 1173 (1987) (\u201cA statute ... should not be construed in a way that produces absurd or unreasonable results when a sensible construction is readily available.\u201d); see also Begier, 496 U.S. at 61, 110 S.Ct. at 2264 (refusing to construe Section 7501 to permit an employer to avoid the creation of a trust simply by refusing to segregate funds)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"496 U.S. 61, 61","parenthetical":"refusing to construe Section 7501 to permit an employer to avoid the creation of a trust simply by refusing to segregate funds","sentence":"See Simon v. Solomon, 385 Mass. 91, 100, 431 N.E.2d 556 (1982) (\u201cA statute should not be read in a manner that defeats its intended utility.\u201d); Manning v. Boston Redevelopment Auth., 400 Mass. 444, 453, 509 N.E.2d 1173 (1987) (\u201cA statute ... should not be construed in a way that produces absurd or unreasonable results when a sensible construction is readily available.\u201d); see also Begier, 496 U.S. at 61, 110 S.Ct. at 2264 (refusing to construe Section 7501 to permit an employer to avoid the creation of a trust simply by refusing to segregate funds)."},"case_id":6521783,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Yet, under the bankruptcy court's reading of Section 5, an employer could prevent the creation of a trust simply by refusing to segregate the funds resulting from the tax withholdings. Nothing in Section 5 indicates that the Massachusetts Legislature wanted the debtor's whim to dictate the extent of protection afforded the Commonwealth's treasury, and I decline to interpret the statute as condoning such an anomalous result.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"110 S.Ct. 2264, 2264","parenthetical":"refusing to construe Section 7501 to permit an employer to avoid the creation of a trust simply by refusing to segregate funds","sentence":"See Simon v. Solomon, 385 Mass. 91, 100, 431 N.E.2d 556 (1982) (\u201cA statute should not be read in a manner that defeats its intended utility.\u201d); Manning v. Boston Redevelopment Auth., 400 Mass. 444, 453, 509 N.E.2d 1173 (1987) (\u201cA statute ... should not be construed in a way that produces absurd or unreasonable results when a sensible construction is readily available.\u201d); see also Begier, 496 U.S. at 61, 110 S.Ct. at 2264 (refusing to construe Section 7501 to permit an employer to avoid the creation of a trust simply by refusing to segregate funds)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"A statute ... should not be construed in a way that produces absurd or unreasonable results when a sensible construction is readily available.\"","sentence":"See Simon v. Solomon, 385 Mass. 91, 100, 431 N.E.2d 556 (1982) (\u201cA statute should not be read in a manner that defeats its intended utility.\u201d); Manning v. Boston Redevelopment Auth., 400 Mass. 444, 453, 509 N.E.2d 1173 (1987) (\u201cA statute ... should not be construed in a way that produces absurd or unreasonable results when a sensible construction is readily available.\u201d); see also Begier, 496 U.S. at 61, 110 S.Ct. at 2264 (refusing to construe Section 7501 to permit an employer to avoid the creation of a trust simply by refusing to segregate funds)."},"case_id":6521783,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Evidence of prior acts that otherwise qualifies for admission under CRE 404(b) is not rendered inadmissible by the defendant's acquittal on criminal charges arising out of those acts.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"defendant's acquittal in previous ease did not collaterally estop court from admitting prior act evidence","sentence":"See People v. Wallen, 996 P.2d 182 (Colo.App.1999)(defendant\u2019s acquittal in previous ease did not collaterally estop court from admitting prior act evidence); People v. Conley, 804 P.2d 240 (Colo.App.1990) (same); see also Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 110 S.Ct. 668, 107 L.Ed.2d 708 (1990) (introduction of evidence relating to crime of which defendant had previously been acquitted does not violate double jeopardy or due process)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"introduction of evidence relating to crime of which defendant had previously been acquitted does not violate double jeopardy or due process","sentence":"See People v. Wallen, 996 P.2d 182 (Colo.App.1999)(defendant\u2019s acquittal in previous ease did not collaterally estop court from admitting prior act evidence); People v. Conley, 804 P.2d 240 (Colo.App.1990) (same); see also Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 110 S.Ct. 668, 107 L.Ed.2d 708 (1990) (introduction of evidence relating to crime of which defendant had previously been acquitted does not violate double jeopardy or due process)."},"case_id":8440259,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Evidence of prior acts that otherwise qualifies for admission under CRE 404(b) is not rendered inadmissible by the defendant's acquittal on criminal charges arising out of those acts.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"defendant's acquittal in previous ease did not collaterally estop court from admitting prior act evidence","sentence":"See People v. Wallen, 996 P.2d 182 (Colo.App.1999)(defendant\u2019s acquittal in previous ease did not collaterally estop court from admitting prior act evidence); People v. Conley, 804 P.2d 240 (Colo.App.1990) (same); see also Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 110 S.Ct. 668, 107 L.Ed.2d 708 (1990) (introduction of evidence relating to crime of which defendant had previously been acquitted does not violate double jeopardy or due process)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"introduction of evidence relating to crime of which defendant had previously been acquitted does not violate double jeopardy or due process","sentence":"See People v. Wallen, 996 P.2d 182 (Colo.App.1999)(defendant\u2019s acquittal in previous ease did not collaterally estop court from admitting prior act evidence); People v. Conley, 804 P.2d 240 (Colo.App.1990) (same); see also Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 110 S.Ct. 668, 107 L.Ed.2d 708 (1990) (introduction of evidence relating to crime of which defendant had previously been acquitted does not violate double jeopardy or due process)."},"case_id":8440259,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Evidence of prior acts that otherwise qualifies for admission under CRE 404(b) is not rendered inadmissible by the defendant's acquittal on criminal charges arising out of those acts.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"introduction of evidence relating to crime of which defendant had previously been acquitted does not violate double jeopardy or due process","sentence":"See People v. Wallen, 996 P.2d 182 (Colo.App.1999)(defendant\u2019s acquittal in previous ease did not collaterally estop court from admitting prior act evidence); People v. Conley, 804 P.2d 240 (Colo.App.1990) (same); see also Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 110 S.Ct. 668, 107 L.Ed.2d 708 (1990) (introduction of evidence relating to crime of which defendant had previously been acquitted does not violate double jeopardy or due process)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"defendant's acquittal in previous ease did not collaterally estop court from admitting prior act evidence","sentence":"See People v. Wallen, 996 P.2d 182 (Colo.App.1999)(defendant\u2019s acquittal in previous ease did not collaterally estop court from admitting prior act evidence); People v. Conley, 804 P.2d 240 (Colo.App.1990) (same); see also Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 110 S.Ct. 668, 107 L.Ed.2d 708 (1990) (introduction of evidence relating to crime of which defendant had previously been acquitted does not violate double jeopardy or due process)."},"case_id":8440259,"label":"b"}
{"context":"There are few cases that turn on the time of loss (as distinct from time of defalcation) in the fiduciary bond context, but the cases that do address the issue similarly focus on the solvency of the guardian or other fiduciary (and thus employ reasoning more akin to that followed in the bankers blanket bond cases than to the reasoning followed in property insurance cases). The cases recognize that a loss from the fiduciary's misuse or misappropriation of assets entrusted to her occurs when the fiduciary is or becomes insolvent (meaning that upon demand she would unable to restore the estate to its original position).","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"reasoning that when the guardian misused funds belonging to the ward's estate by putting them into his own business, that initially \"constitute[d] a diversion but not the destruction or loss of the estate,\" but that if the guardian \"had become absolutely insolvent[,] ... there would have been proof of loss\"","sentence":"See In re Estate of Sacks, 153 Misc. 262, 274 N.Y.S. 707, 715, 716 (N.Y.Sur.Ct.1934) (reasoning that when the guardian misused funds belonging to the ward\u2019s estate by putting them into his own business, that initially \u201cconstitute[d] a diversion but not the destruction or loss of the estate,\u201d but that if the guardian \u201chad become absolutely insolvent[,] ... there would have been proof of loss\u201d) (emphasis added); see also First Nat\u2019l Bank & Trust Co. v. Nat\u2019l Surety Corp., 25 F.Supp. 392, 397, 398-99 (D.Minn.1938) (\u201cIf one is intrusted with trust funds and he violates the trust by spending the estate for his own personal use and has no funds with which to make good the loss, it does not require much to convince any reasonable person that an act has occurred which has caused, the beneficiary loss.\u201d) (emphasis added)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"25 F.Supp. 392, 397, 398-99","parenthetical":"\"If one is intrusted with trust funds and he violates the trust by spending the estate for his own personal use and has no funds with which to make good the loss, it does not require much to convince any reasonable person that an act has occurred which has caused, the beneficiary loss.\"","sentence":"See In re Estate of Sacks, 153 Misc. 262, 274 N.Y.S. 707, 715, 716 (N.Y.Sur.Ct.1934) (reasoning that when the guardian misused funds belonging to the ward\u2019s estate by putting them into his own business, that initially \u201cconstitute[d] a diversion but not the destruction or loss of the estate,\u201d but that if the guardian \u201chad become absolutely insolvent[,] ... there would have been proof of loss\u201d) (emphasis added); see also First Nat\u2019l Bank & Trust Co. v. Nat\u2019l Surety Corp., 25 F.Supp. 392, 397, 398-99 (D.Minn.1938) (\u201cIf one is intrusted with trust funds and he violates the trust by spending the estate for his own personal use and has no funds with which to make good the loss, it does not require much to convince any reasonable person that an act has occurred which has caused, the beneficiary loss.\u201d) (emphasis added)."},"case_id":7272246,"label":"a"}
{"context":"There are few cases that turn on the time of loss (as distinct from time of defalcation) in the fiduciary bond context, but the cases that do address the issue similarly focus on the solvency of the guardian or other fiduciary (and thus employ reasoning more akin to that followed in the bankers blanket bond cases than to the reasoning followed in property insurance cases). The cases recognize that a loss from the fiduciary's misuse or misappropriation of assets entrusted to her occurs when the fiduciary is or becomes insolvent (meaning that upon demand she would unable to restore the estate to its original position).","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"274 N.Y.S. 707, 715, 716","parenthetical":"reasoning that when the guardian misused funds belonging to the ward's estate by putting them into his own business, that initially \"constitute[d] a diversion but not the destruction or loss of the estate,\" but that if the guardian \"had become absolutely insolvent[,] ... there would have been proof of loss\"","sentence":"See In re Estate of Sacks, 153 Misc. 262, 274 N.Y.S. 707, 715, 716 (N.Y.Sur.Ct.1934) (reasoning that when the guardian misused funds belonging to the ward\u2019s estate by putting them into his own business, that initially \u201cconstitute[d] a diversion but not the destruction or loss of the estate,\u201d but that if the guardian \u201chad become absolutely insolvent[,] ... there would have been proof of loss\u201d) (emphasis added); see also First Nat\u2019l Bank & Trust Co. v. Nat\u2019l Surety Corp., 25 F.Supp. 392, 397, 398-99 (D.Minn.1938) (\u201cIf one is intrusted with trust funds and he violates the trust by spending the estate for his own personal use and has no funds with which to make good the loss, it does not require much to convince any reasonable person that an act has occurred which has caused, the beneficiary loss.\u201d) (emphasis added)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"25 F.Supp. 392, 397, 398-99","parenthetical":"\"If one is intrusted with trust funds and he violates the trust by spending the estate for his own personal use and has no funds with which to make good the loss, it does not require much to convince any reasonable person that an act has occurred which has caused, the beneficiary loss.\"","sentence":"See In re Estate of Sacks, 153 Misc. 262, 274 N.Y.S. 707, 715, 716 (N.Y.Sur.Ct.1934) (reasoning that when the guardian misused funds belonging to the ward\u2019s estate by putting them into his own business, that initially \u201cconstitute[d] a diversion but not the destruction or loss of the estate,\u201d but that if the guardian \u201chad become absolutely insolvent[,] ... there would have been proof of loss\u201d) (emphasis added); see also First Nat\u2019l Bank & Trust Co. v. Nat\u2019l Surety Corp., 25 F.Supp. 392, 397, 398-99 (D.Minn.1938) (\u201cIf one is intrusted with trust funds and he violates the trust by spending the estate for his own personal use and has no funds with which to make good the loss, it does not require much to convince any reasonable person that an act has occurred which has caused, the beneficiary loss.\u201d) (emphasis added)."},"case_id":7272246,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Mitchell claims that the description in this case was equally vague, and that we must therefore conclude that it could not give rise to a Terry stop. However, as discussed, the \"stop\" in this case did not occur until the officers frisked Mitchell, and at that point the officers had a reasonable and articulable suspicion based on the totality of the circumstances, including most notably the fact that Mitchell said he had a gun. Thus, the seizure was not based merely on an anonymous tip with some descriptive information of a sub ject's readily observable location and appearance.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"529 U.S. 272, 272","parenthetical":"holding that an anonymous tip does not establish sufficient indicia of reliability simply because it provides \"[a]n accurate description of a subject's readily observable location and appearance,\" because such a tip \"provide[s] no predictive information and therefore [leaves] the police without means to test the informant's knowledge or credibility\"","sentence":"See J.L., 529 U.S. at 272, 120 S.Ct. 1375 (holding that an anonymous tip does not establish sufficient indicia of reliability simply because it provides \u201c[a]n accurate description of a subject\u2019s readily observable location and appearance,\u201d because such a tip \u201cprovide[s] no predictive information and therefore [leaves] the police without means to test the informant\u2019s knowledge or credibility\u201d); cf. United States v. Cohen, 481 F.3d 896 (6th Cir.2007) (holding that police officers lacked reasonable suspicion to support the investigatory stop of the defendant\u2019s vehicle which was based only on a 911 hang-up call from a residence in a cul-de-sac, and the fact that an officer saw the defendant\u2019s vehicle turn off the cul-de-sac four minutes later); United States v. Patterson, 340 F.3d 368, 370-72 (6th Cir.2003) (holding that officers lacked reasonable suspicion to seize the defendant based on an anonymous call to a drug hotline about drug sales in a known \u201chot spot\u201d; stating that \u201c[t]o allow the tip alone to establish reasonable suspicion would allow officers carte blanche to search every person in the vicinity\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that police officers lacked reasonable suspicion to support the investigatory stop of the defendant's vehicle which was based only on a 911 hang-up call from a residence in a cul-de-sac, and the fact that an officer saw the defendant's vehicle turn off the cul-de-sac four minutes later","sentence":"See J.L., 529 U.S. at 272, 120 S.Ct. 1375 (holding that an anonymous tip does not establish sufficient indicia of reliability simply because it provides \u201c[a]n accurate description of a subject\u2019s readily observable location and appearance,\u201d because such a tip \u201cprovide[s] no predictive information and therefore [leaves] the police without means to test the informant\u2019s knowledge or credibility\u201d); cf. United States v. Cohen, 481 F.3d 896 (6th Cir.2007) (holding that police officers lacked reasonable suspicion to support the investigatory stop of the defendant\u2019s vehicle which was based only on a 911 hang-up call from a residence in a cul-de-sac, and the fact that an officer saw the defendant\u2019s vehicle turn off the cul-de-sac four minutes later); United States v. Patterson, 340 F.3d 368, 370-72 (6th Cir.2003) (holding that officers lacked reasonable suspicion to seize the defendant based on an anonymous call to a drug hotline about drug sales in a known \u201chot spot\u201d; stating that \u201c[t]o allow the tip alone to establish reasonable suspicion would allow officers carte blanche to search every person in the vicinity\u201d)."},"case_id":3571572,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Mitchell claims that the description in this case was equally vague, and that we must therefore conclude that it could not give rise to a Terry stop. However, as discussed, the \"stop\" in this case did not occur until the officers frisked Mitchell, and at that point the officers had a reasonable and articulable suspicion based on the totality of the circumstances, including most notably the fact that Mitchell said he had a gun. Thus, the seizure was not based merely on an anonymous tip with some descriptive information of a sub ject's readily observable location and appearance.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that an anonymous tip does not establish sufficient indicia of reliability simply because it provides \"[a]n accurate description of a subject's readily observable location and appearance,\" because such a tip \"provide[s] no predictive information and therefore [leaves] the police without means to test the informant's knowledge or credibility\"","sentence":"See J.L., 529 U.S. at 272, 120 S.Ct. 1375 (holding that an anonymous tip does not establish sufficient indicia of reliability simply because it provides \u201c[a]n accurate description of a subject\u2019s readily observable location and appearance,\u201d because such a tip \u201cprovide[s] no predictive information and therefore [leaves] the police without means to test the informant\u2019s knowledge or credibility\u201d); cf. United States v. Cohen, 481 F.3d 896 (6th Cir.2007) (holding that police officers lacked reasonable suspicion to support the investigatory stop of the defendant\u2019s vehicle which was based only on a 911 hang-up call from a residence in a cul-de-sac, and the fact that an officer saw the defendant\u2019s vehicle turn off the cul-de-sac four minutes later); United States v. Patterson, 340 F.3d 368, 370-72 (6th Cir.2003) (holding that officers lacked reasonable suspicion to seize the defendant based on an anonymous call to a drug hotline about drug sales in a known \u201chot spot\u201d; stating that \u201c[t]o allow the tip alone to establish reasonable suspicion would allow officers carte blanche to search every person in the vicinity\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that police officers lacked reasonable suspicion to support the investigatory stop of the defendant's vehicle which was based only on a 911 hang-up call from a residence in a cul-de-sac, and the fact that an officer saw the defendant's vehicle turn off the cul-de-sac four minutes later","sentence":"See J.L., 529 U.S. at 272, 120 S.Ct. 1375 (holding that an anonymous tip does not establish sufficient indicia of reliability simply because it provides \u201c[a]n accurate description of a subject\u2019s readily observable location and appearance,\u201d because such a tip \u201cprovide[s] no predictive information and therefore [leaves] the police without means to test the informant\u2019s knowledge or credibility\u201d); cf. United States v. Cohen, 481 F.3d 896 (6th Cir.2007) (holding that police officers lacked reasonable suspicion to support the investigatory stop of the defendant\u2019s vehicle which was based only on a 911 hang-up call from a residence in a cul-de-sac, and the fact that an officer saw the defendant\u2019s vehicle turn off the cul-de-sac four minutes later); United States v. Patterson, 340 F.3d 368, 370-72 (6th Cir.2003) (holding that officers lacked reasonable suspicion to seize the defendant based on an anonymous call to a drug hotline about drug sales in a known \u201chot spot\u201d; stating that \u201c[t]o allow the tip alone to establish reasonable suspicion would allow officers carte blanche to search every person in the vicinity\u201d)."},"case_id":3571572,"label":"a"}
{"context":"It also appears that the husband has the present ability to pay some amount of permanent alimony. Nonetheless, the record indicates that the parties' financial circumstances will most likely change in the future, which would at least support an award of nominal permanent alimony.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"997 So.2d 451, 454","parenthetical":"\"[W]hen one party is entitled to permanent periodic alimony but the other spouse has no current ability to pay, the trial court should award a nominal sum of permanent periodic alimony, which will give the court jurisdiction to reconsider the award should the parties' financial circumstances change.\"","sentence":"See Schmidt v. Schmidt, 997 So.2d 451, 454 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008) (\u201c[W]hen one party is entitled to permanent periodic alimony but the other spouse has no current ability to pay, the trial court should award a nominal sum of permanent periodic alimony, which will give the court jurisdiction to reconsider the award should the parties\u2019 financial circumstances change.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding the trial court erred by failing to consider whether an award of nominal permanent alimony was warranted where the parties had disparate earning capacities and the wife had a need for alimony","sentence":"See also Fleck v. Fleck, 958 So.2d 1043 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) (finding the trial court erred by failing to consider whether an award of nominal permanent alimony was warranted where the parties had disparate earning capacities and the wife had a need for alimony)."},"case_id":7048533,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Second, it has apparently never been applied against the government in a criminal case.\"). In any event, the inconsistencies were immaterial to the conviction since [the defendant] could have been convicted for the same offense, carjacking resulting in death and aiding and abetting the same, under both theories.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"217 F.3d 989, 998-99","parenthetical":"\"When it' cannot be determined which of two defendants' guns caused a fatal wound and either defendant could have been convicted under either theory, the prosecution's argument at both trials that the defendant on trial pulled the trigger is not factually inconsistent.\"","sentence":"See United States v. Paul, 217 F.3d 989, 998-99 (8th Cir.2000) (\u201cWhen it' cannot be determined which of two defendants\u2019 guns caused a fatal wound and either defendant could have been convicted under either theory, the prosecution\u2019s argument at both trials that the defendant on trial pulled the trigger is not factually inconsistent.\u201d); cf. Bradshaw v. Stumpf, 545 U.S. 175, 187, 125 S.Ct. 2398, 162 L.Ed.2d 143 (2005) (uphold,ing a guilty plea where the defendant\u2019s assertions of inconsistency related entirely to which individual shot the victim but where \u201cthe precise identity of the triggerman was immaterial to [defendant\u2019s conviction for aggravated murder.\u201d).\u2019"},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"545 U.S. 175, 187","parenthetical":"uphold,ing a guilty plea where the defendant's assertions of inconsistency related entirely to which individual shot the victim but where \"the precise identity of the triggerman was immaterial to [defendant's conviction for aggravated murder.\"","sentence":"See United States v. Paul, 217 F.3d 989, 998-99 (8th Cir.2000) (\u201cWhen it' cannot be determined which of two defendants\u2019 guns caused a fatal wound and either defendant could have been convicted under either theory, the prosecution\u2019s argument at both trials that the defendant on trial pulled the trigger is not factually inconsistent.\u201d); cf. Bradshaw v. Stumpf, 545 U.S. 175, 187, 125 S.Ct. 2398, 162 L.Ed.2d 143 (2005) (uphold,ing a guilty plea where the defendant\u2019s assertions of inconsistency related entirely to which individual shot the victim but where \u201cthe precise identity of the triggerman was immaterial to [defendant\u2019s conviction for aggravated murder.\u201d).\u2019"},"case_id":6789899,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Second, it has apparently never been applied against the government in a criminal case.\"). In any event, the inconsistencies were immaterial to the conviction since [the defendant] could have been convicted for the same offense, carjacking resulting in death and aiding and abetting the same, under both theories.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"217 F.3d 989, 998-99","parenthetical":"\"When it' cannot be determined which of two defendants' guns caused a fatal wound and either defendant could have been convicted under either theory, the prosecution's argument at both trials that the defendant on trial pulled the trigger is not factually inconsistent.\"","sentence":"See United States v. Paul, 217 F.3d 989, 998-99 (8th Cir.2000) (\u201cWhen it' cannot be determined which of two defendants\u2019 guns caused a fatal wound and either defendant could have been convicted under either theory, the prosecution\u2019s argument at both trials that the defendant on trial pulled the trigger is not factually inconsistent.\u201d); cf. Bradshaw v. Stumpf, 545 U.S. 175, 187, 125 S.Ct. 2398, 162 L.Ed.2d 143 (2005) (uphold,ing a guilty plea where the defendant\u2019s assertions of inconsistency related entirely to which individual shot the victim but where \u201cthe precise identity of the triggerman was immaterial to [defendant\u2019s conviction for aggravated murder.\u201d).\u2019"},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"uphold,ing a guilty plea where the defendant's assertions of inconsistency related entirely to which individual shot the victim but where \"the precise identity of the triggerman was immaterial to [defendant's conviction for aggravated murder.\"","sentence":"See United States v. Paul, 217 F.3d 989, 998-99 (8th Cir.2000) (\u201cWhen it' cannot be determined which of two defendants\u2019 guns caused a fatal wound and either defendant could have been convicted under either theory, the prosecution\u2019s argument at both trials that the defendant on trial pulled the trigger is not factually inconsistent.\u201d); cf. Bradshaw v. Stumpf, 545 U.S. 175, 187, 125 S.Ct. 2398, 162 L.Ed.2d 143 (2005) (uphold,ing a guilty plea where the defendant\u2019s assertions of inconsistency related entirely to which individual shot the victim but where \u201cthe precise identity of the triggerman was immaterial to [defendant\u2019s conviction for aggravated murder.\u201d).\u2019"},"case_id":6789899,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Second, it has apparently never been applied against the government in a criminal case.\"). In any event, the inconsistencies were immaterial to the conviction since [the defendant] could have been convicted for the same offense, carjacking resulting in death and aiding and abetting the same, under both theories.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"217 F.3d 989, 998-99","parenthetical":"\"When it' cannot be determined which of two defendants' guns caused a fatal wound and either defendant could have been convicted under either theory, the prosecution's argument at both trials that the defendant on trial pulled the trigger is not factually inconsistent.\"","sentence":"See United States v. Paul, 217 F.3d 989, 998-99 (8th Cir.2000) (\u201cWhen it' cannot be determined which of two defendants\u2019 guns caused a fatal wound and either defendant could have been convicted under either theory, the prosecution\u2019s argument at both trials that the defendant on trial pulled the trigger is not factually inconsistent.\u201d); cf. Bradshaw v. Stumpf, 545 U.S. 175, 187, 125 S.Ct. 2398, 162 L.Ed.2d 143 (2005) (uphold,ing a guilty plea where the defendant\u2019s assertions of inconsistency related entirely to which individual shot the victim but where \u201cthe precise identity of the triggerman was immaterial to [defendant\u2019s conviction for aggravated murder.\u201d).\u2019"},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"uphold,ing a guilty plea where the defendant's assertions of inconsistency related entirely to which individual shot the victim but where \"the precise identity of the triggerman was immaterial to [defendant's conviction for aggravated murder.\"","sentence":"See United States v. Paul, 217 F.3d 989, 998-99 (8th Cir.2000) (\u201cWhen it' cannot be determined which of two defendants\u2019 guns caused a fatal wound and either defendant could have been convicted under either theory, the prosecution\u2019s argument at both trials that the defendant on trial pulled the trigger is not factually inconsistent.\u201d); cf. Bradshaw v. Stumpf, 545 U.S. 175, 187, 125 S.Ct. 2398, 162 L.Ed.2d 143 (2005) (uphold,ing a guilty plea where the defendant\u2019s assertions of inconsistency related entirely to which individual shot the victim but where \u201cthe precise identity of the triggerman was immaterial to [defendant\u2019s conviction for aggravated murder.\u201d).\u2019"},"case_id":6789899,"label":"a"}
{"context":"(See Pis.' Mem. at 4.) However, it is a well-established principle that a court need not look to legislative history if the statutory language is clear and unambiguous.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"202 F.3d 110, 119","parenthetical":"\"In construing the terms of a statute, we look first to the language itself.\"","sentence":"See Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 837, 340, 117 S.Ct. 843, 136 L.Ed.2d 808 (1997) (\u201c[A court\u2019s] first step in interpreting a statute is to determine whether the language at issue has a plain and unambiguous meaning with regard to the particular dispute in the case, and inquiry must cease if the statutory language is unambiguous and the statutory scheme is coherent and consistent .... \u201d); see also Disabled in Action of Metro. N.Y. v. Hammons, 202 F.3d 110, 119 (2d Cir. 2000) (\u201cIn construing the terms of a statute, we look first to the language itself.\u201d); Beckett v. Prudential Ins. Co., 893 F.Supp. 234, 238 (S.D.N.Y.1995) (\u201c[W]here the statutory language is unambiguous, [a] court must do no more and no less than apply language as written.\u201d). In the instant case, the language in Section 6411 is both clear and unambiguous in setting forth the application\u2019s requirements and deadlines."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"519 U.S. 837, 340","parenthetical":"\"[A court's] first step in interpreting a statute is to determine whether the language at issue has a plain and unambiguous meaning with regard to the particular dispute in the case, and inquiry must cease if the statutory language is unambiguous and the statutory scheme is coherent and consistent .... \"","sentence":"See Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 837, 340, 117 S.Ct. 843, 136 L.Ed.2d 808 (1997) (\u201c[A court\u2019s] first step in interpreting a statute is to determine whether the language at issue has a plain and unambiguous meaning with regard to the particular dispute in the case, and inquiry must cease if the statutory language is unambiguous and the statutory scheme is coherent and consistent .... \u201d); see also Disabled in Action of Metro. N.Y. v. Hammons, 202 F.3d 110, 119 (2d Cir. 2000) (\u201cIn construing the terms of a statute, we look first to the language itself.\u201d); Beckett v. Prudential Ins. Co., 893 F.Supp. 234, 238 (S.D.N.Y.1995) (\u201c[W]here the statutory language is unambiguous, [a] court must do no more and no less than apply language as written.\u201d). In the instant case, the language in Section 6411 is both clear and unambiguous in setting forth the application\u2019s requirements and deadlines."},"case_id":11136297,"label":"b"}
{"context":"(See Pis.' Mem. at 4.) However, it is a well-established principle that a court need not look to legislative history if the statutory language is clear and unambiguous.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"519 U.S. 837, 340","parenthetical":"\"[A court's] first step in interpreting a statute is to determine whether the language at issue has a plain and unambiguous meaning with regard to the particular dispute in the case, and inquiry must cease if the statutory language is unambiguous and the statutory scheme is coherent and consistent .... \"","sentence":"See Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 837, 340, 117 S.Ct. 843, 136 L.Ed.2d 808 (1997) (\u201c[A court\u2019s] first step in interpreting a statute is to determine whether the language at issue has a plain and unambiguous meaning with regard to the particular dispute in the case, and inquiry must cease if the statutory language is unambiguous and the statutory scheme is coherent and consistent .... \u201d); see also Disabled in Action of Metro. N.Y. v. Hammons, 202 F.3d 110, 119 (2d Cir. 2000) (\u201cIn construing the terms of a statute, we look first to the language itself.\u201d); Beckett v. Prudential Ins. Co., 893 F.Supp. 234, 238 (S.D.N.Y.1995) (\u201c[W]here the statutory language is unambiguous, [a] court must do no more and no less than apply language as written.\u201d). In the instant case, the language in Section 6411 is both clear and unambiguous in setting forth the application\u2019s requirements and deadlines."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"893 F.Supp. 234, 238","parenthetical":"\"[W]here the statutory language is unambiguous, [a] court must do no more and no less than apply language as written.\"","sentence":"See Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 837, 340, 117 S.Ct. 843, 136 L.Ed.2d 808 (1997) (\u201c[A court\u2019s] first step in interpreting a statute is to determine whether the language at issue has a plain and unambiguous meaning with regard to the particular dispute in the case, and inquiry must cease if the statutory language is unambiguous and the statutory scheme is coherent and consistent .... \u201d); see also Disabled in Action of Metro. N.Y. v. Hammons, 202 F.3d 110, 119 (2d Cir. 2000) (\u201cIn construing the terms of a statute, we look first to the language itself.\u201d); Beckett v. Prudential Ins. Co., 893 F.Supp. 234, 238 (S.D.N.Y.1995) (\u201c[W]here the statutory language is unambiguous, [a] court must do no more and no less than apply language as written.\u201d). In the instant case, the language in Section 6411 is both clear and unambiguous in setting forth the application\u2019s requirements and deadlines."},"case_id":11136297,"label":"a"}
{"context":"(See Pis.' Mem. at 4.) However, it is a well-established principle that a court need not look to legislative history if the statutory language is clear and unambiguous.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[A court's] first step in interpreting a statute is to determine whether the language at issue has a plain and unambiguous meaning with regard to the particular dispute in the case, and inquiry must cease if the statutory language is unambiguous and the statutory scheme is coherent and consistent .... \"","sentence":"See Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 837, 340, 117 S.Ct. 843, 136 L.Ed.2d 808 (1997) (\u201c[A court\u2019s] first step in interpreting a statute is to determine whether the language at issue has a plain and unambiguous meaning with regard to the particular dispute in the case, and inquiry must cease if the statutory language is unambiguous and the statutory scheme is coherent and consistent .... \u201d); see also Disabled in Action of Metro. N.Y. v. Hammons, 202 F.3d 110, 119 (2d Cir. 2000) (\u201cIn construing the terms of a statute, we look first to the language itself.\u201d); Beckett v. Prudential Ins. Co., 893 F.Supp. 234, 238 (S.D.N.Y.1995) (\u201c[W]here the statutory language is unambiguous, [a] court must do no more and no less than apply language as written.\u201d). In the instant case, the language in Section 6411 is both clear and unambiguous in setting forth the application\u2019s requirements and deadlines."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"202 F.3d 110, 119","parenthetical":"\"In construing the terms of a statute, we look first to the language itself.\"","sentence":"See Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 837, 340, 117 S.Ct. 843, 136 L.Ed.2d 808 (1997) (\u201c[A court\u2019s] first step in interpreting a statute is to determine whether the language at issue has a plain and unambiguous meaning with regard to the particular dispute in the case, and inquiry must cease if the statutory language is unambiguous and the statutory scheme is coherent and consistent .... \u201d); see also Disabled in Action of Metro. N.Y. v. Hammons, 202 F.3d 110, 119 (2d Cir. 2000) (\u201cIn construing the terms of a statute, we look first to the language itself.\u201d); Beckett v. Prudential Ins. Co., 893 F.Supp. 234, 238 (S.D.N.Y.1995) (\u201c[W]here the statutory language is unambiguous, [a] court must do no more and no less than apply language as written.\u201d). In the instant case, the language in Section 6411 is both clear and unambiguous in setting forth the application\u2019s requirements and deadlines."},"case_id":11136297,"label":"a"}
{"context":"(See Pis.' Mem. at 4.) However, it is a well-established principle that a court need not look to legislative history if the statutory language is clear and unambiguous.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[A court's] first step in interpreting a statute is to determine whether the language at issue has a plain and unambiguous meaning with regard to the particular dispute in the case, and inquiry must cease if the statutory language is unambiguous and the statutory scheme is coherent and consistent .... \"","sentence":"See Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 837, 340, 117 S.Ct. 843, 136 L.Ed.2d 808 (1997) (\u201c[A court\u2019s] first step in interpreting a statute is to determine whether the language at issue has a plain and unambiguous meaning with regard to the particular dispute in the case, and inquiry must cease if the statutory language is unambiguous and the statutory scheme is coherent and consistent .... \u201d); see also Disabled in Action of Metro. N.Y. v. Hammons, 202 F.3d 110, 119 (2d Cir. 2000) (\u201cIn construing the terms of a statute, we look first to the language itself.\u201d); Beckett v. Prudential Ins. Co., 893 F.Supp. 234, 238 (S.D.N.Y.1995) (\u201c[W]here the statutory language is unambiguous, [a] court must do no more and no less than apply language as written.\u201d). In the instant case, the language in Section 6411 is both clear and unambiguous in setting forth the application\u2019s requirements and deadlines."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"893 F.Supp. 234, 238","parenthetical":"\"[W]here the statutory language is unambiguous, [a] court must do no more and no less than apply language as written.\"","sentence":"See Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 837, 340, 117 S.Ct. 843, 136 L.Ed.2d 808 (1997) (\u201c[A court\u2019s] first step in interpreting a statute is to determine whether the language at issue has a plain and unambiguous meaning with regard to the particular dispute in the case, and inquiry must cease if the statutory language is unambiguous and the statutory scheme is coherent and consistent .... \u201d); see also Disabled in Action of Metro. N.Y. v. Hammons, 202 F.3d 110, 119 (2d Cir. 2000) (\u201cIn construing the terms of a statute, we look first to the language itself.\u201d); Beckett v. Prudential Ins. Co., 893 F.Supp. 234, 238 (S.D.N.Y.1995) (\u201c[W]here the statutory language is unambiguous, [a] court must do no more and no less than apply language as written.\u201d). In the instant case, the language in Section 6411 is both clear and unambiguous in setting forth the application\u2019s requirements and deadlines."},"case_id":11136297,"label":"a"}
{"context":"(See Pis.' Mem. at 4.) However, it is a well-established principle that a court need not look to legislative history if the statutory language is clear and unambiguous.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"202 F.3d 110, 119","parenthetical":"\"In construing the terms of a statute, we look first to the language itself.\"","sentence":"See Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 837, 340, 117 S.Ct. 843, 136 L.Ed.2d 808 (1997) (\u201c[A court\u2019s] first step in interpreting a statute is to determine whether the language at issue has a plain and unambiguous meaning with regard to the particular dispute in the case, and inquiry must cease if the statutory language is unambiguous and the statutory scheme is coherent and consistent .... \u201d); see also Disabled in Action of Metro. N.Y. v. Hammons, 202 F.3d 110, 119 (2d Cir. 2000) (\u201cIn construing the terms of a statute, we look first to the language itself.\u201d); Beckett v. Prudential Ins. Co., 893 F.Supp. 234, 238 (S.D.N.Y.1995) (\u201c[W]here the statutory language is unambiguous, [a] court must do no more and no less than apply language as written.\u201d). In the instant case, the language in Section 6411 is both clear and unambiguous in setting forth the application\u2019s requirements and deadlines."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[A court's] first step in interpreting a statute is to determine whether the language at issue has a plain and unambiguous meaning with regard to the particular dispute in the case, and inquiry must cease if the statutory language is unambiguous and the statutory scheme is coherent and consistent .... \"","sentence":"See Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 837, 340, 117 S.Ct. 843, 136 L.Ed.2d 808 (1997) (\u201c[A court\u2019s] first step in interpreting a statute is to determine whether the language at issue has a plain and unambiguous meaning with regard to the particular dispute in the case, and inquiry must cease if the statutory language is unambiguous and the statutory scheme is coherent and consistent .... \u201d); see also Disabled in Action of Metro. N.Y. v. Hammons, 202 F.3d 110, 119 (2d Cir. 2000) (\u201cIn construing the terms of a statute, we look first to the language itself.\u201d); Beckett v. Prudential Ins. Co., 893 F.Supp. 234, 238 (S.D.N.Y.1995) (\u201c[W]here the statutory language is unambiguous, [a] court must do no more and no less than apply language as written.\u201d). In the instant case, the language in Section 6411 is both clear and unambiguous in setting forth the application\u2019s requirements and deadlines."},"case_id":11136297,"label":"b"}
{"context":"(See Pis.' Mem. at 4.) However, it is a well-established principle that a court need not look to legislative history if the statutory language is clear and unambiguous.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"893 F.Supp. 234, 238","parenthetical":"\"[W]here the statutory language is unambiguous, [a] court must do no more and no less than apply language as written.\"","sentence":"See Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 837, 340, 117 S.Ct. 843, 136 L.Ed.2d 808 (1997) (\u201c[A court\u2019s] first step in interpreting a statute is to determine whether the language at issue has a plain and unambiguous meaning with regard to the particular dispute in the case, and inquiry must cease if the statutory language is unambiguous and the statutory scheme is coherent and consistent .... \u201d); see also Disabled in Action of Metro. N.Y. v. Hammons, 202 F.3d 110, 119 (2d Cir. 2000) (\u201cIn construing the terms of a statute, we look first to the language itself.\u201d); Beckett v. Prudential Ins. Co., 893 F.Supp. 234, 238 (S.D.N.Y.1995) (\u201c[W]here the statutory language is unambiguous, [a] court must do no more and no less than apply language as written.\u201d). In the instant case, the language in Section 6411 is both clear and unambiguous in setting forth the application\u2019s requirements and deadlines."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[A court's] first step in interpreting a statute is to determine whether the language at issue has a plain and unambiguous meaning with regard to the particular dispute in the case, and inquiry must cease if the statutory language is unambiguous and the statutory scheme is coherent and consistent .... \"","sentence":"See Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 837, 340, 117 S.Ct. 843, 136 L.Ed.2d 808 (1997) (\u201c[A court\u2019s] first step in interpreting a statute is to determine whether the language at issue has a plain and unambiguous meaning with regard to the particular dispute in the case, and inquiry must cease if the statutory language is unambiguous and the statutory scheme is coherent and consistent .... \u201d); see also Disabled in Action of Metro. N.Y. v. Hammons, 202 F.3d 110, 119 (2d Cir. 2000) (\u201cIn construing the terms of a statute, we look first to the language itself.\u201d); Beckett v. Prudential Ins. Co., 893 F.Supp. 234, 238 (S.D.N.Y.1995) (\u201c[W]here the statutory language is unambiguous, [a] court must do no more and no less than apply language as written.\u201d). In the instant case, the language in Section 6411 is both clear and unambiguous in setting forth the application\u2019s requirements and deadlines."},"case_id":11136297,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Importantly, the EEOC did not bring a hostile work environment claim, and it points to no actions taken on account of these statements. The extent to which a statement like this one evidences discrimination depends, in large part, on its relation in time and relevance to the allegedly discriminatory action.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"875 F.2d 365, 369, 377","parenthetical":"affirming a district court's conclusion, in part, that \"isolated incidents of discrimination were insufficient to support the class' claim of a pattern or practice of gender discrimination\"","sentence":"See Ottaviani v. SUNY at New Paltz, 875 F.2d 365, 369, 377 (2d Cir.1989) (affirming a district court\u2019s conclusion, in part, that \u201cisolated incidents of discrimination were insufficient to support the class\u2019 claim of a pattern or practice of gender discrimination\u201d); Ste."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"541 F.Supp.2d 572, 584","parenthetical":"stating that there must be \"a sufficient nexus between the remark and the employment decision at issue\"","sentence":"Henry v. Wyeth Pharms., Inc., 616 F.3d 134, 149 (2d Cir.2010); Witkowich v. Gonzales, 541 F.Supp.2d 572, 584 (S.D.N.Y.2008) (stating that there must be \u201ca sufficient nexus between the remark and the employment decision at issue\u201d). Isolated remarks by a handful of executives \u2014 or one specific executive, the head of News, which EEOC focuses on heavily here \u2014 do not show that Bloom-berg\u2019s standard operating procedure was to discriminate against pregnant women and mothers."},"case_id":3837564,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The statement is unsworn and from a source with no apparent personah knowledge of the contract negotiations. In general, unsworn letters carry little to no weight as evidence in opposition to a motion -for summary judgment.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"467 F.Supp.2d 336, 361","parenthetical":"holding that a signed but unsworn letter, which is not otherwise authenticated, is hearsay and \"should not be considered as evidence in opposition to a motion for summary judgment\"","sentence":"See Hill v. Rayboy-Brauestein, 467 F.Supp.2d 336, 361 (S.D.N.Y.2006) (holding that a signed but unsworn letter, which is not otherwise authenticated, is hearsay and \"should not be considered as evidence in opposition to a motion for summary judgment\u201d); see also United States v. Jude Hotel Corp., 77 F.3d 648, 657-58 (2d Cir.1996) (\"The submission of [an] unsworn letter was an inappropriate response to the government\u2019s motion for summary judgment, and the factual assertions made in. that letter were properly disregarded by the court.\u201d)"},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"77 F.3d 648, 657-58","parenthetical":"\"The submission of [an] unsworn letter was an inappropriate response to the government's motion for summary judgment, and the factual assertions made in. that letter were properly disregarded by the court.\"","sentence":"See Hill v. Rayboy-Brauestein, 467 F.Supp.2d 336, 361 (S.D.N.Y.2006) (holding that a signed but unsworn letter, which is not otherwise authenticated, is hearsay and \"should not be considered as evidence in opposition to a motion for summary judgment\u201d); see also United States v. Jude Hotel Corp., 77 F.3d 648, 657-58 (2d Cir.1996) (\"The submission of [an] unsworn letter was an inappropriate response to the government\u2019s motion for summary judgment, and the factual assertions made in. that letter were properly disregarded by the court.\u201d)"},"case_id":4182248,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The privacy interests of third parties, including the victims, weigh in the mix of interests to consider in this ease. See United States v. Robinson, Cr.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"654 F.Supp.2d 557, 566","parenthetical":"in seeking protective order, government may advocate for privacy interests of nonparties","sentence":"No. 08-10309, 2009 WL 137319, at *3 (D.Mass. Jan. 20, 2009) (recognizing and discussing importance of privacy interests of victims in context of newspaper\u2019s request for court to order government\u2019s disclosure of victim\u2019s identity); United States v. Salemme, 985 F.Supp. 193, 197 (D.Mass.1997) (\u201cprivacy interests of third parties may weigh heavily in deciding issues of impoundment\u201d); See also United States v. Carriles, 654 F.Supp.2d 557, 566 (W.D.Tex. 2009) (in seeking protective order, government may advocate for privacy interests of nonparties). This ease involves a large number of victims and also implicates the privacy rights of the victims\u2019 families."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"2009 WL 137319, at *3","parenthetical":"recognizing and discussing importance of privacy interests of victims in context of newspaper's request for court to order government's disclosure of victim's identity","sentence":"No. 08-10309, 2009 WL 137319, at *3 (D.Mass. Jan. 20, 2009) (recognizing and discussing importance of privacy interests of victims in context of newspaper\u2019s request for court to order government\u2019s disclosure of victim\u2019s identity); United States v. Salemme, 985 F.Supp. 193, 197 (D.Mass.1997) (\u201cprivacy interests of third parties may weigh heavily in deciding issues of impoundment\u201d); See also United States v. Carriles, 654 F.Supp.2d 557, 566 (W.D.Tex. 2009) (in seeking protective order, government may advocate for privacy interests of nonparties). This ease involves a large number of victims and also implicates the privacy rights of the victims\u2019 families."},"case_id":4282956,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The privacy interests of third parties, including the victims, weigh in the mix of interests to consider in this ease. See United States v. Robinson, Cr.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"654 F.Supp.2d 557, 566","parenthetical":"in seeking protective order, government may advocate for privacy interests of nonparties","sentence":"No. 08-10309, 2009 WL 137319, at *3 (D.Mass. Jan. 20, 2009) (recognizing and discussing importance of privacy interests of victims in context of newspaper\u2019s request for court to order government\u2019s disclosure of victim\u2019s identity); United States v. Salemme, 985 F.Supp. 193, 197 (D.Mass.1997) (\u201cprivacy interests of third parties may weigh heavily in deciding issues of impoundment\u201d); See also United States v. Carriles, 654 F.Supp.2d 557, 566 (W.D.Tex. 2009) (in seeking protective order, government may advocate for privacy interests of nonparties). This ease involves a large number of victims and also implicates the privacy rights of the victims\u2019 families."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"985 F.Supp. 193, 197","parenthetical":"\"privacy interests of third parties may weigh heavily in deciding issues of impoundment\"","sentence":"No. 08-10309, 2009 WL 137319, at *3 (D.Mass. Jan. 20, 2009) (recognizing and discussing importance of privacy interests of victims in context of newspaper\u2019s request for court to order government\u2019s disclosure of victim\u2019s identity); United States v. Salemme, 985 F.Supp. 193, 197 (D.Mass.1997) (\u201cprivacy interests of third parties may weigh heavily in deciding issues of impoundment\u201d); See also United States v. Carriles, 654 F.Supp.2d 557, 566 (W.D.Tex. 2009) (in seeking protective order, government may advocate for privacy interests of nonparties). This ease involves a large number of victims and also implicates the privacy rights of the victims\u2019 families."},"case_id":4282956,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Mar. 29, 2005)). Indeed, states have a strong interest in the welfare of survivors of terrorist attacks and mass torts.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"2005 WL 756090, at *20","parenthetical":"noting that in the context of mass tort cases \"[e]ach state will choose rules of liability and damages that it thinks are best designed to protect the welfare of its citizens\"","sentence":"See Dammarell, 2005 WL 756090, at *20 (noting that in the context of mass tort cases \u201c[e]ach state will choose rules of liability and damages that it thinks are best designed to protect the welfare of its citizens\u201d); cf. Heiser, 466 F.Supp.2d at 266 (noting that \u201cthe United States has a \u2018unique interest\u2019 in having its domestic law apply in cases involving terrorist attacks on United States citizens\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"466 F.Supp.2d 266, 266","parenthetical":"noting that \"the United States has a 'unique interest' in having its domestic law apply in cases involving terrorist attacks on United States citizens\"","sentence":"See Dammarell, 2005 WL 756090, at *20 (noting that in the context of mass tort cases \u201c[e]ach state will choose rules of liability and damages that it thinks are best designed to protect the welfare of its citizens\u201d); cf. Heiser, 466 F.Supp.2d at 266 (noting that \u201cthe United States has a \u2018unique interest\u2019 in having its domestic law apply in cases involving terrorist attacks on United States citizens\u201d)."},"case_id":4346610,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Defendants argue that NorCal and SoCal lack sufficient knowledge about this lawsuit to serve as lead plaintiffs. (Defs.' Class Cert. Br. at 38-39.) \"In this circuit,\" however, \"general knowledge is sufficient to show adequacy.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"272 F.R.D. 164, 164","parenthetical":"approving lead plaintiff in a MBS case who \"showed knowledge of the general characteristics of mortgage-backed securities, the ... securities [at issue in the suit] in particular, and their fiduciary responsibility as class representatives\"","sentence":"Res. Capital, LLC, 272 F.R.D. at 164 (approving lead plaintiff in a MBS case who \u201cshowed knowledge of the general characteristics of mortgage-backed securities, the ... securities [at issue in the suit] in particular, and their fiduciary responsibility as class representatives\u201d); see also Tsereteli, 283 F.R.D. at 209 (\u201cThe Supreme Court has expressly disapproved of attacks on the adequacy of a class representative based on the representative\u2019s ignorance.\u201d (internal quotation marks omitted)); NYSE Specialists, 260 F.R.D. at 74 (stating that, in complex securities eases, \u201cnamed plaintiffs are not expected to possess expert knowledge of the details of the case and must be expected to rely on expert counsel\u201d (quoting Baffa, 222 F.3d at 61) (internal quotation marks omitted))."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"260 F.R.D. 74, 74","parenthetical":"stating that, in complex securities eases, \"named plaintiffs are not expected to possess expert knowledge of the details of the case and must be expected to rely on expert counsel\" (quoting Baffa, 222 F.3d at 61","sentence":"Res. Capital, LLC, 272 F.R.D. at 164 (approving lead plaintiff in a MBS case who \u201cshowed knowledge of the general characteristics of mortgage-backed securities, the ... securities [at issue in the suit] in particular, and their fiduciary responsibility as class representatives\u201d); see also Tsereteli, 283 F.R.D. at 209 (\u201cThe Supreme Court has expressly disapproved of attacks on the adequacy of a class representative based on the representative\u2019s ignorance.\u201d (internal quotation marks omitted)); NYSE Specialists, 260 F.R.D. at 74 (stating that, in complex securities eases, \u201cnamed plaintiffs are not expected to possess expert knowledge of the details of the case and must be expected to rely on expert counsel\u201d (quoting Baffa, 222 F.3d at 61) (internal quotation marks omitted))."},"case_id":4241679,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Defendants argue that NorCal and SoCal lack sufficient knowledge about this lawsuit to serve as lead plaintiffs. (Defs.' Class Cert. Br. at 38-39.) \"In this circuit,\" however, \"general knowledge is sufficient to show adequacy.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"272 F.R.D. 164, 164","parenthetical":"approving lead plaintiff in a MBS case who \"showed knowledge of the general characteristics of mortgage-backed securities, the ... securities [at issue in the suit] in particular, and their fiduciary responsibility as class representatives\"","sentence":"Res. Capital, LLC, 272 F.R.D. at 164 (approving lead plaintiff in a MBS case who \u201cshowed knowledge of the general characteristics of mortgage-backed securities, the ... securities [at issue in the suit] in particular, and their fiduciary responsibility as class representatives\u201d); see also Tsereteli, 283 F.R.D. at 209 (\u201cThe Supreme Court has expressly disapproved of attacks on the adequacy of a class representative based on the representative\u2019s ignorance.\u201d (internal quotation marks omitted)); NYSE Specialists, 260 F.R.D. at 74 (stating that, in complex securities eases, \u201cnamed plaintiffs are not expected to possess expert knowledge of the details of the case and must be expected to rely on expert counsel\u201d (quoting Baffa, 222 F.3d at 61) (internal quotation marks omitted))."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"222 F.3d 61, 61","parenthetical":"stating that, in complex securities eases, \"named plaintiffs are not expected to possess expert knowledge of the details of the case and must be expected to rely on expert counsel\" (quoting Baffa, 222 F.3d at 61","sentence":"Res. Capital, LLC, 272 F.R.D. at 164 (approving lead plaintiff in a MBS case who \u201cshowed knowledge of the general characteristics of mortgage-backed securities, the ... securities [at issue in the suit] in particular, and their fiduciary responsibility as class representatives\u201d); see also Tsereteli, 283 F.R.D. at 209 (\u201cThe Supreme Court has expressly disapproved of attacks on the adequacy of a class representative based on the representative\u2019s ignorance.\u201d (internal quotation marks omitted)); NYSE Specialists, 260 F.R.D. at 74 (stating that, in complex securities eases, \u201cnamed plaintiffs are not expected to possess expert knowledge of the details of the case and must be expected to rely on expert counsel\u201d (quoting Baffa, 222 F.3d at 61) (internal quotation marks omitted))."},"case_id":4241679,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The district court properly dismissed Acosta's deliberate indifference claims because he failed to allege facts establishing that defendants consciously disregarded his serious medical needs.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"391 F.3d 1051, 1060","parenthetical":"\"A showing of medical malpractice or negligence is insufficient to establish a constitutional deprivation under the Eighth Amendment.\"","sentence":"See Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1060 (9th Cir.2004) (\u201cA showing of medical malpractice or negligence is insufficient to establish a constitutional deprivation under the Eighth Amendment.\u201d); Shapley v. Nev. Bd. of State Prison Comm\u2019rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir.1985) (per curiam) (for delay of treatment to constitute deliberate indifference, prisoner must allege that it led to further injury); see also Steckman v. Hart Brewing, 143 F.3d 1293, 1295-96 (9th Cir.1998) (\u201c[W]e are not required to accept as true eonclusory allegations which are contradicted by documents referred to in the complaint.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"143 F.3d 1293, 1295-96","parenthetical":"\"[W]e are not required to accept as true eonclusory allegations which are contradicted by documents referred to in the complaint.\"","sentence":"See Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1060 (9th Cir.2004) (\u201cA showing of medical malpractice or negligence is insufficient to establish a constitutional deprivation under the Eighth Amendment.\u201d); Shapley v. Nev. Bd. of State Prison Comm\u2019rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir.1985) (per curiam) (for delay of treatment to constitute deliberate indifference, prisoner must allege that it led to further injury); see also Steckman v. Hart Brewing, 143 F.3d 1293, 1295-96 (9th Cir.1998) (\u201c[W]e are not required to accept as true eonclusory allegations which are contradicted by documents referred to in the complaint.\u201d)."},"case_id":3936603,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The district court properly dismissed Acosta's deliberate indifference claims because he failed to allege facts establishing that defendants consciously disregarded his serious medical needs.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"766 F.2d 404, 407","parenthetical":"for delay of treatment to constitute deliberate indifference, prisoner must allege that it led to further injury","sentence":"See Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1060 (9th Cir.2004) (\u201cA showing of medical malpractice or negligence is insufficient to establish a constitutional deprivation under the Eighth Amendment.\u201d); Shapley v. Nev. Bd. of State Prison Comm\u2019rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir.1985) (per curiam) (for delay of treatment to constitute deliberate indifference, prisoner must allege that it led to further injury); see also Steckman v. Hart Brewing, 143 F.3d 1293, 1295-96 (9th Cir.1998) (\u201c[W]e are not required to accept as true eonclusory allegations which are contradicted by documents referred to in the complaint.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"143 F.3d 1293, 1295-96","parenthetical":"\"[W]e are not required to accept as true eonclusory allegations which are contradicted by documents referred to in the complaint.\"","sentence":"See Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1060 (9th Cir.2004) (\u201cA showing of medical malpractice or negligence is insufficient to establish a constitutional deprivation under the Eighth Amendment.\u201d); Shapley v. Nev. Bd. of State Prison Comm\u2019rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir.1985) (per curiam) (for delay of treatment to constitute deliberate indifference, prisoner must allege that it led to further injury); see also Steckman v. Hart Brewing, 143 F.3d 1293, 1295-96 (9th Cir.1998) (\u201c[W]e are not required to accept as true eonclusory allegations which are contradicted by documents referred to in the complaint.\u201d)."},"case_id":3936603,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Particularly in alternative design cases, merely conceptualizing possibilities is not alone sufficient. Testing of the proposed alternative is often required.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"93 F.3d 362, 368","parenthetical":"\"Our cases have recognized the importance of testing in alternative design cases.\"","sentence":"See Watkins, 121 F.3d at 992; Stanczyk, 836 F.Supp. at 567 (\u201c[T]he history of engineering and science is filled with finely conceived ideas that are unworkable in practice.\u201d); see also Cummins v. Lyle Indus., 93 F.3d 362, 368 (7th Cir.1996) (\u201cOur cases have recognized the importance of testing in alternative design cases.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"836 F.Supp. 567, 567","parenthetical":"\"[T]he history of engineering and science is filled with finely conceived ideas that are unworkable in practice.\"","sentence":"See Watkins, 121 F.3d at 992; Stanczyk, 836 F.Supp. at 567 (\u201c[T]he history of engineering and science is filled with finely conceived ideas that are unworkable in practice.\u201d); see also Cummins v. Lyle Indus., 93 F.3d 362, 368 (7th Cir.1996) (\u201cOur cases have recognized the importance of testing in alternative design cases.\u201d)."},"case_id":11084851,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The Munroes cross-appeal the same certified order Continental appeals. Rule 5(b)(2) is not jurisdictional.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"540 U.S. 443, 452-56","parenthetical":"holding that nonstatutory rules of proce dure are not jurisdictional because only Congress may determine a federal court's subject-matter jurisdiction","sentence":"See Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 452-56, 124 S.Ct. 906, 157 L.Ed.2d 867 (2004) (holding that nonstatutory rules of proce dure are not jurisdictional because only Congress may determine a federal court\u2019s subject-matter jurisdiction). \u2022 This court granted the petition to cross-appeal, and will consider it."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"962 F.2d 244, 248","parenthetical":"\"The failure to file the petition for permission to cross-appeal within the time provided is a jurisdictional defect, barring this Court from hearing Tranello's cross-appeal.\"","sentence":"But see Tranello v. Frey, 962 F.2d 244, 248 (2d Cir.1992) (\u201cThe failure to file the petition for permission to cross-appeal within the time provided is a jurisdictional defect, barring this Court from hearing Tranello\u2019s cross-appeal.\u201d); Rodriguez v. Banco Cent., 917 F.2d 664, 668-69 (1st Cir.1990)."},"case_id":3722621,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The Munroes cross-appeal the same certified order Continental appeals. Rule 5(b)(2) is not jurisdictional.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"962 F.2d 244, 248","parenthetical":"\"The failure to file the petition for permission to cross-appeal within the time provided is a jurisdictional defect, barring this Court from hearing Tranello's cross-appeal.\"","sentence":"But see Tranello v. Frey, 962 F.2d 244, 248 (2d Cir.1992) (\u201cThe failure to file the petition for permission to cross-appeal within the time provided is a jurisdictional defect, barring this Court from hearing Tranello\u2019s cross-appeal.\u201d); Rodriguez v. Banco Cent., 917 F.2d 664, 668-69 (1st Cir.1990)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that nonstatutory rules of proce dure are not jurisdictional because only Congress may determine a federal court's subject-matter jurisdiction","sentence":"See Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 452-56, 124 S.Ct. 906, 157 L.Ed.2d 867 (2004) (holding that nonstatutory rules of proce dure are not jurisdictional because only Congress may determine a federal court\u2019s subject-matter jurisdiction). \u2022 This court granted the petition to cross-appeal, and will consider it."},"case_id":3722621,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The Munroes cross-appeal the same certified order Continental appeals. Rule 5(b)(2) is not jurisdictional.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"962 F.2d 244, 248","parenthetical":"\"The failure to file the petition for permission to cross-appeal within the time provided is a jurisdictional defect, barring this Court from hearing Tranello's cross-appeal.\"","sentence":"But see Tranello v. Frey, 962 F.2d 244, 248 (2d Cir.1992) (\u201cThe failure to file the petition for permission to cross-appeal within the time provided is a jurisdictional defect, barring this Court from hearing Tranello\u2019s cross-appeal.\u201d); Rodriguez v. Banco Cent., 917 F.2d 664, 668-69 (1st Cir.1990)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that nonstatutory rules of proce dure are not jurisdictional because only Congress may determine a federal court's subject-matter jurisdiction","sentence":"See Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 452-56, 124 S.Ct. 906, 157 L.Ed.2d 867 (2004) (holding that nonstatutory rules of proce dure are not jurisdictional because only Congress may determine a federal court\u2019s subject-matter jurisdiction). \u2022 This court granted the petition to cross-appeal, and will consider it."},"case_id":3722621,"label":"b"}
{"context":"This leaves for the Court to determine whether Debtor voluntarily and intentionally violated that duty. The taxpayer's state of mind may be inferred from his or her conduct.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"89 F.3d 1050, 1090","parenthetical":"explaining that intent to evade payment of tax may be inferred from circumstances","sentence":"See U.S. v. Weiss, 2000 WL 1708802 *3 (E.D.Pa.) (\u201cA court may properly consider a debtor\u2019s conduct after the return and payment were due to determine whether the evasion of payment was willful.\u201d); see also U.S. v. Voigt, 89 F.3d 1050, 1090 (3d Cir.1996) (explaining that intent to evade payment of tax may be inferred from circumstances) ; United States v. Mal, 942 F.2d 682, 687 (9th Cir.1991) (evasion of payment \u201cinvolves conduct designed to place assets beyond the government\u2019s reach after a tax liability has been assessed\u201d) (emphasis added); United States v. Conley, 826 F.2d 551, 556 (7th Cir.1987) (rational jury can infer intent to evade upon learning of manner in which defendant conducted his financial affairs); United States v. Shorter, 809 F.2d 54, 57 (D.C.Cir.) (jury could infer intent to evade where defendant carried on \u201ccash lifestyle\u201d), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 817, 108 S.Ct. 71, 98 L.Ed.2d 35 (1987). For the Government, the pertinent conduct is Klayman\u2019s diversion of property and income for the past 25 years. It maintains that his continued and uninterrupted enjoyment of those assets held in the name of others shows that this was not arranged by accident; these divestitures and diversions were so systematic, thorough and transparent as to allow but one inference as to why they occurred: for the purpose of frustrating the IRS\u2019 collection efforts."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"2000 WL 1708802, *3","parenthetical":"\"A court may properly consider a debtor's conduct after the return and payment were due to determine whether the evasion of payment was willful.\"","sentence":"See U.S. v. Weiss, 2000 WL 1708802 *3 (E.D.Pa.) (\u201cA court may properly consider a debtor\u2019s conduct after the return and payment were due to determine whether the evasion of payment was willful.\u201d); see also U.S. v. Voigt, 89 F.3d 1050, 1090 (3d Cir.1996) (explaining that intent to evade payment of tax may be inferred from circumstances) ; United States v. Mal, 942 F.2d 682, 687 (9th Cir.1991) (evasion of payment \u201cinvolves conduct designed to place assets beyond the government\u2019s reach after a tax liability has been assessed\u201d) (emphasis added); United States v. Conley, 826 F.2d 551, 556 (7th Cir.1987) (rational jury can infer intent to evade upon learning of manner in which defendant conducted his financial affairs); United States v. Shorter, 809 F.2d 54, 57 (D.C.Cir.) (jury could infer intent to evade where defendant carried on \u201ccash lifestyle\u201d), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 817, 108 S.Ct. 71, 98 L.Ed.2d 35 (1987). For the Government, the pertinent conduct is Klayman\u2019s diversion of property and income for the past 25 years. It maintains that his continued and uninterrupted enjoyment of those assets held in the name of others shows that this was not arranged by accident; these divestitures and diversions were so systematic, thorough and transparent as to allow but one inference as to why they occurred: for the purpose of frustrating the IRS\u2019 collection efforts."},"case_id":1579705,"label":"b"}
{"context":"This leaves for the Court to determine whether Debtor voluntarily and intentionally violated that duty. The taxpayer's state of mind may be inferred from his or her conduct.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"2000 WL 1708802, *3","parenthetical":"\"A court may properly consider a debtor's conduct after the return and payment were due to determine whether the evasion of payment was willful.\"","sentence":"See U.S. v. Weiss, 2000 WL 1708802 *3 (E.D.Pa.) (\u201cA court may properly consider a debtor\u2019s conduct after the return and payment were due to determine whether the evasion of payment was willful.\u201d); see also U.S. v. Voigt, 89 F.3d 1050, 1090 (3d Cir.1996) (explaining that intent to evade payment of tax may be inferred from circumstances) ; United States v. Mal, 942 F.2d 682, 687 (9th Cir.1991) (evasion of payment \u201cinvolves conduct designed to place assets beyond the government\u2019s reach after a tax liability has been assessed\u201d) (emphasis added); United States v. Conley, 826 F.2d 551, 556 (7th Cir.1987) (rational jury can infer intent to evade upon learning of manner in which defendant conducted his financial affairs); United States v. Shorter, 809 F.2d 54, 57 (D.C.Cir.) (jury could infer intent to evade where defendant carried on \u201ccash lifestyle\u201d), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 817, 108 S.Ct. 71, 98 L.Ed.2d 35 (1987). For the Government, the pertinent conduct is Klayman\u2019s diversion of property and income for the past 25 years. It maintains that his continued and uninterrupted enjoyment of those assets held in the name of others shows that this was not arranged by accident; these divestitures and diversions were so systematic, thorough and transparent as to allow but one inference as to why they occurred: for the purpose of frustrating the IRS\u2019 collection efforts."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"942 F.2d 682, 687","parenthetical":"evasion of payment \"involves conduct designed to place assets beyond the government's reach after a tax liability has been assessed\"","sentence":"See U.S. v. Weiss, 2000 WL 1708802 *3 (E.D.Pa.) (\u201cA court may properly consider a debtor\u2019s conduct after the return and payment were due to determine whether the evasion of payment was willful.\u201d); see also U.S. v. Voigt, 89 F.3d 1050, 1090 (3d Cir.1996) (explaining that intent to evade payment of tax may be inferred from circumstances) ; United States v. Mal, 942 F.2d 682, 687 (9th Cir.1991) (evasion of payment \u201cinvolves conduct designed to place assets beyond the government\u2019s reach after a tax liability has been assessed\u201d) (emphasis added); United States v. Conley, 826 F.2d 551, 556 (7th Cir.1987) (rational jury can infer intent to evade upon learning of manner in which defendant conducted his financial affairs); United States v. Shorter, 809 F.2d 54, 57 (D.C.Cir.) (jury could infer intent to evade where defendant carried on \u201ccash lifestyle\u201d), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 817, 108 S.Ct. 71, 98 L.Ed.2d 35 (1987). For the Government, the pertinent conduct is Klayman\u2019s diversion of property and income for the past 25 years. It maintains that his continued and uninterrupted enjoyment of those assets held in the name of others shows that this was not arranged by accident; these divestitures and diversions were so systematic, thorough and transparent as to allow but one inference as to why they occurred: for the purpose of frustrating the IRS\u2019 collection efforts."},"case_id":1579705,"label":"a"}
{"context":"This leaves for the Court to determine whether Debtor voluntarily and intentionally violated that duty. The taxpayer's state of mind may be inferred from his or her conduct.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"826 F.2d 551, 556","parenthetical":"rational jury can infer intent to evade upon learning of manner in which defendant conducted his financial affairs","sentence":"See U.S. v. Weiss, 2000 WL 1708802 *3 (E.D.Pa.) (\u201cA court may properly consider a debtor\u2019s conduct after the return and payment were due to determine whether the evasion of payment was willful.\u201d); see also U.S. v. Voigt, 89 F.3d 1050, 1090 (3d Cir.1996) (explaining that intent to evade payment of tax may be inferred from circumstances) ; United States v. Mal, 942 F.2d 682, 687 (9th Cir.1991) (evasion of payment \u201cinvolves conduct designed to place assets beyond the government\u2019s reach after a tax liability has been assessed\u201d) (emphasis added); United States v. Conley, 826 F.2d 551, 556 (7th Cir.1987) (rational jury can infer intent to evade upon learning of manner in which defendant conducted his financial affairs); United States v. Shorter, 809 F.2d 54, 57 (D.C.Cir.) (jury could infer intent to evade where defendant carried on \u201ccash lifestyle\u201d), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 817, 108 S.Ct. 71, 98 L.Ed.2d 35 (1987). For the Government, the pertinent conduct is Klayman\u2019s diversion of property and income for the past 25 years. It maintains that his continued and uninterrupted enjoyment of those assets held in the name of others shows that this was not arranged by accident; these divestitures and diversions were so systematic, thorough and transparent as to allow but one inference as to why they occurred: for the purpose of frustrating the IRS\u2019 collection efforts."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"2000 WL 1708802, *3","parenthetical":"\"A court may properly consider a debtor's conduct after the return and payment were due to determine whether the evasion of payment was willful.\"","sentence":"See U.S. v. Weiss, 2000 WL 1708802 *3 (E.D.Pa.) (\u201cA court may properly consider a debtor\u2019s conduct after the return and payment were due to determine whether the evasion of payment was willful.\u201d); see also U.S. v. Voigt, 89 F.3d 1050, 1090 (3d Cir.1996) (explaining that intent to evade payment of tax may be inferred from circumstances) ; United States v. Mal, 942 F.2d 682, 687 (9th Cir.1991) (evasion of payment \u201cinvolves conduct designed to place assets beyond the government\u2019s reach after a tax liability has been assessed\u201d) (emphasis added); United States v. Conley, 826 F.2d 551, 556 (7th Cir.1987) (rational jury can infer intent to evade upon learning of manner in which defendant conducted his financial affairs); United States v. Shorter, 809 F.2d 54, 57 (D.C.Cir.) (jury could infer intent to evade where defendant carried on \u201ccash lifestyle\u201d), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 817, 108 S.Ct. 71, 98 L.Ed.2d 35 (1987). For the Government, the pertinent conduct is Klayman\u2019s diversion of property and income for the past 25 years. It maintains that his continued and uninterrupted enjoyment of those assets held in the name of others shows that this was not arranged by accident; these divestitures and diversions were so systematic, thorough and transparent as to allow but one inference as to why they occurred: for the purpose of frustrating the IRS\u2019 collection efforts."},"case_id":1579705,"label":"b"}
{"context":"This leaves for the Court to determine whether Debtor voluntarily and intentionally violated that duty. The taxpayer's state of mind may be inferred from his or her conduct.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"809 F.2d 54, 57","parenthetical":"jury could infer intent to evade where defendant carried on \"cash lifestyle\"","sentence":"See U.S. v. Weiss, 2000 WL 1708802 *3 (E.D.Pa.) (\u201cA court may properly consider a debtor\u2019s conduct after the return and payment were due to determine whether the evasion of payment was willful.\u201d); see also U.S. v. Voigt, 89 F.3d 1050, 1090 (3d Cir.1996) (explaining that intent to evade payment of tax may be inferred from circumstances) ; United States v. Mal, 942 F.2d 682, 687 (9th Cir.1991) (evasion of payment \u201cinvolves conduct designed to place assets beyond the government\u2019s reach after a tax liability has been assessed\u201d) (emphasis added); United States v. Conley, 826 F.2d 551, 556 (7th Cir.1987) (rational jury can infer intent to evade upon learning of manner in which defendant conducted his financial affairs); United States v. Shorter, 809 F.2d 54, 57 (D.C.Cir.) (jury could infer intent to evade where defendant carried on \u201ccash lifestyle\u201d), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 817, 108 S.Ct. 71, 98 L.Ed.2d 35 (1987). For the Government, the pertinent conduct is Klayman\u2019s diversion of property and income for the past 25 years. It maintains that his continued and uninterrupted enjoyment of those assets held in the name of others shows that this was not arranged by accident; these divestitures and diversions were so systematic, thorough and transparent as to allow but one inference as to why they occurred: for the purpose of frustrating the IRS\u2019 collection efforts."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"2000 WL 1708802, *3","parenthetical":"\"A court may properly consider a debtor's conduct after the return and payment were due to determine whether the evasion of payment was willful.\"","sentence":"See U.S. v. Weiss, 2000 WL 1708802 *3 (E.D.Pa.) (\u201cA court may properly consider a debtor\u2019s conduct after the return and payment were due to determine whether the evasion of payment was willful.\u201d); see also U.S. v. Voigt, 89 F.3d 1050, 1090 (3d Cir.1996) (explaining that intent to evade payment of tax may be inferred from circumstances) ; United States v. Mal, 942 F.2d 682, 687 (9th Cir.1991) (evasion of payment \u201cinvolves conduct designed to place assets beyond the government\u2019s reach after a tax liability has been assessed\u201d) (emphasis added); United States v. Conley, 826 F.2d 551, 556 (7th Cir.1987) (rational jury can infer intent to evade upon learning of manner in which defendant conducted his financial affairs); United States v. Shorter, 809 F.2d 54, 57 (D.C.Cir.) (jury could infer intent to evade where defendant carried on \u201ccash lifestyle\u201d), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 817, 108 S.Ct. 71, 98 L.Ed.2d 35 (1987). For the Government, the pertinent conduct is Klayman\u2019s diversion of property and income for the past 25 years. It maintains that his continued and uninterrupted enjoyment of those assets held in the name of others shows that this was not arranged by accident; these divestitures and diversions were so systematic, thorough and transparent as to allow but one inference as to why they occurred: for the purpose of frustrating the IRS\u2019 collection efforts."},"case_id":1579705,"label":"b"}
{"context":"This leaves for the Court to determine whether Debtor voluntarily and intentionally violated that duty. The taxpayer's state of mind may be inferred from his or her conduct.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"jury could infer intent to evade where defendant carried on \"cash lifestyle\"","sentence":"See U.S. v. Weiss, 2000 WL 1708802 *3 (E.D.Pa.) (\u201cA court may properly consider a debtor\u2019s conduct after the return and payment were due to determine whether the evasion of payment was willful.\u201d); see also U.S. v. Voigt, 89 F.3d 1050, 1090 (3d Cir.1996) (explaining that intent to evade payment of tax may be inferred from circumstances) ; United States v. Mal, 942 F.2d 682, 687 (9th Cir.1991) (evasion of payment \u201cinvolves conduct designed to place assets beyond the government\u2019s reach after a tax liability has been assessed\u201d) (emphasis added); United States v. Conley, 826 F.2d 551, 556 (7th Cir.1987) (rational jury can infer intent to evade upon learning of manner in which defendant conducted his financial affairs); United States v. Shorter, 809 F.2d 54, 57 (D.C.Cir.) (jury could infer intent to evade where defendant carried on \u201ccash lifestyle\u201d), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 817, 108 S.Ct. 71, 98 L.Ed.2d 35 (1987). For the Government, the pertinent conduct is Klayman\u2019s diversion of property and income for the past 25 years. It maintains that his continued and uninterrupted enjoyment of those assets held in the name of others shows that this was not arranged by accident; these divestitures and diversions were so systematic, thorough and transparent as to allow but one inference as to why they occurred: for the purpose of frustrating the IRS\u2019 collection efforts."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"2000 WL 1708802, *3","parenthetical":"\"A court may properly consider a debtor's conduct after the return and payment were due to determine whether the evasion of payment was willful.\"","sentence":"See U.S. v. Weiss, 2000 WL 1708802 *3 (E.D.Pa.) (\u201cA court may properly consider a debtor\u2019s conduct after the return and payment were due to determine whether the evasion of payment was willful.\u201d); see also U.S. v. Voigt, 89 F.3d 1050, 1090 (3d Cir.1996) (explaining that intent to evade payment of tax may be inferred from circumstances) ; United States v. Mal, 942 F.2d 682, 687 (9th Cir.1991) (evasion of payment \u201cinvolves conduct designed to place assets beyond the government\u2019s reach after a tax liability has been assessed\u201d) (emphasis added); United States v. Conley, 826 F.2d 551, 556 (7th Cir.1987) (rational jury can infer intent to evade upon learning of manner in which defendant conducted his financial affairs); United States v. Shorter, 809 F.2d 54, 57 (D.C.Cir.) (jury could infer intent to evade where defendant carried on \u201ccash lifestyle\u201d), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 817, 108 S.Ct. 71, 98 L.Ed.2d 35 (1987). For the Government, the pertinent conduct is Klayman\u2019s diversion of property and income for the past 25 years. It maintains that his continued and uninterrupted enjoyment of those assets held in the name of others shows that this was not arranged by accident; these divestitures and diversions were so systematic, thorough and transparent as to allow but one inference as to why they occurred: for the purpose of frustrating the IRS\u2019 collection efforts."},"case_id":1579705,"label":"b"}
{"context":"This leaves for the Court to determine whether Debtor voluntarily and intentionally violated that duty. The taxpayer's state of mind may be inferred from his or her conduct.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"jury could infer intent to evade where defendant carried on \"cash lifestyle\"","sentence":"See U.S. v. Weiss, 2000 WL 1708802 *3 (E.D.Pa.) (\u201cA court may properly consider a debtor\u2019s conduct after the return and payment were due to determine whether the evasion of payment was willful.\u201d); see also U.S. v. Voigt, 89 F.3d 1050, 1090 (3d Cir.1996) (explaining that intent to evade payment of tax may be inferred from circumstances) ; United States v. Mal, 942 F.2d 682, 687 (9th Cir.1991) (evasion of payment \u201cinvolves conduct designed to place assets beyond the government\u2019s reach after a tax liability has been assessed\u201d) (emphasis added); United States v. Conley, 826 F.2d 551, 556 (7th Cir.1987) (rational jury can infer intent to evade upon learning of manner in which defendant conducted his financial affairs); United States v. Shorter, 809 F.2d 54, 57 (D.C.Cir.) (jury could infer intent to evade where defendant carried on \u201ccash lifestyle\u201d), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 817, 108 S.Ct. 71, 98 L.Ed.2d 35 (1987). For the Government, the pertinent conduct is Klayman\u2019s diversion of property and income for the past 25 years. It maintains that his continued and uninterrupted enjoyment of those assets held in the name of others shows that this was not arranged by accident; these divestitures and diversions were so systematic, thorough and transparent as to allow but one inference as to why they occurred: for the purpose of frustrating the IRS\u2019 collection efforts."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"2000 WL 1708802, *3","parenthetical":"\"A court may properly consider a debtor's conduct after the return and payment were due to determine whether the evasion of payment was willful.\"","sentence":"See U.S. v. Weiss, 2000 WL 1708802 *3 (E.D.Pa.) (\u201cA court may properly consider a debtor\u2019s conduct after the return and payment were due to determine whether the evasion of payment was willful.\u201d); see also U.S. v. Voigt, 89 F.3d 1050, 1090 (3d Cir.1996) (explaining that intent to evade payment of tax may be inferred from circumstances) ; United States v. Mal, 942 F.2d 682, 687 (9th Cir.1991) (evasion of payment \u201cinvolves conduct designed to place assets beyond the government\u2019s reach after a tax liability has been assessed\u201d) (emphasis added); United States v. Conley, 826 F.2d 551, 556 (7th Cir.1987) (rational jury can infer intent to evade upon learning of manner in which defendant conducted his financial affairs); United States v. Shorter, 809 F.2d 54, 57 (D.C.Cir.) (jury could infer intent to evade where defendant carried on \u201ccash lifestyle\u201d), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 817, 108 S.Ct. 71, 98 L.Ed.2d 35 (1987). For the Government, the pertinent conduct is Klayman\u2019s diversion of property and income for the past 25 years. It maintains that his continued and uninterrupted enjoyment of those assets held in the name of others shows that this was not arranged by accident; these divestitures and diversions were so systematic, thorough and transparent as to allow but one inference as to why they occurred: for the purpose of frustrating the IRS\u2019 collection efforts."},"case_id":1579705,"label":"b"}
{"context":"This leaves for the Court to determine whether Debtor voluntarily and intentionally violated that duty. The taxpayer's state of mind may be inferred from his or her conduct.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"2000 WL 1708802, *3","parenthetical":"\"A court may properly consider a debtor's conduct after the return and payment were due to determine whether the evasion of payment was willful.\"","sentence":"See U.S. v. Weiss, 2000 WL 1708802 *3 (E.D.Pa.) (\u201cA court may properly consider a debtor\u2019s conduct after the return and payment were due to determine whether the evasion of payment was willful.\u201d); see also U.S. v. Voigt, 89 F.3d 1050, 1090 (3d Cir.1996) (explaining that intent to evade payment of tax may be inferred from circumstances) ; United States v. Mal, 942 F.2d 682, 687 (9th Cir.1991) (evasion of payment \u201cinvolves conduct designed to place assets beyond the government\u2019s reach after a tax liability has been assessed\u201d) (emphasis added); United States v. Conley, 826 F.2d 551, 556 (7th Cir.1987) (rational jury can infer intent to evade upon learning of manner in which defendant conducted his financial affairs); United States v. Shorter, 809 F.2d 54, 57 (D.C.Cir.) (jury could infer intent to evade where defendant carried on \u201ccash lifestyle\u201d), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 817, 108 S.Ct. 71, 98 L.Ed.2d 35 (1987). For the Government, the pertinent conduct is Klayman\u2019s diversion of property and income for the past 25 years. It maintains that his continued and uninterrupted enjoyment of those assets held in the name of others shows that this was not arranged by accident; these divestitures and diversions were so systematic, thorough and transparent as to allow but one inference as to why they occurred: for the purpose of frustrating the IRS\u2019 collection efforts."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"jury could infer intent to evade where defendant carried on \"cash lifestyle\"","sentence":"See U.S. v. Weiss, 2000 WL 1708802 *3 (E.D.Pa.) (\u201cA court may properly consider a debtor\u2019s conduct after the return and payment were due to determine whether the evasion of payment was willful.\u201d); see also U.S. v. Voigt, 89 F.3d 1050, 1090 (3d Cir.1996) (explaining that intent to evade payment of tax may be inferred from circumstances) ; United States v. Mal, 942 F.2d 682, 687 (9th Cir.1991) (evasion of payment \u201cinvolves conduct designed to place assets beyond the government\u2019s reach after a tax liability has been assessed\u201d) (emphasis added); United States v. Conley, 826 F.2d 551, 556 (7th Cir.1987) (rational jury can infer intent to evade upon learning of manner in which defendant conducted his financial affairs); United States v. Shorter, 809 F.2d 54, 57 (D.C.Cir.) (jury could infer intent to evade where defendant carried on \u201ccash lifestyle\u201d), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 817, 108 S.Ct. 71, 98 L.Ed.2d 35 (1987). For the Government, the pertinent conduct is Klayman\u2019s diversion of property and income for the past 25 years. It maintains that his continued and uninterrupted enjoyment of those assets held in the name of others shows that this was not arranged by accident; these divestitures and diversions were so systematic, thorough and transparent as to allow but one inference as to why they occurred: for the purpose of frustrating the IRS\u2019 collection efforts."},"case_id":1579705,"label":"a"}
{"context":"[P 15] In her complaint Martin alleges that the Academy's extreme and outrageous conduct and discriminatory actions damaged her professional reputation. In light of that allegation, there exists at least the potential for coverage under part B of the policy, and thus the court erred by determining that the acts were not within the definition of personal injury.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"673 A.2d 1352, 1352","parenthetical":"duty to defend exists if there is any potential basis of recovery regardless of the actual facts on which the insured's ultimate liability is based","sentence":"See Gibson, 673 A.2d at 1352 (duty to defend exists if there is any potential basis of recovery regardless of the actual facts on which the insured\u2019s ultimate liability is based); cf. City of Old Town v. American Employers Ins. Co., 858 F.Supp. 264, 269 (D.Me.1994) (duty to indemnify jury verdict finding damages from emotional distress and injury to reputation because policy was ambiguous in that it contained broad language covering the utterance of \u201cdefamatory or disparaging material\u201d and the \u201cviolation of an individual\u2019s right of privacy\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"858 F.Supp. 264, 269","parenthetical":"duty to indemnify jury verdict finding damages from emotional distress and injury to reputation because policy was ambiguous in that it contained broad language covering the utterance of \"defamatory or disparaging material\" and the \"violation of an individual's right of privacy\"","sentence":"See Gibson, 673 A.2d at 1352 (duty to defend exists if there is any potential basis of recovery regardless of the actual facts on which the insured\u2019s ultimate liability is based); cf. City of Old Town v. American Employers Ins. Co., 858 F.Supp. 264, 269 (D.Me.1994) (duty to indemnify jury verdict finding damages from emotional distress and injury to reputation because policy was ambiguous in that it contained broad language covering the utterance of \u201cdefamatory or disparaging material\u201d and the \u201cviolation of an individual\u2019s right of privacy\u201d)."},"case_id":11912780,"label":"a"}
{"context":". Although the parties have not addressed choice-of-law issues, Maryland law properly governs the interpretation of the forum selection clause in this case because jurisdiction here is based in diversity and the dispute concerns the meaning of a contract governed by Maryland law.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"578 F.Supp.2d 810, 810-11","parenthetical":"purporting to apply Maryland law, though citing overwhelmingly to federal opinions, in interpreting the meaning of a forum selection clause","sentence":"See Silo Point, 578 F.Supp.2d at 810-11 (purporting to apply Maryland law, though citing overwhelmingly to federal opinions, in interpreting the meaning of a forum selection clause); Koch v. Am. Online, Inc., 139 F.Supp.2d 690, 692-93 (D.Md.2000) (in analyzing the validity of a forum selection clause, noting that when jurisdiction is based on diversity, \"the Fourth Circuit applies the relevant state law\u201d); cf. TECH USA, 592 F.Supp.2d at 855 (\"In a diversity action such as this one, courts in the District of Maryland apply state law in determining the applicability of forum-selection clauses .... \u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"592 F.Supp.2d 855, 855","parenthetical":"\"In a diversity action such as this one, courts in the District of Maryland apply state law in determining the applicability of forum-selection clauses .... \"","sentence":"See Silo Point, 578 F.Supp.2d at 810-11 (purporting to apply Maryland law, though citing overwhelmingly to federal opinions, in interpreting the meaning of a forum selection clause); Koch v. Am. Online, Inc., 139 F.Supp.2d 690, 692-93 (D.Md.2000) (in analyzing the validity of a forum selection clause, noting that when jurisdiction is based on diversity, \"the Fourth Circuit applies the relevant state law\u201d); cf. TECH USA, 592 F.Supp.2d at 855 (\"In a diversity action such as this one, courts in the District of Maryland apply state law in determining the applicability of forum-selection clauses .... \u201d)."},"case_id":4018421,"label":"a"}
{"context":". Although the parties have not addressed choice-of-law issues, Maryland law properly governs the interpretation of the forum selection clause in this case because jurisdiction here is based in diversity and the dispute concerns the meaning of a contract governed by Maryland law.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"592 F.Supp.2d 855, 855","parenthetical":"\"In a diversity action such as this one, courts in the District of Maryland apply state law in determining the applicability of forum-selection clauses .... \"","sentence":"See Silo Point, 578 F.Supp.2d at 810-11 (purporting to apply Maryland law, though citing overwhelmingly to federal opinions, in interpreting the meaning of a forum selection clause); Koch v. Am. Online, Inc., 139 F.Supp.2d 690, 692-93 (D.Md.2000) (in analyzing the validity of a forum selection clause, noting that when jurisdiction is based on diversity, \"the Fourth Circuit applies the relevant state law\u201d); cf. TECH USA, 592 F.Supp.2d at 855 (\"In a diversity action such as this one, courts in the District of Maryland apply state law in determining the applicability of forum-selection clauses .... \u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"139 F.Supp.2d 690, 692-93","parenthetical":"in analyzing the validity of a forum selection clause, noting that when jurisdiction is based on diversity, \"the Fourth Circuit applies the relevant state law\"","sentence":"See Silo Point, 578 F.Supp.2d at 810-11 (purporting to apply Maryland law, though citing overwhelmingly to federal opinions, in interpreting the meaning of a forum selection clause); Koch v. Am. Online, Inc., 139 F.Supp.2d 690, 692-93 (D.Md.2000) (in analyzing the validity of a forum selection clause, noting that when jurisdiction is based on diversity, \"the Fourth Circuit applies the relevant state law\u201d); cf. TECH USA, 592 F.Supp.2d at 855 (\"In a diversity action such as this one, courts in the District of Maryland apply state law in determining the applicability of forum-selection clauses .... \u201d)."},"case_id":4018421,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Under the Court Interpreters Act, a trial judge must use an interpreter in the courtroom if that judge determines that a party \"speaks only or primarily a language other than the English language ... so as to inhibit such party's comprehension of the proceedings or communication with counsel or the presiding judicial officer.\" 28 U.S.C. SS 1827(d)(1). Additionally, some circuits recognize a right to an interpreter when a defendant's inability to communicate in English interferes with the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confrontation or the defendant's Fifth Amendment due process right or his right to testify on his own behalf. Our circuit holds that a constitutional right to an interpreter exists in certain situations.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"17 F.3d 1174, 1179-81","parenthetical":"holding that a defendant's Fifth Amendment rights were violated when an interpreter was withdrawn by the court","sentence":"See United States v. Mayans, 17 F.3d 1174, 1179-81 (9th Cir.1994) (holding that a defendant\u2019s Fifth Amendment rights were violated when an interpreter was withdrawn by the court); see also United States v. Shin, 953 F.2d 559, 561 (9th Cir.1992) (\u201cAs a constitutional matter, the appointment of interpreters is within the district court\u2019s discretion.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"953 F.2d 559, 561","parenthetical":"\"As a constitutional matter, the appointment of interpreters is within the district court's discretion.\"","sentence":"See United States v. Mayans, 17 F.3d 1174, 1179-81 (9th Cir.1994) (holding that a defendant\u2019s Fifth Amendment rights were violated when an interpreter was withdrawn by the court); see also United States v. Shin, 953 F.2d 559, 561 (9th Cir.1992) (\u201cAs a constitutional matter, the appointment of interpreters is within the district court\u2019s discretion.\u201d)."},"case_id":9113463,"label":"a"}
{"context":"According to the clear statutory language of the Speedy Trial Act, \"[fjailure of the defendant to move for dismissal prior to trial ... shall constitute a waiver of the right to dismissal under this section.\" 18 U.S.C. SS 3162(a)(2). This Court has consistently recognized the failure to move in the district court for a dismissal under the Speedy Trial Act as a procedural bar to appellate review.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"119 F.3d 1176, 1186","parenthetical":"noting that \"[t]he Speedy Trial Act provides no exception to this waiver provision, and we may not read one in.\"","sentence":"See United States v. Westbrook, 119 F.3d 1176, 1186 (5th Cir.1997) (noting that \u201c[t]he Speedy Trial Act provides no exception to this waiver provision, and we may not read one in.\u201d); see also United States v. McElhaney, 469 F.3d 382, 386 (5th Cir.2006) (finding waiver where defendant raised violation of the Speedy Trial Act for the first time on appeal); United States v. Hernandez, 457 F.3d 416, 420 (5th Cir.2006) (finding waiver under the Speedy Trial Act where defendants failed to move for dismissal before trial)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"469 F.3d 382, 386","parenthetical":"finding waiver where defendant raised violation of the Speedy Trial Act for the first time on appeal","sentence":"See United States v. Westbrook, 119 F.3d 1176, 1186 (5th Cir.1997) (noting that \u201c[t]he Speedy Trial Act provides no exception to this waiver provision, and we may not read one in.\u201d); see also United States v. McElhaney, 469 F.3d 382, 386 (5th Cir.2006) (finding waiver where defendant raised violation of the Speedy Trial Act for the first time on appeal); United States v. Hernandez, 457 F.3d 416, 420 (5th Cir.2006) (finding waiver under the Speedy Trial Act where defendants failed to move for dismissal before trial)."},"case_id":5532700,"label":"a"}
{"context":"According to the clear statutory language of the Speedy Trial Act, \"[fjailure of the defendant to move for dismissal prior to trial ... shall constitute a waiver of the right to dismissal under this section.\" 18 U.S.C. SS 3162(a)(2). This Court has consistently recognized the failure to move in the district court for a dismissal under the Speedy Trial Act as a procedural bar to appellate review.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"119 F.3d 1176, 1186","parenthetical":"noting that \"[t]he Speedy Trial Act provides no exception to this waiver provision, and we may not read one in.\"","sentence":"See United States v. Westbrook, 119 F.3d 1176, 1186 (5th Cir.1997) (noting that \u201c[t]he Speedy Trial Act provides no exception to this waiver provision, and we may not read one in.\u201d); see also United States v. McElhaney, 469 F.3d 382, 386 (5th Cir.2006) (finding waiver where defendant raised violation of the Speedy Trial Act for the first time on appeal); United States v. Hernandez, 457 F.3d 416, 420 (5th Cir.2006) (finding waiver under the Speedy Trial Act where defendants failed to move for dismissal before trial)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"457 F.3d 416, 420","parenthetical":"finding waiver under the Speedy Trial Act where defendants failed to move for dismissal before trial","sentence":"See United States v. Westbrook, 119 F.3d 1176, 1186 (5th Cir.1997) (noting that \u201c[t]he Speedy Trial Act provides no exception to this waiver provision, and we may not read one in.\u201d); see also United States v. McElhaney, 469 F.3d 382, 386 (5th Cir.2006) (finding waiver where defendant raised violation of the Speedy Trial Act for the first time on appeal); United States v. Hernandez, 457 F.3d 416, 420 (5th Cir.2006) (finding waiver under the Speedy Trial Act where defendants failed to move for dismissal before trial)."},"case_id":5532700,"label":"a"}
{"context":"We are troubled by the district court's summary judgment disposition of the plaintiffs' negligent design and strict liability design defect causes of action. With regard to the negligence claim, the district court properly engaged in a risk-utility analysis.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"981 F.2d 1435, 1435-36","parenthetical":"negligence law requires balancing of risk in light of social value of interest at stake, and potential harm, against value of conflicting interest","sentence":"Griggs, 981 F.2d at 1435-36 (negligence law requires balancing of risk in light of social value of interest at stake, and potential harm, against value of conflicting interest) (citing W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on Torts \u00a7 31, at 173 (5th ed. 1984); Benson v. Pennsylvania Cent Transp. Co., 463 Pa. 37, 342 A.2d 393, 397 (1975); Clewell v. Pummer, 384 Pa. 515, 121 A.2d 459, 462 (1956)); see also Kleinknecht v. Gettysburg College, 989 F.2d 1360, 1369-70 (3d Cir.1993) (the classic risk-utility analysis is used to determine whether a risk is unreasonable in a negligence cause of action). In performing this analysis, the district court relied heavily on the statistical fact that the general population of small children suffer a mortality rate from choking on small toys or toy parts of approximately only one per 720,000 children."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"989 F.2d 1360, 1369-70","parenthetical":"the classic risk-utility analysis is used to determine whether a risk is unreasonable in a negligence cause of action","sentence":"Griggs, 981 F.2d at 1435-36 (negligence law requires balancing of risk in light of social value of interest at stake, and potential harm, against value of conflicting interest) (citing W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on Torts \u00a7 31, at 173 (5th ed. 1984); Benson v. Pennsylvania Cent Transp. Co., 463 Pa. 37, 342 A.2d 393, 397 (1975); Clewell v. Pummer, 384 Pa. 515, 121 A.2d 459, 462 (1956)); see also Kleinknecht v. Gettysburg College, 989 F.2d 1360, 1369-70 (3d Cir.1993) (the classic risk-utility analysis is used to determine whether a risk is unreasonable in a negligence cause of action). In performing this analysis, the district court relied heavily on the statistical fact that the general population of small children suffer a mortality rate from choking on small toys or toy parts of approximately only one per 720,000 children."},"case_id":10525441,"label":"a"}
{"context":"We review de novo a district court's dismissal for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), accepting all well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint as true and drawing all inferences in favor of the plaintiffs. Although courts are generally limited to examining the sufficiency of the pleadings on a motion to dismiss, on a challenge to a district court's subject matter jurisdiction, the court may also resolve disputed jurisdictional fact issues by reference to evidence outside the pleadings.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"991 F.2d 1012, 1019","parenthetical":"\"In resolving the jurisdictional dispute, the district court must review the pleadings and any evidence before it, such as affidavits.\"","sentence":"Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 414 F.3d 233, 255 n.30 (2d Cir. 2003) (consulting evidence outside the pleadings to resolve disputed jurisdictional fact issues); see also Cargill Intl S.A. v. M\/T Pavel Dybenko, 991 F.2d 1012, 1019 (2d Cir. 1993) (\u201cIn resolving the jurisdictional dispute, the district court must review the pleadings and any evidence before it, such as affidavits.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"consulting evidence outside the pleadings to resolve disputed jurisdictional fact issues","sentence":"Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 414 F.3d 233, 255 n.30 (2d Cir. 2003) (consulting evidence outside the pleadings to resolve disputed jurisdictional fact issues); see also Cargill Intl S.A. v. M\/T Pavel Dybenko, 991 F.2d 1012, 1019 (2d Cir. 1993) (\u201cIn resolving the jurisdictional dispute, the district court must review the pleadings and any evidence before it, such as affidavits.\u201d)."},"case_id":6056201,"label":"b"}
{"context":"2. Summary judgment was proper on both the Equal Pay Act claim and the Title VII claim because the work of the proposed comparator, James Casanova, was not substantially equal to Plaintiffs work.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"178 F.3d 1069, 1074","parenthetical":"holding that, to establish a prima facie Equal Pay Act claim, the plaintiff must show that the jobs being compared are \"substantially equal\"","sentence":"See Stanley v. Univ. of S. Cal., 178 F.3d 1069, 1074 (9th Cir.1999) (holding that, to establish a prima facie Equal Pay Act claim, the plaintiff must show that the jobs being compared are \u201csubstantially equal\u201d); see also Forsberg v. Pac. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 840 F.2d 1409, 1414 (9th Cir.1988) (holding that a plaintiff who cannot establish an Equal Pay Act claim likewise cannot establish a pay-based Title VII claim)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"840 F.2d 1409, 1414","parenthetical":"holding that a plaintiff who cannot establish an Equal Pay Act claim likewise cannot establish a pay-based Title VII claim","sentence":"See Stanley v. Univ. of S. Cal., 178 F.3d 1069, 1074 (9th Cir.1999) (holding that, to establish a prima facie Equal Pay Act claim, the plaintiff must show that the jobs being compared are \u201csubstantially equal\u201d); see also Forsberg v. Pac. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 840 F.2d 1409, 1414 (9th Cir.1988) (holding that a plaintiff who cannot establish an Equal Pay Act claim likewise cannot establish a pay-based Title VII claim)."},"case_id":4140532,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Indeed, irreparable harm may be presumed with the finding of a violation of the First Amendment.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"695 F.3d 990, 1002","parenthetical":"\"It is well established that the deprivation of constitutional rights 'unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.' \"","sentence":"See Klein v. City of San Clemente, 584 F.3d 1196, 1208 (9th Cir. 2009) (\u201cThe loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury\u201d) (quoting Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373, 96 S.Ct. 2673, 49 L.Ed.2d 547 (1976)); see also Washington, 847 F.3d at 1169 (citing Melendres v. Arpaio, 695 F.3d 990, 1002 (9th Cir. 2012) (\u201cIt is well established that the deprivation of constitutional rights \u2018unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.\u2019 \u201d)) (additional citations omitted)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"584 F.3d 1196, 1208","parenthetical":"\"The loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury\"","sentence":"See Klein v. City of San Clemente, 584 F.3d 1196, 1208 (9th Cir. 2009) (\u201cThe loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury\u201d) (quoting Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373, 96 S.Ct. 2673, 49 L.Ed.2d 547 (1976)); see also Washington, 847 F.3d at 1169 (citing Melendres v. Arpaio, 695 F.3d 990, 1002 (9th Cir. 2012) (\u201cIt is well established that the deprivation of constitutional rights \u2018unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.\u2019 \u201d)) (additional citations omitted)."},"case_id":12267824,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The FDPA and the Constitution require that the defendant receive adequate notice of the aggravating factor, ..., not notice of the specific evidence that will be used to support it.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"173 F.3d 1343, 1347","parenthetical":"observing that notice given to a defendant of the applicable aggravating factors in a death penalty case is not the same as notice of the specific evidence that the government intends to present at a sentencing hearing","sentence":"See 18 U.S.C.A. \u00a7 3593(a) (requiring only that the government\u2019s notice \u201cset [] forth the aggravating factor or factors that the government, if the defendant is convicted, proposes to prove as justifying a sentence of death\u201d); United States v. Battle, 173 F.3d 1343, 1347 (11th Cir.1999) (observing that notice given to a defendant of the applicable aggravating factors in a death penalty case is not the same as notice of the specific evidence that the government intends to present at a sentencing hearing), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1022, 120 S.Ct. 1428, 146 L.Ed.2d 318 (2000); cf. Gray v. Netherlands 518 U.S. 152, 167-68, 116 S.Ct. 2074, 135 L.Ed.2d 457 (1996) (noting that there is no constitutional right to advance notice of the government\u2019s evidence in aggravation at a capital sentencing hearing)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"518 U.S. 152, 167-68","parenthetical":"noting that there is no constitutional right to advance notice of the government's evidence in aggravation at a capital sentencing hearing","sentence":"See 18 U.S.C.A. \u00a7 3593(a) (requiring only that the government\u2019s notice \u201cset [] forth the aggravating factor or factors that the government, if the defendant is convicted, proposes to prove as justifying a sentence of death\u201d); United States v. Battle, 173 F.3d 1343, 1347 (11th Cir.1999) (observing that notice given to a defendant of the applicable aggravating factors in a death penalty case is not the same as notice of the specific evidence that the government intends to present at a sentencing hearing), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1022, 120 S.Ct. 1428, 146 L.Ed.2d 318 (2000); cf. Gray v. Netherlands 518 U.S. 152, 167-68, 116 S.Ct. 2074, 135 L.Ed.2d 457 (1996) (noting that there is no constitutional right to advance notice of the government\u2019s evidence in aggravation at a capital sentencing hearing)."},"case_id":4300614,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The FDPA and the Constitution require that the defendant receive adequate notice of the aggravating factor, ..., not notice of the specific evidence that will be used to support it.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"173 F.3d 1343, 1347","parenthetical":"observing that notice given to a defendant of the applicable aggravating factors in a death penalty case is not the same as notice of the specific evidence that the government intends to present at a sentencing hearing","sentence":"See 18 U.S.C.A. \u00a7 3593(a) (requiring only that the government\u2019s notice \u201cset [] forth the aggravating factor or factors that the government, if the defendant is convicted, proposes to prove as justifying a sentence of death\u201d); United States v. Battle, 173 F.3d 1343, 1347 (11th Cir.1999) (observing that notice given to a defendant of the applicable aggravating factors in a death penalty case is not the same as notice of the specific evidence that the government intends to present at a sentencing hearing), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1022, 120 S.Ct. 1428, 146 L.Ed.2d 318 (2000); cf. Gray v. Netherlands 518 U.S. 152, 167-68, 116 S.Ct. 2074, 135 L.Ed.2d 457 (1996) (noting that there is no constitutional right to advance notice of the government\u2019s evidence in aggravation at a capital sentencing hearing)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting that there is no constitutional right to advance notice of the government's evidence in aggravation at a capital sentencing hearing","sentence":"See 18 U.S.C.A. \u00a7 3593(a) (requiring only that the government\u2019s notice \u201cset [] forth the aggravating factor or factors that the government, if the defendant is convicted, proposes to prove as justifying a sentence of death\u201d); United States v. Battle, 173 F.3d 1343, 1347 (11th Cir.1999) (observing that notice given to a defendant of the applicable aggravating factors in a death penalty case is not the same as notice of the specific evidence that the government intends to present at a sentencing hearing), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1022, 120 S.Ct. 1428, 146 L.Ed.2d 318 (2000); cf. Gray v. Netherlands 518 U.S. 152, 167-68, 116 S.Ct. 2074, 135 L.Ed.2d 457 (1996) (noting that there is no constitutional right to advance notice of the government\u2019s evidence in aggravation at a capital sentencing hearing)."},"case_id":4300614,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The FDPA and the Constitution require that the defendant receive adequate notice of the aggravating factor, ..., not notice of the specific evidence that will be used to support it.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting that there is no constitutional right to advance notice of the government's evidence in aggravation at a capital sentencing hearing","sentence":"See 18 U.S.C.A. \u00a7 3593(a) (requiring only that the government\u2019s notice \u201cset [] forth the aggravating factor or factors that the government, if the defendant is convicted, proposes to prove as justifying a sentence of death\u201d); United States v. Battle, 173 F.3d 1343, 1347 (11th Cir.1999) (observing that notice given to a defendant of the applicable aggravating factors in a death penalty case is not the same as notice of the specific evidence that the government intends to present at a sentencing hearing), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1022, 120 S.Ct. 1428, 146 L.Ed.2d 318 (2000); cf. Gray v. Netherlands 518 U.S. 152, 167-68, 116 S.Ct. 2074, 135 L.Ed.2d 457 (1996) (noting that there is no constitutional right to advance notice of the government\u2019s evidence in aggravation at a capital sentencing hearing)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"173 F.3d 1343, 1347","parenthetical":"observing that notice given to a defendant of the applicable aggravating factors in a death penalty case is not the same as notice of the specific evidence that the government intends to present at a sentencing hearing","sentence":"See 18 U.S.C.A. \u00a7 3593(a) (requiring only that the government\u2019s notice \u201cset [] forth the aggravating factor or factors that the government, if the defendant is convicted, proposes to prove as justifying a sentence of death\u201d); United States v. Battle, 173 F.3d 1343, 1347 (11th Cir.1999) (observing that notice given to a defendant of the applicable aggravating factors in a death penalty case is not the same as notice of the specific evidence that the government intends to present at a sentencing hearing), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1022, 120 S.Ct. 1428, 146 L.Ed.2d 318 (2000); cf. Gray v. Netherlands 518 U.S. 152, 167-68, 116 S.Ct. 2074, 135 L.Ed.2d 457 (1996) (noting that there is no constitutional right to advance notice of the government\u2019s evidence in aggravation at a capital sentencing hearing)."},"case_id":4300614,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The FDPA and the Constitution require that the defendant receive adequate notice of the aggravating factor, ..., not notice of the specific evidence that will be used to support it.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"observing that notice given to a defendant of the applicable aggravating factors in a death penalty case is not the same as notice of the specific evidence that the government intends to present at a sentencing hearing","sentence":"See 18 U.S.C.A. \u00a7 3593(a) (requiring only that the government\u2019s notice \u201cset [] forth the aggravating factor or factors that the government, if the defendant is convicted, proposes to prove as justifying a sentence of death\u201d); United States v. Battle, 173 F.3d 1343, 1347 (11th Cir.1999) (observing that notice given to a defendant of the applicable aggravating factors in a death penalty case is not the same as notice of the specific evidence that the government intends to present at a sentencing hearing), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1022, 120 S.Ct. 1428, 146 L.Ed.2d 318 (2000); cf. Gray v. Netherlands 518 U.S. 152, 167-68, 116 S.Ct. 2074, 135 L.Ed.2d 457 (1996) (noting that there is no constitutional right to advance notice of the government\u2019s evidence in aggravation at a capital sentencing hearing)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"518 U.S. 152, 167-68","parenthetical":"noting that there is no constitutional right to advance notice of the government's evidence in aggravation at a capital sentencing hearing","sentence":"See 18 U.S.C.A. \u00a7 3593(a) (requiring only that the government\u2019s notice \u201cset [] forth the aggravating factor or factors that the government, if the defendant is convicted, proposes to prove as justifying a sentence of death\u201d); United States v. Battle, 173 F.3d 1343, 1347 (11th Cir.1999) (observing that notice given to a defendant of the applicable aggravating factors in a death penalty case is not the same as notice of the specific evidence that the government intends to present at a sentencing hearing), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1022, 120 S.Ct. 1428, 146 L.Ed.2d 318 (2000); cf. Gray v. Netherlands 518 U.S. 152, 167-68, 116 S.Ct. 2074, 135 L.Ed.2d 457 (1996) (noting that there is no constitutional right to advance notice of the government\u2019s evidence in aggravation at a capital sentencing hearing)."},"case_id":4300614,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The FDPA and the Constitution require that the defendant receive adequate notice of the aggravating factor, ..., not notice of the specific evidence that will be used to support it.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting that there is no constitutional right to advance notice of the government's evidence in aggravation at a capital sentencing hearing","sentence":"See 18 U.S.C.A. \u00a7 3593(a) (requiring only that the government\u2019s notice \u201cset [] forth the aggravating factor or factors that the government, if the defendant is convicted, proposes to prove as justifying a sentence of death\u201d); United States v. Battle, 173 F.3d 1343, 1347 (11th Cir.1999) (observing that notice given to a defendant of the applicable aggravating factors in a death penalty case is not the same as notice of the specific evidence that the government intends to present at a sentencing hearing), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1022, 120 S.Ct. 1428, 146 L.Ed.2d 318 (2000); cf. Gray v. Netherlands 518 U.S. 152, 167-68, 116 S.Ct. 2074, 135 L.Ed.2d 457 (1996) (noting that there is no constitutional right to advance notice of the government\u2019s evidence in aggravation at a capital sentencing hearing)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"observing that notice given to a defendant of the applicable aggravating factors in a death penalty case is not the same as notice of the specific evidence that the government intends to present at a sentencing hearing","sentence":"See 18 U.S.C.A. \u00a7 3593(a) (requiring only that the government\u2019s notice \u201cset [] forth the aggravating factor or factors that the government, if the defendant is convicted, proposes to prove as justifying a sentence of death\u201d); United States v. Battle, 173 F.3d 1343, 1347 (11th Cir.1999) (observing that notice given to a defendant of the applicable aggravating factors in a death penalty case is not the same as notice of the specific evidence that the government intends to present at a sentencing hearing), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1022, 120 S.Ct. 1428, 146 L.Ed.2d 318 (2000); cf. Gray v. Netherlands 518 U.S. 152, 167-68, 116 S.Ct. 2074, 135 L.Ed.2d 457 (1996) (noting that there is no constitutional right to advance notice of the government\u2019s evidence in aggravation at a capital sentencing hearing)."},"case_id":4300614,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The FDPA and the Constitution require that the defendant receive adequate notice of the aggravating factor, ..., not notice of the specific evidence that will be used to support it.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"observing that notice given to a defendant of the applicable aggravating factors in a death penalty case is not the same as notice of the specific evidence that the government intends to present at a sentencing hearing","sentence":"See 18 U.S.C.A. \u00a7 3593(a) (requiring only that the government\u2019s notice \u201cset [] forth the aggravating factor or factors that the government, if the defendant is convicted, proposes to prove as justifying a sentence of death\u201d); United States v. Battle, 173 F.3d 1343, 1347 (11th Cir.1999) (observing that notice given to a defendant of the applicable aggravating factors in a death penalty case is not the same as notice of the specific evidence that the government intends to present at a sentencing hearing), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1022, 120 S.Ct. 1428, 146 L.Ed.2d 318 (2000); cf. Gray v. Netherlands 518 U.S. 152, 167-68, 116 S.Ct. 2074, 135 L.Ed.2d 457 (1996) (noting that there is no constitutional right to advance notice of the government\u2019s evidence in aggravation at a capital sentencing hearing)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting that there is no constitutional right to advance notice of the government's evidence in aggravation at a capital sentencing hearing","sentence":"See 18 U.S.C.A. \u00a7 3593(a) (requiring only that the government\u2019s notice \u201cset [] forth the aggravating factor or factors that the government, if the defendant is convicted, proposes to prove as justifying a sentence of death\u201d); United States v. Battle, 173 F.3d 1343, 1347 (11th Cir.1999) (observing that notice given to a defendant of the applicable aggravating factors in a death penalty case is not the same as notice of the specific evidence that the government intends to present at a sentencing hearing), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1022, 120 S.Ct. 1428, 146 L.Ed.2d 318 (2000); cf. Gray v. Netherlands 518 U.S. 152, 167-68, 116 S.Ct. 2074, 135 L.Ed.2d 457 (1996) (noting that there is no constitutional right to advance notice of the government\u2019s evidence in aggravation at a capital sentencing hearing)."},"case_id":4300614,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The FDPA and the Constitution require that the defendant receive adequate notice of the aggravating factor, ..., not notice of the specific evidence that will be used to support it.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"518 U.S. 152, 167-68","parenthetical":"noting that there is no constitutional right to advance notice of the government's evidence in aggravation at a capital sentencing hearing","sentence":"See 18 U.S.C.A. \u00a7 3593(a) (requiring only that the government\u2019s notice \u201cset [] forth the aggravating factor or factors that the government, if the defendant is convicted, proposes to prove as justifying a sentence of death\u201d); United States v. Battle, 173 F.3d 1343, 1347 (11th Cir.1999) (observing that notice given to a defendant of the applicable aggravating factors in a death penalty case is not the same as notice of the specific evidence that the government intends to present at a sentencing hearing), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1022, 120 S.Ct. 1428, 146 L.Ed.2d 318 (2000); cf. Gray v. Netherlands 518 U.S. 152, 167-68, 116 S.Ct. 2074, 135 L.Ed.2d 457 (1996) (noting that there is no constitutional right to advance notice of the government\u2019s evidence in aggravation at a capital sentencing hearing)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"observing that notice given to a defendant of the applicable aggravating factors in a death penalty case is not the same as notice of the specific evidence that the government intends to present at a sentencing hearing","sentence":"See 18 U.S.C.A. \u00a7 3593(a) (requiring only that the government\u2019s notice \u201cset [] forth the aggravating factor or factors that the government, if the defendant is convicted, proposes to prove as justifying a sentence of death\u201d); United States v. Battle, 173 F.3d 1343, 1347 (11th Cir.1999) (observing that notice given to a defendant of the applicable aggravating factors in a death penalty case is not the same as notice of the specific evidence that the government intends to present at a sentencing hearing), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1022, 120 S.Ct. 1428, 146 L.Ed.2d 318 (2000); cf. Gray v. Netherlands 518 U.S. 152, 167-68, 116 S.Ct. 2074, 135 L.Ed.2d 457 (1996) (noting that there is no constitutional right to advance notice of the government\u2019s evidence in aggravation at a capital sentencing hearing)."},"case_id":4300614,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The FDPA and the Constitution require that the defendant receive adequate notice of the aggravating factor, ..., not notice of the specific evidence that will be used to support it.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting that there is no constitutional right to advance notice of the government's evidence in aggravation at a capital sentencing hearing","sentence":"See 18 U.S.C.A. \u00a7 3593(a) (requiring only that the government\u2019s notice \u201cset [] forth the aggravating factor or factors that the government, if the defendant is convicted, proposes to prove as justifying a sentence of death\u201d); United States v. Battle, 173 F.3d 1343, 1347 (11th Cir.1999) (observing that notice given to a defendant of the applicable aggravating factors in a death penalty case is not the same as notice of the specific evidence that the government intends to present at a sentencing hearing), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1022, 120 S.Ct. 1428, 146 L.Ed.2d 318 (2000); cf. Gray v. Netherlands 518 U.S. 152, 167-68, 116 S.Ct. 2074, 135 L.Ed.2d 457 (1996) (noting that there is no constitutional right to advance notice of the government\u2019s evidence in aggravation at a capital sentencing hearing)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"observing that notice given to a defendant of the applicable aggravating factors in a death penalty case is not the same as notice of the specific evidence that the government intends to present at a sentencing hearing","sentence":"See 18 U.S.C.A. \u00a7 3593(a) (requiring only that the government\u2019s notice \u201cset [] forth the aggravating factor or factors that the government, if the defendant is convicted, proposes to prove as justifying a sentence of death\u201d); United States v. Battle, 173 F.3d 1343, 1347 (11th Cir.1999) (observing that notice given to a defendant of the applicable aggravating factors in a death penalty case is not the same as notice of the specific evidence that the government intends to present at a sentencing hearing), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1022, 120 S.Ct. 1428, 146 L.Ed.2d 318 (2000); cf. Gray v. Netherlands 518 U.S. 152, 167-68, 116 S.Ct. 2074, 135 L.Ed.2d 457 (1996) (noting that there is no constitutional right to advance notice of the government\u2019s evidence in aggravation at a capital sentencing hearing)."},"case_id":4300614,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The FDPA and the Constitution require that the defendant receive adequate notice of the aggravating factor, ..., not notice of the specific evidence that will be used to support it.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"observing that notice given to a defendant of the applicable aggravating factors in a death penalty case is not the same as notice of the specific evidence that the government intends to present at a sentencing hearing","sentence":"See 18 U.S.C.A. \u00a7 3593(a) (requiring only that the government\u2019s notice \u201cset [] forth the aggravating factor or factors that the government, if the defendant is convicted, proposes to prove as justifying a sentence of death\u201d); United States v. Battle, 173 F.3d 1343, 1347 (11th Cir.1999) (observing that notice given to a defendant of the applicable aggravating factors in a death penalty case is not the same as notice of the specific evidence that the government intends to present at a sentencing hearing), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1022, 120 S.Ct. 1428, 146 L.Ed.2d 318 (2000); cf. Gray v. Netherlands 518 U.S. 152, 167-68, 116 S.Ct. 2074, 135 L.Ed.2d 457 (1996) (noting that there is no constitutional right to advance notice of the government\u2019s evidence in aggravation at a capital sentencing hearing)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting that there is no constitutional right to advance notice of the government's evidence in aggravation at a capital sentencing hearing","sentence":"See 18 U.S.C.A. \u00a7 3593(a) (requiring only that the government\u2019s notice \u201cset [] forth the aggravating factor or factors that the government, if the defendant is convicted, proposes to prove as justifying a sentence of death\u201d); United States v. Battle, 173 F.3d 1343, 1347 (11th Cir.1999) (observing that notice given to a defendant of the applicable aggravating factors in a death penalty case is not the same as notice of the specific evidence that the government intends to present at a sentencing hearing), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1022, 120 S.Ct. 1428, 146 L.Ed.2d 318 (2000); cf. Gray v. Netherlands 518 U.S. 152, 167-68, 116 S.Ct. 2074, 135 L.Ed.2d 457 (1996) (noting that there is no constitutional right to advance notice of the government\u2019s evidence in aggravation at a capital sentencing hearing)."},"case_id":4300614,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The FDPA and the Constitution require that the defendant receive adequate notice of the aggravating factor, ..., not notice of the specific evidence that will be used to support it.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"518 U.S. 152, 167-68","parenthetical":"noting that there is no constitutional right to advance notice of the government's evidence in aggravation at a capital sentencing hearing","sentence":"See 18 U.S.C.A. \u00a7 3593(a) (requiring only that the government\u2019s notice \u201cset [] forth the aggravating factor or factors that the government, if the defendant is convicted, proposes to prove as justifying a sentence of death\u201d); United States v. Battle, 173 F.3d 1343, 1347 (11th Cir.1999) (observing that notice given to a defendant of the applicable aggravating factors in a death penalty case is not the same as notice of the specific evidence that the government intends to present at a sentencing hearing), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1022, 120 S.Ct. 1428, 146 L.Ed.2d 318 (2000); cf. Gray v. Netherlands 518 U.S. 152, 167-68, 116 S.Ct. 2074, 135 L.Ed.2d 457 (1996) (noting that there is no constitutional right to advance notice of the government\u2019s evidence in aggravation at a capital sentencing hearing)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"observing that notice given to a defendant of the applicable aggravating factors in a death penalty case is not the same as notice of the specific evidence that the government intends to present at a sentencing hearing","sentence":"See 18 U.S.C.A. \u00a7 3593(a) (requiring only that the government\u2019s notice \u201cset [] forth the aggravating factor or factors that the government, if the defendant is convicted, proposes to prove as justifying a sentence of death\u201d); United States v. Battle, 173 F.3d 1343, 1347 (11th Cir.1999) (observing that notice given to a defendant of the applicable aggravating factors in a death penalty case is not the same as notice of the specific evidence that the government intends to present at a sentencing hearing), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1022, 120 S.Ct. 1428, 146 L.Ed.2d 318 (2000); cf. Gray v. Netherlands 518 U.S. 152, 167-68, 116 S.Ct. 2074, 135 L.Ed.2d 457 (1996) (noting that there is no constitutional right to advance notice of the government\u2019s evidence in aggravation at a capital sentencing hearing)."},"case_id":4300614,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The FDPA and the Constitution require that the defendant receive adequate notice of the aggravating factor, ..., not notice of the specific evidence that will be used to support it.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"observing that notice given to a defendant of the applicable aggravating factors in a death penalty case is not the same as notice of the specific evidence that the government intends to present at a sentencing hearing","sentence":"See 18 U.S.C.A. \u00a7 3593(a) (requiring only that the government\u2019s notice \u201cset [] forth the aggravating factor or factors that the government, if the defendant is convicted, proposes to prove as justifying a sentence of death\u201d); United States v. Battle, 173 F.3d 1343, 1347 (11th Cir.1999) (observing that notice given to a defendant of the applicable aggravating factors in a death penalty case is not the same as notice of the specific evidence that the government intends to present at a sentencing hearing), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1022, 120 S.Ct. 1428, 146 L.Ed.2d 318 (2000); cf. Gray v. Netherlands 518 U.S. 152, 167-68, 116 S.Ct. 2074, 135 L.Ed.2d 457 (1996) (noting that there is no constitutional right to advance notice of the government\u2019s evidence in aggravation at a capital sentencing hearing)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting that there is no constitutional right to advance notice of the government's evidence in aggravation at a capital sentencing hearing","sentence":"See 18 U.S.C.A. \u00a7 3593(a) (requiring only that the government\u2019s notice \u201cset [] forth the aggravating factor or factors that the government, if the defendant is convicted, proposes to prove as justifying a sentence of death\u201d); United States v. Battle, 173 F.3d 1343, 1347 (11th Cir.1999) (observing that notice given to a defendant of the applicable aggravating factors in a death penalty case is not the same as notice of the specific evidence that the government intends to present at a sentencing hearing), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1022, 120 S.Ct. 1428, 146 L.Ed.2d 318 (2000); cf. Gray v. Netherlands 518 U.S. 152, 167-68, 116 S.Ct. 2074, 135 L.Ed.2d 457 (1996) (noting that there is no constitutional right to advance notice of the government\u2019s evidence in aggravation at a capital sentencing hearing)."},"case_id":4300614,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The FDPA and the Constitution require that the defendant receive adequate notice of the aggravating factor, ..., not notice of the specific evidence that will be used to support it.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting that there is no constitutional right to advance notice of the government's evidence in aggravation at a capital sentencing hearing","sentence":"See 18 U.S.C.A. \u00a7 3593(a) (requiring only that the government\u2019s notice \u201cset [] forth the aggravating factor or factors that the government, if the defendant is convicted, proposes to prove as justifying a sentence of death\u201d); United States v. Battle, 173 F.3d 1343, 1347 (11th Cir.1999) (observing that notice given to a defendant of the applicable aggravating factors in a death penalty case is not the same as notice of the specific evidence that the government intends to present at a sentencing hearing), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1022, 120 S.Ct. 1428, 146 L.Ed.2d 318 (2000); cf. Gray v. Netherlands 518 U.S. 152, 167-68, 116 S.Ct. 2074, 135 L.Ed.2d 457 (1996) (noting that there is no constitutional right to advance notice of the government\u2019s evidence in aggravation at a capital sentencing hearing)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"observing that notice given to a defendant of the applicable aggravating factors in a death penalty case is not the same as notice of the specific evidence that the government intends to present at a sentencing hearing","sentence":"See 18 U.S.C.A. \u00a7 3593(a) (requiring only that the government\u2019s notice \u201cset [] forth the aggravating factor or factors that the government, if the defendant is convicted, proposes to prove as justifying a sentence of death\u201d); United States v. Battle, 173 F.3d 1343, 1347 (11th Cir.1999) (observing that notice given to a defendant of the applicable aggravating factors in a death penalty case is not the same as notice of the specific evidence that the government intends to present at a sentencing hearing), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1022, 120 S.Ct. 1428, 146 L.Ed.2d 318 (2000); cf. Gray v. Netherlands 518 U.S. 152, 167-68, 116 S.Ct. 2074, 135 L.Ed.2d 457 (1996) (noting that there is no constitutional right to advance notice of the government\u2019s evidence in aggravation at a capital sentencing hearing)."},"case_id":4300614,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Second, it was well established in other federal courts and in Massachusetts state court, if not in this circuit, that an arrest made on the basis of a facially valid warrant which turns out to have been cleared before the arrest violates the Fourth Amendment.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"927 F.Supp. 1082, 1088","parenthetical":"holding that it was clearly established for SS 1983 purposes that an arrest founded upon a recalled warrant violates the Fourth Amendment","sentence":"See, e.g., Murray v. City of Chicago, 634 F.2d 365, 366 (7th Cir.1980) (ten weeks after court quashed and recalled a warrant for appellant\u2019s arrest, police arrested her on the basis of the warrant; court found it \u201cclear that appellant sustained a violation of constitutional rights by being arrested and detained pursuant to an invalid warrant\u201d); Commonwealth v. Hecox, 35 Mass.App.Ct. 277, 619 N.E.2d 339, 340-44 & n. 2 (1993) (where officer mistakenly believed that a warrant was outstanding for defendant\u2019s arrest, but in fact a warrant either never had issued or had been subsequently cleared, arrest pursuant to that warrant violated Fourth Amendment); see also McMurry v. Sheahan, 927 F.Supp. 1082, 1088 (N.D.Ill.1996) (holding that it was clearly established for \u00a7 1983 purposes that an arrest founded upon a recalled warrant violates the Fourth Amendment)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"where officer mistakenly believed that a warrant was outstanding for defendant's arrest, but in fact a warrant either never had issued or had been subsequently cleared, arrest pursuant to that warrant violated Fourth Amendment","sentence":"See, e.g., Murray v. City of Chicago, 634 F.2d 365, 366 (7th Cir.1980) (ten weeks after court quashed and recalled a warrant for appellant\u2019s arrest, police arrested her on the basis of the warrant; court found it \u201cclear that appellant sustained a violation of constitutional rights by being arrested and detained pursuant to an invalid warrant\u201d); Commonwealth v. Hecox, 35 Mass.App.Ct. 277, 619 N.E.2d 339, 340-44 & n. 2 (1993) (where officer mistakenly believed that a warrant was outstanding for defendant\u2019s arrest, but in fact a warrant either never had issued or had been subsequently cleared, arrest pursuant to that warrant violated Fourth Amendment); see also McMurry v. Sheahan, 927 F.Supp. 1082, 1088 (N.D.Ill.1996) (holding that it was clearly established for \u00a7 1983 purposes that an arrest founded upon a recalled warrant violates the Fourth Amendment)."},"case_id":8927491,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Second, it was well established in other federal courts and in Massachusetts state court, if not in this circuit, that an arrest made on the basis of a facially valid warrant which turns out to have been cleared before the arrest violates the Fourth Amendment.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"where officer mistakenly believed that a warrant was outstanding for defendant's arrest, but in fact a warrant either never had issued or had been subsequently cleared, arrest pursuant to that warrant violated Fourth Amendment","sentence":"See, e.g., Murray v. City of Chicago, 634 F.2d 365, 366 (7th Cir.1980) (ten weeks after court quashed and recalled a warrant for appellant\u2019s arrest, police arrested her on the basis of the warrant; court found it \u201cclear that appellant sustained a violation of constitutional rights by being arrested and detained pursuant to an invalid warrant\u201d); Commonwealth v. Hecox, 35 Mass.App.Ct. 277, 619 N.E.2d 339, 340-44 & n. 2 (1993) (where officer mistakenly believed that a warrant was outstanding for defendant\u2019s arrest, but in fact a warrant either never had issued or had been subsequently cleared, arrest pursuant to that warrant violated Fourth Amendment); see also McMurry v. Sheahan, 927 F.Supp. 1082, 1088 (N.D.Ill.1996) (holding that it was clearly established for \u00a7 1983 purposes that an arrest founded upon a recalled warrant violates the Fourth Amendment)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"927 F.Supp. 1082, 1088","parenthetical":"holding that it was clearly established for SS 1983 purposes that an arrest founded upon a recalled warrant violates the Fourth Amendment","sentence":"See, e.g., Murray v. City of Chicago, 634 F.2d 365, 366 (7th Cir.1980) (ten weeks after court quashed and recalled a warrant for appellant\u2019s arrest, police arrested her on the basis of the warrant; court found it \u201cclear that appellant sustained a violation of constitutional rights by being arrested and detained pursuant to an invalid warrant\u201d); Commonwealth v. Hecox, 35 Mass.App.Ct. 277, 619 N.E.2d 339, 340-44 & n. 2 (1993) (where officer mistakenly believed that a warrant was outstanding for defendant\u2019s arrest, but in fact a warrant either never had issued or had been subsequently cleared, arrest pursuant to that warrant violated Fourth Amendment); see also McMurry v. Sheahan, 927 F.Supp. 1082, 1088 (N.D.Ill.1996) (holding that it was clearly established for \u00a7 1983 purposes that an arrest founded upon a recalled warrant violates the Fourth Amendment)."},"case_id":8927491,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The presence of accomplices during the commission of the crime is immaterial so long as the jury makes an express finding that the defendant convicted actually possessed a firearm during the event.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"720 So.2d 232, 237","parenthetical":"court may impose mandatory minimum sentence for use of a firearm where jury makes finding that defendant committed crime while using a firearm either by finding defendant guilty of crime involving firearm or by answering specific question of special verdict form so indicating","sentence":"Johnson v. State, 720 So.2d 232, 237 (Fla.1998) (court may impose mandatory minimum sentence for use of a firearm where jury makes finding that defendant committed crime while using a firearm either by finding defendant guilty of crime involving firearm or by answering specific question of special verdict form so indicating); and State v. Overfelt, 457 So.2d 1385, 1387 (Fla.1984) (same); cf. Redd v. State, 684 So.2d 881 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996) (mandatory minimum sentence for use of firearm during armed robbery improper where evidence at trial failed to establish conclusively that defendant actually possessed firearm)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"mandatory minimum sentence for use of firearm during armed robbery improper where evidence at trial failed to establish conclusively that defendant actually possessed firearm","sentence":"Johnson v. State, 720 So.2d 232, 237 (Fla.1998) (court may impose mandatory minimum sentence for use of a firearm where jury makes finding that defendant committed crime while using a firearm either by finding defendant guilty of crime involving firearm or by answering specific question of special verdict form so indicating); and State v. Overfelt, 457 So.2d 1385, 1387 (Fla.1984) (same); cf. Redd v. State, 684 So.2d 881 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996) (mandatory minimum sentence for use of firearm during armed robbery improper where evidence at trial failed to establish conclusively that defendant actually possessed firearm)."},"case_id":11543207,"label":"a"}
{"context":"P 21 In this case, during voir dire no seated juror admitted having formed any opinion on Bigger's guilt or innocence and, although many were familiar with publicity about the case, most had only vague reeollee- tions and did not recall specifically Bigger's involvement. Therefore, Bigger has not established actual prejudice.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"207 Ariz. 191, \u00b6 50","parenthetical":"prior knowledge of case insufficient to disqualify if juror has not formed preconceived notions about ease and believes can be fair and impartial","sentence":"See Davolt, 207 Ariz. 191, \u00b6 50, 84 P.3d at 471 (prior knowledge of case insufficient to disqualify if juror has not formed preconceived notions about ease and believes can be fair and impartial); see also Bolton, 182 Ariz. at 301, 896 P.2d at 841 (no actual prejudice where any prior knowledge consisted \u201conly of vague recollections\u201d); Bible, 175 Ariz. at 566, 858 P.2d at 1169 (no actual prejudice where almost all potential jurors had heard about case but all said could set aside opinions and decide case based on evidence)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"182 Ariz. 301, 301","parenthetical":"no actual prejudice where any prior knowledge consisted \"only of vague recollections\"","sentence":"See Davolt, 207 Ariz. 191, \u00b6 50, 84 P.3d at 471 (prior knowledge of case insufficient to disqualify if juror has not formed preconceived notions about ease and believes can be fair and impartial); see also Bolton, 182 Ariz. at 301, 896 P.2d at 841 (no actual prejudice where any prior knowledge consisted \u201conly of vague recollections\u201d); Bible, 175 Ariz. at 566, 858 P.2d at 1169 (no actual prejudice where almost all potential jurors had heard about case but all said could set aside opinions and decide case based on evidence)."},"case_id":4057511,"label":"a"}
{"context":"P 21 In this case, during voir dire no seated juror admitted having formed any opinion on Bigger's guilt or innocence and, although many were familiar with publicity about the case, most had only vague reeollee- tions and did not recall specifically Bigger's involvement. Therefore, Bigger has not established actual prejudice.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"207 Ariz. 191, \u00b6 50","parenthetical":"prior knowledge of case insufficient to disqualify if juror has not formed preconceived notions about ease and believes can be fair and impartial","sentence":"See Davolt, 207 Ariz. 191, \u00b6 50, 84 P.3d at 471 (prior knowledge of case insufficient to disqualify if juror has not formed preconceived notions about ease and believes can be fair and impartial); see also Bolton, 182 Ariz. at 301, 896 P.2d at 841 (no actual prejudice where any prior knowledge consisted \u201conly of vague recollections\u201d); Bible, 175 Ariz. at 566, 858 P.2d at 1169 (no actual prejudice where almost all potential jurors had heard about case but all said could set aside opinions and decide case based on evidence)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"896 P.2d 841, 841","parenthetical":"no actual prejudice where any prior knowledge consisted \"only of vague recollections\"","sentence":"See Davolt, 207 Ariz. 191, \u00b6 50, 84 P.3d at 471 (prior knowledge of case insufficient to disqualify if juror has not formed preconceived notions about ease and believes can be fair and impartial); see also Bolton, 182 Ariz. at 301, 896 P.2d at 841 (no actual prejudice where any prior knowledge consisted \u201conly of vague recollections\u201d); Bible, 175 Ariz. at 566, 858 P.2d at 1169 (no actual prejudice where almost all potential jurors had heard about case but all said could set aside opinions and decide case based on evidence)."},"case_id":4057511,"label":"a"}
{"context":"P 21 In this case, during voir dire no seated juror admitted having formed any opinion on Bigger's guilt or innocence and, although many were familiar with publicity about the case, most had only vague reeollee- tions and did not recall specifically Bigger's involvement. Therefore, Bigger has not established actual prejudice.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"175 Ariz. 566, 566","parenthetical":"no actual prejudice where almost all potential jurors had heard about case but all said could set aside opinions and decide case based on evidence","sentence":"See Davolt, 207 Ariz. 191, \u00b6 50, 84 P.3d at 471 (prior knowledge of case insufficient to disqualify if juror has not formed preconceived notions about ease and believes can be fair and impartial); see also Bolton, 182 Ariz. at 301, 896 P.2d at 841 (no actual prejudice where any prior knowledge consisted \u201conly of vague recollections\u201d); Bible, 175 Ariz. at 566, 858 P.2d at 1169 (no actual prejudice where almost all potential jurors had heard about case but all said could set aside opinions and decide case based on evidence)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"207 Ariz. 191, \u00b6 50","parenthetical":"prior knowledge of case insufficient to disqualify if juror has not formed preconceived notions about ease and believes can be fair and impartial","sentence":"See Davolt, 207 Ariz. 191, \u00b6 50, 84 P.3d at 471 (prior knowledge of case insufficient to disqualify if juror has not formed preconceived notions about ease and believes can be fair and impartial); see also Bolton, 182 Ariz. at 301, 896 P.2d at 841 (no actual prejudice where any prior knowledge consisted \u201conly of vague recollections\u201d); Bible, 175 Ariz. at 566, 858 P.2d at 1169 (no actual prejudice where almost all potential jurors had heard about case but all said could set aside opinions and decide case based on evidence)."},"case_id":4057511,"label":"b"}
{"context":"P 21 In this case, during voir dire no seated juror admitted having formed any opinion on Bigger's guilt or innocence and, although many were familiar with publicity about the case, most had only vague reeollee- tions and did not recall specifically Bigger's involvement. Therefore, Bigger has not established actual prejudice.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"858 P.2d 1169, 1169","parenthetical":"no actual prejudice where almost all potential jurors had heard about case but all said could set aside opinions and decide case based on evidence","sentence":"See Davolt, 207 Ariz. 191, \u00b6 50, 84 P.3d at 471 (prior knowledge of case insufficient to disqualify if juror has not formed preconceived notions about ease and believes can be fair and impartial); see also Bolton, 182 Ariz. at 301, 896 P.2d at 841 (no actual prejudice where any prior knowledge consisted \u201conly of vague recollections\u201d); Bible, 175 Ariz. at 566, 858 P.2d at 1169 (no actual prejudice where almost all potential jurors had heard about case but all said could set aside opinions and decide case based on evidence)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"207 Ariz. 191, \u00b6 50","parenthetical":"prior knowledge of case insufficient to disqualify if juror has not formed preconceived notions about ease and believes can be fair and impartial","sentence":"See Davolt, 207 Ariz. 191, \u00b6 50, 84 P.3d at 471 (prior knowledge of case insufficient to disqualify if juror has not formed preconceived notions about ease and believes can be fair and impartial); see also Bolton, 182 Ariz. at 301, 896 P.2d at 841 (no actual prejudice where any prior knowledge consisted \u201conly of vague recollections\u201d); Bible, 175 Ariz. at 566, 858 P.2d at 1169 (no actual prejudice where almost all potential jurors had heard about case but all said could set aside opinions and decide case based on evidence)."},"case_id":4057511,"label":"b"}
{"context":"P 21 In this case, during voir dire no seated juror admitted having formed any opinion on Bigger's guilt or innocence and, although many were familiar with publicity about the case, most had only vague reeollee- tions and did not recall specifically Bigger's involvement. Therefore, Bigger has not established actual prejudice.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"182 Ariz. 301, 301","parenthetical":"no actual prejudice where any prior knowledge consisted \"only of vague recollections\"","sentence":"See Davolt, 207 Ariz. 191, \u00b6 50, 84 P.3d at 471 (prior knowledge of case insufficient to disqualify if juror has not formed preconceived notions about ease and believes can be fair and impartial); see also Bolton, 182 Ariz. at 301, 896 P.2d at 841 (no actual prejudice where any prior knowledge consisted \u201conly of vague recollections\u201d); Bible, 175 Ariz. at 566, 858 P.2d at 1169 (no actual prejudice where almost all potential jurors had heard about case but all said could set aside opinions and decide case based on evidence)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"84 P.3d 471, 471","parenthetical":"prior knowledge of case insufficient to disqualify if juror has not formed preconceived notions about ease and believes can be fair and impartial","sentence":"See Davolt, 207 Ariz. 191, \u00b6 50, 84 P.3d at 471 (prior knowledge of case insufficient to disqualify if juror has not formed preconceived notions about ease and believes can be fair and impartial); see also Bolton, 182 Ariz. at 301, 896 P.2d at 841 (no actual prejudice where any prior knowledge consisted \u201conly of vague recollections\u201d); Bible, 175 Ariz. at 566, 858 P.2d at 1169 (no actual prejudice where almost all potential jurors had heard about case but all said could set aside opinions and decide case based on evidence)."},"case_id":4057511,"label":"b"}
{"context":"P 21 In this case, during voir dire no seated juror admitted having formed any opinion on Bigger's guilt or innocence and, although many were familiar with publicity about the case, most had only vague reeollee- tions and did not recall specifically Bigger's involvement. Therefore, Bigger has not established actual prejudice.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"84 P.3d 471, 471","parenthetical":"prior knowledge of case insufficient to disqualify if juror has not formed preconceived notions about ease and believes can be fair and impartial","sentence":"See Davolt, 207 Ariz. 191, \u00b6 50, 84 P.3d at 471 (prior knowledge of case insufficient to disqualify if juror has not formed preconceived notions about ease and believes can be fair and impartial); see also Bolton, 182 Ariz. at 301, 896 P.2d at 841 (no actual prejudice where any prior knowledge consisted \u201conly of vague recollections\u201d); Bible, 175 Ariz. at 566, 858 P.2d at 1169 (no actual prejudice where almost all potential jurors had heard about case but all said could set aside opinions and decide case based on evidence)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"896 P.2d 841, 841","parenthetical":"no actual prejudice where any prior knowledge consisted \"only of vague recollections\"","sentence":"See Davolt, 207 Ariz. 191, \u00b6 50, 84 P.3d at 471 (prior knowledge of case insufficient to disqualify if juror has not formed preconceived notions about ease and believes can be fair and impartial); see also Bolton, 182 Ariz. at 301, 896 P.2d at 841 (no actual prejudice where any prior knowledge consisted \u201conly of vague recollections\u201d); Bible, 175 Ariz. at 566, 858 P.2d at 1169 (no actual prejudice where almost all potential jurors had heard about case but all said could set aside opinions and decide case based on evidence)."},"case_id":4057511,"label":"a"}
{"context":"P 21 In this case, during voir dire no seated juror admitted having formed any opinion on Bigger's guilt or innocence and, although many were familiar with publicity about the case, most had only vague reeollee- tions and did not recall specifically Bigger's involvement. Therefore, Bigger has not established actual prejudice.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"175 Ariz. 566, 566","parenthetical":"no actual prejudice where almost all potential jurors had heard about case but all said could set aside opinions and decide case based on evidence","sentence":"See Davolt, 207 Ariz. 191, \u00b6 50, 84 P.3d at 471 (prior knowledge of case insufficient to disqualify if juror has not formed preconceived notions about ease and believes can be fair and impartial); see also Bolton, 182 Ariz. at 301, 896 P.2d at 841 (no actual prejudice where any prior knowledge consisted \u201conly of vague recollections\u201d); Bible, 175 Ariz. at 566, 858 P.2d at 1169 (no actual prejudice where almost all potential jurors had heard about case but all said could set aside opinions and decide case based on evidence)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"84 P.3d 471, 471","parenthetical":"prior knowledge of case insufficient to disqualify if juror has not formed preconceived notions about ease and believes can be fair and impartial","sentence":"See Davolt, 207 Ariz. 191, \u00b6 50, 84 P.3d at 471 (prior knowledge of case insufficient to disqualify if juror has not formed preconceived notions about ease and believes can be fair and impartial); see also Bolton, 182 Ariz. at 301, 896 P.2d at 841 (no actual prejudice where any prior knowledge consisted \u201conly of vague recollections\u201d); Bible, 175 Ariz. at 566, 858 P.2d at 1169 (no actual prejudice where almost all potential jurors had heard about case but all said could set aside opinions and decide case based on evidence)."},"case_id":4057511,"label":"b"}
{"context":"P 21 In this case, during voir dire no seated juror admitted having formed any opinion on Bigger's guilt or innocence and, although many were familiar with publicity about the case, most had only vague reeollee- tions and did not recall specifically Bigger's involvement. Therefore, Bigger has not established actual prejudice.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"858 P.2d 1169, 1169","parenthetical":"no actual prejudice where almost all potential jurors had heard about case but all said could set aside opinions and decide case based on evidence","sentence":"See Davolt, 207 Ariz. 191, \u00b6 50, 84 P.3d at 471 (prior knowledge of case insufficient to disqualify if juror has not formed preconceived notions about ease and believes can be fair and impartial); see also Bolton, 182 Ariz. at 301, 896 P.2d at 841 (no actual prejudice where any prior knowledge consisted \u201conly of vague recollections\u201d); Bible, 175 Ariz. at 566, 858 P.2d at 1169 (no actual prejudice where almost all potential jurors had heard about case but all said could set aside opinions and decide case based on evidence)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"84 P.3d 471, 471","parenthetical":"prior knowledge of case insufficient to disqualify if juror has not formed preconceived notions about ease and believes can be fair and impartial","sentence":"See Davolt, 207 Ariz. 191, \u00b6 50, 84 P.3d at 471 (prior knowledge of case insufficient to disqualify if juror has not formed preconceived notions about ease and believes can be fair and impartial); see also Bolton, 182 Ariz. at 301, 896 P.2d at 841 (no actual prejudice where any prior knowledge consisted \u201conly of vague recollections\u201d); Bible, 175 Ariz. at 566, 858 P.2d at 1169 (no actual prejudice where almost all potential jurors had heard about case but all said could set aside opinions and decide case based on evidence)."},"case_id":4057511,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The trial court stated, \"I do not think that ... the Defense [i.e., Appellant] has made a showing that the Cl was in a position to have information which is critical to the defense such as to warrant the production of the Cl.\" N.T. at p. 53 (May 28,1992). We understand this to be a determination that in light of the fact that Albert Austin had made himself available to Appellant in order to testify that Appellant was not present at the January 23,1991 drug sale, which corroborated Appellant's own testimony, Appellant failed to show that he needed the testimony of the confidential informant.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"326 F.2d 614, 615","parenthetical":"no abuse of trial court's discretion in denying disclosure where \"the testimony of the Special Employee [i.e., the confidential informant] would have been at best cumulative.\"","sentence":"U.S. v. Simonetti, 326 F.2d 614, 615 (2d Cir.1964)(no abuse of trial court\u2019s discretion in denying disclosure where \u201cthe testimony of the Special Employee [i.e., the confidential informant] would have been at best cumulative.\u201d); Suarez v. U.S., 582 F.2d 1007, 1012 (5th Cir.1978)(no error in denying disclosure where the informant\u2019s testimony in Suarez was not essential to the appellant\u2019s defense as was the case in Roviaro because the confidential informant therein represented the only likely source of exculpatory information.)"},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"arguably erroneous exclusion of some evidence was harmless because other similar evidence was admitted and thus no prejudice","sentence":"Cf. Commonwealth v. Christy, 540 Pa. 192, 656 A.2d 877 (1995)(arguably erroneous exclusion of some evidence was harmless because other similar evidence was admitted and thus no prejudice); Henery v. Shadle, 443 Pa.Super. 331, 661 A.2d 439 (1995)(erroneous exclusion of evidence harmless where similar evidence was admitted)."},"case_id":7867668,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The trial court stated, \"I do not think that ... the Defense [i.e., Appellant] has made a showing that the Cl was in a position to have information which is critical to the defense such as to warrant the production of the Cl.\" N.T. at p. 53 (May 28,1992). We understand this to be a determination that in light of the fact that Albert Austin had made himself available to Appellant in order to testify that Appellant was not present at the January 23,1991 drug sale, which corroborated Appellant's own testimony, Appellant failed to show that he needed the testimony of the confidential informant.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"arguably erroneous exclusion of some evidence was harmless because other similar evidence was admitted and thus no prejudice","sentence":"Cf. Commonwealth v. Christy, 540 Pa. 192, 656 A.2d 877 (1995)(arguably erroneous exclusion of some evidence was harmless because other similar evidence was admitted and thus no prejudice); Henery v. Shadle, 443 Pa.Super. 331, 661 A.2d 439 (1995)(erroneous exclusion of evidence harmless where similar evidence was admitted)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"326 F.2d 614, 615","parenthetical":"no abuse of trial court's discretion in denying disclosure where \"the testimony of the Special Employee [i.e., the confidential informant] would have been at best cumulative.\"","sentence":"U.S. v. Simonetti, 326 F.2d 614, 615 (2d Cir.1964)(no abuse of trial court\u2019s discretion in denying disclosure where \u201cthe testimony of the Special Employee [i.e., the confidential informant] would have been at best cumulative.\u201d); Suarez v. U.S., 582 F.2d 1007, 1012 (5th Cir.1978)(no error in denying disclosure where the informant\u2019s testimony in Suarez was not essential to the appellant\u2019s defense as was the case in Roviaro because the confidential informant therein represented the only likely source of exculpatory information.)"},"case_id":7867668,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The trial court stated, \"I do not think that ... the Defense [i.e., Appellant] has made a showing that the Cl was in a position to have information which is critical to the defense such as to warrant the production of the Cl.\" N.T. at p. 53 (May 28,1992). We understand this to be a determination that in light of the fact that Albert Austin had made himself available to Appellant in order to testify that Appellant was not present at the January 23,1991 drug sale, which corroborated Appellant's own testimony, Appellant failed to show that he needed the testimony of the confidential informant.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"326 F.2d 614, 615","parenthetical":"no abuse of trial court's discretion in denying disclosure where \"the testimony of the Special Employee [i.e., the confidential informant] would have been at best cumulative.\"","sentence":"U.S. v. Simonetti, 326 F.2d 614, 615 (2d Cir.1964)(no abuse of trial court\u2019s discretion in denying disclosure where \u201cthe testimony of the Special Employee [i.e., the confidential informant] would have been at best cumulative.\u201d); Suarez v. U.S., 582 F.2d 1007, 1012 (5th Cir.1978)(no error in denying disclosure where the informant\u2019s testimony in Suarez was not essential to the appellant\u2019s defense as was the case in Roviaro because the confidential informant therein represented the only likely source of exculpatory information.)"},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"erroneous exclusion of evidence harmless where similar evidence was admitted","sentence":"Cf. Commonwealth v. Christy, 540 Pa. 192, 656 A.2d 877 (1995)(arguably erroneous exclusion of some evidence was harmless because other similar evidence was admitted and thus no prejudice); Henery v. Shadle, 443 Pa.Super. 331, 661 A.2d 439 (1995)(erroneous exclusion of evidence harmless where similar evidence was admitted)."},"case_id":7867668,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The trial court stated, \"I do not think that ... the Defense [i.e., Appellant] has made a showing that the Cl was in a position to have information which is critical to the defense such as to warrant the production of the Cl.\" N.T. at p. 53 (May 28,1992). We understand this to be a determination that in light of the fact that Albert Austin had made himself available to Appellant in order to testify that Appellant was not present at the January 23,1991 drug sale, which corroborated Appellant's own testimony, Appellant failed to show that he needed the testimony of the confidential informant.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"erroneous exclusion of evidence harmless where similar evidence was admitted","sentence":"Cf. Commonwealth v. Christy, 540 Pa. 192, 656 A.2d 877 (1995)(arguably erroneous exclusion of some evidence was harmless because other similar evidence was admitted and thus no prejudice); Henery v. Shadle, 443 Pa.Super. 331, 661 A.2d 439 (1995)(erroneous exclusion of evidence harmless where similar evidence was admitted)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"326 F.2d 614, 615","parenthetical":"no abuse of trial court's discretion in denying disclosure where \"the testimony of the Special Employee [i.e., the confidential informant] would have been at best cumulative.\"","sentence":"U.S. v. Simonetti, 326 F.2d 614, 615 (2d Cir.1964)(no abuse of trial court\u2019s discretion in denying disclosure where \u201cthe testimony of the Special Employee [i.e., the confidential informant] would have been at best cumulative.\u201d); Suarez v. U.S., 582 F.2d 1007, 1012 (5th Cir.1978)(no error in denying disclosure where the informant\u2019s testimony in Suarez was not essential to the appellant\u2019s defense as was the case in Roviaro because the confidential informant therein represented the only likely source of exculpatory information.)"},"case_id":7867668,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The trial court stated, \"I do not think that ... the Defense [i.e., Appellant] has made a showing that the Cl was in a position to have information which is critical to the defense such as to warrant the production of the Cl.\" N.T. at p. 53 (May 28,1992). We understand this to be a determination that in light of the fact that Albert Austin had made himself available to Appellant in order to testify that Appellant was not present at the January 23,1991 drug sale, which corroborated Appellant's own testimony, Appellant failed to show that he needed the testimony of the confidential informant.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"582 F.2d 1007, 1012","parenthetical":"no error in denying disclosure where the informant's testimony in Suarez was not essential to the appellant's defense as was the case in Roviaro because the confidential informant therein represented the only likely source of exculpatory information.","sentence":"U.S. v. Simonetti, 326 F.2d 614, 615 (2d Cir.1964)(no abuse of trial court\u2019s discretion in denying disclosure where \u201cthe testimony of the Special Employee [i.e., the confidential informant] would have been at best cumulative.\u201d); Suarez v. U.S., 582 F.2d 1007, 1012 (5th Cir.1978)(no error in denying disclosure where the informant\u2019s testimony in Suarez was not essential to the appellant\u2019s defense as was the case in Roviaro because the confidential informant therein represented the only likely source of exculpatory information.)"},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"arguably erroneous exclusion of some evidence was harmless because other similar evidence was admitted and thus no prejudice","sentence":"Cf. Commonwealth v. Christy, 540 Pa. 192, 656 A.2d 877 (1995)(arguably erroneous exclusion of some evidence was harmless because other similar evidence was admitted and thus no prejudice); Henery v. Shadle, 443 Pa.Super. 331, 661 A.2d 439 (1995)(erroneous exclusion of evidence harmless where similar evidence was admitted)."},"case_id":7867668,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The trial court stated, \"I do not think that ... the Defense [i.e., Appellant] has made a showing that the Cl was in a position to have information which is critical to the defense such as to warrant the production of the Cl.\" N.T. at p. 53 (May 28,1992). We understand this to be a determination that in light of the fact that Albert Austin had made himself available to Appellant in order to testify that Appellant was not present at the January 23,1991 drug sale, which corroborated Appellant's own testimony, Appellant failed to show that he needed the testimony of the confidential informant.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"582 F.2d 1007, 1012","parenthetical":"no error in denying disclosure where the informant's testimony in Suarez was not essential to the appellant's defense as was the case in Roviaro because the confidential informant therein represented the only likely source of exculpatory information.","sentence":"U.S. v. Simonetti, 326 F.2d 614, 615 (2d Cir.1964)(no abuse of trial court\u2019s discretion in denying disclosure where \u201cthe testimony of the Special Employee [i.e., the confidential informant] would have been at best cumulative.\u201d); Suarez v. U.S., 582 F.2d 1007, 1012 (5th Cir.1978)(no error in denying disclosure where the informant\u2019s testimony in Suarez was not essential to the appellant\u2019s defense as was the case in Roviaro because the confidential informant therein represented the only likely source of exculpatory information.)"},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"arguably erroneous exclusion of some evidence was harmless because other similar evidence was admitted and thus no prejudice","sentence":"Cf. Commonwealth v. Christy, 540 Pa. 192, 656 A.2d 877 (1995)(arguably erroneous exclusion of some evidence was harmless because other similar evidence was admitted and thus no prejudice); Henery v. Shadle, 443 Pa.Super. 331, 661 A.2d 439 (1995)(erroneous exclusion of evidence harmless where similar evidence was admitted)."},"case_id":7867668,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The trial court stated, \"I do not think that ... the Defense [i.e., Appellant] has made a showing that the Cl was in a position to have information which is critical to the defense such as to warrant the production of the Cl.\" N.T. at p. 53 (May 28,1992). We understand this to be a determination that in light of the fact that Albert Austin had made himself available to Appellant in order to testify that Appellant was not present at the January 23,1991 drug sale, which corroborated Appellant's own testimony, Appellant failed to show that he needed the testimony of the confidential informant.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"erroneous exclusion of evidence harmless where similar evidence was admitted","sentence":"Cf. Commonwealth v. Christy, 540 Pa. 192, 656 A.2d 877 (1995)(arguably erroneous exclusion of some evidence was harmless because other similar evidence was admitted and thus no prejudice); Henery v. Shadle, 443 Pa.Super. 331, 661 A.2d 439 (1995)(erroneous exclusion of evidence harmless where similar evidence was admitted)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"582 F.2d 1007, 1012","parenthetical":"no error in denying disclosure where the informant's testimony in Suarez was not essential to the appellant's defense as was the case in Roviaro because the confidential informant therein represented the only likely source of exculpatory information.","sentence":"U.S. v. Simonetti, 326 F.2d 614, 615 (2d Cir.1964)(no abuse of trial court\u2019s discretion in denying disclosure where \u201cthe testimony of the Special Employee [i.e., the confidential informant] would have been at best cumulative.\u201d); Suarez v. U.S., 582 F.2d 1007, 1012 (5th Cir.1978)(no error in denying disclosure where the informant\u2019s testimony in Suarez was not essential to the appellant\u2019s defense as was the case in Roviaro because the confidential informant therein represented the only likely source of exculpatory information.)"},"case_id":7867668,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The trial court stated, \"I do not think that ... the Defense [i.e., Appellant] has made a showing that the Cl was in a position to have information which is critical to the defense such as to warrant the production of the Cl.\" N.T. at p. 53 (May 28,1992). We understand this to be a determination that in light of the fact that Albert Austin had made himself available to Appellant in order to testify that Appellant was not present at the January 23,1991 drug sale, which corroborated Appellant's own testimony, Appellant failed to show that he needed the testimony of the confidential informant.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"582 F.2d 1007, 1012","parenthetical":"no error in denying disclosure where the informant's testimony in Suarez was not essential to the appellant's defense as was the case in Roviaro because the confidential informant therein represented the only likely source of exculpatory information.","sentence":"U.S. v. Simonetti, 326 F.2d 614, 615 (2d Cir.1964)(no abuse of trial court\u2019s discretion in denying disclosure where \u201cthe testimony of the Special Employee [i.e., the confidential informant] would have been at best cumulative.\u201d); Suarez v. U.S., 582 F.2d 1007, 1012 (5th Cir.1978)(no error in denying disclosure where the informant\u2019s testimony in Suarez was not essential to the appellant\u2019s defense as was the case in Roviaro because the confidential informant therein represented the only likely source of exculpatory information.)"},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"erroneous exclusion of evidence harmless where similar evidence was admitted","sentence":"Cf. Commonwealth v. Christy, 540 Pa. 192, 656 A.2d 877 (1995)(arguably erroneous exclusion of some evidence was harmless because other similar evidence was admitted and thus no prejudice); Henery v. Shadle, 443 Pa.Super. 331, 661 A.2d 439 (1995)(erroneous exclusion of evidence harmless where similar evidence was admitted)."},"case_id":7867668,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In McCorkindale, in addition to the general principles articulated above, this court considered the proper standards for determining the amount in controversy when a state court rule -- such as Rule 1.403 of the Iowa Rules of Civil Procedure -- prohibits the pleading of a specific amount in controversy: Instead of the \"legal certainty\" test, the defendant is required to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional amount.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"393 F.3d 828, 831","parenthetical":"noting that the rule that the party invoking federal jurisdiction must prove the requisite amount by a preponderance of the evidence \"applies even in removed cases where the party invoking jurisdiction is the defendant.\"","sentence":"McCorkindale, 909 F.Supp. at 651-53; see Bell v. Hershey Co., 557 F.3d 953, 956 (8th Cir.2009) (noting that \u201c[w]here the defendant seeks to invoke federal jurisdiction through removal, however, it bears the burden of proving that the jurisdictional threshold is satisfied.\u201d); see also James Neff Kramper Family Farm P\u2019ship, 393 F.3d 828, 831 (8th Cir.2005) (noting that the rule that the party invoking federal jurisdiction must prove the requisite amount by a preponderance of the evidence \u201capplies even in removed cases where the party invoking jurisdiction is the defendant.\u201d); OnePoint Solutions, L.L.C. v. Borchert, 486 F.3d 342, 349 (8th Cir.2007) (noting that the party invoking jurisdiction \u201chas the burden\" of proving the requisite amount by a preponderance of the evidence.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"557 F.3d 953, 956","parenthetical":"noting that \"[w]here the defendant seeks to invoke federal jurisdiction through removal, however, it bears the burden of proving that the jurisdictional threshold is satisfied.\"","sentence":"McCorkindale, 909 F.Supp. at 651-53; see Bell v. Hershey Co., 557 F.3d 953, 956 (8th Cir.2009) (noting that \u201c[w]here the defendant seeks to invoke federal jurisdiction through removal, however, it bears the burden of proving that the jurisdictional threshold is satisfied.\u201d); see also James Neff Kramper Family Farm P\u2019ship, 393 F.3d 828, 831 (8th Cir.2005) (noting that the rule that the party invoking federal jurisdiction must prove the requisite amount by a preponderance of the evidence \u201capplies even in removed cases where the party invoking jurisdiction is the defendant.\u201d); OnePoint Solutions, L.L.C. v. Borchert, 486 F.3d 342, 349 (8th Cir.2007) (noting that the party invoking jurisdiction \u201chas the burden\" of proving the requisite amount by a preponderance of the evidence.\u201d)."},"case_id":4190074,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In McCorkindale, in addition to the general principles articulated above, this court considered the proper standards for determining the amount in controversy when a state court rule -- such as Rule 1.403 of the Iowa Rules of Civil Procedure -- prohibits the pleading of a specific amount in controversy: Instead of the \"legal certainty\" test, the defendant is required to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional amount.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"557 F.3d 953, 956","parenthetical":"noting that \"[w]here the defendant seeks to invoke federal jurisdiction through removal, however, it bears the burden of proving that the jurisdictional threshold is satisfied.\"","sentence":"McCorkindale, 909 F.Supp. at 651-53; see Bell v. Hershey Co., 557 F.3d 953, 956 (8th Cir.2009) (noting that \u201c[w]here the defendant seeks to invoke federal jurisdiction through removal, however, it bears the burden of proving that the jurisdictional threshold is satisfied.\u201d); see also James Neff Kramper Family Farm P\u2019ship, 393 F.3d 828, 831 (8th Cir.2005) (noting that the rule that the party invoking federal jurisdiction must prove the requisite amount by a preponderance of the evidence \u201capplies even in removed cases where the party invoking jurisdiction is the defendant.\u201d); OnePoint Solutions, L.L.C. v. Borchert, 486 F.3d 342, 349 (8th Cir.2007) (noting that the party invoking jurisdiction \u201chas the burden\" of proving the requisite amount by a preponderance of the evidence.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"486 F.3d 342, 349","parenthetical":"noting that the party invoking jurisdiction \"has the burden\" of proving the requisite amount by a preponderance of the evidence.\"","sentence":"McCorkindale, 909 F.Supp. at 651-53; see Bell v. Hershey Co., 557 F.3d 953, 956 (8th Cir.2009) (noting that \u201c[w]here the defendant seeks to invoke federal jurisdiction through removal, however, it bears the burden of proving that the jurisdictional threshold is satisfied.\u201d); see also James Neff Kramper Family Farm P\u2019ship, 393 F.3d 828, 831 (8th Cir.2005) (noting that the rule that the party invoking federal jurisdiction must prove the requisite amount by a preponderance of the evidence \u201capplies even in removed cases where the party invoking jurisdiction is the defendant.\u201d); OnePoint Solutions, L.L.C. v. Borchert, 486 F.3d 342, 349 (8th Cir.2007) (noting that the party invoking jurisdiction \u201chas the burden\" of proving the requisite amount by a preponderance of the evidence.\u201d)."},"case_id":4190074,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In an attempt to do so, the Lorenzens base subject matter jurisdiction on 28 U.S.C. SS 1346. As a matter of law, this will not do. Sovereign immunity is not waived by a statute of general jurisdiction.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"970 F.2d 733, 735","parenthetical":"noting that 28 U.S.C. SS 1340 \"does not constitute a waiver of sovereign immunity\"","sentence":"Wyoming v. United States, 279 F.3d 1214, 1225 (10th Cir.2002); see Shanbaum v. United States, 32 F.3d 180, 182 (5th Cir.1994) (\u201cSection 1346 is a general jurisdiction statute that does not constitute a separate waiver of sovereign immunity.\u201d); Perkins v. United States, 314 F.Supp.2d 664, 667 (E.D.Tex.2004) (\u201cDespite its seeming breadth, courts view [\u00a7 1346(a)(1) ], standing alone, as insufficient to waive sovereign immunity.\u201d); see also Guthrie v. Sawyer, 970 F.2d 733, 735 (10th Cir.1992) (noting that 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1340 \u201cdoes not constitute a waiver of sovereign immunity\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"32 F.3d 180, 182","parenthetical":"\"Section 1346 is a general jurisdiction statute that does not constitute a separate waiver of sovereign immunity.\"","sentence":"Wyoming v. United States, 279 F.3d 1214, 1225 (10th Cir.2002); see Shanbaum v. United States, 32 F.3d 180, 182 (5th Cir.1994) (\u201cSection 1346 is a general jurisdiction statute that does not constitute a separate waiver of sovereign immunity.\u201d); Perkins v. United States, 314 F.Supp.2d 664, 667 (E.D.Tex.2004) (\u201cDespite its seeming breadth, courts view [\u00a7 1346(a)(1) ], standing alone, as insufficient to waive sovereign immunity.\u201d); see also Guthrie v. Sawyer, 970 F.2d 733, 735 (10th Cir.1992) (noting that 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1340 \u201cdoes not constitute a waiver of sovereign immunity\u201d)."},"case_id":3689325,"label":"b"}
{"context":"First, Devenport could not have been sentenced to imprisonment; imprisonment becomes a sentencing option only upon the second violation of the Wisconsin drunk driving statute. Because the penalty for a first offense is only a civil forfeiture, and there is no possibility of imprisonment, Devenport's offense is not a crime under Wisconsin law.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"466 U.S. 740, 753","parenthetical":"\"The State of Wisconsin has chosen to classify the first offense for driving while intoxicated as a noncriminal, civil forfeiture offense for which no imprisonment is possible.\"","sentence":"See State v. McAllister, 107 Wis.2d 532, 319 N.W.2d 865, 868 (1982) (acknowledging that previous convictions under \u00a7 346.63(1) may be civil or criminal); State v. Peterson, 104 Wis.2d 616, 312 N.W.2d 784, 786 (1981) (\u201c[T]he legislature intended that violations of state traffic laws involving forfeitures be treated as civil offenses .... \u201d); see also Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 753, 104 S.Ct. 2091, 2099, 80 L.Ed.2d 732 (1984) (\u201cThe State of Wisconsin has chosen to classify the first offense for driving while intoxicated as a noncriminal, civil forfeiture offense for which no imprisonment is possible.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"acknowledging that previous convictions under SS 346.63(1) may be civil or criminal","sentence":"See State v. McAllister, 107 Wis.2d 532, 319 N.W.2d 865, 868 (1982) (acknowledging that previous convictions under \u00a7 346.63(1) may be civil or criminal); State v. Peterson, 104 Wis.2d 616, 312 N.W.2d 784, 786 (1981) (\u201c[T]he legislature intended that violations of state traffic laws involving forfeitures be treated as civil offenses .... \u201d); see also Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 753, 104 S.Ct. 2091, 2099, 80 L.Ed.2d 732 (1984) (\u201cThe State of Wisconsin has chosen to classify the first offense for driving while intoxicated as a noncriminal, civil forfeiture offense for which no imprisonment is possible.\u201d)."},"case_id":11888192,"label":"b"}
{"context":"First, Devenport could not have been sentenced to imprisonment; imprisonment becomes a sentencing option only upon the second violation of the Wisconsin drunk driving statute. Because the penalty for a first offense is only a civil forfeiture, and there is no possibility of imprisonment, Devenport's offense is not a crime under Wisconsin law.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"104 S.Ct. 2091, 2099","parenthetical":"\"The State of Wisconsin has chosen to classify the first offense for driving while intoxicated as a noncriminal, civil forfeiture offense for which no imprisonment is possible.\"","sentence":"See State v. McAllister, 107 Wis.2d 532, 319 N.W.2d 865, 868 (1982) (acknowledging that previous convictions under \u00a7 346.63(1) may be civil or criminal); State v. Peterson, 104 Wis.2d 616, 312 N.W.2d 784, 786 (1981) (\u201c[T]he legislature intended that violations of state traffic laws involving forfeitures be treated as civil offenses .... \u201d); see also Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 753, 104 S.Ct. 2091, 2099, 80 L.Ed.2d 732 (1984) (\u201cThe State of Wisconsin has chosen to classify the first offense for driving while intoxicated as a noncriminal, civil forfeiture offense for which no imprisonment is possible.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"acknowledging that previous convictions under SS 346.63(1) may be civil or criminal","sentence":"See State v. McAllister, 107 Wis.2d 532, 319 N.W.2d 865, 868 (1982) (acknowledging that previous convictions under \u00a7 346.63(1) may be civil or criminal); State v. Peterson, 104 Wis.2d 616, 312 N.W.2d 784, 786 (1981) (\u201c[T]he legislature intended that violations of state traffic laws involving forfeitures be treated as civil offenses .... \u201d); see also Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 753, 104 S.Ct. 2091, 2099, 80 L.Ed.2d 732 (1984) (\u201cThe State of Wisconsin has chosen to classify the first offense for driving while intoxicated as a noncriminal, civil forfeiture offense for which no imprisonment is possible.\u201d)."},"case_id":11888192,"label":"b"}
{"context":"First, Devenport could not have been sentenced to imprisonment; imprisonment becomes a sentencing option only upon the second violation of the Wisconsin drunk driving statute. Because the penalty for a first offense is only a civil forfeiture, and there is no possibility of imprisonment, Devenport's offense is not a crime under Wisconsin law.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"acknowledging that previous convictions under SS 346.63(1) may be civil or criminal","sentence":"See State v. McAllister, 107 Wis.2d 532, 319 N.W.2d 865, 868 (1982) (acknowledging that previous convictions under \u00a7 346.63(1) may be civil or criminal); State v. Peterson, 104 Wis.2d 616, 312 N.W.2d 784, 786 (1981) (\u201c[T]he legislature intended that violations of state traffic laws involving forfeitures be treated as civil offenses .... \u201d); see also Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 753, 104 S.Ct. 2091, 2099, 80 L.Ed.2d 732 (1984) (\u201cThe State of Wisconsin has chosen to classify the first offense for driving while intoxicated as a noncriminal, civil forfeiture offense for which no imprisonment is possible.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"The State of Wisconsin has chosen to classify the first offense for driving while intoxicated as a noncriminal, civil forfeiture offense for which no imprisonment is possible.\"","sentence":"See State v. McAllister, 107 Wis.2d 532, 319 N.W.2d 865, 868 (1982) (acknowledging that previous convictions under \u00a7 346.63(1) may be civil or criminal); State v. Peterson, 104 Wis.2d 616, 312 N.W.2d 784, 786 (1981) (\u201c[T]he legislature intended that violations of state traffic laws involving forfeitures be treated as civil offenses .... \u201d); see also Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 753, 104 S.Ct. 2091, 2099, 80 L.Ed.2d 732 (1984) (\u201cThe State of Wisconsin has chosen to classify the first offense for driving while intoxicated as a noncriminal, civil forfeiture offense for which no imprisonment is possible.\u201d)."},"case_id":11888192,"label":"a"}
{"context":"First, Devenport could not have been sentenced to imprisonment; imprisonment becomes a sentencing option only upon the second violation of the Wisconsin drunk driving statute. Because the penalty for a first offense is only a civil forfeiture, and there is no possibility of imprisonment, Devenport's offense is not a crime under Wisconsin law.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"319 N.W.2d 865, 868","parenthetical":"acknowledging that previous convictions under SS 346.63(1) may be civil or criminal","sentence":"See State v. McAllister, 107 Wis.2d 532, 319 N.W.2d 865, 868 (1982) (acknowledging that previous convictions under \u00a7 346.63(1) may be civil or criminal); State v. Peterson, 104 Wis.2d 616, 312 N.W.2d 784, 786 (1981) (\u201c[T]he legislature intended that violations of state traffic laws involving forfeitures be treated as civil offenses .... \u201d); see also Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 753, 104 S.Ct. 2091, 2099, 80 L.Ed.2d 732 (1984) (\u201cThe State of Wisconsin has chosen to classify the first offense for driving while intoxicated as a noncriminal, civil forfeiture offense for which no imprisonment is possible.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"466 U.S. 740, 753","parenthetical":"\"The State of Wisconsin has chosen to classify the first offense for driving while intoxicated as a noncriminal, civil forfeiture offense for which no imprisonment is possible.\"","sentence":"See State v. McAllister, 107 Wis.2d 532, 319 N.W.2d 865, 868 (1982) (acknowledging that previous convictions under \u00a7 346.63(1) may be civil or criminal); State v. Peterson, 104 Wis.2d 616, 312 N.W.2d 784, 786 (1981) (\u201c[T]he legislature intended that violations of state traffic laws involving forfeitures be treated as civil offenses .... \u201d); see also Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 753, 104 S.Ct. 2091, 2099, 80 L.Ed.2d 732 (1984) (\u201cThe State of Wisconsin has chosen to classify the first offense for driving while intoxicated as a noncriminal, civil forfeiture offense for which no imprisonment is possible.\u201d)."},"case_id":11888192,"label":"a"}
{"context":"First, Devenport could not have been sentenced to imprisonment; imprisonment becomes a sentencing option only upon the second violation of the Wisconsin drunk driving statute. Because the penalty for a first offense is only a civil forfeiture, and there is no possibility of imprisonment, Devenport's offense is not a crime under Wisconsin law.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"319 N.W.2d 865, 868","parenthetical":"acknowledging that previous convictions under SS 346.63(1) may be civil or criminal","sentence":"See State v. McAllister, 107 Wis.2d 532, 319 N.W.2d 865, 868 (1982) (acknowledging that previous convictions under \u00a7 346.63(1) may be civil or criminal); State v. Peterson, 104 Wis.2d 616, 312 N.W.2d 784, 786 (1981) (\u201c[T]he legislature intended that violations of state traffic laws involving forfeitures be treated as civil offenses .... \u201d); see also Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 753, 104 S.Ct. 2091, 2099, 80 L.Ed.2d 732 (1984) (\u201cThe State of Wisconsin has chosen to classify the first offense for driving while intoxicated as a noncriminal, civil forfeiture offense for which no imprisonment is possible.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"104 S.Ct. 2091, 2099","parenthetical":"\"The State of Wisconsin has chosen to classify the first offense for driving while intoxicated as a noncriminal, civil forfeiture offense for which no imprisonment is possible.\"","sentence":"See State v. McAllister, 107 Wis.2d 532, 319 N.W.2d 865, 868 (1982) (acknowledging that previous convictions under \u00a7 346.63(1) may be civil or criminal); State v. Peterson, 104 Wis.2d 616, 312 N.W.2d 784, 786 (1981) (\u201c[T]he legislature intended that violations of state traffic laws involving forfeitures be treated as civil offenses .... \u201d); see also Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 753, 104 S.Ct. 2091, 2099, 80 L.Ed.2d 732 (1984) (\u201cThe State of Wisconsin has chosen to classify the first offense for driving while intoxicated as a noncriminal, civil forfeiture offense for which no imprisonment is possible.\u201d)."},"case_id":11888192,"label":"a"}
{"context":"First, Devenport could not have been sentenced to imprisonment; imprisonment becomes a sentencing option only upon the second violation of the Wisconsin drunk driving statute. Because the penalty for a first offense is only a civil forfeiture, and there is no possibility of imprisonment, Devenport's offense is not a crime under Wisconsin law.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"319 N.W.2d 865, 868","parenthetical":"acknowledging that previous convictions under SS 346.63(1) may be civil or criminal","sentence":"See State v. McAllister, 107 Wis.2d 532, 319 N.W.2d 865, 868 (1982) (acknowledging that previous convictions under \u00a7 346.63(1) may be civil or criminal); State v. Peterson, 104 Wis.2d 616, 312 N.W.2d 784, 786 (1981) (\u201c[T]he legislature intended that violations of state traffic laws involving forfeitures be treated as civil offenses .... \u201d); see also Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 753, 104 S.Ct. 2091, 2099, 80 L.Ed.2d 732 (1984) (\u201cThe State of Wisconsin has chosen to classify the first offense for driving while intoxicated as a noncriminal, civil forfeiture offense for which no imprisonment is possible.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"The State of Wisconsin has chosen to classify the first offense for driving while intoxicated as a noncriminal, civil forfeiture offense for which no imprisonment is possible.\"","sentence":"See State v. McAllister, 107 Wis.2d 532, 319 N.W.2d 865, 868 (1982) (acknowledging that previous convictions under \u00a7 346.63(1) may be civil or criminal); State v. Peterson, 104 Wis.2d 616, 312 N.W.2d 784, 786 (1981) (\u201c[T]he legislature intended that violations of state traffic laws involving forfeitures be treated as civil offenses .... \u201d); see also Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 753, 104 S.Ct. 2091, 2099, 80 L.Ed.2d 732 (1984) (\u201cThe State of Wisconsin has chosen to classify the first offense for driving while intoxicated as a noncriminal, civil forfeiture offense for which no imprisonment is possible.\u201d)."},"case_id":11888192,"label":"a"}
{"context":"First, Devenport could not have been sentenced to imprisonment; imprisonment becomes a sentencing option only upon the second violation of the Wisconsin drunk driving statute. Because the penalty for a first offense is only a civil forfeiture, and there is no possibility of imprisonment, Devenport's offense is not a crime under Wisconsin law.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"466 U.S. 740, 753","parenthetical":"\"The State of Wisconsin has chosen to classify the first offense for driving while intoxicated as a noncriminal, civil forfeiture offense for which no imprisonment is possible.\"","sentence":"See State v. McAllister, 107 Wis.2d 532, 319 N.W.2d 865, 868 (1982) (acknowledging that previous convictions under \u00a7 346.63(1) may be civil or criminal); State v. Peterson, 104 Wis.2d 616, 312 N.W.2d 784, 786 (1981) (\u201c[T]he legislature intended that violations of state traffic laws involving forfeitures be treated as civil offenses .... \u201d); see also Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 753, 104 S.Ct. 2091, 2099, 80 L.Ed.2d 732 (1984) (\u201cThe State of Wisconsin has chosen to classify the first offense for driving while intoxicated as a noncriminal, civil forfeiture offense for which no imprisonment is possible.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[T]he legislature intended that violations of state traffic laws involving forfeitures be treated as civil offenses .... \"","sentence":"See State v. McAllister, 107 Wis.2d 532, 319 N.W.2d 865, 868 (1982) (acknowledging that previous convictions under \u00a7 346.63(1) may be civil or criminal); State v. Peterson, 104 Wis.2d 616, 312 N.W.2d 784, 786 (1981) (\u201c[T]he legislature intended that violations of state traffic laws involving forfeitures be treated as civil offenses .... \u201d); see also Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 753, 104 S.Ct. 2091, 2099, 80 L.Ed.2d 732 (1984) (\u201cThe State of Wisconsin has chosen to classify the first offense for driving while intoxicated as a noncriminal, civil forfeiture offense for which no imprisonment is possible.\u201d)."},"case_id":11888192,"label":"b"}
{"context":"First, Devenport could not have been sentenced to imprisonment; imprisonment becomes a sentencing option only upon the second violation of the Wisconsin drunk driving statute. Because the penalty for a first offense is only a civil forfeiture, and there is no possibility of imprisonment, Devenport's offense is not a crime under Wisconsin law.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[T]he legislature intended that violations of state traffic laws involving forfeitures be treated as civil offenses .... \"","sentence":"See State v. McAllister, 107 Wis.2d 532, 319 N.W.2d 865, 868 (1982) (acknowledging that previous convictions under \u00a7 346.63(1) may be civil or criminal); State v. Peterson, 104 Wis.2d 616, 312 N.W.2d 784, 786 (1981) (\u201c[T]he legislature intended that violations of state traffic laws involving forfeitures be treated as civil offenses .... \u201d); see also Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 753, 104 S.Ct. 2091, 2099, 80 L.Ed.2d 732 (1984) (\u201cThe State of Wisconsin has chosen to classify the first offense for driving while intoxicated as a noncriminal, civil forfeiture offense for which no imprisonment is possible.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"104 S.Ct. 2091, 2099","parenthetical":"\"The State of Wisconsin has chosen to classify the first offense for driving while intoxicated as a noncriminal, civil forfeiture offense for which no imprisonment is possible.\"","sentence":"See State v. McAllister, 107 Wis.2d 532, 319 N.W.2d 865, 868 (1982) (acknowledging that previous convictions under \u00a7 346.63(1) may be civil or criminal); State v. Peterson, 104 Wis.2d 616, 312 N.W.2d 784, 786 (1981) (\u201c[T]he legislature intended that violations of state traffic laws involving forfeitures be treated as civil offenses .... \u201d); see also Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 753, 104 S.Ct. 2091, 2099, 80 L.Ed.2d 732 (1984) (\u201cThe State of Wisconsin has chosen to classify the first offense for driving while intoxicated as a noncriminal, civil forfeiture offense for which no imprisonment is possible.\u201d)."},"case_id":11888192,"label":"a"}
{"context":"First, Devenport could not have been sentenced to imprisonment; imprisonment becomes a sentencing option only upon the second violation of the Wisconsin drunk driving statute. Because the penalty for a first offense is only a civil forfeiture, and there is no possibility of imprisonment, Devenport's offense is not a crime under Wisconsin law.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[T]he legislature intended that violations of state traffic laws involving forfeitures be treated as civil offenses .... \"","sentence":"See State v. McAllister, 107 Wis.2d 532, 319 N.W.2d 865, 868 (1982) (acknowledging that previous convictions under \u00a7 346.63(1) may be civil or criminal); State v. Peterson, 104 Wis.2d 616, 312 N.W.2d 784, 786 (1981) (\u201c[T]he legislature intended that violations of state traffic laws involving forfeitures be treated as civil offenses .... \u201d); see also Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 753, 104 S.Ct. 2091, 2099, 80 L.Ed.2d 732 (1984) (\u201cThe State of Wisconsin has chosen to classify the first offense for driving while intoxicated as a noncriminal, civil forfeiture offense for which no imprisonment is possible.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"The State of Wisconsin has chosen to classify the first offense for driving while intoxicated as a noncriminal, civil forfeiture offense for which no imprisonment is possible.\"","sentence":"See State v. McAllister, 107 Wis.2d 532, 319 N.W.2d 865, 868 (1982) (acknowledging that previous convictions under \u00a7 346.63(1) may be civil or criminal); State v. Peterson, 104 Wis.2d 616, 312 N.W.2d 784, 786 (1981) (\u201c[T]he legislature intended that violations of state traffic laws involving forfeitures be treated as civil offenses .... \u201d); see also Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 753, 104 S.Ct. 2091, 2099, 80 L.Ed.2d 732 (1984) (\u201cThe State of Wisconsin has chosen to classify the first offense for driving while intoxicated as a noncriminal, civil forfeiture offense for which no imprisonment is possible.\u201d)."},"case_id":11888192,"label":"a"}
{"context":"First, Devenport could not have been sentenced to imprisonment; imprisonment becomes a sentencing option only upon the second violation of the Wisconsin drunk driving statute. Because the penalty for a first offense is only a civil forfeiture, and there is no possibility of imprisonment, Devenport's offense is not a crime under Wisconsin law.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"466 U.S. 740, 753","parenthetical":"\"The State of Wisconsin has chosen to classify the first offense for driving while intoxicated as a noncriminal, civil forfeiture offense for which no imprisonment is possible.\"","sentence":"See State v. McAllister, 107 Wis.2d 532, 319 N.W.2d 865, 868 (1982) (acknowledging that previous convictions under \u00a7 346.63(1) may be civil or criminal); State v. Peterson, 104 Wis.2d 616, 312 N.W.2d 784, 786 (1981) (\u201c[T]he legislature intended that violations of state traffic laws involving forfeitures be treated as civil offenses .... \u201d); see also Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 753, 104 S.Ct. 2091, 2099, 80 L.Ed.2d 732 (1984) (\u201cThe State of Wisconsin has chosen to classify the first offense for driving while intoxicated as a noncriminal, civil forfeiture offense for which no imprisonment is possible.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"312 N.W.2d 784, 786","parenthetical":"\"[T]he legislature intended that violations of state traffic laws involving forfeitures be treated as civil offenses .... \"","sentence":"See State v. McAllister, 107 Wis.2d 532, 319 N.W.2d 865, 868 (1982) (acknowledging that previous convictions under \u00a7 346.63(1) may be civil or criminal); State v. Peterson, 104 Wis.2d 616, 312 N.W.2d 784, 786 (1981) (\u201c[T]he legislature intended that violations of state traffic laws involving forfeitures be treated as civil offenses .... \u201d); see also Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 753, 104 S.Ct. 2091, 2099, 80 L.Ed.2d 732 (1984) (\u201cThe State of Wisconsin has chosen to classify the first offense for driving while intoxicated as a noncriminal, civil forfeiture offense for which no imprisonment is possible.\u201d)."},"case_id":11888192,"label":"b"}
{"context":"First, Devenport could not have been sentenced to imprisonment; imprisonment becomes a sentencing option only upon the second violation of the Wisconsin drunk driving statute. Because the penalty for a first offense is only a civil forfeiture, and there is no possibility of imprisonment, Devenport's offense is not a crime under Wisconsin law.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"104 S.Ct. 2091, 2099","parenthetical":"\"The State of Wisconsin has chosen to classify the first offense for driving while intoxicated as a noncriminal, civil forfeiture offense for which no imprisonment is possible.\"","sentence":"See State v. McAllister, 107 Wis.2d 532, 319 N.W.2d 865, 868 (1982) (acknowledging that previous convictions under \u00a7 346.63(1) may be civil or criminal); State v. Peterson, 104 Wis.2d 616, 312 N.W.2d 784, 786 (1981) (\u201c[T]he legislature intended that violations of state traffic laws involving forfeitures be treated as civil offenses .... \u201d); see also Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 753, 104 S.Ct. 2091, 2099, 80 L.Ed.2d 732 (1984) (\u201cThe State of Wisconsin has chosen to classify the first offense for driving while intoxicated as a noncriminal, civil forfeiture offense for which no imprisonment is possible.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"312 N.W.2d 784, 786","parenthetical":"\"[T]he legislature intended that violations of state traffic laws involving forfeitures be treated as civil offenses .... \"","sentence":"See State v. McAllister, 107 Wis.2d 532, 319 N.W.2d 865, 868 (1982) (acknowledging that previous convictions under \u00a7 346.63(1) may be civil or criminal); State v. Peterson, 104 Wis.2d 616, 312 N.W.2d 784, 786 (1981) (\u201c[T]he legislature intended that violations of state traffic laws involving forfeitures be treated as civil offenses .... \u201d); see also Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 753, 104 S.Ct. 2091, 2099, 80 L.Ed.2d 732 (1984) (\u201cThe State of Wisconsin has chosen to classify the first offense for driving while intoxicated as a noncriminal, civil forfeiture offense for which no imprisonment is possible.\u201d)."},"case_id":11888192,"label":"b"}
{"context":"First, Devenport could not have been sentenced to imprisonment; imprisonment becomes a sentencing option only upon the second violation of the Wisconsin drunk driving statute. Because the penalty for a first offense is only a civil forfeiture, and there is no possibility of imprisonment, Devenport's offense is not a crime under Wisconsin law.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"312 N.W.2d 784, 786","parenthetical":"\"[T]he legislature intended that violations of state traffic laws involving forfeitures be treated as civil offenses .... \"","sentence":"See State v. McAllister, 107 Wis.2d 532, 319 N.W.2d 865, 868 (1982) (acknowledging that previous convictions under \u00a7 346.63(1) may be civil or criminal); State v. Peterson, 104 Wis.2d 616, 312 N.W.2d 784, 786 (1981) (\u201c[T]he legislature intended that violations of state traffic laws involving forfeitures be treated as civil offenses .... \u201d); see also Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 753, 104 S.Ct. 2091, 2099, 80 L.Ed.2d 732 (1984) (\u201cThe State of Wisconsin has chosen to classify the first offense for driving while intoxicated as a noncriminal, civil forfeiture offense for which no imprisonment is possible.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"The State of Wisconsin has chosen to classify the first offense for driving while intoxicated as a noncriminal, civil forfeiture offense for which no imprisonment is possible.\"","sentence":"See State v. McAllister, 107 Wis.2d 532, 319 N.W.2d 865, 868 (1982) (acknowledging that previous convictions under \u00a7 346.63(1) may be civil or criminal); State v. Peterson, 104 Wis.2d 616, 312 N.W.2d 784, 786 (1981) (\u201c[T]he legislature intended that violations of state traffic laws involving forfeitures be treated as civil offenses .... \u201d); see also Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 753, 104 S.Ct. 2091, 2099, 80 L.Ed.2d 732 (1984) (\u201cThe State of Wisconsin has chosen to classify the first offense for driving while intoxicated as a noncriminal, civil forfeiture offense for which no imprisonment is possible.\u201d)."},"case_id":11888192,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The court rejects Mendoza's reasoning finding that the ninety-day period relevant to 18 U.S.C. SS 3164 does not begin to run until the defendant is in federal custody pursuant to a pre-trial detention order issued by a federal judicial officer.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"dual sovereignity requires that the federal government in no way be bound by the action of the state prosecutorial authorities absent \"a clear showing of federal intrusion into, and control over state decision-making processes\"","sentence":"See United States v. Ferrs, 503 F.Supp. 187 (E.D.Pa.1980) aff'd 676 F.2d 688 (1982) (a defendant does not become an \"accused\u201d for Speedy Trial Act purposes until he is under federal arrest); see also United States v. Mejias, 417 F.Supp. 585, 591 n. 6 (S.D.N.Y.) aff\u2019d 552 F.2d 435 (2d Cir.1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 847, 98 S.Ct. 154, 54 L.Ed.2d 115 (1977) (dual sovereignity requires that the federal government in no way be bound by the action of the state prosecutorial authorities absent \"a clear showing of federal intrusion into, and control over state decision-making processes\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"a defendant does not become an \"accused\" for Speedy Trial Act purposes until he is under federal arrest","sentence":"See United States v. Ferrs, 503 F.Supp. 187 (E.D.Pa.1980) aff'd 676 F.2d 688 (1982) (a defendant does not become an \"accused\u201d for Speedy Trial Act purposes until he is under federal arrest); see also United States v. Mejias, 417 F.Supp. 585, 591 n. 6 (S.D.N.Y.) aff\u2019d 552 F.2d 435 (2d Cir.1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 847, 98 S.Ct. 154, 54 L.Ed.2d 115 (1977) (dual sovereignity requires that the federal government in no way be bound by the action of the state prosecutorial authorities absent \"a clear showing of federal intrusion into, and control over state decision-making processes\u201d)."},"case_id":7399745,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The court rejects Mendoza's reasoning finding that the ninety-day period relevant to 18 U.S.C. SS 3164 does not begin to run until the defendant is in federal custody pursuant to a pre-trial detention order issued by a federal judicial officer.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"dual sovereignity requires that the federal government in no way be bound by the action of the state prosecutorial authorities absent \"a clear showing of federal intrusion into, and control over state decision-making processes\"","sentence":"See United States v. Ferrs, 503 F.Supp. 187 (E.D.Pa.1980) aff'd 676 F.2d 688 (1982) (a defendant does not become an \"accused\u201d for Speedy Trial Act purposes until he is under federal arrest); see also United States v. Mejias, 417 F.Supp. 585, 591 n. 6 (S.D.N.Y.) aff\u2019d 552 F.2d 435 (2d Cir.1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 847, 98 S.Ct. 154, 54 L.Ed.2d 115 (1977) (dual sovereignity requires that the federal government in no way be bound by the action of the state prosecutorial authorities absent \"a clear showing of federal intrusion into, and control over state decision-making processes\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"a defendant does not become an \"accused\" for Speedy Trial Act purposes until he is under federal arrest","sentence":"See United States v. Ferrs, 503 F.Supp. 187 (E.D.Pa.1980) aff'd 676 F.2d 688 (1982) (a defendant does not become an \"accused\u201d for Speedy Trial Act purposes until he is under federal arrest); see also United States v. Mejias, 417 F.Supp. 585, 591 n. 6 (S.D.N.Y.) aff\u2019d 552 F.2d 435 (2d Cir.1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 847, 98 S.Ct. 154, 54 L.Ed.2d 115 (1977) (dual sovereignity requires that the federal government in no way be bound by the action of the state prosecutorial authorities absent \"a clear showing of federal intrusion into, and control over state decision-making processes\u201d)."},"case_id":7399745,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The court rejects Mendoza's reasoning finding that the ninety-day period relevant to 18 U.S.C. SS 3164 does not begin to run until the defendant is in federal custody pursuant to a pre-trial detention order issued by a federal judicial officer.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"a defendant does not become an \"accused\" for Speedy Trial Act purposes until he is under federal arrest","sentence":"See United States v. Ferrs, 503 F.Supp. 187 (E.D.Pa.1980) aff'd 676 F.2d 688 (1982) (a defendant does not become an \"accused\u201d for Speedy Trial Act purposes until he is under federal arrest); see also United States v. Mejias, 417 F.Supp. 585, 591 n. 6 (S.D.N.Y.) aff\u2019d 552 F.2d 435 (2d Cir.1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 847, 98 S.Ct. 154, 54 L.Ed.2d 115 (1977) (dual sovereignity requires that the federal government in no way be bound by the action of the state prosecutorial authorities absent \"a clear showing of federal intrusion into, and control over state decision-making processes\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"dual sovereignity requires that the federal government in no way be bound by the action of the state prosecutorial authorities absent \"a clear showing of federal intrusion into, and control over state decision-making processes\"","sentence":"See United States v. Ferrs, 503 F.Supp. 187 (E.D.Pa.1980) aff'd 676 F.2d 688 (1982) (a defendant does not become an \"accused\u201d for Speedy Trial Act purposes until he is under federal arrest); see also United States v. Mejias, 417 F.Supp. 585, 591 n. 6 (S.D.N.Y.) aff\u2019d 552 F.2d 435 (2d Cir.1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 847, 98 S.Ct. 154, 54 L.Ed.2d 115 (1977) (dual sovereignity requires that the federal government in no way be bound by the action of the state prosecutorial authorities absent \"a clear showing of federal intrusion into, and control over state decision-making processes\u201d)."},"case_id":7399745,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The court rejects Mendoza's reasoning finding that the ninety-day period relevant to 18 U.S.C. SS 3164 does not begin to run until the defendant is in federal custody pursuant to a pre-trial detention order issued by a federal judicial officer.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"a defendant does not become an \"accused\" for Speedy Trial Act purposes until he is under federal arrest","sentence":"See United States v. Ferrs, 503 F.Supp. 187 (E.D.Pa.1980) aff'd 676 F.2d 688 (1982) (a defendant does not become an \"accused\u201d for Speedy Trial Act purposes until he is under federal arrest); see also United States v. Mejias, 417 F.Supp. 585, 591 n. 6 (S.D.N.Y.) aff\u2019d 552 F.2d 435 (2d Cir.1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 847, 98 S.Ct. 154, 54 L.Ed.2d 115 (1977) (dual sovereignity requires that the federal government in no way be bound by the action of the state prosecutorial authorities absent \"a clear showing of federal intrusion into, and control over state decision-making processes\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"dual sovereignity requires that the federal government in no way be bound by the action of the state prosecutorial authorities absent \"a clear showing of federal intrusion into, and control over state decision-making processes\"","sentence":"See United States v. Ferrs, 503 F.Supp. 187 (E.D.Pa.1980) aff'd 676 F.2d 688 (1982) (a defendant does not become an \"accused\u201d for Speedy Trial Act purposes until he is under federal arrest); see also United States v. Mejias, 417 F.Supp. 585, 591 n. 6 (S.D.N.Y.) aff\u2019d 552 F.2d 435 (2d Cir.1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 847, 98 S.Ct. 154, 54 L.Ed.2d 115 (1977) (dual sovereignity requires that the federal government in no way be bound by the action of the state prosecutorial authorities absent \"a clear showing of federal intrusion into, and control over state decision-making processes\u201d)."},"case_id":7399745,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The court rejects Mendoza's reasoning finding that the ninety-day period relevant to 18 U.S.C. SS 3164 does not begin to run until the defendant is in federal custody pursuant to a pre-trial detention order issued by a federal judicial officer.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"dual sovereignity requires that the federal government in no way be bound by the action of the state prosecutorial authorities absent \"a clear showing of federal intrusion into, and control over state decision-making processes\"","sentence":"See United States v. Ferrs, 503 F.Supp. 187 (E.D.Pa.1980) aff'd 676 F.2d 688 (1982) (a defendant does not become an \"accused\u201d for Speedy Trial Act purposes until he is under federal arrest); see also United States v. Mejias, 417 F.Supp. 585, 591 n. 6 (S.D.N.Y.) aff\u2019d 552 F.2d 435 (2d Cir.1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 847, 98 S.Ct. 154, 54 L.Ed.2d 115 (1977) (dual sovereignity requires that the federal government in no way be bound by the action of the state prosecutorial authorities absent \"a clear showing of federal intrusion into, and control over state decision-making processes\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"a defendant does not become an \"accused\" for Speedy Trial Act purposes until he is under federal arrest","sentence":"See United States v. Ferrs, 503 F.Supp. 187 (E.D.Pa.1980) aff'd 676 F.2d 688 (1982) (a defendant does not become an \"accused\u201d for Speedy Trial Act purposes until he is under federal arrest); see also United States v. Mejias, 417 F.Supp. 585, 591 n. 6 (S.D.N.Y.) aff\u2019d 552 F.2d 435 (2d Cir.1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 847, 98 S.Ct. 154, 54 L.Ed.2d 115 (1977) (dual sovereignity requires that the federal government in no way be bound by the action of the state prosecutorial authorities absent \"a clear showing of federal intrusion into, and control over state decision-making processes\u201d)."},"case_id":7399745,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The court rejects Mendoza's reasoning finding that the ninety-day period relevant to 18 U.S.C. SS 3164 does not begin to run until the defendant is in federal custody pursuant to a pre-trial detention order issued by a federal judicial officer.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"dual sovereignity requires that the federal government in no way be bound by the action of the state prosecutorial authorities absent \"a clear showing of federal intrusion into, and control over state decision-making processes\"","sentence":"See United States v. Ferrs, 503 F.Supp. 187 (E.D.Pa.1980) aff'd 676 F.2d 688 (1982) (a defendant does not become an \"accused\u201d for Speedy Trial Act purposes until he is under federal arrest); see also United States v. Mejias, 417 F.Supp. 585, 591 n. 6 (S.D.N.Y.) aff\u2019d 552 F.2d 435 (2d Cir.1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 847, 98 S.Ct. 154, 54 L.Ed.2d 115 (1977) (dual sovereignity requires that the federal government in no way be bound by the action of the state prosecutorial authorities absent \"a clear showing of federal intrusion into, and control over state decision-making processes\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"a defendant does not become an \"accused\" for Speedy Trial Act purposes until he is under federal arrest","sentence":"See United States v. Ferrs, 503 F.Supp. 187 (E.D.Pa.1980) aff'd 676 F.2d 688 (1982) (a defendant does not become an \"accused\u201d for Speedy Trial Act purposes until he is under federal arrest); see also United States v. Mejias, 417 F.Supp. 585, 591 n. 6 (S.D.N.Y.) aff\u2019d 552 F.2d 435 (2d Cir.1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 847, 98 S.Ct. 154, 54 L.Ed.2d 115 (1977) (dual sovereignity requires that the federal government in no way be bound by the action of the state prosecutorial authorities absent \"a clear showing of federal intrusion into, and control over state decision-making processes\u201d)."},"case_id":7399745,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The court rejects Mendoza's reasoning finding that the ninety-day period relevant to 18 U.S.C. SS 3164 does not begin to run until the defendant is in federal custody pursuant to a pre-trial detention order issued by a federal judicial officer.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"dual sovereignity requires that the federal government in no way be bound by the action of the state prosecutorial authorities absent \"a clear showing of federal intrusion into, and control over state decision-making processes\"","sentence":"See United States v. Ferrs, 503 F.Supp. 187 (E.D.Pa.1980) aff'd 676 F.2d 688 (1982) (a defendant does not become an \"accused\u201d for Speedy Trial Act purposes until he is under federal arrest); see also United States v. Mejias, 417 F.Supp. 585, 591 n. 6 (S.D.N.Y.) aff\u2019d 552 F.2d 435 (2d Cir.1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 847, 98 S.Ct. 154, 54 L.Ed.2d 115 (1977) (dual sovereignity requires that the federal government in no way be bound by the action of the state prosecutorial authorities absent \"a clear showing of federal intrusion into, and control over state decision-making processes\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"a defendant does not become an \"accused\" for Speedy Trial Act purposes until he is under federal arrest","sentence":"See United States v. Ferrs, 503 F.Supp. 187 (E.D.Pa.1980) aff'd 676 F.2d 688 (1982) (a defendant does not become an \"accused\u201d for Speedy Trial Act purposes until he is under federal arrest); see also United States v. Mejias, 417 F.Supp. 585, 591 n. 6 (S.D.N.Y.) aff\u2019d 552 F.2d 435 (2d Cir.1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 847, 98 S.Ct. 154, 54 L.Ed.2d 115 (1977) (dual sovereignity requires that the federal government in no way be bound by the action of the state prosecutorial authorities absent \"a clear showing of federal intrusion into, and control over state decision-making processes\u201d)."},"case_id":7399745,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The court rejects Mendoza's reasoning finding that the ninety-day period relevant to 18 U.S.C. SS 3164 does not begin to run until the defendant is in federal custody pursuant to a pre-trial detention order issued by a federal judicial officer.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"dual sovereignity requires that the federal government in no way be bound by the action of the state prosecutorial authorities absent \"a clear showing of federal intrusion into, and control over state decision-making processes\"","sentence":"See United States v. Ferrs, 503 F.Supp. 187 (E.D.Pa.1980) aff'd 676 F.2d 688 (1982) (a defendant does not become an \"accused\u201d for Speedy Trial Act purposes until he is under federal arrest); see also United States v. Mejias, 417 F.Supp. 585, 591 n. 6 (S.D.N.Y.) aff\u2019d 552 F.2d 435 (2d Cir.1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 847, 98 S.Ct. 154, 54 L.Ed.2d 115 (1977) (dual sovereignity requires that the federal government in no way be bound by the action of the state prosecutorial authorities absent \"a clear showing of federal intrusion into, and control over state decision-making processes\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"a defendant does not become an \"accused\" for Speedy Trial Act purposes until he is under federal arrest","sentence":"See United States v. Ferrs, 503 F.Supp. 187 (E.D.Pa.1980) aff'd 676 F.2d 688 (1982) (a defendant does not become an \"accused\u201d for Speedy Trial Act purposes until he is under federal arrest); see also United States v. Mejias, 417 F.Supp. 585, 591 n. 6 (S.D.N.Y.) aff\u2019d 552 F.2d 435 (2d Cir.1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 847, 98 S.Ct. 154, 54 L.Ed.2d 115 (1977) (dual sovereignity requires that the federal government in no way be bound by the action of the state prosecutorial authorities absent \"a clear showing of federal intrusion into, and control over state decision-making processes\u201d)."},"case_id":7399745,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The court rejects Mendoza's reasoning finding that the ninety-day period relevant to 18 U.S.C. SS 3164 does not begin to run until the defendant is in federal custody pursuant to a pre-trial detention order issued by a federal judicial officer.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"dual sovereignity requires that the federal government in no way be bound by the action of the state prosecutorial authorities absent \"a clear showing of federal intrusion into, and control over state decision-making processes\"","sentence":"See United States v. Ferrs, 503 F.Supp. 187 (E.D.Pa.1980) aff'd 676 F.2d 688 (1982) (a defendant does not become an \"accused\u201d for Speedy Trial Act purposes until he is under federal arrest); see also United States v. Mejias, 417 F.Supp. 585, 591 n. 6 (S.D.N.Y.) aff\u2019d 552 F.2d 435 (2d Cir.1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 847, 98 S.Ct. 154, 54 L.Ed.2d 115 (1977) (dual sovereignity requires that the federal government in no way be bound by the action of the state prosecutorial authorities absent \"a clear showing of federal intrusion into, and control over state decision-making processes\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"a defendant does not become an \"accused\" for Speedy Trial Act purposes until he is under federal arrest","sentence":"See United States v. Ferrs, 503 F.Supp. 187 (E.D.Pa.1980) aff'd 676 F.2d 688 (1982) (a defendant does not become an \"accused\u201d for Speedy Trial Act purposes until he is under federal arrest); see also United States v. Mejias, 417 F.Supp. 585, 591 n. 6 (S.D.N.Y.) aff\u2019d 552 F.2d 435 (2d Cir.1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 847, 98 S.Ct. 154, 54 L.Ed.2d 115 (1977) (dual sovereignity requires that the federal government in no way be bound by the action of the state prosecutorial authorities absent \"a clear showing of federal intrusion into, and control over state decision-making processes\u201d)."},"case_id":7399745,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The court rejects Mendoza's reasoning finding that the ninety-day period relevant to 18 U.S.C. SS 3164 does not begin to run until the defendant is in federal custody pursuant to a pre-trial detention order issued by a federal judicial officer.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"a defendant does not become an \"accused\" for Speedy Trial Act purposes until he is under federal arrest","sentence":"See United States v. Ferrs, 503 F.Supp. 187 (E.D.Pa.1980) aff'd 676 F.2d 688 (1982) (a defendant does not become an \"accused\u201d for Speedy Trial Act purposes until he is under federal arrest); see also United States v. Mejias, 417 F.Supp. 585, 591 n. 6 (S.D.N.Y.) aff\u2019d 552 F.2d 435 (2d Cir.1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 847, 98 S.Ct. 154, 54 L.Ed.2d 115 (1977) (dual sovereignity requires that the federal government in no way be bound by the action of the state prosecutorial authorities absent \"a clear showing of federal intrusion into, and control over state decision-making processes\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"dual sovereignity requires that the federal government in no way be bound by the action of the state prosecutorial authorities absent \"a clear showing of federal intrusion into, and control over state decision-making processes\"","sentence":"See United States v. Ferrs, 503 F.Supp. 187 (E.D.Pa.1980) aff'd 676 F.2d 688 (1982) (a defendant does not become an \"accused\u201d for Speedy Trial Act purposes until he is under federal arrest); see also United States v. Mejias, 417 F.Supp. 585, 591 n. 6 (S.D.N.Y.) aff\u2019d 552 F.2d 435 (2d Cir.1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 847, 98 S.Ct. 154, 54 L.Ed.2d 115 (1977) (dual sovereignity requires that the federal government in no way be bound by the action of the state prosecutorial authorities absent \"a clear showing of federal intrusion into, and control over state decision-making processes\u201d)."},"case_id":7399745,"label":"a"}
{"context":"At the outset, the court notes that the Second Circuit has strongly suggested that actions taken without authority under state law, such as when a board lacks jurisdiction over property, give rise to a conclusion that the state entity lacked a rational basis for their actions, and that such actions violate substantive due process.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"863 F.2d 216, 216","parenthetical":"holding that where a zoning board had no authority under state law to take certain actions with respect to a protected property interest a \"trier of fact could conclude that there was no rational basis for the [Town's zoning board's] actions, and that, as a result, the [zoning board] violated appellants' rights to substantive due process.\"","sentence":"See Brady, 863 F.2d at 216 (holding that where a zoning board had no authority under state law to take certain actions with respect to a protected property interest a \u201ctrier of fact could conclude that there was no rational basis for the [Town\u2019s zoning board\u2019s] actions, and that, as a result, the [zoning board] violated appellants\u2019 rights to substantive due process.\u201d); see also Cine SK8, 507 F.3d at 789 (\u201c[I]f the Town Board did not have authority for the actions it took regarding Fun Quest\u2019s permit \u2014 as it appears it did not \u2014 the Board\u2019s actions were ultra vires and, as a result, sufficiently arbitrary to amount to a substantive due process violation.\u201d); TZ Manor, LLC v. Daines, 815 F.Supp.2d 726, 745 (S.D.N.Y.2011) (\u201cCine SK8 can be read broadly to stand for the proposition that any governmental action taken outside the scope of the defendant\u2019s authority, i.e., an \u2018ultra vires\u2019 act, is \u2018sufficiently arbitrary to amount to a substantive due process violation.\u2019\u201d) (quoting Cine SK8, 507 F.3d at 789)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"507 F.3d 789, 789","parenthetical":"\"[I]f the Town Board did not have authority for the actions it took regarding Fun Quest's permit -- as it appears it did not -- the Board's actions were ultra vires and, as a result, sufficiently arbitrary to amount to a substantive due process violation.\"","sentence":"See Brady, 863 F.2d at 216 (holding that where a zoning board had no authority under state law to take certain actions with respect to a protected property interest a \u201ctrier of fact could conclude that there was no rational basis for the [Town\u2019s zoning board\u2019s] actions, and that, as a result, the [zoning board] violated appellants\u2019 rights to substantive due process.\u201d); see also Cine SK8, 507 F.3d at 789 (\u201c[I]f the Town Board did not have authority for the actions it took regarding Fun Quest\u2019s permit \u2014 as it appears it did not \u2014 the Board\u2019s actions were ultra vires and, as a result, sufficiently arbitrary to amount to a substantive due process violation.\u201d); TZ Manor, LLC v. Daines, 815 F.Supp.2d 726, 745 (S.D.N.Y.2011) (\u201cCine SK8 can be read broadly to stand for the proposition that any governmental action taken outside the scope of the defendant\u2019s authority, i.e., an \u2018ultra vires\u2019 act, is \u2018sufficiently arbitrary to amount to a substantive due process violation.\u2019\u201d) (quoting Cine SK8, 507 F.3d at 789)."},"case_id":3811435,"label":"a"}
{"context":"And they speak with law enforcement officials to discuss particular investigations and share information with other insurers. Even assuming that the administrative exemption would apply to an employee whose duties were primarily these, GEICO has pointed to nothing in the record that would support a conclusion that these responsibilities were any more than a minor part of the Investigators' jobs, either in their importance or in the amount of the Investigators' time that they occupy.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"789 F.2d 282, 286","parenthetical":"holding that employer \"bears the full burden of persuasion for the facts requisite to an exemption\"","sentence":"See Clark v. J.M. Benson Co., 789 F.2d 282, 286 (4th Cir.1986) (holding that employer \"bears the full burden of persuasion for the facts requisite to an exemption\u201d); see also Schaefer v. Indiana Mich. Power Co., 358 F.3d 394, 403 (6th Cir.2004) (holding that even though some of employee\u2019s duties appeared to satisfy the directly related element, the element was not satisfied where those duties were not part of his primary duty)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"358 F.3d 394, 403","parenthetical":"holding that even though some of employee's duties appeared to satisfy the directly related element, the element was not satisfied where those duties were not part of his primary duty","sentence":"See Clark v. J.M. Benson Co., 789 F.2d 282, 286 (4th Cir.1986) (holding that employer \"bears the full burden of persuasion for the facts requisite to an exemption\u201d); see also Schaefer v. Indiana Mich. Power Co., 358 F.3d 394, 403 (6th Cir.2004) (holding that even though some of employee\u2019s duties appeared to satisfy the directly related element, the element was not satisfied where those duties were not part of his primary duty)."},"case_id":4059517,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The object of restitution is to restore the status quo and return the parties to the positions they occupied before the transactions at issue occurred.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"328 U.S. 402, 402","parenthetical":"equitable restitution consists of \"restoring the status quo and ordering the return of that which rightfully belongs to the purchaser or tenant\"","sentence":"Porter, 328 U.S. at 402, 66 S.Ct. 1086 (equitable restitution consists of \u201crestoring the status quo and ordering the return of that which rightfully belongs to the purchaser or tenant\u201d); United States v. Long, 537 F.2d 1151, 1153 (4th Cir.1975) (restitution consists of restoring the injured party \u201cto the position he formerly occupied either by the return of something which he formerly had or by the receipt of its equivalent in money\u201d) (quoting Restatement of Restitution, \u00a7 1, cmt. a (1937)); see also SEC v. AMX Int\u2019l, Inc., 7 F.3d 71, 74-75 (5th Cir.1993) (\u201c[r]estitution ... has the goal of making the aggrieved party whole\u201d); In re First Penn Corp., 793 F.2d 270, 272 (10th Cir.1986) (\u201c[t]he object of restitution is to return the parties to the position that existed before the transaction occurred\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"7 F.3d 71, 74-75","parenthetical":"\"[r]estitution ... has the goal of making the aggrieved party whole\"","sentence":"Porter, 328 U.S. at 402, 66 S.Ct. 1086 (equitable restitution consists of \u201crestoring the status quo and ordering the return of that which rightfully belongs to the purchaser or tenant\u201d); United States v. Long, 537 F.2d 1151, 1153 (4th Cir.1975) (restitution consists of restoring the injured party \u201cto the position he formerly occupied either by the return of something which he formerly had or by the receipt of its equivalent in money\u201d) (quoting Restatement of Restitution, \u00a7 1, cmt. a (1937)); see also SEC v. AMX Int\u2019l, Inc., 7 F.3d 71, 74-75 (5th Cir.1993) (\u201c[r]estitution ... has the goal of making the aggrieved party whole\u201d); In re First Penn Corp., 793 F.2d 270, 272 (10th Cir.1986) (\u201c[t]he object of restitution is to return the parties to the position that existed before the transaction occurred\u201d)."},"case_id":3817085,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The object of restitution is to restore the status quo and return the parties to the positions they occupied before the transactions at issue occurred.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"328 U.S. 402, 402","parenthetical":"equitable restitution consists of \"restoring the status quo and ordering the return of that which rightfully belongs to the purchaser or tenant\"","sentence":"Porter, 328 U.S. at 402, 66 S.Ct. 1086 (equitable restitution consists of \u201crestoring the status quo and ordering the return of that which rightfully belongs to the purchaser or tenant\u201d); United States v. Long, 537 F.2d 1151, 1153 (4th Cir.1975) (restitution consists of restoring the injured party \u201cto the position he formerly occupied either by the return of something which he formerly had or by the receipt of its equivalent in money\u201d) (quoting Restatement of Restitution, \u00a7 1, cmt. a (1937)); see also SEC v. AMX Int\u2019l, Inc., 7 F.3d 71, 74-75 (5th Cir.1993) (\u201c[r]estitution ... has the goal of making the aggrieved party whole\u201d); In re First Penn Corp., 793 F.2d 270, 272 (10th Cir.1986) (\u201c[t]he object of restitution is to return the parties to the position that existed before the transaction occurred\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"793 F.2d 270, 272","parenthetical":"\"[t]he object of restitution is to return the parties to the position that existed before the transaction occurred\"","sentence":"Porter, 328 U.S. at 402, 66 S.Ct. 1086 (equitable restitution consists of \u201crestoring the status quo and ordering the return of that which rightfully belongs to the purchaser or tenant\u201d); United States v. Long, 537 F.2d 1151, 1153 (4th Cir.1975) (restitution consists of restoring the injured party \u201cto the position he formerly occupied either by the return of something which he formerly had or by the receipt of its equivalent in money\u201d) (quoting Restatement of Restitution, \u00a7 1, cmt. a (1937)); see also SEC v. AMX Int\u2019l, Inc., 7 F.3d 71, 74-75 (5th Cir.1993) (\u201c[r]estitution ... has the goal of making the aggrieved party whole\u201d); In re First Penn Corp., 793 F.2d 270, 272 (10th Cir.1986) (\u201c[t]he object of restitution is to return the parties to the position that existed before the transaction occurred\u201d)."},"case_id":3817085,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The object of restitution is to restore the status quo and return the parties to the positions they occupied before the transactions at issue occurred.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"7 F.3d 71, 74-75","parenthetical":"\"[r]estitution ... has the goal of making the aggrieved party whole\"","sentence":"Porter, 328 U.S. at 402, 66 S.Ct. 1086 (equitable restitution consists of \u201crestoring the status quo and ordering the return of that which rightfully belongs to the purchaser or tenant\u201d); United States v. Long, 537 F.2d 1151, 1153 (4th Cir.1975) (restitution consists of restoring the injured party \u201cto the position he formerly occupied either by the return of something which he formerly had or by the receipt of its equivalent in money\u201d) (quoting Restatement of Restitution, \u00a7 1, cmt. a (1937)); see also SEC v. AMX Int\u2019l, Inc., 7 F.3d 71, 74-75 (5th Cir.1993) (\u201c[r]estitution ... has the goal of making the aggrieved party whole\u201d); In re First Penn Corp., 793 F.2d 270, 272 (10th Cir.1986) (\u201c[t]he object of restitution is to return the parties to the position that existed before the transaction occurred\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"equitable restitution consists of \"restoring the status quo and ordering the return of that which rightfully belongs to the purchaser or tenant\"","sentence":"Porter, 328 U.S. at 402, 66 S.Ct. 1086 (equitable restitution consists of \u201crestoring the status quo and ordering the return of that which rightfully belongs to the purchaser or tenant\u201d); United States v. Long, 537 F.2d 1151, 1153 (4th Cir.1975) (restitution consists of restoring the injured party \u201cto the position he formerly occupied either by the return of something which he formerly had or by the receipt of its equivalent in money\u201d) (quoting Restatement of Restitution, \u00a7 1, cmt. a (1937)); see also SEC v. AMX Int\u2019l, Inc., 7 F.3d 71, 74-75 (5th Cir.1993) (\u201c[r]estitution ... has the goal of making the aggrieved party whole\u201d); In re First Penn Corp., 793 F.2d 270, 272 (10th Cir.1986) (\u201c[t]he object of restitution is to return the parties to the position that existed before the transaction occurred\u201d)."},"case_id":3817085,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The object of restitution is to restore the status quo and return the parties to the positions they occupied before the transactions at issue occurred.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"793 F.2d 270, 272","parenthetical":"\"[t]he object of restitution is to return the parties to the position that existed before the transaction occurred\"","sentence":"Porter, 328 U.S. at 402, 66 S.Ct. 1086 (equitable restitution consists of \u201crestoring the status quo and ordering the return of that which rightfully belongs to the purchaser or tenant\u201d); United States v. Long, 537 F.2d 1151, 1153 (4th Cir.1975) (restitution consists of restoring the injured party \u201cto the position he formerly occupied either by the return of something which he formerly had or by the receipt of its equivalent in money\u201d) (quoting Restatement of Restitution, \u00a7 1, cmt. a (1937)); see also SEC v. AMX Int\u2019l, Inc., 7 F.3d 71, 74-75 (5th Cir.1993) (\u201c[r]estitution ... has the goal of making the aggrieved party whole\u201d); In re First Penn Corp., 793 F.2d 270, 272 (10th Cir.1986) (\u201c[t]he object of restitution is to return the parties to the position that existed before the transaction occurred\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"equitable restitution consists of \"restoring the status quo and ordering the return of that which rightfully belongs to the purchaser or tenant\"","sentence":"Porter, 328 U.S. at 402, 66 S.Ct. 1086 (equitable restitution consists of \u201crestoring the status quo and ordering the return of that which rightfully belongs to the purchaser or tenant\u201d); United States v. Long, 537 F.2d 1151, 1153 (4th Cir.1975) (restitution consists of restoring the injured party \u201cto the position he formerly occupied either by the return of something which he formerly had or by the receipt of its equivalent in money\u201d) (quoting Restatement of Restitution, \u00a7 1, cmt. a (1937)); see also SEC v. AMX Int\u2019l, Inc., 7 F.3d 71, 74-75 (5th Cir.1993) (\u201c[r]estitution ... has the goal of making the aggrieved party whole\u201d); In re First Penn Corp., 793 F.2d 270, 272 (10th Cir.1986) (\u201c[t]he object of restitution is to return the parties to the position that existed before the transaction occurred\u201d)."},"case_id":3817085,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The directive says no such thing. Indeed, the reality of agency operations makes it clear that ALJs cannot independently rule on the legality of third-party human studies, because they may not ignore the Administrator's unequivocal statement prohibiting the agency from considering such studies.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"996 F.2d 1253, 1260","parenthetical":"\"It is commonly recognized that ALJs are entirely subject to the agency on matters of law.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Iran Air v. Kugelman, 996 F.2d 1253, 1260 (D.C.Cir.1993) (\u201cIt is commonly recognized that ALJs are entirely subject to the agency on matters of law.\u201d) (internal quotations omitted); Mullen v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 535, 540 n. 5 (6th Cir.1986); Antonin Scalia, The ALJ Fiasco - A Repri.se, 47 U. Chi. L.Rev. 57, 62 (1979); see also Ass\u2019n of Admin. Law Judges, Inc. v. Heckler, 594 F.Supp. 1132, 1141 (D.D.C.1984) (\u201cAlthough an ALJ may dispute the validity of agency policy, the agency may impose its policy through the administrative appeals process.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"594 F.Supp. 1132, 1141","parenthetical":"\"Although an ALJ may dispute the validity of agency policy, the agency may impose its policy through the administrative appeals process.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Iran Air v. Kugelman, 996 F.2d 1253, 1260 (D.C.Cir.1993) (\u201cIt is commonly recognized that ALJs are entirely subject to the agency on matters of law.\u201d) (internal quotations omitted); Mullen v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 535, 540 n. 5 (6th Cir.1986); Antonin Scalia, The ALJ Fiasco - A Repri.se, 47 U. Chi. L.Rev. 57, 62 (1979); see also Ass\u2019n of Admin. Law Judges, Inc. v. Heckler, 594 F.Supp. 1132, 1141 (D.D.C.1984) (\u201cAlthough an ALJ may dispute the validity of agency policy, the agency may impose its policy through the administrative appeals process.\u201d)."},"case_id":3719297,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Failure to supervise is not a viable theory for recovery of compensatory damages in a Title II ADA claim, since such failure is necessarily not directed at a particular disabled individual.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"398 F.3d 562, 568","parenthetical":"\"Acts and omissions which have a disparate impact on disabled persons in general are not specific acts of intentional discrimination against the plaintiff in particular.\"","sentence":"See Dillery v. City of Sandusky, 398 F.3d 562, 568 (6th Cir.2005) (\u201cActs and omissions which have a disparate impact on disabled persons in general are not specific acts of intentional discrimination against the plaintiff in particular.\u201d) (quotation omitted); see also Scozzari v. City of Clare, 723 F.Supp.2d 945, 973 (E.D.Mich.2010) (recounting how the court earlier \u201cdenied Plaintiff leave to amend the complaint to allege a claim based on the City\u2019s failure to train its officers under the ADA because pursuing such a claim would be futile\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"723 F.Supp.2d 945, 973","parenthetical":"recounting how the court earlier \"denied Plaintiff leave to amend the complaint to allege a claim based on the City's failure to train its officers under the ADA because pursuing such a claim would be futile\"","sentence":"See Dillery v. City of Sandusky, 398 F.3d 562, 568 (6th Cir.2005) (\u201cActs and omissions which have a disparate impact on disabled persons in general are not specific acts of intentional discrimination against the plaintiff in particular.\u201d) (quotation omitted); see also Scozzari v. City of Clare, 723 F.Supp.2d 945, 973 (E.D.Mich.2010) (recounting how the court earlier \u201cdenied Plaintiff leave to amend the complaint to allege a claim based on the City\u2019s failure to train its officers under the ADA because pursuing such a claim would be futile\u201d)."},"case_id":3955121,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Even assuming, without deciding, that Mr. Klepacki is qualified as an expert regarding the matters he intends to address, the process he used in forming his expert opinion must be sufficiently reliable under Daubert and its progeny.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"298 F.3d 1257, 1257","parenthetical":"holding that \"[r]ulings on admissibility under Daubert inherently require the trial court to conduct an exacting analysis of the proffered expert's methodology\"","sentence":"See Quiet Tech. DC-8, Inc., 326 F.3d at 1342 (stating that \u201cone may be considered an expert but still offer unreliable testimony\u201d); cf. McCorvey, 298 F.3d at 1257 (holding that \u201c[r]ulings on admissibility under Daubert inherently require the trial court to conduct an exacting analysis of the proffered expert\u2019s methodology\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"326 F.3d 1342, 1342","parenthetical":"stating that \"one may be considered an expert but still offer unreliable testimony\"","sentence":"See Quiet Tech. DC-8, Inc., 326 F.3d at 1342 (stating that \u201cone may be considered an expert but still offer unreliable testimony\u201d); cf. McCorvey, 298 F.3d at 1257 (holding that \u201c[r]ulings on admissibility under Daubert inherently require the trial court to conduct an exacting analysis of the proffered expert\u2019s methodology\u201d)."},"case_id":4222653,"label":"b"}
{"context":"We have considered these issues and conclude they are without merit, regardless of the status of appellants' adoption petition. Accordingly, we decline to address them further.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"776 P.2d 886, 888","parenthetical":"holding that appellate court \"need not analyze and address in writing each and every argument, issue, or claim raised and properly before us on appeal\"","sentence":"See State v. Carter, 776 P.2d 886, 888 (Utah 1989) (holding that appellate court \u201cneed not analyze and address in writing each and every argument, issue, or claim raised and properly before us on appeal\u201d); see also id. at 889 (stating \u201cit is a maxim of appellate review that the nature and extent of an opinion rendered by an appellate court is largely discretionary with that court\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"1999 UT 75, \u00b6 8","parenthetical":"holding that for purposes of certiorari review, court of appeals must \"identify] the basis for refusing to treat an issue\"","sentence":"Cf. Reese v. Reese, 1999 UT 75, \u00b6 8, 984 P.2d 987 (holding that for purposes of certiorari review, court of appeals must \u201cidentify] the basis for refusing to treat an issue\u201d)."},"case_id":11531139,"label":"a"}
{"context":"We have considered these issues and conclude they are without merit, regardless of the status of appellants' adoption petition. Accordingly, we decline to address them further.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that for purposes of certiorari review, court of appeals must \"identify] the basis for refusing to treat an issue\"","sentence":"Cf. Reese v. Reese, 1999 UT 75, \u00b6 8, 984 P.2d 987 (holding that for purposes of certiorari review, court of appeals must \u201cidentify] the basis for refusing to treat an issue\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"776 P.2d 886, 888","parenthetical":"holding that appellate court \"need not analyze and address in writing each and every argument, issue, or claim raised and properly before us on appeal\"","sentence":"See State v. Carter, 776 P.2d 886, 888 (Utah 1989) (holding that appellate court \u201cneed not analyze and address in writing each and every argument, issue, or claim raised and properly before us on appeal\u201d); see also id. at 889 (stating \u201cit is a maxim of appellate review that the nature and extent of an opinion rendered by an appellate court is largely discretionary with that court\u201d)."},"case_id":11531139,"label":"b"}
{"context":"We begin our analysis of proper class certification with the issue of standing. No class action may proceed unless there is a named plaintiff with standing to represent the class.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"823 F.2d 1476, 1482","parenthetical":"only after the court determines that the named plaintiffs have standing should it address the question of whether the named plaintiffs have representative capacity, as defined by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a","sentence":"Griffin v. Dugger, 823 F.2d 1476, 1482 (11th Cir.1987) (only after the court determines that the named plaintiffs have standing should it address the question of whether the named plaintiffs have representative capacity, as defined by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a), to assert the rights of others), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1005, 108 S.Ct. 1729, 100 L.Ed.2d 193 (U.S.Fla.1988); see also Baptist Hosp. of Miami, Inc. v. Demario, 683 So.2d 641, 643 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996) (court determined inter alia that if the putative class representative has no standing, he has no right to pursue the case as a class action)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"683 So.2d 641, 643","parenthetical":"court determined inter alia that if the putative class representative has no standing, he has no right to pursue the case as a class action","sentence":"Griffin v. Dugger, 823 F.2d 1476, 1482 (11th Cir.1987) (only after the court determines that the named plaintiffs have standing should it address the question of whether the named plaintiffs have representative capacity, as defined by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a), to assert the rights of others), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1005, 108 S.Ct. 1729, 100 L.Ed.2d 193 (U.S.Fla.1988); see also Baptist Hosp. of Miami, Inc. v. Demario, 683 So.2d 641, 643 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996) (court determined inter alia that if the putative class representative has no standing, he has no right to pursue the case as a class action)."},"case_id":11915866,"label":"a"}
{"context":"We begin our analysis of proper class certification with the issue of standing. No class action may proceed unless there is a named plaintiff with standing to represent the class.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"only after the court determines that the named plaintiffs have standing should it address the question of whether the named plaintiffs have representative capacity, as defined by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a","sentence":"Griffin v. Dugger, 823 F.2d 1476, 1482 (11th Cir.1987) (only after the court determines that the named plaintiffs have standing should it address the question of whether the named plaintiffs have representative capacity, as defined by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a), to assert the rights of others), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1005, 108 S.Ct. 1729, 100 L.Ed.2d 193 (U.S.Fla.1988); see also Baptist Hosp. of Miami, Inc. v. Demario, 683 So.2d 641, 643 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996) (court determined inter alia that if the putative class representative has no standing, he has no right to pursue the case as a class action)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"683 So.2d 641, 643","parenthetical":"court determined inter alia that if the putative class representative has no standing, he has no right to pursue the case as a class action","sentence":"Griffin v. Dugger, 823 F.2d 1476, 1482 (11th Cir.1987) (only after the court determines that the named plaintiffs have standing should it address the question of whether the named plaintiffs have representative capacity, as defined by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a), to assert the rights of others), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1005, 108 S.Ct. 1729, 100 L.Ed.2d 193 (U.S.Fla.1988); see also Baptist Hosp. of Miami, Inc. v. Demario, 683 So.2d 641, 643 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996) (court determined inter alia that if the putative class representative has no standing, he has no right to pursue the case as a class action)."},"case_id":11915866,"label":"a"}
{"context":"We begin our analysis of proper class certification with the issue of standing. No class action may proceed unless there is a named plaintiff with standing to represent the class.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"683 So.2d 641, 643","parenthetical":"court determined inter alia that if the putative class representative has no standing, he has no right to pursue the case as a class action","sentence":"Griffin v. Dugger, 823 F.2d 1476, 1482 (11th Cir.1987) (only after the court determines that the named plaintiffs have standing should it address the question of whether the named plaintiffs have representative capacity, as defined by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a), to assert the rights of others), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1005, 108 S.Ct. 1729, 100 L.Ed.2d 193 (U.S.Fla.1988); see also Baptist Hosp. of Miami, Inc. v. Demario, 683 So.2d 641, 643 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996) (court determined inter alia that if the putative class representative has no standing, he has no right to pursue the case as a class action)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"only after the court determines that the named plaintiffs have standing should it address the question of whether the named plaintiffs have representative capacity, as defined by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a","sentence":"Griffin v. Dugger, 823 F.2d 1476, 1482 (11th Cir.1987) (only after the court determines that the named plaintiffs have standing should it address the question of whether the named plaintiffs have representative capacity, as defined by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a), to assert the rights of others), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1005, 108 S.Ct. 1729, 100 L.Ed.2d 193 (U.S.Fla.1988); see also Baptist Hosp. of Miami, Inc. v. Demario, 683 So.2d 641, 643 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996) (court determined inter alia that if the putative class representative has no standing, he has no right to pursue the case as a class action)."},"case_id":11915866,"label":"b"}
{"context":"We begin our analysis of proper class certification with the issue of standing. No class action may proceed unless there is a named plaintiff with standing to represent the class.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"only after the court determines that the named plaintiffs have standing should it address the question of whether the named plaintiffs have representative capacity, as defined by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a","sentence":"Griffin v. Dugger, 823 F.2d 1476, 1482 (11th Cir.1987) (only after the court determines that the named plaintiffs have standing should it address the question of whether the named plaintiffs have representative capacity, as defined by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a), to assert the rights of others), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1005, 108 S.Ct. 1729, 100 L.Ed.2d 193 (U.S.Fla.1988); see also Baptist Hosp. of Miami, Inc. v. Demario, 683 So.2d 641, 643 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996) (court determined inter alia that if the putative class representative has no standing, he has no right to pursue the case as a class action)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"683 So.2d 641, 643","parenthetical":"court determined inter alia that if the putative class representative has no standing, he has no right to pursue the case as a class action","sentence":"Griffin v. Dugger, 823 F.2d 1476, 1482 (11th Cir.1987) (only after the court determines that the named plaintiffs have standing should it address the question of whether the named plaintiffs have representative capacity, as defined by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a), to assert the rights of others), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1005, 108 S.Ct. 1729, 100 L.Ed.2d 193 (U.S.Fla.1988); see also Baptist Hosp. of Miami, Inc. v. Demario, 683 So.2d 641, 643 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996) (court determined inter alia that if the putative class representative has no standing, he has no right to pursue the case as a class action)."},"case_id":11915866,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Third, even assuming that the risk contribution doctrine imposed retroactive liability and that judicial decisions in the civil law area were subject to constitutional challenge on retroactivity grounds, the doctrine does not violate either the Due Process or Takings Clause. As to the former, a civil statute that imposes retroactive liability will be found to violate due process only if it is \"arbitrary and irrational.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"181 F.3d 799, 806","parenthetical":"stating that \"when a question of retroactivity is involved\" the party claiming a due process violation must show that the provision in question is arbitrary and irrational","sentence":"Usery, 428 U.S. at 15, 96 S.Ct. 2882 (holding that black lung compensation scheme satisfied due process because it was a \u201crational measure to spread the costs of the employee\u2019s disabilities to those who have profited from the fruits of their labor\u201d); see also Central States, SE & SW v. Midwest Motor Express, 181 F.3d 799, 806 (7th Cir.1999) (stating that \u201cwhen a question of retroactivity is involved\u201d the party claiming a due process violation must show that the provision in question is arbitrary and irrational)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"428 U.S. 15, 15","parenthetical":"holding that black lung compensation scheme satisfied due process because it was a \"rational measure to spread the costs of the employee's disabilities to those who have profited from the fruits of their labor\"","sentence":"Usery, 428 U.S. at 15, 96 S.Ct. 2882 (holding that black lung compensation scheme satisfied due process because it was a \u201crational measure to spread the costs of the employee\u2019s disabilities to those who have profited from the fruits of their labor\u201d); see also Central States, SE & SW v. Midwest Motor Express, 181 F.3d 799, 806 (7th Cir.1999) (stating that \u201cwhen a question of retroactivity is involved\u201d the party claiming a due process violation must show that the provision in question is arbitrary and irrational)."},"case_id":4254984,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Third, even assuming that the risk contribution doctrine imposed retroactive liability and that judicial decisions in the civil law area were subject to constitutional challenge on retroactivity grounds, the doctrine does not violate either the Due Process or Takings Clause. As to the former, a civil statute that imposes retroactive liability will be found to violate due process only if it is \"arbitrary and irrational.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that black lung compensation scheme satisfied due process because it was a \"rational measure to spread the costs of the employee's disabilities to those who have profited from the fruits of their labor\"","sentence":"Usery, 428 U.S. at 15, 96 S.Ct. 2882 (holding that black lung compensation scheme satisfied due process because it was a \u201crational measure to spread the costs of the employee\u2019s disabilities to those who have profited from the fruits of their labor\u201d); see also Central States, SE & SW v. Midwest Motor Express, 181 F.3d 799, 806 (7th Cir.1999) (stating that \u201cwhen a question of retroactivity is involved\u201d the party claiming a due process violation must show that the provision in question is arbitrary and irrational)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"181 F.3d 799, 806","parenthetical":"stating that \"when a question of retroactivity is involved\" the party claiming a due process violation must show that the provision in question is arbitrary and irrational","sentence":"Usery, 428 U.S. at 15, 96 S.Ct. 2882 (holding that black lung compensation scheme satisfied due process because it was a \u201crational measure to spread the costs of the employee\u2019s disabilities to those who have profited from the fruits of their labor\u201d); see also Central States, SE & SW v. Midwest Motor Express, 181 F.3d 799, 806 (7th Cir.1999) (stating that \u201cwhen a question of retroactivity is involved\u201d the party claiming a due process violation must show that the provision in question is arbitrary and irrational)."},"case_id":4254984,"label":"a"}
{"context":"A motion for summary judgment presents different opportunities and imposes different responsibilities on the parties.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"558 F.3d 735, 735","parenthetical":"\"It was [the plaintiffs] responsibility to show that there were genuine issues of material fact in the record that precluded the summary judgment Appellees sought below.\"","sentence":"See Rodgers v. City of Des Moines, 435 F.3d 904, 908 (8th Cir.2006) (\u201cWithout some guidance, we will not mine a summary judgment record searching for nuggets of factual disputes to gild a party\u2019s arguments.\u201d); see also Satcher v. Univ. of Ark. at Pine Bluff Bd. of Trs., 558 F.3d 731, 735 (8th Cir.2009) (holding that the \u201cfailure to oppose a basis for summary judgment constitutes waiver of that argument\u201d on appeal). Thus, unlike the plaintiff in Schneider, who did not submit briefing in support of her arguments, Ames had the opportunity to oppose Nationwide\u2019s motion and was responsible for presenting any argument that might have precluded summary judgment in favor of Nationwide. See Satcher, 558 F.3d at 735 (\u201cIt was [the plaintiffs] responsibility to show that there were genuine issues of material fact in the record that precluded the summary judgment Appellees sought below.\u201d); see also Grenier v. Cyanamid Plastics, Inc., 70 F.3d 667, 678 (1st Cir.1995) (\u201cIf a party fails to assert a legal reason why summary judgment should not be granted, that ground is waived and cannot be considered or raised on appeal.\u201d (quoting Vaughner v. Pulito, 804 F.2d 873, 877 n. 2 (5th Cir.1986))); Liberles v. County of Cook, 709 F.2d 1122, 1126 (7th Cir.1983) (\u201cIt is a well-settled rule that a party opposing a summary judgment motion must inform the trial judge of the reasons, legal or factual, why summary judgment should not be entered. If it does not do so, and loses the motion, it cannot raise such reasons on appeal.\u201d); Frank C. Bailey Enters., Inc. v. Cargill, Inc., 582 F.2d 333, 334 (5th Cir.1978) (per curiam) (\u201c[A]n appellate court, in reviewing a summary judgment order, can only consider those matters presented to the district court.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"435 F.3d 904, 908","parenthetical":"\"Without some guidance, we will not mine a summary judgment record searching for nuggets of factual disputes to gild a party's arguments.\"","sentence":"See Rodgers v. City of Des Moines, 435 F.3d 904, 908 (8th Cir.2006) (\u201cWithout some guidance, we will not mine a summary judgment record searching for nuggets of factual disputes to gild a party\u2019s arguments.\u201d); see also Satcher v. Univ. of Ark. at Pine Bluff Bd. of Trs., 558 F.3d 731, 735 (8th Cir.2009) (holding that the \u201cfailure to oppose a basis for summary judgment constitutes waiver of that argument\u201d on appeal). Thus, unlike the plaintiff in Schneider, who did not submit briefing in support of her arguments, Ames had the opportunity to oppose Nationwide\u2019s motion and was responsible for presenting any argument that might have precluded summary judgment in favor of Nationwide. See Satcher, 558 F.3d at 735 (\u201cIt was [the plaintiffs] responsibility to show that there were genuine issues of material fact in the record that precluded the summary judgment Appellees sought below.\u201d); see also Grenier v. Cyanamid Plastics, Inc., 70 F.3d 667, 678 (1st Cir.1995) (\u201cIf a party fails to assert a legal reason why summary judgment should not be granted, that ground is waived and cannot be considered or raised on appeal.\u201d (quoting Vaughner v. Pulito, 804 F.2d 873, 877 n. 2 (5th Cir.1986))); Liberles v. County of Cook, 709 F.2d 1122, 1126 (7th Cir.1983) (\u201cIt is a well-settled rule that a party opposing a summary judgment motion must inform the trial judge of the reasons, legal or factual, why summary judgment should not be entered. If it does not do so, and loses the motion, it cannot raise such reasons on appeal.\u201d); Frank C. Bailey Enters., Inc. v. Cargill, Inc., 582 F.2d 333, 334 (5th Cir.1978) (per curiam) (\u201c[A]n appellate court, in reviewing a summary judgment order, can only consider those matters presented to the district court.\u201d)."},"case_id":4179766,"label":"b"}
{"context":"A motion for summary judgment presents different opportunities and imposes different responsibilities on the parties.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"435 F.3d 904, 908","parenthetical":"\"Without some guidance, we will not mine a summary judgment record searching for nuggets of factual disputes to gild a party's arguments.\"","sentence":"See Rodgers v. City of Des Moines, 435 F.3d 904, 908 (8th Cir.2006) (\u201cWithout some guidance, we will not mine a summary judgment record searching for nuggets of factual disputes to gild a party\u2019s arguments.\u201d); see also Satcher v. Univ. of Ark. at Pine Bluff Bd. of Trs., 558 F.3d 731, 735 (8th Cir.2009) (holding that the \u201cfailure to oppose a basis for summary judgment constitutes waiver of that argument\u201d on appeal). Thus, unlike the plaintiff in Schneider, who did not submit briefing in support of her arguments, Ames had the opportunity to oppose Nationwide\u2019s motion and was responsible for presenting any argument that might have precluded summary judgment in favor of Nationwide. See Satcher, 558 F.3d at 735 (\u201cIt was [the plaintiffs] responsibility to show that there were genuine issues of material fact in the record that precluded the summary judgment Appellees sought below.\u201d); see also Grenier v. Cyanamid Plastics, Inc., 70 F.3d 667, 678 (1st Cir.1995) (\u201cIf a party fails to assert a legal reason why summary judgment should not be granted, that ground is waived and cannot be considered or raised on appeal.\u201d (quoting Vaughner v. Pulito, 804 F.2d 873, 877 n. 2 (5th Cir.1986))); Liberles v. County of Cook, 709 F.2d 1122, 1126 (7th Cir.1983) (\u201cIt is a well-settled rule that a party opposing a summary judgment motion must inform the trial judge of the reasons, legal or factual, why summary judgment should not be entered. If it does not do so, and loses the motion, it cannot raise such reasons on appeal.\u201d); Frank C. Bailey Enters., Inc. v. Cargill, Inc., 582 F.2d 333, 334 (5th Cir.1978) (per curiam) (\u201c[A]n appellate court, in reviewing a summary judgment order, can only consider those matters presented to the district court.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"709 F.2d 1122, 1126","parenthetical":"\"It is a well-settled rule that a party opposing a summary judgment motion must inform the trial judge of the reasons, legal or factual, why summary judgment should not be entered. If it does not do so, and loses the motion, it cannot raise such reasons on appeal.\"","sentence":"See Rodgers v. City of Des Moines, 435 F.3d 904, 908 (8th Cir.2006) (\u201cWithout some guidance, we will not mine a summary judgment record searching for nuggets of factual disputes to gild a party\u2019s arguments.\u201d); see also Satcher v. Univ. of Ark. at Pine Bluff Bd. of Trs., 558 F.3d 731, 735 (8th Cir.2009) (holding that the \u201cfailure to oppose a basis for summary judgment constitutes waiver of that argument\u201d on appeal). Thus, unlike the plaintiff in Schneider, who did not submit briefing in support of her arguments, Ames had the opportunity to oppose Nationwide\u2019s motion and was responsible for presenting any argument that might have precluded summary judgment in favor of Nationwide. See Satcher, 558 F.3d at 735 (\u201cIt was [the plaintiffs] responsibility to show that there were genuine issues of material fact in the record that precluded the summary judgment Appellees sought below.\u201d); see also Grenier v. Cyanamid Plastics, Inc., 70 F.3d 667, 678 (1st Cir.1995) (\u201cIf a party fails to assert a legal reason why summary judgment should not be granted, that ground is waived and cannot be considered or raised on appeal.\u201d (quoting Vaughner v. Pulito, 804 F.2d 873, 877 n. 2 (5th Cir.1986))); Liberles v. County of Cook, 709 F.2d 1122, 1126 (7th Cir.1983) (\u201cIt is a well-settled rule that a party opposing a summary judgment motion must inform the trial judge of the reasons, legal or factual, why summary judgment should not be entered. If it does not do so, and loses the motion, it cannot raise such reasons on appeal.\u201d); Frank C. Bailey Enters., Inc. v. Cargill, Inc., 582 F.2d 333, 334 (5th Cir.1978) (per curiam) (\u201c[A]n appellate court, in reviewing a summary judgment order, can only consider those matters presented to the district court.\u201d)."},"case_id":4179766,"label":"a"}
{"context":"A motion for summary judgment presents different opportunities and imposes different responsibilities on the parties.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"435 F.3d 904, 908","parenthetical":"\"Without some guidance, we will not mine a summary judgment record searching for nuggets of factual disputes to gild a party's arguments.\"","sentence":"See Rodgers v. City of Des Moines, 435 F.3d 904, 908 (8th Cir.2006) (\u201cWithout some guidance, we will not mine a summary judgment record searching for nuggets of factual disputes to gild a party\u2019s arguments.\u201d); see also Satcher v. Univ. of Ark. at Pine Bluff Bd. of Trs., 558 F.3d 731, 735 (8th Cir.2009) (holding that the \u201cfailure to oppose a basis for summary judgment constitutes waiver of that argument\u201d on appeal). Thus, unlike the plaintiff in Schneider, who did not submit briefing in support of her arguments, Ames had the opportunity to oppose Nationwide\u2019s motion and was responsible for presenting any argument that might have precluded summary judgment in favor of Nationwide. See Satcher, 558 F.3d at 735 (\u201cIt was [the plaintiffs] responsibility to show that there were genuine issues of material fact in the record that precluded the summary judgment Appellees sought below.\u201d); see also Grenier v. Cyanamid Plastics, Inc., 70 F.3d 667, 678 (1st Cir.1995) (\u201cIf a party fails to assert a legal reason why summary judgment should not be granted, that ground is waived and cannot be considered or raised on appeal.\u201d (quoting Vaughner v. Pulito, 804 F.2d 873, 877 n. 2 (5th Cir.1986))); Liberles v. County of Cook, 709 F.2d 1122, 1126 (7th Cir.1983) (\u201cIt is a well-settled rule that a party opposing a summary judgment motion must inform the trial judge of the reasons, legal or factual, why summary judgment should not be entered. If it does not do so, and loses the motion, it cannot raise such reasons on appeal.\u201d); Frank C. Bailey Enters., Inc. v. Cargill, Inc., 582 F.2d 333, 334 (5th Cir.1978) (per curiam) (\u201c[A]n appellate court, in reviewing a summary judgment order, can only consider those matters presented to the district court.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"582 F.2d 333, 334","parenthetical":"\"[A]n appellate court, in reviewing a summary judgment order, can only consider those matters presented to the district court.\"","sentence":"See Rodgers v. City of Des Moines, 435 F.3d 904, 908 (8th Cir.2006) (\u201cWithout some guidance, we will not mine a summary judgment record searching for nuggets of factual disputes to gild a party\u2019s arguments.\u201d); see also Satcher v. Univ. of Ark. at Pine Bluff Bd. of Trs., 558 F.3d 731, 735 (8th Cir.2009) (holding that the \u201cfailure to oppose a basis for summary judgment constitutes waiver of that argument\u201d on appeal). Thus, unlike the plaintiff in Schneider, who did not submit briefing in support of her arguments, Ames had the opportunity to oppose Nationwide\u2019s motion and was responsible for presenting any argument that might have precluded summary judgment in favor of Nationwide. See Satcher, 558 F.3d at 735 (\u201cIt was [the plaintiffs] responsibility to show that there were genuine issues of material fact in the record that precluded the summary judgment Appellees sought below.\u201d); see also Grenier v. Cyanamid Plastics, Inc., 70 F.3d 667, 678 (1st Cir.1995) (\u201cIf a party fails to assert a legal reason why summary judgment should not be granted, that ground is waived and cannot be considered or raised on appeal.\u201d (quoting Vaughner v. Pulito, 804 F.2d 873, 877 n. 2 (5th Cir.1986))); Liberles v. County of Cook, 709 F.2d 1122, 1126 (7th Cir.1983) (\u201cIt is a well-settled rule that a party opposing a summary judgment motion must inform the trial judge of the reasons, legal or factual, why summary judgment should not be entered. If it does not do so, and loses the motion, it cannot raise such reasons on appeal.\u201d); Frank C. Bailey Enters., Inc. v. Cargill, Inc., 582 F.2d 333, 334 (5th Cir.1978) (per curiam) (\u201c[A]n appellate court, in reviewing a summary judgment order, can only consider those matters presented to the district court.\u201d)."},"case_id":4179766,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Under the facts as presented by Watson, it would have been clear to reasonable officers that the Chrisman exception did not apply because Watson was no longer in his home and the underlying law enforcement needs that justified the Chrisman exception had dissipated. Similarly, given the lack of governmental interest justifying the use of force, it would have been clear to reasonable officers that even the limited amount of force they employed was unreasonable.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"147 F.3d 747, 750","parenthetical":"officers used excessive force when they pushed an individual up against an open door when he refused to consent to their entry","sentence":"See Guite v. Wright, 147 F.3d 747, 750 (8th Cir.1998) (officers used excessive force when they pushed an individual up against an open door when he refused to consent to their entry); see also Liberal v. Estrada, 632 F.3d 1064, 1078-79 (9th Cir.2011) (officers used excessive force when they pushed an individual against a police car)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"632 F.3d 1064, 1078-79","parenthetical":"officers used excessive force when they pushed an individual against a police car","sentence":"See Guite v. Wright, 147 F.3d 747, 750 (8th Cir.1998) (officers used excessive force when they pushed an individual up against an open door when he refused to consent to their entry); see also Liberal v. Estrada, 632 F.3d 1064, 1078-79 (9th Cir.2011) (officers used excessive force when they pushed an individual against a police car)."},"case_id":4144385,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The district court in that case refused a proposed defense instruction that stated that the intent to deprive the victim of his civil rights needed to be the \"predominant purpose\" of the conspiracy. On appeal, we affirmed the district court's decision, noting that the proposed instruction would inappropriately invite jurors to override the guiding purpose of the legislation -- the prevention of constitutional injuries' -- by also finding that the parties had some other permissible purpose.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"107 F.3d 200, 210","parenthetical":"approving under 18 U.S.C. SS 1842 a jury instruction stating it did not matter \"that a defendant may also have been motivated by hatred, anger or revenge, or some other emotion\"","sentence":"Ellis, 595 F.2d at 162; see also United States v. Johnstone, 107 F.3d 200, 210 (3d Cir.1997) (approving under 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 1842 a jury instruction stating it did not matter \u201cthat a defendant may also have been motivated by hatred, anger or revenge, or some other emotion\u201d); cf. United States v. Bledsoe, 728 F.2d 1094, 1098 (8th Cir.1984) (upholding mixed motives instruction under 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 245 that stated that \u201cthe presence of other motives ... does not make his conduct any less a violation\u201d of the statute); Craft, 484 F.3d at 926 (stating that, under \u00a7 3631, the government need only prove that \u201crace or ethnicity partially motivated\u201d the crimes)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"728 F.2d 1094, 1098","parenthetical":"upholding mixed motives instruction under 18 U.S.C. SS 245 that stated that \"the presence of other motives ... does not make his conduct any less a violation\" of the statute","sentence":"Ellis, 595 F.2d at 162; see also United States v. Johnstone, 107 F.3d 200, 210 (3d Cir.1997) (approving under 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 1842 a jury instruction stating it did not matter \u201cthat a defendant may also have been motivated by hatred, anger or revenge, or some other emotion\u201d); cf. United States v. Bledsoe, 728 F.2d 1094, 1098 (8th Cir.1984) (upholding mixed motives instruction under 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 245 that stated that \u201cthe presence of other motives ... does not make his conduct any less a violation\u201d of the statute); Craft, 484 F.3d at 926 (stating that, under \u00a7 3631, the government need only prove that \u201crace or ethnicity partially motivated\u201d the crimes)."},"case_id":5863601,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The district court in that case refused a proposed defense instruction that stated that the intent to deprive the victim of his civil rights needed to be the \"predominant purpose\" of the conspiracy. On appeal, we affirmed the district court's decision, noting that the proposed instruction would inappropriately invite jurors to override the guiding purpose of the legislation -- the prevention of constitutional injuries' -- by also finding that the parties had some other permissible purpose.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"107 F.3d 200, 210","parenthetical":"approving under 18 U.S.C. SS 1842 a jury instruction stating it did not matter \"that a defendant may also have been motivated by hatred, anger or revenge, or some other emotion\"","sentence":"Ellis, 595 F.2d at 162; see also United States v. Johnstone, 107 F.3d 200, 210 (3d Cir.1997) (approving under 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 1842 a jury instruction stating it did not matter \u201cthat a defendant may also have been motivated by hatred, anger or revenge, or some other emotion\u201d); cf. United States v. Bledsoe, 728 F.2d 1094, 1098 (8th Cir.1984) (upholding mixed motives instruction under 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 245 that stated that \u201cthe presence of other motives ... does not make his conduct any less a violation\u201d of the statute); Craft, 484 F.3d at 926 (stating that, under \u00a7 3631, the government need only prove that \u201crace or ethnicity partially motivated\u201d the crimes)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"484 F.3d 926, 926","parenthetical":"stating that, under SS 3631, the government need only prove that \"race or ethnicity partially motivated\" the crimes","sentence":"Ellis, 595 F.2d at 162; see also United States v. Johnstone, 107 F.3d 200, 210 (3d Cir.1997) (approving under 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 1842 a jury instruction stating it did not matter \u201cthat a defendant may also have been motivated by hatred, anger or revenge, or some other emotion\u201d); cf. United States v. Bledsoe, 728 F.2d 1094, 1098 (8th Cir.1984) (upholding mixed motives instruction under 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 245 that stated that \u201cthe presence of other motives ... does not make his conduct any less a violation\u201d of the statute); Craft, 484 F.3d at 926 (stating that, under \u00a7 3631, the government need only prove that \u201crace or ethnicity partially motivated\u201d the crimes)."},"case_id":5863601,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The more completely they are achieved, the more successful the crime.\" Accordingly, if these details were necessary to a proper indictment and a subsequent conspiracy conviction, \"the difficulties, not only of discovery, but of certainty of proof and correlating proof with pleading would become insuperable, and conspirators would go free by their very ingenuity.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"841 F.2d 1229, 1229","parenthetical":"\"an offense that is the object of a conspiracy need not be delineated in the indictment with the same particularity as a substantive offense\"","sentence":"Id.; see also Hooker, 841 F.2d at 1229 (\u201can offense that is the object of a conspiracy need not be delineated in the indictment with the same particularity as a substantive offense\u201d); cf. United States v. Wilson, 565 F.Supp. 1416, 1439 (S.D.N.Y.1983) (denying motion for bill of particulars regarding information about specific conduct of conspirators). Therefore, the indictment here is not unconstitutionally vague for its failure to include such information."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"565 F.Supp. 1416, 1439","parenthetical":"denying motion for bill of particulars regarding information about specific conduct of conspirators","sentence":"Id.; see also Hooker, 841 F.2d at 1229 (\u201can offense that is the object of a conspiracy need not be delineated in the indictment with the same particularity as a substantive offense\u201d); cf. United States v. Wilson, 565 F.Supp. 1416, 1439 (S.D.N.Y.1983) (denying motion for bill of particulars regarding information about specific conduct of conspirators). Therefore, the indictment here is not unconstitutionally vague for its failure to include such information."},"case_id":7389257,"label":"a"}
{"context":"If a party chooses not to assert, or expressly disavows, a certain argument on appeal, we generally will not consider that argument in our review.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"500 F.3d 1099, 1104","parenthetical":"\"[W]e routinely have declined to consider arguments that are not raised, or are inadequately presented, in an appellant's opening brief.\"","sentence":"See Perry v. Woodward, 199 F.3d 1126, 1141 n. 13 (10th Cir.1999) (\u201cThis court ... will not craft a party\u2019s arguments for him\u201d); Vaz Dos Reis v. Holder, 606 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir.2010) (\u201cWhen a party disavows a particular theory of the case, it is not an appellate court\u2019s proper role to make the disavowed argument for him.\u201d); cf. Bronson v. Swensen, 500 F.3d 1099, 1104 (10th Cir.2007) (\u201c[W]e routinely have declined to consider arguments that are not raised, or are inadequately presented, in an appellant\u2019s opening brief.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"This court ... will not craft a party's arguments for him\"","sentence":"See Perry v. Woodward, 199 F.3d 1126, 1141 n. 13 (10th Cir.1999) (\u201cThis court ... will not craft a party\u2019s arguments for him\u201d); Vaz Dos Reis v. Holder, 606 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir.2010) (\u201cWhen a party disavows a particular theory of the case, it is not an appellate court\u2019s proper role to make the disavowed argument for him.\u201d); cf. Bronson v. Swensen, 500 F.3d 1099, 1104 (10th Cir.2007) (\u201c[W]e routinely have declined to consider arguments that are not raised, or are inadequately presented, in an appellant\u2019s opening brief.\u201d)."},"case_id":3528688,"label":"b"}
{"context":"If a party chooses not to assert, or expressly disavows, a certain argument on appeal, we generally will not consider that argument in our review.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"500 F.3d 1099, 1104","parenthetical":"\"[W]e routinely have declined to consider arguments that are not raised, or are inadequately presented, in an appellant's opening brief.\"","sentence":"See Perry v. Woodward, 199 F.3d 1126, 1141 n. 13 (10th Cir.1999) (\u201cThis court ... will not craft a party\u2019s arguments for him\u201d); Vaz Dos Reis v. Holder, 606 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir.2010) (\u201cWhen a party disavows a particular theory of the case, it is not an appellate court\u2019s proper role to make the disavowed argument for him.\u201d); cf. Bronson v. Swensen, 500 F.3d 1099, 1104 (10th Cir.2007) (\u201c[W]e routinely have declined to consider arguments that are not raised, or are inadequately presented, in an appellant\u2019s opening brief.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"606 F.3d 1, 4","parenthetical":"\"When a party disavows a particular theory of the case, it is not an appellate court's proper role to make the disavowed argument for him.\"","sentence":"See Perry v. Woodward, 199 F.3d 1126, 1141 n. 13 (10th Cir.1999) (\u201cThis court ... will not craft a party\u2019s arguments for him\u201d); Vaz Dos Reis v. Holder, 606 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir.2010) (\u201cWhen a party disavows a particular theory of the case, it is not an appellate court\u2019s proper role to make the disavowed argument for him.\u201d); cf. Bronson v. Swensen, 500 F.3d 1099, 1104 (10th Cir.2007) (\u201c[W]e routinely have declined to consider arguments that are not raised, or are inadequately presented, in an appellant\u2019s opening brief.\u201d)."},"case_id":3528688,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The defendants also object to FACE'S reference to the reactions of listeners. In FACE, \"intimidatfion]\" is defined as that conduct which \"place[s] a person in reasonable apprehension of bodily harm to him- or herself or another.\" 18 U.S.C. SS 248(e)(3). The defendants argue that, because this passage makes application of the statute depend on the impact of the communication on its audience, FACE is inherently content-based. I disagree. The \"reasonable apprehension\" language in FACE appears to be a reasonable attempt to limit application of the statute to \"true threats.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"31 F.3d 550, 553","parenthetical":"defining a threat as \"whether the recipient could reasonably have regarded the defendant's statement as a threat\"","sentence":"See, e.g., United States v. Aman, 31 F.3d 550, 553 (7th Cir.1994) (defining a threat as \"whether the recipient could reasonably have regarded the defendant\u2019s statement as a threat\u201d); Wurtz v. Risley, 719 F.2d 1438, 1441 (9th Cir.1983) (\u201cimplicit in the nature of such punishable threats is a reasonable tendency to produce in the victim a fear that the threat will be carried out\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"6 F.3d 1297, 1301","parenthetical":"18 U.S.C. SS 241 unconstitutional as applied because defendant punished for threats of force that were not \"true threats\"","sentence":"Cf. United States v. Lee, 6 F.3d 1297, 1301 (8th Cir.1993) (en banc) (18 U.S.C. \u00a7 241 unconstitutional as applied because defendant punished for threats of force that were not \"true threats\u201d), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 1550, 128 L.Ed.2d 199 (1994)."},"case_id":7849541,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The defendants also object to FACE'S reference to the reactions of listeners. In FACE, \"intimidatfion]\" is defined as that conduct which \"place[s] a person in reasonable apprehension of bodily harm to him- or herself or another.\" 18 U.S.C. SS 248(e)(3). The defendants argue that, because this passage makes application of the statute depend on the impact of the communication on its audience, FACE is inherently content-based. I disagree. The \"reasonable apprehension\" language in FACE appears to be a reasonable attempt to limit application of the statute to \"true threats.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"18 U.S.C. SS 241 unconstitutional as applied because defendant punished for threats of force that were not \"true threats\"","sentence":"Cf. United States v. Lee, 6 F.3d 1297, 1301 (8th Cir.1993) (en banc) (18 U.S.C. \u00a7 241 unconstitutional as applied because defendant punished for threats of force that were not \"true threats\u201d), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 1550, 128 L.Ed.2d 199 (1994)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"31 F.3d 550, 553","parenthetical":"defining a threat as \"whether the recipient could reasonably have regarded the defendant's statement as a threat\"","sentence":"See, e.g., United States v. Aman, 31 F.3d 550, 553 (7th Cir.1994) (defining a threat as \"whether the recipient could reasonably have regarded the defendant\u2019s statement as a threat\u201d); Wurtz v. Risley, 719 F.2d 1438, 1441 (9th Cir.1983) (\u201cimplicit in the nature of such punishable threats is a reasonable tendency to produce in the victim a fear that the threat will be carried out\u201d)."},"case_id":7849541,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The defendants also object to FACE'S reference to the reactions of listeners. In FACE, \"intimidatfion]\" is defined as that conduct which \"place[s] a person in reasonable apprehension of bodily harm to him- or herself or another.\" 18 U.S.C. SS 248(e)(3). The defendants argue that, because this passage makes application of the statute depend on the impact of the communication on its audience, FACE is inherently content-based. I disagree. The \"reasonable apprehension\" language in FACE appears to be a reasonable attempt to limit application of the statute to \"true threats.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"31 F.3d 550, 553","parenthetical":"defining a threat as \"whether the recipient could reasonably have regarded the defendant's statement as a threat\"","sentence":"See, e.g., United States v. Aman, 31 F.3d 550, 553 (7th Cir.1994) (defining a threat as \"whether the recipient could reasonably have regarded the defendant\u2019s statement as a threat\u201d); Wurtz v. Risley, 719 F.2d 1438, 1441 (9th Cir.1983) (\u201cimplicit in the nature of such punishable threats is a reasonable tendency to produce in the victim a fear that the threat will be carried out\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"18 U.S.C. SS 241 unconstitutional as applied because defendant punished for threats of force that were not \"true threats\"","sentence":"Cf. United States v. Lee, 6 F.3d 1297, 1301 (8th Cir.1993) (en banc) (18 U.S.C. \u00a7 241 unconstitutional as applied because defendant punished for threats of force that were not \"true threats\u201d), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 1550, 128 L.Ed.2d 199 (1994)."},"case_id":7849541,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The defendants also object to FACE'S reference to the reactions of listeners. In FACE, \"intimidatfion]\" is defined as that conduct which \"place[s] a person in reasonable apprehension of bodily harm to him- or herself or another.\" 18 U.S.C. SS 248(e)(3). The defendants argue that, because this passage makes application of the statute depend on the impact of the communication on its audience, FACE is inherently content-based. I disagree. The \"reasonable apprehension\" language in FACE appears to be a reasonable attempt to limit application of the statute to \"true threats.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"6 F.3d 1297, 1301","parenthetical":"18 U.S.C. SS 241 unconstitutional as applied because defendant punished for threats of force that were not \"true threats\"","sentence":"Cf. United States v. Lee, 6 F.3d 1297, 1301 (8th Cir.1993) (en banc) (18 U.S.C. \u00a7 241 unconstitutional as applied because defendant punished for threats of force that were not \"true threats\u201d), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 1550, 128 L.Ed.2d 199 (1994)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"719 F.2d 1438, 1441","parenthetical":"\"implicit in the nature of such punishable threats is a reasonable tendency to produce in the victim a fear that the threat will be carried out\"","sentence":"See, e.g., United States v. Aman, 31 F.3d 550, 553 (7th Cir.1994) (defining a threat as \"whether the recipient could reasonably have regarded the defendant\u2019s statement as a threat\u201d); Wurtz v. Risley, 719 F.2d 1438, 1441 (9th Cir.1983) (\u201cimplicit in the nature of such punishable threats is a reasonable tendency to produce in the victim a fear that the threat will be carried out\u201d)."},"case_id":7849541,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The defendants also object to FACE'S reference to the reactions of listeners. In FACE, \"intimidatfion]\" is defined as that conduct which \"place[s] a person in reasonable apprehension of bodily harm to him- or herself or another.\" 18 U.S.C. SS 248(e)(3). The defendants argue that, because this passage makes application of the statute depend on the impact of the communication on its audience, FACE is inherently content-based. I disagree. The \"reasonable apprehension\" language in FACE appears to be a reasonable attempt to limit application of the statute to \"true threats.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"719 F.2d 1438, 1441","parenthetical":"\"implicit in the nature of such punishable threats is a reasonable tendency to produce in the victim a fear that the threat will be carried out\"","sentence":"See, e.g., United States v. Aman, 31 F.3d 550, 553 (7th Cir.1994) (defining a threat as \"whether the recipient could reasonably have regarded the defendant\u2019s statement as a threat\u201d); Wurtz v. Risley, 719 F.2d 1438, 1441 (9th Cir.1983) (\u201cimplicit in the nature of such punishable threats is a reasonable tendency to produce in the victim a fear that the threat will be carried out\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"18 U.S.C. SS 241 unconstitutional as applied because defendant punished for threats of force that were not \"true threats\"","sentence":"Cf. United States v. Lee, 6 F.3d 1297, 1301 (8th Cir.1993) (en banc) (18 U.S.C. \u00a7 241 unconstitutional as applied because defendant punished for threats of force that were not \"true threats\u201d), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 1550, 128 L.Ed.2d 199 (1994)."},"case_id":7849541,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The defendants also object to FACE'S reference to the reactions of listeners. In FACE, \"intimidatfion]\" is defined as that conduct which \"place[s] a person in reasonable apprehension of bodily harm to him- or herself or another.\" 18 U.S.C. SS 248(e)(3). The defendants argue that, because this passage makes application of the statute depend on the impact of the communication on its audience, FACE is inherently content-based. I disagree. The \"reasonable apprehension\" language in FACE appears to be a reasonable attempt to limit application of the statute to \"true threats.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"18 U.S.C. SS 241 unconstitutional as applied because defendant punished for threats of force that were not \"true threats\"","sentence":"Cf. United States v. Lee, 6 F.3d 1297, 1301 (8th Cir.1993) (en banc) (18 U.S.C. \u00a7 241 unconstitutional as applied because defendant punished for threats of force that were not \"true threats\u201d), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 1550, 128 L.Ed.2d 199 (1994)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"719 F.2d 1438, 1441","parenthetical":"\"implicit in the nature of such punishable threats is a reasonable tendency to produce in the victim a fear that the threat will be carried out\"","sentence":"See, e.g., United States v. Aman, 31 F.3d 550, 553 (7th Cir.1994) (defining a threat as \"whether the recipient could reasonably have regarded the defendant\u2019s statement as a threat\u201d); Wurtz v. Risley, 719 F.2d 1438, 1441 (9th Cir.1983) (\u201cimplicit in the nature of such punishable threats is a reasonable tendency to produce in the victim a fear that the threat will be carried out\u201d)."},"case_id":7849541,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Our review of the record reveals that the testimony was not prejudicial in light of the overwhelming evidence of appellant's guilt. We are convinced, therefore, that any possible error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"476 Pa. 391, 405","parenthetical":"an error is harmless only if the appellate court is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the error is harmless","sentence":"Commonwealth v. Story, 476 Pa. 391, 405, 383 A.2d 155, 162 (1978) (an error is harmless only if the appellate court is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the error is harmless); see also, Commonwealth v. Wharton, 530 Pa. 127, 143, 607 A.2d 710, 718 (1992) (admission of codefendant\u2019s confession implicating defendant was harmless error given overwhelming evidence of defendant\u2019s guilt); Commonwealth v. Thomas, supra, 443 Pa. at 245, 279 A.2d at 26 (evidence of coconspirator\u2019s conviction at separate trial in murder prosecution, was not prejudicial in light of overwhelming evidence of petitioner\u2019s guilt)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"530 Pa. 127, 143","parenthetical":"admission of codefendant's confession implicating defendant was harmless error given overwhelming evidence of defendant's guilt","sentence":"Commonwealth v. Story, 476 Pa. 391, 405, 383 A.2d 155, 162 (1978) (an error is harmless only if the appellate court is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the error is harmless); see also, Commonwealth v. Wharton, 530 Pa. 127, 143, 607 A.2d 710, 718 (1992) (admission of codefendant\u2019s confession implicating defendant was harmless error given overwhelming evidence of defendant\u2019s guilt); Commonwealth v. Thomas, supra, 443 Pa. at 245, 279 A.2d at 26 (evidence of coconspirator\u2019s conviction at separate trial in murder prosecution, was not prejudicial in light of overwhelming evidence of petitioner\u2019s guilt)."},"case_id":7862136,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Our review of the record reveals that the testimony was not prejudicial in light of the overwhelming evidence of appellant's guilt. We are convinced, therefore, that any possible error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"476 Pa. 391, 405","parenthetical":"an error is harmless only if the appellate court is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the error is harmless","sentence":"Commonwealth v. Story, 476 Pa. 391, 405, 383 A.2d 155, 162 (1978) (an error is harmless only if the appellate court is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the error is harmless); see also, Commonwealth v. Wharton, 530 Pa. 127, 143, 607 A.2d 710, 718 (1992) (admission of codefendant\u2019s confession implicating defendant was harmless error given overwhelming evidence of defendant\u2019s guilt); Commonwealth v. Thomas, supra, 443 Pa. at 245, 279 A.2d at 26 (evidence of coconspirator\u2019s conviction at separate trial in murder prosecution, was not prejudicial in light of overwhelming evidence of petitioner\u2019s guilt)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"607 A.2d 710, 718","parenthetical":"admission of codefendant's confession implicating defendant was harmless error given overwhelming evidence of defendant's guilt","sentence":"Commonwealth v. Story, 476 Pa. 391, 405, 383 A.2d 155, 162 (1978) (an error is harmless only if the appellate court is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the error is harmless); see also, Commonwealth v. Wharton, 530 Pa. 127, 143, 607 A.2d 710, 718 (1992) (admission of codefendant\u2019s confession implicating defendant was harmless error given overwhelming evidence of defendant\u2019s guilt); Commonwealth v. Thomas, supra, 443 Pa. at 245, 279 A.2d at 26 (evidence of coconspirator\u2019s conviction at separate trial in murder prosecution, was not prejudicial in light of overwhelming evidence of petitioner\u2019s guilt)."},"case_id":7862136,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Our review of the record reveals that the testimony was not prejudicial in light of the overwhelming evidence of appellant's guilt. We are convinced, therefore, that any possible error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"476 Pa. 391, 405","parenthetical":"an error is harmless only if the appellate court is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the error is harmless","sentence":"Commonwealth v. Story, 476 Pa. 391, 405, 383 A.2d 155, 162 (1978) (an error is harmless only if the appellate court is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the error is harmless); see also, Commonwealth v. Wharton, 530 Pa. 127, 143, 607 A.2d 710, 718 (1992) (admission of codefendant\u2019s confession implicating defendant was harmless error given overwhelming evidence of defendant\u2019s guilt); Commonwealth v. Thomas, supra, 443 Pa. at 245, 279 A.2d at 26 (evidence of coconspirator\u2019s conviction at separate trial in murder prosecution, was not prejudicial in light of overwhelming evidence of petitioner\u2019s guilt)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"443 Pa. 245, 245","parenthetical":"evidence of coconspirator's conviction at separate trial in murder prosecution, was not prejudicial in light of overwhelming evidence of petitioner's guilt","sentence":"Commonwealth v. Story, 476 Pa. 391, 405, 383 A.2d 155, 162 (1978) (an error is harmless only if the appellate court is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the error is harmless); see also, Commonwealth v. Wharton, 530 Pa. 127, 143, 607 A.2d 710, 718 (1992) (admission of codefendant\u2019s confession implicating defendant was harmless error given overwhelming evidence of defendant\u2019s guilt); Commonwealth v. Thomas, supra, 443 Pa. at 245, 279 A.2d at 26 (evidence of coconspirator\u2019s conviction at separate trial in murder prosecution, was not prejudicial in light of overwhelming evidence of petitioner\u2019s guilt)."},"case_id":7862136,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Our review of the record reveals that the testimony was not prejudicial in light of the overwhelming evidence of appellant's guilt. We are convinced, therefore, that any possible error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"279 A.2d 26, 26","parenthetical":"evidence of coconspirator's conviction at separate trial in murder prosecution, was not prejudicial in light of overwhelming evidence of petitioner's guilt","sentence":"Commonwealth v. Story, 476 Pa. 391, 405, 383 A.2d 155, 162 (1978) (an error is harmless only if the appellate court is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the error is harmless); see also, Commonwealth v. Wharton, 530 Pa. 127, 143, 607 A.2d 710, 718 (1992) (admission of codefendant\u2019s confession implicating defendant was harmless error given overwhelming evidence of defendant\u2019s guilt); Commonwealth v. Thomas, supra, 443 Pa. at 245, 279 A.2d at 26 (evidence of coconspirator\u2019s conviction at separate trial in murder prosecution, was not prejudicial in light of overwhelming evidence of petitioner\u2019s guilt)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"476 Pa. 391, 405","parenthetical":"an error is harmless only if the appellate court is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the error is harmless","sentence":"Commonwealth v. Story, 476 Pa. 391, 405, 383 A.2d 155, 162 (1978) (an error is harmless only if the appellate court is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the error is harmless); see also, Commonwealth v. Wharton, 530 Pa. 127, 143, 607 A.2d 710, 718 (1992) (admission of codefendant\u2019s confession implicating defendant was harmless error given overwhelming evidence of defendant\u2019s guilt); Commonwealth v. Thomas, supra, 443 Pa. at 245, 279 A.2d at 26 (evidence of coconspirator\u2019s conviction at separate trial in murder prosecution, was not prejudicial in light of overwhelming evidence of petitioner\u2019s guilt)."},"case_id":7862136,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Our review of the record reveals that the testimony was not prejudicial in light of the overwhelming evidence of appellant's guilt. We are convinced, therefore, that any possible error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"383 A.2d 155, 162","parenthetical":"an error is harmless only if the appellate court is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the error is harmless","sentence":"Commonwealth v. Story, 476 Pa. 391, 405, 383 A.2d 155, 162 (1978) (an error is harmless only if the appellate court is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the error is harmless); see also, Commonwealth v. Wharton, 530 Pa. 127, 143, 607 A.2d 710, 718 (1992) (admission of codefendant\u2019s confession implicating defendant was harmless error given overwhelming evidence of defendant\u2019s guilt); Commonwealth v. Thomas, supra, 443 Pa. at 245, 279 A.2d at 26 (evidence of coconspirator\u2019s conviction at separate trial in murder prosecution, was not prejudicial in light of overwhelming evidence of petitioner\u2019s guilt)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"530 Pa. 127, 143","parenthetical":"admission of codefendant's confession implicating defendant was harmless error given overwhelming evidence of defendant's guilt","sentence":"Commonwealth v. Story, 476 Pa. 391, 405, 383 A.2d 155, 162 (1978) (an error is harmless only if the appellate court is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the error is harmless); see also, Commonwealth v. Wharton, 530 Pa. 127, 143, 607 A.2d 710, 718 (1992) (admission of codefendant\u2019s confession implicating defendant was harmless error given overwhelming evidence of defendant\u2019s guilt); Commonwealth v. Thomas, supra, 443 Pa. at 245, 279 A.2d at 26 (evidence of coconspirator\u2019s conviction at separate trial in murder prosecution, was not prejudicial in light of overwhelming evidence of petitioner\u2019s guilt)."},"case_id":7862136,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Our review of the record reveals that the testimony was not prejudicial in light of the overwhelming evidence of appellant's guilt. We are convinced, therefore, that any possible error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"607 A.2d 710, 718","parenthetical":"admission of codefendant's confession implicating defendant was harmless error given overwhelming evidence of defendant's guilt","sentence":"Commonwealth v. Story, 476 Pa. 391, 405, 383 A.2d 155, 162 (1978) (an error is harmless only if the appellate court is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the error is harmless); see also, Commonwealth v. Wharton, 530 Pa. 127, 143, 607 A.2d 710, 718 (1992) (admission of codefendant\u2019s confession implicating defendant was harmless error given overwhelming evidence of defendant\u2019s guilt); Commonwealth v. Thomas, supra, 443 Pa. at 245, 279 A.2d at 26 (evidence of coconspirator\u2019s conviction at separate trial in murder prosecution, was not prejudicial in light of overwhelming evidence of petitioner\u2019s guilt)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"383 A.2d 155, 162","parenthetical":"an error is harmless only if the appellate court is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the error is harmless","sentence":"Commonwealth v. Story, 476 Pa. 391, 405, 383 A.2d 155, 162 (1978) (an error is harmless only if the appellate court is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the error is harmless); see also, Commonwealth v. Wharton, 530 Pa. 127, 143, 607 A.2d 710, 718 (1992) (admission of codefendant\u2019s confession implicating defendant was harmless error given overwhelming evidence of defendant\u2019s guilt); Commonwealth v. Thomas, supra, 443 Pa. at 245, 279 A.2d at 26 (evidence of coconspirator\u2019s conviction at separate trial in murder prosecution, was not prejudicial in light of overwhelming evidence of petitioner\u2019s guilt)."},"case_id":7862136,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Our review of the record reveals that the testimony was not prejudicial in light of the overwhelming evidence of appellant's guilt. We are convinced, therefore, that any possible error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"443 Pa. 245, 245","parenthetical":"evidence of coconspirator's conviction at separate trial in murder prosecution, was not prejudicial in light of overwhelming evidence of petitioner's guilt","sentence":"Commonwealth v. Story, 476 Pa. 391, 405, 383 A.2d 155, 162 (1978) (an error is harmless only if the appellate court is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the error is harmless); see also, Commonwealth v. Wharton, 530 Pa. 127, 143, 607 A.2d 710, 718 (1992) (admission of codefendant\u2019s confession implicating defendant was harmless error given overwhelming evidence of defendant\u2019s guilt); Commonwealth v. Thomas, supra, 443 Pa. at 245, 279 A.2d at 26 (evidence of coconspirator\u2019s conviction at separate trial in murder prosecution, was not prejudicial in light of overwhelming evidence of petitioner\u2019s guilt)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"383 A.2d 155, 162","parenthetical":"an error is harmless only if the appellate court is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the error is harmless","sentence":"Commonwealth v. Story, 476 Pa. 391, 405, 383 A.2d 155, 162 (1978) (an error is harmless only if the appellate court is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the error is harmless); see also, Commonwealth v. Wharton, 530 Pa. 127, 143, 607 A.2d 710, 718 (1992) (admission of codefendant\u2019s confession implicating defendant was harmless error given overwhelming evidence of defendant\u2019s guilt); Commonwealth v. Thomas, supra, 443 Pa. at 245, 279 A.2d at 26 (evidence of coconspirator\u2019s conviction at separate trial in murder prosecution, was not prejudicial in light of overwhelming evidence of petitioner\u2019s guilt)."},"case_id":7862136,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Our review of the record reveals that the testimony was not prejudicial in light of the overwhelming evidence of appellant's guilt. We are convinced, therefore, that any possible error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"279 A.2d 26, 26","parenthetical":"evidence of coconspirator's conviction at separate trial in murder prosecution, was not prejudicial in light of overwhelming evidence of petitioner's guilt","sentence":"Commonwealth v. Story, 476 Pa. 391, 405, 383 A.2d 155, 162 (1978) (an error is harmless only if the appellate court is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the error is harmless); see also, Commonwealth v. Wharton, 530 Pa. 127, 143, 607 A.2d 710, 718 (1992) (admission of codefendant\u2019s confession implicating defendant was harmless error given overwhelming evidence of defendant\u2019s guilt); Commonwealth v. Thomas, supra, 443 Pa. at 245, 279 A.2d at 26 (evidence of coconspirator\u2019s conviction at separate trial in murder prosecution, was not prejudicial in light of overwhelming evidence of petitioner\u2019s guilt)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"383 A.2d 155, 162","parenthetical":"an error is harmless only if the appellate court is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the error is harmless","sentence":"Commonwealth v. Story, 476 Pa. 391, 405, 383 A.2d 155, 162 (1978) (an error is harmless only if the appellate court is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the error is harmless); see also, Commonwealth v. Wharton, 530 Pa. 127, 143, 607 A.2d 710, 718 (1992) (admission of codefendant\u2019s confession implicating defendant was harmless error given overwhelming evidence of defendant\u2019s guilt); Commonwealth v. Thomas, supra, 443 Pa. at 245, 279 A.2d at 26 (evidence of coconspirator\u2019s conviction at separate trial in murder prosecution, was not prejudicial in light of overwhelming evidence of petitioner\u2019s guilt)."},"case_id":7862136,"label":"b"}
{"context":"We find that the case law of this court and of the Supreme Court demonstrates that the right to petition a local, elected representative for assistance in dealing with local government agencies was clearly established at the time that the relevant events took place and that a reasonable local official would have known that retaliating against a citizen exercising that right is unlawful. Moreover, a reasonable city official would have known that the Constitution prohibits retaliation for a citizen's exercise of his First Amendment right to Free Speech, whether that speech takes written, oral, or another form.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"513 F.3d 588, 588","parenthetical":"\"[T]he right to criticize public officials is clearly protected by the First Amendment.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Jenkins, 513 F.3d at 588 (\u201c[T]he right to criticize public officials is clearly protected by the First Amendment.\u201d); see also Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530, 65 S.Ct. 315, 89 L.Ed. 430 (1945) (\u201cIt was not by accident or coincidence that the rights to freedom in speech and press were coupled in a single guaranty with the rights of the people peaceably to assemble and to petition for redress of grievances. All these, though not identical, are inseparable.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"323 U.S. 516, 530","parenthetical":"\"It was not by accident or coincidence that the rights to freedom in speech and press were coupled in a single guaranty with the rights of the people peaceably to assemble and to petition for redress of grievances. All these, though not identical, are inseparable.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Jenkins, 513 F.3d at 588 (\u201c[T]he right to criticize public officials is clearly protected by the First Amendment.\u201d); see also Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530, 65 S.Ct. 315, 89 L.Ed. 430 (1945) (\u201cIt was not by accident or coincidence that the rights to freedom in speech and press were coupled in a single guaranty with the rights of the people peaceably to assemble and to petition for redress of grievances. All these, though not identical, are inseparable.\u201d)."},"case_id":3783854,"label":"a"}
{"context":"We find that the case law of this court and of the Supreme Court demonstrates that the right to petition a local, elected representative for assistance in dealing with local government agencies was clearly established at the time that the relevant events took place and that a reasonable local official would have known that retaliating against a citizen exercising that right is unlawful. Moreover, a reasonable city official would have known that the Constitution prohibits retaliation for a citizen's exercise of his First Amendment right to Free Speech, whether that speech takes written, oral, or another form.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"It was not by accident or coincidence that the rights to freedom in speech and press were coupled in a single guaranty with the rights of the people peaceably to assemble and to petition for redress of grievances. All these, though not identical, are inseparable.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Jenkins, 513 F.3d at 588 (\u201c[T]he right to criticize public officials is clearly protected by the First Amendment.\u201d); see also Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530, 65 S.Ct. 315, 89 L.Ed. 430 (1945) (\u201cIt was not by accident or coincidence that the rights to freedom in speech and press were coupled in a single guaranty with the rights of the people peaceably to assemble and to petition for redress of grievances. All these, though not identical, are inseparable.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"513 F.3d 588, 588","parenthetical":"\"[T]he right to criticize public officials is clearly protected by the First Amendment.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Jenkins, 513 F.3d at 588 (\u201c[T]he right to criticize public officials is clearly protected by the First Amendment.\u201d); see also Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530, 65 S.Ct. 315, 89 L.Ed. 430 (1945) (\u201cIt was not by accident or coincidence that the rights to freedom in speech and press were coupled in a single guaranty with the rights of the people peaceably to assemble and to petition for redress of grievances. All these, though not identical, are inseparable.\u201d)."},"case_id":3783854,"label":"b"}
{"context":"We find that the case law of this court and of the Supreme Court demonstrates that the right to petition a local, elected representative for assistance in dealing with local government agencies was clearly established at the time that the relevant events took place and that a reasonable local official would have known that retaliating against a citizen exercising that right is unlawful. Moreover, a reasonable city official would have known that the Constitution prohibits retaliation for a citizen's exercise of his First Amendment right to Free Speech, whether that speech takes written, oral, or another form.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"513 F.3d 588, 588","parenthetical":"\"[T]he right to criticize public officials is clearly protected by the First Amendment.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Jenkins, 513 F.3d at 588 (\u201c[T]he right to criticize public officials is clearly protected by the First Amendment.\u201d); see also Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530, 65 S.Ct. 315, 89 L.Ed. 430 (1945) (\u201cIt was not by accident or coincidence that the rights to freedom in speech and press were coupled in a single guaranty with the rights of the people peaceably to assemble and to petition for redress of grievances. All these, though not identical, are inseparable.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"It was not by accident or coincidence that the rights to freedom in speech and press were coupled in a single guaranty with the rights of the people peaceably to assemble and to petition for redress of grievances. All these, though not identical, are inseparable.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Jenkins, 513 F.3d at 588 (\u201c[T]he right to criticize public officials is clearly protected by the First Amendment.\u201d); see also Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530, 65 S.Ct. 315, 89 L.Ed. 430 (1945) (\u201cIt was not by accident or coincidence that the rights to freedom in speech and press were coupled in a single guaranty with the rights of the people peaceably to assemble and to petition for redress of grievances. All these, though not identical, are inseparable.\u201d)."},"case_id":3783854,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Third, Solomon's conduct closely resembles conduct for which substantial sentences have been approved in the past.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"578 P.2d 578, 582","parenthetical":"five years' imprisonment approved for defendant who \"roughed up\" and threatened victim with a knife in an attempted robbery","sentence":"See, e.g., Griffith v. State, 578 P.2d 578, 582 (Alaska 1978) (five years\u2019 imprisonment approved for defendant who \u201croughed up\u201d and threatened victim with a knife in an attempted robbery); Holloway v. State, 535 P.2d 467 (Alaska 1975) (five years\u2019 imprisonment approved for defendant who struck victim with full beer can in robbery of $300); Hixon v. State, 508 P.2d 526 (Alaska 1973) (ten years\u2019 imprisonment affirmed for defendant who threw prepared pint of kerosene in victim\u2019s face in order to snatch victim\u2019s money bag)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"501 P.2d 155, 157-58","parenthetical":"apparently approving a sentence of ten years' imprisonment for a first felony offender convicted of a strong-arm robbery, but remanding in order to obtain a psychiatric evaluation","sentence":"Cf. Hawthorne v. State, 501 P.2d 155, 157-58 (Alaska 1972) (apparently approving a sentence of ten years\u2019 imprisonment for a first felony offender convicted of a strong-arm robbery, but remanding in order to obtain a psychiatric evaluation)."},"case_id":10411114,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Third, Solomon's conduct closely resembles conduct for which substantial sentences have been approved in the past.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"five years' imprisonment approved for defendant who struck victim with full beer can in robbery of $300","sentence":"See, e.g., Griffith v. State, 578 P.2d 578, 582 (Alaska 1978) (five years\u2019 imprisonment approved for defendant who \u201croughed up\u201d and threatened victim with a knife in an attempted robbery); Holloway v. State, 535 P.2d 467 (Alaska 1975) (five years\u2019 imprisonment approved for defendant who struck victim with full beer can in robbery of $300); Hixon v. State, 508 P.2d 526 (Alaska 1973) (ten years\u2019 imprisonment affirmed for defendant who threw prepared pint of kerosene in victim\u2019s face in order to snatch victim\u2019s money bag)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"501 P.2d 155, 157-58","parenthetical":"apparently approving a sentence of ten years' imprisonment for a first felony offender convicted of a strong-arm robbery, but remanding in order to obtain a psychiatric evaluation","sentence":"Cf. Hawthorne v. State, 501 P.2d 155, 157-58 (Alaska 1972) (apparently approving a sentence of ten years\u2019 imprisonment for a first felony offender convicted of a strong-arm robbery, but remanding in order to obtain a psychiatric evaluation)."},"case_id":10411114,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Third, Solomon's conduct closely resembles conduct for which substantial sentences have been approved in the past.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"501 P.2d 155, 157-58","parenthetical":"apparently approving a sentence of ten years' imprisonment for a first felony offender convicted of a strong-arm robbery, but remanding in order to obtain a psychiatric evaluation","sentence":"Cf. Hawthorne v. State, 501 P.2d 155, 157-58 (Alaska 1972) (apparently approving a sentence of ten years\u2019 imprisonment for a first felony offender convicted of a strong-arm robbery, but remanding in order to obtain a psychiatric evaluation)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"ten years' imprisonment affirmed for defendant who threw prepared pint of kerosene in victim's face in order to snatch victim's money bag","sentence":"See, e.g., Griffith v. State, 578 P.2d 578, 582 (Alaska 1978) (five years\u2019 imprisonment approved for defendant who \u201croughed up\u201d and threatened victim with a knife in an attempted robbery); Holloway v. State, 535 P.2d 467 (Alaska 1975) (five years\u2019 imprisonment approved for defendant who struck victim with full beer can in robbery of $300); Hixon v. State, 508 P.2d 526 (Alaska 1973) (ten years\u2019 imprisonment affirmed for defendant who threw prepared pint of kerosene in victim\u2019s face in order to snatch victim\u2019s money bag)."},"case_id":10411114,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Here, clause nine did not limit expenditures of principal to only \"necessary\" payments. Accordingly, Beatrice's wide discretion as trustee permitted her to use trust principal to pay for tax liability and for Douvadjian's services, irrespective of any other assets to which she had access.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"323 Mass. 517, 522-23","parenthetical":"where trust expressed unqualified intention to provide support, beneficiary's personal assets were not properly considered by trustee","sentence":"Compare Burnett v. Williams, 323 Mass. 517, 522-23 (1948) (where trust expressed unqualified intention to provide support, beneficiary\u2019s personal assets were not properly considered by trustee); contrast Corkery v. Dorsey, 223 Mass. 97, 102-03 (1916) (where trust language allowed disbursements where beneficiary was \u201cin need of aid,\u201d trustee obligated to consider beneficiary\u2019s personal assets in making payments)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"contra","identifier":"223 Mass. 97, 102-03","parenthetical":"where trust language allowed disbursements where beneficiary was \"in need of aid,\" trustee obligated to consider beneficiary's personal assets in making payments","sentence":"Compare Burnett v. Williams, 323 Mass. 517, 522-23 (1948) (where trust expressed unqualified intention to provide support, beneficiary\u2019s personal assets were not properly considered by trustee); contrast Corkery v. Dorsey, 223 Mass. 97, 102-03 (1916) (where trust language allowed disbursements where beneficiary was \u201cin need of aid,\u201d trustee obligated to consider beneficiary\u2019s personal assets in making payments)."},"case_id":7341493,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Defendants argue that a challenge to the adequacy of testing may implicate labeling issues since additional testing might disclose the need for further warnings. The court, however, is unwilling to read FIFRA's preemption so broadly, particularly in light of the presumption against preemption which counsels a narrow construction of preemption' provisions.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"112 S.Ct. 2622, 2622","parenthetical":"Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969 does not preempt claims that rely solely on testing or research practices","sentence":"Cipollone, \u2014 U.S. at \u2014, 112 S.Ct. at 2618; Florida Lime, 373 U.S. at 144, 83 S.Ct. at 1218. Instead, the court finds the reasoning of the Fourth and First Circuits persuasive and holds that \u201cclaims for negligent testing, manufacturing, and formulating ... are not preempted by FIFRA.\u201d Worm v. American Cyanamid, 5 F.3d 744, 747 (4th Cir.1993) (emphasis added); Williams v. State of Louisiana, 640 So.2d 365, 367 (La. App. 1st Cir.1994); see also DerGazarian v. Dow Chem., 836 F.Supp. 1429, 1447 (W.D.Ark.1993) (FIFRA does not preempt claims for failure to use ordinary care in formulation, inspection, and testing); Wright v. Dow Chem. U.S.A., 845 F.Supp. 503, 507 (M.D.Tenn.1993) (FIFRA does not preempt non-labeling claims for defective design and failure to properly test and study); cf. Cipollone, \u2014 U.S. at -, 112 S.Ct. at 2622 (Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969 does not preempt claims that rely solely on testing or research practices)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"836 F.Supp. 1429, 1447","parenthetical":"FIFRA does not preempt claims for failure to use ordinary care in formulation, inspection, and testing","sentence":"Cipollone, \u2014 U.S. at \u2014, 112 S.Ct. at 2618; Florida Lime, 373 U.S. at 144, 83 S.Ct. at 1218. Instead, the court finds the reasoning of the Fourth and First Circuits persuasive and holds that \u201cclaims for negligent testing, manufacturing, and formulating ... are not preempted by FIFRA.\u201d Worm v. American Cyanamid, 5 F.3d 744, 747 (4th Cir.1993) (emphasis added); Williams v. State of Louisiana, 640 So.2d 365, 367 (La. App. 1st Cir.1994); see also DerGazarian v. Dow Chem., 836 F.Supp. 1429, 1447 (W.D.Ark.1993) (FIFRA does not preempt claims for failure to use ordinary care in formulation, inspection, and testing); Wright v. Dow Chem. U.S.A., 845 F.Supp. 503, 507 (M.D.Tenn.1993) (FIFRA does not preempt non-labeling claims for defective design and failure to properly test and study); cf. Cipollone, \u2014 U.S. at -, 112 S.Ct. at 2622 (Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969 does not preempt claims that rely solely on testing or research practices)."},"case_id":7849229,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Defendants argue that a challenge to the adequacy of testing may implicate labeling issues since additional testing might disclose the need for further warnings. The court, however, is unwilling to read FIFRA's preemption so broadly, particularly in light of the presumption against preemption which counsels a narrow construction of preemption' provisions.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"845 F.Supp. 503, 507","parenthetical":"FIFRA does not preempt non-labeling claims for defective design and failure to properly test and study","sentence":"Cipollone, \u2014 U.S. at \u2014, 112 S.Ct. at 2618; Florida Lime, 373 U.S. at 144, 83 S.Ct. at 1218. Instead, the court finds the reasoning of the Fourth and First Circuits persuasive and holds that \u201cclaims for negligent testing, manufacturing, and formulating ... are not preempted by FIFRA.\u201d Worm v. American Cyanamid, 5 F.3d 744, 747 (4th Cir.1993) (emphasis added); Williams v. State of Louisiana, 640 So.2d 365, 367 (La. App. 1st Cir.1994); see also DerGazarian v. Dow Chem., 836 F.Supp. 1429, 1447 (W.D.Ark.1993) (FIFRA does not preempt claims for failure to use ordinary care in formulation, inspection, and testing); Wright v. Dow Chem. U.S.A., 845 F.Supp. 503, 507 (M.D.Tenn.1993) (FIFRA does not preempt non-labeling claims for defective design and failure to properly test and study); cf. Cipollone, \u2014 U.S. at -, 112 S.Ct. at 2622 (Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969 does not preempt claims that rely solely on testing or research practices)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"112 S.Ct. 2622, 2622","parenthetical":"Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969 does not preempt claims that rely solely on testing or research practices","sentence":"Cipollone, \u2014 U.S. at \u2014, 112 S.Ct. at 2618; Florida Lime, 373 U.S. at 144, 83 S.Ct. at 1218. Instead, the court finds the reasoning of the Fourth and First Circuits persuasive and holds that \u201cclaims for negligent testing, manufacturing, and formulating ... are not preempted by FIFRA.\u201d Worm v. American Cyanamid, 5 F.3d 744, 747 (4th Cir.1993) (emphasis added); Williams v. State of Louisiana, 640 So.2d 365, 367 (La. App. 1st Cir.1994); see also DerGazarian v. Dow Chem., 836 F.Supp. 1429, 1447 (W.D.Ark.1993) (FIFRA does not preempt claims for failure to use ordinary care in formulation, inspection, and testing); Wright v. Dow Chem. U.S.A., 845 F.Supp. 503, 507 (M.D.Tenn.1993) (FIFRA does not preempt non-labeling claims for defective design and failure to properly test and study); cf. Cipollone, \u2014 U.S. at -, 112 S.Ct. at 2622 (Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969 does not preempt claims that rely solely on testing or research practices)."},"case_id":7849229,"label":"a"}
{"context":"By failing to raise any argument in his brief, Xu waives any challenge to the IJ's adverse credibility determination. The IJ's adverse credibility determination alone was dispositive of Xu's application for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"476 F.3d 114, 118","parenthetical":"denying a petition for review because petitioner failed to challenge a dispositive ground for relief","sentence":"See Ramsameachire v. Ashcroft, 357 F.3d 169, 178 (2d Cir.2004) (holding that to establish asylum eligibility based on future persecution, an applicant must show that he or she subjectively fears persecution and that this fear is objectively reasonable); Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156 (2d Cir.2006) (holding that when the asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT claims are based on the same factual predicate, a credibility ruling necessarily forecloses relief in each); see also Steevenez v. Gonzales, 476 F.3d 114, 118 (2d Cir.2007) (denying a petition for review because petitioner failed to challenge a dispositive ground for relief)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"357 F.3d 169, 178","parenthetical":"holding that to establish asylum eligibility based on future persecution, an applicant must show that he or she subjectively fears persecution and that this fear is objectively reasonable","sentence":"See Ramsameachire v. Ashcroft, 357 F.3d 169, 178 (2d Cir.2004) (holding that to establish asylum eligibility based on future persecution, an applicant must show that he or she subjectively fears persecution and that this fear is objectively reasonable); Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156 (2d Cir.2006) (holding that when the asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT claims are based on the same factual predicate, a credibility ruling necessarily forecloses relief in each); see also Steevenez v. Gonzales, 476 F.3d 114, 118 (2d Cir.2007) (denying a petition for review because petitioner failed to challenge a dispositive ground for relief)."},"case_id":4079427,"label":"b"}
{"context":"By failing to raise any argument in his brief, Xu waives any challenge to the IJ's adverse credibility determination. The IJ's adverse credibility determination alone was dispositive of Xu's application for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"444 F.3d 148, 156","parenthetical":"holding that when the asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT claims are based on the same factual predicate, a credibility ruling necessarily forecloses relief in each","sentence":"See Ramsameachire v. Ashcroft, 357 F.3d 169, 178 (2d Cir.2004) (holding that to establish asylum eligibility based on future persecution, an applicant must show that he or she subjectively fears persecution and that this fear is objectively reasonable); Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156 (2d Cir.2006) (holding that when the asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT claims are based on the same factual predicate, a credibility ruling necessarily forecloses relief in each); see also Steevenez v. Gonzales, 476 F.3d 114, 118 (2d Cir.2007) (denying a petition for review because petitioner failed to challenge a dispositive ground for relief)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"476 F.3d 114, 118","parenthetical":"denying a petition for review because petitioner failed to challenge a dispositive ground for relief","sentence":"See Ramsameachire v. Ashcroft, 357 F.3d 169, 178 (2d Cir.2004) (holding that to establish asylum eligibility based on future persecution, an applicant must show that he or she subjectively fears persecution and that this fear is objectively reasonable); Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156 (2d Cir.2006) (holding that when the asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT claims are based on the same factual predicate, a credibility ruling necessarily forecloses relief in each); see also Steevenez v. Gonzales, 476 F.3d 114, 118 (2d Cir.2007) (denying a petition for review because petitioner failed to challenge a dispositive ground for relief)."},"case_id":4079427,"label":"a"}
{"context":"But, as the Supreme Court has noted, escape from custody is a \"continuing offense.\" McCargo's admission that he acquired the gun for \"protection\" is therefore sufficient to show that he possessed it in connection with the felony -- and that such possession was not merely coincidental.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"314 F.3d 1216, 1224","parenthetical":"holding that \"in light of our recognition that escape presents a continuing threat of violence until the escapee is safely returned to custody, we hold that for purposes of SS 2K2.1(b","sentence":"See Spurgeon, 117 F.3d at 644 (the \u201cdefendant\u2019s own assertion that he had the weapon for protection\u201d indicated that the possession of the firearm was in connection with a narcotics felony); see also United States v. Brown, 314 F.3d 1216, 1224 (10th Cir.2003) (holding that \u201cin light of our recognition that escape presents a continuing threat of violence until the escapee is safely returned to custody, we hold that for purposes of \u00a7 2K2.1(b)(5), every escape is sufficiently continuing such that possession of a gun subsequent to the initial departure from custody can qualify as being \u2018in connection with\u2019 the escape\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"117 F.3d 644, 644","parenthetical":"the \"defendant's own assertion that he had the weapon for protection\" indicated that the possession of the firearm was in connection with a narcotics felony","sentence":"See Spurgeon, 117 F.3d at 644 (the \u201cdefendant\u2019s own assertion that he had the weapon for protection\u201d indicated that the possession of the firearm was in connection with a narcotics felony); see also United States v. Brown, 314 F.3d 1216, 1224 (10th Cir.2003) (holding that \u201cin light of our recognition that escape presents a continuing threat of violence until the escapee is safely returned to custody, we hold that for purposes of \u00a7 2K2.1(b)(5), every escape is sufficiently continuing such that possession of a gun subsequent to the initial departure from custody can qualify as being \u2018in connection with\u2019 the escape\u201d)."},"case_id":4121452,"label":"b"}
{"context":"While Dr. Mahan's conduct (construing the facts in the light most favorable to Ms. Morris) was unquestionably juvenile, unprofessional, and perhaps independently tortious, viewed in context, we cannot conclude from this record that it objectively altered the terms and conditions of Ms. Morris's employment.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"123 F.3d 766, 773","parenthetical":"\"Title VII is not a federal guarantee of refinement and sophistication in the workplace' -- -in this context, it prohibits only harassing behavior that is so severe or pervasive as to render the workplace objectively hostile or abusive.\"","sentence":"See Hartsell v. Duplex Prods., Inc., 123 F.3d 766, 773 (4th Cir.1997) (\u201cTitle VII is not a federal guarantee of refinement and sophistication in the workplace' \u2014 -in this context, it prohibits only harassing behavior that is so severe or pervasive as to render the workplace objectively hostile or abusive.\u201d); see also Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67, 106 S.Ct. 2399, 91 L.Ed.2d 49 (1986) (\u201c[N]ot all workplace conduct that may be described as harassment affects a term, condition, or privilege of employment within the meaning of Title VII.\u201d (internal quotation marks omitted)); cf. Chavez, 397 F.3d at 833 (\u201cTitle VII is not a code of workplace conduct, nor was it \u2018designed to bring about a magical transformation in the social mores of American workers!.]\u2019 \u201d (quoting Gross v. Burggraf Constr. Co., 53 F.3d 1531, 1538 (10th Cir.1995))); Baskerville v. Culligan Int\u2019l Co., 50 F.3d 428, 430 (7th Cir.1995) (suggesting that Title VII is \u201cnot designed to purge the workplace of vulgarity\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"50 F.3d 428, 430","parenthetical":"suggesting that Title VII is \"not designed to purge the workplace of vulgarity\"","sentence":"See Hartsell v. Duplex Prods., Inc., 123 F.3d 766, 773 (4th Cir.1997) (\u201cTitle VII is not a federal guarantee of refinement and sophistication in the workplace' \u2014 -in this context, it prohibits only harassing behavior that is so severe or pervasive as to render the workplace objectively hostile or abusive.\u201d); see also Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67, 106 S.Ct. 2399, 91 L.Ed.2d 49 (1986) (\u201c[N]ot all workplace conduct that may be described as harassment affects a term, condition, or privilege of employment within the meaning of Title VII.\u201d (internal quotation marks omitted)); cf. Chavez, 397 F.3d at 833 (\u201cTitle VII is not a code of workplace conduct, nor was it \u2018designed to bring about a magical transformation in the social mores of American workers!.]\u2019 \u201d (quoting Gross v. Burggraf Constr. Co., 53 F.3d 1531, 1538 (10th Cir.1995))); Baskerville v. Culligan Int\u2019l Co., 50 F.3d 428, 430 (7th Cir.1995) (suggesting that Title VII is \u201cnot designed to purge the workplace of vulgarity\u201d)."},"case_id":6051591,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The judge never commented on the merits of Mitchell's case. Because it is clear the judge was admonishing Mitchell and making the remarks to maintain control over the judicial proceedings and to preserve courtroom decorum, we reject Mitchell's judicial bias contention.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"9 F.3d 191, 194-95","parenthetical":"friction between court and counsel did not deprive party of fair trial","sentence":"See Harris, 869 F.2d at 401-02 (judge may properly comment on presentation of evidence to exercise control over trial and to conduct trial efficiently); see also Deary v. City of Glou cester, 9 F.3d 191, 194-95 (1st Cir.1993) (friction between court and counsel did not deprive party of fair trial)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"869 F.2d 401, 401-02","parenthetical":"judge may properly comment on presentation of evidence to exercise control over trial and to conduct trial efficiently","sentence":"See Harris, 869 F.2d at 401-02 (judge may properly comment on presentation of evidence to exercise control over trial and to conduct trial efficiently); see also Deary v. City of Glou cester, 9 F.3d 191, 194-95 (1st Cir.1993) (friction between court and counsel did not deprive party of fair trial)."},"case_id":10512869,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Both federal and New York state courts have repeatedly affirmed the power of the court to determine that the interests of a child or incompetent would best be represented not by a general representative, such as parent or guardian, but by a guardian ad litem or \"next friend.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"where the interests of a child and her legal guardian were adverse, the child was \"not otherwise represented\" as stated in Rule 17(c","sentence":"In Hoffert v. General Motors Corp., 656 F.2d 161 (5th Cir.1981), cert. denied sub nom. Cochrane & Bresnahan v. Smith, 456 U.S. 961, 102 S.Ct. 2037, 72 L.Ed.2d 485 (1982), the appearance of a conflict of interest between a minor and his general representative justified the appointment of a guardian ad litem. See also Adelman v. Graves, 747 F.2d 986 (5th Cir.1983); Noe v. True, 507 F.2d 9 (6th Cir.1974) (where the interests of a child and her legal guardian were adverse, the child was \u201cnot otherwise represented\u201d as stated in Rule 17(c) and thus appointment of a guardian ad litem was appropriate); cf. Developmental Disabilities Advocacy Center, Inc. v. Melton, 689 F.2d 281 (1st Cir.1982) (suit by a \u201cnext friend\u201d not allowed where there was no discernible conflict in the general representative and the general representative opposed the suit as not being in the incompetent\u2019s best interest)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"suit by a \"next friend\" not allowed where there was no discernible conflict in the general representative and the general representative opposed the suit as not being in the incompetent's best interest","sentence":"In Hoffert v. General Motors Corp., 656 F.2d 161 (5th Cir.1981), cert. denied sub nom. Cochrane & Bresnahan v. Smith, 456 U.S. 961, 102 S.Ct. 2037, 72 L.Ed.2d 485 (1982), the appearance of a conflict of interest between a minor and his general representative justified the appointment of a guardian ad litem. See also Adelman v. Graves, 747 F.2d 986 (5th Cir.1983); Noe v. True, 507 F.2d 9 (6th Cir.1974) (where the interests of a child and her legal guardian were adverse, the child was \u201cnot otherwise represented\u201d as stated in Rule 17(c) and thus appointment of a guardian ad litem was appropriate); cf. Developmental Disabilities Advocacy Center, Inc. v. Melton, 689 F.2d 281 (1st Cir.1982) (suit by a \u201cnext friend\u201d not allowed where there was no discernible conflict in the general representative and the general representative opposed the suit as not being in the incompetent\u2019s best interest)."},"case_id":3862052,"label":"a"}
{"context":".In Tang, the working conditions complained of included inter alia being placed on administrative leave and being relocated within the building. There is a First Amendment distinction, however, between complaints about these types of working conditions, which are not protected and complaints about fellow employees' official misconduct, which are protected.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"338 F.3d 639, 643-46","parenthetical":"holding that police reports raising allegations of misconduct by other officers touched upon a matter of public concern even'if drafted within the scope of employment and not disclosed to the media","sentence":"Guilloty Perez, 339 F.3d at 52 (holding that law enforcement agent\u2019s internal reports of misconduct by fellow officers involved matters of public concern and contrasting such speech with employee\u2019s complaints in Tang) (citation omitted); Torres-Rosado v. Rotger-Sabat, 335 F.3d 1, 11-12 n. 10 (1st Cir.2003) (holding that a public employee\u2019s internal memo-randa raising concerns about public corruption are protected First Amendment speech because they addressed a matter of public concern); O\u2019Connor, 994 F.2d at 916 (citing Givhan v. Western Line Consol. Sch. Dist. 439 U.S. 410, 415-16, 99 S.Ct. 693, 58 L.Ed.2d 619 (1979) for the proposition that First Amendment protection is not lost where an employee discloses official misconduct directly to employer rather than to the public); see also Taylor v. Keith, 338 F.3d 639, 643-46 (6th Cir.2003) (holding that police reports raising allegations of misconduct by other officers touched upon a matter of public concern even'if drafted within the scope of employment and not disclosed to the media)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"339 F.3d 52, 52","parenthetical":"holding that law enforcement agent's internal reports of misconduct by fellow officers involved matters of public concern and contrasting such speech with employee's complaints in Tang","sentence":"Guilloty Perez, 339 F.3d at 52 (holding that law enforcement agent\u2019s internal reports of misconduct by fellow officers involved matters of public concern and contrasting such speech with employee\u2019s complaints in Tang) (citation omitted); Torres-Rosado v. Rotger-Sabat, 335 F.3d 1, 11-12 n. 10 (1st Cir.2003) (holding that a public employee\u2019s internal memo-randa raising concerns about public corruption are protected First Amendment speech because they addressed a matter of public concern); O\u2019Connor, 994 F.2d at 916 (citing Givhan v. Western Line Consol. Sch. Dist. 439 U.S. 410, 415-16, 99 S.Ct. 693, 58 L.Ed.2d 619 (1979) for the proposition that First Amendment protection is not lost where an employee discloses official misconduct directly to employer rather than to the public); see also Taylor v. Keith, 338 F.3d 639, 643-46 (6th Cir.2003) (holding that police reports raising allegations of misconduct by other officers touched upon a matter of public concern even'if drafted within the scope of employment and not disclosed to the media)."},"case_id":9008492,"label":"b"}
{"context":".In Tang, the working conditions complained of included inter alia being placed on administrative leave and being relocated within the building. There is a First Amendment distinction, however, between complaints about these types of working conditions, which are not protected and complaints about fellow employees' official misconduct, which are protected.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"338 F.3d 639, 643-46","parenthetical":"holding that police reports raising allegations of misconduct by other officers touched upon a matter of public concern even'if drafted within the scope of employment and not disclosed to the media","sentence":"Guilloty Perez, 339 F.3d at 52 (holding that law enforcement agent\u2019s internal reports of misconduct by fellow officers involved matters of public concern and contrasting such speech with employee\u2019s complaints in Tang) (citation omitted); Torres-Rosado v. Rotger-Sabat, 335 F.3d 1, 11-12 n. 10 (1st Cir.2003) (holding that a public employee\u2019s internal memo-randa raising concerns about public corruption are protected First Amendment speech because they addressed a matter of public concern); O\u2019Connor, 994 F.2d at 916 (citing Givhan v. Western Line Consol. Sch. Dist. 439 U.S. 410, 415-16, 99 S.Ct. 693, 58 L.Ed.2d 619 (1979) for the proposition that First Amendment protection is not lost where an employee discloses official misconduct directly to employer rather than to the public); see also Taylor v. Keith, 338 F.3d 639, 643-46 (6th Cir.2003) (holding that police reports raising allegations of misconduct by other officers touched upon a matter of public concern even'if drafted within the scope of employment and not disclosed to the media)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that a public employee's internal memo-randa raising concerns about public corruption are protected First Amendment speech because they addressed a matter of public concern","sentence":"Guilloty Perez, 339 F.3d at 52 (holding that law enforcement agent\u2019s internal reports of misconduct by fellow officers involved matters of public concern and contrasting such speech with employee\u2019s complaints in Tang) (citation omitted); Torres-Rosado v. Rotger-Sabat, 335 F.3d 1, 11-12 n. 10 (1st Cir.2003) (holding that a public employee\u2019s internal memo-randa raising concerns about public corruption are protected First Amendment speech because they addressed a matter of public concern); O\u2019Connor, 994 F.2d at 916 (citing Givhan v. Western Line Consol. Sch. Dist. 439 U.S. 410, 415-16, 99 S.Ct. 693, 58 L.Ed.2d 619 (1979) for the proposition that First Amendment protection is not lost where an employee discloses official misconduct directly to employer rather than to the public); see also Taylor v. Keith, 338 F.3d 639, 643-46 (6th Cir.2003) (holding that police reports raising allegations of misconduct by other officers touched upon a matter of public concern even'if drafted within the scope of employment and not disclosed to the media)."},"case_id":9008492,"label":"b"}
{"context":"When an official's intent or the reasons for his or her actions are an essential element of the underlying violation, we have treated factual disputes over intent just like any other factual dispute that can justify a denial of qualified immunity.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"26 F.3d 603, 607-10","parenthetical":"holding that the existence of a retaliatory motive was a factual issue that precluded summary judgment on qualified immunity in a First Amendment case in which a teacher claimed that he had been transferred in retaliation for criticizing the school superintendent","sentence":"See Tompkins v. Vickers, 26 F.3d 603, 607-10 (5th Cir.1994) (holding that the existence of a retaliatory motive was a factual issue that precluded summary judgment on qualified immunity in a First Amendment case in which a teacher claimed that he had been transferred in retaliation for criticizing the school superintendent); see also Coleman v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 113 F.3d 528, 535 & n. 6 (5th Cir.1997) (stating that the court lacks jurisdiction on interlocutory appeal to review whether there is a genuine issue of fact as to intentional discrimination)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"stating that the court lacks jurisdiction on interlocutory appeal to review whether there is a genuine issue of fact as to intentional discrimination","sentence":"See Tompkins v. Vickers, 26 F.3d 603, 607-10 (5th Cir.1994) (holding that the existence of a retaliatory motive was a factual issue that precluded summary judgment on qualified immunity in a First Amendment case in which a teacher claimed that he had been transferred in retaliation for criticizing the school superintendent); see also Coleman v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 113 F.3d 528, 535 & n. 6 (5th Cir.1997) (stating that the court lacks jurisdiction on interlocutory appeal to review whether there is a genuine issue of fact as to intentional discrimination)."},"case_id":5604854,"label":"a"}
{"context":"This test of a school's capacity to implement a student's IEP, however, is limited to facts uncovered by a parent prior to rejecting the placement option. It does not permit litigants to establish a substantive violation based on facts discovered for the first time at an IHO hearing.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"793 F.3d 244, 244","parenthetical":"\"[A] school district's proposed placement school must be evaluated prospectively (i.e., at 'the time of the parents' placement decision') and cannot be based on mere speculation.\"","sentence":"See R.E., 694 F.3d at 187 (\u201cIn determining the adequacy of an IEP, both parties are limited to discussing the placement and services specified in the written plan and therefore reasonably known to the parties at the time of the placement decision.\u201d (emphasis added)); see also M.O., 793 F.3d at 244 (\u201c[A] school district\u2019s proposed placement school must be evaluated prospectively (i.e., at \u2018the time of the parents\u2019 placement decision\u2019) and cannot be based on mere speculation.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"694 F.3d 187, 187","parenthetical":"\"In determining the adequacy of an IEP, both parties are limited to discussing the placement and services specified in the written plan and therefore reasonably known to the parties at the time of the placement decision.\" (emphasis added","sentence":"See R.E., 694 F.3d at 187 (\u201cIn determining the adequacy of an IEP, both parties are limited to discussing the placement and services specified in the written plan and therefore reasonably known to the parties at the time of the placement decision.\u201d (emphasis added)); see also M.O., 793 F.3d at 244 (\u201c[A] school district\u2019s proposed placement school must be evaluated prospectively (i.e., at \u2018the time of the parents\u2019 placement decision\u2019) and cannot be based on mere speculation.\u201d)."},"case_id":4340973,"label":"b"}
{"context":"This qualifies as a clear order. As to Coe's dancing, grimacing and gesturing while the court announced a ruling, we are at a loss to understand how any attorney could not know that such conduct would be considered contumacious.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"552 F.2d 510, 510","parenthetical":"act is wilful if person knows or should reasonably be aware that conduct is wrongful","sentence":"See Local Union 542, 552 F.2d at 510 (act is wilful if person knows or should reasonably be aware that conduct is wrongful); cf. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 343, 90 S.Ct. 1057, 1061, 25 L.Ed.2d 353 (1970) (\u201cIt is essential to the proper administration of justice that dignity, order and decorum be the hallmarks of all court proceedings....\u201d)"},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"397 U.S. 337, 343","parenthetical":"\"It is essential to the proper administration of justice that dignity, order and decorum be the hallmarks of all court proceedings....\"","sentence":"See Local Union 542, 552 F.2d at 510 (act is wilful if person knows or should reasonably be aware that conduct is wrongful); cf. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 343, 90 S.Ct. 1057, 1061, 25 L.Ed.2d 353 (1970) (\u201cIt is essential to the proper administration of justice that dignity, order and decorum be the hallmarks of all court proceedings....\u201d)"},"case_id":10520536,"label":"a"}
{"context":"This qualifies as a clear order. As to Coe's dancing, grimacing and gesturing while the court announced a ruling, we are at a loss to understand how any attorney could not know that such conduct would be considered contumacious.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"552 F.2d 510, 510","parenthetical":"act is wilful if person knows or should reasonably be aware that conduct is wrongful","sentence":"See Local Union 542, 552 F.2d at 510 (act is wilful if person knows or should reasonably be aware that conduct is wrongful); cf. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 343, 90 S.Ct. 1057, 1061, 25 L.Ed.2d 353 (1970) (\u201cIt is essential to the proper administration of justice that dignity, order and decorum be the hallmarks of all court proceedings....\u201d)"},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"90 S.Ct. 1057, 1061","parenthetical":"\"It is essential to the proper administration of justice that dignity, order and decorum be the hallmarks of all court proceedings....\"","sentence":"See Local Union 542, 552 F.2d at 510 (act is wilful if person knows or should reasonably be aware that conduct is wrongful); cf. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 343, 90 S.Ct. 1057, 1061, 25 L.Ed.2d 353 (1970) (\u201cIt is essential to the proper administration of justice that dignity, order and decorum be the hallmarks of all court proceedings....\u201d)"},"case_id":10520536,"label":"a"}
{"context":"This qualifies as a clear order. As to Coe's dancing, grimacing and gesturing while the court announced a ruling, we are at a loss to understand how any attorney could not know that such conduct would be considered contumacious.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"552 F.2d 510, 510","parenthetical":"act is wilful if person knows or should reasonably be aware that conduct is wrongful","sentence":"See Local Union 542, 552 F.2d at 510 (act is wilful if person knows or should reasonably be aware that conduct is wrongful); cf. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 343, 90 S.Ct. 1057, 1061, 25 L.Ed.2d 353 (1970) (\u201cIt is essential to the proper administration of justice that dignity, order and decorum be the hallmarks of all court proceedings....\u201d)"},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"It is essential to the proper administration of justice that dignity, order and decorum be the hallmarks of all court proceedings....\"","sentence":"See Local Union 542, 552 F.2d at 510 (act is wilful if person knows or should reasonably be aware that conduct is wrongful); cf. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 343, 90 S.Ct. 1057, 1061, 25 L.Ed.2d 353 (1970) (\u201cIt is essential to the proper administration of justice that dignity, order and decorum be the hallmarks of all court proceedings....\u201d)"},"case_id":10520536,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Because Fox does not challenge the district court's dismissal of hostile work environment claims, those claims are abandoned.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"71 F.3d 88, 92-93","parenthetical":"when a litigant, even if proceeding pro se, raises an issue before the district court but does not raise it on appeal, it is abandoned","sentence":"See LoSacco v. City of Middletown, 71 F.3d 88, 92-93 (2d Cir.1995) (when a litigant, even if proceeding pro se, raises an issue before the district court but does not raise it on appeal, it is abandoned); see also Zhang v. Gonzales, 426 F.3d 540, 546 n. 7 (2d Cir.2005) (holding that a party\u2019s \u201csingle conclusory sentence\u201d in his brief on appeal regarding a claim of error was tantamount to a waiver of that claim); Norton v. Sam\u2019s Club, 145 F.3d 114, 117 (2d Cir.1998) (\u201cIssues not sufficiently argued in the briefs are considered waived and normally will not be addressed on appeal.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that a party's \"single conclusory sentence\" in his brief on appeal regarding a claim of error was tantamount to a waiver of that claim","sentence":"See LoSacco v. City of Middletown, 71 F.3d 88, 92-93 (2d Cir.1995) (when a litigant, even if proceeding pro se, raises an issue before the district court but does not raise it on appeal, it is abandoned); see also Zhang v. Gonzales, 426 F.3d 540, 546 n. 7 (2d Cir.2005) (holding that a party\u2019s \u201csingle conclusory sentence\u201d in his brief on appeal regarding a claim of error was tantamount to a waiver of that claim); Norton v. Sam\u2019s Club, 145 F.3d 114, 117 (2d Cir.1998) (\u201cIssues not sufficiently argued in the briefs are considered waived and normally will not be addressed on appeal.\u201d)."},"case_id":4142628,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Because Fox does not challenge the district court's dismissal of hostile work environment claims, those claims are abandoned.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"71 F.3d 88, 92-93","parenthetical":"when a litigant, even if proceeding pro se, raises an issue before the district court but does not raise it on appeal, it is abandoned","sentence":"See LoSacco v. City of Middletown, 71 F.3d 88, 92-93 (2d Cir.1995) (when a litigant, even if proceeding pro se, raises an issue before the district court but does not raise it on appeal, it is abandoned); see also Zhang v. Gonzales, 426 F.3d 540, 546 n. 7 (2d Cir.2005) (holding that a party\u2019s \u201csingle conclusory sentence\u201d in his brief on appeal regarding a claim of error was tantamount to a waiver of that claim); Norton v. Sam\u2019s Club, 145 F.3d 114, 117 (2d Cir.1998) (\u201cIssues not sufficiently argued in the briefs are considered waived and normally will not be addressed on appeal.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"145 F.3d 114, 117","parenthetical":"\"Issues not sufficiently argued in the briefs are considered waived and normally will not be addressed on appeal.\"","sentence":"See LoSacco v. City of Middletown, 71 F.3d 88, 92-93 (2d Cir.1995) (when a litigant, even if proceeding pro se, raises an issue before the district court but does not raise it on appeal, it is abandoned); see also Zhang v. Gonzales, 426 F.3d 540, 546 n. 7 (2d Cir.2005) (holding that a party\u2019s \u201csingle conclusory sentence\u201d in his brief on appeal regarding a claim of error was tantamount to a waiver of that claim); Norton v. Sam\u2019s Club, 145 F.3d 114, 117 (2d Cir.1998) (\u201cIssues not sufficiently argued in the briefs are considered waived and normally will not be addressed on appeal.\u201d)."},"case_id":4142628,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Other courts examine only whether a plaintiffs losses flow from the diminution of value of the shares held in the corporation.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"756 F.Supp.2d 432, 441-42","parenthetical":"\"Plaintiffs have failed to establish standing because ... [they] suffered only through diminution in the value of their share[s]\" in the corporation","sentence":"See Perlman, 1995 WL 110076, at *3 (\u201cIt is a well-settled rule of law that even in cases of alleged corporate fraud, a decrease in the value of stock in and of itself is not an injury which confers standing to sue upon an individual stockholder.\u201d); see also Lewin v. Lipper Convertibles, Nos. 03 Civ. 1117(RMB), 03 Civ. 2632(RMB), 756 F.Supp.2d 432, 441-42, 2010 WL 4669040, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 17, 2010) (\u201cPlaintiffs have failed to establish standing because ... [they] suffered only through diminution in the value of their share[s]\u201d in the corporation)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"1995 WL 110076, at *3","parenthetical":"\"It is a well-settled rule of law that even in cases of alleged corporate fraud, a decrease in the value of stock in and of itself is not an injury which confers standing to sue upon an individual stockholder.\"","sentence":"See Perlman, 1995 WL 110076, at *3 (\u201cIt is a well-settled rule of law that even in cases of alleged corporate fraud, a decrease in the value of stock in and of itself is not an injury which confers standing to sue upon an individual stockholder.\u201d); see also Lewin v. Lipper Convertibles, Nos. 03 Civ. 1117(RMB), 03 Civ. 2632(RMB), 756 F.Supp.2d 432, 441-42, 2010 WL 4669040, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 17, 2010) (\u201cPlaintiffs have failed to establish standing because ... [they] suffered only through diminution in the value of their share[s]\u201d in the corporation)."},"case_id":4190695,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Other courts examine only whether a plaintiffs losses flow from the diminution of value of the shares held in the corporation.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"2010 WL 4669040, at *7","parenthetical":"\"Plaintiffs have failed to establish standing because ... [they] suffered only through diminution in the value of their share[s]\" in the corporation","sentence":"See Perlman, 1995 WL 110076, at *3 (\u201cIt is a well-settled rule of law that even in cases of alleged corporate fraud, a decrease in the value of stock in and of itself is not an injury which confers standing to sue upon an individual stockholder.\u201d); see also Lewin v. Lipper Convertibles, Nos. 03 Civ. 1117(RMB), 03 Civ. 2632(RMB), 756 F.Supp.2d 432, 441-42, 2010 WL 4669040, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 17, 2010) (\u201cPlaintiffs have failed to establish standing because ... [they] suffered only through diminution in the value of their share[s]\u201d in the corporation)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"1995 WL 110076, at *3","parenthetical":"\"It is a well-settled rule of law that even in cases of alleged corporate fraud, a decrease in the value of stock in and of itself is not an injury which confers standing to sue upon an individual stockholder.\"","sentence":"See Perlman, 1995 WL 110076, at *3 (\u201cIt is a well-settled rule of law that even in cases of alleged corporate fraud, a decrease in the value of stock in and of itself is not an injury which confers standing to sue upon an individual stockholder.\u201d); see also Lewin v. Lipper Convertibles, Nos. 03 Civ. 1117(RMB), 03 Civ. 2632(RMB), 756 F.Supp.2d 432, 441-42, 2010 WL 4669040, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 17, 2010) (\u201cPlaintiffs have failed to establish standing because ... [they] suffered only through diminution in the value of their share[s]\u201d in the corporation)."},"case_id":4190695,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Fed. R.Civ.P. 23(b)(3). In the context of granting approval to a proposed class settlement, settlement is relevant to the predominance inquiry.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"521 U.S. 620, 620","parenthetical":"\"[A] district court need not inquire whether the case, if tried, would present intractable management problems ... for the proposal is that there be no trial.\"","sentence":"See Amchem, 521 U.S., at 620, 117 S.Ct. 2231 (\u201c[A] district court need not inquire whether the case, if tried, would present intractable management problems ... for the proposal is that there be no trial.\u201d); see also Gunnells v. Healthplan Services, Inc., 348 F.3d 417, 440 (4th Cir.2003) (noting the settlement is relevant to a finding of predominance, and recognizing that Rule 23 creates an \u201cinteractive\u201d series of considerations to be used in certifying classes)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"348 F.3d 417, 440","parenthetical":"noting the settlement is relevant to a finding of predominance, and recognizing that Rule 23 creates an \"interactive\" series of considerations to be used in certifying classes","sentence":"See Amchem, 521 U.S., at 620, 117 S.Ct. 2231 (\u201c[A] district court need not inquire whether the case, if tried, would present intractable management problems ... for the proposal is that there be no trial.\u201d); see also Gunnells v. Healthplan Services, Inc., 348 F.3d 417, 440 (4th Cir.2003) (noting the settlement is relevant to a finding of predominance, and recognizing that Rule 23 creates an \u201cinteractive\u201d series of considerations to be used in certifying classes)."},"case_id":1559706,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Fed. R.Civ.P. 23(b)(3). In the context of granting approval to a proposed class settlement, settlement is relevant to the predominance inquiry.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"348 F.3d 417, 440","parenthetical":"noting the settlement is relevant to a finding of predominance, and recognizing that Rule 23 creates an \"interactive\" series of considerations to be used in certifying classes","sentence":"See Amchem, 521 U.S., at 620, 117 S.Ct. 2231 (\u201c[A] district court need not inquire whether the case, if tried, would present intractable management problems ... for the proposal is that there be no trial.\u201d); see also Gunnells v. Healthplan Services, Inc., 348 F.3d 417, 440 (4th Cir.2003) (noting the settlement is relevant to a finding of predominance, and recognizing that Rule 23 creates an \u201cinteractive\u201d series of considerations to be used in certifying classes)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[A] district court need not inquire whether the case, if tried, would present intractable management problems ... for the proposal is that there be no trial.\"","sentence":"See Amchem, 521 U.S., at 620, 117 S.Ct. 2231 (\u201c[A] district court need not inquire whether the case, if tried, would present intractable management problems ... for the proposal is that there be no trial.\u201d); see also Gunnells v. Healthplan Services, Inc., 348 F.3d 417, 440 (4th Cir.2003) (noting the settlement is relevant to a finding of predominance, and recognizing that Rule 23 creates an \u201cinteractive\u201d series of considerations to be used in certifying classes)."},"case_id":1559706,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Although section 1346(a)(1) cross-references the jurisdiction of the United States Court of Federal Claims, it only confers jurisdiction on United States District Courts.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"64 Fed.Cl. 71, 76","parenthetical":"recognizing that the reference to the United States Court of Federal Claims in section 1346(a","sentence":"See Hinck v. United States, 64 Fed.Cl. 71, 76 (2005), aff'd, 446 F.3d 1307 (Fed.Cir.2006) (recognizing that the reference to the United States Court of Federal Claims in section 1346(a)(1) is merely a cross-reference to the Tucker Act); see also Doe v. United States, 372 F.3d 1308, 1312 (Fed.Cir.2004) (distinguishing the Little Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1346, from the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1491)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"372 F.3d 1308, 1312","parenthetical":"distinguishing the Little Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. SS 1346, from the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. SS 1491","sentence":"See Hinck v. United States, 64 Fed.Cl. 71, 76 (2005), aff'd, 446 F.3d 1307 (Fed.Cir.2006) (recognizing that the reference to the United States Court of Federal Claims in section 1346(a)(1) is merely a cross-reference to the Tucker Act); see also Doe v. United States, 372 F.3d 1308, 1312 (Fed.Cir.2004) (distinguishing the Little Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1346, from the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1491)."},"case_id":8455343,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Although section 1346(a)(1) cross-references the jurisdiction of the United States Court of Federal Claims, it only confers jurisdiction on United States District Courts.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"372 F.3d 1308, 1312","parenthetical":"distinguishing the Little Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. SS 1346, from the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. SS 1491","sentence":"See Hinck v. United States, 64 Fed.Cl. 71, 76 (2005), aff'd, 446 F.3d 1307 (Fed.Cir.2006) (recognizing that the reference to the United States Court of Federal Claims in section 1346(a)(1) is merely a cross-reference to the Tucker Act); see also Doe v. United States, 372 F.3d 1308, 1312 (Fed.Cir.2004) (distinguishing the Little Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1346, from the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1491)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"recognizing that the reference to the United States Court of Federal Claims in section 1346(a","sentence":"See Hinck v. United States, 64 Fed.Cl. 71, 76 (2005), aff'd, 446 F.3d 1307 (Fed.Cir.2006) (recognizing that the reference to the United States Court of Federal Claims in section 1346(a)(1) is merely a cross-reference to the Tucker Act); see also Doe v. United States, 372 F.3d 1308, 1312 (Fed.Cir.2004) (distinguishing the Little Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1346, from the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1491)."},"case_id":8455343,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In the present case, the majority views HRFs quarter of Section 8 as the \"land in question.\" One would therefore expect, if it were following the majority's analysis, that the Venetie Court would have narrowly considered whether just the land on which the school was to be built was a dependent Indian community. But the Court decidedly did not do so. Instead, the Court in Venetie looked at all of the land that previously composed the Venetie Reservation--not just the site of the proposed school--to determine whether that land constituted a dependent Indian community.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"522 U.S. 523, 523","parenthetical":"\"In this case, we must decide whether approximately 1.8 million acres of land in northern Alaska, owned in fee simple by the Native Village of Venetie Tribal Government pursuant to the [ANC-SA], is 'Indian country.'\"","sentence":"Venetie, 522 U.S. at 523, 118 S.Ct. 948 (\u201cIn this case, we must decide whether approximately 1.8 million acres of land in northern Alaska, owned in fee simple by the Native Village of Venetie Tribal Government pursuant to the [ANC-SA], is \u2018Indian country.\u2019\u201d) (emphasis added); see also id. at 532, 118 S.Ct. 948 (\u201cThe Tribe\u2019s ANCSA lands do not satisfy either of these requirements.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"The Tribe's ANCSA lands do not satisfy either of these requirements.\"","sentence":"Venetie, 522 U.S. at 523, 118 S.Ct. 948 (\u201cIn this case, we must decide whether approximately 1.8 million acres of land in northern Alaska, owned in fee simple by the Native Village of Venetie Tribal Government pursuant to the [ANC-SA], is \u2018Indian country.\u2019\u201d) (emphasis added); see also id. at 532, 118 S.Ct. 948 (\u201cThe Tribe\u2019s ANCSA lands do not satisfy either of these requirements.\u201d)."},"case_id":7343755,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In the present case, the majority views HRFs quarter of Section 8 as the \"land in question.\" One would therefore expect, if it were following the majority's analysis, that the Venetie Court would have narrowly considered whether just the land on which the school was to be built was a dependent Indian community. But the Court decidedly did not do so. Instead, the Court in Venetie looked at all of the land that previously composed the Venetie Reservation--not just the site of the proposed school--to determine whether that land constituted a dependent Indian community.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"In this case, we must decide whether approximately 1.8 million acres of land in northern Alaska, owned in fee simple by the Native Village of Venetie Tribal Government pursuant to the [ANC-SA], is 'Indian country.'\"","sentence":"Venetie, 522 U.S. at 523, 118 S.Ct. 948 (\u201cIn this case, we must decide whether approximately 1.8 million acres of land in northern Alaska, owned in fee simple by the Native Village of Venetie Tribal Government pursuant to the [ANC-SA], is \u2018Indian country.\u2019\u201d) (emphasis added); see also id. at 532, 118 S.Ct. 948 (\u201cThe Tribe\u2019s ANCSA lands do not satisfy either of these requirements.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"The Tribe's ANCSA lands do not satisfy either of these requirements.\"","sentence":"Venetie, 522 U.S. at 523, 118 S.Ct. 948 (\u201cIn this case, we must decide whether approximately 1.8 million acres of land in northern Alaska, owned in fee simple by the Native Village of Venetie Tribal Government pursuant to the [ANC-SA], is \u2018Indian country.\u2019\u201d) (emphasis added); see also id. at 532, 118 S.Ct. 948 (\u201cThe Tribe\u2019s ANCSA lands do not satisfy either of these requirements.\u201d)."},"case_id":7343755,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In Miller, the Court concluded that an amendment to Florida's sentencing guidelines violated the Ex Post Facto Clause by increasing the petitioner's presumptive sentence after he had committed the offense of conviction. The Court began its discussion by noting that \"[i]t is axiomatic that for a law to be ex post facto it must be more onerous than the prior law.\" Addressing the Florida sentencing guidelines, the Court noted that the amendment at issue disadvantaged the petitioner; it then commented that \"[cjonsidering the revised guidelines law as a whole\" did not change the result because the State was unable \"to identify any feature of the revised guidelines law that could be considered ameliorative.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"450 U.S. 24, 34-36","parenthetical":"holding that statutory provision that reduced retroactively amount of good time reduction to prisoners' sentences was not saved by potentially ameliorative provisions enacted at the same time because their application was purely discretionary","sentence":"Miller, 482 U.S. at 431-32,107 S.Ct. at 2451-52 (emphasis added); see also Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 294, 97 S.Ct. 2290, 2298-99, 53 L.Ed.2d 344 (1977) (noting that, in evaluating an ex post facto claim, the Court \u201cmust compare the two statutory procedures in toto to determine if the new may be fairly characterized as more onerous\u201d); cf. Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 34-36, 101 S.Ct. 960, 967-68, 67 L.Ed.2d 17 (1981) (holding that statutory provision that reduced retroactively amount of good time reduction to prisoners\u2019 sentences was not saved by potentially ameliorative provisions enacted at the same time because their application was purely discretionary)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"432 U.S. 282, 294","parenthetical":"noting that, in evaluating an ex post facto claim, the Court \"must compare the two statutory procedures in toto to determine if the new may be fairly characterized as more onerous\"","sentence":"Miller, 482 U.S. at 431-32,107 S.Ct. at 2451-52 (emphasis added); see also Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 294, 97 S.Ct. 2290, 2298-99, 53 L.Ed.2d 344 (1977) (noting that, in evaluating an ex post facto claim, the Court \u201cmust compare the two statutory procedures in toto to determine if the new may be fairly characterized as more onerous\u201d); cf. Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 34-36, 101 S.Ct. 960, 967-68, 67 L.Ed.2d 17 (1981) (holding that statutory provision that reduced retroactively amount of good time reduction to prisoners\u2019 sentences was not saved by potentially ameliorative provisions enacted at the same time because their application was purely discretionary)."},"case_id":11322763,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In Miller, the Court concluded that an amendment to Florida's sentencing guidelines violated the Ex Post Facto Clause by increasing the petitioner's presumptive sentence after he had committed the offense of conviction. The Court began its discussion by noting that \"[i]t is axiomatic that for a law to be ex post facto it must be more onerous than the prior law.\" Addressing the Florida sentencing guidelines, the Court noted that the amendment at issue disadvantaged the petitioner; it then commented that \"[cjonsidering the revised guidelines law as a whole\" did not change the result because the State was unable \"to identify any feature of the revised guidelines law that could be considered ameliorative.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"432 U.S. 282, 294","parenthetical":"noting that, in evaluating an ex post facto claim, the Court \"must compare the two statutory procedures in toto to determine if the new may be fairly characterized as more onerous\"","sentence":"Miller, 482 U.S. at 431-32,107 S.Ct. at 2451-52 (emphasis added); see also Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 294, 97 S.Ct. 2290, 2298-99, 53 L.Ed.2d 344 (1977) (noting that, in evaluating an ex post facto claim, the Court \u201cmust compare the two statutory procedures in toto to determine if the new may be fairly characterized as more onerous\u201d); cf. Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 34-36, 101 S.Ct. 960, 967-68, 67 L.Ed.2d 17 (1981) (holding that statutory provision that reduced retroactively amount of good time reduction to prisoners\u2019 sentences was not saved by potentially ameliorative provisions enacted at the same time because their application was purely discretionary)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"101 S.Ct. 960, 967-68","parenthetical":"holding that statutory provision that reduced retroactively amount of good time reduction to prisoners' sentences was not saved by potentially ameliorative provisions enacted at the same time because their application was purely discretionary","sentence":"Miller, 482 U.S. at 431-32,107 S.Ct. at 2451-52 (emphasis added); see also Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 294, 97 S.Ct. 2290, 2298-99, 53 L.Ed.2d 344 (1977) (noting that, in evaluating an ex post facto claim, the Court \u201cmust compare the two statutory procedures in toto to determine if the new may be fairly characterized as more onerous\u201d); cf. Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 34-36, 101 S.Ct. 960, 967-68, 67 L.Ed.2d 17 (1981) (holding that statutory provision that reduced retroactively amount of good time reduction to prisoners\u2019 sentences was not saved by potentially ameliorative provisions enacted at the same time because their application was purely discretionary)."},"case_id":11322763,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In Miller, the Court concluded that an amendment to Florida's sentencing guidelines violated the Ex Post Facto Clause by increasing the petitioner's presumptive sentence after he had committed the offense of conviction. The Court began its discussion by noting that \"[i]t is axiomatic that for a law to be ex post facto it must be more onerous than the prior law.\" Addressing the Florida sentencing guidelines, the Court noted that the amendment at issue disadvantaged the petitioner; it then commented that \"[cjonsidering the revised guidelines law as a whole\" did not change the result because the State was unable \"to identify any feature of the revised guidelines law that could be considered ameliorative.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that statutory provision that reduced retroactively amount of good time reduction to prisoners' sentences was not saved by potentially ameliorative provisions enacted at the same time because their application was purely discretionary","sentence":"Miller, 482 U.S. at 431-32,107 S.Ct. at 2451-52 (emphasis added); see also Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 294, 97 S.Ct. 2290, 2298-99, 53 L.Ed.2d 344 (1977) (noting that, in evaluating an ex post facto claim, the Court \u201cmust compare the two statutory procedures in toto to determine if the new may be fairly characterized as more onerous\u201d); cf. Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 34-36, 101 S.Ct. 960, 967-68, 67 L.Ed.2d 17 (1981) (holding that statutory provision that reduced retroactively amount of good time reduction to prisoners\u2019 sentences was not saved by potentially ameliorative provisions enacted at the same time because their application was purely discretionary)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"432 U.S. 282, 294","parenthetical":"noting that, in evaluating an ex post facto claim, the Court \"must compare the two statutory procedures in toto to determine if the new may be fairly characterized as more onerous\"","sentence":"Miller, 482 U.S. at 431-32,107 S.Ct. at 2451-52 (emphasis added); see also Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 294, 97 S.Ct. 2290, 2298-99, 53 L.Ed.2d 344 (1977) (noting that, in evaluating an ex post facto claim, the Court \u201cmust compare the two statutory procedures in toto to determine if the new may be fairly characterized as more onerous\u201d); cf. Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 34-36, 101 S.Ct. 960, 967-68, 67 L.Ed.2d 17 (1981) (holding that statutory provision that reduced retroactively amount of good time reduction to prisoners\u2019 sentences was not saved by potentially ameliorative provisions enacted at the same time because their application was purely discretionary)."},"case_id":11322763,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In Miller, the Court concluded that an amendment to Florida's sentencing guidelines violated the Ex Post Facto Clause by increasing the petitioner's presumptive sentence after he had committed the offense of conviction. The Court began its discussion by noting that \"[i]t is axiomatic that for a law to be ex post facto it must be more onerous than the prior law.\" Addressing the Florida sentencing guidelines, the Court noted that the amendment at issue disadvantaged the petitioner; it then commented that \"[cjonsidering the revised guidelines law as a whole\" did not change the result because the State was unable \"to identify any feature of the revised guidelines law that could be considered ameliorative.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"450 U.S. 24, 34-36","parenthetical":"holding that statutory provision that reduced retroactively amount of good time reduction to prisoners' sentences was not saved by potentially ameliorative provisions enacted at the same time because their application was purely discretionary","sentence":"Miller, 482 U.S. at 431-32,107 S.Ct. at 2451-52 (emphasis added); see also Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 294, 97 S.Ct. 2290, 2298-99, 53 L.Ed.2d 344 (1977) (noting that, in evaluating an ex post facto claim, the Court \u201cmust compare the two statutory procedures in toto to determine if the new may be fairly characterized as more onerous\u201d); cf. Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 34-36, 101 S.Ct. 960, 967-68, 67 L.Ed.2d 17 (1981) (holding that statutory provision that reduced retroactively amount of good time reduction to prisoners\u2019 sentences was not saved by potentially ameliorative provisions enacted at the same time because their application was purely discretionary)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"97 S.Ct. 2290, 2298-99","parenthetical":"noting that, in evaluating an ex post facto claim, the Court \"must compare the two statutory procedures in toto to determine if the new may be fairly characterized as more onerous\"","sentence":"Miller, 482 U.S. at 431-32,107 S.Ct. at 2451-52 (emphasis added); see also Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 294, 97 S.Ct. 2290, 2298-99, 53 L.Ed.2d 344 (1977) (noting that, in evaluating an ex post facto claim, the Court \u201cmust compare the two statutory procedures in toto to determine if the new may be fairly characterized as more onerous\u201d); cf. Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 34-36, 101 S.Ct. 960, 967-68, 67 L.Ed.2d 17 (1981) (holding that statutory provision that reduced retroactively amount of good time reduction to prisoners\u2019 sentences was not saved by potentially ameliorative provisions enacted at the same time because their application was purely discretionary)."},"case_id":11322763,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In Miller, the Court concluded that an amendment to Florida's sentencing guidelines violated the Ex Post Facto Clause by increasing the petitioner's presumptive sentence after he had committed the offense of conviction. The Court began its discussion by noting that \"[i]t is axiomatic that for a law to be ex post facto it must be more onerous than the prior law.\" Addressing the Florida sentencing guidelines, the Court noted that the amendment at issue disadvantaged the petitioner; it then commented that \"[cjonsidering the revised guidelines law as a whole\" did not change the result because the State was unable \"to identify any feature of the revised guidelines law that could be considered ameliorative.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"97 S.Ct. 2290, 2298-99","parenthetical":"noting that, in evaluating an ex post facto claim, the Court \"must compare the two statutory procedures in toto to determine if the new may be fairly characterized as more onerous\"","sentence":"Miller, 482 U.S. at 431-32,107 S.Ct. at 2451-52 (emphasis added); see also Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 294, 97 S.Ct. 2290, 2298-99, 53 L.Ed.2d 344 (1977) (noting that, in evaluating an ex post facto claim, the Court \u201cmust compare the two statutory procedures in toto to determine if the new may be fairly characterized as more onerous\u201d); cf. Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 34-36, 101 S.Ct. 960, 967-68, 67 L.Ed.2d 17 (1981) (holding that statutory provision that reduced retroactively amount of good time reduction to prisoners\u2019 sentences was not saved by potentially ameliorative provisions enacted at the same time because their application was purely discretionary)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"101 S.Ct. 960, 967-68","parenthetical":"holding that statutory provision that reduced retroactively amount of good time reduction to prisoners' sentences was not saved by potentially ameliorative provisions enacted at the same time because their application was purely discretionary","sentence":"Miller, 482 U.S. at 431-32,107 S.Ct. at 2451-52 (emphasis added); see also Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 294, 97 S.Ct. 2290, 2298-99, 53 L.Ed.2d 344 (1977) (noting that, in evaluating an ex post facto claim, the Court \u201cmust compare the two statutory procedures in toto to determine if the new may be fairly characterized as more onerous\u201d); cf. Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 34-36, 101 S.Ct. 960, 967-68, 67 L.Ed.2d 17 (1981) (holding that statutory provision that reduced retroactively amount of good time reduction to prisoners\u2019 sentences was not saved by potentially ameliorative provisions enacted at the same time because their application was purely discretionary)."},"case_id":11322763,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In Miller, the Court concluded that an amendment to Florida's sentencing guidelines violated the Ex Post Facto Clause by increasing the petitioner's presumptive sentence after he had committed the offense of conviction. The Court began its discussion by noting that \"[i]t is axiomatic that for a law to be ex post facto it must be more onerous than the prior law.\" Addressing the Florida sentencing guidelines, the Court noted that the amendment at issue disadvantaged the petitioner; it then commented that \"[cjonsidering the revised guidelines law as a whole\" did not change the result because the State was unable \"to identify any feature of the revised guidelines law that could be considered ameliorative.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"97 S.Ct. 2290, 2298-99","parenthetical":"noting that, in evaluating an ex post facto claim, the Court \"must compare the two statutory procedures in toto to determine if the new may be fairly characterized as more onerous\"","sentence":"Miller, 482 U.S. at 431-32,107 S.Ct. at 2451-52 (emphasis added); see also Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 294, 97 S.Ct. 2290, 2298-99, 53 L.Ed.2d 344 (1977) (noting that, in evaluating an ex post facto claim, the Court \u201cmust compare the two statutory procedures in toto to determine if the new may be fairly characterized as more onerous\u201d); cf. Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 34-36, 101 S.Ct. 960, 967-68, 67 L.Ed.2d 17 (1981) (holding that statutory provision that reduced retroactively amount of good time reduction to prisoners\u2019 sentences was not saved by potentially ameliorative provisions enacted at the same time because their application was purely discretionary)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that statutory provision that reduced retroactively amount of good time reduction to prisoners' sentences was not saved by potentially ameliorative provisions enacted at the same time because their application was purely discretionary","sentence":"Miller, 482 U.S. at 431-32,107 S.Ct. at 2451-52 (emphasis added); see also Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 294, 97 S.Ct. 2290, 2298-99, 53 L.Ed.2d 344 (1977) (noting that, in evaluating an ex post facto claim, the Court \u201cmust compare the two statutory procedures in toto to determine if the new may be fairly characterized as more onerous\u201d); cf. Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 34-36, 101 S.Ct. 960, 967-68, 67 L.Ed.2d 17 (1981) (holding that statutory provision that reduced retroactively amount of good time reduction to prisoners\u2019 sentences was not saved by potentially ameliorative provisions enacted at the same time because their application was purely discretionary)."},"case_id":11322763,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In Miller, the Court concluded that an amendment to Florida's sentencing guidelines violated the Ex Post Facto Clause by increasing the petitioner's presumptive sentence after he had committed the offense of conviction. The Court began its discussion by noting that \"[i]t is axiomatic that for a law to be ex post facto it must be more onerous than the prior law.\" Addressing the Florida sentencing guidelines, the Court noted that the amendment at issue disadvantaged the petitioner; it then commented that \"[cjonsidering the revised guidelines law as a whole\" did not change the result because the State was unable \"to identify any feature of the revised guidelines law that could be considered ameliorative.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting that, in evaluating an ex post facto claim, the Court \"must compare the two statutory procedures in toto to determine if the new may be fairly characterized as more onerous\"","sentence":"Miller, 482 U.S. at 431-32,107 S.Ct. at 2451-52 (emphasis added); see also Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 294, 97 S.Ct. 2290, 2298-99, 53 L.Ed.2d 344 (1977) (noting that, in evaluating an ex post facto claim, the Court \u201cmust compare the two statutory procedures in toto to determine if the new may be fairly characterized as more onerous\u201d); cf. Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 34-36, 101 S.Ct. 960, 967-68, 67 L.Ed.2d 17 (1981) (holding that statutory provision that reduced retroactively amount of good time reduction to prisoners\u2019 sentences was not saved by potentially ameliorative provisions enacted at the same time because their application was purely discretionary)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"450 U.S. 24, 34-36","parenthetical":"holding that statutory provision that reduced retroactively amount of good time reduction to prisoners' sentences was not saved by potentially ameliorative provisions enacted at the same time because their application was purely discretionary","sentence":"Miller, 482 U.S. at 431-32,107 S.Ct. at 2451-52 (emphasis added); see also Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 294, 97 S.Ct. 2290, 2298-99, 53 L.Ed.2d 344 (1977) (noting that, in evaluating an ex post facto claim, the Court \u201cmust compare the two statutory procedures in toto to determine if the new may be fairly characterized as more onerous\u201d); cf. Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 34-36, 101 S.Ct. 960, 967-68, 67 L.Ed.2d 17 (1981) (holding that statutory provision that reduced retroactively amount of good time reduction to prisoners\u2019 sentences was not saved by potentially ameliorative provisions enacted at the same time because their application was purely discretionary)."},"case_id":11322763,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In Miller, the Court concluded that an amendment to Florida's sentencing guidelines violated the Ex Post Facto Clause by increasing the petitioner's presumptive sentence after he had committed the offense of conviction. The Court began its discussion by noting that \"[i]t is axiomatic that for a law to be ex post facto it must be more onerous than the prior law.\" Addressing the Florida sentencing guidelines, the Court noted that the amendment at issue disadvantaged the petitioner; it then commented that \"[cjonsidering the revised guidelines law as a whole\" did not change the result because the State was unable \"to identify any feature of the revised guidelines law that could be considered ameliorative.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting that, in evaluating an ex post facto claim, the Court \"must compare the two statutory procedures in toto to determine if the new may be fairly characterized as more onerous\"","sentence":"Miller, 482 U.S. at 431-32,107 S.Ct. at 2451-52 (emphasis added); see also Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 294, 97 S.Ct. 2290, 2298-99, 53 L.Ed.2d 344 (1977) (noting that, in evaluating an ex post facto claim, the Court \u201cmust compare the two statutory procedures in toto to determine if the new may be fairly characterized as more onerous\u201d); cf. Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 34-36, 101 S.Ct. 960, 967-68, 67 L.Ed.2d 17 (1981) (holding that statutory provision that reduced retroactively amount of good time reduction to prisoners\u2019 sentences was not saved by potentially ameliorative provisions enacted at the same time because their application was purely discretionary)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"101 S.Ct. 960, 967-68","parenthetical":"holding that statutory provision that reduced retroactively amount of good time reduction to prisoners' sentences was not saved by potentially ameliorative provisions enacted at the same time because their application was purely discretionary","sentence":"Miller, 482 U.S. at 431-32,107 S.Ct. at 2451-52 (emphasis added); see also Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 294, 97 S.Ct. 2290, 2298-99, 53 L.Ed.2d 344 (1977) (noting that, in evaluating an ex post facto claim, the Court \u201cmust compare the two statutory procedures in toto to determine if the new may be fairly characterized as more onerous\u201d); cf. Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 34-36, 101 S.Ct. 960, 967-68, 67 L.Ed.2d 17 (1981) (holding that statutory provision that reduced retroactively amount of good time reduction to prisoners\u2019 sentences was not saved by potentially ameliorative provisions enacted at the same time because their application was purely discretionary)."},"case_id":11322763,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In Miller, the Court concluded that an amendment to Florida's sentencing guidelines violated the Ex Post Facto Clause by increasing the petitioner's presumptive sentence after he had committed the offense of conviction. The Court began its discussion by noting that \"[i]t is axiomatic that for a law to be ex post facto it must be more onerous than the prior law.\" Addressing the Florida sentencing guidelines, the Court noted that the amendment at issue disadvantaged the petitioner; it then commented that \"[cjonsidering the revised guidelines law as a whole\" did not change the result because the State was unable \"to identify any feature of the revised guidelines law that could be considered ameliorative.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that statutory provision that reduced retroactively amount of good time reduction to prisoners' sentences was not saved by potentially ameliorative provisions enacted at the same time because their application was purely discretionary","sentence":"Miller, 482 U.S. at 431-32,107 S.Ct. at 2451-52 (emphasis added); see also Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 294, 97 S.Ct. 2290, 2298-99, 53 L.Ed.2d 344 (1977) (noting that, in evaluating an ex post facto claim, the Court \u201cmust compare the two statutory procedures in toto to determine if the new may be fairly characterized as more onerous\u201d); cf. Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 34-36, 101 S.Ct. 960, 967-68, 67 L.Ed.2d 17 (1981) (holding that statutory provision that reduced retroactively amount of good time reduction to prisoners\u2019 sentences was not saved by potentially ameliorative provisions enacted at the same time because their application was purely discretionary)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting that, in evaluating an ex post facto claim, the Court \"must compare the two statutory procedures in toto to determine if the new may be fairly characterized as more onerous\"","sentence":"Miller, 482 U.S. at 431-32,107 S.Ct. at 2451-52 (emphasis added); see also Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 294, 97 S.Ct. 2290, 2298-99, 53 L.Ed.2d 344 (1977) (noting that, in evaluating an ex post facto claim, the Court \u201cmust compare the two statutory procedures in toto to determine if the new may be fairly characterized as more onerous\u201d); cf. Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 34-36, 101 S.Ct. 960, 967-68, 67 L.Ed.2d 17 (1981) (holding that statutory provision that reduced retroactively amount of good time reduction to prisoners\u2019 sentences was not saved by potentially ameliorative provisions enacted at the same time because their application was purely discretionary)."},"case_id":11322763,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The negotiated procedure, though not open to all conceivable complaints, did cover Suzal's. Using terms of art whose meaning derives from the CSRA, the collective bargaining agreement defined grievable matters to include \"prohibited personnel practices\" as well as \"adverse actions and removals for performance\".","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"3 MSPB 297, 297-98","parenthetical":"holding that the expiration and nonrenewal of a term appointment is not an \"adverse action\"","sentence":"See 5 U.S.C. \u00a7 7512 (effectively defining \u201cadverse actions\u201d to include removals, suspensions, reductions in grade or pay, and furloughs); Berger v. Department of Commerce, 3 MSPB 297, 297-98, 3 M.S.P.R. 198 (1980) (holding that the expiration and nonrenewal of a term appointment is not an \u201cadverse action\u201d); cf. National Treasury Employees Union v. MSPB, 743 F.2d 895, 912-15 (D.C.Cir.1984) (holding that short-term layoffs of seasonal employees in accordance with conditions agreed upon at the start of employment are not \u201cfurloughs\u201d within the meaning of \u00a7 7512). But both of Suzal\u2019s theories about why the Voice of America declined to renew his appointment allege \u201cprohibited personnel practices\u201d within the meaning of the collective bargaining agreement."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"743 F.2d 895, 912-15","parenthetical":"holding that short-term layoffs of seasonal employees in accordance with conditions agreed upon at the start of employment are not \"furloughs\" within the meaning of SS 7512","sentence":"See 5 U.S.C. \u00a7 7512 (effectively defining \u201cadverse actions\u201d to include removals, suspensions, reductions in grade or pay, and furloughs); Berger v. Department of Commerce, 3 MSPB 297, 297-98, 3 M.S.P.R. 198 (1980) (holding that the expiration and nonrenewal of a term appointment is not an \u201cadverse action\u201d); cf. National Treasury Employees Union v. MSPB, 743 F.2d 895, 912-15 (D.C.Cir.1984) (holding that short-term layoffs of seasonal employees in accordance with conditions agreed upon at the start of employment are not \u201cfurloughs\u201d within the meaning of \u00a7 7512). But both of Suzal\u2019s theories about why the Voice of America declined to renew his appointment allege \u201cprohibited personnel practices\u201d within the meaning of the collective bargaining agreement."},"case_id":3613387,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The negotiated procedure, though not open to all conceivable complaints, did cover Suzal's. Using terms of art whose meaning derives from the CSRA, the collective bargaining agreement defined grievable matters to include \"prohibited personnel practices\" as well as \"adverse actions and removals for performance\".","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that the expiration and nonrenewal of a term appointment is not an \"adverse action\"","sentence":"See 5 U.S.C. \u00a7 7512 (effectively defining \u201cadverse actions\u201d to include removals, suspensions, reductions in grade or pay, and furloughs); Berger v. Department of Commerce, 3 MSPB 297, 297-98, 3 M.S.P.R. 198 (1980) (holding that the expiration and nonrenewal of a term appointment is not an \u201cadverse action\u201d); cf. National Treasury Employees Union v. MSPB, 743 F.2d 895, 912-15 (D.C.Cir.1984) (holding that short-term layoffs of seasonal employees in accordance with conditions agreed upon at the start of employment are not \u201cfurloughs\u201d within the meaning of \u00a7 7512). But both of Suzal\u2019s theories about why the Voice of America declined to renew his appointment allege \u201cprohibited personnel practices\u201d within the meaning of the collective bargaining agreement."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"743 F.2d 895, 912-15","parenthetical":"holding that short-term layoffs of seasonal employees in accordance with conditions agreed upon at the start of employment are not \"furloughs\" within the meaning of SS 7512","sentence":"See 5 U.S.C. \u00a7 7512 (effectively defining \u201cadverse actions\u201d to include removals, suspensions, reductions in grade or pay, and furloughs); Berger v. Department of Commerce, 3 MSPB 297, 297-98, 3 M.S.P.R. 198 (1980) (holding that the expiration and nonrenewal of a term appointment is not an \u201cadverse action\u201d); cf. National Treasury Employees Union v. MSPB, 743 F.2d 895, 912-15 (D.C.Cir.1984) (holding that short-term layoffs of seasonal employees in accordance with conditions agreed upon at the start of employment are not \u201cfurloughs\u201d within the meaning of \u00a7 7512). But both of Suzal\u2019s theories about why the Voice of America declined to renew his appointment allege \u201cprohibited personnel practices\u201d within the meaning of the collective bargaining agreement."},"case_id":3613387,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Moreover, in addition to the officer's testimony, the evidence also shows that Smith engaged in a high-speed, dangerous chase and then attempted to flee from police on foot and that a nine-millimeter, loaded handgun with a bullet in the chamber was found in the front passenger seat after Smith fled from the car.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"274 Ga. App. 506, 508","parenthetical":"loaded weapon, large quantity of narcotics and cash constituted evidence of involvement in drug trade","sentence":"Causey v. State, 274 Ga. App. 506, 508 (618 SE2d 127) (2005) (loaded weapon, large quantity of narcotics and cash constituted evidence of involvement in drug trade); see generally State v. Jackson, 287 Ga. 646, 652 (697 SE2d 757) (2010) (noting that it is \u201cnot unusual\u201d for drug dealers to be armed). This evidence, coupled with other evidence at trial, was sufficient to support Smith\u2019s conviction of possession of cocaine and marijuana with intent to distribute beyond a reasonable doubt."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"321 Ga. App. 214, 215","parenthetical":"evidence sufficient where officer testified quantity and packaging of crack cocaine was more consistent with drug sales instead of personal use, and manner of concealment was typical of \"street level\" drug dealer","sentence":"See e.g., Thomas v. State, 321 Ga. App. 214, 215 (1) (741 SE2d 298) (2013) (evidence sufficient where officer testified quantity and packaging of crack cocaine was more consistent with drug sales instead of personal use, and manner of concealment was typical of \u201cstreet level\u201d drug dealer); Horne v. State, 318 Ga. App. 484, 485 (1) (733 SE2d 487) (2012) (evidence of intent to distribute sufficient where officer testified amount of cocaine was greater than what would normally be kept for personal use and drugs were packaged separately for distribution); Flemister v. State, 317 Ga. App. 749, 752 (1) (732 SE2d 810) (2012) (evidence sufficient where officer testified drugs were packaged in a manner commonly associated with the sale of marijuana); Causey, 274 Ga. App. at 508 (evidence of intent to distribute when large quantities of drugs, cash, and a weapon found on defendant\u2019s person)."},"case_id":6804776,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Moreover, in addition to the officer's testimony, the evidence also shows that Smith engaged in a high-speed, dangerous chase and then attempted to flee from police on foot and that a nine-millimeter, loaded handgun with a bullet in the chamber was found in the front passenger seat after Smith fled from the car.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"318 Ga. App. 484, 485","parenthetical":"evidence of intent to distribute sufficient where officer testified amount of cocaine was greater than what would normally be kept for personal use and drugs were packaged separately for distribution","sentence":"See e.g., Thomas v. State, 321 Ga. App. 214, 215 (1) (741 SE2d 298) (2013) (evidence sufficient where officer testified quantity and packaging of crack cocaine was more consistent with drug sales instead of personal use, and manner of concealment was typical of \u201cstreet level\u201d drug dealer); Horne v. State, 318 Ga. App. 484, 485 (1) (733 SE2d 487) (2012) (evidence of intent to distribute sufficient where officer testified amount of cocaine was greater than what would normally be kept for personal use and drugs were packaged separately for distribution); Flemister v. State, 317 Ga. App. 749, 752 (1) (732 SE2d 810) (2012) (evidence sufficient where officer testified drugs were packaged in a manner commonly associated with the sale of marijuana); Causey, 274 Ga. App. at 508 (evidence of intent to distribute when large quantities of drugs, cash, and a weapon found on defendant\u2019s person)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"274 Ga. App. 506, 508","parenthetical":"loaded weapon, large quantity of narcotics and cash constituted evidence of involvement in drug trade","sentence":"Causey v. State, 274 Ga. App. 506, 508 (618 SE2d 127) (2005) (loaded weapon, large quantity of narcotics and cash constituted evidence of involvement in drug trade); see generally State v. Jackson, 287 Ga. 646, 652 (697 SE2d 757) (2010) (noting that it is \u201cnot unusual\u201d for drug dealers to be armed). This evidence, coupled with other evidence at trial, was sufficient to support Smith\u2019s conviction of possession of cocaine and marijuana with intent to distribute beyond a reasonable doubt."},"case_id":6804776,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Moreover, in addition to the officer's testimony, the evidence also shows that Smith engaged in a high-speed, dangerous chase and then attempted to flee from police on foot and that a nine-millimeter, loaded handgun with a bullet in the chamber was found in the front passenger seat after Smith fled from the car.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"317 Ga. App. 749, 752","parenthetical":"evidence sufficient where officer testified drugs were packaged in a manner commonly associated with the sale of marijuana","sentence":"See e.g., Thomas v. State, 321 Ga. App. 214, 215 (1) (741 SE2d 298) (2013) (evidence sufficient where officer testified quantity and packaging of crack cocaine was more consistent with drug sales instead of personal use, and manner of concealment was typical of \u201cstreet level\u201d drug dealer); Horne v. State, 318 Ga. App. 484, 485 (1) (733 SE2d 487) (2012) (evidence of intent to distribute sufficient where officer testified amount of cocaine was greater than what would normally be kept for personal use and drugs were packaged separately for distribution); Flemister v. State, 317 Ga. App. 749, 752 (1) (732 SE2d 810) (2012) (evidence sufficient where officer testified drugs were packaged in a manner commonly associated with the sale of marijuana); Causey, 274 Ga. App. at 508 (evidence of intent to distribute when large quantities of drugs, cash, and a weapon found on defendant\u2019s person)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"274 Ga. App. 506, 508","parenthetical":"loaded weapon, large quantity of narcotics and cash constituted evidence of involvement in drug trade","sentence":"Causey v. State, 274 Ga. App. 506, 508 (618 SE2d 127) (2005) (loaded weapon, large quantity of narcotics and cash constituted evidence of involvement in drug trade); see generally State v. Jackson, 287 Ga. 646, 652 (697 SE2d 757) (2010) (noting that it is \u201cnot unusual\u201d for drug dealers to be armed). This evidence, coupled with other evidence at trial, was sufficient to support Smith\u2019s conviction of possession of cocaine and marijuana with intent to distribute beyond a reasonable doubt."},"case_id":6804776,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Moreover, in addition to the officer's testimony, the evidence also shows that Smith engaged in a high-speed, dangerous chase and then attempted to flee from police on foot and that a nine-millimeter, loaded handgun with a bullet in the chamber was found in the front passenger seat after Smith fled from the car.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"274 Ga. App. 506, 508","parenthetical":"loaded weapon, large quantity of narcotics and cash constituted evidence of involvement in drug trade","sentence":"Causey v. State, 274 Ga. App. 506, 508 (618 SE2d 127) (2005) (loaded weapon, large quantity of narcotics and cash constituted evidence of involvement in drug trade); see generally State v. Jackson, 287 Ga. 646, 652 (697 SE2d 757) (2010) (noting that it is \u201cnot unusual\u201d for drug dealers to be armed). This evidence, coupled with other evidence at trial, was sufficient to support Smith\u2019s conviction of possession of cocaine and marijuana with intent to distribute beyond a reasonable doubt."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"274 Ga. App. 508, 508","parenthetical":"evidence of intent to distribute when large quantities of drugs, cash, and a weapon found on defendant's person","sentence":"See e.g., Thomas v. State, 321 Ga. App. 214, 215 (1) (741 SE2d 298) (2013) (evidence sufficient where officer testified quantity and packaging of crack cocaine was more consistent with drug sales instead of personal use, and manner of concealment was typical of \u201cstreet level\u201d drug dealer); Horne v. State, 318 Ga. App. 484, 485 (1) (733 SE2d 487) (2012) (evidence of intent to distribute sufficient where officer testified amount of cocaine was greater than what would normally be kept for personal use and drugs were packaged separately for distribution); Flemister v. State, 317 Ga. App. 749, 752 (1) (732 SE2d 810) (2012) (evidence sufficient where officer testified drugs were packaged in a manner commonly associated with the sale of marijuana); Causey, 274 Ga. App. at 508 (evidence of intent to distribute when large quantities of drugs, cash, and a weapon found on defendant\u2019s person)."},"case_id":6804776,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Garza-Gorena's sole contention is that he is a U.S. citizen and therefore cannot be removed for his criminal offenses. GarzaGorena's alienage has been established twice, in his 1974 deportation hearing and in his 1987 conviction for illegal re-entry pursuant to 8 U.S.C. SS 1326. General principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel prevent him from re-litigating matters that were finally resolved in earlier proceedings.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"394 F.2d 785, 789","parenthetical":"holding that collateral estoppel bars an alien from asserting U.S. citizenship when he has been previously convicted for a false claim to U.S. citizenship","sentence":"See Ramon-Sepulveda v. INS, 824 F.2d 749, 750 (9th Cir.1987) (per curiam) (holding that the doctrine of res judicata applies to deportation proceedings); see also Pena-Cabanillas v. U.S., 394 F.2d 785, 789 (9th Cir.1968) (holding that collateral estoppel bars an alien from asserting U.S. citizenship when he has been previously convicted for a false claim to U.S. citizenship)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"824 F.2d 749, 750","parenthetical":"holding that the doctrine of res judicata applies to deportation proceedings","sentence":"See Ramon-Sepulveda v. INS, 824 F.2d 749, 750 (9th Cir.1987) (per curiam) (holding that the doctrine of res judicata applies to deportation proceedings); see also Pena-Cabanillas v. U.S., 394 F.2d 785, 789 (9th Cir.1968) (holding that collateral estoppel bars an alien from asserting U.S. citizenship when he has been previously convicted for a false claim to U.S. citizenship)."},"case_id":460864,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Second, we review O'Laughlin's sufficiency challenge through the lens of federal habeas review. Under the federal habeas statute, we must presume the correctness of all factual determinations made by the state court, see 28 U.S.C. SS 2254(e)(1), and may grant the writ only if the state court's decision was \"contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,\" id. SS 2254(d)(1). Under this standard, we must uphold even state court decisions that are incorrect so long as they are reasonable.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"550 U.S. 465, 473","parenthetical":"\"The question under AEDPA is not whether a federal court believes the state court's determination was incorrect but whether that determination was unreasonable -- a substantially higher threshold.\"","sentence":"See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 410, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (\u201cFor purposes of today\u2019s opinion, the most important point is that an unreasonable application of federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law.\u201d (emphasis in original)); see also Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473, 127 S.Ct. 1933, 167 L.Ed.2d 836 (2007) (\u201cThe question under AEDPA is not whether a federal court believes the state court\u2019s determination was incorrect but whether that determination was unreasonable \u2014 a substantially higher threshold.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"529 U.S. 362, 410","parenthetical":"\"For purposes of today's opinion, the most important point is that an unreasonable application of federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law.\" (emphasis in original","sentence":"See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 410, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (\u201cFor purposes of today\u2019s opinion, the most important point is that an unreasonable application of federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law.\u201d (emphasis in original)); see also Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473, 127 S.Ct. 1933, 167 L.Ed.2d 836 (2007) (\u201cThe question under AEDPA is not whether a federal court believes the state court\u2019s determination was incorrect but whether that determination was unreasonable \u2014 a substantially higher threshold.\u201d)."},"case_id":4042335,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Second, we review O'Laughlin's sufficiency challenge through the lens of federal habeas review. Under the federal habeas statute, we must presume the correctness of all factual determinations made by the state court, see 28 U.S.C. SS 2254(e)(1), and may grant the writ only if the state court's decision was \"contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,\" id. SS 2254(d)(1). Under this standard, we must uphold even state court decisions that are incorrect so long as they are reasonable.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"529 U.S. 362, 410","parenthetical":"\"For purposes of today's opinion, the most important point is that an unreasonable application of federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law.\" (emphasis in original","sentence":"See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 410, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (\u201cFor purposes of today\u2019s opinion, the most important point is that an unreasonable application of federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law.\u201d (emphasis in original)); see also Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473, 127 S.Ct. 1933, 167 L.Ed.2d 836 (2007) (\u201cThe question under AEDPA is not whether a federal court believes the state court\u2019s determination was incorrect but whether that determination was unreasonable \u2014 a substantially higher threshold.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"The question under AEDPA is not whether a federal court believes the state court's determination was incorrect but whether that determination was unreasonable -- a substantially higher threshold.\"","sentence":"See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 410, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (\u201cFor purposes of today\u2019s opinion, the most important point is that an unreasonable application of federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law.\u201d (emphasis in original)); see also Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473, 127 S.Ct. 1933, 167 L.Ed.2d 836 (2007) (\u201cThe question under AEDPA is not whether a federal court believes the state court\u2019s determination was incorrect but whether that determination was unreasonable \u2014 a substantially higher threshold.\u201d)."},"case_id":4042335,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Second, we review O'Laughlin's sufficiency challenge through the lens of federal habeas review. Under the federal habeas statute, we must presume the correctness of all factual determinations made by the state court, see 28 U.S.C. SS 2254(e)(1), and may grant the writ only if the state court's decision was \"contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,\" id. SS 2254(d)(1). Under this standard, we must uphold even state court decisions that are incorrect so long as they are reasonable.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"529 U.S. 362, 410","parenthetical":"\"For purposes of today's opinion, the most important point is that an unreasonable application of federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law.\" (emphasis in original","sentence":"See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 410, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (\u201cFor purposes of today\u2019s opinion, the most important point is that an unreasonable application of federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law.\u201d (emphasis in original)); see also Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473, 127 S.Ct. 1933, 167 L.Ed.2d 836 (2007) (\u201cThe question under AEDPA is not whether a federal court believes the state court\u2019s determination was incorrect but whether that determination was unreasonable \u2014 a substantially higher threshold.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"The question under AEDPA is not whether a federal court believes the state court's determination was incorrect but whether that determination was unreasonable -- a substantially higher threshold.\"","sentence":"See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 410, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (\u201cFor purposes of today\u2019s opinion, the most important point is that an unreasonable application of federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law.\u201d (emphasis in original)); see also Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473, 127 S.Ct. 1933, 167 L.Ed.2d 836 (2007) (\u201cThe question under AEDPA is not whether a federal court believes the state court\u2019s determination was incorrect but whether that determination was unreasonable \u2014 a substantially higher threshold.\u201d)."},"case_id":4042335,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Second, we review O'Laughlin's sufficiency challenge through the lens of federal habeas review. Under the federal habeas statute, we must presume the correctness of all factual determinations made by the state court, see 28 U.S.C. SS 2254(e)(1), and may grant the writ only if the state court's decision was \"contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,\" id. SS 2254(d)(1). Under this standard, we must uphold even state court decisions that are incorrect so long as they are reasonable.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"550 U.S. 465, 473","parenthetical":"\"The question under AEDPA is not whether a federal court believes the state court's determination was incorrect but whether that determination was unreasonable -- a substantially higher threshold.\"","sentence":"See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 410, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (\u201cFor purposes of today\u2019s opinion, the most important point is that an unreasonable application of federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law.\u201d (emphasis in original)); see also Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473, 127 S.Ct. 1933, 167 L.Ed.2d 836 (2007) (\u201cThe question under AEDPA is not whether a federal court believes the state court\u2019s determination was incorrect but whether that determination was unreasonable \u2014 a substantially higher threshold.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"For purposes of today's opinion, the most important point is that an unreasonable application of federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law.\" (emphasis in original","sentence":"See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 410, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (\u201cFor purposes of today\u2019s opinion, the most important point is that an unreasonable application of federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law.\u201d (emphasis in original)); see also Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473, 127 S.Ct. 1933, 167 L.Ed.2d 836 (2007) (\u201cThe question under AEDPA is not whether a federal court believes the state court\u2019s determination was incorrect but whether that determination was unreasonable \u2014 a substantially higher threshold.\u201d)."},"case_id":4042335,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Second, we review O'Laughlin's sufficiency challenge through the lens of federal habeas review. Under the federal habeas statute, we must presume the correctness of all factual determinations made by the state court, see 28 U.S.C. SS 2254(e)(1), and may grant the writ only if the state court's decision was \"contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,\" id. SS 2254(d)(1). Under this standard, we must uphold even state court decisions that are incorrect so long as they are reasonable.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"The question under AEDPA is not whether a federal court believes the state court's determination was incorrect but whether that determination was unreasonable -- a substantially higher threshold.\"","sentence":"See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 410, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (\u201cFor purposes of today\u2019s opinion, the most important point is that an unreasonable application of federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law.\u201d (emphasis in original)); see also Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473, 127 S.Ct. 1933, 167 L.Ed.2d 836 (2007) (\u201cThe question under AEDPA is not whether a federal court believes the state court\u2019s determination was incorrect but whether that determination was unreasonable \u2014 a substantially higher threshold.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"For purposes of today's opinion, the most important point is that an unreasonable application of federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law.\" (emphasis in original","sentence":"See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 410, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (\u201cFor purposes of today\u2019s opinion, the most important point is that an unreasonable application of federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law.\u201d (emphasis in original)); see also Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473, 127 S.Ct. 1933, 167 L.Ed.2d 836 (2007) (\u201cThe question under AEDPA is not whether a federal court believes the state court\u2019s determination was incorrect but whether that determination was unreasonable \u2014 a substantially higher threshold.\u201d)."},"case_id":4042335,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Second, we review O'Laughlin's sufficiency challenge through the lens of federal habeas review. Under the federal habeas statute, we must presume the correctness of all factual determinations made by the state court, see 28 U.S.C. SS 2254(e)(1), and may grant the writ only if the state court's decision was \"contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,\" id. SS 2254(d)(1). Under this standard, we must uphold even state court decisions that are incorrect so long as they are reasonable.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"For purposes of today's opinion, the most important point is that an unreasonable application of federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law.\" (emphasis in original","sentence":"See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 410, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (\u201cFor purposes of today\u2019s opinion, the most important point is that an unreasonable application of federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law.\u201d (emphasis in original)); see also Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473, 127 S.Ct. 1933, 167 L.Ed.2d 836 (2007) (\u201cThe question under AEDPA is not whether a federal court believes the state court\u2019s determination was incorrect but whether that determination was unreasonable \u2014 a substantially higher threshold.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"The question under AEDPA is not whether a federal court believes the state court's determination was incorrect but whether that determination was unreasonable -- a substantially higher threshold.\"","sentence":"See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 410, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (\u201cFor purposes of today\u2019s opinion, the most important point is that an unreasonable application of federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law.\u201d (emphasis in original)); see also Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473, 127 S.Ct. 1933, 167 L.Ed.2d 836 (2007) (\u201cThe question under AEDPA is not whether a federal court believes the state court\u2019s determination was incorrect but whether that determination was unreasonable \u2014 a substantially higher threshold.\u201d)."},"case_id":4042335,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Second, we review O'Laughlin's sufficiency challenge through the lens of federal habeas review. Under the federal habeas statute, we must presume the correctness of all factual determinations made by the state court, see 28 U.S.C. SS 2254(e)(1), and may grant the writ only if the state court's decision was \"contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,\" id. SS 2254(d)(1). Under this standard, we must uphold even state court decisions that are incorrect so long as they are reasonable.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"550 U.S. 465, 473","parenthetical":"\"The question under AEDPA is not whether a federal court believes the state court's determination was incorrect but whether that determination was unreasonable -- a substantially higher threshold.\"","sentence":"See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 410, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (\u201cFor purposes of today\u2019s opinion, the most important point is that an unreasonable application of federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law.\u201d (emphasis in original)); see also Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473, 127 S.Ct. 1933, 167 L.Ed.2d 836 (2007) (\u201cThe question under AEDPA is not whether a federal court believes the state court\u2019s determination was incorrect but whether that determination was unreasonable \u2014 a substantially higher threshold.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"For purposes of today's opinion, the most important point is that an unreasonable application of federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law.\" (emphasis in original","sentence":"See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 410, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (\u201cFor purposes of today\u2019s opinion, the most important point is that an unreasonable application of federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law.\u201d (emphasis in original)); see also Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473, 127 S.Ct. 1933, 167 L.Ed.2d 836 (2007) (\u201cThe question under AEDPA is not whether a federal court believes the state court\u2019s determination was incorrect but whether that determination was unreasonable \u2014 a substantially higher threshold.\u201d)."},"case_id":4042335,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Second, we review O'Laughlin's sufficiency challenge through the lens of federal habeas review. Under the federal habeas statute, we must presume the correctness of all factual determinations made by the state court, see 28 U.S.C. SS 2254(e)(1), and may grant the writ only if the state court's decision was \"contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,\" id. SS 2254(d)(1). Under this standard, we must uphold even state court decisions that are incorrect so long as they are reasonable.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"The question under AEDPA is not whether a federal court believes the state court's determination was incorrect but whether that determination was unreasonable -- a substantially higher threshold.\"","sentence":"See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 410, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (\u201cFor purposes of today\u2019s opinion, the most important point is that an unreasonable application of federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law.\u201d (emphasis in original)); see also Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473, 127 S.Ct. 1933, 167 L.Ed.2d 836 (2007) (\u201cThe question under AEDPA is not whether a federal court believes the state court\u2019s determination was incorrect but whether that determination was unreasonable \u2014 a substantially higher threshold.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"For purposes of today's opinion, the most important point is that an unreasonable application of federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law.\" (emphasis in original","sentence":"See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 410, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (\u201cFor purposes of today\u2019s opinion, the most important point is that an unreasonable application of federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law.\u201d (emphasis in original)); see also Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473, 127 S.Ct. 1933, 167 L.Ed.2d 836 (2007) (\u201cThe question under AEDPA is not whether a federal court believes the state court\u2019s determination was incorrect but whether that determination was unreasonable \u2014 a substantially higher threshold.\u201d)."},"case_id":4042335,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Second, we review O'Laughlin's sufficiency challenge through the lens of federal habeas review. Under the federal habeas statute, we must presume the correctness of all factual determinations made by the state court, see 28 U.S.C. SS 2254(e)(1), and may grant the writ only if the state court's decision was \"contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,\" id. SS 2254(d)(1). Under this standard, we must uphold even state court decisions that are incorrect so long as they are reasonable.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"The question under AEDPA is not whether a federal court believes the state court's determination was incorrect but whether that determination was unreasonable -- a substantially higher threshold.\"","sentence":"See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 410, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (\u201cFor purposes of today\u2019s opinion, the most important point is that an unreasonable application of federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law.\u201d (emphasis in original)); see also Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473, 127 S.Ct. 1933, 167 L.Ed.2d 836 (2007) (\u201cThe question under AEDPA is not whether a federal court believes the state court\u2019s determination was incorrect but whether that determination was unreasonable \u2014 a substantially higher threshold.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"For purposes of today's opinion, the most important point is that an unreasonable application of federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law.\" (emphasis in original","sentence":"See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 410, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (\u201cFor purposes of today\u2019s opinion, the most important point is that an unreasonable application of federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law.\u201d (emphasis in original)); see also Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473, 127 S.Ct. 1933, 167 L.Ed.2d 836 (2007) (\u201cThe question under AEDPA is not whether a federal court believes the state court\u2019s determination was incorrect but whether that determination was unreasonable \u2014 a substantially higher threshold.\u201d)."},"case_id":4042335,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The court conducted a full hearing outside the presence of the jury in which it allowed the defendant to argue against the offer of proof and, after considering the parties' arguments, determined that the probative value of the prior misconduct evidence outweighed its prejudicial tendency. Moreover, any prejudice was minimized by the court's limiting instruction to the jury on the proper use of the misconduct evidence.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"14 Conn. App. 536, 539","parenthetical":"\"[s]uch a limiting instruction serves to minimize any possible prejudice\"","sentence":"See State v. Lopez, 14 Conn. App. 536, 539, 541 A.2d 902 (1988) (\u201c[s]uch a limiting instruction serves to minimize any possible prejudice\u201d); see also State v. Anderson, 86 Conn. App. 854, 870, 864 A.2d 35 (jury presumed to follow court\u2019s instructions absent clear evidence to contrary), cert. denied, 273 Conn. 924, 871 A.2d 1031 (2005)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"86 Conn. App. 854, 870","parenthetical":"jury presumed to follow court's instructions absent clear evidence to contrary","sentence":"See State v. Lopez, 14 Conn. App. 536, 539, 541 A.2d 902 (1988) (\u201c[s]uch a limiting instruction serves to minimize any possible prejudice\u201d); see also State v. Anderson, 86 Conn. App. 854, 870, 864 A.2d 35 (jury presumed to follow court\u2019s instructions absent clear evidence to contrary), cert. denied, 273 Conn. 924, 871 A.2d 1031 (2005)."},"case_id":6781052,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The court conducted a full hearing outside the presence of the jury in which it allowed the defendant to argue against the offer of proof and, after considering the parties' arguments, determined that the probative value of the prior misconduct evidence outweighed its prejudicial tendency. Moreover, any prejudice was minimized by the court's limiting instruction to the jury on the proper use of the misconduct evidence.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"jury presumed to follow court's instructions absent clear evidence to contrary","sentence":"See State v. Lopez, 14 Conn. App. 536, 539, 541 A.2d 902 (1988) (\u201c[s]uch a limiting instruction serves to minimize any possible prejudice\u201d); see also State v. Anderson, 86 Conn. App. 854, 870, 864 A.2d 35 (jury presumed to follow court\u2019s instructions absent clear evidence to contrary), cert. denied, 273 Conn. 924, 871 A.2d 1031 (2005)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"14 Conn. App. 536, 539","parenthetical":"\"[s]uch a limiting instruction serves to minimize any possible prejudice\"","sentence":"See State v. Lopez, 14 Conn. App. 536, 539, 541 A.2d 902 (1988) (\u201c[s]uch a limiting instruction serves to minimize any possible prejudice\u201d); see also State v. Anderson, 86 Conn. App. 854, 870, 864 A.2d 35 (jury presumed to follow court\u2019s instructions absent clear evidence to contrary), cert. denied, 273 Conn. 924, 871 A.2d 1031 (2005)."},"case_id":6781052,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The court conducted a full hearing outside the presence of the jury in which it allowed the defendant to argue against the offer of proof and, after considering the parties' arguments, determined that the probative value of the prior misconduct evidence outweighed its prejudicial tendency. Moreover, any prejudice was minimized by the court's limiting instruction to the jury on the proper use of the misconduct evidence.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"14 Conn. App. 536, 539","parenthetical":"\"[s]uch a limiting instruction serves to minimize any possible prejudice\"","sentence":"See State v. Lopez, 14 Conn. App. 536, 539, 541 A.2d 902 (1988) (\u201c[s]uch a limiting instruction serves to minimize any possible prejudice\u201d); see also State v. Anderson, 86 Conn. App. 854, 870, 864 A.2d 35 (jury presumed to follow court\u2019s instructions absent clear evidence to contrary), cert. denied, 273 Conn. 924, 871 A.2d 1031 (2005)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"jury presumed to follow court's instructions absent clear evidence to contrary","sentence":"See State v. Lopez, 14 Conn. App. 536, 539, 541 A.2d 902 (1988) (\u201c[s]uch a limiting instruction serves to minimize any possible prejudice\u201d); see also State v. Anderson, 86 Conn. App. 854, 870, 864 A.2d 35 (jury presumed to follow court\u2019s instructions absent clear evidence to contrary), cert. denied, 273 Conn. 924, 871 A.2d 1031 (2005)."},"case_id":6781052,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The court conducted a full hearing outside the presence of the jury in which it allowed the defendant to argue against the offer of proof and, after considering the parties' arguments, determined that the probative value of the prior misconduct evidence outweighed its prejudicial tendency. Moreover, any prejudice was minimized by the court's limiting instruction to the jury on the proper use of the misconduct evidence.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"14 Conn. App. 536, 539","parenthetical":"\"[s]uch a limiting instruction serves to minimize any possible prejudice\"","sentence":"See State v. Lopez, 14 Conn. App. 536, 539, 541 A.2d 902 (1988) (\u201c[s]uch a limiting instruction serves to minimize any possible prejudice\u201d); see also State v. Anderson, 86 Conn. App. 854, 870, 864 A.2d 35 (jury presumed to follow court\u2019s instructions absent clear evidence to contrary), cert. denied, 273 Conn. 924, 871 A.2d 1031 (2005)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"jury presumed to follow court's instructions absent clear evidence to contrary","sentence":"See State v. Lopez, 14 Conn. App. 536, 539, 541 A.2d 902 (1988) (\u201c[s]uch a limiting instruction serves to minimize any possible prejudice\u201d); see also State v. Anderson, 86 Conn. App. 854, 870, 864 A.2d 35 (jury presumed to follow court\u2019s instructions absent clear evidence to contrary), cert. denied, 273 Conn. 924, 871 A.2d 1031 (2005)."},"case_id":6781052,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The court conducted a full hearing outside the presence of the jury in which it allowed the defendant to argue against the offer of proof and, after considering the parties' arguments, determined that the probative value of the prior misconduct evidence outweighed its prejudicial tendency. Moreover, any prejudice was minimized by the court's limiting instruction to the jury on the proper use of the misconduct evidence.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"86 Conn. App. 854, 870","parenthetical":"jury presumed to follow court's instructions absent clear evidence to contrary","sentence":"See State v. Lopez, 14 Conn. App. 536, 539, 541 A.2d 902 (1988) (\u201c[s]uch a limiting instruction serves to minimize any possible prejudice\u201d); see also State v. Anderson, 86 Conn. App. 854, 870, 864 A.2d 35 (jury presumed to follow court\u2019s instructions absent clear evidence to contrary), cert. denied, 273 Conn. 924, 871 A.2d 1031 (2005)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[s]uch a limiting instruction serves to minimize any possible prejudice\"","sentence":"See State v. Lopez, 14 Conn. App. 536, 539, 541 A.2d 902 (1988) (\u201c[s]uch a limiting instruction serves to minimize any possible prejudice\u201d); see also State v. Anderson, 86 Conn. App. 854, 870, 864 A.2d 35 (jury presumed to follow court\u2019s instructions absent clear evidence to contrary), cert. denied, 273 Conn. 924, 871 A.2d 1031 (2005)."},"case_id":6781052,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The court conducted a full hearing outside the presence of the jury in which it allowed the defendant to argue against the offer of proof and, after considering the parties' arguments, determined that the probative value of the prior misconduct evidence outweighed its prejudicial tendency. Moreover, any prejudice was minimized by the court's limiting instruction to the jury on the proper use of the misconduct evidence.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"jury presumed to follow court's instructions absent clear evidence to contrary","sentence":"See State v. Lopez, 14 Conn. App. 536, 539, 541 A.2d 902 (1988) (\u201c[s]uch a limiting instruction serves to minimize any possible prejudice\u201d); see also State v. Anderson, 86 Conn. App. 854, 870, 864 A.2d 35 (jury presumed to follow court\u2019s instructions absent clear evidence to contrary), cert. denied, 273 Conn. 924, 871 A.2d 1031 (2005)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[s]uch a limiting instruction serves to minimize any possible prejudice\"","sentence":"See State v. Lopez, 14 Conn. App. 536, 539, 541 A.2d 902 (1988) (\u201c[s]uch a limiting instruction serves to minimize any possible prejudice\u201d); see also State v. Anderson, 86 Conn. App. 854, 870, 864 A.2d 35 (jury presumed to follow court\u2019s instructions absent clear evidence to contrary), cert. denied, 273 Conn. 924, 871 A.2d 1031 (2005)."},"case_id":6781052,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The court conducted a full hearing outside the presence of the jury in which it allowed the defendant to argue against the offer of proof and, after considering the parties' arguments, determined that the probative value of the prior misconduct evidence outweighed its prejudicial tendency. Moreover, any prejudice was minimized by the court's limiting instruction to the jury on the proper use of the misconduct evidence.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[s]uch a limiting instruction serves to minimize any possible prejudice\"","sentence":"See State v. Lopez, 14 Conn. App. 536, 539, 541 A.2d 902 (1988) (\u201c[s]uch a limiting instruction serves to minimize any possible prejudice\u201d); see also State v. Anderson, 86 Conn. App. 854, 870, 864 A.2d 35 (jury presumed to follow court\u2019s instructions absent clear evidence to contrary), cert. denied, 273 Conn. 924, 871 A.2d 1031 (2005)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"jury presumed to follow court's instructions absent clear evidence to contrary","sentence":"See State v. Lopez, 14 Conn. App. 536, 539, 541 A.2d 902 (1988) (\u201c[s]uch a limiting instruction serves to minimize any possible prejudice\u201d); see also State v. Anderson, 86 Conn. App. 854, 870, 864 A.2d 35 (jury presumed to follow court\u2019s instructions absent clear evidence to contrary), cert. denied, 273 Conn. 924, 871 A.2d 1031 (2005)."},"case_id":6781052,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The court conducted a full hearing outside the presence of the jury in which it allowed the defendant to argue against the offer of proof and, after considering the parties' arguments, determined that the probative value of the prior misconduct evidence outweighed its prejudicial tendency. Moreover, any prejudice was minimized by the court's limiting instruction to the jury on the proper use of the misconduct evidence.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[s]uch a limiting instruction serves to minimize any possible prejudice\"","sentence":"See State v. Lopez, 14 Conn. App. 536, 539, 541 A.2d 902 (1988) (\u201c[s]uch a limiting instruction serves to minimize any possible prejudice\u201d); see also State v. Anderson, 86 Conn. App. 854, 870, 864 A.2d 35 (jury presumed to follow court\u2019s instructions absent clear evidence to contrary), cert. denied, 273 Conn. 924, 871 A.2d 1031 (2005)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"jury presumed to follow court's instructions absent clear evidence to contrary","sentence":"See State v. Lopez, 14 Conn. App. 536, 539, 541 A.2d 902 (1988) (\u201c[s]uch a limiting instruction serves to minimize any possible prejudice\u201d); see also State v. Anderson, 86 Conn. App. 854, 870, 864 A.2d 35 (jury presumed to follow court\u2019s instructions absent clear evidence to contrary), cert. denied, 273 Conn. 924, 871 A.2d 1031 (2005)."},"case_id":6781052,"label":"a"}
{"context":"See Matter of S-M-J, 21 I & N Dec. 722, 726-27 (BIA 1997). At least one circuit has chosen to remand an appeal for further proceedings based on the BIA's reliance on outdated information.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"277 F.3d 158, 163","parenthetical":"remanding based on agency's failure to consult most recent country report and holding INS had \"burden of production\" based on its \"greater access\" to the information","sentence":"See Yang v. McElroy, 277 F.3d 158, 163 (2d Cir.2002) (remanding based on agency\u2019s failure to consult most recent country report and holding INS had \u201cburden of production\u201d based on its \u201cgreater access\u201d to the information)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"236 F.3d 843, 848","parenthetical":"declining to remand for agency's failure to consider most recent country report because it found no cases requiring the BIA to sua sponte take administrative notice of the most recent country report","sentence":"But see Meghani v. INS, 236 F.3d 843, 848 (7th Cir.2001) (declining to remand for agency\u2019s failure to consider most recent country report because it found no cases requiring the BIA to sua sponte take administrative notice of the most recent country report)."},"case_id":2656374,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Plaintiffs claim against defendant Turzillo, an employee of the Monroe County Department of Probation, is based solely on his disagreement with the contents of the presentencing report that Turzillo submitted to Justice Klonick. Turzillo is absolutely immune from liability in that regard.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"849 F.2d 172, 175","parenthetical":"finding Louisiana probation Officer absolutely immune from claim for damages","sentence":"See also Freeze v. Griffith, 849 F.2d 172, 175 (5th Cir.1988) (per curiam) (finding Louisiana probation Officer absolutely immune from claim for damages); Demoran v. Witt, 781 F.2d 155, 157-58 (9th Cir.1985) (same re California probation officer); Hughes v. Chesser, 731 F.2d 1489, 1490 (11th Cir.1984) (same re Alabama probation officer)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"140 F.3d 210, 214","parenthetical":"\"The requirements of New York law with respect to the preparation and submission of presentence reports, along with the procedural mechanisms protecting the defendant's right not to be punished on the basis of inaccurate information in such a report, persuade us that New York probation officers in preparing and furnishing such reports to the courts, like federal probation officers, are entitled to absolute immunity from suits for damages\"","sentence":"Hili v. Sciarrotta, 140 F.3d 210, 214 (2nd Cir.1998) (\u201cThe requirements of New York law with respect to the preparation and submission of presentence reports, along with the procedural mechanisms protecting the defendant\u2019s right not to be punished on the basis of inaccurate information in such a report, persuade us that New York probation officers in preparing and furnishing such reports to the courts, like federal probation officers, are entitled to absolute immunity from suits for damages\u201d)."},"case_id":11686519,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Even if Mosdos was not initially a party to the litigation, it is the current owner of the Nike Site, the development of which was allegedly stymied by the Chestnut Ridge Action. Moreover, after Mosdos gained control of the Nike Site and was added to the Chestnut Ridge Action, Defendants intentionally continued the suit, and thus at that time acted with the requisite intent against Mosdos.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"186 F.3d 243, 249","parenthetical":"\"[T]o advance a continuing violation claim a plaintiff must point to his disparate treatment stemming from a continuous practice of intentional discrimination.\"","sentence":"See Brown v. City of Oneonta, 221 F.3d 329, 337 (2d Cir.2000) (noting that \u201c[t]here are several ways for a plaintiff to plead intentional discrimination,\u201d and that he must simply \u201callege that a government actor intentionally discriminated against him\u201d); cf. Harris v. City of New York, 186 F.3d 243, 249 (2d Cir.1999) (\u201c[T]o advance a continuing violation claim a plaintiff must point to his disparate treatment stemming from a continuous practice of intentional discrimination.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"221 F.3d 329, 337","parenthetical":"noting that \"[t]here are several ways for a plaintiff to plead intentional discrimination,\" and that he must simply \"allege that a government actor intentionally discriminated against him\"","sentence":"See Brown v. City of Oneonta, 221 F.3d 329, 337 (2d Cir.2000) (noting that \u201c[t]here are several ways for a plaintiff to plead intentional discrimination,\u201d and that he must simply \u201callege that a government actor intentionally discriminated against him\u201d); cf. Harris v. City of New York, 186 F.3d 243, 249 (2d Cir.1999) (\u201c[T]o advance a continuing violation claim a plaintiff must point to his disparate treatment stemming from a continuous practice of intentional discrimination.\u201d)."},"case_id":4336844,"label":"b"}
{"context":"As to Cignetti's allegation that the defendants suppressed exculpatory material, the sixth act, it has consistently been held that absolute immunity shields a prosecutor from liability as to claims that they knowingly suppressed exculpatory evidence.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"recognizing that the decisions concerning the materiality of evidence not revealed to the defense could impose unique and intolerable burdens upon a prosecutor responsible annually for hundreds of indictments and trials","sentence":"See Reid v. New Hampshire, 56 F.3d 332, 336-37 (1st Cir.1995) (citations omitted) (applying absolute immunity rule to claim that prosecutors withheld exculpatory evidence in direct violation of trial court orders); see also Imbler, 424 U.S. at 425-r26, 96 S.Ct. 984 (recognizing that the decisions concerning the materiality of evidence not revealed to the defense could impose unique and intolerable burdens upon a prosecutor responsible annually for hundreds of indictments and trials)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"56 F.3d 332, 336-37","parenthetical":"applying absolute immunity rule to claim that prosecutors withheld exculpatory evidence in direct violation of trial court orders","sentence":"See Reid v. New Hampshire, 56 F.3d 332, 336-37 (1st Cir.1995) (citations omitted) (applying absolute immunity rule to claim that prosecutors withheld exculpatory evidence in direct violation of trial court orders); see also Imbler, 424 U.S. at 425-r26, 96 S.Ct. 984 (recognizing that the decisions concerning the materiality of evidence not revealed to the defense could impose unique and intolerable burdens upon a prosecutor responsible annually for hundreds of indictments and trials)."},"case_id":11529769,"label":"b"}
{"context":"As to Cignetti's allegation that the defendants suppressed exculpatory material, the sixth act, it has consistently been held that absolute immunity shields a prosecutor from liability as to claims that they knowingly suppressed exculpatory evidence.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"recognizing that the decisions concerning the materiality of evidence not revealed to the defense could impose unique and intolerable burdens upon a prosecutor responsible annually for hundreds of indictments and trials","sentence":"See Reid v. New Hampshire, 56 F.3d 332, 336-37 (1st Cir.1995) (citations omitted) (applying absolute immunity rule to claim that prosecutors withheld exculpatory evidence in direct violation of trial court orders); see also Imbler, 424 U.S. at 425-r26, 96 S.Ct. 984 (recognizing that the decisions concerning the materiality of evidence not revealed to the defense could impose unique and intolerable burdens upon a prosecutor responsible annually for hundreds of indictments and trials)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"56 F.3d 332, 336-37","parenthetical":"applying absolute immunity rule to claim that prosecutors withheld exculpatory evidence in direct violation of trial court orders","sentence":"See Reid v. New Hampshire, 56 F.3d 332, 336-37 (1st Cir.1995) (citations omitted) (applying absolute immunity rule to claim that prosecutors withheld exculpatory evidence in direct violation of trial court orders); see also Imbler, 424 U.S. at 425-r26, 96 S.Ct. 984 (recognizing that the decisions concerning the materiality of evidence not revealed to the defense could impose unique and intolerable burdens upon a prosecutor responsible annually for hundreds of indictments and trials)."},"case_id":11529769,"label":"b"}
{"context":"It is critical to note that under salvage law, the salvor receives a lien in the property, not title to the property, and as long as the case remains a salvage case, the lienholder cannot assert a right to title even though he may end up with title following execution or foreclosure of the lien.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"640 F.2d 567, 567","parenthetical":"\"Although the law of salvage grants the salvor a right to possession of the property, the salvage of a vessel or goods at sea, even when the goods have been abandoned, does not divest the original owner of title or grant ownership rights to the salvor\"","sentence":"See, e.g., The Akaba v. Burg, 54 F. 197, 200 (4th Cir.1893) (\u201cWhen articles are lost at sea the title of the owner in them remains\u201d); see also Adams v. Unione Mediterranea Di Sicurta, 220 F.3d 659, 670-71 (5th Cir.2000) (explaining that the owner of the salvaged goods \u201cdoes not lose title even though the property may become the subject of salvage services,\u201d because, through the lien, the salvor obtains only a \u201cright of possession\u201d in the property and not \u201cownership or title to the salved property\u201d) (quoting Benedict on Admiralty \u00a7 150); Treasure Salvors, 640 F.2d at 567 (\u201cAlthough the law of salvage grants the salvor a right to possession of the property, the salvage of a vessel or goods at sea, even when the goods have been abandoned, does not divest the original owner of title or grant ownership rights to the salvor\u201d); Continental Ins. Co. v. The Clayton Hardtop Skiff, 367 F.2d 230, 236 (3d Cir.1966) (\u201cThe salvor has the right to salvage but he does not achieve ownership of the vessel by salving it\u201d); Chance, 606 F.Supp. at 804 (stating that \u201ceven though a vessel is abandoned without the hope of recovery or return, the title of the vessel remains in her owner\u201d and \u201c[t]he salvor of property has a right to an award or a lien against the property\u201d), aff'd 775 F.2d 302 (11th Cir.1985); Hener v. United States, 525 F.Supp. 350, 357 (S.D.N.Y.1981) (explaining that salvage law grants the salvor \u201conly a superior right of possession, and not title, until a court has passed on title and the salvage fee\u201d) (citing The Akaba, 54 F. 197 (4th Cir.1893)); The Port Hunter, 6 F.Supp. 1009, 1011 (D.Mass.1934) (stating the salvors have a claim \u201cparamount to all others\u201d and the control to enforce the claim, \u201c[b]ut \u2018their interest in the goods did not amount to ownership.... Th[e] right is merely a lien, a right to retain the goods till the salvage be paid\u2019 \u201d) (quoting Whitwell v. Wells, 41 Mass. 25, 24 Pick (Mass.) 25, 30 (1834)); The Carl Schurz, 5 F. Cas. 84, 86 (W.D.Tenn.1879) (No. 2414) (stating that the salvor \u201cis, to all intents and purposes, a joint owner\u201d of the property along with the original owner); The Amethyst, 1 F. Cas. at 763 (\u201cThe finder of property, left derelict at sea, does not acquire the dominion or the absolute property in what is found. He acquires the right of possession only, with a title to a reasonable reward for his services\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"54 F. 197, 200","parenthetical":"\"When articles are lost at sea the title of the owner in them remains\"","sentence":"See, e.g., The Akaba v. Burg, 54 F. 197, 200 (4th Cir.1893) (\u201cWhen articles are lost at sea the title of the owner in them remains\u201d); see also Adams v. Unione Mediterranea Di Sicurta, 220 F.3d 659, 670-71 (5th Cir.2000) (explaining that the owner of the salvaged goods \u201cdoes not lose title even though the property may become the subject of salvage services,\u201d because, through the lien, the salvor obtains only a \u201cright of possession\u201d in the property and not \u201cownership or title to the salved property\u201d) (quoting Benedict on Admiralty \u00a7 150); Treasure Salvors, 640 F.2d at 567 (\u201cAlthough the law of salvage grants the salvor a right to possession of the property, the salvage of a vessel or goods at sea, even when the goods have been abandoned, does not divest the original owner of title or grant ownership rights to the salvor\u201d); Continental Ins. Co. v. The Clayton Hardtop Skiff, 367 F.2d 230, 236 (3d Cir.1966) (\u201cThe salvor has the right to salvage but he does not achieve ownership of the vessel by salving it\u201d); Chance, 606 F.Supp. at 804 (stating that \u201ceven though a vessel is abandoned without the hope of recovery or return, the title of the vessel remains in her owner\u201d and \u201c[t]he salvor of property has a right to an award or a lien against the property\u201d), aff'd 775 F.2d 302 (11th Cir.1985); Hener v. United States, 525 F.Supp. 350, 357 (S.D.N.Y.1981) (explaining that salvage law grants the salvor \u201conly a superior right of possession, and not title, until a court has passed on title and the salvage fee\u201d) (citing The Akaba, 54 F. 197 (4th Cir.1893)); The Port Hunter, 6 F.Supp. 1009, 1011 (D.Mass.1934) (stating the salvors have a claim \u201cparamount to all others\u201d and the control to enforce the claim, \u201c[b]ut \u2018their interest in the goods did not amount to ownership.... Th[e] right is merely a lien, a right to retain the goods till the salvage be paid\u2019 \u201d) (quoting Whitwell v. Wells, 41 Mass. 25, 24 Pick (Mass.) 25, 30 (1834)); The Carl Schurz, 5 F. Cas. 84, 86 (W.D.Tenn.1879) (No. 2414) (stating that the salvor \u201cis, to all intents and purposes, a joint owner\u201d of the property along with the original owner); The Amethyst, 1 F. Cas. at 763 (\u201cThe finder of property, left derelict at sea, does not acquire the dominion or the absolute property in what is found. He acquires the right of possession only, with a title to a reasonable reward for his services\u201d)."},"case_id":940817,"label":"b"}
{"context":"It is critical to note that under salvage law, the salvor receives a lien in the property, not title to the property, and as long as the case remains a salvage case, the lienholder cannot assert a right to title even though he may end up with title following execution or foreclosure of the lien.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"54 F. 197, 200","parenthetical":"\"When articles are lost at sea the title of the owner in them remains\"","sentence":"See, e.g., The Akaba v. Burg, 54 F. 197, 200 (4th Cir.1893) (\u201cWhen articles are lost at sea the title of the owner in them remains\u201d); see also Adams v. Unione Mediterranea Di Sicurta, 220 F.3d 659, 670-71 (5th Cir.2000) (explaining that the owner of the salvaged goods \u201cdoes not lose title even though the property may become the subject of salvage services,\u201d because, through the lien, the salvor obtains only a \u201cright of possession\u201d in the property and not \u201cownership or title to the salved property\u201d) (quoting Benedict on Admiralty \u00a7 150); Treasure Salvors, 640 F.2d at 567 (\u201cAlthough the law of salvage grants the salvor a right to possession of the property, the salvage of a vessel or goods at sea, even when the goods have been abandoned, does not divest the original owner of title or grant ownership rights to the salvor\u201d); Continental Ins. Co. v. The Clayton Hardtop Skiff, 367 F.2d 230, 236 (3d Cir.1966) (\u201cThe salvor has the right to salvage but he does not achieve ownership of the vessel by salving it\u201d); Chance, 606 F.Supp. at 804 (stating that \u201ceven though a vessel is abandoned without the hope of recovery or return, the title of the vessel remains in her owner\u201d and \u201c[t]he salvor of property has a right to an award or a lien against the property\u201d), aff'd 775 F.2d 302 (11th Cir.1985); Hener v. United States, 525 F.Supp. 350, 357 (S.D.N.Y.1981) (explaining that salvage law grants the salvor \u201conly a superior right of possession, and not title, until a court has passed on title and the salvage fee\u201d) (citing The Akaba, 54 F. 197 (4th Cir.1893)); The Port Hunter, 6 F.Supp. 1009, 1011 (D.Mass.1934) (stating the salvors have a claim \u201cparamount to all others\u201d and the control to enforce the claim, \u201c[b]ut \u2018their interest in the goods did not amount to ownership.... Th[e] right is merely a lien, a right to retain the goods till the salvage be paid\u2019 \u201d) (quoting Whitwell v. Wells, 41 Mass. 25, 24 Pick (Mass.) 25, 30 (1834)); The Carl Schurz, 5 F. Cas. 84, 86 (W.D.Tenn.1879) (No. 2414) (stating that the salvor \u201cis, to all intents and purposes, a joint owner\u201d of the property along with the original owner); The Amethyst, 1 F. Cas. at 763 (\u201cThe finder of property, left derelict at sea, does not acquire the dominion or the absolute property in what is found. He acquires the right of possession only, with a title to a reasonable reward for his services\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"367 F.2d 230, 236","parenthetical":"\"The salvor has the right to salvage but he does not achieve ownership of the vessel by salving it\"","sentence":"See, e.g., The Akaba v. Burg, 54 F. 197, 200 (4th Cir.1893) (\u201cWhen articles are lost at sea the title of the owner in them remains\u201d); see also Adams v. Unione Mediterranea Di Sicurta, 220 F.3d 659, 670-71 (5th Cir.2000) (explaining that the owner of the salvaged goods \u201cdoes not lose title even though the property may become the subject of salvage services,\u201d because, through the lien, the salvor obtains only a \u201cright of possession\u201d in the property and not \u201cownership or title to the salved property\u201d) (quoting Benedict on Admiralty \u00a7 150); Treasure Salvors, 640 F.2d at 567 (\u201cAlthough the law of salvage grants the salvor a right to possession of the property, the salvage of a vessel or goods at sea, even when the goods have been abandoned, does not divest the original owner of title or grant ownership rights to the salvor\u201d); Continental Ins. Co. v. The Clayton Hardtop Skiff, 367 F.2d 230, 236 (3d Cir.1966) (\u201cThe salvor has the right to salvage but he does not achieve ownership of the vessel by salving it\u201d); Chance, 606 F.Supp. at 804 (stating that \u201ceven though a vessel is abandoned without the hope of recovery or return, the title of the vessel remains in her owner\u201d and \u201c[t]he salvor of property has a right to an award or a lien against the property\u201d), aff'd 775 F.2d 302 (11th Cir.1985); Hener v. United States, 525 F.Supp. 350, 357 (S.D.N.Y.1981) (explaining that salvage law grants the salvor \u201conly a superior right of possession, and not title, until a court has passed on title and the salvage fee\u201d) (citing The Akaba, 54 F. 197 (4th Cir.1893)); The Port Hunter, 6 F.Supp. 1009, 1011 (D.Mass.1934) (stating the salvors have a claim \u201cparamount to all others\u201d and the control to enforce the claim, \u201c[b]ut \u2018their interest in the goods did not amount to ownership.... Th[e] right is merely a lien, a right to retain the goods till the salvage be paid\u2019 \u201d) (quoting Whitwell v. Wells, 41 Mass. 25, 24 Pick (Mass.) 25, 30 (1834)); The Carl Schurz, 5 F. Cas. 84, 86 (W.D.Tenn.1879) (No. 2414) (stating that the salvor \u201cis, to all intents and purposes, a joint owner\u201d of the property along with the original owner); The Amethyst, 1 F. Cas. at 763 (\u201cThe finder of property, left derelict at sea, does not acquire the dominion or the absolute property in what is found. He acquires the right of possession only, with a title to a reasonable reward for his services\u201d)."},"case_id":940817,"label":"a"}
{"context":"It is critical to note that under salvage law, the salvor receives a lien in the property, not title to the property, and as long as the case remains a salvage case, the lienholder cannot assert a right to title even though he may end up with title following execution or foreclosure of the lien.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"606 F.Supp. 804, 804","parenthetical":"stating that \"even though a vessel is abandoned without the hope of recovery or return, the title of the vessel remains in her owner\" and \"[t]he salvor of property has a right to an award or a lien against the property\"","sentence":"See, e.g., The Akaba v. Burg, 54 F. 197, 200 (4th Cir.1893) (\u201cWhen articles are lost at sea the title of the owner in them remains\u201d); see also Adams v. Unione Mediterranea Di Sicurta, 220 F.3d 659, 670-71 (5th Cir.2000) (explaining that the owner of the salvaged goods \u201cdoes not lose title even though the property may become the subject of salvage services,\u201d because, through the lien, the salvor obtains only a \u201cright of possession\u201d in the property and not \u201cownership or title to the salved property\u201d) (quoting Benedict on Admiralty \u00a7 150); Treasure Salvors, 640 F.2d at 567 (\u201cAlthough the law of salvage grants the salvor a right to possession of the property, the salvage of a vessel or goods at sea, even when the goods have been abandoned, does not divest the original owner of title or grant ownership rights to the salvor\u201d); Continental Ins. Co. v. The Clayton Hardtop Skiff, 367 F.2d 230, 236 (3d Cir.1966) (\u201cThe salvor has the right to salvage but he does not achieve ownership of the vessel by salving it\u201d); Chance, 606 F.Supp. at 804 (stating that \u201ceven though a vessel is abandoned without the hope of recovery or return, the title of the vessel remains in her owner\u201d and \u201c[t]he salvor of property has a right to an award or a lien against the property\u201d), aff'd 775 F.2d 302 (11th Cir.1985); Hener v. United States, 525 F.Supp. 350, 357 (S.D.N.Y.1981) (explaining that salvage law grants the salvor \u201conly a superior right of possession, and not title, until a court has passed on title and the salvage fee\u201d) (citing The Akaba, 54 F. 197 (4th Cir.1893)); The Port Hunter, 6 F.Supp. 1009, 1011 (D.Mass.1934) (stating the salvors have a claim \u201cparamount to all others\u201d and the control to enforce the claim, \u201c[b]ut \u2018their interest in the goods did not amount to ownership.... Th[e] right is merely a lien, a right to retain the goods till the salvage be paid\u2019 \u201d) (quoting Whitwell v. Wells, 41 Mass. 25, 24 Pick (Mass.) 25, 30 (1834)); The Carl Schurz, 5 F. Cas. 84, 86 (W.D.Tenn.1879) (No. 2414) (stating that the salvor \u201cis, to all intents and purposes, a joint owner\u201d of the property along with the original owner); The Amethyst, 1 F. Cas. at 763 (\u201cThe finder of property, left derelict at sea, does not acquire the dominion or the absolute property in what is found. He acquires the right of possession only, with a title to a reasonable reward for his services\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"54 F. 197, 200","parenthetical":"\"When articles are lost at sea the title of the owner in them remains\"","sentence":"See, e.g., The Akaba v. Burg, 54 F. 197, 200 (4th Cir.1893) (\u201cWhen articles are lost at sea the title of the owner in them remains\u201d); see also Adams v. Unione Mediterranea Di Sicurta, 220 F.3d 659, 670-71 (5th Cir.2000) (explaining that the owner of the salvaged goods \u201cdoes not lose title even though the property may become the subject of salvage services,\u201d because, through the lien, the salvor obtains only a \u201cright of possession\u201d in the property and not \u201cownership or title to the salved property\u201d) (quoting Benedict on Admiralty \u00a7 150); Treasure Salvors, 640 F.2d at 567 (\u201cAlthough the law of salvage grants the salvor a right to possession of the property, the salvage of a vessel or goods at sea, even when the goods have been abandoned, does not divest the original owner of title or grant ownership rights to the salvor\u201d); Continental Ins. Co. v. The Clayton Hardtop Skiff, 367 F.2d 230, 236 (3d Cir.1966) (\u201cThe salvor has the right to salvage but he does not achieve ownership of the vessel by salving it\u201d); Chance, 606 F.Supp. at 804 (stating that \u201ceven though a vessel is abandoned without the hope of recovery or return, the title of the vessel remains in her owner\u201d and \u201c[t]he salvor of property has a right to an award or a lien against the property\u201d), aff'd 775 F.2d 302 (11th Cir.1985); Hener v. United States, 525 F.Supp. 350, 357 (S.D.N.Y.1981) (explaining that salvage law grants the salvor \u201conly a superior right of possession, and not title, until a court has passed on title and the salvage fee\u201d) (citing The Akaba, 54 F. 197 (4th Cir.1893)); The Port Hunter, 6 F.Supp. 1009, 1011 (D.Mass.1934) (stating the salvors have a claim \u201cparamount to all others\u201d and the control to enforce the claim, \u201c[b]ut \u2018their interest in the goods did not amount to ownership.... Th[e] right is merely a lien, a right to retain the goods till the salvage be paid\u2019 \u201d) (quoting Whitwell v. Wells, 41 Mass. 25, 24 Pick (Mass.) 25, 30 (1834)); The Carl Schurz, 5 F. Cas. 84, 86 (W.D.Tenn.1879) (No. 2414) (stating that the salvor \u201cis, to all intents and purposes, a joint owner\u201d of the property along with the original owner); The Amethyst, 1 F. Cas. at 763 (\u201cThe finder of property, left derelict at sea, does not acquire the dominion or the absolute property in what is found. He acquires the right of possession only, with a title to a reasonable reward for his services\u201d)."},"case_id":940817,"label":"b"}
{"context":"It is critical to note that under salvage law, the salvor receives a lien in the property, not title to the property, and as long as the case remains a salvage case, the lienholder cannot assert a right to title even though he may end up with title following execution or foreclosure of the lien.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"stating that \"even though a vessel is abandoned without the hope of recovery or return, the title of the vessel remains in her owner\" and \"[t]he salvor of property has a right to an award or a lien against the property\"","sentence":"See, e.g., The Akaba v. Burg, 54 F. 197, 200 (4th Cir.1893) (\u201cWhen articles are lost at sea the title of the owner in them remains\u201d); see also Adams v. Unione Mediterranea Di Sicurta, 220 F.3d 659, 670-71 (5th Cir.2000) (explaining that the owner of the salvaged goods \u201cdoes not lose title even though the property may become the subject of salvage services,\u201d because, through the lien, the salvor obtains only a \u201cright of possession\u201d in the property and not \u201cownership or title to the salved property\u201d) (quoting Benedict on Admiralty \u00a7 150); Treasure Salvors, 640 F.2d at 567 (\u201cAlthough the law of salvage grants the salvor a right to possession of the property, the salvage of a vessel or goods at sea, even when the goods have been abandoned, does not divest the original owner of title or grant ownership rights to the salvor\u201d); Continental Ins. Co. v. The Clayton Hardtop Skiff, 367 F.2d 230, 236 (3d Cir.1966) (\u201cThe salvor has the right to salvage but he does not achieve ownership of the vessel by salving it\u201d); Chance, 606 F.Supp. at 804 (stating that \u201ceven though a vessel is abandoned without the hope of recovery or return, the title of the vessel remains in her owner\u201d and \u201c[t]he salvor of property has a right to an award or a lien against the property\u201d), aff'd 775 F.2d 302 (11th Cir.1985); Hener v. United States, 525 F.Supp. 350, 357 (S.D.N.Y.1981) (explaining that salvage law grants the salvor \u201conly a superior right of possession, and not title, until a court has passed on title and the salvage fee\u201d) (citing The Akaba, 54 F. 197 (4th Cir.1893)); The Port Hunter, 6 F.Supp. 1009, 1011 (D.Mass.1934) (stating the salvors have a claim \u201cparamount to all others\u201d and the control to enforce the claim, \u201c[b]ut \u2018their interest in the goods did not amount to ownership.... Th[e] right is merely a lien, a right to retain the goods till the salvage be paid\u2019 \u201d) (quoting Whitwell v. Wells, 41 Mass. 25, 24 Pick (Mass.) 25, 30 (1834)); The Carl Schurz, 5 F. Cas. 84, 86 (W.D.Tenn.1879) (No. 2414) (stating that the salvor \u201cis, to all intents and purposes, a joint owner\u201d of the property along with the original owner); The Amethyst, 1 F. Cas. at 763 (\u201cThe finder of property, left derelict at sea, does not acquire the dominion or the absolute property in what is found. He acquires the right of possession only, with a title to a reasonable reward for his services\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"54 F. 197, 200","parenthetical":"\"When articles are lost at sea the title of the owner in them remains\"","sentence":"See, e.g., The Akaba v. Burg, 54 F. 197, 200 (4th Cir.1893) (\u201cWhen articles are lost at sea the title of the owner in them remains\u201d); see also Adams v. Unione Mediterranea Di Sicurta, 220 F.3d 659, 670-71 (5th Cir.2000) (explaining that the owner of the salvaged goods \u201cdoes not lose title even though the property may become the subject of salvage services,\u201d because, through the lien, the salvor obtains only a \u201cright of possession\u201d in the property and not \u201cownership or title to the salved property\u201d) (quoting Benedict on Admiralty \u00a7 150); Treasure Salvors, 640 F.2d at 567 (\u201cAlthough the law of salvage grants the salvor a right to possession of the property, the salvage of a vessel or goods at sea, even when the goods have been abandoned, does not divest the original owner of title or grant ownership rights to the salvor\u201d); Continental Ins. Co. v. The Clayton Hardtop Skiff, 367 F.2d 230, 236 (3d Cir.1966) (\u201cThe salvor has the right to salvage but he does not achieve ownership of the vessel by salving it\u201d); Chance, 606 F.Supp. at 804 (stating that \u201ceven though a vessel is abandoned without the hope of recovery or return, the title of the vessel remains in her owner\u201d and \u201c[t]he salvor of property has a right to an award or a lien against the property\u201d), aff'd 775 F.2d 302 (11th Cir.1985); Hener v. United States, 525 F.Supp. 350, 357 (S.D.N.Y.1981) (explaining that salvage law grants the salvor \u201conly a superior right of possession, and not title, until a court has passed on title and the salvage fee\u201d) (citing The Akaba, 54 F. 197 (4th Cir.1893)); The Port Hunter, 6 F.Supp. 1009, 1011 (D.Mass.1934) (stating the salvors have a claim \u201cparamount to all others\u201d and the control to enforce the claim, \u201c[b]ut \u2018their interest in the goods did not amount to ownership.... Th[e] right is merely a lien, a right to retain the goods till the salvage be paid\u2019 \u201d) (quoting Whitwell v. Wells, 41 Mass. 25, 24 Pick (Mass.) 25, 30 (1834)); The Carl Schurz, 5 F. Cas. 84, 86 (W.D.Tenn.1879) (No. 2414) (stating that the salvor \u201cis, to all intents and purposes, a joint owner\u201d of the property along with the original owner); The Amethyst, 1 F. Cas. at 763 (\u201cThe finder of property, left derelict at sea, does not acquire the dominion or the absolute property in what is found. He acquires the right of possession only, with a title to a reasonable reward for his services\u201d)."},"case_id":940817,"label":"b"}
{"context":"It is critical to note that under salvage law, the salvor receives a lien in the property, not title to the property, and as long as the case remains a salvage case, the lienholder cannot assert a right to title even though he may end up with title following execution or foreclosure of the lien.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"5 F. Cas. 84, 86","parenthetical":"stating that the salvor \"is, to all intents and purposes, a joint owner\" of the property along with the original owner","sentence":"See, e.g., The Akaba v. Burg, 54 F. 197, 200 (4th Cir.1893) (\u201cWhen articles are lost at sea the title of the owner in them remains\u201d); see also Adams v. Unione Mediterranea Di Sicurta, 220 F.3d 659, 670-71 (5th Cir.2000) (explaining that the owner of the salvaged goods \u201cdoes not lose title even though the property may become the subject of salvage services,\u201d because, through the lien, the salvor obtains only a \u201cright of possession\u201d in the property and not \u201cownership or title to the salved property\u201d) (quoting Benedict on Admiralty \u00a7 150); Treasure Salvors, 640 F.2d at 567 (\u201cAlthough the law of salvage grants the salvor a right to possession of the property, the salvage of a vessel or goods at sea, even when the goods have been abandoned, does not divest the original owner of title or grant ownership rights to the salvor\u201d); Continental Ins. Co. v. The Clayton Hardtop Skiff, 367 F.2d 230, 236 (3d Cir.1966) (\u201cThe salvor has the right to salvage but he does not achieve ownership of the vessel by salving it\u201d); Chance, 606 F.Supp. at 804 (stating that \u201ceven though a vessel is abandoned without the hope of recovery or return, the title of the vessel remains in her owner\u201d and \u201c[t]he salvor of property has a right to an award or a lien against the property\u201d), aff'd 775 F.2d 302 (11th Cir.1985); Hener v. United States, 525 F.Supp. 350, 357 (S.D.N.Y.1981) (explaining that salvage law grants the salvor \u201conly a superior right of possession, and not title, until a court has passed on title and the salvage fee\u201d) (citing The Akaba, 54 F. 197 (4th Cir.1893)); The Port Hunter, 6 F.Supp. 1009, 1011 (D.Mass.1934) (stating the salvors have a claim \u201cparamount to all others\u201d and the control to enforce the claim, \u201c[b]ut \u2018their interest in the goods did not amount to ownership.... Th[e] right is merely a lien, a right to retain the goods till the salvage be paid\u2019 \u201d) (quoting Whitwell v. Wells, 41 Mass. 25, 24 Pick (Mass.) 25, 30 (1834)); The Carl Schurz, 5 F. Cas. 84, 86 (W.D.Tenn.1879) (No. 2414) (stating that the salvor \u201cis, to all intents and purposes, a joint owner\u201d of the property along with the original owner); The Amethyst, 1 F. Cas. at 763 (\u201cThe finder of property, left derelict at sea, does not acquire the dominion or the absolute property in what is found. He acquires the right of possession only, with a title to a reasonable reward for his services\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"54 F. 197, 200","parenthetical":"\"When articles are lost at sea the title of the owner in them remains\"","sentence":"See, e.g., The Akaba v. Burg, 54 F. 197, 200 (4th Cir.1893) (\u201cWhen articles are lost at sea the title of the owner in them remains\u201d); see also Adams v. Unione Mediterranea Di Sicurta, 220 F.3d 659, 670-71 (5th Cir.2000) (explaining that the owner of the salvaged goods \u201cdoes not lose title even though the property may become the subject of salvage services,\u201d because, through the lien, the salvor obtains only a \u201cright of possession\u201d in the property and not \u201cownership or title to the salved property\u201d) (quoting Benedict on Admiralty \u00a7 150); Treasure Salvors, 640 F.2d at 567 (\u201cAlthough the law of salvage grants the salvor a right to possession of the property, the salvage of a vessel or goods at sea, even when the goods have been abandoned, does not divest the original owner of title or grant ownership rights to the salvor\u201d); Continental Ins. Co. v. The Clayton Hardtop Skiff, 367 F.2d 230, 236 (3d Cir.1966) (\u201cThe salvor has the right to salvage but he does not achieve ownership of the vessel by salving it\u201d); Chance, 606 F.Supp. at 804 (stating that \u201ceven though a vessel is abandoned without the hope of recovery or return, the title of the vessel remains in her owner\u201d and \u201c[t]he salvor of property has a right to an award or a lien against the property\u201d), aff'd 775 F.2d 302 (11th Cir.1985); Hener v. United States, 525 F.Supp. 350, 357 (S.D.N.Y.1981) (explaining that salvage law grants the salvor \u201conly a superior right of possession, and not title, until a court has passed on title and the salvage fee\u201d) (citing The Akaba, 54 F. 197 (4th Cir.1893)); The Port Hunter, 6 F.Supp. 1009, 1011 (D.Mass.1934) (stating the salvors have a claim \u201cparamount to all others\u201d and the control to enforce the claim, \u201c[b]ut \u2018their interest in the goods did not amount to ownership.... Th[e] right is merely a lien, a right to retain the goods till the salvage be paid\u2019 \u201d) (quoting Whitwell v. Wells, 41 Mass. 25, 24 Pick (Mass.) 25, 30 (1834)); The Carl Schurz, 5 F. Cas. 84, 86 (W.D.Tenn.1879) (No. 2414) (stating that the salvor \u201cis, to all intents and purposes, a joint owner\u201d of the property along with the original owner); The Amethyst, 1 F. Cas. at 763 (\u201cThe finder of property, left derelict at sea, does not acquire the dominion or the absolute property in what is found. He acquires the right of possession only, with a title to a reasonable reward for his services\u201d)."},"case_id":940817,"label":"b"}
{"context":"It is critical to note that under salvage law, the salvor receives a lien in the property, not title to the property, and as long as the case remains a salvage case, the lienholder cannot assert a right to title even though he may end up with title following execution or foreclosure of the lien.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"54 F. 197, 200","parenthetical":"\"When articles are lost at sea the title of the owner in them remains\"","sentence":"See, e.g., The Akaba v. Burg, 54 F. 197, 200 (4th Cir.1893) (\u201cWhen articles are lost at sea the title of the owner in them remains\u201d); see also Adams v. Unione Mediterranea Di Sicurta, 220 F.3d 659, 670-71 (5th Cir.2000) (explaining that the owner of the salvaged goods \u201cdoes not lose title even though the property may become the subject of salvage services,\u201d because, through the lien, the salvor obtains only a \u201cright of possession\u201d in the property and not \u201cownership or title to the salved property\u201d) (quoting Benedict on Admiralty \u00a7 150); Treasure Salvors, 640 F.2d at 567 (\u201cAlthough the law of salvage grants the salvor a right to possession of the property, the salvage of a vessel or goods at sea, even when the goods have been abandoned, does not divest the original owner of title or grant ownership rights to the salvor\u201d); Continental Ins. Co. v. The Clayton Hardtop Skiff, 367 F.2d 230, 236 (3d Cir.1966) (\u201cThe salvor has the right to salvage but he does not achieve ownership of the vessel by salving it\u201d); Chance, 606 F.Supp. at 804 (stating that \u201ceven though a vessel is abandoned without the hope of recovery or return, the title of the vessel remains in her owner\u201d and \u201c[t]he salvor of property has a right to an award or a lien against the property\u201d), aff'd 775 F.2d 302 (11th Cir.1985); Hener v. United States, 525 F.Supp. 350, 357 (S.D.N.Y.1981) (explaining that salvage law grants the salvor \u201conly a superior right of possession, and not title, until a court has passed on title and the salvage fee\u201d) (citing The Akaba, 54 F. 197 (4th Cir.1893)); The Port Hunter, 6 F.Supp. 1009, 1011 (D.Mass.1934) (stating the salvors have a claim \u201cparamount to all others\u201d and the control to enforce the claim, \u201c[b]ut \u2018their interest in the goods did not amount to ownership.... Th[e] right is merely a lien, a right to retain the goods till the salvage be paid\u2019 \u201d) (quoting Whitwell v. Wells, 41 Mass. 25, 24 Pick (Mass.) 25, 30 (1834)); The Carl Schurz, 5 F. Cas. 84, 86 (W.D.Tenn.1879) (No. 2414) (stating that the salvor \u201cis, to all intents and purposes, a joint owner\u201d of the property along with the original owner); The Amethyst, 1 F. Cas. at 763 (\u201cThe finder of property, left derelict at sea, does not acquire the dominion or the absolute property in what is found. He acquires the right of possession only, with a title to a reasonable reward for his services\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"1 F. Cas. 763, 763","parenthetical":"\"The finder of property, left derelict at sea, does not acquire the dominion or the absolute property in what is found. He acquires the right of possession only, with a title to a reasonable reward for his services\"","sentence":"See, e.g., The Akaba v. Burg, 54 F. 197, 200 (4th Cir.1893) (\u201cWhen articles are lost at sea the title of the owner in them remains\u201d); see also Adams v. Unione Mediterranea Di Sicurta, 220 F.3d 659, 670-71 (5th Cir.2000) (explaining that the owner of the salvaged goods \u201cdoes not lose title even though the property may become the subject of salvage services,\u201d because, through the lien, the salvor obtains only a \u201cright of possession\u201d in the property and not \u201cownership or title to the salved property\u201d) (quoting Benedict on Admiralty \u00a7 150); Treasure Salvors, 640 F.2d at 567 (\u201cAlthough the law of salvage grants the salvor a right to possession of the property, the salvage of a vessel or goods at sea, even when the goods have been abandoned, does not divest the original owner of title or grant ownership rights to the salvor\u201d); Continental Ins. Co. v. The Clayton Hardtop Skiff, 367 F.2d 230, 236 (3d Cir.1966) (\u201cThe salvor has the right to salvage but he does not achieve ownership of the vessel by salving it\u201d); Chance, 606 F.Supp. at 804 (stating that \u201ceven though a vessel is abandoned without the hope of recovery or return, the title of the vessel remains in her owner\u201d and \u201c[t]he salvor of property has a right to an award or a lien against the property\u201d), aff'd 775 F.2d 302 (11th Cir.1985); Hener v. United States, 525 F.Supp. 350, 357 (S.D.N.Y.1981) (explaining that salvage law grants the salvor \u201conly a superior right of possession, and not title, until a court has passed on title and the salvage fee\u201d) (citing The Akaba, 54 F. 197 (4th Cir.1893)); The Port Hunter, 6 F.Supp. 1009, 1011 (D.Mass.1934) (stating the salvors have a claim \u201cparamount to all others\u201d and the control to enforce the claim, \u201c[b]ut \u2018their interest in the goods did not amount to ownership.... Th[e] right is merely a lien, a right to retain the goods till the salvage be paid\u2019 \u201d) (quoting Whitwell v. Wells, 41 Mass. 25, 24 Pick (Mass.) 25, 30 (1834)); The Carl Schurz, 5 F. Cas. 84, 86 (W.D.Tenn.1879) (No. 2414) (stating that the salvor \u201cis, to all intents and purposes, a joint owner\u201d of the property along with the original owner); The Amethyst, 1 F. Cas. at 763 (\u201cThe finder of property, left derelict at sea, does not acquire the dominion or the absolute property in what is found. He acquires the right of possession only, with a title to a reasonable reward for his services\u201d)."},"case_id":940817,"label":"a"}
{"context":"So viewed, the trial court's order barring Pinot's testimony in its entirety went to the heart of the contested issue. That testimony was the linchpin of the Mayor's claim that his actions were objectively reasonable; it would have corroborated the Mayor's version of why he did what he did. Consequently, its exclusion was plainly prejudicial.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"329 F.3d 49, 49","parenthetical":"finding prejudicial error when the trial court withheld evidence from the jury on matters that were vital to the case","sentence":"See Cavin, 39 F.3d at 1309 (finding that the exclusion of expert testimony regarding the considerations that face an attorney whose client is using his services to perpetrate fraud was reversible error as it \u201cprevent[ed] the lawyer from effectively presenting his defense\u201d); cf. Blake, 329 F.3d at 49 (finding prejudicial error when the trial court withheld evidence from the jury on matters that were vital to the case)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"39 F.3d 1309, 1309","parenthetical":"finding that the exclusion of expert testimony regarding the considerations that face an attorney whose client is using his services to perpetrate fraud was reversible error as it \"prevent[ed] the lawyer from effectively presenting his defense\"","sentence":"See Cavin, 39 F.3d at 1309 (finding that the exclusion of expert testimony regarding the considerations that face an attorney whose client is using his services to perpetrate fraud was reversible error as it \u201cprevent[ed] the lawyer from effectively presenting his defense\u201d); cf. Blake, 329 F.3d at 49 (finding prejudicial error when the trial court withheld evidence from the jury on matters that were vital to the case)."},"case_id":781082,"label":"b"}
{"context":"We review a circuit court's determination that evidence offered pursuant to Rule 404(b) is clear and convincing under the \"any evidence\" standard.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"Bad act evidence that is not subject to a conviction must be shown by clear and convincing evidence and is reviewed under an 'any evidence' standard on appeal.\" (citing Wilson, 345 S.C. at 5-6, 545 S.E.2d at 829","sentence":"State v. Wilson, 345 S.C. 1, 5-6, 545 S.E.2d 827, 829 (2001) (reversing the court of appeals for not applying the any evidence standard in reviewing a circuit court\u2019s determination that Rule 404(b) evidence was clear and convincing); See also State v. Wallace, 384 S.C. 428, 432 n. 2, 683 S.E.2d 275, 277 n. 2 (2009) (\u201cBad act evidence that is not subject to a conviction must be shown by clear and convincing evidence and is reviewed under an \u2018any evidence\u2019 standard on appeal.\u201d (citing Wilson, 345 S.C. at 5-6, 545 S.E.2d at 829)). Because there is evidence to support the judge\u2019s ruling that the evidence was clear and convincing, we must affirm the trial court\u2019s ruling that the State satisfied the first element."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"345 S.C. 1, 5-6","parenthetical":"reversing the court of appeals for not applying the any evidence standard in reviewing a circuit court's determination that Rule 404(b) evidence was clear and convincing","sentence":"State v. Wilson, 345 S.C. 1, 5-6, 545 S.E.2d 827, 829 (2001) (reversing the court of appeals for not applying the any evidence standard in reviewing a circuit court\u2019s determination that Rule 404(b) evidence was clear and convincing); See also State v. Wallace, 384 S.C. 428, 432 n. 2, 683 S.E.2d 275, 277 n. 2 (2009) (\u201cBad act evidence that is not subject to a conviction must be shown by clear and convincing evidence and is reviewed under an \u2018any evidence\u2019 standard on appeal.\u201d (citing Wilson, 345 S.C. at 5-6, 545 S.E.2d at 829)). Because there is evidence to support the judge\u2019s ruling that the evidence was clear and convincing, we must affirm the trial court\u2019s ruling that the State satisfied the first element."},"case_id":3870997,"label":"b"}
{"context":"We review a circuit court's determination that evidence offered pursuant to Rule 404(b) is clear and convincing under the \"any evidence\" standard.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"345 S.C. 1, 5-6","parenthetical":"reversing the court of appeals for not applying the any evidence standard in reviewing a circuit court's determination that Rule 404(b) evidence was clear and convincing","sentence":"State v. Wilson, 345 S.C. 1, 5-6, 545 S.E.2d 827, 829 (2001) (reversing the court of appeals for not applying the any evidence standard in reviewing a circuit court\u2019s determination that Rule 404(b) evidence was clear and convincing); See also State v. Wallace, 384 S.C. 428, 432 n. 2, 683 S.E.2d 275, 277 n. 2 (2009) (\u201cBad act evidence that is not subject to a conviction must be shown by clear and convincing evidence and is reviewed under an \u2018any evidence\u2019 standard on appeal.\u201d (citing Wilson, 345 S.C. at 5-6, 545 S.E.2d at 829)). Because there is evidence to support the judge\u2019s ruling that the evidence was clear and convincing, we must affirm the trial court\u2019s ruling that the State satisfied the first element."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"Bad act evidence that is not subject to a conviction must be shown by clear and convincing evidence and is reviewed under an 'any evidence' standard on appeal.\" (citing Wilson, 345 S.C. at 5-6, 545 S.E.2d at 829","sentence":"State v. Wilson, 345 S.C. 1, 5-6, 545 S.E.2d 827, 829 (2001) (reversing the court of appeals for not applying the any evidence standard in reviewing a circuit court\u2019s determination that Rule 404(b) evidence was clear and convincing); See also State v. Wallace, 384 S.C. 428, 432 n. 2, 683 S.E.2d 275, 277 n. 2 (2009) (\u201cBad act evidence that is not subject to a conviction must be shown by clear and convincing evidence and is reviewed under an \u2018any evidence\u2019 standard on appeal.\u201d (citing Wilson, 345 S.C. at 5-6, 545 S.E.2d at 829)). Because there is evidence to support the judge\u2019s ruling that the evidence was clear and convincing, we must affirm the trial court\u2019s ruling that the State satisfied the first element."},"case_id":3870997,"label":"a"}
{"context":"We review a circuit court's determination that evidence offered pursuant to Rule 404(b) is clear and convincing under the \"any evidence\" standard.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"345 S.C. 1, 5-6","parenthetical":"reversing the court of appeals for not applying the any evidence standard in reviewing a circuit court's determination that Rule 404(b) evidence was clear and convincing","sentence":"State v. Wilson, 345 S.C. 1, 5-6, 545 S.E.2d 827, 829 (2001) (reversing the court of appeals for not applying the any evidence standard in reviewing a circuit court\u2019s determination that Rule 404(b) evidence was clear and convincing); See also State v. Wallace, 384 S.C. 428, 432 n. 2, 683 S.E.2d 275, 277 n. 2 (2009) (\u201cBad act evidence that is not subject to a conviction must be shown by clear and convincing evidence and is reviewed under an \u2018any evidence\u2019 standard on appeal.\u201d (citing Wilson, 345 S.C. at 5-6, 545 S.E.2d at 829)). Because there is evidence to support the judge\u2019s ruling that the evidence was clear and convincing, we must affirm the trial court\u2019s ruling that the State satisfied the first element."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"345 S.C. 5, 5-6","parenthetical":"\"Bad act evidence that is not subject to a conviction must be shown by clear and convincing evidence and is reviewed under an 'any evidence' standard on appeal.\" (citing Wilson, 345 S.C. at 5-6, 545 S.E.2d at 829","sentence":"State v. Wilson, 345 S.C. 1, 5-6, 545 S.E.2d 827, 829 (2001) (reversing the court of appeals for not applying the any evidence standard in reviewing a circuit court\u2019s determination that Rule 404(b) evidence was clear and convincing); See also State v. Wallace, 384 S.C. 428, 432 n. 2, 683 S.E.2d 275, 277 n. 2 (2009) (\u201cBad act evidence that is not subject to a conviction must be shown by clear and convincing evidence and is reviewed under an \u2018any evidence\u2019 standard on appeal.\u201d (citing Wilson, 345 S.C. at 5-6, 545 S.E.2d at 829)). Because there is evidence to support the judge\u2019s ruling that the evidence was clear and convincing, we must affirm the trial court\u2019s ruling that the State satisfied the first element."},"case_id":3870997,"label":"a"}
{"context":"We review a circuit court's determination that evidence offered pursuant to Rule 404(b) is clear and convincing under the \"any evidence\" standard.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"345 S.C. 1, 5-6","parenthetical":"reversing the court of appeals for not applying the any evidence standard in reviewing a circuit court's determination that Rule 404(b) evidence was clear and convincing","sentence":"State v. Wilson, 345 S.C. 1, 5-6, 545 S.E.2d 827, 829 (2001) (reversing the court of appeals for not applying the any evidence standard in reviewing a circuit court\u2019s determination that Rule 404(b) evidence was clear and convincing); See also State v. Wallace, 384 S.C. 428, 432 n. 2, 683 S.E.2d 275, 277 n. 2 (2009) (\u201cBad act evidence that is not subject to a conviction must be shown by clear and convincing evidence and is reviewed under an \u2018any evidence\u2019 standard on appeal.\u201d (citing Wilson, 345 S.C. at 5-6, 545 S.E.2d at 829)). Because there is evidence to support the judge\u2019s ruling that the evidence was clear and convincing, we must affirm the trial court\u2019s ruling that the State satisfied the first element."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"545 S.E.2d 829, 829","parenthetical":"\"Bad act evidence that is not subject to a conviction must be shown by clear and convincing evidence and is reviewed under an 'any evidence' standard on appeal.\" (citing Wilson, 345 S.C. at 5-6, 545 S.E.2d at 829","sentence":"State v. Wilson, 345 S.C. 1, 5-6, 545 S.E.2d 827, 829 (2001) (reversing the court of appeals for not applying the any evidence standard in reviewing a circuit court\u2019s determination that Rule 404(b) evidence was clear and convincing); See also State v. Wallace, 384 S.C. 428, 432 n. 2, 683 S.E.2d 275, 277 n. 2 (2009) (\u201cBad act evidence that is not subject to a conviction must be shown by clear and convincing evidence and is reviewed under an \u2018any evidence\u2019 standard on appeal.\u201d (citing Wilson, 345 S.C. at 5-6, 545 S.E.2d at 829)). Because there is evidence to support the judge\u2019s ruling that the evidence was clear and convincing, we must affirm the trial court\u2019s ruling that the State satisfied the first element."},"case_id":3870997,"label":"a"}
{"context":"We review a circuit court's determination that evidence offered pursuant to Rule 404(b) is clear and convincing under the \"any evidence\" standard.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"Bad act evidence that is not subject to a conviction must be shown by clear and convincing evidence and is reviewed under an 'any evidence' standard on appeal.\" (citing Wilson, 345 S.C. at 5-6, 545 S.E.2d at 829","sentence":"State v. Wilson, 345 S.C. 1, 5-6, 545 S.E.2d 827, 829 (2001) (reversing the court of appeals for not applying the any evidence standard in reviewing a circuit court\u2019s determination that Rule 404(b) evidence was clear and convincing); See also State v. Wallace, 384 S.C. 428, 432 n. 2, 683 S.E.2d 275, 277 n. 2 (2009) (\u201cBad act evidence that is not subject to a conviction must be shown by clear and convincing evidence and is reviewed under an \u2018any evidence\u2019 standard on appeal.\u201d (citing Wilson, 345 S.C. at 5-6, 545 S.E.2d at 829)). Because there is evidence to support the judge\u2019s ruling that the evidence was clear and convincing, we must affirm the trial court\u2019s ruling that the State satisfied the first element."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"545 S.E.2d 827, 829","parenthetical":"reversing the court of appeals for not applying the any evidence standard in reviewing a circuit court's determination that Rule 404(b) evidence was clear and convincing","sentence":"State v. Wilson, 345 S.C. 1, 5-6, 545 S.E.2d 827, 829 (2001) (reversing the court of appeals for not applying the any evidence standard in reviewing a circuit court\u2019s determination that Rule 404(b) evidence was clear and convincing); See also State v. Wallace, 384 S.C. 428, 432 n. 2, 683 S.E.2d 275, 277 n. 2 (2009) (\u201cBad act evidence that is not subject to a conviction must be shown by clear and convincing evidence and is reviewed under an \u2018any evidence\u2019 standard on appeal.\u201d (citing Wilson, 345 S.C. at 5-6, 545 S.E.2d at 829)). Because there is evidence to support the judge\u2019s ruling that the evidence was clear and convincing, we must affirm the trial court\u2019s ruling that the State satisfied the first element."},"case_id":3870997,"label":"b"}
{"context":"We review a circuit court's determination that evidence offered pursuant to Rule 404(b) is clear and convincing under the \"any evidence\" standard.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"545 S.E.2d 827, 829","parenthetical":"reversing the court of appeals for not applying the any evidence standard in reviewing a circuit court's determination that Rule 404(b) evidence was clear and convincing","sentence":"State v. Wilson, 345 S.C. 1, 5-6, 545 S.E.2d 827, 829 (2001) (reversing the court of appeals for not applying the any evidence standard in reviewing a circuit court\u2019s determination that Rule 404(b) evidence was clear and convincing); See also State v. Wallace, 384 S.C. 428, 432 n. 2, 683 S.E.2d 275, 277 n. 2 (2009) (\u201cBad act evidence that is not subject to a conviction must be shown by clear and convincing evidence and is reviewed under an \u2018any evidence\u2019 standard on appeal.\u201d (citing Wilson, 345 S.C. at 5-6, 545 S.E.2d at 829)). Because there is evidence to support the judge\u2019s ruling that the evidence was clear and convincing, we must affirm the trial court\u2019s ruling that the State satisfied the first element."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"Bad act evidence that is not subject to a conviction must be shown by clear and convincing evidence and is reviewed under an 'any evidence' standard on appeal.\" (citing Wilson, 345 S.C. at 5-6, 545 S.E.2d at 829","sentence":"State v. Wilson, 345 S.C. 1, 5-6, 545 S.E.2d 827, 829 (2001) (reversing the court of appeals for not applying the any evidence standard in reviewing a circuit court\u2019s determination that Rule 404(b) evidence was clear and convincing); See also State v. Wallace, 384 S.C. 428, 432 n. 2, 683 S.E.2d 275, 277 n. 2 (2009) (\u201cBad act evidence that is not subject to a conviction must be shown by clear and convincing evidence and is reviewed under an \u2018any evidence\u2019 standard on appeal.\u201d (citing Wilson, 345 S.C. at 5-6, 545 S.E.2d at 829)). Because there is evidence to support the judge\u2019s ruling that the evidence was clear and convincing, we must affirm the trial court\u2019s ruling that the State satisfied the first element."},"case_id":3870997,"label":"a"}
{"context":"We review a circuit court's determination that evidence offered pursuant to Rule 404(b) is clear and convincing under the \"any evidence\" standard.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"345 S.C. 5, 5-6","parenthetical":"\"Bad act evidence that is not subject to a conviction must be shown by clear and convincing evidence and is reviewed under an 'any evidence' standard on appeal.\" (citing Wilson, 345 S.C. at 5-6, 545 S.E.2d at 829","sentence":"State v. Wilson, 345 S.C. 1, 5-6, 545 S.E.2d 827, 829 (2001) (reversing the court of appeals for not applying the any evidence standard in reviewing a circuit court\u2019s determination that Rule 404(b) evidence was clear and convincing); See also State v. Wallace, 384 S.C. 428, 432 n. 2, 683 S.E.2d 275, 277 n. 2 (2009) (\u201cBad act evidence that is not subject to a conviction must be shown by clear and convincing evidence and is reviewed under an \u2018any evidence\u2019 standard on appeal.\u201d (citing Wilson, 345 S.C. at 5-6, 545 S.E.2d at 829)). Because there is evidence to support the judge\u2019s ruling that the evidence was clear and convincing, we must affirm the trial court\u2019s ruling that the State satisfied the first element."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"545 S.E.2d 827, 829","parenthetical":"reversing the court of appeals for not applying the any evidence standard in reviewing a circuit court's determination that Rule 404(b) evidence was clear and convincing","sentence":"State v. Wilson, 345 S.C. 1, 5-6, 545 S.E.2d 827, 829 (2001) (reversing the court of appeals for not applying the any evidence standard in reviewing a circuit court\u2019s determination that Rule 404(b) evidence was clear and convincing); See also State v. Wallace, 384 S.C. 428, 432 n. 2, 683 S.E.2d 275, 277 n. 2 (2009) (\u201cBad act evidence that is not subject to a conviction must be shown by clear and convincing evidence and is reviewed under an \u2018any evidence\u2019 standard on appeal.\u201d (citing Wilson, 345 S.C. at 5-6, 545 S.E.2d at 829)). Because there is evidence to support the judge\u2019s ruling that the evidence was clear and convincing, we must affirm the trial court\u2019s ruling that the State satisfied the first element."},"case_id":3870997,"label":"b"}
{"context":"We review a circuit court's determination that evidence offered pursuant to Rule 404(b) is clear and convincing under the \"any evidence\" standard.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"545 S.E.2d 827, 829","parenthetical":"reversing the court of appeals for not applying the any evidence standard in reviewing a circuit court's determination that Rule 404(b) evidence was clear and convincing","sentence":"State v. Wilson, 345 S.C. 1, 5-6, 545 S.E.2d 827, 829 (2001) (reversing the court of appeals for not applying the any evidence standard in reviewing a circuit court\u2019s determination that Rule 404(b) evidence was clear and convincing); See also State v. Wallace, 384 S.C. 428, 432 n. 2, 683 S.E.2d 275, 277 n. 2 (2009) (\u201cBad act evidence that is not subject to a conviction must be shown by clear and convincing evidence and is reviewed under an \u2018any evidence\u2019 standard on appeal.\u201d (citing Wilson, 345 S.C. at 5-6, 545 S.E.2d at 829)). Because there is evidence to support the judge\u2019s ruling that the evidence was clear and convincing, we must affirm the trial court\u2019s ruling that the State satisfied the first element."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"545 S.E.2d 829, 829","parenthetical":"\"Bad act evidence that is not subject to a conviction must be shown by clear and convincing evidence and is reviewed under an 'any evidence' standard on appeal.\" (citing Wilson, 345 S.C. at 5-6, 545 S.E.2d at 829","sentence":"State v. Wilson, 345 S.C. 1, 5-6, 545 S.E.2d 827, 829 (2001) (reversing the court of appeals for not applying the any evidence standard in reviewing a circuit court\u2019s determination that Rule 404(b) evidence was clear and convincing); See also State v. Wallace, 384 S.C. 428, 432 n. 2, 683 S.E.2d 275, 277 n. 2 (2009) (\u201cBad act evidence that is not subject to a conviction must be shown by clear and convincing evidence and is reviewed under an \u2018any evidence\u2019 standard on appeal.\u201d (citing Wilson, 345 S.C. at 5-6, 545 S.E.2d at 829)). Because there is evidence to support the judge\u2019s ruling that the evidence was clear and convincing, we must affirm the trial court\u2019s ruling that the State satisfied the first element."},"case_id":3870997,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In addition, we have repeatedly held that, when a party has failed to demand that an issue of fact be submitted to the jury or fails to object to the trial court taking an issue of fact away from the jury, the party waives any objection to the factual issue not being submitted to the jury.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"235 Or App 524, 531","parenthetical":"\"holding that defendant was required to voice an objection to the court's decision to remove that issue from the jury in order to avoid waiving the right to a jury trial of that issue\"","sentence":"Precision Lumber Co., 125 Or App at 37-38 (noting that \u201cwhen an issue has been omitted\u201d from a special verdict, \u201cthe parties must propose additional interrogatories for submission to the jury before it retires; otherwise, the right to a jury trial on that issue is waived\u201d); Taylor v. Ramsay-Gerding Construction Co., 235 Or App 524, 531, 234 P3d 129 (2010) (\u201cholding that defendant was required to voice an objection to the court\u2019s decision to remove that issue from the jury in order to avoid waiving the right to a jury trial of that issue\u201d); see also State ex rel Sam\u2019s Texaco & Towing v. Gallagher, 314 Or 652, 663, 842 P2d 383 (1992) (a party must object to the form of a question in the special verdict form before the jury retires, otherwise the right to raise the issue is waived). Because defendant did not advance at trial the legal issue it raised after trial, it waived any right to have a jury decide any additional or different fact issues related to its employer status under ORS 652.150 that defendant believes existed."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"314 Or 652, 663","parenthetical":"a party must object to the form of a question in the special verdict form before the jury retires, otherwise the right to raise the issue is waived","sentence":"Precision Lumber Co., 125 Or App at 37-38 (noting that \u201cwhen an issue has been omitted\u201d from a special verdict, \u201cthe parties must propose additional interrogatories for submission to the jury before it retires; otherwise, the right to a jury trial on that issue is waived\u201d); Taylor v. Ramsay-Gerding Construction Co., 235 Or App 524, 531, 234 P3d 129 (2010) (\u201cholding that defendant was required to voice an objection to the court\u2019s decision to remove that issue from the jury in order to avoid waiving the right to a jury trial of that issue\u201d); see also State ex rel Sam\u2019s Texaco & Towing v. Gallagher, 314 Or 652, 663, 842 P2d 383 (1992) (a party must object to the form of a question in the special verdict form before the jury retires, otherwise the right to raise the issue is waived). Because defendant did not advance at trial the legal issue it raised after trial, it waived any right to have a jury decide any additional or different fact issues related to its employer status under ORS 652.150 that defendant believes existed."},"case_id":4331180,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The state maintains that the district court failed to recognize that the contraband found in the consensual search of the passenger compartment gave Officer Howard probable cause to search the trunk and Darnall's knapsack, and, therefore, consent was not required.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"342 N.W.2d 105, 111","parenthetical":"if police lawfully discover contraband in passenger compartment of car, they then have probable cause to search trunk","sentence":"See State v. Schinzing, 342 N.W.2d 105, 111 (Minn.1983) (if police lawfully discover contraband in passenger compartment of car, they then have probable cause to search trunk); see also United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825, 102 S.Ct. 2157, 2173, 72 L.Ed.2d 572 (1982) (probable cause permits search of every part of vehicle that may conceal object of search), cited in Schinzing, 342 N.W.2d at 111. Darnall responds that the district court implicitly found that there was no probable cause to believe his knapsack would contain the object of the search."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"456 U.S. 798, 825","parenthetical":"probable cause permits search of every part of vehicle that may conceal object of search","sentence":"See State v. Schinzing, 342 N.W.2d 105, 111 (Minn.1983) (if police lawfully discover contraband in passenger compartment of car, they then have probable cause to search trunk); see also United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825, 102 S.Ct. 2157, 2173, 72 L.Ed.2d 572 (1982) (probable cause permits search of every part of vehicle that may conceal object of search), cited in Schinzing, 342 N.W.2d at 111. Darnall responds that the district court implicitly found that there was no probable cause to believe his knapsack would contain the object of the search."},"case_id":10614514,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The state maintains that the district court failed to recognize that the contraband found in the consensual search of the passenger compartment gave Officer Howard probable cause to search the trunk and Darnall's knapsack, and, therefore, consent was not required.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"102 S.Ct. 2157, 2173","parenthetical":"probable cause permits search of every part of vehicle that may conceal object of search","sentence":"See State v. Schinzing, 342 N.W.2d 105, 111 (Minn.1983) (if police lawfully discover contraband in passenger compartment of car, they then have probable cause to search trunk); see also United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825, 102 S.Ct. 2157, 2173, 72 L.Ed.2d 572 (1982) (probable cause permits search of every part of vehicle that may conceal object of search), cited in Schinzing, 342 N.W.2d at 111. Darnall responds that the district court implicitly found that there was no probable cause to believe his knapsack would contain the object of the search."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"342 N.W.2d 105, 111","parenthetical":"if police lawfully discover contraband in passenger compartment of car, they then have probable cause to search trunk","sentence":"See State v. Schinzing, 342 N.W.2d 105, 111 (Minn.1983) (if police lawfully discover contraband in passenger compartment of car, they then have probable cause to search trunk); see also United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825, 102 S.Ct. 2157, 2173, 72 L.Ed.2d 572 (1982) (probable cause permits search of every part of vehicle that may conceal object of search), cited in Schinzing, 342 N.W.2d at 111. Darnall responds that the district court implicitly found that there was no probable cause to believe his knapsack would contain the object of the search."},"case_id":10614514,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The state maintains that the district court failed to recognize that the contraband found in the consensual search of the passenger compartment gave Officer Howard probable cause to search the trunk and Darnall's knapsack, and, therefore, consent was not required.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"probable cause permits search of every part of vehicle that may conceal object of search","sentence":"See State v. Schinzing, 342 N.W.2d 105, 111 (Minn.1983) (if police lawfully discover contraband in passenger compartment of car, they then have probable cause to search trunk); see also United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825, 102 S.Ct. 2157, 2173, 72 L.Ed.2d 572 (1982) (probable cause permits search of every part of vehicle that may conceal object of search), cited in Schinzing, 342 N.W.2d at 111. Darnall responds that the district court implicitly found that there was no probable cause to believe his knapsack would contain the object of the search."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"342 N.W.2d 105, 111","parenthetical":"if police lawfully discover contraband in passenger compartment of car, they then have probable cause to search trunk","sentence":"See State v. Schinzing, 342 N.W.2d 105, 111 (Minn.1983) (if police lawfully discover contraband in passenger compartment of car, they then have probable cause to search trunk); see also United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825, 102 S.Ct. 2157, 2173, 72 L.Ed.2d 572 (1982) (probable cause permits search of every part of vehicle that may conceal object of search), cited in Schinzing, 342 N.W.2d at 111. Darnall responds that the district court implicitly found that there was no probable cause to believe his knapsack would contain the object of the search."},"case_id":10614514,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The state maintains that the district court failed to recognize that the contraband found in the consensual search of the passenger compartment gave Officer Howard probable cause to search the trunk and Darnall's knapsack, and, therefore, consent was not required.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"342 N.W.2d 105, 111","parenthetical":"if police lawfully discover contraband in passenger compartment of car, they then have probable cause to search trunk","sentence":"See State v. Schinzing, 342 N.W.2d 105, 111 (Minn.1983) (if police lawfully discover contraband in passenger compartment of car, they then have probable cause to search trunk); see also United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825, 102 S.Ct. 2157, 2173, 72 L.Ed.2d 572 (1982) (probable cause permits search of every part of vehicle that may conceal object of search), cited in Schinzing, 342 N.W.2d at 111. Darnall responds that the district court implicitly found that there was no probable cause to believe his knapsack would contain the object of the search."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"342 N.W.2d 111, 111","parenthetical":"probable cause permits search of every part of vehicle that may conceal object of search","sentence":"See State v. Schinzing, 342 N.W.2d 105, 111 (Minn.1983) (if police lawfully discover contraband in passenger compartment of car, they then have probable cause to search trunk); see also United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825, 102 S.Ct. 2157, 2173, 72 L.Ed.2d 572 (1982) (probable cause permits search of every part of vehicle that may conceal object of search), cited in Schinzing, 342 N.W.2d at 111. Darnall responds that the district court implicitly found that there was no probable cause to believe his knapsack would contain the object of the search."},"case_id":10614514,"label":"a"}
{"context":"That Act established two categories of debts, those that were \"allowable\" and those that were \"provable.\" \"Only if a debt was allowable could the creditor receive a share of the bankrupt's assets.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"the only federal court decision found by the Kelly Court that allowed a discharge to affect a sentence imposed by a state criminal court","sentence":"Id., at 45, 107 S.Ct., at 358. See, e.g., In re Abramson, 210 F. 878, 880 (CA2 1914) (\u201cjudgments for penalties are not debts which can be proved or allowed as such because they are not for a fixed liability\u201d); cf. In re Alderson, 98 F. 588 (W.Va.1899) (the only federal court decision found by the Kelly Court that allowed a discharge to affect a sentence imposed by a state criminal court)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"107 S.Ct. 358, 358","parenthetical":"\"judgments for penalties are not debts which can be proved or allowed as such because they are not for a fixed liability\"","sentence":"Id., at 45, 107 S.Ct., at 358. See, e.g., In re Abramson, 210 F. 878, 880 (CA2 1914) (\u201cjudgments for penalties are not debts which can be proved or allowed as such because they are not for a fixed liability\u201d); cf. In re Alderson, 98 F. 588 (W.Va.1899) (the only federal court decision found by the Kelly Court that allowed a discharge to affect a sentence imposed by a state criminal court)."},"case_id":6122672,"label":"b"}
{"context":"That Act established two categories of debts, those that were \"allowable\" and those that were \"provable.\" \"Only if a debt was allowable could the creditor receive a share of the bankrupt's assets.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"210 F. 878, 880","parenthetical":"\"judgments for penalties are not debts which can be proved or allowed as such because they are not for a fixed liability\"","sentence":"Id., at 45, 107 S.Ct., at 358. See, e.g., In re Abramson, 210 F. 878, 880 (CA2 1914) (\u201cjudgments for penalties are not debts which can be proved or allowed as such because they are not for a fixed liability\u201d); cf. In re Alderson, 98 F. 588 (W.Va.1899) (the only federal court decision found by the Kelly Court that allowed a discharge to affect a sentence imposed by a state criminal court)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"the only federal court decision found by the Kelly Court that allowed a discharge to affect a sentence imposed by a state criminal court","sentence":"Id., at 45, 107 S.Ct., at 358. See, e.g., In re Abramson, 210 F. 878, 880 (CA2 1914) (\u201cjudgments for penalties are not debts which can be proved or allowed as such because they are not for a fixed liability\u201d); cf. In re Alderson, 98 F. 588 (W.Va.1899) (the only federal court decision found by the Kelly Court that allowed a discharge to affect a sentence imposed by a state criminal court)."},"case_id":6122672,"label":"a"}
{"context":". Section 3304 also has a similar effect to Section 3303, in that it removes local government's necessary and reasonable authority to carry out its trustee obligations by prohibiting the enactment of ordinances tailored to local conditions. As we explained relative to Section 3303, the General Assembly may not command municipalities to ignore their obligations under Article I, Section 27 and, thereby, abridge citizens' constitutional rights indirectly.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"274 A.2d 196, 196-97","parenthetical":"Judiciary \"must possess\" inherent power to carry out its mandated responsibilities","sentence":"See Mesivtah, 44 A.3d at 9 (statute \u201ccannot excuse the constitutional minimum\u201d for meeting public charity exemption from taxation); cf. Carroll, 274 A.2d at 196-97 (Judiciary \u201cmust possess\u201d inherent power to carry out its mandated responsibilities)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"44 A.3d 9, 9","parenthetical":"statute \"cannot excuse the constitutional minimum\" for meeting public charity exemption from taxation","sentence":"See Mesivtah, 44 A.3d at 9 (statute \u201ccannot excuse the constitutional minimum\u201d for meeting public charity exemption from taxation); cf. Carroll, 274 A.2d at 196-97 (Judiciary \u201cmust possess\u201d inherent power to carry out its mandated responsibilities)."},"case_id":4344715,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The parties here have done just that. The language here expresses the parties' clear intention that acceleration is automatic in the event of a bankruptcy filing, thereby avoiding the need to resort to the rule of construction established in Tymon and Wurzler.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that acceleration clauses are quite common and are generally enforceable according to their terms","sentence":"Corp. v. Pioneer Auto. Parks, Inc., 46 N.Y.2d 573, 577, 415 N.Y.S.2d 800, 389 N.E.2d 113 (1979) (\u201c[A]greements providing for the acceleration of the entire debt upon the default of the obligor ... [i]n the vast majority of instances ... have been enforced at law in accordance with their terms.\u201d)); see also Key Int\u2019l Mfg. Inc. v. Stillman, 103 A.D.2d 475, 480 N.Y.S.2d 528, 530-31 (1984) (holding that acceleration clauses are quite common and are generally enforceable according to their terms)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"379 B.R. 484, 484","parenthetical":"\"It was entirely appropriate to provide for automatic acceleration in the Original Indenture .... \"","sentence":"See, e.g., In re Solutia, 379 B.R. at 484 (\u201cIt was entirely appropriate to provide for automatic acceleration in the Original Indenture .... \u201d); Calpine Corp., 2010 WL 3835200, at *3, 2010 U.S. Dist. Lexis 96792, at *10 (\u201cAccording to the terms of the notes, a voluntary bankruptcy filing constitutes an event of default that accelerates and matures the notes.... \u201d); Premier Entm\u2019t, 445 B.R. at 628, 631 (citing, inter alia, Fifty States Mgt."},"case_id":4164128,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The parties here have done just that. The language here expresses the parties' clear intention that acceleration is automatic in the event of a bankruptcy filing, thereby avoiding the need to resort to the rule of construction established in Tymon and Wurzler.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"480 N.Y.S.2d 528, 530-31","parenthetical":"holding that acceleration clauses are quite common and are generally enforceable according to their terms","sentence":"Corp. v. Pioneer Auto. Parks, Inc., 46 N.Y.2d 573, 577, 415 N.Y.S.2d 800, 389 N.E.2d 113 (1979) (\u201c[A]greements providing for the acceleration of the entire debt upon the default of the obligor ... [i]n the vast majority of instances ... have been enforced at law in accordance with their terms.\u201d)); see also Key Int\u2019l Mfg. Inc. v. Stillman, 103 A.D.2d 475, 480 N.Y.S.2d 528, 530-31 (1984) (holding that acceleration clauses are quite common and are generally enforceable according to their terms)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"379 B.R. 484, 484","parenthetical":"\"It was entirely appropriate to provide for automatic acceleration in the Original Indenture .... \"","sentence":"See, e.g., In re Solutia, 379 B.R. at 484 (\u201cIt was entirely appropriate to provide for automatic acceleration in the Original Indenture .... \u201d); Calpine Corp., 2010 WL 3835200, at *3, 2010 U.S. Dist. Lexis 96792, at *10 (\u201cAccording to the terms of the notes, a voluntary bankruptcy filing constitutes an event of default that accelerates and matures the notes.... \u201d); Premier Entm\u2019t, 445 B.R. at 628, 631 (citing, inter alia, Fifty States Mgt."},"case_id":4164128,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The parties here have done just that. The language here expresses the parties' clear intention that acceleration is automatic in the event of a bankruptcy filing, thereby avoiding the need to resort to the rule of construction established in Tymon and Wurzler.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"2010 WL 3835200, at *3","parenthetical":"\"According to the terms of the notes, a voluntary bankruptcy filing constitutes an event of default that accelerates and matures the notes.... \"","sentence":"See, e.g., In re Solutia, 379 B.R. at 484 (\u201cIt was entirely appropriate to provide for automatic acceleration in the Original Indenture .... \u201d); Calpine Corp., 2010 WL 3835200, at *3, 2010 U.S. Dist. Lexis 96792, at *10 (\u201cAccording to the terms of the notes, a voluntary bankruptcy filing constitutes an event of default that accelerates and matures the notes.... \u201d); Premier Entm\u2019t, 445 B.R. at 628, 631 (citing, inter alia, Fifty States Mgt."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that acceleration clauses are quite common and are generally enforceable according to their terms","sentence":"Corp. v. Pioneer Auto. Parks, Inc., 46 N.Y.2d 573, 577, 415 N.Y.S.2d 800, 389 N.E.2d 113 (1979) (\u201c[A]greements providing for the acceleration of the entire debt upon the default of the obligor ... [i]n the vast majority of instances ... have been enforced at law in accordance with their terms.\u201d)); see also Key Int\u2019l Mfg. Inc. v. Stillman, 103 A.D.2d 475, 480 N.Y.S.2d 528, 530-31 (1984) (holding that acceleration clauses are quite common and are generally enforceable according to their terms)."},"case_id":4164128,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The parties here have done just that. The language here expresses the parties' clear intention that acceleration is automatic in the event of a bankruptcy filing, thereby avoiding the need to resort to the rule of construction established in Tymon and Wurzler.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"2010 WL 3835200, at *3","parenthetical":"\"According to the terms of the notes, a voluntary bankruptcy filing constitutes an event of default that accelerates and matures the notes.... \"","sentence":"See, e.g., In re Solutia, 379 B.R. at 484 (\u201cIt was entirely appropriate to provide for automatic acceleration in the Original Indenture .... \u201d); Calpine Corp., 2010 WL 3835200, at *3, 2010 U.S. Dist. Lexis 96792, at *10 (\u201cAccording to the terms of the notes, a voluntary bankruptcy filing constitutes an event of default that accelerates and matures the notes.... \u201d); Premier Entm\u2019t, 445 B.R. at 628, 631 (citing, inter alia, Fifty States Mgt."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"480 N.Y.S.2d 528, 530-31","parenthetical":"holding that acceleration clauses are quite common and are generally enforceable according to their terms","sentence":"Corp. v. Pioneer Auto. Parks, Inc., 46 N.Y.2d 573, 577, 415 N.Y.S.2d 800, 389 N.E.2d 113 (1979) (\u201c[A]greements providing for the acceleration of the entire debt upon the default of the obligor ... [i]n the vast majority of instances ... have been enforced at law in accordance with their terms.\u201d)); see also Key Int\u2019l Mfg. Inc. v. Stillman, 103 A.D.2d 475, 480 N.Y.S.2d 528, 530-31 (1984) (holding that acceleration clauses are quite common and are generally enforceable according to their terms)."},"case_id":4164128,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The parties here have done just that. The language here expresses the parties' clear intention that acceleration is automatic in the event of a bankruptcy filing, thereby avoiding the need to resort to the rule of construction established in Tymon and Wurzler.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that acceleration clauses are quite common and are generally enforceable according to their terms","sentence":"Corp. v. Pioneer Auto. Parks, Inc., 46 N.Y.2d 573, 577, 415 N.Y.S.2d 800, 389 N.E.2d 113 (1979) (\u201c[A]greements providing for the acceleration of the entire debt upon the default of the obligor ... [i]n the vast majority of instances ... have been enforced at law in accordance with their terms.\u201d)); see also Key Int\u2019l Mfg. Inc. v. Stillman, 103 A.D.2d 475, 480 N.Y.S.2d 528, 530-31 (1984) (holding that acceleration clauses are quite common and are generally enforceable according to their terms)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"46 N.Y.2d 573, 577","parenthetical":"\"[A]greements providing for the acceleration of the entire debt upon the default of the obligor ... [i]n the vast majority of instances ... have been enforced at law in accordance with their terms.\"","sentence":"Corp. v. Pioneer Auto. Parks, Inc., 46 N.Y.2d 573, 577, 415 N.Y.S.2d 800, 389 N.E.2d 113 (1979) (\u201c[A]greements providing for the acceleration of the entire debt upon the default of the obligor ... [i]n the vast majority of instances ... have been enforced at law in accordance with their terms.\u201d)); see also Key Int\u2019l Mfg. Inc. v. Stillman, 103 A.D.2d 475, 480 N.Y.S.2d 528, 530-31 (1984) (holding that acceleration clauses are quite common and are generally enforceable according to their terms)."},"case_id":4164128,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The parties here have done just that. The language here expresses the parties' clear intention that acceleration is automatic in the event of a bankruptcy filing, thereby avoiding the need to resort to the rule of construction established in Tymon and Wurzler.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"480 N.Y.S.2d 528, 530-31","parenthetical":"holding that acceleration clauses are quite common and are generally enforceable according to their terms","sentence":"Corp. v. Pioneer Auto. Parks, Inc., 46 N.Y.2d 573, 577, 415 N.Y.S.2d 800, 389 N.E.2d 113 (1979) (\u201c[A]greements providing for the acceleration of the entire debt upon the default of the obligor ... [i]n the vast majority of instances ... have been enforced at law in accordance with their terms.\u201d)); see also Key Int\u2019l Mfg. Inc. v. Stillman, 103 A.D.2d 475, 480 N.Y.S.2d 528, 530-31 (1984) (holding that acceleration clauses are quite common and are generally enforceable according to their terms)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"46 N.Y.2d 573, 577","parenthetical":"\"[A]greements providing for the acceleration of the entire debt upon the default of the obligor ... [i]n the vast majority of instances ... have been enforced at law in accordance with their terms.\"","sentence":"Corp. v. Pioneer Auto. Parks, Inc., 46 N.Y.2d 573, 577, 415 N.Y.S.2d 800, 389 N.E.2d 113 (1979) (\u201c[A]greements providing for the acceleration of the entire debt upon the default of the obligor ... [i]n the vast majority of instances ... have been enforced at law in accordance with their terms.\u201d)); see also Key Int\u2019l Mfg. Inc. v. Stillman, 103 A.D.2d 475, 480 N.Y.S.2d 528, 530-31 (1984) (holding that acceleration clauses are quite common and are generally enforceable according to their terms)."},"case_id":4164128,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The parties here have done just that. The language here expresses the parties' clear intention that acceleration is automatic in the event of a bankruptcy filing, thereby avoiding the need to resort to the rule of construction established in Tymon and Wurzler.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that acceleration clauses are quite common and are generally enforceable according to their terms","sentence":"Corp. v. Pioneer Auto. Parks, Inc., 46 N.Y.2d 573, 577, 415 N.Y.S.2d 800, 389 N.E.2d 113 (1979) (\u201c[A]greements providing for the acceleration of the entire debt upon the default of the obligor ... [i]n the vast majority of instances ... have been enforced at law in accordance with their terms.\u201d)); see also Key Int\u2019l Mfg. Inc. v. Stillman, 103 A.D.2d 475, 480 N.Y.S.2d 528, 530-31 (1984) (holding that acceleration clauses are quite common and are generally enforceable according to their terms)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[A]greements providing for the acceleration of the entire debt upon the default of the obligor ... [i]n the vast majority of instances ... have been enforced at law in accordance with their terms.\"","sentence":"Corp. v. Pioneer Auto. Parks, Inc., 46 N.Y.2d 573, 577, 415 N.Y.S.2d 800, 389 N.E.2d 113 (1979) (\u201c[A]greements providing for the acceleration of the entire debt upon the default of the obligor ... [i]n the vast majority of instances ... have been enforced at law in accordance with their terms.\u201d)); see also Key Int\u2019l Mfg. Inc. v. Stillman, 103 A.D.2d 475, 480 N.Y.S.2d 528, 530-31 (1984) (holding that acceleration clauses are quite common and are generally enforceable according to their terms)."},"case_id":4164128,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The parties here have done just that. The language here expresses the parties' clear intention that acceleration is automatic in the event of a bankruptcy filing, thereby avoiding the need to resort to the rule of construction established in Tymon and Wurzler.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"480 N.Y.S.2d 528, 530-31","parenthetical":"holding that acceleration clauses are quite common and are generally enforceable according to their terms","sentence":"Corp. v. Pioneer Auto. Parks, Inc., 46 N.Y.2d 573, 577, 415 N.Y.S.2d 800, 389 N.E.2d 113 (1979) (\u201c[A]greements providing for the acceleration of the entire debt upon the default of the obligor ... [i]n the vast majority of instances ... have been enforced at law in accordance with their terms.\u201d)); see also Key Int\u2019l Mfg. Inc. v. Stillman, 103 A.D.2d 475, 480 N.Y.S.2d 528, 530-31 (1984) (holding that acceleration clauses are quite common and are generally enforceable according to their terms)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[A]greements providing for the acceleration of the entire debt upon the default of the obligor ... [i]n the vast majority of instances ... have been enforced at law in accordance with their terms.\"","sentence":"Corp. v. Pioneer Auto. Parks, Inc., 46 N.Y.2d 573, 577, 415 N.Y.S.2d 800, 389 N.E.2d 113 (1979) (\u201c[A]greements providing for the acceleration of the entire debt upon the default of the obligor ... [i]n the vast majority of instances ... have been enforced at law in accordance with their terms.\u201d)); see also Key Int\u2019l Mfg. Inc. v. Stillman, 103 A.D.2d 475, 480 N.Y.S.2d 528, 530-31 (1984) (holding that acceleration clauses are quite common and are generally enforceable according to their terms)."},"case_id":4164128,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The parties here have done just that. The language here expresses the parties' clear intention that acceleration is automatic in the event of a bankruptcy filing, thereby avoiding the need to resort to the rule of construction established in Tymon and Wurzler.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[A]greements providing for the acceleration of the entire debt upon the default of the obligor ... [i]n the vast majority of instances ... have been enforced at law in accordance with their terms.\"","sentence":"Corp. v. Pioneer Auto. Parks, Inc., 46 N.Y.2d 573, 577, 415 N.Y.S.2d 800, 389 N.E.2d 113 (1979) (\u201c[A]greements providing for the acceleration of the entire debt upon the default of the obligor ... [i]n the vast majority of instances ... have been enforced at law in accordance with their terms.\u201d)); see also Key Int\u2019l Mfg. Inc. v. Stillman, 103 A.D.2d 475, 480 N.Y.S.2d 528, 530-31 (1984) (holding that acceleration clauses are quite common and are generally enforceable according to their terms)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that acceleration clauses are quite common and are generally enforceable according to their terms","sentence":"Corp. v. Pioneer Auto. Parks, Inc., 46 N.Y.2d 573, 577, 415 N.Y.S.2d 800, 389 N.E.2d 113 (1979) (\u201c[A]greements providing for the acceleration of the entire debt upon the default of the obligor ... [i]n the vast majority of instances ... have been enforced at law in accordance with their terms.\u201d)); see also Key Int\u2019l Mfg. Inc. v. Stillman, 103 A.D.2d 475, 480 N.Y.S.2d 528, 530-31 (1984) (holding that acceleration clauses are quite common and are generally enforceable according to their terms)."},"case_id":4164128,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The parties here have done just that. The language here expresses the parties' clear intention that acceleration is automatic in the event of a bankruptcy filing, thereby avoiding the need to resort to the rule of construction established in Tymon and Wurzler.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"480 N.Y.S.2d 528, 530-31","parenthetical":"holding that acceleration clauses are quite common and are generally enforceable according to their terms","sentence":"Corp. v. Pioneer Auto. Parks, Inc., 46 N.Y.2d 573, 577, 415 N.Y.S.2d 800, 389 N.E.2d 113 (1979) (\u201c[A]greements providing for the acceleration of the entire debt upon the default of the obligor ... [i]n the vast majority of instances ... have been enforced at law in accordance with their terms.\u201d)); see also Key Int\u2019l Mfg. Inc. v. Stillman, 103 A.D.2d 475, 480 N.Y.S.2d 528, 530-31 (1984) (holding that acceleration clauses are quite common and are generally enforceable according to their terms)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[A]greements providing for the acceleration of the entire debt upon the default of the obligor ... [i]n the vast majority of instances ... have been enforced at law in accordance with their terms.\"","sentence":"Corp. v. Pioneer Auto. Parks, Inc., 46 N.Y.2d 573, 577, 415 N.Y.S.2d 800, 389 N.E.2d 113 (1979) (\u201c[A]greements providing for the acceleration of the entire debt upon the default of the obligor ... [i]n the vast majority of instances ... have been enforced at law in accordance with their terms.\u201d)); see also Key Int\u2019l Mfg. Inc. v. Stillman, 103 A.D.2d 475, 480 N.Y.S.2d 528, 530-31 (1984) (holding that acceleration clauses are quite common and are generally enforceable according to their terms)."},"case_id":4164128,"label":"b"}
{"context":"As to these purported acts of disparate treatment based on race, other than his own speculation and subjective belief, Quintana fails to provide the court with evidence that these events were the result of discriminatory animus. Speculation that these events were motivated in whole, or in part, by racial discrimination, is insufficient to raise a genuine dispute of material fact that racial discrimination was a motivating factor in FNAC's decision to terminate Quintana as part of the RIF.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"28 S.W.3d 22, 25","parenthetical":"\"Subjective beliefs are insufficient to overcome [employer's] summary judgment evidence.\"","sentence":"Auto. Ass\u2019n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1429 (5th Cir.1996) (en banc) (\u201cThis Court has cautioned that \u2018eonclusory allegations, speculation, and unsubstantiated assertions are inadequate to satisfy\u2019 the nonmovant\u2019s burden in a motion for summary judgment.\u201d)); see also M.D. Anderson Hosp. & Tumor Inst. v. Willrich, 28 S.W.3d 22, 25 (2000) (\u201cSubjective beliefs are insufficient to overcome [employer\u2019s] summary judgment evidence.\u201d) (citations omitted)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"79 F.3d 1415, 1429","parenthetical":"\"This Court has cautioned that 'eonclusory allegations, speculation, and unsubstantiated assertions are inadequate to satisfy' the nonmovant's burden in a motion for summary judgment.\"","sentence":"Auto. Ass\u2019n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1429 (5th Cir.1996) (en banc) (\u201cThis Court has cautioned that \u2018eonclusory allegations, speculation, and unsubstantiated assertions are inadequate to satisfy\u2019 the nonmovant\u2019s burden in a motion for summary judgment.\u201d)); see also M.D. Anderson Hosp. & Tumor Inst. v. Willrich, 28 S.W.3d 22, 25 (2000) (\u201cSubjective beliefs are insufficient to overcome [employer\u2019s] summary judgment evidence.\u201d) (citations omitted)."},"case_id":4337665,"label":"b"}
{"context":"We have held, albeit without much discussion, that the fact that a defendant raped his victim twice justified an exceptional sentence because inflicting multiple penetrations on a victim is more egregious than the single act necessary to commit the crime. Other cases hold that more than one act of sexual intercourse cannot, standing alone, constitute a separate aggravating factor, but can be considered as evidence of deliberate cruelty.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"multiple penetrations can be evidence of deliberate cruelty because multiple penetrations or sexual acts over a period of time are more degrading than a single act of rape","sentence":"See, e.g., State v. Strauss, 54 Wn. App. 408, 419, 773 P.2d 898 (1989) (rejecting the State\u2019s contention that the defendant\u2019s multiple penetrations supported the trial court\u2019s finding of deliberate cruelty); State v. Post, 59 Wn. App. 389, 797 P.2d 1160 (1990) (rape defendant\u2019s multiple attempts at penetration over one hour did not, without more, warrant finding of deliberate cruelty, distinguishing Falling because that case involved both oral and vaginal intercourse over 30-minute period), aff\u2019d, 118 Wn.2d 596, 826 P.2d 172, 837 P.2d 599 (1992); but see State v. Herzog, 69 Wn. App. 521, 849 P.2d 1235, review denied, 122 Wn.2d 1021 (1993) (multiple penetrations can be evidence of deliberate cruelty because multiple penetrations or sexual acts over a period of time are more degrading than a single act of rape). We recently resolved this issue in State v. Vaughn, 83 Wn. App. 669, an opinion filed after oral argument in this case."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"54 Wn. App. 408, 419","parenthetical":"rejecting the State's contention that the defendant's multiple penetrations supported the trial court's finding of deliberate cruelty","sentence":"See, e.g., State v. Strauss, 54 Wn. App. 408, 419, 773 P.2d 898 (1989) (rejecting the State\u2019s contention that the defendant\u2019s multiple penetrations supported the trial court\u2019s finding of deliberate cruelty); State v. Post, 59 Wn. App. 389, 797 P.2d 1160 (1990) (rape defendant\u2019s multiple attempts at penetration over one hour did not, without more, warrant finding of deliberate cruelty, distinguishing Falling because that case involved both oral and vaginal intercourse over 30-minute period), aff\u2019d, 118 Wn.2d 596, 826 P.2d 172, 837 P.2d 599 (1992); but see State v. Herzog, 69 Wn. App. 521, 849 P.2d 1235, review denied, 122 Wn.2d 1021 (1993) (multiple penetrations can be evidence of deliberate cruelty because multiple penetrations or sexual acts over a period of time are more degrading than a single act of rape). We recently resolved this issue in State v. Vaughn, 83 Wn. App. 669, an opinion filed after oral argument in this case."},"case_id":1190665,"label":"b"}
{"context":"We have held, albeit without much discussion, that the fact that a defendant raped his victim twice justified an exceptional sentence because inflicting multiple penetrations on a victim is more egregious than the single act necessary to commit the crime. Other cases hold that more than one act of sexual intercourse cannot, standing alone, constitute a separate aggravating factor, but can be considered as evidence of deliberate cruelty.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"54 Wn. App. 408, 419","parenthetical":"rejecting the State's contention that the defendant's multiple penetrations supported the trial court's finding of deliberate cruelty","sentence":"See, e.g., State v. Strauss, 54 Wn. App. 408, 419, 773 P.2d 898 (1989) (rejecting the State\u2019s contention that the defendant\u2019s multiple penetrations supported the trial court\u2019s finding of deliberate cruelty); State v. Post, 59 Wn. App. 389, 797 P.2d 1160 (1990) (rape defendant\u2019s multiple attempts at penetration over one hour did not, without more, warrant finding of deliberate cruelty, distinguishing Falling because that case involved both oral and vaginal intercourse over 30-minute period), aff\u2019d, 118 Wn.2d 596, 826 P.2d 172, 837 P.2d 599 (1992); but see State v. Herzog, 69 Wn. App. 521, 849 P.2d 1235, review denied, 122 Wn.2d 1021 (1993) (multiple penetrations can be evidence of deliberate cruelty because multiple penetrations or sexual acts over a period of time are more degrading than a single act of rape). We recently resolved this issue in State v. Vaughn, 83 Wn. App. 669, an opinion filed after oral argument in this case."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"multiple penetrations can be evidence of deliberate cruelty because multiple penetrations or sexual acts over a period of time are more degrading than a single act of rape","sentence":"See, e.g., State v. Strauss, 54 Wn. App. 408, 419, 773 P.2d 898 (1989) (rejecting the State\u2019s contention that the defendant\u2019s multiple penetrations supported the trial court\u2019s finding of deliberate cruelty); State v. Post, 59 Wn. App. 389, 797 P.2d 1160 (1990) (rape defendant\u2019s multiple attempts at penetration over one hour did not, without more, warrant finding of deliberate cruelty, distinguishing Falling because that case involved both oral and vaginal intercourse over 30-minute period), aff\u2019d, 118 Wn.2d 596, 826 P.2d 172, 837 P.2d 599 (1992); but see State v. Herzog, 69 Wn. App. 521, 849 P.2d 1235, review denied, 122 Wn.2d 1021 (1993) (multiple penetrations can be evidence of deliberate cruelty because multiple penetrations or sexual acts over a period of time are more degrading than a single act of rape). We recently resolved this issue in State v. Vaughn, 83 Wn. App. 669, an opinion filed after oral argument in this case."},"case_id":1190665,"label":"a"}
{"context":"We have held, albeit without much discussion, that the fact that a defendant raped his victim twice justified an exceptional sentence because inflicting multiple penetrations on a victim is more egregious than the single act necessary to commit the crime. Other cases hold that more than one act of sexual intercourse cannot, standing alone, constitute a separate aggravating factor, but can be considered as evidence of deliberate cruelty.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"54 Wn. App. 408, 419","parenthetical":"rejecting the State's contention that the defendant's multiple penetrations supported the trial court's finding of deliberate cruelty","sentence":"See, e.g., State v. Strauss, 54 Wn. App. 408, 419, 773 P.2d 898 (1989) (rejecting the State\u2019s contention that the defendant\u2019s multiple penetrations supported the trial court\u2019s finding of deliberate cruelty); State v. Post, 59 Wn. App. 389, 797 P.2d 1160 (1990) (rape defendant\u2019s multiple attempts at penetration over one hour did not, without more, warrant finding of deliberate cruelty, distinguishing Falling because that case involved both oral and vaginal intercourse over 30-minute period), aff\u2019d, 118 Wn.2d 596, 826 P.2d 172, 837 P.2d 599 (1992); but see State v. Herzog, 69 Wn. App. 521, 849 P.2d 1235, review denied, 122 Wn.2d 1021 (1993) (multiple penetrations can be evidence of deliberate cruelty because multiple penetrations or sexual acts over a period of time are more degrading than a single act of rape). We recently resolved this issue in State v. Vaughn, 83 Wn. App. 669, an opinion filed after oral argument in this case."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"multiple penetrations can be evidence of deliberate cruelty because multiple penetrations or sexual acts over a period of time are more degrading than a single act of rape","sentence":"See, e.g., State v. Strauss, 54 Wn. App. 408, 419, 773 P.2d 898 (1989) (rejecting the State\u2019s contention that the defendant\u2019s multiple penetrations supported the trial court\u2019s finding of deliberate cruelty); State v. Post, 59 Wn. App. 389, 797 P.2d 1160 (1990) (rape defendant\u2019s multiple attempts at penetration over one hour did not, without more, warrant finding of deliberate cruelty, distinguishing Falling because that case involved both oral and vaginal intercourse over 30-minute period), aff\u2019d, 118 Wn.2d 596, 826 P.2d 172, 837 P.2d 599 (1992); but see State v. Herzog, 69 Wn. App. 521, 849 P.2d 1235, review denied, 122 Wn.2d 1021 (1993) (multiple penetrations can be evidence of deliberate cruelty because multiple penetrations or sexual acts over a period of time are more degrading than a single act of rape). We recently resolved this issue in State v. Vaughn, 83 Wn. App. 669, an opinion filed after oral argument in this case."},"case_id":1190665,"label":"a"}
{"context":"We have held, albeit without much discussion, that the fact that a defendant raped his victim twice justified an exceptional sentence because inflicting multiple penetrations on a victim is more egregious than the single act necessary to commit the crime. Other cases hold that more than one act of sexual intercourse cannot, standing alone, constitute a separate aggravating factor, but can be considered as evidence of deliberate cruelty.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"multiple penetrations can be evidence of deliberate cruelty because multiple penetrations or sexual acts over a period of time are more degrading than a single act of rape","sentence":"See, e.g., State v. Strauss, 54 Wn. App. 408, 419, 773 P.2d 898 (1989) (rejecting the State\u2019s contention that the defendant\u2019s multiple penetrations supported the trial court\u2019s finding of deliberate cruelty); State v. Post, 59 Wn. App. 389, 797 P.2d 1160 (1990) (rape defendant\u2019s multiple attempts at penetration over one hour did not, without more, warrant finding of deliberate cruelty, distinguishing Falling because that case involved both oral and vaginal intercourse over 30-minute period), aff\u2019d, 118 Wn.2d 596, 826 P.2d 172, 837 P.2d 599 (1992); but see State v. Herzog, 69 Wn. App. 521, 849 P.2d 1235, review denied, 122 Wn.2d 1021 (1993) (multiple penetrations can be evidence of deliberate cruelty because multiple penetrations or sexual acts over a period of time are more degrading than a single act of rape). We recently resolved this issue in State v. Vaughn, 83 Wn. App. 669, an opinion filed after oral argument in this case."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"54 Wn. App. 408, 419","parenthetical":"rejecting the State's contention that the defendant's multiple penetrations supported the trial court's finding of deliberate cruelty","sentence":"See, e.g., State v. Strauss, 54 Wn. App. 408, 419, 773 P.2d 898 (1989) (rejecting the State\u2019s contention that the defendant\u2019s multiple penetrations supported the trial court\u2019s finding of deliberate cruelty); State v. Post, 59 Wn. App. 389, 797 P.2d 1160 (1990) (rape defendant\u2019s multiple attempts at penetration over one hour did not, without more, warrant finding of deliberate cruelty, distinguishing Falling because that case involved both oral and vaginal intercourse over 30-minute period), aff\u2019d, 118 Wn.2d 596, 826 P.2d 172, 837 P.2d 599 (1992); but see State v. Herzog, 69 Wn. App. 521, 849 P.2d 1235, review denied, 122 Wn.2d 1021 (1993) (multiple penetrations can be evidence of deliberate cruelty because multiple penetrations or sexual acts over a period of time are more degrading than a single act of rape). We recently resolved this issue in State v. Vaughn, 83 Wn. App. 669, an opinion filed after oral argument in this case."},"case_id":1190665,"label":"b"}
{"context":"We have held, albeit without much discussion, that the fact that a defendant raped his victim twice justified an exceptional sentence because inflicting multiple penetrations on a victim is more egregious than the single act necessary to commit the crime. Other cases hold that more than one act of sexual intercourse cannot, standing alone, constitute a separate aggravating factor, but can be considered as evidence of deliberate cruelty.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"rejecting the State's contention that the defendant's multiple penetrations supported the trial court's finding of deliberate cruelty","sentence":"See, e.g., State v. Strauss, 54 Wn. App. 408, 419, 773 P.2d 898 (1989) (rejecting the State\u2019s contention that the defendant\u2019s multiple penetrations supported the trial court\u2019s finding of deliberate cruelty); State v. Post, 59 Wn. App. 389, 797 P.2d 1160 (1990) (rape defendant\u2019s multiple attempts at penetration over one hour did not, without more, warrant finding of deliberate cruelty, distinguishing Falling because that case involved both oral and vaginal intercourse over 30-minute period), aff\u2019d, 118 Wn.2d 596, 826 P.2d 172, 837 P.2d 599 (1992); but see State v. Herzog, 69 Wn. App. 521, 849 P.2d 1235, review denied, 122 Wn.2d 1021 (1993) (multiple penetrations can be evidence of deliberate cruelty because multiple penetrations or sexual acts over a period of time are more degrading than a single act of rape). We recently resolved this issue in State v. Vaughn, 83 Wn. App. 669, an opinion filed after oral argument in this case."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"multiple penetrations can be evidence of deliberate cruelty because multiple penetrations or sexual acts over a period of time are more degrading than a single act of rape","sentence":"See, e.g., State v. Strauss, 54 Wn. App. 408, 419, 773 P.2d 898 (1989) (rejecting the State\u2019s contention that the defendant\u2019s multiple penetrations supported the trial court\u2019s finding of deliberate cruelty); State v. Post, 59 Wn. App. 389, 797 P.2d 1160 (1990) (rape defendant\u2019s multiple attempts at penetration over one hour did not, without more, warrant finding of deliberate cruelty, distinguishing Falling because that case involved both oral and vaginal intercourse over 30-minute period), aff\u2019d, 118 Wn.2d 596, 826 P.2d 172, 837 P.2d 599 (1992); but see State v. Herzog, 69 Wn. App. 521, 849 P.2d 1235, review denied, 122 Wn.2d 1021 (1993) (multiple penetrations can be evidence of deliberate cruelty because multiple penetrations or sexual acts over a period of time are more degrading than a single act of rape). We recently resolved this issue in State v. Vaughn, 83 Wn. App. 669, an opinion filed after oral argument in this case."},"case_id":1190665,"label":"a"}
{"context":"We have held, albeit without much discussion, that the fact that a defendant raped his victim twice justified an exceptional sentence because inflicting multiple penetrations on a victim is more egregious than the single act necessary to commit the crime. Other cases hold that more than one act of sexual intercourse cannot, standing alone, constitute a separate aggravating factor, but can be considered as evidence of deliberate cruelty.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"rejecting the State's contention that the defendant's multiple penetrations supported the trial court's finding of deliberate cruelty","sentence":"See, e.g., State v. Strauss, 54 Wn. App. 408, 419, 773 P.2d 898 (1989) (rejecting the State\u2019s contention that the defendant\u2019s multiple penetrations supported the trial court\u2019s finding of deliberate cruelty); State v. Post, 59 Wn. App. 389, 797 P.2d 1160 (1990) (rape defendant\u2019s multiple attempts at penetration over one hour did not, without more, warrant finding of deliberate cruelty, distinguishing Falling because that case involved both oral and vaginal intercourse over 30-minute period), aff\u2019d, 118 Wn.2d 596, 826 P.2d 172, 837 P.2d 599 (1992); but see State v. Herzog, 69 Wn. App. 521, 849 P.2d 1235, review denied, 122 Wn.2d 1021 (1993) (multiple penetrations can be evidence of deliberate cruelty because multiple penetrations or sexual acts over a period of time are more degrading than a single act of rape). We recently resolved this issue in State v. Vaughn, 83 Wn. App. 669, an opinion filed after oral argument in this case."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"multiple penetrations can be evidence of deliberate cruelty because multiple penetrations or sexual acts over a period of time are more degrading than a single act of rape","sentence":"See, e.g., State v. Strauss, 54 Wn. App. 408, 419, 773 P.2d 898 (1989) (rejecting the State\u2019s contention that the defendant\u2019s multiple penetrations supported the trial court\u2019s finding of deliberate cruelty); State v. Post, 59 Wn. App. 389, 797 P.2d 1160 (1990) (rape defendant\u2019s multiple attempts at penetration over one hour did not, without more, warrant finding of deliberate cruelty, distinguishing Falling because that case involved both oral and vaginal intercourse over 30-minute period), aff\u2019d, 118 Wn.2d 596, 826 P.2d 172, 837 P.2d 599 (1992); but see State v. Herzog, 69 Wn. App. 521, 849 P.2d 1235, review denied, 122 Wn.2d 1021 (1993) (multiple penetrations can be evidence of deliberate cruelty because multiple penetrations or sexual acts over a period of time are more degrading than a single act of rape). We recently resolved this issue in State v. Vaughn, 83 Wn. App. 669, an opinion filed after oral argument in this case."},"case_id":1190665,"label":"a"}
{"context":"We have held, albeit without much discussion, that the fact that a defendant raped his victim twice justified an exceptional sentence because inflicting multiple penetrations on a victim is more egregious than the single act necessary to commit the crime. Other cases hold that more than one act of sexual intercourse cannot, standing alone, constitute a separate aggravating factor, but can be considered as evidence of deliberate cruelty.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"rejecting the State's contention that the defendant's multiple penetrations supported the trial court's finding of deliberate cruelty","sentence":"See, e.g., State v. Strauss, 54 Wn. App. 408, 419, 773 P.2d 898 (1989) (rejecting the State\u2019s contention that the defendant\u2019s multiple penetrations supported the trial court\u2019s finding of deliberate cruelty); State v. Post, 59 Wn. App. 389, 797 P.2d 1160 (1990) (rape defendant\u2019s multiple attempts at penetration over one hour did not, without more, warrant finding of deliberate cruelty, distinguishing Falling because that case involved both oral and vaginal intercourse over 30-minute period), aff\u2019d, 118 Wn.2d 596, 826 P.2d 172, 837 P.2d 599 (1992); but see State v. Herzog, 69 Wn. App. 521, 849 P.2d 1235, review denied, 122 Wn.2d 1021 (1993) (multiple penetrations can be evidence of deliberate cruelty because multiple penetrations or sexual acts over a period of time are more degrading than a single act of rape). We recently resolved this issue in State v. Vaughn, 83 Wn. App. 669, an opinion filed after oral argument in this case."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"multiple penetrations can be evidence of deliberate cruelty because multiple penetrations or sexual acts over a period of time are more degrading than a single act of rape","sentence":"See, e.g., State v. Strauss, 54 Wn. App. 408, 419, 773 P.2d 898 (1989) (rejecting the State\u2019s contention that the defendant\u2019s multiple penetrations supported the trial court\u2019s finding of deliberate cruelty); State v. Post, 59 Wn. App. 389, 797 P.2d 1160 (1990) (rape defendant\u2019s multiple attempts at penetration over one hour did not, without more, warrant finding of deliberate cruelty, distinguishing Falling because that case involved both oral and vaginal intercourse over 30-minute period), aff\u2019d, 118 Wn.2d 596, 826 P.2d 172, 837 P.2d 599 (1992); but see State v. Herzog, 69 Wn. App. 521, 849 P.2d 1235, review denied, 122 Wn.2d 1021 (1993) (multiple penetrations can be evidence of deliberate cruelty because multiple penetrations or sexual acts over a period of time are more degrading than a single act of rape). We recently resolved this issue in State v. Vaughn, 83 Wn. App. 669, an opinion filed after oral argument in this case."},"case_id":1190665,"label":"a"}
{"context":"We have held, albeit without much discussion, that the fact that a defendant raped his victim twice justified an exceptional sentence because inflicting multiple penetrations on a victim is more egregious than the single act necessary to commit the crime. Other cases hold that more than one act of sexual intercourse cannot, standing alone, constitute a separate aggravating factor, but can be considered as evidence of deliberate cruelty.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"multiple penetrations can be evidence of deliberate cruelty because multiple penetrations or sexual acts over a period of time are more degrading than a single act of rape","sentence":"See, e.g., State v. Strauss, 54 Wn. App. 408, 419, 773 P.2d 898 (1989) (rejecting the State\u2019s contention that the defendant\u2019s multiple penetrations supported the trial court\u2019s finding of deliberate cruelty); State v. Post, 59 Wn. App. 389, 797 P.2d 1160 (1990) (rape defendant\u2019s multiple attempts at penetration over one hour did not, without more, warrant finding of deliberate cruelty, distinguishing Falling because that case involved both oral and vaginal intercourse over 30-minute period), aff\u2019d, 118 Wn.2d 596, 826 P.2d 172, 837 P.2d 599 (1992); but see State v. Herzog, 69 Wn. App. 521, 849 P.2d 1235, review denied, 122 Wn.2d 1021 (1993) (multiple penetrations can be evidence of deliberate cruelty because multiple penetrations or sexual acts over a period of time are more degrading than a single act of rape). We recently resolved this issue in State v. Vaughn, 83 Wn. App. 669, an opinion filed after oral argument in this case."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"rejecting the State's contention that the defendant's multiple penetrations supported the trial court's finding of deliberate cruelty","sentence":"See, e.g., State v. Strauss, 54 Wn. App. 408, 419, 773 P.2d 898 (1989) (rejecting the State\u2019s contention that the defendant\u2019s multiple penetrations supported the trial court\u2019s finding of deliberate cruelty); State v. Post, 59 Wn. App. 389, 797 P.2d 1160 (1990) (rape defendant\u2019s multiple attempts at penetration over one hour did not, without more, warrant finding of deliberate cruelty, distinguishing Falling because that case involved both oral and vaginal intercourse over 30-minute period), aff\u2019d, 118 Wn.2d 596, 826 P.2d 172, 837 P.2d 599 (1992); but see State v. Herzog, 69 Wn. App. 521, 849 P.2d 1235, review denied, 122 Wn.2d 1021 (1993) (multiple penetrations can be evidence of deliberate cruelty because multiple penetrations or sexual acts over a period of time are more degrading than a single act of rape). We recently resolved this issue in State v. Vaughn, 83 Wn. App. 669, an opinion filed after oral argument in this case."},"case_id":1190665,"label":"b"}
{"context":"We have held, albeit without much discussion, that the fact that a defendant raped his victim twice justified an exceptional sentence because inflicting multiple penetrations on a victim is more egregious than the single act necessary to commit the crime. Other cases hold that more than one act of sexual intercourse cannot, standing alone, constitute a separate aggravating factor, but can be considered as evidence of deliberate cruelty.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"multiple penetrations can be evidence of deliberate cruelty because multiple penetrations or sexual acts over a period of time are more degrading than a single act of rape","sentence":"See, e.g., State v. Strauss, 54 Wn. App. 408, 419, 773 P.2d 898 (1989) (rejecting the State\u2019s contention that the defendant\u2019s multiple penetrations supported the trial court\u2019s finding of deliberate cruelty); State v. Post, 59 Wn. App. 389, 797 P.2d 1160 (1990) (rape defendant\u2019s multiple attempts at penetration over one hour did not, without more, warrant finding of deliberate cruelty, distinguishing Falling because that case involved both oral and vaginal intercourse over 30-minute period), aff\u2019d, 118 Wn.2d 596, 826 P.2d 172, 837 P.2d 599 (1992); but see State v. Herzog, 69 Wn. App. 521, 849 P.2d 1235, review denied, 122 Wn.2d 1021 (1993) (multiple penetrations can be evidence of deliberate cruelty because multiple penetrations or sexual acts over a period of time are more degrading than a single act of rape). We recently resolved this issue in State v. Vaughn, 83 Wn. App. 669, an opinion filed after oral argument in this case."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"rape defendant's multiple attempts at penetration over one hour did not, without more, warrant finding of deliberate cruelty, distinguishing Falling because that case involved both oral and vaginal intercourse over 30-minute period","sentence":"See, e.g., State v. Strauss, 54 Wn. App. 408, 419, 773 P.2d 898 (1989) (rejecting the State\u2019s contention that the defendant\u2019s multiple penetrations supported the trial court\u2019s finding of deliberate cruelty); State v. Post, 59 Wn. App. 389, 797 P.2d 1160 (1990) (rape defendant\u2019s multiple attempts at penetration over one hour did not, without more, warrant finding of deliberate cruelty, distinguishing Falling because that case involved both oral and vaginal intercourse over 30-minute period), aff\u2019d, 118 Wn.2d 596, 826 P.2d 172, 837 P.2d 599 (1992); but see State v. Herzog, 69 Wn. App. 521, 849 P.2d 1235, review denied, 122 Wn.2d 1021 (1993) (multiple penetrations can be evidence of deliberate cruelty because multiple penetrations or sexual acts over a period of time are more degrading than a single act of rape). We recently resolved this issue in State v. Vaughn, 83 Wn. App. 669, an opinion filed after oral argument in this case."},"case_id":1190665,"label":"b"}
{"context":"We have held, albeit without much discussion, that the fact that a defendant raped his victim twice justified an exceptional sentence because inflicting multiple penetrations on a victim is more egregious than the single act necessary to commit the crime. Other cases hold that more than one act of sexual intercourse cannot, standing alone, constitute a separate aggravating factor, but can be considered as evidence of deliberate cruelty.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"rape defendant's multiple attempts at penetration over one hour did not, without more, warrant finding of deliberate cruelty, distinguishing Falling because that case involved both oral and vaginal intercourse over 30-minute period","sentence":"See, e.g., State v. Strauss, 54 Wn. App. 408, 419, 773 P.2d 898 (1989) (rejecting the State\u2019s contention that the defendant\u2019s multiple penetrations supported the trial court\u2019s finding of deliberate cruelty); State v. Post, 59 Wn. App. 389, 797 P.2d 1160 (1990) (rape defendant\u2019s multiple attempts at penetration over one hour did not, without more, warrant finding of deliberate cruelty, distinguishing Falling because that case involved both oral and vaginal intercourse over 30-minute period), aff\u2019d, 118 Wn.2d 596, 826 P.2d 172, 837 P.2d 599 (1992); but see State v. Herzog, 69 Wn. App. 521, 849 P.2d 1235, review denied, 122 Wn.2d 1021 (1993) (multiple penetrations can be evidence of deliberate cruelty because multiple penetrations or sexual acts over a period of time are more degrading than a single act of rape). We recently resolved this issue in State v. Vaughn, 83 Wn. App. 669, an opinion filed after oral argument in this case."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"multiple penetrations can be evidence of deliberate cruelty because multiple penetrations or sexual acts over a period of time are more degrading than a single act of rape","sentence":"See, e.g., State v. Strauss, 54 Wn. App. 408, 419, 773 P.2d 898 (1989) (rejecting the State\u2019s contention that the defendant\u2019s multiple penetrations supported the trial court\u2019s finding of deliberate cruelty); State v. Post, 59 Wn. App. 389, 797 P.2d 1160 (1990) (rape defendant\u2019s multiple attempts at penetration over one hour did not, without more, warrant finding of deliberate cruelty, distinguishing Falling because that case involved both oral and vaginal intercourse over 30-minute period), aff\u2019d, 118 Wn.2d 596, 826 P.2d 172, 837 P.2d 599 (1992); but see State v. Herzog, 69 Wn. App. 521, 849 P.2d 1235, review denied, 122 Wn.2d 1021 (1993) (multiple penetrations can be evidence of deliberate cruelty because multiple penetrations or sexual acts over a period of time are more degrading than a single act of rape). We recently resolved this issue in State v. Vaughn, 83 Wn. App. 669, an opinion filed after oral argument in this case."},"case_id":1190665,"label":"a"}
{"context":"We have held, albeit without much discussion, that the fact that a defendant raped his victim twice justified an exceptional sentence because inflicting multiple penetrations on a victim is more egregious than the single act necessary to commit the crime. Other cases hold that more than one act of sexual intercourse cannot, standing alone, constitute a separate aggravating factor, but can be considered as evidence of deliberate cruelty.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"multiple penetrations can be evidence of deliberate cruelty because multiple penetrations or sexual acts over a period of time are more degrading than a single act of rape","sentence":"See, e.g., State v. Strauss, 54 Wn. App. 408, 419, 773 P.2d 898 (1989) (rejecting the State\u2019s contention that the defendant\u2019s multiple penetrations supported the trial court\u2019s finding of deliberate cruelty); State v. Post, 59 Wn. App. 389, 797 P.2d 1160 (1990) (rape defendant\u2019s multiple attempts at penetration over one hour did not, without more, warrant finding of deliberate cruelty, distinguishing Falling because that case involved both oral and vaginal intercourse over 30-minute period), aff\u2019d, 118 Wn.2d 596, 826 P.2d 172, 837 P.2d 599 (1992); but see State v. Herzog, 69 Wn. App. 521, 849 P.2d 1235, review denied, 122 Wn.2d 1021 (1993) (multiple penetrations can be evidence of deliberate cruelty because multiple penetrations or sexual acts over a period of time are more degrading than a single act of rape). We recently resolved this issue in State v. Vaughn, 83 Wn. App. 669, an opinion filed after oral argument in this case."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"rape defendant's multiple attempts at penetration over one hour did not, without more, warrant finding of deliberate cruelty, distinguishing Falling because that case involved both oral and vaginal intercourse over 30-minute period","sentence":"See, e.g., State v. Strauss, 54 Wn. App. 408, 419, 773 P.2d 898 (1989) (rejecting the State\u2019s contention that the defendant\u2019s multiple penetrations supported the trial court\u2019s finding of deliberate cruelty); State v. Post, 59 Wn. App. 389, 797 P.2d 1160 (1990) (rape defendant\u2019s multiple attempts at penetration over one hour did not, without more, warrant finding of deliberate cruelty, distinguishing Falling because that case involved both oral and vaginal intercourse over 30-minute period), aff\u2019d, 118 Wn.2d 596, 826 P.2d 172, 837 P.2d 599 (1992); but see State v. Herzog, 69 Wn. App. 521, 849 P.2d 1235, review denied, 122 Wn.2d 1021 (1993) (multiple penetrations can be evidence of deliberate cruelty because multiple penetrations or sexual acts over a period of time are more degrading than a single act of rape). We recently resolved this issue in State v. Vaughn, 83 Wn. App. 669, an opinion filed after oral argument in this case."},"case_id":1190665,"label":"b"}
{"context":"We have held, albeit without much discussion, that the fact that a defendant raped his victim twice justified an exceptional sentence because inflicting multiple penetrations on a victim is more egregious than the single act necessary to commit the crime. Other cases hold that more than one act of sexual intercourse cannot, standing alone, constitute a separate aggravating factor, but can be considered as evidence of deliberate cruelty.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"multiple penetrations can be evidence of deliberate cruelty because multiple penetrations or sexual acts over a period of time are more degrading than a single act of rape","sentence":"See, e.g., State v. Strauss, 54 Wn. App. 408, 419, 773 P.2d 898 (1989) (rejecting the State\u2019s contention that the defendant\u2019s multiple penetrations supported the trial court\u2019s finding of deliberate cruelty); State v. Post, 59 Wn. App. 389, 797 P.2d 1160 (1990) (rape defendant\u2019s multiple attempts at penetration over one hour did not, without more, warrant finding of deliberate cruelty, distinguishing Falling because that case involved both oral and vaginal intercourse over 30-minute period), aff\u2019d, 118 Wn.2d 596, 826 P.2d 172, 837 P.2d 599 (1992); but see State v. Herzog, 69 Wn. App. 521, 849 P.2d 1235, review denied, 122 Wn.2d 1021 (1993) (multiple penetrations can be evidence of deliberate cruelty because multiple penetrations or sexual acts over a period of time are more degrading than a single act of rape). We recently resolved this issue in State v. Vaughn, 83 Wn. App. 669, an opinion filed after oral argument in this case."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"rape defendant's multiple attempts at penetration over one hour did not, without more, warrant finding of deliberate cruelty, distinguishing Falling because that case involved both oral and vaginal intercourse over 30-minute period","sentence":"See, e.g., State v. Strauss, 54 Wn. App. 408, 419, 773 P.2d 898 (1989) (rejecting the State\u2019s contention that the defendant\u2019s multiple penetrations supported the trial court\u2019s finding of deliberate cruelty); State v. Post, 59 Wn. App. 389, 797 P.2d 1160 (1990) (rape defendant\u2019s multiple attempts at penetration over one hour did not, without more, warrant finding of deliberate cruelty, distinguishing Falling because that case involved both oral and vaginal intercourse over 30-minute period), aff\u2019d, 118 Wn.2d 596, 826 P.2d 172, 837 P.2d 599 (1992); but see State v. Herzog, 69 Wn. App. 521, 849 P.2d 1235, review denied, 122 Wn.2d 1021 (1993) (multiple penetrations can be evidence of deliberate cruelty because multiple penetrations or sexual acts over a period of time are more degrading than a single act of rape). We recently resolved this issue in State v. Vaughn, 83 Wn. App. 669, an opinion filed after oral argument in this case."},"case_id":1190665,"label":"b"}
{"context":"We have held, albeit without much discussion, that the fact that a defendant raped his victim twice justified an exceptional sentence because inflicting multiple penetrations on a victim is more egregious than the single act necessary to commit the crime. Other cases hold that more than one act of sexual intercourse cannot, standing alone, constitute a separate aggravating factor, but can be considered as evidence of deliberate cruelty.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"multiple penetrations can be evidence of deliberate cruelty because multiple penetrations or sexual acts over a period of time are more degrading than a single act of rape","sentence":"See, e.g., State v. Strauss, 54 Wn. App. 408, 419, 773 P.2d 898 (1989) (rejecting the State\u2019s contention that the defendant\u2019s multiple penetrations supported the trial court\u2019s finding of deliberate cruelty); State v. Post, 59 Wn. App. 389, 797 P.2d 1160 (1990) (rape defendant\u2019s multiple attempts at penetration over one hour did not, without more, warrant finding of deliberate cruelty, distinguishing Falling because that case involved both oral and vaginal intercourse over 30-minute period), aff\u2019d, 118 Wn.2d 596, 826 P.2d 172, 837 P.2d 599 (1992); but see State v. Herzog, 69 Wn. App. 521, 849 P.2d 1235, review denied, 122 Wn.2d 1021 (1993) (multiple penetrations can be evidence of deliberate cruelty because multiple penetrations or sexual acts over a period of time are more degrading than a single act of rape). We recently resolved this issue in State v. Vaughn, 83 Wn. App. 669, an opinion filed after oral argument in this case."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"rape defendant's multiple attempts at penetration over one hour did not, without more, warrant finding of deliberate cruelty, distinguishing Falling because that case involved both oral and vaginal intercourse over 30-minute period","sentence":"See, e.g., State v. Strauss, 54 Wn. App. 408, 419, 773 P.2d 898 (1989) (rejecting the State\u2019s contention that the defendant\u2019s multiple penetrations supported the trial court\u2019s finding of deliberate cruelty); State v. Post, 59 Wn. App. 389, 797 P.2d 1160 (1990) (rape defendant\u2019s multiple attempts at penetration over one hour did not, without more, warrant finding of deliberate cruelty, distinguishing Falling because that case involved both oral and vaginal intercourse over 30-minute period), aff\u2019d, 118 Wn.2d 596, 826 P.2d 172, 837 P.2d 599 (1992); but see State v. Herzog, 69 Wn. App. 521, 849 P.2d 1235, review denied, 122 Wn.2d 1021 (1993) (multiple penetrations can be evidence of deliberate cruelty because multiple penetrations or sexual acts over a period of time are more degrading than a single act of rape). We recently resolved this issue in State v. Vaughn, 83 Wn. App. 669, an opinion filed after oral argument in this case."},"case_id":1190665,"label":"b"}
{"context":"We have held, albeit without much discussion, that the fact that a defendant raped his victim twice justified an exceptional sentence because inflicting multiple penetrations on a victim is more egregious than the single act necessary to commit the crime. Other cases hold that more than one act of sexual intercourse cannot, standing alone, constitute a separate aggravating factor, but can be considered as evidence of deliberate cruelty.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"rape defendant's multiple attempts at penetration over one hour did not, without more, warrant finding of deliberate cruelty, distinguishing Falling because that case involved both oral and vaginal intercourse over 30-minute period","sentence":"See, e.g., State v. Strauss, 54 Wn. App. 408, 419, 773 P.2d 898 (1989) (rejecting the State\u2019s contention that the defendant\u2019s multiple penetrations supported the trial court\u2019s finding of deliberate cruelty); State v. Post, 59 Wn. App. 389, 797 P.2d 1160 (1990) (rape defendant\u2019s multiple attempts at penetration over one hour did not, without more, warrant finding of deliberate cruelty, distinguishing Falling because that case involved both oral and vaginal intercourse over 30-minute period), aff\u2019d, 118 Wn.2d 596, 826 P.2d 172, 837 P.2d 599 (1992); but see State v. Herzog, 69 Wn. App. 521, 849 P.2d 1235, review denied, 122 Wn.2d 1021 (1993) (multiple penetrations can be evidence of deliberate cruelty because multiple penetrations or sexual acts over a period of time are more degrading than a single act of rape). We recently resolved this issue in State v. Vaughn, 83 Wn. App. 669, an opinion filed after oral argument in this case."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"multiple penetrations can be evidence of deliberate cruelty because multiple penetrations or sexual acts over a period of time are more degrading than a single act of rape","sentence":"See, e.g., State v. Strauss, 54 Wn. App. 408, 419, 773 P.2d 898 (1989) (rejecting the State\u2019s contention that the defendant\u2019s multiple penetrations supported the trial court\u2019s finding of deliberate cruelty); State v. Post, 59 Wn. App. 389, 797 P.2d 1160 (1990) (rape defendant\u2019s multiple attempts at penetration over one hour did not, without more, warrant finding of deliberate cruelty, distinguishing Falling because that case involved both oral and vaginal intercourse over 30-minute period), aff\u2019d, 118 Wn.2d 596, 826 P.2d 172, 837 P.2d 599 (1992); but see State v. Herzog, 69 Wn. App. 521, 849 P.2d 1235, review denied, 122 Wn.2d 1021 (1993) (multiple penetrations can be evidence of deliberate cruelty because multiple penetrations or sexual acts over a period of time are more degrading than a single act of rape). We recently resolved this issue in State v. Vaughn, 83 Wn. App. 669, an opinion filed after oral argument in this case."},"case_id":1190665,"label":"a"}
{"context":"We have held, albeit without much discussion, that the fact that a defendant raped his victim twice justified an exceptional sentence because inflicting multiple penetrations on a victim is more egregious than the single act necessary to commit the crime. Other cases hold that more than one act of sexual intercourse cannot, standing alone, constitute a separate aggravating factor, but can be considered as evidence of deliberate cruelty.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"multiple penetrations can be evidence of deliberate cruelty because multiple penetrations or sexual acts over a period of time are more degrading than a single act of rape","sentence":"See, e.g., State v. Strauss, 54 Wn. App. 408, 419, 773 P.2d 898 (1989) (rejecting the State\u2019s contention that the defendant\u2019s multiple penetrations supported the trial court\u2019s finding of deliberate cruelty); State v. Post, 59 Wn. App. 389, 797 P.2d 1160 (1990) (rape defendant\u2019s multiple attempts at penetration over one hour did not, without more, warrant finding of deliberate cruelty, distinguishing Falling because that case involved both oral and vaginal intercourse over 30-minute period), aff\u2019d, 118 Wn.2d 596, 826 P.2d 172, 837 P.2d 599 (1992); but see State v. Herzog, 69 Wn. App. 521, 849 P.2d 1235, review denied, 122 Wn.2d 1021 (1993) (multiple penetrations can be evidence of deliberate cruelty because multiple penetrations or sexual acts over a period of time are more degrading than a single act of rape). We recently resolved this issue in State v. Vaughn, 83 Wn. App. 669, an opinion filed after oral argument in this case."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"rape defendant's multiple attempts at penetration over one hour did not, without more, warrant finding of deliberate cruelty, distinguishing Falling because that case involved both oral and vaginal intercourse over 30-minute period","sentence":"See, e.g., State v. Strauss, 54 Wn. App. 408, 419, 773 P.2d 898 (1989) (rejecting the State\u2019s contention that the defendant\u2019s multiple penetrations supported the trial court\u2019s finding of deliberate cruelty); State v. Post, 59 Wn. App. 389, 797 P.2d 1160 (1990) (rape defendant\u2019s multiple attempts at penetration over one hour did not, without more, warrant finding of deliberate cruelty, distinguishing Falling because that case involved both oral and vaginal intercourse over 30-minute period), aff\u2019d, 118 Wn.2d 596, 826 P.2d 172, 837 P.2d 599 (1992); but see State v. Herzog, 69 Wn. App. 521, 849 P.2d 1235, review denied, 122 Wn.2d 1021 (1993) (multiple penetrations can be evidence of deliberate cruelty because multiple penetrations or sexual acts over a period of time are more degrading than a single act of rape). We recently resolved this issue in State v. Vaughn, 83 Wn. App. 669, an opinion filed after oral argument in this case."},"case_id":1190665,"label":"b"}
{"context":"We have held, albeit without much discussion, that the fact that a defendant raped his victim twice justified an exceptional sentence because inflicting multiple penetrations on a victim is more egregious than the single act necessary to commit the crime. Other cases hold that more than one act of sexual intercourse cannot, standing alone, constitute a separate aggravating factor, but can be considered as evidence of deliberate cruelty.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"multiple penetrations can be evidence of deliberate cruelty because multiple penetrations or sexual acts over a period of time are more degrading than a single act of rape","sentence":"See, e.g., State v. Strauss, 54 Wn. App. 408, 419, 773 P.2d 898 (1989) (rejecting the State\u2019s contention that the defendant\u2019s multiple penetrations supported the trial court\u2019s finding of deliberate cruelty); State v. Post, 59 Wn. App. 389, 797 P.2d 1160 (1990) (rape defendant\u2019s multiple attempts at penetration over one hour did not, without more, warrant finding of deliberate cruelty, distinguishing Falling because that case involved both oral and vaginal intercourse over 30-minute period), aff\u2019d, 118 Wn.2d 596, 826 P.2d 172, 837 P.2d 599 (1992); but see State v. Herzog, 69 Wn. App. 521, 849 P.2d 1235, review denied, 122 Wn.2d 1021 (1993) (multiple penetrations can be evidence of deliberate cruelty because multiple penetrations or sexual acts over a period of time are more degrading than a single act of rape). We recently resolved this issue in State v. Vaughn, 83 Wn. App. 669, an opinion filed after oral argument in this case."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"rape defendant's multiple attempts at penetration over one hour did not, without more, warrant finding of deliberate cruelty, distinguishing Falling because that case involved both oral and vaginal intercourse over 30-minute period","sentence":"See, e.g., State v. Strauss, 54 Wn. App. 408, 419, 773 P.2d 898 (1989) (rejecting the State\u2019s contention that the defendant\u2019s multiple penetrations supported the trial court\u2019s finding of deliberate cruelty); State v. Post, 59 Wn. App. 389, 797 P.2d 1160 (1990) (rape defendant\u2019s multiple attempts at penetration over one hour did not, without more, warrant finding of deliberate cruelty, distinguishing Falling because that case involved both oral and vaginal intercourse over 30-minute period), aff\u2019d, 118 Wn.2d 596, 826 P.2d 172, 837 P.2d 599 (1992); but see State v. Herzog, 69 Wn. App. 521, 849 P.2d 1235, review denied, 122 Wn.2d 1021 (1993) (multiple penetrations can be evidence of deliberate cruelty because multiple penetrations or sexual acts over a period of time are more degrading than a single act of rape). We recently resolved this issue in State v. Vaughn, 83 Wn. App. 669, an opinion filed after oral argument in this case."},"case_id":1190665,"label":"b"}
{"context":"We have held, albeit without much discussion, that the fact that a defendant raped his victim twice justified an exceptional sentence because inflicting multiple penetrations on a victim is more egregious than the single act necessary to commit the crime. Other cases hold that more than one act of sexual intercourse cannot, standing alone, constitute a separate aggravating factor, but can be considered as evidence of deliberate cruelty.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"rape defendant's multiple attempts at penetration over one hour did not, without more, warrant finding of deliberate cruelty, distinguishing Falling because that case involved both oral and vaginal intercourse over 30-minute period","sentence":"See, e.g., State v. Strauss, 54 Wn. App. 408, 419, 773 P.2d 898 (1989) (rejecting the State\u2019s contention that the defendant\u2019s multiple penetrations supported the trial court\u2019s finding of deliberate cruelty); State v. Post, 59 Wn. App. 389, 797 P.2d 1160 (1990) (rape defendant\u2019s multiple attempts at penetration over one hour did not, without more, warrant finding of deliberate cruelty, distinguishing Falling because that case involved both oral and vaginal intercourse over 30-minute period), aff\u2019d, 118 Wn.2d 596, 826 P.2d 172, 837 P.2d 599 (1992); but see State v. Herzog, 69 Wn. App. 521, 849 P.2d 1235, review denied, 122 Wn.2d 1021 (1993) (multiple penetrations can be evidence of deliberate cruelty because multiple penetrations or sexual acts over a period of time are more degrading than a single act of rape). We recently resolved this issue in State v. Vaughn, 83 Wn. App. 669, an opinion filed after oral argument in this case."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"multiple penetrations can be evidence of deliberate cruelty because multiple penetrations or sexual acts over a period of time are more degrading than a single act of rape","sentence":"See, e.g., State v. Strauss, 54 Wn. App. 408, 419, 773 P.2d 898 (1989) (rejecting the State\u2019s contention that the defendant\u2019s multiple penetrations supported the trial court\u2019s finding of deliberate cruelty); State v. Post, 59 Wn. App. 389, 797 P.2d 1160 (1990) (rape defendant\u2019s multiple attempts at penetration over one hour did not, without more, warrant finding of deliberate cruelty, distinguishing Falling because that case involved both oral and vaginal intercourse over 30-minute period), aff\u2019d, 118 Wn.2d 596, 826 P.2d 172, 837 P.2d 599 (1992); but see State v. Herzog, 69 Wn. App. 521, 849 P.2d 1235, review denied, 122 Wn.2d 1021 (1993) (multiple penetrations can be evidence of deliberate cruelty because multiple penetrations or sexual acts over a period of time are more degrading than a single act of rape). We recently resolved this issue in State v. Vaughn, 83 Wn. App. 669, an opinion filed after oral argument in this case."},"case_id":1190665,"label":"a"}
{"context":"We have held, albeit without much discussion, that the fact that a defendant raped his victim twice justified an exceptional sentence because inflicting multiple penetrations on a victim is more egregious than the single act necessary to commit the crime. Other cases hold that more than one act of sexual intercourse cannot, standing alone, constitute a separate aggravating factor, but can be considered as evidence of deliberate cruelty.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"multiple penetrations can be evidence of deliberate cruelty because multiple penetrations or sexual acts over a period of time are more degrading than a single act of rape","sentence":"See, e.g., State v. Strauss, 54 Wn. App. 408, 419, 773 P.2d 898 (1989) (rejecting the State\u2019s contention that the defendant\u2019s multiple penetrations supported the trial court\u2019s finding of deliberate cruelty); State v. Post, 59 Wn. App. 389, 797 P.2d 1160 (1990) (rape defendant\u2019s multiple attempts at penetration over one hour did not, without more, warrant finding of deliberate cruelty, distinguishing Falling because that case involved both oral and vaginal intercourse over 30-minute period), aff\u2019d, 118 Wn.2d 596, 826 P.2d 172, 837 P.2d 599 (1992); but see State v. Herzog, 69 Wn. App. 521, 849 P.2d 1235, review denied, 122 Wn.2d 1021 (1993) (multiple penetrations can be evidence of deliberate cruelty because multiple penetrations or sexual acts over a period of time are more degrading than a single act of rape). We recently resolved this issue in State v. Vaughn, 83 Wn. App. 669, an opinion filed after oral argument in this case."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"rape defendant's multiple attempts at penetration over one hour did not, without more, warrant finding of deliberate cruelty, distinguishing Falling because that case involved both oral and vaginal intercourse over 30-minute period","sentence":"See, e.g., State v. Strauss, 54 Wn. App. 408, 419, 773 P.2d 898 (1989) (rejecting the State\u2019s contention that the defendant\u2019s multiple penetrations supported the trial court\u2019s finding of deliberate cruelty); State v. Post, 59 Wn. App. 389, 797 P.2d 1160 (1990) (rape defendant\u2019s multiple attempts at penetration over one hour did not, without more, warrant finding of deliberate cruelty, distinguishing Falling because that case involved both oral and vaginal intercourse over 30-minute period), aff\u2019d, 118 Wn.2d 596, 826 P.2d 172, 837 P.2d 599 (1992); but see State v. Herzog, 69 Wn. App. 521, 849 P.2d 1235, review denied, 122 Wn.2d 1021 (1993) (multiple penetrations can be evidence of deliberate cruelty because multiple penetrations or sexual acts over a period of time are more degrading than a single act of rape). We recently resolved this issue in State v. Vaughn, 83 Wn. App. 669, an opinion filed after oral argument in this case."},"case_id":1190665,"label":"b"}
{"context":"We have held, albeit without much discussion, that the fact that a defendant raped his victim twice justified an exceptional sentence because inflicting multiple penetrations on a victim is more egregious than the single act necessary to commit the crime. Other cases hold that more than one act of sexual intercourse cannot, standing alone, constitute a separate aggravating factor, but can be considered as evidence of deliberate cruelty.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"multiple penetrations can be evidence of deliberate cruelty because multiple penetrations or sexual acts over a period of time are more degrading than a single act of rape","sentence":"See, e.g., State v. Strauss, 54 Wn. App. 408, 419, 773 P.2d 898 (1989) (rejecting the State\u2019s contention that the defendant\u2019s multiple penetrations supported the trial court\u2019s finding of deliberate cruelty); State v. Post, 59 Wn. App. 389, 797 P.2d 1160 (1990) (rape defendant\u2019s multiple attempts at penetration over one hour did not, without more, warrant finding of deliberate cruelty, distinguishing Falling because that case involved both oral and vaginal intercourse over 30-minute period), aff\u2019d, 118 Wn.2d 596, 826 P.2d 172, 837 P.2d 599 (1992); but see State v. Herzog, 69 Wn. App. 521, 849 P.2d 1235, review denied, 122 Wn.2d 1021 (1993) (multiple penetrations can be evidence of deliberate cruelty because multiple penetrations or sexual acts over a period of time are more degrading than a single act of rape). We recently resolved this issue in State v. Vaughn, 83 Wn. App. 669, an opinion filed after oral argument in this case."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"rape defendant's multiple attempts at penetration over one hour did not, without more, warrant finding of deliberate cruelty, distinguishing Falling because that case involved both oral and vaginal intercourse over 30-minute period","sentence":"See, e.g., State v. Strauss, 54 Wn. App. 408, 419, 773 P.2d 898 (1989) (rejecting the State\u2019s contention that the defendant\u2019s multiple penetrations supported the trial court\u2019s finding of deliberate cruelty); State v. Post, 59 Wn. App. 389, 797 P.2d 1160 (1990) (rape defendant\u2019s multiple attempts at penetration over one hour did not, without more, warrant finding of deliberate cruelty, distinguishing Falling because that case involved both oral and vaginal intercourse over 30-minute period), aff\u2019d, 118 Wn.2d 596, 826 P.2d 172, 837 P.2d 599 (1992); but see State v. Herzog, 69 Wn. App. 521, 849 P.2d 1235, review denied, 122 Wn.2d 1021 (1993) (multiple penetrations can be evidence of deliberate cruelty because multiple penetrations or sexual acts over a period of time are more degrading than a single act of rape). We recently resolved this issue in State v. Vaughn, 83 Wn. App. 669, an opinion filed after oral argument in this case."},"case_id":1190665,"label":"b"}
{"context":"We have held, albeit without much discussion, that the fact that a defendant raped his victim twice justified an exceptional sentence because inflicting multiple penetrations on a victim is more egregious than the single act necessary to commit the crime. Other cases hold that more than one act of sexual intercourse cannot, standing alone, constitute a separate aggravating factor, but can be considered as evidence of deliberate cruelty.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"multiple penetrations can be evidence of deliberate cruelty because multiple penetrations or sexual acts over a period of time are more degrading than a single act of rape","sentence":"See, e.g., State v. Strauss, 54 Wn. App. 408, 419, 773 P.2d 898 (1989) (rejecting the State\u2019s contention that the defendant\u2019s multiple penetrations supported the trial court\u2019s finding of deliberate cruelty); State v. Post, 59 Wn. App. 389, 797 P.2d 1160 (1990) (rape defendant\u2019s multiple attempts at penetration over one hour did not, without more, warrant finding of deliberate cruelty, distinguishing Falling because that case involved both oral and vaginal intercourse over 30-minute period), aff\u2019d, 118 Wn.2d 596, 826 P.2d 172, 837 P.2d 599 (1992); but see State v. Herzog, 69 Wn. App. 521, 849 P.2d 1235, review denied, 122 Wn.2d 1021 (1993) (multiple penetrations can be evidence of deliberate cruelty because multiple penetrations or sexual acts over a period of time are more degrading than a single act of rape). We recently resolved this issue in State v. Vaughn, 83 Wn. App. 669, an opinion filed after oral argument in this case."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"rape defendant's multiple attempts at penetration over one hour did not, without more, warrant finding of deliberate cruelty, distinguishing Falling because that case involved both oral and vaginal intercourse over 30-minute period","sentence":"See, e.g., State v. Strauss, 54 Wn. App. 408, 419, 773 P.2d 898 (1989) (rejecting the State\u2019s contention that the defendant\u2019s multiple penetrations supported the trial court\u2019s finding of deliberate cruelty); State v. Post, 59 Wn. App. 389, 797 P.2d 1160 (1990) (rape defendant\u2019s multiple attempts at penetration over one hour did not, without more, warrant finding of deliberate cruelty, distinguishing Falling because that case involved both oral and vaginal intercourse over 30-minute period), aff\u2019d, 118 Wn.2d 596, 826 P.2d 172, 837 P.2d 599 (1992); but see State v. Herzog, 69 Wn. App. 521, 849 P.2d 1235, review denied, 122 Wn.2d 1021 (1993) (multiple penetrations can be evidence of deliberate cruelty because multiple penetrations or sexual acts over a period of time are more degrading than a single act of rape). We recently resolved this issue in State v. Vaughn, 83 Wn. App. 669, an opinion filed after oral argument in this case."},"case_id":1190665,"label":"b"}
{"context":"We have held, albeit without much discussion, that the fact that a defendant raped his victim twice justified an exceptional sentence because inflicting multiple penetrations on a victim is more egregious than the single act necessary to commit the crime. Other cases hold that more than one act of sexual intercourse cannot, standing alone, constitute a separate aggravating factor, but can be considered as evidence of deliberate cruelty.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"rape defendant's multiple attempts at penetration over one hour did not, without more, warrant finding of deliberate cruelty, distinguishing Falling because that case involved both oral and vaginal intercourse over 30-minute period","sentence":"See, e.g., State v. Strauss, 54 Wn. App. 408, 419, 773 P.2d 898 (1989) (rejecting the State\u2019s contention that the defendant\u2019s multiple penetrations supported the trial court\u2019s finding of deliberate cruelty); State v. Post, 59 Wn. App. 389, 797 P.2d 1160 (1990) (rape defendant\u2019s multiple attempts at penetration over one hour did not, without more, warrant finding of deliberate cruelty, distinguishing Falling because that case involved both oral and vaginal intercourse over 30-minute period), aff\u2019d, 118 Wn.2d 596, 826 P.2d 172, 837 P.2d 599 (1992); but see State v. Herzog, 69 Wn. App. 521, 849 P.2d 1235, review denied, 122 Wn.2d 1021 (1993) (multiple penetrations can be evidence of deliberate cruelty because multiple penetrations or sexual acts over a period of time are more degrading than a single act of rape). We recently resolved this issue in State v. Vaughn, 83 Wn. App. 669, an opinion filed after oral argument in this case."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"multiple penetrations can be evidence of deliberate cruelty because multiple penetrations or sexual acts over a period of time are more degrading than a single act of rape","sentence":"See, e.g., State v. Strauss, 54 Wn. App. 408, 419, 773 P.2d 898 (1989) (rejecting the State\u2019s contention that the defendant\u2019s multiple penetrations supported the trial court\u2019s finding of deliberate cruelty); State v. Post, 59 Wn. App. 389, 797 P.2d 1160 (1990) (rape defendant\u2019s multiple attempts at penetration over one hour did not, without more, warrant finding of deliberate cruelty, distinguishing Falling because that case involved both oral and vaginal intercourse over 30-minute period), aff\u2019d, 118 Wn.2d 596, 826 P.2d 172, 837 P.2d 599 (1992); but see State v. Herzog, 69 Wn. App. 521, 849 P.2d 1235, review denied, 122 Wn.2d 1021 (1993) (multiple penetrations can be evidence of deliberate cruelty because multiple penetrations or sexual acts over a period of time are more degrading than a single act of rape). We recently resolved this issue in State v. Vaughn, 83 Wn. App. 669, an opinion filed after oral argument in this case."},"case_id":1190665,"label":"a"}
{"context":"We have held, albeit without much discussion, that the fact that a defendant raped his victim twice justified an exceptional sentence because inflicting multiple penetrations on a victim is more egregious than the single act necessary to commit the crime. Other cases hold that more than one act of sexual intercourse cannot, standing alone, constitute a separate aggravating factor, but can be considered as evidence of deliberate cruelty.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"rape defendant's multiple attempts at penetration over one hour did not, without more, warrant finding of deliberate cruelty, distinguishing Falling because that case involved both oral and vaginal intercourse over 30-minute period","sentence":"See, e.g., State v. Strauss, 54 Wn. App. 408, 419, 773 P.2d 898 (1989) (rejecting the State\u2019s contention that the defendant\u2019s multiple penetrations supported the trial court\u2019s finding of deliberate cruelty); State v. Post, 59 Wn. App. 389, 797 P.2d 1160 (1990) (rape defendant\u2019s multiple attempts at penetration over one hour did not, without more, warrant finding of deliberate cruelty, distinguishing Falling because that case involved both oral and vaginal intercourse over 30-minute period), aff\u2019d, 118 Wn.2d 596, 826 P.2d 172, 837 P.2d 599 (1992); but see State v. Herzog, 69 Wn. App. 521, 849 P.2d 1235, review denied, 122 Wn.2d 1021 (1993) (multiple penetrations can be evidence of deliberate cruelty because multiple penetrations or sexual acts over a period of time are more degrading than a single act of rape). We recently resolved this issue in State v. Vaughn, 83 Wn. App. 669, an opinion filed after oral argument in this case."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"multiple penetrations can be evidence of deliberate cruelty because multiple penetrations or sexual acts over a period of time are more degrading than a single act of rape","sentence":"See, e.g., State v. Strauss, 54 Wn. App. 408, 419, 773 P.2d 898 (1989) (rejecting the State\u2019s contention that the defendant\u2019s multiple penetrations supported the trial court\u2019s finding of deliberate cruelty); State v. Post, 59 Wn. App. 389, 797 P.2d 1160 (1990) (rape defendant\u2019s multiple attempts at penetration over one hour did not, without more, warrant finding of deliberate cruelty, distinguishing Falling because that case involved both oral and vaginal intercourse over 30-minute period), aff\u2019d, 118 Wn.2d 596, 826 P.2d 172, 837 P.2d 599 (1992); but see State v. Herzog, 69 Wn. App. 521, 849 P.2d 1235, review denied, 122 Wn.2d 1021 (1993) (multiple penetrations can be evidence of deliberate cruelty because multiple penetrations or sexual acts over a period of time are more degrading than a single act of rape). We recently resolved this issue in State v. Vaughn, 83 Wn. App. 669, an opinion filed after oral argument in this case."},"case_id":1190665,"label":"a"}
{"context":"We have held, albeit without much discussion, that the fact that a defendant raped his victim twice justified an exceptional sentence because inflicting multiple penetrations on a victim is more egregious than the single act necessary to commit the crime. Other cases hold that more than one act of sexual intercourse cannot, standing alone, constitute a separate aggravating factor, but can be considered as evidence of deliberate cruelty.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"multiple penetrations can be evidence of deliberate cruelty because multiple penetrations or sexual acts over a period of time are more degrading than a single act of rape","sentence":"See, e.g., State v. Strauss, 54 Wn. App. 408, 419, 773 P.2d 898 (1989) (rejecting the State\u2019s contention that the defendant\u2019s multiple penetrations supported the trial court\u2019s finding of deliberate cruelty); State v. Post, 59 Wn. App. 389, 797 P.2d 1160 (1990) (rape defendant\u2019s multiple attempts at penetration over one hour did not, without more, warrant finding of deliberate cruelty, distinguishing Falling because that case involved both oral and vaginal intercourse over 30-minute period), aff\u2019d, 118 Wn.2d 596, 826 P.2d 172, 837 P.2d 599 (1992); but see State v. Herzog, 69 Wn. App. 521, 849 P.2d 1235, review denied, 122 Wn.2d 1021 (1993) (multiple penetrations can be evidence of deliberate cruelty because multiple penetrations or sexual acts over a period of time are more degrading than a single act of rape). We recently resolved this issue in State v. Vaughn, 83 Wn. App. 669, an opinion filed after oral argument in this case."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"rape defendant's multiple attempts at penetration over one hour did not, without more, warrant finding of deliberate cruelty, distinguishing Falling because that case involved both oral and vaginal intercourse over 30-minute period","sentence":"See, e.g., State v. Strauss, 54 Wn. App. 408, 419, 773 P.2d 898 (1989) (rejecting the State\u2019s contention that the defendant\u2019s multiple penetrations supported the trial court\u2019s finding of deliberate cruelty); State v. Post, 59 Wn. App. 389, 797 P.2d 1160 (1990) (rape defendant\u2019s multiple attempts at penetration over one hour did not, without more, warrant finding of deliberate cruelty, distinguishing Falling because that case involved both oral and vaginal intercourse over 30-minute period), aff\u2019d, 118 Wn.2d 596, 826 P.2d 172, 837 P.2d 599 (1992); but see State v. Herzog, 69 Wn. App. 521, 849 P.2d 1235, review denied, 122 Wn.2d 1021 (1993) (multiple penetrations can be evidence of deliberate cruelty because multiple penetrations or sexual acts over a period of time are more degrading than a single act of rape). We recently resolved this issue in State v. Vaughn, 83 Wn. App. 669, an opinion filed after oral argument in this case."},"case_id":1190665,"label":"b"}
{"context":"We have held, albeit without much discussion, that the fact that a defendant raped his victim twice justified an exceptional sentence because inflicting multiple penetrations on a victim is more egregious than the single act necessary to commit the crime. Other cases hold that more than one act of sexual intercourse cannot, standing alone, constitute a separate aggravating factor, but can be considered as evidence of deliberate cruelty.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"rape defendant's multiple attempts at penetration over one hour did not, without more, warrant finding of deliberate cruelty, distinguishing Falling because that case involved both oral and vaginal intercourse over 30-minute period","sentence":"See, e.g., State v. Strauss, 54 Wn. App. 408, 419, 773 P.2d 898 (1989) (rejecting the State\u2019s contention that the defendant\u2019s multiple penetrations supported the trial court\u2019s finding of deliberate cruelty); State v. Post, 59 Wn. App. 389, 797 P.2d 1160 (1990) (rape defendant\u2019s multiple attempts at penetration over one hour did not, without more, warrant finding of deliberate cruelty, distinguishing Falling because that case involved both oral and vaginal intercourse over 30-minute period), aff\u2019d, 118 Wn.2d 596, 826 P.2d 172, 837 P.2d 599 (1992); but see State v. Herzog, 69 Wn. App. 521, 849 P.2d 1235, review denied, 122 Wn.2d 1021 (1993) (multiple penetrations can be evidence of deliberate cruelty because multiple penetrations or sexual acts over a period of time are more degrading than a single act of rape). We recently resolved this issue in State v. Vaughn, 83 Wn. App. 669, an opinion filed after oral argument in this case."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"multiple penetrations can be evidence of deliberate cruelty because multiple penetrations or sexual acts over a period of time are more degrading than a single act of rape","sentence":"See, e.g., State v. Strauss, 54 Wn. App. 408, 419, 773 P.2d 898 (1989) (rejecting the State\u2019s contention that the defendant\u2019s multiple penetrations supported the trial court\u2019s finding of deliberate cruelty); State v. Post, 59 Wn. App. 389, 797 P.2d 1160 (1990) (rape defendant\u2019s multiple attempts at penetration over one hour did not, without more, warrant finding of deliberate cruelty, distinguishing Falling because that case involved both oral and vaginal intercourse over 30-minute period), aff\u2019d, 118 Wn.2d 596, 826 P.2d 172, 837 P.2d 599 (1992); but see State v. Herzog, 69 Wn. App. 521, 849 P.2d 1235, review denied, 122 Wn.2d 1021 (1993) (multiple penetrations can be evidence of deliberate cruelty because multiple penetrations or sexual acts over a period of time are more degrading than a single act of rape). We recently resolved this issue in State v. Vaughn, 83 Wn. App. 669, an opinion filed after oral argument in this case."},"case_id":1190665,"label":"a"}
{"context":"We have held, albeit without much discussion, that the fact that a defendant raped his victim twice justified an exceptional sentence because inflicting multiple penetrations on a victim is more egregious than the single act necessary to commit the crime. Other cases hold that more than one act of sexual intercourse cannot, standing alone, constitute a separate aggravating factor, but can be considered as evidence of deliberate cruelty.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"rape defendant's multiple attempts at penetration over one hour did not, without more, warrant finding of deliberate cruelty, distinguishing Falling because that case involved both oral and vaginal intercourse over 30-minute period","sentence":"See, e.g., State v. Strauss, 54 Wn. App. 408, 419, 773 P.2d 898 (1989) (rejecting the State\u2019s contention that the defendant\u2019s multiple penetrations supported the trial court\u2019s finding of deliberate cruelty); State v. Post, 59 Wn. App. 389, 797 P.2d 1160 (1990) (rape defendant\u2019s multiple attempts at penetration over one hour did not, without more, warrant finding of deliberate cruelty, distinguishing Falling because that case involved both oral and vaginal intercourse over 30-minute period), aff\u2019d, 118 Wn.2d 596, 826 P.2d 172, 837 P.2d 599 (1992); but see State v. Herzog, 69 Wn. App. 521, 849 P.2d 1235, review denied, 122 Wn.2d 1021 (1993) (multiple penetrations can be evidence of deliberate cruelty because multiple penetrations or sexual acts over a period of time are more degrading than a single act of rape). We recently resolved this issue in State v. Vaughn, 83 Wn. App. 669, an opinion filed after oral argument in this case."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"multiple penetrations can be evidence of deliberate cruelty because multiple penetrations or sexual acts over a period of time are more degrading than a single act of rape","sentence":"See, e.g., State v. Strauss, 54 Wn. App. 408, 419, 773 P.2d 898 (1989) (rejecting the State\u2019s contention that the defendant\u2019s multiple penetrations supported the trial court\u2019s finding of deliberate cruelty); State v. Post, 59 Wn. App. 389, 797 P.2d 1160 (1990) (rape defendant\u2019s multiple attempts at penetration over one hour did not, without more, warrant finding of deliberate cruelty, distinguishing Falling because that case involved both oral and vaginal intercourse over 30-minute period), aff\u2019d, 118 Wn.2d 596, 826 P.2d 172, 837 P.2d 599 (1992); but see State v. Herzog, 69 Wn. App. 521, 849 P.2d 1235, review denied, 122 Wn.2d 1021 (1993) (multiple penetrations can be evidence of deliberate cruelty because multiple penetrations or sexual acts over a period of time are more degrading than a single act of rape). We recently resolved this issue in State v. Vaughn, 83 Wn. App. 669, an opinion filed after oral argument in this case."},"case_id":1190665,"label":"a"}
{"context":"We have held, albeit without much discussion, that the fact that a defendant raped his victim twice justified an exceptional sentence because inflicting multiple penetrations on a victim is more egregious than the single act necessary to commit the crime. Other cases hold that more than one act of sexual intercourse cannot, standing alone, constitute a separate aggravating factor, but can be considered as evidence of deliberate cruelty.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"multiple penetrations can be evidence of deliberate cruelty because multiple penetrations or sexual acts over a period of time are more degrading than a single act of rape","sentence":"See, e.g., State v. Strauss, 54 Wn. App. 408, 419, 773 P.2d 898 (1989) (rejecting the State\u2019s contention that the defendant\u2019s multiple penetrations supported the trial court\u2019s finding of deliberate cruelty); State v. Post, 59 Wn. App. 389, 797 P.2d 1160 (1990) (rape defendant\u2019s multiple attempts at penetration over one hour did not, without more, warrant finding of deliberate cruelty, distinguishing Falling because that case involved both oral and vaginal intercourse over 30-minute period), aff\u2019d, 118 Wn.2d 596, 826 P.2d 172, 837 P.2d 599 (1992); but see State v. Herzog, 69 Wn. App. 521, 849 P.2d 1235, review denied, 122 Wn.2d 1021 (1993) (multiple penetrations can be evidence of deliberate cruelty because multiple penetrations or sexual acts over a period of time are more degrading than a single act of rape). We recently resolved this issue in State v. Vaughn, 83 Wn. App. 669, an opinion filed after oral argument in this case."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"rape defendant's multiple attempts at penetration over one hour did not, without more, warrant finding of deliberate cruelty, distinguishing Falling because that case involved both oral and vaginal intercourse over 30-minute period","sentence":"See, e.g., State v. Strauss, 54 Wn. App. 408, 419, 773 P.2d 898 (1989) (rejecting the State\u2019s contention that the defendant\u2019s multiple penetrations supported the trial court\u2019s finding of deliberate cruelty); State v. Post, 59 Wn. App. 389, 797 P.2d 1160 (1990) (rape defendant\u2019s multiple attempts at penetration over one hour did not, without more, warrant finding of deliberate cruelty, distinguishing Falling because that case involved both oral and vaginal intercourse over 30-minute period), aff\u2019d, 118 Wn.2d 596, 826 P.2d 172, 837 P.2d 599 (1992); but see State v. Herzog, 69 Wn. App. 521, 849 P.2d 1235, review denied, 122 Wn.2d 1021 (1993) (multiple penetrations can be evidence of deliberate cruelty because multiple penetrations or sexual acts over a period of time are more degrading than a single act of rape). We recently resolved this issue in State v. Vaughn, 83 Wn. App. 669, an opinion filed after oral argument in this case."},"case_id":1190665,"label":"b"}
{"context":"We have held, albeit without much discussion, that the fact that a defendant raped his victim twice justified an exceptional sentence because inflicting multiple penetrations on a victim is more egregious than the single act necessary to commit the crime. Other cases hold that more than one act of sexual intercourse cannot, standing alone, constitute a separate aggravating factor, but can be considered as evidence of deliberate cruelty.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"multiple penetrations can be evidence of deliberate cruelty because multiple penetrations or sexual acts over a period of time are more degrading than a single act of rape","sentence":"See, e.g., State v. Strauss, 54 Wn. App. 408, 419, 773 P.2d 898 (1989) (rejecting the State\u2019s contention that the defendant\u2019s multiple penetrations supported the trial court\u2019s finding of deliberate cruelty); State v. Post, 59 Wn. App. 389, 797 P.2d 1160 (1990) (rape defendant\u2019s multiple attempts at penetration over one hour did not, without more, warrant finding of deliberate cruelty, distinguishing Falling because that case involved both oral and vaginal intercourse over 30-minute period), aff\u2019d, 118 Wn.2d 596, 826 P.2d 172, 837 P.2d 599 (1992); but see State v. Herzog, 69 Wn. App. 521, 849 P.2d 1235, review denied, 122 Wn.2d 1021 (1993) (multiple penetrations can be evidence of deliberate cruelty because multiple penetrations or sexual acts over a period of time are more degrading than a single act of rape). We recently resolved this issue in State v. Vaughn, 83 Wn. App. 669, an opinion filed after oral argument in this case."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"rape defendant's multiple attempts at penetration over one hour did not, without more, warrant finding of deliberate cruelty, distinguishing Falling because that case involved both oral and vaginal intercourse over 30-minute period","sentence":"See, e.g., State v. Strauss, 54 Wn. App. 408, 419, 773 P.2d 898 (1989) (rejecting the State\u2019s contention that the defendant\u2019s multiple penetrations supported the trial court\u2019s finding of deliberate cruelty); State v. Post, 59 Wn. App. 389, 797 P.2d 1160 (1990) (rape defendant\u2019s multiple attempts at penetration over one hour did not, without more, warrant finding of deliberate cruelty, distinguishing Falling because that case involved both oral and vaginal intercourse over 30-minute period), aff\u2019d, 118 Wn.2d 596, 826 P.2d 172, 837 P.2d 599 (1992); but see State v. Herzog, 69 Wn. App. 521, 849 P.2d 1235, review denied, 122 Wn.2d 1021 (1993) (multiple penetrations can be evidence of deliberate cruelty because multiple penetrations or sexual acts over a period of time are more degrading than a single act of rape). We recently resolved this issue in State v. Vaughn, 83 Wn. App. 669, an opinion filed after oral argument in this case."},"case_id":1190665,"label":"b"}
{"context":"We have held, albeit without much discussion, that the fact that a defendant raped his victim twice justified an exceptional sentence because inflicting multiple penetrations on a victim is more egregious than the single act necessary to commit the crime. Other cases hold that more than one act of sexual intercourse cannot, standing alone, constitute a separate aggravating factor, but can be considered as evidence of deliberate cruelty.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"multiple penetrations can be evidence of deliberate cruelty because multiple penetrations or sexual acts over a period of time are more degrading than a single act of rape","sentence":"See, e.g., State v. Strauss, 54 Wn. App. 408, 419, 773 P.2d 898 (1989) (rejecting the State\u2019s contention that the defendant\u2019s multiple penetrations supported the trial court\u2019s finding of deliberate cruelty); State v. Post, 59 Wn. App. 389, 797 P.2d 1160 (1990) (rape defendant\u2019s multiple attempts at penetration over one hour did not, without more, warrant finding of deliberate cruelty, distinguishing Falling because that case involved both oral and vaginal intercourse over 30-minute period), aff\u2019d, 118 Wn.2d 596, 826 P.2d 172, 837 P.2d 599 (1992); but see State v. Herzog, 69 Wn. App. 521, 849 P.2d 1235, review denied, 122 Wn.2d 1021 (1993) (multiple penetrations can be evidence of deliberate cruelty because multiple penetrations or sexual acts over a period of time are more degrading than a single act of rape). We recently resolved this issue in State v. Vaughn, 83 Wn. App. 669, an opinion filed after oral argument in this case."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"rape defendant's multiple attempts at penetration over one hour did not, without more, warrant finding of deliberate cruelty, distinguishing Falling because that case involved both oral and vaginal intercourse over 30-minute period","sentence":"See, e.g., State v. Strauss, 54 Wn. App. 408, 419, 773 P.2d 898 (1989) (rejecting the State\u2019s contention that the defendant\u2019s multiple penetrations supported the trial court\u2019s finding of deliberate cruelty); State v. Post, 59 Wn. App. 389, 797 P.2d 1160 (1990) (rape defendant\u2019s multiple attempts at penetration over one hour did not, without more, warrant finding of deliberate cruelty, distinguishing Falling because that case involved both oral and vaginal intercourse over 30-minute period), aff\u2019d, 118 Wn.2d 596, 826 P.2d 172, 837 P.2d 599 (1992); but see State v. Herzog, 69 Wn. App. 521, 849 P.2d 1235, review denied, 122 Wn.2d 1021 (1993) (multiple penetrations can be evidence of deliberate cruelty because multiple penetrations or sexual acts over a period of time are more degrading than a single act of rape). We recently resolved this issue in State v. Vaughn, 83 Wn. App. 669, an opinion filed after oral argument in this case."},"case_id":1190665,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The court finds that the Terms and Conditions are a \"complete and exclusive statement of the terms of the agreement\" under Iowa Code section 554.2202, and, therefore, the agreement is fully integrated.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"545 N.W.2d 291, 291","parenthetical":"noting that, under the parol evidence rule, a party cannot supplement a fully integrated agreement with extrinsic evidence","sentence":"See Iowa Code \u00a7 554.2202 (providing that, if \u201cthe court finds the writing to have been intended ... as a complete and exclusive statement of the terms of the agreement,\u201d the agreement cannot be supplemented \u201cby evidence of consistent additional terms\u201d); see also Whalen, 545 N.W.2d at 291 (noting that, under the parol evidence rule, a party cannot supplement a fully integrated agreement with extrinsic evidence); Levien Leasing Co., 380 N.W.2d at 750 (\u201cA contract with an integration clause typically represents the complete agreement of the parties and .any- extrinsic evidence which varies, adds, or subtracts from its terms is barred by the parol evidence rule.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"202 N.W. 553, 553","parenthetical":"finding that the parties intended a subsequent written agreement to be a final expression when the parties acted in compliance with the written terms","sentence":"See C & J Vantage Leasing Co., 795 N.W.2d at 85. The court reaches this conclusion because it finds that: (1) the parties intended the invoice to represent the entire agreement because the Terms and Conditions printed on the back of the invoice include an integration clause; (2) the parties acted in compliance with the invoice when BVS paid CDW' the price listed in the invoice rather, than the price listed in the purchase order, see S. Tex. Land Co., 202 N.W. at 553 (finding that the parties intended a subsequent written agreement to be a final expression when the parties acted in compliance with the written terms);, and (3) the parties are sophisticated and of equal bargaining strength, see Whalen, 545 N.W.2d at 291 (applying the parol evidence rule to a contract with an integration clause and noting that the parties \u201cwere sophisticated business persons ... of equal bargaining strength\u201d (quoting Montgomery Props."},"case_id":3901700,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The court finds that the Terms and Conditions are a \"complete and exclusive statement of the terms of the agreement\" under Iowa Code section 554.2202, and, therefore, the agreement is fully integrated.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"202 N.W. 553, 553","parenthetical":"finding that the parties intended a subsequent written agreement to be a final expression when the parties acted in compliance with the written terms","sentence":"See C & J Vantage Leasing Co., 795 N.W.2d at 85. The court reaches this conclusion because it finds that: (1) the parties intended the invoice to represent the entire agreement because the Terms and Conditions printed on the back of the invoice include an integration clause; (2) the parties acted in compliance with the invoice when BVS paid CDW' the price listed in the invoice rather, than the price listed in the purchase order, see S. Tex. Land Co., 202 N.W. at 553 (finding that the parties intended a subsequent written agreement to be a final expression when the parties acted in compliance with the written terms);, and (3) the parties are sophisticated and of equal bargaining strength, see Whalen, 545 N.W.2d at 291 (applying the parol evidence rule to a contract with an integration clause and noting that the parties \u201cwere sophisticated business persons ... of equal bargaining strength\u201d (quoting Montgomery Props."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"380 N.W.2d 750, 750","parenthetical":"\"A contract with an integration clause typically represents the complete agreement of the parties and .any- extrinsic evidence which varies, adds, or subtracts from its terms is barred by the parol evidence rule.\"","sentence":"See Iowa Code \u00a7 554.2202 (providing that, if \u201cthe court finds the writing to have been intended ... as a complete and exclusive statement of the terms of the agreement,\u201d the agreement cannot be supplemented \u201cby evidence of consistent additional terms\u201d); see also Whalen, 545 N.W.2d at 291 (noting that, under the parol evidence rule, a party cannot supplement a fully integrated agreement with extrinsic evidence); Levien Leasing Co., 380 N.W.2d at 750 (\u201cA contract with an integration clause typically represents the complete agreement of the parties and .any- extrinsic evidence which varies, adds, or subtracts from its terms is barred by the parol evidence rule.\u201d)."},"case_id":3901700,"label":"a"}
{"context":"\"Congress has afforded ITA a degree of latitude in implementing its verification procedures ____ The decision to select a particular method of verification rests solely within the agency's sound discretion.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"17 CIT 392, 399","parenthetical":"upholding the ITA's decision not to apply BIA based on ITA's claim that it was able to verify respondent's questionnaire response through \"alternative means\"","sentence":"Floral Trade Council v. United States, 17 CIT 392, 399, 822 F.Supp. 766, 772 (1993)(upholding the ITA\u2019s decision not to apply BIA based on ITA\u2019s claim that it was able to verify respondent\u2019s questionnaire response through \u201calternative means\u201d) (citations omitted); see also American Alloys, Inc. v. United States, 30 F.3d 1469, 1475 (Fed.Cir.1994) (\u201c[T]he statute gives Commerce wide latitude in its verification procedures.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"30 F.3d 1469, 1475","parenthetical":"\"[T]he statute gives Commerce wide latitude in its verification procedures.\"","sentence":"Floral Trade Council v. United States, 17 CIT 392, 399, 822 F.Supp. 766, 772 (1993)(upholding the ITA\u2019s decision not to apply BIA based on ITA\u2019s claim that it was able to verify respondent\u2019s questionnaire response through \u201calternative means\u201d) (citations omitted); see also American Alloys, Inc. v. United States, 30 F.3d 1469, 1475 (Fed.Cir.1994) (\u201c[T]he statute gives Commerce wide latitude in its verification procedures.\u201d)."},"case_id":914379,"label":"a"}
{"context":"\"Congress has afforded ITA a degree of latitude in implementing its verification procedures ____ The decision to select a particular method of verification rests solely within the agency's sound discretion.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"822 F.Supp. 766, 772","parenthetical":"upholding the ITA's decision not to apply BIA based on ITA's claim that it was able to verify respondent's questionnaire response through \"alternative means\"","sentence":"Floral Trade Council v. United States, 17 CIT 392, 399, 822 F.Supp. 766, 772 (1993)(upholding the ITA\u2019s decision not to apply BIA based on ITA\u2019s claim that it was able to verify respondent\u2019s questionnaire response through \u201calternative means\u201d) (citations omitted); see also American Alloys, Inc. v. United States, 30 F.3d 1469, 1475 (Fed.Cir.1994) (\u201c[T]he statute gives Commerce wide latitude in its verification procedures.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"30 F.3d 1469, 1475","parenthetical":"\"[T]he statute gives Commerce wide latitude in its verification procedures.\"","sentence":"Floral Trade Council v. United States, 17 CIT 392, 399, 822 F.Supp. 766, 772 (1993)(upholding the ITA\u2019s decision not to apply BIA based on ITA\u2019s claim that it was able to verify respondent\u2019s questionnaire response through \u201calternative means\u201d) (citations omitted); see also American Alloys, Inc. v. United States, 30 F.3d 1469, 1475 (Fed.Cir.1994) (\u201c[T]he statute gives Commerce wide latitude in its verification procedures.\u201d)."},"case_id":914379,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Furthermore, we agree with the District Court and the State that the statute of limitations defenses which are applicable in a normal civil suit do not apply here because the riverbeds are public trust lands under Article X, Section 11 of the Montana Constitution.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"182 Mont. 446, 446","parenthetical":"noting that the government's efforts to enforce and maintain a policy respecting lands held in the public trust trumps the equitable and legal affirmative defenses which are normally available against State actions","sentence":"See Norman, 182 Mont. at 446, 597 P.2d at 719 (noting that the government\u2019s efforts to enforce and maintain a policy respecting lands held in the public trust trumps the equitable and legal affirmative defenses which are normally available against State actions); see also Chennault v. Sager, 187 Mont. 455, 460, 610 P.2d 173, 176 (1980) (stating that the interests of the general public should not be defeated by the unauthorized or unlawful acts of public agents or officers) (citing Norman)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"187 Mont. 455, 460","parenthetical":"stating that the interests of the general public should not be defeated by the unauthorized or unlawful acts of public agents or officers","sentence":"See Norman, 182 Mont. at 446, 597 P.2d at 719 (noting that the government\u2019s efforts to enforce and maintain a policy respecting lands held in the public trust trumps the equitable and legal affirmative defenses which are normally available against State actions); see also Chennault v. Sager, 187 Mont. 455, 460, 610 P.2d 173, 176 (1980) (stating that the interests of the general public should not be defeated by the unauthorized or unlawful acts of public agents or officers) (citing Norman)."},"case_id":5713702,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Furthermore, we agree with the District Court and the State that the statute of limitations defenses which are applicable in a normal civil suit do not apply here because the riverbeds are public trust lands under Article X, Section 11 of the Montana Constitution.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"610 P.2d 173, 176","parenthetical":"stating that the interests of the general public should not be defeated by the unauthorized or unlawful acts of public agents or officers","sentence":"See Norman, 182 Mont. at 446, 597 P.2d at 719 (noting that the government\u2019s efforts to enforce and maintain a policy respecting lands held in the public trust trumps the equitable and legal affirmative defenses which are normally available against State actions); see also Chennault v. Sager, 187 Mont. 455, 460, 610 P.2d 173, 176 (1980) (stating that the interests of the general public should not be defeated by the unauthorized or unlawful acts of public agents or officers) (citing Norman)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"182 Mont. 446, 446","parenthetical":"noting that the government's efforts to enforce and maintain a policy respecting lands held in the public trust trumps the equitable and legal affirmative defenses which are normally available against State actions","sentence":"See Norman, 182 Mont. at 446, 597 P.2d at 719 (noting that the government\u2019s efforts to enforce and maintain a policy respecting lands held in the public trust trumps the equitable and legal affirmative defenses which are normally available against State actions); see also Chennault v. Sager, 187 Mont. 455, 460, 610 P.2d 173, 176 (1980) (stating that the interests of the general public should not be defeated by the unauthorized or unlawful acts of public agents or officers) (citing Norman)."},"case_id":5713702,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Furthermore, we agree with the District Court and the State that the statute of limitations defenses which are applicable in a normal civil suit do not apply here because the riverbeds are public trust lands under Article X, Section 11 of the Montana Constitution.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"187 Mont. 455, 460","parenthetical":"stating that the interests of the general public should not be defeated by the unauthorized or unlawful acts of public agents or officers","sentence":"See Norman, 182 Mont. at 446, 597 P.2d at 719 (noting that the government\u2019s efforts to enforce and maintain a policy respecting lands held in the public trust trumps the equitable and legal affirmative defenses which are normally available against State actions); see also Chennault v. Sager, 187 Mont. 455, 460, 610 P.2d 173, 176 (1980) (stating that the interests of the general public should not be defeated by the unauthorized or unlawful acts of public agents or officers) (citing Norman)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"597 P.2d 719, 719","parenthetical":"noting that the government's efforts to enforce and maintain a policy respecting lands held in the public trust trumps the equitable and legal affirmative defenses which are normally available against State actions","sentence":"See Norman, 182 Mont. at 446, 597 P.2d at 719 (noting that the government\u2019s efforts to enforce and maintain a policy respecting lands held in the public trust trumps the equitable and legal affirmative defenses which are normally available against State actions); see also Chennault v. Sager, 187 Mont. 455, 460, 610 P.2d 173, 176 (1980) (stating that the interests of the general public should not be defeated by the unauthorized or unlawful acts of public agents or officers) (citing Norman)."},"case_id":5713702,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Furthermore, we agree with the District Court and the State that the statute of limitations defenses which are applicable in a normal civil suit do not apply here because the riverbeds are public trust lands under Article X, Section 11 of the Montana Constitution.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"610 P.2d 173, 176","parenthetical":"stating that the interests of the general public should not be defeated by the unauthorized or unlawful acts of public agents or officers","sentence":"See Norman, 182 Mont. at 446, 597 P.2d at 719 (noting that the government\u2019s efforts to enforce and maintain a policy respecting lands held in the public trust trumps the equitable and legal affirmative defenses which are normally available against State actions); see also Chennault v. Sager, 187 Mont. 455, 460, 610 P.2d 173, 176 (1980) (stating that the interests of the general public should not be defeated by the unauthorized or unlawful acts of public agents or officers) (citing Norman)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"597 P.2d 719, 719","parenthetical":"noting that the government's efforts to enforce and maintain a policy respecting lands held in the public trust trumps the equitable and legal affirmative defenses which are normally available against State actions","sentence":"See Norman, 182 Mont. at 446, 597 P.2d at 719 (noting that the government\u2019s efforts to enforce and maintain a policy respecting lands held in the public trust trumps the equitable and legal affirmative defenses which are normally available against State actions); see also Chennault v. Sager, 187 Mont. 455, 460, 610 P.2d 173, 176 (1980) (stating that the interests of the general public should not be defeated by the unauthorized or unlawful acts of public agents or officers) (citing Norman)."},"case_id":5713702,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Because our 2014 opinion resolved these legal issues on the merits, the trial court was constrained by the law of the case doctrine and was not at liberty to disregard and contradict our holdings.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"330 S.W.3d 20, 20-21","parenthetical":"law of the case doctrine applied where appellate court had resolved issue presented to it on the merits in previous mandamus proceeding","sentence":"See Cantu de Villarreal, 330 S.W.3d at 20-21 (law of the case doctrine applied where appellate court had resolved issue presented to it on the merits in previous mandamus proceeding); B S P Mktg,, Inc., 2004 WL 119235, at *1-2 (applying law of the case doctrine to issue on appeal where appellate court had resolved issue on merits in earlier mandamus proceeding); see also Landerman, 247 S.W.3d at 433 (determination that trial court has abused its discretion in taking some action is a question of law); Hudson, 711 S.W.2d at 630 (application of law of the case doctrine means that question of law decided by appellate court governs case in subsequent stages); Trevino, 564 S.W.2d at 685 (when court has decided question of law, law of the case doctrine means that decision governs case throughout subsequent stages)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"247 S.W.3d 433, 433","parenthetical":"determination that trial court has abused its discretion in taking some action is a question of law","sentence":"See Cantu de Villarreal, 330 S.W.3d at 20-21 (law of the case doctrine applied where appellate court had resolved issue presented to it on the merits in previous mandamus proceeding); B S P Mktg,, Inc., 2004 WL 119235, at *1-2 (applying law of the case doctrine to issue on appeal where appellate court had resolved issue on merits in earlier mandamus proceeding); see also Landerman, 247 S.W.3d at 433 (determination that trial court has abused its discretion in taking some action is a question of law); Hudson, 711 S.W.2d at 630 (application of law of the case doctrine means that question of law decided by appellate court governs case in subsequent stages); Trevino, 564 S.W.2d at 685 (when court has decided question of law, law of the case doctrine means that decision governs case throughout subsequent stages)."},"case_id":12386178,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Because our 2014 opinion resolved these legal issues on the merits, the trial court was constrained by the law of the case doctrine and was not at liberty to disregard and contradict our holdings.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"711 S.W.2d 630, 630","parenthetical":"application of law of the case doctrine means that question of law decided by appellate court governs case in subsequent stages","sentence":"See Cantu de Villarreal, 330 S.W.3d at 20-21 (law of the case doctrine applied where appellate court had resolved issue presented to it on the merits in previous mandamus proceeding); B S P Mktg,, Inc., 2004 WL 119235, at *1-2 (applying law of the case doctrine to issue on appeal where appellate court had resolved issue on merits in earlier mandamus proceeding); see also Landerman, 247 S.W.3d at 433 (determination that trial court has abused its discretion in taking some action is a question of law); Hudson, 711 S.W.2d at 630 (application of law of the case doctrine means that question of law decided by appellate court governs case in subsequent stages); Trevino, 564 S.W.2d at 685 (when court has decided question of law, law of the case doctrine means that decision governs case throughout subsequent stages)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"330 S.W.3d 20, 20-21","parenthetical":"law of the case doctrine applied where appellate court had resolved issue presented to it on the merits in previous mandamus proceeding","sentence":"See Cantu de Villarreal, 330 S.W.3d at 20-21 (law of the case doctrine applied where appellate court had resolved issue presented to it on the merits in previous mandamus proceeding); B S P Mktg,, Inc., 2004 WL 119235, at *1-2 (applying law of the case doctrine to issue on appeal where appellate court had resolved issue on merits in earlier mandamus proceeding); see also Landerman, 247 S.W.3d at 433 (determination that trial court has abused its discretion in taking some action is a question of law); Hudson, 711 S.W.2d at 630 (application of law of the case doctrine means that question of law decided by appellate court governs case in subsequent stages); Trevino, 564 S.W.2d at 685 (when court has decided question of law, law of the case doctrine means that decision governs case throughout subsequent stages)."},"case_id":12386178,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Because our 2014 opinion resolved these legal issues on the merits, the trial court was constrained by the law of the case doctrine and was not at liberty to disregard and contradict our holdings.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"564 S.W.2d 685, 685","parenthetical":"when court has decided question of law, law of the case doctrine means that decision governs case throughout subsequent stages","sentence":"See Cantu de Villarreal, 330 S.W.3d at 20-21 (law of the case doctrine applied where appellate court had resolved issue presented to it on the merits in previous mandamus proceeding); B S P Mktg,, Inc., 2004 WL 119235, at *1-2 (applying law of the case doctrine to issue on appeal where appellate court had resolved issue on merits in earlier mandamus proceeding); see also Landerman, 247 S.W.3d at 433 (determination that trial court has abused its discretion in taking some action is a question of law); Hudson, 711 S.W.2d at 630 (application of law of the case doctrine means that question of law decided by appellate court governs case in subsequent stages); Trevino, 564 S.W.2d at 685 (when court has decided question of law, law of the case doctrine means that decision governs case throughout subsequent stages)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"330 S.W.3d 20, 20-21","parenthetical":"law of the case doctrine applied where appellate court had resolved issue presented to it on the merits in previous mandamus proceeding","sentence":"See Cantu de Villarreal, 330 S.W.3d at 20-21 (law of the case doctrine applied where appellate court had resolved issue presented to it on the merits in previous mandamus proceeding); B S P Mktg,, Inc., 2004 WL 119235, at *1-2 (applying law of the case doctrine to issue on appeal where appellate court had resolved issue on merits in earlier mandamus proceeding); see also Landerman, 247 S.W.3d at 433 (determination that trial court has abused its discretion in taking some action is a question of law); Hudson, 711 S.W.2d at 630 (application of law of the case doctrine means that question of law decided by appellate court governs case in subsequent stages); Trevino, 564 S.W.2d at 685 (when court has decided question of law, law of the case doctrine means that decision governs case throughout subsequent stages)."},"case_id":12386178,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Because our 2014 opinion resolved these legal issues on the merits, the trial court was constrained by the law of the case doctrine and was not at liberty to disregard and contradict our holdings.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"247 S.W.3d 433, 433","parenthetical":"determination that trial court has abused its discretion in taking some action is a question of law","sentence":"See Cantu de Villarreal, 330 S.W.3d at 20-21 (law of the case doctrine applied where appellate court had resolved issue presented to it on the merits in previous mandamus proceeding); B S P Mktg,, Inc., 2004 WL 119235, at *1-2 (applying law of the case doctrine to issue on appeal where appellate court had resolved issue on merits in earlier mandamus proceeding); see also Landerman, 247 S.W.3d at 433 (determination that trial court has abused its discretion in taking some action is a question of law); Hudson, 711 S.W.2d at 630 (application of law of the case doctrine means that question of law decided by appellate court governs case in subsequent stages); Trevino, 564 S.W.2d at 685 (when court has decided question of law, law of the case doctrine means that decision governs case throughout subsequent stages)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"2004 WL 119235, at *1-2","parenthetical":"applying law of the case doctrine to issue on appeal where appellate court had resolved issue on merits in earlier mandamus proceeding","sentence":"See Cantu de Villarreal, 330 S.W.3d at 20-21 (law of the case doctrine applied where appellate court had resolved issue presented to it on the merits in previous mandamus proceeding); B S P Mktg,, Inc., 2004 WL 119235, at *1-2 (applying law of the case doctrine to issue on appeal where appellate court had resolved issue on merits in earlier mandamus proceeding); see also Landerman, 247 S.W.3d at 433 (determination that trial court has abused its discretion in taking some action is a question of law); Hudson, 711 S.W.2d at 630 (application of law of the case doctrine means that question of law decided by appellate court governs case in subsequent stages); Trevino, 564 S.W.2d at 685 (when court has decided question of law, law of the case doctrine means that decision governs case throughout subsequent stages)."},"case_id":12386178,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Because our 2014 opinion resolved these legal issues on the merits, the trial court was constrained by the law of the case doctrine and was not at liberty to disregard and contradict our holdings.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"711 S.W.2d 630, 630","parenthetical":"application of law of the case doctrine means that question of law decided by appellate court governs case in subsequent stages","sentence":"See Cantu de Villarreal, 330 S.W.3d at 20-21 (law of the case doctrine applied where appellate court had resolved issue presented to it on the merits in previous mandamus proceeding); B S P Mktg,, Inc., 2004 WL 119235, at *1-2 (applying law of the case doctrine to issue on appeal where appellate court had resolved issue on merits in earlier mandamus proceeding); see also Landerman, 247 S.W.3d at 433 (determination that trial court has abused its discretion in taking some action is a question of law); Hudson, 711 S.W.2d at 630 (application of law of the case doctrine means that question of law decided by appellate court governs case in subsequent stages); Trevino, 564 S.W.2d at 685 (when court has decided question of law, law of the case doctrine means that decision governs case throughout subsequent stages)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"2004 WL 119235, at *1-2","parenthetical":"applying law of the case doctrine to issue on appeal where appellate court had resolved issue on merits in earlier mandamus proceeding","sentence":"See Cantu de Villarreal, 330 S.W.3d at 20-21 (law of the case doctrine applied where appellate court had resolved issue presented to it on the merits in previous mandamus proceeding); B S P Mktg,, Inc., 2004 WL 119235, at *1-2 (applying law of the case doctrine to issue on appeal where appellate court had resolved issue on merits in earlier mandamus proceeding); see also Landerman, 247 S.W.3d at 433 (determination that trial court has abused its discretion in taking some action is a question of law); Hudson, 711 S.W.2d at 630 (application of law of the case doctrine means that question of law decided by appellate court governs case in subsequent stages); Trevino, 564 S.W.2d at 685 (when court has decided question of law, law of the case doctrine means that decision governs case throughout subsequent stages)."},"case_id":12386178,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Because our 2014 opinion resolved these legal issues on the merits, the trial court was constrained by the law of the case doctrine and was not at liberty to disregard and contradict our holdings.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"2004 WL 119235, at *1-2","parenthetical":"applying law of the case doctrine to issue on appeal where appellate court had resolved issue on merits in earlier mandamus proceeding","sentence":"See Cantu de Villarreal, 330 S.W.3d at 20-21 (law of the case doctrine applied where appellate court had resolved issue presented to it on the merits in previous mandamus proceeding); B S P Mktg,, Inc., 2004 WL 119235, at *1-2 (applying law of the case doctrine to issue on appeal where appellate court had resolved issue on merits in earlier mandamus proceeding); see also Landerman, 247 S.W.3d at 433 (determination that trial court has abused its discretion in taking some action is a question of law); Hudson, 711 S.W.2d at 630 (application of law of the case doctrine means that question of law decided by appellate court governs case in subsequent stages); Trevino, 564 S.W.2d at 685 (when court has decided question of law, law of the case doctrine means that decision governs case throughout subsequent stages)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"564 S.W.2d 685, 685","parenthetical":"when court has decided question of law, law of the case doctrine means that decision governs case throughout subsequent stages","sentence":"See Cantu de Villarreal, 330 S.W.3d at 20-21 (law of the case doctrine applied where appellate court had resolved issue presented to it on the merits in previous mandamus proceeding); B S P Mktg,, Inc., 2004 WL 119235, at *1-2 (applying law of the case doctrine to issue on appeal where appellate court had resolved issue on merits in earlier mandamus proceeding); see also Landerman, 247 S.W.3d at 433 (determination that trial court has abused its discretion in taking some action is a question of law); Hudson, 711 S.W.2d at 630 (application of law of the case doctrine means that question of law decided by appellate court governs case in subsequent stages); Trevino, 564 S.W.2d at 685 (when court has decided question of law, law of the case doctrine means that decision governs case throughout subsequent stages)."},"case_id":12386178,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Rather, every aspect of this case supports the conclusion that the Secretary was acting in his role as the initial trier of fact when he agreed with Mr. Washington -- and represented to the Court and to the Board -- that Mr. Washington's testimony was probative. Because the trier of fact cannot find probative that which has no credibility, it is axiomatic that the Secretary, as the initial trier of fact, had agreed with Mr. Washington that his testimony was credible.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"6 Vet.App. 465, 469","parenthetical":"credibility \"is a factual matter going to the probative value of the evidence\"","sentence":"See Layno v. Brown, 6 Vet.App. 465, 469 (1994) (credibility \u201cis a factual matter going to the probative value of the evidence\u201d); see also Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co. v. Barber, 95 B.R. 684, 688 n. 13 (1988) (\u201cUnless credible, testimony can carry no probative weight as evidence.\u201d)"},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"Unless credible, testimony can carry no probative weight as evidence.\"","sentence":"See Layno v. Brown, 6 Vet.App. 465, 469 (1994) (credibility \u201cis a factual matter going to the probative value of the evidence\u201d); see also Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co. v. Barber, 95 B.R. 684, 688 n. 13 (1988) (\u201cUnless credible, testimony can carry no probative weight as evidence.\u201d)"},"case_id":3003455,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Clearly, where it is alleged that an individual is mentally retarded, the trial court must consider that factor when determining whether an individual \"has the mental capacity to achieve the necessary understanding\" of a guilty plea. Additionally, we have stressed that this is an area where expert testimony should be considered and a trial judge should refrain from relying on personal observations of the individual.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"548 A.2d 810, 810-11","parenthetical":"expert informed judge that appellant appeared to be suffering from organic brain damage","sentence":"Hunter, supra, 548 A.2d at 810-11 (expert informed judge that appellant appeared to be suffering from organic brain damage); cf. Mitchell v. United States, 609 A.2d 1099, 1104 (D.C.1992) (advising trial judge to have assistance of expert guidance and not rely on one\u2019s own perceptions where appellant is al legedly mentally ill, citing Hunter and Masthers)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"609 A.2d 1099, 1104","parenthetical":"advising trial judge to have assistance of expert guidance and not rely on one's own perceptions where appellant is al legedly mentally ill, citing Hunter and Masthers","sentence":"Hunter, supra, 548 A.2d at 810-11 (expert informed judge that appellant appeared to be suffering from organic brain damage); cf. Mitchell v. United States, 609 A.2d 1099, 1104 (D.C.1992) (advising trial judge to have assistance of expert guidance and not rely on one\u2019s own perceptions where appellant is al legedly mentally ill, citing Hunter and Masthers)."},"case_id":11876091,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Weighing the harm of introducing Ms. Day's potential silence to the jury versus the harm of denying to Appellant any potential benefit from that anticipated silence, compels us to conclude that Appellant was unfairly prejudiced by the trial court's refusal to call Ms. Day to the stand. As a result of this refusal to permit Appellant the benefit of his right to compel witnesses in his favor, Appellant was wrongly denied the benefit of either Ms. Day's testimony or any inference from her refusal to testify in light of her complete immunity from prosecution.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"197 W.Va. 700, 709","parenthetical":"recognizing that \"we are obligated to reverse where the improper exclusion of evidence places the underlying fairness of the entire trial in doubt or where the exclusion affects the substantial rights of the defendant\"","sentence":"See State v. Blake, 197 W.Va. 700, 709, 478 S.E.2d 550, 559 (1996) (recognizing that \u201cwe are obligated to reverse where the improper exclusion of evidence places the underlying fairness of the entire trial in doubt or where the exclusion affects the substantial rights of the defendant\u201d); see also Harman, 165 W.Va. at 499, 270 S.E.2d at 150 (recognizing that exclusion of \u201ctestimony [that] provides a direct link to someone other than the defen dant [committing the crime] ... constitutes reversible error\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"165 W.Va. 499, 499","parenthetical":"recognizing that exclusion of \"testimony [that] provides a direct link to someone other than the defen dant [committing the crime] ... constitutes reversible error\"","sentence":"See State v. Blake, 197 W.Va. 700, 709, 478 S.E.2d 550, 559 (1996) (recognizing that \u201cwe are obligated to reverse where the improper exclusion of evidence places the underlying fairness of the entire trial in doubt or where the exclusion affects the substantial rights of the defendant\u201d); see also Harman, 165 W.Va. at 499, 270 S.E.2d at 150 (recognizing that exclusion of \u201ctestimony [that] provides a direct link to someone other than the defen dant [committing the crime] ... constitutes reversible error\u201d)."},"case_id":8370656,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Weighing the harm of introducing Ms. Day's potential silence to the jury versus the harm of denying to Appellant any potential benefit from that anticipated silence, compels us to conclude that Appellant was unfairly prejudiced by the trial court's refusal to call Ms. Day to the stand. As a result of this refusal to permit Appellant the benefit of his right to compel witnesses in his favor, Appellant was wrongly denied the benefit of either Ms. Day's testimony or any inference from her refusal to testify in light of her complete immunity from prosecution.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"197 W.Va. 700, 709","parenthetical":"recognizing that \"we are obligated to reverse where the improper exclusion of evidence places the underlying fairness of the entire trial in doubt or where the exclusion affects the substantial rights of the defendant\"","sentence":"See State v. Blake, 197 W.Va. 700, 709, 478 S.E.2d 550, 559 (1996) (recognizing that \u201cwe are obligated to reverse where the improper exclusion of evidence places the underlying fairness of the entire trial in doubt or where the exclusion affects the substantial rights of the defendant\u201d); see also Harman, 165 W.Va. at 499, 270 S.E.2d at 150 (recognizing that exclusion of \u201ctestimony [that] provides a direct link to someone other than the defen dant [committing the crime] ... constitutes reversible error\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"270 S.E.2d 150, 150","parenthetical":"recognizing that exclusion of \"testimony [that] provides a direct link to someone other than the defen dant [committing the crime] ... constitutes reversible error\"","sentence":"See State v. Blake, 197 W.Va. 700, 709, 478 S.E.2d 550, 559 (1996) (recognizing that \u201cwe are obligated to reverse where the improper exclusion of evidence places the underlying fairness of the entire trial in doubt or where the exclusion affects the substantial rights of the defendant\u201d); see also Harman, 165 W.Va. at 499, 270 S.E.2d at 150 (recognizing that exclusion of \u201ctestimony [that] provides a direct link to someone other than the defen dant [committing the crime] ... constitutes reversible error\u201d)."},"case_id":8370656,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Weighing the harm of introducing Ms. Day's potential silence to the jury versus the harm of denying to Appellant any potential benefit from that anticipated silence, compels us to conclude that Appellant was unfairly prejudiced by the trial court's refusal to call Ms. Day to the stand. As a result of this refusal to permit Appellant the benefit of his right to compel witnesses in his favor, Appellant was wrongly denied the benefit of either Ms. Day's testimony or any inference from her refusal to testify in light of her complete immunity from prosecution.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"478 S.E.2d 550, 559","parenthetical":"recognizing that \"we are obligated to reverse where the improper exclusion of evidence places the underlying fairness of the entire trial in doubt or where the exclusion affects the substantial rights of the defendant\"","sentence":"See State v. Blake, 197 W.Va. 700, 709, 478 S.E.2d 550, 559 (1996) (recognizing that \u201cwe are obligated to reverse where the improper exclusion of evidence places the underlying fairness of the entire trial in doubt or where the exclusion affects the substantial rights of the defendant\u201d); see also Harman, 165 W.Va. at 499, 270 S.E.2d at 150 (recognizing that exclusion of \u201ctestimony [that] provides a direct link to someone other than the defen dant [committing the crime] ... constitutes reversible error\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"165 W.Va. 499, 499","parenthetical":"recognizing that exclusion of \"testimony [that] provides a direct link to someone other than the defen dant [committing the crime] ... constitutes reversible error\"","sentence":"See State v. Blake, 197 W.Va. 700, 709, 478 S.E.2d 550, 559 (1996) (recognizing that \u201cwe are obligated to reverse where the improper exclusion of evidence places the underlying fairness of the entire trial in doubt or where the exclusion affects the substantial rights of the defendant\u201d); see also Harman, 165 W.Va. at 499, 270 S.E.2d at 150 (recognizing that exclusion of \u201ctestimony [that] provides a direct link to someone other than the defen dant [committing the crime] ... constitutes reversible error\u201d)."},"case_id":8370656,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Weighing the harm of introducing Ms. Day's potential silence to the jury versus the harm of denying to Appellant any potential benefit from that anticipated silence, compels us to conclude that Appellant was unfairly prejudiced by the trial court's refusal to call Ms. Day to the stand. As a result of this refusal to permit Appellant the benefit of his right to compel witnesses in his favor, Appellant was wrongly denied the benefit of either Ms. Day's testimony or any inference from her refusal to testify in light of her complete immunity from prosecution.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"270 S.E.2d 150, 150","parenthetical":"recognizing that exclusion of \"testimony [that] provides a direct link to someone other than the defen dant [committing the crime] ... constitutes reversible error\"","sentence":"See State v. Blake, 197 W.Va. 700, 709, 478 S.E.2d 550, 559 (1996) (recognizing that \u201cwe are obligated to reverse where the improper exclusion of evidence places the underlying fairness of the entire trial in doubt or where the exclusion affects the substantial rights of the defendant\u201d); see also Harman, 165 W.Va. at 499, 270 S.E.2d at 150 (recognizing that exclusion of \u201ctestimony [that] provides a direct link to someone other than the defen dant [committing the crime] ... constitutes reversible error\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"478 S.E.2d 550, 559","parenthetical":"recognizing that \"we are obligated to reverse where the improper exclusion of evidence places the underlying fairness of the entire trial in doubt or where the exclusion affects the substantial rights of the defendant\"","sentence":"See State v. Blake, 197 W.Va. 700, 709, 478 S.E.2d 550, 559 (1996) (recognizing that \u201cwe are obligated to reverse where the improper exclusion of evidence places the underlying fairness of the entire trial in doubt or where the exclusion affects the substantial rights of the defendant\u201d); see also Harman, 165 W.Va. at 499, 270 S.E.2d at 150 (recognizing that exclusion of \u201ctestimony [that] provides a direct link to someone other than the defen dant [committing the crime] ... constitutes reversible error\u201d)."},"case_id":8370656,"label":"b"}
{"context":"We conclude Harrington did not have the \"essential facts\" of the police reports so as to allow the defense to wholly take advantage of this evidence. As the Nevada Supreme Court stated under similar circumstances, \"[0]nly access to the documents themselves would have provided the range and detail of information necessary to fully understand the implications of the police investigation.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding oral disclosure of identity of another suspect was not sufficient to avoid Brady violation for failing to produce police investigatory reports","sentence":"Mazzan v. Warden, 116 Nev. 48, 993 P.2d 25, 37 (2000) (holding oral disclosure of identity of another suspect was not sufficient to avoid Brady violation for failing to produce police investigatory reports); see also Wilson v. State, - So.2d -, -, 2002 WL 732110 (Ala.Crim.App.2002) (finding Brady violation despite defendant\u2019s knowledge of witnesses\u2019 identities, where withheld police report gave details of their testimony in the absence of which the defendant would have had \u201cno reason to expend the time or resources to locate them\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding Brady violation despite defendant's knowledge of witnesses' identities, where withheld police report gave details of their testimony in the absence of which the defendant would have had \"no reason to expend the time or resources to locate them\"","sentence":"Mazzan v. Warden, 116 Nev. 48, 993 P.2d 25, 37 (2000) (holding oral disclosure of identity of another suspect was not sufficient to avoid Brady violation for failing to produce police investigatory reports); see also Wilson v. State, - So.2d -, -, 2002 WL 732110 (Ala.Crim.App.2002) (finding Brady violation despite defendant\u2019s knowledge of witnesses\u2019 identities, where withheld police report gave details of their testimony in the absence of which the defendant would have had \u201cno reason to expend the time or resources to locate them\u201d)."},"case_id":9362412,"label":"a"}
{"context":"We conclude Harrington did not have the \"essential facts\" of the police reports so as to allow the defense to wholly take advantage of this evidence. As the Nevada Supreme Court stated under similar circumstances, \"[0]nly access to the documents themselves would have provided the range and detail of information necessary to fully understand the implications of the police investigation.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding Brady violation despite defendant's knowledge of witnesses' identities, where withheld police report gave details of their testimony in the absence of which the defendant would have had \"no reason to expend the time or resources to locate them\"","sentence":"Mazzan v. Warden, 116 Nev. 48, 993 P.2d 25, 37 (2000) (holding oral disclosure of identity of another suspect was not sufficient to avoid Brady violation for failing to produce police investigatory reports); see also Wilson v. State, - So.2d -, -, 2002 WL 732110 (Ala.Crim.App.2002) (finding Brady violation despite defendant\u2019s knowledge of witnesses\u2019 identities, where withheld police report gave details of their testimony in the absence of which the defendant would have had \u201cno reason to expend the time or resources to locate them\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"993 P.2d 25, 37","parenthetical":"holding oral disclosure of identity of another suspect was not sufficient to avoid Brady violation for failing to produce police investigatory reports","sentence":"Mazzan v. Warden, 116 Nev. 48, 993 P.2d 25, 37 (2000) (holding oral disclosure of identity of another suspect was not sufficient to avoid Brady violation for failing to produce police investigatory reports); see also Wilson v. State, - So.2d -, -, 2002 WL 732110 (Ala.Crim.App.2002) (finding Brady violation despite defendant\u2019s knowledge of witnesses\u2019 identities, where withheld police report gave details of their testimony in the absence of which the defendant would have had \u201cno reason to expend the time or resources to locate them\u201d)."},"case_id":9362412,"label":"b"}
{"context":"At the outset, we note the parties agree an investigatory stop occurred when police stopped Martinez. More than one officer was present, and those officers used a commanding tone of voice, told Martinez to stop, and attempted to control his ability to leave the driveway; one officer also displayed a weapon. Moreover, Martinez submitted to the officers' show of authority by stopping his car.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"292 Kan. 1, 6","parenthetical":"investigatory stop occurred when there was more than one officer, a display of weapon, physical contact by officer, use of commanding voice tone and sirens or lights, command to stop, and attempt to control ability to flee","sentence":"See State v. Weaver, 259 Kan. 844, 849, 915 P.3d 746 (1996) (a seizure occurs when defendant submits to show of authority by stopping); see also State v. Walker, 292 Kan. 1, 6, 251 P.3d 618 (2011) (investigatory stop occurred when there was more than one officer, a display of weapon, physical contact by officer, use of commanding voice tone and sirens or lights, command to stop, and attempt to control ability to flee); Johnson, 293 Kan. at 5 (seizure occurred when officers were dressed in FBI clothes, had weapons drawn, used lights on squad cars)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"259 Kan. 844, 849","parenthetical":"a seizure occurs when defendant submits to show of authority by stopping","sentence":"See State v. Weaver, 259 Kan. 844, 849, 915 P.3d 746 (1996) (a seizure occurs when defendant submits to show of authority by stopping); see also State v. Walker, 292 Kan. 1, 6, 251 P.3d 618 (2011) (investigatory stop occurred when there was more than one officer, a display of weapon, physical contact by officer, use of commanding voice tone and sirens or lights, command to stop, and attempt to control ability to flee); Johnson, 293 Kan. at 5 (seizure occurred when officers were dressed in FBI clothes, had weapons drawn, used lights on squad cars)."},"case_id":12416918,"label":"b"}
{"context":"At the outset, we note the parties agree an investigatory stop occurred when police stopped Martinez. More than one officer was present, and those officers used a commanding tone of voice, told Martinez to stop, and attempted to control his ability to leave the driveway; one officer also displayed a weapon. Moreover, Martinez submitted to the officers' show of authority by stopping his car.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"investigatory stop occurred when there was more than one officer, a display of weapon, physical contact by officer, use of commanding voice tone and sirens or lights, command to stop, and attempt to control ability to flee","sentence":"See State v. Weaver, 259 Kan. 844, 849, 915 P.3d 746 (1996) (a seizure occurs when defendant submits to show of authority by stopping); see also State v. Walker, 292 Kan. 1, 6, 251 P.3d 618 (2011) (investigatory stop occurred when there was more than one officer, a display of weapon, physical contact by officer, use of commanding voice tone and sirens or lights, command to stop, and attempt to control ability to flee); Johnson, 293 Kan. at 5 (seizure occurred when officers were dressed in FBI clothes, had weapons drawn, used lights on squad cars)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"259 Kan. 844, 849","parenthetical":"a seizure occurs when defendant submits to show of authority by stopping","sentence":"See State v. Weaver, 259 Kan. 844, 849, 915 P.3d 746 (1996) (a seizure occurs when defendant submits to show of authority by stopping); see also State v. Walker, 292 Kan. 1, 6, 251 P.3d 618 (2011) (investigatory stop occurred when there was more than one officer, a display of weapon, physical contact by officer, use of commanding voice tone and sirens or lights, command to stop, and attempt to control ability to flee); Johnson, 293 Kan. at 5 (seizure occurred when officers were dressed in FBI clothes, had weapons drawn, used lights on squad cars)."},"case_id":12416918,"label":"b"}
{"context":"At the outset, we note the parties agree an investigatory stop occurred when police stopped Martinez. More than one officer was present, and those officers used a commanding tone of voice, told Martinez to stop, and attempted to control his ability to leave the driveway; one officer also displayed a weapon. Moreover, Martinez submitted to the officers' show of authority by stopping his car.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"259 Kan. 844, 849","parenthetical":"a seizure occurs when defendant submits to show of authority by stopping","sentence":"See State v. Weaver, 259 Kan. 844, 849, 915 P.3d 746 (1996) (a seizure occurs when defendant submits to show of authority by stopping); see also State v. Walker, 292 Kan. 1, 6, 251 P.3d 618 (2011) (investigatory stop occurred when there was more than one officer, a display of weapon, physical contact by officer, use of commanding voice tone and sirens or lights, command to stop, and attempt to control ability to flee); Johnson, 293 Kan. at 5 (seizure occurred when officers were dressed in FBI clothes, had weapons drawn, used lights on squad cars)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"293 Kan. 5, 5","parenthetical":"seizure occurred when officers were dressed in FBI clothes, had weapons drawn, used lights on squad cars","sentence":"See State v. Weaver, 259 Kan. 844, 849, 915 P.3d 746 (1996) (a seizure occurs when defendant submits to show of authority by stopping); see also State v. Walker, 292 Kan. 1, 6, 251 P.3d 618 (2011) (investigatory stop occurred when there was more than one officer, a display of weapon, physical contact by officer, use of commanding voice tone and sirens or lights, command to stop, and attempt to control ability to flee); Johnson, 293 Kan. at 5 (seizure occurred when officers were dressed in FBI clothes, had weapons drawn, used lights on squad cars)."},"case_id":12416918,"label":"a"}
{"context":"At the outset, we note the parties agree an investigatory stop occurred when police stopped Martinez. More than one officer was present, and those officers used a commanding tone of voice, told Martinez to stop, and attempted to control his ability to leave the driveway; one officer also displayed a weapon. Moreover, Martinez submitted to the officers' show of authority by stopping his car.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"292 Kan. 1, 6","parenthetical":"investigatory stop occurred when there was more than one officer, a display of weapon, physical contact by officer, use of commanding voice tone and sirens or lights, command to stop, and attempt to control ability to flee","sentence":"See State v. Weaver, 259 Kan. 844, 849, 915 P.3d 746 (1996) (a seizure occurs when defendant submits to show of authority by stopping); see also State v. Walker, 292 Kan. 1, 6, 251 P.3d 618 (2011) (investigatory stop occurred when there was more than one officer, a display of weapon, physical contact by officer, use of commanding voice tone and sirens or lights, command to stop, and attempt to control ability to flee); Johnson, 293 Kan. at 5 (seizure occurred when officers were dressed in FBI clothes, had weapons drawn, used lights on squad cars)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"a seizure occurs when defendant submits to show of authority by stopping","sentence":"See State v. Weaver, 259 Kan. 844, 849, 915 P.3d 746 (1996) (a seizure occurs when defendant submits to show of authority by stopping); see also State v. Walker, 292 Kan. 1, 6, 251 P.3d 618 (2011) (investigatory stop occurred when there was more than one officer, a display of weapon, physical contact by officer, use of commanding voice tone and sirens or lights, command to stop, and attempt to control ability to flee); Johnson, 293 Kan. at 5 (seizure occurred when officers were dressed in FBI clothes, had weapons drawn, used lights on squad cars)."},"case_id":12416918,"label":"b"}
{"context":"At the outset, we note the parties agree an investigatory stop occurred when police stopped Martinez. More than one officer was present, and those officers used a commanding tone of voice, told Martinez to stop, and attempted to control his ability to leave the driveway; one officer also displayed a weapon. Moreover, Martinez submitted to the officers' show of authority by stopping his car.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"a seizure occurs when defendant submits to show of authority by stopping","sentence":"See State v. Weaver, 259 Kan. 844, 849, 915 P.3d 746 (1996) (a seizure occurs when defendant submits to show of authority by stopping); see also State v. Walker, 292 Kan. 1, 6, 251 P.3d 618 (2011) (investigatory stop occurred when there was more than one officer, a display of weapon, physical contact by officer, use of commanding voice tone and sirens or lights, command to stop, and attempt to control ability to flee); Johnson, 293 Kan. at 5 (seizure occurred when officers were dressed in FBI clothes, had weapons drawn, used lights on squad cars)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"investigatory stop occurred when there was more than one officer, a display of weapon, physical contact by officer, use of commanding voice tone and sirens or lights, command to stop, and attempt to control ability to flee","sentence":"See State v. Weaver, 259 Kan. 844, 849, 915 P.3d 746 (1996) (a seizure occurs when defendant submits to show of authority by stopping); see also State v. Walker, 292 Kan. 1, 6, 251 P.3d 618 (2011) (investigatory stop occurred when there was more than one officer, a display of weapon, physical contact by officer, use of commanding voice tone and sirens or lights, command to stop, and attempt to control ability to flee); Johnson, 293 Kan. at 5 (seizure occurred when officers were dressed in FBI clothes, had weapons drawn, used lights on squad cars)."},"case_id":12416918,"label":"a"}
{"context":"At the outset, we note the parties agree an investigatory stop occurred when police stopped Martinez. More than one officer was present, and those officers used a commanding tone of voice, told Martinez to stop, and attempted to control his ability to leave the driveway; one officer also displayed a weapon. Moreover, Martinez submitted to the officers' show of authority by stopping his car.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"293 Kan. 5, 5","parenthetical":"seizure occurred when officers were dressed in FBI clothes, had weapons drawn, used lights on squad cars","sentence":"See State v. Weaver, 259 Kan. 844, 849, 915 P.3d 746 (1996) (a seizure occurs when defendant submits to show of authority by stopping); see also State v. Walker, 292 Kan. 1, 6, 251 P.3d 618 (2011) (investigatory stop occurred when there was more than one officer, a display of weapon, physical contact by officer, use of commanding voice tone and sirens or lights, command to stop, and attempt to control ability to flee); Johnson, 293 Kan. at 5 (seizure occurred when officers were dressed in FBI clothes, had weapons drawn, used lights on squad cars)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"a seizure occurs when defendant submits to show of authority by stopping","sentence":"See State v. Weaver, 259 Kan. 844, 849, 915 P.3d 746 (1996) (a seizure occurs when defendant submits to show of authority by stopping); see also State v. Walker, 292 Kan. 1, 6, 251 P.3d 618 (2011) (investigatory stop occurred when there was more than one officer, a display of weapon, physical contact by officer, use of commanding voice tone and sirens or lights, command to stop, and attempt to control ability to flee); Johnson, 293 Kan. at 5 (seizure occurred when officers were dressed in FBI clothes, had weapons drawn, used lights on squad cars)."},"case_id":12416918,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The testimony offered by defendant in this case cannot be said to relate to the circumstances of the offense. Thus, in order to be relevant, the evidence must be relevant to \"any aspect of the defendant's character or background * * * that one or more * * * jurors believe would justify a sentence less than death.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"319 Or 579, 579","parenthetical":"holding that relevance of evidence with respect to the so-called \"fourth question\" under ORS 163.150(1)(b)(D) to be determined under criteria established by ORS 163.150(1)(c)(B","sentence":"See State v. Guzek, 322 Or 245, 254, 906 P2d 272 (1995) (holding that focus of ORS 163.150(1)(b)(D) is on mitigating evidence); see also Stevens, 319 Or at 579 (holding that relevance of evidence with respect to the so-called \u201cfourth question\u201d under ORS 163.150(1)(b)(D) to be determined under criteria established by ORS 163.150(1)(c)(B))."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"322 Or 245, 254","parenthetical":"holding that focus of ORS 163.150(1)(b)(D) is on mitigating evidence","sentence":"See State v. Guzek, 322 Or 245, 254, 906 P2d 272 (1995) (holding that focus of ORS 163.150(1)(b)(D) is on mitigating evidence); see also Stevens, 319 Or at 579 (holding that relevance of evidence with respect to the so-called \u201cfourth question\u201d under ORS 163.150(1)(b)(D) to be determined under criteria established by ORS 163.150(1)(c)(B))."},"case_id":2215879,"label":"b"}
{"context":". Everett, 893 So.2d at 1286-87: We note that most courts that have considered this issue have held similarly.","citation_a":{"signal":"contra","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"view[ing] a request for consent to search, after the [Fifth Amendment] right to counsel has been invoked, as interrogation and the serving of a search warrant as conduct 'reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response' \"","sentence":"See, e.g., United States v. Shlater, 85 F.3d 1251, 1256 (7th Cir.1996) (holding that a \"consent to search is not an interrogation within the meaning of Miranda \"); United States v. Hidalgo, 7 F.3d 1566, 1568 (11th Cir.1993) (holding that consent to search obtained after defendant invoked right to remain silent is not a self-incriminating statement because it is neither testimonial nor communicative); United States v. Smith, 3 F.3d 1088, 1098 (7th Cir.1993) (\"We have held that a consent to search is not a self-incriminating statement and, therefore, a request to search does not amount to interrogation. This view comports with the view taken by every court of appeals to have addressed the issue.\u201d); United States v. Rodriguez-Garcia, 983 F.2d 1563, 1568 (10th Cir.1993) (stating that a request for consent to search is not custodial interrogation and holding that \"consent to search is not the type of incriminating statement which the Fifth Amendment was designed to address\u201d); Cody v. Solem, 755 F.2d 1323, 1330 (8th Cir.1985) (staling that Fifth Amendment right to counsel stems from privilege against self-incrimination and is not an independent right and that consent to search is not an incriminating statement because it is not testimonial, nor is physical evidence obtained pursuant to search); State v. Moralo, 619 N.W.2d 655, 662 (S.D.2000) (stating that \"[a]n officer's request that a suspect consent to a search, however, is not an interrogation or its functional equivalent\u201d and \"Morato\u2019s consent to search does not constitute an incriminating statement\u201d); State v. Crannell, 170 Vt. 387, 750 A.2d 1002, 1009 (2000) (concluding that the request for consent to search did not violate defendant's Fifth Amendment rights); contra United States v. Yan, 704 F.Supp. 1207, 1211-12 (S.D.N.Y.1989) (holding that a request for search constitutes an interrogation); State v. Britain, 156 Ariz. 384, 752 P.2d 37, 39 (Ariz.Ct.App.1988), (\"view[ing] a request for consent to search, after the [Fifth Amendment] right to counsel has been invoked, as interrogation and the serving of a search warrant as conduct 'reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response' \u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"85 F.3d 1251, 1256","parenthetical":"holding that a \"consent to search is not an interrogation within the meaning of Miranda \"","sentence":"See, e.g., United States v. Shlater, 85 F.3d 1251, 1256 (7th Cir.1996) (holding that a \"consent to search is not an interrogation within the meaning of Miranda \"); United States v. Hidalgo, 7 F.3d 1566, 1568 (11th Cir.1993) (holding that consent to search obtained after defendant invoked right to remain silent is not a self-incriminating statement because it is neither testimonial nor communicative); United States v. Smith, 3 F.3d 1088, 1098 (7th Cir.1993) (\"We have held that a consent to search is not a self-incriminating statement and, therefore, a request to search does not amount to interrogation. This view comports with the view taken by every court of appeals to have addressed the issue.\u201d); United States v. Rodriguez-Garcia, 983 F.2d 1563, 1568 (10th Cir.1993) (stating that a request for consent to search is not custodial interrogation and holding that \"consent to search is not the type of incriminating statement which the Fifth Amendment was designed to address\u201d); Cody v. Solem, 755 F.2d 1323, 1330 (8th Cir.1985) (staling that Fifth Amendment right to counsel stems from privilege against self-incrimination and is not an independent right and that consent to search is not an incriminating statement because it is not testimonial, nor is physical evidence obtained pursuant to search); State v. Moralo, 619 N.W.2d 655, 662 (S.D.2000) (stating that \"[a]n officer's request that a suspect consent to a search, however, is not an interrogation or its functional equivalent\u201d and \"Morato\u2019s consent to search does not constitute an incriminating statement\u201d); State v. Crannell, 170 Vt. 387, 750 A.2d 1002, 1009 (2000) (concluding that the request for consent to search did not violate defendant's Fifth Amendment rights); contra United States v. Yan, 704 F.Supp. 1207, 1211-12 (S.D.N.Y.1989) (holding that a request for search constitutes an interrogation); State v. Britain, 156 Ariz. 384, 752 P.2d 37, 39 (Ariz.Ct.App.1988), (\"view[ing] a request for consent to search, after the [Fifth Amendment] right to counsel has been invoked, as interrogation and the serving of a search warrant as conduct 'reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response' \u201d)."},"case_id":8390950,"label":"b"}
{"context":". Everett, 893 So.2d at 1286-87: We note that most courts that have considered this issue have held similarly.","citation_a":{"signal":"contra","identifier":"752 P.2d 37, 39","parenthetical":"\"view[ing] a request for consent to search, after the [Fifth Amendment] right to counsel has been invoked, as interrogation and the serving of a search warrant as conduct 'reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response' \"","sentence":"See, e.g., United States v. Shlater, 85 F.3d 1251, 1256 (7th Cir.1996) (holding that a \"consent to search is not an interrogation within the meaning of Miranda \"); United States v. Hidalgo, 7 F.3d 1566, 1568 (11th Cir.1993) (holding that consent to search obtained after defendant invoked right to remain silent is not a self-incriminating statement because it is neither testimonial nor communicative); United States v. Smith, 3 F.3d 1088, 1098 (7th Cir.1993) (\"We have held that a consent to search is not a self-incriminating statement and, therefore, a request to search does not amount to interrogation. This view comports with the view taken by every court of appeals to have addressed the issue.\u201d); United States v. Rodriguez-Garcia, 983 F.2d 1563, 1568 (10th Cir.1993) (stating that a request for consent to search is not custodial interrogation and holding that \"consent to search is not the type of incriminating statement which the Fifth Amendment was designed to address\u201d); Cody v. Solem, 755 F.2d 1323, 1330 (8th Cir.1985) (staling that Fifth Amendment right to counsel stems from privilege against self-incrimination and is not an independent right and that consent to search is not an incriminating statement because it is not testimonial, nor is physical evidence obtained pursuant to search); State v. Moralo, 619 N.W.2d 655, 662 (S.D.2000) (stating that \"[a]n officer's request that a suspect consent to a search, however, is not an interrogation or its functional equivalent\u201d and \"Morato\u2019s consent to search does not constitute an incriminating statement\u201d); State v. Crannell, 170 Vt. 387, 750 A.2d 1002, 1009 (2000) (concluding that the request for consent to search did not violate defendant's Fifth Amendment rights); contra United States v. Yan, 704 F.Supp. 1207, 1211-12 (S.D.N.Y.1989) (holding that a request for search constitutes an interrogation); State v. Britain, 156 Ariz. 384, 752 P.2d 37, 39 (Ariz.Ct.App.1988), (\"view[ing] a request for consent to search, after the [Fifth Amendment] right to counsel has been invoked, as interrogation and the serving of a search warrant as conduct 'reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response' \u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"85 F.3d 1251, 1256","parenthetical":"holding that a \"consent to search is not an interrogation within the meaning of Miranda \"","sentence":"See, e.g., United States v. Shlater, 85 F.3d 1251, 1256 (7th Cir.1996) (holding that a \"consent to search is not an interrogation within the meaning of Miranda \"); United States v. Hidalgo, 7 F.3d 1566, 1568 (11th Cir.1993) (holding that consent to search obtained after defendant invoked right to remain silent is not a self-incriminating statement because it is neither testimonial nor communicative); United States v. Smith, 3 F.3d 1088, 1098 (7th Cir.1993) (\"We have held that a consent to search is not a self-incriminating statement and, therefore, a request to search does not amount to interrogation. This view comports with the view taken by every court of appeals to have addressed the issue.\u201d); United States v. Rodriguez-Garcia, 983 F.2d 1563, 1568 (10th Cir.1993) (stating that a request for consent to search is not custodial interrogation and holding that \"consent to search is not the type of incriminating statement which the Fifth Amendment was designed to address\u201d); Cody v. Solem, 755 F.2d 1323, 1330 (8th Cir.1985) (staling that Fifth Amendment right to counsel stems from privilege against self-incrimination and is not an independent right and that consent to search is not an incriminating statement because it is not testimonial, nor is physical evidence obtained pursuant to search); State v. Moralo, 619 N.W.2d 655, 662 (S.D.2000) (stating that \"[a]n officer's request that a suspect consent to a search, however, is not an interrogation or its functional equivalent\u201d and \"Morato\u2019s consent to search does not constitute an incriminating statement\u201d); State v. Crannell, 170 Vt. 387, 750 A.2d 1002, 1009 (2000) (concluding that the request for consent to search did not violate defendant's Fifth Amendment rights); contra United States v. Yan, 704 F.Supp. 1207, 1211-12 (S.D.N.Y.1989) (holding that a request for search constitutes an interrogation); State v. Britain, 156 Ariz. 384, 752 P.2d 37, 39 (Ariz.Ct.App.1988), (\"view[ing] a request for consent to search, after the [Fifth Amendment] right to counsel has been invoked, as interrogation and the serving of a search warrant as conduct 'reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response' \u201d)."},"case_id":8390950,"label":"b"}
{"context":". Everett, 893 So.2d at 1286-87: We note that most courts that have considered this issue have held similarly.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"7 F.3d 1566, 1568","parenthetical":"holding that consent to search obtained after defendant invoked right to remain silent is not a self-incriminating statement because it is neither testimonial nor communicative","sentence":"See, e.g., United States v. Shlater, 85 F.3d 1251, 1256 (7th Cir.1996) (holding that a \"consent to search is not an interrogation within the meaning of Miranda \"); United States v. Hidalgo, 7 F.3d 1566, 1568 (11th Cir.1993) (holding that consent to search obtained after defendant invoked right to remain silent is not a self-incriminating statement because it is neither testimonial nor communicative); United States v. Smith, 3 F.3d 1088, 1098 (7th Cir.1993) (\"We have held that a consent to search is not a self-incriminating statement and, therefore, a request to search does not amount to interrogation. This view comports with the view taken by every court of appeals to have addressed the issue.\u201d); United States v. Rodriguez-Garcia, 983 F.2d 1563, 1568 (10th Cir.1993) (stating that a request for consent to search is not custodial interrogation and holding that \"consent to search is not the type of incriminating statement which the Fifth Amendment was designed to address\u201d); Cody v. Solem, 755 F.2d 1323, 1330 (8th Cir.1985) (staling that Fifth Amendment right to counsel stems from privilege against self-incrimination and is not an independent right and that consent to search is not an incriminating statement because it is not testimonial, nor is physical evidence obtained pursuant to search); State v. Moralo, 619 N.W.2d 655, 662 (S.D.2000) (stating that \"[a]n officer's request that a suspect consent to a search, however, is not an interrogation or its functional equivalent\u201d and \"Morato\u2019s consent to search does not constitute an incriminating statement\u201d); State v. Crannell, 170 Vt. 387, 750 A.2d 1002, 1009 (2000) (concluding that the request for consent to search did not violate defendant's Fifth Amendment rights); contra United States v. Yan, 704 F.Supp. 1207, 1211-12 (S.D.N.Y.1989) (holding that a request for search constitutes an interrogation); State v. Britain, 156 Ariz. 384, 752 P.2d 37, 39 (Ariz.Ct.App.1988), (\"view[ing] a request for consent to search, after the [Fifth Amendment] right to counsel has been invoked, as interrogation and the serving of a search warrant as conduct 'reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response' \u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"contra","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"view[ing] a request for consent to search, after the [Fifth Amendment] right to counsel has been invoked, as interrogation and the serving of a search warrant as conduct 'reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response' \"","sentence":"See, e.g., United States v. Shlater, 85 F.3d 1251, 1256 (7th Cir.1996) (holding that a \"consent to search is not an interrogation within the meaning of Miranda \"); United States v. Hidalgo, 7 F.3d 1566, 1568 (11th Cir.1993) (holding that consent to search obtained after defendant invoked right to remain silent is not a self-incriminating statement because it is neither testimonial nor communicative); United States v. Smith, 3 F.3d 1088, 1098 (7th Cir.1993) (\"We have held that a consent to search is not a self-incriminating statement and, therefore, a request to search does not amount to interrogation. This view comports with the view taken by every court of appeals to have addressed the issue.\u201d); United States v. Rodriguez-Garcia, 983 F.2d 1563, 1568 (10th Cir.1993) (stating that a request for consent to search is not custodial interrogation and holding that \"consent to search is not the type of incriminating statement which the Fifth Amendment was designed to address\u201d); Cody v. Solem, 755 F.2d 1323, 1330 (8th Cir.1985) (staling that Fifth Amendment right to counsel stems from privilege against self-incrimination and is not an independent right and that consent to search is not an incriminating statement because it is not testimonial, nor is physical evidence obtained pursuant to search); State v. Moralo, 619 N.W.2d 655, 662 (S.D.2000) (stating that \"[a]n officer's request that a suspect consent to a search, however, is not an interrogation or its functional equivalent\u201d and \"Morato\u2019s consent to search does not constitute an incriminating statement\u201d); State v. Crannell, 170 Vt. 387, 750 A.2d 1002, 1009 (2000) (concluding that the request for consent to search did not violate defendant's Fifth Amendment rights); contra United States v. Yan, 704 F.Supp. 1207, 1211-12 (S.D.N.Y.1989) (holding that a request for search constitutes an interrogation); State v. Britain, 156 Ariz. 384, 752 P.2d 37, 39 (Ariz.Ct.App.1988), (\"view[ing] a request for consent to search, after the [Fifth Amendment] right to counsel has been invoked, as interrogation and the serving of a search warrant as conduct 'reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response' \u201d)."},"case_id":8390950,"label":"a"}
{"context":". Everett, 893 So.2d at 1286-87: We note that most courts that have considered this issue have held similarly.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"7 F.3d 1566, 1568","parenthetical":"holding that consent to search obtained after defendant invoked right to remain silent is not a self-incriminating statement because it is neither testimonial nor communicative","sentence":"See, e.g., United States v. Shlater, 85 F.3d 1251, 1256 (7th Cir.1996) (holding that a \"consent to search is not an interrogation within the meaning of Miranda \"); United States v. Hidalgo, 7 F.3d 1566, 1568 (11th Cir.1993) (holding that consent to search obtained after defendant invoked right to remain silent is not a self-incriminating statement because it is neither testimonial nor communicative); United States v. Smith, 3 F.3d 1088, 1098 (7th Cir.1993) (\"We have held that a consent to search is not a self-incriminating statement and, therefore, a request to search does not amount to interrogation. This view comports with the view taken by every court of appeals to have addressed the issue.\u201d); United States v. Rodriguez-Garcia, 983 F.2d 1563, 1568 (10th Cir.1993) (stating that a request for consent to search is not custodial interrogation and holding that \"consent to search is not the type of incriminating statement which the Fifth Amendment was designed to address\u201d); Cody v. Solem, 755 F.2d 1323, 1330 (8th Cir.1985) (staling that Fifth Amendment right to counsel stems from privilege against self-incrimination and is not an independent right and that consent to search is not an incriminating statement because it is not testimonial, nor is physical evidence obtained pursuant to search); State v. Moralo, 619 N.W.2d 655, 662 (S.D.2000) (stating that \"[a]n officer's request that a suspect consent to a search, however, is not an interrogation or its functional equivalent\u201d and \"Morato\u2019s consent to search does not constitute an incriminating statement\u201d); State v. Crannell, 170 Vt. 387, 750 A.2d 1002, 1009 (2000) (concluding that the request for consent to search did not violate defendant's Fifth Amendment rights); contra United States v. Yan, 704 F.Supp. 1207, 1211-12 (S.D.N.Y.1989) (holding that a request for search constitutes an interrogation); State v. Britain, 156 Ariz. 384, 752 P.2d 37, 39 (Ariz.Ct.App.1988), (\"view[ing] a request for consent to search, after the [Fifth Amendment] right to counsel has been invoked, as interrogation and the serving of a search warrant as conduct 'reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response' \u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"contra","identifier":"752 P.2d 37, 39","parenthetical":"\"view[ing] a request for consent to search, after the [Fifth Amendment] right to counsel has been invoked, as interrogation and the serving of a search warrant as conduct 'reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response' \"","sentence":"See, e.g., United States v. Shlater, 85 F.3d 1251, 1256 (7th Cir.1996) (holding that a \"consent to search is not an interrogation within the meaning of Miranda \"); United States v. Hidalgo, 7 F.3d 1566, 1568 (11th Cir.1993) (holding that consent to search obtained after defendant invoked right to remain silent is not a self-incriminating statement because it is neither testimonial nor communicative); United States v. Smith, 3 F.3d 1088, 1098 (7th Cir.1993) (\"We have held that a consent to search is not a self-incriminating statement and, therefore, a request to search does not amount to interrogation. This view comports with the view taken by every court of appeals to have addressed the issue.\u201d); United States v. Rodriguez-Garcia, 983 F.2d 1563, 1568 (10th Cir.1993) (stating that a request for consent to search is not custodial interrogation and holding that \"consent to search is not the type of incriminating statement which the Fifth Amendment was designed to address\u201d); Cody v. Solem, 755 F.2d 1323, 1330 (8th Cir.1985) (staling that Fifth Amendment right to counsel stems from privilege against self-incrimination and is not an independent right and that consent to search is not an incriminating statement because it is not testimonial, nor is physical evidence obtained pursuant to search); State v. Moralo, 619 N.W.2d 655, 662 (S.D.2000) (stating that \"[a]n officer's request that a suspect consent to a search, however, is not an interrogation or its functional equivalent\u201d and \"Morato\u2019s consent to search does not constitute an incriminating statement\u201d); State v. Crannell, 170 Vt. 387, 750 A.2d 1002, 1009 (2000) (concluding that the request for consent to search did not violate defendant's Fifth Amendment rights); contra United States v. Yan, 704 F.Supp. 1207, 1211-12 (S.D.N.Y.1989) (holding that a request for search constitutes an interrogation); State v. Britain, 156 Ariz. 384, 752 P.2d 37, 39 (Ariz.Ct.App.1988), (\"view[ing] a request for consent to search, after the [Fifth Amendment] right to counsel has been invoked, as interrogation and the serving of a search warrant as conduct 'reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response' \u201d)."},"case_id":8390950,"label":"a"}
{"context":". Everett, 893 So.2d at 1286-87: We note that most courts that have considered this issue have held similarly.","citation_a":{"signal":"contra","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"view[ing] a request for consent to search, after the [Fifth Amendment] right to counsel has been invoked, as interrogation and the serving of a search warrant as conduct 'reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response' \"","sentence":"See, e.g., United States v. Shlater, 85 F.3d 1251, 1256 (7th Cir.1996) (holding that a \"consent to search is not an interrogation within the meaning of Miranda \"); United States v. Hidalgo, 7 F.3d 1566, 1568 (11th Cir.1993) (holding that consent to search obtained after defendant invoked right to remain silent is not a self-incriminating statement because it is neither testimonial nor communicative); United States v. Smith, 3 F.3d 1088, 1098 (7th Cir.1993) (\"We have held that a consent to search is not a self-incriminating statement and, therefore, a request to search does not amount to interrogation. This view comports with the view taken by every court of appeals to have addressed the issue.\u201d); United States v. Rodriguez-Garcia, 983 F.2d 1563, 1568 (10th Cir.1993) (stating that a request for consent to search is not custodial interrogation and holding that \"consent to search is not the type of incriminating statement which the Fifth Amendment was designed to address\u201d); Cody v. Solem, 755 F.2d 1323, 1330 (8th Cir.1985) (staling that Fifth Amendment right to counsel stems from privilege against self-incrimination and is not an independent right and that consent to search is not an incriminating statement because it is not testimonial, nor is physical evidence obtained pursuant to search); State v. Moralo, 619 N.W.2d 655, 662 (S.D.2000) (stating that \"[a]n officer's request that a suspect consent to a search, however, is not an interrogation or its functional equivalent\u201d and \"Morato\u2019s consent to search does not constitute an incriminating statement\u201d); State v. Crannell, 170 Vt. 387, 750 A.2d 1002, 1009 (2000) (concluding that the request for consent to search did not violate defendant's Fifth Amendment rights); contra United States v. Yan, 704 F.Supp. 1207, 1211-12 (S.D.N.Y.1989) (holding that a request for search constitutes an interrogation); State v. Britain, 156 Ariz. 384, 752 P.2d 37, 39 (Ariz.Ct.App.1988), (\"view[ing] a request for consent to search, after the [Fifth Amendment] right to counsel has been invoked, as interrogation and the serving of a search warrant as conduct 'reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response' \u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"3 F.3d 1088, 1098","parenthetical":"\"We have held that a consent to search is not a self-incriminating statement and, therefore, a request to search does not amount to interrogation. This view comports with the view taken by every court of appeals to have addressed the issue.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., United States v. Shlater, 85 F.3d 1251, 1256 (7th Cir.1996) (holding that a \"consent to search is not an interrogation within the meaning of Miranda \"); United States v. Hidalgo, 7 F.3d 1566, 1568 (11th Cir.1993) (holding that consent to search obtained after defendant invoked right to remain silent is not a self-incriminating statement because it is neither testimonial nor communicative); United States v. Smith, 3 F.3d 1088, 1098 (7th Cir.1993) (\"We have held that a consent to search is not a self-incriminating statement and, therefore, a request to search does not amount to interrogation. This view comports with the view taken by every court of appeals to have addressed the issue.\u201d); United States v. Rodriguez-Garcia, 983 F.2d 1563, 1568 (10th Cir.1993) (stating that a request for consent to search is not custodial interrogation and holding that \"consent to search is not the type of incriminating statement which the Fifth Amendment was designed to address\u201d); Cody v. Solem, 755 F.2d 1323, 1330 (8th Cir.1985) (staling that Fifth Amendment right to counsel stems from privilege against self-incrimination and is not an independent right and that consent to search is not an incriminating statement because it is not testimonial, nor is physical evidence obtained pursuant to search); State v. Moralo, 619 N.W.2d 655, 662 (S.D.2000) (stating that \"[a]n officer's request that a suspect consent to a search, however, is not an interrogation or its functional equivalent\u201d and \"Morato\u2019s consent to search does not constitute an incriminating statement\u201d); State v. Crannell, 170 Vt. 387, 750 A.2d 1002, 1009 (2000) (concluding that the request for consent to search did not violate defendant's Fifth Amendment rights); contra United States v. Yan, 704 F.Supp. 1207, 1211-12 (S.D.N.Y.1989) (holding that a request for search constitutes an interrogation); State v. Britain, 156 Ariz. 384, 752 P.2d 37, 39 (Ariz.Ct.App.1988), (\"view[ing] a request for consent to search, after the [Fifth Amendment] right to counsel has been invoked, as interrogation and the serving of a search warrant as conduct 'reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response' \u201d)."},"case_id":8390950,"label":"b"}
{"context":". Everett, 893 So.2d at 1286-87: We note that most courts that have considered this issue have held similarly.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"3 F.3d 1088, 1098","parenthetical":"\"We have held that a consent to search is not a self-incriminating statement and, therefore, a request to search does not amount to interrogation. This view comports with the view taken by every court of appeals to have addressed the issue.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., United States v. Shlater, 85 F.3d 1251, 1256 (7th Cir.1996) (holding that a \"consent to search is not an interrogation within the meaning of Miranda \"); United States v. Hidalgo, 7 F.3d 1566, 1568 (11th Cir.1993) (holding that consent to search obtained after defendant invoked right to remain silent is not a self-incriminating statement because it is neither testimonial nor communicative); United States v. Smith, 3 F.3d 1088, 1098 (7th Cir.1993) (\"We have held that a consent to search is not a self-incriminating statement and, therefore, a request to search does not amount to interrogation. This view comports with the view taken by every court of appeals to have addressed the issue.\u201d); United States v. Rodriguez-Garcia, 983 F.2d 1563, 1568 (10th Cir.1993) (stating that a request for consent to search is not custodial interrogation and holding that \"consent to search is not the type of incriminating statement which the Fifth Amendment was designed to address\u201d); Cody v. Solem, 755 F.2d 1323, 1330 (8th Cir.1985) (staling that Fifth Amendment right to counsel stems from privilege against self-incrimination and is not an independent right and that consent to search is not an incriminating statement because it is not testimonial, nor is physical evidence obtained pursuant to search); State v. Moralo, 619 N.W.2d 655, 662 (S.D.2000) (stating that \"[a]n officer's request that a suspect consent to a search, however, is not an interrogation or its functional equivalent\u201d and \"Morato\u2019s consent to search does not constitute an incriminating statement\u201d); State v. Crannell, 170 Vt. 387, 750 A.2d 1002, 1009 (2000) (concluding that the request for consent to search did not violate defendant's Fifth Amendment rights); contra United States v. Yan, 704 F.Supp. 1207, 1211-12 (S.D.N.Y.1989) (holding that a request for search constitutes an interrogation); State v. Britain, 156 Ariz. 384, 752 P.2d 37, 39 (Ariz.Ct.App.1988), (\"view[ing] a request for consent to search, after the [Fifth Amendment] right to counsel has been invoked, as interrogation and the serving of a search warrant as conduct 'reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response' \u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"contra","identifier":"752 P.2d 37, 39","parenthetical":"\"view[ing] a request for consent to search, after the [Fifth Amendment] right to counsel has been invoked, as interrogation and the serving of a search warrant as conduct 'reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response' \"","sentence":"See, e.g., United States v. Shlater, 85 F.3d 1251, 1256 (7th Cir.1996) (holding that a \"consent to search is not an interrogation within the meaning of Miranda \"); United States v. Hidalgo, 7 F.3d 1566, 1568 (11th Cir.1993) (holding that consent to search obtained after defendant invoked right to remain silent is not a self-incriminating statement because it is neither testimonial nor communicative); United States v. Smith, 3 F.3d 1088, 1098 (7th Cir.1993) (\"We have held that a consent to search is not a self-incriminating statement and, therefore, a request to search does not amount to interrogation. This view comports with the view taken by every court of appeals to have addressed the issue.\u201d); United States v. Rodriguez-Garcia, 983 F.2d 1563, 1568 (10th Cir.1993) (stating that a request for consent to search is not custodial interrogation and holding that \"consent to search is not the type of incriminating statement which the Fifth Amendment was designed to address\u201d); Cody v. Solem, 755 F.2d 1323, 1330 (8th Cir.1985) (staling that Fifth Amendment right to counsel stems from privilege against self-incrimination and is not an independent right and that consent to search is not an incriminating statement because it is not testimonial, nor is physical evidence obtained pursuant to search); State v. Moralo, 619 N.W.2d 655, 662 (S.D.2000) (stating that \"[a]n officer's request that a suspect consent to a search, however, is not an interrogation or its functional equivalent\u201d and \"Morato\u2019s consent to search does not constitute an incriminating statement\u201d); State v. Crannell, 170 Vt. 387, 750 A.2d 1002, 1009 (2000) (concluding that the request for consent to search did not violate defendant's Fifth Amendment rights); contra United States v. Yan, 704 F.Supp. 1207, 1211-12 (S.D.N.Y.1989) (holding that a request for search constitutes an interrogation); State v. Britain, 156 Ariz. 384, 752 P.2d 37, 39 (Ariz.Ct.App.1988), (\"view[ing] a request for consent to search, after the [Fifth Amendment] right to counsel has been invoked, as interrogation and the serving of a search warrant as conduct 'reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response' \u201d)."},"case_id":8390950,"label":"a"}
{"context":". Everett, 893 So.2d at 1286-87: We note that most courts that have considered this issue have held similarly.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"983 F.2d 1563, 1568","parenthetical":"stating that a request for consent to search is not custodial interrogation and holding that \"consent to search is not the type of incriminating statement which the Fifth Amendment was designed to address\"","sentence":"See, e.g., United States v. Shlater, 85 F.3d 1251, 1256 (7th Cir.1996) (holding that a \"consent to search is not an interrogation within the meaning of Miranda \"); United States v. Hidalgo, 7 F.3d 1566, 1568 (11th Cir.1993) (holding that consent to search obtained after defendant invoked right to remain silent is not a self-incriminating statement because it is neither testimonial nor communicative); United States v. Smith, 3 F.3d 1088, 1098 (7th Cir.1993) (\"We have held that a consent to search is not a self-incriminating statement and, therefore, a request to search does not amount to interrogation. This view comports with the view taken by every court of appeals to have addressed the issue.\u201d); United States v. Rodriguez-Garcia, 983 F.2d 1563, 1568 (10th Cir.1993) (stating that a request for consent to search is not custodial interrogation and holding that \"consent to search is not the type of incriminating statement which the Fifth Amendment was designed to address\u201d); Cody v. Solem, 755 F.2d 1323, 1330 (8th Cir.1985) (staling that Fifth Amendment right to counsel stems from privilege against self-incrimination and is not an independent right and that consent to search is not an incriminating statement because it is not testimonial, nor is physical evidence obtained pursuant to search); State v. Moralo, 619 N.W.2d 655, 662 (S.D.2000) (stating that \"[a]n officer's request that a suspect consent to a search, however, is not an interrogation or its functional equivalent\u201d and \"Morato\u2019s consent to search does not constitute an incriminating statement\u201d); State v. Crannell, 170 Vt. 387, 750 A.2d 1002, 1009 (2000) (concluding that the request for consent to search did not violate defendant's Fifth Amendment rights); contra United States v. Yan, 704 F.Supp. 1207, 1211-12 (S.D.N.Y.1989) (holding that a request for search constitutes an interrogation); State v. Britain, 156 Ariz. 384, 752 P.2d 37, 39 (Ariz.Ct.App.1988), (\"view[ing] a request for consent to search, after the [Fifth Amendment] right to counsel has been invoked, as interrogation and the serving of a search warrant as conduct 'reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response' \u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"contra","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"view[ing] a request for consent to search, after the [Fifth Amendment] right to counsel has been invoked, as interrogation and the serving of a search warrant as conduct 'reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response' \"","sentence":"See, e.g., United States v. Shlater, 85 F.3d 1251, 1256 (7th Cir.1996) (holding that a \"consent to search is not an interrogation within the meaning of Miranda \"); United States v. Hidalgo, 7 F.3d 1566, 1568 (11th Cir.1993) (holding that consent to search obtained after defendant invoked right to remain silent is not a self-incriminating statement because it is neither testimonial nor communicative); United States v. Smith, 3 F.3d 1088, 1098 (7th Cir.1993) (\"We have held that a consent to search is not a self-incriminating statement and, therefore, a request to search does not amount to interrogation. This view comports with the view taken by every court of appeals to have addressed the issue.\u201d); United States v. Rodriguez-Garcia, 983 F.2d 1563, 1568 (10th Cir.1993) (stating that a request for consent to search is not custodial interrogation and holding that \"consent to search is not the type of incriminating statement which the Fifth Amendment was designed to address\u201d); Cody v. Solem, 755 F.2d 1323, 1330 (8th Cir.1985) (staling that Fifth Amendment right to counsel stems from privilege against self-incrimination and is not an independent right and that consent to search is not an incriminating statement because it is not testimonial, nor is physical evidence obtained pursuant to search); State v. Moralo, 619 N.W.2d 655, 662 (S.D.2000) (stating that \"[a]n officer's request that a suspect consent to a search, however, is not an interrogation or its functional equivalent\u201d and \"Morato\u2019s consent to search does not constitute an incriminating statement\u201d); State v. Crannell, 170 Vt. 387, 750 A.2d 1002, 1009 (2000) (concluding that the request for consent to search did not violate defendant's Fifth Amendment rights); contra United States v. Yan, 704 F.Supp. 1207, 1211-12 (S.D.N.Y.1989) (holding that a request for search constitutes an interrogation); State v. Britain, 156 Ariz. 384, 752 P.2d 37, 39 (Ariz.Ct.App.1988), (\"view[ing] a request for consent to search, after the [Fifth Amendment] right to counsel has been invoked, as interrogation and the serving of a search warrant as conduct 'reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response' \u201d)."},"case_id":8390950,"label":"a"}
{"context":". Everett, 893 So.2d at 1286-87: We note that most courts that have considered this issue have held similarly.","citation_a":{"signal":"contra","identifier":"752 P.2d 37, 39","parenthetical":"\"view[ing] a request for consent to search, after the [Fifth Amendment] right to counsel has been invoked, as interrogation and the serving of a search warrant as conduct 'reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response' \"","sentence":"See, e.g., United States v. Shlater, 85 F.3d 1251, 1256 (7th Cir.1996) (holding that a \"consent to search is not an interrogation within the meaning of Miranda \"); United States v. Hidalgo, 7 F.3d 1566, 1568 (11th Cir.1993) (holding that consent to search obtained after defendant invoked right to remain silent is not a self-incriminating statement because it is neither testimonial nor communicative); United States v. Smith, 3 F.3d 1088, 1098 (7th Cir.1993) (\"We have held that a consent to search is not a self-incriminating statement and, therefore, a request to search does not amount to interrogation. This view comports with the view taken by every court of appeals to have addressed the issue.\u201d); United States v. Rodriguez-Garcia, 983 F.2d 1563, 1568 (10th Cir.1993) (stating that a request for consent to search is not custodial interrogation and holding that \"consent to search is not the type of incriminating statement which the Fifth Amendment was designed to address\u201d); Cody v. Solem, 755 F.2d 1323, 1330 (8th Cir.1985) (staling that Fifth Amendment right to counsel stems from privilege against self-incrimination and is not an independent right and that consent to search is not an incriminating statement because it is not testimonial, nor is physical evidence obtained pursuant to search); State v. Moralo, 619 N.W.2d 655, 662 (S.D.2000) (stating that \"[a]n officer's request that a suspect consent to a search, however, is not an interrogation or its functional equivalent\u201d and \"Morato\u2019s consent to search does not constitute an incriminating statement\u201d); State v. Crannell, 170 Vt. 387, 750 A.2d 1002, 1009 (2000) (concluding that the request for consent to search did not violate defendant's Fifth Amendment rights); contra United States v. Yan, 704 F.Supp. 1207, 1211-12 (S.D.N.Y.1989) (holding that a request for search constitutes an interrogation); State v. Britain, 156 Ariz. 384, 752 P.2d 37, 39 (Ariz.Ct.App.1988), (\"view[ing] a request for consent to search, after the [Fifth Amendment] right to counsel has been invoked, as interrogation and the serving of a search warrant as conduct 'reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response' \u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"983 F.2d 1563, 1568","parenthetical":"stating that a request for consent to search is not custodial interrogation and holding that \"consent to search is not the type of incriminating statement which the Fifth Amendment was designed to address\"","sentence":"See, e.g., United States v. Shlater, 85 F.3d 1251, 1256 (7th Cir.1996) (holding that a \"consent to search is not an interrogation within the meaning of Miranda \"); United States v. Hidalgo, 7 F.3d 1566, 1568 (11th Cir.1993) (holding that consent to search obtained after defendant invoked right to remain silent is not a self-incriminating statement because it is neither testimonial nor communicative); United States v. Smith, 3 F.3d 1088, 1098 (7th Cir.1993) (\"We have held that a consent to search is not a self-incriminating statement and, therefore, a request to search does not amount to interrogation. This view comports with the view taken by every court of appeals to have addressed the issue.\u201d); United States v. Rodriguez-Garcia, 983 F.2d 1563, 1568 (10th Cir.1993) (stating that a request for consent to search is not custodial interrogation and holding that \"consent to search is not the type of incriminating statement which the Fifth Amendment was designed to address\u201d); Cody v. Solem, 755 F.2d 1323, 1330 (8th Cir.1985) (staling that Fifth Amendment right to counsel stems from privilege against self-incrimination and is not an independent right and that consent to search is not an incriminating statement because it is not testimonial, nor is physical evidence obtained pursuant to search); State v. Moralo, 619 N.W.2d 655, 662 (S.D.2000) (stating that \"[a]n officer's request that a suspect consent to a search, however, is not an interrogation or its functional equivalent\u201d and \"Morato\u2019s consent to search does not constitute an incriminating statement\u201d); State v. Crannell, 170 Vt. 387, 750 A.2d 1002, 1009 (2000) (concluding that the request for consent to search did not violate defendant's Fifth Amendment rights); contra United States v. Yan, 704 F.Supp. 1207, 1211-12 (S.D.N.Y.1989) (holding that a request for search constitutes an interrogation); State v. Britain, 156 Ariz. 384, 752 P.2d 37, 39 (Ariz.Ct.App.1988), (\"view[ing] a request for consent to search, after the [Fifth Amendment] right to counsel has been invoked, as interrogation and the serving of a search warrant as conduct 'reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response' \u201d)."},"case_id":8390950,"label":"b"}
{"context":". Everett, 893 So.2d at 1286-87: We note that most courts that have considered this issue have held similarly.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"755 F.2d 1323, 1330","parenthetical":"staling that Fifth Amendment right to counsel stems from privilege against self-incrimination and is not an independent right and that consent to search is not an incriminating statement because it is not testimonial, nor is physical evidence obtained pursuant to search","sentence":"See, e.g., United States v. Shlater, 85 F.3d 1251, 1256 (7th Cir.1996) (holding that a \"consent to search is not an interrogation within the meaning of Miranda \"); United States v. Hidalgo, 7 F.3d 1566, 1568 (11th Cir.1993) (holding that consent to search obtained after defendant invoked right to remain silent is not a self-incriminating statement because it is neither testimonial nor communicative); United States v. Smith, 3 F.3d 1088, 1098 (7th Cir.1993) (\"We have held that a consent to search is not a self-incriminating statement and, therefore, a request to search does not amount to interrogation. This view comports with the view taken by every court of appeals to have addressed the issue.\u201d); United States v. Rodriguez-Garcia, 983 F.2d 1563, 1568 (10th Cir.1993) (stating that a request for consent to search is not custodial interrogation and holding that \"consent to search is not the type of incriminating statement which the Fifth Amendment was designed to address\u201d); Cody v. Solem, 755 F.2d 1323, 1330 (8th Cir.1985) (staling that Fifth Amendment right to counsel stems from privilege against self-incrimination and is not an independent right and that consent to search is not an incriminating statement because it is not testimonial, nor is physical evidence obtained pursuant to search); State v. Moralo, 619 N.W.2d 655, 662 (S.D.2000) (stating that \"[a]n officer's request that a suspect consent to a search, however, is not an interrogation or its functional equivalent\u201d and \"Morato\u2019s consent to search does not constitute an incriminating statement\u201d); State v. Crannell, 170 Vt. 387, 750 A.2d 1002, 1009 (2000) (concluding that the request for consent to search did not violate defendant's Fifth Amendment rights); contra United States v. Yan, 704 F.Supp. 1207, 1211-12 (S.D.N.Y.1989) (holding that a request for search constitutes an interrogation); State v. Britain, 156 Ariz. 384, 752 P.2d 37, 39 (Ariz.Ct.App.1988), (\"view[ing] a request for consent to search, after the [Fifth Amendment] right to counsel has been invoked, as interrogation and the serving of a search warrant as conduct 'reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response' \u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"contra","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"view[ing] a request for consent to search, after the [Fifth Amendment] right to counsel has been invoked, as interrogation and the serving of a search warrant as conduct 'reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response' \"","sentence":"See, e.g., United States v. Shlater, 85 F.3d 1251, 1256 (7th Cir.1996) (holding that a \"consent to search is not an interrogation within the meaning of Miranda \"); United States v. Hidalgo, 7 F.3d 1566, 1568 (11th Cir.1993) (holding that consent to search obtained after defendant invoked right to remain silent is not a self-incriminating statement because it is neither testimonial nor communicative); United States v. Smith, 3 F.3d 1088, 1098 (7th Cir.1993) (\"We have held that a consent to search is not a self-incriminating statement and, therefore, a request to search does not amount to interrogation. This view comports with the view taken by every court of appeals to have addressed the issue.\u201d); United States v. Rodriguez-Garcia, 983 F.2d 1563, 1568 (10th Cir.1993) (stating that a request for consent to search is not custodial interrogation and holding that \"consent to search is not the type of incriminating statement which the Fifth Amendment was designed to address\u201d); Cody v. Solem, 755 F.2d 1323, 1330 (8th Cir.1985) (staling that Fifth Amendment right to counsel stems from privilege against self-incrimination and is not an independent right and that consent to search is not an incriminating statement because it is not testimonial, nor is physical evidence obtained pursuant to search); State v. Moralo, 619 N.W.2d 655, 662 (S.D.2000) (stating that \"[a]n officer's request that a suspect consent to a search, however, is not an interrogation or its functional equivalent\u201d and \"Morato\u2019s consent to search does not constitute an incriminating statement\u201d); State v. Crannell, 170 Vt. 387, 750 A.2d 1002, 1009 (2000) (concluding that the request for consent to search did not violate defendant's Fifth Amendment rights); contra United States v. Yan, 704 F.Supp. 1207, 1211-12 (S.D.N.Y.1989) (holding that a request for search constitutes an interrogation); State v. Britain, 156 Ariz. 384, 752 P.2d 37, 39 (Ariz.Ct.App.1988), (\"view[ing] a request for consent to search, after the [Fifth Amendment] right to counsel has been invoked, as interrogation and the serving of a search warrant as conduct 'reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response' \u201d)."},"case_id":8390950,"label":"a"}
{"context":". Everett, 893 So.2d at 1286-87: We note that most courts that have considered this issue have held similarly.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"755 F.2d 1323, 1330","parenthetical":"staling that Fifth Amendment right to counsel stems from privilege against self-incrimination and is not an independent right and that consent to search is not an incriminating statement because it is not testimonial, nor is physical evidence obtained pursuant to search","sentence":"See, e.g., United States v. Shlater, 85 F.3d 1251, 1256 (7th Cir.1996) (holding that a \"consent to search is not an interrogation within the meaning of Miranda \"); United States v. Hidalgo, 7 F.3d 1566, 1568 (11th Cir.1993) (holding that consent to search obtained after defendant invoked right to remain silent is not a self-incriminating statement because it is neither testimonial nor communicative); United States v. Smith, 3 F.3d 1088, 1098 (7th Cir.1993) (\"We have held that a consent to search is not a self-incriminating statement and, therefore, a request to search does not amount to interrogation. This view comports with the view taken by every court of appeals to have addressed the issue.\u201d); United States v. Rodriguez-Garcia, 983 F.2d 1563, 1568 (10th Cir.1993) (stating that a request for consent to search is not custodial interrogation and holding that \"consent to search is not the type of incriminating statement which the Fifth Amendment was designed to address\u201d); Cody v. Solem, 755 F.2d 1323, 1330 (8th Cir.1985) (staling that Fifth Amendment right to counsel stems from privilege against self-incrimination and is not an independent right and that consent to search is not an incriminating statement because it is not testimonial, nor is physical evidence obtained pursuant to search); State v. Moralo, 619 N.W.2d 655, 662 (S.D.2000) (stating that \"[a]n officer's request that a suspect consent to a search, however, is not an interrogation or its functional equivalent\u201d and \"Morato\u2019s consent to search does not constitute an incriminating statement\u201d); State v. Crannell, 170 Vt. 387, 750 A.2d 1002, 1009 (2000) (concluding that the request for consent to search did not violate defendant's Fifth Amendment rights); contra United States v. Yan, 704 F.Supp. 1207, 1211-12 (S.D.N.Y.1989) (holding that a request for search constitutes an interrogation); State v. Britain, 156 Ariz. 384, 752 P.2d 37, 39 (Ariz.Ct.App.1988), (\"view[ing] a request for consent to search, after the [Fifth Amendment] right to counsel has been invoked, as interrogation and the serving of a search warrant as conduct 'reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response' \u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"contra","identifier":"752 P.2d 37, 39","parenthetical":"\"view[ing] a request for consent to search, after the [Fifth Amendment] right to counsel has been invoked, as interrogation and the serving of a search warrant as conduct 'reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response' \"","sentence":"See, e.g., United States v. Shlater, 85 F.3d 1251, 1256 (7th Cir.1996) (holding that a \"consent to search is not an interrogation within the meaning of Miranda \"); United States v. Hidalgo, 7 F.3d 1566, 1568 (11th Cir.1993) (holding that consent to search obtained after defendant invoked right to remain silent is not a self-incriminating statement because it is neither testimonial nor communicative); United States v. Smith, 3 F.3d 1088, 1098 (7th Cir.1993) (\"We have held that a consent to search is not a self-incriminating statement and, therefore, a request to search does not amount to interrogation. This view comports with the view taken by every court of appeals to have addressed the issue.\u201d); United States v. Rodriguez-Garcia, 983 F.2d 1563, 1568 (10th Cir.1993) (stating that a request for consent to search is not custodial interrogation and holding that \"consent to search is not the type of incriminating statement which the Fifth Amendment was designed to address\u201d); Cody v. Solem, 755 F.2d 1323, 1330 (8th Cir.1985) (staling that Fifth Amendment right to counsel stems from privilege against self-incrimination and is not an independent right and that consent to search is not an incriminating statement because it is not testimonial, nor is physical evidence obtained pursuant to search); State v. Moralo, 619 N.W.2d 655, 662 (S.D.2000) (stating that \"[a]n officer's request that a suspect consent to a search, however, is not an interrogation or its functional equivalent\u201d and \"Morato\u2019s consent to search does not constitute an incriminating statement\u201d); State v. Crannell, 170 Vt. 387, 750 A.2d 1002, 1009 (2000) (concluding that the request for consent to search did not violate defendant's Fifth Amendment rights); contra United States v. Yan, 704 F.Supp. 1207, 1211-12 (S.D.N.Y.1989) (holding that a request for search constitutes an interrogation); State v. Britain, 156 Ariz. 384, 752 P.2d 37, 39 (Ariz.Ct.App.1988), (\"view[ing] a request for consent to search, after the [Fifth Amendment] right to counsel has been invoked, as interrogation and the serving of a search warrant as conduct 'reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response' \u201d)."},"case_id":8390950,"label":"a"}
{"context":". Everett, 893 So.2d at 1286-87: We note that most courts that have considered this issue have held similarly.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"619 N.W.2d 655, 662","parenthetical":"stating that \"[a]n officer's request that a suspect consent to a search, however, is not an interrogation or its functional equivalent\" and \"Morato's consent to search does not constitute an incriminating statement\"","sentence":"See, e.g., United States v. Shlater, 85 F.3d 1251, 1256 (7th Cir.1996) (holding that a \"consent to search is not an interrogation within the meaning of Miranda \"); United States v. Hidalgo, 7 F.3d 1566, 1568 (11th Cir.1993) (holding that consent to search obtained after defendant invoked right to remain silent is not a self-incriminating statement because it is neither testimonial nor communicative); United States v. Smith, 3 F.3d 1088, 1098 (7th Cir.1993) (\"We have held that a consent to search is not a self-incriminating statement and, therefore, a request to search does not amount to interrogation. This view comports with the view taken by every court of appeals to have addressed the issue.\u201d); United States v. Rodriguez-Garcia, 983 F.2d 1563, 1568 (10th Cir.1993) (stating that a request for consent to search is not custodial interrogation and holding that \"consent to search is not the type of incriminating statement which the Fifth Amendment was designed to address\u201d); Cody v. Solem, 755 F.2d 1323, 1330 (8th Cir.1985) (staling that Fifth Amendment right to counsel stems from privilege against self-incrimination and is not an independent right and that consent to search is not an incriminating statement because it is not testimonial, nor is physical evidence obtained pursuant to search); State v. Moralo, 619 N.W.2d 655, 662 (S.D.2000) (stating that \"[a]n officer's request that a suspect consent to a search, however, is not an interrogation or its functional equivalent\u201d and \"Morato\u2019s consent to search does not constitute an incriminating statement\u201d); State v. Crannell, 170 Vt. 387, 750 A.2d 1002, 1009 (2000) (concluding that the request for consent to search did not violate defendant's Fifth Amendment rights); contra United States v. Yan, 704 F.Supp. 1207, 1211-12 (S.D.N.Y.1989) (holding that a request for search constitutes an interrogation); State v. Britain, 156 Ariz. 384, 752 P.2d 37, 39 (Ariz.Ct.App.1988), (\"view[ing] a request for consent to search, after the [Fifth Amendment] right to counsel has been invoked, as interrogation and the serving of a search warrant as conduct 'reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response' \u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"contra","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"view[ing] a request for consent to search, after the [Fifth Amendment] right to counsel has been invoked, as interrogation and the serving of a search warrant as conduct 'reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response' \"","sentence":"See, e.g., United States v. Shlater, 85 F.3d 1251, 1256 (7th Cir.1996) (holding that a \"consent to search is not an interrogation within the meaning of Miranda \"); United States v. Hidalgo, 7 F.3d 1566, 1568 (11th Cir.1993) (holding that consent to search obtained after defendant invoked right to remain silent is not a self-incriminating statement because it is neither testimonial nor communicative); United States v. Smith, 3 F.3d 1088, 1098 (7th Cir.1993) (\"We have held that a consent to search is not a self-incriminating statement and, therefore, a request to search does not amount to interrogation. This view comports with the view taken by every court of appeals to have addressed the issue.\u201d); United States v. Rodriguez-Garcia, 983 F.2d 1563, 1568 (10th Cir.1993) (stating that a request for consent to search is not custodial interrogation and holding that \"consent to search is not the type of incriminating statement which the Fifth Amendment was designed to address\u201d); Cody v. Solem, 755 F.2d 1323, 1330 (8th Cir.1985) (staling that Fifth Amendment right to counsel stems from privilege against self-incrimination and is not an independent right and that consent to search is not an incriminating statement because it is not testimonial, nor is physical evidence obtained pursuant to search); State v. Moralo, 619 N.W.2d 655, 662 (S.D.2000) (stating that \"[a]n officer's request that a suspect consent to a search, however, is not an interrogation or its functional equivalent\u201d and \"Morato\u2019s consent to search does not constitute an incriminating statement\u201d); State v. Crannell, 170 Vt. 387, 750 A.2d 1002, 1009 (2000) (concluding that the request for consent to search did not violate defendant's Fifth Amendment rights); contra United States v. Yan, 704 F.Supp. 1207, 1211-12 (S.D.N.Y.1989) (holding that a request for search constitutes an interrogation); State v. Britain, 156 Ariz. 384, 752 P.2d 37, 39 (Ariz.Ct.App.1988), (\"view[ing] a request for consent to search, after the [Fifth Amendment] right to counsel has been invoked, as interrogation and the serving of a search warrant as conduct 'reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response' \u201d)."},"case_id":8390950,"label":"a"}
{"context":". Everett, 893 So.2d at 1286-87: We note that most courts that have considered this issue have held similarly.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"619 N.W.2d 655, 662","parenthetical":"stating that \"[a]n officer's request that a suspect consent to a search, however, is not an interrogation or its functional equivalent\" and \"Morato's consent to search does not constitute an incriminating statement\"","sentence":"See, e.g., United States v. Shlater, 85 F.3d 1251, 1256 (7th Cir.1996) (holding that a \"consent to search is not an interrogation within the meaning of Miranda \"); United States v. Hidalgo, 7 F.3d 1566, 1568 (11th Cir.1993) (holding that consent to search obtained after defendant invoked right to remain silent is not a self-incriminating statement because it is neither testimonial nor communicative); United States v. Smith, 3 F.3d 1088, 1098 (7th Cir.1993) (\"We have held that a consent to search is not a self-incriminating statement and, therefore, a request to search does not amount to interrogation. This view comports with the view taken by every court of appeals to have addressed the issue.\u201d); United States v. Rodriguez-Garcia, 983 F.2d 1563, 1568 (10th Cir.1993) (stating that a request for consent to search is not custodial interrogation and holding that \"consent to search is not the type of incriminating statement which the Fifth Amendment was designed to address\u201d); Cody v. Solem, 755 F.2d 1323, 1330 (8th Cir.1985) (staling that Fifth Amendment right to counsel stems from privilege against self-incrimination and is not an independent right and that consent to search is not an incriminating statement because it is not testimonial, nor is physical evidence obtained pursuant to search); State v. Moralo, 619 N.W.2d 655, 662 (S.D.2000) (stating that \"[a]n officer's request that a suspect consent to a search, however, is not an interrogation or its functional equivalent\u201d and \"Morato\u2019s consent to search does not constitute an incriminating statement\u201d); State v. Crannell, 170 Vt. 387, 750 A.2d 1002, 1009 (2000) (concluding that the request for consent to search did not violate defendant's Fifth Amendment rights); contra United States v. Yan, 704 F.Supp. 1207, 1211-12 (S.D.N.Y.1989) (holding that a request for search constitutes an interrogation); State v. Britain, 156 Ariz. 384, 752 P.2d 37, 39 (Ariz.Ct.App.1988), (\"view[ing] a request for consent to search, after the [Fifth Amendment] right to counsel has been invoked, as interrogation and the serving of a search warrant as conduct 'reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response' \u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"contra","identifier":"752 P.2d 37, 39","parenthetical":"\"view[ing] a request for consent to search, after the [Fifth Amendment] right to counsel has been invoked, as interrogation and the serving of a search warrant as conduct 'reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response' \"","sentence":"See, e.g., United States v. Shlater, 85 F.3d 1251, 1256 (7th Cir.1996) (holding that a \"consent to search is not an interrogation within the meaning of Miranda \"); United States v. Hidalgo, 7 F.3d 1566, 1568 (11th Cir.1993) (holding that consent to search obtained after defendant invoked right to remain silent is not a self-incriminating statement because it is neither testimonial nor communicative); United States v. Smith, 3 F.3d 1088, 1098 (7th Cir.1993) (\"We have held that a consent to search is not a self-incriminating statement and, therefore, a request to search does not amount to interrogation. This view comports with the view taken by every court of appeals to have addressed the issue.\u201d); United States v. Rodriguez-Garcia, 983 F.2d 1563, 1568 (10th Cir.1993) (stating that a request for consent to search is not custodial interrogation and holding that \"consent to search is not the type of incriminating statement which the Fifth Amendment was designed to address\u201d); Cody v. Solem, 755 F.2d 1323, 1330 (8th Cir.1985) (staling that Fifth Amendment right to counsel stems from privilege against self-incrimination and is not an independent right and that consent to search is not an incriminating statement because it is not testimonial, nor is physical evidence obtained pursuant to search); State v. Moralo, 619 N.W.2d 655, 662 (S.D.2000) (stating that \"[a]n officer's request that a suspect consent to a search, however, is not an interrogation or its functional equivalent\u201d and \"Morato\u2019s consent to search does not constitute an incriminating statement\u201d); State v. Crannell, 170 Vt. 387, 750 A.2d 1002, 1009 (2000) (concluding that the request for consent to search did not violate defendant's Fifth Amendment rights); contra United States v. Yan, 704 F.Supp. 1207, 1211-12 (S.D.N.Y.1989) (holding that a request for search constitutes an interrogation); State v. Britain, 156 Ariz. 384, 752 P.2d 37, 39 (Ariz.Ct.App.1988), (\"view[ing] a request for consent to search, after the [Fifth Amendment] right to counsel has been invoked, as interrogation and the serving of a search warrant as conduct 'reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response' \u201d)."},"case_id":8390950,"label":"a"}
{"context":". Everett, 893 So.2d at 1286-87: We note that most courts that have considered this issue have held similarly.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"concluding that the request for consent to search did not violate defendant's Fifth Amendment rights","sentence":"See, e.g., United States v. Shlater, 85 F.3d 1251, 1256 (7th Cir.1996) (holding that a \"consent to search is not an interrogation within the meaning of Miranda \"); United States v. Hidalgo, 7 F.3d 1566, 1568 (11th Cir.1993) (holding that consent to search obtained after defendant invoked right to remain silent is not a self-incriminating statement because it is neither testimonial nor communicative); United States v. Smith, 3 F.3d 1088, 1098 (7th Cir.1993) (\"We have held that a consent to search is not a self-incriminating statement and, therefore, a request to search does not amount to interrogation. This view comports with the view taken by every court of appeals to have addressed the issue.\u201d); United States v. Rodriguez-Garcia, 983 F.2d 1563, 1568 (10th Cir.1993) (stating that a request for consent to search is not custodial interrogation and holding that \"consent to search is not the type of incriminating statement which the Fifth Amendment was designed to address\u201d); Cody v. Solem, 755 F.2d 1323, 1330 (8th Cir.1985) (staling that Fifth Amendment right to counsel stems from privilege against self-incrimination and is not an independent right and that consent to search is not an incriminating statement because it is not testimonial, nor is physical evidence obtained pursuant to search); State v. Moralo, 619 N.W.2d 655, 662 (S.D.2000) (stating that \"[a]n officer's request that a suspect consent to a search, however, is not an interrogation or its functional equivalent\u201d and \"Morato\u2019s consent to search does not constitute an incriminating statement\u201d); State v. Crannell, 170 Vt. 387, 750 A.2d 1002, 1009 (2000) (concluding that the request for consent to search did not violate defendant's Fifth Amendment rights); contra United States v. Yan, 704 F.Supp. 1207, 1211-12 (S.D.N.Y.1989) (holding that a request for search constitutes an interrogation); State v. Britain, 156 Ariz. 384, 752 P.2d 37, 39 (Ariz.Ct.App.1988), (\"view[ing] a request for consent to search, after the [Fifth Amendment] right to counsel has been invoked, as interrogation and the serving of a search warrant as conduct 'reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response' \u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"contra","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"view[ing] a request for consent to search, after the [Fifth Amendment] right to counsel has been invoked, as interrogation and the serving of a search warrant as conduct 'reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response' \"","sentence":"See, e.g., United States v. Shlater, 85 F.3d 1251, 1256 (7th Cir.1996) (holding that a \"consent to search is not an interrogation within the meaning of Miranda \"); United States v. Hidalgo, 7 F.3d 1566, 1568 (11th Cir.1993) (holding that consent to search obtained after defendant invoked right to remain silent is not a self-incriminating statement because it is neither testimonial nor communicative); United States v. Smith, 3 F.3d 1088, 1098 (7th Cir.1993) (\"We have held that a consent to search is not a self-incriminating statement and, therefore, a request to search does not amount to interrogation. This view comports with the view taken by every court of appeals to have addressed the issue.\u201d); United States v. Rodriguez-Garcia, 983 F.2d 1563, 1568 (10th Cir.1993) (stating that a request for consent to search is not custodial interrogation and holding that \"consent to search is not the type of incriminating statement which the Fifth Amendment was designed to address\u201d); Cody v. Solem, 755 F.2d 1323, 1330 (8th Cir.1985) (staling that Fifth Amendment right to counsel stems from privilege against self-incrimination and is not an independent right and that consent to search is not an incriminating statement because it is not testimonial, nor is physical evidence obtained pursuant to search); State v. Moralo, 619 N.W.2d 655, 662 (S.D.2000) (stating that \"[a]n officer's request that a suspect consent to a search, however, is not an interrogation or its functional equivalent\u201d and \"Morato\u2019s consent to search does not constitute an incriminating statement\u201d); State v. Crannell, 170 Vt. 387, 750 A.2d 1002, 1009 (2000) (concluding that the request for consent to search did not violate defendant's Fifth Amendment rights); contra United States v. Yan, 704 F.Supp. 1207, 1211-12 (S.D.N.Y.1989) (holding that a request for search constitutes an interrogation); State v. Britain, 156 Ariz. 384, 752 P.2d 37, 39 (Ariz.Ct.App.1988), (\"view[ing] a request for consent to search, after the [Fifth Amendment] right to counsel has been invoked, as interrogation and the serving of a search warrant as conduct 'reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response' \u201d)."},"case_id":8390950,"label":"a"}
{"context":". Everett, 893 So.2d at 1286-87: We note that most courts that have considered this issue have held similarly.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"concluding that the request for consent to search did not violate defendant's Fifth Amendment rights","sentence":"See, e.g., United States v. Shlater, 85 F.3d 1251, 1256 (7th Cir.1996) (holding that a \"consent to search is not an interrogation within the meaning of Miranda \"); United States v. Hidalgo, 7 F.3d 1566, 1568 (11th Cir.1993) (holding that consent to search obtained after defendant invoked right to remain silent is not a self-incriminating statement because it is neither testimonial nor communicative); United States v. Smith, 3 F.3d 1088, 1098 (7th Cir.1993) (\"We have held that a consent to search is not a self-incriminating statement and, therefore, a request to search does not amount to interrogation. This view comports with the view taken by every court of appeals to have addressed the issue.\u201d); United States v. Rodriguez-Garcia, 983 F.2d 1563, 1568 (10th Cir.1993) (stating that a request for consent to search is not custodial interrogation and holding that \"consent to search is not the type of incriminating statement which the Fifth Amendment was designed to address\u201d); Cody v. Solem, 755 F.2d 1323, 1330 (8th Cir.1985) (staling that Fifth Amendment right to counsel stems from privilege against self-incrimination and is not an independent right and that consent to search is not an incriminating statement because it is not testimonial, nor is physical evidence obtained pursuant to search); State v. Moralo, 619 N.W.2d 655, 662 (S.D.2000) (stating that \"[a]n officer's request that a suspect consent to a search, however, is not an interrogation or its functional equivalent\u201d and \"Morato\u2019s consent to search does not constitute an incriminating statement\u201d); State v. Crannell, 170 Vt. 387, 750 A.2d 1002, 1009 (2000) (concluding that the request for consent to search did not violate defendant's Fifth Amendment rights); contra United States v. Yan, 704 F.Supp. 1207, 1211-12 (S.D.N.Y.1989) (holding that a request for search constitutes an interrogation); State v. Britain, 156 Ariz. 384, 752 P.2d 37, 39 (Ariz.Ct.App.1988), (\"view[ing] a request for consent to search, after the [Fifth Amendment] right to counsel has been invoked, as interrogation and the serving of a search warrant as conduct 'reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response' \u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"contra","identifier":"752 P.2d 37, 39","parenthetical":"\"view[ing] a request for consent to search, after the [Fifth Amendment] right to counsel has been invoked, as interrogation and the serving of a search warrant as conduct 'reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response' \"","sentence":"See, e.g., United States v. Shlater, 85 F.3d 1251, 1256 (7th Cir.1996) (holding that a \"consent to search is not an interrogation within the meaning of Miranda \"); United States v. Hidalgo, 7 F.3d 1566, 1568 (11th Cir.1993) (holding that consent to search obtained after defendant invoked right to remain silent is not a self-incriminating statement because it is neither testimonial nor communicative); United States v. Smith, 3 F.3d 1088, 1098 (7th Cir.1993) (\"We have held that a consent to search is not a self-incriminating statement and, therefore, a request to search does not amount to interrogation. This view comports with the view taken by every court of appeals to have addressed the issue.\u201d); United States v. Rodriguez-Garcia, 983 F.2d 1563, 1568 (10th Cir.1993) (stating that a request for consent to search is not custodial interrogation and holding that \"consent to search is not the type of incriminating statement which the Fifth Amendment was designed to address\u201d); Cody v. Solem, 755 F.2d 1323, 1330 (8th Cir.1985) (staling that Fifth Amendment right to counsel stems from privilege against self-incrimination and is not an independent right and that consent to search is not an incriminating statement because it is not testimonial, nor is physical evidence obtained pursuant to search); State v. Moralo, 619 N.W.2d 655, 662 (S.D.2000) (stating that \"[a]n officer's request that a suspect consent to a search, however, is not an interrogation or its functional equivalent\u201d and \"Morato\u2019s consent to search does not constitute an incriminating statement\u201d); State v. Crannell, 170 Vt. 387, 750 A.2d 1002, 1009 (2000) (concluding that the request for consent to search did not violate defendant's Fifth Amendment rights); contra United States v. Yan, 704 F.Supp. 1207, 1211-12 (S.D.N.Y.1989) (holding that a request for search constitutes an interrogation); State v. Britain, 156 Ariz. 384, 752 P.2d 37, 39 (Ariz.Ct.App.1988), (\"view[ing] a request for consent to search, after the [Fifth Amendment] right to counsel has been invoked, as interrogation and the serving of a search warrant as conduct 'reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response' \u201d)."},"case_id":8390950,"label":"a"}
{"context":". Everett, 893 So.2d at 1286-87: We note that most courts that have considered this issue have held similarly.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"750 A.2d 1002, 1009","parenthetical":"concluding that the request for consent to search did not violate defendant's Fifth Amendment rights","sentence":"See, e.g., United States v. Shlater, 85 F.3d 1251, 1256 (7th Cir.1996) (holding that a \"consent to search is not an interrogation within the meaning of Miranda \"); United States v. Hidalgo, 7 F.3d 1566, 1568 (11th Cir.1993) (holding that consent to search obtained after defendant invoked right to remain silent is not a self-incriminating statement because it is neither testimonial nor communicative); United States v. Smith, 3 F.3d 1088, 1098 (7th Cir.1993) (\"We have held that a consent to search is not a self-incriminating statement and, therefore, a request to search does not amount to interrogation. This view comports with the view taken by every court of appeals to have addressed the issue.\u201d); United States v. Rodriguez-Garcia, 983 F.2d 1563, 1568 (10th Cir.1993) (stating that a request for consent to search is not custodial interrogation and holding that \"consent to search is not the type of incriminating statement which the Fifth Amendment was designed to address\u201d); Cody v. Solem, 755 F.2d 1323, 1330 (8th Cir.1985) (staling that Fifth Amendment right to counsel stems from privilege against self-incrimination and is not an independent right and that consent to search is not an incriminating statement because it is not testimonial, nor is physical evidence obtained pursuant to search); State v. Moralo, 619 N.W.2d 655, 662 (S.D.2000) (stating that \"[a]n officer's request that a suspect consent to a search, however, is not an interrogation or its functional equivalent\u201d and \"Morato\u2019s consent to search does not constitute an incriminating statement\u201d); State v. Crannell, 170 Vt. 387, 750 A.2d 1002, 1009 (2000) (concluding that the request for consent to search did not violate defendant's Fifth Amendment rights); contra United States v. Yan, 704 F.Supp. 1207, 1211-12 (S.D.N.Y.1989) (holding that a request for search constitutes an interrogation); State v. Britain, 156 Ariz. 384, 752 P.2d 37, 39 (Ariz.Ct.App.1988), (\"view[ing] a request for consent to search, after the [Fifth Amendment] right to counsel has been invoked, as interrogation and the serving of a search warrant as conduct 'reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response' \u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"contra","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"view[ing] a request for consent to search, after the [Fifth Amendment] right to counsel has been invoked, as interrogation and the serving of a search warrant as conduct 'reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response' \"","sentence":"See, e.g., United States v. Shlater, 85 F.3d 1251, 1256 (7th Cir.1996) (holding that a \"consent to search is not an interrogation within the meaning of Miranda \"); United States v. Hidalgo, 7 F.3d 1566, 1568 (11th Cir.1993) (holding that consent to search obtained after defendant invoked right to remain silent is not a self-incriminating statement because it is neither testimonial nor communicative); United States v. Smith, 3 F.3d 1088, 1098 (7th Cir.1993) (\"We have held that a consent to search is not a self-incriminating statement and, therefore, a request to search does not amount to interrogation. This view comports with the view taken by every court of appeals to have addressed the issue.\u201d); United States v. Rodriguez-Garcia, 983 F.2d 1563, 1568 (10th Cir.1993) (stating that a request for consent to search is not custodial interrogation and holding that \"consent to search is not the type of incriminating statement which the Fifth Amendment was designed to address\u201d); Cody v. Solem, 755 F.2d 1323, 1330 (8th Cir.1985) (staling that Fifth Amendment right to counsel stems from privilege against self-incrimination and is not an independent right and that consent to search is not an incriminating statement because it is not testimonial, nor is physical evidence obtained pursuant to search); State v. Moralo, 619 N.W.2d 655, 662 (S.D.2000) (stating that \"[a]n officer's request that a suspect consent to a search, however, is not an interrogation or its functional equivalent\u201d and \"Morato\u2019s consent to search does not constitute an incriminating statement\u201d); State v. Crannell, 170 Vt. 387, 750 A.2d 1002, 1009 (2000) (concluding that the request for consent to search did not violate defendant's Fifth Amendment rights); contra United States v. Yan, 704 F.Supp. 1207, 1211-12 (S.D.N.Y.1989) (holding that a request for search constitutes an interrogation); State v. Britain, 156 Ariz. 384, 752 P.2d 37, 39 (Ariz.Ct.App.1988), (\"view[ing] a request for consent to search, after the [Fifth Amendment] right to counsel has been invoked, as interrogation and the serving of a search warrant as conduct 'reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response' \u201d)."},"case_id":8390950,"label":"a"}
{"context":". Everett, 893 So.2d at 1286-87: We note that most courts that have considered this issue have held similarly.","citation_a":{"signal":"contra","identifier":"752 P.2d 37, 39","parenthetical":"\"view[ing] a request for consent to search, after the [Fifth Amendment] right to counsel has been invoked, as interrogation and the serving of a search warrant as conduct 'reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response' \"","sentence":"See, e.g., United States v. Shlater, 85 F.3d 1251, 1256 (7th Cir.1996) (holding that a \"consent to search is not an interrogation within the meaning of Miranda \"); United States v. Hidalgo, 7 F.3d 1566, 1568 (11th Cir.1993) (holding that consent to search obtained after defendant invoked right to remain silent is not a self-incriminating statement because it is neither testimonial nor communicative); United States v. Smith, 3 F.3d 1088, 1098 (7th Cir.1993) (\"We have held that a consent to search is not a self-incriminating statement and, therefore, a request to search does not amount to interrogation. This view comports with the view taken by every court of appeals to have addressed the issue.\u201d); United States v. Rodriguez-Garcia, 983 F.2d 1563, 1568 (10th Cir.1993) (stating that a request for consent to search is not custodial interrogation and holding that \"consent to search is not the type of incriminating statement which the Fifth Amendment was designed to address\u201d); Cody v. Solem, 755 F.2d 1323, 1330 (8th Cir.1985) (staling that Fifth Amendment right to counsel stems from privilege against self-incrimination and is not an independent right and that consent to search is not an incriminating statement because it is not testimonial, nor is physical evidence obtained pursuant to search); State v. Moralo, 619 N.W.2d 655, 662 (S.D.2000) (stating that \"[a]n officer's request that a suspect consent to a search, however, is not an interrogation or its functional equivalent\u201d and \"Morato\u2019s consent to search does not constitute an incriminating statement\u201d); State v. Crannell, 170 Vt. 387, 750 A.2d 1002, 1009 (2000) (concluding that the request for consent to search did not violate defendant's Fifth Amendment rights); contra United States v. Yan, 704 F.Supp. 1207, 1211-12 (S.D.N.Y.1989) (holding that a request for search constitutes an interrogation); State v. Britain, 156 Ariz. 384, 752 P.2d 37, 39 (Ariz.Ct.App.1988), (\"view[ing] a request for consent to search, after the [Fifth Amendment] right to counsel has been invoked, as interrogation and the serving of a search warrant as conduct 'reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response' \u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"750 A.2d 1002, 1009","parenthetical":"concluding that the request for consent to search did not violate defendant's Fifth Amendment rights","sentence":"See, e.g., United States v. Shlater, 85 F.3d 1251, 1256 (7th Cir.1996) (holding that a \"consent to search is not an interrogation within the meaning of Miranda \"); United States v. Hidalgo, 7 F.3d 1566, 1568 (11th Cir.1993) (holding that consent to search obtained after defendant invoked right to remain silent is not a self-incriminating statement because it is neither testimonial nor communicative); United States v. Smith, 3 F.3d 1088, 1098 (7th Cir.1993) (\"We have held that a consent to search is not a self-incriminating statement and, therefore, a request to search does not amount to interrogation. This view comports with the view taken by every court of appeals to have addressed the issue.\u201d); United States v. Rodriguez-Garcia, 983 F.2d 1563, 1568 (10th Cir.1993) (stating that a request for consent to search is not custodial interrogation and holding that \"consent to search is not the type of incriminating statement which the Fifth Amendment was designed to address\u201d); Cody v. Solem, 755 F.2d 1323, 1330 (8th Cir.1985) (staling that Fifth Amendment right to counsel stems from privilege against self-incrimination and is not an independent right and that consent to search is not an incriminating statement because it is not testimonial, nor is physical evidence obtained pursuant to search); State v. Moralo, 619 N.W.2d 655, 662 (S.D.2000) (stating that \"[a]n officer's request that a suspect consent to a search, however, is not an interrogation or its functional equivalent\u201d and \"Morato\u2019s consent to search does not constitute an incriminating statement\u201d); State v. Crannell, 170 Vt. 387, 750 A.2d 1002, 1009 (2000) (concluding that the request for consent to search did not violate defendant's Fifth Amendment rights); contra United States v. Yan, 704 F.Supp. 1207, 1211-12 (S.D.N.Y.1989) (holding that a request for search constitutes an interrogation); State v. Britain, 156 Ariz. 384, 752 P.2d 37, 39 (Ariz.Ct.App.1988), (\"view[ing] a request for consent to search, after the [Fifth Amendment] right to counsel has been invoked, as interrogation and the serving of a search warrant as conduct 'reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response' \u201d)."},"case_id":8390950,"label":"b"}
{"context":"However, where a statute establishes procedures for protection of substantive rights, such as section 77-23-5 does, violation of the statute cannot be dismissed as technical or ministerial in nature and suppression of the evidence gained from the challenged search is the appropriate remedy.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"warrant allowing nighttime search without any showing of reasonable necessity not invalid and suppression not required, when legislature had considered and declined to enact specific exclusionary rule for such circumstances","sentence":"But see State v. Brock, 294 Or. 15, 653 P.2d 543, 545-46 (1982) (warrant allowing nighttime search without any showing of reasonable necessity not invalid and suppression not required, when legislature had considered and declined to enact specific exclusionary rule for such circumstances)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"seizure of evidence not particularly described in the warrant required suppression","sentence":"Awaya v. State, 5 Haw.App. 547, 705 P.2d 54, 59 (seizure of evidence not particularly described in the warrant required suppression), cert. denied, 67 Haw. 685, 744 P.2d 781 (1985); Wiggin v. State, 755 P.2d 115, 117 (Okla.Crim.App.1988) (violation of statute similar to section 77-23-5 mandates suppression); State v. Coyle, 95 Wash.2d 1, 621 P.2d 1256, 1263 (1980) (suppression required for violation of notice requirement)."},"case_id":10379770,"label":"b"}
{"context":"However, where a statute establishes procedures for protection of substantive rights, such as section 77-23-5 does, violation of the statute cannot be dismissed as technical or ministerial in nature and suppression of the evidence gained from the challenged search is the appropriate remedy.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"seizure of evidence not particularly described in the warrant required suppression","sentence":"Awaya v. State, 5 Haw.App. 547, 705 P.2d 54, 59 (seizure of evidence not particularly described in the warrant required suppression), cert. denied, 67 Haw. 685, 744 P.2d 781 (1985); Wiggin v. State, 755 P.2d 115, 117 (Okla.Crim.App.1988) (violation of statute similar to section 77-23-5 mandates suppression); State v. Coyle, 95 Wash.2d 1, 621 P.2d 1256, 1263 (1980) (suppression required for violation of notice requirement)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"653 P.2d 543, 545-46","parenthetical":"warrant allowing nighttime search without any showing of reasonable necessity not invalid and suppression not required, when legislature had considered and declined to enact specific exclusionary rule for such circumstances","sentence":"But see State v. Brock, 294 Or. 15, 653 P.2d 543, 545-46 (1982) (warrant allowing nighttime search without any showing of reasonable necessity not invalid and suppression not required, when legislature had considered and declined to enact specific exclusionary rule for such circumstances)."},"case_id":10379770,"label":"a"}
{"context":"However, where a statute establishes procedures for protection of substantive rights, such as section 77-23-5 does, violation of the statute cannot be dismissed as technical or ministerial in nature and suppression of the evidence gained from the challenged search is the appropriate remedy.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"warrant allowing nighttime search without any showing of reasonable necessity not invalid and suppression not required, when legislature had considered and declined to enact specific exclusionary rule for such circumstances","sentence":"But see State v. Brock, 294 Or. 15, 653 P.2d 543, 545-46 (1982) (warrant allowing nighttime search without any showing of reasonable necessity not invalid and suppression not required, when legislature had considered and declined to enact specific exclusionary rule for such circumstances)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"705 P.2d 54, 59","parenthetical":"seizure of evidence not particularly described in the warrant required suppression","sentence":"Awaya v. State, 5 Haw.App. 547, 705 P.2d 54, 59 (seizure of evidence not particularly described in the warrant required suppression), cert. denied, 67 Haw. 685, 744 P.2d 781 (1985); Wiggin v. State, 755 P.2d 115, 117 (Okla.Crim.App.1988) (violation of statute similar to section 77-23-5 mandates suppression); State v. Coyle, 95 Wash.2d 1, 621 P.2d 1256, 1263 (1980) (suppression required for violation of notice requirement)."},"case_id":10379770,"label":"b"}
{"context":"However, where a statute establishes procedures for protection of substantive rights, such as section 77-23-5 does, violation of the statute cannot be dismissed as technical or ministerial in nature and suppression of the evidence gained from the challenged search is the appropriate remedy.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"653 P.2d 543, 545-46","parenthetical":"warrant allowing nighttime search without any showing of reasonable necessity not invalid and suppression not required, when legislature had considered and declined to enact specific exclusionary rule for such circumstances","sentence":"But see State v. Brock, 294 Or. 15, 653 P.2d 543, 545-46 (1982) (warrant allowing nighttime search without any showing of reasonable necessity not invalid and suppression not required, when legislature had considered and declined to enact specific exclusionary rule for such circumstances)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"705 P.2d 54, 59","parenthetical":"seizure of evidence not particularly described in the warrant required suppression","sentence":"Awaya v. State, 5 Haw.App. 547, 705 P.2d 54, 59 (seizure of evidence not particularly described in the warrant required suppression), cert. denied, 67 Haw. 685, 744 P.2d 781 (1985); Wiggin v. State, 755 P.2d 115, 117 (Okla.Crim.App.1988) (violation of statute similar to section 77-23-5 mandates suppression); State v. Coyle, 95 Wash.2d 1, 621 P.2d 1256, 1263 (1980) (suppression required for violation of notice requirement)."},"case_id":10379770,"label":"b"}
{"context":"However, where a statute establishes procedures for protection of substantive rights, such as section 77-23-5 does, violation of the statute cannot be dismissed as technical or ministerial in nature and suppression of the evidence gained from the challenged search is the appropriate remedy.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"warrant allowing nighttime search without any showing of reasonable necessity not invalid and suppression not required, when legislature had considered and declined to enact specific exclusionary rule for such circumstances","sentence":"But see State v. Brock, 294 Or. 15, 653 P.2d 543, 545-46 (1982) (warrant allowing nighttime search without any showing of reasonable necessity not invalid and suppression not required, when legislature had considered and declined to enact specific exclusionary rule for such circumstances)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"seizure of evidence not particularly described in the warrant required suppression","sentence":"Awaya v. State, 5 Haw.App. 547, 705 P.2d 54, 59 (seizure of evidence not particularly described in the warrant required suppression), cert. denied, 67 Haw. 685, 744 P.2d 781 (1985); Wiggin v. State, 755 P.2d 115, 117 (Okla.Crim.App.1988) (violation of statute similar to section 77-23-5 mandates suppression); State v. Coyle, 95 Wash.2d 1, 621 P.2d 1256, 1263 (1980) (suppression required for violation of notice requirement)."},"case_id":10379770,"label":"b"}
{"context":"However, where a statute establishes procedures for protection of substantive rights, such as section 77-23-5 does, violation of the statute cannot be dismissed as technical or ministerial in nature and suppression of the evidence gained from the challenged search is the appropriate remedy.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"653 P.2d 543, 545-46","parenthetical":"warrant allowing nighttime search without any showing of reasonable necessity not invalid and suppression not required, when legislature had considered and declined to enact specific exclusionary rule for such circumstances","sentence":"But see State v. Brock, 294 Or. 15, 653 P.2d 543, 545-46 (1982) (warrant allowing nighttime search without any showing of reasonable necessity not invalid and suppression not required, when legislature had considered and declined to enact specific exclusionary rule for such circumstances)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"seizure of evidence not particularly described in the warrant required suppression","sentence":"Awaya v. State, 5 Haw.App. 547, 705 P.2d 54, 59 (seizure of evidence not particularly described in the warrant required suppression), cert. denied, 67 Haw. 685, 744 P.2d 781 (1985); Wiggin v. State, 755 P.2d 115, 117 (Okla.Crim.App.1988) (violation of statute similar to section 77-23-5 mandates suppression); State v. Coyle, 95 Wash.2d 1, 621 P.2d 1256, 1263 (1980) (suppression required for violation of notice requirement)."},"case_id":10379770,"label":"b"}
{"context":"However, where a statute establishes procedures for protection of substantive rights, such as section 77-23-5 does, violation of the statute cannot be dismissed as technical or ministerial in nature and suppression of the evidence gained from the challenged search is the appropriate remedy.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"warrant allowing nighttime search without any showing of reasonable necessity not invalid and suppression not required, when legislature had considered and declined to enact specific exclusionary rule for such circumstances","sentence":"But see State v. Brock, 294 Or. 15, 653 P.2d 543, 545-46 (1982) (warrant allowing nighttime search without any showing of reasonable necessity not invalid and suppression not required, when legislature had considered and declined to enact specific exclusionary rule for such circumstances)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"seizure of evidence not particularly described in the warrant required suppression","sentence":"Awaya v. State, 5 Haw.App. 547, 705 P.2d 54, 59 (seizure of evidence not particularly described in the warrant required suppression), cert. denied, 67 Haw. 685, 744 P.2d 781 (1985); Wiggin v. State, 755 P.2d 115, 117 (Okla.Crim.App.1988) (violation of statute similar to section 77-23-5 mandates suppression); State v. Coyle, 95 Wash.2d 1, 621 P.2d 1256, 1263 (1980) (suppression required for violation of notice requirement)."},"case_id":10379770,"label":"b"}
{"context":"However, where a statute establishes procedures for protection of substantive rights, such as section 77-23-5 does, violation of the statute cannot be dismissed as technical or ministerial in nature and suppression of the evidence gained from the challenged search is the appropriate remedy.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"653 P.2d 543, 545-46","parenthetical":"warrant allowing nighttime search without any showing of reasonable necessity not invalid and suppression not required, when legislature had considered and declined to enact specific exclusionary rule for such circumstances","sentence":"But see State v. Brock, 294 Or. 15, 653 P.2d 543, 545-46 (1982) (warrant allowing nighttime search without any showing of reasonable necessity not invalid and suppression not required, when legislature had considered and declined to enact specific exclusionary rule for such circumstances)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"seizure of evidence not particularly described in the warrant required suppression","sentence":"Awaya v. State, 5 Haw.App. 547, 705 P.2d 54, 59 (seizure of evidence not particularly described in the warrant required suppression), cert. denied, 67 Haw. 685, 744 P.2d 781 (1985); Wiggin v. State, 755 P.2d 115, 117 (Okla.Crim.App.1988) (violation of statute similar to section 77-23-5 mandates suppression); State v. Coyle, 95 Wash.2d 1, 621 P.2d 1256, 1263 (1980) (suppression required for violation of notice requirement)."},"case_id":10379770,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Nonetheless, the presence of obstructions or gates, open or closed, unlocked or locked, has been treated as only one of the many factors a trial court may consider when determining if the public use was continuous. Indeed, the Utah Supreme Court has declined opportunities to rely solely on the presence of a gate, locked or unlocked, to affirm trial courts' determinations that roads have not been dedicated to the public.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"weighing presence of gates, locked and unlocked, along with signage, lack of governmental maintenance, nature of use, and character of users in finding road was not abandoned","sentence":"See Thomson v. Condas, 27 Utah 2d 129, 493 P.2d 639, 640-41 (1972) (weighing presence of gates, locked and unlocked, along with signage, lack of governmental maintenance, nature of use, and character of users in finding road was not abandoned); Gillmor v. Carter, 15 Utah 2d 280, 391 P.2d 426, 427 (1964) (relying on evidence of gates, as well as signs, grants of permission, past litigation initiated by the property owners alleging private road,; and contracts for exclusive use); cf. Wilhelm v. Pine Meadows Estates, Inc., 2001 UT App 285U, No. 20000559-CA, 2001 WL 1178570, at *1-*2, 2001 Utah App. LEXIS 181, at *3-*4 (Oct. 4, 2001) (per curiam) (noting that the owners had blocked access to the road several times but also weighing character of users and nature of use); Campbell, 962 P.2d at 809 (examining evidence of locked gate and testimony by members of the public who had been unable to use the road because of the gate)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"962 P.2d 809, 809","parenthetical":"examining evidence of locked gate and testimony by members of the public who had been unable to use the road because of the gate","sentence":"See Thomson v. Condas, 27 Utah 2d 129, 493 P.2d 639, 640-41 (1972) (weighing presence of gates, locked and unlocked, along with signage, lack of governmental maintenance, nature of use, and character of users in finding road was not abandoned); Gillmor v. Carter, 15 Utah 2d 280, 391 P.2d 426, 427 (1964) (relying on evidence of gates, as well as signs, grants of permission, past litigation initiated by the property owners alleging private road,; and contracts for exclusive use); cf. Wilhelm v. Pine Meadows Estates, Inc., 2001 UT App 285U, No. 20000559-CA, 2001 WL 1178570, at *1-*2, 2001 Utah App. LEXIS 181, at *3-*4 (Oct. 4, 2001) (per curiam) (noting that the owners had blocked access to the road several times but also weighing character of users and nature of use); Campbell, 962 P.2d at 809 (examining evidence of locked gate and testimony by members of the public who had been unable to use the road because of the gate)."},"case_id":8323156,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Nonetheless, the presence of obstructions or gates, open or closed, unlocked or locked, has been treated as only one of the many factors a trial court may consider when determining if the public use was continuous. Indeed, the Utah Supreme Court has declined opportunities to rely solely on the presence of a gate, locked or unlocked, to affirm trial courts' determinations that roads have not been dedicated to the public.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"962 P.2d 809, 809","parenthetical":"examining evidence of locked gate and testimony by members of the public who had been unable to use the road because of the gate","sentence":"See Thomson v. Condas, 27 Utah 2d 129, 493 P.2d 639, 640-41 (1972) (weighing presence of gates, locked and unlocked, along with signage, lack of governmental maintenance, nature of use, and character of users in finding road was not abandoned); Gillmor v. Carter, 15 Utah 2d 280, 391 P.2d 426, 427 (1964) (relying on evidence of gates, as well as signs, grants of permission, past litigation initiated by the property owners alleging private road,; and contracts for exclusive use); cf. Wilhelm v. Pine Meadows Estates, Inc., 2001 UT App 285U, No. 20000559-CA, 2001 WL 1178570, at *1-*2, 2001 Utah App. LEXIS 181, at *3-*4 (Oct. 4, 2001) (per curiam) (noting that the owners had blocked access to the road several times but also weighing character of users and nature of use); Campbell, 962 P.2d at 809 (examining evidence of locked gate and testimony by members of the public who had been unable to use the road because of the gate)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"493 P.2d 639, 640-41","parenthetical":"weighing presence of gates, locked and unlocked, along with signage, lack of governmental maintenance, nature of use, and character of users in finding road was not abandoned","sentence":"See Thomson v. Condas, 27 Utah 2d 129, 493 P.2d 639, 640-41 (1972) (weighing presence of gates, locked and unlocked, along with signage, lack of governmental maintenance, nature of use, and character of users in finding road was not abandoned); Gillmor v. Carter, 15 Utah 2d 280, 391 P.2d 426, 427 (1964) (relying on evidence of gates, as well as signs, grants of permission, past litigation initiated by the property owners alleging private road,; and contracts for exclusive use); cf. Wilhelm v. Pine Meadows Estates, Inc., 2001 UT App 285U, No. 20000559-CA, 2001 WL 1178570, at *1-*2, 2001 Utah App. LEXIS 181, at *3-*4 (Oct. 4, 2001) (per curiam) (noting that the owners had blocked access to the road several times but also weighing character of users and nature of use); Campbell, 962 P.2d at 809 (examining evidence of locked gate and testimony by members of the public who had been unable to use the road because of the gate)."},"case_id":8323156,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Thus, violations of the covenant prohibiting mobile homes exist on 1.75% of the lots in Pebble Beach. In support of its argument that this is an insufficient number of violations to constitute a waiver of the restrictive covenant, PBPOA presents a relative statistical analysis of cases where the courts have found no waiver of a restrictive covenants.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"728 S.W.2d 43, 43","parenthetical":"holding, on allegation of separate violation, that eight violations of particular covenant in total of 56 properties (14.28%) supported finding of abandonment of restrictive covenant","sentence":"But see Tanglewood Homes Ass\u2019n, 728 S.W.2d at 43 (holding, on allegation of separate violation, that eight violations of particular covenant in total of 56 properties (14.28%) supported finding of abandonment of restrictive covenant)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"737 S.W.2d 595, 595","parenthetical":"no waiver where 11 of 2,460 properties (4%) violated covenants","sentence":"See Dempsey, 737 S.W.2d at 595(no waiver where 11 of 2,460 properties (4%) violated covenants); Tanglewood Homes Assoc. v. Henke, 728 S.W.2d 39, 44 (Tex.App.\u2014Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.)(no waiver where five violations existed in total of 560 properties (.89%)); New Jerusalem Baptist Church, 598 S.W.2d at 669 (finding no waiver where four violations in total of 169 properties (2.3%) existed); Underwood v. Webb, 544 S.W.2d 187, 190 (Tex.Civ.App.\u2014Waco 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (waiver did not exist when two violations existed in total of 493 properties (.4%))."},"case_id":11555559,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Thus, violations of the covenant prohibiting mobile homes exist on 1.75% of the lots in Pebble Beach. In support of its argument that this is an insufficient number of violations to constitute a waiver of the restrictive covenant, PBPOA presents a relative statistical analysis of cases where the courts have found no waiver of a restrictive covenants.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"728 S.W.2d 43, 43","parenthetical":"holding, on allegation of separate violation, that eight violations of particular covenant in total of 56 properties (14.28%) supported finding of abandonment of restrictive covenant","sentence":"But see Tanglewood Homes Ass\u2019n, 728 S.W.2d at 43 (holding, on allegation of separate violation, that eight violations of particular covenant in total of 56 properties (14.28%) supported finding of abandonment of restrictive covenant)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"598 S.W.2d 669, 669","parenthetical":"finding no waiver where four violations in total of 169 properties (2.3%) existed","sentence":"See Dempsey, 737 S.W.2d at 595(no waiver where 11 of 2,460 properties (4%) violated covenants); Tanglewood Homes Assoc. v. Henke, 728 S.W.2d 39, 44 (Tex.App.\u2014Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.)(no waiver where five violations existed in total of 560 properties (.89%)); New Jerusalem Baptist Church, 598 S.W.2d at 669 (finding no waiver where four violations in total of 169 properties (2.3%) existed); Underwood v. Webb, 544 S.W.2d 187, 190 (Tex.Civ.App.\u2014Waco 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (waiver did not exist when two violations existed in total of 493 properties (.4%))."},"case_id":11555559,"label":"b"}
{"context":". In this regard, we distinguish the cases in which the denial of an expert psychiatrist was deemed a due process violation. Those cases recognized that when the defendant's mental state is an important issue and is seriously in question, and when obtaining an accurate assessment of that mental state is uniquely dependant on psychological expertise, an expert psychiatrist indeed becomes a basic and integral tool to presenting an adequate defense.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"963 F.2d 308, 314","parenthetical":"finding due process violation where denying expert on battered women's syndrome prevented defendant from presenting information on specific intent, an essential element of the crime","sentence":"See, e.g., Ake, 470 U.S. at 74, 80-83, 105 S.Ct. at 1091-92, 1094-96 (holding that due process entitled indigent defendant to psychiatrist to present insanity defense and cross-examine state psychiatrists because of the tremendous reliance jurors place on psychiatric testimony where \"there is often no single, accurate psychiatric conclusion on legal insanity\u201d); United States v. Sloan, 776 F.2d 926, 928-29 (10th Cir.1985) (holding that due process entitled indigent defendant to psychiatrist to present defense of lack of capacity to form specific intent and to cross-examine government\u2019s psychiatrist on this point); see also Dunn v. Roberts, 963 F.2d 308, 314 (10th Cir.1992) (finding due process violation where denying expert on battered women's syndrome prevented defendant from presenting information on specific intent, an essential element of the crime)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"470 U.S. 74, 74, 80-83","parenthetical":"holding that due process entitled indigent defendant to psychiatrist to present insanity defense and cross-examine state psychiatrists because of the tremendous reliance jurors place on psychiatric testimony where \"there is often no single, accurate psychiatric conclusion on legal insanity\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Ake, 470 U.S. at 74, 80-83, 105 S.Ct. at 1091-92, 1094-96 (holding that due process entitled indigent defendant to psychiatrist to present insanity defense and cross-examine state psychiatrists because of the tremendous reliance jurors place on psychiatric testimony where \"there is often no single, accurate psychiatric conclusion on legal insanity\u201d); United States v. Sloan, 776 F.2d 926, 928-29 (10th Cir.1985) (holding that due process entitled indigent defendant to psychiatrist to present defense of lack of capacity to form specific intent and to cross-examine government\u2019s psychiatrist on this point); see also Dunn v. Roberts, 963 F.2d 308, 314 (10th Cir.1992) (finding due process violation where denying expert on battered women's syndrome prevented defendant from presenting information on specific intent, an essential element of the crime)."},"case_id":7416035,"label":"b"}
{"context":". In this regard, we distinguish the cases in which the denial of an expert psychiatrist was deemed a due process violation. Those cases recognized that when the defendant's mental state is an important issue and is seriously in question, and when obtaining an accurate assessment of that mental state is uniquely dependant on psychological expertise, an expert psychiatrist indeed becomes a basic and integral tool to presenting an adequate defense.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"105 S.Ct. 1091, 1091-92, 1094-96","parenthetical":"holding that due process entitled indigent defendant to psychiatrist to present insanity defense and cross-examine state psychiatrists because of the tremendous reliance jurors place on psychiatric testimony where \"there is often no single, accurate psychiatric conclusion on legal insanity\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Ake, 470 U.S. at 74, 80-83, 105 S.Ct. at 1091-92, 1094-96 (holding that due process entitled indigent defendant to psychiatrist to present insanity defense and cross-examine state psychiatrists because of the tremendous reliance jurors place on psychiatric testimony where \"there is often no single, accurate psychiatric conclusion on legal insanity\u201d); United States v. Sloan, 776 F.2d 926, 928-29 (10th Cir.1985) (holding that due process entitled indigent defendant to psychiatrist to present defense of lack of capacity to form specific intent and to cross-examine government\u2019s psychiatrist on this point); see also Dunn v. Roberts, 963 F.2d 308, 314 (10th Cir.1992) (finding due process violation where denying expert on battered women's syndrome prevented defendant from presenting information on specific intent, an essential element of the crime)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"963 F.2d 308, 314","parenthetical":"finding due process violation where denying expert on battered women's syndrome prevented defendant from presenting information on specific intent, an essential element of the crime","sentence":"See, e.g., Ake, 470 U.S. at 74, 80-83, 105 S.Ct. at 1091-92, 1094-96 (holding that due process entitled indigent defendant to psychiatrist to present insanity defense and cross-examine state psychiatrists because of the tremendous reliance jurors place on psychiatric testimony where \"there is often no single, accurate psychiatric conclusion on legal insanity\u201d); United States v. Sloan, 776 F.2d 926, 928-29 (10th Cir.1985) (holding that due process entitled indigent defendant to psychiatrist to present defense of lack of capacity to form specific intent and to cross-examine government\u2019s psychiatrist on this point); see also Dunn v. Roberts, 963 F.2d 308, 314 (10th Cir.1992) (finding due process violation where denying expert on battered women's syndrome prevented defendant from presenting information on specific intent, an essential element of the crime)."},"case_id":7416035,"label":"a"}
{"context":". In this regard, we distinguish the cases in which the denial of an expert psychiatrist was deemed a due process violation. Those cases recognized that when the defendant's mental state is an important issue and is seriously in question, and when obtaining an accurate assessment of that mental state is uniquely dependant on psychological expertise, an expert psychiatrist indeed becomes a basic and integral tool to presenting an adequate defense.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"776 F.2d 926, 928-29","parenthetical":"holding that due process entitled indigent defendant to psychiatrist to present defense of lack of capacity to form specific intent and to cross-examine government's psychiatrist on this point","sentence":"See, e.g., Ake, 470 U.S. at 74, 80-83, 105 S.Ct. at 1091-92, 1094-96 (holding that due process entitled indigent defendant to psychiatrist to present insanity defense and cross-examine state psychiatrists because of the tremendous reliance jurors place on psychiatric testimony where \"there is often no single, accurate psychiatric conclusion on legal insanity\u201d); United States v. Sloan, 776 F.2d 926, 928-29 (10th Cir.1985) (holding that due process entitled indigent defendant to psychiatrist to present defense of lack of capacity to form specific intent and to cross-examine government\u2019s psychiatrist on this point); see also Dunn v. Roberts, 963 F.2d 308, 314 (10th Cir.1992) (finding due process violation where denying expert on battered women's syndrome prevented defendant from presenting information on specific intent, an essential element of the crime)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"963 F.2d 308, 314","parenthetical":"finding due process violation where denying expert on battered women's syndrome prevented defendant from presenting information on specific intent, an essential element of the crime","sentence":"See, e.g., Ake, 470 U.S. at 74, 80-83, 105 S.Ct. at 1091-92, 1094-96 (holding that due process entitled indigent defendant to psychiatrist to present insanity defense and cross-examine state psychiatrists because of the tremendous reliance jurors place on psychiatric testimony where \"there is often no single, accurate psychiatric conclusion on legal insanity\u201d); United States v. Sloan, 776 F.2d 926, 928-29 (10th Cir.1985) (holding that due process entitled indigent defendant to psychiatrist to present defense of lack of capacity to form specific intent and to cross-examine government\u2019s psychiatrist on this point); see also Dunn v. Roberts, 963 F.2d 308, 314 (10th Cir.1992) (finding due process violation where denying expert on battered women's syndrome prevented defendant from presenting information on specific intent, an essential element of the crime)."},"case_id":7416035,"label":"a"}
{"context":"First, she inferred that Tommasetti's pain was not as all-disabling as he reported in light of the fact that he did not seek an aggressive treatment program and did not seek an alternative or more-tailored treatment program after he stopped taking an effective medication due to mild side effects. This is a permissible inference.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"172 F.3d 1111, 1114","parenthetical":"rejecting subjective pain complaints where petitioner's \"claim that she experienced pain approaching the highest level imaginable was inconsistent with the 'minimal, conservative treatment' that she received\"","sentence":"See Parra v. Astrue, 481 F.3d 742, 750-51 (9th Cir.2007) (stating that \u201cevidence of \u2018conservative treatment\u2019 is sufficient to discount a claimant\u2019s testimony regarding severity of an impairment\u201d); see also Meanel v. Apfel, 172 F.3d 1111, 1114 (9th Cir.1999) (rejecting subjective pain complaints where petitioner\u2019s \u201cclaim that she experienced pain approaching the highest level imaginable was inconsistent with the \u2018minimal, conservative treatment\u2019 that she received\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"481 F.3d 742, 750-51","parenthetical":"stating that \"evidence of 'conservative treatment' is sufficient to discount a claimant's testimony regarding severity of an impairment\"","sentence":"See Parra v. Astrue, 481 F.3d 742, 750-51 (9th Cir.2007) (stating that \u201cevidence of \u2018conservative treatment\u2019 is sufficient to discount a claimant\u2019s testimony regarding severity of an impairment\u201d); see also Meanel v. Apfel, 172 F.3d 1111, 1114 (9th Cir.1999) (rejecting subjective pain complaints where petitioner\u2019s \u201cclaim that she experienced pain approaching the highest level imaginable was inconsistent with the \u2018minimal, conservative treatment\u2019 that she received\u201d)."},"case_id":4039857,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Yassin's motion to vacate summary judgment and granting the government's motion to enforce the judgment, because Yassin failed to establish that the judgment was obtained through fraud, and did not explain why he could not have discovered this alleged fraud pri- or to the judgment.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"523 F.3d 1025, 1031","parenthetical":"reviewing for an abuse of discretion the denial of a motion to enforce a judgment","sentence":"See Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(3); Casey, 362 F.3d at 1260 (to prevail on a Rule 60(b)(3) motion the moving party must prove that the judgment was obtained through fraud, and that the fraud was not discoverable by due diligence before or during proceedings); see also Cal. Dep\u2019t of Social Services v. Leavitt, 523 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir.2008) (reviewing for an abuse of discretion the denial of a motion to enforce a judgment)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"362 F.3d 1260, 1260","parenthetical":"to prevail on a Rule 60(b)(3) motion the moving party must prove that the judgment was obtained through fraud, and that the fraud was not discoverable by due diligence before or during proceedings","sentence":"See Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(3); Casey, 362 F.3d at 1260 (to prevail on a Rule 60(b)(3) motion the moving party must prove that the judgment was obtained through fraud, and that the fraud was not discoverable by due diligence before or during proceedings); see also Cal. Dep\u2019t of Social Services v. Leavitt, 523 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir.2008) (reviewing for an abuse of discretion the denial of a motion to enforce a judgment)."},"case_id":4123574,"label":"b"}
{"context":". An example of the additional type of bias evidence that is required would be evidence that the hearing examiner stood to benefit financially from the result that was reached.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"rejecting contention that statute earmarking civil and criminal fines for judicial building fund created improper incentive for levy of fines","sentence":"See Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 93 S.Ct. 80, 34 L.Ed.2d 267 (1972) (holding that mayor whose village revenues were comprised of between one-third to one-half of levied traffic fines could not be impartial hearing examiner); cf. Commonwealth of N. Mariana Islands v. Kaipat, 94 F.3d 574 (9th Cir.1996) (rejecting contention that statute earmarking civil and criminal fines for judicial building fund created improper incentive for levy of fines). Besides a direct pecuniary interest in the outcome of the proceedings, another basis for disqualifying a hearing officer exists when the decision maker has strong institutional responsibilities requiring him or her to rule in the institution\u2019s favor."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that mayor whose village revenues were comprised of between one-third to one-half of levied traffic fines could not be impartial hearing examiner","sentence":"See Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 93 S.Ct. 80, 34 L.Ed.2d 267 (1972) (holding that mayor whose village revenues were comprised of between one-third to one-half of levied traffic fines could not be impartial hearing examiner); cf. Commonwealth of N. Mariana Islands v. Kaipat, 94 F.3d 574 (9th Cir.1996) (rejecting contention that statute earmarking civil and criminal fines for judicial building fund created improper incentive for levy of fines). Besides a direct pecuniary interest in the outcome of the proceedings, another basis for disqualifying a hearing officer exists when the decision maker has strong institutional responsibilities requiring him or her to rule in the institution\u2019s favor."},"case_id":9159486,"label":"b"}
{"context":". An example of the additional type of bias evidence that is required would be evidence that the hearing examiner stood to benefit financially from the result that was reached.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that mayor whose village revenues were comprised of between one-third to one-half of levied traffic fines could not be impartial hearing examiner","sentence":"See Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 93 S.Ct. 80, 34 L.Ed.2d 267 (1972) (holding that mayor whose village revenues were comprised of between one-third to one-half of levied traffic fines could not be impartial hearing examiner); cf. Commonwealth of N. Mariana Islands v. Kaipat, 94 F.3d 574 (9th Cir.1996) (rejecting contention that statute earmarking civil and criminal fines for judicial building fund created improper incentive for levy of fines). Besides a direct pecuniary interest in the outcome of the proceedings, another basis for disqualifying a hearing officer exists when the decision maker has strong institutional responsibilities requiring him or her to rule in the institution\u2019s favor."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"rejecting contention that statute earmarking civil and criminal fines for judicial building fund created improper incentive for levy of fines","sentence":"See Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 93 S.Ct. 80, 34 L.Ed.2d 267 (1972) (holding that mayor whose village revenues were comprised of between one-third to one-half of levied traffic fines could not be impartial hearing examiner); cf. Commonwealth of N. Mariana Islands v. Kaipat, 94 F.3d 574 (9th Cir.1996) (rejecting contention that statute earmarking civil and criminal fines for judicial building fund created improper incentive for levy of fines). Besides a direct pecuniary interest in the outcome of the proceedings, another basis for disqualifying a hearing officer exists when the decision maker has strong institutional responsibilities requiring him or her to rule in the institution\u2019s favor."},"case_id":9159486,"label":"a"}
{"context":". An example of the additional type of bias evidence that is required would be evidence that the hearing examiner stood to benefit financially from the result that was reached.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that mayor whose village revenues were comprised of between one-third to one-half of levied traffic fines could not be impartial hearing examiner","sentence":"See Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 93 S.Ct. 80, 34 L.Ed.2d 267 (1972) (holding that mayor whose village revenues were comprised of between one-third to one-half of levied traffic fines could not be impartial hearing examiner); cf. Commonwealth of N. Mariana Islands v. Kaipat, 94 F.3d 574 (9th Cir.1996) (rejecting contention that statute earmarking civil and criminal fines for judicial building fund created improper incentive for levy of fines). Besides a direct pecuniary interest in the outcome of the proceedings, another basis for disqualifying a hearing officer exists when the decision maker has strong institutional responsibilities requiring him or her to rule in the institution\u2019s favor."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"rejecting contention that statute earmarking civil and criminal fines for judicial building fund created improper incentive for levy of fines","sentence":"See Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 93 S.Ct. 80, 34 L.Ed.2d 267 (1972) (holding that mayor whose village revenues were comprised of between one-third to one-half of levied traffic fines could not be impartial hearing examiner); cf. Commonwealth of N. Mariana Islands v. Kaipat, 94 F.3d 574 (9th Cir.1996) (rejecting contention that statute earmarking civil and criminal fines for judicial building fund created improper incentive for levy of fines). Besides a direct pecuniary interest in the outcome of the proceedings, another basis for disqualifying a hearing officer exists when the decision maker has strong institutional responsibilities requiring him or her to rule in the institution\u2019s favor."},"case_id":9159486,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Even when the Government has discretion to act, it may not act arbitrarily or irrationally or base its actions on an unconstitutional motive.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"504 U.S. 181, 186-87","parenthetical":"holding that government-motion requirement of SS 5K1.1 does not impose duty on Government but that Government decision not to move must be related to legitimate governmental end","sentence":"Wade v. United States, 504 U.S. 181, 186-87, 112 S.Ct. 1840, 118 L.Ed.2d 524 (1992) (holding that government-motion requirement of \u00a7 5K1.1 does not impose duty on Government but that Government decision not to move must be related to legitimate governmental end); see also United States v. Solis, 169 F.3d 224, 226 (5th Cir.1999) (government motion for downward departure under \u00a7 5C1.2 for defendant who provides substantial assistance in investigation cannot be withheld for unconstitutional motive)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"169 F.3d 224, 226","parenthetical":"government motion for downward departure under SS 5C1.2 for defendant who provides substantial assistance in investigation cannot be withheld for unconstitutional motive","sentence":"Wade v. United States, 504 U.S. 181, 186-87, 112 S.Ct. 1840, 118 L.Ed.2d 524 (1992) (holding that government-motion requirement of \u00a7 5K1.1 does not impose duty on Government but that Government decision not to move must be related to legitimate governmental end); see also United States v. Solis, 169 F.3d 224, 226 (5th Cir.1999) (government motion for downward departure under \u00a7 5C1.2 for defendant who provides substantial assistance in investigation cannot be withheld for unconstitutional motive)."},"case_id":3645793,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Even when the Government has discretion to act, it may not act arbitrarily or irrationally or base its actions on an unconstitutional motive.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"169 F.3d 224, 226","parenthetical":"government motion for downward departure under SS 5C1.2 for defendant who provides substantial assistance in investigation cannot be withheld for unconstitutional motive","sentence":"Wade v. United States, 504 U.S. 181, 186-87, 112 S.Ct. 1840, 118 L.Ed.2d 524 (1992) (holding that government-motion requirement of \u00a7 5K1.1 does not impose duty on Government but that Government decision not to move must be related to legitimate governmental end); see also United States v. Solis, 169 F.3d 224, 226 (5th Cir.1999) (government motion for downward departure under \u00a7 5C1.2 for defendant who provides substantial assistance in investigation cannot be withheld for unconstitutional motive)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that government-motion requirement of SS 5K1.1 does not impose duty on Government but that Government decision not to move must be related to legitimate governmental end","sentence":"Wade v. United States, 504 U.S. 181, 186-87, 112 S.Ct. 1840, 118 L.Ed.2d 524 (1992) (holding that government-motion requirement of \u00a7 5K1.1 does not impose duty on Government but that Government decision not to move must be related to legitimate governmental end); see also United States v. Solis, 169 F.3d 224, 226 (5th Cir.1999) (government motion for downward departure under \u00a7 5C1.2 for defendant who provides substantial assistance in investigation cannot be withheld for unconstitutional motive)."},"case_id":3645793,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Even when the Government has discretion to act, it may not act arbitrarily or irrationally or base its actions on an unconstitutional motive.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"169 F.3d 224, 226","parenthetical":"government motion for downward departure under SS 5C1.2 for defendant who provides substantial assistance in investigation cannot be withheld for unconstitutional motive","sentence":"Wade v. United States, 504 U.S. 181, 186-87, 112 S.Ct. 1840, 118 L.Ed.2d 524 (1992) (holding that government-motion requirement of \u00a7 5K1.1 does not impose duty on Government but that Government decision not to move must be related to legitimate governmental end); see also United States v. Solis, 169 F.3d 224, 226 (5th Cir.1999) (government motion for downward departure under \u00a7 5C1.2 for defendant who provides substantial assistance in investigation cannot be withheld for unconstitutional motive)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that government-motion requirement of SS 5K1.1 does not impose duty on Government but that Government decision not to move must be related to legitimate governmental end","sentence":"Wade v. United States, 504 U.S. 181, 186-87, 112 S.Ct. 1840, 118 L.Ed.2d 524 (1992) (holding that government-motion requirement of \u00a7 5K1.1 does not impose duty on Government but that Government decision not to move must be related to legitimate governmental end); see also United States v. Solis, 169 F.3d 224, 226 (5th Cir.1999) (government motion for downward departure under \u00a7 5C1.2 for defendant who provides substantial assistance in investigation cannot be withheld for unconstitutional motive)."},"case_id":3645793,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Pis.' Opp'n at 27. These policies and procedures are not D.C. law and do not create liberty interests.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"580 A.2d 127, 133","parenthetical":"\"Agency protocols and procedures, like agency manuals, do not have the force or effect of a statute or an administrative regulation.\"","sentence":"Wanzer v. Dist. of Columbia, 580 A.2d 127, 133 (D.C.1990) (\u201cAgency protocols and procedures, like agency manuals, do not have the force or effect of a statute or an administrative regulation.\u201d); see also Abney v. Dist. of Columbia, 580 A.2d 1036, 1041 (D.C.1990) (finding that an MPD General Order did not carry the force of law)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"580 A.2d 1036, 1041","parenthetical":"finding that an MPD General Order did not carry the force of law","sentence":"Wanzer v. Dist. of Columbia, 580 A.2d 127, 133 (D.C.1990) (\u201cAgency protocols and procedures, like agency manuals, do not have the force or effect of a statute or an administrative regulation.\u201d); see also Abney v. Dist. of Columbia, 580 A.2d 1036, 1041 (D.C.1990) (finding that an MPD General Order did not carry the force of law)."},"case_id":5878408,"label":"a"}
{"context":"dence therefore does not support the BIA's reliance on this omission to find Ghebremedhin incredible, because the record does not support the agency's rejection of Ghebremedhin's explanation for the omission.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"403 F.3d 1081, 1087-91","parenthetical":"stating that without officer testimony or detailed notes from the asylum interview, an Assessment to Refer provides insufficient evidence to support an adverse credibility determination","sentence":"See Singh v. Gonzales, 403 F.3d 1081, 1087-91 (9th Cir.2005) (stating that without officer testimony or detailed notes from the asylum interview, an Assessment to Refer provides insufficient evidence to support an adverse credibility determination); see also Campos-Sanchez v. INS, 164 F.3d 448, 450 (9th Cir.1999) (holding the BIA must address in a reasoned manner the explanations that a petitioner offers for perceived inconsistencies)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"164 F.3d 448, 450","parenthetical":"holding the BIA must address in a reasoned manner the explanations that a petitioner offers for perceived inconsistencies","sentence":"See Singh v. Gonzales, 403 F.3d 1081, 1087-91 (9th Cir.2005) (stating that without officer testimony or detailed notes from the asylum interview, an Assessment to Refer provides insufficient evidence to support an adverse credibility determination); see also Campos-Sanchez v. INS, 164 F.3d 448, 450 (9th Cir.1999) (holding the BIA must address in a reasoned manner the explanations that a petitioner offers for perceived inconsistencies)."},"case_id":3904032,"label":"a"}
{"context":"On the contrary, given the clear language of the rule and its underlying rationale, courts consistently require substantial contemporaneity. Indeed, we have previously expressed skepticism that a statement made some 40 minutes after the fact could be properly admitted as a present-sense impression.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"754 F.2d 512, 512","parenthetical":"concluding it was \"not necessarily an abuse of discretion\" to admit statement made \"several minutes\" after the fact as excited utterance, but noting \"courts have recognized that the length of time separating the event from the statement [for admission as an excited utterance] may be considerably longer than for statements qualifying under the present sense impression exception of Rule 803(1","sentence":"Mitchell, 145 F.3d at 577 (where robbery occurred between 9:00am and 9:15am and notes were found in getaway car a mile from the crime scene at approximately 10:00am, intervening lapse was \u201cprobably too long for applicability of the present-sense impression ... which requires the statement to be made virtually contemporaneously with the event being perceived\u201d); see also Miller, 754 F.2d at 512 (concluding it was \u201cnot necessarily an abuse of discretion\u201d to admit statement made \u201cseveral minutes\u201d after the fact as excited utterance, but noting \u201ccourts have recognized that the length of time separating the event from the statement [for admission as an excited utterance] may be considerably longer than for statements qualifying under the present sense impression exception of Rule 803(1)\u201d) (emphasis added)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"145 F.3d 577, 577","parenthetical":"where robbery occurred between 9:00am and 9:15am and notes were found in getaway car a mile from the crime scene at approximately 10:00am, intervening lapse was \"probably too long for applicability of the present-sense impression ... which requires the statement to be made virtually contemporaneously with the event being perceived\"","sentence":"Mitchell, 145 F.3d at 577 (where robbery occurred between 9:00am and 9:15am and notes were found in getaway car a mile from the crime scene at approximately 10:00am, intervening lapse was \u201cprobably too long for applicability of the present-sense impression ... which requires the statement to be made virtually contemporaneously with the event being perceived\u201d); see also Miller, 754 F.2d at 512 (concluding it was \u201cnot necessarily an abuse of discretion\u201d to admit statement made \u201cseveral minutes\u201d after the fact as excited utterance, but noting \u201ccourts have recognized that the length of time separating the event from the statement [for admission as an excited utterance] may be considerably longer than for statements qualifying under the present sense impression exception of Rule 803(1)\u201d) (emphasis added)."},"case_id":3752988,"label":"b"}
{"context":". There is no evidentiary basis for inferring that H & M's professional standards were met by Byrd, nor that any other associate remained with the firm notwithstanding such deficiencies in performance. And though it is undisputed that no female associate had ever been considered for partnership at H & M before Byrd's termination, Byrd has not shown that any other associate-- male or female--who failed to conform with the firm's professional standards, had ever been considered for partnership.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"6 F.3d 848, 848","parenthetical":"statistical data on general hiring patterns, though relevant, cany less probative weight in disparate treatment cases than in disparate impact cases: ''[A] company's overall employment statistics will, in at least many cases, have little direct bearing on the specific intentions of the employer when dismissing a particular individual.''","sentence":"See Stratus, 40 F.3d at 17 (\u201d[F]or us to compare [female plaintiff's] treatment with that of ... male executives in a meaningful way, [plaintiff] would have to show that she was similarly situated to those men in terms of performance, qualifications and conduct, 'without such differentiating or mitigating circumstances that would distinguish' their situations.\") (citation omitted); cf. LeBlanc, 6 F.3d at 848 (statistical data on general hiring patterns, though relevant, cany less probative weight in disparate treatment cases than in disparate impact cases: \u2018\u2018[A] company\u2019s overall employment statistics will, in at least many cases, have little direct bearing on the specific intentions of the employer when dismissing a particular individual.\u2019\u2019)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"40 F.3d 17, 17","parenthetical":"\"[F]or us to compare [female plaintiff's] treatment with that of ... male executives in a meaningful way, [plaintiff] would have to show that she was similarly situated to those men in terms of performance, qualifications and conduct, 'without such differentiating or mitigating circumstances that would distinguish' their situations.\"","sentence":"See Stratus, 40 F.3d at 17 (\u201d[F]or us to compare [female plaintiff's] treatment with that of ... male executives in a meaningful way, [plaintiff] would have to show that she was similarly situated to those men in terms of performance, qualifications and conduct, 'without such differentiating or mitigating circumstances that would distinguish' their situations.\") (citation omitted); cf. LeBlanc, 6 F.3d at 848 (statistical data on general hiring patterns, though relevant, cany less probative weight in disparate treatment cases than in disparate impact cases: \u2018\u2018[A] company\u2019s overall employment statistics will, in at least many cases, have little direct bearing on the specific intentions of the employer when dismissing a particular individual.\u2019\u2019)."},"case_id":11320815,"label":"b"}
{"context":"It is unclear whether our affirmance of the District Court's findings regarding actual bias ends our inquiry, or whether a post-trial allegation of jury partiality may alternatively be proven by implied or inferred bias.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"455 U.S. 215, 215","parenthetical":"\"[T]he remedy for allegations of juror partiality is a hearing in which the defendant has the opportunity to prove actual bias.\"","sentence":"See Smith, 455 U.S. at 215, 102 S.Ct. 940 (\u201c[T]he remedy for allegations of juror partiality is a hearing in which the defendant has the opportunity to prove actual bias.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"464 U.S. 556, 556-57","parenthetical":"noting that in exceptional circumstances, post-trial hearing could demonstrate inferred bias","sentence":"But see McDonough, 464 U.S. at 556-57, 104 S.Ct. 845 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (noting that in exceptional circumstances, post-trial hearing could demonstrate inferred bias)."},"case_id":9444582,"label":"a"}
{"context":"It is unclear whether our affirmance of the District Court's findings regarding actual bias ends our inquiry, or whether a post-trial allegation of jury partiality may alternatively be proven by implied or inferred bias.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting that in exceptional circumstances, post-trial hearing could demonstrate inferred bias","sentence":"But see McDonough, 464 U.S. at 556-57, 104 S.Ct. 845 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (noting that in exceptional circumstances, post-trial hearing could demonstrate inferred bias)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"455 U.S. 215, 215","parenthetical":"\"[T]he remedy for allegations of juror partiality is a hearing in which the defendant has the opportunity to prove actual bias.\"","sentence":"See Smith, 455 U.S. at 215, 102 S.Ct. 940 (\u201c[T]he remedy for allegations of juror partiality is a hearing in which the defendant has the opportunity to prove actual bias.\u201d)."},"case_id":9444582,"label":"b"}
{"context":"It is unclear whether our affirmance of the District Court's findings regarding actual bias ends our inquiry, or whether a post-trial allegation of jury partiality may alternatively be proven by implied or inferred bias.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"464 U.S. 556, 556-57","parenthetical":"noting that in exceptional circumstances, post-trial hearing could demonstrate inferred bias","sentence":"But see McDonough, 464 U.S. at 556-57, 104 S.Ct. 845 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (noting that in exceptional circumstances, post-trial hearing could demonstrate inferred bias)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[T]he remedy for allegations of juror partiality is a hearing in which the defendant has the opportunity to prove actual bias.\"","sentence":"See Smith, 455 U.S. at 215, 102 S.Ct. 940 (\u201c[T]he remedy for allegations of juror partiality is a hearing in which the defendant has the opportunity to prove actual bias.\u201d)."},"case_id":9444582,"label":"b"}
{"context":"It is unclear whether our affirmance of the District Court's findings regarding actual bias ends our inquiry, or whether a post-trial allegation of jury partiality may alternatively be proven by implied or inferred bias.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting that in exceptional circumstances, post-trial hearing could demonstrate inferred bias","sentence":"But see McDonough, 464 U.S. at 556-57, 104 S.Ct. 845 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (noting that in exceptional circumstances, post-trial hearing could demonstrate inferred bias)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[T]he remedy for allegations of juror partiality is a hearing in which the defendant has the opportunity to prove actual bias.\"","sentence":"See Smith, 455 U.S. at 215, 102 S.Ct. 940 (\u201c[T]he remedy for allegations of juror partiality is a hearing in which the defendant has the opportunity to prove actual bias.\u201d)."},"case_id":9444582,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Because neither the plain language of the statute nor our interpretation of it compels the conclusion that Alvarado-Ca-sas must have been the direct cause of the serious bodily injury to be criminally liable under SS 1324(a)(1)(B)(iii), we conclude that the district court's error in accepting Alvarado-Casas's plea, if any, was not plain.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"669 F.3d 550, 550","parenthetical":"\"[A]s we have never addressed whether obtaining a phone number and having conversations with a minor about meeting for illicit sexual activity constitutes a substantial step toward persuading a minor to engage in illicit sexual activity under SS 2422(b","sentence":"See Broussard, 669 F.3d at 550 (\u201c[A]s we have never addressed whether obtaining a phone number and having conversations with a minor about meeting for illicit sexual activity constitutes a substantial step toward persuading a minor to engage in illicit sexual activity under \u00a7 2422(b) \u2014 nor has any intervening decision clarified the issue \u2014 any error on the district court\u2019s part in accepting Broussard\u2019s plea on the factual basis established by the evidence could not be plain.\u201d); id. at 550-51 (\u201c[A]ny error the district court may have committed was not plain as we have never addressed whether an alleged violation of \u00a7 14:81.3 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes constituted \u2018sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal offense\u2019 under \u00a7 2422(b).\u201d); Trejo, 610 F.3d at 319 (\u201cVariously describing Trejo\u2019s claim as \u2018novel\u2019 and \u2018not entirely clear under the existing case authority,\u2019 we doom the case for plain error.\u201d); see also Caraballo-Rodriguez, 480 F.3d at 70-76 (concluding that any error could not be plain because the defendant\u2019s proposed reading of the statute was not compelled by its plain language or a binding judicial construction of it)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"480 F.3d 70, 70-76","parenthetical":"concluding that any error could not be plain because the defendant's proposed reading of the statute was not compelled by its plain language or a binding judicial construction of it","sentence":"See Broussard, 669 F.3d at 550 (\u201c[A]s we have never addressed whether obtaining a phone number and having conversations with a minor about meeting for illicit sexual activity constitutes a substantial step toward persuading a minor to engage in illicit sexual activity under \u00a7 2422(b) \u2014 nor has any intervening decision clarified the issue \u2014 any error on the district court\u2019s part in accepting Broussard\u2019s plea on the factual basis established by the evidence could not be plain.\u201d); id. at 550-51 (\u201c[A]ny error the district court may have committed was not plain as we have never addressed whether an alleged violation of \u00a7 14:81.3 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes constituted \u2018sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal offense\u2019 under \u00a7 2422(b).\u201d); Trejo, 610 F.3d at 319 (\u201cVariously describing Trejo\u2019s claim as \u2018novel\u2019 and \u2018not entirely clear under the existing case authority,\u2019 we doom the case for plain error.\u201d); see also Caraballo-Rodriguez, 480 F.3d at 70-76 (concluding that any error could not be plain because the defendant\u2019s proposed reading of the statute was not compelled by its plain language or a binding judicial construction of it)."},"case_id":6047515,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Because neither the plain language of the statute nor our interpretation of it compels the conclusion that Alvarado-Ca-sas must have been the direct cause of the serious bodily injury to be criminally liable under SS 1324(a)(1)(B)(iii), we conclude that the district court's error in accepting Alvarado-Casas's plea, if any, was not plain.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"610 F.3d 319, 319","parenthetical":"\"Variously describing Trejo's claim as 'novel' and 'not entirely clear under the existing case authority,' we doom the case for plain error.\"","sentence":"See Broussard, 669 F.3d at 550 (\u201c[A]s we have never addressed whether obtaining a phone number and having conversations with a minor about meeting for illicit sexual activity constitutes a substantial step toward persuading a minor to engage in illicit sexual activity under \u00a7 2422(b) \u2014 nor has any intervening decision clarified the issue \u2014 any error on the district court\u2019s part in accepting Broussard\u2019s plea on the factual basis established by the evidence could not be plain.\u201d); id. at 550-51 (\u201c[A]ny error the district court may have committed was not plain as we have never addressed whether an alleged violation of \u00a7 14:81.3 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes constituted \u2018sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal offense\u2019 under \u00a7 2422(b).\u201d); Trejo, 610 F.3d at 319 (\u201cVariously describing Trejo\u2019s claim as \u2018novel\u2019 and \u2018not entirely clear under the existing case authority,\u2019 we doom the case for plain error.\u201d); see also Caraballo-Rodriguez, 480 F.3d at 70-76 (concluding that any error could not be plain because the defendant\u2019s proposed reading of the statute was not compelled by its plain language or a binding judicial construction of it)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"480 F.3d 70, 70-76","parenthetical":"concluding that any error could not be plain because the defendant's proposed reading of the statute was not compelled by its plain language or a binding judicial construction of it","sentence":"See Broussard, 669 F.3d at 550 (\u201c[A]s we have never addressed whether obtaining a phone number and having conversations with a minor about meeting for illicit sexual activity constitutes a substantial step toward persuading a minor to engage in illicit sexual activity under \u00a7 2422(b) \u2014 nor has any intervening decision clarified the issue \u2014 any error on the district court\u2019s part in accepting Broussard\u2019s plea on the factual basis established by the evidence could not be plain.\u201d); id. at 550-51 (\u201c[A]ny error the district court may have committed was not plain as we have never addressed whether an alleged violation of \u00a7 14:81.3 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes constituted \u2018sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal offense\u2019 under \u00a7 2422(b).\u201d); Trejo, 610 F.3d at 319 (\u201cVariously describing Trejo\u2019s claim as \u2018novel\u2019 and \u2018not entirely clear under the existing case authority,\u2019 we doom the case for plain error.\u201d); see also Caraballo-Rodriguez, 480 F.3d at 70-76 (concluding that any error could not be plain because the defendant\u2019s proposed reading of the statute was not compelled by its plain language or a binding judicial construction of it)."},"case_id":6047515,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Vang argues that because his French travel document expired after he entered the United States, France may forbid his return. Vang claims that the BIA therefore erred in finding him to be firmly resettled in France. Vang's position is not persuasive, however, because the fact that Vang allowed his French travel document to expire after he entered the United States cannot alter the disposition of his asylum claim.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"43 F.3d 1397, 1400","parenthetical":"determining that expiration of petitioner's UAE residence permit after entry into United States did not affect finding that petitioner had firmly resettled in UAE","sentence":"See Yang, 79 F.3d at 934 (finding firm resettlement despite petitioners\u2019 claim that they would no longer be able to return to country of firm resettlement due to eviration of travel documents); see also Abdalla v. INS, 43 F.3d 1397, 1400 (10th Cir.1994) (determining that expiration of petitioner\u2019s UAE residence permit after entry into United States did not affect finding that petitioner had firmly resettled in UAE). We consequently affirm the BIA\u2019s asylum determination."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"79 F.3d 934, 934","parenthetical":"finding firm resettlement despite petitioners' claim that they would no longer be able to return to country of firm resettlement due to eviration of travel documents","sentence":"See Yang, 79 F.3d at 934 (finding firm resettlement despite petitioners\u2019 claim that they would no longer be able to return to country of firm resettlement due to eviration of travel documents); see also Abdalla v. INS, 43 F.3d 1397, 1400 (10th Cir.1994) (determining that expiration of petitioner\u2019s UAE residence permit after entry into United States did not affect finding that petitioner had firmly resettled in UAE). We consequently affirm the BIA\u2019s asylum determination."},"case_id":11822378,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Hayes, Prison Suicide: An Overview and Guide to Prevention 78 (1995) (noting that inmates at high risk for suicide should be in rooms without electrical outlets). The police saw further evidence that Coscia intended to commit suicide when he tried to bite off his handcuffs and hit and kicked the walls at the station.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"listing wall punching as a potential indicator of the likelihood of violent conduct or suicide in an Americans with Disabilities Act case","sentence":"See Sanville v. McCaughtry, 266 F.3d 724, 738 (7th Cir.2001) (stating that strange behavior may be relevant to the determination of delib erate indifference under the Eighth Amendment when combined with other facts indicating a likelihood of suicide); cf. McKenzie v. Benton, 388 F.3d 1342, 1355 & n. 6 (10th Cir.2004) (listing wall punching as a potential indicator of the likelihood of violent conduct or suicide in an Americans with Disabilities Act case)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"266 F.3d 724, 738","parenthetical":"stating that strange behavior may be relevant to the determination of delib erate indifference under the Eighth Amendment when combined with other facts indicating a likelihood of suicide","sentence":"See Sanville v. McCaughtry, 266 F.3d 724, 738 (7th Cir.2001) (stating that strange behavior may be relevant to the determination of delib erate indifference under the Eighth Amendment when combined with other facts indicating a likelihood of suicide); cf. McKenzie v. Benton, 388 F.3d 1342, 1355 & n. 6 (10th Cir.2004) (listing wall punching as a potential indicator of the likelihood of violent conduct or suicide in an Americans with Disabilities Act case)."},"case_id":4032979,"label":"b"}
{"context":"There is no force to the argument that the destruction of duplicative materials constitutes spoliation of evidence or that there is anything improper in the DVA's practice of retaining only a single copy of particular medical records in veterans' claim files in an effort to maintain orderly records. The routine destruction of duplicative documents does not present the risk of denying an adversary access to relevant information, which is what the doctrine of spoliation is directed to.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"492 F.3d 1372, 1375","parenthetical":"holding that an adverse inference for spoliation of evidence requires proof that evidence was destroyed \"with a culpable state of mind\" and that it was \"relevant to the party's claim or defense\"","sentence":"See Jandreau v. Nicholson, 492 F.3d 1372, 1375 (Fed.Cir.2007) (holding that an adverse inference for spoliation of evidence requires proof that evidence was destroyed \u201cwith a culpable state of mind\u201d and that it was \u201crelevant to the party\u2019s claim or defense\u201d); see also Kirkendall v. Dep\u2019t of the Army, 573 F.3d 1318, 1325-27 (Fed.Cir.2009) (spoliation found when agency destroyed relevant documents in violation its own document retention program and petitioner made a \u201ccompelling case\u201d that his effort to prove his case was hampered by the destruction of the documents)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"573 F.3d 1318, 1325-27","parenthetical":"spoliation found when agency destroyed relevant documents in violation its own document retention program and petitioner made a \"compelling case\" that his effort to prove his case was hampered by the destruction of the documents","sentence":"See Jandreau v. Nicholson, 492 F.3d 1372, 1375 (Fed.Cir.2007) (holding that an adverse inference for spoliation of evidence requires proof that evidence was destroyed \u201cwith a culpable state of mind\u201d and that it was \u201crelevant to the party\u2019s claim or defense\u201d); see also Kirkendall v. Dep\u2019t of the Army, 573 F.3d 1318, 1325-27 (Fed.Cir.2009) (spoliation found when agency destroyed relevant documents in violation its own document retention program and petitioner made a \u201ccompelling case\u201d that his effort to prove his case was hampered by the destruction of the documents)."},"case_id":4153211,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Defendant argues that the assignment \"can only reasonably be read to reflect Betty-as-Trustee's distribution of principal to Betty-as-beneficiary,\" because \"there can be no serious dispute concerning the intentions of the two Trustees: they intended to and did transfer the Betty 1989 Trust's interest in the Partnership to the Betty 1992 Trust.\" Def.'s Opp'n at 11. This argument fails because the trustees' intentions, whatever they may have been, cannot override the unambiguous language of the assignment.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"affirming the lower court's exclusion of intent evidence because \"there was no ambiguity in the language of the trust instrument\"","sentence":"See Elmore v. Virginia Nat\u2019l Bank, 232 Va. 310, 350 S.E.2d 603, 607 (1986) (affirming the lower court\u2019s exclusion of intent evidence because \u201cthere was no ambiguity in the language of the trust instrument\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"758 F.2d 676, 681","parenthetical":"\"Where the language of a contract is clear and unambiguous on its face, a court will assume that the meaning ordinarily ascribed to those words reflects the intentions of the parties\"","sentence":"See also NRM Corp. v. Hercules, Inc., 758 F.2d 676, 681 (D.C.Cir.1985) (\u201cWhere the language of a contract is clear and unambiguous on its face, a court will assume that the meaning ordinarily ascribed to those words reflects the intentions of the parties\u201d)."},"case_id":4026300,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Defendant argues that the assignment \"can only reasonably be read to reflect Betty-as-Trustee's distribution of principal to Betty-as-beneficiary,\" because \"there can be no serious dispute concerning the intentions of the two Trustees: they intended to and did transfer the Betty 1989 Trust's interest in the Partnership to the Betty 1992 Trust.\" Def.'s Opp'n at 11. This argument fails because the trustees' intentions, whatever they may have been, cannot override the unambiguous language of the assignment.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"758 F.2d 676, 681","parenthetical":"\"Where the language of a contract is clear and unambiguous on its face, a court will assume that the meaning ordinarily ascribed to those words reflects the intentions of the parties\"","sentence":"See also NRM Corp. v. Hercules, Inc., 758 F.2d 676, 681 (D.C.Cir.1985) (\u201cWhere the language of a contract is clear and unambiguous on its face, a court will assume that the meaning ordinarily ascribed to those words reflects the intentions of the parties\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"350 S.E.2d 603, 607","parenthetical":"affirming the lower court's exclusion of intent evidence because \"there was no ambiguity in the language of the trust instrument\"","sentence":"See Elmore v. Virginia Nat\u2019l Bank, 232 Va. 310, 350 S.E.2d 603, 607 (1986) (affirming the lower court\u2019s exclusion of intent evidence because \u201cthere was no ambiguity in the language of the trust instrument\u201d)."},"case_id":4026300,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The trial court was in no position to judge whether the resumed operation of the range under new conditions would create a nuisance when it had neither evidence of what those new conditions would be, nor evidence of how those new conditions affected sound frequency and levels on Wild's property. The court's opinion would have been advisory if under these circumstances it had applied the nuisance criteria and issued an injunction based on range operations that were no longer extant.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"2004 VT 6, \u00b6 19","parenthetical":"judicial power, as conferred by Vermont Constitution, is limited to the determination of \"actual controversies arising between adverse litigants\"","sentence":"See In re Bennington School, Inc., 2004 VT 6, \u00b6 19, 176 Vt. 584, 845 A.2d 832 (judicial power, as conferred by Vermont Constitution, is limited to the determination of \u201cactual controversies arising between adverse litigants\u201d); see also Parker v. Town of Milton, 169 Vt. 74, 77, 726 A.2d 477, 480 (1998) (\u201cThe existence of an actual controversy turns on whether the plaintiff is suffering the threat of actual injury to a protected legal interest, or is merely speculating about the impact of some generalized grievance.\u201d) (internal quotations omitted)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"169 Vt. 74, 77","parenthetical":"\"The existence of an actual controversy turns on whether the plaintiff is suffering the threat of actual injury to a protected legal interest, or is merely speculating about the impact of some generalized grievance.\"","sentence":"See In re Bennington School, Inc., 2004 VT 6, \u00b6 19, 176 Vt. 584, 845 A.2d 832 (judicial power, as conferred by Vermont Constitution, is limited to the determination of \u201cactual controversies arising between adverse litigants\u201d); see also Parker v. Town of Milton, 169 Vt. 74, 77, 726 A.2d 477, 480 (1998) (\u201cThe existence of an actual controversy turns on whether the plaintiff is suffering the threat of actual injury to a protected legal interest, or is merely speculating about the impact of some generalized grievance.\u201d) (internal quotations omitted)."},"case_id":1605877,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The trial court was in no position to judge whether the resumed operation of the range under new conditions would create a nuisance when it had neither evidence of what those new conditions would be, nor evidence of how those new conditions affected sound frequency and levels on Wild's property. The court's opinion would have been advisory if under these circumstances it had applied the nuisance criteria and issued an injunction based on range operations that were no longer extant.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"726 A.2d 477, 480","parenthetical":"\"The existence of an actual controversy turns on whether the plaintiff is suffering the threat of actual injury to a protected legal interest, or is merely speculating about the impact of some generalized grievance.\"","sentence":"See In re Bennington School, Inc., 2004 VT 6, \u00b6 19, 176 Vt. 584, 845 A.2d 832 (judicial power, as conferred by Vermont Constitution, is limited to the determination of \u201cactual controversies arising between adverse litigants\u201d); see also Parker v. Town of Milton, 169 Vt. 74, 77, 726 A.2d 477, 480 (1998) (\u201cThe existence of an actual controversy turns on whether the plaintiff is suffering the threat of actual injury to a protected legal interest, or is merely speculating about the impact of some generalized grievance.\u201d) (internal quotations omitted)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"2004 VT 6, \u00b6 19","parenthetical":"judicial power, as conferred by Vermont Constitution, is limited to the determination of \"actual controversies arising between adverse litigants\"","sentence":"See In re Bennington School, Inc., 2004 VT 6, \u00b6 19, 176 Vt. 584, 845 A.2d 832 (judicial power, as conferred by Vermont Constitution, is limited to the determination of \u201cactual controversies arising between adverse litigants\u201d); see also Parker v. Town of Milton, 169 Vt. 74, 77, 726 A.2d 477, 480 (1998) (\u201cThe existence of an actual controversy turns on whether the plaintiff is suffering the threat of actual injury to a protected legal interest, or is merely speculating about the impact of some generalized grievance.\u201d) (internal quotations omitted)."},"case_id":1605877,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The trial court was in no position to judge whether the resumed operation of the range under new conditions would create a nuisance when it had neither evidence of what those new conditions would be, nor evidence of how those new conditions affected sound frequency and levels on Wild's property. The court's opinion would have been advisory if under these circumstances it had applied the nuisance criteria and issued an injunction based on range operations that were no longer extant.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"judicial power, as conferred by Vermont Constitution, is limited to the determination of \"actual controversies arising between adverse litigants\"","sentence":"See In re Bennington School, Inc., 2004 VT 6, \u00b6 19, 176 Vt. 584, 845 A.2d 832 (judicial power, as conferred by Vermont Constitution, is limited to the determination of \u201cactual controversies arising between adverse litigants\u201d); see also Parker v. Town of Milton, 169 Vt. 74, 77, 726 A.2d 477, 480 (1998) (\u201cThe existence of an actual controversy turns on whether the plaintiff is suffering the threat of actual injury to a protected legal interest, or is merely speculating about the impact of some generalized grievance.\u201d) (internal quotations omitted)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"169 Vt. 74, 77","parenthetical":"\"The existence of an actual controversy turns on whether the plaintiff is suffering the threat of actual injury to a protected legal interest, or is merely speculating about the impact of some generalized grievance.\"","sentence":"See In re Bennington School, Inc., 2004 VT 6, \u00b6 19, 176 Vt. 584, 845 A.2d 832 (judicial power, as conferred by Vermont Constitution, is limited to the determination of \u201cactual controversies arising between adverse litigants\u201d); see also Parker v. Town of Milton, 169 Vt. 74, 77, 726 A.2d 477, 480 (1998) (\u201cThe existence of an actual controversy turns on whether the plaintiff is suffering the threat of actual injury to a protected legal interest, or is merely speculating about the impact of some generalized grievance.\u201d) (internal quotations omitted)."},"case_id":1605877,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The trial court was in no position to judge whether the resumed operation of the range under new conditions would create a nuisance when it had neither evidence of what those new conditions would be, nor evidence of how those new conditions affected sound frequency and levels on Wild's property. The court's opinion would have been advisory if under these circumstances it had applied the nuisance criteria and issued an injunction based on range operations that were no longer extant.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"726 A.2d 477, 480","parenthetical":"\"The existence of an actual controversy turns on whether the plaintiff is suffering the threat of actual injury to a protected legal interest, or is merely speculating about the impact of some generalized grievance.\"","sentence":"See In re Bennington School, Inc., 2004 VT 6, \u00b6 19, 176 Vt. 584, 845 A.2d 832 (judicial power, as conferred by Vermont Constitution, is limited to the determination of \u201cactual controversies arising between adverse litigants\u201d); see also Parker v. Town of Milton, 169 Vt. 74, 77, 726 A.2d 477, 480 (1998) (\u201cThe existence of an actual controversy turns on whether the plaintiff is suffering the threat of actual injury to a protected legal interest, or is merely speculating about the impact of some generalized grievance.\u201d) (internal quotations omitted)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"judicial power, as conferred by Vermont Constitution, is limited to the determination of \"actual controversies arising between adverse litigants\"","sentence":"See In re Bennington School, Inc., 2004 VT 6, \u00b6 19, 176 Vt. 584, 845 A.2d 832 (judicial power, as conferred by Vermont Constitution, is limited to the determination of \u201cactual controversies arising between adverse litigants\u201d); see also Parker v. Town of Milton, 169 Vt. 74, 77, 726 A.2d 477, 480 (1998) (\u201cThe existence of an actual controversy turns on whether the plaintiff is suffering the threat of actual injury to a protected legal interest, or is merely speculating about the impact of some generalized grievance.\u201d) (internal quotations omitted)."},"case_id":1605877,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The trial court was in no position to judge whether the resumed operation of the range under new conditions would create a nuisance when it had neither evidence of what those new conditions would be, nor evidence of how those new conditions affected sound frequency and levels on Wild's property. The court's opinion would have been advisory if under these circumstances it had applied the nuisance criteria and issued an injunction based on range operations that were no longer extant.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"169 Vt. 74, 77","parenthetical":"\"The existence of an actual controversy turns on whether the plaintiff is suffering the threat of actual injury to a protected legal interest, or is merely speculating about the impact of some generalized grievance.\"","sentence":"See In re Bennington School, Inc., 2004 VT 6, \u00b6 19, 176 Vt. 584, 845 A.2d 832 (judicial power, as conferred by Vermont Constitution, is limited to the determination of \u201cactual controversies arising between adverse litigants\u201d); see also Parker v. Town of Milton, 169 Vt. 74, 77, 726 A.2d 477, 480 (1998) (\u201cThe existence of an actual controversy turns on whether the plaintiff is suffering the threat of actual injury to a protected legal interest, or is merely speculating about the impact of some generalized grievance.\u201d) (internal quotations omitted)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"judicial power, as conferred by Vermont Constitution, is limited to the determination of \"actual controversies arising between adverse litigants\"","sentence":"See In re Bennington School, Inc., 2004 VT 6, \u00b6 19, 176 Vt. 584, 845 A.2d 832 (judicial power, as conferred by Vermont Constitution, is limited to the determination of \u201cactual controversies arising between adverse litigants\u201d); see also Parker v. Town of Milton, 169 Vt. 74, 77, 726 A.2d 477, 480 (1998) (\u201cThe existence of an actual controversy turns on whether the plaintiff is suffering the threat of actual injury to a protected legal interest, or is merely speculating about the impact of some generalized grievance.\u201d) (internal quotations omitted)."},"case_id":1605877,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The trial court was in no position to judge whether the resumed operation of the range under new conditions would create a nuisance when it had neither evidence of what those new conditions would be, nor evidence of how those new conditions affected sound frequency and levels on Wild's property. The court's opinion would have been advisory if under these circumstances it had applied the nuisance criteria and issued an injunction based on range operations that were no longer extant.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"726 A.2d 477, 480","parenthetical":"\"The existence of an actual controversy turns on whether the plaintiff is suffering the threat of actual injury to a protected legal interest, or is merely speculating about the impact of some generalized grievance.\"","sentence":"See In re Bennington School, Inc., 2004 VT 6, \u00b6 19, 176 Vt. 584, 845 A.2d 832 (judicial power, as conferred by Vermont Constitution, is limited to the determination of \u201cactual controversies arising between adverse litigants\u201d); see also Parker v. Town of Milton, 169 Vt. 74, 77, 726 A.2d 477, 480 (1998) (\u201cThe existence of an actual controversy turns on whether the plaintiff is suffering the threat of actual injury to a protected legal interest, or is merely speculating about the impact of some generalized grievance.\u201d) (internal quotations omitted)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"judicial power, as conferred by Vermont Constitution, is limited to the determination of \"actual controversies arising between adverse litigants\"","sentence":"See In re Bennington School, Inc., 2004 VT 6, \u00b6 19, 176 Vt. 584, 845 A.2d 832 (judicial power, as conferred by Vermont Constitution, is limited to the determination of \u201cactual controversies arising between adverse litigants\u201d); see also Parker v. Town of Milton, 169 Vt. 74, 77, 726 A.2d 477, 480 (1998) (\u201cThe existence of an actual controversy turns on whether the plaintiff is suffering the threat of actual injury to a protected legal interest, or is merely speculating about the impact of some generalized grievance.\u201d) (internal quotations omitted)."},"case_id":1605877,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Courts typically have refused the instruction where the eyewitness or victim had an adequate opportunity to observe the defendant, there was corroborating evidence bolstering the identification, and\/or there was no evidence that race affected the identification.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"647 N.E.2d 1171, 1171","parenthetical":"declining instruction in rape and robbery case where victim was terrorized for fifteen to twenty minutes in broad daylight and could see the attacker's face","sentence":"See Hyatt, supra, 647 N.E.2d at 1171 (declining instruction in rape and robbery case where victim was terrorized for fifteen to twenty minutes in broad daylight and could see the attacker\u2019s face); see also Commonwealth v. Engram, 43 Mass.App.Ct. 804, 686 N.E.2d 1080 (1997) (declining instruction where numerous eyewitnesses saw defendant at close range and positively identified him from a lineup and photo array)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"declining instruction where numerous eyewitnesses saw defendant at close range and positively identified him from a lineup and photo array","sentence":"See Hyatt, supra, 647 N.E.2d at 1171 (declining instruction in rape and robbery case where victim was terrorized for fifteen to twenty minutes in broad daylight and could see the attacker\u2019s face); see also Commonwealth v. Engram, 43 Mass.App.Ct. 804, 686 N.E.2d 1080 (1997) (declining instruction where numerous eyewitnesses saw defendant at close range and positively identified him from a lineup and photo array)."},"case_id":9305293,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Courts typically have refused the instruction where the eyewitness or victim had an adequate opportunity to observe the defendant, there was corroborating evidence bolstering the identification, and\/or there was no evidence that race affected the identification.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"declining instruction where numerous eyewitnesses saw defendant at close range and positively identified him from a lineup and photo array","sentence":"See Hyatt, supra, 647 N.E.2d at 1171 (declining instruction in rape and robbery case where victim was terrorized for fifteen to twenty minutes in broad daylight and could see the attacker\u2019s face); see also Commonwealth v. Engram, 43 Mass.App.Ct. 804, 686 N.E.2d 1080 (1997) (declining instruction where numerous eyewitnesses saw defendant at close range and positively identified him from a lineup and photo array)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"647 N.E.2d 1171, 1171","parenthetical":"declining instruction in rape and robbery case where victim was terrorized for fifteen to twenty minutes in broad daylight and could see the attacker's face","sentence":"See Hyatt, supra, 647 N.E.2d at 1171 (declining instruction in rape and robbery case where victim was terrorized for fifteen to twenty minutes in broad daylight and could see the attacker\u2019s face); see also Commonwealth v. Engram, 43 Mass.App.Ct. 804, 686 N.E.2d 1080 (1997) (declining instruction where numerous eyewitnesses saw defendant at close range and positively identified him from a lineup and photo array)."},"case_id":9305293,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Even accepting that Defendants engaged in some monitoring and discipline, however, the Court finds that the first factor slightly favors independent contractor status.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"2011 WL 1240022, at *23","parenthetical":"\"[E]ven assuming that, for the purposes of this motion, [Defendant] did actually exercise or retain control over [Plaintiff] as set forth in the Franchise Agreement and the Rulebook ... the court finds that the totality of the circumstances weighs in favor of finding that an independent contractor relationship existed as a matter of law.\"","sentence":"See Browning, 885 F.Supp.2d at 608 (noting that while \u201cthe Defendants certainly had some degree of control over the overall safe performance of the Plaintiffs in their tasks[,] ... the degree of control is not so great as to weigh in favor of finding the Plaintiffs.to be employees as opposed to independent contractors\u201d); Scruggs v. Skylink Ltd., No. 10-CV-789, 2011 WL 6026152, at *5 (S.D.W.Va. Dec. 2, 2011) (noting that, even accepting that failure to attend weekly meetings could subject plaintiffs to discipline, \u201cno reasonable trier of fact could take these issues in context with the undisputed facts, and conclude that Plaintiffs were employees\u201d); cf. Leach, 2011 WL 1240022, at *23 (\u201c[E]ven assuming that, for the purposes of this motion, [Defendant] did actually exercise or retain control over [Plaintiff] as set forth in the Franchise Agreement and the Rulebook ... the court finds that the totality of the circumstances weighs in favor of finding that an independent contractor relationship existed as a matter of law.\u201d)"},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"885 F.Supp.2d 608, 608","parenthetical":"noting that while \"the Defendants certainly had some degree of control over the overall safe performance of the Plaintiffs in their tasks[,] ... the degree of control is not so great as to weigh in favor of finding the Plaintiffs.to be employees as opposed to independent contractors\"","sentence":"See Browning, 885 F.Supp.2d at 608 (noting that while \u201cthe Defendants certainly had some degree of control over the overall safe performance of the Plaintiffs in their tasks[,] ... the degree of control is not so great as to weigh in favor of finding the Plaintiffs.to be employees as opposed to independent contractors\u201d); Scruggs v. Skylink Ltd., No. 10-CV-789, 2011 WL 6026152, at *5 (S.D.W.Va. Dec. 2, 2011) (noting that, even accepting that failure to attend weekly meetings could subject plaintiffs to discipline, \u201cno reasonable trier of fact could take these issues in context with the undisputed facts, and conclude that Plaintiffs were employees\u201d); cf. Leach, 2011 WL 1240022, at *23 (\u201c[E]ven assuming that, for the purposes of this motion, [Defendant] did actually exercise or retain control over [Plaintiff] as set forth in the Franchise Agreement and the Rulebook ... the court finds that the totality of the circumstances weighs in favor of finding that an independent contractor relationship existed as a matter of law.\u201d)"},"case_id":4059732,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Even accepting that Defendants engaged in some monitoring and discipline, however, the Court finds that the first factor slightly favors independent contractor status.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"2011 WL 1240022, at *23","parenthetical":"\"[E]ven assuming that, for the purposes of this motion, [Defendant] did actually exercise or retain control over [Plaintiff] as set forth in the Franchise Agreement and the Rulebook ... the court finds that the totality of the circumstances weighs in favor of finding that an independent contractor relationship existed as a matter of law.\"","sentence":"See Browning, 885 F.Supp.2d at 608 (noting that while \u201cthe Defendants certainly had some degree of control over the overall safe performance of the Plaintiffs in their tasks[,] ... the degree of control is not so great as to weigh in favor of finding the Plaintiffs.to be employees as opposed to independent contractors\u201d); Scruggs v. Skylink Ltd., No. 10-CV-789, 2011 WL 6026152, at *5 (S.D.W.Va. Dec. 2, 2011) (noting that, even accepting that failure to attend weekly meetings could subject plaintiffs to discipline, \u201cno reasonable trier of fact could take these issues in context with the undisputed facts, and conclude that Plaintiffs were employees\u201d); cf. Leach, 2011 WL 1240022, at *23 (\u201c[E]ven assuming that, for the purposes of this motion, [Defendant] did actually exercise or retain control over [Plaintiff] as set forth in the Franchise Agreement and the Rulebook ... the court finds that the totality of the circumstances weighs in favor of finding that an independent contractor relationship existed as a matter of law.\u201d)"},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"2011 WL 6026152, at *5","parenthetical":"noting that, even accepting that failure to attend weekly meetings could subject plaintiffs to discipline, \"no reasonable trier of fact could take these issues in context with the undisputed facts, and conclude that Plaintiffs were employees\"","sentence":"See Browning, 885 F.Supp.2d at 608 (noting that while \u201cthe Defendants certainly had some degree of control over the overall safe performance of the Plaintiffs in their tasks[,] ... the degree of control is not so great as to weigh in favor of finding the Plaintiffs.to be employees as opposed to independent contractors\u201d); Scruggs v. Skylink Ltd., No. 10-CV-789, 2011 WL 6026152, at *5 (S.D.W.Va. Dec. 2, 2011) (noting that, even accepting that failure to attend weekly meetings could subject plaintiffs to discipline, \u201cno reasonable trier of fact could take these issues in context with the undisputed facts, and conclude that Plaintiffs were employees\u201d); cf. Leach, 2011 WL 1240022, at *23 (\u201c[E]ven assuming that, for the purposes of this motion, [Defendant] did actually exercise or retain control over [Plaintiff] as set forth in the Franchise Agreement and the Rulebook ... the court finds that the totality of the circumstances weighs in favor of finding that an independent contractor relationship existed as a matter of law.\u201d)"},"case_id":4059732,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Petitioner was never arrested, imprisoned, or detained. He and his wife have traveled into and from Kenya without difficulty. To bolster his asylum claim, Patel testified to various events, and the most recent occurred in 1997. The record shows that Petitioner and his family have been the victim of several crimes, but such generalized lawlessness normally does not constitute persecution.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"236 F.3d 843, 847","parenthetical":"holding \"[cjonditions of political upheaval which affect the populace as a whole or in large part are generally insufficient to establish eligibility for asylum\"","sentence":"See Singh, 134 F.3d at 967 (stating that \u201c[m]ere generalized lawlessness and violence between diverse populations ... generally is not sufficient\u201d to obtain asylum); see also Meghani v. INS, 236 F.3d 843, 847 (7th Cir.2001) (holding \u201c[cjonditions of political upheaval which affect the populace as a whole or in large part are generally insufficient to establish eligibility for asylum\u201d); Mitev v. INS, 67 F.3d 1325, 1330-31 (7th Cir.1995) (stating that \u201cunpleasant and even dangerous conditions do not necessarily rise to the level of persecution\u201d). At most, Patel describes incidents that constitute harassment or discrimination based upon wealth."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"134 F.3d 967, 967","parenthetical":"stating that \"[m]ere generalized lawlessness and violence between diverse populations ... generally is not sufficient\" to obtain asylum","sentence":"See Singh, 134 F.3d at 967 (stating that \u201c[m]ere generalized lawlessness and violence between diverse populations ... generally is not sufficient\u201d to obtain asylum); see also Meghani v. INS, 236 F.3d 843, 847 (7th Cir.2001) (holding \u201c[cjonditions of political upheaval which affect the populace as a whole or in large part are generally insufficient to establish eligibility for asylum\u201d); Mitev v. INS, 67 F.3d 1325, 1330-31 (7th Cir.1995) (stating that \u201cunpleasant and even dangerous conditions do not necessarily rise to the level of persecution\u201d). At most, Patel describes incidents that constitute harassment or discrimination based upon wealth."},"case_id":489679,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Petitioner was never arrested, imprisoned, or detained. He and his wife have traveled into and from Kenya without difficulty. To bolster his asylum claim, Patel testified to various events, and the most recent occurred in 1997. The record shows that Petitioner and his family have been the victim of several crimes, but such generalized lawlessness normally does not constitute persecution.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"134 F.3d 967, 967","parenthetical":"stating that \"[m]ere generalized lawlessness and violence between diverse populations ... generally is not sufficient\" to obtain asylum","sentence":"See Singh, 134 F.3d at 967 (stating that \u201c[m]ere generalized lawlessness and violence between diverse populations ... generally is not sufficient\u201d to obtain asylum); see also Meghani v. INS, 236 F.3d 843, 847 (7th Cir.2001) (holding \u201c[cjonditions of political upheaval which affect the populace as a whole or in large part are generally insufficient to establish eligibility for asylum\u201d); Mitev v. INS, 67 F.3d 1325, 1330-31 (7th Cir.1995) (stating that \u201cunpleasant and even dangerous conditions do not necessarily rise to the level of persecution\u201d). At most, Patel describes incidents that constitute harassment or discrimination based upon wealth."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"67 F.3d 1325, 1330-31","parenthetical":"stating that \"unpleasant and even dangerous conditions do not necessarily rise to the level of persecution\"","sentence":"See Singh, 134 F.3d at 967 (stating that \u201c[m]ere generalized lawlessness and violence between diverse populations ... generally is not sufficient\u201d to obtain asylum); see also Meghani v. INS, 236 F.3d 843, 847 (7th Cir.2001) (holding \u201c[cjonditions of political upheaval which affect the populace as a whole or in large part are generally insufficient to establish eligibility for asylum\u201d); Mitev v. INS, 67 F.3d 1325, 1330-31 (7th Cir.1995) (stating that \u201cunpleasant and even dangerous conditions do not necessarily rise to the level of persecution\u201d). At most, Patel describes incidents that constitute harassment or discrimination based upon wealth."},"case_id":489679,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Given Herbert's steps to protect her identity, however -- including referring to herself in the third person -- there is no rational basis to draw such an inference. Moreover, Dixon denies having any knowledge of the complainant's identity until April 2008, long after Herbert was demoted. (Def. 56.1 Stmt. P 70) In short, there is no evidence in the record to suggest that Dixon knew at the time of Herbert's demotion in January 2008 that the December 2007 complaint to SCI was authored by Herbert. Herbert cannot rely on conjecture and speculation -- and that is all there is here-- to defeat Defendants' summary judgment motion concerning the whistleblower retaliation claim.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"528 F.Supp.2d 257, 271","parenthetical":"nothing in Title VII retaliation context that \"district courts have consistently held that, with regard to the causation prong of the prima facie standard, absent any evidence to support an inference that the decision-makers knew of plaintiffs complaints, plaintiff cannot rely on circumstantial evidence of knowledge as evidence of causation\"","sentence":"See Manessis, 2003 WL 289969, at *15 (dismissing N.Y. Civil Service \u00a7 75-b retaliation claim because decision-maker lacked knowledge of plaintiffs complaint); see also Murray v. Visiting Nurse Servs. of NY, 528 F.Supp.2d 257, 271 (S.D.N.Y.2007) (nothing in Title VII retaliation context that \u201cdistrict courts have consistently held that, with regard to the causation prong of the prima facie standard, absent any evidence to support an inference that the decision-makers knew of plaintiffs complaints, plaintiff cannot rely on circumstantial evidence of knowledge as evidence of causation\u201d); Gross v. National Broad. Co., Inc., 232 F.Supp.2d 58, 67 (S.D.N.Y.2002) (\u201cMere conclusory statements, conjecture or speculation\u201d by the plaintiff will not defeat a summary judgment motion.)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"2003 WL 289969, at *15","parenthetical":"dismissing N.Y. Civil Service SS 75-b retaliation claim because decision-maker lacked knowledge of plaintiffs complaint","sentence":"See Manessis, 2003 WL 289969, at *15 (dismissing N.Y. Civil Service \u00a7 75-b retaliation claim because decision-maker lacked knowledge of plaintiffs complaint); see also Murray v. Visiting Nurse Servs. of NY, 528 F.Supp.2d 257, 271 (S.D.N.Y.2007) (nothing in Title VII retaliation context that \u201cdistrict courts have consistently held that, with regard to the causation prong of the prima facie standard, absent any evidence to support an inference that the decision-makers knew of plaintiffs complaints, plaintiff cannot rely on circumstantial evidence of knowledge as evidence of causation\u201d); Gross v. National Broad. Co., Inc., 232 F.Supp.2d 58, 67 (S.D.N.Y.2002) (\u201cMere conclusory statements, conjecture or speculation\u201d by the plaintiff will not defeat a summary judgment motion.)."},"case_id":4261291,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Given Herbert's steps to protect her identity, however -- including referring to herself in the third person -- there is no rational basis to draw such an inference. Moreover, Dixon denies having any knowledge of the complainant's identity until April 2008, long after Herbert was demoted. (Def. 56.1 Stmt. P 70) In short, there is no evidence in the record to suggest that Dixon knew at the time of Herbert's demotion in January 2008 that the December 2007 complaint to SCI was authored by Herbert. Herbert cannot rely on conjecture and speculation -- and that is all there is here-- to defeat Defendants' summary judgment motion concerning the whistleblower retaliation claim.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"2003 WL 289969, at *15","parenthetical":"dismissing N.Y. Civil Service SS 75-b retaliation claim because decision-maker lacked knowledge of plaintiffs complaint","sentence":"See Manessis, 2003 WL 289969, at *15 (dismissing N.Y. Civil Service \u00a7 75-b retaliation claim because decision-maker lacked knowledge of plaintiffs complaint); see also Murray v. Visiting Nurse Servs. of NY, 528 F.Supp.2d 257, 271 (S.D.N.Y.2007) (nothing in Title VII retaliation context that \u201cdistrict courts have consistently held that, with regard to the causation prong of the prima facie standard, absent any evidence to support an inference that the decision-makers knew of plaintiffs complaints, plaintiff cannot rely on circumstantial evidence of knowledge as evidence of causation\u201d); Gross v. National Broad. Co., Inc., 232 F.Supp.2d 58, 67 (S.D.N.Y.2002) (\u201cMere conclusory statements, conjecture or speculation\u201d by the plaintiff will not defeat a summary judgment motion.)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"232 F.Supp.2d 58, 67","parenthetical":"\"Mere conclusory statements, conjecture or speculation\" by the plaintiff will not defeat a summary judgment motion.","sentence":"See Manessis, 2003 WL 289969, at *15 (dismissing N.Y. Civil Service \u00a7 75-b retaliation claim because decision-maker lacked knowledge of plaintiffs complaint); see also Murray v. Visiting Nurse Servs. of NY, 528 F.Supp.2d 257, 271 (S.D.N.Y.2007) (nothing in Title VII retaliation context that \u201cdistrict courts have consistently held that, with regard to the causation prong of the prima facie standard, absent any evidence to support an inference that the decision-makers knew of plaintiffs complaints, plaintiff cannot rely on circumstantial evidence of knowledge as evidence of causation\u201d); Gross v. National Broad. Co., Inc., 232 F.Supp.2d 58, 67 (S.D.N.Y.2002) (\u201cMere conclusory statements, conjecture or speculation\u201d by the plaintiff will not defeat a summary judgment motion.)."},"case_id":4261291,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Under these circumstances, Pacheco's continued detention following the traffic stop amounted to a full-fledged arrest, thus requiring probable cause , to believe he was (1) unlawfully present in the United States and (2) likely to escape before Agent Myers could obtain a warrant for his arrest.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"623 F.3d 1241, 1241","parenthetical":"asking whether officer \"had 'reason to believe' (i.e., probable cause to believe","sentence":"See Quintana, 623 F.3d at 1241 (asking whether officer \u201chad \u2018reason to believe\u2019 (i.e., probable cause to believe) that the [arrestee] was an alien subject to deportation.... [and] likely to escape before a warrant [could] be obtained\u201d in assessing lawfulness of \u201ca warrantless \u2018administrative\u2019 arrest for deportation proceedings under 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1357(a)(2)\u201d); see also Morales, 793 F.3d at 216 (\u201cIt is beyond debate that an immigration officer ... would need probable cause to arrest and detain individuals for the purpose of investigating their immigration status.\u201d); Vargas Ramirez, 93 F.Supp.3d at 1221-22 (same)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"793 F.3d 216, 216","parenthetical":"\"It is beyond debate that an immigration officer ... would need probable cause to arrest and detain individuals for the purpose of investigating their immigration status.\"","sentence":"See Quintana, 623 F.3d at 1241 (asking whether officer \u201chad \u2018reason to believe\u2019 (i.e., probable cause to believe) that the [arrestee] was an alien subject to deportation.... [and] likely to escape before a warrant [could] be obtained\u201d in assessing lawfulness of \u201ca warrantless \u2018administrative\u2019 arrest for deportation proceedings under 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1357(a)(2)\u201d); see also Morales, 793 F.3d at 216 (\u201cIt is beyond debate that an immigration officer ... would need probable cause to arrest and detain individuals for the purpose of investigating their immigration status.\u201d); Vargas Ramirez, 93 F.Supp.3d at 1221-22 (same)."},"case_id":12270195,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Telegroup contends that appellants' claims \"arise from\" the purchase or sale of Telegroup's common stock because they allege a breach of the purchase agreement whereby claimants acquired shares of- Tel-egroup stock, which required Telegroup- to use its best efforts to register its stock.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that a claim for breach of a provision in a merger agreement arises from the purchase or sale of the debtor's securities","sentence":"See In re NAL Fin. Group, Inc., 237 B.R. 225 (Bankr.S.D.Fla.1999) (holding that claims for breach of debtor\u2019s agreement to use its best efforts to register its securities arise from the purchase of those securities, for purposes of \u00a7 510(b)); see also In re Betacom of Phoenix, Inc., 240 F.3d 828 (9th Cir.2001) (holding that a claim for breach of a provision in a merger agreement arises from the purchase or sale of the debtor\u2019s securities); In re Int\u2019l Wireless Communications Holdings, Inc., 257 B.R. 739, 746 (Bankr.D.Del.2001) (disapproving Angeles and Amarex, supra, and holding that claims against the debtor for breach of a supplement to a share purchase agreement arise from the purchase or sale of those securities); In re Kaiser Group Int\u2019l, Inc., 260 B.R. 684 (Bankr.D.Del.2001) (holding that plaims for breach of a merger agreement arise from the purchase or sale of debtor\u2019s securities)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that claims for breach of debtor's agreement to use its best efforts to register its securities arise from the purchase of those securities, for purposes of SS 510(b","sentence":"See In re NAL Fin. Group, Inc., 237 B.R. 225 (Bankr.S.D.Fla.1999) (holding that claims for breach of debtor\u2019s agreement to use its best efforts to register its securities arise from the purchase of those securities, for purposes of \u00a7 510(b)); see also In re Betacom of Phoenix, Inc., 240 F.3d 828 (9th Cir.2001) (holding that a claim for breach of a provision in a merger agreement arises from the purchase or sale of the debtor\u2019s securities); In re Int\u2019l Wireless Communications Holdings, Inc., 257 B.R. 739, 746 (Bankr.D.Del.2001) (disapproving Angeles and Amarex, supra, and holding that claims against the debtor for breach of a supplement to a share purchase agreement arise from the purchase or sale of those securities); In re Kaiser Group Int\u2019l, Inc., 260 B.R. 684 (Bankr.D.Del.2001) (holding that plaims for breach of a merger agreement arise from the purchase or sale of debtor\u2019s securities)."},"case_id":9395524,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Telegroup contends that appellants' claims \"arise from\" the purchase or sale of Telegroup's common stock because they allege a breach of the purchase agreement whereby claimants acquired shares of- Tel-egroup stock, which required Telegroup- to use its best efforts to register its stock.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"257 B.R. 739, 746","parenthetical":"disapproving Angeles and Amarex, supra, and holding that claims against the debtor for breach of a supplement to a share purchase agreement arise from the purchase or sale of those securities","sentence":"See In re NAL Fin. Group, Inc., 237 B.R. 225 (Bankr.S.D.Fla.1999) (holding that claims for breach of debtor\u2019s agreement to use its best efforts to register its securities arise from the purchase of those securities, for purposes of \u00a7 510(b)); see also In re Betacom of Phoenix, Inc., 240 F.3d 828 (9th Cir.2001) (holding that a claim for breach of a provision in a merger agreement arises from the purchase or sale of the debtor\u2019s securities); In re Int\u2019l Wireless Communications Holdings, Inc., 257 B.R. 739, 746 (Bankr.D.Del.2001) (disapproving Angeles and Amarex, supra, and holding that claims against the debtor for breach of a supplement to a share purchase agreement arise from the purchase or sale of those securities); In re Kaiser Group Int\u2019l, Inc., 260 B.R. 684 (Bankr.D.Del.2001) (holding that plaims for breach of a merger agreement arise from the purchase or sale of debtor\u2019s securities)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that claims for breach of debtor's agreement to use its best efforts to register its securities arise from the purchase of those securities, for purposes of SS 510(b","sentence":"See In re NAL Fin. Group, Inc., 237 B.R. 225 (Bankr.S.D.Fla.1999) (holding that claims for breach of debtor\u2019s agreement to use its best efforts to register its securities arise from the purchase of those securities, for purposes of \u00a7 510(b)); see also In re Betacom of Phoenix, Inc., 240 F.3d 828 (9th Cir.2001) (holding that a claim for breach of a provision in a merger agreement arises from the purchase or sale of the debtor\u2019s securities); In re Int\u2019l Wireless Communications Holdings, Inc., 257 B.R. 739, 746 (Bankr.D.Del.2001) (disapproving Angeles and Amarex, supra, and holding that claims against the debtor for breach of a supplement to a share purchase agreement arise from the purchase or sale of those securities); In re Kaiser Group Int\u2019l, Inc., 260 B.R. 684 (Bankr.D.Del.2001) (holding that plaims for breach of a merger agreement arise from the purchase or sale of debtor\u2019s securities)."},"case_id":9395524,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Telegroup contends that appellants' claims \"arise from\" the purchase or sale of Telegroup's common stock because they allege a breach of the purchase agreement whereby claimants acquired shares of- Tel-egroup stock, which required Telegroup- to use its best efforts to register its stock.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that plaims for breach of a merger agreement arise from the purchase or sale of debtor's securities","sentence":"See In re NAL Fin. Group, Inc., 237 B.R. 225 (Bankr.S.D.Fla.1999) (holding that claims for breach of debtor\u2019s agreement to use its best efforts to register its securities arise from the purchase of those securities, for purposes of \u00a7 510(b)); see also In re Betacom of Phoenix, Inc., 240 F.3d 828 (9th Cir.2001) (holding that a claim for breach of a provision in a merger agreement arises from the purchase or sale of the debtor\u2019s securities); In re Int\u2019l Wireless Communications Holdings, Inc., 257 B.R. 739, 746 (Bankr.D.Del.2001) (disapproving Angeles and Amarex, supra, and holding that claims against the debtor for breach of a supplement to a share purchase agreement arise from the purchase or sale of those securities); In re Kaiser Group Int\u2019l, Inc., 260 B.R. 684 (Bankr.D.Del.2001) (holding that plaims for breach of a merger agreement arise from the purchase or sale of debtor\u2019s securities)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that claims for breach of debtor's agreement to use its best efforts to register its securities arise from the purchase of those securities, for purposes of SS 510(b","sentence":"See In re NAL Fin. Group, Inc., 237 B.R. 225 (Bankr.S.D.Fla.1999) (holding that claims for breach of debtor\u2019s agreement to use its best efforts to register its securities arise from the purchase of those securities, for purposes of \u00a7 510(b)); see also In re Betacom of Phoenix, Inc., 240 F.3d 828 (9th Cir.2001) (holding that a claim for breach of a provision in a merger agreement arises from the purchase or sale of the debtor\u2019s securities); In re Int\u2019l Wireless Communications Holdings, Inc., 257 B.R. 739, 746 (Bankr.D.Del.2001) (disapproving Angeles and Amarex, supra, and holding that claims against the debtor for breach of a supplement to a share purchase agreement arise from the purchase or sale of those securities); In re Kaiser Group Int\u2019l, Inc., 260 B.R. 684 (Bankr.D.Del.2001) (holding that plaims for breach of a merger agreement arise from the purchase or sale of debtor\u2019s securities)."},"case_id":9395524,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Even before the Francis decision, the supreme court had held that a settlement agreement adopted in a divorce decree falls within the purview of contract law.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that judgment based on terms of settlement agreement must be interpreted under law of contracts rather than law of judgments","sentence":"See Ex parte Jones, 163 Tex. 513, 358 S.W.2d 370, 375 (1962) (holding that judgment based on terms of settlement agreement must be interpreted under law of contracts rather than law of judgments). Since Francis, the supreme court has, on several occasions, confirmed that under Texas law the legal force and meaning of marital property settlement agreements are governed by the law of contracts. See McGoodwin v. McGoodwin, 671 S.W.2d 880, 882 (Tex.1984); see also McCray v. McCray, 584 S.W.2d 279, 281 (Tex.1979) (applying law of contracts to contractual alimony agreement); cf. Hutchings v. Bates, 406 S.W.2d 419, 421 (Tex.1966) (holding that agreement for periodic child support payments is governed by law of contracts)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"406 S.W.2d 419, 421","parenthetical":"holding that agreement for periodic child support payments is governed by law of contracts","sentence":"See Ex parte Jones, 163 Tex. 513, 358 S.W.2d 370, 375 (1962) (holding that judgment based on terms of settlement agreement must be interpreted under law of contracts rather than law of judgments). Since Francis, the supreme court has, on several occasions, confirmed that under Texas law the legal force and meaning of marital property settlement agreements are governed by the law of contracts. See McGoodwin v. McGoodwin, 671 S.W.2d 880, 882 (Tex.1984); see also McCray v. McCray, 584 S.W.2d 279, 281 (Tex.1979) (applying law of contracts to contractual alimony agreement); cf. Hutchings v. Bates, 406 S.W.2d 419, 421 (Tex.1966) (holding that agreement for periodic child support payments is governed by law of contracts)."},"case_id":11678259,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Even before the Francis decision, the supreme court had held that a settlement agreement adopted in a divorce decree falls within the purview of contract law.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"406 S.W.2d 419, 421","parenthetical":"holding that agreement for periodic child support payments is governed by law of contracts","sentence":"See Ex parte Jones, 163 Tex. 513, 358 S.W.2d 370, 375 (1962) (holding that judgment based on terms of settlement agreement must be interpreted under law of contracts rather than law of judgments). Since Francis, the supreme court has, on several occasions, confirmed that under Texas law the legal force and meaning of marital property settlement agreements are governed by the law of contracts. See McGoodwin v. McGoodwin, 671 S.W.2d 880, 882 (Tex.1984); see also McCray v. McCray, 584 S.W.2d 279, 281 (Tex.1979) (applying law of contracts to contractual alimony agreement); cf. Hutchings v. Bates, 406 S.W.2d 419, 421 (Tex.1966) (holding that agreement for periodic child support payments is governed by law of contracts)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"358 S.W.2d 370, 375","parenthetical":"holding that judgment based on terms of settlement agreement must be interpreted under law of contracts rather than law of judgments","sentence":"See Ex parte Jones, 163 Tex. 513, 358 S.W.2d 370, 375 (1962) (holding that judgment based on terms of settlement agreement must be interpreted under law of contracts rather than law of judgments). Since Francis, the supreme court has, on several occasions, confirmed that under Texas law the legal force and meaning of marital property settlement agreements are governed by the law of contracts. See McGoodwin v. McGoodwin, 671 S.W.2d 880, 882 (Tex.1984); see also McCray v. McCray, 584 S.W.2d 279, 281 (Tex.1979) (applying law of contracts to contractual alimony agreement); cf. Hutchings v. Bates, 406 S.W.2d 419, 421 (Tex.1966) (holding that agreement for periodic child support payments is governed by law of contracts)."},"case_id":11678259,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Even before the Francis decision, the supreme court had held that a settlement agreement adopted in a divorce decree falls within the purview of contract law.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"671 S.W.2d 880, 882","parenthetical":"holding that judgment based on terms of settlement agreement must be interpreted under law of contracts rather than law of judgments","sentence":"See Ex parte Jones, 163 Tex. 513, 358 S.W.2d 370, 375 (1962) (holding that judgment based on terms of settlement agreement must be interpreted under law of contracts rather than law of judgments). Since Francis, the supreme court has, on several occasions, confirmed that under Texas law the legal force and meaning of marital property settlement agreements are governed by the law of contracts. See McGoodwin v. McGoodwin, 671 S.W.2d 880, 882 (Tex.1984); see also McCray v. McCray, 584 S.W.2d 279, 281 (Tex.1979) (applying law of contracts to contractual alimony agreement); cf. Hutchings v. Bates, 406 S.W.2d 419, 421 (Tex.1966) (holding that agreement for periodic child support payments is governed by law of contracts)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"406 S.W.2d 419, 421","parenthetical":"holding that agreement for periodic child support payments is governed by law of contracts","sentence":"See Ex parte Jones, 163 Tex. 513, 358 S.W.2d 370, 375 (1962) (holding that judgment based on terms of settlement agreement must be interpreted under law of contracts rather than law of judgments). Since Francis, the supreme court has, on several occasions, confirmed that under Texas law the legal force and meaning of marital property settlement agreements are governed by the law of contracts. See McGoodwin v. McGoodwin, 671 S.W.2d 880, 882 (Tex.1984); see also McCray v. McCray, 584 S.W.2d 279, 281 (Tex.1979) (applying law of contracts to contractual alimony agreement); cf. Hutchings v. Bates, 406 S.W.2d 419, 421 (Tex.1966) (holding that agreement for periodic child support payments is governed by law of contracts)."},"case_id":11678259,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Debtor argues that, objectively viewed, Sweetwater's rejection of the Plan does not make economic sense, so it must have another, improper purpose in rejecting it. It is for Sweetwater, however, and Sweet-water alone, to decide what is in its economic interest.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"104 B.R. 206, 216","parenthetical":"\"Good faith voting does not require, nor can it expect, a creditor to act with selfless disinterest.\"","sentence":"In re Fed. Support Co., 859 F.2d 17, 20 (4th Cir.1988) (\u201cIt was for [the creditor] to decide its own self-interest.\u201d); accord, Landing Assoc., 157 B.R. at 803 (\u201ceach creditor is expected to cast his vote \u2018in accordance with his perception of his own self-interest\u2019 \u201d), quoting Fed. Support, 859 F.2d at 19; see also In re Gilbert, 104 B.R. 206, 216 (Bankr.W.D.Mo.1989) (\u201cGood faith voting does not require, nor can it expect, a creditor to act with selfless disinterest.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"859 F.2d 17, 20","parenthetical":"\"It was for [the creditor] to decide its own self-interest.\"","sentence":"In re Fed. Support Co., 859 F.2d 17, 20 (4th Cir.1988) (\u201cIt was for [the creditor] to decide its own self-interest.\u201d); accord, Landing Assoc., 157 B.R. at 803 (\u201ceach creditor is expected to cast his vote \u2018in accordance with his perception of his own self-interest\u2019 \u201d), quoting Fed. Support, 859 F.2d at 19; see also In re Gilbert, 104 B.R. 206, 216 (Bankr.W.D.Mo.1989) (\u201cGood faith voting does not require, nor can it expect, a creditor to act with selfless disinterest.\u201d)."},"case_id":3620489,"label":"b"}
{"context":"As the Supreme Court has noted, a state law \"determination that [an entity] is a 'government agency,' and therefore entitled to the treatment accorded a governor, a mayor, or a state tax commission, for instance, is not binding on us when such a determination is essential to the decision of a federal question.\" The analysis may differ when the government nominally controls the production of advertisements, but as a practical matter has delegated control over the speech to a particular group that represents only one segment of the population.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"348 F.3d 157, 161","parenthetical":"\"We conclude that the pork industry's extensive control over the Pork Act's promotional activities prevents their attribution to the government.\"","sentence":"See Frame, 885 F.2d at 1133-34 (describing compelled contributions to a nominally government controlled \u201cCattleman\u2019s Board,\u201d where the persons with actual control over the disbursement of funds were private individuals \u201cwhose primary or overriding purpose is to promote the welfare of the cattle producers\u201d (quoting 7 U.S.C. \u00a7 2905(b)(4))); see also Mich. Pork Producers Ass\u2019n v. Veneman, 348 F.3d 157, 161 (6th Cir.2003) (\u201cWe conclude that the pork industry\u2019s extensive control over the Pork Act\u2019s promotional activities prevents their attribution to the government.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"885 F.2d 1133, 1133-34","parenthetical":"describing compelled contributions to a nominally government controlled \"Cattleman's Board,\" where the persons with actual control over the disbursement of funds were private individuals \"whose primary or overriding purpose is to promote the welfare of the cattle producers\" (quoting 7 U.S.C. SS 2905(b","sentence":"See Frame, 885 F.2d at 1133-34 (describing compelled contributions to a nominally government controlled \u201cCattleman\u2019s Board,\u201d where the persons with actual control over the disbursement of funds were private individuals \u201cwhose primary or overriding purpose is to promote the welfare of the cattle producers\u201d (quoting 7 U.S.C. \u00a7 2905(b)(4))); see also Mich. Pork Producers Ass\u2019n v. Veneman, 348 F.3d 157, 161 (6th Cir.2003) (\u201cWe conclude that the pork industry\u2019s extensive control over the Pork Act\u2019s promotional activities prevents their attribution to the government.\u201d)."},"case_id":8929374,"label":"b"}
{"context":"This statutory and regulatory framework, like the statutory and regulatory framework of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), involves an interactive process that requires participation by both the employer and the employee.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"827 F.2d 1081, 1085","parenthetical":"\"Although the burden is on the employer to accommodate the employee's religious needs, the employee must make some effort to cooperate with an employer's attempt at accommodation.\"","sentence":"See Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 69 107 S.Ct. 367, 372, 93 L.Ed.2d 305 (stating that, consistent with the goals expressed in the legislative history of the religious accommodation provision, \u201ccourts have noted that bilateral cooperation is appropriate in the search for an acceptable reconciliation of the needs of the employee\u2019s religion and the exigencies of the employer\u2019s business\u201d) (internal quotations and citations omitted); Smith v. Pyro Mining Co., 827 F.2d 1081, 1085 (6th Cir.1987) (\u201cAlthough the burden is on the employer to accommodate the employee\u2019s religious needs, the employee must make some effort to cooperate with an employer\u2019s attempt at accommodation.\u201d); cf. Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154, 1171-72 (10th Cir.1999) (en banc) (discussing the interactive process between an employer and an employee under the ADA)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"180 F.3d 1154, 1171-72","parenthetical":"discussing the interactive process between an employer and an employee under the ADA","sentence":"See Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 69 107 S.Ct. 367, 372, 93 L.Ed.2d 305 (stating that, consistent with the goals expressed in the legislative history of the religious accommodation provision, \u201ccourts have noted that bilateral cooperation is appropriate in the search for an acceptable reconciliation of the needs of the employee\u2019s religion and the exigencies of the employer\u2019s business\u201d) (internal quotations and citations omitted); Smith v. Pyro Mining Co., 827 F.2d 1081, 1085 (6th Cir.1987) (\u201cAlthough the burden is on the employer to accommodate the employee\u2019s religious needs, the employee must make some effort to cooperate with an employer\u2019s attempt at accommodation.\u201d); cf. Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154, 1171-72 (10th Cir.1999) (en banc) (discussing the interactive process between an employer and an employee under the ADA)."},"case_id":11235116,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Under the legal prong, an instruction on the lesser offense is proper \"only if the charged crime 'could not be committed' without also committing the lesser offense.\" Under this test, a lesser included instruction is inappropriate when alternative means exist by which the charged crime can be committed, one of which would not result in the commission of the alleged lesser included offense.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"121 Wn.2d 5, 5-6","parenthetical":"holding that there are no lesser included offenses of second degree felony murder because of the multiple means of committing the offense","sentence":"See Davis, 121 Wn.2d at 5-6 (holding that there are no lesser included offenses of second degree felony murder because of the multiple means of committing the offense); see also Curran, 116 Wn.2d at 183 (holding th\u00e1t an instruction on reckless driving was inappropriate as a. lesser included offense of vehicular homicide because the offense could be committed by the alternative means of driving with disregard for the safety of others)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"116 Wn.2d 183, 183","parenthetical":"holding that an instruction on reckless driving was inappropriate as a. lesser included offense of vehicular homicide because the offense could be committed by the alternative means of driving with disregard for the safety of others","sentence":"See Davis, 121 Wn.2d at 5-6 (holding that there are no lesser included offenses of second degree felony murder because of the multiple means of committing the offense); see also Curran, 116 Wn.2d at 183 (holding th\u00e1t an instruction on reckless driving was inappropriate as a. lesser included offense of vehicular homicide because the offense could be committed by the alternative means of driving with disregard for the safety of others)."},"case_id":11976829,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The district court properly determined that defendants were entitled to qualified immunity from Campbell's Free Exercise and RLUIPA claims for damages, because defendants' conduct did not violate clearly established law.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"514 F.3d 884, 884-85","parenthetical":"clarifying that sincerity of prisoner's religious beliefs, not objective doctrinal centrality of beliefs, determines whether Free Exercise Clause applies","sentence":"See Levine v. City of Alameda, 525 F.3d 903, 906 (9th Cir.2008) (\u201cUnder the defense of qualified immunity, a government official is immune from civil damages unless his conduct violates a clearly established right of which a reasonable person would have known\u201d); see also Shakur, 514 F.3d at 884-85 (clarifying that sincerity of prisoner\u2019s religious beliefs, not objective doctrinal centrality of beliefs, determines whether Free Exercise Clause applies)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"525 F.3d 903, 906","parenthetical":"\"Under the defense of qualified immunity, a government official is immune from civil damages unless his conduct violates a clearly established right of which a reasonable person would have known\"","sentence":"See Levine v. City of Alameda, 525 F.3d 903, 906 (9th Cir.2008) (\u201cUnder the defense of qualified immunity, a government official is immune from civil damages unless his conduct violates a clearly established right of which a reasonable person would have known\u201d); see also Shakur, 514 F.3d at 884-85 (clarifying that sincerity of prisoner\u2019s religious beliefs, not objective doctrinal centrality of beliefs, determines whether Free Exercise Clause applies)."},"case_id":3199977,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Corson argues that the ALJ erred in relying on the grids as she exhibits nonex-ertional limitations which restrict her from performing a full range of work. Plaintiffs Memorandum at 34. The Second Circuit has directed that where a disability benefits claimant cannot perform the full range of sedentary work, a strict, mechanical application of the grids is improper; rather, the claimant must be evaluated on an individual basis, and that such evaluation on an individual basis can \"can be met only by calling a vocational expert to testify as to the plaintiffs ability to perform some particular job.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"882 F.2d 45, 49","parenthetical":"reversing district court's decision upholding denial of plaintiffs claim for disability benefits and remanding for further evaluation of plaintiff on an individual basis, including testimony by a vocational expert, given that the grids do not apply to claimants who are unable to perform a full range of sedentary work","sentence":"Nelson v. Bowen, 882 F.2d 45, 49 (2d Cir.1989) (reversing district court\u2019s decision upholding denial of plaintiffs claim for disability benefits and remanding for further evaluation of plaintiff on an individual basis, including testimony by a vocational expert, given that the grids do not apply to claimants who are unable to perform a full range of sedentary work); see also Bapp v. Bowen, 802 F.2d 601, 605-06 (2d Cir.1986) (holding that application of the grids is inappropriate if a claimant suffers from nonexertional impairments which diminish his or her ability to perform a full range of work). However, the testimony of a vocational expert is not required where there is a finding that the claimant can perform a full range of work within a given category."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"802 F.2d 601, 605-06","parenthetical":"holding that application of the grids is inappropriate if a claimant suffers from nonexertional impairments which diminish his or her ability to perform a full range of work","sentence":"Nelson v. Bowen, 882 F.2d 45, 49 (2d Cir.1989) (reversing district court\u2019s decision upholding denial of plaintiffs claim for disability benefits and remanding for further evaluation of plaintiff on an individual basis, including testimony by a vocational expert, given that the grids do not apply to claimants who are unable to perform a full range of sedentary work); see also Bapp v. Bowen, 802 F.2d 601, 605-06 (2d Cir.1986) (holding that application of the grids is inappropriate if a claimant suffers from nonexertional impairments which diminish his or her ability to perform a full range of work). However, the testimony of a vocational expert is not required where there is a finding that the claimant can perform a full range of work within a given category."},"case_id":3416206,"label":"a"}
{"context":"However, as the Supreme Court observed in Morgan, \"discrete discriminatory acts are not actionable if time barred, even when they are related to acts alleged in timely filed charges. Each discrete discriminatory act starts a new clock for filing charges alleging that act.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"385 F.3d 220, 220","parenthetical":"\"The law is clear that termination and promotion claims may not be based on discrete acts falling outside the limitations period.\"","sentence":"Morgan, 536 U.S. at 113, 122 S.Ct. 2061; see Petrosino, 385 F.3d at 220 (\u201cThe law is clear that termination and promotion claims may not be based on discrete acts falling outside the limitations period.\u201d); Butts, 2007 WL 259937, at *7, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6534, at *22-23; see also Sundaram v. Brookhaven Nat\u2019l Lab., 424 F.Supp.2d 545, 560 (E.D.N.Y.2006) (\u201c[T]he exception does not apply to discrete, completed employment actions such as transfers, failures to promote, demotions, or inadequate wages.\u201d) (citations omitted)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"424 F.Supp.2d 545, 560","parenthetical":"\"[T]he exception does not apply to discrete, completed employment actions such as transfers, failures to promote, demotions, or inadequate wages.\"","sentence":"Morgan, 536 U.S. at 113, 122 S.Ct. 2061; see Petrosino, 385 F.3d at 220 (\u201cThe law is clear that termination and promotion claims may not be based on discrete acts falling outside the limitations period.\u201d); Butts, 2007 WL 259937, at *7, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6534, at *22-23; see also Sundaram v. Brookhaven Nat\u2019l Lab., 424 F.Supp.2d 545, 560 (E.D.N.Y.2006) (\u201c[T]he exception does not apply to discrete, completed employment actions such as transfers, failures to promote, demotions, or inadequate wages.\u201d) (citations omitted)."},"case_id":4230746,"label":"a"}
{"context":"I am less sanguine about the majority conclusion that there was no concealment or \"deliberate misstatement\" within the meaning of the controlling case law in this area. However, because materiality is a sine qua non to the grant of a new trial on the basis of juror nondisclosure, Tejada, 814 So.2d at 339 (delineating three elements, all of which must exist for a party to be awarded a new trial on the basis of juror nondisclosure), we need not reach that question.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"362 F.3d 786, 799","parenthetical":"\"[I]f it is not necessary to decide more, it is necessary not to decide more ... \"","sentence":"See Mann v. State, 937 So.2d 722, 730 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006) (Shepherd, J., specially concurring)(noting that \u201c[the] procedural ground [was] a sufficient ground to affirm the decision of the trial court\u201d and therefore declining to join remainder of majority opinion); N. Fla. Women\u2019s Health & Counseling Servs., Inc. v. State, 866 So.2d 612, 640 (Fla.2003) (declining to address remaining constitutional claims in case because unnecessary to disposition of the case); see also PDK Labs., Inc. v. United States DEA, 362 F.3d 786, 799 (D.C.Cir.2004)(Roberts, J., concurring) (\u201c[I]f it is not necessary to decide more, it is necessary not to decide more ... \u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"866 So.2d 612, 640","parenthetical":"declining to address remaining constitutional claims in case because unnecessary to disposition of the case","sentence":"See Mann v. State, 937 So.2d 722, 730 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006) (Shepherd, J., specially concurring)(noting that \u201c[the] procedural ground [was] a sufficient ground to affirm the decision of the trial court\u201d and therefore declining to join remainder of majority opinion); N. Fla. Women\u2019s Health & Counseling Servs., Inc. v. State, 866 So.2d 612, 640 (Fla.2003) (declining to address remaining constitutional claims in case because unnecessary to disposition of the case); see also PDK Labs., Inc. v. United States DEA, 362 F.3d 786, 799 (D.C.Cir.2004)(Roberts, J., concurring) (\u201c[I]f it is not necessary to decide more, it is necessary not to decide more ... \u201d)."},"case_id":8330033,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Accordingly, we conclude the court did not abuse its discretion when it included this instruction in the charge.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"855 S.W.2d 593, 601","parenthetical":"\"A court should uphold the petition as to a cause of action that may be reasonably inferred from what is specifically stated, even if an element of the cause of action is not specifically alleged.\"","sentence":"See Boyles v. Kerr, 855 S.W.2d 593, 601 (Tex.1993) (\u201cA court should uphold the petition as to a cause of action that may be reasonably inferred from what is specifically stated, even if an element of the cause of action is not specifically alleged.\u201d); see also Horizon\/CMS Healthcare Corp. v. Auld, 34 S.W.3d 887, 897 (Tex.2000) (petition is sufficient if it gives fair and adequate notice of facts upon which pleader bases claim)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"34 S.W.3d 887, 897","parenthetical":"petition is sufficient if it gives fair and adequate notice of facts upon which pleader bases claim","sentence":"See Boyles v. Kerr, 855 S.W.2d 593, 601 (Tex.1993) (\u201cA court should uphold the petition as to a cause of action that may be reasonably inferred from what is specifically stated, even if an element of the cause of action is not specifically alleged.\u201d); see also Horizon\/CMS Healthcare Corp. v. Auld, 34 S.W.3d 887, 897 (Tex.2000) (petition is sufficient if it gives fair and adequate notice of facts upon which pleader bases claim)."},"case_id":9082818,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The Supreme Court has never upheld, by contrast, a police roadblock designed to promote general law enforcement purposes. Indeed, the Court has indicated that the police must have individual suspicion before they can seize someone for general law enforcement purposes.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"43 Cal.3d 1321, 1327-28","parenthetical":"\"if the primary purpose of the [roadblock] were to detect crime or gather evidence of crime, we would agree with the contention that an individualized suspicion of wrongdoing is required\"","sentence":"In Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153-54, 45 S.Ct. 280, 285, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925), the Court stated that \u201c[i]t would be intolerable and unreasonable if a prohibition officer were authorized to stop every automobile on the chance of finding liquor, and thus subject all persons lawfully using the highways to the inconvenience and indignity of such a search.\u201d Thus, if Judge Dixon meant that the police established the Galberth roadblock in order to detect evidence of drugs or other crimes, the roadblock would be unconstitutional. See 3 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment \u00a7 9.5(b), at 551 (2d ed. 1987) (\u201ca general roadblock ... established on the chance of finding someone who has committed a serious crime\u201d would \u201cquite clearly\u201d be unconstitutional) (citation omitted); see also Ingersoll v. Palmer, 43 Cal.3d 1321, 1327-28, 743 P.2d 1299, 1303 (1987) (\u201cif the primary purpose of the [roadblock] were to detect crime or gather evidence of crime, we would agree with the contention that an individualized suspicion of wrongdoing is required\u201d); Meeks v. State, 692 S.W.2d 504, 508 (Tex.Crim.App.1985) (\u201cThe mere asking for a driver\u2019s license will not validate the stopping of an automobile if it is clear that the driver\u2019s license check was not the reason for detention\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"the governmental interest in controlling automobile thefts \"is not distinguishable from the general interest in crime control\" and is therefore insufficient to justify suspicionless stops","sentence":"See Delaware v. Prouse, supra, 440 U.S. at 659 n. 18, 99 S.Ct. at 1399 n. 18 (the governmental interest in controlling automobile thefts \u201cis not distinguishable from the general interest in crime control\u201d and is therefore insufficient to justify suspicionless stops)."},"case_id":7375413,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The Supreme Court has never upheld, by contrast, a police roadblock designed to promote general law enforcement purposes. Indeed, the Court has indicated that the police must have individual suspicion before they can seize someone for general law enforcement purposes.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"743 P.2d 1299, 1303","parenthetical":"\"if the primary purpose of the [roadblock] were to detect crime or gather evidence of crime, we would agree with the contention that an individualized suspicion of wrongdoing is required\"","sentence":"In Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153-54, 45 S.Ct. 280, 285, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925), the Court stated that \u201c[i]t would be intolerable and unreasonable if a prohibition officer were authorized to stop every automobile on the chance of finding liquor, and thus subject all persons lawfully using the highways to the inconvenience and indignity of such a search.\u201d Thus, if Judge Dixon meant that the police established the Galberth roadblock in order to detect evidence of drugs or other crimes, the roadblock would be unconstitutional. See 3 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment \u00a7 9.5(b), at 551 (2d ed. 1987) (\u201ca general roadblock ... established on the chance of finding someone who has committed a serious crime\u201d would \u201cquite clearly\u201d be unconstitutional) (citation omitted); see also Ingersoll v. Palmer, 43 Cal.3d 1321, 1327-28, 743 P.2d 1299, 1303 (1987) (\u201cif the primary purpose of the [roadblock] were to detect crime or gather evidence of crime, we would agree with the contention that an individualized suspicion of wrongdoing is required\u201d); Meeks v. State, 692 S.W.2d 504, 508 (Tex.Crim.App.1985) (\u201cThe mere asking for a driver\u2019s license will not validate the stopping of an automobile if it is clear that the driver\u2019s license check was not the reason for detention\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"the governmental interest in controlling automobile thefts \"is not distinguishable from the general interest in crime control\" and is therefore insufficient to justify suspicionless stops","sentence":"See Delaware v. Prouse, supra, 440 U.S. at 659 n. 18, 99 S.Ct. at 1399 n. 18 (the governmental interest in controlling automobile thefts \u201cis not distinguishable from the general interest in crime control\u201d and is therefore insufficient to justify suspicionless stops)."},"case_id":7375413,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The Supreme Court has never upheld, by contrast, a police roadblock designed to promote general law enforcement purposes. Indeed, the Court has indicated that the police must have individual suspicion before they can seize someone for general law enforcement purposes.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"692 S.W.2d 504, 508","parenthetical":"\"The mere asking for a driver's license will not validate the stopping of an automobile if it is clear that the driver's license check was not the reason for detention\"","sentence":"In Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153-54, 45 S.Ct. 280, 285, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925), the Court stated that \u201c[i]t would be intolerable and unreasonable if a prohibition officer were authorized to stop every automobile on the chance of finding liquor, and thus subject all persons lawfully using the highways to the inconvenience and indignity of such a search.\u201d Thus, if Judge Dixon meant that the police established the Galberth roadblock in order to detect evidence of drugs or other crimes, the roadblock would be unconstitutional. See 3 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment \u00a7 9.5(b), at 551 (2d ed. 1987) (\u201ca general roadblock ... established on the chance of finding someone who has committed a serious crime\u201d would \u201cquite clearly\u201d be unconstitutional) (citation omitted); see also Ingersoll v. Palmer, 43 Cal.3d 1321, 1327-28, 743 P.2d 1299, 1303 (1987) (\u201cif the primary purpose of the [roadblock] were to detect crime or gather evidence of crime, we would agree with the contention that an individualized suspicion of wrongdoing is required\u201d); Meeks v. State, 692 S.W.2d 504, 508 (Tex.Crim.App.1985) (\u201cThe mere asking for a driver\u2019s license will not validate the stopping of an automobile if it is clear that the driver\u2019s license check was not the reason for detention\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"the governmental interest in controlling automobile thefts \"is not distinguishable from the general interest in crime control\" and is therefore insufficient to justify suspicionless stops","sentence":"See Delaware v. Prouse, supra, 440 U.S. at 659 n. 18, 99 S.Ct. at 1399 n. 18 (the governmental interest in controlling automobile thefts \u201cis not distinguishable from the general interest in crime control\u201d and is therefore insufficient to justify suspicionless stops)."},"case_id":7375413,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The Supreme Court has never upheld, by contrast, a police roadblock designed to promote general law enforcement purposes. Indeed, the Court has indicated that the police must have individual suspicion before they can seize someone for general law enforcement purposes.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"the governmental interest in controlling automobile thefts \"is not distinguishable from the general interest in crime control\" and is therefore insufficient to justify suspicionless stops","sentence":"See Delaware v. Prouse, supra, 440 U.S. at 659 n. 18, 99 S.Ct. at 1399 n. 18 (the governmental interest in controlling automobile thefts \u201cis not distinguishable from the general interest in crime control\u201d and is therefore insufficient to justify suspicionless stops)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"43 Cal.3d 1321, 1327-28","parenthetical":"\"if the primary purpose of the [roadblock] were to detect crime or gather evidence of crime, we would agree with the contention that an individualized suspicion of wrongdoing is required\"","sentence":"In Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153-54, 45 S.Ct. 280, 285, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925), the Court stated that \u201c[i]t would be intolerable and unreasonable if a prohibition officer were authorized to stop every automobile on the chance of finding liquor, and thus subject all persons lawfully using the highways to the inconvenience and indignity of such a search.\u201d Thus, if Judge Dixon meant that the police established the Galberth roadblock in order to detect evidence of drugs or other crimes, the roadblock would be unconstitutional. See 3 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment \u00a7 9.5(b), at 551 (2d ed. 1987) (\u201ca general roadblock ... established on the chance of finding someone who has committed a serious crime\u201d would \u201cquite clearly\u201d be unconstitutional) (citation omitted); see also Ingersoll v. Palmer, 43 Cal.3d 1321, 1327-28, 743 P.2d 1299, 1303 (1987) (\u201cif the primary purpose of the [roadblock] were to detect crime or gather evidence of crime, we would agree with the contention that an individualized suspicion of wrongdoing is required\u201d); Meeks v. State, 692 S.W.2d 504, 508 (Tex.Crim.App.1985) (\u201cThe mere asking for a driver\u2019s license will not validate the stopping of an automobile if it is clear that the driver\u2019s license check was not the reason for detention\u201d)."},"case_id":7375413,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The Supreme Court has never upheld, by contrast, a police roadblock designed to promote general law enforcement purposes. Indeed, the Court has indicated that the police must have individual suspicion before they can seize someone for general law enforcement purposes.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"the governmental interest in controlling automobile thefts \"is not distinguishable from the general interest in crime control\" and is therefore insufficient to justify suspicionless stops","sentence":"See Delaware v. Prouse, supra, 440 U.S. at 659 n. 18, 99 S.Ct. at 1399 n. 18 (the governmental interest in controlling automobile thefts \u201cis not distinguishable from the general interest in crime control\u201d and is therefore insufficient to justify suspicionless stops)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"743 P.2d 1299, 1303","parenthetical":"\"if the primary purpose of the [roadblock] were to detect crime or gather evidence of crime, we would agree with the contention that an individualized suspicion of wrongdoing is required\"","sentence":"In Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153-54, 45 S.Ct. 280, 285, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925), the Court stated that \u201c[i]t would be intolerable and unreasonable if a prohibition officer were authorized to stop every automobile on the chance of finding liquor, and thus subject all persons lawfully using the highways to the inconvenience and indignity of such a search.\u201d Thus, if Judge Dixon meant that the police established the Galberth roadblock in order to detect evidence of drugs or other crimes, the roadblock would be unconstitutional. See 3 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment \u00a7 9.5(b), at 551 (2d ed. 1987) (\u201ca general roadblock ... established on the chance of finding someone who has committed a serious crime\u201d would \u201cquite clearly\u201d be unconstitutional) (citation omitted); see also Ingersoll v. Palmer, 43 Cal.3d 1321, 1327-28, 743 P.2d 1299, 1303 (1987) (\u201cif the primary purpose of the [roadblock] were to detect crime or gather evidence of crime, we would agree with the contention that an individualized suspicion of wrongdoing is required\u201d); Meeks v. State, 692 S.W.2d 504, 508 (Tex.Crim.App.1985) (\u201cThe mere asking for a driver\u2019s license will not validate the stopping of an automobile if it is clear that the driver\u2019s license check was not the reason for detention\u201d)."},"case_id":7375413,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The Supreme Court has never upheld, by contrast, a police roadblock designed to promote general law enforcement purposes. Indeed, the Court has indicated that the police must have individual suspicion before they can seize someone for general law enforcement purposes.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"the governmental interest in controlling automobile thefts \"is not distinguishable from the general interest in crime control\" and is therefore insufficient to justify suspicionless stops","sentence":"See Delaware v. Prouse, supra, 440 U.S. at 659 n. 18, 99 S.Ct. at 1399 n. 18 (the governmental interest in controlling automobile thefts \u201cis not distinguishable from the general interest in crime control\u201d and is therefore insufficient to justify suspicionless stops)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"692 S.W.2d 504, 508","parenthetical":"\"The mere asking for a driver's license will not validate the stopping of an automobile if it is clear that the driver's license check was not the reason for detention\"","sentence":"In Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153-54, 45 S.Ct. 280, 285, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925), the Court stated that \u201c[i]t would be intolerable and unreasonable if a prohibition officer were authorized to stop every automobile on the chance of finding liquor, and thus subject all persons lawfully using the highways to the inconvenience and indignity of such a search.\u201d Thus, if Judge Dixon meant that the police established the Galberth roadblock in order to detect evidence of drugs or other crimes, the roadblock would be unconstitutional. See 3 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment \u00a7 9.5(b), at 551 (2d ed. 1987) (\u201ca general roadblock ... established on the chance of finding someone who has committed a serious crime\u201d would \u201cquite clearly\u201d be unconstitutional) (citation omitted); see also Ingersoll v. Palmer, 43 Cal.3d 1321, 1327-28, 743 P.2d 1299, 1303 (1987) (\u201cif the primary purpose of the [roadblock] were to detect crime or gather evidence of crime, we would agree with the contention that an individualized suspicion of wrongdoing is required\u201d); Meeks v. State, 692 S.W.2d 504, 508 (Tex.Crim.App.1985) (\u201cThe mere asking for a driver\u2019s license will not validate the stopping of an automobile if it is clear that the driver\u2019s license check was not the reason for detention\u201d)."},"case_id":7375413,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The Supreme Court has never upheld, by contrast, a police roadblock designed to promote general law enforcement purposes. Indeed, the Court has indicated that the police must have individual suspicion before they can seize someone for general law enforcement purposes.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"43 Cal.3d 1321, 1327-28","parenthetical":"\"if the primary purpose of the [roadblock] were to detect crime or gather evidence of crime, we would agree with the contention that an individualized suspicion of wrongdoing is required\"","sentence":"In Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153-54, 45 S.Ct. 280, 285, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925), the Court stated that \u201c[i]t would be intolerable and unreasonable if a prohibition officer were authorized to stop every automobile on the chance of finding liquor, and thus subject all persons lawfully using the highways to the inconvenience and indignity of such a search.\u201d Thus, if Judge Dixon meant that the police established the Galberth roadblock in order to detect evidence of drugs or other crimes, the roadblock would be unconstitutional. See 3 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment \u00a7 9.5(b), at 551 (2d ed. 1987) (\u201ca general roadblock ... established on the chance of finding someone who has committed a serious crime\u201d would \u201cquite clearly\u201d be unconstitutional) (citation omitted); see also Ingersoll v. Palmer, 43 Cal.3d 1321, 1327-28, 743 P.2d 1299, 1303 (1987) (\u201cif the primary purpose of the [roadblock] were to detect crime or gather evidence of crime, we would agree with the contention that an individualized suspicion of wrongdoing is required\u201d); Meeks v. State, 692 S.W.2d 504, 508 (Tex.Crim.App.1985) (\u201cThe mere asking for a driver\u2019s license will not validate the stopping of an automobile if it is clear that the driver\u2019s license check was not the reason for detention\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"267 U.S. 132, 153-54","parenthetical":"\"a general roadblock ... established on the chance of finding someone who has committed a serious crime\" would \"quite clearly\" be unconstitutional","sentence":"In Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153-54, 45 S.Ct. 280, 285, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925), the Court stated that \u201c[i]t would be intolerable and unreasonable if a prohibition officer were authorized to stop every automobile on the chance of finding liquor, and thus subject all persons lawfully using the highways to the inconvenience and indignity of such a search.\u201d Thus, if Judge Dixon meant that the police established the Galberth roadblock in order to detect evidence of drugs or other crimes, the roadblock would be unconstitutional. See 3 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment \u00a7 9.5(b), at 551 (2d ed. 1987) (\u201ca general roadblock ... established on the chance of finding someone who has committed a serious crime\u201d would \u201cquite clearly\u201d be unconstitutional) (citation omitted); see also Ingersoll v. Palmer, 43 Cal.3d 1321, 1327-28, 743 P.2d 1299, 1303 (1987) (\u201cif the primary purpose of the [roadblock] were to detect crime or gather evidence of crime, we would agree with the contention that an individualized suspicion of wrongdoing is required\u201d); Meeks v. State, 692 S.W.2d 504, 508 (Tex.Crim.App.1985) (\u201cThe mere asking for a driver\u2019s license will not validate the stopping of an automobile if it is clear that the driver\u2019s license check was not the reason for detention\u201d)."},"case_id":7375413,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The Supreme Court has never upheld, by contrast, a police roadblock designed to promote general law enforcement purposes. Indeed, the Court has indicated that the police must have individual suspicion before they can seize someone for general law enforcement purposes.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"267 U.S. 132, 153-54","parenthetical":"\"a general roadblock ... established on the chance of finding someone who has committed a serious crime\" would \"quite clearly\" be unconstitutional","sentence":"In Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153-54, 45 S.Ct. 280, 285, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925), the Court stated that \u201c[i]t would be intolerable and unreasonable if a prohibition officer were authorized to stop every automobile on the chance of finding liquor, and thus subject all persons lawfully using the highways to the inconvenience and indignity of such a search.\u201d Thus, if Judge Dixon meant that the police established the Galberth roadblock in order to detect evidence of drugs or other crimes, the roadblock would be unconstitutional. See 3 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment \u00a7 9.5(b), at 551 (2d ed. 1987) (\u201ca general roadblock ... established on the chance of finding someone who has committed a serious crime\u201d would \u201cquite clearly\u201d be unconstitutional) (citation omitted); see also Ingersoll v. Palmer, 43 Cal.3d 1321, 1327-28, 743 P.2d 1299, 1303 (1987) (\u201cif the primary purpose of the [roadblock] were to detect crime or gather evidence of crime, we would agree with the contention that an individualized suspicion of wrongdoing is required\u201d); Meeks v. State, 692 S.W.2d 504, 508 (Tex.Crim.App.1985) (\u201cThe mere asking for a driver\u2019s license will not validate the stopping of an automobile if it is clear that the driver\u2019s license check was not the reason for detention\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"743 P.2d 1299, 1303","parenthetical":"\"if the primary purpose of the [roadblock] were to detect crime or gather evidence of crime, we would agree with the contention that an individualized suspicion of wrongdoing is required\"","sentence":"In Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153-54, 45 S.Ct. 280, 285, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925), the Court stated that \u201c[i]t would be intolerable and unreasonable if a prohibition officer were authorized to stop every automobile on the chance of finding liquor, and thus subject all persons lawfully using the highways to the inconvenience and indignity of such a search.\u201d Thus, if Judge Dixon meant that the police established the Galberth roadblock in order to detect evidence of drugs or other crimes, the roadblock would be unconstitutional. See 3 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment \u00a7 9.5(b), at 551 (2d ed. 1987) (\u201ca general roadblock ... established on the chance of finding someone who has committed a serious crime\u201d would \u201cquite clearly\u201d be unconstitutional) (citation omitted); see also Ingersoll v. Palmer, 43 Cal.3d 1321, 1327-28, 743 P.2d 1299, 1303 (1987) (\u201cif the primary purpose of the [roadblock] were to detect crime or gather evidence of crime, we would agree with the contention that an individualized suspicion of wrongdoing is required\u201d); Meeks v. State, 692 S.W.2d 504, 508 (Tex.Crim.App.1985) (\u201cThe mere asking for a driver\u2019s license will not validate the stopping of an automobile if it is clear that the driver\u2019s license check was not the reason for detention\u201d)."},"case_id":7375413,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The Supreme Court has never upheld, by contrast, a police roadblock designed to promote general law enforcement purposes. Indeed, the Court has indicated that the police must have individual suspicion before they can seize someone for general law enforcement purposes.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"692 S.W.2d 504, 508","parenthetical":"\"The mere asking for a driver's license will not validate the stopping of an automobile if it is clear that the driver's license check was not the reason for detention\"","sentence":"In Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153-54, 45 S.Ct. 280, 285, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925), the Court stated that \u201c[i]t would be intolerable and unreasonable if a prohibition officer were authorized to stop every automobile on the chance of finding liquor, and thus subject all persons lawfully using the highways to the inconvenience and indignity of such a search.\u201d Thus, if Judge Dixon meant that the police established the Galberth roadblock in order to detect evidence of drugs or other crimes, the roadblock would be unconstitutional. See 3 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment \u00a7 9.5(b), at 551 (2d ed. 1987) (\u201ca general roadblock ... established on the chance of finding someone who has committed a serious crime\u201d would \u201cquite clearly\u201d be unconstitutional) (citation omitted); see also Ingersoll v. Palmer, 43 Cal.3d 1321, 1327-28, 743 P.2d 1299, 1303 (1987) (\u201cif the primary purpose of the [roadblock] were to detect crime or gather evidence of crime, we would agree with the contention that an individualized suspicion of wrongdoing is required\u201d); Meeks v. State, 692 S.W.2d 504, 508 (Tex.Crim.App.1985) (\u201cThe mere asking for a driver\u2019s license will not validate the stopping of an automobile if it is clear that the driver\u2019s license check was not the reason for detention\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"267 U.S. 132, 153-54","parenthetical":"\"a general roadblock ... established on the chance of finding someone who has committed a serious crime\" would \"quite clearly\" be unconstitutional","sentence":"In Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153-54, 45 S.Ct. 280, 285, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925), the Court stated that \u201c[i]t would be intolerable and unreasonable if a prohibition officer were authorized to stop every automobile on the chance of finding liquor, and thus subject all persons lawfully using the highways to the inconvenience and indignity of such a search.\u201d Thus, if Judge Dixon meant that the police established the Galberth roadblock in order to detect evidence of drugs or other crimes, the roadblock would be unconstitutional. See 3 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment \u00a7 9.5(b), at 551 (2d ed. 1987) (\u201ca general roadblock ... established on the chance of finding someone who has committed a serious crime\u201d would \u201cquite clearly\u201d be unconstitutional) (citation omitted); see also Ingersoll v. Palmer, 43 Cal.3d 1321, 1327-28, 743 P.2d 1299, 1303 (1987) (\u201cif the primary purpose of the [roadblock] were to detect crime or gather evidence of crime, we would agree with the contention that an individualized suspicion of wrongdoing is required\u201d); Meeks v. State, 692 S.W.2d 504, 508 (Tex.Crim.App.1985) (\u201cThe mere asking for a driver\u2019s license will not validate the stopping of an automobile if it is clear that the driver\u2019s license check was not the reason for detention\u201d)."},"case_id":7375413,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The Supreme Court has never upheld, by contrast, a police roadblock designed to promote general law enforcement purposes. Indeed, the Court has indicated that the police must have individual suspicion before they can seize someone for general law enforcement purposes.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"43 Cal.3d 1321, 1327-28","parenthetical":"\"if the primary purpose of the [roadblock] were to detect crime or gather evidence of crime, we would agree with the contention that an individualized suspicion of wrongdoing is required\"","sentence":"In Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153-54, 45 S.Ct. 280, 285, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925), the Court stated that \u201c[i]t would be intolerable and unreasonable if a prohibition officer were authorized to stop every automobile on the chance of finding liquor, and thus subject all persons lawfully using the highways to the inconvenience and indignity of such a search.\u201d Thus, if Judge Dixon meant that the police established the Galberth roadblock in order to detect evidence of drugs or other crimes, the roadblock would be unconstitutional. See 3 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment \u00a7 9.5(b), at 551 (2d ed. 1987) (\u201ca general roadblock ... established on the chance of finding someone who has committed a serious crime\u201d would \u201cquite clearly\u201d be unconstitutional) (citation omitted); see also Ingersoll v. Palmer, 43 Cal.3d 1321, 1327-28, 743 P.2d 1299, 1303 (1987) (\u201cif the primary purpose of the [roadblock] were to detect crime or gather evidence of crime, we would agree with the contention that an individualized suspicion of wrongdoing is required\u201d); Meeks v. State, 692 S.W.2d 504, 508 (Tex.Crim.App.1985) (\u201cThe mere asking for a driver\u2019s license will not validate the stopping of an automobile if it is clear that the driver\u2019s license check was not the reason for detention\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"45 S.Ct. 280, 285","parenthetical":"\"a general roadblock ... established on the chance of finding someone who has committed a serious crime\" would \"quite clearly\" be unconstitutional","sentence":"In Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153-54, 45 S.Ct. 280, 285, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925), the Court stated that \u201c[i]t would be intolerable and unreasonable if a prohibition officer were authorized to stop every automobile on the chance of finding liquor, and thus subject all persons lawfully using the highways to the inconvenience and indignity of such a search.\u201d Thus, if Judge Dixon meant that the police established the Galberth roadblock in order to detect evidence of drugs or other crimes, the roadblock would be unconstitutional. See 3 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment \u00a7 9.5(b), at 551 (2d ed. 1987) (\u201ca general roadblock ... established on the chance of finding someone who has committed a serious crime\u201d would \u201cquite clearly\u201d be unconstitutional) (citation omitted); see also Ingersoll v. Palmer, 43 Cal.3d 1321, 1327-28, 743 P.2d 1299, 1303 (1987) (\u201cif the primary purpose of the [roadblock] were to detect crime or gather evidence of crime, we would agree with the contention that an individualized suspicion of wrongdoing is required\u201d); Meeks v. State, 692 S.W.2d 504, 508 (Tex.Crim.App.1985) (\u201cThe mere asking for a driver\u2019s license will not validate the stopping of an automobile if it is clear that the driver\u2019s license check was not the reason for detention\u201d)."},"case_id":7375413,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The Supreme Court has never upheld, by contrast, a police roadblock designed to promote general law enforcement purposes. Indeed, the Court has indicated that the police must have individual suspicion before they can seize someone for general law enforcement purposes.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"743 P.2d 1299, 1303","parenthetical":"\"if the primary purpose of the [roadblock] were to detect crime or gather evidence of crime, we would agree with the contention that an individualized suspicion of wrongdoing is required\"","sentence":"In Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153-54, 45 S.Ct. 280, 285, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925), the Court stated that \u201c[i]t would be intolerable and unreasonable if a prohibition officer were authorized to stop every automobile on the chance of finding liquor, and thus subject all persons lawfully using the highways to the inconvenience and indignity of such a search.\u201d Thus, if Judge Dixon meant that the police established the Galberth roadblock in order to detect evidence of drugs or other crimes, the roadblock would be unconstitutional. See 3 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment \u00a7 9.5(b), at 551 (2d ed. 1987) (\u201ca general roadblock ... established on the chance of finding someone who has committed a serious crime\u201d would \u201cquite clearly\u201d be unconstitutional) (citation omitted); see also Ingersoll v. Palmer, 43 Cal.3d 1321, 1327-28, 743 P.2d 1299, 1303 (1987) (\u201cif the primary purpose of the [roadblock] were to detect crime or gather evidence of crime, we would agree with the contention that an individualized suspicion of wrongdoing is required\u201d); Meeks v. State, 692 S.W.2d 504, 508 (Tex.Crim.App.1985) (\u201cThe mere asking for a driver\u2019s license will not validate the stopping of an automobile if it is clear that the driver\u2019s license check was not the reason for detention\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"45 S.Ct. 280, 285","parenthetical":"\"a general roadblock ... established on the chance of finding someone who has committed a serious crime\" would \"quite clearly\" be unconstitutional","sentence":"In Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153-54, 45 S.Ct. 280, 285, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925), the Court stated that \u201c[i]t would be intolerable and unreasonable if a prohibition officer were authorized to stop every automobile on the chance of finding liquor, and thus subject all persons lawfully using the highways to the inconvenience and indignity of such a search.\u201d Thus, if Judge Dixon meant that the police established the Galberth roadblock in order to detect evidence of drugs or other crimes, the roadblock would be unconstitutional. See 3 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment \u00a7 9.5(b), at 551 (2d ed. 1987) (\u201ca general roadblock ... established on the chance of finding someone who has committed a serious crime\u201d would \u201cquite clearly\u201d be unconstitutional) (citation omitted); see also Ingersoll v. Palmer, 43 Cal.3d 1321, 1327-28, 743 P.2d 1299, 1303 (1987) (\u201cif the primary purpose of the [roadblock] were to detect crime or gather evidence of crime, we would agree with the contention that an individualized suspicion of wrongdoing is required\u201d); Meeks v. State, 692 S.W.2d 504, 508 (Tex.Crim.App.1985) (\u201cThe mere asking for a driver\u2019s license will not validate the stopping of an automobile if it is clear that the driver\u2019s license check was not the reason for detention\u201d)."},"case_id":7375413,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The Supreme Court has never upheld, by contrast, a police roadblock designed to promote general law enforcement purposes. Indeed, the Court has indicated that the police must have individual suspicion before they can seize someone for general law enforcement purposes.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"45 S.Ct. 280, 285","parenthetical":"\"a general roadblock ... established on the chance of finding someone who has committed a serious crime\" would \"quite clearly\" be unconstitutional","sentence":"In Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153-54, 45 S.Ct. 280, 285, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925), the Court stated that \u201c[i]t would be intolerable and unreasonable if a prohibition officer were authorized to stop every automobile on the chance of finding liquor, and thus subject all persons lawfully using the highways to the inconvenience and indignity of such a search.\u201d Thus, if Judge Dixon meant that the police established the Galberth roadblock in order to detect evidence of drugs or other crimes, the roadblock would be unconstitutional. See 3 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment \u00a7 9.5(b), at 551 (2d ed. 1987) (\u201ca general roadblock ... established on the chance of finding someone who has committed a serious crime\u201d would \u201cquite clearly\u201d be unconstitutional) (citation omitted); see also Ingersoll v. Palmer, 43 Cal.3d 1321, 1327-28, 743 P.2d 1299, 1303 (1987) (\u201cif the primary purpose of the [roadblock] were to detect crime or gather evidence of crime, we would agree with the contention that an individualized suspicion of wrongdoing is required\u201d); Meeks v. State, 692 S.W.2d 504, 508 (Tex.Crim.App.1985) (\u201cThe mere asking for a driver\u2019s license will not validate the stopping of an automobile if it is clear that the driver\u2019s license check was not the reason for detention\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"692 S.W.2d 504, 508","parenthetical":"\"The mere asking for a driver's license will not validate the stopping of an automobile if it is clear that the driver's license check was not the reason for detention\"","sentence":"In Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153-54, 45 S.Ct. 280, 285, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925), the Court stated that \u201c[i]t would be intolerable and unreasonable if a prohibition officer were authorized to stop every automobile on the chance of finding liquor, and thus subject all persons lawfully using the highways to the inconvenience and indignity of such a search.\u201d Thus, if Judge Dixon meant that the police established the Galberth roadblock in order to detect evidence of drugs or other crimes, the roadblock would be unconstitutional. See 3 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment \u00a7 9.5(b), at 551 (2d ed. 1987) (\u201ca general roadblock ... established on the chance of finding someone who has committed a serious crime\u201d would \u201cquite clearly\u201d be unconstitutional) (citation omitted); see also Ingersoll v. Palmer, 43 Cal.3d 1321, 1327-28, 743 P.2d 1299, 1303 (1987) (\u201cif the primary purpose of the [roadblock] were to detect crime or gather evidence of crime, we would agree with the contention that an individualized suspicion of wrongdoing is required\u201d); Meeks v. State, 692 S.W.2d 504, 508 (Tex.Crim.App.1985) (\u201cThe mere asking for a driver\u2019s license will not validate the stopping of an automobile if it is clear that the driver\u2019s license check was not the reason for detention\u201d)."},"case_id":7375413,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The Supreme Court has never upheld, by contrast, a police roadblock designed to promote general law enforcement purposes. Indeed, the Court has indicated that the police must have individual suspicion before they can seize someone for general law enforcement purposes.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"43 Cal.3d 1321, 1327-28","parenthetical":"\"if the primary purpose of the [roadblock] were to detect crime or gather evidence of crime, we would agree with the contention that an individualized suspicion of wrongdoing is required\"","sentence":"In Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153-54, 45 S.Ct. 280, 285, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925), the Court stated that \u201c[i]t would be intolerable and unreasonable if a prohibition officer were authorized to stop every automobile on the chance of finding liquor, and thus subject all persons lawfully using the highways to the inconvenience and indignity of such a search.\u201d Thus, if Judge Dixon meant that the police established the Galberth roadblock in order to detect evidence of drugs or other crimes, the roadblock would be unconstitutional. See 3 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment \u00a7 9.5(b), at 551 (2d ed. 1987) (\u201ca general roadblock ... established on the chance of finding someone who has committed a serious crime\u201d would \u201cquite clearly\u201d be unconstitutional) (citation omitted); see also Ingersoll v. Palmer, 43 Cal.3d 1321, 1327-28, 743 P.2d 1299, 1303 (1987) (\u201cif the primary purpose of the [roadblock] were to detect crime or gather evidence of crime, we would agree with the contention that an individualized suspicion of wrongdoing is required\u201d); Meeks v. State, 692 S.W.2d 504, 508 (Tex.Crim.App.1985) (\u201cThe mere asking for a driver\u2019s license will not validate the stopping of an automobile if it is clear that the driver\u2019s license check was not the reason for detention\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"a general roadblock ... established on the chance of finding someone who has committed a serious crime\" would \"quite clearly\" be unconstitutional","sentence":"In Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153-54, 45 S.Ct. 280, 285, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925), the Court stated that \u201c[i]t would be intolerable and unreasonable if a prohibition officer were authorized to stop every automobile on the chance of finding liquor, and thus subject all persons lawfully using the highways to the inconvenience and indignity of such a search.\u201d Thus, if Judge Dixon meant that the police established the Galberth roadblock in order to detect evidence of drugs or other crimes, the roadblock would be unconstitutional. See 3 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment \u00a7 9.5(b), at 551 (2d ed. 1987) (\u201ca general roadblock ... established on the chance of finding someone who has committed a serious crime\u201d would \u201cquite clearly\u201d be unconstitutional) (citation omitted); see also Ingersoll v. Palmer, 43 Cal.3d 1321, 1327-28, 743 P.2d 1299, 1303 (1987) (\u201cif the primary purpose of the [roadblock] were to detect crime or gather evidence of crime, we would agree with the contention that an individualized suspicion of wrongdoing is required\u201d); Meeks v. State, 692 S.W.2d 504, 508 (Tex.Crim.App.1985) (\u201cThe mere asking for a driver\u2019s license will not validate the stopping of an automobile if it is clear that the driver\u2019s license check was not the reason for detention\u201d)."},"case_id":7375413,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The Supreme Court has never upheld, by contrast, a police roadblock designed to promote general law enforcement purposes. Indeed, the Court has indicated that the police must have individual suspicion before they can seize someone for general law enforcement purposes.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"743 P.2d 1299, 1303","parenthetical":"\"if the primary purpose of the [roadblock] were to detect crime or gather evidence of crime, we would agree with the contention that an individualized suspicion of wrongdoing is required\"","sentence":"In Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153-54, 45 S.Ct. 280, 285, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925), the Court stated that \u201c[i]t would be intolerable and unreasonable if a prohibition officer were authorized to stop every automobile on the chance of finding liquor, and thus subject all persons lawfully using the highways to the inconvenience and indignity of such a search.\u201d Thus, if Judge Dixon meant that the police established the Galberth roadblock in order to detect evidence of drugs or other crimes, the roadblock would be unconstitutional. See 3 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment \u00a7 9.5(b), at 551 (2d ed. 1987) (\u201ca general roadblock ... established on the chance of finding someone who has committed a serious crime\u201d would \u201cquite clearly\u201d be unconstitutional) (citation omitted); see also Ingersoll v. Palmer, 43 Cal.3d 1321, 1327-28, 743 P.2d 1299, 1303 (1987) (\u201cif the primary purpose of the [roadblock] were to detect crime or gather evidence of crime, we would agree with the contention that an individualized suspicion of wrongdoing is required\u201d); Meeks v. State, 692 S.W.2d 504, 508 (Tex.Crim.App.1985) (\u201cThe mere asking for a driver\u2019s license will not validate the stopping of an automobile if it is clear that the driver\u2019s license check was not the reason for detention\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"a general roadblock ... established on the chance of finding someone who has committed a serious crime\" would \"quite clearly\" be unconstitutional","sentence":"In Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153-54, 45 S.Ct. 280, 285, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925), the Court stated that \u201c[i]t would be intolerable and unreasonable if a prohibition officer were authorized to stop every automobile on the chance of finding liquor, and thus subject all persons lawfully using the highways to the inconvenience and indignity of such a search.\u201d Thus, if Judge Dixon meant that the police established the Galberth roadblock in order to detect evidence of drugs or other crimes, the roadblock would be unconstitutional. See 3 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment \u00a7 9.5(b), at 551 (2d ed. 1987) (\u201ca general roadblock ... established on the chance of finding someone who has committed a serious crime\u201d would \u201cquite clearly\u201d be unconstitutional) (citation omitted); see also Ingersoll v. Palmer, 43 Cal.3d 1321, 1327-28, 743 P.2d 1299, 1303 (1987) (\u201cif the primary purpose of the [roadblock] were to detect crime or gather evidence of crime, we would agree with the contention that an individualized suspicion of wrongdoing is required\u201d); Meeks v. State, 692 S.W.2d 504, 508 (Tex.Crim.App.1985) (\u201cThe mere asking for a driver\u2019s license will not validate the stopping of an automobile if it is clear that the driver\u2019s license check was not the reason for detention\u201d)."},"case_id":7375413,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The Supreme Court has never upheld, by contrast, a police roadblock designed to promote general law enforcement purposes. Indeed, the Court has indicated that the police must have individual suspicion before they can seize someone for general law enforcement purposes.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"a general roadblock ... established on the chance of finding someone who has committed a serious crime\" would \"quite clearly\" be unconstitutional","sentence":"In Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153-54, 45 S.Ct. 280, 285, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925), the Court stated that \u201c[i]t would be intolerable and unreasonable if a prohibition officer were authorized to stop every automobile on the chance of finding liquor, and thus subject all persons lawfully using the highways to the inconvenience and indignity of such a search.\u201d Thus, if Judge Dixon meant that the police established the Galberth roadblock in order to detect evidence of drugs or other crimes, the roadblock would be unconstitutional. See 3 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment \u00a7 9.5(b), at 551 (2d ed. 1987) (\u201ca general roadblock ... established on the chance of finding someone who has committed a serious crime\u201d would \u201cquite clearly\u201d be unconstitutional) (citation omitted); see also Ingersoll v. Palmer, 43 Cal.3d 1321, 1327-28, 743 P.2d 1299, 1303 (1987) (\u201cif the primary purpose of the [roadblock] were to detect crime or gather evidence of crime, we would agree with the contention that an individualized suspicion of wrongdoing is required\u201d); Meeks v. State, 692 S.W.2d 504, 508 (Tex.Crim.App.1985) (\u201cThe mere asking for a driver\u2019s license will not validate the stopping of an automobile if it is clear that the driver\u2019s license check was not the reason for detention\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"692 S.W.2d 504, 508","parenthetical":"\"The mere asking for a driver's license will not validate the stopping of an automobile if it is clear that the driver's license check was not the reason for detention\"","sentence":"In Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153-54, 45 S.Ct. 280, 285, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925), the Court stated that \u201c[i]t would be intolerable and unreasonable if a prohibition officer were authorized to stop every automobile on the chance of finding liquor, and thus subject all persons lawfully using the highways to the inconvenience and indignity of such a search.\u201d Thus, if Judge Dixon meant that the police established the Galberth roadblock in order to detect evidence of drugs or other crimes, the roadblock would be unconstitutional. See 3 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment \u00a7 9.5(b), at 551 (2d ed. 1987) (\u201ca general roadblock ... established on the chance of finding someone who has committed a serious crime\u201d would \u201cquite clearly\u201d be unconstitutional) (citation omitted); see also Ingersoll v. Palmer, 43 Cal.3d 1321, 1327-28, 743 P.2d 1299, 1303 (1987) (\u201cif the primary purpose of the [roadblock] were to detect crime or gather evidence of crime, we would agree with the contention that an individualized suspicion of wrongdoing is required\u201d); Meeks v. State, 692 S.W.2d 504, 508 (Tex.Crim.App.1985) (\u201cThe mere asking for a driver\u2019s license will not validate the stopping of an automobile if it is clear that the driver\u2019s license check was not the reason for detention\u201d)."},"case_id":7375413,"label":"a"}
{"context":". In his Concurring Opinion, Mr. Justice Saylor proposes that appellant was not a civil officer within the meaning of Article VI, Section 7 because he was not a statewide officer.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"923 A.2d 1167, 1167","parenthetical":"contending that \"state-level officials were almost exclusively in view when [the precursor to Article VI, Section 7] was framed\" in 1873","sentence":"See Concurring Op., at 213-14, 923 A.2d at 1167 (contending that \"state-level officials were almost exclusively in view when [the precursor to Article VI, Section 7] was framed\u201d in 1873). Although he acknowledges that this Court applied Article VI, Section 7 to local officers as recently as South Newton Township Electors, supra, and In re Petition to Recall Reese, 542 Pa. 114, 665 A.2d 1162 (1995), Justice Saylor would distinguish those decisions by noting that \u201cit is not clear that those decisions took into account the Commonwealth-official versus local-official distinction.\u201d"},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"applying Article VI, Section 7 to board members of the Allegheny Regional Asset District","sentence":"Op. at 213, 923 A.2d at 1167; see also Allegheny Inst. Taxpayers Coalition v. Allegheny Regional Asset Dist., 556 Pa. 102, 727 A.2d 113, 118 (1999) (applying Article VI, Section 7 to board members of the Allegheny Regional Asset District)."},"case_id":3556559,"label":"a"}
{"context":". In his Concurring Opinion, Mr. Justice Saylor proposes that appellant was not a civil officer within the meaning of Article VI, Section 7 because he was not a statewide officer.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"727 A.2d 113, 118","parenthetical":"applying Article VI, Section 7 to board members of the Allegheny Regional Asset District","sentence":"Op. at 213, 923 A.2d at 1167; see also Allegheny Inst. Taxpayers Coalition v. Allegheny Regional Asset Dist., 556 Pa. 102, 727 A.2d 113, 118 (1999) (applying Article VI, Section 7 to board members of the Allegheny Regional Asset District)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"923 A.2d 1167, 1167","parenthetical":"contending that \"state-level officials were almost exclusively in view when [the precursor to Article VI, Section 7] was framed\" in 1873","sentence":"See Concurring Op., at 213-14, 923 A.2d at 1167 (contending that \"state-level officials were almost exclusively in view when [the precursor to Article VI, Section 7] was framed\u201d in 1873). Although he acknowledges that this Court applied Article VI, Section 7 to local officers as recently as South Newton Township Electors, supra, and In re Petition to Recall Reese, 542 Pa. 114, 665 A.2d 1162 (1995), Justice Saylor would distinguish those decisions by noting that \u201cit is not clear that those decisions took into account the Commonwealth-official versus local-official distinction.\u201d"},"case_id":3556559,"label":"b"}
{"context":". In his Concurring Opinion, Mr. Justice Saylor proposes that appellant was not a civil officer within the meaning of Article VI, Section 7 because he was not a statewide officer.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"contending that \"state-level officials were almost exclusively in view when [the precursor to Article VI, Section 7] was framed\" in 1873","sentence":"See Concurring Op., at 213-14, 923 A.2d at 1167 (contending that \"state-level officials were almost exclusively in view when [the precursor to Article VI, Section 7] was framed\u201d in 1873). Although he acknowledges that this Court applied Article VI, Section 7 to local officers as recently as South Newton Township Electors, supra, and In re Petition to Recall Reese, 542 Pa. 114, 665 A.2d 1162 (1995), Justice Saylor would distinguish those decisions by noting that \u201cit is not clear that those decisions took into account the Commonwealth-official versus local-official distinction.\u201d"},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"applying Article VI, Section 7 to board members of the Allegheny Regional Asset District","sentence":"Op. at 213, 923 A.2d at 1167; see also Allegheny Inst. Taxpayers Coalition v. Allegheny Regional Asset Dist., 556 Pa. 102, 727 A.2d 113, 118 (1999) (applying Article VI, Section 7 to board members of the Allegheny Regional Asset District)."},"case_id":3556559,"label":"a"}
{"context":". In his Concurring Opinion, Mr. Justice Saylor proposes that appellant was not a civil officer within the meaning of Article VI, Section 7 because he was not a statewide officer.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"contending that \"state-level officials were almost exclusively in view when [the precursor to Article VI, Section 7] was framed\" in 1873","sentence":"See Concurring Op., at 213-14, 923 A.2d at 1167 (contending that \"state-level officials were almost exclusively in view when [the precursor to Article VI, Section 7] was framed\u201d in 1873). Although he acknowledges that this Court applied Article VI, Section 7 to local officers as recently as South Newton Township Electors, supra, and In re Petition to Recall Reese, 542 Pa. 114, 665 A.2d 1162 (1995), Justice Saylor would distinguish those decisions by noting that \u201cit is not clear that those decisions took into account the Commonwealth-official versus local-official distinction.\u201d"},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"727 A.2d 113, 118","parenthetical":"applying Article VI, Section 7 to board members of the Allegheny Regional Asset District","sentence":"Op. at 213, 923 A.2d at 1167; see also Allegheny Inst. Taxpayers Coalition v. Allegheny Regional Asset Dist., 556 Pa. 102, 727 A.2d 113, 118 (1999) (applying Article VI, Section 7 to board members of the Allegheny Regional Asset District)."},"case_id":3556559,"label":"a"}
{"context":". In his Concurring Opinion, Mr. Justice Saylor proposes that appellant was not a civil officer within the meaning of Article VI, Section 7 because he was not a statewide officer.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"contending that \"state-level officials were almost exclusively in view when [the precursor to Article VI, Section 7] was framed\" in 1873","sentence":"See Concurring Op., at 213-14, 923 A.2d at 1167 (contending that \"state-level officials were almost exclusively in view when [the precursor to Article VI, Section 7] was framed\u201d in 1873). Although he acknowledges that this Court applied Article VI, Section 7 to local officers as recently as South Newton Township Electors, supra, and In re Petition to Recall Reese, 542 Pa. 114, 665 A.2d 1162 (1995), Justice Saylor would distinguish those decisions by noting that \u201cit is not clear that those decisions took into account the Commonwealth-official versus local-official distinction.\u201d"},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"applying Article VI, Section 7 to board members of the Allegheny Regional Asset District","sentence":"Op. at 213, 923 A.2d at 1167; see also Allegheny Inst. Taxpayers Coalition v. Allegheny Regional Asset Dist., 556 Pa. 102, 727 A.2d 113, 118 (1999) (applying Article VI, Section 7 to board members of the Allegheny Regional Asset District)."},"case_id":3556559,"label":"a"}
{"context":". In his Concurring Opinion, Mr. Justice Saylor proposes that appellant was not a civil officer within the meaning of Article VI, Section 7 because he was not a statewide officer.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"727 A.2d 113, 118","parenthetical":"applying Article VI, Section 7 to board members of the Allegheny Regional Asset District","sentence":"Op. at 213, 923 A.2d at 1167; see also Allegheny Inst. Taxpayers Coalition v. Allegheny Regional Asset Dist., 556 Pa. 102, 727 A.2d 113, 118 (1999) (applying Article VI, Section 7 to board members of the Allegheny Regional Asset District)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"contending that \"state-level officials were almost exclusively in view when [the precursor to Article VI, Section 7] was framed\" in 1873","sentence":"See Concurring Op., at 213-14, 923 A.2d at 1167 (contending that \"state-level officials were almost exclusively in view when [the precursor to Article VI, Section 7] was framed\u201d in 1873). Although he acknowledges that this Court applied Article VI, Section 7 to local officers as recently as South Newton Township Electors, supra, and In re Petition to Recall Reese, 542 Pa. 114, 665 A.2d 1162 (1995), Justice Saylor would distinguish those decisions by noting that \u201cit is not clear that those decisions took into account the Commonwealth-official versus local-official distinction.\u201d"},"case_id":3556559,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Other than requesting attorney's fees in their pre-judgment pleadings, the LaAsmars failed to follow any of these other required procedures. Under these circumstances, the district court did not err in not addressing their request for fees.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"436 F.3d 750, 750","parenthetical":"affirming the district court's denial of an untimely Rule 54(d)(2)(B) motion for fees in an ERISA case","sentence":"See Bender; 436 F.3d at 750 (affirming the district court\u2019s denial of an untimely Rule 54(d)(2)(B) motion for fees in an ERISA case); cf. Quigley v. Rosenthal, 427 F.3d 1232, 1236-38 (10th Cir.2005) (holding the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying attorney\u2019s fees because plaintiffs\u2019 Rule 54(d)(2) motion was untimely and they had failed to show excusable neglect that would justify extending the time they had to file such a motion)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"427 F.3d 1232, 1236-38","parenthetical":"holding the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying attorney's fees because plaintiffs' Rule 54(d","sentence":"See Bender; 436 F.3d at 750 (affirming the district court\u2019s denial of an untimely Rule 54(d)(2)(B) motion for fees in an ERISA case); cf. Quigley v. Rosenthal, 427 F.3d 1232, 1236-38 (10th Cir.2005) (holding the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying attorney\u2019s fees because plaintiffs\u2019 Rule 54(d)(2) motion was untimely and they had failed to show excusable neglect that would justify extending the time they had to file such a motion)."},"case_id":6054495,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The exact nature of Leonard's conduct is instead a disputed issue of material fact, and our legal analysis need not consider the merits of that dispute. \"It is firmly settled that under our Constitution the public expression of ideas may not be prohibited merely because the ideas are themselves offensive to some of their hearers.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"408 U.S. 92, 96","parenthetical":"noting \"an 'equality of status in the field of ideas' \"","sentence":"Street, 394 U.S. at 592, 89 S.Ct. 1354; Police Dep\u2019t of City of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96, 92 S.Ct. 2286, 33 L.Ed.2d 212 (1972) (noting \u201can \u2018equality of status in the field of ideas\u2019 \u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"340 U.S. 315, 320","parenthetical":"upholding conviction for breach of the peace where sidewalk speaker created an \"immediate threat to public safety, peace, or order.\"","sentence":"But see Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315, 320, 71 S.Ct. 303, 95 L.Ed. 295 (1951) (upholding conviction for breach of the peace where sidewalk speaker created an \u201cimmediate threat to public safety, peace, or order.\u201d)"},"case_id":3778932,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The exact nature of Leonard's conduct is instead a disputed issue of material fact, and our legal analysis need not consider the merits of that dispute. \"It is firmly settled that under our Constitution the public expression of ideas may not be prohibited merely because the ideas are themselves offensive to some of their hearers.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"408 U.S. 92, 96","parenthetical":"noting \"an 'equality of status in the field of ideas' \"","sentence":"Street, 394 U.S. at 592, 89 S.Ct. 1354; Police Dep\u2019t of City of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96, 92 S.Ct. 2286, 33 L.Ed.2d 212 (1972) (noting \u201can \u2018equality of status in the field of ideas\u2019 \u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"upholding conviction for breach of the peace where sidewalk speaker created an \"immediate threat to public safety, peace, or order.\"","sentence":"But see Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315, 320, 71 S.Ct. 303, 95 L.Ed. 295 (1951) (upholding conviction for breach of the peace where sidewalk speaker created an \u201cimmediate threat to public safety, peace, or order.\u201d)"},"case_id":3778932,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The exact nature of Leonard's conduct is instead a disputed issue of material fact, and our legal analysis need not consider the merits of that dispute. \"It is firmly settled that under our Constitution the public expression of ideas may not be prohibited merely because the ideas are themselves offensive to some of their hearers.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"upholding conviction for breach of the peace where sidewalk speaker created an \"immediate threat to public safety, peace, or order.\"","sentence":"But see Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315, 320, 71 S.Ct. 303, 95 L.Ed. 295 (1951) (upholding conviction for breach of the peace where sidewalk speaker created an \u201cimmediate threat to public safety, peace, or order.\u201d)"},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"408 U.S. 92, 96","parenthetical":"noting \"an 'equality of status in the field of ideas' \"","sentence":"Street, 394 U.S. at 592, 89 S.Ct. 1354; Police Dep\u2019t of City of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96, 92 S.Ct. 2286, 33 L.Ed.2d 212 (1972) (noting \u201can \u2018equality of status in the field of ideas\u2019 \u201d)."},"case_id":3778932,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The exact nature of Leonard's conduct is instead a disputed issue of material fact, and our legal analysis need not consider the merits of that dispute. \"It is firmly settled that under our Constitution the public expression of ideas may not be prohibited merely because the ideas are themselves offensive to some of their hearers.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"340 U.S. 315, 320","parenthetical":"upholding conviction for breach of the peace where sidewalk speaker created an \"immediate threat to public safety, peace, or order.\"","sentence":"But see Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315, 320, 71 S.Ct. 303, 95 L.Ed. 295 (1951) (upholding conviction for breach of the peace where sidewalk speaker created an \u201cimmediate threat to public safety, peace, or order.\u201d)"},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting \"an 'equality of status in the field of ideas' \"","sentence":"Street, 394 U.S. at 592, 89 S.Ct. 1354; Police Dep\u2019t of City of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96, 92 S.Ct. 2286, 33 L.Ed.2d 212 (1972) (noting \u201can \u2018equality of status in the field of ideas\u2019 \u201d)."},"case_id":3778932,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The exact nature of Leonard's conduct is instead a disputed issue of material fact, and our legal analysis need not consider the merits of that dispute. \"It is firmly settled that under our Constitution the public expression of ideas may not be prohibited merely because the ideas are themselves offensive to some of their hearers.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting \"an 'equality of status in the field of ideas' \"","sentence":"Street, 394 U.S. at 592, 89 S.Ct. 1354; Police Dep\u2019t of City of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96, 92 S.Ct. 2286, 33 L.Ed.2d 212 (1972) (noting \u201can \u2018equality of status in the field of ideas\u2019 \u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"upholding conviction for breach of the peace where sidewalk speaker created an \"immediate threat to public safety, peace, or order.\"","sentence":"But see Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315, 320, 71 S.Ct. 303, 95 L.Ed. 295 (1951) (upholding conviction for breach of the peace where sidewalk speaker created an \u201cimmediate threat to public safety, peace, or order.\u201d)"},"case_id":3778932,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The exact nature of Leonard's conduct is instead a disputed issue of material fact, and our legal analysis need not consider the merits of that dispute. \"It is firmly settled that under our Constitution the public expression of ideas may not be prohibited merely because the ideas are themselves offensive to some of their hearers.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"upholding conviction for breach of the peace where sidewalk speaker created an \"immediate threat to public safety, peace, or order.\"","sentence":"But see Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315, 320, 71 S.Ct. 303, 95 L.Ed. 295 (1951) (upholding conviction for breach of the peace where sidewalk speaker created an \u201cimmediate threat to public safety, peace, or order.\u201d)"},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting \"an 'equality of status in the field of ideas' \"","sentence":"Street, 394 U.S. at 592, 89 S.Ct. 1354; Police Dep\u2019t of City of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96, 92 S.Ct. 2286, 33 L.Ed.2d 212 (1972) (noting \u201can \u2018equality of status in the field of ideas\u2019 \u201d)."},"case_id":3778932,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The exact nature of Leonard's conduct is instead a disputed issue of material fact, and our legal analysis need not consider the merits of that dispute. \"It is firmly settled that under our Constitution the public expression of ideas may not be prohibited merely because the ideas are themselves offensive to some of their hearers.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"340 U.S. 315, 320","parenthetical":"upholding conviction for breach of the peace where sidewalk speaker created an \"immediate threat to public safety, peace, or order.\"","sentence":"But see Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315, 320, 71 S.Ct. 303, 95 L.Ed. 295 (1951) (upholding conviction for breach of the peace where sidewalk speaker created an \u201cimmediate threat to public safety, peace, or order.\u201d)"},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting \"an 'equality of status in the field of ideas' \"","sentence":"Street, 394 U.S. at 592, 89 S.Ct. 1354; Police Dep\u2019t of City of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96, 92 S.Ct. 2286, 33 L.Ed.2d 212 (1972) (noting \u201can \u2018equality of status in the field of ideas\u2019 \u201d)."},"case_id":3778932,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The exact nature of Leonard's conduct is instead a disputed issue of material fact, and our legal analysis need not consider the merits of that dispute. \"It is firmly settled that under our Constitution the public expression of ideas may not be prohibited merely because the ideas are themselves offensive to some of their hearers.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting \"an 'equality of status in the field of ideas' \"","sentence":"Street, 394 U.S. at 592, 89 S.Ct. 1354; Police Dep\u2019t of City of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96, 92 S.Ct. 2286, 33 L.Ed.2d 212 (1972) (noting \u201can \u2018equality of status in the field of ideas\u2019 \u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"upholding conviction for breach of the peace where sidewalk speaker created an \"immediate threat to public safety, peace, or order.\"","sentence":"But see Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315, 320, 71 S.Ct. 303, 95 L.Ed. 295 (1951) (upholding conviction for breach of the peace where sidewalk speaker created an \u201cimmediate threat to public safety, peace, or order.\u201d)"},"case_id":3778932,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The exact nature of Leonard's conduct is instead a disputed issue of material fact, and our legal analysis need not consider the merits of that dispute. \"It is firmly settled that under our Constitution the public expression of ideas may not be prohibited merely because the ideas are themselves offensive to some of their hearers.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"upholding conviction for breach of the peace where sidewalk speaker created an \"immediate threat to public safety, peace, or order.\"","sentence":"But see Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315, 320, 71 S.Ct. 303, 95 L.Ed. 295 (1951) (upholding conviction for breach of the peace where sidewalk speaker created an \u201cimmediate threat to public safety, peace, or order.\u201d)"},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting \"an 'equality of status in the field of ideas' \"","sentence":"Street, 394 U.S. at 592, 89 S.Ct. 1354; Police Dep\u2019t of City of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96, 92 S.Ct. 2286, 33 L.Ed.2d 212 (1972) (noting \u201can \u2018equality of status in the field of ideas\u2019 \u201d)."},"case_id":3778932,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In finding the statute constitutional under the Commerce Clause, we reasoned that, unlike the Gun-Free School Zones Act at issue in Lopez, the felon-in-possession statute has an express jurisdictional element, which would ensure that the firearm possession in question affects interstate commerce.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"258 F.3d 1258, 1259","parenthetical":"holding that \"Morrison does not change the holding in McAllister and that SS 922(g","sentence":"United States, 529 U.S. 848, 120 S.Ct. 1904, 146 L.Ed.2d 902 (2000) ] alters the reasoning upon which McAllister is moored.\u201d); United States v. Dupree, 258 F.3d 1258, 1259 (11th Cir.2001) (holding that \u201cMorrison does not change the holding in McAllister and that \u00a7 922(g) is a constitutional exercise of Congress\u2019s commerce power.\u201d); see also United States v. Ballinger, 395 F.3d 1218 (11th Cir.) (en banc) (rejecting facial and as-applied challenges, based on the Commerce Clause, to 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 247, pursuant to the \u201capproach this Circuit has repeatedly taken to the nearly identical language found in \u00a7 922(g)\u201d), pet. for cert. filed, No. 04-9627 (Apr. 7, 2005)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"rejecting facial and as-applied challenges, based on the Commerce Clause, to 18 U.S.C. SS 247, pursuant to the \"approach this Circuit has repeatedly taken to the nearly identical language found in SS 922(g","sentence":"United States, 529 U.S. 848, 120 S.Ct. 1904, 146 L.Ed.2d 902 (2000) ] alters the reasoning upon which McAllister is moored.\u201d); United States v. Dupree, 258 F.3d 1258, 1259 (11th Cir.2001) (holding that \u201cMorrison does not change the holding in McAllister and that \u00a7 922(g) is a constitutional exercise of Congress\u2019s commerce power.\u201d); see also United States v. Ballinger, 395 F.3d 1218 (11th Cir.) (en banc) (rejecting facial and as-applied challenges, based on the Commerce Clause, to 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 247, pursuant to the \u201capproach this Circuit has repeatedly taken to the nearly identical language found in \u00a7 922(g)\u201d), pet. for cert. filed, No. 04-9627 (Apr. 7, 2005)."},"case_id":1231398,"label":"a"}
{"context":"We do not think that de la Cruz-Paulino's comment, \"No, watch out the police is around, going around here,\" is sufficient in this context to allow a reasonable jury to conclude that de la Cruz-Paulino specifically intended to aid and abet Diaz-Perez in possessing cocaine for distribution. Even if de la Cruz-Paulino could have inferred from Diaz-Perez's sudden shift in attitude and her statements about the \"two bales,\" and from the two government agents' opening of one of the garbage bags, that, unbeknownst to her, a drug transaction was going on, such last-minute knowledge would not support the conclusion that she shared the specific intent to possess cocaine for distribution.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"912 F.2d 1536, 1538","parenthetical":"stating that warning about police in the area and advice on avoiding arrest were what \"anyone might do as a friend\"","sentence":"See Francomano, 554 F.2d at 487 (\u201cEven if it could be inferred that appellants acquired knowledge of the throwing of the packages [of marijuana] overboard, such last minute knowledge together with all other evidence produced by the Government affords no legal basis for appellants\u2019 conviction as aiders and abetters.\u201d); see also United States v. Lopez-Pena, 912 F.2d 1536, 1538 (1st Cir.1989) (stating that warning about police in the area and advice on avoiding arrest were what \u201canyone might do as a friend\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"554 F.2d 487, 487","parenthetical":"\"Even if it could be inferred that appellants acquired knowledge of the throwing of the packages [of marijuana] overboard, such last minute knowledge together with all other evidence produced by the Government affords no legal basis for appellants' conviction as aiders and abetters.\"","sentence":"See Francomano, 554 F.2d at 487 (\u201cEven if it could be inferred that appellants acquired knowledge of the throwing of the packages [of marijuana] overboard, such last minute knowledge together with all other evidence produced by the Government affords no legal basis for appellants\u2019 conviction as aiders and abetters.\u201d); see also United States v. Lopez-Pena, 912 F.2d 1536, 1538 (1st Cir.1989) (stating that warning about police in the area and advice on avoiding arrest were what \u201canyone might do as a friend\u201d)."},"case_id":11320386,"label":"b"}
{"context":"A prime function of that limited judicial review, however, is to ensure that the Board's decisions are consistent with the Act's basic premises. See, e.g., H.K.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"Board exceeded its remedial authority in ordering employer to repay government for wages paid to illegally discharged workers because Board is not empowered to vindicate public rights","sentence":"Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 90 S.Ct. 821, 25 L.Ed.2d 146 (1970) (Board\u2019s remedial authority does not include directing an employer to accede to a particular contract clause); cf. Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 7, 61 S.Ct. 77, 85 L.Ed. 6 (1940) (Board exceeded its remedial authority in ordering employer to repay government for wages paid to illegally discharged workers because Board is not empowered to vindicate public rights)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"Board's remedial authority does not include directing an employer to accede to a particular contract clause","sentence":"Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 90 S.Ct. 821, 25 L.Ed.2d 146 (1970) (Board\u2019s remedial authority does not include directing an employer to accede to a particular contract clause); cf. Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 7, 61 S.Ct. 77, 85 L.Ed. 6 (1940) (Board exceeded its remedial authority in ordering employer to repay government for wages paid to illegally discharged workers because Board is not empowered to vindicate public rights)."},"case_id":1908793,"label":"b"}
{"context":"A prime function of that limited judicial review, however, is to ensure that the Board's decisions are consistent with the Act's basic premises. See, e.g., H.K.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"Board exceeded its remedial authority in ordering employer to repay government for wages paid to illegally discharged workers because Board is not empowered to vindicate public rights","sentence":"Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 90 S.Ct. 821, 25 L.Ed.2d 146 (1970) (Board\u2019s remedial authority does not include directing an employer to accede to a particular contract clause); cf. Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 7, 61 S.Ct. 77, 85 L.Ed. 6 (1940) (Board exceeded its remedial authority in ordering employer to repay government for wages paid to illegally discharged workers because Board is not empowered to vindicate public rights)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"Board's remedial authority does not include directing an employer to accede to a particular contract clause","sentence":"Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 90 S.Ct. 821, 25 L.Ed.2d 146 (1970) (Board\u2019s remedial authority does not include directing an employer to accede to a particular contract clause); cf. Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 7, 61 S.Ct. 77, 85 L.Ed. 6 (1940) (Board exceeded its remedial authority in ordering employer to repay government for wages paid to illegally discharged workers because Board is not empowered to vindicate public rights)."},"case_id":1908793,"label":"b"}
{"context":"A prime function of that limited judicial review, however, is to ensure that the Board's decisions are consistent with the Act's basic premises. See, e.g., H.K.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"Board's remedial authority does not include directing an employer to accede to a particular contract clause","sentence":"Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 90 S.Ct. 821, 25 L.Ed.2d 146 (1970) (Board\u2019s remedial authority does not include directing an employer to accede to a particular contract clause); cf. Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 7, 61 S.Ct. 77, 85 L.Ed. 6 (1940) (Board exceeded its remedial authority in ordering employer to repay government for wages paid to illegally discharged workers because Board is not empowered to vindicate public rights)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"Board exceeded its remedial authority in ordering employer to repay government for wages paid to illegally discharged workers because Board is not empowered to vindicate public rights","sentence":"Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 90 S.Ct. 821, 25 L.Ed.2d 146 (1970) (Board\u2019s remedial authority does not include directing an employer to accede to a particular contract clause); cf. Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 7, 61 S.Ct. 77, 85 L.Ed. 6 (1940) (Board exceeded its remedial authority in ordering employer to repay government for wages paid to illegally discharged workers because Board is not empowered to vindicate public rights)."},"case_id":1908793,"label":"a"}
{"context":"A prime function of that limited judicial review, however, is to ensure that the Board's decisions are consistent with the Act's basic premises. See, e.g., H.K.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"Board's remedial authority does not include directing an employer to accede to a particular contract clause","sentence":"Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 90 S.Ct. 821, 25 L.Ed.2d 146 (1970) (Board\u2019s remedial authority does not include directing an employer to accede to a particular contract clause); cf. Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 7, 61 S.Ct. 77, 85 L.Ed. 6 (1940) (Board exceeded its remedial authority in ordering employer to repay government for wages paid to illegally discharged workers because Board is not empowered to vindicate public rights)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"Board exceeded its remedial authority in ordering employer to repay government for wages paid to illegally discharged workers because Board is not empowered to vindicate public rights","sentence":"Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 90 S.Ct. 821, 25 L.Ed.2d 146 (1970) (Board\u2019s remedial authority does not include directing an employer to accede to a particular contract clause); cf. Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 7, 61 S.Ct. 77, 85 L.Ed. 6 (1940) (Board exceeded its remedial authority in ordering employer to repay government for wages paid to illegally discharged workers because Board is not empowered to vindicate public rights)."},"case_id":1908793,"label":"a"}
{"context":"A prime function of that limited judicial review, however, is to ensure that the Board's decisions are consistent with the Act's basic premises. See, e.g., H.K.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"Board's remedial authority does not include directing an employer to accede to a particular contract clause","sentence":"Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 90 S.Ct. 821, 25 L.Ed.2d 146 (1970) (Board\u2019s remedial authority does not include directing an employer to accede to a particular contract clause); cf. Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 7, 61 S.Ct. 77, 85 L.Ed. 6 (1940) (Board exceeded its remedial authority in ordering employer to repay government for wages paid to illegally discharged workers because Board is not empowered to vindicate public rights)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"Board exceeded its remedial authority in ordering employer to repay government for wages paid to illegally discharged workers because Board is not empowered to vindicate public rights","sentence":"Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 90 S.Ct. 821, 25 L.Ed.2d 146 (1970) (Board\u2019s remedial authority does not include directing an employer to accede to a particular contract clause); cf. Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 7, 61 S.Ct. 77, 85 L.Ed. 6 (1940) (Board exceeded its remedial authority in ordering employer to repay government for wages paid to illegally discharged workers because Board is not empowered to vindicate public rights)."},"case_id":1908793,"label":"a"}
{"context":"A prime function of that limited judicial review, however, is to ensure that the Board's decisions are consistent with the Act's basic premises. See, e.g., H.K.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"Board exceeded its remedial authority in ordering employer to repay government for wages paid to illegally discharged workers because Board is not empowered to vindicate public rights","sentence":"Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 90 S.Ct. 821, 25 L.Ed.2d 146 (1970) (Board\u2019s remedial authority does not include directing an employer to accede to a particular contract clause); cf. Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 7, 61 S.Ct. 77, 85 L.Ed. 6 (1940) (Board exceeded its remedial authority in ordering employer to repay government for wages paid to illegally discharged workers because Board is not empowered to vindicate public rights)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"Board's remedial authority does not include directing an employer to accede to a particular contract clause","sentence":"Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 90 S.Ct. 821, 25 L.Ed.2d 146 (1970) (Board\u2019s remedial authority does not include directing an employer to accede to a particular contract clause); cf. Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 7, 61 S.Ct. 77, 85 L.Ed. 6 (1940) (Board exceeded its remedial authority in ordering employer to repay government for wages paid to illegally discharged workers because Board is not empowered to vindicate public rights)."},"case_id":1908793,"label":"b"}
{"context":"A prime function of that limited judicial review, however, is to ensure that the Board's decisions are consistent with the Act's basic premises. See, e.g., H.K.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"Board exceeded its remedial authority in ordering employer to repay government for wages paid to illegally discharged workers because Board is not empowered to vindicate public rights","sentence":"Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 90 S.Ct. 821, 25 L.Ed.2d 146 (1970) (Board\u2019s remedial authority does not include directing an employer to accede to a particular contract clause); cf. Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 7, 61 S.Ct. 77, 85 L.Ed. 6 (1940) (Board exceeded its remedial authority in ordering employer to repay government for wages paid to illegally discharged workers because Board is not empowered to vindicate public rights)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"Board's remedial authority does not include directing an employer to accede to a particular contract clause","sentence":"Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 90 S.Ct. 821, 25 L.Ed.2d 146 (1970) (Board\u2019s remedial authority does not include directing an employer to accede to a particular contract clause); cf. Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 7, 61 S.Ct. 77, 85 L.Ed. 6 (1940) (Board exceeded its remedial authority in ordering employer to repay government for wages paid to illegally discharged workers because Board is not empowered to vindicate public rights)."},"case_id":1908793,"label":"b"}
{"context":"A prime function of that limited judicial review, however, is to ensure that the Board's decisions are consistent with the Act's basic premises. See, e.g., H.K.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"Board exceeded its remedial authority in ordering employer to repay government for wages paid to illegally discharged workers because Board is not empowered to vindicate public rights","sentence":"Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 90 S.Ct. 821, 25 L.Ed.2d 146 (1970) (Board\u2019s remedial authority does not include directing an employer to accede to a particular contract clause); cf. Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 7, 61 S.Ct. 77, 85 L.Ed. 6 (1940) (Board exceeded its remedial authority in ordering employer to repay government for wages paid to illegally discharged workers because Board is not empowered to vindicate public rights)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"Board's remedial authority does not include directing an employer to accede to a particular contract clause","sentence":"Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 90 S.Ct. 821, 25 L.Ed.2d 146 (1970) (Board\u2019s remedial authority does not include directing an employer to accede to a particular contract clause); cf. Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 7, 61 S.Ct. 77, 85 L.Ed. 6 (1940) (Board exceeded its remedial authority in ordering employer to repay government for wages paid to illegally discharged workers because Board is not empowered to vindicate public rights)."},"case_id":1908793,"label":"b"}
{"context":"A prime function of that limited judicial review, however, is to ensure that the Board's decisions are consistent with the Act's basic premises. See, e.g., H.K.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"Board exceeded its remedial authority in ordering employer to repay government for wages paid to illegally discharged workers because Board is not empowered to vindicate public rights","sentence":"Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 90 S.Ct. 821, 25 L.Ed.2d 146 (1970) (Board\u2019s remedial authority does not include directing an employer to accede to a particular contract clause); cf. Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 7, 61 S.Ct. 77, 85 L.Ed. 6 (1940) (Board exceeded its remedial authority in ordering employer to repay government for wages paid to illegally discharged workers because Board is not empowered to vindicate public rights)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"Board's remedial authority does not include directing an employer to accede to a particular contract clause","sentence":"Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 90 S.Ct. 821, 25 L.Ed.2d 146 (1970) (Board\u2019s remedial authority does not include directing an employer to accede to a particular contract clause); cf. Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 7, 61 S.Ct. 77, 85 L.Ed. 6 (1940) (Board exceeded its remedial authority in ordering employer to repay government for wages paid to illegally discharged workers because Board is not empowered to vindicate public rights)."},"case_id":1908793,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Other jurisdictions have similarly conelud-ed that juror statements about possible consequences of a jury's verdict cannot be offered as evidence under their versions of CRE 606(b).","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"290 F.3d 663, 684","parenthetical":"in a habeas corpus proceeding, a juror's statement regarding the availability of parole for the defendant was not extraneous information for purposes of the Sixth Amendment","sentence":"See, eg., Dobbs v. Zant, 963 F.2d 1403, 1411 (11th Cir.1991) (testimony concerning a jury's mistaken belief that the defendant would not be executed if sentenced to death held not admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b)), rev'd on other grounds, 506 U.S. 357, 113 S.Ct. 835, 122 L.Ed.2d 103 (1993), Stlagy v. Peters, 905 F.2d 986, 1008 (7th Cir.1990) (refusing to consider evidence of a juror's erroneous statements that the defendant would serve only seven years if convicted and would not be executed if sentenced to death); Lewis v. State, 249 Ga.App. 812, 549 S.E.2d 732, 736 (2001) (refusing, under a rule similar to CRE 606(b), to consider jurors' testimony that they believed defendant would receive probation if convicted), disapproved of on other grounds by Miller v. State, 285 Ga. 285, 676 S.E.2d 178 (2009); State v. Robinson, 336 N.C. 78, 443 S.E.2d 306, 330 (1994) (refusing to consider information based on juror's previous experiences regarding possibility defendant would receive parole); State v. Galbreath, 359 S.C. 398, 597 S.E.2d 845, 849 (2004) (information regarding the possible sentence the defendant would receive held not extraneous because a juror had acquired the knowledge through her own personal experience); see also Fullwood v. Lee, 290 F.3d 663, 684 (4th Cir.2002) (in a habeas corpus proceeding, a juror's statement regarding the availability of parole for the defendant was not extraneous information for purposes of the Sixth Amendment)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"refusing, under a rule similar to CRE 606(b), to consider jurors' testimony that they believed defendant would receive probation if convicted","sentence":"See, eg., Dobbs v. Zant, 963 F.2d 1403, 1411 (11th Cir.1991) (testimony concerning a jury's mistaken belief that the defendant would not be executed if sentenced to death held not admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b)), rev'd on other grounds, 506 U.S. 357, 113 S.Ct. 835, 122 L.Ed.2d 103 (1993), Stlagy v. Peters, 905 F.2d 986, 1008 (7th Cir.1990) (refusing to consider evidence of a juror's erroneous statements that the defendant would serve only seven years if convicted and would not be executed if sentenced to death); Lewis v. State, 249 Ga.App. 812, 549 S.E.2d 732, 736 (2001) (refusing, under a rule similar to CRE 606(b), to consider jurors' testimony that they believed defendant would receive probation if convicted), disapproved of on other grounds by Miller v. State, 285 Ga. 285, 676 S.E.2d 178 (2009); State v. Robinson, 336 N.C. 78, 443 S.E.2d 306, 330 (1994) (refusing to consider information based on juror's previous experiences regarding possibility defendant would receive parole); State v. Galbreath, 359 S.C. 398, 597 S.E.2d 845, 849 (2004) (information regarding the possible sentence the defendant would receive held not extraneous because a juror had acquired the knowledge through her own personal experience); see also Fullwood v. Lee, 290 F.3d 663, 684 (4th Cir.2002) (in a habeas corpus proceeding, a juror's statement regarding the availability of parole for the defendant was not extraneous information for purposes of the Sixth Amendment)."},"case_id":6985465,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Other jurisdictions have similarly conelud-ed that juror statements about possible consequences of a jury's verdict cannot be offered as evidence under their versions of CRE 606(b).","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"549 S.E.2d 732, 736","parenthetical":"refusing, under a rule similar to CRE 606(b), to consider jurors' testimony that they believed defendant would receive probation if convicted","sentence":"See, eg., Dobbs v. Zant, 963 F.2d 1403, 1411 (11th Cir.1991) (testimony concerning a jury's mistaken belief that the defendant would not be executed if sentenced to death held not admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b)), rev'd on other grounds, 506 U.S. 357, 113 S.Ct. 835, 122 L.Ed.2d 103 (1993), Stlagy v. Peters, 905 F.2d 986, 1008 (7th Cir.1990) (refusing to consider evidence of a juror's erroneous statements that the defendant would serve only seven years if convicted and would not be executed if sentenced to death); Lewis v. State, 249 Ga.App. 812, 549 S.E.2d 732, 736 (2001) (refusing, under a rule similar to CRE 606(b), to consider jurors' testimony that they believed defendant would receive probation if convicted), disapproved of on other grounds by Miller v. State, 285 Ga. 285, 676 S.E.2d 178 (2009); State v. Robinson, 336 N.C. 78, 443 S.E.2d 306, 330 (1994) (refusing to consider information based on juror's previous experiences regarding possibility defendant would receive parole); State v. Galbreath, 359 S.C. 398, 597 S.E.2d 845, 849 (2004) (information regarding the possible sentence the defendant would receive held not extraneous because a juror had acquired the knowledge through her own personal experience); see also Fullwood v. Lee, 290 F.3d 663, 684 (4th Cir.2002) (in a habeas corpus proceeding, a juror's statement regarding the availability of parole for the defendant was not extraneous information for purposes of the Sixth Amendment)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"290 F.3d 663, 684","parenthetical":"in a habeas corpus proceeding, a juror's statement regarding the availability of parole for the defendant was not extraneous information for purposes of the Sixth Amendment","sentence":"See, eg., Dobbs v. Zant, 963 F.2d 1403, 1411 (11th Cir.1991) (testimony concerning a jury's mistaken belief that the defendant would not be executed if sentenced to death held not admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b)), rev'd on other grounds, 506 U.S. 357, 113 S.Ct. 835, 122 L.Ed.2d 103 (1993), Stlagy v. Peters, 905 F.2d 986, 1008 (7th Cir.1990) (refusing to consider evidence of a juror's erroneous statements that the defendant would serve only seven years if convicted and would not be executed if sentenced to death); Lewis v. State, 249 Ga.App. 812, 549 S.E.2d 732, 736 (2001) (refusing, under a rule similar to CRE 606(b), to consider jurors' testimony that they believed defendant would receive probation if convicted), disapproved of on other grounds by Miller v. State, 285 Ga. 285, 676 S.E.2d 178 (2009); State v. Robinson, 336 N.C. 78, 443 S.E.2d 306, 330 (1994) (refusing to consider information based on juror's previous experiences regarding possibility defendant would receive parole); State v. Galbreath, 359 S.C. 398, 597 S.E.2d 845, 849 (2004) (information regarding the possible sentence the defendant would receive held not extraneous because a juror had acquired the knowledge through her own personal experience); see also Fullwood v. Lee, 290 F.3d 663, 684 (4th Cir.2002) (in a habeas corpus proceeding, a juror's statement regarding the availability of parole for the defendant was not extraneous information for purposes of the Sixth Amendment)."},"case_id":6985465,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Other jurisdictions have similarly conelud-ed that juror statements about possible consequences of a jury's verdict cannot be offered as evidence under their versions of CRE 606(b).","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"refusing to consider information based on juror's previous experiences regarding possibility defendant would receive parole","sentence":"See, eg., Dobbs v. Zant, 963 F.2d 1403, 1411 (11th Cir.1991) (testimony concerning a jury's mistaken belief that the defendant would not be executed if sentenced to death held not admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b)), rev'd on other grounds, 506 U.S. 357, 113 S.Ct. 835, 122 L.Ed.2d 103 (1993), Stlagy v. Peters, 905 F.2d 986, 1008 (7th Cir.1990) (refusing to consider evidence of a juror's erroneous statements that the defendant would serve only seven years if convicted and would not be executed if sentenced to death); Lewis v. State, 249 Ga.App. 812, 549 S.E.2d 732, 736 (2001) (refusing, under a rule similar to CRE 606(b), to consider jurors' testimony that they believed defendant would receive probation if convicted), disapproved of on other grounds by Miller v. State, 285 Ga. 285, 676 S.E.2d 178 (2009); State v. Robinson, 336 N.C. 78, 443 S.E.2d 306, 330 (1994) (refusing to consider information based on juror's previous experiences regarding possibility defendant would receive parole); State v. Galbreath, 359 S.C. 398, 597 S.E.2d 845, 849 (2004) (information regarding the possible sentence the defendant would receive held not extraneous because a juror had acquired the knowledge through her own personal experience); see also Fullwood v. Lee, 290 F.3d 663, 684 (4th Cir.2002) (in a habeas corpus proceeding, a juror's statement regarding the availability of parole for the defendant was not extraneous information for purposes of the Sixth Amendment)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"290 F.3d 663, 684","parenthetical":"in a habeas corpus proceeding, a juror's statement regarding the availability of parole for the defendant was not extraneous information for purposes of the Sixth Amendment","sentence":"See, eg., Dobbs v. Zant, 963 F.2d 1403, 1411 (11th Cir.1991) (testimony concerning a jury's mistaken belief that the defendant would not be executed if sentenced to death held not admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b)), rev'd on other grounds, 506 U.S. 357, 113 S.Ct. 835, 122 L.Ed.2d 103 (1993), Stlagy v. Peters, 905 F.2d 986, 1008 (7th Cir.1990) (refusing to consider evidence of a juror's erroneous statements that the defendant would serve only seven years if convicted and would not be executed if sentenced to death); Lewis v. State, 249 Ga.App. 812, 549 S.E.2d 732, 736 (2001) (refusing, under a rule similar to CRE 606(b), to consider jurors' testimony that they believed defendant would receive probation if convicted), disapproved of on other grounds by Miller v. State, 285 Ga. 285, 676 S.E.2d 178 (2009); State v. Robinson, 336 N.C. 78, 443 S.E.2d 306, 330 (1994) (refusing to consider information based on juror's previous experiences regarding possibility defendant would receive parole); State v. Galbreath, 359 S.C. 398, 597 S.E.2d 845, 849 (2004) (information regarding the possible sentence the defendant would receive held not extraneous because a juror had acquired the knowledge through her own personal experience); see also Fullwood v. Lee, 290 F.3d 663, 684 (4th Cir.2002) (in a habeas corpus proceeding, a juror's statement regarding the availability of parole for the defendant was not extraneous information for purposes of the Sixth Amendment)."},"case_id":6985465,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Other jurisdictions have similarly conelud-ed that juror statements about possible consequences of a jury's verdict cannot be offered as evidence under their versions of CRE 606(b).","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"443 S.E.2d 306, 330","parenthetical":"refusing to consider information based on juror's previous experiences regarding possibility defendant would receive parole","sentence":"See, eg., Dobbs v. Zant, 963 F.2d 1403, 1411 (11th Cir.1991) (testimony concerning a jury's mistaken belief that the defendant would not be executed if sentenced to death held not admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b)), rev'd on other grounds, 506 U.S. 357, 113 S.Ct. 835, 122 L.Ed.2d 103 (1993), Stlagy v. Peters, 905 F.2d 986, 1008 (7th Cir.1990) (refusing to consider evidence of a juror's erroneous statements that the defendant would serve only seven years if convicted and would not be executed if sentenced to death); Lewis v. State, 249 Ga.App. 812, 549 S.E.2d 732, 736 (2001) (refusing, under a rule similar to CRE 606(b), to consider jurors' testimony that they believed defendant would receive probation if convicted), disapproved of on other grounds by Miller v. State, 285 Ga. 285, 676 S.E.2d 178 (2009); State v. Robinson, 336 N.C. 78, 443 S.E.2d 306, 330 (1994) (refusing to consider information based on juror's previous experiences regarding possibility defendant would receive parole); State v. Galbreath, 359 S.C. 398, 597 S.E.2d 845, 849 (2004) (information regarding the possible sentence the defendant would receive held not extraneous because a juror had acquired the knowledge through her own personal experience); see also Fullwood v. Lee, 290 F.3d 663, 684 (4th Cir.2002) (in a habeas corpus proceeding, a juror's statement regarding the availability of parole for the defendant was not extraneous information for purposes of the Sixth Amendment)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"290 F.3d 663, 684","parenthetical":"in a habeas corpus proceeding, a juror's statement regarding the availability of parole for the defendant was not extraneous information for purposes of the Sixth Amendment","sentence":"See, eg., Dobbs v. Zant, 963 F.2d 1403, 1411 (11th Cir.1991) (testimony concerning a jury's mistaken belief that the defendant would not be executed if sentenced to death held not admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b)), rev'd on other grounds, 506 U.S. 357, 113 S.Ct. 835, 122 L.Ed.2d 103 (1993), Stlagy v. Peters, 905 F.2d 986, 1008 (7th Cir.1990) (refusing to consider evidence of a juror's erroneous statements that the defendant would serve only seven years if convicted and would not be executed if sentenced to death); Lewis v. State, 249 Ga.App. 812, 549 S.E.2d 732, 736 (2001) (refusing, under a rule similar to CRE 606(b), to consider jurors' testimony that they believed defendant would receive probation if convicted), disapproved of on other grounds by Miller v. State, 285 Ga. 285, 676 S.E.2d 178 (2009); State v. Robinson, 336 N.C. 78, 443 S.E.2d 306, 330 (1994) (refusing to consider information based on juror's previous experiences regarding possibility defendant would receive parole); State v. Galbreath, 359 S.C. 398, 597 S.E.2d 845, 849 (2004) (information regarding the possible sentence the defendant would receive held not extraneous because a juror had acquired the knowledge through her own personal experience); see also Fullwood v. Lee, 290 F.3d 663, 684 (4th Cir.2002) (in a habeas corpus proceeding, a juror's statement regarding the availability of parole for the defendant was not extraneous information for purposes of the Sixth Amendment)."},"case_id":6985465,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Other jurisdictions have similarly conelud-ed that juror statements about possible consequences of a jury's verdict cannot be offered as evidence under their versions of CRE 606(b).","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"information regarding the possible sentence the defendant would receive held not extraneous because a juror had acquired the knowledge through her own personal experience","sentence":"See, eg., Dobbs v. Zant, 963 F.2d 1403, 1411 (11th Cir.1991) (testimony concerning a jury's mistaken belief that the defendant would not be executed if sentenced to death held not admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b)), rev'd on other grounds, 506 U.S. 357, 113 S.Ct. 835, 122 L.Ed.2d 103 (1993), Stlagy v. Peters, 905 F.2d 986, 1008 (7th Cir.1990) (refusing to consider evidence of a juror's erroneous statements that the defendant would serve only seven years if convicted and would not be executed if sentenced to death); Lewis v. State, 249 Ga.App. 812, 549 S.E.2d 732, 736 (2001) (refusing, under a rule similar to CRE 606(b), to consider jurors' testimony that they believed defendant would receive probation if convicted), disapproved of on other grounds by Miller v. State, 285 Ga. 285, 676 S.E.2d 178 (2009); State v. Robinson, 336 N.C. 78, 443 S.E.2d 306, 330 (1994) (refusing to consider information based on juror's previous experiences regarding possibility defendant would receive parole); State v. Galbreath, 359 S.C. 398, 597 S.E.2d 845, 849 (2004) (information regarding the possible sentence the defendant would receive held not extraneous because a juror had acquired the knowledge through her own personal experience); see also Fullwood v. Lee, 290 F.3d 663, 684 (4th Cir.2002) (in a habeas corpus proceeding, a juror's statement regarding the availability of parole for the defendant was not extraneous information for purposes of the Sixth Amendment)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"290 F.3d 663, 684","parenthetical":"in a habeas corpus proceeding, a juror's statement regarding the availability of parole for the defendant was not extraneous information for purposes of the Sixth Amendment","sentence":"See, eg., Dobbs v. Zant, 963 F.2d 1403, 1411 (11th Cir.1991) (testimony concerning a jury's mistaken belief that the defendant would not be executed if sentenced to death held not admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b)), rev'd on other grounds, 506 U.S. 357, 113 S.Ct. 835, 122 L.Ed.2d 103 (1993), Stlagy v. Peters, 905 F.2d 986, 1008 (7th Cir.1990) (refusing to consider evidence of a juror's erroneous statements that the defendant would serve only seven years if convicted and would not be executed if sentenced to death); Lewis v. State, 249 Ga.App. 812, 549 S.E.2d 732, 736 (2001) (refusing, under a rule similar to CRE 606(b), to consider jurors' testimony that they believed defendant would receive probation if convicted), disapproved of on other grounds by Miller v. State, 285 Ga. 285, 676 S.E.2d 178 (2009); State v. Robinson, 336 N.C. 78, 443 S.E.2d 306, 330 (1994) (refusing to consider information based on juror's previous experiences regarding possibility defendant would receive parole); State v. Galbreath, 359 S.C. 398, 597 S.E.2d 845, 849 (2004) (information regarding the possible sentence the defendant would receive held not extraneous because a juror had acquired the knowledge through her own personal experience); see also Fullwood v. Lee, 290 F.3d 663, 684 (4th Cir.2002) (in a habeas corpus proceeding, a juror's statement regarding the availability of parole for the defendant was not extraneous information for purposes of the Sixth Amendment)."},"case_id":6985465,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Other jurisdictions have similarly conelud-ed that juror statements about possible consequences of a jury's verdict cannot be offered as evidence under their versions of CRE 606(b).","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"597 S.E.2d 845, 849","parenthetical":"information regarding the possible sentence the defendant would receive held not extraneous because a juror had acquired the knowledge through her own personal experience","sentence":"See, eg., Dobbs v. Zant, 963 F.2d 1403, 1411 (11th Cir.1991) (testimony concerning a jury's mistaken belief that the defendant would not be executed if sentenced to death held not admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b)), rev'd on other grounds, 506 U.S. 357, 113 S.Ct. 835, 122 L.Ed.2d 103 (1993), Stlagy v. Peters, 905 F.2d 986, 1008 (7th Cir.1990) (refusing to consider evidence of a juror's erroneous statements that the defendant would serve only seven years if convicted and would not be executed if sentenced to death); Lewis v. State, 249 Ga.App. 812, 549 S.E.2d 732, 736 (2001) (refusing, under a rule similar to CRE 606(b), to consider jurors' testimony that they believed defendant would receive probation if convicted), disapproved of on other grounds by Miller v. State, 285 Ga. 285, 676 S.E.2d 178 (2009); State v. Robinson, 336 N.C. 78, 443 S.E.2d 306, 330 (1994) (refusing to consider information based on juror's previous experiences regarding possibility defendant would receive parole); State v. Galbreath, 359 S.C. 398, 597 S.E.2d 845, 849 (2004) (information regarding the possible sentence the defendant would receive held not extraneous because a juror had acquired the knowledge through her own personal experience); see also Fullwood v. Lee, 290 F.3d 663, 684 (4th Cir.2002) (in a habeas corpus proceeding, a juror's statement regarding the availability of parole for the defendant was not extraneous information for purposes of the Sixth Amendment)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"290 F.3d 663, 684","parenthetical":"in a habeas corpus proceeding, a juror's statement regarding the availability of parole for the defendant was not extraneous information for purposes of the Sixth Amendment","sentence":"See, eg., Dobbs v. Zant, 963 F.2d 1403, 1411 (11th Cir.1991) (testimony concerning a jury's mistaken belief that the defendant would not be executed if sentenced to death held not admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b)), rev'd on other grounds, 506 U.S. 357, 113 S.Ct. 835, 122 L.Ed.2d 103 (1993), Stlagy v. Peters, 905 F.2d 986, 1008 (7th Cir.1990) (refusing to consider evidence of a juror's erroneous statements that the defendant would serve only seven years if convicted and would not be executed if sentenced to death); Lewis v. State, 249 Ga.App. 812, 549 S.E.2d 732, 736 (2001) (refusing, under a rule similar to CRE 606(b), to consider jurors' testimony that they believed defendant would receive probation if convicted), disapproved of on other grounds by Miller v. State, 285 Ga. 285, 676 S.E.2d 178 (2009); State v. Robinson, 336 N.C. 78, 443 S.E.2d 306, 330 (1994) (refusing to consider information based on juror's previous experiences regarding possibility defendant would receive parole); State v. Galbreath, 359 S.C. 398, 597 S.E.2d 845, 849 (2004) (information regarding the possible sentence the defendant would receive held not extraneous because a juror had acquired the knowledge through her own personal experience); see also Fullwood v. Lee, 290 F.3d 663, 684 (4th Cir.2002) (in a habeas corpus proceeding, a juror's statement regarding the availability of parole for the defendant was not extraneous information for purposes of the Sixth Amendment)."},"case_id":6985465,"label":"a"}
{"context":"We also recognize that Remmer established a separate, but related requirement that a defendant be entitled to a hearing when the defendant presents a credible allegation of communications or contact between a third party and a juror concerning the matter pending before the jury.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"758 F.2d 979, 982","parenthetical":"referring to the post-trial evidentiary hearing concerning potential juror bias as a \"required\" hearing","sentence":"See Haley v. Blue Ridge Transfer Co., 802 F.2d 1532, 1535 (4th Cir.1986) (describing the Remmer presumption and explaining that \u201cRemmer also established the requirement of a post-trial evidentiary hearing in which the prevailing party has the opportunity and burden of rebutting the presumption of juror prejudice\u201d); see also United States v. Malloy, 758 F.2d 979, 982 (4th Cir.1985) (referring to the post-trial evidentiary hearing concerning potential juror bias as a \u201crequired\u201d hearing); Stouffer v. Trammell, 738 F.3d 1205, 1214 (10th Cir.2013) (explaining that \u201c[t]he trial court\u2019s duty to conduct a Remmer hearing when genuine concerns of improper juror contact arise is clearly established by the Supreme Court\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"802 F.2d 1532, 1535","parenthetical":"describing the Remmer presumption and explaining that \"Remmer also established the requirement of a post-trial evidentiary hearing in which the prevailing party has the opportunity and burden of rebutting the presumption of juror prejudice\"","sentence":"See Haley v. Blue Ridge Transfer Co., 802 F.2d 1532, 1535 (4th Cir.1986) (describing the Remmer presumption and explaining that \u201cRemmer also established the requirement of a post-trial evidentiary hearing in which the prevailing party has the opportunity and burden of rebutting the presumption of juror prejudice\u201d); see also United States v. Malloy, 758 F.2d 979, 982 (4th Cir.1985) (referring to the post-trial evidentiary hearing concerning potential juror bias as a \u201crequired\u201d hearing); Stouffer v. Trammell, 738 F.3d 1205, 1214 (10th Cir.2013) (explaining that \u201c[t]he trial court\u2019s duty to conduct a Remmer hearing when genuine concerns of improper juror contact arise is clearly established by the Supreme Court\u201d)."},"case_id":4069843,"label":"b"}
{"context":"We also recognize that Remmer established a separate, but related requirement that a defendant be entitled to a hearing when the defendant presents a credible allegation of communications or contact between a third party and a juror concerning the matter pending before the jury.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"802 F.2d 1532, 1535","parenthetical":"describing the Remmer presumption and explaining that \"Remmer also established the requirement of a post-trial evidentiary hearing in which the prevailing party has the opportunity and burden of rebutting the presumption of juror prejudice\"","sentence":"See Haley v. Blue Ridge Transfer Co., 802 F.2d 1532, 1535 (4th Cir.1986) (describing the Remmer presumption and explaining that \u201cRemmer also established the requirement of a post-trial evidentiary hearing in which the prevailing party has the opportunity and burden of rebutting the presumption of juror prejudice\u201d); see also United States v. Malloy, 758 F.2d 979, 982 (4th Cir.1985) (referring to the post-trial evidentiary hearing concerning potential juror bias as a \u201crequired\u201d hearing); Stouffer v. Trammell, 738 F.3d 1205, 1214 (10th Cir.2013) (explaining that \u201c[t]he trial court\u2019s duty to conduct a Remmer hearing when genuine concerns of improper juror contact arise is clearly established by the Supreme Court\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"738 F.3d 1205, 1214","parenthetical":"explaining that \"[t]he trial court's duty to conduct a Remmer hearing when genuine concerns of improper juror contact arise is clearly established by the Supreme Court\"","sentence":"See Haley v. Blue Ridge Transfer Co., 802 F.2d 1532, 1535 (4th Cir.1986) (describing the Remmer presumption and explaining that \u201cRemmer also established the requirement of a post-trial evidentiary hearing in which the prevailing party has the opportunity and burden of rebutting the presumption of juror prejudice\u201d); see also United States v. Malloy, 758 F.2d 979, 982 (4th Cir.1985) (referring to the post-trial evidentiary hearing concerning potential juror bias as a \u201crequired\u201d hearing); Stouffer v. Trammell, 738 F.3d 1205, 1214 (10th Cir.2013) (explaining that \u201c[t]he trial court\u2019s duty to conduct a Remmer hearing when genuine concerns of improper juror contact arise is clearly established by the Supreme Court\u201d)."},"case_id":4069843,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The Eighth Circuit has taken the view \"that Rule 54(b) certifications must, either in express words or by unmistakably clear implication, contain the findings specifically required by the rule.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"appeal dismissed where district judge endorsed \"So Ordered\" on motion for Rule 54(b","sentence":"Cf. Mooney v. Frierdich, 784 F.2d 875 (8th Cir.1986) (appeal dismissed where district judge endorsed \u201cSo Ordered\u201d on motion for Rule 54(b) certification); Kocher v. Dow Chem. Co., 132 F.3d 1225, 1228-29 (8th Cir.1997) (finding that orders \u201cunquestionably were intended to be final for purposes of appeal.\u201d); Speer v. City of Wynne, Arkansas, 276 F.3d 980, 987-88 (8th Cir.2002) (\u201cWhere the district court\u2019s intent to enter a partial final judgment under Rule 54(b) is clear, the order is considered appealable.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"817 F.2d 58, 59","parenthetical":"district court's statement that \"immediate appeal from its Order may ultimately advance termination of this litigation\" was not the equivalent of a finding that there was no just reason for delay","sentence":"Bullock v. Baptist Memorial Hosp., 817 F.2d 58, 59 (8th Cir.1987) (district court\u2019s statement that \u201cimmediate appeal from its Order may ultimately advance termination of this litigation\u201d was not the equivalent of a finding that there was no just reason for delay)."},"case_id":9129955,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The Eighth Circuit has taken the view \"that Rule 54(b) certifications must, either in express words or by unmistakably clear implication, contain the findings specifically required by the rule.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"817 F.2d 58, 59","parenthetical":"district court's statement that \"immediate appeal from its Order may ultimately advance termination of this litigation\" was not the equivalent of a finding that there was no just reason for delay","sentence":"Bullock v. Baptist Memorial Hosp., 817 F.2d 58, 59 (8th Cir.1987) (district court\u2019s statement that \u201cimmediate appeal from its Order may ultimately advance termination of this litigation\u201d was not the equivalent of a finding that there was no just reason for delay)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"132 F.3d 1225, 1228-29","parenthetical":"finding that orders \"unquestionably were intended to be final for purposes of appeal.\"","sentence":"Cf. Mooney v. Frierdich, 784 F.2d 875 (8th Cir.1986) (appeal dismissed where district judge endorsed \u201cSo Ordered\u201d on motion for Rule 54(b) certification); Kocher v. Dow Chem. Co., 132 F.3d 1225, 1228-29 (8th Cir.1997) (finding that orders \u201cunquestionably were intended to be final for purposes of appeal.\u201d); Speer v. City of Wynne, Arkansas, 276 F.3d 980, 987-88 (8th Cir.2002) (\u201cWhere the district court\u2019s intent to enter a partial final judgment under Rule 54(b) is clear, the order is considered appealable.\u201d)."},"case_id":9129955,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The Eighth Circuit has taken the view \"that Rule 54(b) certifications must, either in express words or by unmistakably clear implication, contain the findings specifically required by the rule.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"817 F.2d 58, 59","parenthetical":"district court's statement that \"immediate appeal from its Order may ultimately advance termination of this litigation\" was not the equivalent of a finding that there was no just reason for delay","sentence":"Bullock v. Baptist Memorial Hosp., 817 F.2d 58, 59 (8th Cir.1987) (district court\u2019s statement that \u201cimmediate appeal from its Order may ultimately advance termination of this litigation\u201d was not the equivalent of a finding that there was no just reason for delay)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"276 F.3d 980, 987-88","parenthetical":"\"Where the district court's intent to enter a partial final judgment under Rule 54(b","sentence":"Cf. Mooney v. Frierdich, 784 F.2d 875 (8th Cir.1986) (appeal dismissed where district judge endorsed \u201cSo Ordered\u201d on motion for Rule 54(b) certification); Kocher v. Dow Chem. Co., 132 F.3d 1225, 1228-29 (8th Cir.1997) (finding that orders \u201cunquestionably were intended to be final for purposes of appeal.\u201d); Speer v. City of Wynne, Arkansas, 276 F.3d 980, 987-88 (8th Cir.2002) (\u201cWhere the district court\u2019s intent to enter a partial final judgment under Rule 54(b) is clear, the order is considered appealable.\u201d)."},"case_id":9129955,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Washington's motion may be more properly construed as a Wis. Stat. SS 974.06 postconviction motion.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"113 Wis. 2d 514, 520","parenthetical":"We liberally construe a pro se defendant's motion and are not bound by the defendant's labels.","sentence":"See bin-Rilla v. Israel, 113 Wis. 2d 514, 520, 335 N.W.2d 384 (1983) (We liberally construe a pro se defendant's motion and are not bound by the defendant's labels.); see also Loop v. State, 65 Wis. 2d 499, 501, 222 N.W.2d 694 (1974) (\u00a7 974.06 motions are properly used to bring issues of jurisdictional or constitutional dimension before the court)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"65 Wis. 2d 499, 501","parenthetical":"SS 974.06 motions are properly used to bring issues of jurisdictional or constitutional dimension before the court","sentence":"See bin-Rilla v. Israel, 113 Wis. 2d 514, 520, 335 N.W.2d 384 (1983) (We liberally construe a pro se defendant's motion and are not bound by the defendant's labels.); see also Loop v. State, 65 Wis. 2d 499, 501, 222 N.W.2d 694 (1974) (\u00a7 974.06 motions are properly used to bring issues of jurisdictional or constitutional dimension before the court)."},"case_id":4029386,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Washington's motion may be more properly construed as a Wis. Stat. SS 974.06 postconviction motion.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"SS 974.06 motions are properly used to bring issues of jurisdictional or constitutional dimension before the court","sentence":"See bin-Rilla v. Israel, 113 Wis. 2d 514, 520, 335 N.W.2d 384 (1983) (We liberally construe a pro se defendant's motion and are not bound by the defendant's labels.); see also Loop v. State, 65 Wis. 2d 499, 501, 222 N.W.2d 694 (1974) (\u00a7 974.06 motions are properly used to bring issues of jurisdictional or constitutional dimension before the court)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"113 Wis. 2d 514, 520","parenthetical":"We liberally construe a pro se defendant's motion and are not bound by the defendant's labels.","sentence":"See bin-Rilla v. Israel, 113 Wis. 2d 514, 520, 335 N.W.2d 384 (1983) (We liberally construe a pro se defendant's motion and are not bound by the defendant's labels.); see also Loop v. State, 65 Wis. 2d 499, 501, 222 N.W.2d 694 (1974) (\u00a7 974.06 motions are properly used to bring issues of jurisdictional or constitutional dimension before the court)."},"case_id":4029386,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Washington's motion may be more properly construed as a Wis. Stat. SS 974.06 postconviction motion.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"65 Wis. 2d 499, 501","parenthetical":"SS 974.06 motions are properly used to bring issues of jurisdictional or constitutional dimension before the court","sentence":"See bin-Rilla v. Israel, 113 Wis. 2d 514, 520, 335 N.W.2d 384 (1983) (We liberally construe a pro se defendant's motion and are not bound by the defendant's labels.); see also Loop v. State, 65 Wis. 2d 499, 501, 222 N.W.2d 694 (1974) (\u00a7 974.06 motions are properly used to bring issues of jurisdictional or constitutional dimension before the court)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"We liberally construe a pro se defendant's motion and are not bound by the defendant's labels.","sentence":"See bin-Rilla v. Israel, 113 Wis. 2d 514, 520, 335 N.W.2d 384 (1983) (We liberally construe a pro se defendant's motion and are not bound by the defendant's labels.); see also Loop v. State, 65 Wis. 2d 499, 501, 222 N.W.2d 694 (1974) (\u00a7 974.06 motions are properly used to bring issues of jurisdictional or constitutional dimension before the court)."},"case_id":4029386,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Washington's motion may be more properly construed as a Wis. Stat. SS 974.06 postconviction motion.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"We liberally construe a pro se defendant's motion and are not bound by the defendant's labels.","sentence":"See bin-Rilla v. Israel, 113 Wis. 2d 514, 520, 335 N.W.2d 384 (1983) (We liberally construe a pro se defendant's motion and are not bound by the defendant's labels.); see also Loop v. State, 65 Wis. 2d 499, 501, 222 N.W.2d 694 (1974) (\u00a7 974.06 motions are properly used to bring issues of jurisdictional or constitutional dimension before the court)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"SS 974.06 motions are properly used to bring issues of jurisdictional or constitutional dimension before the court","sentence":"See bin-Rilla v. Israel, 113 Wis. 2d 514, 520, 335 N.W.2d 384 (1983) (We liberally construe a pro se defendant's motion and are not bound by the defendant's labels.); see also Loop v. State, 65 Wis. 2d 499, 501, 222 N.W.2d 694 (1974) (\u00a7 974.06 motions are properly used to bring issues of jurisdictional or constitutional dimension before the court)."},"case_id":4029386,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Dismissal of the case terminated the automatic stay and co-debtor stay as to Deutsche and all creditors. 11 U.S.C. SSSS 362(c)(2)(B) and 1301(a)(2). The court retained jurisdiction, however, to consider Deutsche's request for imposition of an equitable servitude or relief under 11 U.S.C. SS 362(d)(4), since that motion was pending at the time of dismissal and has not been withdrawn.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"7 F.3d 1199, 1201-02","parenthetical":"when main bankruptcy case dismissed or closed, court has discretion to retain jurisdiction or dismiss related proceedings","sentence":"See In re Hardy, 209 B.R. 371, 373 (Bankr.E.D.Va.1997)(\u201cNotwithstanding the fact that [debtor\u2019s] bankruptcy case is closed and all scheduled debts have been discharged, the Court retains jurisdiction over the debtor\u2019s case for certain purposes,\u201d including when a \u201cparty claims a right or remedy created by one of the specific Bankruptcy Code sections.\u201d) (citations omitted); cf. Matter of Querner, 7 F.3d 1199, 1201-02 (5th Cir.1993)(when main bankruptcy case dismissed or closed, court has discretion to retain jurisdiction or dismiss related proceedings)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"209 B.R. 371, 373","parenthetical":"\"Notwithstanding the fact that [debtor's] bankruptcy case is closed and all scheduled debts have been discharged, the Court retains jurisdiction over the debtor's case for certain purposes,\" including when a \"party claims a right or remedy created by one of the specific Bankruptcy Code sections.\"","sentence":"See In re Hardy, 209 B.R. 371, 373 (Bankr.E.D.Va.1997)(\u201cNotwithstanding the fact that [debtor\u2019s] bankruptcy case is closed and all scheduled debts have been discharged, the Court retains jurisdiction over the debtor\u2019s case for certain purposes,\u201d including when a \u201cparty claims a right or remedy created by one of the specific Bankruptcy Code sections.\u201d) (citations omitted); cf. Matter of Querner, 7 F.3d 1199, 1201-02 (5th Cir.1993)(when main bankruptcy case dismissed or closed, court has discretion to retain jurisdiction or dismiss related proceedings)."},"case_id":3278240,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Nevertheless, in applying Article II, Section 7 of the Colorado Constitution, we have ruled that Colorado law affords broader protections in some instances than the Fourth Amendment.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"698 P.2d 811, 815","parenthetical":"\"Several times we have determined that the Colorado proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures protects a greater range of privacy interests than does its federal counterpart.\"","sentence":"See People v. Oates, 698 P.2d 811, 815 (Colo.1985)(\"Several times we have determined that the Colorado proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures protects a greater range of privacy interests than does its federal counterpart.\"); People v. - Sporleder, - 666 P.2d 135, 140 (Colo.1983)(\"Although Article II, Section 7 of the Colorado Constitution is substantially similar to its federal counterpart, we are not bound by the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the Fourth Amendment when determining the seope of state constitutional protections.\"); see also People v. Mason, 989 P.2d 757, 759 (Colo.1999)(\"IWle have afforded suspects in Colorado greater rights than are available under the federal Constitution.\"); People v. Young, 814 P.2d 834, 842-43 (Colo.1991)(\"We have recognized and exercised our independent role on a number of occasions and on several have determined that the Colorado Constitution provides more protection for our citizens than do similarly or identically worded provisions of the United States Constitution.\")."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"989 P.2d 757, 759","parenthetical":"\"IWle have afforded suspects in Colorado greater rights than are available under the federal Constitution.\"","sentence":"See People v. Oates, 698 P.2d 811, 815 (Colo.1985)(\"Several times we have determined that the Colorado proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures protects a greater range of privacy interests than does its federal counterpart.\"); People v. - Sporleder, - 666 P.2d 135, 140 (Colo.1983)(\"Although Article II, Section 7 of the Colorado Constitution is substantially similar to its federal counterpart, we are not bound by the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the Fourth Amendment when determining the seope of state constitutional protections.\"); see also People v. Mason, 989 P.2d 757, 759 (Colo.1999)(\"IWle have afforded suspects in Colorado greater rights than are available under the federal Constitution.\"); People v. Young, 814 P.2d 834, 842-43 (Colo.1991)(\"We have recognized and exercised our independent role on a number of occasions and on several have determined that the Colorado Constitution provides more protection for our citizens than do similarly or identically worded provisions of the United States Constitution.\")."},"case_id":9474997,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Nevertheless, in applying Article II, Section 7 of the Colorado Constitution, we have ruled that Colorado law affords broader protections in some instances than the Fourth Amendment.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"698 P.2d 811, 815","parenthetical":"\"Several times we have determined that the Colorado proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures protects a greater range of privacy interests than does its federal counterpart.\"","sentence":"See People v. Oates, 698 P.2d 811, 815 (Colo.1985)(\"Several times we have determined that the Colorado proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures protects a greater range of privacy interests than does its federal counterpart.\"); People v. - Sporleder, - 666 P.2d 135, 140 (Colo.1983)(\"Although Article II, Section 7 of the Colorado Constitution is substantially similar to its federal counterpart, we are not bound by the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the Fourth Amendment when determining the seope of state constitutional protections.\"); see also People v. Mason, 989 P.2d 757, 759 (Colo.1999)(\"IWle have afforded suspects in Colorado greater rights than are available under the federal Constitution.\"); People v. Young, 814 P.2d 834, 842-43 (Colo.1991)(\"We have recognized and exercised our independent role on a number of occasions and on several have determined that the Colorado Constitution provides more protection for our citizens than do similarly or identically worded provisions of the United States Constitution.\")."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"814 P.2d 834, 842-43","parenthetical":"\"We have recognized and exercised our independent role on a number of occasions and on several have determined that the Colorado Constitution provides more protection for our citizens than do similarly or identically worded provisions of the United States Constitution.\"","sentence":"See People v. Oates, 698 P.2d 811, 815 (Colo.1985)(\"Several times we have determined that the Colorado proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures protects a greater range of privacy interests than does its federal counterpart.\"); People v. - Sporleder, - 666 P.2d 135, 140 (Colo.1983)(\"Although Article II, Section 7 of the Colorado Constitution is substantially similar to its federal counterpart, we are not bound by the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the Fourth Amendment when determining the seope of state constitutional protections.\"); see also People v. Mason, 989 P.2d 757, 759 (Colo.1999)(\"IWle have afforded suspects in Colorado greater rights than are available under the federal Constitution.\"); People v. Young, 814 P.2d 834, 842-43 (Colo.1991)(\"We have recognized and exercised our independent role on a number of occasions and on several have determined that the Colorado Constitution provides more protection for our citizens than do similarly or identically worded provisions of the United States Constitution.\")."},"case_id":9474997,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Nevertheless, in applying Article II, Section 7 of the Colorado Constitution, we have ruled that Colorado law affords broader protections in some instances than the Fourth Amendment.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"989 P.2d 757, 759","parenthetical":"\"IWle have afforded suspects in Colorado greater rights than are available under the federal Constitution.\"","sentence":"See People v. Oates, 698 P.2d 811, 815 (Colo.1985)(\"Several times we have determined that the Colorado proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures protects a greater range of privacy interests than does its federal counterpart.\"); People v. - Sporleder, - 666 P.2d 135, 140 (Colo.1983)(\"Although Article II, Section 7 of the Colorado Constitution is substantially similar to its federal counterpart, we are not bound by the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the Fourth Amendment when determining the seope of state constitutional protections.\"); see also People v. Mason, 989 P.2d 757, 759 (Colo.1999)(\"IWle have afforded suspects in Colorado greater rights than are available under the federal Constitution.\"); People v. Young, 814 P.2d 834, 842-43 (Colo.1991)(\"We have recognized and exercised our independent role on a number of occasions and on several have determined that the Colorado Constitution provides more protection for our citizens than do similarly or identically worded provisions of the United States Constitution.\")."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"666 P.2d 135, 140","parenthetical":"\"Although Article II, Section 7 of the Colorado Constitution is substantially similar to its federal counterpart, we are not bound by the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the Fourth Amendment when determining the seope of state constitutional protections.\"","sentence":"See People v. Oates, 698 P.2d 811, 815 (Colo.1985)(\"Several times we have determined that the Colorado proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures protects a greater range of privacy interests than does its federal counterpart.\"); People v. - Sporleder, - 666 P.2d 135, 140 (Colo.1983)(\"Although Article II, Section 7 of the Colorado Constitution is substantially similar to its federal counterpart, we are not bound by the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the Fourth Amendment when determining the seope of state constitutional protections.\"); see also People v. Mason, 989 P.2d 757, 759 (Colo.1999)(\"IWle have afforded suspects in Colorado greater rights than are available under the federal Constitution.\"); People v. Young, 814 P.2d 834, 842-43 (Colo.1991)(\"We have recognized and exercised our independent role on a number of occasions and on several have determined that the Colorado Constitution provides more protection for our citizens than do similarly or identically worded provisions of the United States Constitution.\")."},"case_id":9474997,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Nevertheless, in applying Article II, Section 7 of the Colorado Constitution, we have ruled that Colorado law affords broader protections in some instances than the Fourth Amendment.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"814 P.2d 834, 842-43","parenthetical":"\"We have recognized and exercised our independent role on a number of occasions and on several have determined that the Colorado Constitution provides more protection for our citizens than do similarly or identically worded provisions of the United States Constitution.\"","sentence":"See People v. Oates, 698 P.2d 811, 815 (Colo.1985)(\"Several times we have determined that the Colorado proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures protects a greater range of privacy interests than does its federal counterpart.\"); People v. - Sporleder, - 666 P.2d 135, 140 (Colo.1983)(\"Although Article II, Section 7 of the Colorado Constitution is substantially similar to its federal counterpart, we are not bound by the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the Fourth Amendment when determining the seope of state constitutional protections.\"); see also People v. Mason, 989 P.2d 757, 759 (Colo.1999)(\"IWle have afforded suspects in Colorado greater rights than are available under the federal Constitution.\"); People v. Young, 814 P.2d 834, 842-43 (Colo.1991)(\"We have recognized and exercised our independent role on a number of occasions and on several have determined that the Colorado Constitution provides more protection for our citizens than do similarly or identically worded provisions of the United States Constitution.\")."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"666 P.2d 135, 140","parenthetical":"\"Although Article II, Section 7 of the Colorado Constitution is substantially similar to its federal counterpart, we are not bound by the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the Fourth Amendment when determining the seope of state constitutional protections.\"","sentence":"See People v. Oates, 698 P.2d 811, 815 (Colo.1985)(\"Several times we have determined that the Colorado proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures protects a greater range of privacy interests than does its federal counterpart.\"); People v. - Sporleder, - 666 P.2d 135, 140 (Colo.1983)(\"Although Article II, Section 7 of the Colorado Constitution is substantially similar to its federal counterpart, we are not bound by the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the Fourth Amendment when determining the seope of state constitutional protections.\"); see also People v. Mason, 989 P.2d 757, 759 (Colo.1999)(\"IWle have afforded suspects in Colorado greater rights than are available under the federal Constitution.\"); People v. Young, 814 P.2d 834, 842-43 (Colo.1991)(\"We have recognized and exercised our independent role on a number of occasions and on several have determined that the Colorado Constitution provides more protection for our citizens than do similarly or identically worded provisions of the United States Constitution.\")."},"case_id":9474997,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Reply Br. 7. An exiguous mention in one's introductory \"statement of the case\" does not a developed argument make, however.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"927 F.2d 955, 956","parenthetical":"\"A skeletal 'argument,' really nothing more than an assertion, does not preserve a claim.\"","sentence":"See United States v. Dunkel, 927 F.2d 955, 956 (7th Cir. 1991) (\u201cA skeletal \u2018argument,\u2019 really nothing more than an assertion, does not preserve a claim.\u201d); cf. Bradshaw v. Miners' Bank, 77 F. 932, 933 (7th Cir. 1897) (expressing displeasure with appellants\u2019 brief because its \u201cso-called 'statement of the case' is burdened and confused with matter of argument\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"77 F. 932, 933","parenthetical":"expressing displeasure with appellants' brief because its \"so-called 'statement of the case' is burdened and confused with matter of argument\"","sentence":"See United States v. Dunkel, 927 F.2d 955, 956 (7th Cir. 1991) (\u201cA skeletal \u2018argument,\u2019 really nothing more than an assertion, does not preserve a claim.\u201d); cf. Bradshaw v. Miners' Bank, 77 F. 932, 933 (7th Cir. 1897) (expressing displeasure with appellants\u2019 brief because its \u201cso-called 'statement of the case' is burdened and confused with matter of argument\u201d)."},"case_id":3782039,"label":"a"}
{"context":"When the advertising at issue directly or indirectly implied that one non-Orange Book drug was the generic of or equivalent to another drug, courts have split over whether a claim was precluded.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"228 F.Supp.2d 1055, 1055","parenthetical":"stating that this issue \"is better left to the FDA\" because \"this Court would be forced to determine FDA policy in order to determine the truth or falsity of the 'generic' nomenclature\"","sentence":"See First Horizon, 228 F.Supp.2d at 1055 (stating that this issue \u201cis better left to the FDA\u201d because \u201cthis Court would be forced to determine FDA policy in order to determine the truth or falsity of the \u2018generic\u2019 nomenclature\u201d); Ethex, 273 F.Supp.2d at 846 n. 140 (finding the generic claim was within the FDA\u2019s jurisdiction); Stratus, 273 F.Supp.2d at 793 n. 147 (same); but see Schwarz, 388 F.Supp.2d at 975 (allowing the plaintiffs claim to proceed where the defendant used the term \u201creference\u201d in comparing its drug to the plaintiffs drug); Solvay, 298 F.Supp.2d at 885 (allowing \u201cgeneric\u201d claims to proceed)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"388 F.Supp.2d 975, 975","parenthetical":"allowing the plaintiffs claim to proceed where the defendant used the term \"reference\" in comparing its drug to the plaintiffs drug","sentence":"See First Horizon, 228 F.Supp.2d at 1055 (stating that this issue \u201cis better left to the FDA\u201d because \u201cthis Court would be forced to determine FDA policy in order to determine the truth or falsity of the \u2018generic\u2019 nomenclature\u201d); Ethex, 273 F.Supp.2d at 846 n. 140 (finding the generic claim was within the FDA\u2019s jurisdiction); Stratus, 273 F.Supp.2d at 793 n. 147 (same); but see Schwarz, 388 F.Supp.2d at 975 (allowing the plaintiffs claim to proceed where the defendant used the term \u201creference\u201d in comparing its drug to the plaintiffs drug); Solvay, 298 F.Supp.2d at 885 (allowing \u201cgeneric\u201d claims to proceed)."},"case_id":2689054,"label":"a"}
{"context":"A signatory cannot base a cause of action on terms or obligations of a contract and refuse to submit to that contract's arbitration provision.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"177 F.3d 947, 947","parenthetical":"\"To allow [a plaintiff] to claim the benefit of the contract and simultaneously avoid its burdens would both disregard equity and contravene the purposes underlying the enactment of the Arbitration Act.\"","sentence":"See MS Dealer Serv. Corp., 177 F.3d at 947 (\u201cTo allow [a plaintiff] to claim the benefit of the contract and simultaneously avoid its burdens would both disregard equity and contravene the purposes underlying the enactment of the Arbitration Act.\u201d) (internal citations omitted)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"659 F.2d 840, 840-41","parenthetical":"finding signatory equitably estopped from repudiating arbitration clause in agreement on which suit against nonsignatory was based","sentence":"See also Hughes Masonry Co., 659 F.2d at 840-41 (finding signatory equitably estopped from repudiating arbitration clause in agreement on which suit against nonsignatory was based)."},"case_id":3944556,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Specifically, the IJ found that Ms. Romentes's demeanor at the merits hearing was casual and detached even though she was describing repeated incidents of physical abuse that she allegedly suffered at the hands of the person whom she feared in the Ukraine. Further, the IJ outlined numerous inconsistencies between Ms. Ro-mentes's testimony and her documentary evidence -- many of which went to the heart of her asylum claim -- and the IJ was unpersuaded by the reasons that Ms. Ro-mentes gave to justify or explain the discrepancies.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"686 F.3d 534, 537-38","parenthetical":"credibility findings are reviewed for substantial evidence, and are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to reach contrary conclusion","sentence":"See Ali v. Holder, 686 F.3d 534, 537-38 (8th Cir. 2012) (credibility findings are reviewed for substantial evidence, and are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to reach contrary conclusion); cf. Redd v. Mukasey, 535 F.3d 838, 842 (8th Cir. 2008) (unexplained inconsistencies that went to heart of asylum claim supported IJ\u2019s credibility determination)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"535 F.3d 838, 842","parenthetical":"unexplained inconsistencies that went to heart of asylum claim supported IJ's credibility determination","sentence":"See Ali v. Holder, 686 F.3d 534, 537-38 (8th Cir. 2012) (credibility findings are reviewed for substantial evidence, and are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to reach contrary conclusion); cf. Redd v. Mukasey, 535 F.3d 838, 842 (8th Cir. 2008) (unexplained inconsistencies that went to heart of asylum claim supported IJ\u2019s credibility determination)."},"case_id":12400565,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Defendants Intelsat, Cowan, and Stoner, if they hosted the Christmas party and after-party for social reasons, will not be hable to plaintiffs. Social hosts have no duty and are not liable to parties who are injured when alcohol is served to social guests.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"694 F.2d 957, 960","parenthetical":"stating North Carolina common law does not permit recovery against a social host","sentence":"See, e.g., Chastain v. Litton Sys., 694 F.2d 957, 960 (4th Cir.1982) (stating North Carolina common law does not permit recovery against a social host); Hill v. Honey\u2019s, Inc., 786 F.Supp. 549, 550 (D.S.C.1992) (explaining a social host is free from liability to third parties when he serves alcohol in South Carolina (citing Garren v. Cummings & McCrady, Inc., 289 S.C. 348, 345 S.E.2d 508, 510 (Ct.App.1986))); Wright v. Sue & Charles, Inc., 131 Md.App. 466, 749 A.2d 241, 247 (Md.2000) (\u201cMaryland does not recognize a cause of action for social host liability\u201d); Dan B. Dobbs, The Law of Torts \u00a7 332 (1st ed. 2000) (\u201cSocial host liability today remains the exception rather than the rule.\u201d); but see Makynen v. Mustakangas, 39 Mass.App.Ct. 309, 655 N.E.2d 1284, 1285-87 (1995) (allowing liability to be imposed upon a social host for serving an obviously intoxicated person); Wiener v. Gamma Phi Chapter of Alpha Tau Omega Fraternity, 258 Or. 632, 485 P.2d 18, 21 (1971) (permitting social host liability against parties who had reason to know the people alcohol was served to might do unreasonable things)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"allowing liability to be imposed upon a social host for serving an obviously intoxicated person","sentence":"See, e.g., Chastain v. Litton Sys., 694 F.2d 957, 960 (4th Cir.1982) (stating North Carolina common law does not permit recovery against a social host); Hill v. Honey\u2019s, Inc., 786 F.Supp. 549, 550 (D.S.C.1992) (explaining a social host is free from liability to third parties when he serves alcohol in South Carolina (citing Garren v. Cummings & McCrady, Inc., 289 S.C. 348, 345 S.E.2d 508, 510 (Ct.App.1986))); Wright v. Sue & Charles, Inc., 131 Md.App. 466, 749 A.2d 241, 247 (Md.2000) (\u201cMaryland does not recognize a cause of action for social host liability\u201d); Dan B. Dobbs, The Law of Torts \u00a7 332 (1st ed. 2000) (\u201cSocial host liability today remains the exception rather than the rule.\u201d); but see Makynen v. Mustakangas, 39 Mass.App.Ct. 309, 655 N.E.2d 1284, 1285-87 (1995) (allowing liability to be imposed upon a social host for serving an obviously intoxicated person); Wiener v. Gamma Phi Chapter of Alpha Tau Omega Fraternity, 258 Or. 632, 485 P.2d 18, 21 (1971) (permitting social host liability against parties who had reason to know the people alcohol was served to might do unreasonable things)."},"case_id":9477704,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Defendants Intelsat, Cowan, and Stoner, if they hosted the Christmas party and after-party for social reasons, will not be hable to plaintiffs. Social hosts have no duty and are not liable to parties who are injured when alcohol is served to social guests.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"655 N.E.2d 1284, 1285-87","parenthetical":"allowing liability to be imposed upon a social host for serving an obviously intoxicated person","sentence":"See, e.g., Chastain v. Litton Sys., 694 F.2d 957, 960 (4th Cir.1982) (stating North Carolina common law does not permit recovery against a social host); Hill v. Honey\u2019s, Inc., 786 F.Supp. 549, 550 (D.S.C.1992) (explaining a social host is free from liability to third parties when he serves alcohol in South Carolina (citing Garren v. Cummings & McCrady, Inc., 289 S.C. 348, 345 S.E.2d 508, 510 (Ct.App.1986))); Wright v. Sue & Charles, Inc., 131 Md.App. 466, 749 A.2d 241, 247 (Md.2000) (\u201cMaryland does not recognize a cause of action for social host liability\u201d); Dan B. Dobbs, The Law of Torts \u00a7 332 (1st ed. 2000) (\u201cSocial host liability today remains the exception rather than the rule.\u201d); but see Makynen v. Mustakangas, 39 Mass.App.Ct. 309, 655 N.E.2d 1284, 1285-87 (1995) (allowing liability to be imposed upon a social host for serving an obviously intoxicated person); Wiener v. Gamma Phi Chapter of Alpha Tau Omega Fraternity, 258 Or. 632, 485 P.2d 18, 21 (1971) (permitting social host liability against parties who had reason to know the people alcohol was served to might do unreasonable things)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"694 F.2d 957, 960","parenthetical":"stating North Carolina common law does not permit recovery against a social host","sentence":"See, e.g., Chastain v. Litton Sys., 694 F.2d 957, 960 (4th Cir.1982) (stating North Carolina common law does not permit recovery against a social host); Hill v. Honey\u2019s, Inc., 786 F.Supp. 549, 550 (D.S.C.1992) (explaining a social host is free from liability to third parties when he serves alcohol in South Carolina (citing Garren v. Cummings & McCrady, Inc., 289 S.C. 348, 345 S.E.2d 508, 510 (Ct.App.1986))); Wright v. Sue & Charles, Inc., 131 Md.App. 466, 749 A.2d 241, 247 (Md.2000) (\u201cMaryland does not recognize a cause of action for social host liability\u201d); Dan B. Dobbs, The Law of Torts \u00a7 332 (1st ed. 2000) (\u201cSocial host liability today remains the exception rather than the rule.\u201d); but see Makynen v. Mustakangas, 39 Mass.App.Ct. 309, 655 N.E.2d 1284, 1285-87 (1995) (allowing liability to be imposed upon a social host for serving an obviously intoxicated person); Wiener v. Gamma Phi Chapter of Alpha Tau Omega Fraternity, 258 Or. 632, 485 P.2d 18, 21 (1971) (permitting social host liability against parties who had reason to know the people alcohol was served to might do unreasonable things)."},"case_id":9477704,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Defendants Intelsat, Cowan, and Stoner, if they hosted the Christmas party and after-party for social reasons, will not be hable to plaintiffs. Social hosts have no duty and are not liable to parties who are injured when alcohol is served to social guests.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"permitting social host liability against parties who had reason to know the people alcohol was served to might do unreasonable things","sentence":"See, e.g., Chastain v. Litton Sys., 694 F.2d 957, 960 (4th Cir.1982) (stating North Carolina common law does not permit recovery against a social host); Hill v. Honey\u2019s, Inc., 786 F.Supp. 549, 550 (D.S.C.1992) (explaining a social host is free from liability to third parties when he serves alcohol in South Carolina (citing Garren v. Cummings & McCrady, Inc., 289 S.C. 348, 345 S.E.2d 508, 510 (Ct.App.1986))); Wright v. Sue & Charles, Inc., 131 Md.App. 466, 749 A.2d 241, 247 (Md.2000) (\u201cMaryland does not recognize a cause of action for social host liability\u201d); Dan B. Dobbs, The Law of Torts \u00a7 332 (1st ed. 2000) (\u201cSocial host liability today remains the exception rather than the rule.\u201d); but see Makynen v. Mustakangas, 39 Mass.App.Ct. 309, 655 N.E.2d 1284, 1285-87 (1995) (allowing liability to be imposed upon a social host for serving an obviously intoxicated person); Wiener v. Gamma Phi Chapter of Alpha Tau Omega Fraternity, 258 Or. 632, 485 P.2d 18, 21 (1971) (permitting social host liability against parties who had reason to know the people alcohol was served to might do unreasonable things)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"694 F.2d 957, 960","parenthetical":"stating North Carolina common law does not permit recovery against a social host","sentence":"See, e.g., Chastain v. Litton Sys., 694 F.2d 957, 960 (4th Cir.1982) (stating North Carolina common law does not permit recovery against a social host); Hill v. Honey\u2019s, Inc., 786 F.Supp. 549, 550 (D.S.C.1992) (explaining a social host is free from liability to third parties when he serves alcohol in South Carolina (citing Garren v. Cummings & McCrady, Inc., 289 S.C. 348, 345 S.E.2d 508, 510 (Ct.App.1986))); Wright v. Sue & Charles, Inc., 131 Md.App. 466, 749 A.2d 241, 247 (Md.2000) (\u201cMaryland does not recognize a cause of action for social host liability\u201d); Dan B. Dobbs, The Law of Torts \u00a7 332 (1st ed. 2000) (\u201cSocial host liability today remains the exception rather than the rule.\u201d); but see Makynen v. Mustakangas, 39 Mass.App.Ct. 309, 655 N.E.2d 1284, 1285-87 (1995) (allowing liability to be imposed upon a social host for serving an obviously intoxicated person); Wiener v. Gamma Phi Chapter of Alpha Tau Omega Fraternity, 258 Or. 632, 485 P.2d 18, 21 (1971) (permitting social host liability against parties who had reason to know the people alcohol was served to might do unreasonable things)."},"case_id":9477704,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Defendants Intelsat, Cowan, and Stoner, if they hosted the Christmas party and after-party for social reasons, will not be hable to plaintiffs. Social hosts have no duty and are not liable to parties who are injured when alcohol is served to social guests.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"694 F.2d 957, 960","parenthetical":"stating North Carolina common law does not permit recovery against a social host","sentence":"See, e.g., Chastain v. Litton Sys., 694 F.2d 957, 960 (4th Cir.1982) (stating North Carolina common law does not permit recovery against a social host); Hill v. Honey\u2019s, Inc., 786 F.Supp. 549, 550 (D.S.C.1992) (explaining a social host is free from liability to third parties when he serves alcohol in South Carolina (citing Garren v. Cummings & McCrady, Inc., 289 S.C. 348, 345 S.E.2d 508, 510 (Ct.App.1986))); Wright v. Sue & Charles, Inc., 131 Md.App. 466, 749 A.2d 241, 247 (Md.2000) (\u201cMaryland does not recognize a cause of action for social host liability\u201d); Dan B. Dobbs, The Law of Torts \u00a7 332 (1st ed. 2000) (\u201cSocial host liability today remains the exception rather than the rule.\u201d); but see Makynen v. Mustakangas, 39 Mass.App.Ct. 309, 655 N.E.2d 1284, 1285-87 (1995) (allowing liability to be imposed upon a social host for serving an obviously intoxicated person); Wiener v. Gamma Phi Chapter of Alpha Tau Omega Fraternity, 258 Or. 632, 485 P.2d 18, 21 (1971) (permitting social host liability against parties who had reason to know the people alcohol was served to might do unreasonable things)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"485 P.2d 18, 21","parenthetical":"permitting social host liability against parties who had reason to know the people alcohol was served to might do unreasonable things","sentence":"See, e.g., Chastain v. Litton Sys., 694 F.2d 957, 960 (4th Cir.1982) (stating North Carolina common law does not permit recovery against a social host); Hill v. Honey\u2019s, Inc., 786 F.Supp. 549, 550 (D.S.C.1992) (explaining a social host is free from liability to third parties when he serves alcohol in South Carolina (citing Garren v. Cummings & McCrady, Inc., 289 S.C. 348, 345 S.E.2d 508, 510 (Ct.App.1986))); Wright v. Sue & Charles, Inc., 131 Md.App. 466, 749 A.2d 241, 247 (Md.2000) (\u201cMaryland does not recognize a cause of action for social host liability\u201d); Dan B. Dobbs, The Law of Torts \u00a7 332 (1st ed. 2000) (\u201cSocial host liability today remains the exception rather than the rule.\u201d); but see Makynen v. Mustakangas, 39 Mass.App.Ct. 309, 655 N.E.2d 1284, 1285-87 (1995) (allowing liability to be imposed upon a social host for serving an obviously intoxicated person); Wiener v. Gamma Phi Chapter of Alpha Tau Omega Fraternity, 258 Or. 632, 485 P.2d 18, 21 (1971) (permitting social host liability against parties who had reason to know the people alcohol was served to might do unreasonable things)."},"case_id":9477704,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Defendants Intelsat, Cowan, and Stoner, if they hosted the Christmas party and after-party for social reasons, will not be hable to plaintiffs. Social hosts have no duty and are not liable to parties who are injured when alcohol is served to social guests.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"Maryland does not recognize a cause of action for social host liability\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Chastain v. Litton Sys., 694 F.2d 957, 960 (4th Cir.1982) (stating North Carolina common law does not permit recovery against a social host); Hill v. Honey\u2019s, Inc., 786 F.Supp. 549, 550 (D.S.C.1992) (explaining a social host is free from liability to third parties when he serves alcohol in South Carolina (citing Garren v. Cummings & McCrady, Inc., 289 S.C. 348, 345 S.E.2d 508, 510 (Ct.App.1986))); Wright v. Sue & Charles, Inc., 131 Md.App. 466, 749 A.2d 241, 247 (Md.2000) (\u201cMaryland does not recognize a cause of action for social host liability\u201d); Dan B. Dobbs, The Law of Torts \u00a7 332 (1st ed. 2000) (\u201cSocial host liability today remains the exception rather than the rule.\u201d); but see Makynen v. Mustakangas, 39 Mass.App.Ct. 309, 655 N.E.2d 1284, 1285-87 (1995) (allowing liability to be imposed upon a social host for serving an obviously intoxicated person); Wiener v. Gamma Phi Chapter of Alpha Tau Omega Fraternity, 258 Or. 632, 485 P.2d 18, 21 (1971) (permitting social host liability against parties who had reason to know the people alcohol was served to might do unreasonable things)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"allowing liability to be imposed upon a social host for serving an obviously intoxicated person","sentence":"See, e.g., Chastain v. Litton Sys., 694 F.2d 957, 960 (4th Cir.1982) (stating North Carolina common law does not permit recovery against a social host); Hill v. Honey\u2019s, Inc., 786 F.Supp. 549, 550 (D.S.C.1992) (explaining a social host is free from liability to third parties when he serves alcohol in South Carolina (citing Garren v. Cummings & McCrady, Inc., 289 S.C. 348, 345 S.E.2d 508, 510 (Ct.App.1986))); Wright v. Sue & Charles, Inc., 131 Md.App. 466, 749 A.2d 241, 247 (Md.2000) (\u201cMaryland does not recognize a cause of action for social host liability\u201d); Dan B. Dobbs, The Law of Torts \u00a7 332 (1st ed. 2000) (\u201cSocial host liability today remains the exception rather than the rule.\u201d); but see Makynen v. Mustakangas, 39 Mass.App.Ct. 309, 655 N.E.2d 1284, 1285-87 (1995) (allowing liability to be imposed upon a social host for serving an obviously intoxicated person); Wiener v. Gamma Phi Chapter of Alpha Tau Omega Fraternity, 258 Or. 632, 485 P.2d 18, 21 (1971) (permitting social host liability against parties who had reason to know the people alcohol was served to might do unreasonable things)."},"case_id":9477704,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Defendants Intelsat, Cowan, and Stoner, if they hosted the Christmas party and after-party for social reasons, will not be hable to plaintiffs. Social hosts have no duty and are not liable to parties who are injured when alcohol is served to social guests.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"Maryland does not recognize a cause of action for social host liability\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Chastain v. Litton Sys., 694 F.2d 957, 960 (4th Cir.1982) (stating North Carolina common law does not permit recovery against a social host); Hill v. Honey\u2019s, Inc., 786 F.Supp. 549, 550 (D.S.C.1992) (explaining a social host is free from liability to third parties when he serves alcohol in South Carolina (citing Garren v. Cummings & McCrady, Inc., 289 S.C. 348, 345 S.E.2d 508, 510 (Ct.App.1986))); Wright v. Sue & Charles, Inc., 131 Md.App. 466, 749 A.2d 241, 247 (Md.2000) (\u201cMaryland does not recognize a cause of action for social host liability\u201d); Dan B. Dobbs, The Law of Torts \u00a7 332 (1st ed. 2000) (\u201cSocial host liability today remains the exception rather than the rule.\u201d); but see Makynen v. Mustakangas, 39 Mass.App.Ct. 309, 655 N.E.2d 1284, 1285-87 (1995) (allowing liability to be imposed upon a social host for serving an obviously intoxicated person); Wiener v. Gamma Phi Chapter of Alpha Tau Omega Fraternity, 258 Or. 632, 485 P.2d 18, 21 (1971) (permitting social host liability against parties who had reason to know the people alcohol was served to might do unreasonable things)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"655 N.E.2d 1284, 1285-87","parenthetical":"allowing liability to be imposed upon a social host for serving an obviously intoxicated person","sentence":"See, e.g., Chastain v. Litton Sys., 694 F.2d 957, 960 (4th Cir.1982) (stating North Carolina common law does not permit recovery against a social host); Hill v. Honey\u2019s, Inc., 786 F.Supp. 549, 550 (D.S.C.1992) (explaining a social host is free from liability to third parties when he serves alcohol in South Carolina (citing Garren v. Cummings & McCrady, Inc., 289 S.C. 348, 345 S.E.2d 508, 510 (Ct.App.1986))); Wright v. Sue & Charles, Inc., 131 Md.App. 466, 749 A.2d 241, 247 (Md.2000) (\u201cMaryland does not recognize a cause of action for social host liability\u201d); Dan B. Dobbs, The Law of Torts \u00a7 332 (1st ed. 2000) (\u201cSocial host liability today remains the exception rather than the rule.\u201d); but see Makynen v. Mustakangas, 39 Mass.App.Ct. 309, 655 N.E.2d 1284, 1285-87 (1995) (allowing liability to be imposed upon a social host for serving an obviously intoxicated person); Wiener v. Gamma Phi Chapter of Alpha Tau Omega Fraternity, 258 Or. 632, 485 P.2d 18, 21 (1971) (permitting social host liability against parties who had reason to know the people alcohol was served to might do unreasonable things)."},"case_id":9477704,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Defendants Intelsat, Cowan, and Stoner, if they hosted the Christmas party and after-party for social reasons, will not be hable to plaintiffs. Social hosts have no duty and are not liable to parties who are injured when alcohol is served to social guests.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"Maryland does not recognize a cause of action for social host liability\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Chastain v. Litton Sys., 694 F.2d 957, 960 (4th Cir.1982) (stating North Carolina common law does not permit recovery against a social host); Hill v. Honey\u2019s, Inc., 786 F.Supp. 549, 550 (D.S.C.1992) (explaining a social host is free from liability to third parties when he serves alcohol in South Carolina (citing Garren v. Cummings & McCrady, Inc., 289 S.C. 348, 345 S.E.2d 508, 510 (Ct.App.1986))); Wright v. Sue & Charles, Inc., 131 Md.App. 466, 749 A.2d 241, 247 (Md.2000) (\u201cMaryland does not recognize a cause of action for social host liability\u201d); Dan B. Dobbs, The Law of Torts \u00a7 332 (1st ed. 2000) (\u201cSocial host liability today remains the exception rather than the rule.\u201d); but see Makynen v. Mustakangas, 39 Mass.App.Ct. 309, 655 N.E.2d 1284, 1285-87 (1995) (allowing liability to be imposed upon a social host for serving an obviously intoxicated person); Wiener v. Gamma Phi Chapter of Alpha Tau Omega Fraternity, 258 Or. 632, 485 P.2d 18, 21 (1971) (permitting social host liability against parties who had reason to know the people alcohol was served to might do unreasonable things)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"permitting social host liability against parties who had reason to know the people alcohol was served to might do unreasonable things","sentence":"See, e.g., Chastain v. Litton Sys., 694 F.2d 957, 960 (4th Cir.1982) (stating North Carolina common law does not permit recovery against a social host); Hill v. Honey\u2019s, Inc., 786 F.Supp. 549, 550 (D.S.C.1992) (explaining a social host is free from liability to third parties when he serves alcohol in South Carolina (citing Garren v. Cummings & McCrady, Inc., 289 S.C. 348, 345 S.E.2d 508, 510 (Ct.App.1986))); Wright v. Sue & Charles, Inc., 131 Md.App. 466, 749 A.2d 241, 247 (Md.2000) (\u201cMaryland does not recognize a cause of action for social host liability\u201d); Dan B. Dobbs, The Law of Torts \u00a7 332 (1st ed. 2000) (\u201cSocial host liability today remains the exception rather than the rule.\u201d); but see Makynen v. Mustakangas, 39 Mass.App.Ct. 309, 655 N.E.2d 1284, 1285-87 (1995) (allowing liability to be imposed upon a social host for serving an obviously intoxicated person); Wiener v. Gamma Phi Chapter of Alpha Tau Omega Fraternity, 258 Or. 632, 485 P.2d 18, 21 (1971) (permitting social host liability against parties who had reason to know the people alcohol was served to might do unreasonable things)."},"case_id":9477704,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Defendants Intelsat, Cowan, and Stoner, if they hosted the Christmas party and after-party for social reasons, will not be hable to plaintiffs. Social hosts have no duty and are not liable to parties who are injured when alcohol is served to social guests.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"485 P.2d 18, 21","parenthetical":"permitting social host liability against parties who had reason to know the people alcohol was served to might do unreasonable things","sentence":"See, e.g., Chastain v. Litton Sys., 694 F.2d 957, 960 (4th Cir.1982) (stating North Carolina common law does not permit recovery against a social host); Hill v. Honey\u2019s, Inc., 786 F.Supp. 549, 550 (D.S.C.1992) (explaining a social host is free from liability to third parties when he serves alcohol in South Carolina (citing Garren v. Cummings & McCrady, Inc., 289 S.C. 348, 345 S.E.2d 508, 510 (Ct.App.1986))); Wright v. Sue & Charles, Inc., 131 Md.App. 466, 749 A.2d 241, 247 (Md.2000) (\u201cMaryland does not recognize a cause of action for social host liability\u201d); Dan B. Dobbs, The Law of Torts \u00a7 332 (1st ed. 2000) (\u201cSocial host liability today remains the exception rather than the rule.\u201d); but see Makynen v. Mustakangas, 39 Mass.App.Ct. 309, 655 N.E.2d 1284, 1285-87 (1995) (allowing liability to be imposed upon a social host for serving an obviously intoxicated person); Wiener v. Gamma Phi Chapter of Alpha Tau Omega Fraternity, 258 Or. 632, 485 P.2d 18, 21 (1971) (permitting social host liability against parties who had reason to know the people alcohol was served to might do unreasonable things)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"Maryland does not recognize a cause of action for social host liability\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Chastain v. Litton Sys., 694 F.2d 957, 960 (4th Cir.1982) (stating North Carolina common law does not permit recovery against a social host); Hill v. Honey\u2019s, Inc., 786 F.Supp. 549, 550 (D.S.C.1992) (explaining a social host is free from liability to third parties when he serves alcohol in South Carolina (citing Garren v. Cummings & McCrady, Inc., 289 S.C. 348, 345 S.E.2d 508, 510 (Ct.App.1986))); Wright v. Sue & Charles, Inc., 131 Md.App. 466, 749 A.2d 241, 247 (Md.2000) (\u201cMaryland does not recognize a cause of action for social host liability\u201d); Dan B. Dobbs, The Law of Torts \u00a7 332 (1st ed. 2000) (\u201cSocial host liability today remains the exception rather than the rule.\u201d); but see Makynen v. Mustakangas, 39 Mass.App.Ct. 309, 655 N.E.2d 1284, 1285-87 (1995) (allowing liability to be imposed upon a social host for serving an obviously intoxicated person); Wiener v. Gamma Phi Chapter of Alpha Tau Omega Fraternity, 258 Or. 632, 485 P.2d 18, 21 (1971) (permitting social host liability against parties who had reason to know the people alcohol was served to might do unreasonable things)."},"case_id":9477704,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Defendants Intelsat, Cowan, and Stoner, if they hosted the Christmas party and after-party for social reasons, will not be hable to plaintiffs. Social hosts have no duty and are not liable to parties who are injured when alcohol is served to social guests.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"allowing liability to be imposed upon a social host for serving an obviously intoxicated person","sentence":"See, e.g., Chastain v. Litton Sys., 694 F.2d 957, 960 (4th Cir.1982) (stating North Carolina common law does not permit recovery against a social host); Hill v. Honey\u2019s, Inc., 786 F.Supp. 549, 550 (D.S.C.1992) (explaining a social host is free from liability to third parties when he serves alcohol in South Carolina (citing Garren v. Cummings & McCrady, Inc., 289 S.C. 348, 345 S.E.2d 508, 510 (Ct.App.1986))); Wright v. Sue & Charles, Inc., 131 Md.App. 466, 749 A.2d 241, 247 (Md.2000) (\u201cMaryland does not recognize a cause of action for social host liability\u201d); Dan B. Dobbs, The Law of Torts \u00a7 332 (1st ed. 2000) (\u201cSocial host liability today remains the exception rather than the rule.\u201d); but see Makynen v. Mustakangas, 39 Mass.App.Ct. 309, 655 N.E.2d 1284, 1285-87 (1995) (allowing liability to be imposed upon a social host for serving an obviously intoxicated person); Wiener v. Gamma Phi Chapter of Alpha Tau Omega Fraternity, 258 Or. 632, 485 P.2d 18, 21 (1971) (permitting social host liability against parties who had reason to know the people alcohol was served to might do unreasonable things)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"749 A.2d 241, 247","parenthetical":"\"Maryland does not recognize a cause of action for social host liability\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Chastain v. Litton Sys., 694 F.2d 957, 960 (4th Cir.1982) (stating North Carolina common law does not permit recovery against a social host); Hill v. Honey\u2019s, Inc., 786 F.Supp. 549, 550 (D.S.C.1992) (explaining a social host is free from liability to third parties when he serves alcohol in South Carolina (citing Garren v. Cummings & McCrady, Inc., 289 S.C. 348, 345 S.E.2d 508, 510 (Ct.App.1986))); Wright v. Sue & Charles, Inc., 131 Md.App. 466, 749 A.2d 241, 247 (Md.2000) (\u201cMaryland does not recognize a cause of action for social host liability\u201d); Dan B. Dobbs, The Law of Torts \u00a7 332 (1st ed. 2000) (\u201cSocial host liability today remains the exception rather than the rule.\u201d); but see Makynen v. Mustakangas, 39 Mass.App.Ct. 309, 655 N.E.2d 1284, 1285-87 (1995) (allowing liability to be imposed upon a social host for serving an obviously intoxicated person); Wiener v. Gamma Phi Chapter of Alpha Tau Omega Fraternity, 258 Or. 632, 485 P.2d 18, 21 (1971) (permitting social host liability against parties who had reason to know the people alcohol was served to might do unreasonable things)."},"case_id":9477704,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Defendants Intelsat, Cowan, and Stoner, if they hosted the Christmas party and after-party for social reasons, will not be hable to plaintiffs. Social hosts have no duty and are not liable to parties who are injured when alcohol is served to social guests.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"749 A.2d 241, 247","parenthetical":"\"Maryland does not recognize a cause of action for social host liability\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Chastain v. Litton Sys., 694 F.2d 957, 960 (4th Cir.1982) (stating North Carolina common law does not permit recovery against a social host); Hill v. Honey\u2019s, Inc., 786 F.Supp. 549, 550 (D.S.C.1992) (explaining a social host is free from liability to third parties when he serves alcohol in South Carolina (citing Garren v. Cummings & McCrady, Inc., 289 S.C. 348, 345 S.E.2d 508, 510 (Ct.App.1986))); Wright v. Sue & Charles, Inc., 131 Md.App. 466, 749 A.2d 241, 247 (Md.2000) (\u201cMaryland does not recognize a cause of action for social host liability\u201d); Dan B. Dobbs, The Law of Torts \u00a7 332 (1st ed. 2000) (\u201cSocial host liability today remains the exception rather than the rule.\u201d); but see Makynen v. Mustakangas, 39 Mass.App.Ct. 309, 655 N.E.2d 1284, 1285-87 (1995) (allowing liability to be imposed upon a social host for serving an obviously intoxicated person); Wiener v. Gamma Phi Chapter of Alpha Tau Omega Fraternity, 258 Or. 632, 485 P.2d 18, 21 (1971) (permitting social host liability against parties who had reason to know the people alcohol was served to might do unreasonable things)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"655 N.E.2d 1284, 1285-87","parenthetical":"allowing liability to be imposed upon a social host for serving an obviously intoxicated person","sentence":"See, e.g., Chastain v. Litton Sys., 694 F.2d 957, 960 (4th Cir.1982) (stating North Carolina common law does not permit recovery against a social host); Hill v. Honey\u2019s, Inc., 786 F.Supp. 549, 550 (D.S.C.1992) (explaining a social host is free from liability to third parties when he serves alcohol in South Carolina (citing Garren v. Cummings & McCrady, Inc., 289 S.C. 348, 345 S.E.2d 508, 510 (Ct.App.1986))); Wright v. Sue & Charles, Inc., 131 Md.App. 466, 749 A.2d 241, 247 (Md.2000) (\u201cMaryland does not recognize a cause of action for social host liability\u201d); Dan B. Dobbs, The Law of Torts \u00a7 332 (1st ed. 2000) (\u201cSocial host liability today remains the exception rather than the rule.\u201d); but see Makynen v. Mustakangas, 39 Mass.App.Ct. 309, 655 N.E.2d 1284, 1285-87 (1995) (allowing liability to be imposed upon a social host for serving an obviously intoxicated person); Wiener v. Gamma Phi Chapter of Alpha Tau Omega Fraternity, 258 Or. 632, 485 P.2d 18, 21 (1971) (permitting social host liability against parties who had reason to know the people alcohol was served to might do unreasonable things)."},"case_id":9477704,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Defendants Intelsat, Cowan, and Stoner, if they hosted the Christmas party and after-party for social reasons, will not be hable to plaintiffs. Social hosts have no duty and are not liable to parties who are injured when alcohol is served to social guests.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"749 A.2d 241, 247","parenthetical":"\"Maryland does not recognize a cause of action for social host liability\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Chastain v. Litton Sys., 694 F.2d 957, 960 (4th Cir.1982) (stating North Carolina common law does not permit recovery against a social host); Hill v. Honey\u2019s, Inc., 786 F.Supp. 549, 550 (D.S.C.1992) (explaining a social host is free from liability to third parties when he serves alcohol in South Carolina (citing Garren v. Cummings & McCrady, Inc., 289 S.C. 348, 345 S.E.2d 508, 510 (Ct.App.1986))); Wright v. Sue & Charles, Inc., 131 Md.App. 466, 749 A.2d 241, 247 (Md.2000) (\u201cMaryland does not recognize a cause of action for social host liability\u201d); Dan B. Dobbs, The Law of Torts \u00a7 332 (1st ed. 2000) (\u201cSocial host liability today remains the exception rather than the rule.\u201d); but see Makynen v. Mustakangas, 39 Mass.App.Ct. 309, 655 N.E.2d 1284, 1285-87 (1995) (allowing liability to be imposed upon a social host for serving an obviously intoxicated person); Wiener v. Gamma Phi Chapter of Alpha Tau Omega Fraternity, 258 Or. 632, 485 P.2d 18, 21 (1971) (permitting social host liability against parties who had reason to know the people alcohol was served to might do unreasonable things)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"permitting social host liability against parties who had reason to know the people alcohol was served to might do unreasonable things","sentence":"See, e.g., Chastain v. Litton Sys., 694 F.2d 957, 960 (4th Cir.1982) (stating North Carolina common law does not permit recovery against a social host); Hill v. Honey\u2019s, Inc., 786 F.Supp. 549, 550 (D.S.C.1992) (explaining a social host is free from liability to third parties when he serves alcohol in South Carolina (citing Garren v. Cummings & McCrady, Inc., 289 S.C. 348, 345 S.E.2d 508, 510 (Ct.App.1986))); Wright v. Sue & Charles, Inc., 131 Md.App. 466, 749 A.2d 241, 247 (Md.2000) (\u201cMaryland does not recognize a cause of action for social host liability\u201d); Dan B. Dobbs, The Law of Torts \u00a7 332 (1st ed. 2000) (\u201cSocial host liability today remains the exception rather than the rule.\u201d); but see Makynen v. Mustakangas, 39 Mass.App.Ct. 309, 655 N.E.2d 1284, 1285-87 (1995) (allowing liability to be imposed upon a social host for serving an obviously intoxicated person); Wiener v. Gamma Phi Chapter of Alpha Tau Omega Fraternity, 258 Or. 632, 485 P.2d 18, 21 (1971) (permitting social host liability against parties who had reason to know the people alcohol was served to might do unreasonable things)."},"case_id":9477704,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Defendants Intelsat, Cowan, and Stoner, if they hosted the Christmas party and after-party for social reasons, will not be hable to plaintiffs. Social hosts have no duty and are not liable to parties who are injured when alcohol is served to social guests.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"749 A.2d 241, 247","parenthetical":"\"Maryland does not recognize a cause of action for social host liability\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Chastain v. Litton Sys., 694 F.2d 957, 960 (4th Cir.1982) (stating North Carolina common law does not permit recovery against a social host); Hill v. Honey\u2019s, Inc., 786 F.Supp. 549, 550 (D.S.C.1992) (explaining a social host is free from liability to third parties when he serves alcohol in South Carolina (citing Garren v. Cummings & McCrady, Inc., 289 S.C. 348, 345 S.E.2d 508, 510 (Ct.App.1986))); Wright v. Sue & Charles, Inc., 131 Md.App. 466, 749 A.2d 241, 247 (Md.2000) (\u201cMaryland does not recognize a cause of action for social host liability\u201d); Dan B. Dobbs, The Law of Torts \u00a7 332 (1st ed. 2000) (\u201cSocial host liability today remains the exception rather than the rule.\u201d); but see Makynen v. Mustakangas, 39 Mass.App.Ct. 309, 655 N.E.2d 1284, 1285-87 (1995) (allowing liability to be imposed upon a social host for serving an obviously intoxicated person); Wiener v. Gamma Phi Chapter of Alpha Tau Omega Fraternity, 258 Or. 632, 485 P.2d 18, 21 (1971) (permitting social host liability against parties who had reason to know the people alcohol was served to might do unreasonable things)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"485 P.2d 18, 21","parenthetical":"permitting social host liability against parties who had reason to know the people alcohol was served to might do unreasonable things","sentence":"See, e.g., Chastain v. Litton Sys., 694 F.2d 957, 960 (4th Cir.1982) (stating North Carolina common law does not permit recovery against a social host); Hill v. Honey\u2019s, Inc., 786 F.Supp. 549, 550 (D.S.C.1992) (explaining a social host is free from liability to third parties when he serves alcohol in South Carolina (citing Garren v. Cummings & McCrady, Inc., 289 S.C. 348, 345 S.E.2d 508, 510 (Ct.App.1986))); Wright v. Sue & Charles, Inc., 131 Md.App. 466, 749 A.2d 241, 247 (Md.2000) (\u201cMaryland does not recognize a cause of action for social host liability\u201d); Dan B. Dobbs, The Law of Torts \u00a7 332 (1st ed. 2000) (\u201cSocial host liability today remains the exception rather than the rule.\u201d); but see Makynen v. Mustakangas, 39 Mass.App.Ct. 309, 655 N.E.2d 1284, 1285-87 (1995) (allowing liability to be imposed upon a social host for serving an obviously intoxicated person); Wiener v. Gamma Phi Chapter of Alpha Tau Omega Fraternity, 258 Or. 632, 485 P.2d 18, 21 (1971) (permitting social host liability against parties who had reason to know the people alcohol was served to might do unreasonable things)."},"case_id":9477704,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Furthermore, the June 13, 2006, order did not make the fines payable to VITA. At the conclusion of the September 7, 2006, show cause hearing, the trial judge directed that the $105,000 retroactive fine be paid to the registry of the Superior Court. The retroactive fines levied by the June 13, 2006, order do not serve to compensate VITA, but rather to vindicate the authority of the Superior Court.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"485 U.S. 632, 632","parenthetical":"\"If the relief provided is a fine, it is . . . punitive when it is paid to the court, though a fine that would be payable to the court is also remedial when the defendant can avoid paying the fine simply by performing the affirmative act required by the court's order.\"","sentence":"See Hicks, 485 U.S. at 632 (\u201cIf the relief provided is a fine, it is . . . punitive when it is paid to the court, though a fine that would be payable to the court is also remedial when the defendant can avoid paying the fine simply by performing the affirmative act required by the court\u2019s order.\u201d); see also Roe I, 919 F.2d at 870 (\u201c[I]f the fine is unconditionally payable to the court, the relief is punitive, not remedial, and the contempt proceeding is, by definition, criminal.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"919 F.2d 870, 870","parenthetical":"\"[I]f the fine is unconditionally payable to the court, the relief is punitive, not remedial, and the contempt proceeding is, by definition, criminal.\"","sentence":"See Hicks, 485 U.S. at 632 (\u201cIf the relief provided is a fine, it is . . . punitive when it is paid to the court, though a fine that would be payable to the court is also remedial when the defendant can avoid paying the fine simply by performing the affirmative act required by the court\u2019s order.\u201d); see also Roe I, 919 F.2d at 870 (\u201c[I]f the fine is unconditionally payable to the court, the relief is punitive, not remedial, and the contempt proceeding is, by definition, criminal.\u201d)."},"case_id":4021046,"label":"a"}
{"context":". See Walker v. M & G Convoy, Inc., No. CIV.A.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"1989 WL 158511, at *1","parenthetical":"concluding that claimant who slipped and fell on ice while securing cars on his employer's car trailer was an occupier of the vehicle and therefore entitled to PIP coverage","sentence":"88C-DE-191, 1989 WL 158511, at *1 (Del.Super.Ct. Nov.2, 1989) (concluding that claimant who slipped and fell on ice while securing cars on his employer's car trailer was an occupier of the vehicle and therefore entitled to PIP coverage); Padron v. Long Island Ins. Co., 356 So.2d 1337, 1339 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1978) (concluding that injuries sustained by motorist whose left foot slid as he stepped out of car on driver\u2019s side, causing right leg to hit bottom part of car door, thereby breaking leg, was bodily injury arising out of use of motor vehicle for which motorist was entitled to PIP benefits); Putkamer, 563 N.W.2d at 688 (concluding that injuries sustained when person slipped on ice while entering car were covered by statutory scheme for PIP coverage); Haagenson, 277 N.W.2d at 652 (upholding jury verdict that no-fault provisions covered claimant's injuries suffered while entering motor vehicle); Hill, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 805-06 (concluding that injuries suffered when a claimant caught her arm in the bus door and then tripped on a nail or tile on the floor were covered by no-fault scheme); Berry, 534 S.W.2d at 432-33 (concluding PIP coverage existed for injuries sustained when claimant snapped the cartilage in his knee while exiting car); S. Surety Co. v. Davidson, 280 S.W. 336, 337 (Tex.Civ.App.-Fort Worth 1926, no writ) (concluding that coverage existed for injuries sustained when claimant stepped on a brick while exiting the car); cf. Parker v. Atlanta Cas. Co. 157 Ga.App. 539, 278 S.E.2d 119, 120 (1981) (finding that PIP coverage was not available when claimant stepped on grease when alighting from car only because policy excluded conduct within the course of business of repairing or servicing vehicles unless conduct also involved \u201cactual operation of a motor vehicle as a vehicle on business premises\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding that PIP coverage was not available when claimant stepped on grease when alighting from car only because policy excluded conduct within the course of business of repairing or servicing vehicles unless conduct also involved \"actual operation of a motor vehicle as a vehicle on business premises\"","sentence":"88C-DE-191, 1989 WL 158511, at *1 (Del.Super.Ct. Nov.2, 1989) (concluding that claimant who slipped and fell on ice while securing cars on his employer's car trailer was an occupier of the vehicle and therefore entitled to PIP coverage); Padron v. Long Island Ins. Co., 356 So.2d 1337, 1339 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1978) (concluding that injuries sustained by motorist whose left foot slid as he stepped out of car on driver\u2019s side, causing right leg to hit bottom part of car door, thereby breaking leg, was bodily injury arising out of use of motor vehicle for which motorist was entitled to PIP benefits); Putkamer, 563 N.W.2d at 688 (concluding that injuries sustained when person slipped on ice while entering car were covered by statutory scheme for PIP coverage); Haagenson, 277 N.W.2d at 652 (upholding jury verdict that no-fault provisions covered claimant's injuries suffered while entering motor vehicle); Hill, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 805-06 (concluding that injuries suffered when a claimant caught her arm in the bus door and then tripped on a nail or tile on the floor were covered by no-fault scheme); Berry, 534 S.W.2d at 432-33 (concluding PIP coverage existed for injuries sustained when claimant snapped the cartilage in his knee while exiting car); S. Surety Co. v. Davidson, 280 S.W. 336, 337 (Tex.Civ.App.-Fort Worth 1926, no writ) (concluding that coverage existed for injuries sustained when claimant stepped on a brick while exiting the car); cf. Parker v. Atlanta Cas. Co. 157 Ga.App. 539, 278 S.E.2d 119, 120 (1981) (finding that PIP coverage was not available when claimant stepped on grease when alighting from car only because policy excluded conduct within the course of business of repairing or servicing vehicles unless conduct also involved \u201cactual operation of a motor vehicle as a vehicle on business premises\u201d)."},"case_id":9149655,"label":"a"}
{"context":". See Walker v. M & G Convoy, Inc., No. CIV.A.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"1989 WL 158511, at *1","parenthetical":"concluding that claimant who slipped and fell on ice while securing cars on his employer's car trailer was an occupier of the vehicle and therefore entitled to PIP coverage","sentence":"88C-DE-191, 1989 WL 158511, at *1 (Del.Super.Ct. Nov.2, 1989) (concluding that claimant who slipped and fell on ice while securing cars on his employer's car trailer was an occupier of the vehicle and therefore entitled to PIP coverage); Padron v. Long Island Ins. Co., 356 So.2d 1337, 1339 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1978) (concluding that injuries sustained by motorist whose left foot slid as he stepped out of car on driver\u2019s side, causing right leg to hit bottom part of car door, thereby breaking leg, was bodily injury arising out of use of motor vehicle for which motorist was entitled to PIP benefits); Putkamer, 563 N.W.2d at 688 (concluding that injuries sustained when person slipped on ice while entering car were covered by statutory scheme for PIP coverage); Haagenson, 277 N.W.2d at 652 (upholding jury verdict that no-fault provisions covered claimant's injuries suffered while entering motor vehicle); Hill, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 805-06 (concluding that injuries suffered when a claimant caught her arm in the bus door and then tripped on a nail or tile on the floor were covered by no-fault scheme); Berry, 534 S.W.2d at 432-33 (concluding PIP coverage existed for injuries sustained when claimant snapped the cartilage in his knee while exiting car); S. Surety Co. v. Davidson, 280 S.W. 336, 337 (Tex.Civ.App.-Fort Worth 1926, no writ) (concluding that coverage existed for injuries sustained when claimant stepped on a brick while exiting the car); cf. Parker v. Atlanta Cas. Co. 157 Ga.App. 539, 278 S.E.2d 119, 120 (1981) (finding that PIP coverage was not available when claimant stepped on grease when alighting from car only because policy excluded conduct within the course of business of repairing or servicing vehicles unless conduct also involved \u201cactual operation of a motor vehicle as a vehicle on business premises\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"278 S.E.2d 119, 120","parenthetical":"finding that PIP coverage was not available when claimant stepped on grease when alighting from car only because policy excluded conduct within the course of business of repairing or servicing vehicles unless conduct also involved \"actual operation of a motor vehicle as a vehicle on business premises\"","sentence":"88C-DE-191, 1989 WL 158511, at *1 (Del.Super.Ct. Nov.2, 1989) (concluding that claimant who slipped and fell on ice while securing cars on his employer's car trailer was an occupier of the vehicle and therefore entitled to PIP coverage); Padron v. Long Island Ins. Co., 356 So.2d 1337, 1339 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1978) (concluding that injuries sustained by motorist whose left foot slid as he stepped out of car on driver\u2019s side, causing right leg to hit bottom part of car door, thereby breaking leg, was bodily injury arising out of use of motor vehicle for which motorist was entitled to PIP benefits); Putkamer, 563 N.W.2d at 688 (concluding that injuries sustained when person slipped on ice while entering car were covered by statutory scheme for PIP coverage); Haagenson, 277 N.W.2d at 652 (upholding jury verdict that no-fault provisions covered claimant's injuries suffered while entering motor vehicle); Hill, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 805-06 (concluding that injuries suffered when a claimant caught her arm in the bus door and then tripped on a nail or tile on the floor were covered by no-fault scheme); Berry, 534 S.W.2d at 432-33 (concluding PIP coverage existed for injuries sustained when claimant snapped the cartilage in his knee while exiting car); S. Surety Co. v. Davidson, 280 S.W. 336, 337 (Tex.Civ.App.-Fort Worth 1926, no writ) (concluding that coverage existed for injuries sustained when claimant stepped on a brick while exiting the car); cf. Parker v. Atlanta Cas. Co. 157 Ga.App. 539, 278 S.E.2d 119, 120 (1981) (finding that PIP coverage was not available when claimant stepped on grease when alighting from car only because policy excluded conduct within the course of business of repairing or servicing vehicles unless conduct also involved \u201cactual operation of a motor vehicle as a vehicle on business premises\u201d)."},"case_id":9149655,"label":"a"}
{"context":". See Walker v. M & G Convoy, Inc., No. CIV.A.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding that PIP coverage was not available when claimant stepped on grease when alighting from car only because policy excluded conduct within the course of business of repairing or servicing vehicles unless conduct also involved \"actual operation of a motor vehicle as a vehicle on business premises\"","sentence":"88C-DE-191, 1989 WL 158511, at *1 (Del.Super.Ct. Nov.2, 1989) (concluding that claimant who slipped and fell on ice while securing cars on his employer's car trailer was an occupier of the vehicle and therefore entitled to PIP coverage); Padron v. Long Island Ins. Co., 356 So.2d 1337, 1339 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1978) (concluding that injuries sustained by motorist whose left foot slid as he stepped out of car on driver\u2019s side, causing right leg to hit bottom part of car door, thereby breaking leg, was bodily injury arising out of use of motor vehicle for which motorist was entitled to PIP benefits); Putkamer, 563 N.W.2d at 688 (concluding that injuries sustained when person slipped on ice while entering car were covered by statutory scheme for PIP coverage); Haagenson, 277 N.W.2d at 652 (upholding jury verdict that no-fault provisions covered claimant's injuries suffered while entering motor vehicle); Hill, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 805-06 (concluding that injuries suffered when a claimant caught her arm in the bus door and then tripped on a nail or tile on the floor were covered by no-fault scheme); Berry, 534 S.W.2d at 432-33 (concluding PIP coverage existed for injuries sustained when claimant snapped the cartilage in his knee while exiting car); S. Surety Co. v. Davidson, 280 S.W. 336, 337 (Tex.Civ.App.-Fort Worth 1926, no writ) (concluding that coverage existed for injuries sustained when claimant stepped on a brick while exiting the car); cf. Parker v. Atlanta Cas. Co. 157 Ga.App. 539, 278 S.E.2d 119, 120 (1981) (finding that PIP coverage was not available when claimant stepped on grease when alighting from car only because policy excluded conduct within the course of business of repairing or servicing vehicles unless conduct also involved \u201cactual operation of a motor vehicle as a vehicle on business premises\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"356 So.2d 1337, 1339","parenthetical":"concluding that injuries sustained by motorist whose left foot slid as he stepped out of car on driver's side, causing right leg to hit bottom part of car door, thereby breaking leg, was bodily injury arising out of use of motor vehicle for which motorist was entitled to PIP benefits","sentence":"88C-DE-191, 1989 WL 158511, at *1 (Del.Super.Ct. Nov.2, 1989) (concluding that claimant who slipped and fell on ice while securing cars on his employer's car trailer was an occupier of the vehicle and therefore entitled to PIP coverage); Padron v. Long Island Ins. Co., 356 So.2d 1337, 1339 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1978) (concluding that injuries sustained by motorist whose left foot slid as he stepped out of car on driver\u2019s side, causing right leg to hit bottom part of car door, thereby breaking leg, was bodily injury arising out of use of motor vehicle for which motorist was entitled to PIP benefits); Putkamer, 563 N.W.2d at 688 (concluding that injuries sustained when person slipped on ice while entering car were covered by statutory scheme for PIP coverage); Haagenson, 277 N.W.2d at 652 (upholding jury verdict that no-fault provisions covered claimant's injuries suffered while entering motor vehicle); Hill, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 805-06 (concluding that injuries suffered when a claimant caught her arm in the bus door and then tripped on a nail or tile on the floor were covered by no-fault scheme); Berry, 534 S.W.2d at 432-33 (concluding PIP coverage existed for injuries sustained when claimant snapped the cartilage in his knee while exiting car); S. Surety Co. v. Davidson, 280 S.W. 336, 337 (Tex.Civ.App.-Fort Worth 1926, no writ) (concluding that coverage existed for injuries sustained when claimant stepped on a brick while exiting the car); cf. Parker v. Atlanta Cas. Co. 157 Ga.App. 539, 278 S.E.2d 119, 120 (1981) (finding that PIP coverage was not available when claimant stepped on grease when alighting from car only because policy excluded conduct within the course of business of repairing or servicing vehicles unless conduct also involved \u201cactual operation of a motor vehicle as a vehicle on business premises\u201d)."},"case_id":9149655,"label":"b"}
{"context":". See Walker v. M & G Convoy, Inc., No. CIV.A.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"356 So.2d 1337, 1339","parenthetical":"concluding that injuries sustained by motorist whose left foot slid as he stepped out of car on driver's side, causing right leg to hit bottom part of car door, thereby breaking leg, was bodily injury arising out of use of motor vehicle for which motorist was entitled to PIP benefits","sentence":"88C-DE-191, 1989 WL 158511, at *1 (Del.Super.Ct. Nov.2, 1989) (concluding that claimant who slipped and fell on ice while securing cars on his employer's car trailer was an occupier of the vehicle and therefore entitled to PIP coverage); Padron v. Long Island Ins. Co., 356 So.2d 1337, 1339 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1978) (concluding that injuries sustained by motorist whose left foot slid as he stepped out of car on driver\u2019s side, causing right leg to hit bottom part of car door, thereby breaking leg, was bodily injury arising out of use of motor vehicle for which motorist was entitled to PIP benefits); Putkamer, 563 N.W.2d at 688 (concluding that injuries sustained when person slipped on ice while entering car were covered by statutory scheme for PIP coverage); Haagenson, 277 N.W.2d at 652 (upholding jury verdict that no-fault provisions covered claimant's injuries suffered while entering motor vehicle); Hill, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 805-06 (concluding that injuries suffered when a claimant caught her arm in the bus door and then tripped on a nail or tile on the floor were covered by no-fault scheme); Berry, 534 S.W.2d at 432-33 (concluding PIP coverage existed for injuries sustained when claimant snapped the cartilage in his knee while exiting car); S. Surety Co. v. Davidson, 280 S.W. 336, 337 (Tex.Civ.App.-Fort Worth 1926, no writ) (concluding that coverage existed for injuries sustained when claimant stepped on a brick while exiting the car); cf. Parker v. Atlanta Cas. Co. 157 Ga.App. 539, 278 S.E.2d 119, 120 (1981) (finding that PIP coverage was not available when claimant stepped on grease when alighting from car only because policy excluded conduct within the course of business of repairing or servicing vehicles unless conduct also involved \u201cactual operation of a motor vehicle as a vehicle on business premises\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"278 S.E.2d 119, 120","parenthetical":"finding that PIP coverage was not available when claimant stepped on grease when alighting from car only because policy excluded conduct within the course of business of repairing or servicing vehicles unless conduct also involved \"actual operation of a motor vehicle as a vehicle on business premises\"","sentence":"88C-DE-191, 1989 WL 158511, at *1 (Del.Super.Ct. Nov.2, 1989) (concluding that claimant who slipped and fell on ice while securing cars on his employer's car trailer was an occupier of the vehicle and therefore entitled to PIP coverage); Padron v. Long Island Ins. Co., 356 So.2d 1337, 1339 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1978) (concluding that injuries sustained by motorist whose left foot slid as he stepped out of car on driver\u2019s side, causing right leg to hit bottom part of car door, thereby breaking leg, was bodily injury arising out of use of motor vehicle for which motorist was entitled to PIP benefits); Putkamer, 563 N.W.2d at 688 (concluding that injuries sustained when person slipped on ice while entering car were covered by statutory scheme for PIP coverage); Haagenson, 277 N.W.2d at 652 (upholding jury verdict that no-fault provisions covered claimant's injuries suffered while entering motor vehicle); Hill, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 805-06 (concluding that injuries suffered when a claimant caught her arm in the bus door and then tripped on a nail or tile on the floor were covered by no-fault scheme); Berry, 534 S.W.2d at 432-33 (concluding PIP coverage existed for injuries sustained when claimant snapped the cartilage in his knee while exiting car); S. Surety Co. v. Davidson, 280 S.W. 336, 337 (Tex.Civ.App.-Fort Worth 1926, no writ) (concluding that coverage existed for injuries sustained when claimant stepped on a brick while exiting the car); cf. Parker v. Atlanta Cas. Co. 157 Ga.App. 539, 278 S.E.2d 119, 120 (1981) (finding that PIP coverage was not available when claimant stepped on grease when alighting from car only because policy excluded conduct within the course of business of repairing or servicing vehicles unless conduct also involved \u201cactual operation of a motor vehicle as a vehicle on business premises\u201d)."},"case_id":9149655,"label":"a"}
{"context":". See Walker v. M & G Convoy, Inc., No. CIV.A.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding that PIP coverage was not available when claimant stepped on grease when alighting from car only because policy excluded conduct within the course of business of repairing or servicing vehicles unless conduct also involved \"actual operation of a motor vehicle as a vehicle on business premises\"","sentence":"88C-DE-191, 1989 WL 158511, at *1 (Del.Super.Ct. Nov.2, 1989) (concluding that claimant who slipped and fell on ice while securing cars on his employer's car trailer was an occupier of the vehicle and therefore entitled to PIP coverage); Padron v. Long Island Ins. Co., 356 So.2d 1337, 1339 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1978) (concluding that injuries sustained by motorist whose left foot slid as he stepped out of car on driver\u2019s side, causing right leg to hit bottom part of car door, thereby breaking leg, was bodily injury arising out of use of motor vehicle for which motorist was entitled to PIP benefits); Putkamer, 563 N.W.2d at 688 (concluding that injuries sustained when person slipped on ice while entering car were covered by statutory scheme for PIP coverage); Haagenson, 277 N.W.2d at 652 (upholding jury verdict that no-fault provisions covered claimant's injuries suffered while entering motor vehicle); Hill, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 805-06 (concluding that injuries suffered when a claimant caught her arm in the bus door and then tripped on a nail or tile on the floor were covered by no-fault scheme); Berry, 534 S.W.2d at 432-33 (concluding PIP coverage existed for injuries sustained when claimant snapped the cartilage in his knee while exiting car); S. Surety Co. v. Davidson, 280 S.W. 336, 337 (Tex.Civ.App.-Fort Worth 1926, no writ) (concluding that coverage existed for injuries sustained when claimant stepped on a brick while exiting the car); cf. Parker v. Atlanta Cas. Co. 157 Ga.App. 539, 278 S.E.2d 119, 120 (1981) (finding that PIP coverage was not available when claimant stepped on grease when alighting from car only because policy excluded conduct within the course of business of repairing or servicing vehicles unless conduct also involved \u201cactual operation of a motor vehicle as a vehicle on business premises\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"563 N.W.2d 688, 688","parenthetical":"concluding that injuries sustained when person slipped on ice while entering car were covered by statutory scheme for PIP coverage","sentence":"88C-DE-191, 1989 WL 158511, at *1 (Del.Super.Ct. Nov.2, 1989) (concluding that claimant who slipped and fell on ice while securing cars on his employer's car trailer was an occupier of the vehicle and therefore entitled to PIP coverage); Padron v. Long Island Ins. Co., 356 So.2d 1337, 1339 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1978) (concluding that injuries sustained by motorist whose left foot slid as he stepped out of car on driver\u2019s side, causing right leg to hit bottom part of car door, thereby breaking leg, was bodily injury arising out of use of motor vehicle for which motorist was entitled to PIP benefits); Putkamer, 563 N.W.2d at 688 (concluding that injuries sustained when person slipped on ice while entering car were covered by statutory scheme for PIP coverage); Haagenson, 277 N.W.2d at 652 (upholding jury verdict that no-fault provisions covered claimant's injuries suffered while entering motor vehicle); Hill, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 805-06 (concluding that injuries suffered when a claimant caught her arm in the bus door and then tripped on a nail or tile on the floor were covered by no-fault scheme); Berry, 534 S.W.2d at 432-33 (concluding PIP coverage existed for injuries sustained when claimant snapped the cartilage in his knee while exiting car); S. Surety Co. v. Davidson, 280 S.W. 336, 337 (Tex.Civ.App.-Fort Worth 1926, no writ) (concluding that coverage existed for injuries sustained when claimant stepped on a brick while exiting the car); cf. Parker v. Atlanta Cas. Co. 157 Ga.App. 539, 278 S.E.2d 119, 120 (1981) (finding that PIP coverage was not available when claimant stepped on grease when alighting from car only because policy excluded conduct within the course of business of repairing or servicing vehicles unless conduct also involved \u201cactual operation of a motor vehicle as a vehicle on business premises\u201d)."},"case_id":9149655,"label":"b"}
{"context":". See Walker v. M & G Convoy, Inc., No. CIV.A.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"278 S.E.2d 119, 120","parenthetical":"finding that PIP coverage was not available when claimant stepped on grease when alighting from car only because policy excluded conduct within the course of business of repairing or servicing vehicles unless conduct also involved \"actual operation of a motor vehicle as a vehicle on business premises\"","sentence":"88C-DE-191, 1989 WL 158511, at *1 (Del.Super.Ct. Nov.2, 1989) (concluding that claimant who slipped and fell on ice while securing cars on his employer's car trailer was an occupier of the vehicle and therefore entitled to PIP coverage); Padron v. Long Island Ins. Co., 356 So.2d 1337, 1339 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1978) (concluding that injuries sustained by motorist whose left foot slid as he stepped out of car on driver\u2019s side, causing right leg to hit bottom part of car door, thereby breaking leg, was bodily injury arising out of use of motor vehicle for which motorist was entitled to PIP benefits); Putkamer, 563 N.W.2d at 688 (concluding that injuries sustained when person slipped on ice while entering car were covered by statutory scheme for PIP coverage); Haagenson, 277 N.W.2d at 652 (upholding jury verdict that no-fault provisions covered claimant's injuries suffered while entering motor vehicle); Hill, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 805-06 (concluding that injuries suffered when a claimant caught her arm in the bus door and then tripped on a nail or tile on the floor were covered by no-fault scheme); Berry, 534 S.W.2d at 432-33 (concluding PIP coverage existed for injuries sustained when claimant snapped the cartilage in his knee while exiting car); S. Surety Co. v. Davidson, 280 S.W. 336, 337 (Tex.Civ.App.-Fort Worth 1926, no writ) (concluding that coverage existed for injuries sustained when claimant stepped on a brick while exiting the car); cf. Parker v. Atlanta Cas. Co. 157 Ga.App. 539, 278 S.E.2d 119, 120 (1981) (finding that PIP coverage was not available when claimant stepped on grease when alighting from car only because policy excluded conduct within the course of business of repairing or servicing vehicles unless conduct also involved \u201cactual operation of a motor vehicle as a vehicle on business premises\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"563 N.W.2d 688, 688","parenthetical":"concluding that injuries sustained when person slipped on ice while entering car were covered by statutory scheme for PIP coverage","sentence":"88C-DE-191, 1989 WL 158511, at *1 (Del.Super.Ct. Nov.2, 1989) (concluding that claimant who slipped and fell on ice while securing cars on his employer's car trailer was an occupier of the vehicle and therefore entitled to PIP coverage); Padron v. Long Island Ins. Co., 356 So.2d 1337, 1339 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1978) (concluding that injuries sustained by motorist whose left foot slid as he stepped out of car on driver\u2019s side, causing right leg to hit bottom part of car door, thereby breaking leg, was bodily injury arising out of use of motor vehicle for which motorist was entitled to PIP benefits); Putkamer, 563 N.W.2d at 688 (concluding that injuries sustained when person slipped on ice while entering car were covered by statutory scheme for PIP coverage); Haagenson, 277 N.W.2d at 652 (upholding jury verdict that no-fault provisions covered claimant's injuries suffered while entering motor vehicle); Hill, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 805-06 (concluding that injuries suffered when a claimant caught her arm in the bus door and then tripped on a nail or tile on the floor were covered by no-fault scheme); Berry, 534 S.W.2d at 432-33 (concluding PIP coverage existed for injuries sustained when claimant snapped the cartilage in his knee while exiting car); S. Surety Co. v. Davidson, 280 S.W. 336, 337 (Tex.Civ.App.-Fort Worth 1926, no writ) (concluding that coverage existed for injuries sustained when claimant stepped on a brick while exiting the car); cf. Parker v. Atlanta Cas. Co. 157 Ga.App. 539, 278 S.E.2d 119, 120 (1981) (finding that PIP coverage was not available when claimant stepped on grease when alighting from car only because policy excluded conduct within the course of business of repairing or servicing vehicles unless conduct also involved \u201cactual operation of a motor vehicle as a vehicle on business premises\u201d)."},"case_id":9149655,"label":"b"}
{"context":". See Walker v. M & G Convoy, Inc., No. CIV.A.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding that PIP coverage was not available when claimant stepped on grease when alighting from car only because policy excluded conduct within the course of business of repairing or servicing vehicles unless conduct also involved \"actual operation of a motor vehicle as a vehicle on business premises\"","sentence":"88C-DE-191, 1989 WL 158511, at *1 (Del.Super.Ct. Nov.2, 1989) (concluding that claimant who slipped and fell on ice while securing cars on his employer's car trailer was an occupier of the vehicle and therefore entitled to PIP coverage); Padron v. Long Island Ins. Co., 356 So.2d 1337, 1339 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1978) (concluding that injuries sustained by motorist whose left foot slid as he stepped out of car on driver\u2019s side, causing right leg to hit bottom part of car door, thereby breaking leg, was bodily injury arising out of use of motor vehicle for which motorist was entitled to PIP benefits); Putkamer, 563 N.W.2d at 688 (concluding that injuries sustained when person slipped on ice while entering car were covered by statutory scheme for PIP coverage); Haagenson, 277 N.W.2d at 652 (upholding jury verdict that no-fault provisions covered claimant's injuries suffered while entering motor vehicle); Hill, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 805-06 (concluding that injuries suffered when a claimant caught her arm in the bus door and then tripped on a nail or tile on the floor were covered by no-fault scheme); Berry, 534 S.W.2d at 432-33 (concluding PIP coverage existed for injuries sustained when claimant snapped the cartilage in his knee while exiting car); S. Surety Co. v. Davidson, 280 S.W. 336, 337 (Tex.Civ.App.-Fort Worth 1926, no writ) (concluding that coverage existed for injuries sustained when claimant stepped on a brick while exiting the car); cf. Parker v. Atlanta Cas. Co. 157 Ga.App. 539, 278 S.E.2d 119, 120 (1981) (finding that PIP coverage was not available when claimant stepped on grease when alighting from car only because policy excluded conduct within the course of business of repairing or servicing vehicles unless conduct also involved \u201cactual operation of a motor vehicle as a vehicle on business premises\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"277 N.W.2d 652, 652","parenthetical":"upholding jury verdict that no-fault provisions covered claimant's injuries suffered while entering motor vehicle","sentence":"88C-DE-191, 1989 WL 158511, at *1 (Del.Super.Ct. Nov.2, 1989) (concluding that claimant who slipped and fell on ice while securing cars on his employer's car trailer was an occupier of the vehicle and therefore entitled to PIP coverage); Padron v. Long Island Ins. Co., 356 So.2d 1337, 1339 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1978) (concluding that injuries sustained by motorist whose left foot slid as he stepped out of car on driver\u2019s side, causing right leg to hit bottom part of car door, thereby breaking leg, was bodily injury arising out of use of motor vehicle for which motorist was entitled to PIP benefits); Putkamer, 563 N.W.2d at 688 (concluding that injuries sustained when person slipped on ice while entering car were covered by statutory scheme for PIP coverage); Haagenson, 277 N.W.2d at 652 (upholding jury verdict that no-fault provisions covered claimant's injuries suffered while entering motor vehicle); Hill, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 805-06 (concluding that injuries suffered when a claimant caught her arm in the bus door and then tripped on a nail or tile on the floor were covered by no-fault scheme); Berry, 534 S.W.2d at 432-33 (concluding PIP coverage existed for injuries sustained when claimant snapped the cartilage in his knee while exiting car); S. Surety Co. v. Davidson, 280 S.W. 336, 337 (Tex.Civ.App.-Fort Worth 1926, no writ) (concluding that coverage existed for injuries sustained when claimant stepped on a brick while exiting the car); cf. Parker v. Atlanta Cas. Co. 157 Ga.App. 539, 278 S.E.2d 119, 120 (1981) (finding that PIP coverage was not available when claimant stepped on grease when alighting from car only because policy excluded conduct within the course of business of repairing or servicing vehicles unless conduct also involved \u201cactual operation of a motor vehicle as a vehicle on business premises\u201d)."},"case_id":9149655,"label":"b"}
{"context":". See Walker v. M & G Convoy, Inc., No. CIV.A.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"278 S.E.2d 119, 120","parenthetical":"finding that PIP coverage was not available when claimant stepped on grease when alighting from car only because policy excluded conduct within the course of business of repairing or servicing vehicles unless conduct also involved \"actual operation of a motor vehicle as a vehicle on business premises\"","sentence":"88C-DE-191, 1989 WL 158511, at *1 (Del.Super.Ct. Nov.2, 1989) (concluding that claimant who slipped and fell on ice while securing cars on his employer's car trailer was an occupier of the vehicle and therefore entitled to PIP coverage); Padron v. Long Island Ins. Co., 356 So.2d 1337, 1339 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1978) (concluding that injuries sustained by motorist whose left foot slid as he stepped out of car on driver\u2019s side, causing right leg to hit bottom part of car door, thereby breaking leg, was bodily injury arising out of use of motor vehicle for which motorist was entitled to PIP benefits); Putkamer, 563 N.W.2d at 688 (concluding that injuries sustained when person slipped on ice while entering car were covered by statutory scheme for PIP coverage); Haagenson, 277 N.W.2d at 652 (upholding jury verdict that no-fault provisions covered claimant's injuries suffered while entering motor vehicle); Hill, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 805-06 (concluding that injuries suffered when a claimant caught her arm in the bus door and then tripped on a nail or tile on the floor were covered by no-fault scheme); Berry, 534 S.W.2d at 432-33 (concluding PIP coverage existed for injuries sustained when claimant snapped the cartilage in his knee while exiting car); S. Surety Co. v. Davidson, 280 S.W. 336, 337 (Tex.Civ.App.-Fort Worth 1926, no writ) (concluding that coverage existed for injuries sustained when claimant stepped on a brick while exiting the car); cf. Parker v. Atlanta Cas. Co. 157 Ga.App. 539, 278 S.E.2d 119, 120 (1981) (finding that PIP coverage was not available when claimant stepped on grease when alighting from car only because policy excluded conduct within the course of business of repairing or servicing vehicles unless conduct also involved \u201cactual operation of a motor vehicle as a vehicle on business premises\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"277 N.W.2d 652, 652","parenthetical":"upholding jury verdict that no-fault provisions covered claimant's injuries suffered while entering motor vehicle","sentence":"88C-DE-191, 1989 WL 158511, at *1 (Del.Super.Ct. Nov.2, 1989) (concluding that claimant who slipped and fell on ice while securing cars on his employer's car trailer was an occupier of the vehicle and therefore entitled to PIP coverage); Padron v. Long Island Ins. Co., 356 So.2d 1337, 1339 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1978) (concluding that injuries sustained by motorist whose left foot slid as he stepped out of car on driver\u2019s side, causing right leg to hit bottom part of car door, thereby breaking leg, was bodily injury arising out of use of motor vehicle for which motorist was entitled to PIP benefits); Putkamer, 563 N.W.2d at 688 (concluding that injuries sustained when person slipped on ice while entering car were covered by statutory scheme for PIP coverage); Haagenson, 277 N.W.2d at 652 (upholding jury verdict that no-fault provisions covered claimant's injuries suffered while entering motor vehicle); Hill, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 805-06 (concluding that injuries suffered when a claimant caught her arm in the bus door and then tripped on a nail or tile on the floor were covered by no-fault scheme); Berry, 534 S.W.2d at 432-33 (concluding PIP coverage existed for injuries sustained when claimant snapped the cartilage in his knee while exiting car); S. Surety Co. v. Davidson, 280 S.W. 336, 337 (Tex.Civ.App.-Fort Worth 1926, no writ) (concluding that coverage existed for injuries sustained when claimant stepped on a brick while exiting the car); cf. Parker v. Atlanta Cas. Co. 157 Ga.App. 539, 278 S.E.2d 119, 120 (1981) (finding that PIP coverage was not available when claimant stepped on grease when alighting from car only because policy excluded conduct within the course of business of repairing or servicing vehicles unless conduct also involved \u201cactual operation of a motor vehicle as a vehicle on business premises\u201d)."},"case_id":9149655,"label":"b"}
{"context":". See Walker v. M & G Convoy, Inc., No. CIV.A.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"555 N.Y.S.2d 805, 805-06","parenthetical":"concluding that injuries suffered when a claimant caught her arm in the bus door and then tripped on a nail or tile on the floor were covered by no-fault scheme","sentence":"88C-DE-191, 1989 WL 158511, at *1 (Del.Super.Ct. Nov.2, 1989) (concluding that claimant who slipped and fell on ice while securing cars on his employer's car trailer was an occupier of the vehicle and therefore entitled to PIP coverage); Padron v. Long Island Ins. Co., 356 So.2d 1337, 1339 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1978) (concluding that injuries sustained by motorist whose left foot slid as he stepped out of car on driver\u2019s side, causing right leg to hit bottom part of car door, thereby breaking leg, was bodily injury arising out of use of motor vehicle for which motorist was entitled to PIP benefits); Putkamer, 563 N.W.2d at 688 (concluding that injuries sustained when person slipped on ice while entering car were covered by statutory scheme for PIP coverage); Haagenson, 277 N.W.2d at 652 (upholding jury verdict that no-fault provisions covered claimant's injuries suffered while entering motor vehicle); Hill, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 805-06 (concluding that injuries suffered when a claimant caught her arm in the bus door and then tripped on a nail or tile on the floor were covered by no-fault scheme); Berry, 534 S.W.2d at 432-33 (concluding PIP coverage existed for injuries sustained when claimant snapped the cartilage in his knee while exiting car); S. Surety Co. v. Davidson, 280 S.W. 336, 337 (Tex.Civ.App.-Fort Worth 1926, no writ) (concluding that coverage existed for injuries sustained when claimant stepped on a brick while exiting the car); cf. Parker v. Atlanta Cas. Co. 157 Ga.App. 539, 278 S.E.2d 119, 120 (1981) (finding that PIP coverage was not available when claimant stepped on grease when alighting from car only because policy excluded conduct within the course of business of repairing or servicing vehicles unless conduct also involved \u201cactual operation of a motor vehicle as a vehicle on business premises\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding that PIP coverage was not available when claimant stepped on grease when alighting from car only because policy excluded conduct within the course of business of repairing or servicing vehicles unless conduct also involved \"actual operation of a motor vehicle as a vehicle on business premises\"","sentence":"88C-DE-191, 1989 WL 158511, at *1 (Del.Super.Ct. Nov.2, 1989) (concluding that claimant who slipped and fell on ice while securing cars on his employer's car trailer was an occupier of the vehicle and therefore entitled to PIP coverage); Padron v. Long Island Ins. Co., 356 So.2d 1337, 1339 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1978) (concluding that injuries sustained by motorist whose left foot slid as he stepped out of car on driver\u2019s side, causing right leg to hit bottom part of car door, thereby breaking leg, was bodily injury arising out of use of motor vehicle for which motorist was entitled to PIP benefits); Putkamer, 563 N.W.2d at 688 (concluding that injuries sustained when person slipped on ice while entering car were covered by statutory scheme for PIP coverage); Haagenson, 277 N.W.2d at 652 (upholding jury verdict that no-fault provisions covered claimant's injuries suffered while entering motor vehicle); Hill, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 805-06 (concluding that injuries suffered when a claimant caught her arm in the bus door and then tripped on a nail or tile on the floor were covered by no-fault scheme); Berry, 534 S.W.2d at 432-33 (concluding PIP coverage existed for injuries sustained when claimant snapped the cartilage in his knee while exiting car); S. Surety Co. v. Davidson, 280 S.W. 336, 337 (Tex.Civ.App.-Fort Worth 1926, no writ) (concluding that coverage existed for injuries sustained when claimant stepped on a brick while exiting the car); cf. Parker v. Atlanta Cas. Co. 157 Ga.App. 539, 278 S.E.2d 119, 120 (1981) (finding that PIP coverage was not available when claimant stepped on grease when alighting from car only because policy excluded conduct within the course of business of repairing or servicing vehicles unless conduct also involved \u201cactual operation of a motor vehicle as a vehicle on business premises\u201d)."},"case_id":9149655,"label":"a"}
{"context":". See Walker v. M & G Convoy, Inc., No. CIV.A.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"278 S.E.2d 119, 120","parenthetical":"finding that PIP coverage was not available when claimant stepped on grease when alighting from car only because policy excluded conduct within the course of business of repairing or servicing vehicles unless conduct also involved \"actual operation of a motor vehicle as a vehicle on business premises\"","sentence":"88C-DE-191, 1989 WL 158511, at *1 (Del.Super.Ct. Nov.2, 1989) (concluding that claimant who slipped and fell on ice while securing cars on his employer's car trailer was an occupier of the vehicle and therefore entitled to PIP coverage); Padron v. Long Island Ins. Co., 356 So.2d 1337, 1339 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1978) (concluding that injuries sustained by motorist whose left foot slid as he stepped out of car on driver\u2019s side, causing right leg to hit bottom part of car door, thereby breaking leg, was bodily injury arising out of use of motor vehicle for which motorist was entitled to PIP benefits); Putkamer, 563 N.W.2d at 688 (concluding that injuries sustained when person slipped on ice while entering car were covered by statutory scheme for PIP coverage); Haagenson, 277 N.W.2d at 652 (upholding jury verdict that no-fault provisions covered claimant's injuries suffered while entering motor vehicle); Hill, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 805-06 (concluding that injuries suffered when a claimant caught her arm in the bus door and then tripped on a nail or tile on the floor were covered by no-fault scheme); Berry, 534 S.W.2d at 432-33 (concluding PIP coverage existed for injuries sustained when claimant snapped the cartilage in his knee while exiting car); S. Surety Co. v. Davidson, 280 S.W. 336, 337 (Tex.Civ.App.-Fort Worth 1926, no writ) (concluding that coverage existed for injuries sustained when claimant stepped on a brick while exiting the car); cf. Parker v. Atlanta Cas. Co. 157 Ga.App. 539, 278 S.E.2d 119, 120 (1981) (finding that PIP coverage was not available when claimant stepped on grease when alighting from car only because policy excluded conduct within the course of business of repairing or servicing vehicles unless conduct also involved \u201cactual operation of a motor vehicle as a vehicle on business premises\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"555 N.Y.S.2d 805, 805-06","parenthetical":"concluding that injuries suffered when a claimant caught her arm in the bus door and then tripped on a nail or tile on the floor were covered by no-fault scheme","sentence":"88C-DE-191, 1989 WL 158511, at *1 (Del.Super.Ct. Nov.2, 1989) (concluding that claimant who slipped and fell on ice while securing cars on his employer's car trailer was an occupier of the vehicle and therefore entitled to PIP coverage); Padron v. Long Island Ins. Co., 356 So.2d 1337, 1339 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1978) (concluding that injuries sustained by motorist whose left foot slid as he stepped out of car on driver\u2019s side, causing right leg to hit bottom part of car door, thereby breaking leg, was bodily injury arising out of use of motor vehicle for which motorist was entitled to PIP benefits); Putkamer, 563 N.W.2d at 688 (concluding that injuries sustained when person slipped on ice while entering car were covered by statutory scheme for PIP coverage); Haagenson, 277 N.W.2d at 652 (upholding jury verdict that no-fault provisions covered claimant's injuries suffered while entering motor vehicle); Hill, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 805-06 (concluding that injuries suffered when a claimant caught her arm in the bus door and then tripped on a nail or tile on the floor were covered by no-fault scheme); Berry, 534 S.W.2d at 432-33 (concluding PIP coverage existed for injuries sustained when claimant snapped the cartilage in his knee while exiting car); S. Surety Co. v. Davidson, 280 S.W. 336, 337 (Tex.Civ.App.-Fort Worth 1926, no writ) (concluding that coverage existed for injuries sustained when claimant stepped on a brick while exiting the car); cf. Parker v. Atlanta Cas. Co. 157 Ga.App. 539, 278 S.E.2d 119, 120 (1981) (finding that PIP coverage was not available when claimant stepped on grease when alighting from car only because policy excluded conduct within the course of business of repairing or servicing vehicles unless conduct also involved \u201cactual operation of a motor vehicle as a vehicle on business premises\u201d)."},"case_id":9149655,"label":"b"}
{"context":". See Walker v. M & G Convoy, Inc., No. CIV.A.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding that PIP coverage was not available when claimant stepped on grease when alighting from car only because policy excluded conduct within the course of business of repairing or servicing vehicles unless conduct also involved \"actual operation of a motor vehicle as a vehicle on business premises\"","sentence":"88C-DE-191, 1989 WL 158511, at *1 (Del.Super.Ct. Nov.2, 1989) (concluding that claimant who slipped and fell on ice while securing cars on his employer's car trailer was an occupier of the vehicle and therefore entitled to PIP coverage); Padron v. Long Island Ins. Co., 356 So.2d 1337, 1339 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1978) (concluding that injuries sustained by motorist whose left foot slid as he stepped out of car on driver\u2019s side, causing right leg to hit bottom part of car door, thereby breaking leg, was bodily injury arising out of use of motor vehicle for which motorist was entitled to PIP benefits); Putkamer, 563 N.W.2d at 688 (concluding that injuries sustained when person slipped on ice while entering car were covered by statutory scheme for PIP coverage); Haagenson, 277 N.W.2d at 652 (upholding jury verdict that no-fault provisions covered claimant's injuries suffered while entering motor vehicle); Hill, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 805-06 (concluding that injuries suffered when a claimant caught her arm in the bus door and then tripped on a nail or tile on the floor were covered by no-fault scheme); Berry, 534 S.W.2d at 432-33 (concluding PIP coverage existed for injuries sustained when claimant snapped the cartilage in his knee while exiting car); S. Surety Co. v. Davidson, 280 S.W. 336, 337 (Tex.Civ.App.-Fort Worth 1926, no writ) (concluding that coverage existed for injuries sustained when claimant stepped on a brick while exiting the car); cf. Parker v. Atlanta Cas. Co. 157 Ga.App. 539, 278 S.E.2d 119, 120 (1981) (finding that PIP coverage was not available when claimant stepped on grease when alighting from car only because policy excluded conduct within the course of business of repairing or servicing vehicles unless conduct also involved \u201cactual operation of a motor vehicle as a vehicle on business premises\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"534 S.W.2d 432, 432-33","parenthetical":"concluding PIP coverage existed for injuries sustained when claimant snapped the cartilage in his knee while exiting car","sentence":"88C-DE-191, 1989 WL 158511, at *1 (Del.Super.Ct. Nov.2, 1989) (concluding that claimant who slipped and fell on ice while securing cars on his employer's car trailer was an occupier of the vehicle and therefore entitled to PIP coverage); Padron v. Long Island Ins. Co., 356 So.2d 1337, 1339 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1978) (concluding that injuries sustained by motorist whose left foot slid as he stepped out of car on driver\u2019s side, causing right leg to hit bottom part of car door, thereby breaking leg, was bodily injury arising out of use of motor vehicle for which motorist was entitled to PIP benefits); Putkamer, 563 N.W.2d at 688 (concluding that injuries sustained when person slipped on ice while entering car were covered by statutory scheme for PIP coverage); Haagenson, 277 N.W.2d at 652 (upholding jury verdict that no-fault provisions covered claimant's injuries suffered while entering motor vehicle); Hill, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 805-06 (concluding that injuries suffered when a claimant caught her arm in the bus door and then tripped on a nail or tile on the floor were covered by no-fault scheme); Berry, 534 S.W.2d at 432-33 (concluding PIP coverage existed for injuries sustained when claimant snapped the cartilage in his knee while exiting car); S. Surety Co. v. Davidson, 280 S.W. 336, 337 (Tex.Civ.App.-Fort Worth 1926, no writ) (concluding that coverage existed for injuries sustained when claimant stepped on a brick while exiting the car); cf. Parker v. Atlanta Cas. Co. 157 Ga.App. 539, 278 S.E.2d 119, 120 (1981) (finding that PIP coverage was not available when claimant stepped on grease when alighting from car only because policy excluded conduct within the course of business of repairing or servicing vehicles unless conduct also involved \u201cactual operation of a motor vehicle as a vehicle on business premises\u201d)."},"case_id":9149655,"label":"b"}
{"context":". See Walker v. M & G Convoy, Inc., No. CIV.A.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"278 S.E.2d 119, 120","parenthetical":"finding that PIP coverage was not available when claimant stepped on grease when alighting from car only because policy excluded conduct within the course of business of repairing or servicing vehicles unless conduct also involved \"actual operation of a motor vehicle as a vehicle on business premises\"","sentence":"88C-DE-191, 1989 WL 158511, at *1 (Del.Super.Ct. Nov.2, 1989) (concluding that claimant who slipped and fell on ice while securing cars on his employer's car trailer was an occupier of the vehicle and therefore entitled to PIP coverage); Padron v. Long Island Ins. Co., 356 So.2d 1337, 1339 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1978) (concluding that injuries sustained by motorist whose left foot slid as he stepped out of car on driver\u2019s side, causing right leg to hit bottom part of car door, thereby breaking leg, was bodily injury arising out of use of motor vehicle for which motorist was entitled to PIP benefits); Putkamer, 563 N.W.2d at 688 (concluding that injuries sustained when person slipped on ice while entering car were covered by statutory scheme for PIP coverage); Haagenson, 277 N.W.2d at 652 (upholding jury verdict that no-fault provisions covered claimant's injuries suffered while entering motor vehicle); Hill, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 805-06 (concluding that injuries suffered when a claimant caught her arm in the bus door and then tripped on a nail or tile on the floor were covered by no-fault scheme); Berry, 534 S.W.2d at 432-33 (concluding PIP coverage existed for injuries sustained when claimant snapped the cartilage in his knee while exiting car); S. Surety Co. v. Davidson, 280 S.W. 336, 337 (Tex.Civ.App.-Fort Worth 1926, no writ) (concluding that coverage existed for injuries sustained when claimant stepped on a brick while exiting the car); cf. Parker v. Atlanta Cas. Co. 157 Ga.App. 539, 278 S.E.2d 119, 120 (1981) (finding that PIP coverage was not available when claimant stepped on grease when alighting from car only because policy excluded conduct within the course of business of repairing or servicing vehicles unless conduct also involved \u201cactual operation of a motor vehicle as a vehicle on business premises\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"534 S.W.2d 432, 432-33","parenthetical":"concluding PIP coverage existed for injuries sustained when claimant snapped the cartilage in his knee while exiting car","sentence":"88C-DE-191, 1989 WL 158511, at *1 (Del.Super.Ct. Nov.2, 1989) (concluding that claimant who slipped and fell on ice while securing cars on his employer's car trailer was an occupier of the vehicle and therefore entitled to PIP coverage); Padron v. Long Island Ins. Co., 356 So.2d 1337, 1339 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1978) (concluding that injuries sustained by motorist whose left foot slid as he stepped out of car on driver\u2019s side, causing right leg to hit bottom part of car door, thereby breaking leg, was bodily injury arising out of use of motor vehicle for which motorist was entitled to PIP benefits); Putkamer, 563 N.W.2d at 688 (concluding that injuries sustained when person slipped on ice while entering car were covered by statutory scheme for PIP coverage); Haagenson, 277 N.W.2d at 652 (upholding jury verdict that no-fault provisions covered claimant's injuries suffered while entering motor vehicle); Hill, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 805-06 (concluding that injuries suffered when a claimant caught her arm in the bus door and then tripped on a nail or tile on the floor were covered by no-fault scheme); Berry, 534 S.W.2d at 432-33 (concluding PIP coverage existed for injuries sustained when claimant snapped the cartilage in his knee while exiting car); S. Surety Co. v. Davidson, 280 S.W. 336, 337 (Tex.Civ.App.-Fort Worth 1926, no writ) (concluding that coverage existed for injuries sustained when claimant stepped on a brick while exiting the car); cf. Parker v. Atlanta Cas. Co. 157 Ga.App. 539, 278 S.E.2d 119, 120 (1981) (finding that PIP coverage was not available when claimant stepped on grease when alighting from car only because policy excluded conduct within the course of business of repairing or servicing vehicles unless conduct also involved \u201cactual operation of a motor vehicle as a vehicle on business premises\u201d)."},"case_id":9149655,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Utah courts have repeatedly addressed nervousness as a factor supporting reasonable suspicion and have long downplayed its significance. Similarly, the late hour is not particularly suspicious given the location of the stop on a public highway.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"29 F.3d 537, 548","parenthetical":"\"If the law were otherwise, any person with any sort of criminal record ... could be subjected to a Terry-type investigative stop by a law enforcement officer at any time without the need for any other justification at all.\"","sentence":"Umited States v. Wood, 106 F.3d 942, 948 (10th Cir.1997); see also United States v. Sandoval, 29 F.3d 537, 548 (10th Cir.1994) (\"If the law were otherwise, any person with any sort of criminal record ... could be subjected to a Terry-type investigative stop by a law enforcement officer at any time without the need for any other justification at all.\"). And finally, without more detail, Dennis and Straugh's presence at the motel gives little indication that they were involved in any of the illegal activities that may have previously occurred there."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"748 P.2d 183, 183-84","parenthetical":"\"[TJravelers use the interstate highway at all times of the day and night. ...\"","sentence":"See Mendoza, 748 P.2d at 183-84 (\"[TJravelers use the interstate highway at all times of the day and night. ...\"); State v. Steward, 806 P.2d 213, 216 (Utah Ct.App.1991) (holding no reasonable suspicion where only indicia of criminal activity was truck driving on public road late at night). Criminal history alone is also \"insufficient to give rise to the necessary reasonable suspicion\" to shift the focus of a traffic stop to an investigation of criminal activity."},"case_id":8346237,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Utah courts have repeatedly addressed nervousness as a factor supporting reasonable suspicion and have long downplayed its significance. Similarly, the late hour is not particularly suspicious given the location of the stop on a public highway.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"528 U.S. 119, 124","parenthetical":"\"[OIfficers are not required to ignore the relevant characteristics of a location in determining whether the circumstances are sufficiently suspicious to warrant further investigation.\"","sentence":"See State v. Singleton, 2005 UT App 464, \u00b6 9, 128 P.3d 28 (\"[AlIthough an individual's presence in an area of expected criminal activity is not enough to support reasonable suspicion, it is a relevant consideration ....\"); see also Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124, 120 S.Ct. 673, 145 L.Ed.2d 570 (2000) (\"[OIfficers are not required to ignore the relevant characteristics of a location in determining whether the circumstances are sufficiently suspicious to warrant further investigation.\")."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"748 P.2d 183, 183-84","parenthetical":"\"[TJravelers use the interstate highway at all times of the day and night. ...\"","sentence":"See Mendoza, 748 P.2d at 183-84 (\"[TJravelers use the interstate highway at all times of the day and night. ...\"); State v. Steward, 806 P.2d 213, 216 (Utah Ct.App.1991) (holding no reasonable suspicion where only indicia of criminal activity was truck driving on public road late at night). Criminal history alone is also \"insufficient to give rise to the necessary reasonable suspicion\" to shift the focus of a traffic stop to an investigation of criminal activity."},"case_id":8346237,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Utah courts have repeatedly addressed nervousness as a factor supporting reasonable suspicion and have long downplayed its significance. Similarly, the late hour is not particularly suspicious given the location of the stop on a public highway.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"748 P.2d 183, 183-84","parenthetical":"\"[TJravelers use the interstate highway at all times of the day and night. ...\"","sentence":"See Mendoza, 748 P.2d at 183-84 (\"[TJravelers use the interstate highway at all times of the day and night. ...\"); State v. Steward, 806 P.2d 213, 216 (Utah Ct.App.1991) (holding no reasonable suspicion where only indicia of criminal activity was truck driving on public road late at night). Criminal history alone is also \"insufficient to give rise to the necessary reasonable suspicion\" to shift the focus of a traffic stop to an investigation of criminal activity."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[OIfficers are not required to ignore the relevant characteristics of a location in determining whether the circumstances are sufficiently suspicious to warrant further investigation.\"","sentence":"See State v. Singleton, 2005 UT App 464, \u00b6 9, 128 P.3d 28 (\"[AlIthough an individual's presence in an area of expected criminal activity is not enough to support reasonable suspicion, it is a relevant consideration ....\"); see also Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124, 120 S.Ct. 673, 145 L.Ed.2d 570 (2000) (\"[OIfficers are not required to ignore the relevant characteristics of a location in determining whether the circumstances are sufficiently suspicious to warrant further investigation.\")."},"case_id":8346237,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Utah courts have repeatedly addressed nervousness as a factor supporting reasonable suspicion and have long downplayed its significance. Similarly, the late hour is not particularly suspicious given the location of the stop on a public highway.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"748 P.2d 183, 183-84","parenthetical":"\"[TJravelers use the interstate highway at all times of the day and night. ...\"","sentence":"See Mendoza, 748 P.2d at 183-84 (\"[TJravelers use the interstate highway at all times of the day and night. ...\"); State v. Steward, 806 P.2d 213, 216 (Utah Ct.App.1991) (holding no reasonable suspicion where only indicia of criminal activity was truck driving on public road late at night). Criminal history alone is also \"insufficient to give rise to the necessary reasonable suspicion\" to shift the focus of a traffic stop to an investigation of criminal activity."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[OIfficers are not required to ignore the relevant characteristics of a location in determining whether the circumstances are sufficiently suspicious to warrant further investigation.\"","sentence":"See State v. Singleton, 2005 UT App 464, \u00b6 9, 128 P.3d 28 (\"[AlIthough an individual's presence in an area of expected criminal activity is not enough to support reasonable suspicion, it is a relevant consideration ....\"); see also Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124, 120 S.Ct. 673, 145 L.Ed.2d 570 (2000) (\"[OIfficers are not required to ignore the relevant characteristics of a location in determining whether the circumstances are sufficiently suspicious to warrant further investigation.\")."},"case_id":8346237,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Utah courts have repeatedly addressed nervousness as a factor supporting reasonable suspicion and have long downplayed its significance. Similarly, the late hour is not particularly suspicious given the location of the stop on a public highway.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"806 P.2d 213, 216","parenthetical":"holding no reasonable suspicion where only indicia of criminal activity was truck driving on public road late at night","sentence":"See Mendoza, 748 P.2d at 183-84 (\"[TJravelers use the interstate highway at all times of the day and night. ...\"); State v. Steward, 806 P.2d 213, 216 (Utah Ct.App.1991) (holding no reasonable suspicion where only indicia of criminal activity was truck driving on public road late at night). Criminal history alone is also \"insufficient to give rise to the necessary reasonable suspicion\" to shift the focus of a traffic stop to an investigation of criminal activity."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"29 F.3d 537, 548","parenthetical":"\"If the law were otherwise, any person with any sort of criminal record ... could be subjected to a Terry-type investigative stop by a law enforcement officer at any time without the need for any other justification at all.\"","sentence":"Umited States v. Wood, 106 F.3d 942, 948 (10th Cir.1997); see also United States v. Sandoval, 29 F.3d 537, 548 (10th Cir.1994) (\"If the law were otherwise, any person with any sort of criminal record ... could be subjected to a Terry-type investigative stop by a law enforcement officer at any time without the need for any other justification at all.\"). And finally, without more detail, Dennis and Straugh's presence at the motel gives little indication that they were involved in any of the illegal activities that may have previously occurred there."},"case_id":8346237,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Utah courts have repeatedly addressed nervousness as a factor supporting reasonable suspicion and have long downplayed its significance. Similarly, the late hour is not particularly suspicious given the location of the stop on a public highway.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"528 U.S. 119, 124","parenthetical":"\"[OIfficers are not required to ignore the relevant characteristics of a location in determining whether the circumstances are sufficiently suspicious to warrant further investigation.\"","sentence":"See State v. Singleton, 2005 UT App 464, \u00b6 9, 128 P.3d 28 (\"[AlIthough an individual's presence in an area of expected criminal activity is not enough to support reasonable suspicion, it is a relevant consideration ....\"); see also Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124, 120 S.Ct. 673, 145 L.Ed.2d 570 (2000) (\"[OIfficers are not required to ignore the relevant characteristics of a location in determining whether the circumstances are sufficiently suspicious to warrant further investigation.\")."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"806 P.2d 213, 216","parenthetical":"holding no reasonable suspicion where only indicia of criminal activity was truck driving on public road late at night","sentence":"See Mendoza, 748 P.2d at 183-84 (\"[TJravelers use the interstate highway at all times of the day and night. ...\"); State v. Steward, 806 P.2d 213, 216 (Utah Ct.App.1991) (holding no reasonable suspicion where only indicia of criminal activity was truck driving on public road late at night). Criminal history alone is also \"insufficient to give rise to the necessary reasonable suspicion\" to shift the focus of a traffic stop to an investigation of criminal activity."},"case_id":8346237,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Utah courts have repeatedly addressed nervousness as a factor supporting reasonable suspicion and have long downplayed its significance. Similarly, the late hour is not particularly suspicious given the location of the stop on a public highway.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[OIfficers are not required to ignore the relevant characteristics of a location in determining whether the circumstances are sufficiently suspicious to warrant further investigation.\"","sentence":"See State v. Singleton, 2005 UT App 464, \u00b6 9, 128 P.3d 28 (\"[AlIthough an individual's presence in an area of expected criminal activity is not enough to support reasonable suspicion, it is a relevant consideration ....\"); see also Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124, 120 S.Ct. 673, 145 L.Ed.2d 570 (2000) (\"[OIfficers are not required to ignore the relevant characteristics of a location in determining whether the circumstances are sufficiently suspicious to warrant further investigation.\")."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"806 P.2d 213, 216","parenthetical":"holding no reasonable suspicion where only indicia of criminal activity was truck driving on public road late at night","sentence":"See Mendoza, 748 P.2d at 183-84 (\"[TJravelers use the interstate highway at all times of the day and night. ...\"); State v. Steward, 806 P.2d 213, 216 (Utah Ct.App.1991) (holding no reasonable suspicion where only indicia of criminal activity was truck driving on public road late at night). Criminal history alone is also \"insufficient to give rise to the necessary reasonable suspicion\" to shift the focus of a traffic stop to an investigation of criminal activity."},"case_id":8346237,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Utah courts have repeatedly addressed nervousness as a factor supporting reasonable suspicion and have long downplayed its significance. Similarly, the late hour is not particularly suspicious given the location of the stop on a public highway.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[OIfficers are not required to ignore the relevant characteristics of a location in determining whether the circumstances are sufficiently suspicious to warrant further investigation.\"","sentence":"See State v. Singleton, 2005 UT App 464, \u00b6 9, 128 P.3d 28 (\"[AlIthough an individual's presence in an area of expected criminal activity is not enough to support reasonable suspicion, it is a relevant consideration ....\"); see also Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124, 120 S.Ct. 673, 145 L.Ed.2d 570 (2000) (\"[OIfficers are not required to ignore the relevant characteristics of a location in determining whether the circumstances are sufficiently suspicious to warrant further investigation.\")."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"806 P.2d 213, 216","parenthetical":"holding no reasonable suspicion where only indicia of criminal activity was truck driving on public road late at night","sentence":"See Mendoza, 748 P.2d at 183-84 (\"[TJravelers use the interstate highway at all times of the day and night. ...\"); State v. Steward, 806 P.2d 213, 216 (Utah Ct.App.1991) (holding no reasonable suspicion where only indicia of criminal activity was truck driving on public road late at night). Criminal history alone is also \"insufficient to give rise to the necessary reasonable suspicion\" to shift the focus of a traffic stop to an investigation of criminal activity."},"case_id":8346237,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Utah courts have repeatedly addressed nervousness as a factor supporting reasonable suspicion and have long downplayed its significance. Similarly, the late hour is not particularly suspicious given the location of the stop on a public highway.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"528 U.S. 119, 124","parenthetical":"\"[OIfficers are not required to ignore the relevant characteristics of a location in determining whether the circumstances are sufficiently suspicious to warrant further investigation.\"","sentence":"See State v. Singleton, 2005 UT App 464, \u00b6 9, 128 P.3d 28 (\"[AlIthough an individual's presence in an area of expected criminal activity is not enough to support reasonable suspicion, it is a relevant consideration ....\"); see also Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124, 120 S.Ct. 673, 145 L.Ed.2d 570 (2000) (\"[OIfficers are not required to ignore the relevant characteristics of a location in determining whether the circumstances are sufficiently suspicious to warrant further investigation.\")."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"2005 UT App 464, \u00b6 9","parenthetical":"\"[AlIthough an individual's presence in an area of expected criminal activity is not enough to support reasonable suspicion, it is a relevant consideration ....\"","sentence":"See State v. Singleton, 2005 UT App 464, \u00b6 9, 128 P.3d 28 (\"[AlIthough an individual's presence in an area of expected criminal activity is not enough to support reasonable suspicion, it is a relevant consideration ....\"); see also Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124, 120 S.Ct. 673, 145 L.Ed.2d 570 (2000) (\"[OIfficers are not required to ignore the relevant characteristics of a location in determining whether the circumstances are sufficiently suspicious to warrant further investigation.\")."},"case_id":8346237,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Utah courts have repeatedly addressed nervousness as a factor supporting reasonable suspicion and have long downplayed its significance. Similarly, the late hour is not particularly suspicious given the location of the stop on a public highway.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[OIfficers are not required to ignore the relevant characteristics of a location in determining whether the circumstances are sufficiently suspicious to warrant further investigation.\"","sentence":"See State v. Singleton, 2005 UT App 464, \u00b6 9, 128 P.3d 28 (\"[AlIthough an individual's presence in an area of expected criminal activity is not enough to support reasonable suspicion, it is a relevant consideration ....\"); see also Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124, 120 S.Ct. 673, 145 L.Ed.2d 570 (2000) (\"[OIfficers are not required to ignore the relevant characteristics of a location in determining whether the circumstances are sufficiently suspicious to warrant further investigation.\")."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"2005 UT App 464, \u00b6 9","parenthetical":"\"[AlIthough an individual's presence in an area of expected criminal activity is not enough to support reasonable suspicion, it is a relevant consideration ....\"","sentence":"See State v. Singleton, 2005 UT App 464, \u00b6 9, 128 P.3d 28 (\"[AlIthough an individual's presence in an area of expected criminal activity is not enough to support reasonable suspicion, it is a relevant consideration ....\"); see also Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124, 120 S.Ct. 673, 145 L.Ed.2d 570 (2000) (\"[OIfficers are not required to ignore the relevant characteristics of a location in determining whether the circumstances are sufficiently suspicious to warrant further investigation.\")."},"case_id":8346237,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Utah courts have repeatedly addressed nervousness as a factor supporting reasonable suspicion and have long downplayed its significance. Similarly, the late hour is not particularly suspicious given the location of the stop on a public highway.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"2005 UT App 464, \u00b6 9","parenthetical":"\"[AlIthough an individual's presence in an area of expected criminal activity is not enough to support reasonable suspicion, it is a relevant consideration ....\"","sentence":"See State v. Singleton, 2005 UT App 464, \u00b6 9, 128 P.3d 28 (\"[AlIthough an individual's presence in an area of expected criminal activity is not enough to support reasonable suspicion, it is a relevant consideration ....\"); see also Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124, 120 S.Ct. 673, 145 L.Ed.2d 570 (2000) (\"[OIfficers are not required to ignore the relevant characteristics of a location in determining whether the circumstances are sufficiently suspicious to warrant further investigation.\")."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[OIfficers are not required to ignore the relevant characteristics of a location in determining whether the circumstances are sufficiently suspicious to warrant further investigation.\"","sentence":"See State v. Singleton, 2005 UT App 464, \u00b6 9, 128 P.3d 28 (\"[AlIthough an individual's presence in an area of expected criminal activity is not enough to support reasonable suspicion, it is a relevant consideration ....\"); see also Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124, 120 S.Ct. 673, 145 L.Ed.2d 570 (2000) (\"[OIfficers are not required to ignore the relevant characteristics of a location in determining whether the circumstances are sufficiently suspicious to warrant further investigation.\")."},"case_id":8346237,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Utah courts have repeatedly addressed nervousness as a factor supporting reasonable suspicion and have long downplayed its significance. Similarly, the late hour is not particularly suspicious given the location of the stop on a public highway.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[AlIthough an individual's presence in an area of expected criminal activity is not enough to support reasonable suspicion, it is a relevant consideration ....\"","sentence":"See State v. Singleton, 2005 UT App 464, \u00b6 9, 128 P.3d 28 (\"[AlIthough an individual's presence in an area of expected criminal activity is not enough to support reasonable suspicion, it is a relevant consideration ....\"); see also Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124, 120 S.Ct. 673, 145 L.Ed.2d 570 (2000) (\"[OIfficers are not required to ignore the relevant characteristics of a location in determining whether the circumstances are sufficiently suspicious to warrant further investigation.\")."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"528 U.S. 119, 124","parenthetical":"\"[OIfficers are not required to ignore the relevant characteristics of a location in determining whether the circumstances are sufficiently suspicious to warrant further investigation.\"","sentence":"See State v. Singleton, 2005 UT App 464, \u00b6 9, 128 P.3d 28 (\"[AlIthough an individual's presence in an area of expected criminal activity is not enough to support reasonable suspicion, it is a relevant consideration ....\"); see also Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124, 120 S.Ct. 673, 145 L.Ed.2d 570 (2000) (\"[OIfficers are not required to ignore the relevant characteristics of a location in determining whether the circumstances are sufficiently suspicious to warrant further investigation.\")."},"case_id":8346237,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Utah courts have repeatedly addressed nervousness as a factor supporting reasonable suspicion and have long downplayed its significance. Similarly, the late hour is not particularly suspicious given the location of the stop on a public highway.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[OIfficers are not required to ignore the relevant characteristics of a location in determining whether the circumstances are sufficiently suspicious to warrant further investigation.\"","sentence":"See State v. Singleton, 2005 UT App 464, \u00b6 9, 128 P.3d 28 (\"[AlIthough an individual's presence in an area of expected criminal activity is not enough to support reasonable suspicion, it is a relevant consideration ....\"); see also Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124, 120 S.Ct. 673, 145 L.Ed.2d 570 (2000) (\"[OIfficers are not required to ignore the relevant characteristics of a location in determining whether the circumstances are sufficiently suspicious to warrant further investigation.\")."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[AlIthough an individual's presence in an area of expected criminal activity is not enough to support reasonable suspicion, it is a relevant consideration ....\"","sentence":"See State v. Singleton, 2005 UT App 464, \u00b6 9, 128 P.3d 28 (\"[AlIthough an individual's presence in an area of expected criminal activity is not enough to support reasonable suspicion, it is a relevant consideration ....\"); see also Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124, 120 S.Ct. 673, 145 L.Ed.2d 570 (2000) (\"[OIfficers are not required to ignore the relevant characteristics of a location in determining whether the circumstances are sufficiently suspicious to warrant further investigation.\")."},"case_id":8346237,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Utah courts have repeatedly addressed nervousness as a factor supporting reasonable suspicion and have long downplayed its significance. Similarly, the late hour is not particularly suspicious given the location of the stop on a public highway.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[OIfficers are not required to ignore the relevant characteristics of a location in determining whether the circumstances are sufficiently suspicious to warrant further investigation.\"","sentence":"See State v. Singleton, 2005 UT App 464, \u00b6 9, 128 P.3d 28 (\"[AlIthough an individual's presence in an area of expected criminal activity is not enough to support reasonable suspicion, it is a relevant consideration ....\"); see also Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124, 120 S.Ct. 673, 145 L.Ed.2d 570 (2000) (\"[OIfficers are not required to ignore the relevant characteristics of a location in determining whether the circumstances are sufficiently suspicious to warrant further investigation.\")."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[AlIthough an individual's presence in an area of expected criminal activity is not enough to support reasonable suspicion, it is a relevant consideration ....\"","sentence":"See State v. Singleton, 2005 UT App 464, \u00b6 9, 128 P.3d 28 (\"[AlIthough an individual's presence in an area of expected criminal activity is not enough to support reasonable suspicion, it is a relevant consideration ....\"); see also Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124, 120 S.Ct. 673, 145 L.Ed.2d 570 (2000) (\"[OIfficers are not required to ignore the relevant characteristics of a location in determining whether the circumstances are sufficiently suspicious to warrant further investigation.\")."},"case_id":8346237,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Meloche's confrontation with the O'Neills lacked all the elements required by LMCO SSSS 91.073(A)-(B) and 91.074(D) -- sections of an ordinance that Meloche claims he created -- and was not reasonably calculated to apprise the O'Neills of the allegations against them or of the procedures available to present their objections.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"275 F.3d 553, 557","parenthetical":"holding that a parking citation provided adequate notice where it was \"reasonably calculated to inform the vehicle owners of the allegations against them and the procedures available to obtain a hearing to contest the allegations\"","sentence":"See United States v. Baker, 807 F.2d 1315, 1323-24 (6th Cir.1986) (holding that notice was not constitutionally adequate where the clear-cut statutory procedures for notification were not followed); cf. Herrada v. City of Detroit, 275 F.3d 553, 557 (6th Cir.2001) (holding that a parking citation provided adequate notice where it was \u201creasonably calculated to inform the vehicle owners of the allegations against them and the procedures available to obtain a hearing to contest the allegations\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"807 F.2d 1315, 1323-24","parenthetical":"holding that notice was not constitutionally adequate where the clear-cut statutory procedures for notification were not followed","sentence":"See United States v. Baker, 807 F.2d 1315, 1323-24 (6th Cir.1986) (holding that notice was not constitutionally adequate where the clear-cut statutory procedures for notification were not followed); cf. Herrada v. City of Detroit, 275 F.3d 553, 557 (6th Cir.2001) (holding that a parking citation provided adequate notice where it was \u201creasonably calculated to inform the vehicle owners of the allegations against them and the procedures available to obtain a hearing to contest the allegations\u201d)."},"case_id":3850902,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Instead, he signed a waiver of rights and, when asked whether he would make a statement, gave several unintelligible responses before stating, \"yeah.\" Thus, Andrade did not unambiguously and unequivocally invoke his right to remain silent.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"279 Ga. 646, 648","parenthetical":"trial court properly found that defendant invoked his right to remain silent where defendant \"shook his head in the negative when asked if he wanted to talk about the victim's death and the questioning agent took [defendant's] response to be a refusal to talk about the incident\"","sentence":"But see State v. Nash, 279 Ga. 646, 648 (2) (619 SE2d 684) (2005) (trial court properly found that defendant invoked his right to remain silent where defendant \u201cshook his head in the negative when asked if he wanted to talk about the victim\u2019s death and the questioning agent took [defendant\u2019s] response to be a refusal to talk about the incident\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"283 Ga. 196, 200-201","parenthetical":"\"If Perez had truly intended to withdraw his waiver and invoke his right to remain silent, he would not have acquiesced in responding to the officer's further questioning.\"","sentence":"See id. at 426 (2) (\u201cdefendant\u2019s statement that he should not talk in the absence of \u2018real talk\u2019 was insufficient to trigger the interrogating agent\u2019s duty to cease questioning\u201d); Perez v. State, 283 Ga. 196, 200-201 (657 SE2d 846) (2008) (\u201cIf Perez had truly intended to withdraw his waiver and invoke his right to remain silent, he would not have acquiesced in responding to the officer\u2019s further questioning.\u201d)."},"case_id":12441558,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The Ninth Circuit soundly rejected the argument. \"The fundamental requirements of procedural due process are notice and an opportunity to be heard before the government may deprive a person of a protected liberty or property interest.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"judicial involvement not required to meet the due process demand of an impartial tribunal","sentence":"See also Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188 [72 L.Ed.2d 1, 102 S.Ct. 1665] (1982) (judicial involvement not required to meet the due process demand of an impartial tribunal).\u201d"},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"'There is no constitutional requirement that the decisionmaker be an uninvolved person when a property interest protected by due process is at stake.'","sentence":"Jordan v. City of Lake Oswego, 734 F.2d 1374, 1376 n. 1 (9th Cir. 1984) (\u2018There is no constitutional requirement that the decisionmaker be an uninvolved person when a property interest protected by due process is at stake.\u2019); Price v. City of Junction, Texas, 711 F.2d 582, 589 n. 5 (5th Cir. 1983) (\u2018There is no requirement that the impartial tribunal be a judicial tribunal.\u2019); Stretten v. Wadsworth Veterans Hospital, 537 F.2d 361, 369 n. 18 (9th Cir. 1976) (same)."},"case_id":6053225,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The Ninth Circuit soundly rejected the argument. \"The fundamental requirements of procedural due process are notice and an opportunity to be heard before the government may deprive a person of a protected liberty or property interest.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"'There is no constitutional requirement that the decisionmaker be an uninvolved person when a property interest protected by due process is at stake.'","sentence":"Jordan v. City of Lake Oswego, 734 F.2d 1374, 1376 n. 1 (9th Cir. 1984) (\u2018There is no constitutional requirement that the decisionmaker be an uninvolved person when a property interest protected by due process is at stake.\u2019); Price v. City of Junction, Texas, 711 F.2d 582, 589 n. 5 (5th Cir. 1983) (\u2018There is no requirement that the impartial tribunal be a judicial tribunal.\u2019); Stretten v. Wadsworth Veterans Hospital, 537 F.2d 361, 369 n. 18 (9th Cir. 1976) (same)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"judicial involvement not required to meet the due process demand of an impartial tribunal","sentence":"See also Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188 [72 L.Ed.2d 1, 102 S.Ct. 1665] (1982) (judicial involvement not required to meet the due process demand of an impartial tribunal).\u201d"},"case_id":6053225,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The Ninth Circuit soundly rejected the argument. \"The fundamental requirements of procedural due process are notice and an opportunity to be heard before the government may deprive a person of a protected liberty or property interest.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"'There is no constitutional requirement that the decisionmaker be an uninvolved person when a property interest protected by due process is at stake.'","sentence":"Jordan v. City of Lake Oswego, 734 F.2d 1374, 1376 n. 1 (9th Cir. 1984) (\u2018There is no constitutional requirement that the decisionmaker be an uninvolved person when a property interest protected by due process is at stake.\u2019); Price v. City of Junction, Texas, 711 F.2d 582, 589 n. 5 (5th Cir. 1983) (\u2018There is no requirement that the impartial tribunal be a judicial tribunal.\u2019); Stretten v. Wadsworth Veterans Hospital, 537 F.2d 361, 369 n. 18 (9th Cir. 1976) (same)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"judicial involvement not required to meet the due process demand of an impartial tribunal","sentence":"See also Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188 [72 L.Ed.2d 1, 102 S.Ct. 1665] (1982) (judicial involvement not required to meet the due process demand of an impartial tribunal).\u201d"},"case_id":6053225,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The Ninth Circuit soundly rejected the argument. \"The fundamental requirements of procedural due process are notice and an opportunity to be heard before the government may deprive a person of a protected liberty or property interest.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"'There is no requirement that the impartial tribunal be a judicial tribunal.'","sentence":"Jordan v. City of Lake Oswego, 734 F.2d 1374, 1376 n. 1 (9th Cir. 1984) (\u2018There is no constitutional requirement that the decisionmaker be an uninvolved person when a property interest protected by due process is at stake.\u2019); Price v. City of Junction, Texas, 711 F.2d 582, 589 n. 5 (5th Cir. 1983) (\u2018There is no requirement that the impartial tribunal be a judicial tribunal.\u2019); Stretten v. Wadsworth Veterans Hospital, 537 F.2d 361, 369 n. 18 (9th Cir. 1976) (same)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"judicial involvement not required to meet the due process demand of an impartial tribunal","sentence":"See also Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188 [72 L.Ed.2d 1, 102 S.Ct. 1665] (1982) (judicial involvement not required to meet the due process demand of an impartial tribunal).\u201d"},"case_id":6053225,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The Ninth Circuit soundly rejected the argument. \"The fundamental requirements of procedural due process are notice and an opportunity to be heard before the government may deprive a person of a protected liberty or property interest.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"'There is no requirement that the impartial tribunal be a judicial tribunal.'","sentence":"Jordan v. City of Lake Oswego, 734 F.2d 1374, 1376 n. 1 (9th Cir. 1984) (\u2018There is no constitutional requirement that the decisionmaker be an uninvolved person when a property interest protected by due process is at stake.\u2019); Price v. City of Junction, Texas, 711 F.2d 582, 589 n. 5 (5th Cir. 1983) (\u2018There is no requirement that the impartial tribunal be a judicial tribunal.\u2019); Stretten v. Wadsworth Veterans Hospital, 537 F.2d 361, 369 n. 18 (9th Cir. 1976) (same)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"judicial involvement not required to meet the due process demand of an impartial tribunal","sentence":"See also Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188 [72 L.Ed.2d 1, 102 S.Ct. 1665] (1982) (judicial involvement not required to meet the due process demand of an impartial tribunal).\u201d"},"case_id":6053225,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The Ninth Circuit soundly rejected the argument. \"The fundamental requirements of procedural due process are notice and an opportunity to be heard before the government may deprive a person of a protected liberty or property interest.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"'There is no requirement that the impartial tribunal be a judicial tribunal.'","sentence":"Jordan v. City of Lake Oswego, 734 F.2d 1374, 1376 n. 1 (9th Cir. 1984) (\u2018There is no constitutional requirement that the decisionmaker be an uninvolved person when a property interest protected by due process is at stake.\u2019); Price v. City of Junction, Texas, 711 F.2d 582, 589 n. 5 (5th Cir. 1983) (\u2018There is no requirement that the impartial tribunal be a judicial tribunal.\u2019); Stretten v. Wadsworth Veterans Hospital, 537 F.2d 361, 369 n. 18 (9th Cir. 1976) (same)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"judicial involvement not required to meet the due process demand of an impartial tribunal","sentence":"See also Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188 [72 L.Ed.2d 1, 102 S.Ct. 1665] (1982) (judicial involvement not required to meet the due process demand of an impartial tribunal).\u201d"},"case_id":6053225,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Boyd's lowest I.Q. score of 64 is on the upper borderline of mental retardation. We found that Andrews's counsel did not perform deficiently in failing to present the evidence of his low intelligence.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"788 F.2d 1101, 1103","parenthetical":"finding counsel ineffective for failing to present evidence of I.Q. score below 41","sentence":"See also Smith v. Black, 904 F.2d 950, 977 (5th Cir,1990)(finding that counsel was not deficient for failing to present mitigating evidence of I.Q.\u2019 of 70), vacated on other grounds, 503 U.S. 930, 112 S.Ct. 1463, 117 L.Ed.2d 609 (1992), aff'd in relevant part, 970 F.2d 1383 (5th Cir.1992); cf. Jones v. Thigpen, 788 F.2d 1101, 1103 (5th Cir.1986)(finding counsel ineffective for failing to present evidence of I.Q. score below 41)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"904 F.2d 950, 977","parenthetical":"finding that counsel was not deficient for failing to present mitigating evidence of I.Q.' of 70","sentence":"See also Smith v. Black, 904 F.2d 950, 977 (5th Cir,1990)(finding that counsel was not deficient for failing to present mitigating evidence of I.Q.\u2019 of 70), vacated on other grounds, 503 U.S. 930, 112 S.Ct. 1463, 117 L.Ed.2d 609 (1992), aff'd in relevant part, 970 F.2d 1383 (5th Cir.1992); cf. Jones v. Thigpen, 788 F.2d 1101, 1103 (5th Cir.1986)(finding counsel ineffective for failing to present evidence of I.Q. score below 41)."},"case_id":11598429,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Boyd's lowest I.Q. score of 64 is on the upper borderline of mental retardation. We found that Andrews's counsel did not perform deficiently in failing to present the evidence of his low intelligence.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"788 F.2d 1101, 1103","parenthetical":"finding counsel ineffective for failing to present evidence of I.Q. score below 41","sentence":"See also Smith v. Black, 904 F.2d 950, 977 (5th Cir,1990)(finding that counsel was not deficient for failing to present mitigating evidence of I.Q.\u2019 of 70), vacated on other grounds, 503 U.S. 930, 112 S.Ct. 1463, 117 L.Ed.2d 609 (1992), aff'd in relevant part, 970 F.2d 1383 (5th Cir.1992); cf. Jones v. Thigpen, 788 F.2d 1101, 1103 (5th Cir.1986)(finding counsel ineffective for failing to present evidence of I.Q. score below 41)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding that counsel was not deficient for failing to present mitigating evidence of I.Q.' of 70","sentence":"See also Smith v. Black, 904 F.2d 950, 977 (5th Cir,1990)(finding that counsel was not deficient for failing to present mitigating evidence of I.Q.\u2019 of 70), vacated on other grounds, 503 U.S. 930, 112 S.Ct. 1463, 117 L.Ed.2d 609 (1992), aff'd in relevant part, 970 F.2d 1383 (5th Cir.1992); cf. Jones v. Thigpen, 788 F.2d 1101, 1103 (5th Cir.1986)(finding counsel ineffective for failing to present evidence of I.Q. score below 41)."},"case_id":11598429,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Boyd's lowest I.Q. score of 64 is on the upper borderline of mental retardation. We found that Andrews's counsel did not perform deficiently in failing to present the evidence of his low intelligence.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding that counsel was not deficient for failing to present mitigating evidence of I.Q.' of 70","sentence":"See also Smith v. Black, 904 F.2d 950, 977 (5th Cir,1990)(finding that counsel was not deficient for failing to present mitigating evidence of I.Q.\u2019 of 70), vacated on other grounds, 503 U.S. 930, 112 S.Ct. 1463, 117 L.Ed.2d 609 (1992), aff'd in relevant part, 970 F.2d 1383 (5th Cir.1992); cf. Jones v. Thigpen, 788 F.2d 1101, 1103 (5th Cir.1986)(finding counsel ineffective for failing to present evidence of I.Q. score below 41)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"788 F.2d 1101, 1103","parenthetical":"finding counsel ineffective for failing to present evidence of I.Q. score below 41","sentence":"See also Smith v. Black, 904 F.2d 950, 977 (5th Cir,1990)(finding that counsel was not deficient for failing to present mitigating evidence of I.Q.\u2019 of 70), vacated on other grounds, 503 U.S. 930, 112 S.Ct. 1463, 117 L.Ed.2d 609 (1992), aff'd in relevant part, 970 F.2d 1383 (5th Cir.1992); cf. Jones v. Thigpen, 788 F.2d 1101, 1103 (5th Cir.1986)(finding counsel ineffective for failing to present evidence of I.Q. score below 41)."},"case_id":11598429,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Boyd's lowest I.Q. score of 64 is on the upper borderline of mental retardation. We found that Andrews's counsel did not perform deficiently in failing to present the evidence of his low intelligence.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"788 F.2d 1101, 1103","parenthetical":"finding counsel ineffective for failing to present evidence of I.Q. score below 41","sentence":"See also Smith v. Black, 904 F.2d 950, 977 (5th Cir,1990)(finding that counsel was not deficient for failing to present mitigating evidence of I.Q.\u2019 of 70), vacated on other grounds, 503 U.S. 930, 112 S.Ct. 1463, 117 L.Ed.2d 609 (1992), aff'd in relevant part, 970 F.2d 1383 (5th Cir.1992); cf. Jones v. Thigpen, 788 F.2d 1101, 1103 (5th Cir.1986)(finding counsel ineffective for failing to present evidence of I.Q. score below 41)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding that counsel was not deficient for failing to present mitigating evidence of I.Q.' of 70","sentence":"See also Smith v. Black, 904 F.2d 950, 977 (5th Cir,1990)(finding that counsel was not deficient for failing to present mitigating evidence of I.Q.\u2019 of 70), vacated on other grounds, 503 U.S. 930, 112 S.Ct. 1463, 117 L.Ed.2d 609 (1992), aff'd in relevant part, 970 F.2d 1383 (5th Cir.1992); cf. Jones v. Thigpen, 788 F.2d 1101, 1103 (5th Cir.1986)(finding counsel ineffective for failing to present evidence of I.Q. score below 41)."},"case_id":11598429,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Boyd's lowest I.Q. score of 64 is on the upper borderline of mental retardation. We found that Andrews's counsel did not perform deficiently in failing to present the evidence of his low intelligence.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding that counsel was not deficient for failing to present mitigating evidence of I.Q.' of 70","sentence":"See also Smith v. Black, 904 F.2d 950, 977 (5th Cir,1990)(finding that counsel was not deficient for failing to present mitigating evidence of I.Q.\u2019 of 70), vacated on other grounds, 503 U.S. 930, 112 S.Ct. 1463, 117 L.Ed.2d 609 (1992), aff'd in relevant part, 970 F.2d 1383 (5th Cir.1992); cf. Jones v. Thigpen, 788 F.2d 1101, 1103 (5th Cir.1986)(finding counsel ineffective for failing to present evidence of I.Q. score below 41)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"788 F.2d 1101, 1103","parenthetical":"finding counsel ineffective for failing to present evidence of I.Q. score below 41","sentence":"See also Smith v. Black, 904 F.2d 950, 977 (5th Cir,1990)(finding that counsel was not deficient for failing to present mitigating evidence of I.Q.\u2019 of 70), vacated on other grounds, 503 U.S. 930, 112 S.Ct. 1463, 117 L.Ed.2d 609 (1992), aff'd in relevant part, 970 F.2d 1383 (5th Cir.1992); cf. Jones v. Thigpen, 788 F.2d 1101, 1103 (5th Cir.1986)(finding counsel ineffective for failing to present evidence of I.Q. score below 41)."},"case_id":11598429,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The obvious purpose of a civil consumer protection action in which a receiver is appointed is protection of the public. The decision to initiate a civil consumer protection action is closely analogous to. a prosecutor's discretionary decision to initiate a criminal proceeding.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"568 F.2d 117, 119","parenthetical":"attorney general and deputies were entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity for bringing civil consumer protection action under deceptive trade practices act","sentence":"See Brewer v. Hill, 453 F.Supp. 67, 69 (N.D.Tex.1978) (attorney general and his deputies were entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity for bringing civil deceptive trade practices consumer protection action because the reasons for affording immunity \u201care the same as if the Attorney General or one of his deputies had been seeking an indictment and prosecuting a criminal action\u201d); see also Ledwith v. Douglas, 568 F.2d 117, 119 (8th Cir.1978) (attorney general and deputies were entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity for bringing civil consumer protection action under deceptive trade practices act)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"453 F.Supp. 67, 69","parenthetical":"attorney general and his deputies were entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity for bringing civil deceptive trade practices consumer protection action because the reasons for affording immunity \"are the same as if the Attorney General or one of his deputies had been seeking an indictment and prosecuting a criminal action\"","sentence":"See Brewer v. Hill, 453 F.Supp. 67, 69 (N.D.Tex.1978) (attorney general and his deputies were entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity for bringing civil deceptive trade practices consumer protection action because the reasons for affording immunity \u201care the same as if the Attorney General or one of his deputies had been seeking an indictment and prosecuting a criminal action\u201d); see also Ledwith v. Douglas, 568 F.2d 117, 119 (8th Cir.1978) (attorney general and deputies were entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity for bringing civil consumer protection action under deceptive trade practices act)."},"case_id":11842926,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In contrast to the purported consent at issue in Bautista, Cooper's consent was not simply the product of compliance with police demands.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"923 F.2d 1512, 1512","parenthetical":"explaining that courts have held that consent was not voluntary in \"cases in which police have used their position to demand entry\"","sentence":"See Bautista, 362 F.3d at 591-92 (holding that opening the door in response to a police demand and then failing to object when officers entered was not voluntary consent); see also Tobin, 923 F.2d at 1512 (explaining that courts have held that consent was not voluntary in \u201ccases in which police have used their position to demand entry\u201d); United States v. Edmondson, 791 F.2d 1512, 1514-15 (11th Cir.1986) (finding a defendant\u2019s \u201cconsent\u201d \u2014 opening the door, stepping back, and placing his hands upon his head\u2014 involuntary where it was prompted by a number of Federal Bureau of Investigation agents who had surrounded Edmondson\u2019s apartment, drawn their weapons, and knocked on the door yelling, \u201cFBI."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"362 F.3d 591, 591-92","parenthetical":"holding that opening the door in response to a police demand and then failing to object when officers entered was not voluntary consent","sentence":"See Bautista, 362 F.3d at 591-92 (holding that opening the door in response to a police demand and then failing to object when officers entered was not voluntary consent); see also Tobin, 923 F.2d at 1512 (explaining that courts have held that consent was not voluntary in \u201ccases in which police have used their position to demand entry\u201d); United States v. Edmondson, 791 F.2d 1512, 1514-15 (11th Cir.1986) (finding a defendant\u2019s \u201cconsent\u201d \u2014 opening the door, stepping back, and placing his hands upon his head\u2014 involuntary where it was prompted by a number of Federal Bureau of Investigation agents who had surrounded Edmondson\u2019s apartment, drawn their weapons, and knocked on the door yelling, \u201cFBI."},"case_id":4252080,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Although this change occurred well before Doe submitted his form, Du-chesne's first affidavit indicates that at least as late as the EEO investigation of Doe's complaint, FMLA forms were still shared with managers and supervisors such as Tahir. These two statements do not necessarily contradict one another, for it seems perfectly possible that medical leave information continued to be shared with relevant managers and supervisors even after Paul Neff assumed responsibility for tracking and processing the requests. In any event, whatever conflict may exist must be resolved at trial, where Doe will have an opportunity to question Duchesne about his two statements.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"275 F.3d 1096, 1103","parenthetical":"\"Summary judgment is inappropriate when contradictory inferences may be drawn from the evidence.\"","sentence":"See Rogers Corp. v. EPA, 275 F.3d 1096, 1103 (D.C.Cir.2002) (\u201cSummary judgment is inappropriate when contradictory inferences may be drawn from the evidence.\u201d); cf. Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795, 806-07, 119 S.Ct. 1597, 1603-04, 143 L.Ed.2d 966 (1999) (a nonmoving party cannot defeat summary judgment by submitting, without explanation, an affidavit contradicting a prior sworn statement)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"526 U.S. 795, 806-07","parenthetical":"a nonmoving party cannot defeat summary judgment by submitting, without explanation, an affidavit contradicting a prior sworn statement","sentence":"See Rogers Corp. v. EPA, 275 F.3d 1096, 1103 (D.C.Cir.2002) (\u201cSummary judgment is inappropriate when contradictory inferences may be drawn from the evidence.\u201d); cf. Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795, 806-07, 119 S.Ct. 1597, 1603-04, 143 L.Ed.2d 966 (1999) (a nonmoving party cannot defeat summary judgment by submitting, without explanation, an affidavit contradicting a prior sworn statement)."},"case_id":9337975,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Although this change occurred well before Doe submitted his form, Du-chesne's first affidavit indicates that at least as late as the EEO investigation of Doe's complaint, FMLA forms were still shared with managers and supervisors such as Tahir. These two statements do not necessarily contradict one another, for it seems perfectly possible that medical leave information continued to be shared with relevant managers and supervisors even after Paul Neff assumed responsibility for tracking and processing the requests. In any event, whatever conflict may exist must be resolved at trial, where Doe will have an opportunity to question Duchesne about his two statements.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"119 S.Ct. 1597, 1603-04","parenthetical":"a nonmoving party cannot defeat summary judgment by submitting, without explanation, an affidavit contradicting a prior sworn statement","sentence":"See Rogers Corp. v. EPA, 275 F.3d 1096, 1103 (D.C.Cir.2002) (\u201cSummary judgment is inappropriate when contradictory inferences may be drawn from the evidence.\u201d); cf. Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795, 806-07, 119 S.Ct. 1597, 1603-04, 143 L.Ed.2d 966 (1999) (a nonmoving party cannot defeat summary judgment by submitting, without explanation, an affidavit contradicting a prior sworn statement)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"275 F.3d 1096, 1103","parenthetical":"\"Summary judgment is inappropriate when contradictory inferences may be drawn from the evidence.\"","sentence":"See Rogers Corp. v. EPA, 275 F.3d 1096, 1103 (D.C.Cir.2002) (\u201cSummary judgment is inappropriate when contradictory inferences may be drawn from the evidence.\u201d); cf. Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795, 806-07, 119 S.Ct. 1597, 1603-04, 143 L.Ed.2d 966 (1999) (a nonmoving party cannot defeat summary judgment by submitting, without explanation, an affidavit contradicting a prior sworn statement)."},"case_id":9337975,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Although this change occurred well before Doe submitted his form, Du-chesne's first affidavit indicates that at least as late as the EEO investigation of Doe's complaint, FMLA forms were still shared with managers and supervisors such as Tahir. These two statements do not necessarily contradict one another, for it seems perfectly possible that medical leave information continued to be shared with relevant managers and supervisors even after Paul Neff assumed responsibility for tracking and processing the requests. In any event, whatever conflict may exist must be resolved at trial, where Doe will have an opportunity to question Duchesne about his two statements.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"275 F.3d 1096, 1103","parenthetical":"\"Summary judgment is inappropriate when contradictory inferences may be drawn from the evidence.\"","sentence":"See Rogers Corp. v. EPA, 275 F.3d 1096, 1103 (D.C.Cir.2002) (\u201cSummary judgment is inappropriate when contradictory inferences may be drawn from the evidence.\u201d); cf. Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795, 806-07, 119 S.Ct. 1597, 1603-04, 143 L.Ed.2d 966 (1999) (a nonmoving party cannot defeat summary judgment by submitting, without explanation, an affidavit contradicting a prior sworn statement)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"a nonmoving party cannot defeat summary judgment by submitting, without explanation, an affidavit contradicting a prior sworn statement","sentence":"See Rogers Corp. v. EPA, 275 F.3d 1096, 1103 (D.C.Cir.2002) (\u201cSummary judgment is inappropriate when contradictory inferences may be drawn from the evidence.\u201d); cf. Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795, 806-07, 119 S.Ct. 1597, 1603-04, 143 L.Ed.2d 966 (1999) (a nonmoving party cannot defeat summary judgment by submitting, without explanation, an affidavit contradicting a prior sworn statement)."},"case_id":9337975,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Pa.R.Crim.P. 121. Where a defendant knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently seeks to waive his right to counsel, the trial court, in keeping with Faretta, must allow the individual to proceed pro se.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that a defendant must demonstrate a knowing waiver under Faretta","sentence":"See Commonwealth v. Starr, 541 Pa. 564, 664 A.2d 1326, 1335 (1995) (holding that a defendant must demonstrate a knowing waiver under Faretta)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"concluding that Faretta requires an on-the-record colloquy in satisfaction of Pa.R.Crim.P. 121, which colloquy may be conducted by the court, the prosecutor, or defense counsel.","sentence":"See also Commonwealth v. McDonough, 571 Pa. 232, 812 A.2d 504, 508 (2002) (concluding that Faretta requires an on-the-record colloquy in satisfaction of Pa.R.Crim.P. 121, which colloquy may be conducted by the court, the prosecutor, or defense counsel.)"},"case_id":7307292,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Pa.R.Crim.P. 121. Where a defendant knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently seeks to waive his right to counsel, the trial court, in keeping with Faretta, must allow the individual to proceed pro se.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that a defendant must demonstrate a knowing waiver under Faretta","sentence":"See Commonwealth v. Starr, 541 Pa. 564, 664 A.2d 1326, 1335 (1995) (holding that a defendant must demonstrate a knowing waiver under Faretta)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"812 A.2d 504, 508","parenthetical":"concluding that Faretta requires an on-the-record colloquy in satisfaction of Pa.R.Crim.P. 121, which colloquy may be conducted by the court, the prosecutor, or defense counsel.","sentence":"See also Commonwealth v. McDonough, 571 Pa. 232, 812 A.2d 504, 508 (2002) (concluding that Faretta requires an on-the-record colloquy in satisfaction of Pa.R.Crim.P. 121, which colloquy may be conducted by the court, the prosecutor, or defense counsel.)"},"case_id":7307292,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Pa.R.Crim.P. 121. Where a defendant knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently seeks to waive his right to counsel, the trial court, in keeping with Faretta, must allow the individual to proceed pro se.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"concluding that Faretta requires an on-the-record colloquy in satisfaction of Pa.R.Crim.P. 121, which colloquy may be conducted by the court, the prosecutor, or defense counsel.","sentence":"See also Commonwealth v. McDonough, 571 Pa. 232, 812 A.2d 504, 508 (2002) (concluding that Faretta requires an on-the-record colloquy in satisfaction of Pa.R.Crim.P. 121, which colloquy may be conducted by the court, the prosecutor, or defense counsel.)"},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"664 A.2d 1326, 1335","parenthetical":"holding that a defendant must demonstrate a knowing waiver under Faretta","sentence":"See Commonwealth v. Starr, 541 Pa. 564, 664 A.2d 1326, 1335 (1995) (holding that a defendant must demonstrate a knowing waiver under Faretta)."},"case_id":7307292,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Pa.R.Crim.P. 121. Where a defendant knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently seeks to waive his right to counsel, the trial court, in keeping with Faretta, must allow the individual to proceed pro se.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"812 A.2d 504, 508","parenthetical":"concluding that Faretta requires an on-the-record colloquy in satisfaction of Pa.R.Crim.P. 121, which colloquy may be conducted by the court, the prosecutor, or defense counsel.","sentence":"See also Commonwealth v. McDonough, 571 Pa. 232, 812 A.2d 504, 508 (2002) (concluding that Faretta requires an on-the-record colloquy in satisfaction of Pa.R.Crim.P. 121, which colloquy may be conducted by the court, the prosecutor, or defense counsel.)"},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"664 A.2d 1326, 1335","parenthetical":"holding that a defendant must demonstrate a knowing waiver under Faretta","sentence":"See Commonwealth v. Starr, 541 Pa. 564, 664 A.2d 1326, 1335 (1995) (holding that a defendant must demonstrate a knowing waiver under Faretta)."},"case_id":7307292,"label":"b"}
{"context":"However, if one of the spouses acts as the agent of the non-participating spouse, section 5127 is not violated.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"in construing similar Washington \"joinder\" statute, court states that \"[a] community is estopped to deny liability due to the failure of one spouse to join a transaction when one spouse permits the other to conduct the transaction, both have a general knowledge of the transaction, and both are ready to accept the benefits which may come from it.\"","sentence":"See Miller v. Johnston, 270 Cal.App.2d 289, 75 Cal.Rptr. 699, 707 n. 6 (1969) (although wife claimed that she could not be bound by a conveyance of community property to which she was not a party, her knowledge of and acquiescence to the conveyance made her bound); see also Colorado Nat. Bank of Denver v. Merlino, 35 Wash.App. 610, 668 P.2d 1304, 1307 (1983) (in construing similar Washington \u201cjoinder\u201d statute, court states that \u201c[a] community is estopped to deny liability due to the failure of one spouse to join a transaction when one spouse permits the other to conduct the transaction, both have a general knowledge of the transaction, and both are ready to accept the benefits which may come from it.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"although wife claimed that she could not be bound by a conveyance of community property to which she was not a party, her knowledge of and acquiescence to the conveyance made her bound","sentence":"See Miller v. Johnston, 270 Cal.App.2d 289, 75 Cal.Rptr. 699, 707 n. 6 (1969) (although wife claimed that she could not be bound by a conveyance of community property to which she was not a party, her knowledge of and acquiescence to the conveyance made her bound); see also Colorado Nat. Bank of Denver v. Merlino, 35 Wash.App. 610, 668 P.2d 1304, 1307 (1983) (in construing similar Washington \u201cjoinder\u201d statute, court states that \u201c[a] community is estopped to deny liability due to the failure of one spouse to join a transaction when one spouse permits the other to conduct the transaction, both have a general knowledge of the transaction, and both are ready to accept the benefits which may come from it.\u201d)."},"case_id":29517,"label":"b"}
{"context":"However, if one of the spouses acts as the agent of the non-participating spouse, section 5127 is not violated.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"although wife claimed that she could not be bound by a conveyance of community property to which she was not a party, her knowledge of and acquiescence to the conveyance made her bound","sentence":"See Miller v. Johnston, 270 Cal.App.2d 289, 75 Cal.Rptr. 699, 707 n. 6 (1969) (although wife claimed that she could not be bound by a conveyance of community property to which she was not a party, her knowledge of and acquiescence to the conveyance made her bound); see also Colorado Nat. Bank of Denver v. Merlino, 35 Wash.App. 610, 668 P.2d 1304, 1307 (1983) (in construing similar Washington \u201cjoinder\u201d statute, court states that \u201c[a] community is estopped to deny liability due to the failure of one spouse to join a transaction when one spouse permits the other to conduct the transaction, both have a general knowledge of the transaction, and both are ready to accept the benefits which may come from it.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"668 P.2d 1304, 1307","parenthetical":"in construing similar Washington \"joinder\" statute, court states that \"[a] community is estopped to deny liability due to the failure of one spouse to join a transaction when one spouse permits the other to conduct the transaction, both have a general knowledge of the transaction, and both are ready to accept the benefits which may come from it.\"","sentence":"See Miller v. Johnston, 270 Cal.App.2d 289, 75 Cal.Rptr. 699, 707 n. 6 (1969) (although wife claimed that she could not be bound by a conveyance of community property to which she was not a party, her knowledge of and acquiescence to the conveyance made her bound); see also Colorado Nat. Bank of Denver v. Merlino, 35 Wash.App. 610, 668 P.2d 1304, 1307 (1983) (in construing similar Washington \u201cjoinder\u201d statute, court states that \u201c[a] community is estopped to deny liability due to the failure of one spouse to join a transaction when one spouse permits the other to conduct the transaction, both have a general knowledge of the transaction, and both are ready to accept the benefits which may come from it.\u201d)."},"case_id":29517,"label":"a"}
{"context":"However, if one of the spouses acts as the agent of the non-participating spouse, section 5127 is not violated.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"in construing similar Washington \"joinder\" statute, court states that \"[a] community is estopped to deny liability due to the failure of one spouse to join a transaction when one spouse permits the other to conduct the transaction, both have a general knowledge of the transaction, and both are ready to accept the benefits which may come from it.\"","sentence":"See Miller v. Johnston, 270 Cal.App.2d 289, 75 Cal.Rptr. 699, 707 n. 6 (1969) (although wife claimed that she could not be bound by a conveyance of community property to which she was not a party, her knowledge of and acquiescence to the conveyance made her bound); see also Colorado Nat. Bank of Denver v. Merlino, 35 Wash.App. 610, 668 P.2d 1304, 1307 (1983) (in construing similar Washington \u201cjoinder\u201d statute, court states that \u201c[a] community is estopped to deny liability due to the failure of one spouse to join a transaction when one spouse permits the other to conduct the transaction, both have a general knowledge of the transaction, and both are ready to accept the benefits which may come from it.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"although wife claimed that she could not be bound by a conveyance of community property to which she was not a party, her knowledge of and acquiescence to the conveyance made her bound","sentence":"See Miller v. Johnston, 270 Cal.App.2d 289, 75 Cal.Rptr. 699, 707 n. 6 (1969) (although wife claimed that she could not be bound by a conveyance of community property to which she was not a party, her knowledge of and acquiescence to the conveyance made her bound); see also Colorado Nat. Bank of Denver v. Merlino, 35 Wash.App. 610, 668 P.2d 1304, 1307 (1983) (in construing similar Washington \u201cjoinder\u201d statute, court states that \u201c[a] community is estopped to deny liability due to the failure of one spouse to join a transaction when one spouse permits the other to conduct the transaction, both have a general knowledge of the transaction, and both are ready to accept the benefits which may come from it.\u201d)."},"case_id":29517,"label":"b"}
{"context":"However, if one of the spouses acts as the agent of the non-participating spouse, section 5127 is not violated.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"668 P.2d 1304, 1307","parenthetical":"in construing similar Washington \"joinder\" statute, court states that \"[a] community is estopped to deny liability due to the failure of one spouse to join a transaction when one spouse permits the other to conduct the transaction, both have a general knowledge of the transaction, and both are ready to accept the benefits which may come from it.\"","sentence":"See Miller v. Johnston, 270 Cal.App.2d 289, 75 Cal.Rptr. 699, 707 n. 6 (1969) (although wife claimed that she could not be bound by a conveyance of community property to which she was not a party, her knowledge of and acquiescence to the conveyance made her bound); see also Colorado Nat. Bank of Denver v. Merlino, 35 Wash.App. 610, 668 P.2d 1304, 1307 (1983) (in construing similar Washington \u201cjoinder\u201d statute, court states that \u201c[a] community is estopped to deny liability due to the failure of one spouse to join a transaction when one spouse permits the other to conduct the transaction, both have a general knowledge of the transaction, and both are ready to accept the benefits which may come from it.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"although wife claimed that she could not be bound by a conveyance of community property to which she was not a party, her knowledge of and acquiescence to the conveyance made her bound","sentence":"See Miller v. Johnston, 270 Cal.App.2d 289, 75 Cal.Rptr. 699, 707 n. 6 (1969) (although wife claimed that she could not be bound by a conveyance of community property to which she was not a party, her knowledge of and acquiescence to the conveyance made her bound); see also Colorado Nat. Bank of Denver v. Merlino, 35 Wash.App. 610, 668 P.2d 1304, 1307 (1983) (in construing similar Washington \u201cjoinder\u201d statute, court states that \u201c[a] community is estopped to deny liability due to the failure of one spouse to join a transaction when one spouse permits the other to conduct the transaction, both have a general knowledge of the transaction, and both are ready to accept the benefits which may come from it.\u201d)."},"case_id":29517,"label":"b"}
{"context":"When analyzing judicial economy, it is proper to consider whether there will be a timely resolution of the matter.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"451 F.Supp.2d 1045, 1045","parenthetical":"finding factors favoring retention included the trial being less than four months away and obtaining a comparable date in state court was uncertain (citing Hansen, 988 F.Supp. at 1261 (retaining jurisdiction where trial was three months away and it was uncertain whether the state court could accommodate trial in the same time frame","sentence":"See Krambeck, 451 F.Supp.2d at 1045 (finding factors favoring retention included the trial being less than four months away and obtaining a comparable date in state court was uncertain (citing Hansen, 988 F.Supp. at 1261 (retaining jurisdiction where trial was three months away and it was uncertain whether the state court could accommodate trial in the same time frame))); see also Tinius v. Carroll County Sheriff Dep\u2019t, No. C03-3001, 2004 WL 2943846, at *3 (N.D.Iowa Dec.17, 2004) (finding uncertain availability of comparable trial date in state court a factor favoring exercise of jurisdiction). In the present case, judicial economy weighs against retaining supplemental jurisdiction because it is uncertain when a federal court trial will be scheduled, and the state district court has already set a May 2008 trial date."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"2004 WL 2943846, at *3","parenthetical":"finding uncertain availability of comparable trial date in state court a factor favoring exercise of jurisdiction","sentence":"See Krambeck, 451 F.Supp.2d at 1045 (finding factors favoring retention included the trial being less than four months away and obtaining a comparable date in state court was uncertain (citing Hansen, 988 F.Supp. at 1261 (retaining jurisdiction where trial was three months away and it was uncertain whether the state court could accommodate trial in the same time frame))); see also Tinius v. Carroll County Sheriff Dep\u2019t, No. C03-3001, 2004 WL 2943846, at *3 (N.D.Iowa Dec.17, 2004) (finding uncertain availability of comparable trial date in state court a factor favoring exercise of jurisdiction). In the present case, judicial economy weighs against retaining supplemental jurisdiction because it is uncertain when a federal court trial will be scheduled, and the state district court has already set a May 2008 trial date."},"case_id":5875952,"label":"a"}
{"context":"When analyzing judicial economy, it is proper to consider whether there will be a timely resolution of the matter.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"988 F.Supp. 1261, 1261","parenthetical":"retaining jurisdiction where trial was three months away and it was uncertain whether the state court could accommodate trial in the same time frame","sentence":"See Krambeck, 451 F.Supp.2d at 1045 (finding factors favoring retention included the trial being less than four months away and obtaining a comparable date in state court was uncertain (citing Hansen, 988 F.Supp. at 1261 (retaining jurisdiction where trial was three months away and it was uncertain whether the state court could accommodate trial in the same time frame))); see also Tinius v. Carroll County Sheriff Dep\u2019t, No. C03-3001, 2004 WL 2943846, at *3 (N.D.Iowa Dec.17, 2004) (finding uncertain availability of comparable trial date in state court a factor favoring exercise of jurisdiction). In the present case, judicial economy weighs against retaining supplemental jurisdiction because it is uncertain when a federal court trial will be scheduled, and the state district court has already set a May 2008 trial date."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"2004 WL 2943846, at *3","parenthetical":"finding uncertain availability of comparable trial date in state court a factor favoring exercise of jurisdiction","sentence":"See Krambeck, 451 F.Supp.2d at 1045 (finding factors favoring retention included the trial being less than four months away and obtaining a comparable date in state court was uncertain (citing Hansen, 988 F.Supp. at 1261 (retaining jurisdiction where trial was three months away and it was uncertain whether the state court could accommodate trial in the same time frame))); see also Tinius v. Carroll County Sheriff Dep\u2019t, No. C03-3001, 2004 WL 2943846, at *3 (N.D.Iowa Dec.17, 2004) (finding uncertain availability of comparable trial date in state court a factor favoring exercise of jurisdiction). In the present case, judicial economy weighs against retaining supplemental jurisdiction because it is uncertain when a federal court trial will be scheduled, and the state district court has already set a May 2008 trial date."},"case_id":5875952,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Lastly, to establish a money-laundering conspiracy \"the government must prove (1) that two or more persons conspired to commit the crime of money laundering, and (2) that the defendant knowingly and voluntarily joined the conspiracy.\" There was ample proof that a money-laundering conspiracy existed, and the evidence was sufficient to lead a rational juror to conclude that Proge conducted or attempted to conduct a financial transaction knowing that it involved the proceeds of drug trafficking and with intent to promote the drug trafficking.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"468 Fed.Appx. 551, 555","parenthetical":"noting that the \"paradigmatic example\" of promotional money laundering is a drug dealer using the proceeds of a drug transaction to purchase additional drugs","sentence":"United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772, 782 (6th Cir. 2012) (finding evidence sufficient where defendant \u201cknowingly and routinely transported drug proceeds in furtherance of the drug-trafficking conspiracy\u201d); see United States v. Kelso, 468 Fed.Appx. 551, 555 (6th Cir. 2012) (noting that the \u201cparadigmatic example\u201d of promotional money laundering is a drug dealer using the proceeds of a drug transaction to purchase additional drugs)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"690 F.3d 772, 782","parenthetical":"finding evidence sufficient where defendant \"knowingly and routinely transported drug proceeds in furtherance of the drug-trafficking conspiracy\"","sentence":"United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772, 782 (6th Cir. 2012) (finding evidence sufficient where defendant \u201cknowingly and routinely transported drug proceeds in furtherance of the drug-trafficking conspiracy\u201d); see United States v. Kelso, 468 Fed.Appx. 551, 555 (6th Cir. 2012) (noting that the \u201cparadigmatic example\u201d of promotional money laundering is a drug dealer using the proceeds of a drug transaction to purchase additional drugs)."},"case_id":12188933,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In the realm of domestic relations litigation, matters which do not bear on a debtor's economic status, such as the dissolution of the marital relationship, are not stayed by a bankruptcy court.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"33 B.R. 717, 718","parenthetical":"reviewing legislative history of SS 362 indicating that divorce or child custody proceedings involving debtor may bear no relation to bankruptcy case.","sentence":"In re Schock, 37 B.R. 399, 400 (Bankr: D.N.D.1984) (determining that divorce petitions are not stayed by \u00a7 362 of the Code); see also In re General Oil Distributors, Inc., 33 B.R. 717, 718 (Bankr.E.D.N.Y.1983) (reviewing legislative history of \u00a7 362 indicating that divorce or child custody proceedings involving debtor may bear no relation to bankruptcy case.)"},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"37 B.R. 399, 400","parenthetical":"determining that divorce petitions are not stayed by SS 362 of the Code","sentence":"In re Schock, 37 B.R. 399, 400 (Bankr: D.N.D.1984) (determining that divorce petitions are not stayed by \u00a7 362 of the Code); see also In re General Oil Distributors, Inc., 33 B.R. 717, 718 (Bankr.E.D.N.Y.1983) (reviewing legislative history of \u00a7 362 indicating that divorce or child custody proceedings involving debtor may bear no relation to bankruptcy case.)"},"case_id":337298,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In some ways, the claims made by plaintiffs here parallel those made in Clinton: that the Constitution vested power in the legislative branch as a necessary check on the power of the executive branch, and that Congress is not free to upset the careful balance by giving power to the executive.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"505 U.S. 144, 182","parenthetical":"\"The Constitution's division of power among the three branches is violated where one branch invades the territory of another, whether or not the encroached-upon branch approves the encroachment.\"","sentence":"See 524 U.S. at 452, 118 S.Ct. 2091 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (\u201cThat a congressional cession of power is voluntary does not make it innocuous.... Abdication of responsibility is not part of the constitutional design.\u201d); cf. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 182, 112 S.Ct. 2408, 120 L.Ed.2d 120 (1992) (\u201cThe Constitution\u2019s division of power among the three branches is violated where one branch invades the territory of another, whether or not the encroached-upon branch approves the encroachment.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"524 U.S. 452, 452","parenthetical":"\"That a congressional cession of power is voluntary does not make it innocuous.... Abdication of responsibility is not part of the constitutional design.\"","sentence":"See 524 U.S. at 452, 118 S.Ct. 2091 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (\u201cThat a congressional cession of power is voluntary does not make it innocuous.... Abdication of responsibility is not part of the constitutional design.\u201d); cf. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 182, 112 S.Ct. 2408, 120 L.Ed.2d 120 (1992) (\u201cThe Constitution\u2019s division of power among the three branches is violated where one branch invades the territory of another, whether or not the encroached-upon branch approves the encroachment.\u201d)."},"case_id":9343758,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In some ways, the claims made by plaintiffs here parallel those made in Clinton: that the Constitution vested power in the legislative branch as a necessary check on the power of the executive branch, and that Congress is not free to upset the careful balance by giving power to the executive.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"524 U.S. 452, 452","parenthetical":"\"That a congressional cession of power is voluntary does not make it innocuous.... Abdication of responsibility is not part of the constitutional design.\"","sentence":"See 524 U.S. at 452, 118 S.Ct. 2091 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (\u201cThat a congressional cession of power is voluntary does not make it innocuous.... Abdication of responsibility is not part of the constitutional design.\u201d); cf. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 182, 112 S.Ct. 2408, 120 L.Ed.2d 120 (1992) (\u201cThe Constitution\u2019s division of power among the three branches is violated where one branch invades the territory of another, whether or not the encroached-upon branch approves the encroachment.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"The Constitution's division of power among the three branches is violated where one branch invades the territory of another, whether or not the encroached-upon branch approves the encroachment.\"","sentence":"See 524 U.S. at 452, 118 S.Ct. 2091 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (\u201cThat a congressional cession of power is voluntary does not make it innocuous.... Abdication of responsibility is not part of the constitutional design.\u201d); cf. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 182, 112 S.Ct. 2408, 120 L.Ed.2d 120 (1992) (\u201cThe Constitution\u2019s division of power among the three branches is violated where one branch invades the territory of another, whether or not the encroached-upon branch approves the encroachment.\u201d)."},"case_id":9343758,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In some ways, the claims made by plaintiffs here parallel those made in Clinton: that the Constitution vested power in the legislative branch as a necessary check on the power of the executive branch, and that Congress is not free to upset the careful balance by giving power to the executive.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"The Constitution's division of power among the three branches is violated where one branch invades the territory of another, whether or not the encroached-upon branch approves the encroachment.\"","sentence":"See 524 U.S. at 452, 118 S.Ct. 2091 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (\u201cThat a congressional cession of power is voluntary does not make it innocuous.... Abdication of responsibility is not part of the constitutional design.\u201d); cf. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 182, 112 S.Ct. 2408, 120 L.Ed.2d 120 (1992) (\u201cThe Constitution\u2019s division of power among the three branches is violated where one branch invades the territory of another, whether or not the encroached-upon branch approves the encroachment.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"524 U.S. 452, 452","parenthetical":"\"That a congressional cession of power is voluntary does not make it innocuous.... Abdication of responsibility is not part of the constitutional design.\"","sentence":"See 524 U.S. at 452, 118 S.Ct. 2091 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (\u201cThat a congressional cession of power is voluntary does not make it innocuous.... Abdication of responsibility is not part of the constitutional design.\u201d); cf. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 182, 112 S.Ct. 2408, 120 L.Ed.2d 120 (1992) (\u201cThe Constitution\u2019s division of power among the three branches is violated where one branch invades the territory of another, whether or not the encroached-upon branch approves the encroachment.\u201d)."},"case_id":9343758,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In some ways, the claims made by plaintiffs here parallel those made in Clinton: that the Constitution vested power in the legislative branch as a necessary check on the power of the executive branch, and that Congress is not free to upset the careful balance by giving power to the executive.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"That a congressional cession of power is voluntary does not make it innocuous.... Abdication of responsibility is not part of the constitutional design.\"","sentence":"See 524 U.S. at 452, 118 S.Ct. 2091 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (\u201cThat a congressional cession of power is voluntary does not make it innocuous.... Abdication of responsibility is not part of the constitutional design.\u201d); cf. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 182, 112 S.Ct. 2408, 120 L.Ed.2d 120 (1992) (\u201cThe Constitution\u2019s division of power among the three branches is violated where one branch invades the territory of another, whether or not the encroached-upon branch approves the encroachment.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"505 U.S. 144, 182","parenthetical":"\"The Constitution's division of power among the three branches is violated where one branch invades the territory of another, whether or not the encroached-upon branch approves the encroachment.\"","sentence":"See 524 U.S. at 452, 118 S.Ct. 2091 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (\u201cThat a congressional cession of power is voluntary does not make it innocuous.... Abdication of responsibility is not part of the constitutional design.\u201d); cf. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 182, 112 S.Ct. 2408, 120 L.Ed.2d 120 (1992) (\u201cThe Constitution\u2019s division of power among the three branches is violated where one branch invades the territory of another, whether or not the encroached-upon branch approves the encroachment.\u201d)."},"case_id":9343758,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In some ways, the claims made by plaintiffs here parallel those made in Clinton: that the Constitution vested power in the legislative branch as a necessary check on the power of the executive branch, and that Congress is not free to upset the careful balance by giving power to the executive.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"The Constitution's division of power among the three branches is violated where one branch invades the territory of another, whether or not the encroached-upon branch approves the encroachment.\"","sentence":"See 524 U.S. at 452, 118 S.Ct. 2091 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (\u201cThat a congressional cession of power is voluntary does not make it innocuous.... Abdication of responsibility is not part of the constitutional design.\u201d); cf. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 182, 112 S.Ct. 2408, 120 L.Ed.2d 120 (1992) (\u201cThe Constitution\u2019s division of power among the three branches is violated where one branch invades the territory of another, whether or not the encroached-upon branch approves the encroachment.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"That a congressional cession of power is voluntary does not make it innocuous.... Abdication of responsibility is not part of the constitutional design.\"","sentence":"See 524 U.S. at 452, 118 S.Ct. 2091 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (\u201cThat a congressional cession of power is voluntary does not make it innocuous.... Abdication of responsibility is not part of the constitutional design.\u201d); cf. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 182, 112 S.Ct. 2408, 120 L.Ed.2d 120 (1992) (\u201cThe Constitution\u2019s division of power among the three branches is violated where one branch invades the territory of another, whether or not the encroached-upon branch approves the encroachment.\u201d)."},"case_id":9343758,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In some ways, the claims made by plaintiffs here parallel those made in Clinton: that the Constitution vested power in the legislative branch as a necessary check on the power of the executive branch, and that Congress is not free to upset the careful balance by giving power to the executive.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"The Constitution's division of power among the three branches is violated where one branch invades the territory of another, whether or not the encroached-upon branch approves the encroachment.\"","sentence":"See 524 U.S. at 452, 118 S.Ct. 2091 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (\u201cThat a congressional cession of power is voluntary does not make it innocuous.... Abdication of responsibility is not part of the constitutional design.\u201d); cf. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 182, 112 S.Ct. 2408, 120 L.Ed.2d 120 (1992) (\u201cThe Constitution\u2019s division of power among the three branches is violated where one branch invades the territory of another, whether or not the encroached-upon branch approves the encroachment.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"That a congressional cession of power is voluntary does not make it innocuous.... Abdication of responsibility is not part of the constitutional design.\"","sentence":"See 524 U.S. at 452, 118 S.Ct. 2091 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (\u201cThat a congressional cession of power is voluntary does not make it innocuous.... Abdication of responsibility is not part of the constitutional design.\u201d); cf. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 182, 112 S.Ct. 2408, 120 L.Ed.2d 120 (1992) (\u201cThe Constitution\u2019s division of power among the three branches is violated where one branch invades the territory of another, whether or not the encroached-upon branch approves the encroachment.\u201d)."},"case_id":9343758,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The First Circuit's approach in Doe suggests that to trigger the elevated arbitrary and capricious standard, focused on reasonableness, it is sufficient to simply point out a conflict of interest that exists where the plan administrator is also the insurer that would be paying out any benefits ultimately awarded. The Doe Court was careful not to explicitly overrule Doyle, construing that case as holding that the plan administrator-insurer's interest in denying claims that would cost it money did not justify de novo review.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"144 F.3d 184, 184","parenthetical":"\"Consistent with Doyle, 144 F.3d at 184, we do not think that [the plan fiduciary's] general interest in conserving its resources is the kind of conflict that warrants de novo review\"","sentence":"(\u201cConsistent with Doyle, 144 F.3d at 184, we do not think that [the plan fiduciary\u2019s] general interest in conserving its resources is the kind of conflict that warrants de novo review\u201d) In light of Doe, this Court finds that the governing standard of review in the case at bar, where MetLife operated as both the plan administrator and the insurer that would be responsible for paying Cort\u00e9s\u2019 LTD benefits, is the elevated arbitrary and capricious standard, with an emphasis on reasonableness. See id.; see also Terry, 145 F.3d at 36 n. 6 (noting that reasonableness is the touchstone when applying deferential standard of review)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting that reasonableness is the touchstone when applying deferential standard of review","sentence":"(\u201cConsistent with Doyle, 144 F.3d at 184, we do not think that [the plan fiduciary\u2019s] general interest in conserving its resources is the kind of conflict that warrants de novo review\u201d) In light of Doe, this Court finds that the governing standard of review in the case at bar, where MetLife operated as both the plan administrator and the insurer that would be responsible for paying Cort\u00e9s\u2019 LTD benefits, is the elevated arbitrary and capricious standard, with an emphasis on reasonableness. See id.; see also Terry, 145 F.3d at 36 n. 6 (noting that reasonableness is the touchstone when applying deferential standard of review)."},"case_id":11152612,"label":"a"}
{"context":"This possibility, though not a certainty, is sufficient to meet the redressability requirement. See Motor & Equip. Mfrs.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"698 F.2d 1239, 1249","parenthetical":"\"redressability element ... does not prevent a court from hearing a case which may ultimately be unsuccessful\"","sentence":"Ass\u2019n v. Nichols, 142 F.3d 449, 457-58 (D.C.Cir.1998) (redressability satisfied because court\u2019s decision to vacate EPA rule would give petitioner opportunity for favorable outcome in new rulemaking); see also Community Nutrition Institute v. Block, 698 F.2d 1239, 1249 (D.C.Cir.1983) (\u201credressability element ... does not prevent a court from hearing a case which may ultimately be unsuccessful\u201d), rev\u2019d on other grounds, 467 U.S. 340, 104 S.Ct. 2450, 81 L.Ed.2d 270 (1984)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"142 F.3d 449, 457-58","parenthetical":"redressability satisfied because court's decision to vacate EPA rule would give petitioner opportunity for favorable outcome in new rulemaking","sentence":"Ass\u2019n v. Nichols, 142 F.3d 449, 457-58 (D.C.Cir.1998) (redressability satisfied because court\u2019s decision to vacate EPA rule would give petitioner opportunity for favorable outcome in new rulemaking); see also Community Nutrition Institute v. Block, 698 F.2d 1239, 1249 (D.C.Cir.1983) (\u201credressability element ... does not prevent a court from hearing a case which may ultimately be unsuccessful\u201d), rev\u2019d on other grounds, 467 U.S. 340, 104 S.Ct. 2450, 81 L.Ed.2d 270 (1984)."},"case_id":2338956,"label":"b"}
{"context":"This possibility, though not a certainty, is sufficient to meet the redressability requirement. See Motor & Equip. Mfrs.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"142 F.3d 449, 457-58","parenthetical":"redressability satisfied because court's decision to vacate EPA rule would give petitioner opportunity for favorable outcome in new rulemaking","sentence":"Ass\u2019n v. Nichols, 142 F.3d 449, 457-58 (D.C.Cir.1998) (redressability satisfied because court\u2019s decision to vacate EPA rule would give petitioner opportunity for favorable outcome in new rulemaking); see also Community Nutrition Institute v. Block, 698 F.2d 1239, 1249 (D.C.Cir.1983) (\u201credressability element ... does not prevent a court from hearing a case which may ultimately be unsuccessful\u201d), rev\u2019d on other grounds, 467 U.S. 340, 104 S.Ct. 2450, 81 L.Ed.2d 270 (1984)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"redressability element ... does not prevent a court from hearing a case which may ultimately be unsuccessful\"","sentence":"Ass\u2019n v. Nichols, 142 F.3d 449, 457-58 (D.C.Cir.1998) (redressability satisfied because court\u2019s decision to vacate EPA rule would give petitioner opportunity for favorable outcome in new rulemaking); see also Community Nutrition Institute v. Block, 698 F.2d 1239, 1249 (D.C.Cir.1983) (\u201credressability element ... does not prevent a court from hearing a case which may ultimately be unsuccessful\u201d), rev\u2019d on other grounds, 467 U.S. 340, 104 S.Ct. 2450, 81 L.Ed.2d 270 (1984)."},"case_id":2338956,"label":"a"}
{"context":"This possibility, though not a certainty, is sufficient to meet the redressability requirement. See Motor & Equip. Mfrs.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"142 F.3d 449, 457-58","parenthetical":"redressability satisfied because court's decision to vacate EPA rule would give petitioner opportunity for favorable outcome in new rulemaking","sentence":"Ass\u2019n v. Nichols, 142 F.3d 449, 457-58 (D.C.Cir.1998) (redressability satisfied because court\u2019s decision to vacate EPA rule would give petitioner opportunity for favorable outcome in new rulemaking); see also Community Nutrition Institute v. Block, 698 F.2d 1239, 1249 (D.C.Cir.1983) (\u201credressability element ... does not prevent a court from hearing a case which may ultimately be unsuccessful\u201d), rev\u2019d on other grounds, 467 U.S. 340, 104 S.Ct. 2450, 81 L.Ed.2d 270 (1984)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"redressability element ... does not prevent a court from hearing a case which may ultimately be unsuccessful\"","sentence":"Ass\u2019n v. Nichols, 142 F.3d 449, 457-58 (D.C.Cir.1998) (redressability satisfied because court\u2019s decision to vacate EPA rule would give petitioner opportunity for favorable outcome in new rulemaking); see also Community Nutrition Institute v. Block, 698 F.2d 1239, 1249 (D.C.Cir.1983) (\u201credressability element ... does not prevent a court from hearing a case which may ultimately be unsuccessful\u201d), rev\u2019d on other grounds, 467 U.S. 340, 104 S.Ct. 2450, 81 L.Ed.2d 270 (1984)."},"case_id":2338956,"label":"a"}
{"context":"This possibility, though not a certainty, is sufficient to meet the redressability requirement. See Motor & Equip. Mfrs.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"redressability element ... does not prevent a court from hearing a case which may ultimately be unsuccessful\"","sentence":"Ass\u2019n v. Nichols, 142 F.3d 449, 457-58 (D.C.Cir.1998) (redressability satisfied because court\u2019s decision to vacate EPA rule would give petitioner opportunity for favorable outcome in new rulemaking); see also Community Nutrition Institute v. Block, 698 F.2d 1239, 1249 (D.C.Cir.1983) (\u201credressability element ... does not prevent a court from hearing a case which may ultimately be unsuccessful\u201d), rev\u2019d on other grounds, 467 U.S. 340, 104 S.Ct. 2450, 81 L.Ed.2d 270 (1984)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"142 F.3d 449, 457-58","parenthetical":"redressability satisfied because court's decision to vacate EPA rule would give petitioner opportunity for favorable outcome in new rulemaking","sentence":"Ass\u2019n v. Nichols, 142 F.3d 449, 457-58 (D.C.Cir.1998) (redressability satisfied because court\u2019s decision to vacate EPA rule would give petitioner opportunity for favorable outcome in new rulemaking); see also Community Nutrition Institute v. Block, 698 F.2d 1239, 1249 (D.C.Cir.1983) (\u201credressability element ... does not prevent a court from hearing a case which may ultimately be unsuccessful\u201d), rev\u2019d on other grounds, 467 U.S. 340, 104 S.Ct. 2450, 81 L.Ed.2d 270 (1984)."},"case_id":2338956,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Courts have routinely affirmed agencies' strict application of internal regulatory deadlines.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"80 F.3d 368, 368","parenthetical":"finding that NTSB did not act arbitrarily and capriciously in applying its strict procedural regulation regarding filing deadlines to dismiss complainant's appeal for failing to file a timely appellate brief or request an extension of time before expiration of the filing deadline","sentence":"See, e.g., Gilbert, 80 F.3d at 368 (finding that NTSB did not act arbitrarily and capriciously in applying its strict procedural regulation regarding filing deadlines to dismiss complainant\u2019s appeal for failing to file a timely appellate brief or request an extension of time before expiration of the filing deadline); see also Tinker Air Force Base v. FLRB, 321 F.3d 1242, 1246 (10th Cir.2002) (\u201c[T]he general rule is well established that reviewing courts will not overturn an agency\u2019s strict application of its own procedural regulations so long as the rule is applied uniformly or with reasoned distinctions.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"321 F.3d 1242, 1246","parenthetical":"\"[T]he general rule is well established that reviewing courts will not overturn an agency's strict application of its own procedural regulations so long as the rule is applied uniformly or with reasoned distinctions.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Gilbert, 80 F.3d at 368 (finding that NTSB did not act arbitrarily and capriciously in applying its strict procedural regulation regarding filing deadlines to dismiss complainant\u2019s appeal for failing to file a timely appellate brief or request an extension of time before expiration of the filing deadline); see also Tinker Air Force Base v. FLRB, 321 F.3d 1242, 1246 (10th Cir.2002) (\u201c[T]he general rule is well established that reviewing courts will not overturn an agency\u2019s strict application of its own procedural regulations so long as the rule is applied uniformly or with reasoned distinctions.\u201d)."},"case_id":855930,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Indeed, the Supreme Court recently noted that an isolated incident can amount to a \"discriminatory changef] in the 'terms and conditions of employment' \" when the incident is \"extremely serious.\" Other circuits have come to a similar conclusion.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"96 F.3d 1004, 1009","parenthetical":"\"[Although this single incident was insufficient, we do not] hold that a single incident of harassment never will support an actionable claim.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1305 (2d Cir.1995) (noting that \u201ceven a single incident of sexual assault sufficiently alters the conditions of the victim\u2019s employment and clearly creates an abusive work environment for purposes of Title VII liability\u201d); Guess v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 913 F.2d 463, 464 (7th Cir.1990) (holding that a single incident where supervisor picked up plaintiff and forced her face against his crotch impliedly considered to create hostile environment); cf. DiCenso v. Cisneros, 96 F.3d 1004, 1009 (7th Cir.1996) (\u201c[Although this single incident was insufficient, we do not] hold that a single incident of harassment never will support an actionable claim.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"66 F.3d 1295, 1305","parenthetical":"noting that \"even a single incident of sexual assault sufficiently alters the conditions of the victim's employment and clearly creates an abusive work environment for purposes of Title VII liability\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1305 (2d Cir.1995) (noting that \u201ceven a single incident of sexual assault sufficiently alters the conditions of the victim\u2019s employment and clearly creates an abusive work environment for purposes of Title VII liability\u201d); Guess v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 913 F.2d 463, 464 (7th Cir.1990) (holding that a single incident where supervisor picked up plaintiff and forced her face against his crotch impliedly considered to create hostile environment); cf. DiCenso v. Cisneros, 96 F.3d 1004, 1009 (7th Cir.1996) (\u201c[Although this single incident was insufficient, we do not] hold that a single incident of harassment never will support an actionable claim.\u201d)."},"case_id":11423512,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Indeed, the Supreme Court recently noted that an isolated incident can amount to a \"discriminatory changef] in the 'terms and conditions of employment' \" when the incident is \"extremely serious.\" Other circuits have come to a similar conclusion.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"96 F.3d 1004, 1009","parenthetical":"\"[Although this single incident was insufficient, we do not] hold that a single incident of harassment never will support an actionable claim.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1305 (2d Cir.1995) (noting that \u201ceven a single incident of sexual assault sufficiently alters the conditions of the victim\u2019s employment and clearly creates an abusive work environment for purposes of Title VII liability\u201d); Guess v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 913 F.2d 463, 464 (7th Cir.1990) (holding that a single incident where supervisor picked up plaintiff and forced her face against his crotch impliedly considered to create hostile environment); cf. DiCenso v. Cisneros, 96 F.3d 1004, 1009 (7th Cir.1996) (\u201c[Although this single incident was insufficient, we do not] hold that a single incident of harassment never will support an actionable claim.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"913 F.2d 463, 464","parenthetical":"holding that a single incident where supervisor picked up plaintiff and forced her face against his crotch impliedly considered to create hostile environment","sentence":"See, e.g., Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1305 (2d Cir.1995) (noting that \u201ceven a single incident of sexual assault sufficiently alters the conditions of the victim\u2019s employment and clearly creates an abusive work environment for purposes of Title VII liability\u201d); Guess v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 913 F.2d 463, 464 (7th Cir.1990) (holding that a single incident where supervisor picked up plaintiff and forced her face against his crotch impliedly considered to create hostile environment); cf. DiCenso v. Cisneros, 96 F.3d 1004, 1009 (7th Cir.1996) (\u201c[Although this single incident was insufficient, we do not] hold that a single incident of harassment never will support an actionable claim.\u201d)."},"case_id":11423512,"label":"b"}
{"context":"When the policy means to refer to defense costs ... it expressly does so, avoiding the confusion that is [the insurer's] downfall here\"). In other words, IICNA's \"plain language\" argument fails.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding an insurance policy obligating a primary insurer to indemnify for \"damages\" which were defined to include \"costs, charges and expenses\" not to be a DWL or \"self-reducing\" policy","sentence":"See also Branning v. CNA Ins. Cos., 729 F.Supp. 728, 732-33 (W.D.Wash.1989) (finding policy ambiguous as to whether defense costs were included within liability limit, \u201cin the absence of any clear statement that defense costs are included within the cap,\u201d and commenting \u201c[i]f [the insurer] intended the \u2018limit of liability\u2019 to apply to all losses, rather than only the amounts needed to resolve claims against the insureds, it would have been a simple matter for [the insurer] to have made that clear\u201d); cf. International Ins. Co. v. Imperial Cas. & Indem. Co., 1992 WL 547721 (C.D.Cal.1992) (finding an insurance policy obligating a primary insurer to indemnify for \u201cdamages\u201d which were defined to include \u201ccosts, charges and expenses\u201d not to be a DWL or \u201cself-reducing\u201d policy)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"729 F.Supp. 728, 732-33","parenthetical":"finding policy ambiguous as to whether defense costs were included within liability limit, \"in the absence of any clear statement that defense costs are included within the cap,\" and commenting \"[i]f [the insurer] intended the 'limit of liability' to apply to all losses, rather than only the amounts needed to resolve claims against the insureds, it would have been a simple matter for [the insurer] to have made that clear\"","sentence":"See also Branning v. CNA Ins. Cos., 729 F.Supp. 728, 732-33 (W.D.Wash.1989) (finding policy ambiguous as to whether defense costs were included within liability limit, \u201cin the absence of any clear statement that defense costs are included within the cap,\u201d and commenting \u201c[i]f [the insurer] intended the \u2018limit of liability\u2019 to apply to all losses, rather than only the amounts needed to resolve claims against the insureds, it would have been a simple matter for [the insurer] to have made that clear\u201d); cf. International Ins. Co. v. Imperial Cas. & Indem. Co., 1992 WL 547721 (C.D.Cal.1992) (finding an insurance policy obligating a primary insurer to indemnify for \u201cdamages\u201d which were defined to include \u201ccosts, charges and expenses\u201d not to be a DWL or \u201cself-reducing\u201d policy)."},"case_id":9165580,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Under the Supreme Court's equal protection jurisprudence, however, wealth is generally not a suspect classification.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"396 U.S. 346, 362","parenthetical":"striking down a property ownership requirement for school board membership, because the the requirement was violative of the \"constitutional right to be considered for public service without the burden of invidiously discriminatory disqualifications\"","sentence":"But see, Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346, 362, 90 S.Ct. 532, 24 L.Ed.2d 567 (1970) (striking down a property ownership requirement for school board membership, because the the requirement was violative of the \u201cconstitutional right to be considered for public service without the burden of invidiously discriminatory disqualifications\u201d); Quinn v. Millsap, 491 U.S. 95, 109, 109 S.Ct. 2324, 105 L.Ed.2d 74 (1989) (citing Turner, at 364, 90 S.Ct. 532, and holding that the government cannot require property ownership as a prerequisite to running for and holding public office)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"432 U.S. 464, 471","parenthetical":"stating that the Court \"has never held that financial need alone identifies a suspect class for purposes of equal protection analysis.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 471, 97 S.Ct. 2376, 53 L.Ed.2d 484 (1977) (stating that the Court \u201chas never held that financial need alone identifies a suspect class for purposes of equal protection analysis.\u201d)."},"case_id":4084910,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Under the Supreme Court's equal protection jurisprudence, however, wealth is generally not a suspect classification.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"striking down a property ownership requirement for school board membership, because the the requirement was violative of the \"constitutional right to be considered for public service without the burden of invidiously discriminatory disqualifications\"","sentence":"But see, Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346, 362, 90 S.Ct. 532, 24 L.Ed.2d 567 (1970) (striking down a property ownership requirement for school board membership, because the the requirement was violative of the \u201cconstitutional right to be considered for public service without the burden of invidiously discriminatory disqualifications\u201d); Quinn v. Millsap, 491 U.S. 95, 109, 109 S.Ct. 2324, 105 L.Ed.2d 74 (1989) (citing Turner, at 364, 90 S.Ct. 532, and holding that the government cannot require property ownership as a prerequisite to running for and holding public office)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"432 U.S. 464, 471","parenthetical":"stating that the Court \"has never held that financial need alone identifies a suspect class for purposes of equal protection analysis.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 471, 97 S.Ct. 2376, 53 L.Ed.2d 484 (1977) (stating that the Court \u201chas never held that financial need alone identifies a suspect class for purposes of equal protection analysis.\u201d)."},"case_id":4084910,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Under the Supreme Court's equal protection jurisprudence, however, wealth is generally not a suspect classification.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"striking down a property ownership requirement for school board membership, because the the requirement was violative of the \"constitutional right to be considered for public service without the burden of invidiously discriminatory disqualifications\"","sentence":"But see, Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346, 362, 90 S.Ct. 532, 24 L.Ed.2d 567 (1970) (striking down a property ownership requirement for school board membership, because the the requirement was violative of the \u201cconstitutional right to be considered for public service without the burden of invidiously discriminatory disqualifications\u201d); Quinn v. Millsap, 491 U.S. 95, 109, 109 S.Ct. 2324, 105 L.Ed.2d 74 (1989) (citing Turner, at 364, 90 S.Ct. 532, and holding that the government cannot require property ownership as a prerequisite to running for and holding public office)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"432 U.S. 464, 471","parenthetical":"stating that the Court \"has never held that financial need alone identifies a suspect class for purposes of equal protection analysis.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 471, 97 S.Ct. 2376, 53 L.Ed.2d 484 (1977) (stating that the Court \u201chas never held that financial need alone identifies a suspect class for purposes of equal protection analysis.\u201d)."},"case_id":4084910,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Under the Supreme Court's equal protection jurisprudence, however, wealth is generally not a suspect classification.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"stating that the Court \"has never held that financial need alone identifies a suspect class for purposes of equal protection analysis.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 471, 97 S.Ct. 2376, 53 L.Ed.2d 484 (1977) (stating that the Court \u201chas never held that financial need alone identifies a suspect class for purposes of equal protection analysis.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"396 U.S. 346, 362","parenthetical":"striking down a property ownership requirement for school board membership, because the the requirement was violative of the \"constitutional right to be considered for public service without the burden of invidiously discriminatory disqualifications\"","sentence":"But see, Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346, 362, 90 S.Ct. 532, 24 L.Ed.2d 567 (1970) (striking down a property ownership requirement for school board membership, because the the requirement was violative of the \u201cconstitutional right to be considered for public service without the burden of invidiously discriminatory disqualifications\u201d); Quinn v. Millsap, 491 U.S. 95, 109, 109 S.Ct. 2324, 105 L.Ed.2d 74 (1989) (citing Turner, at 364, 90 S.Ct. 532, and holding that the government cannot require property ownership as a prerequisite to running for and holding public office)."},"case_id":4084910,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Under the Supreme Court's equal protection jurisprudence, however, wealth is generally not a suspect classification.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"stating that the Court \"has never held that financial need alone identifies a suspect class for purposes of equal protection analysis.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 471, 97 S.Ct. 2376, 53 L.Ed.2d 484 (1977) (stating that the Court \u201chas never held that financial need alone identifies a suspect class for purposes of equal protection analysis.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"striking down a property ownership requirement for school board membership, because the the requirement was violative of the \"constitutional right to be considered for public service without the burden of invidiously discriminatory disqualifications\"","sentence":"But see, Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346, 362, 90 S.Ct. 532, 24 L.Ed.2d 567 (1970) (striking down a property ownership requirement for school board membership, because the the requirement was violative of the \u201cconstitutional right to be considered for public service without the burden of invidiously discriminatory disqualifications\u201d); Quinn v. Millsap, 491 U.S. 95, 109, 109 S.Ct. 2324, 105 L.Ed.2d 74 (1989) (citing Turner, at 364, 90 S.Ct. 532, and holding that the government cannot require property ownership as a prerequisite to running for and holding public office)."},"case_id":4084910,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Under the Supreme Court's equal protection jurisprudence, however, wealth is generally not a suspect classification.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"striking down a property ownership requirement for school board membership, because the the requirement was violative of the \"constitutional right to be considered for public service without the burden of invidiously discriminatory disqualifications\"","sentence":"But see, Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346, 362, 90 S.Ct. 532, 24 L.Ed.2d 567 (1970) (striking down a property ownership requirement for school board membership, because the the requirement was violative of the \u201cconstitutional right to be considered for public service without the burden of invidiously discriminatory disqualifications\u201d); Quinn v. Millsap, 491 U.S. 95, 109, 109 S.Ct. 2324, 105 L.Ed.2d 74 (1989) (citing Turner, at 364, 90 S.Ct. 532, and holding that the government cannot require property ownership as a prerequisite to running for and holding public office)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"stating that the Court \"has never held that financial need alone identifies a suspect class for purposes of equal protection analysis.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 471, 97 S.Ct. 2376, 53 L.Ed.2d 484 (1977) (stating that the Court \u201chas never held that financial need alone identifies a suspect class for purposes of equal protection analysis.\u201d)."},"case_id":4084910,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Under the Supreme Court's equal protection jurisprudence, however, wealth is generally not a suspect classification.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"stating that the Court \"has never held that financial need alone identifies a suspect class for purposes of equal protection analysis.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 471, 97 S.Ct. 2376, 53 L.Ed.2d 484 (1977) (stating that the Court \u201chas never held that financial need alone identifies a suspect class for purposes of equal protection analysis.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"396 U.S. 346, 362","parenthetical":"striking down a property ownership requirement for school board membership, because the the requirement was violative of the \"constitutional right to be considered for public service without the burden of invidiously discriminatory disqualifications\"","sentence":"But see, Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346, 362, 90 S.Ct. 532, 24 L.Ed.2d 567 (1970) (striking down a property ownership requirement for school board membership, because the the requirement was violative of the \u201cconstitutional right to be considered for public service without the burden of invidiously discriminatory disqualifications\u201d); Quinn v. Millsap, 491 U.S. 95, 109, 109 S.Ct. 2324, 105 L.Ed.2d 74 (1989) (citing Turner, at 364, 90 S.Ct. 532, and holding that the government cannot require property ownership as a prerequisite to running for and holding public office)."},"case_id":4084910,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Under the Supreme Court's equal protection jurisprudence, however, wealth is generally not a suspect classification.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"stating that the Court \"has never held that financial need alone identifies a suspect class for purposes of equal protection analysis.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 471, 97 S.Ct. 2376, 53 L.Ed.2d 484 (1977) (stating that the Court \u201chas never held that financial need alone identifies a suspect class for purposes of equal protection analysis.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"striking down a property ownership requirement for school board membership, because the the requirement was violative of the \"constitutional right to be considered for public service without the burden of invidiously discriminatory disqualifications\"","sentence":"But see, Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346, 362, 90 S.Ct. 532, 24 L.Ed.2d 567 (1970) (striking down a property ownership requirement for school board membership, because the the requirement was violative of the \u201cconstitutional right to be considered for public service without the burden of invidiously discriminatory disqualifications\u201d); Quinn v. Millsap, 491 U.S. 95, 109, 109 S.Ct. 2324, 105 L.Ed.2d 74 (1989) (citing Turner, at 364, 90 S.Ct. 532, and holding that the government cannot require property ownership as a prerequisite to running for and holding public office)."},"case_id":4084910,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Under the Supreme Court's equal protection jurisprudence, however, wealth is generally not a suspect classification.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"stating that the Court \"has never held that financial need alone identifies a suspect class for purposes of equal protection analysis.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 471, 97 S.Ct. 2376, 53 L.Ed.2d 484 (1977) (stating that the Court \u201chas never held that financial need alone identifies a suspect class for purposes of equal protection analysis.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"striking down a property ownership requirement for school board membership, because the the requirement was violative of the \"constitutional right to be considered for public service without the burden of invidiously discriminatory disqualifications\"","sentence":"But see, Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346, 362, 90 S.Ct. 532, 24 L.Ed.2d 567 (1970) (striking down a property ownership requirement for school board membership, because the the requirement was violative of the \u201cconstitutional right to be considered for public service without the burden of invidiously discriminatory disqualifications\u201d); Quinn v. Millsap, 491 U.S. 95, 109, 109 S.Ct. 2324, 105 L.Ed.2d 74 (1989) (citing Turner, at 364, 90 S.Ct. 532, and holding that the government cannot require property ownership as a prerequisite to running for and holding public office)."},"case_id":4084910,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Other district courts in this Circuit have found allegations of control sufficient in similar circumstances.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"2000 WL 1708186, at *7","parenthetical":"\"As either a member of Solucorp's senior management or a director with access to information regarding Solucorp's day-to-day business, the individual defendants are alleged to have had the power and influence to cause Solu-corp to engage in the alleged fraudulent conduct.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., In re Leslie Fay, 918 F.Supp. at 763 (finding allegations of control sufficient in the case of outside directors who held 12% of stock and signed public disclosure documents that allegedly contained misrepresentations); Robbins v. Moore Medical Corp., 788 F.Supp. 179, 188 (S.D.N.Y.1992) (finding allegations of control sufficient as against defendants who were directors or officers and signed company statements that were allegedly misleading); see also In re Solucorp Indus., Ltd., No. 98 Civ. 3248, 2000 WL 1708186, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 15, 2000) (\u201cAs either a member of Solucorp\u2019s senior management or a director with access to information regarding Solucorp\u2019s day-to-day business, the individual defendants are alleged to have had the power and influence to cause Solu-corp to engage in the alleged fraudulent conduct.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"918 F.Supp. 763, 763","parenthetical":"finding allegations of control sufficient in the case of outside directors who held 12% of stock and signed public disclosure documents that allegedly contained misrepresentations","sentence":"See, e.g., In re Leslie Fay, 918 F.Supp. at 763 (finding allegations of control sufficient in the case of outside directors who held 12% of stock and signed public disclosure documents that allegedly contained misrepresentations); Robbins v. Moore Medical Corp., 788 F.Supp. 179, 188 (S.D.N.Y.1992) (finding allegations of control sufficient as against defendants who were directors or officers and signed company statements that were allegedly misleading); see also In re Solucorp Indus., Ltd., No. 98 Civ. 3248, 2000 WL 1708186, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 15, 2000) (\u201cAs either a member of Solucorp\u2019s senior management or a director with access to information regarding Solucorp\u2019s day-to-day business, the individual defendants are alleged to have had the power and influence to cause Solu-corp to engage in the alleged fraudulent conduct.\u201d)."},"case_id":1588448,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Other district courts in this Circuit have found allegations of control sufficient in similar circumstances.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"2000 WL 1708186, at *7","parenthetical":"\"As either a member of Solucorp's senior management or a director with access to information regarding Solucorp's day-to-day business, the individual defendants are alleged to have had the power and influence to cause Solu-corp to engage in the alleged fraudulent conduct.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., In re Leslie Fay, 918 F.Supp. at 763 (finding allegations of control sufficient in the case of outside directors who held 12% of stock and signed public disclosure documents that allegedly contained misrepresentations); Robbins v. Moore Medical Corp., 788 F.Supp. 179, 188 (S.D.N.Y.1992) (finding allegations of control sufficient as against defendants who were directors or officers and signed company statements that were allegedly misleading); see also In re Solucorp Indus., Ltd., No. 98 Civ. 3248, 2000 WL 1708186, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 15, 2000) (\u201cAs either a member of Solucorp\u2019s senior management or a director with access to information regarding Solucorp\u2019s day-to-day business, the individual defendants are alleged to have had the power and influence to cause Solu-corp to engage in the alleged fraudulent conduct.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"788 F.Supp. 179, 188","parenthetical":"finding allegations of control sufficient as against defendants who were directors or officers and signed company statements that were allegedly misleading","sentence":"See, e.g., In re Leslie Fay, 918 F.Supp. at 763 (finding allegations of control sufficient in the case of outside directors who held 12% of stock and signed public disclosure documents that allegedly contained misrepresentations); Robbins v. Moore Medical Corp., 788 F.Supp. 179, 188 (S.D.N.Y.1992) (finding allegations of control sufficient as against defendants who were directors or officers and signed company statements that were allegedly misleading); see also In re Solucorp Indus., Ltd., No. 98 Civ. 3248, 2000 WL 1708186, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 15, 2000) (\u201cAs either a member of Solucorp\u2019s senior management or a director with access to information regarding Solucorp\u2019s day-to-day business, the individual defendants are alleged to have had the power and influence to cause Solu-corp to engage in the alleged fraudulent conduct.\u201d)."},"case_id":1588448,"label":"b"}
{"context":"We note that we have summarily affirmed application of R.C.M. 305 to restriction tantamount to confinement without specifically finding physical restraint.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"suggesting that there may be \"cases where the conditions of restriction are exactly like confinement\" and that the requirement for a probable cause hearing under R.C.M. 305 may apply","sentence":"See also United States v. King, 58 M.J. 110, 115 n. 4 (C.A.A.F.2003). Cf. United States v. Perez, 45 M.J. at 324 (suggesting that there may be \u201ccases where the conditions of restriction are exactly like confinement\u201d and that the requirement for a probable cause hearing under R.C.M. 305 may apply)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"23 M.J. 246, 246","parenthetical":"\"it appears that the Court of Military Review correctly concluded that restriction tantamount to confinement is a form of confinement to which R.C.M. 305 ... applies.\"","sentence":"Gregory, 23 M.J. at 246 (\u201cit appears that the Court of Military Review correctly concluded that restriction tantamount to confinement is a form of confinement to which R.C.M. 305 ... applies.\u201d)."},"case_id":315167,"label":"b"}
{"context":"We note that we have summarily affirmed application of R.C.M. 305 to restriction tantamount to confinement without specifically finding physical restraint.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"45 M.J. 324, 324","parenthetical":"suggesting that there may be \"cases where the conditions of restriction are exactly like confinement\" and that the requirement for a probable cause hearing under R.C.M. 305 may apply","sentence":"See also United States v. King, 58 M.J. 110, 115 n. 4 (C.A.A.F.2003). Cf. United States v. Perez, 45 M.J. at 324 (suggesting that there may be \u201ccases where the conditions of restriction are exactly like confinement\u201d and that the requirement for a probable cause hearing under R.C.M. 305 may apply)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"23 M.J. 246, 246","parenthetical":"\"it appears that the Court of Military Review correctly concluded that restriction tantamount to confinement is a form of confinement to which R.C.M. 305 ... applies.\"","sentence":"Gregory, 23 M.J. at 246 (\u201cit appears that the Court of Military Review correctly concluded that restriction tantamount to confinement is a form of confinement to which R.C.M. 305 ... applies.\u201d)."},"case_id":315167,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Contrary to taxpayers' contention, the notice of deficiency was valid because it was sent to taxpayers' last known address.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"724 F.2d 808, 810","parenthetical":"explaining that the last known address is the one \"on [the taxpayer's] most recent return, unless the taxpayer communicates to the IRS clear and concise notice of a change of address\"","sentence":"See 26 U.S.C. \u00a7 6212(b)(1); Williams v. Comm\u2019r, 935 F.2d 1066, 1067 (9th Cir. 1991) (\u201cA notice of deficiency is valid if it is mailed to the taxpayer\u2019s last known address even if it is not received by the taxpayer.\u201d); see also United States v. Zolla, 724 F.2d 808, 810 (9th Cir. 1984) (explaining that the last known address is the one \u201con [the taxpayer\u2019s] most recent return, unless the taxpayer communicates to the IRS clear and concise notice of a change of address\u201d). We reject as without merit taxpayers\u2019 contentions that the notice of deficiency was not valid because it was not mailed to their power of attorney, and that the issuance of the deficiency notice deprived taxpayers of their day in court."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"935 F.2d 1066, 1067","parenthetical":"\"A notice of deficiency is valid if it is mailed to the taxpayer's last known address even if it is not received by the taxpayer.\"","sentence":"See 26 U.S.C. \u00a7 6212(b)(1); Williams v. Comm\u2019r, 935 F.2d 1066, 1067 (9th Cir. 1991) (\u201cA notice of deficiency is valid if it is mailed to the taxpayer\u2019s last known address even if it is not received by the taxpayer.\u201d); see also United States v. Zolla, 724 F.2d 808, 810 (9th Cir. 1984) (explaining that the last known address is the one \u201con [the taxpayer\u2019s] most recent return, unless the taxpayer communicates to the IRS clear and concise notice of a change of address\u201d). We reject as without merit taxpayers\u2019 contentions that the notice of deficiency was not valid because it was not mailed to their power of attorney, and that the issuance of the deficiency notice deprived taxpayers of their day in court."},"case_id":12399111,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Waiver has been found where juror misconduct was only alleged, as in the Koenigs' case. Waiver has also been found where there was actual misconduct.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"a defendant cannot learn of juror misconduct during the trial, gamble on a favorable verdict by remaining silent, and then complain in a post-verdict motion that the verdict was prejudicially influenced by that misconduct\"","sentence":"See, e.g., United States v. Gootee, 34 F.3d 475-479 (7th Cir.1994) (finding defendant waived claim of juror misconduct by not bringing it to the court\u2019s attention at the time he became aware of it) (citing United States v. Bolinger, 837 F.2d 436, 438-39 (11th Cir.1988) (same), cert. denied sub nom. De La Fuente v. United States, 486 U.S. 1009, 108 S.Ct. 1737, 100 L.Ed.2d 200 (1988)); United States v. Jones, 597 F.2d 485, 488 n. 3 (5th Cir.1979) (\u201ca defendant cannot learn of juror misconduct during the trial, gamble on a favorable verdict by remaining silent, and then complain in a post-verdict motion that the verdict was prejudicially influenced by that misconduct\u201d), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1043, 100 S.Ct. 729, 62 L.Ed.2d 728 (1980); see also 96 A.L.R. 530 (1935) (\u201cThe general rule is that misconduct on the part of anyone in connection with the jury after their retirement, although it be of a character which might vitiate the verdict if brought to the attention of the court by timely complaint, is not available after the return of the verdict, as a ground for a new trial or reversal, where it was known to the defendant or his counsel before the return of the verdict.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"The general rule is that misconduct on the part of anyone in connection with the jury after their retirement, although it be of a character which might vitiate the verdict if brought to the attention of the court by timely complaint, is not available after the return of the verdict, as a ground for a new trial or reversal, where it was known to the defendant or his counsel before the return of the verdict.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., United States v. Gootee, 34 F.3d 475-479 (7th Cir.1994) (finding defendant waived claim of juror misconduct by not bringing it to the court\u2019s attention at the time he became aware of it) (citing United States v. Bolinger, 837 F.2d 436, 438-39 (11th Cir.1988) (same), cert. denied sub nom. De La Fuente v. United States, 486 U.S. 1009, 108 S.Ct. 1737, 100 L.Ed.2d 200 (1988)); United States v. Jones, 597 F.2d 485, 488 n. 3 (5th Cir.1979) (\u201ca defendant cannot learn of juror misconduct during the trial, gamble on a favorable verdict by remaining silent, and then complain in a post-verdict motion that the verdict was prejudicially influenced by that misconduct\u201d), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1043, 100 S.Ct. 729, 62 L.Ed.2d 728 (1980); see also 96 A.L.R. 530 (1935) (\u201cThe general rule is that misconduct on the part of anyone in connection with the jury after their retirement, although it be of a character which might vitiate the verdict if brought to the attention of the court by timely complaint, is not available after the return of the verdict, as a ground for a new trial or reversal, where it was known to the defendant or his counsel before the return of the verdict.\u201d)."},"case_id":11586471,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Waiver has been found where juror misconduct was only alleged, as in the Koenigs' case. Waiver has also been found where there was actual misconduct.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"The general rule is that misconduct on the part of anyone in connection with the jury after their retirement, although it be of a character which might vitiate the verdict if brought to the attention of the court by timely complaint, is not available after the return of the verdict, as a ground for a new trial or reversal, where it was known to the defendant or his counsel before the return of the verdict.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., United States v. Gootee, 34 F.3d 475-479 (7th Cir.1994) (finding defendant waived claim of juror misconduct by not bringing it to the court\u2019s attention at the time he became aware of it) (citing United States v. Bolinger, 837 F.2d 436, 438-39 (11th Cir.1988) (same), cert. denied sub nom. De La Fuente v. United States, 486 U.S. 1009, 108 S.Ct. 1737, 100 L.Ed.2d 200 (1988)); United States v. Jones, 597 F.2d 485, 488 n. 3 (5th Cir.1979) (\u201ca defendant cannot learn of juror misconduct during the trial, gamble on a favorable verdict by remaining silent, and then complain in a post-verdict motion that the verdict was prejudicially influenced by that misconduct\u201d), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1043, 100 S.Ct. 729, 62 L.Ed.2d 728 (1980); see also 96 A.L.R. 530 (1935) (\u201cThe general rule is that misconduct on the part of anyone in connection with the jury after their retirement, although it be of a character which might vitiate the verdict if brought to the attention of the court by timely complaint, is not available after the return of the verdict, as a ground for a new trial or reversal, where it was known to the defendant or his counsel before the return of the verdict.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"a defendant cannot learn of juror misconduct during the trial, gamble on a favorable verdict by remaining silent, and then complain in a post-verdict motion that the verdict was prejudicially influenced by that misconduct\"","sentence":"See, e.g., United States v. Gootee, 34 F.3d 475-479 (7th Cir.1994) (finding defendant waived claim of juror misconduct by not bringing it to the court\u2019s attention at the time he became aware of it) (citing United States v. Bolinger, 837 F.2d 436, 438-39 (11th Cir.1988) (same), cert. denied sub nom. De La Fuente v. United States, 486 U.S. 1009, 108 S.Ct. 1737, 100 L.Ed.2d 200 (1988)); United States v. Jones, 597 F.2d 485, 488 n. 3 (5th Cir.1979) (\u201ca defendant cannot learn of juror misconduct during the trial, gamble on a favorable verdict by remaining silent, and then complain in a post-verdict motion that the verdict was prejudicially influenced by that misconduct\u201d), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1043, 100 S.Ct. 729, 62 L.Ed.2d 728 (1980); see also 96 A.L.R. 530 (1935) (\u201cThe general rule is that misconduct on the part of anyone in connection with the jury after their retirement, although it be of a character which might vitiate the verdict if brought to the attention of the court by timely complaint, is not available after the return of the verdict, as a ground for a new trial or reversal, where it was known to the defendant or his counsel before the return of the verdict.\u201d)."},"case_id":11586471,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Waiver has been found where juror misconduct was only alleged, as in the Koenigs' case. Waiver has also been found where there was actual misconduct.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"a defendant cannot learn of juror misconduct during the trial, gamble on a favorable verdict by remaining silent, and then complain in a post-verdict motion that the verdict was prejudicially influenced by that misconduct\"","sentence":"See, e.g., United States v. Gootee, 34 F.3d 475-479 (7th Cir.1994) (finding defendant waived claim of juror misconduct by not bringing it to the court\u2019s attention at the time he became aware of it) (citing United States v. Bolinger, 837 F.2d 436, 438-39 (11th Cir.1988) (same), cert. denied sub nom. De La Fuente v. United States, 486 U.S. 1009, 108 S.Ct. 1737, 100 L.Ed.2d 200 (1988)); United States v. Jones, 597 F.2d 485, 488 n. 3 (5th Cir.1979) (\u201ca defendant cannot learn of juror misconduct during the trial, gamble on a favorable verdict by remaining silent, and then complain in a post-verdict motion that the verdict was prejudicially influenced by that misconduct\u201d), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1043, 100 S.Ct. 729, 62 L.Ed.2d 728 (1980); see also 96 A.L.R. 530 (1935) (\u201cThe general rule is that misconduct on the part of anyone in connection with the jury after their retirement, although it be of a character which might vitiate the verdict if brought to the attention of the court by timely complaint, is not available after the return of the verdict, as a ground for a new trial or reversal, where it was known to the defendant or his counsel before the return of the verdict.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"The general rule is that misconduct on the part of anyone in connection with the jury after their retirement, although it be of a character which might vitiate the verdict if brought to the attention of the court by timely complaint, is not available after the return of the verdict, as a ground for a new trial or reversal, where it was known to the defendant or his counsel before the return of the verdict.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., United States v. Gootee, 34 F.3d 475-479 (7th Cir.1994) (finding defendant waived claim of juror misconduct by not bringing it to the court\u2019s attention at the time he became aware of it) (citing United States v. Bolinger, 837 F.2d 436, 438-39 (11th Cir.1988) (same), cert. denied sub nom. De La Fuente v. United States, 486 U.S. 1009, 108 S.Ct. 1737, 100 L.Ed.2d 200 (1988)); United States v. Jones, 597 F.2d 485, 488 n. 3 (5th Cir.1979) (\u201ca defendant cannot learn of juror misconduct during the trial, gamble on a favorable verdict by remaining silent, and then complain in a post-verdict motion that the verdict was prejudicially influenced by that misconduct\u201d), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1043, 100 S.Ct. 729, 62 L.Ed.2d 728 (1980); see also 96 A.L.R. 530 (1935) (\u201cThe general rule is that misconduct on the part of anyone in connection with the jury after their retirement, although it be of a character which might vitiate the verdict if brought to the attention of the court by timely complaint, is not available after the return of the verdict, as a ground for a new trial or reversal, where it was known to the defendant or his counsel before the return of the verdict.\u201d)."},"case_id":11586471,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Waiver has been found where juror misconduct was only alleged, as in the Koenigs' case. Waiver has also been found where there was actual misconduct.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"The general rule is that misconduct on the part of anyone in connection with the jury after their retirement, although it be of a character which might vitiate the verdict if brought to the attention of the court by timely complaint, is not available after the return of the verdict, as a ground for a new trial or reversal, where it was known to the defendant or his counsel before the return of the verdict.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., United States v. Gootee, 34 F.3d 475-479 (7th Cir.1994) (finding defendant waived claim of juror misconduct by not bringing it to the court\u2019s attention at the time he became aware of it) (citing United States v. Bolinger, 837 F.2d 436, 438-39 (11th Cir.1988) (same), cert. denied sub nom. De La Fuente v. United States, 486 U.S. 1009, 108 S.Ct. 1737, 100 L.Ed.2d 200 (1988)); United States v. Jones, 597 F.2d 485, 488 n. 3 (5th Cir.1979) (\u201ca defendant cannot learn of juror misconduct during the trial, gamble on a favorable verdict by remaining silent, and then complain in a post-verdict motion that the verdict was prejudicially influenced by that misconduct\u201d), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1043, 100 S.Ct. 729, 62 L.Ed.2d 728 (1980); see also 96 A.L.R. 530 (1935) (\u201cThe general rule is that misconduct on the part of anyone in connection with the jury after their retirement, although it be of a character which might vitiate the verdict if brought to the attention of the court by timely complaint, is not available after the return of the verdict, as a ground for a new trial or reversal, where it was known to the defendant or his counsel before the return of the verdict.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"a defendant cannot learn of juror misconduct during the trial, gamble on a favorable verdict by remaining silent, and then complain in a post-verdict motion that the verdict was prejudicially influenced by that misconduct\"","sentence":"See, e.g., United States v. Gootee, 34 F.3d 475-479 (7th Cir.1994) (finding defendant waived claim of juror misconduct by not bringing it to the court\u2019s attention at the time he became aware of it) (citing United States v. Bolinger, 837 F.2d 436, 438-39 (11th Cir.1988) (same), cert. denied sub nom. De La Fuente v. United States, 486 U.S. 1009, 108 S.Ct. 1737, 100 L.Ed.2d 200 (1988)); United States v. Jones, 597 F.2d 485, 488 n. 3 (5th Cir.1979) (\u201ca defendant cannot learn of juror misconduct during the trial, gamble on a favorable verdict by remaining silent, and then complain in a post-verdict motion that the verdict was prejudicially influenced by that misconduct\u201d), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1043, 100 S.Ct. 729, 62 L.Ed.2d 728 (1980); see also 96 A.L.R. 530 (1935) (\u201cThe general rule is that misconduct on the part of anyone in connection with the jury after their retirement, although it be of a character which might vitiate the verdict if brought to the attention of the court by timely complaint, is not available after the return of the verdict, as a ground for a new trial or reversal, where it was known to the defendant or his counsel before the return of the verdict.\u201d)."},"case_id":11586471,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Even from that time in 1994 to mid-1995, when Senior's and John IPs relationship arguably had improved, Senior expressed his dissatisfaction with John II to his attorney and also told the Age Wise worker Gordon that John II invited him to coffee only to get Senior to pay for it. Given the history of the stormy relationship between Senior and John II and the details of the argument between them on August 4 that culminated with Senior ordering John II from his house, it would be difficult to say that there was an \"unexplained\" change in Senior's attitude toward John II that can be attributed to Taylor's influence.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"124 Or App 309, 309","parenthetical":"testator's \"drastic change\" in attitude toward new beneficiary and previous beneficiary shortly before will was executed was indicative of new beneficiary's dominance over testator","sentence":"Compare Sangster, 144 Or App at 217-18 (testator who underwent an \u201cextreme change in attitude\u201d toward the grandchildren to whom she intended to leave her estate up until the last month of her life was under \u201cundue influence\u201d); cf. Knutsen, 124 Or App at 309 (testator\u2019s \u201cdrastic change\u201d in attitude toward new beneficiary and previous beneficiary shortly before will was executed was indicative of new beneficiary\u2019s dominance over testator)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"144 Or App 217, 217-18","parenthetical":"testator who underwent an \"extreme change in attitude\" toward the grandchildren to whom she intended to leave her estate up until the last month of her life was under \"undue influence\"","sentence":"Compare Sangster, 144 Or App at 217-18 (testator who underwent an \u201cextreme change in attitude\u201d toward the grandchildren to whom she intended to leave her estate up until the last month of her life was under \u201cundue influence\u201d); cf. Knutsen, 124 Or App at 309 (testator\u2019s \u201cdrastic change\u201d in attitude toward new beneficiary and previous beneficiary shortly before will was executed was indicative of new beneficiary\u2019s dominance over testator)."},"case_id":1088431,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Although this court has not previously addressed tolling requirements in relation to the IAD, we find persuasive the analysis and interpretation of the courts that held that delay occasioned by the defendant is excludable, particularly in light of recent application of speedy trial provisions to IAD cases by Pennsylvania courts.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"applying speedy trial provisions to the IAD in holding that defendant's continued presence in federal custody constitutes an inability to stand trial, thereby tolling the statute","sentence":"See e.g., Commonwealth v. Woods, 444 Pa.Super. 321, 663 A.2d 803 (Pa.Super.1995)(applying speedy trial provisions to the IAD in holding that defendant\u2019s continued presence in federal custody constitutes an inability to stand trial, thereby tolling the statute)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that the speedy trial provision is tolled when a defendant's pretrial motion is pending","sentence":"Cf. Commonwealth v. Riffert, 379 Pa.Super. 1, 549 A.2d 566 (Pa.Super.1988), alloc. denied, 522 Pa. 602, 562 A.2d 825 (Pa.1989)(holding that the speedy trial provision is tolled when a defendant\u2019s pretrial motion is pending). The Woods court determined that the IAD is consistent with the speedy trial provisions of Pa.R.Crim.P. 1100."},"case_id":765966,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Although this court has not previously addressed tolling requirements in relation to the IAD, we find persuasive the analysis and interpretation of the courts that held that delay occasioned by the defendant is excludable, particularly in light of recent application of speedy trial provisions to IAD cases by Pennsylvania courts.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"applying speedy trial provisions to the IAD in holding that defendant's continued presence in federal custody constitutes an inability to stand trial, thereby tolling the statute","sentence":"See e.g., Commonwealth v. Woods, 444 Pa.Super. 321, 663 A.2d 803 (Pa.Super.1995)(applying speedy trial provisions to the IAD in holding that defendant\u2019s continued presence in federal custody constitutes an inability to stand trial, thereby tolling the statute)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that the speedy trial provision is tolled when a defendant's pretrial motion is pending","sentence":"Cf. Commonwealth v. Riffert, 379 Pa.Super. 1, 549 A.2d 566 (Pa.Super.1988), alloc. denied, 522 Pa. 602, 562 A.2d 825 (Pa.1989)(holding that the speedy trial provision is tolled when a defendant\u2019s pretrial motion is pending). The Woods court determined that the IAD is consistent with the speedy trial provisions of Pa.R.Crim.P. 1100."},"case_id":765966,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Although this court has not previously addressed tolling requirements in relation to the IAD, we find persuasive the analysis and interpretation of the courts that held that delay occasioned by the defendant is excludable, particularly in light of recent application of speedy trial provisions to IAD cases by Pennsylvania courts.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that the speedy trial provision is tolled when a defendant's pretrial motion is pending","sentence":"Cf. Commonwealth v. Riffert, 379 Pa.Super. 1, 549 A.2d 566 (Pa.Super.1988), alloc. denied, 522 Pa. 602, 562 A.2d 825 (Pa.1989)(holding that the speedy trial provision is tolled when a defendant\u2019s pretrial motion is pending). The Woods court determined that the IAD is consistent with the speedy trial provisions of Pa.R.Crim.P. 1100."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"applying speedy trial provisions to the IAD in holding that defendant's continued presence in federal custody constitutes an inability to stand trial, thereby tolling the statute","sentence":"See e.g., Commonwealth v. Woods, 444 Pa.Super. 321, 663 A.2d 803 (Pa.Super.1995)(applying speedy trial provisions to the IAD in holding that defendant\u2019s continued presence in federal custody constitutes an inability to stand trial, thereby tolling the statute)."},"case_id":765966,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Although this court has not previously addressed tolling requirements in relation to the IAD, we find persuasive the analysis and interpretation of the courts that held that delay occasioned by the defendant is excludable, particularly in light of recent application of speedy trial provisions to IAD cases by Pennsylvania courts.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that the speedy trial provision is tolled when a defendant's pretrial motion is pending","sentence":"Cf. Commonwealth v. Riffert, 379 Pa.Super. 1, 549 A.2d 566 (Pa.Super.1988), alloc. denied, 522 Pa. 602, 562 A.2d 825 (Pa.1989)(holding that the speedy trial provision is tolled when a defendant\u2019s pretrial motion is pending). The Woods court determined that the IAD is consistent with the speedy trial provisions of Pa.R.Crim.P. 1100."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"applying speedy trial provisions to the IAD in holding that defendant's continued presence in federal custody constitutes an inability to stand trial, thereby tolling the statute","sentence":"See e.g., Commonwealth v. Woods, 444 Pa.Super. 321, 663 A.2d 803 (Pa.Super.1995)(applying speedy trial provisions to the IAD in holding that defendant\u2019s continued presence in federal custody constitutes an inability to stand trial, thereby tolling the statute)."},"case_id":765966,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Although this court has not previously addressed tolling requirements in relation to the IAD, we find persuasive the analysis and interpretation of the courts that held that delay occasioned by the defendant is excludable, particularly in light of recent application of speedy trial provisions to IAD cases by Pennsylvania courts.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"applying speedy trial provisions to the IAD in holding that defendant's continued presence in federal custody constitutes an inability to stand trial, thereby tolling the statute","sentence":"See e.g., Commonwealth v. Woods, 444 Pa.Super. 321, 663 A.2d 803 (Pa.Super.1995)(applying speedy trial provisions to the IAD in holding that defendant\u2019s continued presence in federal custody constitutes an inability to stand trial, thereby tolling the statute)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that the speedy trial provision is tolled when a defendant's pretrial motion is pending","sentence":"Cf. Commonwealth v. Riffert, 379 Pa.Super. 1, 549 A.2d 566 (Pa.Super.1988), alloc. denied, 522 Pa. 602, 562 A.2d 825 (Pa.1989)(holding that the speedy trial provision is tolled when a defendant\u2019s pretrial motion is pending). The Woods court determined that the IAD is consistent with the speedy trial provisions of Pa.R.Crim.P. 1100."},"case_id":765966,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Although this court has not previously addressed tolling requirements in relation to the IAD, we find persuasive the analysis and interpretation of the courts that held that delay occasioned by the defendant is excludable, particularly in light of recent application of speedy trial provisions to IAD cases by Pennsylvania courts.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that the speedy trial provision is tolled when a defendant's pretrial motion is pending","sentence":"Cf. Commonwealth v. Riffert, 379 Pa.Super. 1, 549 A.2d 566 (Pa.Super.1988), alloc. denied, 522 Pa. 602, 562 A.2d 825 (Pa.1989)(holding that the speedy trial provision is tolled when a defendant\u2019s pretrial motion is pending). The Woods court determined that the IAD is consistent with the speedy trial provisions of Pa.R.Crim.P. 1100."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"applying speedy trial provisions to the IAD in holding that defendant's continued presence in federal custody constitutes an inability to stand trial, thereby tolling the statute","sentence":"See e.g., Commonwealth v. Woods, 444 Pa.Super. 321, 663 A.2d 803 (Pa.Super.1995)(applying speedy trial provisions to the IAD in holding that defendant\u2019s continued presence in federal custody constitutes an inability to stand trial, thereby tolling the statute)."},"case_id":765966,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Although this court has not previously addressed tolling requirements in relation to the IAD, we find persuasive the analysis and interpretation of the courts that held that delay occasioned by the defendant is excludable, particularly in light of recent application of speedy trial provisions to IAD cases by Pennsylvania courts.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"applying speedy trial provisions to the IAD in holding that defendant's continued presence in federal custody constitutes an inability to stand trial, thereby tolling the statute","sentence":"See e.g., Commonwealth v. Woods, 444 Pa.Super. 321, 663 A.2d 803 (Pa.Super.1995)(applying speedy trial provisions to the IAD in holding that defendant\u2019s continued presence in federal custody constitutes an inability to stand trial, thereby tolling the statute)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that the speedy trial provision is tolled when a defendant's pretrial motion is pending","sentence":"Cf. Commonwealth v. Riffert, 379 Pa.Super. 1, 549 A.2d 566 (Pa.Super.1988), alloc. denied, 522 Pa. 602, 562 A.2d 825 (Pa.1989)(holding that the speedy trial provision is tolled when a defendant\u2019s pretrial motion is pending). The Woods court determined that the IAD is consistent with the speedy trial provisions of Pa.R.Crim.P. 1100."},"case_id":765966,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Although this court has not previously addressed tolling requirements in relation to the IAD, we find persuasive the analysis and interpretation of the courts that held that delay occasioned by the defendant is excludable, particularly in light of recent application of speedy trial provisions to IAD cases by Pennsylvania courts.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"applying speedy trial provisions to the IAD in holding that defendant's continued presence in federal custody constitutes an inability to stand trial, thereby tolling the statute","sentence":"See e.g., Commonwealth v. Woods, 444 Pa.Super. 321, 663 A.2d 803 (Pa.Super.1995)(applying speedy trial provisions to the IAD in holding that defendant\u2019s continued presence in federal custody constitutes an inability to stand trial, thereby tolling the statute)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that the speedy trial provision is tolled when a defendant's pretrial motion is pending","sentence":"Cf. Commonwealth v. Riffert, 379 Pa.Super. 1, 549 A.2d 566 (Pa.Super.1988), alloc. denied, 522 Pa. 602, 562 A.2d 825 (Pa.1989)(holding that the speedy trial provision is tolled when a defendant\u2019s pretrial motion is pending). The Woods court determined that the IAD is consistent with the speedy trial provisions of Pa.R.Crim.P. 1100."},"case_id":765966,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The more difficult inquiry involves the second factor. Aronov instructs that \"there must be judicial approval of the relief vis-a-vis the merits of the case.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"291 F.3d 857, 859","parenthetical":"\"individual may be entitled to attorney's fees\" without obtaining final judgment after a trial on the merits \"but he must obtain relief based 1 \"on the merits of at least some of his claims,\" ' \"","sentence":"Aronov v. Napolitano, 562 F.3d at 90. Similar merits based language, see Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 760, 107 S.Ct. 2672, 96 L.Ed.2d 654 (1987) (\u201crespect for ordinary language requires that a plaintiff receive at least some relief on the merits of his claim before he can be said to prevail\u201d); accord Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 603-604, 121 S.Ct. 1835 (quoting Hewitt); Richardson v. Miller, 279 F.3d at 3 (quoting Hewitt ); see Race v. Toledo-Davila, 291 F.3d 857, 859 (1st Cir.2002) (\u201cindividual may be entitled to attorney\u2019s fees\u201d without obtaining final judgment after a trial on the merits \u201cbut he must obtain relief based 1 \u201con the merits of at least some of his claims,\u201d \u2019 \u201d), favors defendant\u2019s position that there was no judicial imprimatur on the change in the parties\u2019 legal relationship."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"562 F.3d 90, 90","parenthetical":"\"respect for ordinary language requires that a plaintiff receive at least some relief on the merits of his claim before he can be said to prevail\"","sentence":"Aronov v. Napolitano, 562 F.3d at 90. Similar merits based language, see Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 760, 107 S.Ct. 2672, 96 L.Ed.2d 654 (1987) (\u201crespect for ordinary language requires that a plaintiff receive at least some relief on the merits of his claim before he can be said to prevail\u201d); accord Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 603-604, 121 S.Ct. 1835 (quoting Hewitt); Richardson v. Miller, 279 F.3d at 3 (quoting Hewitt ); see Race v. Toledo-Davila, 291 F.3d 857, 859 (1st Cir.2002) (\u201cindividual may be entitled to attorney\u2019s fees\u201d without obtaining final judgment after a trial on the merits \u201cbut he must obtain relief based 1 \u201con the merits of at least some of his claims,\u201d \u2019 \u201d), favors defendant\u2019s position that there was no judicial imprimatur on the change in the parties\u2019 legal relationship."},"case_id":3783614,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The more difficult inquiry involves the second factor. Aronov instructs that \"there must be judicial approval of the relief vis-a-vis the merits of the case.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"482 U.S. 755, 760","parenthetical":"\"respect for ordinary language requires that a plaintiff receive at least some relief on the merits of his claim before he can be said to prevail\"","sentence":"Aronov v. Napolitano, 562 F.3d at 90. Similar merits based language, see Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 760, 107 S.Ct. 2672, 96 L.Ed.2d 654 (1987) (\u201crespect for ordinary language requires that a plaintiff receive at least some relief on the merits of his claim before he can be said to prevail\u201d); accord Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 603-604, 121 S.Ct. 1835 (quoting Hewitt); Richardson v. Miller, 279 F.3d at 3 (quoting Hewitt ); see Race v. Toledo-Davila, 291 F.3d 857, 859 (1st Cir.2002) (\u201cindividual may be entitled to attorney\u2019s fees\u201d without obtaining final judgment after a trial on the merits \u201cbut he must obtain relief based 1 \u201con the merits of at least some of his claims,\u201d \u2019 \u201d), favors defendant\u2019s position that there was no judicial imprimatur on the change in the parties\u2019 legal relationship."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"291 F.3d 857, 859","parenthetical":"\"individual may be entitled to attorney's fees\" without obtaining final judgment after a trial on the merits \"but he must obtain relief based 1 \"on the merits of at least some of his claims,\" ' \"","sentence":"Aronov v. Napolitano, 562 F.3d at 90. Similar merits based language, see Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 760, 107 S.Ct. 2672, 96 L.Ed.2d 654 (1987) (\u201crespect for ordinary language requires that a plaintiff receive at least some relief on the merits of his claim before he can be said to prevail\u201d); accord Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 603-604, 121 S.Ct. 1835 (quoting Hewitt); Richardson v. Miller, 279 F.3d at 3 (quoting Hewitt ); see Race v. Toledo-Davila, 291 F.3d 857, 859 (1st Cir.2002) (\u201cindividual may be entitled to attorney\u2019s fees\u201d without obtaining final judgment after a trial on the merits \u201cbut he must obtain relief based 1 \u201con the merits of at least some of his claims,\u201d \u2019 \u201d), favors defendant\u2019s position that there was no judicial imprimatur on the change in the parties\u2019 legal relationship."},"case_id":3783614,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The more difficult inquiry involves the second factor. Aronov instructs that \"there must be judicial approval of the relief vis-a-vis the merits of the case.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"291 F.3d 857, 859","parenthetical":"\"individual may be entitled to attorney's fees\" without obtaining final judgment after a trial on the merits \"but he must obtain relief based 1 \"on the merits of at least some of his claims,\" ' \"","sentence":"Aronov v. Napolitano, 562 F.3d at 90. Similar merits based language, see Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 760, 107 S.Ct. 2672, 96 L.Ed.2d 654 (1987) (\u201crespect for ordinary language requires that a plaintiff receive at least some relief on the merits of his claim before he can be said to prevail\u201d); accord Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 603-604, 121 S.Ct. 1835 (quoting Hewitt); Richardson v. Miller, 279 F.3d at 3 (quoting Hewitt ); see Race v. Toledo-Davila, 291 F.3d 857, 859 (1st Cir.2002) (\u201cindividual may be entitled to attorney\u2019s fees\u201d without obtaining final judgment after a trial on the merits \u201cbut he must obtain relief based 1 \u201con the merits of at least some of his claims,\u201d \u2019 \u201d), favors defendant\u2019s position that there was no judicial imprimatur on the change in the parties\u2019 legal relationship."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"respect for ordinary language requires that a plaintiff receive at least some relief on the merits of his claim before he can be said to prevail\"","sentence":"Aronov v. Napolitano, 562 F.3d at 90. Similar merits based language, see Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 760, 107 S.Ct. 2672, 96 L.Ed.2d 654 (1987) (\u201crespect for ordinary language requires that a plaintiff receive at least some relief on the merits of his claim before he can be said to prevail\u201d); accord Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 603-604, 121 S.Ct. 1835 (quoting Hewitt); Richardson v. Miller, 279 F.3d at 3 (quoting Hewitt ); see Race v. Toledo-Davila, 291 F.3d 857, 859 (1st Cir.2002) (\u201cindividual may be entitled to attorney\u2019s fees\u201d without obtaining final judgment after a trial on the merits \u201cbut he must obtain relief based 1 \u201con the merits of at least some of his claims,\u201d \u2019 \u201d), favors defendant\u2019s position that there was no judicial imprimatur on the change in the parties\u2019 legal relationship."},"case_id":3783614,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The more difficult inquiry involves the second factor. Aronov instructs that \"there must be judicial approval of the relief vis-a-vis the merits of the case.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"respect for ordinary language requires that a plaintiff receive at least some relief on the merits of his claim before he can be said to prevail\"","sentence":"Aronov v. Napolitano, 562 F.3d at 90. Similar merits based language, see Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 760, 107 S.Ct. 2672, 96 L.Ed.2d 654 (1987) (\u201crespect for ordinary language requires that a plaintiff receive at least some relief on the merits of his claim before he can be said to prevail\u201d); accord Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 603-604, 121 S.Ct. 1835 (quoting Hewitt); Richardson v. Miller, 279 F.3d at 3 (quoting Hewitt ); see Race v. Toledo-Davila, 291 F.3d 857, 859 (1st Cir.2002) (\u201cindividual may be entitled to attorney\u2019s fees\u201d without obtaining final judgment after a trial on the merits \u201cbut he must obtain relief based 1 \u201con the merits of at least some of his claims,\u201d \u2019 \u201d), favors defendant\u2019s position that there was no judicial imprimatur on the change in the parties\u2019 legal relationship."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"291 F.3d 857, 859","parenthetical":"\"individual may be entitled to attorney's fees\" without obtaining final judgment after a trial on the merits \"but he must obtain relief based 1 \"on the merits of at least some of his claims,\" ' \"","sentence":"Aronov v. Napolitano, 562 F.3d at 90. Similar merits based language, see Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 760, 107 S.Ct. 2672, 96 L.Ed.2d 654 (1987) (\u201crespect for ordinary language requires that a plaintiff receive at least some relief on the merits of his claim before he can be said to prevail\u201d); accord Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 603-604, 121 S.Ct. 1835 (quoting Hewitt); Richardson v. Miller, 279 F.3d at 3 (quoting Hewitt ); see Race v. Toledo-Davila, 291 F.3d 857, 859 (1st Cir.2002) (\u201cindividual may be entitled to attorney\u2019s fees\u201d without obtaining final judgment after a trial on the merits \u201cbut he must obtain relief based 1 \u201con the merits of at least some of his claims,\u201d \u2019 \u201d), favors defendant\u2019s position that there was no judicial imprimatur on the change in the parties\u2019 legal relationship."},"case_id":3783614,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Thus, there was no possibility that the jury's SS 924(c) verdict rested only on a Hobbs Act robbery predicate because (1) the robbery was an act inextricably intertwined with and, indeed, in furtherance of the charged narcotics conspiracy, and (2) the jury found that narcotics conspiracy proved beyond a reasonable doubt. In these circumstances, where a challenged SS 924 verdict undoubtedly rests on a valid drug-trafficking predicate, no Yates concern arises from a possible defect in a related \"crime of violence\" predicate.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"168 F.3d 49, 55-56","parenthetical":"rejecting Yates challenge where time-barred money-laundering predicate implicitly required finding of valid wire-fraud predicate","sentence":"See United States v. Zvi, 168 F.3d 49, 55-56 (2d Cir. 1999) (rejecting Yates challenge where time-barred money-laundering predicate implicitly required finding of valid wire-fraud predicate); see also United States v. Coppola, 671 F.3d 220, 237-38 (2d Cir. 2012) (holding any Yates error harmless where predicates rested on same ex-tortive acts of which jury found defendants guilty). '"},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"671 F.3d 220, 237-38","parenthetical":"holding any Yates error harmless where predicates rested on same ex-tortive acts of which jury found defendants guilty","sentence":"See United States v. Zvi, 168 F.3d 49, 55-56 (2d Cir. 1999) (rejecting Yates challenge where time-barred money-laundering predicate implicitly required finding of valid wire-fraud predicate); see also United States v. Coppola, 671 F.3d 220, 237-38 (2d Cir. 2012) (holding any Yates error harmless where predicates rested on same ex-tortive acts of which jury found defendants guilty). '"},"case_id":12389130,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The district court properly dismissed Smith's First Amendment free association claims because the prison's classification of Smith reasonably related to legitimate pe-nological interests and Smith's complaint indicates that he has associated with the gang in the past.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"351 F.3d 1283, 1289","parenthetical":"\"It is clear ... that prisons have a legitimate penological interest in stopping prison gang activity.\"","sentence":"See Stefanow v. McFadden, 103 F.3d 1466, 1472 (9th Cir.1996) (prison actions affecting First Amendment rights are permissible when reasonably related to legitimate interest of prison security); see also Bruce v. Ylst, 351 F.3d 1283, 1289 (9th Cir.2003) (\u201cIt is clear ... that prisons have a legitimate penological interest in stopping prison gang activity.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"103 F.3d 1466, 1472","parenthetical":"prison actions affecting First Amendment rights are permissible when reasonably related to legitimate interest of prison security","sentence":"See Stefanow v. McFadden, 103 F.3d 1466, 1472 (9th Cir.1996) (prison actions affecting First Amendment rights are permissible when reasonably related to legitimate interest of prison security); see also Bruce v. Ylst, 351 F.3d 1283, 1289 (9th Cir.2003) (\u201cIt is clear ... that prisons have a legitimate penological interest in stopping prison gang activity.\u201d)."},"case_id":5749052,"label":"b"}
{"context":". A number of district courts have addressed the issue as well and concur with the Second and Fifth Circuit's holdings.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that general maritime and unseaworthiness claims brought in state court are removable to federal court only if they constitute \"separate and independent\" claims or causes of action in relation to the non-removable Jones Act claim","sentence":"See In re Waterman Steamship Corp., 1992 WL 124819 (E.D.La.)(holding that although claims asserted under the general maritime law of unseaworthiness are removable when diversity exists, they cannot be removed when combined with a claim under the Jones Act); See also Lonthier v. Northwest Ins. Co., 599 F.Supp. 963 (W.D.La.1985)(holding that general maritime and unseaworthiness claims brought in state court are removable to federal court only if they constitute \"separate and independent\u201d claims or causes of action in relation to the non-removable Jones Act claim); See also Iwag v. Geisel Compania Maritima, 882 F.Supp. 597, 605 (S.D.Tx.1995)(holding that joinder of a non-removable Jones Act claim, with a removable claim under general maritime law that is not separate and independent, is not grounds for removal)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that although claims asserted under the general maritime law of unseaworthiness are removable when diversity exists, they cannot be removed when combined with a claim under the Jones Act","sentence":"See In re Waterman Steamship Corp., 1992 WL 124819 (E.D.La.)(holding that although claims asserted under the general maritime law of unseaworthiness are removable when diversity exists, they cannot be removed when combined with a claim under the Jones Act); See also Lonthier v. Northwest Ins. Co., 599 F.Supp. 963 (W.D.La.1985)(holding that general maritime and unseaworthiness claims brought in state court are removable to federal court only if they constitute \"separate and independent\u201d claims or causes of action in relation to the non-removable Jones Act claim); See also Iwag v. Geisel Compania Maritima, 882 F.Supp. 597, 605 (S.D.Tx.1995)(holding that joinder of a non-removable Jones Act claim, with a removable claim under general maritime law that is not separate and independent, is not grounds for removal)."},"case_id":9070852,"label":"b"}
{"context":". A number of district courts have addressed the issue as well and concur with the Second and Fifth Circuit's holdings.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that although claims asserted under the general maritime law of unseaworthiness are removable when diversity exists, they cannot be removed when combined with a claim under the Jones Act","sentence":"See In re Waterman Steamship Corp., 1992 WL 124819 (E.D.La.)(holding that although claims asserted under the general maritime law of unseaworthiness are removable when diversity exists, they cannot be removed when combined with a claim under the Jones Act); See also Lonthier v. Northwest Ins. Co., 599 F.Supp. 963 (W.D.La.1985)(holding that general maritime and unseaworthiness claims brought in state court are removable to federal court only if they constitute \"separate and independent\u201d claims or causes of action in relation to the non-removable Jones Act claim); See also Iwag v. Geisel Compania Maritima, 882 F.Supp. 597, 605 (S.D.Tx.1995)(holding that joinder of a non-removable Jones Act claim, with a removable claim under general maritime law that is not separate and independent, is not grounds for removal)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"882 F.Supp. 597, 605","parenthetical":"holding that joinder of a non-removable Jones Act claim, with a removable claim under general maritime law that is not separate and independent, is not grounds for removal","sentence":"See In re Waterman Steamship Corp., 1992 WL 124819 (E.D.La.)(holding that although claims asserted under the general maritime law of unseaworthiness are removable when diversity exists, they cannot be removed when combined with a claim under the Jones Act); See also Lonthier v. Northwest Ins. Co., 599 F.Supp. 963 (W.D.La.1985)(holding that general maritime and unseaworthiness claims brought in state court are removable to federal court only if they constitute \"separate and independent\u201d claims or causes of action in relation to the non-removable Jones Act claim); See also Iwag v. Geisel Compania Maritima, 882 F.Supp. 597, 605 (S.D.Tx.1995)(holding that joinder of a non-removable Jones Act claim, with a removable claim under general maritime law that is not separate and independent, is not grounds for removal)."},"case_id":9070852,"label":"a"}
{"context":"However, at least one other Circuit has concluded that erroneous admission of evidence in violation of Rule 701(c) is, like other erroneous evidentiary rulings, reviewed under the \"harmless error\" standard. Moreover, we have consistently held that erroneous evidentia-ry rulings, including rulings regarding expert testimony, are reviewed under the \"harmless error\" standard.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"40 F.3d 32, 35","parenthetical":"district court's erroneous conclusion that a witness was not qualified as an expert reviewed under the \"harmless error\" standard","sentence":"See Parker v. Reda, 327 F.3d 211, 213 (2d Cir.2003) (\u201cThis Court will order a new trial only if the introduction of inadmissible evidence was a clear abuse of discretion and was so clearly prejudicial to the outcome of the trial that we are convinced that the jury has reached a seriously erroneous result or that the verdict is a miscarriage of justice.\u201d (quotations omitted)); Hygh v. Jacobs, 961 F.2d 359, 364-65 (2d Cir.1992) (erroneous admission of expert testimony reviewed under the \u201charmless error\u201d standard); cf. United States v. Diallo, 40 F.3d 32, 35 (2d Cir.1994) (district court\u2019s erroneous conclusion that a witness was not qualified as an expert reviewed under the \u201charmless error\u201d standard)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"961 F.2d 359, 364-65","parenthetical":"erroneous admission of expert testimony reviewed under the \"harmless error\" standard","sentence":"See Parker v. Reda, 327 F.3d 211, 213 (2d Cir.2003) (\u201cThis Court will order a new trial only if the introduction of inadmissible evidence was a clear abuse of discretion and was so clearly prejudicial to the outcome of the trial that we are convinced that the jury has reached a seriously erroneous result or that the verdict is a miscarriage of justice.\u201d (quotations omitted)); Hygh v. Jacobs, 961 F.2d 359, 364-65 (2d Cir.1992) (erroneous admission of expert testimony reviewed under the \u201charmless error\u201d standard); cf. United States v. Diallo, 40 F.3d 32, 35 (2d Cir.1994) (district court\u2019s erroneous conclusion that a witness was not qualified as an expert reviewed under the \u201charmless error\u201d standard)."},"case_id":9283109,"label":"b"}
{"context":"What this case comes down to, then, is whether the IJ made an explicit adverse credibility finding before denying Ikama-Obambi's application due to lack of corroborating evidence. Ikama-Obambi argues that the IJ failed to do so. To make such a credibility determination, an IJ must provide more than \"a passing reference implying doubt.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"439 F.3d 764, 766","parenthetical":"holding that an IJ failed to make explicit credibility flnd- ing when he described applicant's testimony as \"general\" and \"meager,\" making his demand for corroborating evidence improper","sentence":"Diallo v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 764, 766 (7th Cir.2006) (citations and quotations omitted) (holding that an IJ failed to make explicit credibility flnd- ing when he described applicant\u2019s testimony as \u201cgeneral\u201d and \u201cmeager,\u201d making his demand for corroborating evidence improper); see also Nakibuka v. Gonzales, 421 F.3d 473, 478-79 (7th Cir.2005) (holding that an IJ failed to make explicit credibility finding when he remarked that applicant\u2019s testimony was \u201cvague and confusing\u201d as well as \u201cexaggerated\u201d); Soumahoro v. Gonzales, 415 F.3d 732, 736 (7th Cir.2005) (holding that an IJ failed to make explicit credibility finding when he made passing remark that he \u201cdisbelieved\u201d applicant\u2019s testimony); but see Hussain v. Gonzales, 424 F.3d 622, 628-630 (7th Cir.2005) (holding that an IJ made an explicit credibility when the IJ found testimony not credible based on several enumerated inconsistencies)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"421 F.3d 473, 478-79","parenthetical":"holding that an IJ failed to make explicit credibility finding when he remarked that applicant's testimony was \"vague and confusing\" as well as \"exaggerated\"","sentence":"Diallo v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 764, 766 (7th Cir.2006) (citations and quotations omitted) (holding that an IJ failed to make explicit credibility flnd- ing when he described applicant\u2019s testimony as \u201cgeneral\u201d and \u201cmeager,\u201d making his demand for corroborating evidence improper); see also Nakibuka v. Gonzales, 421 F.3d 473, 478-79 (7th Cir.2005) (holding that an IJ failed to make explicit credibility finding when he remarked that applicant\u2019s testimony was \u201cvague and confusing\u201d as well as \u201cexaggerated\u201d); Soumahoro v. Gonzales, 415 F.3d 732, 736 (7th Cir.2005) (holding that an IJ failed to make explicit credibility finding when he made passing remark that he \u201cdisbelieved\u201d applicant\u2019s testimony); but see Hussain v. Gonzales, 424 F.3d 622, 628-630 (7th Cir.2005) (holding that an IJ made an explicit credibility when the IJ found testimony not credible based on several enumerated inconsistencies)."},"case_id":5663707,"label":"a"}
{"context":"What this case comes down to, then, is whether the IJ made an explicit adverse credibility finding before denying Ikama-Obambi's application due to lack of corroborating evidence. Ikama-Obambi argues that the IJ failed to do so. To make such a credibility determination, an IJ must provide more than \"a passing reference implying doubt.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"439 F.3d 764, 766","parenthetical":"holding that an IJ failed to make explicit credibility flnd- ing when he described applicant's testimony as \"general\" and \"meager,\" making his demand for corroborating evidence improper","sentence":"Diallo v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 764, 766 (7th Cir.2006) (citations and quotations omitted) (holding that an IJ failed to make explicit credibility flnd- ing when he described applicant\u2019s testimony as \u201cgeneral\u201d and \u201cmeager,\u201d making his demand for corroborating evidence improper); see also Nakibuka v. Gonzales, 421 F.3d 473, 478-79 (7th Cir.2005) (holding that an IJ failed to make explicit credibility finding when he remarked that applicant\u2019s testimony was \u201cvague and confusing\u201d as well as \u201cexaggerated\u201d); Soumahoro v. Gonzales, 415 F.3d 732, 736 (7th Cir.2005) (holding that an IJ failed to make explicit credibility finding when he made passing remark that he \u201cdisbelieved\u201d applicant\u2019s testimony); but see Hussain v. Gonzales, 424 F.3d 622, 628-630 (7th Cir.2005) (holding that an IJ made an explicit credibility when the IJ found testimony not credible based on several enumerated inconsistencies)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"415 F.3d 732, 736","parenthetical":"holding that an IJ failed to make explicit credibility finding when he made passing remark that he \"disbelieved\" applicant's testimony","sentence":"Diallo v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 764, 766 (7th Cir.2006) (citations and quotations omitted) (holding that an IJ failed to make explicit credibility flnd- ing when he described applicant\u2019s testimony as \u201cgeneral\u201d and \u201cmeager,\u201d making his demand for corroborating evidence improper); see also Nakibuka v. Gonzales, 421 F.3d 473, 478-79 (7th Cir.2005) (holding that an IJ failed to make explicit credibility finding when he remarked that applicant\u2019s testimony was \u201cvague and confusing\u201d as well as \u201cexaggerated\u201d); Soumahoro v. Gonzales, 415 F.3d 732, 736 (7th Cir.2005) (holding that an IJ failed to make explicit credibility finding when he made passing remark that he \u201cdisbelieved\u201d applicant\u2019s testimony); but see Hussain v. Gonzales, 424 F.3d 622, 628-630 (7th Cir.2005) (holding that an IJ made an explicit credibility when the IJ found testimony not credible based on several enumerated inconsistencies)."},"case_id":5663707,"label":"a"}
{"context":"What this case comes down to, then, is whether the IJ made an explicit adverse credibility finding before denying Ikama-Obambi's application due to lack of corroborating evidence. Ikama-Obambi argues that the IJ failed to do so. To make such a credibility determination, an IJ must provide more than \"a passing reference implying doubt.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"424 F.3d 622, 628-630","parenthetical":"holding that an IJ made an explicit credibility when the IJ found testimony not credible based on several enumerated inconsistencies","sentence":"Diallo v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 764, 766 (7th Cir.2006) (citations and quotations omitted) (holding that an IJ failed to make explicit credibility flnd- ing when he described applicant\u2019s testimony as \u201cgeneral\u201d and \u201cmeager,\u201d making his demand for corroborating evidence improper); see also Nakibuka v. Gonzales, 421 F.3d 473, 478-79 (7th Cir.2005) (holding that an IJ failed to make explicit credibility finding when he remarked that applicant\u2019s testimony was \u201cvague and confusing\u201d as well as \u201cexaggerated\u201d); Soumahoro v. Gonzales, 415 F.3d 732, 736 (7th Cir.2005) (holding that an IJ failed to make explicit credibility finding when he made passing remark that he \u201cdisbelieved\u201d applicant\u2019s testimony); but see Hussain v. Gonzales, 424 F.3d 622, 628-630 (7th Cir.2005) (holding that an IJ made an explicit credibility when the IJ found testimony not credible based on several enumerated inconsistencies)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"439 F.3d 764, 766","parenthetical":"holding that an IJ failed to make explicit credibility flnd- ing when he described applicant's testimony as \"general\" and \"meager,\" making his demand for corroborating evidence improper","sentence":"Diallo v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 764, 766 (7th Cir.2006) (citations and quotations omitted) (holding that an IJ failed to make explicit credibility flnd- ing when he described applicant\u2019s testimony as \u201cgeneral\u201d and \u201cmeager,\u201d making his demand for corroborating evidence improper); see also Nakibuka v. Gonzales, 421 F.3d 473, 478-79 (7th Cir.2005) (holding that an IJ failed to make explicit credibility finding when he remarked that applicant\u2019s testimony was \u201cvague and confusing\u201d as well as \u201cexaggerated\u201d); Soumahoro v. Gonzales, 415 F.3d 732, 736 (7th Cir.2005) (holding that an IJ failed to make explicit credibility finding when he made passing remark that he \u201cdisbelieved\u201d applicant\u2019s testimony); but see Hussain v. Gonzales, 424 F.3d 622, 628-630 (7th Cir.2005) (holding that an IJ made an explicit credibility when the IJ found testimony not credible based on several enumerated inconsistencies)."},"case_id":5663707,"label":"b"}
{"context":"What this case comes down to, then, is whether the IJ made an explicit adverse credibility finding before denying Ikama-Obambi's application due to lack of corroborating evidence. Ikama-Obambi argues that the IJ failed to do so. To make such a credibility determination, an IJ must provide more than \"a passing reference implying doubt.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"421 F.3d 473, 478-79","parenthetical":"holding that an IJ failed to make explicit credibility finding when he remarked that applicant's testimony was \"vague and confusing\" as well as \"exaggerated\"","sentence":"Diallo v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 764, 766 (7th Cir.2006) (citations and quotations omitted) (holding that an IJ failed to make explicit credibility flnd- ing when he described applicant\u2019s testimony as \u201cgeneral\u201d and \u201cmeager,\u201d making his demand for corroborating evidence improper); see also Nakibuka v. Gonzales, 421 F.3d 473, 478-79 (7th Cir.2005) (holding that an IJ failed to make explicit credibility finding when he remarked that applicant\u2019s testimony was \u201cvague and confusing\u201d as well as \u201cexaggerated\u201d); Soumahoro v. Gonzales, 415 F.3d 732, 736 (7th Cir.2005) (holding that an IJ failed to make explicit credibility finding when he made passing remark that he \u201cdisbelieved\u201d applicant\u2019s testimony); but see Hussain v. Gonzales, 424 F.3d 622, 628-630 (7th Cir.2005) (holding that an IJ made an explicit credibility when the IJ found testimony not credible based on several enumerated inconsistencies)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"424 F.3d 622, 628-630","parenthetical":"holding that an IJ made an explicit credibility when the IJ found testimony not credible based on several enumerated inconsistencies","sentence":"Diallo v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 764, 766 (7th Cir.2006) (citations and quotations omitted) (holding that an IJ failed to make explicit credibility flnd- ing when he described applicant\u2019s testimony as \u201cgeneral\u201d and \u201cmeager,\u201d making his demand for corroborating evidence improper); see also Nakibuka v. Gonzales, 421 F.3d 473, 478-79 (7th Cir.2005) (holding that an IJ failed to make explicit credibility finding when he remarked that applicant\u2019s testimony was \u201cvague and confusing\u201d as well as \u201cexaggerated\u201d); Soumahoro v. Gonzales, 415 F.3d 732, 736 (7th Cir.2005) (holding that an IJ failed to make explicit credibility finding when he made passing remark that he \u201cdisbelieved\u201d applicant\u2019s testimony); but see Hussain v. Gonzales, 424 F.3d 622, 628-630 (7th Cir.2005) (holding that an IJ made an explicit credibility when the IJ found testimony not credible based on several enumerated inconsistencies)."},"case_id":5663707,"label":"a"}
{"context":"What this case comes down to, then, is whether the IJ made an explicit adverse credibility finding before denying Ikama-Obambi's application due to lack of corroborating evidence. Ikama-Obambi argues that the IJ failed to do so. To make such a credibility determination, an IJ must provide more than \"a passing reference implying doubt.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"415 F.3d 732, 736","parenthetical":"holding that an IJ failed to make explicit credibility finding when he made passing remark that he \"disbelieved\" applicant's testimony","sentence":"Diallo v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 764, 766 (7th Cir.2006) (citations and quotations omitted) (holding that an IJ failed to make explicit credibility flnd- ing when he described applicant\u2019s testimony as \u201cgeneral\u201d and \u201cmeager,\u201d making his demand for corroborating evidence improper); see also Nakibuka v. Gonzales, 421 F.3d 473, 478-79 (7th Cir.2005) (holding that an IJ failed to make explicit credibility finding when he remarked that applicant\u2019s testimony was \u201cvague and confusing\u201d as well as \u201cexaggerated\u201d); Soumahoro v. Gonzales, 415 F.3d 732, 736 (7th Cir.2005) (holding that an IJ failed to make explicit credibility finding when he made passing remark that he \u201cdisbelieved\u201d applicant\u2019s testimony); but see Hussain v. Gonzales, 424 F.3d 622, 628-630 (7th Cir.2005) (holding that an IJ made an explicit credibility when the IJ found testimony not credible based on several enumerated inconsistencies)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"424 F.3d 622, 628-630","parenthetical":"holding that an IJ made an explicit credibility when the IJ found testimony not credible based on several enumerated inconsistencies","sentence":"Diallo v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 764, 766 (7th Cir.2006) (citations and quotations omitted) (holding that an IJ failed to make explicit credibility flnd- ing when he described applicant\u2019s testimony as \u201cgeneral\u201d and \u201cmeager,\u201d making his demand for corroborating evidence improper); see also Nakibuka v. Gonzales, 421 F.3d 473, 478-79 (7th Cir.2005) (holding that an IJ failed to make explicit credibility finding when he remarked that applicant\u2019s testimony was \u201cvague and confusing\u201d as well as \u201cexaggerated\u201d); Soumahoro v. Gonzales, 415 F.3d 732, 736 (7th Cir.2005) (holding that an IJ failed to make explicit credibility finding when he made passing remark that he \u201cdisbelieved\u201d applicant\u2019s testimony); but see Hussain v. Gonzales, 424 F.3d 622, 628-630 (7th Cir.2005) (holding that an IJ made an explicit credibility when the IJ found testimony not credible based on several enumerated inconsistencies)."},"case_id":5663707,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Here, the issue the jury was called upon to decide was whether a reasonable person in Hanna's position would foresee that his communications would be perceived by those to whom he communicated as serious expressions of intent to harm the President. Without additional assistance, the average layperson is qualified to determine what a \"reasonable person\" would foresee under the circumstances.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"31 F.3d 747, 749","parenthetical":"expert testimony on whether defendant accused of making threats was actually a threat to victim was properly excluded because it was \"not probative of the issue of whether a reasonable recipient, knowing what she knew about the writer of the letters, would have interpreted them as a threat\"","sentence":"See United States v. Whitfield, 31 F.3d 747, 749 (8th Cir.1994) (expert testimony on whether defendant accused of making threats was actually a threat to victim was properly excluded because it was \u201cnot probative of the issue of whether a reasonable recipient, knowing what she knew about the writer of the letters, would have interpreted them as a threat\u201d); cf. Torres v. Johnson Lines, 932 F.2d 748, 751 (9th Cir.1991) (expert testimony properly excluded where record did not reveal \u201cany specific evidence that was so technical or complex that a jury could not have grasped it without the aid of experts\u201d); Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353, 1356 (9th Cir.1990) (in copyright infringement case, expert testimony not appropriate for determining whether a reasonable person would find similarity between artistic works)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"932 F.2d 748, 751","parenthetical":"expert testimony properly excluded where record did not reveal \"any specific evidence that was so technical or complex that a jury could not have grasped it without the aid of experts\"","sentence":"See United States v. Whitfield, 31 F.3d 747, 749 (8th Cir.1994) (expert testimony on whether defendant accused of making threats was actually a threat to victim was properly excluded because it was \u201cnot probative of the issue of whether a reasonable recipient, knowing what she knew about the writer of the letters, would have interpreted them as a threat\u201d); cf. Torres v. Johnson Lines, 932 F.2d 748, 751 (9th Cir.1991) (expert testimony properly excluded where record did not reveal \u201cany specific evidence that was so technical or complex that a jury could not have grasped it without the aid of experts\u201d); Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353, 1356 (9th Cir.1990) (in copyright infringement case, expert testimony not appropriate for determining whether a reasonable person would find similarity between artistic works)."},"case_id":9419147,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Here, the issue the jury was called upon to decide was whether a reasonable person in Hanna's position would foresee that his communications would be perceived by those to whom he communicated as serious expressions of intent to harm the President. Without additional assistance, the average layperson is qualified to determine what a \"reasonable person\" would foresee under the circumstances.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"919 F.2d 1353, 1356","parenthetical":"in copyright infringement case, expert testimony not appropriate for determining whether a reasonable person would find similarity between artistic works","sentence":"See United States v. Whitfield, 31 F.3d 747, 749 (8th Cir.1994) (expert testimony on whether defendant accused of making threats was actually a threat to victim was properly excluded because it was \u201cnot probative of the issue of whether a reasonable recipient, knowing what she knew about the writer of the letters, would have interpreted them as a threat\u201d); cf. Torres v. Johnson Lines, 932 F.2d 748, 751 (9th Cir.1991) (expert testimony properly excluded where record did not reveal \u201cany specific evidence that was so technical or complex that a jury could not have grasped it without the aid of experts\u201d); Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353, 1356 (9th Cir.1990) (in copyright infringement case, expert testimony not appropriate for determining whether a reasonable person would find similarity between artistic works)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"31 F.3d 747, 749","parenthetical":"expert testimony on whether defendant accused of making threats was actually a threat to victim was properly excluded because it was \"not probative of the issue of whether a reasonable recipient, knowing what she knew about the writer of the letters, would have interpreted them as a threat\"","sentence":"See United States v. Whitfield, 31 F.3d 747, 749 (8th Cir.1994) (expert testimony on whether defendant accused of making threats was actually a threat to victim was properly excluded because it was \u201cnot probative of the issue of whether a reasonable recipient, knowing what she knew about the writer of the letters, would have interpreted them as a threat\u201d); cf. Torres v. Johnson Lines, 932 F.2d 748, 751 (9th Cir.1991) (expert testimony properly excluded where record did not reveal \u201cany specific evidence that was so technical or complex that a jury could not have grasped it without the aid of experts\u201d); Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353, 1356 (9th Cir.1990) (in copyright infringement case, expert testimony not appropriate for determining whether a reasonable person would find similarity between artistic works)."},"case_id":9419147,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The defendants muster no support for this claim. Perhaps that is because we have already implicitly rejected this argument.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"405 F.3d 615, 619","parenthetical":"\"[T]he amount of criminal restitution is determined by the judge, whereas a suit for damages is a suit at law within the [Seventh] [Amendment's meaning.\"","sentence":"See United States v. Scott, 405 F.3d 615, 619 (7th Cir.2005) (\u201c[T]he amount of criminal restitution is determined by the judge, whereas a suit for damages is a suit at law within the [Seventh] [Amendment\u2019s meaning.\u201d); see also Kelly, 479 U.S. at 53 n. 14, 107 S.Ct. 353 (noting the uniformity among lower courts in finding the Seventh Amendment inapplicable to restitution orders in the context of the federal Victim and Witness Protection Act)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting the uniformity among lower courts in finding the Seventh Amendment inapplicable to restitution orders in the context of the federal Victim and Witness Protection Act","sentence":"See United States v. Scott, 405 F.3d 615, 619 (7th Cir.2005) (\u201c[T]he amount of criminal restitution is determined by the judge, whereas a suit for damages is a suit at law within the [Seventh] [Amendment\u2019s meaning.\u201d); see also Kelly, 479 U.S. at 53 n. 14, 107 S.Ct. 353 (noting the uniformity among lower courts in finding the Seventh Amendment inapplicable to restitution orders in the context of the federal Victim and Witness Protection Act)."},"case_id":3760983,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The defendants muster no support for this claim. Perhaps that is because we have already implicitly rejected this argument.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting the uniformity among lower courts in finding the Seventh Amendment inapplicable to restitution orders in the context of the federal Victim and Witness Protection Act","sentence":"See United States v. Scott, 405 F.3d 615, 619 (7th Cir.2005) (\u201c[T]he amount of criminal restitution is determined by the judge, whereas a suit for damages is a suit at law within the [Seventh] [Amendment\u2019s meaning.\u201d); see also Kelly, 479 U.S. at 53 n. 14, 107 S.Ct. 353 (noting the uniformity among lower courts in finding the Seventh Amendment inapplicable to restitution orders in the context of the federal Victim and Witness Protection Act)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"405 F.3d 615, 619","parenthetical":"\"[T]he amount of criminal restitution is determined by the judge, whereas a suit for damages is a suit at law within the [Seventh] [Amendment's meaning.\"","sentence":"See United States v. Scott, 405 F.3d 615, 619 (7th Cir.2005) (\u201c[T]he amount of criminal restitution is determined by the judge, whereas a suit for damages is a suit at law within the [Seventh] [Amendment\u2019s meaning.\u201d); see also Kelly, 479 U.S. at 53 n. 14, 107 S.Ct. 353 (noting the uniformity among lower courts in finding the Seventh Amendment inapplicable to restitution orders in the context of the federal Victim and Witness Protection Act)."},"case_id":3760983,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Nor can the County of Monmouth be said to control Prosecutor Kaye's employment decisions. Indeed, attempts by various parties to interfere with county prosecutors' employment prerogatives have been rejected consistently by New Jersey courts.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"county board of chosen freeholders' appointment of a legal assistant to prosecutor beyond the scope of its powers","sentence":"See Cetrulo v. Byrne, 31 N.J. 320, 157 A.2d 297 (1960) (county board of chosen freeholders\u2019 appointment of a legal assistant to prosecutor beyond the scope of its powers); Zamboni v. Stamler, 199 N.J.Super. 378, 489 A.2d 1169 (App.Div.1985) (rejecting Union County detectives\u2019 challenge to a reorganization plan that created superior officer positions within the unclassified civil service of the Prosecutor\u2019s investigative staff and enabled the Prosecutor to appoint detectives to serve temporarily in that capacity); cf. Bergen County Bd. of Chosen Freeholders v. Bergen County Prosecutor, 172 N.J.Super. 363, 412 A.2d 130 (App.Div.1980) (upholding decision of the New Jersey Public Employment Relations Commission that the county prosecutor, and not the board of chosen freeholders, is the employer of his subordinates in the county office for purposes of labor relations and collective bargaining)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"upholding decision of the New Jersey Public Employment Relations Commission that the county prosecutor, and not the board of chosen freeholders, is the employer of his subordinates in the county office for purposes of labor relations and collective bargaining","sentence":"See Cetrulo v. Byrne, 31 N.J. 320, 157 A.2d 297 (1960) (county board of chosen freeholders\u2019 appointment of a legal assistant to prosecutor beyond the scope of its powers); Zamboni v. Stamler, 199 N.J.Super. 378, 489 A.2d 1169 (App.Div.1985) (rejecting Union County detectives\u2019 challenge to a reorganization plan that created superior officer positions within the unclassified civil service of the Prosecutor\u2019s investigative staff and enabled the Prosecutor to appoint detectives to serve temporarily in that capacity); cf. Bergen County Bd. of Chosen Freeholders v. Bergen County Prosecutor, 172 N.J.Super. 363, 412 A.2d 130 (App.Div.1980) (upholding decision of the New Jersey Public Employment Relations Commission that the county prosecutor, and not the board of chosen freeholders, is the employer of his subordinates in the county office for purposes of labor relations and collective bargaining)."},"case_id":573,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Nor can the County of Monmouth be said to control Prosecutor Kaye's employment decisions. Indeed, attempts by various parties to interfere with county prosecutors' employment prerogatives have been rejected consistently by New Jersey courts.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"county board of chosen freeholders' appointment of a legal assistant to prosecutor beyond the scope of its powers","sentence":"See Cetrulo v. Byrne, 31 N.J. 320, 157 A.2d 297 (1960) (county board of chosen freeholders\u2019 appointment of a legal assistant to prosecutor beyond the scope of its powers); Zamboni v. Stamler, 199 N.J.Super. 378, 489 A.2d 1169 (App.Div.1985) (rejecting Union County detectives\u2019 challenge to a reorganization plan that created superior officer positions within the unclassified civil service of the Prosecutor\u2019s investigative staff and enabled the Prosecutor to appoint detectives to serve temporarily in that capacity); cf. Bergen County Bd. of Chosen Freeholders v. Bergen County Prosecutor, 172 N.J.Super. 363, 412 A.2d 130 (App.Div.1980) (upholding decision of the New Jersey Public Employment Relations Commission that the county prosecutor, and not the board of chosen freeholders, is the employer of his subordinates in the county office for purposes of labor relations and collective bargaining)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"upholding decision of the New Jersey Public Employment Relations Commission that the county prosecutor, and not the board of chosen freeholders, is the employer of his subordinates in the county office for purposes of labor relations and collective bargaining","sentence":"See Cetrulo v. Byrne, 31 N.J. 320, 157 A.2d 297 (1960) (county board of chosen freeholders\u2019 appointment of a legal assistant to prosecutor beyond the scope of its powers); Zamboni v. Stamler, 199 N.J.Super. 378, 489 A.2d 1169 (App.Div.1985) (rejecting Union County detectives\u2019 challenge to a reorganization plan that created superior officer positions within the unclassified civil service of the Prosecutor\u2019s investigative staff and enabled the Prosecutor to appoint detectives to serve temporarily in that capacity); cf. Bergen County Bd. of Chosen Freeholders v. Bergen County Prosecutor, 172 N.J.Super. 363, 412 A.2d 130 (App.Div.1980) (upholding decision of the New Jersey Public Employment Relations Commission that the county prosecutor, and not the board of chosen freeholders, is the employer of his subordinates in the county office for purposes of labor relations and collective bargaining)."},"case_id":573,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Nor can the County of Monmouth be said to control Prosecutor Kaye's employment decisions. Indeed, attempts by various parties to interfere with county prosecutors' employment prerogatives have been rejected consistently by New Jersey courts.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"county board of chosen freeholders' appointment of a legal assistant to prosecutor beyond the scope of its powers","sentence":"See Cetrulo v. Byrne, 31 N.J. 320, 157 A.2d 297 (1960) (county board of chosen freeholders\u2019 appointment of a legal assistant to prosecutor beyond the scope of its powers); Zamboni v. Stamler, 199 N.J.Super. 378, 489 A.2d 1169 (App.Div.1985) (rejecting Union County detectives\u2019 challenge to a reorganization plan that created superior officer positions within the unclassified civil service of the Prosecutor\u2019s investigative staff and enabled the Prosecutor to appoint detectives to serve temporarily in that capacity); cf. Bergen County Bd. of Chosen Freeholders v. Bergen County Prosecutor, 172 N.J.Super. 363, 412 A.2d 130 (App.Div.1980) (upholding decision of the New Jersey Public Employment Relations Commission that the county prosecutor, and not the board of chosen freeholders, is the employer of his subordinates in the county office for purposes of labor relations and collective bargaining)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"upholding decision of the New Jersey Public Employment Relations Commission that the county prosecutor, and not the board of chosen freeholders, is the employer of his subordinates in the county office for purposes of labor relations and collective bargaining","sentence":"See Cetrulo v. Byrne, 31 N.J. 320, 157 A.2d 297 (1960) (county board of chosen freeholders\u2019 appointment of a legal assistant to prosecutor beyond the scope of its powers); Zamboni v. Stamler, 199 N.J.Super. 378, 489 A.2d 1169 (App.Div.1985) (rejecting Union County detectives\u2019 challenge to a reorganization plan that created superior officer positions within the unclassified civil service of the Prosecutor\u2019s investigative staff and enabled the Prosecutor to appoint detectives to serve temporarily in that capacity); cf. Bergen County Bd. of Chosen Freeholders v. Bergen County Prosecutor, 172 N.J.Super. 363, 412 A.2d 130 (App.Div.1980) (upholding decision of the New Jersey Public Employment Relations Commission that the county prosecutor, and not the board of chosen freeholders, is the employer of his subordinates in the county office for purposes of labor relations and collective bargaining)."},"case_id":573,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Nor can the County of Monmouth be said to control Prosecutor Kaye's employment decisions. Indeed, attempts by various parties to interfere with county prosecutors' employment prerogatives have been rejected consistently by New Jersey courts.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"county board of chosen freeholders' appointment of a legal assistant to prosecutor beyond the scope of its powers","sentence":"See Cetrulo v. Byrne, 31 N.J. 320, 157 A.2d 297 (1960) (county board of chosen freeholders\u2019 appointment of a legal assistant to prosecutor beyond the scope of its powers); Zamboni v. Stamler, 199 N.J.Super. 378, 489 A.2d 1169 (App.Div.1985) (rejecting Union County detectives\u2019 challenge to a reorganization plan that created superior officer positions within the unclassified civil service of the Prosecutor\u2019s investigative staff and enabled the Prosecutor to appoint detectives to serve temporarily in that capacity); cf. Bergen County Bd. of Chosen Freeholders v. Bergen County Prosecutor, 172 N.J.Super. 363, 412 A.2d 130 (App.Div.1980) (upholding decision of the New Jersey Public Employment Relations Commission that the county prosecutor, and not the board of chosen freeholders, is the employer of his subordinates in the county office for purposes of labor relations and collective bargaining)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"upholding decision of the New Jersey Public Employment Relations Commission that the county prosecutor, and not the board of chosen freeholders, is the employer of his subordinates in the county office for purposes of labor relations and collective bargaining","sentence":"See Cetrulo v. Byrne, 31 N.J. 320, 157 A.2d 297 (1960) (county board of chosen freeholders\u2019 appointment of a legal assistant to prosecutor beyond the scope of its powers); Zamboni v. Stamler, 199 N.J.Super. 378, 489 A.2d 1169 (App.Div.1985) (rejecting Union County detectives\u2019 challenge to a reorganization plan that created superior officer positions within the unclassified civil service of the Prosecutor\u2019s investigative staff and enabled the Prosecutor to appoint detectives to serve temporarily in that capacity); cf. Bergen County Bd. of Chosen Freeholders v. Bergen County Prosecutor, 172 N.J.Super. 363, 412 A.2d 130 (App.Div.1980) (upholding decision of the New Jersey Public Employment Relations Commission that the county prosecutor, and not the board of chosen freeholders, is the employer of his subordinates in the county office for purposes of labor relations and collective bargaining)."},"case_id":573,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Nor can the County of Monmouth be said to control Prosecutor Kaye's employment decisions. Indeed, attempts by various parties to interfere with county prosecutors' employment prerogatives have been rejected consistently by New Jersey courts.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"upholding decision of the New Jersey Public Employment Relations Commission that the county prosecutor, and not the board of chosen freeholders, is the employer of his subordinates in the county office for purposes of labor relations and collective bargaining","sentence":"See Cetrulo v. Byrne, 31 N.J. 320, 157 A.2d 297 (1960) (county board of chosen freeholders\u2019 appointment of a legal assistant to prosecutor beyond the scope of its powers); Zamboni v. Stamler, 199 N.J.Super. 378, 489 A.2d 1169 (App.Div.1985) (rejecting Union County detectives\u2019 challenge to a reorganization plan that created superior officer positions within the unclassified civil service of the Prosecutor\u2019s investigative staff and enabled the Prosecutor to appoint detectives to serve temporarily in that capacity); cf. Bergen County Bd. of Chosen Freeholders v. Bergen County Prosecutor, 172 N.J.Super. 363, 412 A.2d 130 (App.Div.1980) (upholding decision of the New Jersey Public Employment Relations Commission that the county prosecutor, and not the board of chosen freeholders, is the employer of his subordinates in the county office for purposes of labor relations and collective bargaining)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"rejecting Union County detectives' challenge to a reorganization plan that created superior officer positions within the unclassified civil service of the Prosecutor's investigative staff and enabled the Prosecutor to appoint detectives to serve temporarily in that capacity","sentence":"See Cetrulo v. Byrne, 31 N.J. 320, 157 A.2d 297 (1960) (county board of chosen freeholders\u2019 appointment of a legal assistant to prosecutor beyond the scope of its powers); Zamboni v. Stamler, 199 N.J.Super. 378, 489 A.2d 1169 (App.Div.1985) (rejecting Union County detectives\u2019 challenge to a reorganization plan that created superior officer positions within the unclassified civil service of the Prosecutor\u2019s investigative staff and enabled the Prosecutor to appoint detectives to serve temporarily in that capacity); cf. Bergen County Bd. of Chosen Freeholders v. Bergen County Prosecutor, 172 N.J.Super. 363, 412 A.2d 130 (App.Div.1980) (upholding decision of the New Jersey Public Employment Relations Commission that the county prosecutor, and not the board of chosen freeholders, is the employer of his subordinates in the county office for purposes of labor relations and collective bargaining)."},"case_id":573,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Nor can the County of Monmouth be said to control Prosecutor Kaye's employment decisions. Indeed, attempts by various parties to interfere with county prosecutors' employment prerogatives have been rejected consistently by New Jersey courts.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"upholding decision of the New Jersey Public Employment Relations Commission that the county prosecutor, and not the board of chosen freeholders, is the employer of his subordinates in the county office for purposes of labor relations and collective bargaining","sentence":"See Cetrulo v. Byrne, 31 N.J. 320, 157 A.2d 297 (1960) (county board of chosen freeholders\u2019 appointment of a legal assistant to prosecutor beyond the scope of its powers); Zamboni v. Stamler, 199 N.J.Super. 378, 489 A.2d 1169 (App.Div.1985) (rejecting Union County detectives\u2019 challenge to a reorganization plan that created superior officer positions within the unclassified civil service of the Prosecutor\u2019s investigative staff and enabled the Prosecutor to appoint detectives to serve temporarily in that capacity); cf. Bergen County Bd. of Chosen Freeholders v. Bergen County Prosecutor, 172 N.J.Super. 363, 412 A.2d 130 (App.Div.1980) (upholding decision of the New Jersey Public Employment Relations Commission that the county prosecutor, and not the board of chosen freeholders, is the employer of his subordinates in the county office for purposes of labor relations and collective bargaining)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"rejecting Union County detectives' challenge to a reorganization plan that created superior officer positions within the unclassified civil service of the Prosecutor's investigative staff and enabled the Prosecutor to appoint detectives to serve temporarily in that capacity","sentence":"See Cetrulo v. Byrne, 31 N.J. 320, 157 A.2d 297 (1960) (county board of chosen freeholders\u2019 appointment of a legal assistant to prosecutor beyond the scope of its powers); Zamboni v. Stamler, 199 N.J.Super. 378, 489 A.2d 1169 (App.Div.1985) (rejecting Union County detectives\u2019 challenge to a reorganization plan that created superior officer positions within the unclassified civil service of the Prosecutor\u2019s investigative staff and enabled the Prosecutor to appoint detectives to serve temporarily in that capacity); cf. Bergen County Bd. of Chosen Freeholders v. Bergen County Prosecutor, 172 N.J.Super. 363, 412 A.2d 130 (App.Div.1980) (upholding decision of the New Jersey Public Employment Relations Commission that the county prosecutor, and not the board of chosen freeholders, is the employer of his subordinates in the county office for purposes of labor relations and collective bargaining)."},"case_id":573,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Nor can the County of Monmouth be said to control Prosecutor Kaye's employment decisions. Indeed, attempts by various parties to interfere with county prosecutors' employment prerogatives have been rejected consistently by New Jersey courts.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"upholding decision of the New Jersey Public Employment Relations Commission that the county prosecutor, and not the board of chosen freeholders, is the employer of his subordinates in the county office for purposes of labor relations and collective bargaining","sentence":"See Cetrulo v. Byrne, 31 N.J. 320, 157 A.2d 297 (1960) (county board of chosen freeholders\u2019 appointment of a legal assistant to prosecutor beyond the scope of its powers); Zamboni v. Stamler, 199 N.J.Super. 378, 489 A.2d 1169 (App.Div.1985) (rejecting Union County detectives\u2019 challenge to a reorganization plan that created superior officer positions within the unclassified civil service of the Prosecutor\u2019s investigative staff and enabled the Prosecutor to appoint detectives to serve temporarily in that capacity); cf. Bergen County Bd. of Chosen Freeholders v. Bergen County Prosecutor, 172 N.J.Super. 363, 412 A.2d 130 (App.Div.1980) (upholding decision of the New Jersey Public Employment Relations Commission that the county prosecutor, and not the board of chosen freeholders, is the employer of his subordinates in the county office for purposes of labor relations and collective bargaining)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"rejecting Union County detectives' challenge to a reorganization plan that created superior officer positions within the unclassified civil service of the Prosecutor's investigative staff and enabled the Prosecutor to appoint detectives to serve temporarily in that capacity","sentence":"See Cetrulo v. Byrne, 31 N.J. 320, 157 A.2d 297 (1960) (county board of chosen freeholders\u2019 appointment of a legal assistant to prosecutor beyond the scope of its powers); Zamboni v. Stamler, 199 N.J.Super. 378, 489 A.2d 1169 (App.Div.1985) (rejecting Union County detectives\u2019 challenge to a reorganization plan that created superior officer positions within the unclassified civil service of the Prosecutor\u2019s investigative staff and enabled the Prosecutor to appoint detectives to serve temporarily in that capacity); cf. Bergen County Bd. of Chosen Freeholders v. Bergen County Prosecutor, 172 N.J.Super. 363, 412 A.2d 130 (App.Div.1980) (upholding decision of the New Jersey Public Employment Relations Commission that the county prosecutor, and not the board of chosen freeholders, is the employer of his subordinates in the county office for purposes of labor relations and collective bargaining)."},"case_id":573,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Nor can the County of Monmouth be said to control Prosecutor Kaye's employment decisions. Indeed, attempts by various parties to interfere with county prosecutors' employment prerogatives have been rejected consistently by New Jersey courts.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"rejecting Union County detectives' challenge to a reorganization plan that created superior officer positions within the unclassified civil service of the Prosecutor's investigative staff and enabled the Prosecutor to appoint detectives to serve temporarily in that capacity","sentence":"See Cetrulo v. Byrne, 31 N.J. 320, 157 A.2d 297 (1960) (county board of chosen freeholders\u2019 appointment of a legal assistant to prosecutor beyond the scope of its powers); Zamboni v. Stamler, 199 N.J.Super. 378, 489 A.2d 1169 (App.Div.1985) (rejecting Union County detectives\u2019 challenge to a reorganization plan that created superior officer positions within the unclassified civil service of the Prosecutor\u2019s investigative staff and enabled the Prosecutor to appoint detectives to serve temporarily in that capacity); cf. Bergen County Bd. of Chosen Freeholders v. Bergen County Prosecutor, 172 N.J.Super. 363, 412 A.2d 130 (App.Div.1980) (upholding decision of the New Jersey Public Employment Relations Commission that the county prosecutor, and not the board of chosen freeholders, is the employer of his subordinates in the county office for purposes of labor relations and collective bargaining)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"upholding decision of the New Jersey Public Employment Relations Commission that the county prosecutor, and not the board of chosen freeholders, is the employer of his subordinates in the county office for purposes of labor relations and collective bargaining","sentence":"See Cetrulo v. Byrne, 31 N.J. 320, 157 A.2d 297 (1960) (county board of chosen freeholders\u2019 appointment of a legal assistant to prosecutor beyond the scope of its powers); Zamboni v. Stamler, 199 N.J.Super. 378, 489 A.2d 1169 (App.Div.1985) (rejecting Union County detectives\u2019 challenge to a reorganization plan that created superior officer positions within the unclassified civil service of the Prosecutor\u2019s investigative staff and enabled the Prosecutor to appoint detectives to serve temporarily in that capacity); cf. Bergen County Bd. of Chosen Freeholders v. Bergen County Prosecutor, 172 N.J.Super. 363, 412 A.2d 130 (App.Div.1980) (upholding decision of the New Jersey Public Employment Relations Commission that the county prosecutor, and not the board of chosen freeholders, is the employer of his subordinates in the county office for purposes of labor relations and collective bargaining)."},"case_id":573,"label":"a"}
{"context":". There are no published cases which provide guidance on the meaning of \"owner\" under the state regulations, as applied to property managers. The only published opinions on ownership are not particularly helpful here.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"imposing civil liability on an owner's wife where she was identified as the landlord on the lease, had joined with her husband in mortgaging the property, and was listed as the record owner in a UCC statement recorded at the county registry of deeds","sentence":"Roman v. Friedland, 849 F.Supp. 827 (D.Mass.1994) (imposing civil liability on an owner\u2019s wife where she was identified as the landlord on the lease, had joined with her husband in mortgaging the property, and was listed as the record owner in a UCC statement recorded at the county registry of deeds); Cf. Commonwealth v. Advantage Bank, 406 Mass. 885, 887, 550 N.E.2d 1388, 1390 (1994) (no criminal sanctions on bank which was a mortgagee not yet in physical possession)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"406 Mass. 885, 887","parenthetical":"no criminal sanctions on bank which was a mortgagee not yet in physical possession","sentence":"Roman v. Friedland, 849 F.Supp. 827 (D.Mass.1994) (imposing civil liability on an owner\u2019s wife where she was identified as the landlord on the lease, had joined with her husband in mortgaging the property, and was listed as the record owner in a UCC statement recorded at the county registry of deeds); Cf. Commonwealth v. Advantage Bank, 406 Mass. 885, 887, 550 N.E.2d 1388, 1390 (1994) (no criminal sanctions on bank which was a mortgagee not yet in physical possession)."},"case_id":11930039,"label":"a"}
{"context":". There are no published cases which provide guidance on the meaning of \"owner\" under the state regulations, as applied to property managers. The only published opinions on ownership are not particularly helpful here.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"550 N.E.2d 1388, 1390","parenthetical":"no criminal sanctions on bank which was a mortgagee not yet in physical possession","sentence":"Roman v. Friedland, 849 F.Supp. 827 (D.Mass.1994) (imposing civil liability on an owner\u2019s wife where she was identified as the landlord on the lease, had joined with her husband in mortgaging the property, and was listed as the record owner in a UCC statement recorded at the county registry of deeds); Cf. Commonwealth v. Advantage Bank, 406 Mass. 885, 887, 550 N.E.2d 1388, 1390 (1994) (no criminal sanctions on bank which was a mortgagee not yet in physical possession)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"imposing civil liability on an owner's wife where she was identified as the landlord on the lease, had joined with her husband in mortgaging the property, and was listed as the record owner in a UCC statement recorded at the county registry of deeds","sentence":"Roman v. Friedland, 849 F.Supp. 827 (D.Mass.1994) (imposing civil liability on an owner\u2019s wife where she was identified as the landlord on the lease, had joined with her husband in mortgaging the property, and was listed as the record owner in a UCC statement recorded at the county registry of deeds); Cf. Commonwealth v. Advantage Bank, 406 Mass. 885, 887, 550 N.E.2d 1388, 1390 (1994) (no criminal sanctions on bank which was a mortgagee not yet in physical possession)."},"case_id":11930039,"label":"b"}
{"context":"\"This Court cannot impose its own independent judgment on an issue of credibility to overrule the decision of a court that had the opportunity to view Petitioner's testimony first-hand.\" Likewise, the court is in no position to find error in the state appellate court's refusal to re-examine questions of credibility, especially where (as here) petitioner has failed to proffer clear and convincing evidence that the state court should have adopted his version of the facts.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"45 F.Supp.2d 1157, 1161","parenthetical":"explaining that petitioner bears the burden of establishing by convincing evidence that any challenged factual determination is erroneous, and that factual issues include the recital of events and the credibility of the narrators","sentence":"See 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2254(e); Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114, .121 n. 6, 104 S.Ct. 453, 78 L.Ed.2d 267 (1983) (explaining that the state courts\u2019 determinations about witness credibility and inferences to be drawn from the testimony were binding on the federal district court); see also Lile v. McKune, 45 F.Supp.2d 1157, 1161 (D.Kan. 1999) (explaining that petitioner bears the burden of establishing by convincing evidence that any challenged factual determination is erroneous, and that factual issues include the recital of events and the credibility of the narrators)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"explaining that the state courts' determinations about witness credibility and inferences to be drawn from the testimony were binding on the federal district court","sentence":"See 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2254(e); Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114, .121 n. 6, 104 S.Ct. 453, 78 L.Ed.2d 267 (1983) (explaining that the state courts\u2019 determinations about witness credibility and inferences to be drawn from the testimony were binding on the federal district court); see also Lile v. McKune, 45 F.Supp.2d 1157, 1161 (D.Kan. 1999) (explaining that petitioner bears the burden of establishing by convincing evidence that any challenged factual determination is erroneous, and that factual issues include the recital of events and the credibility of the narrators)."},"case_id":9087929,"label":"b"}
{"context":"\"This Court cannot impose its own independent judgment on an issue of credibility to overrule the decision of a court that had the opportunity to view Petitioner's testimony first-hand.\" Likewise, the court is in no position to find error in the state appellate court's refusal to re-examine questions of credibility, especially where (as here) petitioner has failed to proffer clear and convincing evidence that the state court should have adopted his version of the facts.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"45 F.Supp.2d 1157, 1161","parenthetical":"explaining that petitioner bears the burden of establishing by convincing evidence that any challenged factual determination is erroneous, and that factual issues include the recital of events and the credibility of the narrators","sentence":"See 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2254(e); Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114, .121 n. 6, 104 S.Ct. 453, 78 L.Ed.2d 267 (1983) (explaining that the state courts\u2019 determinations about witness credibility and inferences to be drawn from the testimony were binding on the federal district court); see also Lile v. McKune, 45 F.Supp.2d 1157, 1161 (D.Kan. 1999) (explaining that petitioner bears the burden of establishing by convincing evidence that any challenged factual determination is erroneous, and that factual issues include the recital of events and the credibility of the narrators)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"explaining that the state courts' determinations about witness credibility and inferences to be drawn from the testimony were binding on the federal district court","sentence":"See 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2254(e); Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114, .121 n. 6, 104 S.Ct. 453, 78 L.Ed.2d 267 (1983) (explaining that the state courts\u2019 determinations about witness credibility and inferences to be drawn from the testimony were binding on the federal district court); see also Lile v. McKune, 45 F.Supp.2d 1157, 1161 (D.Kan. 1999) (explaining that petitioner bears the burden of establishing by convincing evidence that any challenged factual determination is erroneous, and that factual issues include the recital of events and the credibility of the narrators)."},"case_id":9087929,"label":"b"}
{"context":"\"This Court cannot impose its own independent judgment on an issue of credibility to overrule the decision of a court that had the opportunity to view Petitioner's testimony first-hand.\" Likewise, the court is in no position to find error in the state appellate court's refusal to re-examine questions of credibility, especially where (as here) petitioner has failed to proffer clear and convincing evidence that the state court should have adopted his version of the facts.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"45 F.Supp.2d 1157, 1161","parenthetical":"explaining that petitioner bears the burden of establishing by convincing evidence that any challenged factual determination is erroneous, and that factual issues include the recital of events and the credibility of the narrators","sentence":"See 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2254(e); Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114, .121 n. 6, 104 S.Ct. 453, 78 L.Ed.2d 267 (1983) (explaining that the state courts\u2019 determinations about witness credibility and inferences to be drawn from the testimony were binding on the federal district court); see also Lile v. McKune, 45 F.Supp.2d 1157, 1161 (D.Kan. 1999) (explaining that petitioner bears the burden of establishing by convincing evidence that any challenged factual determination is erroneous, and that factual issues include the recital of events and the credibility of the narrators)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"explaining that the state courts' determinations about witness credibility and inferences to be drawn from the testimony were binding on the federal district court","sentence":"See 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2254(e); Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114, .121 n. 6, 104 S.Ct. 453, 78 L.Ed.2d 267 (1983) (explaining that the state courts\u2019 determinations about witness credibility and inferences to be drawn from the testimony were binding on the federal district court); see also Lile v. McKune, 45 F.Supp.2d 1157, 1161 (D.Kan. 1999) (explaining that petitioner bears the burden of establishing by convincing evidence that any challenged factual determination is erroneous, and that factual issues include the recital of events and the credibility of the narrators)."},"case_id":9087929,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Once a defendant establishes a basis for a motion to suppress, the Government must prove that the admissibility of any disputed evidence is proper by a preponderance of the evidence.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"422 U.S. 590, 602","parenthetical":"stating that \"the burden of showing admissibility [of seized items or statements by a defendant] rests, of course, on the prosecution\"","sentence":"See, Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 602, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975) (stating that \u201cthe burden of showing admissibility [of seized items or statements by a defendant] rests, of course, on the prosecution\u201d); United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 177 n. 14, 94 S.Ct. 988, 39 L.Ed.2d 242 (1974) (stating that \u201cthe controlling burden of proof at suppression hearings should impose no greater burden than proof by a preponderance of the evidence\u201d); see also United States v. Calvente, 722 F.2d 1019, 1023 (2d Cir.1983) (noting that the government bears the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence at a suppression hearing)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"722 F.2d 1019, 1023","parenthetical":"noting that the government bears the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence at a suppression hearing","sentence":"See, Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 602, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975) (stating that \u201cthe burden of showing admissibility [of seized items or statements by a defendant] rests, of course, on the prosecution\u201d); United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 177 n. 14, 94 S.Ct. 988, 39 L.Ed.2d 242 (1974) (stating that \u201cthe controlling burden of proof at suppression hearings should impose no greater burden than proof by a preponderance of the evidence\u201d); see also United States v. Calvente, 722 F.2d 1019, 1023 (2d Cir.1983) (noting that the government bears the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence at a suppression hearing)."},"case_id":4303210,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Once a defendant establishes a basis for a motion to suppress, the Government must prove that the admissibility of any disputed evidence is proper by a preponderance of the evidence.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"722 F.2d 1019, 1023","parenthetical":"noting that the government bears the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence at a suppression hearing","sentence":"See, Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 602, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975) (stating that \u201cthe burden of showing admissibility [of seized items or statements by a defendant] rests, of course, on the prosecution\u201d); United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 177 n. 14, 94 S.Ct. 988, 39 L.Ed.2d 242 (1974) (stating that \u201cthe controlling burden of proof at suppression hearings should impose no greater burden than proof by a preponderance of the evidence\u201d); see also United States v. Calvente, 722 F.2d 1019, 1023 (2d Cir.1983) (noting that the government bears the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence at a suppression hearing)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"stating that \"the burden of showing admissibility [of seized items or statements by a defendant] rests, of course, on the prosecution\"","sentence":"See, Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 602, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975) (stating that \u201cthe burden of showing admissibility [of seized items or statements by a defendant] rests, of course, on the prosecution\u201d); United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 177 n. 14, 94 S.Ct. 988, 39 L.Ed.2d 242 (1974) (stating that \u201cthe controlling burden of proof at suppression hearings should impose no greater burden than proof by a preponderance of the evidence\u201d); see also United States v. Calvente, 722 F.2d 1019, 1023 (2d Cir.1983) (noting that the government bears the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence at a suppression hearing)."},"case_id":4303210,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Once a defendant establishes a basis for a motion to suppress, the Government must prove that the admissibility of any disputed evidence is proper by a preponderance of the evidence.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"722 F.2d 1019, 1023","parenthetical":"noting that the government bears the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence at a suppression hearing","sentence":"See, Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 602, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975) (stating that \u201cthe burden of showing admissibility [of seized items or statements by a defendant] rests, of course, on the prosecution\u201d); United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 177 n. 14, 94 S.Ct. 988, 39 L.Ed.2d 242 (1974) (stating that \u201cthe controlling burden of proof at suppression hearings should impose no greater burden than proof by a preponderance of the evidence\u201d); see also United States v. Calvente, 722 F.2d 1019, 1023 (2d Cir.1983) (noting that the government bears the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence at a suppression hearing)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"stating that \"the burden of showing admissibility [of seized items or statements by a defendant] rests, of course, on the prosecution\"","sentence":"See, Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 602, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975) (stating that \u201cthe burden of showing admissibility [of seized items or statements by a defendant] rests, of course, on the prosecution\u201d); United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 177 n. 14, 94 S.Ct. 988, 39 L.Ed.2d 242 (1974) (stating that \u201cthe controlling burden of proof at suppression hearings should impose no greater burden than proof by a preponderance of the evidence\u201d); see also United States v. Calvente, 722 F.2d 1019, 1023 (2d Cir.1983) (noting that the government bears the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence at a suppression hearing)."},"case_id":4303210,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Once a defendant establishes a basis for a motion to suppress, the Government must prove that the admissibility of any disputed evidence is proper by a preponderance of the evidence.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"stating that \"the controlling burden of proof at suppression hearings should impose no greater burden than proof by a preponderance of the evidence\"","sentence":"See, Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 602, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975) (stating that \u201cthe burden of showing admissibility [of seized items or statements by a defendant] rests, of course, on the prosecution\u201d); United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 177 n. 14, 94 S.Ct. 988, 39 L.Ed.2d 242 (1974) (stating that \u201cthe controlling burden of proof at suppression hearings should impose no greater burden than proof by a preponderance of the evidence\u201d); see also United States v. Calvente, 722 F.2d 1019, 1023 (2d Cir.1983) (noting that the government bears the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence at a suppression hearing)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"722 F.2d 1019, 1023","parenthetical":"noting that the government bears the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence at a suppression hearing","sentence":"See, Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 602, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975) (stating that \u201cthe burden of showing admissibility [of seized items or statements by a defendant] rests, of course, on the prosecution\u201d); United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 177 n. 14, 94 S.Ct. 988, 39 L.Ed.2d 242 (1974) (stating that \u201cthe controlling burden of proof at suppression hearings should impose no greater burden than proof by a preponderance of the evidence\u201d); see also United States v. Calvente, 722 F.2d 1019, 1023 (2d Cir.1983) (noting that the government bears the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence at a suppression hearing)."},"case_id":4303210,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Once a defendant establishes a basis for a motion to suppress, the Government must prove that the admissibility of any disputed evidence is proper by a preponderance of the evidence.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"722 F.2d 1019, 1023","parenthetical":"noting that the government bears the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence at a suppression hearing","sentence":"See, Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 602, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975) (stating that \u201cthe burden of showing admissibility [of seized items or statements by a defendant] rests, of course, on the prosecution\u201d); United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 177 n. 14, 94 S.Ct. 988, 39 L.Ed.2d 242 (1974) (stating that \u201cthe controlling burden of proof at suppression hearings should impose no greater burden than proof by a preponderance of the evidence\u201d); see also United States v. Calvente, 722 F.2d 1019, 1023 (2d Cir.1983) (noting that the government bears the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence at a suppression hearing)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"stating that \"the controlling burden of proof at suppression hearings should impose no greater burden than proof by a preponderance of the evidence\"","sentence":"See, Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 602, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975) (stating that \u201cthe burden of showing admissibility [of seized items or statements by a defendant] rests, of course, on the prosecution\u201d); United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 177 n. 14, 94 S.Ct. 988, 39 L.Ed.2d 242 (1974) (stating that \u201cthe controlling burden of proof at suppression hearings should impose no greater burden than proof by a preponderance of the evidence\u201d); see also United States v. Calvente, 722 F.2d 1019, 1023 (2d Cir.1983) (noting that the government bears the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence at a suppression hearing)."},"case_id":4303210,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Once a defendant establishes a basis for a motion to suppress, the Government must prove that the admissibility of any disputed evidence is proper by a preponderance of the evidence.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"stating that \"the controlling burden of proof at suppression hearings should impose no greater burden than proof by a preponderance of the evidence\"","sentence":"See, Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 602, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975) (stating that \u201cthe burden of showing admissibility [of seized items or statements by a defendant] rests, of course, on the prosecution\u201d); United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 177 n. 14, 94 S.Ct. 988, 39 L.Ed.2d 242 (1974) (stating that \u201cthe controlling burden of proof at suppression hearings should impose no greater burden than proof by a preponderance of the evidence\u201d); see also United States v. Calvente, 722 F.2d 1019, 1023 (2d Cir.1983) (noting that the government bears the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence at a suppression hearing)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"722 F.2d 1019, 1023","parenthetical":"noting that the government bears the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence at a suppression hearing","sentence":"See, Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 602, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975) (stating that \u201cthe burden of showing admissibility [of seized items or statements by a defendant] rests, of course, on the prosecution\u201d); United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 177 n. 14, 94 S.Ct. 988, 39 L.Ed.2d 242 (1974) (stating that \u201cthe controlling burden of proof at suppression hearings should impose no greater burden than proof by a preponderance of the evidence\u201d); see also United States v. Calvente, 722 F.2d 1019, 1023 (2d Cir.1983) (noting that the government bears the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence at a suppression hearing)."},"case_id":4303210,"label":"a"}
{"context":"We agree with those courts that \"have relied upon the express provisions of plans of reorganization that confer the right to bring particular kinds of actions on a particular party in concluding that that party has been appointed for SS 1123 purposes.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"63 B.R. 785, 786","parenthetical":"plan provided that debtors retained all causes of action against third parties including actions under SSSS 547, 550","sentence":"Amarex, 96 B.R. at 334 (plan provided that all claims for return of preference payments or fraudulent transfers were preserved and retained for enforcement by reorganized debtor); see also Kroh Bros. Development Co. v. United Missouri Bank (In re Kroh Bros. Development Co.), 100 B.R. 487, 497 (Bankr.W.D.Mo.1989) (appointment under \u00a7 1123 does not require \u201cmagic words,\u201d but record was \u201creplete\u201d with proceedings recognizing that party in question would become a representative of the estate); Tennessee Wheel & Rubber Co. v. Captron Corporate Air Fleet (In re Tennessee Wheel & Rubber Co.), 64 B.R. 721, 723 (Bankr.M.D.Tenn.1986) (plan designated post-confirmation representative of the estate specifically to recover assets under \u00a7\u00a7 547, 548); Xonics, Inc. v. E & F King & Co. (In re Xonics), 63 B.R. 785, 786 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.1986) (plan provided that debtors retained all causes of action against third parties including actions under \u00a7\u00a7 547, 550); Perlstein v. Saltzstein (In re AOV Indus., Inc.), 62 B.R. 968, 970 n. 1 (Bankr.D.D.C.1986) (plan provided that upon confirmation \u201cthe Debtors shall assign to the Disbursing Agent their powers under Sections 547 and 548 of the Bankruptcy Code\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"96 B.R. 334, 334","parenthetical":"plan provided that all claims for return of preference payments or fraudulent transfers were preserved and retained for enforcement by reorganized debtor","sentence":"Amarex, 96 B.R. at 334 (plan provided that all claims for return of preference payments or fraudulent transfers were preserved and retained for enforcement by reorganized debtor); see also Kroh Bros. Development Co. v. United Missouri Bank (In re Kroh Bros. Development Co.), 100 B.R. 487, 497 (Bankr.W.D.Mo.1989) (appointment under \u00a7 1123 does not require \u201cmagic words,\u201d but record was \u201creplete\u201d with proceedings recognizing that party in question would become a representative of the estate); Tennessee Wheel & Rubber Co. v. Captron Corporate Air Fleet (In re Tennessee Wheel & Rubber Co.), 64 B.R. 721, 723 (Bankr.M.D.Tenn.1986) (plan designated post-confirmation representative of the estate specifically to recover assets under \u00a7\u00a7 547, 548); Xonics, Inc. v. E & F King & Co. (In re Xonics), 63 B.R. 785, 786 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.1986) (plan provided that debtors retained all causes of action against third parties including actions under \u00a7\u00a7 547, 550); Perlstein v. Saltzstein (In re AOV Indus., Inc.), 62 B.R. 968, 970 n. 1 (Bankr.D.D.C.1986) (plan provided that upon confirmation \u201cthe Debtors shall assign to the Disbursing Agent their powers under Sections 547 and 548 of the Bankruptcy Code\u201d)."},"case_id":10517526,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In sum, even analyzing the provision under the more lenient confidentiality agreement standard, the provision is unenforceable under Indiana law because it is overly broad and unreasonable in light of the interests sought to be protected, and thus, is a restraint of trade that violates public policy.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"486 F.Supp.2d 816, 816","parenthetical":"noting that Indiana has \"a public policy against contracts that unreasonably restrain trade.\"","sentence":"See Austin, 466 N.E.2d at 744 (\u201c[W]hatever restraint is larger than necessary for the protection of the party, is void, as being injurious to the interests of the party.\u201d); see also Dearborn, 486 F.Supp.2d at 816 (noting that Indiana has \u201ca public policy against contracts that unreasonably restrain trade.\u201d); Fumo v. Med. Grp. of Mich. City, Inc., 590 N.E.2d 1103, 1109 (Ind.Ct.App.1992)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"466 N.E.2d 744, 744","parenthetical":"\"[W]hatever restraint is larger than necessary for the protection of the party, is void, as being injurious to the interests of the party.\"","sentence":"See Austin, 466 N.E.2d at 744 (\u201c[W]hatever restraint is larger than necessary for the protection of the party, is void, as being injurious to the interests of the party.\u201d); see also Dearborn, 486 F.Supp.2d at 816 (noting that Indiana has \u201ca public policy against contracts that unreasonably restrain trade.\u201d); Fumo v. Med. Grp. of Mich. City, Inc., 590 N.E.2d 1103, 1109 (Ind.Ct.App.1992)."},"case_id":4313021,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In sum, we conclude that, as a general rule, a defendant who has agreed \"[t]o waive knowingly and expressly all rights, conferred by 18 U.S.C. SS 3742, to appeal whatever sentence is imposed,\" J.A. 66, has waived his right to appeal a restitution order.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"71 F.3d 1143, 1146-47","parenthetical":"implicitly finding that a defendant who waives the \"right to appeal her sentence on [the] grounds [listed in 18 U.S.C.A. SS 3742(a","sentence":"See United States v. Broughton-Jones, 71 F.3d 1143, 1146-47 (4th Cir.1995) (implicitly finding that a defendant who waives the \u201cright to appeal her sentence on [the] grounds [listed in 18 U.S.C.A. \u00a7 3742(a) ]\u201d is deemed to have waived the right to appeal a lawfully imposed restitution order); see also United States v. Sharp, 442 F.3d 946, 948-52 (6th Cir.2006) (dismissing appeal of restitution order where defendant waived the right \u201cto appeal the conviction or sentence in this case, including the appeal right conferred by 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 3742, and to challenge the conviction or sentence collaterally,\u201d but reserved the right to appeal a punishment in excess of the statutory maximum and an upward departure from the most applicable sentencing guidelines range, because restitution fell under neither exception); United States v. Behrman, 235 F.3d 1049, 1052 (7th Cir.2000) (concluding that \u201c[a]n agreement waiving appeal from \u2018any sentence within the maximum provided by Title 18\u2019 or similar language would foreclose [an appeal from the restitution order]\u201d); but see United States v. Phillips, 174 F.3d 1074, 1075-76 (9th Cir.1999) (finding no waiver of right to appeal restitution where defendant \u201cknowingly and voluntarily waive[d][his] right to appeal any sentence and restitution order imposed by the Court and the manner in which the Court determine[d][his] sentence and restitution order, so long as the sentence is up to a net offense level of 12 following an adjustment for acceptance of responsibility,\u201d because the plea agreement contained no cap on restitution and the plea agreement was ambiguous as to the amount of damages the defendant might owe); United States v. Cupit, 169 F.3d 536, 539 (8th Cir.1999) (per curiam) (considering challenge to restitution order despite defendant\u2019s agreement to \u201cwaive all rights to appeal whatever sentence is imposed,\u201d expressly declining to \u201cresolve the waiver of restitution issue in this case\u201d); United States v. Ready, 82 F.3d 551, 559-60 (2d Cir.1996) (concluding that defendant did not waive his right to appeal a restitution order despite his \u201cadmittedly broad [ Jwaiver of right to appeal \u2018whatever sentence is imposed\u2019 \u201d because the terms of the plea agreement were ambiguous as to whether \u201csentence\u201d included \u201crestitution\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"442 F.3d 946, 948-52","parenthetical":"dismissing appeal of restitution order where defendant waived the right \"to appeal the conviction or sentence in this case, including the appeal right conferred by 18 U.S.C. SS 3742, and to challenge the conviction or sentence collaterally,\" but reserved the right to appeal a punishment in excess of the statutory maximum and an upward departure from the most applicable sentencing guidelines range, because restitution fell under neither exception","sentence":"See United States v. Broughton-Jones, 71 F.3d 1143, 1146-47 (4th Cir.1995) (implicitly finding that a defendant who waives the \u201cright to appeal her sentence on [the] grounds [listed in 18 U.S.C.A. \u00a7 3742(a) ]\u201d is deemed to have waived the right to appeal a lawfully imposed restitution order); see also United States v. Sharp, 442 F.3d 946, 948-52 (6th Cir.2006) (dismissing appeal of restitution order where defendant waived the right \u201cto appeal the conviction or sentence in this case, including the appeal right conferred by 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 3742, and to challenge the conviction or sentence collaterally,\u201d but reserved the right to appeal a punishment in excess of the statutory maximum and an upward departure from the most applicable sentencing guidelines range, because restitution fell under neither exception); United States v. Behrman, 235 F.3d 1049, 1052 (7th Cir.2000) (concluding that \u201c[a]n agreement waiving appeal from \u2018any sentence within the maximum provided by Title 18\u2019 or similar language would foreclose [an appeal from the restitution order]\u201d); but see United States v. Phillips, 174 F.3d 1074, 1075-76 (9th Cir.1999) (finding no waiver of right to appeal restitution where defendant \u201cknowingly and voluntarily waive[d][his] right to appeal any sentence and restitution order imposed by the Court and the manner in which the Court determine[d][his] sentence and restitution order, so long as the sentence is up to a net offense level of 12 following an adjustment for acceptance of responsibility,\u201d because the plea agreement contained no cap on restitution and the plea agreement was ambiguous as to the amount of damages the defendant might owe); United States v. Cupit, 169 F.3d 536, 539 (8th Cir.1999) (per curiam) (considering challenge to restitution order despite defendant\u2019s agreement to \u201cwaive all rights to appeal whatever sentence is imposed,\u201d expressly declining to \u201cresolve the waiver of restitution issue in this case\u201d); United States v. Ready, 82 F.3d 551, 559-60 (2d Cir.1996) (concluding that defendant did not waive his right to appeal a restitution order despite his \u201cadmittedly broad [ Jwaiver of right to appeal \u2018whatever sentence is imposed\u2019 \u201d because the terms of the plea agreement were ambiguous as to whether \u201csentence\u201d included \u201crestitution\u201d)."},"case_id":3645418,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In sum, we conclude that, as a general rule, a defendant who has agreed \"[t]o waive knowingly and expressly all rights, conferred by 18 U.S.C. SS 3742, to appeal whatever sentence is imposed,\" J.A. 66, has waived his right to appeal a restitution order.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"71 F.3d 1143, 1146-47","parenthetical":"implicitly finding that a defendant who waives the \"right to appeal her sentence on [the] grounds [listed in 18 U.S.C.A. SS 3742(a","sentence":"See United States v. Broughton-Jones, 71 F.3d 1143, 1146-47 (4th Cir.1995) (implicitly finding that a defendant who waives the \u201cright to appeal her sentence on [the] grounds [listed in 18 U.S.C.A. \u00a7 3742(a) ]\u201d is deemed to have waived the right to appeal a lawfully imposed restitution order); see also United States v. Sharp, 442 F.3d 946, 948-52 (6th Cir.2006) (dismissing appeal of restitution order where defendant waived the right \u201cto appeal the conviction or sentence in this case, including the appeal right conferred by 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 3742, and to challenge the conviction or sentence collaterally,\u201d but reserved the right to appeal a punishment in excess of the statutory maximum and an upward departure from the most applicable sentencing guidelines range, because restitution fell under neither exception); United States v. Behrman, 235 F.3d 1049, 1052 (7th Cir.2000) (concluding that \u201c[a]n agreement waiving appeal from \u2018any sentence within the maximum provided by Title 18\u2019 or similar language would foreclose [an appeal from the restitution order]\u201d); but see United States v. Phillips, 174 F.3d 1074, 1075-76 (9th Cir.1999) (finding no waiver of right to appeal restitution where defendant \u201cknowingly and voluntarily waive[d][his] right to appeal any sentence and restitution order imposed by the Court and the manner in which the Court determine[d][his] sentence and restitution order, so long as the sentence is up to a net offense level of 12 following an adjustment for acceptance of responsibility,\u201d because the plea agreement contained no cap on restitution and the plea agreement was ambiguous as to the amount of damages the defendant might owe); United States v. Cupit, 169 F.3d 536, 539 (8th Cir.1999) (per curiam) (considering challenge to restitution order despite defendant\u2019s agreement to \u201cwaive all rights to appeal whatever sentence is imposed,\u201d expressly declining to \u201cresolve the waiver of restitution issue in this case\u201d); United States v. Ready, 82 F.3d 551, 559-60 (2d Cir.1996) (concluding that defendant did not waive his right to appeal a restitution order despite his \u201cadmittedly broad [ Jwaiver of right to appeal \u2018whatever sentence is imposed\u2019 \u201d because the terms of the plea agreement were ambiguous as to whether \u201csentence\u201d included \u201crestitution\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"235 F.3d 1049, 1052","parenthetical":"concluding that \"[a]n agreement waiving appeal from 'any sentence within the maximum provided by Title 18' or similar language would foreclose [an appeal from the restitution order]\"","sentence":"See United States v. Broughton-Jones, 71 F.3d 1143, 1146-47 (4th Cir.1995) (implicitly finding that a defendant who waives the \u201cright to appeal her sentence on [the] grounds [listed in 18 U.S.C.A. \u00a7 3742(a) ]\u201d is deemed to have waived the right to appeal a lawfully imposed restitution order); see also United States v. Sharp, 442 F.3d 946, 948-52 (6th Cir.2006) (dismissing appeal of restitution order where defendant waived the right \u201cto appeal the conviction or sentence in this case, including the appeal right conferred by 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 3742, and to challenge the conviction or sentence collaterally,\u201d but reserved the right to appeal a punishment in excess of the statutory maximum and an upward departure from the most applicable sentencing guidelines range, because restitution fell under neither exception); United States v. Behrman, 235 F.3d 1049, 1052 (7th Cir.2000) (concluding that \u201c[a]n agreement waiving appeal from \u2018any sentence within the maximum provided by Title 18\u2019 or similar language would foreclose [an appeal from the restitution order]\u201d); but see United States v. Phillips, 174 F.3d 1074, 1075-76 (9th Cir.1999) (finding no waiver of right to appeal restitution where defendant \u201cknowingly and voluntarily waive[d][his] right to appeal any sentence and restitution order imposed by the Court and the manner in which the Court determine[d][his] sentence and restitution order, so long as the sentence is up to a net offense level of 12 following an adjustment for acceptance of responsibility,\u201d because the plea agreement contained no cap on restitution and the plea agreement was ambiguous as to the amount of damages the defendant might owe); United States v. Cupit, 169 F.3d 536, 539 (8th Cir.1999) (per curiam) (considering challenge to restitution order despite defendant\u2019s agreement to \u201cwaive all rights to appeal whatever sentence is imposed,\u201d expressly declining to \u201cresolve the waiver of restitution issue in this case\u201d); United States v. Ready, 82 F.3d 551, 559-60 (2d Cir.1996) (concluding that defendant did not waive his right to appeal a restitution order despite his \u201cadmittedly broad [ Jwaiver of right to appeal \u2018whatever sentence is imposed\u2019 \u201d because the terms of the plea agreement were ambiguous as to whether \u201csentence\u201d included \u201crestitution\u201d)."},"case_id":3645418,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In sum, we conclude that, as a general rule, a defendant who has agreed \"[t]o waive knowingly and expressly all rights, conferred by 18 U.S.C. SS 3742, to appeal whatever sentence is imposed,\" J.A. 66, has waived his right to appeal a restitution order.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"71 F.3d 1143, 1146-47","parenthetical":"implicitly finding that a defendant who waives the \"right to appeal her sentence on [the] grounds [listed in 18 U.S.C.A. SS 3742(a","sentence":"See United States v. Broughton-Jones, 71 F.3d 1143, 1146-47 (4th Cir.1995) (implicitly finding that a defendant who waives the \u201cright to appeal her sentence on [the] grounds [listed in 18 U.S.C.A. \u00a7 3742(a) ]\u201d is deemed to have waived the right to appeal a lawfully imposed restitution order); see also United States v. Sharp, 442 F.3d 946, 948-52 (6th Cir.2006) (dismissing appeal of restitution order where defendant waived the right \u201cto appeal the conviction or sentence in this case, including the appeal right conferred by 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 3742, and to challenge the conviction or sentence collaterally,\u201d but reserved the right to appeal a punishment in excess of the statutory maximum and an upward departure from the most applicable sentencing guidelines range, because restitution fell under neither exception); United States v. Behrman, 235 F.3d 1049, 1052 (7th Cir.2000) (concluding that \u201c[a]n agreement waiving appeal from \u2018any sentence within the maximum provided by Title 18\u2019 or similar language would foreclose [an appeal from the restitution order]\u201d); but see United States v. Phillips, 174 F.3d 1074, 1075-76 (9th Cir.1999) (finding no waiver of right to appeal restitution where defendant \u201cknowingly and voluntarily waive[d][his] right to appeal any sentence and restitution order imposed by the Court and the manner in which the Court determine[d][his] sentence and restitution order, so long as the sentence is up to a net offense level of 12 following an adjustment for acceptance of responsibility,\u201d because the plea agreement contained no cap on restitution and the plea agreement was ambiguous as to the amount of damages the defendant might owe); United States v. Cupit, 169 F.3d 536, 539 (8th Cir.1999) (per curiam) (considering challenge to restitution order despite defendant\u2019s agreement to \u201cwaive all rights to appeal whatever sentence is imposed,\u201d expressly declining to \u201cresolve the waiver of restitution issue in this case\u201d); United States v. Ready, 82 F.3d 551, 559-60 (2d Cir.1996) (concluding that defendant did not waive his right to appeal a restitution order despite his \u201cadmittedly broad [ Jwaiver of right to appeal \u2018whatever sentence is imposed\u2019 \u201d because the terms of the plea agreement were ambiguous as to whether \u201csentence\u201d included \u201crestitution\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"174 F.3d 1074, 1075-76","parenthetical":"finding no waiver of right to appeal restitution where defendant \"knowingly and voluntarily waive[d][his] right to appeal any sentence and restitution order imposed by the Court and the manner in which the Court determine[d][his] sentence and restitution order, so long as the sentence is up to a net offense level of 12 following an adjustment for acceptance of responsibility,\" because the plea agreement contained no cap on restitution and the plea agreement was ambiguous as to the amount of damages the defendant might owe","sentence":"See United States v. Broughton-Jones, 71 F.3d 1143, 1146-47 (4th Cir.1995) (implicitly finding that a defendant who waives the \u201cright to appeal her sentence on [the] grounds [listed in 18 U.S.C.A. \u00a7 3742(a) ]\u201d is deemed to have waived the right to appeal a lawfully imposed restitution order); see also United States v. Sharp, 442 F.3d 946, 948-52 (6th Cir.2006) (dismissing appeal of restitution order where defendant waived the right \u201cto appeal the conviction or sentence in this case, including the appeal right conferred by 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 3742, and to challenge the conviction or sentence collaterally,\u201d but reserved the right to appeal a punishment in excess of the statutory maximum and an upward departure from the most applicable sentencing guidelines range, because restitution fell under neither exception); United States v. Behrman, 235 F.3d 1049, 1052 (7th Cir.2000) (concluding that \u201c[a]n agreement waiving appeal from \u2018any sentence within the maximum provided by Title 18\u2019 or similar language would foreclose [an appeal from the restitution order]\u201d); but see United States v. Phillips, 174 F.3d 1074, 1075-76 (9th Cir.1999) (finding no waiver of right to appeal restitution where defendant \u201cknowingly and voluntarily waive[d][his] right to appeal any sentence and restitution order imposed by the Court and the manner in which the Court determine[d][his] sentence and restitution order, so long as the sentence is up to a net offense level of 12 following an adjustment for acceptance of responsibility,\u201d because the plea agreement contained no cap on restitution and the plea agreement was ambiguous as to the amount of damages the defendant might owe); United States v. Cupit, 169 F.3d 536, 539 (8th Cir.1999) (per curiam) (considering challenge to restitution order despite defendant\u2019s agreement to \u201cwaive all rights to appeal whatever sentence is imposed,\u201d expressly declining to \u201cresolve the waiver of restitution issue in this case\u201d); United States v. Ready, 82 F.3d 551, 559-60 (2d Cir.1996) (concluding that defendant did not waive his right to appeal a restitution order despite his \u201cadmittedly broad [ Jwaiver of right to appeal \u2018whatever sentence is imposed\u2019 \u201d because the terms of the plea agreement were ambiguous as to whether \u201csentence\u201d included \u201crestitution\u201d)."},"case_id":3645418,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In sum, we conclude that, as a general rule, a defendant who has agreed \"[t]o waive knowingly and expressly all rights, conferred by 18 U.S.C. SS 3742, to appeal whatever sentence is imposed,\" J.A. 66, has waived his right to appeal a restitution order.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"169 F.3d 536, 539","parenthetical":"considering challenge to restitution order despite defendant's agreement to \"waive all rights to appeal whatever sentence is imposed,\" expressly declining to \"resolve the waiver of restitution issue in this case\"","sentence":"See United States v. Broughton-Jones, 71 F.3d 1143, 1146-47 (4th Cir.1995) (implicitly finding that a defendant who waives the \u201cright to appeal her sentence on [the] grounds [listed in 18 U.S.C.A. \u00a7 3742(a) ]\u201d is deemed to have waived the right to appeal a lawfully imposed restitution order); see also United States v. Sharp, 442 F.3d 946, 948-52 (6th Cir.2006) (dismissing appeal of restitution order where defendant waived the right \u201cto appeal the conviction or sentence in this case, including the appeal right conferred by 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 3742, and to challenge the conviction or sentence collaterally,\u201d but reserved the right to appeal a punishment in excess of the statutory maximum and an upward departure from the most applicable sentencing guidelines range, because restitution fell under neither exception); United States v. Behrman, 235 F.3d 1049, 1052 (7th Cir.2000) (concluding that \u201c[a]n agreement waiving appeal from \u2018any sentence within the maximum provided by Title 18\u2019 or similar language would foreclose [an appeal from the restitution order]\u201d); but see United States v. Phillips, 174 F.3d 1074, 1075-76 (9th Cir.1999) (finding no waiver of right to appeal restitution where defendant \u201cknowingly and voluntarily waive[d][his] right to appeal any sentence and restitution order imposed by the Court and the manner in which the Court determine[d][his] sentence and restitution order, so long as the sentence is up to a net offense level of 12 following an adjustment for acceptance of responsibility,\u201d because the plea agreement contained no cap on restitution and the plea agreement was ambiguous as to the amount of damages the defendant might owe); United States v. Cupit, 169 F.3d 536, 539 (8th Cir.1999) (per curiam) (considering challenge to restitution order despite defendant\u2019s agreement to \u201cwaive all rights to appeal whatever sentence is imposed,\u201d expressly declining to \u201cresolve the waiver of restitution issue in this case\u201d); United States v. Ready, 82 F.3d 551, 559-60 (2d Cir.1996) (concluding that defendant did not waive his right to appeal a restitution order despite his \u201cadmittedly broad [ Jwaiver of right to appeal \u2018whatever sentence is imposed\u2019 \u201d because the terms of the plea agreement were ambiguous as to whether \u201csentence\u201d included \u201crestitution\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"71 F.3d 1143, 1146-47","parenthetical":"implicitly finding that a defendant who waives the \"right to appeal her sentence on [the] grounds [listed in 18 U.S.C.A. SS 3742(a","sentence":"See United States v. Broughton-Jones, 71 F.3d 1143, 1146-47 (4th Cir.1995) (implicitly finding that a defendant who waives the \u201cright to appeal her sentence on [the] grounds [listed in 18 U.S.C.A. \u00a7 3742(a) ]\u201d is deemed to have waived the right to appeal a lawfully imposed restitution order); see also United States v. Sharp, 442 F.3d 946, 948-52 (6th Cir.2006) (dismissing appeal of restitution order where defendant waived the right \u201cto appeal the conviction or sentence in this case, including the appeal right conferred by 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 3742, and to challenge the conviction or sentence collaterally,\u201d but reserved the right to appeal a punishment in excess of the statutory maximum and an upward departure from the most applicable sentencing guidelines range, because restitution fell under neither exception); United States v. Behrman, 235 F.3d 1049, 1052 (7th Cir.2000) (concluding that \u201c[a]n agreement waiving appeal from \u2018any sentence within the maximum provided by Title 18\u2019 or similar language would foreclose [an appeal from the restitution order]\u201d); but see United States v. Phillips, 174 F.3d 1074, 1075-76 (9th Cir.1999) (finding no waiver of right to appeal restitution where defendant \u201cknowingly and voluntarily waive[d][his] right to appeal any sentence and restitution order imposed by the Court and the manner in which the Court determine[d][his] sentence and restitution order, so long as the sentence is up to a net offense level of 12 following an adjustment for acceptance of responsibility,\u201d because the plea agreement contained no cap on restitution and the plea agreement was ambiguous as to the amount of damages the defendant might owe); United States v. Cupit, 169 F.3d 536, 539 (8th Cir.1999) (per curiam) (considering challenge to restitution order despite defendant\u2019s agreement to \u201cwaive all rights to appeal whatever sentence is imposed,\u201d expressly declining to \u201cresolve the waiver of restitution issue in this case\u201d); United States v. Ready, 82 F.3d 551, 559-60 (2d Cir.1996) (concluding that defendant did not waive his right to appeal a restitution order despite his \u201cadmittedly broad [ Jwaiver of right to appeal \u2018whatever sentence is imposed\u2019 \u201d because the terms of the plea agreement were ambiguous as to whether \u201csentence\u201d included \u201crestitution\u201d)."},"case_id":3645418,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In sum, we conclude that, as a general rule, a defendant who has agreed \"[t]o waive knowingly and expressly all rights, conferred by 18 U.S.C. SS 3742, to appeal whatever sentence is imposed,\" J.A. 66, has waived his right to appeal a restitution order.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"82 F.3d 551, 559-60","parenthetical":"concluding that defendant did not waive his right to appeal a restitution order despite his \"admittedly broad [ Jwaiver of right to appeal 'whatever sentence is imposed' \" because the terms of the plea agreement were ambiguous as to whether \"sentence\" included \"restitution\"","sentence":"See United States v. Broughton-Jones, 71 F.3d 1143, 1146-47 (4th Cir.1995) (implicitly finding that a defendant who waives the \u201cright to appeal her sentence on [the] grounds [listed in 18 U.S.C.A. \u00a7 3742(a) ]\u201d is deemed to have waived the right to appeal a lawfully imposed restitution order); see also United States v. Sharp, 442 F.3d 946, 948-52 (6th Cir.2006) (dismissing appeal of restitution order where defendant waived the right \u201cto appeal the conviction or sentence in this case, including the appeal right conferred by 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 3742, and to challenge the conviction or sentence collaterally,\u201d but reserved the right to appeal a punishment in excess of the statutory maximum and an upward departure from the most applicable sentencing guidelines range, because restitution fell under neither exception); United States v. Behrman, 235 F.3d 1049, 1052 (7th Cir.2000) (concluding that \u201c[a]n agreement waiving appeal from \u2018any sentence within the maximum provided by Title 18\u2019 or similar language would foreclose [an appeal from the restitution order]\u201d); but see United States v. Phillips, 174 F.3d 1074, 1075-76 (9th Cir.1999) (finding no waiver of right to appeal restitution where defendant \u201cknowingly and voluntarily waive[d][his] right to appeal any sentence and restitution order imposed by the Court and the manner in which the Court determine[d][his] sentence and restitution order, so long as the sentence is up to a net offense level of 12 following an adjustment for acceptance of responsibility,\u201d because the plea agreement contained no cap on restitution and the plea agreement was ambiguous as to the amount of damages the defendant might owe); United States v. Cupit, 169 F.3d 536, 539 (8th Cir.1999) (per curiam) (considering challenge to restitution order despite defendant\u2019s agreement to \u201cwaive all rights to appeal whatever sentence is imposed,\u201d expressly declining to \u201cresolve the waiver of restitution issue in this case\u201d); United States v. Ready, 82 F.3d 551, 559-60 (2d Cir.1996) (concluding that defendant did not waive his right to appeal a restitution order despite his \u201cadmittedly broad [ Jwaiver of right to appeal \u2018whatever sentence is imposed\u2019 \u201d because the terms of the plea agreement were ambiguous as to whether \u201csentence\u201d included \u201crestitution\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"71 F.3d 1143, 1146-47","parenthetical":"implicitly finding that a defendant who waives the \"right to appeal her sentence on [the] grounds [listed in 18 U.S.C.A. SS 3742(a","sentence":"See United States v. Broughton-Jones, 71 F.3d 1143, 1146-47 (4th Cir.1995) (implicitly finding that a defendant who waives the \u201cright to appeal her sentence on [the] grounds [listed in 18 U.S.C.A. \u00a7 3742(a) ]\u201d is deemed to have waived the right to appeal a lawfully imposed restitution order); see also United States v. Sharp, 442 F.3d 946, 948-52 (6th Cir.2006) (dismissing appeal of restitution order where defendant waived the right \u201cto appeal the conviction or sentence in this case, including the appeal right conferred by 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 3742, and to challenge the conviction or sentence collaterally,\u201d but reserved the right to appeal a punishment in excess of the statutory maximum and an upward departure from the most applicable sentencing guidelines range, because restitution fell under neither exception); United States v. Behrman, 235 F.3d 1049, 1052 (7th Cir.2000) (concluding that \u201c[a]n agreement waiving appeal from \u2018any sentence within the maximum provided by Title 18\u2019 or similar language would foreclose [an appeal from the restitution order]\u201d); but see United States v. Phillips, 174 F.3d 1074, 1075-76 (9th Cir.1999) (finding no waiver of right to appeal restitution where defendant \u201cknowingly and voluntarily waive[d][his] right to appeal any sentence and restitution order imposed by the Court and the manner in which the Court determine[d][his] sentence and restitution order, so long as the sentence is up to a net offense level of 12 following an adjustment for acceptance of responsibility,\u201d because the plea agreement contained no cap on restitution and the plea agreement was ambiguous as to the amount of damages the defendant might owe); United States v. Cupit, 169 F.3d 536, 539 (8th Cir.1999) (per curiam) (considering challenge to restitution order despite defendant\u2019s agreement to \u201cwaive all rights to appeal whatever sentence is imposed,\u201d expressly declining to \u201cresolve the waiver of restitution issue in this case\u201d); United States v. Ready, 82 F.3d 551, 559-60 (2d Cir.1996) (concluding that defendant did not waive his right to appeal a restitution order despite his \u201cadmittedly broad [ Jwaiver of right to appeal \u2018whatever sentence is imposed\u2019 \u201d because the terms of the plea agreement were ambiguous as to whether \u201csentence\u201d included \u201crestitution\u201d)."},"case_id":3645418,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In sum, we conclude that, as a general rule, a defendant who has agreed \"[t]o waive knowingly and expressly all rights, conferred by 18 U.S.C. SS 3742, to appeal whatever sentence is imposed,\" J.A. 66, has waived his right to appeal a restitution order.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"174 F.3d 1074, 1075-76","parenthetical":"finding no waiver of right to appeal restitution where defendant \"knowingly and voluntarily waive[d][his] right to appeal any sentence and restitution order imposed by the Court and the manner in which the Court determine[d][his] sentence and restitution order, so long as the sentence is up to a net offense level of 12 following an adjustment for acceptance of responsibility,\" because the plea agreement contained no cap on restitution and the plea agreement was ambiguous as to the amount of damages the defendant might owe","sentence":"See United States v. Broughton-Jones, 71 F.3d 1143, 1146-47 (4th Cir.1995) (implicitly finding that a defendant who waives the \u201cright to appeal her sentence on [the] grounds [listed in 18 U.S.C.A. \u00a7 3742(a) ]\u201d is deemed to have waived the right to appeal a lawfully imposed restitution order); see also United States v. Sharp, 442 F.3d 946, 948-52 (6th Cir.2006) (dismissing appeal of restitution order where defendant waived the right \u201cto appeal the conviction or sentence in this case, including the appeal right conferred by 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 3742, and to challenge the conviction or sentence collaterally,\u201d but reserved the right to appeal a punishment in excess of the statutory maximum and an upward departure from the most applicable sentencing guidelines range, because restitution fell under neither exception); United States v. Behrman, 235 F.3d 1049, 1052 (7th Cir.2000) (concluding that \u201c[a]n agreement waiving appeal from \u2018any sentence within the maximum provided by Title 18\u2019 or similar language would foreclose [an appeal from the restitution order]\u201d); but see United States v. Phillips, 174 F.3d 1074, 1075-76 (9th Cir.1999) (finding no waiver of right to appeal restitution where defendant \u201cknowingly and voluntarily waive[d][his] right to appeal any sentence and restitution order imposed by the Court and the manner in which the Court determine[d][his] sentence and restitution order, so long as the sentence is up to a net offense level of 12 following an adjustment for acceptance of responsibility,\u201d because the plea agreement contained no cap on restitution and the plea agreement was ambiguous as to the amount of damages the defendant might owe); United States v. Cupit, 169 F.3d 536, 539 (8th Cir.1999) (per curiam) (considering challenge to restitution order despite defendant\u2019s agreement to \u201cwaive all rights to appeal whatever sentence is imposed,\u201d expressly declining to \u201cresolve the waiver of restitution issue in this case\u201d); United States v. Ready, 82 F.3d 551, 559-60 (2d Cir.1996) (concluding that defendant did not waive his right to appeal a restitution order despite his \u201cadmittedly broad [ Jwaiver of right to appeal \u2018whatever sentence is imposed\u2019 \u201d because the terms of the plea agreement were ambiguous as to whether \u201csentence\u201d included \u201crestitution\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"442 F.3d 946, 948-52","parenthetical":"dismissing appeal of restitution order where defendant waived the right \"to appeal the conviction or sentence in this case, including the appeal right conferred by 18 U.S.C. SS 3742, and to challenge the conviction or sentence collaterally,\" but reserved the right to appeal a punishment in excess of the statutory maximum and an upward departure from the most applicable sentencing guidelines range, because restitution fell under neither exception","sentence":"See United States v. Broughton-Jones, 71 F.3d 1143, 1146-47 (4th Cir.1995) (implicitly finding that a defendant who waives the \u201cright to appeal her sentence on [the] grounds [listed in 18 U.S.C.A. \u00a7 3742(a) ]\u201d is deemed to have waived the right to appeal a lawfully imposed restitution order); see also United States v. Sharp, 442 F.3d 946, 948-52 (6th Cir.2006) (dismissing appeal of restitution order where defendant waived the right \u201cto appeal the conviction or sentence in this case, including the appeal right conferred by 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 3742, and to challenge the conviction or sentence collaterally,\u201d but reserved the right to appeal a punishment in excess of the statutory maximum and an upward departure from the most applicable sentencing guidelines range, because restitution fell under neither exception); United States v. Behrman, 235 F.3d 1049, 1052 (7th Cir.2000) (concluding that \u201c[a]n agreement waiving appeal from \u2018any sentence within the maximum provided by Title 18\u2019 or similar language would foreclose [an appeal from the restitution order]\u201d); but see United States v. Phillips, 174 F.3d 1074, 1075-76 (9th Cir.1999) (finding no waiver of right to appeal restitution where defendant \u201cknowingly and voluntarily waive[d][his] right to appeal any sentence and restitution order imposed by the Court and the manner in which the Court determine[d][his] sentence and restitution order, so long as the sentence is up to a net offense level of 12 following an adjustment for acceptance of responsibility,\u201d because the plea agreement contained no cap on restitution and the plea agreement was ambiguous as to the amount of damages the defendant might owe); United States v. Cupit, 169 F.3d 536, 539 (8th Cir.1999) (per curiam) (considering challenge to restitution order despite defendant\u2019s agreement to \u201cwaive all rights to appeal whatever sentence is imposed,\u201d expressly declining to \u201cresolve the waiver of restitution issue in this case\u201d); United States v. Ready, 82 F.3d 551, 559-60 (2d Cir.1996) (concluding that defendant did not waive his right to appeal a restitution order despite his \u201cadmittedly broad [ Jwaiver of right to appeal \u2018whatever sentence is imposed\u2019 \u201d because the terms of the plea agreement were ambiguous as to whether \u201csentence\u201d included \u201crestitution\u201d)."},"case_id":3645418,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In sum, we conclude that, as a general rule, a defendant who has agreed \"[t]o waive knowingly and expressly all rights, conferred by 18 U.S.C. SS 3742, to appeal whatever sentence is imposed,\" J.A. 66, has waived his right to appeal a restitution order.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"442 F.3d 946, 948-52","parenthetical":"dismissing appeal of restitution order where defendant waived the right \"to appeal the conviction or sentence in this case, including the appeal right conferred by 18 U.S.C. SS 3742, and to challenge the conviction or sentence collaterally,\" but reserved the right to appeal a punishment in excess of the statutory maximum and an upward departure from the most applicable sentencing guidelines range, because restitution fell under neither exception","sentence":"See United States v. Broughton-Jones, 71 F.3d 1143, 1146-47 (4th Cir.1995) (implicitly finding that a defendant who waives the \u201cright to appeal her sentence on [the] grounds [listed in 18 U.S.C.A. \u00a7 3742(a) ]\u201d is deemed to have waived the right to appeal a lawfully imposed restitution order); see also United States v. Sharp, 442 F.3d 946, 948-52 (6th Cir.2006) (dismissing appeal of restitution order where defendant waived the right \u201cto appeal the conviction or sentence in this case, including the appeal right conferred by 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 3742, and to challenge the conviction or sentence collaterally,\u201d but reserved the right to appeal a punishment in excess of the statutory maximum and an upward departure from the most applicable sentencing guidelines range, because restitution fell under neither exception); United States v. Behrman, 235 F.3d 1049, 1052 (7th Cir.2000) (concluding that \u201c[a]n agreement waiving appeal from \u2018any sentence within the maximum provided by Title 18\u2019 or similar language would foreclose [an appeal from the restitution order]\u201d); but see United States v. Phillips, 174 F.3d 1074, 1075-76 (9th Cir.1999) (finding no waiver of right to appeal restitution where defendant \u201cknowingly and voluntarily waive[d][his] right to appeal any sentence and restitution order imposed by the Court and the manner in which the Court determine[d][his] sentence and restitution order, so long as the sentence is up to a net offense level of 12 following an adjustment for acceptance of responsibility,\u201d because the plea agreement contained no cap on restitution and the plea agreement was ambiguous as to the amount of damages the defendant might owe); United States v. Cupit, 169 F.3d 536, 539 (8th Cir.1999) (per curiam) (considering challenge to restitution order despite defendant\u2019s agreement to \u201cwaive all rights to appeal whatever sentence is imposed,\u201d expressly declining to \u201cresolve the waiver of restitution issue in this case\u201d); United States v. Ready, 82 F.3d 551, 559-60 (2d Cir.1996) (concluding that defendant did not waive his right to appeal a restitution order despite his \u201cadmittedly broad [ Jwaiver of right to appeal \u2018whatever sentence is imposed\u2019 \u201d because the terms of the plea agreement were ambiguous as to whether \u201csentence\u201d included \u201crestitution\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"169 F.3d 536, 539","parenthetical":"considering challenge to restitution order despite defendant's agreement to \"waive all rights to appeal whatever sentence is imposed,\" expressly declining to \"resolve the waiver of restitution issue in this case\"","sentence":"See United States v. Broughton-Jones, 71 F.3d 1143, 1146-47 (4th Cir.1995) (implicitly finding that a defendant who waives the \u201cright to appeal her sentence on [the] grounds [listed in 18 U.S.C.A. \u00a7 3742(a) ]\u201d is deemed to have waived the right to appeal a lawfully imposed restitution order); see also United States v. Sharp, 442 F.3d 946, 948-52 (6th Cir.2006) (dismissing appeal of restitution order where defendant waived the right \u201cto appeal the conviction or sentence in this case, including the appeal right conferred by 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 3742, and to challenge the conviction or sentence collaterally,\u201d but reserved the right to appeal a punishment in excess of the statutory maximum and an upward departure from the most applicable sentencing guidelines range, because restitution fell under neither exception); United States v. Behrman, 235 F.3d 1049, 1052 (7th Cir.2000) (concluding that \u201c[a]n agreement waiving appeal from \u2018any sentence within the maximum provided by Title 18\u2019 or similar language would foreclose [an appeal from the restitution order]\u201d); but see United States v. Phillips, 174 F.3d 1074, 1075-76 (9th Cir.1999) (finding no waiver of right to appeal restitution where defendant \u201cknowingly and voluntarily waive[d][his] right to appeal any sentence and restitution order imposed by the Court and the manner in which the Court determine[d][his] sentence and restitution order, so long as the sentence is up to a net offense level of 12 following an adjustment for acceptance of responsibility,\u201d because the plea agreement contained no cap on restitution and the plea agreement was ambiguous as to the amount of damages the defendant might owe); United States v. Cupit, 169 F.3d 536, 539 (8th Cir.1999) (per curiam) (considering challenge to restitution order despite defendant\u2019s agreement to \u201cwaive all rights to appeal whatever sentence is imposed,\u201d expressly declining to \u201cresolve the waiver of restitution issue in this case\u201d); United States v. Ready, 82 F.3d 551, 559-60 (2d Cir.1996) (concluding that defendant did not waive his right to appeal a restitution order despite his \u201cadmittedly broad [ Jwaiver of right to appeal \u2018whatever sentence is imposed\u2019 \u201d because the terms of the plea agreement were ambiguous as to whether \u201csentence\u201d included \u201crestitution\u201d)."},"case_id":3645418,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In sum, we conclude that, as a general rule, a defendant who has agreed \"[t]o waive knowingly and expressly all rights, conferred by 18 U.S.C. SS 3742, to appeal whatever sentence is imposed,\" J.A. 66, has waived his right to appeal a restitution order.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"82 F.3d 551, 559-60","parenthetical":"concluding that defendant did not waive his right to appeal a restitution order despite his \"admittedly broad [ Jwaiver of right to appeal 'whatever sentence is imposed' \" because the terms of the plea agreement were ambiguous as to whether \"sentence\" included \"restitution\"","sentence":"See United States v. Broughton-Jones, 71 F.3d 1143, 1146-47 (4th Cir.1995) (implicitly finding that a defendant who waives the \u201cright to appeal her sentence on [the] grounds [listed in 18 U.S.C.A. \u00a7 3742(a) ]\u201d is deemed to have waived the right to appeal a lawfully imposed restitution order); see also United States v. Sharp, 442 F.3d 946, 948-52 (6th Cir.2006) (dismissing appeal of restitution order where defendant waived the right \u201cto appeal the conviction or sentence in this case, including the appeal right conferred by 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 3742, and to challenge the conviction or sentence collaterally,\u201d but reserved the right to appeal a punishment in excess of the statutory maximum and an upward departure from the most applicable sentencing guidelines range, because restitution fell under neither exception); United States v. Behrman, 235 F.3d 1049, 1052 (7th Cir.2000) (concluding that \u201c[a]n agreement waiving appeal from \u2018any sentence within the maximum provided by Title 18\u2019 or similar language would foreclose [an appeal from the restitution order]\u201d); but see United States v. Phillips, 174 F.3d 1074, 1075-76 (9th Cir.1999) (finding no waiver of right to appeal restitution where defendant \u201cknowingly and voluntarily waive[d][his] right to appeal any sentence and restitution order imposed by the Court and the manner in which the Court determine[d][his] sentence and restitution order, so long as the sentence is up to a net offense level of 12 following an adjustment for acceptance of responsibility,\u201d because the plea agreement contained no cap on restitution and the plea agreement was ambiguous as to the amount of damages the defendant might owe); United States v. Cupit, 169 F.3d 536, 539 (8th Cir.1999) (per curiam) (considering challenge to restitution order despite defendant\u2019s agreement to \u201cwaive all rights to appeal whatever sentence is imposed,\u201d expressly declining to \u201cresolve the waiver of restitution issue in this case\u201d); United States v. Ready, 82 F.3d 551, 559-60 (2d Cir.1996) (concluding that defendant did not waive his right to appeal a restitution order despite his \u201cadmittedly broad [ Jwaiver of right to appeal \u2018whatever sentence is imposed\u2019 \u201d because the terms of the plea agreement were ambiguous as to whether \u201csentence\u201d included \u201crestitution\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"442 F.3d 946, 948-52","parenthetical":"dismissing appeal of restitution order where defendant waived the right \"to appeal the conviction or sentence in this case, including the appeal right conferred by 18 U.S.C. SS 3742, and to challenge the conviction or sentence collaterally,\" but reserved the right to appeal a punishment in excess of the statutory maximum and an upward departure from the most applicable sentencing guidelines range, because restitution fell under neither exception","sentence":"See United States v. Broughton-Jones, 71 F.3d 1143, 1146-47 (4th Cir.1995) (implicitly finding that a defendant who waives the \u201cright to appeal her sentence on [the] grounds [listed in 18 U.S.C.A. \u00a7 3742(a) ]\u201d is deemed to have waived the right to appeal a lawfully imposed restitution order); see also United States v. Sharp, 442 F.3d 946, 948-52 (6th Cir.2006) (dismissing appeal of restitution order where defendant waived the right \u201cto appeal the conviction or sentence in this case, including the appeal right conferred by 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 3742, and to challenge the conviction or sentence collaterally,\u201d but reserved the right to appeal a punishment in excess of the statutory maximum and an upward departure from the most applicable sentencing guidelines range, because restitution fell under neither exception); United States v. Behrman, 235 F.3d 1049, 1052 (7th Cir.2000) (concluding that \u201c[a]n agreement waiving appeal from \u2018any sentence within the maximum provided by Title 18\u2019 or similar language would foreclose [an appeal from the restitution order]\u201d); but see United States v. Phillips, 174 F.3d 1074, 1075-76 (9th Cir.1999) (finding no waiver of right to appeal restitution where defendant \u201cknowingly and voluntarily waive[d][his] right to appeal any sentence and restitution order imposed by the Court and the manner in which the Court determine[d][his] sentence and restitution order, so long as the sentence is up to a net offense level of 12 following an adjustment for acceptance of responsibility,\u201d because the plea agreement contained no cap on restitution and the plea agreement was ambiguous as to the amount of damages the defendant might owe); United States v. Cupit, 169 F.3d 536, 539 (8th Cir.1999) (per curiam) (considering challenge to restitution order despite defendant\u2019s agreement to \u201cwaive all rights to appeal whatever sentence is imposed,\u201d expressly declining to \u201cresolve the waiver of restitution issue in this case\u201d); United States v. Ready, 82 F.3d 551, 559-60 (2d Cir.1996) (concluding that defendant did not waive his right to appeal a restitution order despite his \u201cadmittedly broad [ Jwaiver of right to appeal \u2018whatever sentence is imposed\u2019 \u201d because the terms of the plea agreement were ambiguous as to whether \u201csentence\u201d included \u201crestitution\u201d)."},"case_id":3645418,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In sum, we conclude that, as a general rule, a defendant who has agreed \"[t]o waive knowingly and expressly all rights, conferred by 18 U.S.C. SS 3742, to appeal whatever sentence is imposed,\" J.A. 66, has waived his right to appeal a restitution order.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"174 F.3d 1074, 1075-76","parenthetical":"finding no waiver of right to appeal restitution where defendant \"knowingly and voluntarily waive[d][his] right to appeal any sentence and restitution order imposed by the Court and the manner in which the Court determine[d][his] sentence and restitution order, so long as the sentence is up to a net offense level of 12 following an adjustment for acceptance of responsibility,\" because the plea agreement contained no cap on restitution and the plea agreement was ambiguous as to the amount of damages the defendant might owe","sentence":"See United States v. Broughton-Jones, 71 F.3d 1143, 1146-47 (4th Cir.1995) (implicitly finding that a defendant who waives the \u201cright to appeal her sentence on [the] grounds [listed in 18 U.S.C.A. \u00a7 3742(a) ]\u201d is deemed to have waived the right to appeal a lawfully imposed restitution order); see also United States v. Sharp, 442 F.3d 946, 948-52 (6th Cir.2006) (dismissing appeal of restitution order where defendant waived the right \u201cto appeal the conviction or sentence in this case, including the appeal right conferred by 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 3742, and to challenge the conviction or sentence collaterally,\u201d but reserved the right to appeal a punishment in excess of the statutory maximum and an upward departure from the most applicable sentencing guidelines range, because restitution fell under neither exception); United States v. Behrman, 235 F.3d 1049, 1052 (7th Cir.2000) (concluding that \u201c[a]n agreement waiving appeal from \u2018any sentence within the maximum provided by Title 18\u2019 or similar language would foreclose [an appeal from the restitution order]\u201d); but see United States v. Phillips, 174 F.3d 1074, 1075-76 (9th Cir.1999) (finding no waiver of right to appeal restitution where defendant \u201cknowingly and voluntarily waive[d][his] right to appeal any sentence and restitution order imposed by the Court and the manner in which the Court determine[d][his] sentence and restitution order, so long as the sentence is up to a net offense level of 12 following an adjustment for acceptance of responsibility,\u201d because the plea agreement contained no cap on restitution and the plea agreement was ambiguous as to the amount of damages the defendant might owe); United States v. Cupit, 169 F.3d 536, 539 (8th Cir.1999) (per curiam) (considering challenge to restitution order despite defendant\u2019s agreement to \u201cwaive all rights to appeal whatever sentence is imposed,\u201d expressly declining to \u201cresolve the waiver of restitution issue in this case\u201d); United States v. Ready, 82 F.3d 551, 559-60 (2d Cir.1996) (concluding that defendant did not waive his right to appeal a restitution order despite his \u201cadmittedly broad [ Jwaiver of right to appeal \u2018whatever sentence is imposed\u2019 \u201d because the terms of the plea agreement were ambiguous as to whether \u201csentence\u201d included \u201crestitution\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"235 F.3d 1049, 1052","parenthetical":"concluding that \"[a]n agreement waiving appeal from 'any sentence within the maximum provided by Title 18' or similar language would foreclose [an appeal from the restitution order]\"","sentence":"See United States v. Broughton-Jones, 71 F.3d 1143, 1146-47 (4th Cir.1995) (implicitly finding that a defendant who waives the \u201cright to appeal her sentence on [the] grounds [listed in 18 U.S.C.A. \u00a7 3742(a) ]\u201d is deemed to have waived the right to appeal a lawfully imposed restitution order); see also United States v. Sharp, 442 F.3d 946, 948-52 (6th Cir.2006) (dismissing appeal of restitution order where defendant waived the right \u201cto appeal the conviction or sentence in this case, including the appeal right conferred by 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 3742, and to challenge the conviction or sentence collaterally,\u201d but reserved the right to appeal a punishment in excess of the statutory maximum and an upward departure from the most applicable sentencing guidelines range, because restitution fell under neither exception); United States v. Behrman, 235 F.3d 1049, 1052 (7th Cir.2000) (concluding that \u201c[a]n agreement waiving appeal from \u2018any sentence within the maximum provided by Title 18\u2019 or similar language would foreclose [an appeal from the restitution order]\u201d); but see United States v. Phillips, 174 F.3d 1074, 1075-76 (9th Cir.1999) (finding no waiver of right to appeal restitution where defendant \u201cknowingly and voluntarily waive[d][his] right to appeal any sentence and restitution order imposed by the Court and the manner in which the Court determine[d][his] sentence and restitution order, so long as the sentence is up to a net offense level of 12 following an adjustment for acceptance of responsibility,\u201d because the plea agreement contained no cap on restitution and the plea agreement was ambiguous as to the amount of damages the defendant might owe); United States v. Cupit, 169 F.3d 536, 539 (8th Cir.1999) (per curiam) (considering challenge to restitution order despite defendant\u2019s agreement to \u201cwaive all rights to appeal whatever sentence is imposed,\u201d expressly declining to \u201cresolve the waiver of restitution issue in this case\u201d); United States v. Ready, 82 F.3d 551, 559-60 (2d Cir.1996) (concluding that defendant did not waive his right to appeal a restitution order despite his \u201cadmittedly broad [ Jwaiver of right to appeal \u2018whatever sentence is imposed\u2019 \u201d because the terms of the plea agreement were ambiguous as to whether \u201csentence\u201d included \u201crestitution\u201d)."},"case_id":3645418,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In sum, we conclude that, as a general rule, a defendant who has agreed \"[t]o waive knowingly and expressly all rights, conferred by 18 U.S.C. SS 3742, to appeal whatever sentence is imposed,\" J.A. 66, has waived his right to appeal a restitution order.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"169 F.3d 536, 539","parenthetical":"considering challenge to restitution order despite defendant's agreement to \"waive all rights to appeal whatever sentence is imposed,\" expressly declining to \"resolve the waiver of restitution issue in this case\"","sentence":"See United States v. Broughton-Jones, 71 F.3d 1143, 1146-47 (4th Cir.1995) (implicitly finding that a defendant who waives the \u201cright to appeal her sentence on [the] grounds [listed in 18 U.S.C.A. \u00a7 3742(a) ]\u201d is deemed to have waived the right to appeal a lawfully imposed restitution order); see also United States v. Sharp, 442 F.3d 946, 948-52 (6th Cir.2006) (dismissing appeal of restitution order where defendant waived the right \u201cto appeal the conviction or sentence in this case, including the appeal right conferred by 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 3742, and to challenge the conviction or sentence collaterally,\u201d but reserved the right to appeal a punishment in excess of the statutory maximum and an upward departure from the most applicable sentencing guidelines range, because restitution fell under neither exception); United States v. Behrman, 235 F.3d 1049, 1052 (7th Cir.2000) (concluding that \u201c[a]n agreement waiving appeal from \u2018any sentence within the maximum provided by Title 18\u2019 or similar language would foreclose [an appeal from the restitution order]\u201d); but see United States v. Phillips, 174 F.3d 1074, 1075-76 (9th Cir.1999) (finding no waiver of right to appeal restitution where defendant \u201cknowingly and voluntarily waive[d][his] right to appeal any sentence and restitution order imposed by the Court and the manner in which the Court determine[d][his] sentence and restitution order, so long as the sentence is up to a net offense level of 12 following an adjustment for acceptance of responsibility,\u201d because the plea agreement contained no cap on restitution and the plea agreement was ambiguous as to the amount of damages the defendant might owe); United States v. Cupit, 169 F.3d 536, 539 (8th Cir.1999) (per curiam) (considering challenge to restitution order despite defendant\u2019s agreement to \u201cwaive all rights to appeal whatever sentence is imposed,\u201d expressly declining to \u201cresolve the waiver of restitution issue in this case\u201d); United States v. Ready, 82 F.3d 551, 559-60 (2d Cir.1996) (concluding that defendant did not waive his right to appeal a restitution order despite his \u201cadmittedly broad [ Jwaiver of right to appeal \u2018whatever sentence is imposed\u2019 \u201d because the terms of the plea agreement were ambiguous as to whether \u201csentence\u201d included \u201crestitution\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"235 F.3d 1049, 1052","parenthetical":"concluding that \"[a]n agreement waiving appeal from 'any sentence within the maximum provided by Title 18' or similar language would foreclose [an appeal from the restitution order]\"","sentence":"See United States v. Broughton-Jones, 71 F.3d 1143, 1146-47 (4th Cir.1995) (implicitly finding that a defendant who waives the \u201cright to appeal her sentence on [the] grounds [listed in 18 U.S.C.A. \u00a7 3742(a) ]\u201d is deemed to have waived the right to appeal a lawfully imposed restitution order); see also United States v. Sharp, 442 F.3d 946, 948-52 (6th Cir.2006) (dismissing appeal of restitution order where defendant waived the right \u201cto appeal the conviction or sentence in this case, including the appeal right conferred by 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 3742, and to challenge the conviction or sentence collaterally,\u201d but reserved the right to appeal a punishment in excess of the statutory maximum and an upward departure from the most applicable sentencing guidelines range, because restitution fell under neither exception); United States v. Behrman, 235 F.3d 1049, 1052 (7th Cir.2000) (concluding that \u201c[a]n agreement waiving appeal from \u2018any sentence within the maximum provided by Title 18\u2019 or similar language would foreclose [an appeal from the restitution order]\u201d); but see United States v. Phillips, 174 F.3d 1074, 1075-76 (9th Cir.1999) (finding no waiver of right to appeal restitution where defendant \u201cknowingly and voluntarily waive[d][his] right to appeal any sentence and restitution order imposed by the Court and the manner in which the Court determine[d][his] sentence and restitution order, so long as the sentence is up to a net offense level of 12 following an adjustment for acceptance of responsibility,\u201d because the plea agreement contained no cap on restitution and the plea agreement was ambiguous as to the amount of damages the defendant might owe); United States v. Cupit, 169 F.3d 536, 539 (8th Cir.1999) (per curiam) (considering challenge to restitution order despite defendant\u2019s agreement to \u201cwaive all rights to appeal whatever sentence is imposed,\u201d expressly declining to \u201cresolve the waiver of restitution issue in this case\u201d); United States v. Ready, 82 F.3d 551, 559-60 (2d Cir.1996) (concluding that defendant did not waive his right to appeal a restitution order despite his \u201cadmittedly broad [ Jwaiver of right to appeal \u2018whatever sentence is imposed\u2019 \u201d because the terms of the plea agreement were ambiguous as to whether \u201csentence\u201d included \u201crestitution\u201d)."},"case_id":3645418,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In sum, we conclude that, as a general rule, a defendant who has agreed \"[t]o waive knowingly and expressly all rights, conferred by 18 U.S.C. SS 3742, to appeal whatever sentence is imposed,\" J.A. 66, has waived his right to appeal a restitution order.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"82 F.3d 551, 559-60","parenthetical":"concluding that defendant did not waive his right to appeal a restitution order despite his \"admittedly broad [ Jwaiver of right to appeal 'whatever sentence is imposed' \" because the terms of the plea agreement were ambiguous as to whether \"sentence\" included \"restitution\"","sentence":"See United States v. Broughton-Jones, 71 F.3d 1143, 1146-47 (4th Cir.1995) (implicitly finding that a defendant who waives the \u201cright to appeal her sentence on [the] grounds [listed in 18 U.S.C.A. \u00a7 3742(a) ]\u201d is deemed to have waived the right to appeal a lawfully imposed restitution order); see also United States v. Sharp, 442 F.3d 946, 948-52 (6th Cir.2006) (dismissing appeal of restitution order where defendant waived the right \u201cto appeal the conviction or sentence in this case, including the appeal right conferred by 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 3742, and to challenge the conviction or sentence collaterally,\u201d but reserved the right to appeal a punishment in excess of the statutory maximum and an upward departure from the most applicable sentencing guidelines range, because restitution fell under neither exception); United States v. Behrman, 235 F.3d 1049, 1052 (7th Cir.2000) (concluding that \u201c[a]n agreement waiving appeal from \u2018any sentence within the maximum provided by Title 18\u2019 or similar language would foreclose [an appeal from the restitution order]\u201d); but see United States v. Phillips, 174 F.3d 1074, 1075-76 (9th Cir.1999) (finding no waiver of right to appeal restitution where defendant \u201cknowingly and voluntarily waive[d][his] right to appeal any sentence and restitution order imposed by the Court and the manner in which the Court determine[d][his] sentence and restitution order, so long as the sentence is up to a net offense level of 12 following an adjustment for acceptance of responsibility,\u201d because the plea agreement contained no cap on restitution and the plea agreement was ambiguous as to the amount of damages the defendant might owe); United States v. Cupit, 169 F.3d 536, 539 (8th Cir.1999) (per curiam) (considering challenge to restitution order despite defendant\u2019s agreement to \u201cwaive all rights to appeal whatever sentence is imposed,\u201d expressly declining to \u201cresolve the waiver of restitution issue in this case\u201d); United States v. Ready, 82 F.3d 551, 559-60 (2d Cir.1996) (concluding that defendant did not waive his right to appeal a restitution order despite his \u201cadmittedly broad [ Jwaiver of right to appeal \u2018whatever sentence is imposed\u2019 \u201d because the terms of the plea agreement were ambiguous as to whether \u201csentence\u201d included \u201crestitution\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"235 F.3d 1049, 1052","parenthetical":"concluding that \"[a]n agreement waiving appeal from 'any sentence within the maximum provided by Title 18' or similar language would foreclose [an appeal from the restitution order]\"","sentence":"See United States v. Broughton-Jones, 71 F.3d 1143, 1146-47 (4th Cir.1995) (implicitly finding that a defendant who waives the \u201cright to appeal her sentence on [the] grounds [listed in 18 U.S.C.A. \u00a7 3742(a) ]\u201d is deemed to have waived the right to appeal a lawfully imposed restitution order); see also United States v. Sharp, 442 F.3d 946, 948-52 (6th Cir.2006) (dismissing appeal of restitution order where defendant waived the right \u201cto appeal the conviction or sentence in this case, including the appeal right conferred by 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 3742, and to challenge the conviction or sentence collaterally,\u201d but reserved the right to appeal a punishment in excess of the statutory maximum and an upward departure from the most applicable sentencing guidelines range, because restitution fell under neither exception); United States v. Behrman, 235 F.3d 1049, 1052 (7th Cir.2000) (concluding that \u201c[a]n agreement waiving appeal from \u2018any sentence within the maximum provided by Title 18\u2019 or similar language would foreclose [an appeal from the restitution order]\u201d); but see United States v. Phillips, 174 F.3d 1074, 1075-76 (9th Cir.1999) (finding no waiver of right to appeal restitution where defendant \u201cknowingly and voluntarily waive[d][his] right to appeal any sentence and restitution order imposed by the Court and the manner in which the Court determine[d][his] sentence and restitution order, so long as the sentence is up to a net offense level of 12 following an adjustment for acceptance of responsibility,\u201d because the plea agreement contained no cap on restitution and the plea agreement was ambiguous as to the amount of damages the defendant might owe); United States v. Cupit, 169 F.3d 536, 539 (8th Cir.1999) (per curiam) (considering challenge to restitution order despite defendant\u2019s agreement to \u201cwaive all rights to appeal whatever sentence is imposed,\u201d expressly declining to \u201cresolve the waiver of restitution issue in this case\u201d); United States v. Ready, 82 F.3d 551, 559-60 (2d Cir.1996) (concluding that defendant did not waive his right to appeal a restitution order despite his \u201cadmittedly broad [ Jwaiver of right to appeal \u2018whatever sentence is imposed\u2019 \u201d because the terms of the plea agreement were ambiguous as to whether \u201csentence\u201d included \u201crestitution\u201d)."},"case_id":3645418,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Hence, on remand, the court should focus on the mutual intent of the parties in an effort to determine whether the property-settlement agreement was intended to encompass life insurance. Any inequities occasioned by the non-disclosure of the insurance asset in the marital settlement may be remedied by the familiar principles of matrimonial law.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"225 N.J.Super. 33, 37","parenthetical":"\"where there is a showing of fraud or misconduct by a spouse in failing to disclose the true worth of his or her assets, relief may be granted\"","sentence":"Rosen v. Rosen, 225 N.J.Super. 33, 37, 541 A.2d 716 (App.Div. 1988) (\u201cwhere there is a showing of fraud or misconduct by a spouse in failing to disclose the true worth of his or her assets, relief may be granted\u201d), certif. denied, 111 N.J. 649, 546 A.2d 558 (1988); see also Carr v. Carr, supra, 120 N.J. at 351, 576 A.2d 872 (\u201ccourts\u2019 equitable powers are particularly appropriate in the context of domestic relations\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"120 N.J. 351, 351","parenthetical":"\"courts' equitable powers are particularly appropriate in the context of domestic relations\"","sentence":"Rosen v. Rosen, 225 N.J.Super. 33, 37, 541 A.2d 716 (App.Div. 1988) (\u201cwhere there is a showing of fraud or misconduct by a spouse in failing to disclose the true worth of his or her assets, relief may be granted\u201d), certif. denied, 111 N.J. 649, 546 A.2d 558 (1988); see also Carr v. Carr, supra, 120 N.J. at 351, 576 A.2d 872 (\u201ccourts\u2019 equitable powers are particularly appropriate in the context of domestic relations\u201d)."},"case_id":307868,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Hence, on remand, the court should focus on the mutual intent of the parties in an effort to determine whether the property-settlement agreement was intended to encompass life insurance. Any inequities occasioned by the non-disclosure of the insurance asset in the marital settlement may be remedied by the familiar principles of matrimonial law.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"courts' equitable powers are particularly appropriate in the context of domestic relations\"","sentence":"Rosen v. Rosen, 225 N.J.Super. 33, 37, 541 A.2d 716 (App.Div. 1988) (\u201cwhere there is a showing of fraud or misconduct by a spouse in failing to disclose the true worth of his or her assets, relief may be granted\u201d), certif. denied, 111 N.J. 649, 546 A.2d 558 (1988); see also Carr v. Carr, supra, 120 N.J. at 351, 576 A.2d 872 (\u201ccourts\u2019 equitable powers are particularly appropriate in the context of domestic relations\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"225 N.J.Super. 33, 37","parenthetical":"\"where there is a showing of fraud or misconduct by a spouse in failing to disclose the true worth of his or her assets, relief may be granted\"","sentence":"Rosen v. Rosen, 225 N.J.Super. 33, 37, 541 A.2d 716 (App.Div. 1988) (\u201cwhere there is a showing of fraud or misconduct by a spouse in failing to disclose the true worth of his or her assets, relief may be granted\u201d), certif. denied, 111 N.J. 649, 546 A.2d 558 (1988); see also Carr v. Carr, supra, 120 N.J. at 351, 576 A.2d 872 (\u201ccourts\u2019 equitable powers are particularly appropriate in the context of domestic relations\u201d)."},"case_id":307868,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Hence, on remand, the court should focus on the mutual intent of the parties in an effort to determine whether the property-settlement agreement was intended to encompass life insurance. Any inequities occasioned by the non-disclosure of the insurance asset in the marital settlement may be remedied by the familiar principles of matrimonial law.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"where there is a showing of fraud or misconduct by a spouse in failing to disclose the true worth of his or her assets, relief may be granted\"","sentence":"Rosen v. Rosen, 225 N.J.Super. 33, 37, 541 A.2d 716 (App.Div. 1988) (\u201cwhere there is a showing of fraud or misconduct by a spouse in failing to disclose the true worth of his or her assets, relief may be granted\u201d), certif. denied, 111 N.J. 649, 546 A.2d 558 (1988); see also Carr v. Carr, supra, 120 N.J. at 351, 576 A.2d 872 (\u201ccourts\u2019 equitable powers are particularly appropriate in the context of domestic relations\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"120 N.J. 351, 351","parenthetical":"\"courts' equitable powers are particularly appropriate in the context of domestic relations\"","sentence":"Rosen v. Rosen, 225 N.J.Super. 33, 37, 541 A.2d 716 (App.Div. 1988) (\u201cwhere there is a showing of fraud or misconduct by a spouse in failing to disclose the true worth of his or her assets, relief may be granted\u201d), certif. denied, 111 N.J. 649, 546 A.2d 558 (1988); see also Carr v. Carr, supra, 120 N.J. at 351, 576 A.2d 872 (\u201ccourts\u2019 equitable powers are particularly appropriate in the context of domestic relations\u201d)."},"case_id":307868,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Hence, on remand, the court should focus on the mutual intent of the parties in an effort to determine whether the property-settlement agreement was intended to encompass life insurance. Any inequities occasioned by the non-disclosure of the insurance asset in the marital settlement may be remedied by the familiar principles of matrimonial law.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"courts' equitable powers are particularly appropriate in the context of domestic relations\"","sentence":"Rosen v. Rosen, 225 N.J.Super. 33, 37, 541 A.2d 716 (App.Div. 1988) (\u201cwhere there is a showing of fraud or misconduct by a spouse in failing to disclose the true worth of his or her assets, relief may be granted\u201d), certif. denied, 111 N.J. 649, 546 A.2d 558 (1988); see also Carr v. Carr, supra, 120 N.J. at 351, 576 A.2d 872 (\u201ccourts\u2019 equitable powers are particularly appropriate in the context of domestic relations\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"where there is a showing of fraud or misconduct by a spouse in failing to disclose the true worth of his or her assets, relief may be granted\"","sentence":"Rosen v. Rosen, 225 N.J.Super. 33, 37, 541 A.2d 716 (App.Div. 1988) (\u201cwhere there is a showing of fraud or misconduct by a spouse in failing to disclose the true worth of his or her assets, relief may be granted\u201d), certif. denied, 111 N.J. 649, 546 A.2d 558 (1988); see also Carr v. Carr, supra, 120 N.J. at 351, 576 A.2d 872 (\u201ccourts\u2019 equitable powers are particularly appropriate in the context of domestic relations\u201d)."},"case_id":307868,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Hence, on remand, the court should focus on the mutual intent of the parties in an effort to determine whether the property-settlement agreement was intended to encompass life insurance. Any inequities occasioned by the non-disclosure of the insurance asset in the marital settlement may be remedied by the familiar principles of matrimonial law.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"120 N.J. 351, 351","parenthetical":"\"courts' equitable powers are particularly appropriate in the context of domestic relations\"","sentence":"Rosen v. Rosen, 225 N.J.Super. 33, 37, 541 A.2d 716 (App.Div. 1988) (\u201cwhere there is a showing of fraud or misconduct by a spouse in failing to disclose the true worth of his or her assets, relief may be granted\u201d), certif. denied, 111 N.J. 649, 546 A.2d 558 (1988); see also Carr v. Carr, supra, 120 N.J. at 351, 576 A.2d 872 (\u201ccourts\u2019 equitable powers are particularly appropriate in the context of domestic relations\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"where there is a showing of fraud or misconduct by a spouse in failing to disclose the true worth of his or her assets, relief may be granted\"","sentence":"Rosen v. Rosen, 225 N.J.Super. 33, 37, 541 A.2d 716 (App.Div. 1988) (\u201cwhere there is a showing of fraud or misconduct by a spouse in failing to disclose the true worth of his or her assets, relief may be granted\u201d), certif. denied, 111 N.J. 649, 546 A.2d 558 (1988); see also Carr v. Carr, supra, 120 N.J. at 351, 576 A.2d 872 (\u201ccourts\u2019 equitable powers are particularly appropriate in the context of domestic relations\u201d)."},"case_id":307868,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Hence, on remand, the court should focus on the mutual intent of the parties in an effort to determine whether the property-settlement agreement was intended to encompass life insurance. Any inequities occasioned by the non-disclosure of the insurance asset in the marital settlement may be remedied by the familiar principles of matrimonial law.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"where there is a showing of fraud or misconduct by a spouse in failing to disclose the true worth of his or her assets, relief may be granted\"","sentence":"Rosen v. Rosen, 225 N.J.Super. 33, 37, 541 A.2d 716 (App.Div. 1988) (\u201cwhere there is a showing of fraud or misconduct by a spouse in failing to disclose the true worth of his or her assets, relief may be granted\u201d), certif. denied, 111 N.J. 649, 546 A.2d 558 (1988); see also Carr v. Carr, supra, 120 N.J. at 351, 576 A.2d 872 (\u201ccourts\u2019 equitable powers are particularly appropriate in the context of domestic relations\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"courts' equitable powers are particularly appropriate in the context of domestic relations\"","sentence":"Rosen v. Rosen, 225 N.J.Super. 33, 37, 541 A.2d 716 (App.Div. 1988) (\u201cwhere there is a showing of fraud or misconduct by a spouse in failing to disclose the true worth of his or her assets, relief may be granted\u201d), certif. denied, 111 N.J. 649, 546 A.2d 558 (1988); see also Carr v. Carr, supra, 120 N.J. at 351, 576 A.2d 872 (\u201ccourts\u2019 equitable powers are particularly appropriate in the context of domestic relations\u201d)."},"case_id":307868,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Hence, on remand, the court should focus on the mutual intent of the parties in an effort to determine whether the property-settlement agreement was intended to encompass life insurance. Any inequities occasioned by the non-disclosure of the insurance asset in the marital settlement may be remedied by the familiar principles of matrimonial law.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"where there is a showing of fraud or misconduct by a spouse in failing to disclose the true worth of his or her assets, relief may be granted\"","sentence":"Rosen v. Rosen, 225 N.J.Super. 33, 37, 541 A.2d 716 (App.Div. 1988) (\u201cwhere there is a showing of fraud or misconduct by a spouse in failing to disclose the true worth of his or her assets, relief may be granted\u201d), certif. denied, 111 N.J. 649, 546 A.2d 558 (1988); see also Carr v. Carr, supra, 120 N.J. at 351, 576 A.2d 872 (\u201ccourts\u2019 equitable powers are particularly appropriate in the context of domestic relations\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"120 N.J. 351, 351","parenthetical":"\"courts' equitable powers are particularly appropriate in the context of domestic relations\"","sentence":"Rosen v. Rosen, 225 N.J.Super. 33, 37, 541 A.2d 716 (App.Div. 1988) (\u201cwhere there is a showing of fraud or misconduct by a spouse in failing to disclose the true worth of his or her assets, relief may be granted\u201d), certif. denied, 111 N.J. 649, 546 A.2d 558 (1988); see also Carr v. Carr, supra, 120 N.J. at 351, 576 A.2d 872 (\u201ccourts\u2019 equitable powers are particularly appropriate in the context of domestic relations\u201d)."},"case_id":307868,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Hence, on remand, the court should focus on the mutual intent of the parties in an effort to determine whether the property-settlement agreement was intended to encompass life insurance. Any inequities occasioned by the non-disclosure of the insurance asset in the marital settlement may be remedied by the familiar principles of matrimonial law.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"courts' equitable powers are particularly appropriate in the context of domestic relations\"","sentence":"Rosen v. Rosen, 225 N.J.Super. 33, 37, 541 A.2d 716 (App.Div. 1988) (\u201cwhere there is a showing of fraud or misconduct by a spouse in failing to disclose the true worth of his or her assets, relief may be granted\u201d), certif. denied, 111 N.J. 649, 546 A.2d 558 (1988); see also Carr v. Carr, supra, 120 N.J. at 351, 576 A.2d 872 (\u201ccourts\u2019 equitable powers are particularly appropriate in the context of domestic relations\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"where there is a showing of fraud or misconduct by a spouse in failing to disclose the true worth of his or her assets, relief may be granted\"","sentence":"Rosen v. Rosen, 225 N.J.Super. 33, 37, 541 A.2d 716 (App.Div. 1988) (\u201cwhere there is a showing of fraud or misconduct by a spouse in failing to disclose the true worth of his or her assets, relief may be granted\u201d), certif. denied, 111 N.J. 649, 546 A.2d 558 (1988); see also Carr v. Carr, supra, 120 N.J. at 351, 576 A.2d 872 (\u201ccourts\u2019 equitable powers are particularly appropriate in the context of domestic relations\u201d)."},"case_id":307868,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Succinctly stated, the Board's denial of benefits should be set aside and the matter remanded for the Board to determine, in the first instance, if the use of topical corticosteroids in this case was \"required\" immunosuppressive therapy within the meaning of DC 7806. To do otherwise is unwarranted and unwise.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"11 Vet.App. 369, 374","parenthetical":"remand, and not reversal, is appropriate \"where the Board has incorrectly applied the law, failed to provide an adequate statement of reasons or bases for its determinations, or where the record is otherwise inadequate\"","sentence":"See Tucker v. West, 11 Vet.App. 369, 374 (1998) (remand, and not reversal, is appropriate \u201cwhere the Board has incorrectly applied the law, failed to provide an adequate statement of reasons or bases for its determinations, or where the record is otherwise inadequate\u201d); see also Deloach v. Shinseki, 704 F.3d 1370, 1380 (Fed.Cir.2013) (\u201c[W]here the Board has performed the necessary-fact-finding and explicitly weighed the evidence, the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims should reverse when, on the entire evidence, it is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.\u201d); see also Merck Manual at 647."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"704 F.3d 1370, 1380","parenthetical":"\"[W]here the Board has performed the necessary-fact-finding and explicitly weighed the evidence, the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims should reverse when, on the entire evidence, it is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.\"","sentence":"See Tucker v. West, 11 Vet.App. 369, 374 (1998) (remand, and not reversal, is appropriate \u201cwhere the Board has incorrectly applied the law, failed to provide an adequate statement of reasons or bases for its determinations, or where the record is otherwise inadequate\u201d); see also Deloach v. Shinseki, 704 F.3d 1370, 1380 (Fed.Cir.2013) (\u201c[W]here the Board has performed the necessary-fact-finding and explicitly weighed the evidence, the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims should reverse when, on the entire evidence, it is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.\u201d); see also Merck Manual at 647."},"case_id":4047220,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The fact that Sunbelt Beverage's error was so glaring reinforces our conclusion that the information Sunbelt Beverage provided was sufficient to trigger the default three-year statute of limitation. The substantial disparity in this case between Sunbelt Beverage's gross national income and the $12,000 income limit should have alerted OTR to a potential filing error and a need to calculate some amount of business franchise tax. We see no need to readjust the balance of Sunbelt Beverage's interest in repose and OTR's need for time to discern tax liability in a situation where the error was likely to be caught with cursory review.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"293 U.S. 182, 182","parenthetical":"\"An examiner needs more time for an audit when errors are latent, to be discovered only by digging into books and vouchers, than when errors are apparent upon a bare inspection of the record.\"","sentence":"See Zellerbach, 293 U.S. at 182, 55 S.Ct. 127 (\u201cAn examiner needs more time for an audit when errors are latent, to be discovered only by digging into books and vouchers, than when errors are apparent upon a bare inspection of the record.\u201d); see also Colony, Inc. v. Commissioner, 357 U.S. 28, 36, 78 S.Ct. 1033, 2 L.Ed.2d 1119 (1958) (discussing the extension for 25 percent under-reporting of income \u2014 created because Congress recognized in such cases that the government was \u201cat a special disadvantage in detecting errors\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"357 U.S. 28, 36","parenthetical":"discussing the extension for 25 percent under-reporting of income -- created because Congress recognized in such cases that the government was \"at a special disadvantage in detecting errors\"","sentence":"See Zellerbach, 293 U.S. at 182, 55 S.Ct. 127 (\u201cAn examiner needs more time for an audit when errors are latent, to be discovered only by digging into books and vouchers, than when errors are apparent upon a bare inspection of the record.\u201d); see also Colony, Inc. v. Commissioner, 357 U.S. 28, 36, 78 S.Ct. 1033, 2 L.Ed.2d 1119 (1958) (discussing the extension for 25 percent under-reporting of income \u2014 created because Congress recognized in such cases that the government was \u201cat a special disadvantage in detecting errors\u201d)."},"case_id":7308025,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The fact that Sunbelt Beverage's error was so glaring reinforces our conclusion that the information Sunbelt Beverage provided was sufficient to trigger the default three-year statute of limitation. The substantial disparity in this case between Sunbelt Beverage's gross national income and the $12,000 income limit should have alerted OTR to a potential filing error and a need to calculate some amount of business franchise tax. We see no need to readjust the balance of Sunbelt Beverage's interest in repose and OTR's need for time to discern tax liability in a situation where the error was likely to be caught with cursory review.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"293 U.S. 182, 182","parenthetical":"\"An examiner needs more time for an audit when errors are latent, to be discovered only by digging into books and vouchers, than when errors are apparent upon a bare inspection of the record.\"","sentence":"See Zellerbach, 293 U.S. at 182, 55 S.Ct. 127 (\u201cAn examiner needs more time for an audit when errors are latent, to be discovered only by digging into books and vouchers, than when errors are apparent upon a bare inspection of the record.\u201d); see also Colony, Inc. v. Commissioner, 357 U.S. 28, 36, 78 S.Ct. 1033, 2 L.Ed.2d 1119 (1958) (discussing the extension for 25 percent under-reporting of income \u2014 created because Congress recognized in such cases that the government was \u201cat a special disadvantage in detecting errors\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"discussing the extension for 25 percent under-reporting of income -- created because Congress recognized in such cases that the government was \"at a special disadvantage in detecting errors\"","sentence":"See Zellerbach, 293 U.S. at 182, 55 S.Ct. 127 (\u201cAn examiner needs more time for an audit when errors are latent, to be discovered only by digging into books and vouchers, than when errors are apparent upon a bare inspection of the record.\u201d); see also Colony, Inc. v. Commissioner, 357 U.S. 28, 36, 78 S.Ct. 1033, 2 L.Ed.2d 1119 (1958) (discussing the extension for 25 percent under-reporting of income \u2014 created because Congress recognized in such cases that the government was \u201cat a special disadvantage in detecting errors\u201d)."},"case_id":7308025,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The fact that Sunbelt Beverage's error was so glaring reinforces our conclusion that the information Sunbelt Beverage provided was sufficient to trigger the default three-year statute of limitation. The substantial disparity in this case between Sunbelt Beverage's gross national income and the $12,000 income limit should have alerted OTR to a potential filing error and a need to calculate some amount of business franchise tax. We see no need to readjust the balance of Sunbelt Beverage's interest in repose and OTR's need for time to discern tax liability in a situation where the error was likely to be caught with cursory review.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"discussing the extension for 25 percent under-reporting of income -- created because Congress recognized in such cases that the government was \"at a special disadvantage in detecting errors\"","sentence":"See Zellerbach, 293 U.S. at 182, 55 S.Ct. 127 (\u201cAn examiner needs more time for an audit when errors are latent, to be discovered only by digging into books and vouchers, than when errors are apparent upon a bare inspection of the record.\u201d); see also Colony, Inc. v. Commissioner, 357 U.S. 28, 36, 78 S.Ct. 1033, 2 L.Ed.2d 1119 (1958) (discussing the extension for 25 percent under-reporting of income \u2014 created because Congress recognized in such cases that the government was \u201cat a special disadvantage in detecting errors\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"293 U.S. 182, 182","parenthetical":"\"An examiner needs more time for an audit when errors are latent, to be discovered only by digging into books and vouchers, than when errors are apparent upon a bare inspection of the record.\"","sentence":"See Zellerbach, 293 U.S. at 182, 55 S.Ct. 127 (\u201cAn examiner needs more time for an audit when errors are latent, to be discovered only by digging into books and vouchers, than when errors are apparent upon a bare inspection of the record.\u201d); see also Colony, Inc. v. Commissioner, 357 U.S. 28, 36, 78 S.Ct. 1033, 2 L.Ed.2d 1119 (1958) (discussing the extension for 25 percent under-reporting of income \u2014 created because Congress recognized in such cases that the government was \u201cat a special disadvantage in detecting errors\u201d)."},"case_id":7308025,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The fact that Sunbelt Beverage's error was so glaring reinforces our conclusion that the information Sunbelt Beverage provided was sufficient to trigger the default three-year statute of limitation. The substantial disparity in this case between Sunbelt Beverage's gross national income and the $12,000 income limit should have alerted OTR to a potential filing error and a need to calculate some amount of business franchise tax. We see no need to readjust the balance of Sunbelt Beverage's interest in repose and OTR's need for time to discern tax liability in a situation where the error was likely to be caught with cursory review.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"An examiner needs more time for an audit when errors are latent, to be discovered only by digging into books and vouchers, than when errors are apparent upon a bare inspection of the record.\"","sentence":"See Zellerbach, 293 U.S. at 182, 55 S.Ct. 127 (\u201cAn examiner needs more time for an audit when errors are latent, to be discovered only by digging into books and vouchers, than when errors are apparent upon a bare inspection of the record.\u201d); see also Colony, Inc. v. Commissioner, 357 U.S. 28, 36, 78 S.Ct. 1033, 2 L.Ed.2d 1119 (1958) (discussing the extension for 25 percent under-reporting of income \u2014 created because Congress recognized in such cases that the government was \u201cat a special disadvantage in detecting errors\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"357 U.S. 28, 36","parenthetical":"discussing the extension for 25 percent under-reporting of income -- created because Congress recognized in such cases that the government was \"at a special disadvantage in detecting errors\"","sentence":"See Zellerbach, 293 U.S. at 182, 55 S.Ct. 127 (\u201cAn examiner needs more time for an audit when errors are latent, to be discovered only by digging into books and vouchers, than when errors are apparent upon a bare inspection of the record.\u201d); see also Colony, Inc. v. Commissioner, 357 U.S. 28, 36, 78 S.Ct. 1033, 2 L.Ed.2d 1119 (1958) (discussing the extension for 25 percent under-reporting of income \u2014 created because Congress recognized in such cases that the government was \u201cat a special disadvantage in detecting errors\u201d)."},"case_id":7308025,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The fact that Sunbelt Beverage's error was so glaring reinforces our conclusion that the information Sunbelt Beverage provided was sufficient to trigger the default three-year statute of limitation. The substantial disparity in this case between Sunbelt Beverage's gross national income and the $12,000 income limit should have alerted OTR to a potential filing error and a need to calculate some amount of business franchise tax. We see no need to readjust the balance of Sunbelt Beverage's interest in repose and OTR's need for time to discern tax liability in a situation where the error was likely to be caught with cursory review.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"discussing the extension for 25 percent under-reporting of income -- created because Congress recognized in such cases that the government was \"at a special disadvantage in detecting errors\"","sentence":"See Zellerbach, 293 U.S. at 182, 55 S.Ct. 127 (\u201cAn examiner needs more time for an audit when errors are latent, to be discovered only by digging into books and vouchers, than when errors are apparent upon a bare inspection of the record.\u201d); see also Colony, Inc. v. Commissioner, 357 U.S. 28, 36, 78 S.Ct. 1033, 2 L.Ed.2d 1119 (1958) (discussing the extension for 25 percent under-reporting of income \u2014 created because Congress recognized in such cases that the government was \u201cat a special disadvantage in detecting errors\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"An examiner needs more time for an audit when errors are latent, to be discovered only by digging into books and vouchers, than when errors are apparent upon a bare inspection of the record.\"","sentence":"See Zellerbach, 293 U.S. at 182, 55 S.Ct. 127 (\u201cAn examiner needs more time for an audit when errors are latent, to be discovered only by digging into books and vouchers, than when errors are apparent upon a bare inspection of the record.\u201d); see also Colony, Inc. v. Commissioner, 357 U.S. 28, 36, 78 S.Ct. 1033, 2 L.Ed.2d 1119 (1958) (discussing the extension for 25 percent under-reporting of income \u2014 created because Congress recognized in such cases that the government was \u201cat a special disadvantage in detecting errors\u201d)."},"case_id":7308025,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The fact that Sunbelt Beverage's error was so glaring reinforces our conclusion that the information Sunbelt Beverage provided was sufficient to trigger the default three-year statute of limitation. The substantial disparity in this case between Sunbelt Beverage's gross national income and the $12,000 income limit should have alerted OTR to a potential filing error and a need to calculate some amount of business franchise tax. We see no need to readjust the balance of Sunbelt Beverage's interest in repose and OTR's need for time to discern tax liability in a situation where the error was likely to be caught with cursory review.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"discussing the extension for 25 percent under-reporting of income -- created because Congress recognized in such cases that the government was \"at a special disadvantage in detecting errors\"","sentence":"See Zellerbach, 293 U.S. at 182, 55 S.Ct. 127 (\u201cAn examiner needs more time for an audit when errors are latent, to be discovered only by digging into books and vouchers, than when errors are apparent upon a bare inspection of the record.\u201d); see also Colony, Inc. v. Commissioner, 357 U.S. 28, 36, 78 S.Ct. 1033, 2 L.Ed.2d 1119 (1958) (discussing the extension for 25 percent under-reporting of income \u2014 created because Congress recognized in such cases that the government was \u201cat a special disadvantage in detecting errors\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"An examiner needs more time for an audit when errors are latent, to be discovered only by digging into books and vouchers, than when errors are apparent upon a bare inspection of the record.\"","sentence":"See Zellerbach, 293 U.S. at 182, 55 S.Ct. 127 (\u201cAn examiner needs more time for an audit when errors are latent, to be discovered only by digging into books and vouchers, than when errors are apparent upon a bare inspection of the record.\u201d); see also Colony, Inc. v. Commissioner, 357 U.S. 28, 36, 78 S.Ct. 1033, 2 L.Ed.2d 1119 (1958) (discussing the extension for 25 percent under-reporting of income \u2014 created because Congress recognized in such cases that the government was \u201cat a special disadvantage in detecting errors\u201d)."},"case_id":7308025,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Choice of law clauses are generally honored in South Carolina.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"316 S.C. 245, 248","parenthetical":"\"When the language of a contract is plain and capable of legal construction, that language alone determines the instrument's force and effect.\"","sentence":"Nucor Corp. v. Bell, 482 F.Supp.2d 714, 728 (D.S.C. 2007) (\u201cGenerally, under South Carolina choice of law principles, if the parties to a contract specify the law under which the contract shall be governed, the court will honor this choice of law.\u201d); Russell v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 353 S.C. 208, 221, 578 S.E.2d 329, 336 (2003) (\u201cWe hold that a settlor may designate the law governing his trust, and absent a strong public policy reason, or lack of substantial relation to the trust, the choice of law provision will be honored.\u201d); see also Ellis v. Taylor, 316 S.C. 245, 248, 449 S.E.2d 487, 488 (1994) (\u201cWhen the language of a contract is plain and capable of legal construction, that language alone determines the instrument\u2019s force and effect.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"482 F.Supp.2d 714, 728","parenthetical":"\"Generally, under South Carolina choice of law principles, if the parties to a contract specify the law under which the contract shall be governed, the court will honor this choice of law.\"","sentence":"Nucor Corp. v. Bell, 482 F.Supp.2d 714, 728 (D.S.C. 2007) (\u201cGenerally, under South Carolina choice of law principles, if the parties to a contract specify the law under which the contract shall be governed, the court will honor this choice of law.\u201d); Russell v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 353 S.C. 208, 221, 578 S.E.2d 329, 336 (2003) (\u201cWe hold that a settlor may designate the law governing his trust, and absent a strong public policy reason, or lack of substantial relation to the trust, the choice of law provision will be honored.\u201d); see also Ellis v. Taylor, 316 S.C. 245, 248, 449 S.E.2d 487, 488 (1994) (\u201cWhen the language of a contract is plain and capable of legal construction, that language alone determines the instrument\u2019s force and effect.\u201d)."},"case_id":3876057,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Choice of law clauses are generally honored in South Carolina.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"449 S.E.2d 487, 488","parenthetical":"\"When the language of a contract is plain and capable of legal construction, that language alone determines the instrument's force and effect.\"","sentence":"Nucor Corp. v. Bell, 482 F.Supp.2d 714, 728 (D.S.C. 2007) (\u201cGenerally, under South Carolina choice of law principles, if the parties to a contract specify the law under which the contract shall be governed, the court will honor this choice of law.\u201d); Russell v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 353 S.C. 208, 221, 578 S.E.2d 329, 336 (2003) (\u201cWe hold that a settlor may designate the law governing his trust, and absent a strong public policy reason, or lack of substantial relation to the trust, the choice of law provision will be honored.\u201d); see also Ellis v. Taylor, 316 S.C. 245, 248, 449 S.E.2d 487, 488 (1994) (\u201cWhen the language of a contract is plain and capable of legal construction, that language alone determines the instrument\u2019s force and effect.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"482 F.Supp.2d 714, 728","parenthetical":"\"Generally, under South Carolina choice of law principles, if the parties to a contract specify the law under which the contract shall be governed, the court will honor this choice of law.\"","sentence":"Nucor Corp. v. Bell, 482 F.Supp.2d 714, 728 (D.S.C. 2007) (\u201cGenerally, under South Carolina choice of law principles, if the parties to a contract specify the law under which the contract shall be governed, the court will honor this choice of law.\u201d); Russell v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 353 S.C. 208, 221, 578 S.E.2d 329, 336 (2003) (\u201cWe hold that a settlor may designate the law governing his trust, and absent a strong public policy reason, or lack of substantial relation to the trust, the choice of law provision will be honored.\u201d); see also Ellis v. Taylor, 316 S.C. 245, 248, 449 S.E.2d 487, 488 (1994) (\u201cWhen the language of a contract is plain and capable of legal construction, that language alone determines the instrument\u2019s force and effect.\u201d)."},"case_id":3876057,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Choice of law clauses are generally honored in South Carolina.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"316 S.C. 245, 248","parenthetical":"\"When the language of a contract is plain and capable of legal construction, that language alone determines the instrument's force and effect.\"","sentence":"Nucor Corp. v. Bell, 482 F.Supp.2d 714, 728 (D.S.C. 2007) (\u201cGenerally, under South Carolina choice of law principles, if the parties to a contract specify the law under which the contract shall be governed, the court will honor this choice of law.\u201d); Russell v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 353 S.C. 208, 221, 578 S.E.2d 329, 336 (2003) (\u201cWe hold that a settlor may designate the law governing his trust, and absent a strong public policy reason, or lack of substantial relation to the trust, the choice of law provision will be honored.\u201d); see also Ellis v. Taylor, 316 S.C. 245, 248, 449 S.E.2d 487, 488 (1994) (\u201cWhen the language of a contract is plain and capable of legal construction, that language alone determines the instrument\u2019s force and effect.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"353 S.C. 208, 221","parenthetical":"\"We hold that a settlor may designate the law governing his trust, and absent a strong public policy reason, or lack of substantial relation to the trust, the choice of law provision will be honored.\"","sentence":"Nucor Corp. v. Bell, 482 F.Supp.2d 714, 728 (D.S.C. 2007) (\u201cGenerally, under South Carolina choice of law principles, if the parties to a contract specify the law under which the contract shall be governed, the court will honor this choice of law.\u201d); Russell v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 353 S.C. 208, 221, 578 S.E.2d 329, 336 (2003) (\u201cWe hold that a settlor may designate the law governing his trust, and absent a strong public policy reason, or lack of substantial relation to the trust, the choice of law provision will be honored.\u201d); see also Ellis v. Taylor, 316 S.C. 245, 248, 449 S.E.2d 487, 488 (1994) (\u201cWhen the language of a contract is plain and capable of legal construction, that language alone determines the instrument\u2019s force and effect.\u201d)."},"case_id":3876057,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Choice of law clauses are generally honored in South Carolina.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"353 S.C. 208, 221","parenthetical":"\"We hold that a settlor may designate the law governing his trust, and absent a strong public policy reason, or lack of substantial relation to the trust, the choice of law provision will be honored.\"","sentence":"Nucor Corp. v. Bell, 482 F.Supp.2d 714, 728 (D.S.C. 2007) (\u201cGenerally, under South Carolina choice of law principles, if the parties to a contract specify the law under which the contract shall be governed, the court will honor this choice of law.\u201d); Russell v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 353 S.C. 208, 221, 578 S.E.2d 329, 336 (2003) (\u201cWe hold that a settlor may designate the law governing his trust, and absent a strong public policy reason, or lack of substantial relation to the trust, the choice of law provision will be honored.\u201d); see also Ellis v. Taylor, 316 S.C. 245, 248, 449 S.E.2d 487, 488 (1994) (\u201cWhen the language of a contract is plain and capable of legal construction, that language alone determines the instrument\u2019s force and effect.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"449 S.E.2d 487, 488","parenthetical":"\"When the language of a contract is plain and capable of legal construction, that language alone determines the instrument's force and effect.\"","sentence":"Nucor Corp. v. Bell, 482 F.Supp.2d 714, 728 (D.S.C. 2007) (\u201cGenerally, under South Carolina choice of law principles, if the parties to a contract specify the law under which the contract shall be governed, the court will honor this choice of law.\u201d); Russell v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 353 S.C. 208, 221, 578 S.E.2d 329, 336 (2003) (\u201cWe hold that a settlor may designate the law governing his trust, and absent a strong public policy reason, or lack of substantial relation to the trust, the choice of law provision will be honored.\u201d); see also Ellis v. Taylor, 316 S.C. 245, 248, 449 S.E.2d 487, 488 (1994) (\u201cWhen the language of a contract is plain and capable of legal construction, that language alone determines the instrument\u2019s force and effect.\u201d)."},"case_id":3876057,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Choice of law clauses are generally honored in South Carolina.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"316 S.C. 245, 248","parenthetical":"\"When the language of a contract is plain and capable of legal construction, that language alone determines the instrument's force and effect.\"","sentence":"Nucor Corp. v. Bell, 482 F.Supp.2d 714, 728 (D.S.C. 2007) (\u201cGenerally, under South Carolina choice of law principles, if the parties to a contract specify the law under which the contract shall be governed, the court will honor this choice of law.\u201d); Russell v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 353 S.C. 208, 221, 578 S.E.2d 329, 336 (2003) (\u201cWe hold that a settlor may designate the law governing his trust, and absent a strong public policy reason, or lack of substantial relation to the trust, the choice of law provision will be honored.\u201d); see also Ellis v. Taylor, 316 S.C. 245, 248, 449 S.E.2d 487, 488 (1994) (\u201cWhen the language of a contract is plain and capable of legal construction, that language alone determines the instrument\u2019s force and effect.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"578 S.E.2d 329, 336","parenthetical":"\"We hold that a settlor may designate the law governing his trust, and absent a strong public policy reason, or lack of substantial relation to the trust, the choice of law provision will be honored.\"","sentence":"Nucor Corp. v. Bell, 482 F.Supp.2d 714, 728 (D.S.C. 2007) (\u201cGenerally, under South Carolina choice of law principles, if the parties to a contract specify the law under which the contract shall be governed, the court will honor this choice of law.\u201d); Russell v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 353 S.C. 208, 221, 578 S.E.2d 329, 336 (2003) (\u201cWe hold that a settlor may designate the law governing his trust, and absent a strong public policy reason, or lack of substantial relation to the trust, the choice of law provision will be honored.\u201d); see also Ellis v. Taylor, 316 S.C. 245, 248, 449 S.E.2d 487, 488 (1994) (\u201cWhen the language of a contract is plain and capable of legal construction, that language alone determines the instrument\u2019s force and effect.\u201d)."},"case_id":3876057,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Choice of law clauses are generally honored in South Carolina.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"578 S.E.2d 329, 336","parenthetical":"\"We hold that a settlor may designate the law governing his trust, and absent a strong public policy reason, or lack of substantial relation to the trust, the choice of law provision will be honored.\"","sentence":"Nucor Corp. v. Bell, 482 F.Supp.2d 714, 728 (D.S.C. 2007) (\u201cGenerally, under South Carolina choice of law principles, if the parties to a contract specify the law under which the contract shall be governed, the court will honor this choice of law.\u201d); Russell v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 353 S.C. 208, 221, 578 S.E.2d 329, 336 (2003) (\u201cWe hold that a settlor may designate the law governing his trust, and absent a strong public policy reason, or lack of substantial relation to the trust, the choice of law provision will be honored.\u201d); see also Ellis v. Taylor, 316 S.C. 245, 248, 449 S.E.2d 487, 488 (1994) (\u201cWhen the language of a contract is plain and capable of legal construction, that language alone determines the instrument\u2019s force and effect.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"449 S.E.2d 487, 488","parenthetical":"\"When the language of a contract is plain and capable of legal construction, that language alone determines the instrument's force and effect.\"","sentence":"Nucor Corp. v. Bell, 482 F.Supp.2d 714, 728 (D.S.C. 2007) (\u201cGenerally, under South Carolina choice of law principles, if the parties to a contract specify the law under which the contract shall be governed, the court will honor this choice of law.\u201d); Russell v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 353 S.C. 208, 221, 578 S.E.2d 329, 336 (2003) (\u201cWe hold that a settlor may designate the law governing his trust, and absent a strong public policy reason, or lack of substantial relation to the trust, the choice of law provision will be honored.\u201d); see also Ellis v. Taylor, 316 S.C. 245, 248, 449 S.E.2d 487, 488 (1994) (\u201cWhen the language of a contract is plain and capable of legal construction, that language alone determines the instrument\u2019s force and effect.\u201d)."},"case_id":3876057,"label":"a"}
{"context":". Younglove does not contend a literal application of the statute gives rise to constitutional concerns. We note that an award of benefits under Iowa's workers' compensation law would not violate the Full Faith and Credit Clause of Article IV, Section 1 of the United States Constitution nor the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as long as Iowa has a significant interest in applying its statute to Henrik-sen's claim.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"598 A.2d 176, 177","parenthetical":"residency of injured employee in Maine gave Maine a sufficient state interest in the subject matter of the employee's claim for workers' compensation benefits so as to satisfy due process","sentence":"Smith, Inc., 598 A.2d 176, 177 (Me.1991) (residency of injured employee in Maine gave Maine a sufficient state interest in the subject matter of the employee's claim for workers' compensation benefits so as to satisfy due process); LeBlanc v. United Eng\u2019rs & Constructors, 584 A.2d 675, 677-78 (Me.1991) (same re full faith and credit); Dissell, 511 A.2d at 444-45; Olmstead v. Anderson, 428 Mich. 1, 400 N.W.2d 292, 305 n. 13 (1987); 4 Arthur Larson, The Law on Workmen\u2019s Compensation \u00a7 86.00, at 16-48 (1994); see also Garcia v. American Airlines, Inc., 12 F.3d 308, 310 (1st Cir.1993) (more than one state's workers' compensation law may apply to an injuiy if both states have a valid interest in the case)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"12 F.3d 308, 310","parenthetical":"more than one state's workers' compensation law may apply to an injuiy if both states have a valid interest in the case","sentence":"Smith, Inc., 598 A.2d 176, 177 (Me.1991) (residency of injured employee in Maine gave Maine a sufficient state interest in the subject matter of the employee's claim for workers' compensation benefits so as to satisfy due process); LeBlanc v. United Eng\u2019rs & Constructors, 584 A.2d 675, 677-78 (Me.1991) (same re full faith and credit); Dissell, 511 A.2d at 444-45; Olmstead v. Anderson, 428 Mich. 1, 400 N.W.2d 292, 305 n. 13 (1987); 4 Arthur Larson, The Law on Workmen\u2019s Compensation \u00a7 86.00, at 16-48 (1994); see also Garcia v. American Airlines, Inc., 12 F.3d 308, 310 (1st Cir.1993) (more than one state's workers' compensation law may apply to an injuiy if both states have a valid interest in the case)."},"case_id":10698893,"label":"a"}
{"context":"After jury selection, his street clothes arrived, and he wore them throughout the rest of the trial. Under these circumstances, we conclude that Mr. Akbar's wearing of jail clothes during jury selection was harmless.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"47 F.3d 577, 581","parenthetical":"even if defendant is made to wear prison clothes at trial, this constitutional error is subject to harmless-error analysis","sentence":"See United States v. Hurtado, 47 F.3d 577, 581 (2d Cir.) (even if defendant is made to wear prison clothes at trial, this constitutional error is subject to harmless-error analysis), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 903, 116 S.Ct. 266, 133 L.Ed.2d 188 (1995); cf. United States v. Grady, 997 F.2d 421, 424 (8th Cir.) (on facts very similar to Mr. Akbar\u2019s, concluding under plain-error standard of review that defendant was not denied fair trial), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 958, 114 S.Ct. 416, 126 L.Ed.2d 363 (1993)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"997 F.2d 421, 424","parenthetical":"on facts very similar to Mr. Akbar's, concluding under plain-error standard of review that defendant was not denied fair trial","sentence":"See United States v. Hurtado, 47 F.3d 577, 581 (2d Cir.) (even if defendant is made to wear prison clothes at trial, this constitutional error is subject to harmless-error analysis), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 903, 116 S.Ct. 266, 133 L.Ed.2d 188 (1995); cf. United States v. Grady, 997 F.2d 421, 424 (8th Cir.) (on facts very similar to Mr. Akbar\u2019s, concluding under plain-error standard of review that defendant was not denied fair trial), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 958, 114 S.Ct. 416, 126 L.Ed.2d 363 (1993)."},"case_id":51194,"label":"a"}
{"context":"After jury selection, his street clothes arrived, and he wore them throughout the rest of the trial. Under these circumstances, we conclude that Mr. Akbar's wearing of jail clothes during jury selection was harmless.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"47 F.3d 577, 581","parenthetical":"even if defendant is made to wear prison clothes at trial, this constitutional error is subject to harmless-error analysis","sentence":"See United States v. Hurtado, 47 F.3d 577, 581 (2d Cir.) (even if defendant is made to wear prison clothes at trial, this constitutional error is subject to harmless-error analysis), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 903, 116 S.Ct. 266, 133 L.Ed.2d 188 (1995); cf. United States v. Grady, 997 F.2d 421, 424 (8th Cir.) (on facts very similar to Mr. Akbar\u2019s, concluding under plain-error standard of review that defendant was not denied fair trial), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 958, 114 S.Ct. 416, 126 L.Ed.2d 363 (1993)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"on facts very similar to Mr. Akbar's, concluding under plain-error standard of review that defendant was not denied fair trial","sentence":"See United States v. Hurtado, 47 F.3d 577, 581 (2d Cir.) (even if defendant is made to wear prison clothes at trial, this constitutional error is subject to harmless-error analysis), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 903, 116 S.Ct. 266, 133 L.Ed.2d 188 (1995); cf. United States v. Grady, 997 F.2d 421, 424 (8th Cir.) (on facts very similar to Mr. Akbar\u2019s, concluding under plain-error standard of review that defendant was not denied fair trial), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 958, 114 S.Ct. 416, 126 L.Ed.2d 363 (1993)."},"case_id":51194,"label":"a"}
{"context":"After jury selection, his street clothes arrived, and he wore them throughout the rest of the trial. Under these circumstances, we conclude that Mr. Akbar's wearing of jail clothes during jury selection was harmless.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"47 F.3d 577, 581","parenthetical":"even if defendant is made to wear prison clothes at trial, this constitutional error is subject to harmless-error analysis","sentence":"See United States v. Hurtado, 47 F.3d 577, 581 (2d Cir.) (even if defendant is made to wear prison clothes at trial, this constitutional error is subject to harmless-error analysis), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 903, 116 S.Ct. 266, 133 L.Ed.2d 188 (1995); cf. United States v. Grady, 997 F.2d 421, 424 (8th Cir.) (on facts very similar to Mr. Akbar\u2019s, concluding under plain-error standard of review that defendant was not denied fair trial), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 958, 114 S.Ct. 416, 126 L.Ed.2d 363 (1993)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"on facts very similar to Mr. Akbar's, concluding under plain-error standard of review that defendant was not denied fair trial","sentence":"See United States v. Hurtado, 47 F.3d 577, 581 (2d Cir.) (even if defendant is made to wear prison clothes at trial, this constitutional error is subject to harmless-error analysis), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 903, 116 S.Ct. 266, 133 L.Ed.2d 188 (1995); cf. United States v. Grady, 997 F.2d 421, 424 (8th Cir.) (on facts very similar to Mr. Akbar\u2019s, concluding under plain-error standard of review that defendant was not denied fair trial), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 958, 114 S.Ct. 416, 126 L.Ed.2d 363 (1993)."},"case_id":51194,"label":"a"}
{"context":"After jury selection, his street clothes arrived, and he wore them throughout the rest of the trial. Under these circumstances, we conclude that Mr. Akbar's wearing of jail clothes during jury selection was harmless.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"on facts very similar to Mr. Akbar's, concluding under plain-error standard of review that defendant was not denied fair trial","sentence":"See United States v. Hurtado, 47 F.3d 577, 581 (2d Cir.) (even if defendant is made to wear prison clothes at trial, this constitutional error is subject to harmless-error analysis), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 903, 116 S.Ct. 266, 133 L.Ed.2d 188 (1995); cf. United States v. Grady, 997 F.2d 421, 424 (8th Cir.) (on facts very similar to Mr. Akbar\u2019s, concluding under plain-error standard of review that defendant was not denied fair trial), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 958, 114 S.Ct. 416, 126 L.Ed.2d 363 (1993)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"47 F.3d 577, 581","parenthetical":"even if defendant is made to wear prison clothes at trial, this constitutional error is subject to harmless-error analysis","sentence":"See United States v. Hurtado, 47 F.3d 577, 581 (2d Cir.) (even if defendant is made to wear prison clothes at trial, this constitutional error is subject to harmless-error analysis), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 903, 116 S.Ct. 266, 133 L.Ed.2d 188 (1995); cf. United States v. Grady, 997 F.2d 421, 424 (8th Cir.) (on facts very similar to Mr. Akbar\u2019s, concluding under plain-error standard of review that defendant was not denied fair trial), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 958, 114 S.Ct. 416, 126 L.Ed.2d 363 (1993)."},"case_id":51194,"label":"b"}
{"context":"After jury selection, his street clothes arrived, and he wore them throughout the rest of the trial. Under these circumstances, we conclude that Mr. Akbar's wearing of jail clothes during jury selection was harmless.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"even if defendant is made to wear prison clothes at trial, this constitutional error is subject to harmless-error analysis","sentence":"See United States v. Hurtado, 47 F.3d 577, 581 (2d Cir.) (even if defendant is made to wear prison clothes at trial, this constitutional error is subject to harmless-error analysis), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 903, 116 S.Ct. 266, 133 L.Ed.2d 188 (1995); cf. United States v. Grady, 997 F.2d 421, 424 (8th Cir.) (on facts very similar to Mr. Akbar\u2019s, concluding under plain-error standard of review that defendant was not denied fair trial), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 958, 114 S.Ct. 416, 126 L.Ed.2d 363 (1993)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"997 F.2d 421, 424","parenthetical":"on facts very similar to Mr. Akbar's, concluding under plain-error standard of review that defendant was not denied fair trial","sentence":"See United States v. Hurtado, 47 F.3d 577, 581 (2d Cir.) (even if defendant is made to wear prison clothes at trial, this constitutional error is subject to harmless-error analysis), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 903, 116 S.Ct. 266, 133 L.Ed.2d 188 (1995); cf. United States v. Grady, 997 F.2d 421, 424 (8th Cir.) (on facts very similar to Mr. Akbar\u2019s, concluding under plain-error standard of review that defendant was not denied fair trial), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 958, 114 S.Ct. 416, 126 L.Ed.2d 363 (1993)."},"case_id":51194,"label":"a"}
{"context":"After jury selection, his street clothes arrived, and he wore them throughout the rest of the trial. Under these circumstances, we conclude that Mr. Akbar's wearing of jail clothes during jury selection was harmless.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"even if defendant is made to wear prison clothes at trial, this constitutional error is subject to harmless-error analysis","sentence":"See United States v. Hurtado, 47 F.3d 577, 581 (2d Cir.) (even if defendant is made to wear prison clothes at trial, this constitutional error is subject to harmless-error analysis), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 903, 116 S.Ct. 266, 133 L.Ed.2d 188 (1995); cf. United States v. Grady, 997 F.2d 421, 424 (8th Cir.) (on facts very similar to Mr. Akbar\u2019s, concluding under plain-error standard of review that defendant was not denied fair trial), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 958, 114 S.Ct. 416, 126 L.Ed.2d 363 (1993)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"on facts very similar to Mr. Akbar's, concluding under plain-error standard of review that defendant was not denied fair trial","sentence":"See United States v. Hurtado, 47 F.3d 577, 581 (2d Cir.) (even if defendant is made to wear prison clothes at trial, this constitutional error is subject to harmless-error analysis), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 903, 116 S.Ct. 266, 133 L.Ed.2d 188 (1995); cf. United States v. Grady, 997 F.2d 421, 424 (8th Cir.) (on facts very similar to Mr. Akbar\u2019s, concluding under plain-error standard of review that defendant was not denied fair trial), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 958, 114 S.Ct. 416, 126 L.Ed.2d 363 (1993)."},"case_id":51194,"label":"a"}
{"context":"After jury selection, his street clothes arrived, and he wore them throughout the rest of the trial. Under these circumstances, we conclude that Mr. Akbar's wearing of jail clothes during jury selection was harmless.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"even if defendant is made to wear prison clothes at trial, this constitutional error is subject to harmless-error analysis","sentence":"See United States v. Hurtado, 47 F.3d 577, 581 (2d Cir.) (even if defendant is made to wear prison clothes at trial, this constitutional error is subject to harmless-error analysis), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 903, 116 S.Ct. 266, 133 L.Ed.2d 188 (1995); cf. United States v. Grady, 997 F.2d 421, 424 (8th Cir.) (on facts very similar to Mr. Akbar\u2019s, concluding under plain-error standard of review that defendant was not denied fair trial), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 958, 114 S.Ct. 416, 126 L.Ed.2d 363 (1993)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"on facts very similar to Mr. Akbar's, concluding under plain-error standard of review that defendant was not denied fair trial","sentence":"See United States v. Hurtado, 47 F.3d 577, 581 (2d Cir.) (even if defendant is made to wear prison clothes at trial, this constitutional error is subject to harmless-error analysis), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 903, 116 S.Ct. 266, 133 L.Ed.2d 188 (1995); cf. United States v. Grady, 997 F.2d 421, 424 (8th Cir.) (on facts very similar to Mr. Akbar\u2019s, concluding under plain-error standard of review that defendant was not denied fair trial), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 958, 114 S.Ct. 416, 126 L.Ed.2d 363 (1993)."},"case_id":51194,"label":"a"}
{"context":"After jury selection, his street clothes arrived, and he wore them throughout the rest of the trial. Under these circumstances, we conclude that Mr. Akbar's wearing of jail clothes during jury selection was harmless.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"even if defendant is made to wear prison clothes at trial, this constitutional error is subject to harmless-error analysis","sentence":"See United States v. Hurtado, 47 F.3d 577, 581 (2d Cir.) (even if defendant is made to wear prison clothes at trial, this constitutional error is subject to harmless-error analysis), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 903, 116 S.Ct. 266, 133 L.Ed.2d 188 (1995); cf. United States v. Grady, 997 F.2d 421, 424 (8th Cir.) (on facts very similar to Mr. Akbar\u2019s, concluding under plain-error standard of review that defendant was not denied fair trial), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 958, 114 S.Ct. 416, 126 L.Ed.2d 363 (1993)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"on facts very similar to Mr. Akbar's, concluding under plain-error standard of review that defendant was not denied fair trial","sentence":"See United States v. Hurtado, 47 F.3d 577, 581 (2d Cir.) (even if defendant is made to wear prison clothes at trial, this constitutional error is subject to harmless-error analysis), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 903, 116 S.Ct. 266, 133 L.Ed.2d 188 (1995); cf. United States v. Grady, 997 F.2d 421, 424 (8th Cir.) (on facts very similar to Mr. Akbar\u2019s, concluding under plain-error standard of review that defendant was not denied fair trial), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 958, 114 S.Ct. 416, 126 L.Ed.2d 363 (1993)."},"case_id":51194,"label":"a"}
{"context":"After jury selection, his street clothes arrived, and he wore them throughout the rest of the trial. Under these circumstances, we conclude that Mr. Akbar's wearing of jail clothes during jury selection was harmless.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"even if defendant is made to wear prison clothes at trial, this constitutional error is subject to harmless-error analysis","sentence":"See United States v. Hurtado, 47 F.3d 577, 581 (2d Cir.) (even if defendant is made to wear prison clothes at trial, this constitutional error is subject to harmless-error analysis), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 903, 116 S.Ct. 266, 133 L.Ed.2d 188 (1995); cf. United States v. Grady, 997 F.2d 421, 424 (8th Cir.) (on facts very similar to Mr. Akbar\u2019s, concluding under plain-error standard of review that defendant was not denied fair trial), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 958, 114 S.Ct. 416, 126 L.Ed.2d 363 (1993)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"997 F.2d 421, 424","parenthetical":"on facts very similar to Mr. Akbar's, concluding under plain-error standard of review that defendant was not denied fair trial","sentence":"See United States v. Hurtado, 47 F.3d 577, 581 (2d Cir.) (even if defendant is made to wear prison clothes at trial, this constitutional error is subject to harmless-error analysis), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 903, 116 S.Ct. 266, 133 L.Ed.2d 188 (1995); cf. United States v. Grady, 997 F.2d 421, 424 (8th Cir.) (on facts very similar to Mr. Akbar\u2019s, concluding under plain-error standard of review that defendant was not denied fair trial), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 958, 114 S.Ct. 416, 126 L.Ed.2d 363 (1993)."},"case_id":51194,"label":"a"}
{"context":"After jury selection, his street clothes arrived, and he wore them throughout the rest of the trial. Under these circumstances, we conclude that Mr. Akbar's wearing of jail clothes during jury selection was harmless.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"even if defendant is made to wear prison clothes at trial, this constitutional error is subject to harmless-error analysis","sentence":"See United States v. Hurtado, 47 F.3d 577, 581 (2d Cir.) (even if defendant is made to wear prison clothes at trial, this constitutional error is subject to harmless-error analysis), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 903, 116 S.Ct. 266, 133 L.Ed.2d 188 (1995); cf. United States v. Grady, 997 F.2d 421, 424 (8th Cir.) (on facts very similar to Mr. Akbar\u2019s, concluding under plain-error standard of review that defendant was not denied fair trial), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 958, 114 S.Ct. 416, 126 L.Ed.2d 363 (1993)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"on facts very similar to Mr. Akbar's, concluding under plain-error standard of review that defendant was not denied fair trial","sentence":"See United States v. Hurtado, 47 F.3d 577, 581 (2d Cir.) (even if defendant is made to wear prison clothes at trial, this constitutional error is subject to harmless-error analysis), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 903, 116 S.Ct. 266, 133 L.Ed.2d 188 (1995); cf. United States v. Grady, 997 F.2d 421, 424 (8th Cir.) (on facts very similar to Mr. Akbar\u2019s, concluding under plain-error standard of review that defendant was not denied fair trial), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 958, 114 S.Ct. 416, 126 L.Ed.2d 363 (1993)."},"case_id":51194,"label":"a"}
{"context":"After jury selection, his street clothes arrived, and he wore them throughout the rest of the trial. Under these circumstances, we conclude that Mr. Akbar's wearing of jail clothes during jury selection was harmless.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"even if defendant is made to wear prison clothes at trial, this constitutional error is subject to harmless-error analysis","sentence":"See United States v. Hurtado, 47 F.3d 577, 581 (2d Cir.) (even if defendant is made to wear prison clothes at trial, this constitutional error is subject to harmless-error analysis), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 903, 116 S.Ct. 266, 133 L.Ed.2d 188 (1995); cf. United States v. Grady, 997 F.2d 421, 424 (8th Cir.) (on facts very similar to Mr. Akbar\u2019s, concluding under plain-error standard of review that defendant was not denied fair trial), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 958, 114 S.Ct. 416, 126 L.Ed.2d 363 (1993)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"on facts very similar to Mr. Akbar's, concluding under plain-error standard of review that defendant was not denied fair trial","sentence":"See United States v. Hurtado, 47 F.3d 577, 581 (2d Cir.) (even if defendant is made to wear prison clothes at trial, this constitutional error is subject to harmless-error analysis), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 903, 116 S.Ct. 266, 133 L.Ed.2d 188 (1995); cf. United States v. Grady, 997 F.2d 421, 424 (8th Cir.) (on facts very similar to Mr. Akbar\u2019s, concluding under plain-error standard of review that defendant was not denied fair trial), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 958, 114 S.Ct. 416, 126 L.Ed.2d 363 (1993)."},"case_id":51194,"label":"a"}
{"context":"After jury selection, his street clothes arrived, and he wore them throughout the rest of the trial. Under these circumstances, we conclude that Mr. Akbar's wearing of jail clothes during jury selection was harmless.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"even if defendant is made to wear prison clothes at trial, this constitutional error is subject to harmless-error analysis","sentence":"See United States v. Hurtado, 47 F.3d 577, 581 (2d Cir.) (even if defendant is made to wear prison clothes at trial, this constitutional error is subject to harmless-error analysis), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 903, 116 S.Ct. 266, 133 L.Ed.2d 188 (1995); cf. United States v. Grady, 997 F.2d 421, 424 (8th Cir.) (on facts very similar to Mr. Akbar\u2019s, concluding under plain-error standard of review that defendant was not denied fair trial), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 958, 114 S.Ct. 416, 126 L.Ed.2d 363 (1993)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"on facts very similar to Mr. Akbar's, concluding under plain-error standard of review that defendant was not denied fair trial","sentence":"See United States v. Hurtado, 47 F.3d 577, 581 (2d Cir.) (even if defendant is made to wear prison clothes at trial, this constitutional error is subject to harmless-error analysis), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 903, 116 S.Ct. 266, 133 L.Ed.2d 188 (1995); cf. United States v. Grady, 997 F.2d 421, 424 (8th Cir.) (on facts very similar to Mr. Akbar\u2019s, concluding under plain-error standard of review that defendant was not denied fair trial), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 958, 114 S.Ct. 416, 126 L.Ed.2d 363 (1993)."},"case_id":51194,"label":"a"}
{"context":"After jury selection, his street clothes arrived, and he wore them throughout the rest of the trial. Under these circumstances, we conclude that Mr. Akbar's wearing of jail clothes during jury selection was harmless.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"997 F.2d 421, 424","parenthetical":"on facts very similar to Mr. Akbar's, concluding under plain-error standard of review that defendant was not denied fair trial","sentence":"See United States v. Hurtado, 47 F.3d 577, 581 (2d Cir.) (even if defendant is made to wear prison clothes at trial, this constitutional error is subject to harmless-error analysis), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 903, 116 S.Ct. 266, 133 L.Ed.2d 188 (1995); cf. United States v. Grady, 997 F.2d 421, 424 (8th Cir.) (on facts very similar to Mr. Akbar\u2019s, concluding under plain-error standard of review that defendant was not denied fair trial), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 958, 114 S.Ct. 416, 126 L.Ed.2d 363 (1993)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"even if defendant is made to wear prison clothes at trial, this constitutional error is subject to harmless-error analysis","sentence":"See United States v. Hurtado, 47 F.3d 577, 581 (2d Cir.) (even if defendant is made to wear prison clothes at trial, this constitutional error is subject to harmless-error analysis), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 903, 116 S.Ct. 266, 133 L.Ed.2d 188 (1995); cf. United States v. Grady, 997 F.2d 421, 424 (8th Cir.) (on facts very similar to Mr. Akbar\u2019s, concluding under plain-error standard of review that defendant was not denied fair trial), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 958, 114 S.Ct. 416, 126 L.Ed.2d 363 (1993)."},"case_id":51194,"label":"b"}
{"context":"After jury selection, his street clothes arrived, and he wore them throughout the rest of the trial. Under these circumstances, we conclude that Mr. Akbar's wearing of jail clothes during jury selection was harmless.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"even if defendant is made to wear prison clothes at trial, this constitutional error is subject to harmless-error analysis","sentence":"See United States v. Hurtado, 47 F.3d 577, 581 (2d Cir.) (even if defendant is made to wear prison clothes at trial, this constitutional error is subject to harmless-error analysis), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 903, 116 S.Ct. 266, 133 L.Ed.2d 188 (1995); cf. United States v. Grady, 997 F.2d 421, 424 (8th Cir.) (on facts very similar to Mr. Akbar\u2019s, concluding under plain-error standard of review that defendant was not denied fair trial), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 958, 114 S.Ct. 416, 126 L.Ed.2d 363 (1993)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"on facts very similar to Mr. Akbar's, concluding under plain-error standard of review that defendant was not denied fair trial","sentence":"See United States v. Hurtado, 47 F.3d 577, 581 (2d Cir.) (even if defendant is made to wear prison clothes at trial, this constitutional error is subject to harmless-error analysis), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 903, 116 S.Ct. 266, 133 L.Ed.2d 188 (1995); cf. United States v. Grady, 997 F.2d 421, 424 (8th Cir.) (on facts very similar to Mr. Akbar\u2019s, concluding under plain-error standard of review that defendant was not denied fair trial), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 958, 114 S.Ct. 416, 126 L.Ed.2d 363 (1993)."},"case_id":51194,"label":"a"}
{"context":"After jury selection, his street clothes arrived, and he wore them throughout the rest of the trial. Under these circumstances, we conclude that Mr. Akbar's wearing of jail clothes during jury selection was harmless.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"even if defendant is made to wear prison clothes at trial, this constitutional error is subject to harmless-error analysis","sentence":"See United States v. Hurtado, 47 F.3d 577, 581 (2d Cir.) (even if defendant is made to wear prison clothes at trial, this constitutional error is subject to harmless-error analysis), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 903, 116 S.Ct. 266, 133 L.Ed.2d 188 (1995); cf. United States v. Grady, 997 F.2d 421, 424 (8th Cir.) (on facts very similar to Mr. Akbar\u2019s, concluding under plain-error standard of review that defendant was not denied fair trial), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 958, 114 S.Ct. 416, 126 L.Ed.2d 363 (1993)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"on facts very similar to Mr. Akbar's, concluding under plain-error standard of review that defendant was not denied fair trial","sentence":"See United States v. Hurtado, 47 F.3d 577, 581 (2d Cir.) (even if defendant is made to wear prison clothes at trial, this constitutional error is subject to harmless-error analysis), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 903, 116 S.Ct. 266, 133 L.Ed.2d 188 (1995); cf. United States v. Grady, 997 F.2d 421, 424 (8th Cir.) (on facts very similar to Mr. Akbar\u2019s, concluding under plain-error standard of review that defendant was not denied fair trial), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 958, 114 S.Ct. 416, 126 L.Ed.2d 363 (1993)."},"case_id":51194,"label":"a"}
{"context":"After jury selection, his street clothes arrived, and he wore them throughout the rest of the trial. Under these circumstances, we conclude that Mr. Akbar's wearing of jail clothes during jury selection was harmless.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"on facts very similar to Mr. Akbar's, concluding under plain-error standard of review that defendant was not denied fair trial","sentence":"See United States v. Hurtado, 47 F.3d 577, 581 (2d Cir.) (even if defendant is made to wear prison clothes at trial, this constitutional error is subject to harmless-error analysis), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 903, 116 S.Ct. 266, 133 L.Ed.2d 188 (1995); cf. United States v. Grady, 997 F.2d 421, 424 (8th Cir.) (on facts very similar to Mr. Akbar\u2019s, concluding under plain-error standard of review that defendant was not denied fair trial), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 958, 114 S.Ct. 416, 126 L.Ed.2d 363 (1993)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"even if defendant is made to wear prison clothes at trial, this constitutional error is subject to harmless-error analysis","sentence":"See United States v. Hurtado, 47 F.3d 577, 581 (2d Cir.) (even if defendant is made to wear prison clothes at trial, this constitutional error is subject to harmless-error analysis), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 903, 116 S.Ct. 266, 133 L.Ed.2d 188 (1995); cf. United States v. Grady, 997 F.2d 421, 424 (8th Cir.) (on facts very similar to Mr. Akbar\u2019s, concluding under plain-error standard of review that defendant was not denied fair trial), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 958, 114 S.Ct. 416, 126 L.Ed.2d 363 (1993)."},"case_id":51194,"label":"b"}
{"context":". In fact, the BIA has shown a willingness to sua sponte reopen cases where there is evidence that an immigrant's conviction was vacated for substantive or procedural defects.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"2007 WL 2197540, *1","parenthetical":"using its sua sponte power to reopen proceedings where the immigrant presented evidence indicating that his conviction was vacated, in part, due to an alleged defect in the proceedings related to his plea bargain.","sentence":"In re Noel, 2007 WL 2197540, *1 (BIA Jun 29, 2007) (using its sua sponte power to reopen proceedings where the immigrant presented evidence indicating that his conviction was vacated, in part, due to an alleged defect in the proceedings related to his plea bargain.); In re Bworna, 2007 WL 1520877, *1 (BIA May 14, 2007) (holding that \"[s]ince the basis for the respondent's order of removal and the denial of relief no longer exists, the respondent has presented exceptional circumstances justifying reopening\u201d); In re Sorokin, 2007 WL 1520791, *1 (BIA May 11, 2007) (same); but see In re Noor, 2007 WL 4699923, *1 (BIA Dec 11, 2007) (refusing to use its sua sponte authority to reopen a case to consider the petitioner\u2019s vacated convictions because under Fifth Circuit precedent all vacated convictions remain valid for immigration purposes regardless of the reason for the vacatur)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"2007 WL 4699923, *1","parenthetical":"refusing to use its sua sponte authority to reopen a case to consider the petitioner's vacated convictions because under Fifth Circuit precedent all vacated convictions remain valid for immigration purposes regardless of the reason for the vacatur","sentence":"In re Noel, 2007 WL 2197540, *1 (BIA Jun 29, 2007) (using its sua sponte power to reopen proceedings where the immigrant presented evidence indicating that his conviction was vacated, in part, due to an alleged defect in the proceedings related to his plea bargain.); In re Bworna, 2007 WL 1520877, *1 (BIA May 14, 2007) (holding that \"[s]ince the basis for the respondent's order of removal and the denial of relief no longer exists, the respondent has presented exceptional circumstances justifying reopening\u201d); In re Sorokin, 2007 WL 1520791, *1 (BIA May 11, 2007) (same); but see In re Noor, 2007 WL 4699923, *1 (BIA Dec 11, 2007) (refusing to use its sua sponte authority to reopen a case to consider the petitioner\u2019s vacated convictions because under Fifth Circuit precedent all vacated convictions remain valid for immigration purposes regardless of the reason for the vacatur)."},"case_id":3737801,"label":"a"}
{"context":". In fact, the BIA has shown a willingness to sua sponte reopen cases where there is evidence that an immigrant's conviction was vacated for substantive or procedural defects.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"2007 WL 4699923, *1","parenthetical":"refusing to use its sua sponte authority to reopen a case to consider the petitioner's vacated convictions because under Fifth Circuit precedent all vacated convictions remain valid for immigration purposes regardless of the reason for the vacatur","sentence":"In re Noel, 2007 WL 2197540, *1 (BIA Jun 29, 2007) (using its sua sponte power to reopen proceedings where the immigrant presented evidence indicating that his conviction was vacated, in part, due to an alleged defect in the proceedings related to his plea bargain.); In re Bworna, 2007 WL 1520877, *1 (BIA May 14, 2007) (holding that \"[s]ince the basis for the respondent's order of removal and the denial of relief no longer exists, the respondent has presented exceptional circumstances justifying reopening\u201d); In re Sorokin, 2007 WL 1520791, *1 (BIA May 11, 2007) (same); but see In re Noor, 2007 WL 4699923, *1 (BIA Dec 11, 2007) (refusing to use its sua sponte authority to reopen a case to consider the petitioner\u2019s vacated convictions because under Fifth Circuit precedent all vacated convictions remain valid for immigration purposes regardless of the reason for the vacatur)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"2007 WL 1520877, *1","parenthetical":"holding that \"[s]ince the basis for the respondent's order of removal and the denial of relief no longer exists, the respondent has presented exceptional circumstances justifying reopening\"","sentence":"In re Noel, 2007 WL 2197540, *1 (BIA Jun 29, 2007) (using its sua sponte power to reopen proceedings where the immigrant presented evidence indicating that his conviction was vacated, in part, due to an alleged defect in the proceedings related to his plea bargain.); In re Bworna, 2007 WL 1520877, *1 (BIA May 14, 2007) (holding that \"[s]ince the basis for the respondent's order of removal and the denial of relief no longer exists, the respondent has presented exceptional circumstances justifying reopening\u201d); In re Sorokin, 2007 WL 1520791, *1 (BIA May 11, 2007) (same); but see In re Noor, 2007 WL 4699923, *1 (BIA Dec 11, 2007) (refusing to use its sua sponte authority to reopen a case to consider the petitioner\u2019s vacated convictions because under Fifth Circuit precedent all vacated convictions remain valid for immigration purposes regardless of the reason for the vacatur)."},"case_id":3737801,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Before conducting this exercise here, we must dispatch one of Idy's arguments: he says that for an assault-based crime to involve moral turpitude, it must involve a death. But we have squarely rejected this argument before, so it is simply beyond debate that crimes involving moral turpitude are not limited to those causing death.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting that the petitioner's \"good fortune in not ... killing anyone does not change the quality of his actions\"","sentence":"See Nguyen, 211 F.3d at 695 (rejecting the argument that death to another person is a necessary element of a crime involving moral turpitude); see also Knapik v. Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 84, 90 n. 5 (3d Cir.2004) (noting that the petitioner\u2019s \u201cgood fortune in not ... killing anyone does not change the quality of his actions\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"211 F.3d 695, 695","parenthetical":"rejecting the argument that death to another person is a necessary element of a crime involving moral turpitude","sentence":"See Nguyen, 211 F.3d at 695 (rejecting the argument that death to another person is a necessary element of a crime involving moral turpitude); see also Knapik v. Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 84, 90 n. 5 (3d Cir.2004) (noting that the petitioner\u2019s \u201cgood fortune in not ... killing anyone does not change the quality of his actions\u201d)."},"case_id":3748027,"label":"b"}
{"context":"First, the police officers plainly had a reasonable belief that Williams might possess a weapon. Williams had a criminal history that suggested not only that he possessed weapons, but also that he was willing to use force, as evidenced by his aggravated robbery conviction and his arrest for discharging a weapon into a home or school. Moreover, Williams was a suspected dealer of crack cocaine and, as Detective Daniel testified at the motion to suppress hearing, in Daniel's experience \"the majority of people who traffic, especially in cocaine, own a gun or have a gun ... at their ready.\" We have often recognized the propensity of drug traffickers to carry firearms.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"430 F.3d 606, 613","parenthetical":"\"We have often recognized that firearms are tools of the drug trade that are commonly kept on the premises of major narcotics dealers\"","sentence":"See United States v. Till, 434 F.3d 880, 884 (6th Cir.2006) (affirming district court\u2019s evidentiary ruling that drugs found in possession of the defendant constituted relevant evidence \u201cbecause of the propensity of people involved with drugs to carry weapons\u201d); United States v. Swafford, 385 F.3d 1026, 1030 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding admissible police officer\u2019s testimony that firearms are commonly used in drug trafficking); see also United States v. Estrada, 430 F.3d 606, 613 (2d Cir.2005) (\u201cWe have often recognized that firearms are tools of the drug trade that are commonly kept on the premises of major narcotics dealers\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"434 F.3d 880, 884","parenthetical":"affirming district court's evidentiary ruling that drugs found in possession of the defendant constituted relevant evidence \"because of the propensity of people involved with drugs to carry weapons\"","sentence":"See United States v. Till, 434 F.3d 880, 884 (6th Cir.2006) (affirming district court\u2019s evidentiary ruling that drugs found in possession of the defendant constituted relevant evidence \u201cbecause of the propensity of people involved with drugs to carry weapons\u201d); United States v. Swafford, 385 F.3d 1026, 1030 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding admissible police officer\u2019s testimony that firearms are commonly used in drug trafficking); see also United States v. Estrada, 430 F.3d 606, 613 (2d Cir.2005) (\u201cWe have often recognized that firearms are tools of the drug trade that are commonly kept on the premises of major narcotics dealers\u201d)."},"case_id":3629345,"label":"b"}
{"context":"First, the police officers plainly had a reasonable belief that Williams might possess a weapon. Williams had a criminal history that suggested not only that he possessed weapons, but also that he was willing to use force, as evidenced by his aggravated robbery conviction and his arrest for discharging a weapon into a home or school. Moreover, Williams was a suspected dealer of crack cocaine and, as Detective Daniel testified at the motion to suppress hearing, in Daniel's experience \"the majority of people who traffic, especially in cocaine, own a gun or have a gun ... at their ready.\" We have often recognized the propensity of drug traffickers to carry firearms.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"430 F.3d 606, 613","parenthetical":"\"We have often recognized that firearms are tools of the drug trade that are commonly kept on the premises of major narcotics dealers\"","sentence":"See United States v. Till, 434 F.3d 880, 884 (6th Cir.2006) (affirming district court\u2019s evidentiary ruling that drugs found in possession of the defendant constituted relevant evidence \u201cbecause of the propensity of people involved with drugs to carry weapons\u201d); United States v. Swafford, 385 F.3d 1026, 1030 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding admissible police officer\u2019s testimony that firearms are commonly used in drug trafficking); see also United States v. Estrada, 430 F.3d 606, 613 (2d Cir.2005) (\u201cWe have often recognized that firearms are tools of the drug trade that are commonly kept on the premises of major narcotics dealers\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"385 F.3d 1026, 1030","parenthetical":"holding admissible police officer's testimony that firearms are commonly used in drug trafficking","sentence":"See United States v. Till, 434 F.3d 880, 884 (6th Cir.2006) (affirming district court\u2019s evidentiary ruling that drugs found in possession of the defendant constituted relevant evidence \u201cbecause of the propensity of people involved with drugs to carry weapons\u201d); United States v. Swafford, 385 F.3d 1026, 1030 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding admissible police officer\u2019s testimony that firearms are commonly used in drug trafficking); see also United States v. Estrada, 430 F.3d 606, 613 (2d Cir.2005) (\u201cWe have often recognized that firearms are tools of the drug trade that are commonly kept on the premises of major narcotics dealers\u201d)."},"case_id":3629345,"label":"b"}
{"context":"P 10. Defendant's main argument comes with regard to the fourth factor in Gardner: \"the relative importance of the defendant's testimony and the need for impeachment by prior conviction.\" As we have noted in similar cases in the past, we cannot determine the potential prejudice of such evidence where the defendant has made a \"tactical decision\" not to present testimony that would give rise to the actual introduction of the allegedly harmful evidence.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"173 Vt. 578, 578","parenthetical":"\"The trial court exercised its discretion appropriately [in allowing prior conviction to be used for impeachment if defendant testified], particularly where defendant failed to make an offer of proof supporting his asserted need to testify in his own defense.\"","sentence":"State v. Koveos, 169 Vt. 62, 71, 732 A.2d 722, 728 (1999) (noting that defendant\u2019s series of hypothetical questions to trial court about permissible scope of examination were insufficient to provide for appellate review); cf. Setien, 173 Vt. at 578, 795 A.2d at 1138 (\u201cThe trial court exercised its discretion appropriately [in allowing prior conviction to be used for impeachment if defendant testified], particularly where defendant failed to make an offer of proof supporting his asserted need to testify in his own defense.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"169 Vt. 62, 71","parenthetical":"noting that defendant's series of hypothetical questions to trial court about permissible scope of examination were insufficient to provide for appellate review","sentence":"State v. Koveos, 169 Vt. 62, 71, 732 A.2d 722, 728 (1999) (noting that defendant\u2019s series of hypothetical questions to trial court about permissible scope of examination were insufficient to provide for appellate review); cf. Setien, 173 Vt. at 578, 795 A.2d at 1138 (\u201cThe trial court exercised its discretion appropriately [in allowing prior conviction to be used for impeachment if defendant testified], particularly where defendant failed to make an offer of proof supporting his asserted need to testify in his own defense.\u201d)."},"case_id":3700201,"label":"b"}
{"context":"P 10. Defendant's main argument comes with regard to the fourth factor in Gardner: \"the relative importance of the defendant's testimony and the need for impeachment by prior conviction.\" As we have noted in similar cases in the past, we cannot determine the potential prejudice of such evidence where the defendant has made a \"tactical decision\" not to present testimony that would give rise to the actual introduction of the allegedly harmful evidence.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"795 A.2d 1138, 1138","parenthetical":"\"The trial court exercised its discretion appropriately [in allowing prior conviction to be used for impeachment if defendant testified], particularly where defendant failed to make an offer of proof supporting his asserted need to testify in his own defense.\"","sentence":"State v. Koveos, 169 Vt. 62, 71, 732 A.2d 722, 728 (1999) (noting that defendant\u2019s series of hypothetical questions to trial court about permissible scope of examination were insufficient to provide for appellate review); cf. Setien, 173 Vt. at 578, 795 A.2d at 1138 (\u201cThe trial court exercised its discretion appropriately [in allowing prior conviction to be used for impeachment if defendant testified], particularly where defendant failed to make an offer of proof supporting his asserted need to testify in his own defense.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"169 Vt. 62, 71","parenthetical":"noting that defendant's series of hypothetical questions to trial court about permissible scope of examination were insufficient to provide for appellate review","sentence":"State v. Koveos, 169 Vt. 62, 71, 732 A.2d 722, 728 (1999) (noting that defendant\u2019s series of hypothetical questions to trial court about permissible scope of examination were insufficient to provide for appellate review); cf. Setien, 173 Vt. at 578, 795 A.2d at 1138 (\u201cThe trial court exercised its discretion appropriately [in allowing prior conviction to be used for impeachment if defendant testified], particularly where defendant failed to make an offer of proof supporting his asserted need to testify in his own defense.\u201d)."},"case_id":3700201,"label":"b"}
{"context":"P 10. Defendant's main argument comes with regard to the fourth factor in Gardner: \"the relative importance of the defendant's testimony and the need for impeachment by prior conviction.\" As we have noted in similar cases in the past, we cannot determine the potential prejudice of such evidence where the defendant has made a \"tactical decision\" not to present testimony that would give rise to the actual introduction of the allegedly harmful evidence.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"732 A.2d 722, 728","parenthetical":"noting that defendant's series of hypothetical questions to trial court about permissible scope of examination were insufficient to provide for appellate review","sentence":"State v. Koveos, 169 Vt. 62, 71, 732 A.2d 722, 728 (1999) (noting that defendant\u2019s series of hypothetical questions to trial court about permissible scope of examination were insufficient to provide for appellate review); cf. Setien, 173 Vt. at 578, 795 A.2d at 1138 (\u201cThe trial court exercised its discretion appropriately [in allowing prior conviction to be used for impeachment if defendant testified], particularly where defendant failed to make an offer of proof supporting his asserted need to testify in his own defense.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"173 Vt. 578, 578","parenthetical":"\"The trial court exercised its discretion appropriately [in allowing prior conviction to be used for impeachment if defendant testified], particularly where defendant failed to make an offer of proof supporting his asserted need to testify in his own defense.\"","sentence":"State v. Koveos, 169 Vt. 62, 71, 732 A.2d 722, 728 (1999) (noting that defendant\u2019s series of hypothetical questions to trial court about permissible scope of examination were insufficient to provide for appellate review); cf. Setien, 173 Vt. at 578, 795 A.2d at 1138 (\u201cThe trial court exercised its discretion appropriately [in allowing prior conviction to be used for impeachment if defendant testified], particularly where defendant failed to make an offer of proof supporting his asserted need to testify in his own defense.\u201d)."},"case_id":3700201,"label":"a"}
{"context":"P 10. Defendant's main argument comes with regard to the fourth factor in Gardner: \"the relative importance of the defendant's testimony and the need for impeachment by prior conviction.\" As we have noted in similar cases in the past, we cannot determine the potential prejudice of such evidence where the defendant has made a \"tactical decision\" not to present testimony that would give rise to the actual introduction of the allegedly harmful evidence.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"795 A.2d 1138, 1138","parenthetical":"\"The trial court exercised its discretion appropriately [in allowing prior conviction to be used for impeachment if defendant testified], particularly where defendant failed to make an offer of proof supporting his asserted need to testify in his own defense.\"","sentence":"State v. Koveos, 169 Vt. 62, 71, 732 A.2d 722, 728 (1999) (noting that defendant\u2019s series of hypothetical questions to trial court about permissible scope of examination were insufficient to provide for appellate review); cf. Setien, 173 Vt. at 578, 795 A.2d at 1138 (\u201cThe trial court exercised its discretion appropriately [in allowing prior conviction to be used for impeachment if defendant testified], particularly where defendant failed to make an offer of proof supporting his asserted need to testify in his own defense.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"732 A.2d 722, 728","parenthetical":"noting that defendant's series of hypothetical questions to trial court about permissible scope of examination were insufficient to provide for appellate review","sentence":"State v. Koveos, 169 Vt. 62, 71, 732 A.2d 722, 728 (1999) (noting that defendant\u2019s series of hypothetical questions to trial court about permissible scope of examination were insufficient to provide for appellate review); cf. Setien, 173 Vt. at 578, 795 A.2d at 1138 (\u201cThe trial court exercised its discretion appropriately [in allowing prior conviction to be used for impeachment if defendant testified], particularly where defendant failed to make an offer of proof supporting his asserted need to testify in his own defense.\u201d)."},"case_id":3700201,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Courts generally have held that the existence of a direct threat is a defense to be proved by the employer.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"357 F.3d 1151, 1151","parenthetical":"\"[I]t is a defense to claims under the Rehabilitation Act that an employee may pose a 'direct threat' to the welfare of others.\"","sentence":"See Branham v. Snow, 392 F.3d 896, 906 (7th Cir.2004) (burden is on employer to show employee posed a direct threat); Echazabal v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 336 F.3d 1023, 1027 (9th Cir.2003) (burden of establishing direct threat is on employer); see also Taylor v. Rice, 451 F.3d 898, 905-06 (D.C.Cir.2006) (characterizing direct threat as defense); McGeshick, 357 F.3d at 1151 (\u201c[I]t is a defense to claims under the Rehabilitation Act that an employee may pose a \u2018direct threat\u2019 to the welfare of others.\u201d). We have recognized an exception to the general rule: \u201c[Wjhere the essential job duties necessarily implicate the safety of others, then the burden may be on the plaintiff to show that she can perform those functions without endangering others.\u201d"},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"392 F.3d 896, 906","parenthetical":"burden is on employer to show employee posed a direct threat","sentence":"See Branham v. Snow, 392 F.3d 896, 906 (7th Cir.2004) (burden is on employer to show employee posed a direct threat); Echazabal v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 336 F.3d 1023, 1027 (9th Cir.2003) (burden of establishing direct threat is on employer); see also Taylor v. Rice, 451 F.3d 898, 905-06 (D.C.Cir.2006) (characterizing direct threat as defense); McGeshick, 357 F.3d at 1151 (\u201c[I]t is a defense to claims under the Rehabilitation Act that an employee may pose a \u2018direct threat\u2019 to the welfare of others.\u201d). We have recognized an exception to the general rule: \u201c[Wjhere the essential job duties necessarily implicate the safety of others, then the burden may be on the plaintiff to show that she can perform those functions without endangering others.\u201d"},"case_id":3698484,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Although Hughey involved the preamendment version of the VWPA, courts have extended its analysis to the amended version of that statute. We have approved of this analysis and, because the amended version of the VWPA contains identical language to the MVRA, we have further extended Hughey to the MVRA.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"200 F.3d 136, 141","parenthetical":"holding that \"[t]he conduct underlying the offense of conviction thus stakes out the boundaries of the restitutionary authority\" under the MVRA","sentence":"United States v. Oladimeji, 463 F.3d 152, 158-59 (2d Cir.2006) (holding that the relevant question in imposing restitution under the MVRA is whether the \u201closs [is] caused by the specific conduct that is the basis of the offense of conviction\u201d); see also United States v. Akande, 200 F.3d 136, 141 (3d Cir.1999) (holding that \u201c[t]he conduct underlying the offense of conviction thus stakes out the boundaries of the restitutionary authority\u201d under the MVRA)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"463 F.3d 152, 158-59","parenthetical":"holding that the relevant question in imposing restitution under the MVRA is whether the \"loss [is] caused by the specific conduct that is the basis of the offense of conviction\"","sentence":"United States v. Oladimeji, 463 F.3d 152, 158-59 (2d Cir.2006) (holding that the relevant question in imposing restitution under the MVRA is whether the \u201closs [is] caused by the specific conduct that is the basis of the offense of conviction\u201d); see also United States v. Akande, 200 F.3d 136, 141 (3d Cir.1999) (holding that \u201c[t]he conduct underlying the offense of conviction thus stakes out the boundaries of the restitutionary authority\u201d under the MVRA)."},"case_id":3608646,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Daugherty argues that Appellees violated her Fourth Amendment rights, asserting that they unlawfully entered the Swedes Flat Property, where her dogs were found, and searched for the poodles on the property, in the mobile home, and in the barn. We disagree. Appellees were properly on the property pursuant to the open fields doctrine, which stands for the proposition that the Fourth Amendment does not extend to areas, like the grounds at issue here, that are usually accessible to the public.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"466 U.S. 170, 177-79","parenthetical":"noting that even putting up a fence or a no trespassing sign does not create a legitimate expectation of privacy in open fields","sentence":"Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177-79, 104 S.Ct. 1735, 80 L.Ed.2d 214 (1984) (noting that even putting up a fence or a no trespassing sign does not create a legitimate expectation of privacy in open fields); cf. United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 301, 107 S.Ct. 1134, 94 L.Ed.2d 326 (1987) (the Fourth Amendment does protect the area harboring the intimate activity associated with the sanctity of a man\u2019s home and the privacies of life)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"480 U.S. 294, 301","parenthetical":"the Fourth Amendment does protect the area harboring the intimate activity associated with the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life","sentence":"Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177-79, 104 S.Ct. 1735, 80 L.Ed.2d 214 (1984) (noting that even putting up a fence or a no trespassing sign does not create a legitimate expectation of privacy in open fields); cf. United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 301, 107 S.Ct. 1134, 94 L.Ed.2d 326 (1987) (the Fourth Amendment does protect the area harboring the intimate activity associated with the sanctity of a man\u2019s home and the privacies of life)."},"case_id":281021,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Daugherty argues that Appellees violated her Fourth Amendment rights, asserting that they unlawfully entered the Swedes Flat Property, where her dogs were found, and searched for the poodles on the property, in the mobile home, and in the barn. We disagree. Appellees were properly on the property pursuant to the open fields doctrine, which stands for the proposition that the Fourth Amendment does not extend to areas, like the grounds at issue here, that are usually accessible to the public.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"466 U.S. 170, 177-79","parenthetical":"noting that even putting up a fence or a no trespassing sign does not create a legitimate expectation of privacy in open fields","sentence":"Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177-79, 104 S.Ct. 1735, 80 L.Ed.2d 214 (1984) (noting that even putting up a fence or a no trespassing sign does not create a legitimate expectation of privacy in open fields); cf. United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 301, 107 S.Ct. 1134, 94 L.Ed.2d 326 (1987) (the Fourth Amendment does protect the area harboring the intimate activity associated with the sanctity of a man\u2019s home and the privacies of life)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"the Fourth Amendment does protect the area harboring the intimate activity associated with the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life","sentence":"Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177-79, 104 S.Ct. 1735, 80 L.Ed.2d 214 (1984) (noting that even putting up a fence or a no trespassing sign does not create a legitimate expectation of privacy in open fields); cf. United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 301, 107 S.Ct. 1134, 94 L.Ed.2d 326 (1987) (the Fourth Amendment does protect the area harboring the intimate activity associated with the sanctity of a man\u2019s home and the privacies of life)."},"case_id":281021,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Daugherty argues that Appellees violated her Fourth Amendment rights, asserting that they unlawfully entered the Swedes Flat Property, where her dogs were found, and searched for the poodles on the property, in the mobile home, and in the barn. We disagree. Appellees were properly on the property pursuant to the open fields doctrine, which stands for the proposition that the Fourth Amendment does not extend to areas, like the grounds at issue here, that are usually accessible to the public.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"the Fourth Amendment does protect the area harboring the intimate activity associated with the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life","sentence":"Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177-79, 104 S.Ct. 1735, 80 L.Ed.2d 214 (1984) (noting that even putting up a fence or a no trespassing sign does not create a legitimate expectation of privacy in open fields); cf. United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 301, 107 S.Ct. 1134, 94 L.Ed.2d 326 (1987) (the Fourth Amendment does protect the area harboring the intimate activity associated with the sanctity of a man\u2019s home and the privacies of life)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"466 U.S. 170, 177-79","parenthetical":"noting that even putting up a fence or a no trespassing sign does not create a legitimate expectation of privacy in open fields","sentence":"Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177-79, 104 S.Ct. 1735, 80 L.Ed.2d 214 (1984) (noting that even putting up a fence or a no trespassing sign does not create a legitimate expectation of privacy in open fields); cf. United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 301, 107 S.Ct. 1134, 94 L.Ed.2d 326 (1987) (the Fourth Amendment does protect the area harboring the intimate activity associated with the sanctity of a man\u2019s home and the privacies of life)."},"case_id":281021,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Daugherty argues that Appellees violated her Fourth Amendment rights, asserting that they unlawfully entered the Swedes Flat Property, where her dogs were found, and searched for the poodles on the property, in the mobile home, and in the barn. We disagree. Appellees were properly on the property pursuant to the open fields doctrine, which stands for the proposition that the Fourth Amendment does not extend to areas, like the grounds at issue here, that are usually accessible to the public.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting that even putting up a fence or a no trespassing sign does not create a legitimate expectation of privacy in open fields","sentence":"Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177-79, 104 S.Ct. 1735, 80 L.Ed.2d 214 (1984) (noting that even putting up a fence or a no trespassing sign does not create a legitimate expectation of privacy in open fields); cf. United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 301, 107 S.Ct. 1134, 94 L.Ed.2d 326 (1987) (the Fourth Amendment does protect the area harboring the intimate activity associated with the sanctity of a man\u2019s home and the privacies of life)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"480 U.S. 294, 301","parenthetical":"the Fourth Amendment does protect the area harboring the intimate activity associated with the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life","sentence":"Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177-79, 104 S.Ct. 1735, 80 L.Ed.2d 214 (1984) (noting that even putting up a fence or a no trespassing sign does not create a legitimate expectation of privacy in open fields); cf. United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 301, 107 S.Ct. 1134, 94 L.Ed.2d 326 (1987) (the Fourth Amendment does protect the area harboring the intimate activity associated with the sanctity of a man\u2019s home and the privacies of life)."},"case_id":281021,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Daugherty argues that Appellees violated her Fourth Amendment rights, asserting that they unlawfully entered the Swedes Flat Property, where her dogs were found, and searched for the poodles on the property, in the mobile home, and in the barn. We disagree. Appellees were properly on the property pursuant to the open fields doctrine, which stands for the proposition that the Fourth Amendment does not extend to areas, like the grounds at issue here, that are usually accessible to the public.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting that even putting up a fence or a no trespassing sign does not create a legitimate expectation of privacy in open fields","sentence":"Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177-79, 104 S.Ct. 1735, 80 L.Ed.2d 214 (1984) (noting that even putting up a fence or a no trespassing sign does not create a legitimate expectation of privacy in open fields); cf. United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 301, 107 S.Ct. 1134, 94 L.Ed.2d 326 (1987) (the Fourth Amendment does protect the area harboring the intimate activity associated with the sanctity of a man\u2019s home and the privacies of life)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"the Fourth Amendment does protect the area harboring the intimate activity associated with the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life","sentence":"Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177-79, 104 S.Ct. 1735, 80 L.Ed.2d 214 (1984) (noting that even putting up a fence or a no trespassing sign does not create a legitimate expectation of privacy in open fields); cf. United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 301, 107 S.Ct. 1134, 94 L.Ed.2d 326 (1987) (the Fourth Amendment does protect the area harboring the intimate activity associated with the sanctity of a man\u2019s home and the privacies of life)."},"case_id":281021,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Daugherty argues that Appellees violated her Fourth Amendment rights, asserting that they unlawfully entered the Swedes Flat Property, where her dogs were found, and searched for the poodles on the property, in the mobile home, and in the barn. We disagree. Appellees were properly on the property pursuant to the open fields doctrine, which stands for the proposition that the Fourth Amendment does not extend to areas, like the grounds at issue here, that are usually accessible to the public.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"the Fourth Amendment does protect the area harboring the intimate activity associated with the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life","sentence":"Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177-79, 104 S.Ct. 1735, 80 L.Ed.2d 214 (1984) (noting that even putting up a fence or a no trespassing sign does not create a legitimate expectation of privacy in open fields); cf. United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 301, 107 S.Ct. 1134, 94 L.Ed.2d 326 (1987) (the Fourth Amendment does protect the area harboring the intimate activity associated with the sanctity of a man\u2019s home and the privacies of life)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting that even putting up a fence or a no trespassing sign does not create a legitimate expectation of privacy in open fields","sentence":"Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177-79, 104 S.Ct. 1735, 80 L.Ed.2d 214 (1984) (noting that even putting up a fence or a no trespassing sign does not create a legitimate expectation of privacy in open fields); cf. United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 301, 107 S.Ct. 1134, 94 L.Ed.2d 326 (1987) (the Fourth Amendment does protect the area harboring the intimate activity associated with the sanctity of a man\u2019s home and the privacies of life)."},"case_id":281021,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Daugherty argues that Appellees violated her Fourth Amendment rights, asserting that they unlawfully entered the Swedes Flat Property, where her dogs were found, and searched for the poodles on the property, in the mobile home, and in the barn. We disagree. Appellees were properly on the property pursuant to the open fields doctrine, which stands for the proposition that the Fourth Amendment does not extend to areas, like the grounds at issue here, that are usually accessible to the public.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"480 U.S. 294, 301","parenthetical":"the Fourth Amendment does protect the area harboring the intimate activity associated with the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life","sentence":"Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177-79, 104 S.Ct. 1735, 80 L.Ed.2d 214 (1984) (noting that even putting up a fence or a no trespassing sign does not create a legitimate expectation of privacy in open fields); cf. United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 301, 107 S.Ct. 1134, 94 L.Ed.2d 326 (1987) (the Fourth Amendment does protect the area harboring the intimate activity associated with the sanctity of a man\u2019s home and the privacies of life)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting that even putting up a fence or a no trespassing sign does not create a legitimate expectation of privacy in open fields","sentence":"Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177-79, 104 S.Ct. 1735, 80 L.Ed.2d 214 (1984) (noting that even putting up a fence or a no trespassing sign does not create a legitimate expectation of privacy in open fields); cf. United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 301, 107 S.Ct. 1134, 94 L.Ed.2d 326 (1987) (the Fourth Amendment does protect the area harboring the intimate activity associated with the sanctity of a man\u2019s home and the privacies of life)."},"case_id":281021,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Daugherty argues that Appellees violated her Fourth Amendment rights, asserting that they unlawfully entered the Swedes Flat Property, where her dogs were found, and searched for the poodles on the property, in the mobile home, and in the barn. We disagree. Appellees were properly on the property pursuant to the open fields doctrine, which stands for the proposition that the Fourth Amendment does not extend to areas, like the grounds at issue here, that are usually accessible to the public.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting that even putting up a fence or a no trespassing sign does not create a legitimate expectation of privacy in open fields","sentence":"Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177-79, 104 S.Ct. 1735, 80 L.Ed.2d 214 (1984) (noting that even putting up a fence or a no trespassing sign does not create a legitimate expectation of privacy in open fields); cf. United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 301, 107 S.Ct. 1134, 94 L.Ed.2d 326 (1987) (the Fourth Amendment does protect the area harboring the intimate activity associated with the sanctity of a man\u2019s home and the privacies of life)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"the Fourth Amendment does protect the area harboring the intimate activity associated with the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life","sentence":"Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177-79, 104 S.Ct. 1735, 80 L.Ed.2d 214 (1984) (noting that even putting up a fence or a no trespassing sign does not create a legitimate expectation of privacy in open fields); cf. United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 301, 107 S.Ct. 1134, 94 L.Ed.2d 326 (1987) (the Fourth Amendment does protect the area harboring the intimate activity associated with the sanctity of a man\u2019s home and the privacies of life)."},"case_id":281021,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Daugherty argues that Appellees violated her Fourth Amendment rights, asserting that they unlawfully entered the Swedes Flat Property, where her dogs were found, and searched for the poodles on the property, in the mobile home, and in the barn. We disagree. Appellees were properly on the property pursuant to the open fields doctrine, which stands for the proposition that the Fourth Amendment does not extend to areas, like the grounds at issue here, that are usually accessible to the public.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting that even putting up a fence or a no trespassing sign does not create a legitimate expectation of privacy in open fields","sentence":"Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177-79, 104 S.Ct. 1735, 80 L.Ed.2d 214 (1984) (noting that even putting up a fence or a no trespassing sign does not create a legitimate expectation of privacy in open fields); cf. United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 301, 107 S.Ct. 1134, 94 L.Ed.2d 326 (1987) (the Fourth Amendment does protect the area harboring the intimate activity associated with the sanctity of a man\u2019s home and the privacies of life)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"the Fourth Amendment does protect the area harboring the intimate activity associated with the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life","sentence":"Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177-79, 104 S.Ct. 1735, 80 L.Ed.2d 214 (1984) (noting that even putting up a fence or a no trespassing sign does not create a legitimate expectation of privacy in open fields); cf. United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 301, 107 S.Ct. 1134, 94 L.Ed.2d 326 (1987) (the Fourth Amendment does protect the area harboring the intimate activity associated with the sanctity of a man\u2019s home and the privacies of life)."},"case_id":281021,"label":"a"}
{"context":"viability of the community[ ] while protecting ... the aesthetics ... and health, safety, and welfare\" of the City.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"323 F.3d 655, 655","parenthetical":"statute's different treatment of commercial speech from non-commercial speech valid where distinction was \"relevant to the asserted governmental interest\"","sentence":"See Am. Blast Fax, 323 F.3d at 655 (statute\u2019s different treatment of commercial speech from non-commercial speech valid where distinction was \u201crelevant to the asserted governmental interest\u201d); see also Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 567, 101 S.Ct. 2882 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (\u201cWhen a city chooses to impose looser restrictions in one area than it does in another analogous area \u2014 even one in which the Constitution more narrowly constrains legislative discretion \u2014 it [does not] undermine[] the constitutionality of its regulatory scheme.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"453 U.S. 567, 567","parenthetical":"\"When a city chooses to impose looser restrictions in one area than it does in another analogous area -- even one in which the Constitution more narrowly constrains legislative discretion -- it [does not] undermine[] the constitutionality of its regulatory scheme.\"","sentence":"See Am. Blast Fax, 323 F.3d at 655 (statute\u2019s different treatment of commercial speech from non-commercial speech valid where distinction was \u201crelevant to the asserted governmental interest\u201d); see also Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 567, 101 S.Ct. 2882 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (\u201cWhen a city chooses to impose looser restrictions in one area than it does in another analogous area \u2014 even one in which the Constitution more narrowly constrains legislative discretion \u2014 it [does not] undermine[] the constitutionality of its regulatory scheme.\u201d)."},"case_id":4324722,"label":"a"}
{"context":"viability of the community[ ] while protecting ... the aesthetics ... and health, safety, and welfare\" of the City.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"When a city chooses to impose looser restrictions in one area than it does in another analogous area -- even one in which the Constitution more narrowly constrains legislative discretion -- it [does not] undermine[] the constitutionality of its regulatory scheme.\"","sentence":"See Am. Blast Fax, 323 F.3d at 655 (statute\u2019s different treatment of commercial speech from non-commercial speech valid where distinction was \u201crelevant to the asserted governmental interest\u201d); see also Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 567, 101 S.Ct. 2882 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (\u201cWhen a city chooses to impose looser restrictions in one area than it does in another analogous area \u2014 even one in which the Constitution more narrowly constrains legislative discretion \u2014 it [does not] undermine[] the constitutionality of its regulatory scheme.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"323 F.3d 655, 655","parenthetical":"statute's different treatment of commercial speech from non-commercial speech valid where distinction was \"relevant to the asserted governmental interest\"","sentence":"See Am. Blast Fax, 323 F.3d at 655 (statute\u2019s different treatment of commercial speech from non-commercial speech valid where distinction was \u201crelevant to the asserted governmental interest\u201d); see also Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 567, 101 S.Ct. 2882 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (\u201cWhen a city chooses to impose looser restrictions in one area than it does in another analogous area \u2014 even one in which the Constitution more narrowly constrains legislative discretion \u2014 it [does not] undermine[] the constitutionality of its regulatory scheme.\u201d)."},"case_id":4324722,"label":"b"}
{"context":"As Doe I also acknowledged, the government's asserted interest in seeking to impose a gag on NSL recipients -- protecting the nation's security by preventing terrorism -- is certainly compelling in appropriate circumstances.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"334 F.Supp.2d 513, 513","parenthetical":"\"[T]he Government's interest in protecting the integrity of international terrorism and counterintelligence investigations is a compelling one.\"","sentence":"See 334 F.Supp.2d at 513 (\u201c[T]he Government\u2019s interest in protecting the integrity of international terrorism and counterintelligence investigations is a compelling one.\u201d); see also Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 307, 101 S.Ct. 2766, 69 L.Ed.2d 640 (1981) (\u201cIt is \u2018obvious and unarguable\u2019 that no governmental interest is more compelling than the security of the Nation.\u201d) (quoting Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 509, 84 S.Ct. 1659, 12 L.Ed.2d 992 (1964)); Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 706 (6th Cir.2002) (\u201cThe Government certainly has a compelling interest in preventing terrorism.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"453 U.S. 280, 307","parenthetical":"\"It is 'obvious and unarguable' that no governmental interest is more compelling than the security of the Nation.\"","sentence":"See 334 F.Supp.2d at 513 (\u201c[T]he Government\u2019s interest in protecting the integrity of international terrorism and counterintelligence investigations is a compelling one.\u201d); see also Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 307, 101 S.Ct. 2766, 69 L.Ed.2d 640 (1981) (\u201cIt is \u2018obvious and unarguable\u2019 that no governmental interest is more compelling than the security of the Nation.\u201d) (quoting Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 509, 84 S.Ct. 1659, 12 L.Ed.2d 992 (1964)); Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 706 (6th Cir.2002) (\u201cThe Government certainly has a compelling interest in preventing terrorism.\u201d)."},"case_id":3531932,"label":"a"}
{"context":"As Doe I also acknowledged, the government's asserted interest in seeking to impose a gag on NSL recipients -- protecting the nation's security by preventing terrorism -- is certainly compelling in appropriate circumstances.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"It is 'obvious and unarguable' that no governmental interest is more compelling than the security of the Nation.\"","sentence":"See 334 F.Supp.2d at 513 (\u201c[T]he Government\u2019s interest in protecting the integrity of international terrorism and counterintelligence investigations is a compelling one.\u201d); see also Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 307, 101 S.Ct. 2766, 69 L.Ed.2d 640 (1981) (\u201cIt is \u2018obvious and unarguable\u2019 that no governmental interest is more compelling than the security of the Nation.\u201d) (quoting Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 509, 84 S.Ct. 1659, 12 L.Ed.2d 992 (1964)); Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 706 (6th Cir.2002) (\u201cThe Government certainly has a compelling interest in preventing terrorism.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"334 F.Supp.2d 513, 513","parenthetical":"\"[T]he Government's interest in protecting the integrity of international terrorism and counterintelligence investigations is a compelling one.\"","sentence":"See 334 F.Supp.2d at 513 (\u201c[T]he Government\u2019s interest in protecting the integrity of international terrorism and counterintelligence investigations is a compelling one.\u201d); see also Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 307, 101 S.Ct. 2766, 69 L.Ed.2d 640 (1981) (\u201cIt is \u2018obvious and unarguable\u2019 that no governmental interest is more compelling than the security of the Nation.\u201d) (quoting Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 509, 84 S.Ct. 1659, 12 L.Ed.2d 992 (1964)); Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 706 (6th Cir.2002) (\u201cThe Government certainly has a compelling interest in preventing terrorism.\u201d)."},"case_id":3531932,"label":"b"}
{"context":"As Doe I also acknowledged, the government's asserted interest in seeking to impose a gag on NSL recipients -- protecting the nation's security by preventing terrorism -- is certainly compelling in appropriate circumstances.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"334 F.Supp.2d 513, 513","parenthetical":"\"[T]he Government's interest in protecting the integrity of international terrorism and counterintelligence investigations is a compelling one.\"","sentence":"See 334 F.Supp.2d at 513 (\u201c[T]he Government\u2019s interest in protecting the integrity of international terrorism and counterintelligence investigations is a compelling one.\u201d); see also Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 307, 101 S.Ct. 2766, 69 L.Ed.2d 640 (1981) (\u201cIt is \u2018obvious and unarguable\u2019 that no governmental interest is more compelling than the security of the Nation.\u201d) (quoting Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 509, 84 S.Ct. 1659, 12 L.Ed.2d 992 (1964)); Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 706 (6th Cir.2002) (\u201cThe Government certainly has a compelling interest in preventing terrorism.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"It is 'obvious and unarguable' that no governmental interest is more compelling than the security of the Nation.\"","sentence":"See 334 F.Supp.2d at 513 (\u201c[T]he Government\u2019s interest in protecting the integrity of international terrorism and counterintelligence investigations is a compelling one.\u201d); see also Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 307, 101 S.Ct. 2766, 69 L.Ed.2d 640 (1981) (\u201cIt is \u2018obvious and unarguable\u2019 that no governmental interest is more compelling than the security of the Nation.\u201d) (quoting Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 509, 84 S.Ct. 1659, 12 L.Ed.2d 992 (1964)); Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 706 (6th Cir.2002) (\u201cThe Government certainly has a compelling interest in preventing terrorism.\u201d)."},"case_id":3531932,"label":"a"}
{"context":"As Doe I also acknowledged, the government's asserted interest in seeking to impose a gag on NSL recipients -- protecting the nation's security by preventing terrorism -- is certainly compelling in appropriate circumstances.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"303 F.3d 681, 706","parenthetical":"\"The Government certainly has a compelling interest in preventing terrorism.\"","sentence":"See 334 F.Supp.2d at 513 (\u201c[T]he Government\u2019s interest in protecting the integrity of international terrorism and counterintelligence investigations is a compelling one.\u201d); see also Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 307, 101 S.Ct. 2766, 69 L.Ed.2d 640 (1981) (\u201cIt is \u2018obvious and unarguable\u2019 that no governmental interest is more compelling than the security of the Nation.\u201d) (quoting Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 509, 84 S.Ct. 1659, 12 L.Ed.2d 992 (1964)); Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 706 (6th Cir.2002) (\u201cThe Government certainly has a compelling interest in preventing terrorism.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"334 F.Supp.2d 513, 513","parenthetical":"\"[T]he Government's interest in protecting the integrity of international terrorism and counterintelligence investigations is a compelling one.\"","sentence":"See 334 F.Supp.2d at 513 (\u201c[T]he Government\u2019s interest in protecting the integrity of international terrorism and counterintelligence investigations is a compelling one.\u201d); see also Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 307, 101 S.Ct. 2766, 69 L.Ed.2d 640 (1981) (\u201cIt is \u2018obvious and unarguable\u2019 that no governmental interest is more compelling than the security of the Nation.\u201d) (quoting Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 509, 84 S.Ct. 1659, 12 L.Ed.2d 992 (1964)); Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 706 (6th Cir.2002) (\u201cThe Government certainly has a compelling interest in preventing terrorism.\u201d)."},"case_id":3531932,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The first criteria is clearly satisfied here. All of the significant issues involved in this case have been resolved as a matter of law. The issues are also controlling and some involve constitutional questions.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"634 F.Supp. 1284, 1312-13","parenthetical":"certification is not appropriate with respect to a ruling which does not involve a question of law but an exercise of discretion","sentence":"See Johnson v. Alldredge, 488 F.2d 820, 822-23 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 882, 95 S.Ct. 148, 42 L.Ed.2d 122 (1974) (questions on immunity, which are purely legal in nature, are appropriate for resolution by way of an interlocutory appeal); Mattioni, supra, at 917 (an issue is controlling where \u201cif erroneous, [it] would be reversible error on final appeal\u201d); cf. Von Bulow by Auersperg v. Von Bulow, 634 F.Supp. 1284, 1312-13 (S.D.N.Y.1986), aff'd, 811 F.2d 136 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1015, 107 S.Ct. 1891, 95 L.Ed.2d 498 (1987) (certification is not appropriate with respect to a ruling which does not involve a question of law but an exercise of discretion)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"488 F.2d 820, 822-23","parenthetical":"questions on immunity, which are purely legal in nature, are appropriate for resolution by way of an interlocutory appeal","sentence":"See Johnson v. Alldredge, 488 F.2d 820, 822-23 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 882, 95 S.Ct. 148, 42 L.Ed.2d 122 (1974) (questions on immunity, which are purely legal in nature, are appropriate for resolution by way of an interlocutory appeal); Mattioni, supra, at 917 (an issue is controlling where \u201cif erroneous, [it] would be reversible error on final appeal\u201d); cf. Von Bulow by Auersperg v. Von Bulow, 634 F.Supp. 1284, 1312-13 (S.D.N.Y.1986), aff'd, 811 F.2d 136 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1015, 107 S.Ct. 1891, 95 L.Ed.2d 498 (1987) (certification is not appropriate with respect to a ruling which does not involve a question of law but an exercise of discretion)."},"case_id":7386528,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The first criteria is clearly satisfied here. All of the significant issues involved in this case have been resolved as a matter of law. The issues are also controlling and some involve constitutional questions.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"certification is not appropriate with respect to a ruling which does not involve a question of law but an exercise of discretion","sentence":"See Johnson v. Alldredge, 488 F.2d 820, 822-23 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 882, 95 S.Ct. 148, 42 L.Ed.2d 122 (1974) (questions on immunity, which are purely legal in nature, are appropriate for resolution by way of an interlocutory appeal); Mattioni, supra, at 917 (an issue is controlling where \u201cif erroneous, [it] would be reversible error on final appeal\u201d); cf. Von Bulow by Auersperg v. Von Bulow, 634 F.Supp. 1284, 1312-13 (S.D.N.Y.1986), aff'd, 811 F.2d 136 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1015, 107 S.Ct. 1891, 95 L.Ed.2d 498 (1987) (certification is not appropriate with respect to a ruling which does not involve a question of law but an exercise of discretion)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"488 F.2d 820, 822-23","parenthetical":"questions on immunity, which are purely legal in nature, are appropriate for resolution by way of an interlocutory appeal","sentence":"See Johnson v. Alldredge, 488 F.2d 820, 822-23 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 882, 95 S.Ct. 148, 42 L.Ed.2d 122 (1974) (questions on immunity, which are purely legal in nature, are appropriate for resolution by way of an interlocutory appeal); Mattioni, supra, at 917 (an issue is controlling where \u201cif erroneous, [it] would be reversible error on final appeal\u201d); cf. Von Bulow by Auersperg v. Von Bulow, 634 F.Supp. 1284, 1312-13 (S.D.N.Y.1986), aff'd, 811 F.2d 136 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1015, 107 S.Ct. 1891, 95 L.Ed.2d 498 (1987) (certification is not appropriate with respect to a ruling which does not involve a question of law but an exercise of discretion)."},"case_id":7386528,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The first criteria is clearly satisfied here. All of the significant issues involved in this case have been resolved as a matter of law. The issues are also controlling and some involve constitutional questions.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"certification is not appropriate with respect to a ruling which does not involve a question of law but an exercise of discretion","sentence":"See Johnson v. Alldredge, 488 F.2d 820, 822-23 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 882, 95 S.Ct. 148, 42 L.Ed.2d 122 (1974) (questions on immunity, which are purely legal in nature, are appropriate for resolution by way of an interlocutory appeal); Mattioni, supra, at 917 (an issue is controlling where \u201cif erroneous, [it] would be reversible error on final appeal\u201d); cf. Von Bulow by Auersperg v. Von Bulow, 634 F.Supp. 1284, 1312-13 (S.D.N.Y.1986), aff'd, 811 F.2d 136 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1015, 107 S.Ct. 1891, 95 L.Ed.2d 498 (1987) (certification is not appropriate with respect to a ruling which does not involve a question of law but an exercise of discretion)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"488 F.2d 820, 822-23","parenthetical":"questions on immunity, which are purely legal in nature, are appropriate for resolution by way of an interlocutory appeal","sentence":"See Johnson v. Alldredge, 488 F.2d 820, 822-23 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 882, 95 S.Ct. 148, 42 L.Ed.2d 122 (1974) (questions on immunity, which are purely legal in nature, are appropriate for resolution by way of an interlocutory appeal); Mattioni, supra, at 917 (an issue is controlling where \u201cif erroneous, [it] would be reversible error on final appeal\u201d); cf. Von Bulow by Auersperg v. Von Bulow, 634 F.Supp. 1284, 1312-13 (S.D.N.Y.1986), aff'd, 811 F.2d 136 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1015, 107 S.Ct. 1891, 95 L.Ed.2d 498 (1987) (certification is not appropriate with respect to a ruling which does not involve a question of law but an exercise of discretion)."},"case_id":7386528,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The first criteria is clearly satisfied here. All of the significant issues involved in this case have been resolved as a matter of law. The issues are also controlling and some involve constitutional questions.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"488 F.2d 820, 822-23","parenthetical":"questions on immunity, which are purely legal in nature, are appropriate for resolution by way of an interlocutory appeal","sentence":"See Johnson v. Alldredge, 488 F.2d 820, 822-23 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 882, 95 S.Ct. 148, 42 L.Ed.2d 122 (1974) (questions on immunity, which are purely legal in nature, are appropriate for resolution by way of an interlocutory appeal); Mattioni, supra, at 917 (an issue is controlling where \u201cif erroneous, [it] would be reversible error on final appeal\u201d); cf. Von Bulow by Auersperg v. Von Bulow, 634 F.Supp. 1284, 1312-13 (S.D.N.Y.1986), aff'd, 811 F.2d 136 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1015, 107 S.Ct. 1891, 95 L.Ed.2d 498 (1987) (certification is not appropriate with respect to a ruling which does not involve a question of law but an exercise of discretion)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"certification is not appropriate with respect to a ruling which does not involve a question of law but an exercise of discretion","sentence":"See Johnson v. Alldredge, 488 F.2d 820, 822-23 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 882, 95 S.Ct. 148, 42 L.Ed.2d 122 (1974) (questions on immunity, which are purely legal in nature, are appropriate for resolution by way of an interlocutory appeal); Mattioni, supra, at 917 (an issue is controlling where \u201cif erroneous, [it] would be reversible error on final appeal\u201d); cf. Von Bulow by Auersperg v. Von Bulow, 634 F.Supp. 1284, 1312-13 (S.D.N.Y.1986), aff'd, 811 F.2d 136 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1015, 107 S.Ct. 1891, 95 L.Ed.2d 498 (1987) (certification is not appropriate with respect to a ruling which does not involve a question of law but an exercise of discretion)."},"case_id":7386528,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The first criteria is clearly satisfied here. All of the significant issues involved in this case have been resolved as a matter of law. The issues are also controlling and some involve constitutional questions.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"certification is not appropriate with respect to a ruling which does not involve a question of law but an exercise of discretion","sentence":"See Johnson v. Alldredge, 488 F.2d 820, 822-23 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 882, 95 S.Ct. 148, 42 L.Ed.2d 122 (1974) (questions on immunity, which are purely legal in nature, are appropriate for resolution by way of an interlocutory appeal); Mattioni, supra, at 917 (an issue is controlling where \u201cif erroneous, [it] would be reversible error on final appeal\u201d); cf. Von Bulow by Auersperg v. Von Bulow, 634 F.Supp. 1284, 1312-13 (S.D.N.Y.1986), aff'd, 811 F.2d 136 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1015, 107 S.Ct. 1891, 95 L.Ed.2d 498 (1987) (certification is not appropriate with respect to a ruling which does not involve a question of law but an exercise of discretion)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"488 F.2d 820, 822-23","parenthetical":"questions on immunity, which are purely legal in nature, are appropriate for resolution by way of an interlocutory appeal","sentence":"See Johnson v. Alldredge, 488 F.2d 820, 822-23 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 882, 95 S.Ct. 148, 42 L.Ed.2d 122 (1974) (questions on immunity, which are purely legal in nature, are appropriate for resolution by way of an interlocutory appeal); Mattioni, supra, at 917 (an issue is controlling where \u201cif erroneous, [it] would be reversible error on final appeal\u201d); cf. Von Bulow by Auersperg v. Von Bulow, 634 F.Supp. 1284, 1312-13 (S.D.N.Y.1986), aff'd, 811 F.2d 136 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1015, 107 S.Ct. 1891, 95 L.Ed.2d 498 (1987) (certification is not appropriate with respect to a ruling which does not involve a question of law but an exercise of discretion)."},"case_id":7386528,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The first criteria is clearly satisfied here. All of the significant issues involved in this case have been resolved as a matter of law. The issues are also controlling and some involve constitutional questions.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"questions on immunity, which are purely legal in nature, are appropriate for resolution by way of an interlocutory appeal","sentence":"See Johnson v. Alldredge, 488 F.2d 820, 822-23 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 882, 95 S.Ct. 148, 42 L.Ed.2d 122 (1974) (questions on immunity, which are purely legal in nature, are appropriate for resolution by way of an interlocutory appeal); Mattioni, supra, at 917 (an issue is controlling where \u201cif erroneous, [it] would be reversible error on final appeal\u201d); cf. Von Bulow by Auersperg v. Von Bulow, 634 F.Supp. 1284, 1312-13 (S.D.N.Y.1986), aff'd, 811 F.2d 136 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1015, 107 S.Ct. 1891, 95 L.Ed.2d 498 (1987) (certification is not appropriate with respect to a ruling which does not involve a question of law but an exercise of discretion)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"634 F.Supp. 1284, 1312-13","parenthetical":"certification is not appropriate with respect to a ruling which does not involve a question of law but an exercise of discretion","sentence":"See Johnson v. Alldredge, 488 F.2d 820, 822-23 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 882, 95 S.Ct. 148, 42 L.Ed.2d 122 (1974) (questions on immunity, which are purely legal in nature, are appropriate for resolution by way of an interlocutory appeal); Mattioni, supra, at 917 (an issue is controlling where \u201cif erroneous, [it] would be reversible error on final appeal\u201d); cf. Von Bulow by Auersperg v. Von Bulow, 634 F.Supp. 1284, 1312-13 (S.D.N.Y.1986), aff'd, 811 F.2d 136 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1015, 107 S.Ct. 1891, 95 L.Ed.2d 498 (1987) (certification is not appropriate with respect to a ruling which does not involve a question of law but an exercise of discretion)."},"case_id":7386528,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The first criteria is clearly satisfied here. All of the significant issues involved in this case have been resolved as a matter of law. The issues are also controlling and some involve constitutional questions.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"certification is not appropriate with respect to a ruling which does not involve a question of law but an exercise of discretion","sentence":"See Johnson v. Alldredge, 488 F.2d 820, 822-23 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 882, 95 S.Ct. 148, 42 L.Ed.2d 122 (1974) (questions on immunity, which are purely legal in nature, are appropriate for resolution by way of an interlocutory appeal); Mattioni, supra, at 917 (an issue is controlling where \u201cif erroneous, [it] would be reversible error on final appeal\u201d); cf. Von Bulow by Auersperg v. Von Bulow, 634 F.Supp. 1284, 1312-13 (S.D.N.Y.1986), aff'd, 811 F.2d 136 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1015, 107 S.Ct. 1891, 95 L.Ed.2d 498 (1987) (certification is not appropriate with respect to a ruling which does not involve a question of law but an exercise of discretion)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"questions on immunity, which are purely legal in nature, are appropriate for resolution by way of an interlocutory appeal","sentence":"See Johnson v. Alldredge, 488 F.2d 820, 822-23 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 882, 95 S.Ct. 148, 42 L.Ed.2d 122 (1974) (questions on immunity, which are purely legal in nature, are appropriate for resolution by way of an interlocutory appeal); Mattioni, supra, at 917 (an issue is controlling where \u201cif erroneous, [it] would be reversible error on final appeal\u201d); cf. Von Bulow by Auersperg v. Von Bulow, 634 F.Supp. 1284, 1312-13 (S.D.N.Y.1986), aff'd, 811 F.2d 136 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1015, 107 S.Ct. 1891, 95 L.Ed.2d 498 (1987) (certification is not appropriate with respect to a ruling which does not involve a question of law but an exercise of discretion)."},"case_id":7386528,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The first criteria is clearly satisfied here. All of the significant issues involved in this case have been resolved as a matter of law. The issues are also controlling and some involve constitutional questions.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"certification is not appropriate with respect to a ruling which does not involve a question of law but an exercise of discretion","sentence":"See Johnson v. Alldredge, 488 F.2d 820, 822-23 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 882, 95 S.Ct. 148, 42 L.Ed.2d 122 (1974) (questions on immunity, which are purely legal in nature, are appropriate for resolution by way of an interlocutory appeal); Mattioni, supra, at 917 (an issue is controlling where \u201cif erroneous, [it] would be reversible error on final appeal\u201d); cf. Von Bulow by Auersperg v. Von Bulow, 634 F.Supp. 1284, 1312-13 (S.D.N.Y.1986), aff'd, 811 F.2d 136 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1015, 107 S.Ct. 1891, 95 L.Ed.2d 498 (1987) (certification is not appropriate with respect to a ruling which does not involve a question of law but an exercise of discretion)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"questions on immunity, which are purely legal in nature, are appropriate for resolution by way of an interlocutory appeal","sentence":"See Johnson v. Alldredge, 488 F.2d 820, 822-23 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 882, 95 S.Ct. 148, 42 L.Ed.2d 122 (1974) (questions on immunity, which are purely legal in nature, are appropriate for resolution by way of an interlocutory appeal); Mattioni, supra, at 917 (an issue is controlling where \u201cif erroneous, [it] would be reversible error on final appeal\u201d); cf. Von Bulow by Auersperg v. Von Bulow, 634 F.Supp. 1284, 1312-13 (S.D.N.Y.1986), aff'd, 811 F.2d 136 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1015, 107 S.Ct. 1891, 95 L.Ed.2d 498 (1987) (certification is not appropriate with respect to a ruling which does not involve a question of law but an exercise of discretion)."},"case_id":7386528,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The first criteria is clearly satisfied here. All of the significant issues involved in this case have been resolved as a matter of law. The issues are also controlling and some involve constitutional questions.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"questions on immunity, which are purely legal in nature, are appropriate for resolution by way of an interlocutory appeal","sentence":"See Johnson v. Alldredge, 488 F.2d 820, 822-23 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 882, 95 S.Ct. 148, 42 L.Ed.2d 122 (1974) (questions on immunity, which are purely legal in nature, are appropriate for resolution by way of an interlocutory appeal); Mattioni, supra, at 917 (an issue is controlling where \u201cif erroneous, [it] would be reversible error on final appeal\u201d); cf. Von Bulow by Auersperg v. Von Bulow, 634 F.Supp. 1284, 1312-13 (S.D.N.Y.1986), aff'd, 811 F.2d 136 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1015, 107 S.Ct. 1891, 95 L.Ed.2d 498 (1987) (certification is not appropriate with respect to a ruling which does not involve a question of law but an exercise of discretion)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"certification is not appropriate with respect to a ruling which does not involve a question of law but an exercise of discretion","sentence":"See Johnson v. Alldredge, 488 F.2d 820, 822-23 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 882, 95 S.Ct. 148, 42 L.Ed.2d 122 (1974) (questions on immunity, which are purely legal in nature, are appropriate for resolution by way of an interlocutory appeal); Mattioni, supra, at 917 (an issue is controlling where \u201cif erroneous, [it] would be reversible error on final appeal\u201d); cf. Von Bulow by Auersperg v. Von Bulow, 634 F.Supp. 1284, 1312-13 (S.D.N.Y.1986), aff'd, 811 F.2d 136 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1015, 107 S.Ct. 1891, 95 L.Ed.2d 498 (1987) (certification is not appropriate with respect to a ruling which does not involve a question of law but an exercise of discretion)."},"case_id":7386528,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The first criteria is clearly satisfied here. All of the significant issues involved in this case have been resolved as a matter of law. The issues are also controlling and some involve constitutional questions.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"questions on immunity, which are purely legal in nature, are appropriate for resolution by way of an interlocutory appeal","sentence":"See Johnson v. Alldredge, 488 F.2d 820, 822-23 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 882, 95 S.Ct. 148, 42 L.Ed.2d 122 (1974) (questions on immunity, which are purely legal in nature, are appropriate for resolution by way of an interlocutory appeal); Mattioni, supra, at 917 (an issue is controlling where \u201cif erroneous, [it] would be reversible error on final appeal\u201d); cf. Von Bulow by Auersperg v. Von Bulow, 634 F.Supp. 1284, 1312-13 (S.D.N.Y.1986), aff'd, 811 F.2d 136 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1015, 107 S.Ct. 1891, 95 L.Ed.2d 498 (1987) (certification is not appropriate with respect to a ruling which does not involve a question of law but an exercise of discretion)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"certification is not appropriate with respect to a ruling which does not involve a question of law but an exercise of discretion","sentence":"See Johnson v. Alldredge, 488 F.2d 820, 822-23 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 882, 95 S.Ct. 148, 42 L.Ed.2d 122 (1974) (questions on immunity, which are purely legal in nature, are appropriate for resolution by way of an interlocutory appeal); Mattioni, supra, at 917 (an issue is controlling where \u201cif erroneous, [it] would be reversible error on final appeal\u201d); cf. Von Bulow by Auersperg v. Von Bulow, 634 F.Supp. 1284, 1312-13 (S.D.N.Y.1986), aff'd, 811 F.2d 136 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1015, 107 S.Ct. 1891, 95 L.Ed.2d 498 (1987) (certification is not appropriate with respect to a ruling which does not involve a question of law but an exercise of discretion)."},"case_id":7386528,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The first criteria is clearly satisfied here. All of the significant issues involved in this case have been resolved as a matter of law. The issues are also controlling and some involve constitutional questions.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"634 F.Supp. 1284, 1312-13","parenthetical":"certification is not appropriate with respect to a ruling which does not involve a question of law but an exercise of discretion","sentence":"See Johnson v. Alldredge, 488 F.2d 820, 822-23 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 882, 95 S.Ct. 148, 42 L.Ed.2d 122 (1974) (questions on immunity, which are purely legal in nature, are appropriate for resolution by way of an interlocutory appeal); Mattioni, supra, at 917 (an issue is controlling where \u201cif erroneous, [it] would be reversible error on final appeal\u201d); cf. Von Bulow by Auersperg v. Von Bulow, 634 F.Supp. 1284, 1312-13 (S.D.N.Y.1986), aff'd, 811 F.2d 136 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1015, 107 S.Ct. 1891, 95 L.Ed.2d 498 (1987) (certification is not appropriate with respect to a ruling which does not involve a question of law but an exercise of discretion)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"questions on immunity, which are purely legal in nature, are appropriate for resolution by way of an interlocutory appeal","sentence":"See Johnson v. Alldredge, 488 F.2d 820, 822-23 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 882, 95 S.Ct. 148, 42 L.Ed.2d 122 (1974) (questions on immunity, which are purely legal in nature, are appropriate for resolution by way of an interlocutory appeal); Mattioni, supra, at 917 (an issue is controlling where \u201cif erroneous, [it] would be reversible error on final appeal\u201d); cf. Von Bulow by Auersperg v. Von Bulow, 634 F.Supp. 1284, 1312-13 (S.D.N.Y.1986), aff'd, 811 F.2d 136 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1015, 107 S.Ct. 1891, 95 L.Ed.2d 498 (1987) (certification is not appropriate with respect to a ruling which does not involve a question of law but an exercise of discretion)."},"case_id":7386528,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The first criteria is clearly satisfied here. All of the significant issues involved in this case have been resolved as a matter of law. The issues are also controlling and some involve constitutional questions.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"questions on immunity, which are purely legal in nature, are appropriate for resolution by way of an interlocutory appeal","sentence":"See Johnson v. Alldredge, 488 F.2d 820, 822-23 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 882, 95 S.Ct. 148, 42 L.Ed.2d 122 (1974) (questions on immunity, which are purely legal in nature, are appropriate for resolution by way of an interlocutory appeal); Mattioni, supra, at 917 (an issue is controlling where \u201cif erroneous, [it] would be reversible error on final appeal\u201d); cf. Von Bulow by Auersperg v. Von Bulow, 634 F.Supp. 1284, 1312-13 (S.D.N.Y.1986), aff'd, 811 F.2d 136 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1015, 107 S.Ct. 1891, 95 L.Ed.2d 498 (1987) (certification is not appropriate with respect to a ruling which does not involve a question of law but an exercise of discretion)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"certification is not appropriate with respect to a ruling which does not involve a question of law but an exercise of discretion","sentence":"See Johnson v. Alldredge, 488 F.2d 820, 822-23 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 882, 95 S.Ct. 148, 42 L.Ed.2d 122 (1974) (questions on immunity, which are purely legal in nature, are appropriate for resolution by way of an interlocutory appeal); Mattioni, supra, at 917 (an issue is controlling where \u201cif erroneous, [it] would be reversible error on final appeal\u201d); cf. Von Bulow by Auersperg v. Von Bulow, 634 F.Supp. 1284, 1312-13 (S.D.N.Y.1986), aff'd, 811 F.2d 136 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1015, 107 S.Ct. 1891, 95 L.Ed.2d 498 (1987) (certification is not appropriate with respect to a ruling which does not involve a question of law but an exercise of discretion)."},"case_id":7386528,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The first criteria is clearly satisfied here. All of the significant issues involved in this case have been resolved as a matter of law. The issues are also controlling and some involve constitutional questions.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"certification is not appropriate with respect to a ruling which does not involve a question of law but an exercise of discretion","sentence":"See Johnson v. Alldredge, 488 F.2d 820, 822-23 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 882, 95 S.Ct. 148, 42 L.Ed.2d 122 (1974) (questions on immunity, which are purely legal in nature, are appropriate for resolution by way of an interlocutory appeal); Mattioni, supra, at 917 (an issue is controlling where \u201cif erroneous, [it] would be reversible error on final appeal\u201d); cf. Von Bulow by Auersperg v. Von Bulow, 634 F.Supp. 1284, 1312-13 (S.D.N.Y.1986), aff'd, 811 F.2d 136 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1015, 107 S.Ct. 1891, 95 L.Ed.2d 498 (1987) (certification is not appropriate with respect to a ruling which does not involve a question of law but an exercise of discretion)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"questions on immunity, which are purely legal in nature, are appropriate for resolution by way of an interlocutory appeal","sentence":"See Johnson v. Alldredge, 488 F.2d 820, 822-23 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 882, 95 S.Ct. 148, 42 L.Ed.2d 122 (1974) (questions on immunity, which are purely legal in nature, are appropriate for resolution by way of an interlocutory appeal); Mattioni, supra, at 917 (an issue is controlling where \u201cif erroneous, [it] would be reversible error on final appeal\u201d); cf. Von Bulow by Auersperg v. Von Bulow, 634 F.Supp. 1284, 1312-13 (S.D.N.Y.1986), aff'd, 811 F.2d 136 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1015, 107 S.Ct. 1891, 95 L.Ed.2d 498 (1987) (certification is not appropriate with respect to a ruling which does not involve a question of law but an exercise of discretion)."},"case_id":7386528,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The first criteria is clearly satisfied here. All of the significant issues involved in this case have been resolved as a matter of law. The issues are also controlling and some involve constitutional questions.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"questions on immunity, which are purely legal in nature, are appropriate for resolution by way of an interlocutory appeal","sentence":"See Johnson v. Alldredge, 488 F.2d 820, 822-23 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 882, 95 S.Ct. 148, 42 L.Ed.2d 122 (1974) (questions on immunity, which are purely legal in nature, are appropriate for resolution by way of an interlocutory appeal); Mattioni, supra, at 917 (an issue is controlling where \u201cif erroneous, [it] would be reversible error on final appeal\u201d); cf. Von Bulow by Auersperg v. Von Bulow, 634 F.Supp. 1284, 1312-13 (S.D.N.Y.1986), aff'd, 811 F.2d 136 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1015, 107 S.Ct. 1891, 95 L.Ed.2d 498 (1987) (certification is not appropriate with respect to a ruling which does not involve a question of law but an exercise of discretion)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"certification is not appropriate with respect to a ruling which does not involve a question of law but an exercise of discretion","sentence":"See Johnson v. Alldredge, 488 F.2d 820, 822-23 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 882, 95 S.Ct. 148, 42 L.Ed.2d 122 (1974) (questions on immunity, which are purely legal in nature, are appropriate for resolution by way of an interlocutory appeal); Mattioni, supra, at 917 (an issue is controlling where \u201cif erroneous, [it] would be reversible error on final appeal\u201d); cf. Von Bulow by Auersperg v. Von Bulow, 634 F.Supp. 1284, 1312-13 (S.D.N.Y.1986), aff'd, 811 F.2d 136 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1015, 107 S.Ct. 1891, 95 L.Ed.2d 498 (1987) (certification is not appropriate with respect to a ruling which does not involve a question of law but an exercise of discretion)."},"case_id":7386528,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The first criteria is clearly satisfied here. All of the significant issues involved in this case have been resolved as a matter of law. The issues are also controlling and some involve constitutional questions.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"questions on immunity, which are purely legal in nature, are appropriate for resolution by way of an interlocutory appeal","sentence":"See Johnson v. Alldredge, 488 F.2d 820, 822-23 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 882, 95 S.Ct. 148, 42 L.Ed.2d 122 (1974) (questions on immunity, which are purely legal in nature, are appropriate for resolution by way of an interlocutory appeal); Mattioni, supra, at 917 (an issue is controlling where \u201cif erroneous, [it] would be reversible error on final appeal\u201d); cf. Von Bulow by Auersperg v. Von Bulow, 634 F.Supp. 1284, 1312-13 (S.D.N.Y.1986), aff'd, 811 F.2d 136 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1015, 107 S.Ct. 1891, 95 L.Ed.2d 498 (1987) (certification is not appropriate with respect to a ruling which does not involve a question of law but an exercise of discretion)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"certification is not appropriate with respect to a ruling which does not involve a question of law but an exercise of discretion","sentence":"See Johnson v. Alldredge, 488 F.2d 820, 822-23 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 882, 95 S.Ct. 148, 42 L.Ed.2d 122 (1974) (questions on immunity, which are purely legal in nature, are appropriate for resolution by way of an interlocutory appeal); Mattioni, supra, at 917 (an issue is controlling where \u201cif erroneous, [it] would be reversible error on final appeal\u201d); cf. Von Bulow by Auersperg v. Von Bulow, 634 F.Supp. 1284, 1312-13 (S.D.N.Y.1986), aff'd, 811 F.2d 136 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1015, 107 S.Ct. 1891, 95 L.Ed.2d 498 (1987) (certification is not appropriate with respect to a ruling which does not involve a question of law but an exercise of discretion)."},"case_id":7386528,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The first criteria is clearly satisfied here. All of the significant issues involved in this case have been resolved as a matter of law. The issues are also controlling and some involve constitutional questions.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"questions on immunity, which are purely legal in nature, are appropriate for resolution by way of an interlocutory appeal","sentence":"See Johnson v. Alldredge, 488 F.2d 820, 822-23 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 882, 95 S.Ct. 148, 42 L.Ed.2d 122 (1974) (questions on immunity, which are purely legal in nature, are appropriate for resolution by way of an interlocutory appeal); Mattioni, supra, at 917 (an issue is controlling where \u201cif erroneous, [it] would be reversible error on final appeal\u201d); cf. Von Bulow by Auersperg v. Von Bulow, 634 F.Supp. 1284, 1312-13 (S.D.N.Y.1986), aff'd, 811 F.2d 136 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1015, 107 S.Ct. 1891, 95 L.Ed.2d 498 (1987) (certification is not appropriate with respect to a ruling which does not involve a question of law but an exercise of discretion)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"634 F.Supp. 1284, 1312-13","parenthetical":"certification is not appropriate with respect to a ruling which does not involve a question of law but an exercise of discretion","sentence":"See Johnson v. Alldredge, 488 F.2d 820, 822-23 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 882, 95 S.Ct. 148, 42 L.Ed.2d 122 (1974) (questions on immunity, which are purely legal in nature, are appropriate for resolution by way of an interlocutory appeal); Mattioni, supra, at 917 (an issue is controlling where \u201cif erroneous, [it] would be reversible error on final appeal\u201d); cf. Von Bulow by Auersperg v. Von Bulow, 634 F.Supp. 1284, 1312-13 (S.D.N.Y.1986), aff'd, 811 F.2d 136 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1015, 107 S.Ct. 1891, 95 L.Ed.2d 498 (1987) (certification is not appropriate with respect to a ruling which does not involve a question of law but an exercise of discretion)."},"case_id":7386528,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The first criteria is clearly satisfied here. All of the significant issues involved in this case have been resolved as a matter of law. The issues are also controlling and some involve constitutional questions.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"questions on immunity, which are purely legal in nature, are appropriate for resolution by way of an interlocutory appeal","sentence":"See Johnson v. Alldredge, 488 F.2d 820, 822-23 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 882, 95 S.Ct. 148, 42 L.Ed.2d 122 (1974) (questions on immunity, which are purely legal in nature, are appropriate for resolution by way of an interlocutory appeal); Mattioni, supra, at 917 (an issue is controlling where \u201cif erroneous, [it] would be reversible error on final appeal\u201d); cf. Von Bulow by Auersperg v. Von Bulow, 634 F.Supp. 1284, 1312-13 (S.D.N.Y.1986), aff'd, 811 F.2d 136 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1015, 107 S.Ct. 1891, 95 L.Ed.2d 498 (1987) (certification is not appropriate with respect to a ruling which does not involve a question of law but an exercise of discretion)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"certification is not appropriate with respect to a ruling which does not involve a question of law but an exercise of discretion","sentence":"See Johnson v. Alldredge, 488 F.2d 820, 822-23 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 882, 95 S.Ct. 148, 42 L.Ed.2d 122 (1974) (questions on immunity, which are purely legal in nature, are appropriate for resolution by way of an interlocutory appeal); Mattioni, supra, at 917 (an issue is controlling where \u201cif erroneous, [it] would be reversible error on final appeal\u201d); cf. Von Bulow by Auersperg v. Von Bulow, 634 F.Supp. 1284, 1312-13 (S.D.N.Y.1986), aff'd, 811 F.2d 136 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1015, 107 S.Ct. 1891, 95 L.Ed.2d 498 (1987) (certification is not appropriate with respect to a ruling which does not involve a question of law but an exercise of discretion)."},"case_id":7386528,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The first criteria is clearly satisfied here. All of the significant issues involved in this case have been resolved as a matter of law. The issues are also controlling and some involve constitutional questions.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"certification is not appropriate with respect to a ruling which does not involve a question of law but an exercise of discretion","sentence":"See Johnson v. Alldredge, 488 F.2d 820, 822-23 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 882, 95 S.Ct. 148, 42 L.Ed.2d 122 (1974) (questions on immunity, which are purely legal in nature, are appropriate for resolution by way of an interlocutory appeal); Mattioni, supra, at 917 (an issue is controlling where \u201cif erroneous, [it] would be reversible error on final appeal\u201d); cf. Von Bulow by Auersperg v. Von Bulow, 634 F.Supp. 1284, 1312-13 (S.D.N.Y.1986), aff'd, 811 F.2d 136 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1015, 107 S.Ct. 1891, 95 L.Ed.2d 498 (1987) (certification is not appropriate with respect to a ruling which does not involve a question of law but an exercise of discretion)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"questions on immunity, which are purely legal in nature, are appropriate for resolution by way of an interlocutory appeal","sentence":"See Johnson v. Alldredge, 488 F.2d 820, 822-23 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 882, 95 S.Ct. 148, 42 L.Ed.2d 122 (1974) (questions on immunity, which are purely legal in nature, are appropriate for resolution by way of an interlocutory appeal); Mattioni, supra, at 917 (an issue is controlling where \u201cif erroneous, [it] would be reversible error on final appeal\u201d); cf. Von Bulow by Auersperg v. Von Bulow, 634 F.Supp. 1284, 1312-13 (S.D.N.Y.1986), aff'd, 811 F.2d 136 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1015, 107 S.Ct. 1891, 95 L.Ed.2d 498 (1987) (certification is not appropriate with respect to a ruling which does not involve a question of law but an exercise of discretion)."},"case_id":7386528,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The first criteria is clearly satisfied here. All of the significant issues involved in this case have been resolved as a matter of law. The issues are also controlling and some involve constitutional questions.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"questions on immunity, which are purely legal in nature, are appropriate for resolution by way of an interlocutory appeal","sentence":"See Johnson v. Alldredge, 488 F.2d 820, 822-23 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 882, 95 S.Ct. 148, 42 L.Ed.2d 122 (1974) (questions on immunity, which are purely legal in nature, are appropriate for resolution by way of an interlocutory appeal); Mattioni, supra, at 917 (an issue is controlling where \u201cif erroneous, [it] would be reversible error on final appeal\u201d); cf. Von Bulow by Auersperg v. Von Bulow, 634 F.Supp. 1284, 1312-13 (S.D.N.Y.1986), aff'd, 811 F.2d 136 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1015, 107 S.Ct. 1891, 95 L.Ed.2d 498 (1987) (certification is not appropriate with respect to a ruling which does not involve a question of law but an exercise of discretion)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"certification is not appropriate with respect to a ruling which does not involve a question of law but an exercise of discretion","sentence":"See Johnson v. Alldredge, 488 F.2d 820, 822-23 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 882, 95 S.Ct. 148, 42 L.Ed.2d 122 (1974) (questions on immunity, which are purely legal in nature, are appropriate for resolution by way of an interlocutory appeal); Mattioni, supra, at 917 (an issue is controlling where \u201cif erroneous, [it] would be reversible error on final appeal\u201d); cf. Von Bulow by Auersperg v. Von Bulow, 634 F.Supp. 1284, 1312-13 (S.D.N.Y.1986), aff'd, 811 F.2d 136 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1015, 107 S.Ct. 1891, 95 L.Ed.2d 498 (1987) (certification is not appropriate with respect to a ruling which does not involve a question of law but an exercise of discretion)."},"case_id":7386528,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The first criteria is clearly satisfied here. All of the significant issues involved in this case have been resolved as a matter of law. The issues are also controlling and some involve constitutional questions.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"certification is not appropriate with respect to a ruling which does not involve a question of law but an exercise of discretion","sentence":"See Johnson v. Alldredge, 488 F.2d 820, 822-23 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 882, 95 S.Ct. 148, 42 L.Ed.2d 122 (1974) (questions on immunity, which are purely legal in nature, are appropriate for resolution by way of an interlocutory appeal); Mattioni, supra, at 917 (an issue is controlling where \u201cif erroneous, [it] would be reversible error on final appeal\u201d); cf. Von Bulow by Auersperg v. Von Bulow, 634 F.Supp. 1284, 1312-13 (S.D.N.Y.1986), aff'd, 811 F.2d 136 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1015, 107 S.Ct. 1891, 95 L.Ed.2d 498 (1987) (certification is not appropriate with respect to a ruling which does not involve a question of law but an exercise of discretion)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"questions on immunity, which are purely legal in nature, are appropriate for resolution by way of an interlocutory appeal","sentence":"See Johnson v. Alldredge, 488 F.2d 820, 822-23 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 882, 95 S.Ct. 148, 42 L.Ed.2d 122 (1974) (questions on immunity, which are purely legal in nature, are appropriate for resolution by way of an interlocutory appeal); Mattioni, supra, at 917 (an issue is controlling where \u201cif erroneous, [it] would be reversible error on final appeal\u201d); cf. Von Bulow by Auersperg v. Von Bulow, 634 F.Supp. 1284, 1312-13 (S.D.N.Y.1986), aff'd, 811 F.2d 136 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1015, 107 S.Ct. 1891, 95 L.Ed.2d 498 (1987) (certification is not appropriate with respect to a ruling which does not involve a question of law but an exercise of discretion)."},"case_id":7386528,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The United States Court of Federal Claims has \"jurisdiction to render judgment upon any claim against the United States founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any regulation of an executive department, or upon any express or implied contract with the United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort.\" 28 U.S.C. SS 1491(a)(1). The Tucker Act, however, is \"only a jurisdictional statute; it does not create any substantive right enforceable against the United States for money damages.\" Therefore, in order to come within the jurisdictional reach of the Tucker Act, a plaintiff must identify and plead a constitutional provision, federal statute, independent contractual relationship, and\/or executive agency regulation that provides a substantive right to money damages.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"378 F.3d 1371, 1384","parenthetical":"\"Because the Tucker Act itself does not provide a substantive cause of action, ... a plaintiff must find elsewhere a money-mandating source upon which to base a suit.\"","sentence":"See Todd v. United States, 386 F.3d 1091, 1094 (Fed.Cir.2004) (\u201c[Jjurisdiction under the Tucker Act requires the litigant to identify a substantive right for money damages against the United States separate from the Tucker Act.\u201d); see also Roth v. United States, 378 F.3d 1371, 1384 (Fed.Cir.2004) (\u201cBecause the Tucker Act itself does not provide a substantive cause of action, ... a plaintiff must find elsewhere a money-mandating source upon which to base a suit.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"386 F.3d 1091, 1094","parenthetical":"\"[Jjurisdiction under the Tucker Act requires the litigant to identify a substantive right for money damages against the United States separate from the Tucker Act.\"","sentence":"See Todd v. United States, 386 F.3d 1091, 1094 (Fed.Cir.2004) (\u201c[Jjurisdiction under the Tucker Act requires the litigant to identify a substantive right for money damages against the United States separate from the Tucker Act.\u201d); see also Roth v. United States, 378 F.3d 1371, 1384 (Fed.Cir.2004) (\u201cBecause the Tucker Act itself does not provide a substantive cause of action, ... a plaintiff must find elsewhere a money-mandating source upon which to base a suit.\u201d)."},"case_id":8450611,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The United States Court of Federal Claims has \"jurisdiction to render judgment upon any claim against the United States founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any regulation of an executive department, or upon any express or implied contract with the United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort.\" 28 U.S.C. SS 1491(a)(1). The Tucker Act, however, is \"only a jurisdictional statute; it does not create any substantive right enforceable against the United States for money damages.\" Therefore, in order to come within the jurisdictional reach of the Tucker Act, a plaintiff must identify and plead a constitutional provision, federal statute, independent contractual relationship, and\/or executive agency regulation that provides a substantive right to money damages.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"386 F.3d 1091, 1094","parenthetical":"\"[Jjurisdiction under the Tucker Act requires the litigant to identify a substantive right for money damages against the United States separate from the Tucker Act.\"","sentence":"See Todd v. United States, 386 F.3d 1091, 1094 (Fed.Cir.2004) (\u201c[Jjurisdiction under the Tucker Act requires the litigant to identify a substantive right for money damages against the United States separate from the Tucker Act.\u201d); see also Roth v. United States, 378 F.3d 1371, 1384 (Fed.Cir.2004) (\u201cBecause the Tucker Act itself does not provide a substantive cause of action, ... a plaintiff must find elsewhere a money-mandating source upon which to base a suit.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"378 F.3d 1371, 1384","parenthetical":"\"Because the Tucker Act itself does not provide a substantive cause of action, ... a plaintiff must find elsewhere a money-mandating source upon which to base a suit.\"","sentence":"See Todd v. United States, 386 F.3d 1091, 1094 (Fed.Cir.2004) (\u201c[Jjurisdiction under the Tucker Act requires the litigant to identify a substantive right for money damages against the United States separate from the Tucker Act.\u201d); see also Roth v. United States, 378 F.3d 1371, 1384 (Fed.Cir.2004) (\u201cBecause the Tucker Act itself does not provide a substantive cause of action, ... a plaintiff must find elsewhere a money-mandating source upon which to base a suit.\u201d)."},"case_id":702838,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The statute is entitled \"Sealing of records,\" and empowers the court to order \"the sealing of files.\" 33 V.S.A. SS 5119(g). It makes no mention of correcting records or amending later convictions. Had the Legislature intended for the statute to have that effect, it would have included such language.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"128 Vt. 586, 591","parenthetical":"\"[FJinality ... is of vital significance in the administration of criminal justice.\"","sentence":"See State v. Boskind, 174 Vt. 184, 191, 807 A.2d 358, 365 (2002) (\u201cAdhering to our [post-conviction relief] procedures safeguards a defendant\u2019s rights while promoting the State\u2019s interest in finality of judgments.\u201d); see also State v. Provencher, 128 Vt. 586, 591, 270 A.2d 147, 150 (1970) (\u201c[FJinality ... is of vital significance in the administration of criminal justice.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"144 Vt. 70, 75","parenthetical":"explaining that it is inappropriate \"to expand a statute by implication, that is, by reading into it something which is not there, unless it is necessary in order to make it effective\"","sentence":"See State v. Jacobs, 144 Vt. 70, 75, 472 A.2d 1247, 1250 (1984) (explaining that it is inappropriate \u201cto expand a statute by implication, that is, by reading into it something which is not there, unless it is necessary in order to make it effective\u201d). Furthermore, reading that effect into the statute would interfere with the principle of finality and veer from the principle that substantive review of an enhanced conviction is expressly limited by Vermont law to a collateral attack presented through a petition for post-conviction relief."},"case_id":12453542,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The statute is entitled \"Sealing of records,\" and empowers the court to order \"the sealing of files.\" 33 V.S.A. SS 5119(g). It makes no mention of correcting records or amending later convictions. Had the Legislature intended for the statute to have that effect, it would have included such language.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"270 A.2d 147, 150","parenthetical":"\"[FJinality ... is of vital significance in the administration of criminal justice.\"","sentence":"See State v. Boskind, 174 Vt. 184, 191, 807 A.2d 358, 365 (2002) (\u201cAdhering to our [post-conviction relief] procedures safeguards a defendant\u2019s rights while promoting the State\u2019s interest in finality of judgments.\u201d); see also State v. Provencher, 128 Vt. 586, 591, 270 A.2d 147, 150 (1970) (\u201c[FJinality ... is of vital significance in the administration of criminal justice.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"144 Vt. 70, 75","parenthetical":"explaining that it is inappropriate \"to expand a statute by implication, that is, by reading into it something which is not there, unless it is necessary in order to make it effective\"","sentence":"See State v. Jacobs, 144 Vt. 70, 75, 472 A.2d 1247, 1250 (1984) (explaining that it is inappropriate \u201cto expand a statute by implication, that is, by reading into it something which is not there, unless it is necessary in order to make it effective\u201d). Furthermore, reading that effect into the statute would interfere with the principle of finality and veer from the principle that substantive review of an enhanced conviction is expressly limited by Vermont law to a collateral attack presented through a petition for post-conviction relief."},"case_id":12453542,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The statute is entitled \"Sealing of records,\" and empowers the court to order \"the sealing of files.\" 33 V.S.A. SS 5119(g). It makes no mention of correcting records or amending later convictions. Had the Legislature intended for the statute to have that effect, it would have included such language.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"472 A.2d 1247, 1250","parenthetical":"explaining that it is inappropriate \"to expand a statute by implication, that is, by reading into it something which is not there, unless it is necessary in order to make it effective\"","sentence":"See State v. Jacobs, 144 Vt. 70, 75, 472 A.2d 1247, 1250 (1984) (explaining that it is inappropriate \u201cto expand a statute by implication, that is, by reading into it something which is not there, unless it is necessary in order to make it effective\u201d). Furthermore, reading that effect into the statute would interfere with the principle of finality and veer from the principle that substantive review of an enhanced conviction is expressly limited by Vermont law to a collateral attack presented through a petition for post-conviction relief."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"128 Vt. 586, 591","parenthetical":"\"[FJinality ... is of vital significance in the administration of criminal justice.\"","sentence":"See State v. Boskind, 174 Vt. 184, 191, 807 A.2d 358, 365 (2002) (\u201cAdhering to our [post-conviction relief] procedures safeguards a defendant\u2019s rights while promoting the State\u2019s interest in finality of judgments.\u201d); see also State v. Provencher, 128 Vt. 586, 591, 270 A.2d 147, 150 (1970) (\u201c[FJinality ... is of vital significance in the administration of criminal justice.\u201d)."},"case_id":12453542,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The statute is entitled \"Sealing of records,\" and empowers the court to order \"the sealing of files.\" 33 V.S.A. SS 5119(g). It makes no mention of correcting records or amending later convictions. Had the Legislature intended for the statute to have that effect, it would have included such language.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"472 A.2d 1247, 1250","parenthetical":"explaining that it is inappropriate \"to expand a statute by implication, that is, by reading into it something which is not there, unless it is necessary in order to make it effective\"","sentence":"See State v. Jacobs, 144 Vt. 70, 75, 472 A.2d 1247, 1250 (1984) (explaining that it is inappropriate \u201cto expand a statute by implication, that is, by reading into it something which is not there, unless it is necessary in order to make it effective\u201d). Furthermore, reading that effect into the statute would interfere with the principle of finality and veer from the principle that substantive review of an enhanced conviction is expressly limited by Vermont law to a collateral attack presented through a petition for post-conviction relief."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"270 A.2d 147, 150","parenthetical":"\"[FJinality ... is of vital significance in the administration of criminal justice.\"","sentence":"See State v. Boskind, 174 Vt. 184, 191, 807 A.2d 358, 365 (2002) (\u201cAdhering to our [post-conviction relief] procedures safeguards a defendant\u2019s rights while promoting the State\u2019s interest in finality of judgments.\u201d); see also State v. Provencher, 128 Vt. 586, 591, 270 A.2d 147, 150 (1970) (\u201c[FJinality ... is of vital significance in the administration of criminal justice.\u201d)."},"case_id":12453542,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The statute is entitled \"Sealing of records,\" and empowers the court to order \"the sealing of files.\" 33 V.S.A. SS 5119(g). It makes no mention of correcting records or amending later convictions. Had the Legislature intended for the statute to have that effect, it would have included such language.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"128 Vt. 586, 591","parenthetical":"\"[FJinality ... is of vital significance in the administration of criminal justice.\"","sentence":"See State v. Boskind, 174 Vt. 184, 191, 807 A.2d 358, 365 (2002) (\u201cAdhering to our [post-conviction relief] procedures safeguards a defendant\u2019s rights while promoting the State\u2019s interest in finality of judgments.\u201d); see also State v. Provencher, 128 Vt. 586, 591, 270 A.2d 147, 150 (1970) (\u201c[FJinality ... is of vital significance in the administration of criminal justice.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"174 Vt. 184, 191","parenthetical":"\"Adhering to our [post-conviction relief] procedures safeguards a defendant's rights while promoting the State's interest in finality of judgments.\"","sentence":"See State v. Boskind, 174 Vt. 184, 191, 807 A.2d 358, 365 (2002) (\u201cAdhering to our [post-conviction relief] procedures safeguards a defendant\u2019s rights while promoting the State\u2019s interest in finality of judgments.\u201d); see also State v. Provencher, 128 Vt. 586, 591, 270 A.2d 147, 150 (1970) (\u201c[FJinality ... is of vital significance in the administration of criminal justice.\u201d)."},"case_id":12453542,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The statute is entitled \"Sealing of records,\" and empowers the court to order \"the sealing of files.\" 33 V.S.A. SS 5119(g). It makes no mention of correcting records or amending later convictions. Had the Legislature intended for the statute to have that effect, it would have included such language.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"174 Vt. 184, 191","parenthetical":"\"Adhering to our [post-conviction relief] procedures safeguards a defendant's rights while promoting the State's interest in finality of judgments.\"","sentence":"See State v. Boskind, 174 Vt. 184, 191, 807 A.2d 358, 365 (2002) (\u201cAdhering to our [post-conviction relief] procedures safeguards a defendant\u2019s rights while promoting the State\u2019s interest in finality of judgments.\u201d); see also State v. Provencher, 128 Vt. 586, 591, 270 A.2d 147, 150 (1970) (\u201c[FJinality ... is of vital significance in the administration of criminal justice.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"270 A.2d 147, 150","parenthetical":"\"[FJinality ... is of vital significance in the administration of criminal justice.\"","sentence":"See State v. Boskind, 174 Vt. 184, 191, 807 A.2d 358, 365 (2002) (\u201cAdhering to our [post-conviction relief] procedures safeguards a defendant\u2019s rights while promoting the State\u2019s interest in finality of judgments.\u201d); see also State v. Provencher, 128 Vt. 586, 591, 270 A.2d 147, 150 (1970) (\u201c[FJinality ... is of vital significance in the administration of criminal justice.\u201d)."},"case_id":12453542,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The statute is entitled \"Sealing of records,\" and empowers the court to order \"the sealing of files.\" 33 V.S.A. SS 5119(g). It makes no mention of correcting records or amending later convictions. Had the Legislature intended for the statute to have that effect, it would have included such language.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"128 Vt. 586, 591","parenthetical":"\"[FJinality ... is of vital significance in the administration of criminal justice.\"","sentence":"See State v. Boskind, 174 Vt. 184, 191, 807 A.2d 358, 365 (2002) (\u201cAdhering to our [post-conviction relief] procedures safeguards a defendant\u2019s rights while promoting the State\u2019s interest in finality of judgments.\u201d); see also State v. Provencher, 128 Vt. 586, 591, 270 A.2d 147, 150 (1970) (\u201c[FJinality ... is of vital significance in the administration of criminal justice.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"807 A.2d 358, 365","parenthetical":"\"Adhering to our [post-conviction relief] procedures safeguards a defendant's rights while promoting the State's interest in finality of judgments.\"","sentence":"See State v. Boskind, 174 Vt. 184, 191, 807 A.2d 358, 365 (2002) (\u201cAdhering to our [post-conviction relief] procedures safeguards a defendant\u2019s rights while promoting the State\u2019s interest in finality of judgments.\u201d); see also State v. Provencher, 128 Vt. 586, 591, 270 A.2d 147, 150 (1970) (\u201c[FJinality ... is of vital significance in the administration of criminal justice.\u201d)."},"case_id":12453542,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The statute is entitled \"Sealing of records,\" and empowers the court to order \"the sealing of files.\" 33 V.S.A. SS 5119(g). It makes no mention of correcting records or amending later convictions. Had the Legislature intended for the statute to have that effect, it would have included such language.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"270 A.2d 147, 150","parenthetical":"\"[FJinality ... is of vital significance in the administration of criminal justice.\"","sentence":"See State v. Boskind, 174 Vt. 184, 191, 807 A.2d 358, 365 (2002) (\u201cAdhering to our [post-conviction relief] procedures safeguards a defendant\u2019s rights while promoting the State\u2019s interest in finality of judgments.\u201d); see also State v. Provencher, 128 Vt. 586, 591, 270 A.2d 147, 150 (1970) (\u201c[FJinality ... is of vital significance in the administration of criminal justice.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"807 A.2d 358, 365","parenthetical":"\"Adhering to our [post-conviction relief] procedures safeguards a defendant's rights while promoting the State's interest in finality of judgments.\"","sentence":"See State v. Boskind, 174 Vt. 184, 191, 807 A.2d 358, 365 (2002) (\u201cAdhering to our [post-conviction relief] procedures safeguards a defendant\u2019s rights while promoting the State\u2019s interest in finality of judgments.\u201d); see also State v. Provencher, 128 Vt. 586, 591, 270 A.2d 147, 150 (1970) (\u201c[FJinality ... is of vital significance in the administration of criminal justice.\u201d)."},"case_id":12453542,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Haverda was speaking as a citizen, supporting a candidate during an election, when he submitted his letter to the editor. Letters to the editor, supporting a candidate during a campaign, are a unique form of speech that embody the very essence of the First Amendment and require its full protection.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"391 U.S. 563, 565","parenthetical":"holding that a teacher's First Amendment rights were violated when the Board of Education dismissed him for sending a letter to newspaper criticizing a proposed tax increase","sentence":"See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 565, 88 S.Ct. 1731, 20 L.Ed.2d 811 (1968) (holding that a teacher\u2019s First Amendment rights were violated when the Board of Education dismissed him for sending a letter to newspaper criticizing a proposed tax increase); see also Garcetti 547 U.S. at 419, 126 S.Ct. 1951 (\u201cThe Court has acknowledged the importance of promoting the public\u2019s interest in receiving the well-informed views of government employees engaging in civic discussion.\u201d); cf. Jordan v. Ector Cnty., 516 F.3d 290, 295 (5th Cir.2008) (recognizing that the First Amendment forbids government officials to discharge public employees for not being supporters of the political party in power). For these reasons, we conclude that Haverda was speaking as a citizen, and his letter to the editor is protected speech under the First Amendment."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"547 U.S. 419, 419","parenthetical":"\"The Court has acknowledged the importance of promoting the public's interest in receiving the well-informed views of government employees engaging in civic discussion.\"","sentence":"See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 565, 88 S.Ct. 1731, 20 L.Ed.2d 811 (1968) (holding that a teacher\u2019s First Amendment rights were violated when the Board of Education dismissed him for sending a letter to newspaper criticizing a proposed tax increase); see also Garcetti 547 U.S. at 419, 126 S.Ct. 1951 (\u201cThe Court has acknowledged the importance of promoting the public\u2019s interest in receiving the well-informed views of government employees engaging in civic discussion.\u201d); cf. Jordan v. Ector Cnty., 516 F.3d 290, 295 (5th Cir.2008) (recognizing that the First Amendment forbids government officials to discharge public employees for not being supporters of the political party in power). For these reasons, we conclude that Haverda was speaking as a citizen, and his letter to the editor is protected speech under the First Amendment."},"case_id":4064673,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Haverda was speaking as a citizen, supporting a candidate during an election, when he submitted his letter to the editor. Letters to the editor, supporting a candidate during a campaign, are a unique form of speech that embody the very essence of the First Amendment and require its full protection.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"391 U.S. 563, 565","parenthetical":"holding that a teacher's First Amendment rights were violated when the Board of Education dismissed him for sending a letter to newspaper criticizing a proposed tax increase","sentence":"See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 565, 88 S.Ct. 1731, 20 L.Ed.2d 811 (1968) (holding that a teacher\u2019s First Amendment rights were violated when the Board of Education dismissed him for sending a letter to newspaper criticizing a proposed tax increase); see also Garcetti 547 U.S. at 419, 126 S.Ct. 1951 (\u201cThe Court has acknowledged the importance of promoting the public\u2019s interest in receiving the well-informed views of government employees engaging in civic discussion.\u201d); cf. Jordan v. Ector Cnty., 516 F.3d 290, 295 (5th Cir.2008) (recognizing that the First Amendment forbids government officials to discharge public employees for not being supporters of the political party in power). For these reasons, we conclude that Haverda was speaking as a citizen, and his letter to the editor is protected speech under the First Amendment."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"The Court has acknowledged the importance of promoting the public's interest in receiving the well-informed views of government employees engaging in civic discussion.\"","sentence":"See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 565, 88 S.Ct. 1731, 20 L.Ed.2d 811 (1968) (holding that a teacher\u2019s First Amendment rights were violated when the Board of Education dismissed him for sending a letter to newspaper criticizing a proposed tax increase); see also Garcetti 547 U.S. at 419, 126 S.Ct. 1951 (\u201cThe Court has acknowledged the importance of promoting the public\u2019s interest in receiving the well-informed views of government employees engaging in civic discussion.\u201d); cf. Jordan v. Ector Cnty., 516 F.3d 290, 295 (5th Cir.2008) (recognizing that the First Amendment forbids government officials to discharge public employees for not being supporters of the political party in power). For these reasons, we conclude that Haverda was speaking as a citizen, and his letter to the editor is protected speech under the First Amendment."},"case_id":4064673,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Haverda was speaking as a citizen, supporting a candidate during an election, when he submitted his letter to the editor. Letters to the editor, supporting a candidate during a campaign, are a unique form of speech that embody the very essence of the First Amendment and require its full protection.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"391 U.S. 563, 565","parenthetical":"holding that a teacher's First Amendment rights were violated when the Board of Education dismissed him for sending a letter to newspaper criticizing a proposed tax increase","sentence":"See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 565, 88 S.Ct. 1731, 20 L.Ed.2d 811 (1968) (holding that a teacher\u2019s First Amendment rights were violated when the Board of Education dismissed him for sending a letter to newspaper criticizing a proposed tax increase); see also Garcetti 547 U.S. at 419, 126 S.Ct. 1951 (\u201cThe Court has acknowledged the importance of promoting the public\u2019s interest in receiving the well-informed views of government employees engaging in civic discussion.\u201d); cf. Jordan v. Ector Cnty., 516 F.3d 290, 295 (5th Cir.2008) (recognizing that the First Amendment forbids government officials to discharge public employees for not being supporters of the political party in power). For these reasons, we conclude that Haverda was speaking as a citizen, and his letter to the editor is protected speech under the First Amendment."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"516 F.3d 290, 295","parenthetical":"recognizing that the First Amendment forbids government officials to discharge public employees for not being supporters of the political party in power","sentence":"See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 565, 88 S.Ct. 1731, 20 L.Ed.2d 811 (1968) (holding that a teacher\u2019s First Amendment rights were violated when the Board of Education dismissed him for sending a letter to newspaper criticizing a proposed tax increase); see also Garcetti 547 U.S. at 419, 126 S.Ct. 1951 (\u201cThe Court has acknowledged the importance of promoting the public\u2019s interest in receiving the well-informed views of government employees engaging in civic discussion.\u201d); cf. Jordan v. Ector Cnty., 516 F.3d 290, 295 (5th Cir.2008) (recognizing that the First Amendment forbids government officials to discharge public employees for not being supporters of the political party in power). For these reasons, we conclude that Haverda was speaking as a citizen, and his letter to the editor is protected speech under the First Amendment."},"case_id":4064673,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Haverda was speaking as a citizen, supporting a candidate during an election, when he submitted his letter to the editor. Letters to the editor, supporting a candidate during a campaign, are a unique form of speech that embody the very essence of the First Amendment and require its full protection.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that a teacher's First Amendment rights were violated when the Board of Education dismissed him for sending a letter to newspaper criticizing a proposed tax increase","sentence":"See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 565, 88 S.Ct. 1731, 20 L.Ed.2d 811 (1968) (holding that a teacher\u2019s First Amendment rights were violated when the Board of Education dismissed him for sending a letter to newspaper criticizing a proposed tax increase); see also Garcetti 547 U.S. at 419, 126 S.Ct. 1951 (\u201cThe Court has acknowledged the importance of promoting the public\u2019s interest in receiving the well-informed views of government employees engaging in civic discussion.\u201d); cf. Jordan v. Ector Cnty., 516 F.3d 290, 295 (5th Cir.2008) (recognizing that the First Amendment forbids government officials to discharge public employees for not being supporters of the political party in power). For these reasons, we conclude that Haverda was speaking as a citizen, and his letter to the editor is protected speech under the First Amendment."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"547 U.S. 419, 419","parenthetical":"\"The Court has acknowledged the importance of promoting the public's interest in receiving the well-informed views of government employees engaging in civic discussion.\"","sentence":"See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 565, 88 S.Ct. 1731, 20 L.Ed.2d 811 (1968) (holding that a teacher\u2019s First Amendment rights were violated when the Board of Education dismissed him for sending a letter to newspaper criticizing a proposed tax increase); see also Garcetti 547 U.S. at 419, 126 S.Ct. 1951 (\u201cThe Court has acknowledged the importance of promoting the public\u2019s interest in receiving the well-informed views of government employees engaging in civic discussion.\u201d); cf. Jordan v. Ector Cnty., 516 F.3d 290, 295 (5th Cir.2008) (recognizing that the First Amendment forbids government officials to discharge public employees for not being supporters of the political party in power). For these reasons, we conclude that Haverda was speaking as a citizen, and his letter to the editor is protected speech under the First Amendment."},"case_id":4064673,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Haverda was speaking as a citizen, supporting a candidate during an election, when he submitted his letter to the editor. Letters to the editor, supporting a candidate during a campaign, are a unique form of speech that embody the very essence of the First Amendment and require its full protection.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that a teacher's First Amendment rights were violated when the Board of Education dismissed him for sending a letter to newspaper criticizing a proposed tax increase","sentence":"See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 565, 88 S.Ct. 1731, 20 L.Ed.2d 811 (1968) (holding that a teacher\u2019s First Amendment rights were violated when the Board of Education dismissed him for sending a letter to newspaper criticizing a proposed tax increase); see also Garcetti 547 U.S. at 419, 126 S.Ct. 1951 (\u201cThe Court has acknowledged the importance of promoting the public\u2019s interest in receiving the well-informed views of government employees engaging in civic discussion.\u201d); cf. Jordan v. Ector Cnty., 516 F.3d 290, 295 (5th Cir.2008) (recognizing that the First Amendment forbids government officials to discharge public employees for not being supporters of the political party in power). For these reasons, we conclude that Haverda was speaking as a citizen, and his letter to the editor is protected speech under the First Amendment."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"The Court has acknowledged the importance of promoting the public's interest in receiving the well-informed views of government employees engaging in civic discussion.\"","sentence":"See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 565, 88 S.Ct. 1731, 20 L.Ed.2d 811 (1968) (holding that a teacher\u2019s First Amendment rights were violated when the Board of Education dismissed him for sending a letter to newspaper criticizing a proposed tax increase); see also Garcetti 547 U.S. at 419, 126 S.Ct. 1951 (\u201cThe Court has acknowledged the importance of promoting the public\u2019s interest in receiving the well-informed views of government employees engaging in civic discussion.\u201d); cf. Jordan v. Ector Cnty., 516 F.3d 290, 295 (5th Cir.2008) (recognizing that the First Amendment forbids government officials to discharge public employees for not being supporters of the political party in power). For these reasons, we conclude that Haverda was speaking as a citizen, and his letter to the editor is protected speech under the First Amendment."},"case_id":4064673,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Haverda was speaking as a citizen, supporting a candidate during an election, when he submitted his letter to the editor. Letters to the editor, supporting a candidate during a campaign, are a unique form of speech that embody the very essence of the First Amendment and require its full protection.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"516 F.3d 290, 295","parenthetical":"recognizing that the First Amendment forbids government officials to discharge public employees for not being supporters of the political party in power","sentence":"See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 565, 88 S.Ct. 1731, 20 L.Ed.2d 811 (1968) (holding that a teacher\u2019s First Amendment rights were violated when the Board of Education dismissed him for sending a letter to newspaper criticizing a proposed tax increase); see also Garcetti 547 U.S. at 419, 126 S.Ct. 1951 (\u201cThe Court has acknowledged the importance of promoting the public\u2019s interest in receiving the well-informed views of government employees engaging in civic discussion.\u201d); cf. Jordan v. Ector Cnty., 516 F.3d 290, 295 (5th Cir.2008) (recognizing that the First Amendment forbids government officials to discharge public employees for not being supporters of the political party in power). For these reasons, we conclude that Haverda was speaking as a citizen, and his letter to the editor is protected speech under the First Amendment."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that a teacher's First Amendment rights were violated when the Board of Education dismissed him for sending a letter to newspaper criticizing a proposed tax increase","sentence":"See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 565, 88 S.Ct. 1731, 20 L.Ed.2d 811 (1968) (holding that a teacher\u2019s First Amendment rights were violated when the Board of Education dismissed him for sending a letter to newspaper criticizing a proposed tax increase); see also Garcetti 547 U.S. at 419, 126 S.Ct. 1951 (\u201cThe Court has acknowledged the importance of promoting the public\u2019s interest in receiving the well-informed views of government employees engaging in civic discussion.\u201d); cf. Jordan v. Ector Cnty., 516 F.3d 290, 295 (5th Cir.2008) (recognizing that the First Amendment forbids government officials to discharge public employees for not being supporters of the political party in power). For these reasons, we conclude that Haverda was speaking as a citizen, and his letter to the editor is protected speech under the First Amendment."},"case_id":4064673,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Haverda was speaking as a citizen, supporting a candidate during an election, when he submitted his letter to the editor. Letters to the editor, supporting a candidate during a campaign, are a unique form of speech that embody the very essence of the First Amendment and require its full protection.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"547 U.S. 419, 419","parenthetical":"\"The Court has acknowledged the importance of promoting the public's interest in receiving the well-informed views of government employees engaging in civic discussion.\"","sentence":"See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 565, 88 S.Ct. 1731, 20 L.Ed.2d 811 (1968) (holding that a teacher\u2019s First Amendment rights were violated when the Board of Education dismissed him for sending a letter to newspaper criticizing a proposed tax increase); see also Garcetti 547 U.S. at 419, 126 S.Ct. 1951 (\u201cThe Court has acknowledged the importance of promoting the public\u2019s interest in receiving the well-informed views of government employees engaging in civic discussion.\u201d); cf. Jordan v. Ector Cnty., 516 F.3d 290, 295 (5th Cir.2008) (recognizing that the First Amendment forbids government officials to discharge public employees for not being supporters of the political party in power). For these reasons, we conclude that Haverda was speaking as a citizen, and his letter to the editor is protected speech under the First Amendment."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that a teacher's First Amendment rights were violated when the Board of Education dismissed him for sending a letter to newspaper criticizing a proposed tax increase","sentence":"See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 565, 88 S.Ct. 1731, 20 L.Ed.2d 811 (1968) (holding that a teacher\u2019s First Amendment rights were violated when the Board of Education dismissed him for sending a letter to newspaper criticizing a proposed tax increase); see also Garcetti 547 U.S. at 419, 126 S.Ct. 1951 (\u201cThe Court has acknowledged the importance of promoting the public\u2019s interest in receiving the well-informed views of government employees engaging in civic discussion.\u201d); cf. Jordan v. Ector Cnty., 516 F.3d 290, 295 (5th Cir.2008) (recognizing that the First Amendment forbids government officials to discharge public employees for not being supporters of the political party in power). For these reasons, we conclude that Haverda was speaking as a citizen, and his letter to the editor is protected speech under the First Amendment."},"case_id":4064673,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Haverda was speaking as a citizen, supporting a candidate during an election, when he submitted his letter to the editor. Letters to the editor, supporting a candidate during a campaign, are a unique form of speech that embody the very essence of the First Amendment and require its full protection.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"The Court has acknowledged the importance of promoting the public's interest in receiving the well-informed views of government employees engaging in civic discussion.\"","sentence":"See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 565, 88 S.Ct. 1731, 20 L.Ed.2d 811 (1968) (holding that a teacher\u2019s First Amendment rights were violated when the Board of Education dismissed him for sending a letter to newspaper criticizing a proposed tax increase); see also Garcetti 547 U.S. at 419, 126 S.Ct. 1951 (\u201cThe Court has acknowledged the importance of promoting the public\u2019s interest in receiving the well-informed views of government employees engaging in civic discussion.\u201d); cf. Jordan v. Ector Cnty., 516 F.3d 290, 295 (5th Cir.2008) (recognizing that the First Amendment forbids government officials to discharge public employees for not being supporters of the political party in power). For these reasons, we conclude that Haverda was speaking as a citizen, and his letter to the editor is protected speech under the First Amendment."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that a teacher's First Amendment rights were violated when the Board of Education dismissed him for sending a letter to newspaper criticizing a proposed tax increase","sentence":"See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 565, 88 S.Ct. 1731, 20 L.Ed.2d 811 (1968) (holding that a teacher\u2019s First Amendment rights were violated when the Board of Education dismissed him for sending a letter to newspaper criticizing a proposed tax increase); see also Garcetti 547 U.S. at 419, 126 S.Ct. 1951 (\u201cThe Court has acknowledged the importance of promoting the public\u2019s interest in receiving the well-informed views of government employees engaging in civic discussion.\u201d); cf. Jordan v. Ector Cnty., 516 F.3d 290, 295 (5th Cir.2008) (recognizing that the First Amendment forbids government officials to discharge public employees for not being supporters of the political party in power). For these reasons, we conclude that Haverda was speaking as a citizen, and his letter to the editor is protected speech under the First Amendment."},"case_id":4064673,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Haverda was speaking as a citizen, supporting a candidate during an election, when he submitted his letter to the editor. Letters to the editor, supporting a candidate during a campaign, are a unique form of speech that embody the very essence of the First Amendment and require its full protection.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that a teacher's First Amendment rights were violated when the Board of Education dismissed him for sending a letter to newspaper criticizing a proposed tax increase","sentence":"See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 565, 88 S.Ct. 1731, 20 L.Ed.2d 811 (1968) (holding that a teacher\u2019s First Amendment rights were violated when the Board of Education dismissed him for sending a letter to newspaper criticizing a proposed tax increase); see also Garcetti 547 U.S. at 419, 126 S.Ct. 1951 (\u201cThe Court has acknowledged the importance of promoting the public\u2019s interest in receiving the well-informed views of government employees engaging in civic discussion.\u201d); cf. Jordan v. Ector Cnty., 516 F.3d 290, 295 (5th Cir.2008) (recognizing that the First Amendment forbids government officials to discharge public employees for not being supporters of the political party in power). For these reasons, we conclude that Haverda was speaking as a citizen, and his letter to the editor is protected speech under the First Amendment."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"516 F.3d 290, 295","parenthetical":"recognizing that the First Amendment forbids government officials to discharge public employees for not being supporters of the political party in power","sentence":"See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 565, 88 S.Ct. 1731, 20 L.Ed.2d 811 (1968) (holding that a teacher\u2019s First Amendment rights were violated when the Board of Education dismissed him for sending a letter to newspaper criticizing a proposed tax increase); see also Garcetti 547 U.S. at 419, 126 S.Ct. 1951 (\u201cThe Court has acknowledged the importance of promoting the public\u2019s interest in receiving the well-informed views of government employees engaging in civic discussion.\u201d); cf. Jordan v. Ector Cnty., 516 F.3d 290, 295 (5th Cir.2008) (recognizing that the First Amendment forbids government officials to discharge public employees for not being supporters of the political party in power). For these reasons, we conclude that Haverda was speaking as a citizen, and his letter to the editor is protected speech under the First Amendment."},"case_id":4064673,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Haverda was speaking as a citizen, supporting a candidate during an election, when he submitted his letter to the editor. Letters to the editor, supporting a candidate during a campaign, are a unique form of speech that embody the very essence of the First Amendment and require its full protection.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"516 F.3d 290, 295","parenthetical":"recognizing that the First Amendment forbids government officials to discharge public employees for not being supporters of the political party in power","sentence":"See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 565, 88 S.Ct. 1731, 20 L.Ed.2d 811 (1968) (holding that a teacher\u2019s First Amendment rights were violated when the Board of Education dismissed him for sending a letter to newspaper criticizing a proposed tax increase); see also Garcetti 547 U.S. at 419, 126 S.Ct. 1951 (\u201cThe Court has acknowledged the importance of promoting the public\u2019s interest in receiving the well-informed views of government employees engaging in civic discussion.\u201d); cf. Jordan v. Ector Cnty., 516 F.3d 290, 295 (5th Cir.2008) (recognizing that the First Amendment forbids government officials to discharge public employees for not being supporters of the political party in power). For these reasons, we conclude that Haverda was speaking as a citizen, and his letter to the editor is protected speech under the First Amendment."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"547 U.S. 419, 419","parenthetical":"\"The Court has acknowledged the importance of promoting the public's interest in receiving the well-informed views of government employees engaging in civic discussion.\"","sentence":"See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 565, 88 S.Ct. 1731, 20 L.Ed.2d 811 (1968) (holding that a teacher\u2019s First Amendment rights were violated when the Board of Education dismissed him for sending a letter to newspaper criticizing a proposed tax increase); see also Garcetti 547 U.S. at 419, 126 S.Ct. 1951 (\u201cThe Court has acknowledged the importance of promoting the public\u2019s interest in receiving the well-informed views of government employees engaging in civic discussion.\u201d); cf. Jordan v. Ector Cnty., 516 F.3d 290, 295 (5th Cir.2008) (recognizing that the First Amendment forbids government officials to discharge public employees for not being supporters of the political party in power). For these reasons, we conclude that Haverda was speaking as a citizen, and his letter to the editor is protected speech under the First Amendment."},"case_id":4064673,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Haverda was speaking as a citizen, supporting a candidate during an election, when he submitted his letter to the editor. Letters to the editor, supporting a candidate during a campaign, are a unique form of speech that embody the very essence of the First Amendment and require its full protection.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"The Court has acknowledged the importance of promoting the public's interest in receiving the well-informed views of government employees engaging in civic discussion.\"","sentence":"See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 565, 88 S.Ct. 1731, 20 L.Ed.2d 811 (1968) (holding that a teacher\u2019s First Amendment rights were violated when the Board of Education dismissed him for sending a letter to newspaper criticizing a proposed tax increase); see also Garcetti 547 U.S. at 419, 126 S.Ct. 1951 (\u201cThe Court has acknowledged the importance of promoting the public\u2019s interest in receiving the well-informed views of government employees engaging in civic discussion.\u201d); cf. Jordan v. Ector Cnty., 516 F.3d 290, 295 (5th Cir.2008) (recognizing that the First Amendment forbids government officials to discharge public employees for not being supporters of the political party in power). For these reasons, we conclude that Haverda was speaking as a citizen, and his letter to the editor is protected speech under the First Amendment."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"516 F.3d 290, 295","parenthetical":"recognizing that the First Amendment forbids government officials to discharge public employees for not being supporters of the political party in power","sentence":"See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 565, 88 S.Ct. 1731, 20 L.Ed.2d 811 (1968) (holding that a teacher\u2019s First Amendment rights were violated when the Board of Education dismissed him for sending a letter to newspaper criticizing a proposed tax increase); see also Garcetti 547 U.S. at 419, 126 S.Ct. 1951 (\u201cThe Court has acknowledged the importance of promoting the public\u2019s interest in receiving the well-informed views of government employees engaging in civic discussion.\u201d); cf. Jordan v. Ector Cnty., 516 F.3d 290, 295 (5th Cir.2008) (recognizing that the First Amendment forbids government officials to discharge public employees for not being supporters of the political party in power). For these reasons, we conclude that Haverda was speaking as a citizen, and his letter to the editor is protected speech under the First Amendment."},"case_id":4064673,"label":"a"}
{"context":"P 12. Specifically, Brown asserts that, because the plea colloquy did not include an explanation of party to a crime liability, (1) an essential element of the charge to which he pled guilty was omitted, and (2) he did not understand the robbery with threat of force as party to a crime charge to which he pled guilty.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"2007 WI 74, \u00b6 25","parenthetical":"\"Whether a plea colloquy conforms to the statutory requirements is a question of law that we review independently.\"","sentence":"See also State v. Lackershire, 2007 WI 74, \u00b6 25, 301 Wis. 2d 418, 734 N.W.2d 23 (\"Whether a plea colloquy conforms to the statutory requirements is a question of law that we review independently.\")."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"293 Wis. 2d 594, \u00b6 36","parenthetical":"trial court's failure to fulfill a duty at the plea hearing necessitates evidentiary hearing if postconviction motion alleges defendant did not understand an aspect of the plea because of the omission","sentence":"See Brown, 293 Wis. 2d 594, \u00b6 36 (trial court's failure to fulfill a duty at the plea hearing necessitates evidentiary hearing if postconviction motion alleges defendant did not understand an aspect of the plea because of the omission)."},"case_id":4032920,"label":"b"}
{"context":"P 12. Specifically, Brown asserts that, because the plea colloquy did not include an explanation of party to a crime liability, (1) an essential element of the charge to which he pled guilty was omitted, and (2) he did not understand the robbery with threat of force as party to a crime charge to which he pled guilty.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"293 Wis. 2d 594, \u00b6 36","parenthetical":"trial court's failure to fulfill a duty at the plea hearing necessitates evidentiary hearing if postconviction motion alleges defendant did not understand an aspect of the plea because of the omission","sentence":"See Brown, 293 Wis. 2d 594, \u00b6 36 (trial court's failure to fulfill a duty at the plea hearing necessitates evidentiary hearing if postconviction motion alleges defendant did not understand an aspect of the plea because of the omission)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"Whether a plea colloquy conforms to the statutory requirements is a question of law that we review independently.\"","sentence":"See also State v. Lackershire, 2007 WI 74, \u00b6 25, 301 Wis. 2d 418, 734 N.W.2d 23 (\"Whether a plea colloquy conforms to the statutory requirements is a question of law that we review independently.\")."},"case_id":4032920,"label":"a"}
{"context":"P 12. Specifically, Brown asserts that, because the plea colloquy did not include an explanation of party to a crime liability, (1) an essential element of the charge to which he pled guilty was omitted, and (2) he did not understand the robbery with threat of force as party to a crime charge to which he pled guilty.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"Whether a plea colloquy conforms to the statutory requirements is a question of law that we review independently.\"","sentence":"See also State v. Lackershire, 2007 WI 74, \u00b6 25, 301 Wis. 2d 418, 734 N.W.2d 23 (\"Whether a plea colloquy conforms to the statutory requirements is a question of law that we review independently.\")."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"293 Wis. 2d 594, \u00b6 36","parenthetical":"trial court's failure to fulfill a duty at the plea hearing necessitates evidentiary hearing if postconviction motion alleges defendant did not understand an aspect of the plea because of the omission","sentence":"See Brown, 293 Wis. 2d 594, \u00b6 36 (trial court's failure to fulfill a duty at the plea hearing necessitates evidentiary hearing if postconviction motion alleges defendant did not understand an aspect of the plea because of the omission)."},"case_id":4032920,"label":"b"}
{"context":". Appellants must establish standing based on future harm, since their previous title insurance purchases do not constitute a continuing injury. As the District Court held, the existing rates do not constitute a cognizable legal injury under the filed rate doctrine.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"260 U.S. 163, 163","parenthetical":"stating that \"[ujnless and until suspended or set aside, th[e filed] rate is made, for all purposes, the legal rate\"","sentence":"Keogh, 260 U.S. at 163, 43 S.Ct. 47 (stating that \"[ujnless and until suspended or set aside, th[e filed] rate is made, for all purposes, the legal rate\"); see also Wegoland Ltd., 27 F.3d at 18 (\"[T]he doctrine holds that any 'filed rate\u2019 ... is per se reasonable and unassailable in judicial proceedings brought by ratepayers.\u201d). Thus, Appellants must establish standing based on the possibility of future unfair rates."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"27 F.3d 18, 18","parenthetical":"\"[T]he doctrine holds that any 'filed rate' ... is per se reasonable and unassailable in judicial proceedings brought by ratepayers.\"","sentence":"Keogh, 260 U.S. at 163, 43 S.Ct. 47 (stating that \"[ujnless and until suspended or set aside, th[e filed] rate is made, for all purposes, the legal rate\"); see also Wegoland Ltd., 27 F.3d at 18 (\"[T]he doctrine holds that any 'filed rate\u2019 ... is per se reasonable and unassailable in judicial proceedings brought by ratepayers.\u201d). Thus, Appellants must establish standing based on the possibility of future unfair rates."},"case_id":3895259,"label":"a"}
{"context":". Appellants must establish standing based on future harm, since their previous title insurance purchases do not constitute a continuing injury. As the District Court held, the existing rates do not constitute a cognizable legal injury under the filed rate doctrine.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"27 F.3d 18, 18","parenthetical":"\"[T]he doctrine holds that any 'filed rate' ... is per se reasonable and unassailable in judicial proceedings brought by ratepayers.\"","sentence":"Keogh, 260 U.S. at 163, 43 S.Ct. 47 (stating that \"[ujnless and until suspended or set aside, th[e filed] rate is made, for all purposes, the legal rate\"); see also Wegoland Ltd., 27 F.3d at 18 (\"[T]he doctrine holds that any 'filed rate\u2019 ... is per se reasonable and unassailable in judicial proceedings brought by ratepayers.\u201d). Thus, Appellants must establish standing based on the possibility of future unfair rates."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"stating that \"[ujnless and until suspended or set aside, th[e filed] rate is made, for all purposes, the legal rate\"","sentence":"Keogh, 260 U.S. at 163, 43 S.Ct. 47 (stating that \"[ujnless and until suspended or set aside, th[e filed] rate is made, for all purposes, the legal rate\"); see also Wegoland Ltd., 27 F.3d at 18 (\"[T]he doctrine holds that any 'filed rate\u2019 ... is per se reasonable and unassailable in judicial proceedings brought by ratepayers.\u201d). Thus, Appellants must establish standing based on the possibility of future unfair rates."},"case_id":3895259,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Substantial evidence supports the agency's denial of withholding of removal because Gonzalez de Leon failed to establish a well-founded fear of persecution on account of an enumerated ground.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"133 F.3d 1279, 1280-81","parenthetical":"explaining that evidence of criminal street gang activity does not establish persecution on account of a protected ground","sentence":"See Bolshakov v. INS, 133 F.3d 1279, 1280-81 (9th Cir.1998) (explaining that evidence of criminal street gang activity does not establish persecution on account of a protected ground); see also Pedro-Mateo v. INS, 224 F.3d 1147, 1150-51 (9th Cir.2000) (upholding conclusion that petitioner failed to establish that the military and guerrillas were interested in him for any reason other than his physical presence in a particular war-torn region of Guatemala)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"224 F.3d 1147, 1150-51","parenthetical":"upholding conclusion that petitioner failed to establish that the military and guerrillas were interested in him for any reason other than his physical presence in a particular war-torn region of Guatemala","sentence":"See Bolshakov v. INS, 133 F.3d 1279, 1280-81 (9th Cir.1998) (explaining that evidence of criminal street gang activity does not establish persecution on account of a protected ground); see also Pedro-Mateo v. INS, 224 F.3d 1147, 1150-51 (9th Cir.2000) (upholding conclusion that petitioner failed to establish that the military and guerrillas were interested in him for any reason other than his physical presence in a particular war-torn region of Guatemala)."},"case_id":3732364,"label":"a"}
{"context":"On appeal, neither party raised the standard of proof issue in terms. However, Kikumura has asked us to review findings of fact, an exercise that necessarily entails determining what standard of proof the factfinder should have applied in the first instance.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"477 U.S. 242, 252","parenthetical":"\"[T]he inquiry involved in a ruling on a motion for summary judgment or for a directed verdict necessarily implicates the substantive evidentiary standard of proof that would apply at the trial on the merits.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2788, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) (holding that a habeas court reviewing the sufficiency of evidence underlying a criminal conviction must \u201cdetermine whether the record evidence could reasonably support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt \u201d (emphasis added)); cf. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2512, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (\u201c[T]he inquiry involved in a ruling on a motion for summary judgment or for a directed verdict necessarily implicates the substantive evidentiary standard of proof that would apply at the trial on the merits.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"443 U.S. 307, 318","parenthetical":"holding that a habeas court reviewing the sufficiency of evidence underlying a criminal conviction must \"determine whether the record evidence could reasonably support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt \" (emphasis added","sentence":"See, e.g., Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2788, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) (holding that a habeas court reviewing the sufficiency of evidence underlying a criminal conviction must \u201cdetermine whether the record evidence could reasonably support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt \u201d (emphasis added)); cf. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2512, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (\u201c[T]he inquiry involved in a ruling on a motion for summary judgment or for a directed verdict necessarily implicates the substantive evidentiary standard of proof that would apply at the trial on the merits.\u201d)."},"case_id":10539555,"label":"b"}
{"context":"On appeal, neither party raised the standard of proof issue in terms. However, Kikumura has asked us to review findings of fact, an exercise that necessarily entails determining what standard of proof the factfinder should have applied in the first instance.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"443 U.S. 307, 318","parenthetical":"holding that a habeas court reviewing the sufficiency of evidence underlying a criminal conviction must \"determine whether the record evidence could reasonably support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt \" (emphasis added","sentence":"See, e.g., Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2788, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) (holding that a habeas court reviewing the sufficiency of evidence underlying a criminal conviction must \u201cdetermine whether the record evidence could reasonably support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt \u201d (emphasis added)); cf. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2512, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (\u201c[T]he inquiry involved in a ruling on a motion for summary judgment or for a directed verdict necessarily implicates the substantive evidentiary standard of proof that would apply at the trial on the merits.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"106 S.Ct. 2505, 2512","parenthetical":"\"[T]he inquiry involved in a ruling on a motion for summary judgment or for a directed verdict necessarily implicates the substantive evidentiary standard of proof that would apply at the trial on the merits.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2788, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) (holding that a habeas court reviewing the sufficiency of evidence underlying a criminal conviction must \u201cdetermine whether the record evidence could reasonably support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt \u201d (emphasis added)); cf. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2512, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (\u201c[T]he inquiry involved in a ruling on a motion for summary judgment or for a directed verdict necessarily implicates the substantive evidentiary standard of proof that would apply at the trial on the merits.\u201d)."},"case_id":10539555,"label":"a"}
{"context":"On appeal, neither party raised the standard of proof issue in terms. However, Kikumura has asked us to review findings of fact, an exercise that necessarily entails determining what standard of proof the factfinder should have applied in the first instance.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"443 U.S. 307, 318","parenthetical":"holding that a habeas court reviewing the sufficiency of evidence underlying a criminal conviction must \"determine whether the record evidence could reasonably support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt \" (emphasis added","sentence":"See, e.g., Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2788, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) (holding that a habeas court reviewing the sufficiency of evidence underlying a criminal conviction must \u201cdetermine whether the record evidence could reasonably support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt \u201d (emphasis added)); cf. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2512, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (\u201c[T]he inquiry involved in a ruling on a motion for summary judgment or for a directed verdict necessarily implicates the substantive evidentiary standard of proof that would apply at the trial on the merits.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[T]he inquiry involved in a ruling on a motion for summary judgment or for a directed verdict necessarily implicates the substantive evidentiary standard of proof that would apply at the trial on the merits.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2788, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) (holding that a habeas court reviewing the sufficiency of evidence underlying a criminal conviction must \u201cdetermine whether the record evidence could reasonably support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt \u201d (emphasis added)); cf. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2512, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (\u201c[T]he inquiry involved in a ruling on a motion for summary judgment or for a directed verdict necessarily implicates the substantive evidentiary standard of proof that would apply at the trial on the merits.\u201d)."},"case_id":10539555,"label":"a"}
{"context":"On appeal, neither party raised the standard of proof issue in terms. However, Kikumura has asked us to review findings of fact, an exercise that necessarily entails determining what standard of proof the factfinder should have applied in the first instance.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"477 U.S. 242, 252","parenthetical":"\"[T]he inquiry involved in a ruling on a motion for summary judgment or for a directed verdict necessarily implicates the substantive evidentiary standard of proof that would apply at the trial on the merits.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2788, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) (holding that a habeas court reviewing the sufficiency of evidence underlying a criminal conviction must \u201cdetermine whether the record evidence could reasonably support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt \u201d (emphasis added)); cf. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2512, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (\u201c[T]he inquiry involved in a ruling on a motion for summary judgment or for a directed verdict necessarily implicates the substantive evidentiary standard of proof that would apply at the trial on the merits.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"99 S.Ct. 2781, 2788","parenthetical":"holding that a habeas court reviewing the sufficiency of evidence underlying a criminal conviction must \"determine whether the record evidence could reasonably support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt \" (emphasis added","sentence":"See, e.g., Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2788, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) (holding that a habeas court reviewing the sufficiency of evidence underlying a criminal conviction must \u201cdetermine whether the record evidence could reasonably support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt \u201d (emphasis added)); cf. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2512, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (\u201c[T]he inquiry involved in a ruling on a motion for summary judgment or for a directed verdict necessarily implicates the substantive evidentiary standard of proof that would apply at the trial on the merits.\u201d)."},"case_id":10539555,"label":"b"}
{"context":"On appeal, neither party raised the standard of proof issue in terms. However, Kikumura has asked us to review findings of fact, an exercise that necessarily entails determining what standard of proof the factfinder should have applied in the first instance.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"106 S.Ct. 2505, 2512","parenthetical":"\"[T]he inquiry involved in a ruling on a motion for summary judgment or for a directed verdict necessarily implicates the substantive evidentiary standard of proof that would apply at the trial on the merits.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2788, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) (holding that a habeas court reviewing the sufficiency of evidence underlying a criminal conviction must \u201cdetermine whether the record evidence could reasonably support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt \u201d (emphasis added)); cf. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2512, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (\u201c[T]he inquiry involved in a ruling on a motion for summary judgment or for a directed verdict necessarily implicates the substantive evidentiary standard of proof that would apply at the trial on the merits.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"99 S.Ct. 2781, 2788","parenthetical":"holding that a habeas court reviewing the sufficiency of evidence underlying a criminal conviction must \"determine whether the record evidence could reasonably support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt \" (emphasis added","sentence":"See, e.g., Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2788, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) (holding that a habeas court reviewing the sufficiency of evidence underlying a criminal conviction must \u201cdetermine whether the record evidence could reasonably support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt \u201d (emphasis added)); cf. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2512, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (\u201c[T]he inquiry involved in a ruling on a motion for summary judgment or for a directed verdict necessarily implicates the substantive evidentiary standard of proof that would apply at the trial on the merits.\u201d)."},"case_id":10539555,"label":"b"}
{"context":"On appeal, neither party raised the standard of proof issue in terms. However, Kikumura has asked us to review findings of fact, an exercise that necessarily entails determining what standard of proof the factfinder should have applied in the first instance.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"99 S.Ct. 2781, 2788","parenthetical":"holding that a habeas court reviewing the sufficiency of evidence underlying a criminal conviction must \"determine whether the record evidence could reasonably support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt \" (emphasis added","sentence":"See, e.g., Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2788, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) (holding that a habeas court reviewing the sufficiency of evidence underlying a criminal conviction must \u201cdetermine whether the record evidence could reasonably support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt \u201d (emphasis added)); cf. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2512, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (\u201c[T]he inquiry involved in a ruling on a motion for summary judgment or for a directed verdict necessarily implicates the substantive evidentiary standard of proof that would apply at the trial on the merits.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[T]he inquiry involved in a ruling on a motion for summary judgment or for a directed verdict necessarily implicates the substantive evidentiary standard of proof that would apply at the trial on the merits.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2788, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) (holding that a habeas court reviewing the sufficiency of evidence underlying a criminal conviction must \u201cdetermine whether the record evidence could reasonably support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt \u201d (emphasis added)); cf. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2512, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (\u201c[T]he inquiry involved in a ruling on a motion for summary judgment or for a directed verdict necessarily implicates the substantive evidentiary standard of proof that would apply at the trial on the merits.\u201d)."},"case_id":10539555,"label":"a"}
{"context":"On appeal, neither party raised the standard of proof issue in terms. However, Kikumura has asked us to review findings of fact, an exercise that necessarily entails determining what standard of proof the factfinder should have applied in the first instance.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that a habeas court reviewing the sufficiency of evidence underlying a criminal conviction must \"determine whether the record evidence could reasonably support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt \" (emphasis added","sentence":"See, e.g., Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2788, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) (holding that a habeas court reviewing the sufficiency of evidence underlying a criminal conviction must \u201cdetermine whether the record evidence could reasonably support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt \u201d (emphasis added)); cf. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2512, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (\u201c[T]he inquiry involved in a ruling on a motion for summary judgment or for a directed verdict necessarily implicates the substantive evidentiary standard of proof that would apply at the trial on the merits.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"477 U.S. 242, 252","parenthetical":"\"[T]he inquiry involved in a ruling on a motion for summary judgment or for a directed verdict necessarily implicates the substantive evidentiary standard of proof that would apply at the trial on the merits.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2788, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) (holding that a habeas court reviewing the sufficiency of evidence underlying a criminal conviction must \u201cdetermine whether the record evidence could reasonably support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt \u201d (emphasis added)); cf. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2512, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (\u201c[T]he inquiry involved in a ruling on a motion for summary judgment or for a directed verdict necessarily implicates the substantive evidentiary standard of proof that would apply at the trial on the merits.\u201d)."},"case_id":10539555,"label":"a"}
{"context":"On appeal, neither party raised the standard of proof issue in terms. However, Kikumura has asked us to review findings of fact, an exercise that necessarily entails determining what standard of proof the factfinder should have applied in the first instance.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that a habeas court reviewing the sufficiency of evidence underlying a criminal conviction must \"determine whether the record evidence could reasonably support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt \" (emphasis added","sentence":"See, e.g., Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2788, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) (holding that a habeas court reviewing the sufficiency of evidence underlying a criminal conviction must \u201cdetermine whether the record evidence could reasonably support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt \u201d (emphasis added)); cf. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2512, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (\u201c[T]he inquiry involved in a ruling on a motion for summary judgment or for a directed verdict necessarily implicates the substantive evidentiary standard of proof that would apply at the trial on the merits.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"106 S.Ct. 2505, 2512","parenthetical":"\"[T]he inquiry involved in a ruling on a motion for summary judgment or for a directed verdict necessarily implicates the substantive evidentiary standard of proof that would apply at the trial on the merits.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2788, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) (holding that a habeas court reviewing the sufficiency of evidence underlying a criminal conviction must \u201cdetermine whether the record evidence could reasonably support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt \u201d (emphasis added)); cf. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2512, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (\u201c[T]he inquiry involved in a ruling on a motion for summary judgment or for a directed verdict necessarily implicates the substantive evidentiary standard of proof that would apply at the trial on the merits.\u201d)."},"case_id":10539555,"label":"a"}
{"context":"On appeal, neither party raised the standard of proof issue in terms. However, Kikumura has asked us to review findings of fact, an exercise that necessarily entails determining what standard of proof the factfinder should have applied in the first instance.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that a habeas court reviewing the sufficiency of evidence underlying a criminal conviction must \"determine whether the record evidence could reasonably support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt \" (emphasis added","sentence":"See, e.g., Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2788, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) (holding that a habeas court reviewing the sufficiency of evidence underlying a criminal conviction must \u201cdetermine whether the record evidence could reasonably support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt \u201d (emphasis added)); cf. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2512, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (\u201c[T]he inquiry involved in a ruling on a motion for summary judgment or for a directed verdict necessarily implicates the substantive evidentiary standard of proof that would apply at the trial on the merits.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[T]he inquiry involved in a ruling on a motion for summary judgment or for a directed verdict necessarily implicates the substantive evidentiary standard of proof that would apply at the trial on the merits.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2788, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) (holding that a habeas court reviewing the sufficiency of evidence underlying a criminal conviction must \u201cdetermine whether the record evidence could reasonably support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt \u201d (emphasis added)); cf. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2512, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (\u201c[T]he inquiry involved in a ruling on a motion for summary judgment or for a directed verdict necessarily implicates the substantive evidentiary standard of proof that would apply at the trial on the merits.\u201d)."},"case_id":10539555,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Section 1581(i) jurisdiction may not be invoked when jurisdiction under another subsection of SS 1581 is or could have been available, unless the remedy provided under that other subsection would be manifestly inadequate.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"importers whose SS 1581(c) action was untimely could not use SS 1581(i) as alternative jurisdictional basis","sentence":"United States v. Uniroyal, Inc., 69 C.C.P.A. 179, 687 F.2d 467, 475 (CCPA 1982) (Nies, J., concurring); Lowa, Ltd. v. United States, 5 C.I.T. 81, 561 F. Supp. 441, 446-47 (Ct. Int\u2019l Trade 1983), aff\u2019d, 724 F.2d 121 (Fed. Cir. 1984); see American Air Parcel Forwarding v. United States, 718 F.2d 1546, 1549-51 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (no \u00a7 1581(i) jurisdiction where importers could have taken steps to qualify under \u00a7\u00a7 1581(a) or (h), and remedies under those subsections would not have been inadequate), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 937, 104 S. Ct. 1909, 80 L. Ed. 2d 458 (1984); United States Cane Sugar Refiners\u2019 Ass\u2019n v. Block, 69 C.C.P.A. 172, 683 F.2d 399, 402 n.5 (CCPA 1982) (\u201cThe delay inherent in proceeding under \u00a7 1581(a) makes relief under that provision manifestly inadequate and, accordingly, the court has jurisdiction in this case under \u00a7 1581(i).\u201d); see also Royal Business Mach., Inc. v. United States, 69 C.C.P.A. 61, 669 F.2d 692, 701-02 (CCPA 1982) (importers whose \u00a7 1581(c) action was untimely could not use \u00a7 1581(i) as alternative jurisdictional basis)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"718 F.2d 1546, 1549-51","parenthetical":"no SS 1581(i) jurisdiction where importers could have taken steps to qualify under SSSS 1581(a) or (h), and remedies under those subsections would not have been inadequate","sentence":"United States v. Uniroyal, Inc., 69 C.C.P.A. 179, 687 F.2d 467, 475 (CCPA 1982) (Nies, J., concurring); Lowa, Ltd. v. United States, 5 C.I.T. 81, 561 F. Supp. 441, 446-47 (Ct. Int\u2019l Trade 1983), aff\u2019d, 724 F.2d 121 (Fed. Cir. 1984); see American Air Parcel Forwarding v. United States, 718 F.2d 1546, 1549-51 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (no \u00a7 1581(i) jurisdiction where importers could have taken steps to qualify under \u00a7\u00a7 1581(a) or (h), and remedies under those subsections would not have been inadequate), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 937, 104 S. Ct. 1909, 80 L. Ed. 2d 458 (1984); United States Cane Sugar Refiners\u2019 Ass\u2019n v. Block, 69 C.C.P.A. 172, 683 F.2d 399, 402 n.5 (CCPA 1982) (\u201cThe delay inherent in proceeding under \u00a7 1581(a) makes relief under that provision manifestly inadequate and, accordingly, the court has jurisdiction in this case under \u00a7 1581(i).\u201d); see also Royal Business Mach., Inc. v. United States, 69 C.C.P.A. 61, 669 F.2d 692, 701-02 (CCPA 1982) (importers whose \u00a7 1581(c) action was untimely could not use \u00a7 1581(i) as alternative jurisdictional basis)."},"case_id":9010679,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Section 1581(i) jurisdiction may not be invoked when jurisdiction under another subsection of SS 1581 is or could have been available, unless the remedy provided under that other subsection would be manifestly inadequate.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"718 F.2d 1546, 1549-51","parenthetical":"no SS 1581(i) jurisdiction where importers could have taken steps to qualify under SSSS 1581(a) or (h), and remedies under those subsections would not have been inadequate","sentence":"United States v. Uniroyal, Inc., 69 C.C.P.A. 179, 687 F.2d 467, 475 (CCPA 1982) (Nies, J., concurring); Lowa, Ltd. v. United States, 5 C.I.T. 81, 561 F. Supp. 441, 446-47 (Ct. Int\u2019l Trade 1983), aff\u2019d, 724 F.2d 121 (Fed. Cir. 1984); see American Air Parcel Forwarding v. United States, 718 F.2d 1546, 1549-51 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (no \u00a7 1581(i) jurisdiction where importers could have taken steps to qualify under \u00a7\u00a7 1581(a) or (h), and remedies under those subsections would not have been inadequate), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 937, 104 S. Ct. 1909, 80 L. Ed. 2d 458 (1984); United States Cane Sugar Refiners\u2019 Ass\u2019n v. Block, 69 C.C.P.A. 172, 683 F.2d 399, 402 n.5 (CCPA 1982) (\u201cThe delay inherent in proceeding under \u00a7 1581(a) makes relief under that provision manifestly inadequate and, accordingly, the court has jurisdiction in this case under \u00a7 1581(i).\u201d); see also Royal Business Mach., Inc. v. United States, 69 C.C.P.A. 61, 669 F.2d 692, 701-02 (CCPA 1982) (importers whose \u00a7 1581(c) action was untimely could not use \u00a7 1581(i) as alternative jurisdictional basis)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"669 F.2d 692, 701-02","parenthetical":"importers whose SS 1581(c) action was untimely could not use SS 1581(i) as alternative jurisdictional basis","sentence":"United States v. Uniroyal, Inc., 69 C.C.P.A. 179, 687 F.2d 467, 475 (CCPA 1982) (Nies, J., concurring); Lowa, Ltd. v. United States, 5 C.I.T. 81, 561 F. Supp. 441, 446-47 (Ct. Int\u2019l Trade 1983), aff\u2019d, 724 F.2d 121 (Fed. Cir. 1984); see American Air Parcel Forwarding v. United States, 718 F.2d 1546, 1549-51 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (no \u00a7 1581(i) jurisdiction where importers could have taken steps to qualify under \u00a7\u00a7 1581(a) or (h), and remedies under those subsections would not have been inadequate), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 937, 104 S. Ct. 1909, 80 L. Ed. 2d 458 (1984); United States Cane Sugar Refiners\u2019 Ass\u2019n v. Block, 69 C.C.P.A. 172, 683 F.2d 399, 402 n.5 (CCPA 1982) (\u201cThe delay inherent in proceeding under \u00a7 1581(a) makes relief under that provision manifestly inadequate and, accordingly, the court has jurisdiction in this case under \u00a7 1581(i).\u201d); see also Royal Business Mach., Inc. v. United States, 69 C.C.P.A. 61, 669 F.2d 692, 701-02 (CCPA 1982) (importers whose \u00a7 1581(c) action was untimely could not use \u00a7 1581(i) as alternative jurisdictional basis)."},"case_id":9010679,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Section 1581(i) jurisdiction may not be invoked when jurisdiction under another subsection of SS 1581 is or could have been available, unless the remedy provided under that other subsection would be manifestly inadequate.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"The delay inherent in proceeding under SS 1581(a) makes relief under that provision manifestly inadequate and, accordingly, the court has jurisdiction in this case under SS 1581(i).\"","sentence":"United States v. Uniroyal, Inc., 69 C.C.P.A. 179, 687 F.2d 467, 475 (CCPA 1982) (Nies, J., concurring); Lowa, Ltd. v. United States, 5 C.I.T. 81, 561 F. Supp. 441, 446-47 (Ct. Int\u2019l Trade 1983), aff\u2019d, 724 F.2d 121 (Fed. Cir. 1984); see American Air Parcel Forwarding v. United States, 718 F.2d 1546, 1549-51 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (no \u00a7 1581(i) jurisdiction where importers could have taken steps to qualify under \u00a7\u00a7 1581(a) or (h), and remedies under those subsections would not have been inadequate), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 937, 104 S. Ct. 1909, 80 L. Ed. 2d 458 (1984); United States Cane Sugar Refiners\u2019 Ass\u2019n v. Block, 69 C.C.P.A. 172, 683 F.2d 399, 402 n.5 (CCPA 1982) (\u201cThe delay inherent in proceeding under \u00a7 1581(a) makes relief under that provision manifestly inadequate and, accordingly, the court has jurisdiction in this case under \u00a7 1581(i).\u201d); see also Royal Business Mach., Inc. v. United States, 69 C.C.P.A. 61, 669 F.2d 692, 701-02 (CCPA 1982) (importers whose \u00a7 1581(c) action was untimely could not use \u00a7 1581(i) as alternative jurisdictional basis)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"importers whose SS 1581(c) action was untimely could not use SS 1581(i) as alternative jurisdictional basis","sentence":"United States v. Uniroyal, Inc., 69 C.C.P.A. 179, 687 F.2d 467, 475 (CCPA 1982) (Nies, J., concurring); Lowa, Ltd. v. United States, 5 C.I.T. 81, 561 F. Supp. 441, 446-47 (Ct. Int\u2019l Trade 1983), aff\u2019d, 724 F.2d 121 (Fed. Cir. 1984); see American Air Parcel Forwarding v. United States, 718 F.2d 1546, 1549-51 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (no \u00a7 1581(i) jurisdiction where importers could have taken steps to qualify under \u00a7\u00a7 1581(a) or (h), and remedies under those subsections would not have been inadequate), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 937, 104 S. Ct. 1909, 80 L. Ed. 2d 458 (1984); United States Cane Sugar Refiners\u2019 Ass\u2019n v. Block, 69 C.C.P.A. 172, 683 F.2d 399, 402 n.5 (CCPA 1982) (\u201cThe delay inherent in proceeding under \u00a7 1581(a) makes relief under that provision manifestly inadequate and, accordingly, the court has jurisdiction in this case under \u00a7 1581(i).\u201d); see also Royal Business Mach., Inc. v. United States, 69 C.C.P.A. 61, 669 F.2d 692, 701-02 (CCPA 1982) (importers whose \u00a7 1581(c) action was untimely could not use \u00a7 1581(i) as alternative jurisdictional basis)."},"case_id":9010679,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Section 1581(i) jurisdiction may not be invoked when jurisdiction under another subsection of SS 1581 is or could have been available, unless the remedy provided under that other subsection would be manifestly inadequate.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"669 F.2d 692, 701-02","parenthetical":"importers whose SS 1581(c) action was untimely could not use SS 1581(i) as alternative jurisdictional basis","sentence":"United States v. Uniroyal, Inc., 69 C.C.P.A. 179, 687 F.2d 467, 475 (CCPA 1982) (Nies, J., concurring); Lowa, Ltd. v. United States, 5 C.I.T. 81, 561 F. Supp. 441, 446-47 (Ct. Int\u2019l Trade 1983), aff\u2019d, 724 F.2d 121 (Fed. Cir. 1984); see American Air Parcel Forwarding v. United States, 718 F.2d 1546, 1549-51 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (no \u00a7 1581(i) jurisdiction where importers could have taken steps to qualify under \u00a7\u00a7 1581(a) or (h), and remedies under those subsections would not have been inadequate), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 937, 104 S. Ct. 1909, 80 L. Ed. 2d 458 (1984); United States Cane Sugar Refiners\u2019 Ass\u2019n v. Block, 69 C.C.P.A. 172, 683 F.2d 399, 402 n.5 (CCPA 1982) (\u201cThe delay inherent in proceeding under \u00a7 1581(a) makes relief under that provision manifestly inadequate and, accordingly, the court has jurisdiction in this case under \u00a7 1581(i).\u201d); see also Royal Business Mach., Inc. v. United States, 69 C.C.P.A. 61, 669 F.2d 692, 701-02 (CCPA 1982) (importers whose \u00a7 1581(c) action was untimely could not use \u00a7 1581(i) as alternative jurisdictional basis)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"The delay inherent in proceeding under SS 1581(a) makes relief under that provision manifestly inadequate and, accordingly, the court has jurisdiction in this case under SS 1581(i).\"","sentence":"United States v. Uniroyal, Inc., 69 C.C.P.A. 179, 687 F.2d 467, 475 (CCPA 1982) (Nies, J., concurring); Lowa, Ltd. v. United States, 5 C.I.T. 81, 561 F. Supp. 441, 446-47 (Ct. Int\u2019l Trade 1983), aff\u2019d, 724 F.2d 121 (Fed. Cir. 1984); see American Air Parcel Forwarding v. United States, 718 F.2d 1546, 1549-51 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (no \u00a7 1581(i) jurisdiction where importers could have taken steps to qualify under \u00a7\u00a7 1581(a) or (h), and remedies under those subsections would not have been inadequate), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 937, 104 S. Ct. 1909, 80 L. Ed. 2d 458 (1984); United States Cane Sugar Refiners\u2019 Ass\u2019n v. Block, 69 C.C.P.A. 172, 683 F.2d 399, 402 n.5 (CCPA 1982) (\u201cThe delay inherent in proceeding under \u00a7 1581(a) makes relief under that provision manifestly inadequate and, accordingly, the court has jurisdiction in this case under \u00a7 1581(i).\u201d); see also Royal Business Mach., Inc. v. United States, 69 C.C.P.A. 61, 669 F.2d 692, 701-02 (CCPA 1982) (importers whose \u00a7 1581(c) action was untimely could not use \u00a7 1581(i) as alternative jurisdictional basis)."},"case_id":9010679,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Section 1581(i) jurisdiction may not be invoked when jurisdiction under another subsection of SS 1581 is or could have been available, unless the remedy provided under that other subsection would be manifestly inadequate.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"The delay inherent in proceeding under SS 1581(a) makes relief under that provision manifestly inadequate and, accordingly, the court has jurisdiction in this case under SS 1581(i).\"","sentence":"United States v. Uniroyal, Inc., 69 C.C.P.A. 179, 687 F.2d 467, 475 (CCPA 1982) (Nies, J., concurring); Lowa, Ltd. v. United States, 5 C.I.T. 81, 561 F. Supp. 441, 446-47 (Ct. Int\u2019l Trade 1983), aff\u2019d, 724 F.2d 121 (Fed. Cir. 1984); see American Air Parcel Forwarding v. United States, 718 F.2d 1546, 1549-51 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (no \u00a7 1581(i) jurisdiction where importers could have taken steps to qualify under \u00a7\u00a7 1581(a) or (h), and remedies under those subsections would not have been inadequate), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 937, 104 S. Ct. 1909, 80 L. Ed. 2d 458 (1984); United States Cane Sugar Refiners\u2019 Ass\u2019n v. Block, 69 C.C.P.A. 172, 683 F.2d 399, 402 n.5 (CCPA 1982) (\u201cThe delay inherent in proceeding under \u00a7 1581(a) makes relief under that provision manifestly inadequate and, accordingly, the court has jurisdiction in this case under \u00a7 1581(i).\u201d); see also Royal Business Mach., Inc. v. United States, 69 C.C.P.A. 61, 669 F.2d 692, 701-02 (CCPA 1982) (importers whose \u00a7 1581(c) action was untimely could not use \u00a7 1581(i) as alternative jurisdictional basis)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"importers whose SS 1581(c) action was untimely could not use SS 1581(i) as alternative jurisdictional basis","sentence":"United States v. Uniroyal, Inc., 69 C.C.P.A. 179, 687 F.2d 467, 475 (CCPA 1982) (Nies, J., concurring); Lowa, Ltd. v. United States, 5 C.I.T. 81, 561 F. Supp. 441, 446-47 (Ct. Int\u2019l Trade 1983), aff\u2019d, 724 F.2d 121 (Fed. Cir. 1984); see American Air Parcel Forwarding v. United States, 718 F.2d 1546, 1549-51 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (no \u00a7 1581(i) jurisdiction where importers could have taken steps to qualify under \u00a7\u00a7 1581(a) or (h), and remedies under those subsections would not have been inadequate), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 937, 104 S. Ct. 1909, 80 L. Ed. 2d 458 (1984); United States Cane Sugar Refiners\u2019 Ass\u2019n v. Block, 69 C.C.P.A. 172, 683 F.2d 399, 402 n.5 (CCPA 1982) (\u201cThe delay inherent in proceeding under \u00a7 1581(a) makes relief under that provision manifestly inadequate and, accordingly, the court has jurisdiction in this case under \u00a7 1581(i).\u201d); see also Royal Business Mach., Inc. v. United States, 69 C.C.P.A. 61, 669 F.2d 692, 701-02 (CCPA 1982) (importers whose \u00a7 1581(c) action was untimely could not use \u00a7 1581(i) as alternative jurisdictional basis)."},"case_id":9010679,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Section 1581(i) jurisdiction may not be invoked when jurisdiction under another subsection of SS 1581 is or could have been available, unless the remedy provided under that other subsection would be manifestly inadequate.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"669 F.2d 692, 701-02","parenthetical":"importers whose SS 1581(c) action was untimely could not use SS 1581(i) as alternative jurisdictional basis","sentence":"United States v. Uniroyal, Inc., 69 C.C.P.A. 179, 687 F.2d 467, 475 (CCPA 1982) (Nies, J., concurring); Lowa, Ltd. v. United States, 5 C.I.T. 81, 561 F. Supp. 441, 446-47 (Ct. Int\u2019l Trade 1983), aff\u2019d, 724 F.2d 121 (Fed. Cir. 1984); see American Air Parcel Forwarding v. United States, 718 F.2d 1546, 1549-51 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (no \u00a7 1581(i) jurisdiction where importers could have taken steps to qualify under \u00a7\u00a7 1581(a) or (h), and remedies under those subsections would not have been inadequate), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 937, 104 S. Ct. 1909, 80 L. Ed. 2d 458 (1984); United States Cane Sugar Refiners\u2019 Ass\u2019n v. Block, 69 C.C.P.A. 172, 683 F.2d 399, 402 n.5 (CCPA 1982) (\u201cThe delay inherent in proceeding under \u00a7 1581(a) makes relief under that provision manifestly inadequate and, accordingly, the court has jurisdiction in this case under \u00a7 1581(i).\u201d); see also Royal Business Mach., Inc. v. United States, 69 C.C.P.A. 61, 669 F.2d 692, 701-02 (CCPA 1982) (importers whose \u00a7 1581(c) action was untimely could not use \u00a7 1581(i) as alternative jurisdictional basis)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"The delay inherent in proceeding under SS 1581(a) makes relief under that provision manifestly inadequate and, accordingly, the court has jurisdiction in this case under SS 1581(i).\"","sentence":"United States v. Uniroyal, Inc., 69 C.C.P.A. 179, 687 F.2d 467, 475 (CCPA 1982) (Nies, J., concurring); Lowa, Ltd. v. United States, 5 C.I.T. 81, 561 F. Supp. 441, 446-47 (Ct. Int\u2019l Trade 1983), aff\u2019d, 724 F.2d 121 (Fed. Cir. 1984); see American Air Parcel Forwarding v. United States, 718 F.2d 1546, 1549-51 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (no \u00a7 1581(i) jurisdiction where importers could have taken steps to qualify under \u00a7\u00a7 1581(a) or (h), and remedies under those subsections would not have been inadequate), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 937, 104 S. Ct. 1909, 80 L. Ed. 2d 458 (1984); United States Cane Sugar Refiners\u2019 Ass\u2019n v. Block, 69 C.C.P.A. 172, 683 F.2d 399, 402 n.5 (CCPA 1982) (\u201cThe delay inherent in proceeding under \u00a7 1581(a) makes relief under that provision manifestly inadequate and, accordingly, the court has jurisdiction in this case under \u00a7 1581(i).\u201d); see also Royal Business Mach., Inc. v. United States, 69 C.C.P.A. 61, 669 F.2d 692, 701-02 (CCPA 1982) (importers whose \u00a7 1581(c) action was untimely could not use \u00a7 1581(i) as alternative jurisdictional basis)."},"case_id":9010679,"label":"b"}
{"context":"2. Even if the Defendants had not forfeited their objection to the closure of the courtroom during voir dire, that objection would not be persuasive. Assuming without deciding, for purposes of this analysis, that the district court's Rule 10(e) factual findings in the Settling Order were appropriate, the Defendants have not made the requisite showing of an affirmative courtroom closure for a non-trivial duration.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"682 F.3d 1223, 1229","parenthetical":"when a closure is trivial, \"exclusion of members of the public from a judicial proceeding does not implicate the constitutional guarantee\"","sentence":"See United States v. Shryock, 342 F.3d 948, 974 (9th Cir.2003) (a defendant must show not mere closure, but that it was closed affirmatively, completely, and pursuant to judicial act or order); see also United States v. Rivera, 682 F.3d 1223, 1229 (9th Cir.2012) (when a closure is trivial, \u201cexclusion of members of the public from a judicial proceeding does not implicate the constitutional guarantee\u201d); United States v. Withers, 638 F.3d 1055, 1063 (9th Cir.2011) (a courtroom closure must be total and of significant duration); United States v. Ivester, 316 F.3d 955, 959-60 (9th Cir.2003) (holding that some closures are too trivial to implicate the Sixth Amendment right to a public trial)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"342 F.3d 948, 974","parenthetical":"a defendant must show not mere closure, but that it was closed affirmatively, completely, and pursuant to judicial act or order","sentence":"See United States v. Shryock, 342 F.3d 948, 974 (9th Cir.2003) (a defendant must show not mere closure, but that it was closed affirmatively, completely, and pursuant to judicial act or order); see also United States v. Rivera, 682 F.3d 1223, 1229 (9th Cir.2012) (when a closure is trivial, \u201cexclusion of members of the public from a judicial proceeding does not implicate the constitutional guarantee\u201d); United States v. Withers, 638 F.3d 1055, 1063 (9th Cir.2011) (a courtroom closure must be total and of significant duration); United States v. Ivester, 316 F.3d 955, 959-60 (9th Cir.2003) (holding that some closures are too trivial to implicate the Sixth Amendment right to a public trial)."},"case_id":3765266,"label":"b"}
{"context":"2. Even if the Defendants had not forfeited their objection to the closure of the courtroom during voir dire, that objection would not be persuasive. Assuming without deciding, for purposes of this analysis, that the district court's Rule 10(e) factual findings in the Settling Order were appropriate, the Defendants have not made the requisite showing of an affirmative courtroom closure for a non-trivial duration.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"342 F.3d 948, 974","parenthetical":"a defendant must show not mere closure, but that it was closed affirmatively, completely, and pursuant to judicial act or order","sentence":"See United States v. Shryock, 342 F.3d 948, 974 (9th Cir.2003) (a defendant must show not mere closure, but that it was closed affirmatively, completely, and pursuant to judicial act or order); see also United States v. Rivera, 682 F.3d 1223, 1229 (9th Cir.2012) (when a closure is trivial, \u201cexclusion of members of the public from a judicial proceeding does not implicate the constitutional guarantee\u201d); United States v. Withers, 638 F.3d 1055, 1063 (9th Cir.2011) (a courtroom closure must be total and of significant duration); United States v. Ivester, 316 F.3d 955, 959-60 (9th Cir.2003) (holding that some closures are too trivial to implicate the Sixth Amendment right to a public trial)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"638 F.3d 1055, 1063","parenthetical":"a courtroom closure must be total and of significant duration","sentence":"See United States v. Shryock, 342 F.3d 948, 974 (9th Cir.2003) (a defendant must show not mere closure, but that it was closed affirmatively, completely, and pursuant to judicial act or order); see also United States v. Rivera, 682 F.3d 1223, 1229 (9th Cir.2012) (when a closure is trivial, \u201cexclusion of members of the public from a judicial proceeding does not implicate the constitutional guarantee\u201d); United States v. Withers, 638 F.3d 1055, 1063 (9th Cir.2011) (a courtroom closure must be total and of significant duration); United States v. Ivester, 316 F.3d 955, 959-60 (9th Cir.2003) (holding that some closures are too trivial to implicate the Sixth Amendment right to a public trial)."},"case_id":3765266,"label":"a"}
{"context":"2. Even if the Defendants had not forfeited their objection to the closure of the courtroom during voir dire, that objection would not be persuasive. Assuming without deciding, for purposes of this analysis, that the district court's Rule 10(e) factual findings in the Settling Order were appropriate, the Defendants have not made the requisite showing of an affirmative courtroom closure for a non-trivial duration.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"342 F.3d 948, 974","parenthetical":"a defendant must show not mere closure, but that it was closed affirmatively, completely, and pursuant to judicial act or order","sentence":"See United States v. Shryock, 342 F.3d 948, 974 (9th Cir.2003) (a defendant must show not mere closure, but that it was closed affirmatively, completely, and pursuant to judicial act or order); see also United States v. Rivera, 682 F.3d 1223, 1229 (9th Cir.2012) (when a closure is trivial, \u201cexclusion of members of the public from a judicial proceeding does not implicate the constitutional guarantee\u201d); United States v. Withers, 638 F.3d 1055, 1063 (9th Cir.2011) (a courtroom closure must be total and of significant duration); United States v. Ivester, 316 F.3d 955, 959-60 (9th Cir.2003) (holding that some closures are too trivial to implicate the Sixth Amendment right to a public trial)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"316 F.3d 955, 959-60","parenthetical":"holding that some closures are too trivial to implicate the Sixth Amendment right to a public trial","sentence":"See United States v. Shryock, 342 F.3d 948, 974 (9th Cir.2003) (a defendant must show not mere closure, but that it was closed affirmatively, completely, and pursuant to judicial act or order); see also United States v. Rivera, 682 F.3d 1223, 1229 (9th Cir.2012) (when a closure is trivial, \u201cexclusion of members of the public from a judicial proceeding does not implicate the constitutional guarantee\u201d); United States v. Withers, 638 F.3d 1055, 1063 (9th Cir.2011) (a courtroom closure must be total and of significant duration); United States v. Ivester, 316 F.3d 955, 959-60 (9th Cir.2003) (holding that some closures are too trivial to implicate the Sixth Amendment right to a public trial)."},"case_id":3765266,"label":"a"}
{"context":"It is the Loveladies court's interpretation of Keene that is binding on this panel.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"To the extent that [the appellant] believes that we have construed [an earlier Supreme Court decision] incorrectly, we note that absent an intervening Supreme Court decision or a decision by this court sitting en banc, we are bound by a prior panel's interpretation.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Barclay v. United States, 443 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed.Cir.2006) (\u201cPanels of this court are bound by previous prece-dential decisions until overturned by the Supreme Court or by this court en banc.\u201d); Foster v. Hallco Mfg. Co., 947 F.2d 469, 475 n. 5 (Fed.Cir.1991) (remarking that district court committed legal error by reinterpreting an earlier Supreme Court case, rather than applying this court\u2019s subsequent interpretation of that case); see also Walton v. Bisco Indus., Inc., 119 F.3d 368, 371 n. 4 (5th Cir.1997) (\u201cTo the extent that [the appellant] believes that we have construed [an earlier Supreme Court decision] incorrectly, we note that absent an intervening Supreme Court decision or a decision by this court sitting en banc, we are bound by a prior panel\u2019s interpretation.\u201d); Tucker v. Phyfer, 819 F.2d 1030, 1035 n. 7 (11th Cir.1987) (\u201c[H]ad the [earlier] panel expressly considered [two Supreme Court decisions], we would be bound by its interpretation and application of those decisions.\u201d); Diamond Shamrock Co. v. N.L.R.B., 443 F.2d 52, 60 n. 27 (3d Cir.1971) (holding that court is bound by prior panel\u2019s interpretation of Supreme Court decision); cf. United States v. Rapanos, 376 F.3d 629, 642 (6th Cir.2004), vacated on other grounds, 547 U.S. 715, 126 S.Ct. 2208, 165 L.Ed.2d 159 (2006) (rejecting appellee\u2019s argument concerning interpretation of a Supreme Court decision because it had \u201cpreviously been adjudicated by this court, in a published disposition, and its conclusion is entitled to stare decisis \u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"443 F.3d 1368, 1373","parenthetical":"\"Panels of this court are bound by previous prece-dential decisions until overturned by the Supreme Court or by this court en banc.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Barclay v. United States, 443 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed.Cir.2006) (\u201cPanels of this court are bound by previous prece-dential decisions until overturned by the Supreme Court or by this court en banc.\u201d); Foster v. Hallco Mfg. Co., 947 F.2d 469, 475 n. 5 (Fed.Cir.1991) (remarking that district court committed legal error by reinterpreting an earlier Supreme Court case, rather than applying this court\u2019s subsequent interpretation of that case); see also Walton v. Bisco Indus., Inc., 119 F.3d 368, 371 n. 4 (5th Cir.1997) (\u201cTo the extent that [the appellant] believes that we have construed [an earlier Supreme Court decision] incorrectly, we note that absent an intervening Supreme Court decision or a decision by this court sitting en banc, we are bound by a prior panel\u2019s interpretation.\u201d); Tucker v. Phyfer, 819 F.2d 1030, 1035 n. 7 (11th Cir.1987) (\u201c[H]ad the [earlier] panel expressly considered [two Supreme Court decisions], we would be bound by its interpretation and application of those decisions.\u201d); Diamond Shamrock Co. v. N.L.R.B., 443 F.2d 52, 60 n. 27 (3d Cir.1971) (holding that court is bound by prior panel\u2019s interpretation of Supreme Court decision); cf. United States v. Rapanos, 376 F.3d 629, 642 (6th Cir.2004), vacated on other grounds, 547 U.S. 715, 126 S.Ct. 2208, 165 L.Ed.2d 159 (2006) (rejecting appellee\u2019s argument concerning interpretation of a Supreme Court decision because it had \u201cpreviously been adjudicated by this court, in a published disposition, and its conclusion is entitled to stare decisis \u201d)."},"case_id":4262128,"label":"b"}
{"context":"It is the Loveladies court's interpretation of Keene that is binding on this panel.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[H]ad the [earlier] panel expressly considered [two Supreme Court decisions], we would be bound by its interpretation and application of those decisions.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Barclay v. United States, 443 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed.Cir.2006) (\u201cPanels of this court are bound by previous prece-dential decisions until overturned by the Supreme Court or by this court en banc.\u201d); Foster v. Hallco Mfg. Co., 947 F.2d 469, 475 n. 5 (Fed.Cir.1991) (remarking that district court committed legal error by reinterpreting an earlier Supreme Court case, rather than applying this court\u2019s subsequent interpretation of that case); see also Walton v. Bisco Indus., Inc., 119 F.3d 368, 371 n. 4 (5th Cir.1997) (\u201cTo the extent that [the appellant] believes that we have construed [an earlier Supreme Court decision] incorrectly, we note that absent an intervening Supreme Court decision or a decision by this court sitting en banc, we are bound by a prior panel\u2019s interpretation.\u201d); Tucker v. Phyfer, 819 F.2d 1030, 1035 n. 7 (11th Cir.1987) (\u201c[H]ad the [earlier] panel expressly considered [two Supreme Court decisions], we would be bound by its interpretation and application of those decisions.\u201d); Diamond Shamrock Co. v. N.L.R.B., 443 F.2d 52, 60 n. 27 (3d Cir.1971) (holding that court is bound by prior panel\u2019s interpretation of Supreme Court decision); cf. United States v. Rapanos, 376 F.3d 629, 642 (6th Cir.2004), vacated on other grounds, 547 U.S. 715, 126 S.Ct. 2208, 165 L.Ed.2d 159 (2006) (rejecting appellee\u2019s argument concerning interpretation of a Supreme Court decision because it had \u201cpreviously been adjudicated by this court, in a published disposition, and its conclusion is entitled to stare decisis \u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"443 F.3d 1368, 1373","parenthetical":"\"Panels of this court are bound by previous prece-dential decisions until overturned by the Supreme Court or by this court en banc.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Barclay v. United States, 443 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed.Cir.2006) (\u201cPanels of this court are bound by previous prece-dential decisions until overturned by the Supreme Court or by this court en banc.\u201d); Foster v. Hallco Mfg. Co., 947 F.2d 469, 475 n. 5 (Fed.Cir.1991) (remarking that district court committed legal error by reinterpreting an earlier Supreme Court case, rather than applying this court\u2019s subsequent interpretation of that case); see also Walton v. Bisco Indus., Inc., 119 F.3d 368, 371 n. 4 (5th Cir.1997) (\u201cTo the extent that [the appellant] believes that we have construed [an earlier Supreme Court decision] incorrectly, we note that absent an intervening Supreme Court decision or a decision by this court sitting en banc, we are bound by a prior panel\u2019s interpretation.\u201d); Tucker v. Phyfer, 819 F.2d 1030, 1035 n. 7 (11th Cir.1987) (\u201c[H]ad the [earlier] panel expressly considered [two Supreme Court decisions], we would be bound by its interpretation and application of those decisions.\u201d); Diamond Shamrock Co. v. N.L.R.B., 443 F.2d 52, 60 n. 27 (3d Cir.1971) (holding that court is bound by prior panel\u2019s interpretation of Supreme Court decision); cf. United States v. Rapanos, 376 F.3d 629, 642 (6th Cir.2004), vacated on other grounds, 547 U.S. 715, 126 S.Ct. 2208, 165 L.Ed.2d 159 (2006) (rejecting appellee\u2019s argument concerning interpretation of a Supreme Court decision because it had \u201cpreviously been adjudicated by this court, in a published disposition, and its conclusion is entitled to stare decisis \u201d)."},"case_id":4262128,"label":"b"}
{"context":"It is the Loveladies court's interpretation of Keene that is binding on this panel.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"443 F.3d 1368, 1373","parenthetical":"\"Panels of this court are bound by previous prece-dential decisions until overturned by the Supreme Court or by this court en banc.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Barclay v. United States, 443 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed.Cir.2006) (\u201cPanels of this court are bound by previous prece-dential decisions until overturned by the Supreme Court or by this court en banc.\u201d); Foster v. Hallco Mfg. Co., 947 F.2d 469, 475 n. 5 (Fed.Cir.1991) (remarking that district court committed legal error by reinterpreting an earlier Supreme Court case, rather than applying this court\u2019s subsequent interpretation of that case); see also Walton v. Bisco Indus., Inc., 119 F.3d 368, 371 n. 4 (5th Cir.1997) (\u201cTo the extent that [the appellant] believes that we have construed [an earlier Supreme Court decision] incorrectly, we note that absent an intervening Supreme Court decision or a decision by this court sitting en banc, we are bound by a prior panel\u2019s interpretation.\u201d); Tucker v. Phyfer, 819 F.2d 1030, 1035 n. 7 (11th Cir.1987) (\u201c[H]ad the [earlier] panel expressly considered [two Supreme Court decisions], we would be bound by its interpretation and application of those decisions.\u201d); Diamond Shamrock Co. v. N.L.R.B., 443 F.2d 52, 60 n. 27 (3d Cir.1971) (holding that court is bound by prior panel\u2019s interpretation of Supreme Court decision); cf. United States v. Rapanos, 376 F.3d 629, 642 (6th Cir.2004), vacated on other grounds, 547 U.S. 715, 126 S.Ct. 2208, 165 L.Ed.2d 159 (2006) (rejecting appellee\u2019s argument concerning interpretation of a Supreme Court decision because it had \u201cpreviously been adjudicated by this court, in a published disposition, and its conclusion is entitled to stare decisis \u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that court is bound by prior panel's interpretation of Supreme Court decision","sentence":"See, e.g., Barclay v. United States, 443 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed.Cir.2006) (\u201cPanels of this court are bound by previous prece-dential decisions until overturned by the Supreme Court or by this court en banc.\u201d); Foster v. Hallco Mfg. Co., 947 F.2d 469, 475 n. 5 (Fed.Cir.1991) (remarking that district court committed legal error by reinterpreting an earlier Supreme Court case, rather than applying this court\u2019s subsequent interpretation of that case); see also Walton v. Bisco Indus., Inc., 119 F.3d 368, 371 n. 4 (5th Cir.1997) (\u201cTo the extent that [the appellant] believes that we have construed [an earlier Supreme Court decision] incorrectly, we note that absent an intervening Supreme Court decision or a decision by this court sitting en banc, we are bound by a prior panel\u2019s interpretation.\u201d); Tucker v. Phyfer, 819 F.2d 1030, 1035 n. 7 (11th Cir.1987) (\u201c[H]ad the [earlier] panel expressly considered [two Supreme Court decisions], we would be bound by its interpretation and application of those decisions.\u201d); Diamond Shamrock Co. v. N.L.R.B., 443 F.2d 52, 60 n. 27 (3d Cir.1971) (holding that court is bound by prior panel\u2019s interpretation of Supreme Court decision); cf. United States v. Rapanos, 376 F.3d 629, 642 (6th Cir.2004), vacated on other grounds, 547 U.S. 715, 126 S.Ct. 2208, 165 L.Ed.2d 159 (2006) (rejecting appellee\u2019s argument concerning interpretation of a Supreme Court decision because it had \u201cpreviously been adjudicated by this court, in a published disposition, and its conclusion is entitled to stare decisis \u201d)."},"case_id":4262128,"label":"a"}
{"context":"It is the Loveladies court's interpretation of Keene that is binding on this panel.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"376 F.3d 629, 642","parenthetical":"rejecting appellee's argument concerning interpretation of a Supreme Court decision because it had \"previously been adjudicated by this court, in a published disposition, and its conclusion is entitled to stare decisis \"","sentence":"See, e.g., Barclay v. United States, 443 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed.Cir.2006) (\u201cPanels of this court are bound by previous prece-dential decisions until overturned by the Supreme Court or by this court en banc.\u201d); Foster v. Hallco Mfg. Co., 947 F.2d 469, 475 n. 5 (Fed.Cir.1991) (remarking that district court committed legal error by reinterpreting an earlier Supreme Court case, rather than applying this court\u2019s subsequent interpretation of that case); see also Walton v. Bisco Indus., Inc., 119 F.3d 368, 371 n. 4 (5th Cir.1997) (\u201cTo the extent that [the appellant] believes that we have construed [an earlier Supreme Court decision] incorrectly, we note that absent an intervening Supreme Court decision or a decision by this court sitting en banc, we are bound by a prior panel\u2019s interpretation.\u201d); Tucker v. Phyfer, 819 F.2d 1030, 1035 n. 7 (11th Cir.1987) (\u201c[H]ad the [earlier] panel expressly considered [two Supreme Court decisions], we would be bound by its interpretation and application of those decisions.\u201d); Diamond Shamrock Co. v. N.L.R.B., 443 F.2d 52, 60 n. 27 (3d Cir.1971) (holding that court is bound by prior panel\u2019s interpretation of Supreme Court decision); cf. United States v. Rapanos, 376 F.3d 629, 642 (6th Cir.2004), vacated on other grounds, 547 U.S. 715, 126 S.Ct. 2208, 165 L.Ed.2d 159 (2006) (rejecting appellee\u2019s argument concerning interpretation of a Supreme Court decision because it had \u201cpreviously been adjudicated by this court, in a published disposition, and its conclusion is entitled to stare decisis \u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"443 F.3d 1368, 1373","parenthetical":"\"Panels of this court are bound by previous prece-dential decisions until overturned by the Supreme Court or by this court en banc.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Barclay v. United States, 443 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed.Cir.2006) (\u201cPanels of this court are bound by previous prece-dential decisions until overturned by the Supreme Court or by this court en banc.\u201d); Foster v. Hallco Mfg. Co., 947 F.2d 469, 475 n. 5 (Fed.Cir.1991) (remarking that district court committed legal error by reinterpreting an earlier Supreme Court case, rather than applying this court\u2019s subsequent interpretation of that case); see also Walton v. Bisco Indus., Inc., 119 F.3d 368, 371 n. 4 (5th Cir.1997) (\u201cTo the extent that [the appellant] believes that we have construed [an earlier Supreme Court decision] incorrectly, we note that absent an intervening Supreme Court decision or a decision by this court sitting en banc, we are bound by a prior panel\u2019s interpretation.\u201d); Tucker v. Phyfer, 819 F.2d 1030, 1035 n. 7 (11th Cir.1987) (\u201c[H]ad the [earlier] panel expressly considered [two Supreme Court decisions], we would be bound by its interpretation and application of those decisions.\u201d); Diamond Shamrock Co. v. N.L.R.B., 443 F.2d 52, 60 n. 27 (3d Cir.1971) (holding that court is bound by prior panel\u2019s interpretation of Supreme Court decision); cf. United States v. Rapanos, 376 F.3d 629, 642 (6th Cir.2004), vacated on other grounds, 547 U.S. 715, 126 S.Ct. 2208, 165 L.Ed.2d 159 (2006) (rejecting appellee\u2019s argument concerning interpretation of a Supreme Court decision because it had \u201cpreviously been adjudicated by this court, in a published disposition, and its conclusion is entitled to stare decisis \u201d)."},"case_id":4262128,"label":"b"}
{"context":"It is the Loveladies court's interpretation of Keene that is binding on this panel.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"443 F.3d 1368, 1373","parenthetical":"\"Panels of this court are bound by previous prece-dential decisions until overturned by the Supreme Court or by this court en banc.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Barclay v. United States, 443 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed.Cir.2006) (\u201cPanels of this court are bound by previous prece-dential decisions until overturned by the Supreme Court or by this court en banc.\u201d); Foster v. Hallco Mfg. Co., 947 F.2d 469, 475 n. 5 (Fed.Cir.1991) (remarking that district court committed legal error by reinterpreting an earlier Supreme Court case, rather than applying this court\u2019s subsequent interpretation of that case); see also Walton v. Bisco Indus., Inc., 119 F.3d 368, 371 n. 4 (5th Cir.1997) (\u201cTo the extent that [the appellant] believes that we have construed [an earlier Supreme Court decision] incorrectly, we note that absent an intervening Supreme Court decision or a decision by this court sitting en banc, we are bound by a prior panel\u2019s interpretation.\u201d); Tucker v. Phyfer, 819 F.2d 1030, 1035 n. 7 (11th Cir.1987) (\u201c[H]ad the [earlier] panel expressly considered [two Supreme Court decisions], we would be bound by its interpretation and application of those decisions.\u201d); Diamond Shamrock Co. v. N.L.R.B., 443 F.2d 52, 60 n. 27 (3d Cir.1971) (holding that court is bound by prior panel\u2019s interpretation of Supreme Court decision); cf. United States v. Rapanos, 376 F.3d 629, 642 (6th Cir.2004), vacated on other grounds, 547 U.S. 715, 126 S.Ct. 2208, 165 L.Ed.2d 159 (2006) (rejecting appellee\u2019s argument concerning interpretation of a Supreme Court decision because it had \u201cpreviously been adjudicated by this court, in a published disposition, and its conclusion is entitled to stare decisis \u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"rejecting appellee's argument concerning interpretation of a Supreme Court decision because it had \"previously been adjudicated by this court, in a published disposition, and its conclusion is entitled to stare decisis \"","sentence":"See, e.g., Barclay v. United States, 443 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed.Cir.2006) (\u201cPanels of this court are bound by previous prece-dential decisions until overturned by the Supreme Court or by this court en banc.\u201d); Foster v. Hallco Mfg. Co., 947 F.2d 469, 475 n. 5 (Fed.Cir.1991) (remarking that district court committed legal error by reinterpreting an earlier Supreme Court case, rather than applying this court\u2019s subsequent interpretation of that case); see also Walton v. Bisco Indus., Inc., 119 F.3d 368, 371 n. 4 (5th Cir.1997) (\u201cTo the extent that [the appellant] believes that we have construed [an earlier Supreme Court decision] incorrectly, we note that absent an intervening Supreme Court decision or a decision by this court sitting en banc, we are bound by a prior panel\u2019s interpretation.\u201d); Tucker v. Phyfer, 819 F.2d 1030, 1035 n. 7 (11th Cir.1987) (\u201c[H]ad the [earlier] panel expressly considered [two Supreme Court decisions], we would be bound by its interpretation and application of those decisions.\u201d); Diamond Shamrock Co. v. N.L.R.B., 443 F.2d 52, 60 n. 27 (3d Cir.1971) (holding that court is bound by prior panel\u2019s interpretation of Supreme Court decision); cf. United States v. Rapanos, 376 F.3d 629, 642 (6th Cir.2004), vacated on other grounds, 547 U.S. 715, 126 S.Ct. 2208, 165 L.Ed.2d 159 (2006) (rejecting appellee\u2019s argument concerning interpretation of a Supreme Court decision because it had \u201cpreviously been adjudicated by this court, in a published disposition, and its conclusion is entitled to stare decisis \u201d)."},"case_id":4262128,"label":"a"}
{"context":"It is the Loveladies court's interpretation of Keene that is binding on this panel.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"rejecting appellee's argument concerning interpretation of a Supreme Court decision because it had \"previously been adjudicated by this court, in a published disposition, and its conclusion is entitled to stare decisis \"","sentence":"See, e.g., Barclay v. United States, 443 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed.Cir.2006) (\u201cPanels of this court are bound by previous prece-dential decisions until overturned by the Supreme Court or by this court en banc.\u201d); Foster v. Hallco Mfg. Co., 947 F.2d 469, 475 n. 5 (Fed.Cir.1991) (remarking that district court committed legal error by reinterpreting an earlier Supreme Court case, rather than applying this court\u2019s subsequent interpretation of that case); see also Walton v. Bisco Indus., Inc., 119 F.3d 368, 371 n. 4 (5th Cir.1997) (\u201cTo the extent that [the appellant] believes that we have construed [an earlier Supreme Court decision] incorrectly, we note that absent an intervening Supreme Court decision or a decision by this court sitting en banc, we are bound by a prior panel\u2019s interpretation.\u201d); Tucker v. Phyfer, 819 F.2d 1030, 1035 n. 7 (11th Cir.1987) (\u201c[H]ad the [earlier] panel expressly considered [two Supreme Court decisions], we would be bound by its interpretation and application of those decisions.\u201d); Diamond Shamrock Co. v. N.L.R.B., 443 F.2d 52, 60 n. 27 (3d Cir.1971) (holding that court is bound by prior panel\u2019s interpretation of Supreme Court decision); cf. United States v. Rapanos, 376 F.3d 629, 642 (6th Cir.2004), vacated on other grounds, 547 U.S. 715, 126 S.Ct. 2208, 165 L.Ed.2d 159 (2006) (rejecting appellee\u2019s argument concerning interpretation of a Supreme Court decision because it had \u201cpreviously been adjudicated by this court, in a published disposition, and its conclusion is entitled to stare decisis \u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"443 F.3d 1368, 1373","parenthetical":"\"Panels of this court are bound by previous prece-dential decisions until overturned by the Supreme Court or by this court en banc.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Barclay v. United States, 443 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed.Cir.2006) (\u201cPanels of this court are bound by previous prece-dential decisions until overturned by the Supreme Court or by this court en banc.\u201d); Foster v. Hallco Mfg. Co., 947 F.2d 469, 475 n. 5 (Fed.Cir.1991) (remarking that district court committed legal error by reinterpreting an earlier Supreme Court case, rather than applying this court\u2019s subsequent interpretation of that case); see also Walton v. Bisco Indus., Inc., 119 F.3d 368, 371 n. 4 (5th Cir.1997) (\u201cTo the extent that [the appellant] believes that we have construed [an earlier Supreme Court decision] incorrectly, we note that absent an intervening Supreme Court decision or a decision by this court sitting en banc, we are bound by a prior panel\u2019s interpretation.\u201d); Tucker v. Phyfer, 819 F.2d 1030, 1035 n. 7 (11th Cir.1987) (\u201c[H]ad the [earlier] panel expressly considered [two Supreme Court decisions], we would be bound by its interpretation and application of those decisions.\u201d); Diamond Shamrock Co. v. N.L.R.B., 443 F.2d 52, 60 n. 27 (3d Cir.1971) (holding that court is bound by prior panel\u2019s interpretation of Supreme Court decision); cf. United States v. Rapanos, 376 F.3d 629, 642 (6th Cir.2004), vacated on other grounds, 547 U.S. 715, 126 S.Ct. 2208, 165 L.Ed.2d 159 (2006) (rejecting appellee\u2019s argument concerning interpretation of a Supreme Court decision because it had \u201cpreviously been adjudicated by this court, in a published disposition, and its conclusion is entitled to stare decisis \u201d)."},"case_id":4262128,"label":"b"}
{"context":"It is the Loveladies court's interpretation of Keene that is binding on this panel.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"443 F.3d 1368, 1373","parenthetical":"\"Panels of this court are bound by previous prece-dential decisions until overturned by the Supreme Court or by this court en banc.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Barclay v. United States, 443 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed.Cir.2006) (\u201cPanels of this court are bound by previous prece-dential decisions until overturned by the Supreme Court or by this court en banc.\u201d); Foster v. Hallco Mfg. Co., 947 F.2d 469, 475 n. 5 (Fed.Cir.1991) (remarking that district court committed legal error by reinterpreting an earlier Supreme Court case, rather than applying this court\u2019s subsequent interpretation of that case); see also Walton v. Bisco Indus., Inc., 119 F.3d 368, 371 n. 4 (5th Cir.1997) (\u201cTo the extent that [the appellant] believes that we have construed [an earlier Supreme Court decision] incorrectly, we note that absent an intervening Supreme Court decision or a decision by this court sitting en banc, we are bound by a prior panel\u2019s interpretation.\u201d); Tucker v. Phyfer, 819 F.2d 1030, 1035 n. 7 (11th Cir.1987) (\u201c[H]ad the [earlier] panel expressly considered [two Supreme Court decisions], we would be bound by its interpretation and application of those decisions.\u201d); Diamond Shamrock Co. v. N.L.R.B., 443 F.2d 52, 60 n. 27 (3d Cir.1971) (holding that court is bound by prior panel\u2019s interpretation of Supreme Court decision); cf. United States v. Rapanos, 376 F.3d 629, 642 (6th Cir.2004), vacated on other grounds, 547 U.S. 715, 126 S.Ct. 2208, 165 L.Ed.2d 159 (2006) (rejecting appellee\u2019s argument concerning interpretation of a Supreme Court decision because it had \u201cpreviously been adjudicated by this court, in a published disposition, and its conclusion is entitled to stare decisis \u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"rejecting appellee's argument concerning interpretation of a Supreme Court decision because it had \"previously been adjudicated by this court, in a published disposition, and its conclusion is entitled to stare decisis \"","sentence":"See, e.g., Barclay v. United States, 443 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed.Cir.2006) (\u201cPanels of this court are bound by previous prece-dential decisions until overturned by the Supreme Court or by this court en banc.\u201d); Foster v. Hallco Mfg. Co., 947 F.2d 469, 475 n. 5 (Fed.Cir.1991) (remarking that district court committed legal error by reinterpreting an earlier Supreme Court case, rather than applying this court\u2019s subsequent interpretation of that case); see also Walton v. Bisco Indus., Inc., 119 F.3d 368, 371 n. 4 (5th Cir.1997) (\u201cTo the extent that [the appellant] believes that we have construed [an earlier Supreme Court decision] incorrectly, we note that absent an intervening Supreme Court decision or a decision by this court sitting en banc, we are bound by a prior panel\u2019s interpretation.\u201d); Tucker v. Phyfer, 819 F.2d 1030, 1035 n. 7 (11th Cir.1987) (\u201c[H]ad the [earlier] panel expressly considered [two Supreme Court decisions], we would be bound by its interpretation and application of those decisions.\u201d); Diamond Shamrock Co. v. N.L.R.B., 443 F.2d 52, 60 n. 27 (3d Cir.1971) (holding that court is bound by prior panel\u2019s interpretation of Supreme Court decision); cf. United States v. Rapanos, 376 F.3d 629, 642 (6th Cir.2004), vacated on other grounds, 547 U.S. 715, 126 S.Ct. 2208, 165 L.Ed.2d 159 (2006) (rejecting appellee\u2019s argument concerning interpretation of a Supreme Court decision because it had \u201cpreviously been adjudicated by this court, in a published disposition, and its conclusion is entitled to stare decisis \u201d)."},"case_id":4262128,"label":"a"}
{"context":"It is the Loveladies court's interpretation of Keene that is binding on this panel.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"To the extent that [the appellant] believes that we have construed [an earlier Supreme Court decision] incorrectly, we note that absent an intervening Supreme Court decision or a decision by this court sitting en banc, we are bound by a prior panel's interpretation.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Barclay v. United States, 443 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed.Cir.2006) (\u201cPanels of this court are bound by previous prece-dential decisions until overturned by the Supreme Court or by this court en banc.\u201d); Foster v. Hallco Mfg. Co., 947 F.2d 469, 475 n. 5 (Fed.Cir.1991) (remarking that district court committed legal error by reinterpreting an earlier Supreme Court case, rather than applying this court\u2019s subsequent interpretation of that case); see also Walton v. Bisco Indus., Inc., 119 F.3d 368, 371 n. 4 (5th Cir.1997) (\u201cTo the extent that [the appellant] believes that we have construed [an earlier Supreme Court decision] incorrectly, we note that absent an intervening Supreme Court decision or a decision by this court sitting en banc, we are bound by a prior panel\u2019s interpretation.\u201d); Tucker v. Phyfer, 819 F.2d 1030, 1035 n. 7 (11th Cir.1987) (\u201c[H]ad the [earlier] panel expressly considered [two Supreme Court decisions], we would be bound by its interpretation and application of those decisions.\u201d); Diamond Shamrock Co. v. N.L.R.B., 443 F.2d 52, 60 n. 27 (3d Cir.1971) (holding that court is bound by prior panel\u2019s interpretation of Supreme Court decision); cf. United States v. Rapanos, 376 F.3d 629, 642 (6th Cir.2004), vacated on other grounds, 547 U.S. 715, 126 S.Ct. 2208, 165 L.Ed.2d 159 (2006) (rejecting appellee\u2019s argument concerning interpretation of a Supreme Court decision because it had \u201cpreviously been adjudicated by this court, in a published disposition, and its conclusion is entitled to stare decisis \u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"remarking that district court committed legal error by reinterpreting an earlier Supreme Court case, rather than applying this court's subsequent interpretation of that case","sentence":"See, e.g., Barclay v. United States, 443 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed.Cir.2006) (\u201cPanels of this court are bound by previous prece-dential decisions until overturned by the Supreme Court or by this court en banc.\u201d); Foster v. Hallco Mfg. Co., 947 F.2d 469, 475 n. 5 (Fed.Cir.1991) (remarking that district court committed legal error by reinterpreting an earlier Supreme Court case, rather than applying this court\u2019s subsequent interpretation of that case); see also Walton v. Bisco Indus., Inc., 119 F.3d 368, 371 n. 4 (5th Cir.1997) (\u201cTo the extent that [the appellant] believes that we have construed [an earlier Supreme Court decision] incorrectly, we note that absent an intervening Supreme Court decision or a decision by this court sitting en banc, we are bound by a prior panel\u2019s interpretation.\u201d); Tucker v. Phyfer, 819 F.2d 1030, 1035 n. 7 (11th Cir.1987) (\u201c[H]ad the [earlier] panel expressly considered [two Supreme Court decisions], we would be bound by its interpretation and application of those decisions.\u201d); Diamond Shamrock Co. v. N.L.R.B., 443 F.2d 52, 60 n. 27 (3d Cir.1971) (holding that court is bound by prior panel\u2019s interpretation of Supreme Court decision); cf. United States v. Rapanos, 376 F.3d 629, 642 (6th Cir.2004), vacated on other grounds, 547 U.S. 715, 126 S.Ct. 2208, 165 L.Ed.2d 159 (2006) (rejecting appellee\u2019s argument concerning interpretation of a Supreme Court decision because it had \u201cpreviously been adjudicated by this court, in a published disposition, and its conclusion is entitled to stare decisis \u201d)."},"case_id":4262128,"label":"b"}
{"context":"It is the Loveladies court's interpretation of Keene that is binding on this panel.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"remarking that district court committed legal error by reinterpreting an earlier Supreme Court case, rather than applying this court's subsequent interpretation of that case","sentence":"See, e.g., Barclay v. United States, 443 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed.Cir.2006) (\u201cPanels of this court are bound by previous prece-dential decisions until overturned by the Supreme Court or by this court en banc.\u201d); Foster v. Hallco Mfg. Co., 947 F.2d 469, 475 n. 5 (Fed.Cir.1991) (remarking that district court committed legal error by reinterpreting an earlier Supreme Court case, rather than applying this court\u2019s subsequent interpretation of that case); see also Walton v. Bisco Indus., Inc., 119 F.3d 368, 371 n. 4 (5th Cir.1997) (\u201cTo the extent that [the appellant] believes that we have construed [an earlier Supreme Court decision] incorrectly, we note that absent an intervening Supreme Court decision or a decision by this court sitting en banc, we are bound by a prior panel\u2019s interpretation.\u201d); Tucker v. Phyfer, 819 F.2d 1030, 1035 n. 7 (11th Cir.1987) (\u201c[H]ad the [earlier] panel expressly considered [two Supreme Court decisions], we would be bound by its interpretation and application of those decisions.\u201d); Diamond Shamrock Co. v. N.L.R.B., 443 F.2d 52, 60 n. 27 (3d Cir.1971) (holding that court is bound by prior panel\u2019s interpretation of Supreme Court decision); cf. United States v. Rapanos, 376 F.3d 629, 642 (6th Cir.2004), vacated on other grounds, 547 U.S. 715, 126 S.Ct. 2208, 165 L.Ed.2d 159 (2006) (rejecting appellee\u2019s argument concerning interpretation of a Supreme Court decision because it had \u201cpreviously been adjudicated by this court, in a published disposition, and its conclusion is entitled to stare decisis \u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[H]ad the [earlier] panel expressly considered [two Supreme Court decisions], we would be bound by its interpretation and application of those decisions.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Barclay v. United States, 443 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed.Cir.2006) (\u201cPanels of this court are bound by previous prece-dential decisions until overturned by the Supreme Court or by this court en banc.\u201d); Foster v. Hallco Mfg. Co., 947 F.2d 469, 475 n. 5 (Fed.Cir.1991) (remarking that district court committed legal error by reinterpreting an earlier Supreme Court case, rather than applying this court\u2019s subsequent interpretation of that case); see also Walton v. Bisco Indus., Inc., 119 F.3d 368, 371 n. 4 (5th Cir.1997) (\u201cTo the extent that [the appellant] believes that we have construed [an earlier Supreme Court decision] incorrectly, we note that absent an intervening Supreme Court decision or a decision by this court sitting en banc, we are bound by a prior panel\u2019s interpretation.\u201d); Tucker v. Phyfer, 819 F.2d 1030, 1035 n. 7 (11th Cir.1987) (\u201c[H]ad the [earlier] panel expressly considered [two Supreme Court decisions], we would be bound by its interpretation and application of those decisions.\u201d); Diamond Shamrock Co. v. N.L.R.B., 443 F.2d 52, 60 n. 27 (3d Cir.1971) (holding that court is bound by prior panel\u2019s interpretation of Supreme Court decision); cf. United States v. Rapanos, 376 F.3d 629, 642 (6th Cir.2004), vacated on other grounds, 547 U.S. 715, 126 S.Ct. 2208, 165 L.Ed.2d 159 (2006) (rejecting appellee\u2019s argument concerning interpretation of a Supreme Court decision because it had \u201cpreviously been adjudicated by this court, in a published disposition, and its conclusion is entitled to stare decisis \u201d)."},"case_id":4262128,"label":"a"}
{"context":"It is the Loveladies court's interpretation of Keene that is binding on this panel.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"remarking that district court committed legal error by reinterpreting an earlier Supreme Court case, rather than applying this court's subsequent interpretation of that case","sentence":"See, e.g., Barclay v. United States, 443 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed.Cir.2006) (\u201cPanels of this court are bound by previous prece-dential decisions until overturned by the Supreme Court or by this court en banc.\u201d); Foster v. Hallco Mfg. Co., 947 F.2d 469, 475 n. 5 (Fed.Cir.1991) (remarking that district court committed legal error by reinterpreting an earlier Supreme Court case, rather than applying this court\u2019s subsequent interpretation of that case); see also Walton v. Bisco Indus., Inc., 119 F.3d 368, 371 n. 4 (5th Cir.1997) (\u201cTo the extent that [the appellant] believes that we have construed [an earlier Supreme Court decision] incorrectly, we note that absent an intervening Supreme Court decision or a decision by this court sitting en banc, we are bound by a prior panel\u2019s interpretation.\u201d); Tucker v. Phyfer, 819 F.2d 1030, 1035 n. 7 (11th Cir.1987) (\u201c[H]ad the [earlier] panel expressly considered [two Supreme Court decisions], we would be bound by its interpretation and application of those decisions.\u201d); Diamond Shamrock Co. v. N.L.R.B., 443 F.2d 52, 60 n. 27 (3d Cir.1971) (holding that court is bound by prior panel\u2019s interpretation of Supreme Court decision); cf. United States v. Rapanos, 376 F.3d 629, 642 (6th Cir.2004), vacated on other grounds, 547 U.S. 715, 126 S.Ct. 2208, 165 L.Ed.2d 159 (2006) (rejecting appellee\u2019s argument concerning interpretation of a Supreme Court decision because it had \u201cpreviously been adjudicated by this court, in a published disposition, and its conclusion is entitled to stare decisis \u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that court is bound by prior panel's interpretation of Supreme Court decision","sentence":"See, e.g., Barclay v. United States, 443 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed.Cir.2006) (\u201cPanels of this court are bound by previous prece-dential decisions until overturned by the Supreme Court or by this court en banc.\u201d); Foster v. Hallco Mfg. Co., 947 F.2d 469, 475 n. 5 (Fed.Cir.1991) (remarking that district court committed legal error by reinterpreting an earlier Supreme Court case, rather than applying this court\u2019s subsequent interpretation of that case); see also Walton v. Bisco Indus., Inc., 119 F.3d 368, 371 n. 4 (5th Cir.1997) (\u201cTo the extent that [the appellant] believes that we have construed [an earlier Supreme Court decision] incorrectly, we note that absent an intervening Supreme Court decision or a decision by this court sitting en banc, we are bound by a prior panel\u2019s interpretation.\u201d); Tucker v. Phyfer, 819 F.2d 1030, 1035 n. 7 (11th Cir.1987) (\u201c[H]ad the [earlier] panel expressly considered [two Supreme Court decisions], we would be bound by its interpretation and application of those decisions.\u201d); Diamond Shamrock Co. v. N.L.R.B., 443 F.2d 52, 60 n. 27 (3d Cir.1971) (holding that court is bound by prior panel\u2019s interpretation of Supreme Court decision); cf. United States v. Rapanos, 376 F.3d 629, 642 (6th Cir.2004), vacated on other grounds, 547 U.S. 715, 126 S.Ct. 2208, 165 L.Ed.2d 159 (2006) (rejecting appellee\u2019s argument concerning interpretation of a Supreme Court decision because it had \u201cpreviously been adjudicated by this court, in a published disposition, and its conclusion is entitled to stare decisis \u201d)."},"case_id":4262128,"label":"a"}
{"context":"It is the Loveladies court's interpretation of Keene that is binding on this panel.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"376 F.3d 629, 642","parenthetical":"rejecting appellee's argument concerning interpretation of a Supreme Court decision because it had \"previously been adjudicated by this court, in a published disposition, and its conclusion is entitled to stare decisis \"","sentence":"See, e.g., Barclay v. United States, 443 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed.Cir.2006) (\u201cPanels of this court are bound by previous prece-dential decisions until overturned by the Supreme Court or by this court en banc.\u201d); Foster v. Hallco Mfg. Co., 947 F.2d 469, 475 n. 5 (Fed.Cir.1991) (remarking that district court committed legal error by reinterpreting an earlier Supreme Court case, rather than applying this court\u2019s subsequent interpretation of that case); see also Walton v. Bisco Indus., Inc., 119 F.3d 368, 371 n. 4 (5th Cir.1997) (\u201cTo the extent that [the appellant] believes that we have construed [an earlier Supreme Court decision] incorrectly, we note that absent an intervening Supreme Court decision or a decision by this court sitting en banc, we are bound by a prior panel\u2019s interpretation.\u201d); Tucker v. Phyfer, 819 F.2d 1030, 1035 n. 7 (11th Cir.1987) (\u201c[H]ad the [earlier] panel expressly considered [two Supreme Court decisions], we would be bound by its interpretation and application of those decisions.\u201d); Diamond Shamrock Co. v. N.L.R.B., 443 F.2d 52, 60 n. 27 (3d Cir.1971) (holding that court is bound by prior panel\u2019s interpretation of Supreme Court decision); cf. United States v. Rapanos, 376 F.3d 629, 642 (6th Cir.2004), vacated on other grounds, 547 U.S. 715, 126 S.Ct. 2208, 165 L.Ed.2d 159 (2006) (rejecting appellee\u2019s argument concerning interpretation of a Supreme Court decision because it had \u201cpreviously been adjudicated by this court, in a published disposition, and its conclusion is entitled to stare decisis \u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"remarking that district court committed legal error by reinterpreting an earlier Supreme Court case, rather than applying this court's subsequent interpretation of that case","sentence":"See, e.g., Barclay v. United States, 443 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed.Cir.2006) (\u201cPanels of this court are bound by previous prece-dential decisions until overturned by the Supreme Court or by this court en banc.\u201d); Foster v. Hallco Mfg. Co., 947 F.2d 469, 475 n. 5 (Fed.Cir.1991) (remarking that district court committed legal error by reinterpreting an earlier Supreme Court case, rather than applying this court\u2019s subsequent interpretation of that case); see also Walton v. Bisco Indus., Inc., 119 F.3d 368, 371 n. 4 (5th Cir.1997) (\u201cTo the extent that [the appellant] believes that we have construed [an earlier Supreme Court decision] incorrectly, we note that absent an intervening Supreme Court decision or a decision by this court sitting en banc, we are bound by a prior panel\u2019s interpretation.\u201d); Tucker v. Phyfer, 819 F.2d 1030, 1035 n. 7 (11th Cir.1987) (\u201c[H]ad the [earlier] panel expressly considered [two Supreme Court decisions], we would be bound by its interpretation and application of those decisions.\u201d); Diamond Shamrock Co. v. N.L.R.B., 443 F.2d 52, 60 n. 27 (3d Cir.1971) (holding that court is bound by prior panel\u2019s interpretation of Supreme Court decision); cf. United States v. Rapanos, 376 F.3d 629, 642 (6th Cir.2004), vacated on other grounds, 547 U.S. 715, 126 S.Ct. 2208, 165 L.Ed.2d 159 (2006) (rejecting appellee\u2019s argument concerning interpretation of a Supreme Court decision because it had \u201cpreviously been adjudicated by this court, in a published disposition, and its conclusion is entitled to stare decisis \u201d)."},"case_id":4262128,"label":"b"}
{"context":"It is the Loveladies court's interpretation of Keene that is binding on this panel.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"remarking that district court committed legal error by reinterpreting an earlier Supreme Court case, rather than applying this court's subsequent interpretation of that case","sentence":"See, e.g., Barclay v. United States, 443 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed.Cir.2006) (\u201cPanels of this court are bound by previous prece-dential decisions until overturned by the Supreme Court or by this court en banc.\u201d); Foster v. Hallco Mfg. Co., 947 F.2d 469, 475 n. 5 (Fed.Cir.1991) (remarking that district court committed legal error by reinterpreting an earlier Supreme Court case, rather than applying this court\u2019s subsequent interpretation of that case); see also Walton v. Bisco Indus., Inc., 119 F.3d 368, 371 n. 4 (5th Cir.1997) (\u201cTo the extent that [the appellant] believes that we have construed [an earlier Supreme Court decision] incorrectly, we note that absent an intervening Supreme Court decision or a decision by this court sitting en banc, we are bound by a prior panel\u2019s interpretation.\u201d); Tucker v. Phyfer, 819 F.2d 1030, 1035 n. 7 (11th Cir.1987) (\u201c[H]ad the [earlier] panel expressly considered [two Supreme Court decisions], we would be bound by its interpretation and application of those decisions.\u201d); Diamond Shamrock Co. v. N.L.R.B., 443 F.2d 52, 60 n. 27 (3d Cir.1971) (holding that court is bound by prior panel\u2019s interpretation of Supreme Court decision); cf. United States v. Rapanos, 376 F.3d 629, 642 (6th Cir.2004), vacated on other grounds, 547 U.S. 715, 126 S.Ct. 2208, 165 L.Ed.2d 159 (2006) (rejecting appellee\u2019s argument concerning interpretation of a Supreme Court decision because it had \u201cpreviously been adjudicated by this court, in a published disposition, and its conclusion is entitled to stare decisis \u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"rejecting appellee's argument concerning interpretation of a Supreme Court decision because it had \"previously been adjudicated by this court, in a published disposition, and its conclusion is entitled to stare decisis \"","sentence":"See, e.g., Barclay v. United States, 443 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed.Cir.2006) (\u201cPanels of this court are bound by previous prece-dential decisions until overturned by the Supreme Court or by this court en banc.\u201d); Foster v. Hallco Mfg. Co., 947 F.2d 469, 475 n. 5 (Fed.Cir.1991) (remarking that district court committed legal error by reinterpreting an earlier Supreme Court case, rather than applying this court\u2019s subsequent interpretation of that case); see also Walton v. Bisco Indus., Inc., 119 F.3d 368, 371 n. 4 (5th Cir.1997) (\u201cTo the extent that [the appellant] believes that we have construed [an earlier Supreme Court decision] incorrectly, we note that absent an intervening Supreme Court decision or a decision by this court sitting en banc, we are bound by a prior panel\u2019s interpretation.\u201d); Tucker v. Phyfer, 819 F.2d 1030, 1035 n. 7 (11th Cir.1987) (\u201c[H]ad the [earlier] panel expressly considered [two Supreme Court decisions], we would be bound by its interpretation and application of those decisions.\u201d); Diamond Shamrock Co. v. N.L.R.B., 443 F.2d 52, 60 n. 27 (3d Cir.1971) (holding that court is bound by prior panel\u2019s interpretation of Supreme Court decision); cf. United States v. Rapanos, 376 F.3d 629, 642 (6th Cir.2004), vacated on other grounds, 547 U.S. 715, 126 S.Ct. 2208, 165 L.Ed.2d 159 (2006) (rejecting appellee\u2019s argument concerning interpretation of a Supreme Court decision because it had \u201cpreviously been adjudicated by this court, in a published disposition, and its conclusion is entitled to stare decisis \u201d)."},"case_id":4262128,"label":"a"}
{"context":"It is the Loveladies court's interpretation of Keene that is binding on this panel.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"remarking that district court committed legal error by reinterpreting an earlier Supreme Court case, rather than applying this court's subsequent interpretation of that case","sentence":"See, e.g., Barclay v. United States, 443 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed.Cir.2006) (\u201cPanels of this court are bound by previous prece-dential decisions until overturned by the Supreme Court or by this court en banc.\u201d); Foster v. Hallco Mfg. Co., 947 F.2d 469, 475 n. 5 (Fed.Cir.1991) (remarking that district court committed legal error by reinterpreting an earlier Supreme Court case, rather than applying this court\u2019s subsequent interpretation of that case); see also Walton v. Bisco Indus., Inc., 119 F.3d 368, 371 n. 4 (5th Cir.1997) (\u201cTo the extent that [the appellant] believes that we have construed [an earlier Supreme Court decision] incorrectly, we note that absent an intervening Supreme Court decision or a decision by this court sitting en banc, we are bound by a prior panel\u2019s interpretation.\u201d); Tucker v. Phyfer, 819 F.2d 1030, 1035 n. 7 (11th Cir.1987) (\u201c[H]ad the [earlier] panel expressly considered [two Supreme Court decisions], we would be bound by its interpretation and application of those decisions.\u201d); Diamond Shamrock Co. v. N.L.R.B., 443 F.2d 52, 60 n. 27 (3d Cir.1971) (holding that court is bound by prior panel\u2019s interpretation of Supreme Court decision); cf. United States v. Rapanos, 376 F.3d 629, 642 (6th Cir.2004), vacated on other grounds, 547 U.S. 715, 126 S.Ct. 2208, 165 L.Ed.2d 159 (2006) (rejecting appellee\u2019s argument concerning interpretation of a Supreme Court decision because it had \u201cpreviously been adjudicated by this court, in a published disposition, and its conclusion is entitled to stare decisis \u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"rejecting appellee's argument concerning interpretation of a Supreme Court decision because it had \"previously been adjudicated by this court, in a published disposition, and its conclusion is entitled to stare decisis \"","sentence":"See, e.g., Barclay v. United States, 443 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed.Cir.2006) (\u201cPanels of this court are bound by previous prece-dential decisions until overturned by the Supreme Court or by this court en banc.\u201d); Foster v. Hallco Mfg. Co., 947 F.2d 469, 475 n. 5 (Fed.Cir.1991) (remarking that district court committed legal error by reinterpreting an earlier Supreme Court case, rather than applying this court\u2019s subsequent interpretation of that case); see also Walton v. Bisco Indus., Inc., 119 F.3d 368, 371 n. 4 (5th Cir.1997) (\u201cTo the extent that [the appellant] believes that we have construed [an earlier Supreme Court decision] incorrectly, we note that absent an intervening Supreme Court decision or a decision by this court sitting en banc, we are bound by a prior panel\u2019s interpretation.\u201d); Tucker v. Phyfer, 819 F.2d 1030, 1035 n. 7 (11th Cir.1987) (\u201c[H]ad the [earlier] panel expressly considered [two Supreme Court decisions], we would be bound by its interpretation and application of those decisions.\u201d); Diamond Shamrock Co. v. N.L.R.B., 443 F.2d 52, 60 n. 27 (3d Cir.1971) (holding that court is bound by prior panel\u2019s interpretation of Supreme Court decision); cf. United States v. Rapanos, 376 F.3d 629, 642 (6th Cir.2004), vacated on other grounds, 547 U.S. 715, 126 S.Ct. 2208, 165 L.Ed.2d 159 (2006) (rejecting appellee\u2019s argument concerning interpretation of a Supreme Court decision because it had \u201cpreviously been adjudicated by this court, in a published disposition, and its conclusion is entitled to stare decisis \u201d)."},"case_id":4262128,"label":"a"}
{"context":"It is the Loveladies court's interpretation of Keene that is binding on this panel.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"rejecting appellee's argument concerning interpretation of a Supreme Court decision because it had \"previously been adjudicated by this court, in a published disposition, and its conclusion is entitled to stare decisis \"","sentence":"See, e.g., Barclay v. United States, 443 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed.Cir.2006) (\u201cPanels of this court are bound by previous prece-dential decisions until overturned by the Supreme Court or by this court en banc.\u201d); Foster v. Hallco Mfg. Co., 947 F.2d 469, 475 n. 5 (Fed.Cir.1991) (remarking that district court committed legal error by reinterpreting an earlier Supreme Court case, rather than applying this court\u2019s subsequent interpretation of that case); see also Walton v. Bisco Indus., Inc., 119 F.3d 368, 371 n. 4 (5th Cir.1997) (\u201cTo the extent that [the appellant] believes that we have construed [an earlier Supreme Court decision] incorrectly, we note that absent an intervening Supreme Court decision or a decision by this court sitting en banc, we are bound by a prior panel\u2019s interpretation.\u201d); Tucker v. Phyfer, 819 F.2d 1030, 1035 n. 7 (11th Cir.1987) (\u201c[H]ad the [earlier] panel expressly considered [two Supreme Court decisions], we would be bound by its interpretation and application of those decisions.\u201d); Diamond Shamrock Co. v. N.L.R.B., 443 F.2d 52, 60 n. 27 (3d Cir.1971) (holding that court is bound by prior panel\u2019s interpretation of Supreme Court decision); cf. United States v. Rapanos, 376 F.3d 629, 642 (6th Cir.2004), vacated on other grounds, 547 U.S. 715, 126 S.Ct. 2208, 165 L.Ed.2d 159 (2006) (rejecting appellee\u2019s argument concerning interpretation of a Supreme Court decision because it had \u201cpreviously been adjudicated by this court, in a published disposition, and its conclusion is entitled to stare decisis \u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"remarking that district court committed legal error by reinterpreting an earlier Supreme Court case, rather than applying this court's subsequent interpretation of that case","sentence":"See, e.g., Barclay v. United States, 443 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed.Cir.2006) (\u201cPanels of this court are bound by previous prece-dential decisions until overturned by the Supreme Court or by this court en banc.\u201d); Foster v. Hallco Mfg. Co., 947 F.2d 469, 475 n. 5 (Fed.Cir.1991) (remarking that district court committed legal error by reinterpreting an earlier Supreme Court case, rather than applying this court\u2019s subsequent interpretation of that case); see also Walton v. Bisco Indus., Inc., 119 F.3d 368, 371 n. 4 (5th Cir.1997) (\u201cTo the extent that [the appellant] believes that we have construed [an earlier Supreme Court decision] incorrectly, we note that absent an intervening Supreme Court decision or a decision by this court sitting en banc, we are bound by a prior panel\u2019s interpretation.\u201d); Tucker v. Phyfer, 819 F.2d 1030, 1035 n. 7 (11th Cir.1987) (\u201c[H]ad the [earlier] panel expressly considered [two Supreme Court decisions], we would be bound by its interpretation and application of those decisions.\u201d); Diamond Shamrock Co. v. N.L.R.B., 443 F.2d 52, 60 n. 27 (3d Cir.1971) (holding that court is bound by prior panel\u2019s interpretation of Supreme Court decision); cf. United States v. Rapanos, 376 F.3d 629, 642 (6th Cir.2004), vacated on other grounds, 547 U.S. 715, 126 S.Ct. 2208, 165 L.Ed.2d 159 (2006) (rejecting appellee\u2019s argument concerning interpretation of a Supreme Court decision because it had \u201cpreviously been adjudicated by this court, in a published disposition, and its conclusion is entitled to stare decisis \u201d)."},"case_id":4262128,"label":"b"}
{"context":"It is the Loveladies court's interpretation of Keene that is binding on this panel.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"To the extent that [the appellant] believes that we have construed [an earlier Supreme Court decision] incorrectly, we note that absent an intervening Supreme Court decision or a decision by this court sitting en banc, we are bound by a prior panel's interpretation.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Barclay v. United States, 443 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed.Cir.2006) (\u201cPanels of this court are bound by previous prece-dential decisions until overturned by the Supreme Court or by this court en banc.\u201d); Foster v. Hallco Mfg. Co., 947 F.2d 469, 475 n. 5 (Fed.Cir.1991) (remarking that district court committed legal error by reinterpreting an earlier Supreme Court case, rather than applying this court\u2019s subsequent interpretation of that case); see also Walton v. Bisco Indus., Inc., 119 F.3d 368, 371 n. 4 (5th Cir.1997) (\u201cTo the extent that [the appellant] believes that we have construed [an earlier Supreme Court decision] incorrectly, we note that absent an intervening Supreme Court decision or a decision by this court sitting en banc, we are bound by a prior panel\u2019s interpretation.\u201d); Tucker v. Phyfer, 819 F.2d 1030, 1035 n. 7 (11th Cir.1987) (\u201c[H]ad the [earlier] panel expressly considered [two Supreme Court decisions], we would be bound by its interpretation and application of those decisions.\u201d); Diamond Shamrock Co. v. N.L.R.B., 443 F.2d 52, 60 n. 27 (3d Cir.1971) (holding that court is bound by prior panel\u2019s interpretation of Supreme Court decision); cf. United States v. Rapanos, 376 F.3d 629, 642 (6th Cir.2004), vacated on other grounds, 547 U.S. 715, 126 S.Ct. 2208, 165 L.Ed.2d 159 (2006) (rejecting appellee\u2019s argument concerning interpretation of a Supreme Court decision because it had \u201cpreviously been adjudicated by this court, in a published disposition, and its conclusion is entitled to stare decisis \u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"376 F.3d 629, 642","parenthetical":"rejecting appellee's argument concerning interpretation of a Supreme Court decision because it had \"previously been adjudicated by this court, in a published disposition, and its conclusion is entitled to stare decisis \"","sentence":"See, e.g., Barclay v. United States, 443 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed.Cir.2006) (\u201cPanels of this court are bound by previous prece-dential decisions until overturned by the Supreme Court or by this court en banc.\u201d); Foster v. Hallco Mfg. Co., 947 F.2d 469, 475 n. 5 (Fed.Cir.1991) (remarking that district court committed legal error by reinterpreting an earlier Supreme Court case, rather than applying this court\u2019s subsequent interpretation of that case); see also Walton v. Bisco Indus., Inc., 119 F.3d 368, 371 n. 4 (5th Cir.1997) (\u201cTo the extent that [the appellant] believes that we have construed [an earlier Supreme Court decision] incorrectly, we note that absent an intervening Supreme Court decision or a decision by this court sitting en banc, we are bound by a prior panel\u2019s interpretation.\u201d); Tucker v. Phyfer, 819 F.2d 1030, 1035 n. 7 (11th Cir.1987) (\u201c[H]ad the [earlier] panel expressly considered [two Supreme Court decisions], we would be bound by its interpretation and application of those decisions.\u201d); Diamond Shamrock Co. v. N.L.R.B., 443 F.2d 52, 60 n. 27 (3d Cir.1971) (holding that court is bound by prior panel\u2019s interpretation of Supreme Court decision); cf. United States v. Rapanos, 376 F.3d 629, 642 (6th Cir.2004), vacated on other grounds, 547 U.S. 715, 126 S.Ct. 2208, 165 L.Ed.2d 159 (2006) (rejecting appellee\u2019s argument concerning interpretation of a Supreme Court decision because it had \u201cpreviously been adjudicated by this court, in a published disposition, and its conclusion is entitled to stare decisis \u201d)."},"case_id":4262128,"label":"a"}
{"context":"It is the Loveladies court's interpretation of Keene that is binding on this panel.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"To the extent that [the appellant] believes that we have construed [an earlier Supreme Court decision] incorrectly, we note that absent an intervening Supreme Court decision or a decision by this court sitting en banc, we are bound by a prior panel's interpretation.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Barclay v. United States, 443 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed.Cir.2006) (\u201cPanels of this court are bound by previous prece-dential decisions until overturned by the Supreme Court or by this court en banc.\u201d); Foster v. Hallco Mfg. Co., 947 F.2d 469, 475 n. 5 (Fed.Cir.1991) (remarking that district court committed legal error by reinterpreting an earlier Supreme Court case, rather than applying this court\u2019s subsequent interpretation of that case); see also Walton v. Bisco Indus., Inc., 119 F.3d 368, 371 n. 4 (5th Cir.1997) (\u201cTo the extent that [the appellant] believes that we have construed [an earlier Supreme Court decision] incorrectly, we note that absent an intervening Supreme Court decision or a decision by this court sitting en banc, we are bound by a prior panel\u2019s interpretation.\u201d); Tucker v. Phyfer, 819 F.2d 1030, 1035 n. 7 (11th Cir.1987) (\u201c[H]ad the [earlier] panel expressly considered [two Supreme Court decisions], we would be bound by its interpretation and application of those decisions.\u201d); Diamond Shamrock Co. v. N.L.R.B., 443 F.2d 52, 60 n. 27 (3d Cir.1971) (holding that court is bound by prior panel\u2019s interpretation of Supreme Court decision); cf. United States v. Rapanos, 376 F.3d 629, 642 (6th Cir.2004), vacated on other grounds, 547 U.S. 715, 126 S.Ct. 2208, 165 L.Ed.2d 159 (2006) (rejecting appellee\u2019s argument concerning interpretation of a Supreme Court decision because it had \u201cpreviously been adjudicated by this court, in a published disposition, and its conclusion is entitled to stare decisis \u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"rejecting appellee's argument concerning interpretation of a Supreme Court decision because it had \"previously been adjudicated by this court, in a published disposition, and its conclusion is entitled to stare decisis \"","sentence":"See, e.g., Barclay v. United States, 443 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed.Cir.2006) (\u201cPanels of this court are bound by previous prece-dential decisions until overturned by the Supreme Court or by this court en banc.\u201d); Foster v. Hallco Mfg. Co., 947 F.2d 469, 475 n. 5 (Fed.Cir.1991) (remarking that district court committed legal error by reinterpreting an earlier Supreme Court case, rather than applying this court\u2019s subsequent interpretation of that case); see also Walton v. Bisco Indus., Inc., 119 F.3d 368, 371 n. 4 (5th Cir.1997) (\u201cTo the extent that [the appellant] believes that we have construed [an earlier Supreme Court decision] incorrectly, we note that absent an intervening Supreme Court decision or a decision by this court sitting en banc, we are bound by a prior panel\u2019s interpretation.\u201d); Tucker v. Phyfer, 819 F.2d 1030, 1035 n. 7 (11th Cir.1987) (\u201c[H]ad the [earlier] panel expressly considered [two Supreme Court decisions], we would be bound by its interpretation and application of those decisions.\u201d); Diamond Shamrock Co. v. N.L.R.B., 443 F.2d 52, 60 n. 27 (3d Cir.1971) (holding that court is bound by prior panel\u2019s interpretation of Supreme Court decision); cf. United States v. Rapanos, 376 F.3d 629, 642 (6th Cir.2004), vacated on other grounds, 547 U.S. 715, 126 S.Ct. 2208, 165 L.Ed.2d 159 (2006) (rejecting appellee\u2019s argument concerning interpretation of a Supreme Court decision because it had \u201cpreviously been adjudicated by this court, in a published disposition, and its conclusion is entitled to stare decisis \u201d)."},"case_id":4262128,"label":"a"}
{"context":"It is the Loveladies court's interpretation of Keene that is binding on this panel.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"To the extent that [the appellant] believes that we have construed [an earlier Supreme Court decision] incorrectly, we note that absent an intervening Supreme Court decision or a decision by this court sitting en banc, we are bound by a prior panel's interpretation.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Barclay v. United States, 443 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed.Cir.2006) (\u201cPanels of this court are bound by previous prece-dential decisions until overturned by the Supreme Court or by this court en banc.\u201d); Foster v. Hallco Mfg. Co., 947 F.2d 469, 475 n. 5 (Fed.Cir.1991) (remarking that district court committed legal error by reinterpreting an earlier Supreme Court case, rather than applying this court\u2019s subsequent interpretation of that case); see also Walton v. Bisco Indus., Inc., 119 F.3d 368, 371 n. 4 (5th Cir.1997) (\u201cTo the extent that [the appellant] believes that we have construed [an earlier Supreme Court decision] incorrectly, we note that absent an intervening Supreme Court decision or a decision by this court sitting en banc, we are bound by a prior panel\u2019s interpretation.\u201d); Tucker v. Phyfer, 819 F.2d 1030, 1035 n. 7 (11th Cir.1987) (\u201c[H]ad the [earlier] panel expressly considered [two Supreme Court decisions], we would be bound by its interpretation and application of those decisions.\u201d); Diamond Shamrock Co. v. N.L.R.B., 443 F.2d 52, 60 n. 27 (3d Cir.1971) (holding that court is bound by prior panel\u2019s interpretation of Supreme Court decision); cf. United States v. Rapanos, 376 F.3d 629, 642 (6th Cir.2004), vacated on other grounds, 547 U.S. 715, 126 S.Ct. 2208, 165 L.Ed.2d 159 (2006) (rejecting appellee\u2019s argument concerning interpretation of a Supreme Court decision because it had \u201cpreviously been adjudicated by this court, in a published disposition, and its conclusion is entitled to stare decisis \u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"rejecting appellee's argument concerning interpretation of a Supreme Court decision because it had \"previously been adjudicated by this court, in a published disposition, and its conclusion is entitled to stare decisis \"","sentence":"See, e.g., Barclay v. United States, 443 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed.Cir.2006) (\u201cPanels of this court are bound by previous prece-dential decisions until overturned by the Supreme Court or by this court en banc.\u201d); Foster v. Hallco Mfg. Co., 947 F.2d 469, 475 n. 5 (Fed.Cir.1991) (remarking that district court committed legal error by reinterpreting an earlier Supreme Court case, rather than applying this court\u2019s subsequent interpretation of that case); see also Walton v. Bisco Indus., Inc., 119 F.3d 368, 371 n. 4 (5th Cir.1997) (\u201cTo the extent that [the appellant] believes that we have construed [an earlier Supreme Court decision] incorrectly, we note that absent an intervening Supreme Court decision or a decision by this court sitting en banc, we are bound by a prior panel\u2019s interpretation.\u201d); Tucker v. Phyfer, 819 F.2d 1030, 1035 n. 7 (11th Cir.1987) (\u201c[H]ad the [earlier] panel expressly considered [two Supreme Court decisions], we would be bound by its interpretation and application of those decisions.\u201d); Diamond Shamrock Co. v. N.L.R.B., 443 F.2d 52, 60 n. 27 (3d Cir.1971) (holding that court is bound by prior panel\u2019s interpretation of Supreme Court decision); cf. United States v. Rapanos, 376 F.3d 629, 642 (6th Cir.2004), vacated on other grounds, 547 U.S. 715, 126 S.Ct. 2208, 165 L.Ed.2d 159 (2006) (rejecting appellee\u2019s argument concerning interpretation of a Supreme Court decision because it had \u201cpreviously been adjudicated by this court, in a published disposition, and its conclusion is entitled to stare decisis \u201d)."},"case_id":4262128,"label":"a"}
{"context":"It is the Loveladies court's interpretation of Keene that is binding on this panel.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"To the extent that [the appellant] believes that we have construed [an earlier Supreme Court decision] incorrectly, we note that absent an intervening Supreme Court decision or a decision by this court sitting en banc, we are bound by a prior panel's interpretation.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Barclay v. United States, 443 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed.Cir.2006) (\u201cPanels of this court are bound by previous prece-dential decisions until overturned by the Supreme Court or by this court en banc.\u201d); Foster v. Hallco Mfg. Co., 947 F.2d 469, 475 n. 5 (Fed.Cir.1991) (remarking that district court committed legal error by reinterpreting an earlier Supreme Court case, rather than applying this court\u2019s subsequent interpretation of that case); see also Walton v. Bisco Indus., Inc., 119 F.3d 368, 371 n. 4 (5th Cir.1997) (\u201cTo the extent that [the appellant] believes that we have construed [an earlier Supreme Court decision] incorrectly, we note that absent an intervening Supreme Court decision or a decision by this court sitting en banc, we are bound by a prior panel\u2019s interpretation.\u201d); Tucker v. Phyfer, 819 F.2d 1030, 1035 n. 7 (11th Cir.1987) (\u201c[H]ad the [earlier] panel expressly considered [two Supreme Court decisions], we would be bound by its interpretation and application of those decisions.\u201d); Diamond Shamrock Co. v. N.L.R.B., 443 F.2d 52, 60 n. 27 (3d Cir.1971) (holding that court is bound by prior panel\u2019s interpretation of Supreme Court decision); cf. United States v. Rapanos, 376 F.3d 629, 642 (6th Cir.2004), vacated on other grounds, 547 U.S. 715, 126 S.Ct. 2208, 165 L.Ed.2d 159 (2006) (rejecting appellee\u2019s argument concerning interpretation of a Supreme Court decision because it had \u201cpreviously been adjudicated by this court, in a published disposition, and its conclusion is entitled to stare decisis \u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"rejecting appellee's argument concerning interpretation of a Supreme Court decision because it had \"previously been adjudicated by this court, in a published disposition, and its conclusion is entitled to stare decisis \"","sentence":"See, e.g., Barclay v. United States, 443 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed.Cir.2006) (\u201cPanels of this court are bound by previous prece-dential decisions until overturned by the Supreme Court or by this court en banc.\u201d); Foster v. Hallco Mfg. Co., 947 F.2d 469, 475 n. 5 (Fed.Cir.1991) (remarking that district court committed legal error by reinterpreting an earlier Supreme Court case, rather than applying this court\u2019s subsequent interpretation of that case); see also Walton v. Bisco Indus., Inc., 119 F.3d 368, 371 n. 4 (5th Cir.1997) (\u201cTo the extent that [the appellant] believes that we have construed [an earlier Supreme Court decision] incorrectly, we note that absent an intervening Supreme Court decision or a decision by this court sitting en banc, we are bound by a prior panel\u2019s interpretation.\u201d); Tucker v. Phyfer, 819 F.2d 1030, 1035 n. 7 (11th Cir.1987) (\u201c[H]ad the [earlier] panel expressly considered [two Supreme Court decisions], we would be bound by its interpretation and application of those decisions.\u201d); Diamond Shamrock Co. v. N.L.R.B., 443 F.2d 52, 60 n. 27 (3d Cir.1971) (holding that court is bound by prior panel\u2019s interpretation of Supreme Court decision); cf. United States v. Rapanos, 376 F.3d 629, 642 (6th Cir.2004), vacated on other grounds, 547 U.S. 715, 126 S.Ct. 2208, 165 L.Ed.2d 159 (2006) (rejecting appellee\u2019s argument concerning interpretation of a Supreme Court decision because it had \u201cpreviously been adjudicated by this court, in a published disposition, and its conclusion is entitled to stare decisis \u201d)."},"case_id":4262128,"label":"a"}
{"context":"It is the Loveladies court's interpretation of Keene that is binding on this panel.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[H]ad the [earlier] panel expressly considered [two Supreme Court decisions], we would be bound by its interpretation and application of those decisions.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Barclay v. United States, 443 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed.Cir.2006) (\u201cPanels of this court are bound by previous prece-dential decisions until overturned by the Supreme Court or by this court en banc.\u201d); Foster v. Hallco Mfg. Co., 947 F.2d 469, 475 n. 5 (Fed.Cir.1991) (remarking that district court committed legal error by reinterpreting an earlier Supreme Court case, rather than applying this court\u2019s subsequent interpretation of that case); see also Walton v. Bisco Indus., Inc., 119 F.3d 368, 371 n. 4 (5th Cir.1997) (\u201cTo the extent that [the appellant] believes that we have construed [an earlier Supreme Court decision] incorrectly, we note that absent an intervening Supreme Court decision or a decision by this court sitting en banc, we are bound by a prior panel\u2019s interpretation.\u201d); Tucker v. Phyfer, 819 F.2d 1030, 1035 n. 7 (11th Cir.1987) (\u201c[H]ad the [earlier] panel expressly considered [two Supreme Court decisions], we would be bound by its interpretation and application of those decisions.\u201d); Diamond Shamrock Co. v. N.L.R.B., 443 F.2d 52, 60 n. 27 (3d Cir.1971) (holding that court is bound by prior panel\u2019s interpretation of Supreme Court decision); cf. United States v. Rapanos, 376 F.3d 629, 642 (6th Cir.2004), vacated on other grounds, 547 U.S. 715, 126 S.Ct. 2208, 165 L.Ed.2d 159 (2006) (rejecting appellee\u2019s argument concerning interpretation of a Supreme Court decision because it had \u201cpreviously been adjudicated by this court, in a published disposition, and its conclusion is entitled to stare decisis \u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"376 F.3d 629, 642","parenthetical":"rejecting appellee's argument concerning interpretation of a Supreme Court decision because it had \"previously been adjudicated by this court, in a published disposition, and its conclusion is entitled to stare decisis \"","sentence":"See, e.g., Barclay v. United States, 443 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed.Cir.2006) (\u201cPanels of this court are bound by previous prece-dential decisions until overturned by the Supreme Court or by this court en banc.\u201d); Foster v. Hallco Mfg. Co., 947 F.2d 469, 475 n. 5 (Fed.Cir.1991) (remarking that district court committed legal error by reinterpreting an earlier Supreme Court case, rather than applying this court\u2019s subsequent interpretation of that case); see also Walton v. Bisco Indus., Inc., 119 F.3d 368, 371 n. 4 (5th Cir.1997) (\u201cTo the extent that [the appellant] believes that we have construed [an earlier Supreme Court decision] incorrectly, we note that absent an intervening Supreme Court decision or a decision by this court sitting en banc, we are bound by a prior panel\u2019s interpretation.\u201d); Tucker v. Phyfer, 819 F.2d 1030, 1035 n. 7 (11th Cir.1987) (\u201c[H]ad the [earlier] panel expressly considered [two Supreme Court decisions], we would be bound by its interpretation and application of those decisions.\u201d); Diamond Shamrock Co. v. N.L.R.B., 443 F.2d 52, 60 n. 27 (3d Cir.1971) (holding that court is bound by prior panel\u2019s interpretation of Supreme Court decision); cf. United States v. Rapanos, 376 F.3d 629, 642 (6th Cir.2004), vacated on other grounds, 547 U.S. 715, 126 S.Ct. 2208, 165 L.Ed.2d 159 (2006) (rejecting appellee\u2019s argument concerning interpretation of a Supreme Court decision because it had \u201cpreviously been adjudicated by this court, in a published disposition, and its conclusion is entitled to stare decisis \u201d)."},"case_id":4262128,"label":"a"}
{"context":"It is the Loveladies court's interpretation of Keene that is binding on this panel.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[H]ad the [earlier] panel expressly considered [two Supreme Court decisions], we would be bound by its interpretation and application of those decisions.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Barclay v. United States, 443 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed.Cir.2006) (\u201cPanels of this court are bound by previous prece-dential decisions until overturned by the Supreme Court or by this court en banc.\u201d); Foster v. Hallco Mfg. Co., 947 F.2d 469, 475 n. 5 (Fed.Cir.1991) (remarking that district court committed legal error by reinterpreting an earlier Supreme Court case, rather than applying this court\u2019s subsequent interpretation of that case); see also Walton v. Bisco Indus., Inc., 119 F.3d 368, 371 n. 4 (5th Cir.1997) (\u201cTo the extent that [the appellant] believes that we have construed [an earlier Supreme Court decision] incorrectly, we note that absent an intervening Supreme Court decision or a decision by this court sitting en banc, we are bound by a prior panel\u2019s interpretation.\u201d); Tucker v. Phyfer, 819 F.2d 1030, 1035 n. 7 (11th Cir.1987) (\u201c[H]ad the [earlier] panel expressly considered [two Supreme Court decisions], we would be bound by its interpretation and application of those decisions.\u201d); Diamond Shamrock Co. v. N.L.R.B., 443 F.2d 52, 60 n. 27 (3d Cir.1971) (holding that court is bound by prior panel\u2019s interpretation of Supreme Court decision); cf. United States v. Rapanos, 376 F.3d 629, 642 (6th Cir.2004), vacated on other grounds, 547 U.S. 715, 126 S.Ct. 2208, 165 L.Ed.2d 159 (2006) (rejecting appellee\u2019s argument concerning interpretation of a Supreme Court decision because it had \u201cpreviously been adjudicated by this court, in a published disposition, and its conclusion is entitled to stare decisis \u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"rejecting appellee's argument concerning interpretation of a Supreme Court decision because it had \"previously been adjudicated by this court, in a published disposition, and its conclusion is entitled to stare decisis \"","sentence":"See, e.g., Barclay v. United States, 443 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed.Cir.2006) (\u201cPanels of this court are bound by previous prece-dential decisions until overturned by the Supreme Court or by this court en banc.\u201d); Foster v. Hallco Mfg. Co., 947 F.2d 469, 475 n. 5 (Fed.Cir.1991) (remarking that district court committed legal error by reinterpreting an earlier Supreme Court case, rather than applying this court\u2019s subsequent interpretation of that case); see also Walton v. Bisco Indus., Inc., 119 F.3d 368, 371 n. 4 (5th Cir.1997) (\u201cTo the extent that [the appellant] believes that we have construed [an earlier Supreme Court decision] incorrectly, we note that absent an intervening Supreme Court decision or a decision by this court sitting en banc, we are bound by a prior panel\u2019s interpretation.\u201d); Tucker v. Phyfer, 819 F.2d 1030, 1035 n. 7 (11th Cir.1987) (\u201c[H]ad the [earlier] panel expressly considered [two Supreme Court decisions], we would be bound by its interpretation and application of those decisions.\u201d); Diamond Shamrock Co. v. N.L.R.B., 443 F.2d 52, 60 n. 27 (3d Cir.1971) (holding that court is bound by prior panel\u2019s interpretation of Supreme Court decision); cf. United States v. Rapanos, 376 F.3d 629, 642 (6th Cir.2004), vacated on other grounds, 547 U.S. 715, 126 S.Ct. 2208, 165 L.Ed.2d 159 (2006) (rejecting appellee\u2019s argument concerning interpretation of a Supreme Court decision because it had \u201cpreviously been adjudicated by this court, in a published disposition, and its conclusion is entitled to stare decisis \u201d)."},"case_id":4262128,"label":"a"}
{"context":"It is the Loveladies court's interpretation of Keene that is binding on this panel.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[H]ad the [earlier] panel expressly considered [two Supreme Court decisions], we would be bound by its interpretation and application of those decisions.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Barclay v. United States, 443 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed.Cir.2006) (\u201cPanels of this court are bound by previous prece-dential decisions until overturned by the Supreme Court or by this court en banc.\u201d); Foster v. Hallco Mfg. Co., 947 F.2d 469, 475 n. 5 (Fed.Cir.1991) (remarking that district court committed legal error by reinterpreting an earlier Supreme Court case, rather than applying this court\u2019s subsequent interpretation of that case); see also Walton v. Bisco Indus., Inc., 119 F.3d 368, 371 n. 4 (5th Cir.1997) (\u201cTo the extent that [the appellant] believes that we have construed [an earlier Supreme Court decision] incorrectly, we note that absent an intervening Supreme Court decision or a decision by this court sitting en banc, we are bound by a prior panel\u2019s interpretation.\u201d); Tucker v. Phyfer, 819 F.2d 1030, 1035 n. 7 (11th Cir.1987) (\u201c[H]ad the [earlier] panel expressly considered [two Supreme Court decisions], we would be bound by its interpretation and application of those decisions.\u201d); Diamond Shamrock Co. v. N.L.R.B., 443 F.2d 52, 60 n. 27 (3d Cir.1971) (holding that court is bound by prior panel\u2019s interpretation of Supreme Court decision); cf. United States v. Rapanos, 376 F.3d 629, 642 (6th Cir.2004), vacated on other grounds, 547 U.S. 715, 126 S.Ct. 2208, 165 L.Ed.2d 159 (2006) (rejecting appellee\u2019s argument concerning interpretation of a Supreme Court decision because it had \u201cpreviously been adjudicated by this court, in a published disposition, and its conclusion is entitled to stare decisis \u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"rejecting appellee's argument concerning interpretation of a Supreme Court decision because it had \"previously been adjudicated by this court, in a published disposition, and its conclusion is entitled to stare decisis \"","sentence":"See, e.g., Barclay v. United States, 443 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed.Cir.2006) (\u201cPanels of this court are bound by previous prece-dential decisions until overturned by the Supreme Court or by this court en banc.\u201d); Foster v. Hallco Mfg. Co., 947 F.2d 469, 475 n. 5 (Fed.Cir.1991) (remarking that district court committed legal error by reinterpreting an earlier Supreme Court case, rather than applying this court\u2019s subsequent interpretation of that case); see also Walton v. Bisco Indus., Inc., 119 F.3d 368, 371 n. 4 (5th Cir.1997) (\u201cTo the extent that [the appellant] believes that we have construed [an earlier Supreme Court decision] incorrectly, we note that absent an intervening Supreme Court decision or a decision by this court sitting en banc, we are bound by a prior panel\u2019s interpretation.\u201d); Tucker v. Phyfer, 819 F.2d 1030, 1035 n. 7 (11th Cir.1987) (\u201c[H]ad the [earlier] panel expressly considered [two Supreme Court decisions], we would be bound by its interpretation and application of those decisions.\u201d); Diamond Shamrock Co. v. N.L.R.B., 443 F.2d 52, 60 n. 27 (3d Cir.1971) (holding that court is bound by prior panel\u2019s interpretation of Supreme Court decision); cf. United States v. Rapanos, 376 F.3d 629, 642 (6th Cir.2004), vacated on other grounds, 547 U.S. 715, 126 S.Ct. 2208, 165 L.Ed.2d 159 (2006) (rejecting appellee\u2019s argument concerning interpretation of a Supreme Court decision because it had \u201cpreviously been adjudicated by this court, in a published disposition, and its conclusion is entitled to stare decisis \u201d)."},"case_id":4262128,"label":"a"}
{"context":"It is the Loveladies court's interpretation of Keene that is binding on this panel.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[H]ad the [earlier] panel expressly considered [two Supreme Court decisions], we would be bound by its interpretation and application of those decisions.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Barclay v. United States, 443 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed.Cir.2006) (\u201cPanels of this court are bound by previous prece-dential decisions until overturned by the Supreme Court or by this court en banc.\u201d); Foster v. Hallco Mfg. Co., 947 F.2d 469, 475 n. 5 (Fed.Cir.1991) (remarking that district court committed legal error by reinterpreting an earlier Supreme Court case, rather than applying this court\u2019s subsequent interpretation of that case); see also Walton v. Bisco Indus., Inc., 119 F.3d 368, 371 n. 4 (5th Cir.1997) (\u201cTo the extent that [the appellant] believes that we have construed [an earlier Supreme Court decision] incorrectly, we note that absent an intervening Supreme Court decision or a decision by this court sitting en banc, we are bound by a prior panel\u2019s interpretation.\u201d); Tucker v. Phyfer, 819 F.2d 1030, 1035 n. 7 (11th Cir.1987) (\u201c[H]ad the [earlier] panel expressly considered [two Supreme Court decisions], we would be bound by its interpretation and application of those decisions.\u201d); Diamond Shamrock Co. v. N.L.R.B., 443 F.2d 52, 60 n. 27 (3d Cir.1971) (holding that court is bound by prior panel\u2019s interpretation of Supreme Court decision); cf. United States v. Rapanos, 376 F.3d 629, 642 (6th Cir.2004), vacated on other grounds, 547 U.S. 715, 126 S.Ct. 2208, 165 L.Ed.2d 159 (2006) (rejecting appellee\u2019s argument concerning interpretation of a Supreme Court decision because it had \u201cpreviously been adjudicated by this court, in a published disposition, and its conclusion is entitled to stare decisis \u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"rejecting appellee's argument concerning interpretation of a Supreme Court decision because it had \"previously been adjudicated by this court, in a published disposition, and its conclusion is entitled to stare decisis \"","sentence":"See, e.g., Barclay v. United States, 443 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed.Cir.2006) (\u201cPanels of this court are bound by previous prece-dential decisions until overturned by the Supreme Court or by this court en banc.\u201d); Foster v. Hallco Mfg. Co., 947 F.2d 469, 475 n. 5 (Fed.Cir.1991) (remarking that district court committed legal error by reinterpreting an earlier Supreme Court case, rather than applying this court\u2019s subsequent interpretation of that case); see also Walton v. Bisco Indus., Inc., 119 F.3d 368, 371 n. 4 (5th Cir.1997) (\u201cTo the extent that [the appellant] believes that we have construed [an earlier Supreme Court decision] incorrectly, we note that absent an intervening Supreme Court decision or a decision by this court sitting en banc, we are bound by a prior panel\u2019s interpretation.\u201d); Tucker v. Phyfer, 819 F.2d 1030, 1035 n. 7 (11th Cir.1987) (\u201c[H]ad the [earlier] panel expressly considered [two Supreme Court decisions], we would be bound by its interpretation and application of those decisions.\u201d); Diamond Shamrock Co. v. N.L.R.B., 443 F.2d 52, 60 n. 27 (3d Cir.1971) (holding that court is bound by prior panel\u2019s interpretation of Supreme Court decision); cf. United States v. Rapanos, 376 F.3d 629, 642 (6th Cir.2004), vacated on other grounds, 547 U.S. 715, 126 S.Ct. 2208, 165 L.Ed.2d 159 (2006) (rejecting appellee\u2019s argument concerning interpretation of a Supreme Court decision because it had \u201cpreviously been adjudicated by this court, in a published disposition, and its conclusion is entitled to stare decisis \u201d)."},"case_id":4262128,"label":"a"}
{"context":"It is the Loveladies court's interpretation of Keene that is binding on this panel.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"376 F.3d 629, 642","parenthetical":"rejecting appellee's argument concerning interpretation of a Supreme Court decision because it had \"previously been adjudicated by this court, in a published disposition, and its conclusion is entitled to stare decisis \"","sentence":"See, e.g., Barclay v. United States, 443 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed.Cir.2006) (\u201cPanels of this court are bound by previous prece-dential decisions until overturned by the Supreme Court or by this court en banc.\u201d); Foster v. Hallco Mfg. Co., 947 F.2d 469, 475 n. 5 (Fed.Cir.1991) (remarking that district court committed legal error by reinterpreting an earlier Supreme Court case, rather than applying this court\u2019s subsequent interpretation of that case); see also Walton v. Bisco Indus., Inc., 119 F.3d 368, 371 n. 4 (5th Cir.1997) (\u201cTo the extent that [the appellant] believes that we have construed [an earlier Supreme Court decision] incorrectly, we note that absent an intervening Supreme Court decision or a decision by this court sitting en banc, we are bound by a prior panel\u2019s interpretation.\u201d); Tucker v. Phyfer, 819 F.2d 1030, 1035 n. 7 (11th Cir.1987) (\u201c[H]ad the [earlier] panel expressly considered [two Supreme Court decisions], we would be bound by its interpretation and application of those decisions.\u201d); Diamond Shamrock Co. v. N.L.R.B., 443 F.2d 52, 60 n. 27 (3d Cir.1971) (holding that court is bound by prior panel\u2019s interpretation of Supreme Court decision); cf. United States v. Rapanos, 376 F.3d 629, 642 (6th Cir.2004), vacated on other grounds, 547 U.S. 715, 126 S.Ct. 2208, 165 L.Ed.2d 159 (2006) (rejecting appellee\u2019s argument concerning interpretation of a Supreme Court decision because it had \u201cpreviously been adjudicated by this court, in a published disposition, and its conclusion is entitled to stare decisis \u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that court is bound by prior panel's interpretation of Supreme Court decision","sentence":"See, e.g., Barclay v. United States, 443 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed.Cir.2006) (\u201cPanels of this court are bound by previous prece-dential decisions until overturned by the Supreme Court or by this court en banc.\u201d); Foster v. Hallco Mfg. Co., 947 F.2d 469, 475 n. 5 (Fed.Cir.1991) (remarking that district court committed legal error by reinterpreting an earlier Supreme Court case, rather than applying this court\u2019s subsequent interpretation of that case); see also Walton v. Bisco Indus., Inc., 119 F.3d 368, 371 n. 4 (5th Cir.1997) (\u201cTo the extent that [the appellant] believes that we have construed [an earlier Supreme Court decision] incorrectly, we note that absent an intervening Supreme Court decision or a decision by this court sitting en banc, we are bound by a prior panel\u2019s interpretation.\u201d); Tucker v. Phyfer, 819 F.2d 1030, 1035 n. 7 (11th Cir.1987) (\u201c[H]ad the [earlier] panel expressly considered [two Supreme Court decisions], we would be bound by its interpretation and application of those decisions.\u201d); Diamond Shamrock Co. v. N.L.R.B., 443 F.2d 52, 60 n. 27 (3d Cir.1971) (holding that court is bound by prior panel\u2019s interpretation of Supreme Court decision); cf. United States v. Rapanos, 376 F.3d 629, 642 (6th Cir.2004), vacated on other grounds, 547 U.S. 715, 126 S.Ct. 2208, 165 L.Ed.2d 159 (2006) (rejecting appellee\u2019s argument concerning interpretation of a Supreme Court decision because it had \u201cpreviously been adjudicated by this court, in a published disposition, and its conclusion is entitled to stare decisis \u201d)."},"case_id":4262128,"label":"b"}
{"context":"It is the Loveladies court's interpretation of Keene that is binding on this panel.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that court is bound by prior panel's interpretation of Supreme Court decision","sentence":"See, e.g., Barclay v. United States, 443 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed.Cir.2006) (\u201cPanels of this court are bound by previous prece-dential decisions until overturned by the Supreme Court or by this court en banc.\u201d); Foster v. Hallco Mfg. Co., 947 F.2d 469, 475 n. 5 (Fed.Cir.1991) (remarking that district court committed legal error by reinterpreting an earlier Supreme Court case, rather than applying this court\u2019s subsequent interpretation of that case); see also Walton v. Bisco Indus., Inc., 119 F.3d 368, 371 n. 4 (5th Cir.1997) (\u201cTo the extent that [the appellant] believes that we have construed [an earlier Supreme Court decision] incorrectly, we note that absent an intervening Supreme Court decision or a decision by this court sitting en banc, we are bound by a prior panel\u2019s interpretation.\u201d); Tucker v. Phyfer, 819 F.2d 1030, 1035 n. 7 (11th Cir.1987) (\u201c[H]ad the [earlier] panel expressly considered [two Supreme Court decisions], we would be bound by its interpretation and application of those decisions.\u201d); Diamond Shamrock Co. v. N.L.R.B., 443 F.2d 52, 60 n. 27 (3d Cir.1971) (holding that court is bound by prior panel\u2019s interpretation of Supreme Court decision); cf. United States v. Rapanos, 376 F.3d 629, 642 (6th Cir.2004), vacated on other grounds, 547 U.S. 715, 126 S.Ct. 2208, 165 L.Ed.2d 159 (2006) (rejecting appellee\u2019s argument concerning interpretation of a Supreme Court decision because it had \u201cpreviously been adjudicated by this court, in a published disposition, and its conclusion is entitled to stare decisis \u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"rejecting appellee's argument concerning interpretation of a Supreme Court decision because it had \"previously been adjudicated by this court, in a published disposition, and its conclusion is entitled to stare decisis \"","sentence":"See, e.g., Barclay v. United States, 443 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed.Cir.2006) (\u201cPanels of this court are bound by previous prece-dential decisions until overturned by the Supreme Court or by this court en banc.\u201d); Foster v. Hallco Mfg. Co., 947 F.2d 469, 475 n. 5 (Fed.Cir.1991) (remarking that district court committed legal error by reinterpreting an earlier Supreme Court case, rather than applying this court\u2019s subsequent interpretation of that case); see also Walton v. Bisco Indus., Inc., 119 F.3d 368, 371 n. 4 (5th Cir.1997) (\u201cTo the extent that [the appellant] believes that we have construed [an earlier Supreme Court decision] incorrectly, we note that absent an intervening Supreme Court decision or a decision by this court sitting en banc, we are bound by a prior panel\u2019s interpretation.\u201d); Tucker v. Phyfer, 819 F.2d 1030, 1035 n. 7 (11th Cir.1987) (\u201c[H]ad the [earlier] panel expressly considered [two Supreme Court decisions], we would be bound by its interpretation and application of those decisions.\u201d); Diamond Shamrock Co. v. N.L.R.B., 443 F.2d 52, 60 n. 27 (3d Cir.1971) (holding that court is bound by prior panel\u2019s interpretation of Supreme Court decision); cf. United States v. Rapanos, 376 F.3d 629, 642 (6th Cir.2004), vacated on other grounds, 547 U.S. 715, 126 S.Ct. 2208, 165 L.Ed.2d 159 (2006) (rejecting appellee\u2019s argument concerning interpretation of a Supreme Court decision because it had \u201cpreviously been adjudicated by this court, in a published disposition, and its conclusion is entitled to stare decisis \u201d)."},"case_id":4262128,"label":"a"}
{"context":"It is the Loveladies court's interpretation of Keene that is binding on this panel.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that court is bound by prior panel's interpretation of Supreme Court decision","sentence":"See, e.g., Barclay v. United States, 443 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed.Cir.2006) (\u201cPanels of this court are bound by previous prece-dential decisions until overturned by the Supreme Court or by this court en banc.\u201d); Foster v. Hallco Mfg. Co., 947 F.2d 469, 475 n. 5 (Fed.Cir.1991) (remarking that district court committed legal error by reinterpreting an earlier Supreme Court case, rather than applying this court\u2019s subsequent interpretation of that case); see also Walton v. Bisco Indus., Inc., 119 F.3d 368, 371 n. 4 (5th Cir.1997) (\u201cTo the extent that [the appellant] believes that we have construed [an earlier Supreme Court decision] incorrectly, we note that absent an intervening Supreme Court decision or a decision by this court sitting en banc, we are bound by a prior panel\u2019s interpretation.\u201d); Tucker v. Phyfer, 819 F.2d 1030, 1035 n. 7 (11th Cir.1987) (\u201c[H]ad the [earlier] panel expressly considered [two Supreme Court decisions], we would be bound by its interpretation and application of those decisions.\u201d); Diamond Shamrock Co. v. N.L.R.B., 443 F.2d 52, 60 n. 27 (3d Cir.1971) (holding that court is bound by prior panel\u2019s interpretation of Supreme Court decision); cf. United States v. Rapanos, 376 F.3d 629, 642 (6th Cir.2004), vacated on other grounds, 547 U.S. 715, 126 S.Ct. 2208, 165 L.Ed.2d 159 (2006) (rejecting appellee\u2019s argument concerning interpretation of a Supreme Court decision because it had \u201cpreviously been adjudicated by this court, in a published disposition, and its conclusion is entitled to stare decisis \u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"rejecting appellee's argument concerning interpretation of a Supreme Court decision because it had \"previously been adjudicated by this court, in a published disposition, and its conclusion is entitled to stare decisis \"","sentence":"See, e.g., Barclay v. United States, 443 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed.Cir.2006) (\u201cPanels of this court are bound by previous prece-dential decisions until overturned by the Supreme Court or by this court en banc.\u201d); Foster v. Hallco Mfg. Co., 947 F.2d 469, 475 n. 5 (Fed.Cir.1991) (remarking that district court committed legal error by reinterpreting an earlier Supreme Court case, rather than applying this court\u2019s subsequent interpretation of that case); see also Walton v. Bisco Indus., Inc., 119 F.3d 368, 371 n. 4 (5th Cir.1997) (\u201cTo the extent that [the appellant] believes that we have construed [an earlier Supreme Court decision] incorrectly, we note that absent an intervening Supreme Court decision or a decision by this court sitting en banc, we are bound by a prior panel\u2019s interpretation.\u201d); Tucker v. Phyfer, 819 F.2d 1030, 1035 n. 7 (11th Cir.1987) (\u201c[H]ad the [earlier] panel expressly considered [two Supreme Court decisions], we would be bound by its interpretation and application of those decisions.\u201d); Diamond Shamrock Co. v. N.L.R.B., 443 F.2d 52, 60 n. 27 (3d Cir.1971) (holding that court is bound by prior panel\u2019s interpretation of Supreme Court decision); cf. United States v. Rapanos, 376 F.3d 629, 642 (6th Cir.2004), vacated on other grounds, 547 U.S. 715, 126 S.Ct. 2208, 165 L.Ed.2d 159 (2006) (rejecting appellee\u2019s argument concerning interpretation of a Supreme Court decision because it had \u201cpreviously been adjudicated by this court, in a published disposition, and its conclusion is entitled to stare decisis \u201d)."},"case_id":4262128,"label":"a"}
{"context":"It is the Loveladies court's interpretation of Keene that is binding on this panel.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that court is bound by prior panel's interpretation of Supreme Court decision","sentence":"See, e.g., Barclay v. United States, 443 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed.Cir.2006) (\u201cPanels of this court are bound by previous prece-dential decisions until overturned by the Supreme Court or by this court en banc.\u201d); Foster v. Hallco Mfg. Co., 947 F.2d 469, 475 n. 5 (Fed.Cir.1991) (remarking that district court committed legal error by reinterpreting an earlier Supreme Court case, rather than applying this court\u2019s subsequent interpretation of that case); see also Walton v. Bisco Indus., Inc., 119 F.3d 368, 371 n. 4 (5th Cir.1997) (\u201cTo the extent that [the appellant] believes that we have construed [an earlier Supreme Court decision] incorrectly, we note that absent an intervening Supreme Court decision or a decision by this court sitting en banc, we are bound by a prior panel\u2019s interpretation.\u201d); Tucker v. Phyfer, 819 F.2d 1030, 1035 n. 7 (11th Cir.1987) (\u201c[H]ad the [earlier] panel expressly considered [two Supreme Court decisions], we would be bound by its interpretation and application of those decisions.\u201d); Diamond Shamrock Co. v. N.L.R.B., 443 F.2d 52, 60 n. 27 (3d Cir.1971) (holding that court is bound by prior panel\u2019s interpretation of Supreme Court decision); cf. United States v. Rapanos, 376 F.3d 629, 642 (6th Cir.2004), vacated on other grounds, 547 U.S. 715, 126 S.Ct. 2208, 165 L.Ed.2d 159 (2006) (rejecting appellee\u2019s argument concerning interpretation of a Supreme Court decision because it had \u201cpreviously been adjudicated by this court, in a published disposition, and its conclusion is entitled to stare decisis \u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"rejecting appellee's argument concerning interpretation of a Supreme Court decision because it had \"previously been adjudicated by this court, in a published disposition, and its conclusion is entitled to stare decisis \"","sentence":"See, e.g., Barclay v. United States, 443 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed.Cir.2006) (\u201cPanels of this court are bound by previous prece-dential decisions until overturned by the Supreme Court or by this court en banc.\u201d); Foster v. Hallco Mfg. Co., 947 F.2d 469, 475 n. 5 (Fed.Cir.1991) (remarking that district court committed legal error by reinterpreting an earlier Supreme Court case, rather than applying this court\u2019s subsequent interpretation of that case); see also Walton v. Bisco Indus., Inc., 119 F.3d 368, 371 n. 4 (5th Cir.1997) (\u201cTo the extent that [the appellant] believes that we have construed [an earlier Supreme Court decision] incorrectly, we note that absent an intervening Supreme Court decision or a decision by this court sitting en banc, we are bound by a prior panel\u2019s interpretation.\u201d); Tucker v. Phyfer, 819 F.2d 1030, 1035 n. 7 (11th Cir.1987) (\u201c[H]ad the [earlier] panel expressly considered [two Supreme Court decisions], we would be bound by its interpretation and application of those decisions.\u201d); Diamond Shamrock Co. v. N.L.R.B., 443 F.2d 52, 60 n. 27 (3d Cir.1971) (holding that court is bound by prior panel\u2019s interpretation of Supreme Court decision); cf. United States v. Rapanos, 376 F.3d 629, 642 (6th Cir.2004), vacated on other grounds, 547 U.S. 715, 126 S.Ct. 2208, 165 L.Ed.2d 159 (2006) (rejecting appellee\u2019s argument concerning interpretation of a Supreme Court decision because it had \u201cpreviously been adjudicated by this court, in a published disposition, and its conclusion is entitled to stare decisis \u201d)."},"case_id":4262128,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In Section 282 proceedings, a party accused of infringement may claim, as an affirmative defense, that the relevant patent is invalid due to obviousness. To prevail on this defense, the accused infringer must show obviousness by clear'and convincing evidence. Section 282 is a fundamentally different context than the present one, and the burdens of proof governing those proceedings are inapplicable here.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"540 F.3d 1377, 1377","parenthetical":"noting that PTO examination and reexamination proceedings \"have distinctly different standards, parties, purposes, and outcomes\" than Section 282 infringement proceedings","sentence":"See In re Swanson, 540 F.3d at 1377 (noting that PTO examination and reexamination proceedings \u201chave distinctly different standards, parties, purposes, and outcomes\u201d than Section 282 infringement proceedings); In re Etter, 756 F.2d at 855-59; cf. Sciele Pharma Inc. v. Lupin Ltd., 684 F.3d 1253, 1260 (Fed.Cir.2012) (noting that the clear and convincing standard applicable in Section 282 proceedings is rooted in a \u201cnecessary deference to the PTO\u201d) (internal quotation omitted)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"684 F.3d 1253, 1260","parenthetical":"noting that the clear and convincing standard applicable in Section 282 proceedings is rooted in a \"necessary deference to the PTO\"","sentence":"See In re Swanson, 540 F.3d at 1377 (noting that PTO examination and reexamination proceedings \u201chave distinctly different standards, parties, purposes, and outcomes\u201d than Section 282 infringement proceedings); In re Etter, 756 F.2d at 855-59; cf. Sciele Pharma Inc. v. Lupin Ltd., 684 F.3d 1253, 1260 (Fed.Cir.2012) (noting that the clear and convincing standard applicable in Section 282 proceedings is rooted in a \u201cnecessary deference to the PTO\u201d) (internal quotation omitted)."},"case_id":4128724,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Delaware courts have repeatedly held that majority voting power, without more, is not enough to \"strip the directors of the presumptions of independence, and that their acts have been taken in good faith and in the best interests of the corporation.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"845 A.2d 1051, 1051","parenthetical":"finding 94% voting power insufficient to rebut presumption of outside directors' independence","sentence":"Aronson, 473 A.2d at 815-16; see Stewart, 845 A.2d at 1051 (finding 94% voting power insufficient to rebut presumption of outside directors\u2019 independence); see also Zimmerman v. Braddock, No. 18473-NC, 2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS 135, 2005 WL 2266566, at *8 (Del. Ch. Sept. 8, 2005) (finding that 48% stock ownership alone is not sufficient proof of domination of control of the board)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding that 48% stock ownership alone is not sufficient proof of domination of control of the board","sentence":"Aronson, 473 A.2d at 815-16; see Stewart, 845 A.2d at 1051 (finding 94% voting power insufficient to rebut presumption of outside directors\u2019 independence); see also Zimmerman v. Braddock, No. 18473-NC, 2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS 135, 2005 WL 2266566, at *8 (Del. Ch. Sept. 8, 2005) (finding that 48% stock ownership alone is not sufficient proof of domination of control of the board)."},"case_id":4013955,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Delaware courts have repeatedly held that majority voting power, without more, is not enough to \"strip the directors of the presumptions of independence, and that their acts have been taken in good faith and in the best interests of the corporation.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"845 A.2d 1051, 1051","parenthetical":"finding 94% voting power insufficient to rebut presumption of outside directors' independence","sentence":"Aronson, 473 A.2d at 815-16; see Stewart, 845 A.2d at 1051 (finding 94% voting power insufficient to rebut presumption of outside directors\u2019 independence); see also Zimmerman v. Braddock, No. 18473-NC, 2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS 135, 2005 WL 2266566, at *8 (Del. Ch. Sept. 8, 2005) (finding that 48% stock ownership alone is not sufficient proof of domination of control of the board)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"2005 WL 2266566, at *8","parenthetical":"finding that 48% stock ownership alone is not sufficient proof of domination of control of the board","sentence":"Aronson, 473 A.2d at 815-16; see Stewart, 845 A.2d at 1051 (finding 94% voting power insufficient to rebut presumption of outside directors\u2019 independence); see also Zimmerman v. Braddock, No. 18473-NC, 2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS 135, 2005 WL 2266566, at *8 (Del. Ch. Sept. 8, 2005) (finding that 48% stock ownership alone is not sufficient proof of domination of control of the board)."},"case_id":4013955,"label":"a"}
{"context":"As a preliminary matter, the Court holds that Xerox bears the burden of demonstrating that the collateral source rule does not apply.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"619 F.2d 1299, 1305-06","parenthetical":"plaintiff receiving Medicare benefits must \"show he has contributed to the fund he claims as a collateral source\" in order to invoke the collateral source rule","sentence":"But see Overton v. United States, 619 F.2d 1299, 1305-06 (8th Cir.1980) (plaintiff receiving Medicare benefits must \u201cshow he has contributed to the fund he claims as a collateral source\u201d in order to invoke the collateral source rule)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"766 F.2d 788, 795","parenthetical":"\"[a]s between the employer, whose action caused the discharge, and the employee, who may have experienced other noneompensable losses, it is fitting that the burden be placed on the employer.\"","sentence":"Hylind, 481 Fed.Appx. at 824 (citing Sloas, 616 F.3d at 389). Accord, Promisel v. First Am. Artificial Flowers, Inc., 943 F.2d 251, 258 (2d Cir.1991) (finding employer waived its claim to offset social security and unemployment payments from the damage award when it failed to object at trial); Maxfield v. Sinclair Int\u2019l, 766 F.2d 788, 795 (3d Cir.1985) (\u201c[a]s between the employer, whose action caused the discharge, and the employee, who may have experienced other noneompensable losses, it is fitting that the burden be placed on the employer.\u201d)."},"case_id":4323324,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The use of medical experts to determine issues continued throughout the 1800s. With time, Delaware Courts allowed expert testimony to be used to prove matters beyond medicine.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"allowing a locomotive engineer to give his opinion in a negligence case as to whether a train car could have stopped more quickly with the application of sand to the steel rails","sentence":"See Rice v. Pennypacker, Del. Ch., 5 Del. Ch. 33 (1875) (admitting expert testimony in the science of bookkeeping); Maxwell v. Wilmington City Railway Co., Del. Super., 1 Marv. 199, 40 A. 945, 946 (1893) (allowing a locomotive engineer to give his opinion in a negligence case as to whether a train car could have stopped more quickly with the application of sand to the steel rails); but see State v. Fleming, Del. Ch., 3 Del.Ch. 517 (1867) (not allowing expert testimony on the issue of whether a trustee had acted with due diligence and fidelity because, as the Court noted: \u201c[i]t is for the Court, not for the witnesses, to adjudge the question of neglect, bad faith or mismanagement).\u201d"},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"not allowing expert testimony on the issue of whether a trustee had acted with due diligence and fidelity because, as the Court noted: \"[i]t is for the Court, not for the witnesses, to adjudge the question of neglect, bad faith or mismanagement","sentence":"See Rice v. Pennypacker, Del. Ch., 5 Del. Ch. 33 (1875) (admitting expert testimony in the science of bookkeeping); Maxwell v. Wilmington City Railway Co., Del. Super., 1 Marv. 199, 40 A. 945, 946 (1893) (allowing a locomotive engineer to give his opinion in a negligence case as to whether a train car could have stopped more quickly with the application of sand to the steel rails); but see State v. Fleming, Del. Ch., 3 Del.Ch. 517 (1867) (not allowing expert testimony on the issue of whether a trustee had acted with due diligence and fidelity because, as the Court noted: \u201c[i]t is for the Court, not for the witnesses, to adjudge the question of neglect, bad faith or mismanagement).\u201d"},"case_id":9476352,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The use of medical experts to determine issues continued throughout the 1800s. With time, Delaware Courts allowed expert testimony to be used to prove matters beyond medicine.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"not allowing expert testimony on the issue of whether a trustee had acted with due diligence and fidelity because, as the Court noted: \"[i]t is for the Court, not for the witnesses, to adjudge the question of neglect, bad faith or mismanagement","sentence":"See Rice v. Pennypacker, Del. Ch., 5 Del. Ch. 33 (1875) (admitting expert testimony in the science of bookkeeping); Maxwell v. Wilmington City Railway Co., Del. Super., 1 Marv. 199, 40 A. 945, 946 (1893) (allowing a locomotive engineer to give his opinion in a negligence case as to whether a train car could have stopped more quickly with the application of sand to the steel rails); but see State v. Fleming, Del. Ch., 3 Del.Ch. 517 (1867) (not allowing expert testimony on the issue of whether a trustee had acted with due diligence and fidelity because, as the Court noted: \u201c[i]t is for the Court, not for the witnesses, to adjudge the question of neglect, bad faith or mismanagement).\u201d"},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"40 A. 945, 946","parenthetical":"allowing a locomotive engineer to give his opinion in a negligence case as to whether a train car could have stopped more quickly with the application of sand to the steel rails","sentence":"See Rice v. Pennypacker, Del. Ch., 5 Del. Ch. 33 (1875) (admitting expert testimony in the science of bookkeeping); Maxwell v. Wilmington City Railway Co., Del. Super., 1 Marv. 199, 40 A. 945, 946 (1893) (allowing a locomotive engineer to give his opinion in a negligence case as to whether a train car could have stopped more quickly with the application of sand to the steel rails); but see State v. Fleming, Del. Ch., 3 Del.Ch. 517 (1867) (not allowing expert testimony on the issue of whether a trustee had acted with due diligence and fidelity because, as the Court noted: \u201c[i]t is for the Court, not for the witnesses, to adjudge the question of neglect, bad faith or mismanagement).\u201d"},"case_id":9476352,"label":"b"}
{"context":"While the plaintiffs here argue that since Guffy was not decided until after they filed suit, and as such should not be applied retroactively today, the plaintiffs are mistaken. Because this Court handed down Guffy while this litigation was ongoing between the parties, we find Guffy controlling.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"813 So.2d 717, 721","parenthetical":"retroactive application of judicially articulated rulings applied to cases awaiting trial","sentence":"See Thompson v. City of Vicksburg, 813 So.2d 717, 721 (Miss.2002) (retroactive application of judicially articulated rulings applied to cases awaiting trial); see also Anderson v. Anderson, 692 So.2d 65, 70 (Miss.1997) (change in the law applied retroactively to the case pending review on appeal)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"692 So.2d 65, 70","parenthetical":"change in the law applied retroactively to the case pending review on appeal","sentence":"See Thompson v. City of Vicksburg, 813 So.2d 717, 721 (Miss.2002) (retroactive application of judicially articulated rulings applied to cases awaiting trial); see also Anderson v. Anderson, 692 So.2d 65, 70 (Miss.1997) (change in the law applied retroactively to the case pending review on appeal)."},"case_id":8174595,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Notwithstanding the Government's argument that we lack jurisdiction to review the IJ's pretermission of Chen's asylum application under 8 U.S.C. SS 1158(a), we assume hypothetical jurisdiction over that application because the jurisdictional issues presented here are complex, and because the substance of that application is without merit.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"378 F.3d 173, 180","parenthetical":"asserting hypothetical jurisdiction when the jurisdictional issues related to statutory and not constitutional jurisdiction","sentence":"See Abimbola v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 173, 180 (2d Cir.2004) (asserting hypothetical jurisdiction when the jurisdictional issues related to statutory and not constitutional jurisdiction); see also Ivanishvili v. U.S. Dep\u2019t of Justice, 433 F.3d 332, 338 (2d Cir.2006) (\u201cOur assumption of jurisdiction to consider first the merits is not barred where the jurisdictional constraints are imposed by statute, not the Constitution, and where the jurisdictional issues are complex and the substance of the claim is, as here, plainly without merit.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"433 F.3d 332, 338","parenthetical":"\"Our assumption of jurisdiction to consider first the merits is not barred where the jurisdictional constraints are imposed by statute, not the Constitution, and where the jurisdictional issues are complex and the substance of the claim is, as here, plainly without merit.\"","sentence":"See Abimbola v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 173, 180 (2d Cir.2004) (asserting hypothetical jurisdiction when the jurisdictional issues related to statutory and not constitutional jurisdiction); see also Ivanishvili v. U.S. Dep\u2019t of Justice, 433 F.3d 332, 338 (2d Cir.2006) (\u201cOur assumption of jurisdiction to consider first the merits is not barred where the jurisdictional constraints are imposed by statute, not the Constitution, and where the jurisdictional issues are complex and the substance of the claim is, as here, plainly without merit.\u201d)."},"case_id":4118542,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The Seventh Amendment \"preserve[s]\" the right to a jury trial as existed during the founding of this nation; it does not grant an unconditional right to a jury in all matters. And it is well settled that dismissal for failure to state a claim does not violate a party's right to a jury trial.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"It is well settled that an otherwise proper ruling is not erroneous merely because it has the incidental effect of precluding a jury trial.\"","sentence":"James v. Mann, 234 F.3d 1268, at *2 (6th Cir.2000) (unpublished table opinion); Anderson v. Law Firm of Shorty, Dooley & Hall, 393 Fed.Appx. 214 (5th Cir.2010); Henry v. Jones, 484 Fed.Appx. 290 (11th Cir.2012); Winslow v. Lehr, 646 F.Supp. 242 (D.Colo.1986); Allen v. Biggs, 62 F.Supp. 229 (E.D.Penn.1945); see Perkins v. Spivey, 911 F.2d 22, 28 n. 6 (8th Cir.1990) (\u201cIt is well settled that an otherwise proper ruling is not erroneous merely because it has the incidental effect of precluding a jury trial.\u201d); cf. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Md. v. United States, 187 U.S. 315, 23 S.Ct. 120, 47 L.Ed. 194 (1902) (summary judgment does not violate Seventh Amendment right to jury); Biegas v. Quickway Carriers, Inc., 573 F.3d 365 (6th Cir.2009) (same); Oglesby v. Terminal Transp. Co., 543 F.2d 1111 (5th Cir.1976) (same); Garvie v. City of Ft. Walton Beach, 366 F.3d 1186 (11th Cir.2004) (same)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"summary judgment does not violate Seventh Amendment right to jury","sentence":"James v. Mann, 234 F.3d 1268, at *2 (6th Cir.2000) (unpublished table opinion); Anderson v. Law Firm of Shorty, Dooley & Hall, 393 Fed.Appx. 214 (5th Cir.2010); Henry v. Jones, 484 Fed.Appx. 290 (11th Cir.2012); Winslow v. Lehr, 646 F.Supp. 242 (D.Colo.1986); Allen v. Biggs, 62 F.Supp. 229 (E.D.Penn.1945); see Perkins v. Spivey, 911 F.2d 22, 28 n. 6 (8th Cir.1990) (\u201cIt is well settled that an otherwise proper ruling is not erroneous merely because it has the incidental effect of precluding a jury trial.\u201d); cf. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Md. v. United States, 187 U.S. 315, 23 S.Ct. 120, 47 L.Ed. 194 (1902) (summary judgment does not violate Seventh Amendment right to jury); Biegas v. Quickway Carriers, Inc., 573 F.3d 365 (6th Cir.2009) (same); Oglesby v. Terminal Transp. Co., 543 F.2d 1111 (5th Cir.1976) (same); Garvie v. City of Ft. Walton Beach, 366 F.3d 1186 (11th Cir.2004) (same)."},"case_id":6928009,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The Seventh Amendment \"preserve[s]\" the right to a jury trial as existed during the founding of this nation; it does not grant an unconditional right to a jury in all matters. And it is well settled that dismissal for failure to state a claim does not violate a party's right to a jury trial.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"summary judgment does not violate Seventh Amendment right to jury","sentence":"James v. Mann, 234 F.3d 1268, at *2 (6th Cir.2000) (unpublished table opinion); Anderson v. Law Firm of Shorty, Dooley & Hall, 393 Fed.Appx. 214 (5th Cir.2010); Henry v. Jones, 484 Fed.Appx. 290 (11th Cir.2012); Winslow v. Lehr, 646 F.Supp. 242 (D.Colo.1986); Allen v. Biggs, 62 F.Supp. 229 (E.D.Penn.1945); see Perkins v. Spivey, 911 F.2d 22, 28 n. 6 (8th Cir.1990) (\u201cIt is well settled that an otherwise proper ruling is not erroneous merely because it has the incidental effect of precluding a jury trial.\u201d); cf. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Md. v. United States, 187 U.S. 315, 23 S.Ct. 120, 47 L.Ed. 194 (1902) (summary judgment does not violate Seventh Amendment right to jury); Biegas v. Quickway Carriers, Inc., 573 F.3d 365 (6th Cir.2009) (same); Oglesby v. Terminal Transp. Co., 543 F.2d 1111 (5th Cir.1976) (same); Garvie v. City of Ft. Walton Beach, 366 F.3d 1186 (11th Cir.2004) (same)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"It is well settled that an otherwise proper ruling is not erroneous merely because it has the incidental effect of precluding a jury trial.\"","sentence":"James v. Mann, 234 F.3d 1268, at *2 (6th Cir.2000) (unpublished table opinion); Anderson v. Law Firm of Shorty, Dooley & Hall, 393 Fed.Appx. 214 (5th Cir.2010); Henry v. Jones, 484 Fed.Appx. 290 (11th Cir.2012); Winslow v. Lehr, 646 F.Supp. 242 (D.Colo.1986); Allen v. Biggs, 62 F.Supp. 229 (E.D.Penn.1945); see Perkins v. Spivey, 911 F.2d 22, 28 n. 6 (8th Cir.1990) (\u201cIt is well settled that an otherwise proper ruling is not erroneous merely because it has the incidental effect of precluding a jury trial.\u201d); cf. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Md. v. United States, 187 U.S. 315, 23 S.Ct. 120, 47 L.Ed. 194 (1902) (summary judgment does not violate Seventh Amendment right to jury); Biegas v. Quickway Carriers, Inc., 573 F.3d 365 (6th Cir.2009) (same); Oglesby v. Terminal Transp. Co., 543 F.2d 1111 (5th Cir.1976) (same); Garvie v. City of Ft. Walton Beach, 366 F.3d 1186 (11th Cir.2004) (same)."},"case_id":6928009,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The Seventh Amendment \"preserve[s]\" the right to a jury trial as existed during the founding of this nation; it does not grant an unconditional right to a jury in all matters. And it is well settled that dismissal for failure to state a claim does not violate a party's right to a jury trial.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"summary judgment does not violate Seventh Amendment right to jury","sentence":"James v. Mann, 234 F.3d 1268, at *2 (6th Cir.2000) (unpublished table opinion); Anderson v. Law Firm of Shorty, Dooley & Hall, 393 Fed.Appx. 214 (5th Cir.2010); Henry v. Jones, 484 Fed.Appx. 290 (11th Cir.2012); Winslow v. Lehr, 646 F.Supp. 242 (D.Colo.1986); Allen v. Biggs, 62 F.Supp. 229 (E.D.Penn.1945); see Perkins v. Spivey, 911 F.2d 22, 28 n. 6 (8th Cir.1990) (\u201cIt is well settled that an otherwise proper ruling is not erroneous merely because it has the incidental effect of precluding a jury trial.\u201d); cf. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Md. v. United States, 187 U.S. 315, 23 S.Ct. 120, 47 L.Ed. 194 (1902) (summary judgment does not violate Seventh Amendment right to jury); Biegas v. Quickway Carriers, Inc., 573 F.3d 365 (6th Cir.2009) (same); Oglesby v. Terminal Transp. Co., 543 F.2d 1111 (5th Cir.1976) (same); Garvie v. City of Ft. Walton Beach, 366 F.3d 1186 (11th Cir.2004) (same)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"It is well settled that an otherwise proper ruling is not erroneous merely because it has the incidental effect of precluding a jury trial.\"","sentence":"James v. Mann, 234 F.3d 1268, at *2 (6th Cir.2000) (unpublished table opinion); Anderson v. Law Firm of Shorty, Dooley & Hall, 393 Fed.Appx. 214 (5th Cir.2010); Henry v. Jones, 484 Fed.Appx. 290 (11th Cir.2012); Winslow v. Lehr, 646 F.Supp. 242 (D.Colo.1986); Allen v. Biggs, 62 F.Supp. 229 (E.D.Penn.1945); see Perkins v. Spivey, 911 F.2d 22, 28 n. 6 (8th Cir.1990) (\u201cIt is well settled that an otherwise proper ruling is not erroneous merely because it has the incidental effect of precluding a jury trial.\u201d); cf. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Md. v. United States, 187 U.S. 315, 23 S.Ct. 120, 47 L.Ed. 194 (1902) (summary judgment does not violate Seventh Amendment right to jury); Biegas v. Quickway Carriers, Inc., 573 F.3d 365 (6th Cir.2009) (same); Oglesby v. Terminal Transp. Co., 543 F.2d 1111 (5th Cir.1976) (same); Garvie v. City of Ft. Walton Beach, 366 F.3d 1186 (11th Cir.2004) (same)."},"case_id":6928009,"label":"b"}
{"context":"His 17.5 year sentence does not exceed the maximum penalty set forth in SS 841(b)(1)(B), nor is it at or near the statutorily prescribed minimum penalty in this subsection. We therefore conclude that Lucas's sentence does not violate Apprendi.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"242 F.3d 348, 350-52","parenthetical":"holding that the defendant's rights under Appren-di were violated where the sentence was at the mandatory minimum for the judge-determined drug quantity and the judge felt constrained by the statute to impose this sentence","sentence":"See United States v. Garcia, 252 F.3d 838, 843 (6th Cir.2001) (holding that the defendant\u2019s sentence did not violate Apprendi where the actual sentence imposed did not exceed the maximum penalty corresponding to the quantity of drugs for which the defendant acknowledged responsibility, nor was the sentence at the bottom end of a higher statutory range of penalties); cf. United States v. Ramirez, 242 F.3d 348, 350-52 (6th Cir.2001) (holding that the defendant\u2019s rights under Appren-di were violated where the sentence was at the mandatory minimum for the judge-determined drug quantity and the judge felt constrained by the statute to impose this sentence)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"252 F.3d 838, 843","parenthetical":"holding that the defendant's sentence did not violate Apprendi where the actual sentence imposed did not exceed the maximum penalty corresponding to the quantity of drugs for which the defendant acknowledged responsibility, nor was the sentence at the bottom end of a higher statutory range of penalties","sentence":"See United States v. Garcia, 252 F.3d 838, 843 (6th Cir.2001) (holding that the defendant\u2019s sentence did not violate Apprendi where the actual sentence imposed did not exceed the maximum penalty corresponding to the quantity of drugs for which the defendant acknowledged responsibility, nor was the sentence at the bottom end of a higher statutory range of penalties); cf. United States v. Ramirez, 242 F.3d 348, 350-52 (6th Cir.2001) (holding that the defendant\u2019s rights under Appren-di were violated where the sentence was at the mandatory minimum for the judge-determined drug quantity and the judge felt constrained by the statute to impose this sentence)."},"case_id":9473677,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The same holds true for his prior convictions for pointing a firearm at another person and possessing a firearm after a felony conviction. By claiming as a defense that he was in the wrong place at the wrong time, Robertson placed his state of mind at issue for the charged firearms offenses.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"531 F.3d 1352, 1362","parenthetical":"listing \"knowing! ] ... possession]\" as an essential element of the crime of possessing a firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking","sentence":"See United States v. Moran, 503 F.3d 1135, 1144 (10th Cir.2007) (affirming the admission of an eleven year-old conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm to show \u201cknowing possession of the firearm,\u201d where the defendant denied knowledge of the gun\u2019s presence), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 128 S.Ct. 2424, 171 L.Ed.2d 234 (2008); cf. United States v. Woodard, 531 F.3d 1352, 1362 (11th Cir.2008) (listing \u201cknowing! ] ... possession]\u201d as an essential element of the crime of possessing a firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"503 F.3d 1135, 1144","parenthetical":"affirming the admission of an eleven year-old conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm to show \"knowing possession of the firearm,\" where the defendant denied knowledge of the gun's presence","sentence":"See United States v. Moran, 503 F.3d 1135, 1144 (10th Cir.2007) (affirming the admission of an eleven year-old conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm to show \u201cknowing possession of the firearm,\u201d where the defendant denied knowledge of the gun\u2019s presence), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 128 S.Ct. 2424, 171 L.Ed.2d 234 (2008); cf. United States v. Woodard, 531 F.3d 1352, 1362 (11th Cir.2008) (listing \u201cknowing! ] ... possession]\u201d as an essential element of the crime of possessing a firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking)."},"case_id":3986586,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The same holds true for his prior convictions for pointing a firearm at another person and possessing a firearm after a felony conviction. By claiming as a defense that he was in the wrong place at the wrong time, Robertson placed his state of mind at issue for the charged firearms offenses.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"531 F.3d 1352, 1362","parenthetical":"listing \"knowing! ] ... possession]\" as an essential element of the crime of possessing a firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking","sentence":"See United States v. Moran, 503 F.3d 1135, 1144 (10th Cir.2007) (affirming the admission of an eleven year-old conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm to show \u201cknowing possession of the firearm,\u201d where the defendant denied knowledge of the gun\u2019s presence), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 128 S.Ct. 2424, 171 L.Ed.2d 234 (2008); cf. United States v. Woodard, 531 F.3d 1352, 1362 (11th Cir.2008) (listing \u201cknowing! ] ... possession]\u201d as an essential element of the crime of possessing a firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"affirming the admission of an eleven year-old conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm to show \"knowing possession of the firearm,\" where the defendant denied knowledge of the gun's presence","sentence":"See United States v. Moran, 503 F.3d 1135, 1144 (10th Cir.2007) (affirming the admission of an eleven year-old conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm to show \u201cknowing possession of the firearm,\u201d where the defendant denied knowledge of the gun\u2019s presence), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 128 S.Ct. 2424, 171 L.Ed.2d 234 (2008); cf. United States v. Woodard, 531 F.3d 1352, 1362 (11th Cir.2008) (listing \u201cknowing! ] ... possession]\u201d as an essential element of the crime of possessing a firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking)."},"case_id":3986586,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The same holds true for his prior convictions for pointing a firearm at another person and possessing a firearm after a felony conviction. By claiming as a defense that he was in the wrong place at the wrong time, Robertson placed his state of mind at issue for the charged firearms offenses.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"affirming the admission of an eleven year-old conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm to show \"knowing possession of the firearm,\" where the defendant denied knowledge of the gun's presence","sentence":"See United States v. Moran, 503 F.3d 1135, 1144 (10th Cir.2007) (affirming the admission of an eleven year-old conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm to show \u201cknowing possession of the firearm,\u201d where the defendant denied knowledge of the gun\u2019s presence), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 128 S.Ct. 2424, 171 L.Ed.2d 234 (2008); cf. United States v. Woodard, 531 F.3d 1352, 1362 (11th Cir.2008) (listing \u201cknowing! ] ... possession]\u201d as an essential element of the crime of possessing a firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"531 F.3d 1352, 1362","parenthetical":"listing \"knowing! ] ... possession]\" as an essential element of the crime of possessing a firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking","sentence":"See United States v. Moran, 503 F.3d 1135, 1144 (10th Cir.2007) (affirming the admission of an eleven year-old conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm to show \u201cknowing possession of the firearm,\u201d where the defendant denied knowledge of the gun\u2019s presence), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 128 S.Ct. 2424, 171 L.Ed.2d 234 (2008); cf. United States v. Woodard, 531 F.3d 1352, 1362 (11th Cir.2008) (listing \u201cknowing! ] ... possession]\u201d as an essential element of the crime of possessing a firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking)."},"case_id":3986586,"label":"a"}
{"context":"As ProNav's new argument as to why the Court should have admitted the Lemiska evidence was not raised by ProNav at the time of trial and was far from obvious, the argument has been waived.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"378 F.3d 269, 281-82","parenthetical":"where defendant asserted a new argument for the admissibility of certain evidence, that it had failed to articulate at trial, this challenge to the trial judge's evidentiary ruling would not be entertained on appeal","sentence":"United States v. Cruz, 894 F.2d 41, 43-44 (2d Cir.1990) (\u201cUnless the basis for a-proposed admission is obvious, it is the burden of counsel who seeks admission to alert the Court to the legal basis for the proffer.\u201d) (quotation omitted); see also Ramey v. District 141, Int\u2019l Assoc. of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, 378 F.3d 269, 281-82 (2d Cir.2004) (where defendant asserted a new argument for the admissibility of certain evidence, that it had failed to articulate at trial, this challenge to the trial judge\u2019s evidentiary ruling would not be entertained on appeal); Fed.R.Evid. 103."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"894 F.2d 41, 43-44","parenthetical":"\"Unless the basis for a-proposed admission is obvious, it is the burden of counsel who seeks admission to alert the Court to the legal basis for the proffer.\"","sentence":"United States v. Cruz, 894 F.2d 41, 43-44 (2d Cir.1990) (\u201cUnless the basis for a-proposed admission is obvious, it is the burden of counsel who seeks admission to alert the Court to the legal basis for the proffer.\u201d) (quotation omitted); see also Ramey v. District 141, Int\u2019l Assoc. of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, 378 F.3d 269, 281-82 (2d Cir.2004) (where defendant asserted a new argument for the admissibility of certain evidence, that it had failed to articulate at trial, this challenge to the trial judge\u2019s evidentiary ruling would not be entertained on appeal); Fed.R.Evid. 103."},"case_id":1496950,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Before trial the Thomases stipulated that the issue of Mayflower's fault would be submitted to the jury so the jury could compare Mayflower's fault to any fault for which the jury held defendants responsible. During trial the Thomases raised concerns with the legality of the stipulation agreement, but they ultimately agreed to submit the issue of Mayflower's fault to the jury and agreed to the related special interrogatory, and they thus have waived appellate review.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"58 F.3d 358, 361-62","parenthetical":"it is fundamental that where party invited error, there can be no reversible error","sentence":"See Starks v. Rent-A-Center, 58 F.3d 358, 361-62 (8th Cir.1995) (it is fundamental that where party invited error, there can be no reversible error); cf. Porterco, Inc. v. Igloo Prods. Corp., 955 F.2d 1164, 1173 (8th Cir.1992) (where no specific objections are made to district court\u2019s decision to submit issue to jury, party waives appellate review of ruling)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"955 F.2d 1164, 1173","parenthetical":"where no specific objections are made to district court's decision to submit issue to jury, party waives appellate review of ruling","sentence":"See Starks v. Rent-A-Center, 58 F.3d 358, 361-62 (8th Cir.1995) (it is fundamental that where party invited error, there can be no reversible error); cf. Porterco, Inc. v. Igloo Prods. Corp., 955 F.2d 1164, 1173 (8th Cir.1992) (where no specific objections are made to district court\u2019s decision to submit issue to jury, party waives appellate review of ruling)."},"case_id":921435,"label":"a"}
{"context":"This is true regardless of whether the prosecution solicited testimony it knew to be false or simply allowed such testimony to pass uncorrected. And, knowingly false or misleading testimony by a law enforcement officer is imputed to the prosecution.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"541 F.2d 447, 450-51","parenthetical":"recognizing that withholding of exculpatory evidence by police is imputed to the prosecution","sentence":"See Wedra v. Thomas, 671 F.2d 713, 717 n. 1 (2d Cir.1982); Curran v. Delaware, 259 F.2d 707, 712-13 (3d Cir.1958) (citing Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213, 63 S.Ct. 177, 87 L.Ed. 214 (1942)); cf. Boone v. Paderick, 541 F.2d 447, 450-51 (4th Cir.1976) (recognizing that withholding of exculpatory evidence by police is imputed to the prosecution)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"907 F.2d 524, 530-31","parenthetical":"rejecting habeas petitioner's claim that sheriff and investigators testified falsely at trial on the basis that petitioner had failed to show that the prosecutor knew the testimony was perjurious","sentence":"But see Koch v. Puckett, 907 F.2d 524, 530-31 (5th Cir.1990) (rejecting habeas petitioner\u2019s claim that sheriff and investigators testified falsely at trial on the basis that petitioner had failed to show that the prosecutor knew the testimony was perjurious)."},"case_id":9282026,"label":"a"}
{"context":"See Rules of the Superior Court, Rules Governing Persons Authorized to Take Bail, Rules 14 & 15 (1996) (providing that persons appointed or authorized to take bails must respond promptly to calls from the defendant or his or her family, attorneys, or custodians, and a plan must be in place to insure coverage of the entire jurisdiction). When the court has established an order of bail as in this case the defendant or a putative surety on his behalf who is prepared to tender United States currency to the court has a right to have access to a judicial officer unimpeded by police interference.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"410 Mass. 53, 55-56","parenthetical":"police violated rights of defendant in custody for operating under the influence of alcohol when they obstructed his efforts to secure his release on bail","sentence":"See also Commonwealth v. Rosewarne, 410 Mass. 53, 55-56(1991) (police violated rights of defendant in custody for operating under the influence of alcohol when they obstructed his efforts to secure his release on bail)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"429 Mass. 169, 174-76","parenthetical":"noting that a clerk-magistrate was not justified in refusing on public safety grounds to come to the police barracks to conduct a bail hearing","sentence":"Compare Commonwealth v. King, 429 Mass. 169, 174-76 (1999) (noting that a clerk-magistrate was not justified in refusing on public safety grounds to come to the police barracks to conduct a bail hearing)."},"case_id":8985527,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Dumont argues that the maximum entry age of 36 violates the equal protection clause of the Fifth Amendment. An equal protection challenge based upon an age classification must be judged under a rational basis standard.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"786 F.2d 523, 525","parenthetical":"Court found that a New York State statute prohibiting the hiring of police officers over 29 years of age was rationally related to \"ensuring that the police force is physically able and capable of being trained\"","sentence":"Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 99 S.Ct. 939, 59 L.Ed.2d 171 (1979) (in upholding a mandatory retirement age for Foreign Service Employees the Court explained that it would not \u201coverturn such a statute unless the varying treatment of different groups or persons is so unrelated to the achievement of any combination of legitimate purposes that we can only conclude that the legislature\u2019s actions were irrational\u201d); see also Doyle v. Suffolk County, 786 F.2d 523, 525 (2d Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 825, 107 S.Ct. 98, 93 L.Ed.2d 49 (1986) (Court found that a New York State statute prohibiting the hiring of police officers over 29 years of age was rationally related to \u201censuring that the police force is physically able and capable of being trained\u201d); Francke v. Dep\u2019t of Treasury, 721 F.Supp. 47, 53 (S.D.N.Y.1989) (Department of Treasury\u2019s maximum hiring age policy for criminal investigators is rationally related to its legislative purpose of creating a young and vigorous work force); Crane v. Schneider, 635 F.Supp. 1430, 1433 (E.D.N.Y.1986) (age 36 cut-off for county deputy sheriff position does not violate equal protection clause because it is rationally related to the \u201cgovernment\u2019s legitimate interest in employing healthy and vigorous individuals in [strenuous] jobs ... and ensuring candidates are physically capable of being trained\u201d); Klotsche v. City of New York, 621 F.Supp. 1113 (S.D.N.Y.1985) (maximum hiring age limitation of 29 contained in City\u2019s administrative code does not violate equal protection clause); Colon v. City of New York, 535 F.Supp. 1108 (S.D.N.Y.1982) (maximum hiring age for city police officers does not violate equal protection clause)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"in upholding a mandatory retirement age for Foreign Service Employees the Court explained that it would not \"overturn such a statute unless the varying treatment of different groups or persons is so unrelated to the achievement of any combination of legitimate purposes that we can only conclude that the legislature's actions were irrational\"","sentence":"Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 99 S.Ct. 939, 59 L.Ed.2d 171 (1979) (in upholding a mandatory retirement age for Foreign Service Employees the Court explained that it would not \u201coverturn such a statute unless the varying treatment of different groups or persons is so unrelated to the achievement of any combination of legitimate purposes that we can only conclude that the legislature\u2019s actions were irrational\u201d); see also Doyle v. Suffolk County, 786 F.2d 523, 525 (2d Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 825, 107 S.Ct. 98, 93 L.Ed.2d 49 (1986) (Court found that a New York State statute prohibiting the hiring of police officers over 29 years of age was rationally related to \u201censuring that the police force is physically able and capable of being trained\u201d); Francke v. Dep\u2019t of Treasury, 721 F.Supp. 47, 53 (S.D.N.Y.1989) (Department of Treasury\u2019s maximum hiring age policy for criminal investigators is rationally related to its legislative purpose of creating a young and vigorous work force); Crane v. Schneider, 635 F.Supp. 1430, 1433 (E.D.N.Y.1986) (age 36 cut-off for county deputy sheriff position does not violate equal protection clause because it is rationally related to the \u201cgovernment\u2019s legitimate interest in employing healthy and vigorous individuals in [strenuous] jobs ... and ensuring candidates are physically capable of being trained\u201d); Klotsche v. City of New York, 621 F.Supp. 1113 (S.D.N.Y.1985) (maximum hiring age limitation of 29 contained in City\u2019s administrative code does not violate equal protection clause); Colon v. City of New York, 535 F.Supp. 1108 (S.D.N.Y.1982) (maximum hiring age for city police officers does not violate equal protection clause)."},"case_id":7806638,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Dumont argues that the maximum entry age of 36 violates the equal protection clause of the Fifth Amendment. An equal protection challenge based upon an age classification must be judged under a rational basis standard.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"in upholding a mandatory retirement age for Foreign Service Employees the Court explained that it would not \"overturn such a statute unless the varying treatment of different groups or persons is so unrelated to the achievement of any combination of legitimate purposes that we can only conclude that the legislature's actions were irrational\"","sentence":"Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 99 S.Ct. 939, 59 L.Ed.2d 171 (1979) (in upholding a mandatory retirement age for Foreign Service Employees the Court explained that it would not \u201coverturn such a statute unless the varying treatment of different groups or persons is so unrelated to the achievement of any combination of legitimate purposes that we can only conclude that the legislature\u2019s actions were irrational\u201d); see also Doyle v. Suffolk County, 786 F.2d 523, 525 (2d Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 825, 107 S.Ct. 98, 93 L.Ed.2d 49 (1986) (Court found that a New York State statute prohibiting the hiring of police officers over 29 years of age was rationally related to \u201censuring that the police force is physically able and capable of being trained\u201d); Francke v. Dep\u2019t of Treasury, 721 F.Supp. 47, 53 (S.D.N.Y.1989) (Department of Treasury\u2019s maximum hiring age policy for criminal investigators is rationally related to its legislative purpose of creating a young and vigorous work force); Crane v. Schneider, 635 F.Supp. 1430, 1433 (E.D.N.Y.1986) (age 36 cut-off for county deputy sheriff position does not violate equal protection clause because it is rationally related to the \u201cgovernment\u2019s legitimate interest in employing healthy and vigorous individuals in [strenuous] jobs ... and ensuring candidates are physically capable of being trained\u201d); Klotsche v. City of New York, 621 F.Supp. 1113 (S.D.N.Y.1985) (maximum hiring age limitation of 29 contained in City\u2019s administrative code does not violate equal protection clause); Colon v. City of New York, 535 F.Supp. 1108 (S.D.N.Y.1982) (maximum hiring age for city police officers does not violate equal protection clause)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"Court found that a New York State statute prohibiting the hiring of police officers over 29 years of age was rationally related to \"ensuring that the police force is physically able and capable of being trained\"","sentence":"Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 99 S.Ct. 939, 59 L.Ed.2d 171 (1979) (in upholding a mandatory retirement age for Foreign Service Employees the Court explained that it would not \u201coverturn such a statute unless the varying treatment of different groups or persons is so unrelated to the achievement of any combination of legitimate purposes that we can only conclude that the legislature\u2019s actions were irrational\u201d); see also Doyle v. Suffolk County, 786 F.2d 523, 525 (2d Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 825, 107 S.Ct. 98, 93 L.Ed.2d 49 (1986) (Court found that a New York State statute prohibiting the hiring of police officers over 29 years of age was rationally related to \u201censuring that the police force is physically able and capable of being trained\u201d); Francke v. Dep\u2019t of Treasury, 721 F.Supp. 47, 53 (S.D.N.Y.1989) (Department of Treasury\u2019s maximum hiring age policy for criminal investigators is rationally related to its legislative purpose of creating a young and vigorous work force); Crane v. Schneider, 635 F.Supp. 1430, 1433 (E.D.N.Y.1986) (age 36 cut-off for county deputy sheriff position does not violate equal protection clause because it is rationally related to the \u201cgovernment\u2019s legitimate interest in employing healthy and vigorous individuals in [strenuous] jobs ... and ensuring candidates are physically capable of being trained\u201d); Klotsche v. City of New York, 621 F.Supp. 1113 (S.D.N.Y.1985) (maximum hiring age limitation of 29 contained in City\u2019s administrative code does not violate equal protection clause); Colon v. City of New York, 535 F.Supp. 1108 (S.D.N.Y.1982) (maximum hiring age for city police officers does not violate equal protection clause)."},"case_id":7806638,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Dumont argues that the maximum entry age of 36 violates the equal protection clause of the Fifth Amendment. An equal protection challenge based upon an age classification must be judged under a rational basis standard.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"Court found that a New York State statute prohibiting the hiring of police officers over 29 years of age was rationally related to \"ensuring that the police force is physically able and capable of being trained\"","sentence":"Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 99 S.Ct. 939, 59 L.Ed.2d 171 (1979) (in upholding a mandatory retirement age for Foreign Service Employees the Court explained that it would not \u201coverturn such a statute unless the varying treatment of different groups or persons is so unrelated to the achievement of any combination of legitimate purposes that we can only conclude that the legislature\u2019s actions were irrational\u201d); see also Doyle v. Suffolk County, 786 F.2d 523, 525 (2d Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 825, 107 S.Ct. 98, 93 L.Ed.2d 49 (1986) (Court found that a New York State statute prohibiting the hiring of police officers over 29 years of age was rationally related to \u201censuring that the police force is physically able and capable of being trained\u201d); Francke v. Dep\u2019t of Treasury, 721 F.Supp. 47, 53 (S.D.N.Y.1989) (Department of Treasury\u2019s maximum hiring age policy for criminal investigators is rationally related to its legislative purpose of creating a young and vigorous work force); Crane v. Schneider, 635 F.Supp. 1430, 1433 (E.D.N.Y.1986) (age 36 cut-off for county deputy sheriff position does not violate equal protection clause because it is rationally related to the \u201cgovernment\u2019s legitimate interest in employing healthy and vigorous individuals in [strenuous] jobs ... and ensuring candidates are physically capable of being trained\u201d); Klotsche v. City of New York, 621 F.Supp. 1113 (S.D.N.Y.1985) (maximum hiring age limitation of 29 contained in City\u2019s administrative code does not violate equal protection clause); Colon v. City of New York, 535 F.Supp. 1108 (S.D.N.Y.1982) (maximum hiring age for city police officers does not violate equal protection clause)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"in upholding a mandatory retirement age for Foreign Service Employees the Court explained that it would not \"overturn such a statute unless the varying treatment of different groups or persons is so unrelated to the achievement of any combination of legitimate purposes that we can only conclude that the legislature's actions were irrational\"","sentence":"Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 99 S.Ct. 939, 59 L.Ed.2d 171 (1979) (in upholding a mandatory retirement age for Foreign Service Employees the Court explained that it would not \u201coverturn such a statute unless the varying treatment of different groups or persons is so unrelated to the achievement of any combination of legitimate purposes that we can only conclude that the legislature\u2019s actions were irrational\u201d); see also Doyle v. Suffolk County, 786 F.2d 523, 525 (2d Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 825, 107 S.Ct. 98, 93 L.Ed.2d 49 (1986) (Court found that a New York State statute prohibiting the hiring of police officers over 29 years of age was rationally related to \u201censuring that the police force is physically able and capable of being trained\u201d); Francke v. Dep\u2019t of Treasury, 721 F.Supp. 47, 53 (S.D.N.Y.1989) (Department of Treasury\u2019s maximum hiring age policy for criminal investigators is rationally related to its legislative purpose of creating a young and vigorous work force); Crane v. Schneider, 635 F.Supp. 1430, 1433 (E.D.N.Y.1986) (age 36 cut-off for county deputy sheriff position does not violate equal protection clause because it is rationally related to the \u201cgovernment\u2019s legitimate interest in employing healthy and vigorous individuals in [strenuous] jobs ... and ensuring candidates are physically capable of being trained\u201d); Klotsche v. City of New York, 621 F.Supp. 1113 (S.D.N.Y.1985) (maximum hiring age limitation of 29 contained in City\u2019s administrative code does not violate equal protection clause); Colon v. City of New York, 535 F.Supp. 1108 (S.D.N.Y.1982) (maximum hiring age for city police officers does not violate equal protection clause)."},"case_id":7806638,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Dumont argues that the maximum entry age of 36 violates the equal protection clause of the Fifth Amendment. An equal protection challenge based upon an age classification must be judged under a rational basis standard.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"Court found that a New York State statute prohibiting the hiring of police officers over 29 years of age was rationally related to \"ensuring that the police force is physically able and capable of being trained\"","sentence":"Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 99 S.Ct. 939, 59 L.Ed.2d 171 (1979) (in upholding a mandatory retirement age for Foreign Service Employees the Court explained that it would not \u201coverturn such a statute unless the varying treatment of different groups or persons is so unrelated to the achievement of any combination of legitimate purposes that we can only conclude that the legislature\u2019s actions were irrational\u201d); see also Doyle v. Suffolk County, 786 F.2d 523, 525 (2d Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 825, 107 S.Ct. 98, 93 L.Ed.2d 49 (1986) (Court found that a New York State statute prohibiting the hiring of police officers over 29 years of age was rationally related to \u201censuring that the police force is physically able and capable of being trained\u201d); Francke v. Dep\u2019t of Treasury, 721 F.Supp. 47, 53 (S.D.N.Y.1989) (Department of Treasury\u2019s maximum hiring age policy for criminal investigators is rationally related to its legislative purpose of creating a young and vigorous work force); Crane v. Schneider, 635 F.Supp. 1430, 1433 (E.D.N.Y.1986) (age 36 cut-off for county deputy sheriff position does not violate equal protection clause because it is rationally related to the \u201cgovernment\u2019s legitimate interest in employing healthy and vigorous individuals in [strenuous] jobs ... and ensuring candidates are physically capable of being trained\u201d); Klotsche v. City of New York, 621 F.Supp. 1113 (S.D.N.Y.1985) (maximum hiring age limitation of 29 contained in City\u2019s administrative code does not violate equal protection clause); Colon v. City of New York, 535 F.Supp. 1108 (S.D.N.Y.1982) (maximum hiring age for city police officers does not violate equal protection clause)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"in upholding a mandatory retirement age for Foreign Service Employees the Court explained that it would not \"overturn such a statute unless the varying treatment of different groups or persons is so unrelated to the achievement of any combination of legitimate purposes that we can only conclude that the legislature's actions were irrational\"","sentence":"Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 99 S.Ct. 939, 59 L.Ed.2d 171 (1979) (in upholding a mandatory retirement age for Foreign Service Employees the Court explained that it would not \u201coverturn such a statute unless the varying treatment of different groups or persons is so unrelated to the achievement of any combination of legitimate purposes that we can only conclude that the legislature\u2019s actions were irrational\u201d); see also Doyle v. Suffolk County, 786 F.2d 523, 525 (2d Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 825, 107 S.Ct. 98, 93 L.Ed.2d 49 (1986) (Court found that a New York State statute prohibiting the hiring of police officers over 29 years of age was rationally related to \u201censuring that the police force is physically able and capable of being trained\u201d); Francke v. Dep\u2019t of Treasury, 721 F.Supp. 47, 53 (S.D.N.Y.1989) (Department of Treasury\u2019s maximum hiring age policy for criminal investigators is rationally related to its legislative purpose of creating a young and vigorous work force); Crane v. Schneider, 635 F.Supp. 1430, 1433 (E.D.N.Y.1986) (age 36 cut-off for county deputy sheriff position does not violate equal protection clause because it is rationally related to the \u201cgovernment\u2019s legitimate interest in employing healthy and vigorous individuals in [strenuous] jobs ... and ensuring candidates are physically capable of being trained\u201d); Klotsche v. City of New York, 621 F.Supp. 1113 (S.D.N.Y.1985) (maximum hiring age limitation of 29 contained in City\u2019s administrative code does not violate equal protection clause); Colon v. City of New York, 535 F.Supp. 1108 (S.D.N.Y.1982) (maximum hiring age for city police officers does not violate equal protection clause)."},"case_id":7806638,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Dumont argues that the maximum entry age of 36 violates the equal protection clause of the Fifth Amendment. An equal protection challenge based upon an age classification must be judged under a rational basis standard.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"in upholding a mandatory retirement age for Foreign Service Employees the Court explained that it would not \"overturn such a statute unless the varying treatment of different groups or persons is so unrelated to the achievement of any combination of legitimate purposes that we can only conclude that the legislature's actions were irrational\"","sentence":"Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 99 S.Ct. 939, 59 L.Ed.2d 171 (1979) (in upholding a mandatory retirement age for Foreign Service Employees the Court explained that it would not \u201coverturn such a statute unless the varying treatment of different groups or persons is so unrelated to the achievement of any combination of legitimate purposes that we can only conclude that the legislature\u2019s actions were irrational\u201d); see also Doyle v. Suffolk County, 786 F.2d 523, 525 (2d Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 825, 107 S.Ct. 98, 93 L.Ed.2d 49 (1986) (Court found that a New York State statute prohibiting the hiring of police officers over 29 years of age was rationally related to \u201censuring that the police force is physically able and capable of being trained\u201d); Francke v. Dep\u2019t of Treasury, 721 F.Supp. 47, 53 (S.D.N.Y.1989) (Department of Treasury\u2019s maximum hiring age policy for criminal investigators is rationally related to its legislative purpose of creating a young and vigorous work force); Crane v. Schneider, 635 F.Supp. 1430, 1433 (E.D.N.Y.1986) (age 36 cut-off for county deputy sheriff position does not violate equal protection clause because it is rationally related to the \u201cgovernment\u2019s legitimate interest in employing healthy and vigorous individuals in [strenuous] jobs ... and ensuring candidates are physically capable of being trained\u201d); Klotsche v. City of New York, 621 F.Supp. 1113 (S.D.N.Y.1985) (maximum hiring age limitation of 29 contained in City\u2019s administrative code does not violate equal protection clause); Colon v. City of New York, 535 F.Supp. 1108 (S.D.N.Y.1982) (maximum hiring age for city police officers does not violate equal protection clause)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"721 F.Supp. 47, 53","parenthetical":"Department of Treasury's maximum hiring age policy for criminal investigators is rationally related to its legislative purpose of creating a young and vigorous work force","sentence":"Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 99 S.Ct. 939, 59 L.Ed.2d 171 (1979) (in upholding a mandatory retirement age for Foreign Service Employees the Court explained that it would not \u201coverturn such a statute unless the varying treatment of different groups or persons is so unrelated to the achievement of any combination of legitimate purposes that we can only conclude that the legislature\u2019s actions were irrational\u201d); see also Doyle v. Suffolk County, 786 F.2d 523, 525 (2d Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 825, 107 S.Ct. 98, 93 L.Ed.2d 49 (1986) (Court found that a New York State statute prohibiting the hiring of police officers over 29 years of age was rationally related to \u201censuring that the police force is physically able and capable of being trained\u201d); Francke v. Dep\u2019t of Treasury, 721 F.Supp. 47, 53 (S.D.N.Y.1989) (Department of Treasury\u2019s maximum hiring age policy for criminal investigators is rationally related to its legislative purpose of creating a young and vigorous work force); Crane v. Schneider, 635 F.Supp. 1430, 1433 (E.D.N.Y.1986) (age 36 cut-off for county deputy sheriff position does not violate equal protection clause because it is rationally related to the \u201cgovernment\u2019s legitimate interest in employing healthy and vigorous individuals in [strenuous] jobs ... and ensuring candidates are physically capable of being trained\u201d); Klotsche v. City of New York, 621 F.Supp. 1113 (S.D.N.Y.1985) (maximum hiring age limitation of 29 contained in City\u2019s administrative code does not violate equal protection clause); Colon v. City of New York, 535 F.Supp. 1108 (S.D.N.Y.1982) (maximum hiring age for city police officers does not violate equal protection clause)."},"case_id":7806638,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Dumont argues that the maximum entry age of 36 violates the equal protection clause of the Fifth Amendment. An equal protection challenge based upon an age classification must be judged under a rational basis standard.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"635 F.Supp. 1430, 1433","parenthetical":"age 36 cut-off for county deputy sheriff position does not violate equal protection clause because it is rationally related to the \"government's legitimate interest in employing healthy and vigorous individuals in [strenuous] jobs ... and ensuring candidates are physically capable of being trained\"","sentence":"Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 99 S.Ct. 939, 59 L.Ed.2d 171 (1979) (in upholding a mandatory retirement age for Foreign Service Employees the Court explained that it would not \u201coverturn such a statute unless the varying treatment of different groups or persons is so unrelated to the achievement of any combination of legitimate purposes that we can only conclude that the legislature\u2019s actions were irrational\u201d); see also Doyle v. Suffolk County, 786 F.2d 523, 525 (2d Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 825, 107 S.Ct. 98, 93 L.Ed.2d 49 (1986) (Court found that a New York State statute prohibiting the hiring of police officers over 29 years of age was rationally related to \u201censuring that the police force is physically able and capable of being trained\u201d); Francke v. Dep\u2019t of Treasury, 721 F.Supp. 47, 53 (S.D.N.Y.1989) (Department of Treasury\u2019s maximum hiring age policy for criminal investigators is rationally related to its legislative purpose of creating a young and vigorous work force); Crane v. Schneider, 635 F.Supp. 1430, 1433 (E.D.N.Y.1986) (age 36 cut-off for county deputy sheriff position does not violate equal protection clause because it is rationally related to the \u201cgovernment\u2019s legitimate interest in employing healthy and vigorous individuals in [strenuous] jobs ... and ensuring candidates are physically capable of being trained\u201d); Klotsche v. City of New York, 621 F.Supp. 1113 (S.D.N.Y.1985) (maximum hiring age limitation of 29 contained in City\u2019s administrative code does not violate equal protection clause); Colon v. City of New York, 535 F.Supp. 1108 (S.D.N.Y.1982) (maximum hiring age for city police officers does not violate equal protection clause)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"in upholding a mandatory retirement age for Foreign Service Employees the Court explained that it would not \"overturn such a statute unless the varying treatment of different groups or persons is so unrelated to the achievement of any combination of legitimate purposes that we can only conclude that the legislature's actions were irrational\"","sentence":"Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 99 S.Ct. 939, 59 L.Ed.2d 171 (1979) (in upholding a mandatory retirement age for Foreign Service Employees the Court explained that it would not \u201coverturn such a statute unless the varying treatment of different groups or persons is so unrelated to the achievement of any combination of legitimate purposes that we can only conclude that the legislature\u2019s actions were irrational\u201d); see also Doyle v. Suffolk County, 786 F.2d 523, 525 (2d Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 825, 107 S.Ct. 98, 93 L.Ed.2d 49 (1986) (Court found that a New York State statute prohibiting the hiring of police officers over 29 years of age was rationally related to \u201censuring that the police force is physically able and capable of being trained\u201d); Francke v. Dep\u2019t of Treasury, 721 F.Supp. 47, 53 (S.D.N.Y.1989) (Department of Treasury\u2019s maximum hiring age policy for criminal investigators is rationally related to its legislative purpose of creating a young and vigorous work force); Crane v. Schneider, 635 F.Supp. 1430, 1433 (E.D.N.Y.1986) (age 36 cut-off for county deputy sheriff position does not violate equal protection clause because it is rationally related to the \u201cgovernment\u2019s legitimate interest in employing healthy and vigorous individuals in [strenuous] jobs ... and ensuring candidates are physically capable of being trained\u201d); Klotsche v. City of New York, 621 F.Supp. 1113 (S.D.N.Y.1985) (maximum hiring age limitation of 29 contained in City\u2019s administrative code does not violate equal protection clause); Colon v. City of New York, 535 F.Supp. 1108 (S.D.N.Y.1982) (maximum hiring age for city police officers does not violate equal protection clause)."},"case_id":7806638,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Dumont argues that the maximum entry age of 36 violates the equal protection clause of the Fifth Amendment. An equal protection challenge based upon an age classification must be judged under a rational basis standard.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"in upholding a mandatory retirement age for Foreign Service Employees the Court explained that it would not \"overturn such a statute unless the varying treatment of different groups or persons is so unrelated to the achievement of any combination of legitimate purposes that we can only conclude that the legislature's actions were irrational\"","sentence":"Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 99 S.Ct. 939, 59 L.Ed.2d 171 (1979) (in upholding a mandatory retirement age for Foreign Service Employees the Court explained that it would not \u201coverturn such a statute unless the varying treatment of different groups or persons is so unrelated to the achievement of any combination of legitimate purposes that we can only conclude that the legislature\u2019s actions were irrational\u201d); see also Doyle v. Suffolk County, 786 F.2d 523, 525 (2d Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 825, 107 S.Ct. 98, 93 L.Ed.2d 49 (1986) (Court found that a New York State statute prohibiting the hiring of police officers over 29 years of age was rationally related to \u201censuring that the police force is physically able and capable of being trained\u201d); Francke v. Dep\u2019t of Treasury, 721 F.Supp. 47, 53 (S.D.N.Y.1989) (Department of Treasury\u2019s maximum hiring age policy for criminal investigators is rationally related to its legislative purpose of creating a young and vigorous work force); Crane v. Schneider, 635 F.Supp. 1430, 1433 (E.D.N.Y.1986) (age 36 cut-off for county deputy sheriff position does not violate equal protection clause because it is rationally related to the \u201cgovernment\u2019s legitimate interest in employing healthy and vigorous individuals in [strenuous] jobs ... and ensuring candidates are physically capable of being trained\u201d); Klotsche v. City of New York, 621 F.Supp. 1113 (S.D.N.Y.1985) (maximum hiring age limitation of 29 contained in City\u2019s administrative code does not violate equal protection clause); Colon v. City of New York, 535 F.Supp. 1108 (S.D.N.Y.1982) (maximum hiring age for city police officers does not violate equal protection clause)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"maximum hiring age limitation of 29 contained in City's administrative code does not violate equal protection clause","sentence":"Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 99 S.Ct. 939, 59 L.Ed.2d 171 (1979) (in upholding a mandatory retirement age for Foreign Service Employees the Court explained that it would not \u201coverturn such a statute unless the varying treatment of different groups or persons is so unrelated to the achievement of any combination of legitimate purposes that we can only conclude that the legislature\u2019s actions were irrational\u201d); see also Doyle v. Suffolk County, 786 F.2d 523, 525 (2d Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 825, 107 S.Ct. 98, 93 L.Ed.2d 49 (1986) (Court found that a New York State statute prohibiting the hiring of police officers over 29 years of age was rationally related to \u201censuring that the police force is physically able and capable of being trained\u201d); Francke v. Dep\u2019t of Treasury, 721 F.Supp. 47, 53 (S.D.N.Y.1989) (Department of Treasury\u2019s maximum hiring age policy for criminal investigators is rationally related to its legislative purpose of creating a young and vigorous work force); Crane v. Schneider, 635 F.Supp. 1430, 1433 (E.D.N.Y.1986) (age 36 cut-off for county deputy sheriff position does not violate equal protection clause because it is rationally related to the \u201cgovernment\u2019s legitimate interest in employing healthy and vigorous individuals in [strenuous] jobs ... and ensuring candidates are physically capable of being trained\u201d); Klotsche v. City of New York, 621 F.Supp. 1113 (S.D.N.Y.1985) (maximum hiring age limitation of 29 contained in City\u2019s administrative code does not violate equal protection clause); Colon v. City of New York, 535 F.Supp. 1108 (S.D.N.Y.1982) (maximum hiring age for city police officers does not violate equal protection clause)."},"case_id":7806638,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Dumont argues that the maximum entry age of 36 violates the equal protection clause of the Fifth Amendment. An equal protection challenge based upon an age classification must be judged under a rational basis standard.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"in upholding a mandatory retirement age for Foreign Service Employees the Court explained that it would not \"overturn such a statute unless the varying treatment of different groups or persons is so unrelated to the achievement of any combination of legitimate purposes that we can only conclude that the legislature's actions were irrational\"","sentence":"Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 99 S.Ct. 939, 59 L.Ed.2d 171 (1979) (in upholding a mandatory retirement age for Foreign Service Employees the Court explained that it would not \u201coverturn such a statute unless the varying treatment of different groups or persons is so unrelated to the achievement of any combination of legitimate purposes that we can only conclude that the legislature\u2019s actions were irrational\u201d); see also Doyle v. Suffolk County, 786 F.2d 523, 525 (2d Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 825, 107 S.Ct. 98, 93 L.Ed.2d 49 (1986) (Court found that a New York State statute prohibiting the hiring of police officers over 29 years of age was rationally related to \u201censuring that the police force is physically able and capable of being trained\u201d); Francke v. Dep\u2019t of Treasury, 721 F.Supp. 47, 53 (S.D.N.Y.1989) (Department of Treasury\u2019s maximum hiring age policy for criminal investigators is rationally related to its legislative purpose of creating a young and vigorous work force); Crane v. Schneider, 635 F.Supp. 1430, 1433 (E.D.N.Y.1986) (age 36 cut-off for county deputy sheriff position does not violate equal protection clause because it is rationally related to the \u201cgovernment\u2019s legitimate interest in employing healthy and vigorous individuals in [strenuous] jobs ... and ensuring candidates are physically capable of being trained\u201d); Klotsche v. City of New York, 621 F.Supp. 1113 (S.D.N.Y.1985) (maximum hiring age limitation of 29 contained in City\u2019s administrative code does not violate equal protection clause); Colon v. City of New York, 535 F.Supp. 1108 (S.D.N.Y.1982) (maximum hiring age for city police officers does not violate equal protection clause)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"maximum hiring age for city police officers does not violate equal protection clause","sentence":"Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 99 S.Ct. 939, 59 L.Ed.2d 171 (1979) (in upholding a mandatory retirement age for Foreign Service Employees the Court explained that it would not \u201coverturn such a statute unless the varying treatment of different groups or persons is so unrelated to the achievement of any combination of legitimate purposes that we can only conclude that the legislature\u2019s actions were irrational\u201d); see also Doyle v. Suffolk County, 786 F.2d 523, 525 (2d Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 825, 107 S.Ct. 98, 93 L.Ed.2d 49 (1986) (Court found that a New York State statute prohibiting the hiring of police officers over 29 years of age was rationally related to \u201censuring that the police force is physically able and capable of being trained\u201d); Francke v. Dep\u2019t of Treasury, 721 F.Supp. 47, 53 (S.D.N.Y.1989) (Department of Treasury\u2019s maximum hiring age policy for criminal investigators is rationally related to its legislative purpose of creating a young and vigorous work force); Crane v. Schneider, 635 F.Supp. 1430, 1433 (E.D.N.Y.1986) (age 36 cut-off for county deputy sheriff position does not violate equal protection clause because it is rationally related to the \u201cgovernment\u2019s legitimate interest in employing healthy and vigorous individuals in [strenuous] jobs ... and ensuring candidates are physically capable of being trained\u201d); Klotsche v. City of New York, 621 F.Supp. 1113 (S.D.N.Y.1985) (maximum hiring age limitation of 29 contained in City\u2019s administrative code does not violate equal protection clause); Colon v. City of New York, 535 F.Supp. 1108 (S.D.N.Y.1982) (maximum hiring age for city police officers does not violate equal protection clause)."},"case_id":7806638,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Dumont argues that the maximum entry age of 36 violates the equal protection clause of the Fifth Amendment. An equal protection challenge based upon an age classification must be judged under a rational basis standard.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"in upholding a mandatory retirement age for Foreign Service Employees the Court explained that it would not \"overturn such a statute unless the varying treatment of different groups or persons is so unrelated to the achievement of any combination of legitimate purposes that we can only conclude that the legislature's actions were irrational\"","sentence":"Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 99 S.Ct. 939, 59 L.Ed.2d 171 (1979) (in upholding a mandatory retirement age for Foreign Service Employees the Court explained that it would not \u201coverturn such a statute unless the varying treatment of different groups or persons is so unrelated to the achievement of any combination of legitimate purposes that we can only conclude that the legislature\u2019s actions were irrational\u201d); see also Doyle v. Suffolk County, 786 F.2d 523, 525 (2d Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 825, 107 S.Ct. 98, 93 L.Ed.2d 49 (1986) (Court found that a New York State statute prohibiting the hiring of police officers over 29 years of age was rationally related to \u201censuring that the police force is physically able and capable of being trained\u201d); Francke v. Dep\u2019t of Treasury, 721 F.Supp. 47, 53 (S.D.N.Y.1989) (Department of Treasury\u2019s maximum hiring age policy for criminal investigators is rationally related to its legislative purpose of creating a young and vigorous work force); Crane v. Schneider, 635 F.Supp. 1430, 1433 (E.D.N.Y.1986) (age 36 cut-off for county deputy sheriff position does not violate equal protection clause because it is rationally related to the \u201cgovernment\u2019s legitimate interest in employing healthy and vigorous individuals in [strenuous] jobs ... and ensuring candidates are physically capable of being trained\u201d); Klotsche v. City of New York, 621 F.Supp. 1113 (S.D.N.Y.1985) (maximum hiring age limitation of 29 contained in City\u2019s administrative code does not violate equal protection clause); Colon v. City of New York, 535 F.Supp. 1108 (S.D.N.Y.1982) (maximum hiring age for city police officers does not violate equal protection clause)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"786 F.2d 523, 525","parenthetical":"Court found that a New York State statute prohibiting the hiring of police officers over 29 years of age was rationally related to \"ensuring that the police force is physically able and capable of being trained\"","sentence":"Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 99 S.Ct. 939, 59 L.Ed.2d 171 (1979) (in upholding a mandatory retirement age for Foreign Service Employees the Court explained that it would not \u201coverturn such a statute unless the varying treatment of different groups or persons is so unrelated to the achievement of any combination of legitimate purposes that we can only conclude that the legislature\u2019s actions were irrational\u201d); see also Doyle v. Suffolk County, 786 F.2d 523, 525 (2d Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 825, 107 S.Ct. 98, 93 L.Ed.2d 49 (1986) (Court found that a New York State statute prohibiting the hiring of police officers over 29 years of age was rationally related to \u201censuring that the police force is physically able and capable of being trained\u201d); Francke v. Dep\u2019t of Treasury, 721 F.Supp. 47, 53 (S.D.N.Y.1989) (Department of Treasury\u2019s maximum hiring age policy for criminal investigators is rationally related to its legislative purpose of creating a young and vigorous work force); Crane v. Schneider, 635 F.Supp. 1430, 1433 (E.D.N.Y.1986) (age 36 cut-off for county deputy sheriff position does not violate equal protection clause because it is rationally related to the \u201cgovernment\u2019s legitimate interest in employing healthy and vigorous individuals in [strenuous] jobs ... and ensuring candidates are physically capable of being trained\u201d); Klotsche v. City of New York, 621 F.Supp. 1113 (S.D.N.Y.1985) (maximum hiring age limitation of 29 contained in City\u2019s administrative code does not violate equal protection clause); Colon v. City of New York, 535 F.Supp. 1108 (S.D.N.Y.1982) (maximum hiring age for city police officers does not violate equal protection clause)."},"case_id":7806638,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Dumont argues that the maximum entry age of 36 violates the equal protection clause of the Fifth Amendment. An equal protection challenge based upon an age classification must be judged under a rational basis standard.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"Court found that a New York State statute prohibiting the hiring of police officers over 29 years of age was rationally related to \"ensuring that the police force is physically able and capable of being trained\"","sentence":"Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 99 S.Ct. 939, 59 L.Ed.2d 171 (1979) (in upholding a mandatory retirement age for Foreign Service Employees the Court explained that it would not \u201coverturn such a statute unless the varying treatment of different groups or persons is so unrelated to the achievement of any combination of legitimate purposes that we can only conclude that the legislature\u2019s actions were irrational\u201d); see also Doyle v. Suffolk County, 786 F.2d 523, 525 (2d Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 825, 107 S.Ct. 98, 93 L.Ed.2d 49 (1986) (Court found that a New York State statute prohibiting the hiring of police officers over 29 years of age was rationally related to \u201censuring that the police force is physically able and capable of being trained\u201d); Francke v. Dep\u2019t of Treasury, 721 F.Supp. 47, 53 (S.D.N.Y.1989) (Department of Treasury\u2019s maximum hiring age policy for criminal investigators is rationally related to its legislative purpose of creating a young and vigorous work force); Crane v. Schneider, 635 F.Supp. 1430, 1433 (E.D.N.Y.1986) (age 36 cut-off for county deputy sheriff position does not violate equal protection clause because it is rationally related to the \u201cgovernment\u2019s legitimate interest in employing healthy and vigorous individuals in [strenuous] jobs ... and ensuring candidates are physically capable of being trained\u201d); Klotsche v. City of New York, 621 F.Supp. 1113 (S.D.N.Y.1985) (maximum hiring age limitation of 29 contained in City\u2019s administrative code does not violate equal protection clause); Colon v. City of New York, 535 F.Supp. 1108 (S.D.N.Y.1982) (maximum hiring age for city police officers does not violate equal protection clause)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"in upholding a mandatory retirement age for Foreign Service Employees the Court explained that it would not \"overturn such a statute unless the varying treatment of different groups or persons is so unrelated to the achievement of any combination of legitimate purposes that we can only conclude that the legislature's actions were irrational\"","sentence":"Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 99 S.Ct. 939, 59 L.Ed.2d 171 (1979) (in upholding a mandatory retirement age for Foreign Service Employees the Court explained that it would not \u201coverturn such a statute unless the varying treatment of different groups or persons is so unrelated to the achievement of any combination of legitimate purposes that we can only conclude that the legislature\u2019s actions were irrational\u201d); see also Doyle v. Suffolk County, 786 F.2d 523, 525 (2d Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 825, 107 S.Ct. 98, 93 L.Ed.2d 49 (1986) (Court found that a New York State statute prohibiting the hiring of police officers over 29 years of age was rationally related to \u201censuring that the police force is physically able and capable of being trained\u201d); Francke v. Dep\u2019t of Treasury, 721 F.Supp. 47, 53 (S.D.N.Y.1989) (Department of Treasury\u2019s maximum hiring age policy for criminal investigators is rationally related to its legislative purpose of creating a young and vigorous work force); Crane v. Schneider, 635 F.Supp. 1430, 1433 (E.D.N.Y.1986) (age 36 cut-off for county deputy sheriff position does not violate equal protection clause because it is rationally related to the \u201cgovernment\u2019s legitimate interest in employing healthy and vigorous individuals in [strenuous] jobs ... and ensuring candidates are physically capable of being trained\u201d); Klotsche v. City of New York, 621 F.Supp. 1113 (S.D.N.Y.1985) (maximum hiring age limitation of 29 contained in City\u2019s administrative code does not violate equal protection clause); Colon v. City of New York, 535 F.Supp. 1108 (S.D.N.Y.1982) (maximum hiring age for city police officers does not violate equal protection clause)."},"case_id":7806638,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Dumont argues that the maximum entry age of 36 violates the equal protection clause of the Fifth Amendment. An equal protection challenge based upon an age classification must be judged under a rational basis standard.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"Court found that a New York State statute prohibiting the hiring of police officers over 29 years of age was rationally related to \"ensuring that the police force is physically able and capable of being trained\"","sentence":"Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 99 S.Ct. 939, 59 L.Ed.2d 171 (1979) (in upholding a mandatory retirement age for Foreign Service Employees the Court explained that it would not \u201coverturn such a statute unless the varying treatment of different groups or persons is so unrelated to the achievement of any combination of legitimate purposes that we can only conclude that the legislature\u2019s actions were irrational\u201d); see also Doyle v. Suffolk County, 786 F.2d 523, 525 (2d Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 825, 107 S.Ct. 98, 93 L.Ed.2d 49 (1986) (Court found that a New York State statute prohibiting the hiring of police officers over 29 years of age was rationally related to \u201censuring that the police force is physically able and capable of being trained\u201d); Francke v. Dep\u2019t of Treasury, 721 F.Supp. 47, 53 (S.D.N.Y.1989) (Department of Treasury\u2019s maximum hiring age policy for criminal investigators is rationally related to its legislative purpose of creating a young and vigorous work force); Crane v. Schneider, 635 F.Supp. 1430, 1433 (E.D.N.Y.1986) (age 36 cut-off for county deputy sheriff position does not violate equal protection clause because it is rationally related to the \u201cgovernment\u2019s legitimate interest in employing healthy and vigorous individuals in [strenuous] jobs ... and ensuring candidates are physically capable of being trained\u201d); Klotsche v. City of New York, 621 F.Supp. 1113 (S.D.N.Y.1985) (maximum hiring age limitation of 29 contained in City\u2019s administrative code does not violate equal protection clause); Colon v. City of New York, 535 F.Supp. 1108 (S.D.N.Y.1982) (maximum hiring age for city police officers does not violate equal protection clause)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"in upholding a mandatory retirement age for Foreign Service Employees the Court explained that it would not \"overturn such a statute unless the varying treatment of different groups or persons is so unrelated to the achievement of any combination of legitimate purposes that we can only conclude that the legislature's actions were irrational\"","sentence":"Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 99 S.Ct. 939, 59 L.Ed.2d 171 (1979) (in upholding a mandatory retirement age for Foreign Service Employees the Court explained that it would not \u201coverturn such a statute unless the varying treatment of different groups or persons is so unrelated to the achievement of any combination of legitimate purposes that we can only conclude that the legislature\u2019s actions were irrational\u201d); see also Doyle v. Suffolk County, 786 F.2d 523, 525 (2d Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 825, 107 S.Ct. 98, 93 L.Ed.2d 49 (1986) (Court found that a New York State statute prohibiting the hiring of police officers over 29 years of age was rationally related to \u201censuring that the police force is physically able and capable of being trained\u201d); Francke v. Dep\u2019t of Treasury, 721 F.Supp. 47, 53 (S.D.N.Y.1989) (Department of Treasury\u2019s maximum hiring age policy for criminal investigators is rationally related to its legislative purpose of creating a young and vigorous work force); Crane v. Schneider, 635 F.Supp. 1430, 1433 (E.D.N.Y.1986) (age 36 cut-off for county deputy sheriff position does not violate equal protection clause because it is rationally related to the \u201cgovernment\u2019s legitimate interest in employing healthy and vigorous individuals in [strenuous] jobs ... and ensuring candidates are physically capable of being trained\u201d); Klotsche v. City of New York, 621 F.Supp. 1113 (S.D.N.Y.1985) (maximum hiring age limitation of 29 contained in City\u2019s administrative code does not violate equal protection clause); Colon v. City of New York, 535 F.Supp. 1108 (S.D.N.Y.1982) (maximum hiring age for city police officers does not violate equal protection clause)."},"case_id":7806638,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Dumont argues that the maximum entry age of 36 violates the equal protection clause of the Fifth Amendment. An equal protection challenge based upon an age classification must be judged under a rational basis standard.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"Court found that a New York State statute prohibiting the hiring of police officers over 29 years of age was rationally related to \"ensuring that the police force is physically able and capable of being trained\"","sentence":"Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 99 S.Ct. 939, 59 L.Ed.2d 171 (1979) (in upholding a mandatory retirement age for Foreign Service Employees the Court explained that it would not \u201coverturn such a statute unless the varying treatment of different groups or persons is so unrelated to the achievement of any combination of legitimate purposes that we can only conclude that the legislature\u2019s actions were irrational\u201d); see also Doyle v. Suffolk County, 786 F.2d 523, 525 (2d Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 825, 107 S.Ct. 98, 93 L.Ed.2d 49 (1986) (Court found that a New York State statute prohibiting the hiring of police officers over 29 years of age was rationally related to \u201censuring that the police force is physically able and capable of being trained\u201d); Francke v. Dep\u2019t of Treasury, 721 F.Supp. 47, 53 (S.D.N.Y.1989) (Department of Treasury\u2019s maximum hiring age policy for criminal investigators is rationally related to its legislative purpose of creating a young and vigorous work force); Crane v. Schneider, 635 F.Supp. 1430, 1433 (E.D.N.Y.1986) (age 36 cut-off for county deputy sheriff position does not violate equal protection clause because it is rationally related to the \u201cgovernment\u2019s legitimate interest in employing healthy and vigorous individuals in [strenuous] jobs ... and ensuring candidates are physically capable of being trained\u201d); Klotsche v. City of New York, 621 F.Supp. 1113 (S.D.N.Y.1985) (maximum hiring age limitation of 29 contained in City\u2019s administrative code does not violate equal protection clause); Colon v. City of New York, 535 F.Supp. 1108 (S.D.N.Y.1982) (maximum hiring age for city police officers does not violate equal protection clause)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"in upholding a mandatory retirement age for Foreign Service Employees the Court explained that it would not \"overturn such a statute unless the varying treatment of different groups or persons is so unrelated to the achievement of any combination of legitimate purposes that we can only conclude that the legislature's actions were irrational\"","sentence":"Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 99 S.Ct. 939, 59 L.Ed.2d 171 (1979) (in upholding a mandatory retirement age for Foreign Service Employees the Court explained that it would not \u201coverturn such a statute unless the varying treatment of different groups or persons is so unrelated to the achievement of any combination of legitimate purposes that we can only conclude that the legislature\u2019s actions were irrational\u201d); see also Doyle v. Suffolk County, 786 F.2d 523, 525 (2d Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 825, 107 S.Ct. 98, 93 L.Ed.2d 49 (1986) (Court found that a New York State statute prohibiting the hiring of police officers over 29 years of age was rationally related to \u201censuring that the police force is physically able and capable of being trained\u201d); Francke v. Dep\u2019t of Treasury, 721 F.Supp. 47, 53 (S.D.N.Y.1989) (Department of Treasury\u2019s maximum hiring age policy for criminal investigators is rationally related to its legislative purpose of creating a young and vigorous work force); Crane v. Schneider, 635 F.Supp. 1430, 1433 (E.D.N.Y.1986) (age 36 cut-off for county deputy sheriff position does not violate equal protection clause because it is rationally related to the \u201cgovernment\u2019s legitimate interest in employing healthy and vigorous individuals in [strenuous] jobs ... and ensuring candidates are physically capable of being trained\u201d); Klotsche v. City of New York, 621 F.Supp. 1113 (S.D.N.Y.1985) (maximum hiring age limitation of 29 contained in City\u2019s administrative code does not violate equal protection clause); Colon v. City of New York, 535 F.Supp. 1108 (S.D.N.Y.1982) (maximum hiring age for city police officers does not violate equal protection clause)."},"case_id":7806638,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Dumont argues that the maximum entry age of 36 violates the equal protection clause of the Fifth Amendment. An equal protection challenge based upon an age classification must be judged under a rational basis standard.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"in upholding a mandatory retirement age for Foreign Service Employees the Court explained that it would not \"overturn such a statute unless the varying treatment of different groups or persons is so unrelated to the achievement of any combination of legitimate purposes that we can only conclude that the legislature's actions were irrational\"","sentence":"Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 99 S.Ct. 939, 59 L.Ed.2d 171 (1979) (in upholding a mandatory retirement age for Foreign Service Employees the Court explained that it would not \u201coverturn such a statute unless the varying treatment of different groups or persons is so unrelated to the achievement of any combination of legitimate purposes that we can only conclude that the legislature\u2019s actions were irrational\u201d); see also Doyle v. Suffolk County, 786 F.2d 523, 525 (2d Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 825, 107 S.Ct. 98, 93 L.Ed.2d 49 (1986) (Court found that a New York State statute prohibiting the hiring of police officers over 29 years of age was rationally related to \u201censuring that the police force is physically able and capable of being trained\u201d); Francke v. Dep\u2019t of Treasury, 721 F.Supp. 47, 53 (S.D.N.Y.1989) (Department of Treasury\u2019s maximum hiring age policy for criminal investigators is rationally related to its legislative purpose of creating a young and vigorous work force); Crane v. Schneider, 635 F.Supp. 1430, 1433 (E.D.N.Y.1986) (age 36 cut-off for county deputy sheriff position does not violate equal protection clause because it is rationally related to the \u201cgovernment\u2019s legitimate interest in employing healthy and vigorous individuals in [strenuous] jobs ... and ensuring candidates are physically capable of being trained\u201d); Klotsche v. City of New York, 621 F.Supp. 1113 (S.D.N.Y.1985) (maximum hiring age limitation of 29 contained in City\u2019s administrative code does not violate equal protection clause); Colon v. City of New York, 535 F.Supp. 1108 (S.D.N.Y.1982) (maximum hiring age for city police officers does not violate equal protection clause)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"721 F.Supp. 47, 53","parenthetical":"Department of Treasury's maximum hiring age policy for criminal investigators is rationally related to its legislative purpose of creating a young and vigorous work force","sentence":"Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 99 S.Ct. 939, 59 L.Ed.2d 171 (1979) (in upholding a mandatory retirement age for Foreign Service Employees the Court explained that it would not \u201coverturn such a statute unless the varying treatment of different groups or persons is so unrelated to the achievement of any combination of legitimate purposes that we can only conclude that the legislature\u2019s actions were irrational\u201d); see also Doyle v. Suffolk County, 786 F.2d 523, 525 (2d Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 825, 107 S.Ct. 98, 93 L.Ed.2d 49 (1986) (Court found that a New York State statute prohibiting the hiring of police officers over 29 years of age was rationally related to \u201censuring that the police force is physically able and capable of being trained\u201d); Francke v. Dep\u2019t of Treasury, 721 F.Supp. 47, 53 (S.D.N.Y.1989) (Department of Treasury\u2019s maximum hiring age policy for criminal investigators is rationally related to its legislative purpose of creating a young and vigorous work force); Crane v. Schneider, 635 F.Supp. 1430, 1433 (E.D.N.Y.1986) (age 36 cut-off for county deputy sheriff position does not violate equal protection clause because it is rationally related to the \u201cgovernment\u2019s legitimate interest in employing healthy and vigorous individuals in [strenuous] jobs ... and ensuring candidates are physically capable of being trained\u201d); Klotsche v. City of New York, 621 F.Supp. 1113 (S.D.N.Y.1985) (maximum hiring age limitation of 29 contained in City\u2019s administrative code does not violate equal protection clause); Colon v. City of New York, 535 F.Supp. 1108 (S.D.N.Y.1982) (maximum hiring age for city police officers does not violate equal protection clause)."},"case_id":7806638,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Dumont argues that the maximum entry age of 36 violates the equal protection clause of the Fifth Amendment. An equal protection challenge based upon an age classification must be judged under a rational basis standard.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"635 F.Supp. 1430, 1433","parenthetical":"age 36 cut-off for county deputy sheriff position does not violate equal protection clause because it is rationally related to the \"government's legitimate interest in employing healthy and vigorous individuals in [strenuous] jobs ... and ensuring candidates are physically capable of being trained\"","sentence":"Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 99 S.Ct. 939, 59 L.Ed.2d 171 (1979) (in upholding a mandatory retirement age for Foreign Service Employees the Court explained that it would not \u201coverturn such a statute unless the varying treatment of different groups or persons is so unrelated to the achievement of any combination of legitimate purposes that we can only conclude that the legislature\u2019s actions were irrational\u201d); see also Doyle v. Suffolk County, 786 F.2d 523, 525 (2d Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 825, 107 S.Ct. 98, 93 L.Ed.2d 49 (1986) (Court found that a New York State statute prohibiting the hiring of police officers over 29 years of age was rationally related to \u201censuring that the police force is physically able and capable of being trained\u201d); Francke v. Dep\u2019t of Treasury, 721 F.Supp. 47, 53 (S.D.N.Y.1989) (Department of Treasury\u2019s maximum hiring age policy for criminal investigators is rationally related to its legislative purpose of creating a young and vigorous work force); Crane v. Schneider, 635 F.Supp. 1430, 1433 (E.D.N.Y.1986) (age 36 cut-off for county deputy sheriff position does not violate equal protection clause because it is rationally related to the \u201cgovernment\u2019s legitimate interest in employing healthy and vigorous individuals in [strenuous] jobs ... and ensuring candidates are physically capable of being trained\u201d); Klotsche v. City of New York, 621 F.Supp. 1113 (S.D.N.Y.1985) (maximum hiring age limitation of 29 contained in City\u2019s administrative code does not violate equal protection clause); Colon v. City of New York, 535 F.Supp. 1108 (S.D.N.Y.1982) (maximum hiring age for city police officers does not violate equal protection clause)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"in upholding a mandatory retirement age for Foreign Service Employees the Court explained that it would not \"overturn such a statute unless the varying treatment of different groups or persons is so unrelated to the achievement of any combination of legitimate purposes that we can only conclude that the legislature's actions were irrational\"","sentence":"Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 99 S.Ct. 939, 59 L.Ed.2d 171 (1979) (in upholding a mandatory retirement age for Foreign Service Employees the Court explained that it would not \u201coverturn such a statute unless the varying treatment of different groups or persons is so unrelated to the achievement of any combination of legitimate purposes that we can only conclude that the legislature\u2019s actions were irrational\u201d); see also Doyle v. Suffolk County, 786 F.2d 523, 525 (2d Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 825, 107 S.Ct. 98, 93 L.Ed.2d 49 (1986) (Court found that a New York State statute prohibiting the hiring of police officers over 29 years of age was rationally related to \u201censuring that the police force is physically able and capable of being trained\u201d); Francke v. Dep\u2019t of Treasury, 721 F.Supp. 47, 53 (S.D.N.Y.1989) (Department of Treasury\u2019s maximum hiring age policy for criminal investigators is rationally related to its legislative purpose of creating a young and vigorous work force); Crane v. Schneider, 635 F.Supp. 1430, 1433 (E.D.N.Y.1986) (age 36 cut-off for county deputy sheriff position does not violate equal protection clause because it is rationally related to the \u201cgovernment\u2019s legitimate interest in employing healthy and vigorous individuals in [strenuous] jobs ... and ensuring candidates are physically capable of being trained\u201d); Klotsche v. City of New York, 621 F.Supp. 1113 (S.D.N.Y.1985) (maximum hiring age limitation of 29 contained in City\u2019s administrative code does not violate equal protection clause); Colon v. City of New York, 535 F.Supp. 1108 (S.D.N.Y.1982) (maximum hiring age for city police officers does not violate equal protection clause)."},"case_id":7806638,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Dumont argues that the maximum entry age of 36 violates the equal protection clause of the Fifth Amendment. An equal protection challenge based upon an age classification must be judged under a rational basis standard.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"maximum hiring age limitation of 29 contained in City's administrative code does not violate equal protection clause","sentence":"Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 99 S.Ct. 939, 59 L.Ed.2d 171 (1979) (in upholding a mandatory retirement age for Foreign Service Employees the Court explained that it would not \u201coverturn such a statute unless the varying treatment of different groups or persons is so unrelated to the achievement of any combination of legitimate purposes that we can only conclude that the legislature\u2019s actions were irrational\u201d); see also Doyle v. Suffolk County, 786 F.2d 523, 525 (2d Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 825, 107 S.Ct. 98, 93 L.Ed.2d 49 (1986) (Court found that a New York State statute prohibiting the hiring of police officers over 29 years of age was rationally related to \u201censuring that the police force is physically able and capable of being trained\u201d); Francke v. Dep\u2019t of Treasury, 721 F.Supp. 47, 53 (S.D.N.Y.1989) (Department of Treasury\u2019s maximum hiring age policy for criminal investigators is rationally related to its legislative purpose of creating a young and vigorous work force); Crane v. Schneider, 635 F.Supp. 1430, 1433 (E.D.N.Y.1986) (age 36 cut-off for county deputy sheriff position does not violate equal protection clause because it is rationally related to the \u201cgovernment\u2019s legitimate interest in employing healthy and vigorous individuals in [strenuous] jobs ... and ensuring candidates are physically capable of being trained\u201d); Klotsche v. City of New York, 621 F.Supp. 1113 (S.D.N.Y.1985) (maximum hiring age limitation of 29 contained in City\u2019s administrative code does not violate equal protection clause); Colon v. City of New York, 535 F.Supp. 1108 (S.D.N.Y.1982) (maximum hiring age for city police officers does not violate equal protection clause)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"in upholding a mandatory retirement age for Foreign Service Employees the Court explained that it would not \"overturn such a statute unless the varying treatment of different groups or persons is so unrelated to the achievement of any combination of legitimate purposes that we can only conclude that the legislature's actions were irrational\"","sentence":"Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 99 S.Ct. 939, 59 L.Ed.2d 171 (1979) (in upholding a mandatory retirement age for Foreign Service Employees the Court explained that it would not \u201coverturn such a statute unless the varying treatment of different groups or persons is so unrelated to the achievement of any combination of legitimate purposes that we can only conclude that the legislature\u2019s actions were irrational\u201d); see also Doyle v. Suffolk County, 786 F.2d 523, 525 (2d Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 825, 107 S.Ct. 98, 93 L.Ed.2d 49 (1986) (Court found that a New York State statute prohibiting the hiring of police officers over 29 years of age was rationally related to \u201censuring that the police force is physically able and capable of being trained\u201d); Francke v. Dep\u2019t of Treasury, 721 F.Supp. 47, 53 (S.D.N.Y.1989) (Department of Treasury\u2019s maximum hiring age policy for criminal investigators is rationally related to its legislative purpose of creating a young and vigorous work force); Crane v. Schneider, 635 F.Supp. 1430, 1433 (E.D.N.Y.1986) (age 36 cut-off for county deputy sheriff position does not violate equal protection clause because it is rationally related to the \u201cgovernment\u2019s legitimate interest in employing healthy and vigorous individuals in [strenuous] jobs ... and ensuring candidates are physically capable of being trained\u201d); Klotsche v. City of New York, 621 F.Supp. 1113 (S.D.N.Y.1985) (maximum hiring age limitation of 29 contained in City\u2019s administrative code does not violate equal protection clause); Colon v. City of New York, 535 F.Supp. 1108 (S.D.N.Y.1982) (maximum hiring age for city police officers does not violate equal protection clause)."},"case_id":7806638,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Dumont argues that the maximum entry age of 36 violates the equal protection clause of the Fifth Amendment. An equal protection challenge based upon an age classification must be judged under a rational basis standard.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"in upholding a mandatory retirement age for Foreign Service Employees the Court explained that it would not \"overturn such a statute unless the varying treatment of different groups or persons is so unrelated to the achievement of any combination of legitimate purposes that we can only conclude that the legislature's actions were irrational\"","sentence":"Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 99 S.Ct. 939, 59 L.Ed.2d 171 (1979) (in upholding a mandatory retirement age for Foreign Service Employees the Court explained that it would not \u201coverturn such a statute unless the varying treatment of different groups or persons is so unrelated to the achievement of any combination of legitimate purposes that we can only conclude that the legislature\u2019s actions were irrational\u201d); see also Doyle v. Suffolk County, 786 F.2d 523, 525 (2d Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 825, 107 S.Ct. 98, 93 L.Ed.2d 49 (1986) (Court found that a New York State statute prohibiting the hiring of police officers over 29 years of age was rationally related to \u201censuring that the police force is physically able and capable of being trained\u201d); Francke v. Dep\u2019t of Treasury, 721 F.Supp. 47, 53 (S.D.N.Y.1989) (Department of Treasury\u2019s maximum hiring age policy for criminal investigators is rationally related to its legislative purpose of creating a young and vigorous work force); Crane v. Schneider, 635 F.Supp. 1430, 1433 (E.D.N.Y.1986) (age 36 cut-off for county deputy sheriff position does not violate equal protection clause because it is rationally related to the \u201cgovernment\u2019s legitimate interest in employing healthy and vigorous individuals in [strenuous] jobs ... and ensuring candidates are physically capable of being trained\u201d); Klotsche v. City of New York, 621 F.Supp. 1113 (S.D.N.Y.1985) (maximum hiring age limitation of 29 contained in City\u2019s administrative code does not violate equal protection clause); Colon v. City of New York, 535 F.Supp. 1108 (S.D.N.Y.1982) (maximum hiring age for city police officers does not violate equal protection clause)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"maximum hiring age for city police officers does not violate equal protection clause","sentence":"Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 99 S.Ct. 939, 59 L.Ed.2d 171 (1979) (in upholding a mandatory retirement age for Foreign Service Employees the Court explained that it would not \u201coverturn such a statute unless the varying treatment of different groups or persons is so unrelated to the achievement of any combination of legitimate purposes that we can only conclude that the legislature\u2019s actions were irrational\u201d); see also Doyle v. Suffolk County, 786 F.2d 523, 525 (2d Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 825, 107 S.Ct. 98, 93 L.Ed.2d 49 (1986) (Court found that a New York State statute prohibiting the hiring of police officers over 29 years of age was rationally related to \u201censuring that the police force is physically able and capable of being trained\u201d); Francke v. Dep\u2019t of Treasury, 721 F.Supp. 47, 53 (S.D.N.Y.1989) (Department of Treasury\u2019s maximum hiring age policy for criminal investigators is rationally related to its legislative purpose of creating a young and vigorous work force); Crane v. Schneider, 635 F.Supp. 1430, 1433 (E.D.N.Y.1986) (age 36 cut-off for county deputy sheriff position does not violate equal protection clause because it is rationally related to the \u201cgovernment\u2019s legitimate interest in employing healthy and vigorous individuals in [strenuous] jobs ... and ensuring candidates are physically capable of being trained\u201d); Klotsche v. City of New York, 621 F.Supp. 1113 (S.D.N.Y.1985) (maximum hiring age limitation of 29 contained in City\u2019s administrative code does not violate equal protection clause); Colon v. City of New York, 535 F.Supp. 1108 (S.D.N.Y.1982) (maximum hiring age for city police officers does not violate equal protection clause)."},"case_id":7806638,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Dumont argues that the maximum entry age of 36 violates the equal protection clause of the Fifth Amendment. An equal protection challenge based upon an age classification must be judged under a rational basis standard.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"in upholding a mandatory retirement age for Foreign Service Employees the Court explained that it would not \"overturn such a statute unless the varying treatment of different groups or persons is so unrelated to the achievement of any combination of legitimate purposes that we can only conclude that the legislature's actions were irrational\"","sentence":"Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 99 S.Ct. 939, 59 L.Ed.2d 171 (1979) (in upholding a mandatory retirement age for Foreign Service Employees the Court explained that it would not \u201coverturn such a statute unless the varying treatment of different groups or persons is so unrelated to the achievement of any combination of legitimate purposes that we can only conclude that the legislature\u2019s actions were irrational\u201d); see also Doyle v. Suffolk County, 786 F.2d 523, 525 (2d Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 825, 107 S.Ct. 98, 93 L.Ed.2d 49 (1986) (Court found that a New York State statute prohibiting the hiring of police officers over 29 years of age was rationally related to \u201censuring that the police force is physically able and capable of being trained\u201d); Francke v. Dep\u2019t of Treasury, 721 F.Supp. 47, 53 (S.D.N.Y.1989) (Department of Treasury\u2019s maximum hiring age policy for criminal investigators is rationally related to its legislative purpose of creating a young and vigorous work force); Crane v. Schneider, 635 F.Supp. 1430, 1433 (E.D.N.Y.1986) (age 36 cut-off for county deputy sheriff position does not violate equal protection clause because it is rationally related to the \u201cgovernment\u2019s legitimate interest in employing healthy and vigorous individuals in [strenuous] jobs ... and ensuring candidates are physically capable of being trained\u201d); Klotsche v. City of New York, 621 F.Supp. 1113 (S.D.N.Y.1985) (maximum hiring age limitation of 29 contained in City\u2019s administrative code does not violate equal protection clause); Colon v. City of New York, 535 F.Supp. 1108 (S.D.N.Y.1982) (maximum hiring age for city police officers does not violate equal protection clause)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"786 F.2d 523, 525","parenthetical":"Court found that a New York State statute prohibiting the hiring of police officers over 29 years of age was rationally related to \"ensuring that the police force is physically able and capable of being trained\"","sentence":"Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 99 S.Ct. 939, 59 L.Ed.2d 171 (1979) (in upholding a mandatory retirement age for Foreign Service Employees the Court explained that it would not \u201coverturn such a statute unless the varying treatment of different groups or persons is so unrelated to the achievement of any combination of legitimate purposes that we can only conclude that the legislature\u2019s actions were irrational\u201d); see also Doyle v. Suffolk County, 786 F.2d 523, 525 (2d Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 825, 107 S.Ct. 98, 93 L.Ed.2d 49 (1986) (Court found that a New York State statute prohibiting the hiring of police officers over 29 years of age was rationally related to \u201censuring that the police force is physically able and capable of being trained\u201d); Francke v. Dep\u2019t of Treasury, 721 F.Supp. 47, 53 (S.D.N.Y.1989) (Department of Treasury\u2019s maximum hiring age policy for criminal investigators is rationally related to its legislative purpose of creating a young and vigorous work force); Crane v. Schneider, 635 F.Supp. 1430, 1433 (E.D.N.Y.1986) (age 36 cut-off for county deputy sheriff position does not violate equal protection clause because it is rationally related to the \u201cgovernment\u2019s legitimate interest in employing healthy and vigorous individuals in [strenuous] jobs ... and ensuring candidates are physically capable of being trained\u201d); Klotsche v. City of New York, 621 F.Supp. 1113 (S.D.N.Y.1985) (maximum hiring age limitation of 29 contained in City\u2019s administrative code does not violate equal protection clause); Colon v. City of New York, 535 F.Supp. 1108 (S.D.N.Y.1982) (maximum hiring age for city police officers does not violate equal protection clause)."},"case_id":7806638,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Dumont argues that the maximum entry age of 36 violates the equal protection clause of the Fifth Amendment. An equal protection challenge based upon an age classification must be judged under a rational basis standard.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"Court found that a New York State statute prohibiting the hiring of police officers over 29 years of age was rationally related to \"ensuring that the police force is physically able and capable of being trained\"","sentence":"Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 99 S.Ct. 939, 59 L.Ed.2d 171 (1979) (in upholding a mandatory retirement age for Foreign Service Employees the Court explained that it would not \u201coverturn such a statute unless the varying treatment of different groups or persons is so unrelated to the achievement of any combination of legitimate purposes that we can only conclude that the legislature\u2019s actions were irrational\u201d); see also Doyle v. Suffolk County, 786 F.2d 523, 525 (2d Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 825, 107 S.Ct. 98, 93 L.Ed.2d 49 (1986) (Court found that a New York State statute prohibiting the hiring of police officers over 29 years of age was rationally related to \u201censuring that the police force is physically able and capable of being trained\u201d); Francke v. Dep\u2019t of Treasury, 721 F.Supp. 47, 53 (S.D.N.Y.1989) (Department of Treasury\u2019s maximum hiring age policy for criminal investigators is rationally related to its legislative purpose of creating a young and vigorous work force); Crane v. Schneider, 635 F.Supp. 1430, 1433 (E.D.N.Y.1986) (age 36 cut-off for county deputy sheriff position does not violate equal protection clause because it is rationally related to the \u201cgovernment\u2019s legitimate interest in employing healthy and vigorous individuals in [strenuous] jobs ... and ensuring candidates are physically capable of being trained\u201d); Klotsche v. City of New York, 621 F.Supp. 1113 (S.D.N.Y.1985) (maximum hiring age limitation of 29 contained in City\u2019s administrative code does not violate equal protection clause); Colon v. City of New York, 535 F.Supp. 1108 (S.D.N.Y.1982) (maximum hiring age for city police officers does not violate equal protection clause)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"in upholding a mandatory retirement age for Foreign Service Employees the Court explained that it would not \"overturn such a statute unless the varying treatment of different groups or persons is so unrelated to the achievement of any combination of legitimate purposes that we can only conclude that the legislature's actions were irrational\"","sentence":"Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 99 S.Ct. 939, 59 L.Ed.2d 171 (1979) (in upholding a mandatory retirement age for Foreign Service Employees the Court explained that it would not \u201coverturn such a statute unless the varying treatment of different groups or persons is so unrelated to the achievement of any combination of legitimate purposes that we can only conclude that the legislature\u2019s actions were irrational\u201d); see also Doyle v. Suffolk County, 786 F.2d 523, 525 (2d Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 825, 107 S.Ct. 98, 93 L.Ed.2d 49 (1986) (Court found that a New York State statute prohibiting the hiring of police officers over 29 years of age was rationally related to \u201censuring that the police force is physically able and capable of being trained\u201d); Francke v. Dep\u2019t of Treasury, 721 F.Supp. 47, 53 (S.D.N.Y.1989) (Department of Treasury\u2019s maximum hiring age policy for criminal investigators is rationally related to its legislative purpose of creating a young and vigorous work force); Crane v. Schneider, 635 F.Supp. 1430, 1433 (E.D.N.Y.1986) (age 36 cut-off for county deputy sheriff position does not violate equal protection clause because it is rationally related to the \u201cgovernment\u2019s legitimate interest in employing healthy and vigorous individuals in [strenuous] jobs ... and ensuring candidates are physically capable of being trained\u201d); Klotsche v. City of New York, 621 F.Supp. 1113 (S.D.N.Y.1985) (maximum hiring age limitation of 29 contained in City\u2019s administrative code does not violate equal protection clause); Colon v. City of New York, 535 F.Supp. 1108 (S.D.N.Y.1982) (maximum hiring age for city police officers does not violate equal protection clause)."},"case_id":7806638,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Dumont argues that the maximum entry age of 36 violates the equal protection clause of the Fifth Amendment. An equal protection challenge based upon an age classification must be judged under a rational basis standard.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"in upholding a mandatory retirement age for Foreign Service Employees the Court explained that it would not \"overturn such a statute unless the varying treatment of different groups or persons is so unrelated to the achievement of any combination of legitimate purposes that we can only conclude that the legislature's actions were irrational\"","sentence":"Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 99 S.Ct. 939, 59 L.Ed.2d 171 (1979) (in upholding a mandatory retirement age for Foreign Service Employees the Court explained that it would not \u201coverturn such a statute unless the varying treatment of different groups or persons is so unrelated to the achievement of any combination of legitimate purposes that we can only conclude that the legislature\u2019s actions were irrational\u201d); see also Doyle v. Suffolk County, 786 F.2d 523, 525 (2d Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 825, 107 S.Ct. 98, 93 L.Ed.2d 49 (1986) (Court found that a New York State statute prohibiting the hiring of police officers over 29 years of age was rationally related to \u201censuring that the police force is physically able and capable of being trained\u201d); Francke v. Dep\u2019t of Treasury, 721 F.Supp. 47, 53 (S.D.N.Y.1989) (Department of Treasury\u2019s maximum hiring age policy for criminal investigators is rationally related to its legislative purpose of creating a young and vigorous work force); Crane v. Schneider, 635 F.Supp. 1430, 1433 (E.D.N.Y.1986) (age 36 cut-off for county deputy sheriff position does not violate equal protection clause because it is rationally related to the \u201cgovernment\u2019s legitimate interest in employing healthy and vigorous individuals in [strenuous] jobs ... and ensuring candidates are physically capable of being trained\u201d); Klotsche v. City of New York, 621 F.Supp. 1113 (S.D.N.Y.1985) (maximum hiring age limitation of 29 contained in City\u2019s administrative code does not violate equal protection clause); Colon v. City of New York, 535 F.Supp. 1108 (S.D.N.Y.1982) (maximum hiring age for city police officers does not violate equal protection clause)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"Court found that a New York State statute prohibiting the hiring of police officers over 29 years of age was rationally related to \"ensuring that the police force is physically able and capable of being trained\"","sentence":"Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 99 S.Ct. 939, 59 L.Ed.2d 171 (1979) (in upholding a mandatory retirement age for Foreign Service Employees the Court explained that it would not \u201coverturn such a statute unless the varying treatment of different groups or persons is so unrelated to the achievement of any combination of legitimate purposes that we can only conclude that the legislature\u2019s actions were irrational\u201d); see also Doyle v. Suffolk County, 786 F.2d 523, 525 (2d Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 825, 107 S.Ct. 98, 93 L.Ed.2d 49 (1986) (Court found that a New York State statute prohibiting the hiring of police officers over 29 years of age was rationally related to \u201censuring that the police force is physically able and capable of being trained\u201d); Francke v. Dep\u2019t of Treasury, 721 F.Supp. 47, 53 (S.D.N.Y.1989) (Department of Treasury\u2019s maximum hiring age policy for criminal investigators is rationally related to its legislative purpose of creating a young and vigorous work force); Crane v. Schneider, 635 F.Supp. 1430, 1433 (E.D.N.Y.1986) (age 36 cut-off for county deputy sheriff position does not violate equal protection clause because it is rationally related to the \u201cgovernment\u2019s legitimate interest in employing healthy and vigorous individuals in [strenuous] jobs ... and ensuring candidates are physically capable of being trained\u201d); Klotsche v. City of New York, 621 F.Supp. 1113 (S.D.N.Y.1985) (maximum hiring age limitation of 29 contained in City\u2019s administrative code does not violate equal protection clause); Colon v. City of New York, 535 F.Supp. 1108 (S.D.N.Y.1982) (maximum hiring age for city police officers does not violate equal protection clause)."},"case_id":7806638,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Dumont argues that the maximum entry age of 36 violates the equal protection clause of the Fifth Amendment. An equal protection challenge based upon an age classification must be judged under a rational basis standard.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"in upholding a mandatory retirement age for Foreign Service Employees the Court explained that it would not \"overturn such a statute unless the varying treatment of different groups or persons is so unrelated to the achievement of any combination of legitimate purposes that we can only conclude that the legislature's actions were irrational\"","sentence":"Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 99 S.Ct. 939, 59 L.Ed.2d 171 (1979) (in upholding a mandatory retirement age for Foreign Service Employees the Court explained that it would not \u201coverturn such a statute unless the varying treatment of different groups or persons is so unrelated to the achievement of any combination of legitimate purposes that we can only conclude that the legislature\u2019s actions were irrational\u201d); see also Doyle v. Suffolk County, 786 F.2d 523, 525 (2d Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 825, 107 S.Ct. 98, 93 L.Ed.2d 49 (1986) (Court found that a New York State statute prohibiting the hiring of police officers over 29 years of age was rationally related to \u201censuring that the police force is physically able and capable of being trained\u201d); Francke v. Dep\u2019t of Treasury, 721 F.Supp. 47, 53 (S.D.N.Y.1989) (Department of Treasury\u2019s maximum hiring age policy for criminal investigators is rationally related to its legislative purpose of creating a young and vigorous work force); Crane v. Schneider, 635 F.Supp. 1430, 1433 (E.D.N.Y.1986) (age 36 cut-off for county deputy sheriff position does not violate equal protection clause because it is rationally related to the \u201cgovernment\u2019s legitimate interest in employing healthy and vigorous individuals in [strenuous] jobs ... and ensuring candidates are physically capable of being trained\u201d); Klotsche v. City of New York, 621 F.Supp. 1113 (S.D.N.Y.1985) (maximum hiring age limitation of 29 contained in City\u2019s administrative code does not violate equal protection clause); Colon v. City of New York, 535 F.Supp. 1108 (S.D.N.Y.1982) (maximum hiring age for city police officers does not violate equal protection clause)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"Court found that a New York State statute prohibiting the hiring of police officers over 29 years of age was rationally related to \"ensuring that the police force is physically able and capable of being trained\"","sentence":"Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 99 S.Ct. 939, 59 L.Ed.2d 171 (1979) (in upholding a mandatory retirement age for Foreign Service Employees the Court explained that it would not \u201coverturn such a statute unless the varying treatment of different groups or persons is so unrelated to the achievement of any combination of legitimate purposes that we can only conclude that the legislature\u2019s actions were irrational\u201d); see also Doyle v. Suffolk County, 786 F.2d 523, 525 (2d Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 825, 107 S.Ct. 98, 93 L.Ed.2d 49 (1986) (Court found that a New York State statute prohibiting the hiring of police officers over 29 years of age was rationally related to \u201censuring that the police force is physically able and capable of being trained\u201d); Francke v. Dep\u2019t of Treasury, 721 F.Supp. 47, 53 (S.D.N.Y.1989) (Department of Treasury\u2019s maximum hiring age policy for criminal investigators is rationally related to its legislative purpose of creating a young and vigorous work force); Crane v. Schneider, 635 F.Supp. 1430, 1433 (E.D.N.Y.1986) (age 36 cut-off for county deputy sheriff position does not violate equal protection clause because it is rationally related to the \u201cgovernment\u2019s legitimate interest in employing healthy and vigorous individuals in [strenuous] jobs ... and ensuring candidates are physically capable of being trained\u201d); Klotsche v. City of New York, 621 F.Supp. 1113 (S.D.N.Y.1985) (maximum hiring age limitation of 29 contained in City\u2019s administrative code does not violate equal protection clause); Colon v. City of New York, 535 F.Supp. 1108 (S.D.N.Y.1982) (maximum hiring age for city police officers does not violate equal protection clause)."},"case_id":7806638,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Dumont argues that the maximum entry age of 36 violates the equal protection clause of the Fifth Amendment. An equal protection challenge based upon an age classification must be judged under a rational basis standard.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"721 F.Supp. 47, 53","parenthetical":"Department of Treasury's maximum hiring age policy for criminal investigators is rationally related to its legislative purpose of creating a young and vigorous work force","sentence":"Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 99 S.Ct. 939, 59 L.Ed.2d 171 (1979) (in upholding a mandatory retirement age for Foreign Service Employees the Court explained that it would not \u201coverturn such a statute unless the varying treatment of different groups or persons is so unrelated to the achievement of any combination of legitimate purposes that we can only conclude that the legislature\u2019s actions were irrational\u201d); see also Doyle v. Suffolk County, 786 F.2d 523, 525 (2d Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 825, 107 S.Ct. 98, 93 L.Ed.2d 49 (1986) (Court found that a New York State statute prohibiting the hiring of police officers over 29 years of age was rationally related to \u201censuring that the police force is physically able and capable of being trained\u201d); Francke v. Dep\u2019t of Treasury, 721 F.Supp. 47, 53 (S.D.N.Y.1989) (Department of Treasury\u2019s maximum hiring age policy for criminal investigators is rationally related to its legislative purpose of creating a young and vigorous work force); Crane v. Schneider, 635 F.Supp. 1430, 1433 (E.D.N.Y.1986) (age 36 cut-off for county deputy sheriff position does not violate equal protection clause because it is rationally related to the \u201cgovernment\u2019s legitimate interest in employing healthy and vigorous individuals in [strenuous] jobs ... and ensuring candidates are physically capable of being trained\u201d); Klotsche v. City of New York, 621 F.Supp. 1113 (S.D.N.Y.1985) (maximum hiring age limitation of 29 contained in City\u2019s administrative code does not violate equal protection clause); Colon v. City of New York, 535 F.Supp. 1108 (S.D.N.Y.1982) (maximum hiring age for city police officers does not violate equal protection clause)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"in upholding a mandatory retirement age for Foreign Service Employees the Court explained that it would not \"overturn such a statute unless the varying treatment of different groups or persons is so unrelated to the achievement of any combination of legitimate purposes that we can only conclude that the legislature's actions were irrational\"","sentence":"Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 99 S.Ct. 939, 59 L.Ed.2d 171 (1979) (in upholding a mandatory retirement age for Foreign Service Employees the Court explained that it would not \u201coverturn such a statute unless the varying treatment of different groups or persons is so unrelated to the achievement of any combination of legitimate purposes that we can only conclude that the legislature\u2019s actions were irrational\u201d); see also Doyle v. Suffolk County, 786 F.2d 523, 525 (2d Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 825, 107 S.Ct. 98, 93 L.Ed.2d 49 (1986) (Court found that a New York State statute prohibiting the hiring of police officers over 29 years of age was rationally related to \u201censuring that the police force is physically able and capable of being trained\u201d); Francke v. Dep\u2019t of Treasury, 721 F.Supp. 47, 53 (S.D.N.Y.1989) (Department of Treasury\u2019s maximum hiring age policy for criminal investigators is rationally related to its legislative purpose of creating a young and vigorous work force); Crane v. Schneider, 635 F.Supp. 1430, 1433 (E.D.N.Y.1986) (age 36 cut-off for county deputy sheriff position does not violate equal protection clause because it is rationally related to the \u201cgovernment\u2019s legitimate interest in employing healthy and vigorous individuals in [strenuous] jobs ... and ensuring candidates are physically capable of being trained\u201d); Klotsche v. City of New York, 621 F.Supp. 1113 (S.D.N.Y.1985) (maximum hiring age limitation of 29 contained in City\u2019s administrative code does not violate equal protection clause); Colon v. City of New York, 535 F.Supp. 1108 (S.D.N.Y.1982) (maximum hiring age for city police officers does not violate equal protection clause)."},"case_id":7806638,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Dumont argues that the maximum entry age of 36 violates the equal protection clause of the Fifth Amendment. An equal protection challenge based upon an age classification must be judged under a rational basis standard.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"in upholding a mandatory retirement age for Foreign Service Employees the Court explained that it would not \"overturn such a statute unless the varying treatment of different groups or persons is so unrelated to the achievement of any combination of legitimate purposes that we can only conclude that the legislature's actions were irrational\"","sentence":"Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 99 S.Ct. 939, 59 L.Ed.2d 171 (1979) (in upholding a mandatory retirement age for Foreign Service Employees the Court explained that it would not \u201coverturn such a statute unless the varying treatment of different groups or persons is so unrelated to the achievement of any combination of legitimate purposes that we can only conclude that the legislature\u2019s actions were irrational\u201d); see also Doyle v. Suffolk County, 786 F.2d 523, 525 (2d Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 825, 107 S.Ct. 98, 93 L.Ed.2d 49 (1986) (Court found that a New York State statute prohibiting the hiring of police officers over 29 years of age was rationally related to \u201censuring that the police force is physically able and capable of being trained\u201d); Francke v. Dep\u2019t of Treasury, 721 F.Supp. 47, 53 (S.D.N.Y.1989) (Department of Treasury\u2019s maximum hiring age policy for criminal investigators is rationally related to its legislative purpose of creating a young and vigorous work force); Crane v. Schneider, 635 F.Supp. 1430, 1433 (E.D.N.Y.1986) (age 36 cut-off for county deputy sheriff position does not violate equal protection clause because it is rationally related to the \u201cgovernment\u2019s legitimate interest in employing healthy and vigorous individuals in [strenuous] jobs ... and ensuring candidates are physically capable of being trained\u201d); Klotsche v. City of New York, 621 F.Supp. 1113 (S.D.N.Y.1985) (maximum hiring age limitation of 29 contained in City\u2019s administrative code does not violate equal protection clause); Colon v. City of New York, 535 F.Supp. 1108 (S.D.N.Y.1982) (maximum hiring age for city police officers does not violate equal protection clause)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"635 F.Supp. 1430, 1433","parenthetical":"age 36 cut-off for county deputy sheriff position does not violate equal protection clause because it is rationally related to the \"government's legitimate interest in employing healthy and vigorous individuals in [strenuous] jobs ... and ensuring candidates are physically capable of being trained\"","sentence":"Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 99 S.Ct. 939, 59 L.Ed.2d 171 (1979) (in upholding a mandatory retirement age for Foreign Service Employees the Court explained that it would not \u201coverturn such a statute unless the varying treatment of different groups or persons is so unrelated to the achievement of any combination of legitimate purposes that we can only conclude that the legislature\u2019s actions were irrational\u201d); see also Doyle v. Suffolk County, 786 F.2d 523, 525 (2d Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 825, 107 S.Ct. 98, 93 L.Ed.2d 49 (1986) (Court found that a New York State statute prohibiting the hiring of police officers over 29 years of age was rationally related to \u201censuring that the police force is physically able and capable of being trained\u201d); Francke v. Dep\u2019t of Treasury, 721 F.Supp. 47, 53 (S.D.N.Y.1989) (Department of Treasury\u2019s maximum hiring age policy for criminal investigators is rationally related to its legislative purpose of creating a young and vigorous work force); Crane v. Schneider, 635 F.Supp. 1430, 1433 (E.D.N.Y.1986) (age 36 cut-off for county deputy sheriff position does not violate equal protection clause because it is rationally related to the \u201cgovernment\u2019s legitimate interest in employing healthy and vigorous individuals in [strenuous] jobs ... and ensuring candidates are physically capable of being trained\u201d); Klotsche v. City of New York, 621 F.Supp. 1113 (S.D.N.Y.1985) (maximum hiring age limitation of 29 contained in City\u2019s administrative code does not violate equal protection clause); Colon v. City of New York, 535 F.Supp. 1108 (S.D.N.Y.1982) (maximum hiring age for city police officers does not violate equal protection clause)."},"case_id":7806638,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Dumont argues that the maximum entry age of 36 violates the equal protection clause of the Fifth Amendment. An equal protection challenge based upon an age classification must be judged under a rational basis standard.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"in upholding a mandatory retirement age for Foreign Service Employees the Court explained that it would not \"overturn such a statute unless the varying treatment of different groups or persons is so unrelated to the achievement of any combination of legitimate purposes that we can only conclude that the legislature's actions were irrational\"","sentence":"Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 99 S.Ct. 939, 59 L.Ed.2d 171 (1979) (in upholding a mandatory retirement age for Foreign Service Employees the Court explained that it would not \u201coverturn such a statute unless the varying treatment of different groups or persons is so unrelated to the achievement of any combination of legitimate purposes that we can only conclude that the legislature\u2019s actions were irrational\u201d); see also Doyle v. Suffolk County, 786 F.2d 523, 525 (2d Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 825, 107 S.Ct. 98, 93 L.Ed.2d 49 (1986) (Court found that a New York State statute prohibiting the hiring of police officers over 29 years of age was rationally related to \u201censuring that the police force is physically able and capable of being trained\u201d); Francke v. Dep\u2019t of Treasury, 721 F.Supp. 47, 53 (S.D.N.Y.1989) (Department of Treasury\u2019s maximum hiring age policy for criminal investigators is rationally related to its legislative purpose of creating a young and vigorous work force); Crane v. Schneider, 635 F.Supp. 1430, 1433 (E.D.N.Y.1986) (age 36 cut-off for county deputy sheriff position does not violate equal protection clause because it is rationally related to the \u201cgovernment\u2019s legitimate interest in employing healthy and vigorous individuals in [strenuous] jobs ... and ensuring candidates are physically capable of being trained\u201d); Klotsche v. City of New York, 621 F.Supp. 1113 (S.D.N.Y.1985) (maximum hiring age limitation of 29 contained in City\u2019s administrative code does not violate equal protection clause); Colon v. City of New York, 535 F.Supp. 1108 (S.D.N.Y.1982) (maximum hiring age for city police officers does not violate equal protection clause)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"maximum hiring age limitation of 29 contained in City's administrative code does not violate equal protection clause","sentence":"Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 99 S.Ct. 939, 59 L.Ed.2d 171 (1979) (in upholding a mandatory retirement age for Foreign Service Employees the Court explained that it would not \u201coverturn such a statute unless the varying treatment of different groups or persons is so unrelated to the achievement of any combination of legitimate purposes that we can only conclude that the legislature\u2019s actions were irrational\u201d); see also Doyle v. Suffolk County, 786 F.2d 523, 525 (2d Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 825, 107 S.Ct. 98, 93 L.Ed.2d 49 (1986) (Court found that a New York State statute prohibiting the hiring of police officers over 29 years of age was rationally related to \u201censuring that the police force is physically able and capable of being trained\u201d); Francke v. Dep\u2019t of Treasury, 721 F.Supp. 47, 53 (S.D.N.Y.1989) (Department of Treasury\u2019s maximum hiring age policy for criminal investigators is rationally related to its legislative purpose of creating a young and vigorous work force); Crane v. Schneider, 635 F.Supp. 1430, 1433 (E.D.N.Y.1986) (age 36 cut-off for county deputy sheriff position does not violate equal protection clause because it is rationally related to the \u201cgovernment\u2019s legitimate interest in employing healthy and vigorous individuals in [strenuous] jobs ... and ensuring candidates are physically capable of being trained\u201d); Klotsche v. City of New York, 621 F.Supp. 1113 (S.D.N.Y.1985) (maximum hiring age limitation of 29 contained in City\u2019s administrative code does not violate equal protection clause); Colon v. City of New York, 535 F.Supp. 1108 (S.D.N.Y.1982) (maximum hiring age for city police officers does not violate equal protection clause)."},"case_id":7806638,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Dumont argues that the maximum entry age of 36 violates the equal protection clause of the Fifth Amendment. An equal protection challenge based upon an age classification must be judged under a rational basis standard.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"in upholding a mandatory retirement age for Foreign Service Employees the Court explained that it would not \"overturn such a statute unless the varying treatment of different groups or persons is so unrelated to the achievement of any combination of legitimate purposes that we can only conclude that the legislature's actions were irrational\"","sentence":"Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 99 S.Ct. 939, 59 L.Ed.2d 171 (1979) (in upholding a mandatory retirement age for Foreign Service Employees the Court explained that it would not \u201coverturn such a statute unless the varying treatment of different groups or persons is so unrelated to the achievement of any combination of legitimate purposes that we can only conclude that the legislature\u2019s actions were irrational\u201d); see also Doyle v. Suffolk County, 786 F.2d 523, 525 (2d Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 825, 107 S.Ct. 98, 93 L.Ed.2d 49 (1986) (Court found that a New York State statute prohibiting the hiring of police officers over 29 years of age was rationally related to \u201censuring that the police force is physically able and capable of being trained\u201d); Francke v. Dep\u2019t of Treasury, 721 F.Supp. 47, 53 (S.D.N.Y.1989) (Department of Treasury\u2019s maximum hiring age policy for criminal investigators is rationally related to its legislative purpose of creating a young and vigorous work force); Crane v. Schneider, 635 F.Supp. 1430, 1433 (E.D.N.Y.1986) (age 36 cut-off for county deputy sheriff position does not violate equal protection clause because it is rationally related to the \u201cgovernment\u2019s legitimate interest in employing healthy and vigorous individuals in [strenuous] jobs ... and ensuring candidates are physically capable of being trained\u201d); Klotsche v. City of New York, 621 F.Supp. 1113 (S.D.N.Y.1985) (maximum hiring age limitation of 29 contained in City\u2019s administrative code does not violate equal protection clause); Colon v. City of New York, 535 F.Supp. 1108 (S.D.N.Y.1982) (maximum hiring age for city police officers does not violate equal protection clause)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"maximum hiring age for city police officers does not violate equal protection clause","sentence":"Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 99 S.Ct. 939, 59 L.Ed.2d 171 (1979) (in upholding a mandatory retirement age for Foreign Service Employees the Court explained that it would not \u201coverturn such a statute unless the varying treatment of different groups or persons is so unrelated to the achievement of any combination of legitimate purposes that we can only conclude that the legislature\u2019s actions were irrational\u201d); see also Doyle v. Suffolk County, 786 F.2d 523, 525 (2d Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 825, 107 S.Ct. 98, 93 L.Ed.2d 49 (1986) (Court found that a New York State statute prohibiting the hiring of police officers over 29 years of age was rationally related to \u201censuring that the police force is physically able and capable of being trained\u201d); Francke v. Dep\u2019t of Treasury, 721 F.Supp. 47, 53 (S.D.N.Y.1989) (Department of Treasury\u2019s maximum hiring age policy for criminal investigators is rationally related to its legislative purpose of creating a young and vigorous work force); Crane v. Schneider, 635 F.Supp. 1430, 1433 (E.D.N.Y.1986) (age 36 cut-off for county deputy sheriff position does not violate equal protection clause because it is rationally related to the \u201cgovernment\u2019s legitimate interest in employing healthy and vigorous individuals in [strenuous] jobs ... and ensuring candidates are physically capable of being trained\u201d); Klotsche v. City of New York, 621 F.Supp. 1113 (S.D.N.Y.1985) (maximum hiring age limitation of 29 contained in City\u2019s administrative code does not violate equal protection clause); Colon v. City of New York, 535 F.Supp. 1108 (S.D.N.Y.1982) (maximum hiring age for city police officers does not violate equal protection clause)."},"case_id":7806638,"label":"a"}
{"context":"This circuit has repeatedly held that movement within ones own lane or other relatively benign driving activity is not a sufficient ground on which to base reasonable suspicion, even when coupled with other suspicious circumstances.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"291 Mont. 157, 160","parenthetical":"dispatcher's report and officer's observation of defendant crossing the fog line were insufficient for particularized suspicion that defendant was driving under the influence","sentence":"See United States v. Jimenez-Medina, 173 F.3d 752, 755 (9th Cir.1999) (\u201cThe law of this circuit teaches that the presence of such facts as driver preoccupation, slow speed, movement within one\u2019s own lane of traffic, and even coming from the wrong neighborhood\u2019 do not give rise to legally sufficient \u2018reasonable suspicion.\u2019 \u201d); United States v. Rodriguez, 976 F.2d 592, 595-96(9th Cir. 1992) (observation of preoccupied driver in particular type of vehicle, swerving within his lane of traffic, on highway with reputation for alien smuggling, did not support reasonable suspicion); United States v. Hernandez-Alvarado, 891 F.2d 1414, 1418 (9th Cir.1989) (large reduction in speed of vehicle, driver\u2019s \u201cnervous demeanor,\u201d license plate brackets from a dealership associated with drug trafficking, and driver\u2019s residence in neighborhood under investigation for narcotics activity, did not support a finding of reasonable suspicion); see also State v. Lafferty, 291 Mont. 157, 160, 967 P.2d 363 (1998) (dispatcher\u2019s report and officer\u2019s observation of defendant crossing the fog line were insufficient for particularized suspicion that defendant was driving under the influence)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"173 F.3d 752, 755","parenthetical":"\"The law of this circuit teaches that the presence of such facts as driver preoccupation, slow speed, movement within one's own lane of traffic, and even coming from the wrong neighborhood' do not give rise to legally sufficient 'reasonable suspicion.' \"","sentence":"See United States v. Jimenez-Medina, 173 F.3d 752, 755 (9th Cir.1999) (\u201cThe law of this circuit teaches that the presence of such facts as driver preoccupation, slow speed, movement within one\u2019s own lane of traffic, and even coming from the wrong neighborhood\u2019 do not give rise to legally sufficient \u2018reasonable suspicion.\u2019 \u201d); United States v. Rodriguez, 976 F.2d 592, 595-96(9th Cir. 1992) (observation of preoccupied driver in particular type of vehicle, swerving within his lane of traffic, on highway with reputation for alien smuggling, did not support reasonable suspicion); United States v. Hernandez-Alvarado, 891 F.2d 1414, 1418 (9th Cir.1989) (large reduction in speed of vehicle, driver\u2019s \u201cnervous demeanor,\u201d license plate brackets from a dealership associated with drug trafficking, and driver\u2019s residence in neighborhood under investigation for narcotics activity, did not support a finding of reasonable suspicion); see also State v. Lafferty, 291 Mont. 157, 160, 967 P.2d 363 (1998) (dispatcher\u2019s report and officer\u2019s observation of defendant crossing the fog line were insufficient for particularized suspicion that defendant was driving under the influence)."},"case_id":2160907,"label":"b"}
{"context":"This circuit has repeatedly held that movement within ones own lane or other relatively benign driving activity is not a sufficient ground on which to base reasonable suspicion, even when coupled with other suspicious circumstances.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"dispatcher's report and officer's observation of defendant crossing the fog line were insufficient for particularized suspicion that defendant was driving under the influence","sentence":"See United States v. Jimenez-Medina, 173 F.3d 752, 755 (9th Cir.1999) (\u201cThe law of this circuit teaches that the presence of such facts as driver preoccupation, slow speed, movement within one\u2019s own lane of traffic, and even coming from the wrong neighborhood\u2019 do not give rise to legally sufficient \u2018reasonable suspicion.\u2019 \u201d); United States v. Rodriguez, 976 F.2d 592, 595-96(9th Cir. 1992) (observation of preoccupied driver in particular type of vehicle, swerving within his lane of traffic, on highway with reputation for alien smuggling, did not support reasonable suspicion); United States v. Hernandez-Alvarado, 891 F.2d 1414, 1418 (9th Cir.1989) (large reduction in speed of vehicle, driver\u2019s \u201cnervous demeanor,\u201d license plate brackets from a dealership associated with drug trafficking, and driver\u2019s residence in neighborhood under investigation for narcotics activity, did not support a finding of reasonable suspicion); see also State v. Lafferty, 291 Mont. 157, 160, 967 P.2d 363 (1998) (dispatcher\u2019s report and officer\u2019s observation of defendant crossing the fog line were insufficient for particularized suspicion that defendant was driving under the influence)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"173 F.3d 752, 755","parenthetical":"\"The law of this circuit teaches that the presence of such facts as driver preoccupation, slow speed, movement within one's own lane of traffic, and even coming from the wrong neighborhood' do not give rise to legally sufficient 'reasonable suspicion.' \"","sentence":"See United States v. Jimenez-Medina, 173 F.3d 752, 755 (9th Cir.1999) (\u201cThe law of this circuit teaches that the presence of such facts as driver preoccupation, slow speed, movement within one\u2019s own lane of traffic, and even coming from the wrong neighborhood\u2019 do not give rise to legally sufficient \u2018reasonable suspicion.\u2019 \u201d); United States v. Rodriguez, 976 F.2d 592, 595-96(9th Cir. 1992) (observation of preoccupied driver in particular type of vehicle, swerving within his lane of traffic, on highway with reputation for alien smuggling, did not support reasonable suspicion); United States v. Hernandez-Alvarado, 891 F.2d 1414, 1418 (9th Cir.1989) (large reduction in speed of vehicle, driver\u2019s \u201cnervous demeanor,\u201d license plate brackets from a dealership associated with drug trafficking, and driver\u2019s residence in neighborhood under investigation for narcotics activity, did not support a finding of reasonable suspicion); see also State v. Lafferty, 291 Mont. 157, 160, 967 P.2d 363 (1998) (dispatcher\u2019s report and officer\u2019s observation of defendant crossing the fog line were insufficient for particularized suspicion that defendant was driving under the influence)."},"case_id":2160907,"label":"b"}
{"context":"This circuit has repeatedly held that movement within ones own lane or other relatively benign driving activity is not a sufficient ground on which to base reasonable suspicion, even when coupled with other suspicious circumstances.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"291 Mont. 157, 160","parenthetical":"dispatcher's report and officer's observation of defendant crossing the fog line were insufficient for particularized suspicion that defendant was driving under the influence","sentence":"See United States v. Jimenez-Medina, 173 F.3d 752, 755 (9th Cir.1999) (\u201cThe law of this circuit teaches that the presence of such facts as driver preoccupation, slow speed, movement within one\u2019s own lane of traffic, and even coming from the wrong neighborhood\u2019 do not give rise to legally sufficient \u2018reasonable suspicion.\u2019 \u201d); United States v. Rodriguez, 976 F.2d 592, 595-96(9th Cir. 1992) (observation of preoccupied driver in particular type of vehicle, swerving within his lane of traffic, on highway with reputation for alien smuggling, did not support reasonable suspicion); United States v. Hernandez-Alvarado, 891 F.2d 1414, 1418 (9th Cir.1989) (large reduction in speed of vehicle, driver\u2019s \u201cnervous demeanor,\u201d license plate brackets from a dealership associated with drug trafficking, and driver\u2019s residence in neighborhood under investigation for narcotics activity, did not support a finding of reasonable suspicion); see also State v. Lafferty, 291 Mont. 157, 160, 967 P.2d 363 (1998) (dispatcher\u2019s report and officer\u2019s observation of defendant crossing the fog line were insufficient for particularized suspicion that defendant was driving under the influence)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"976 F.2d 592, 595-96","parenthetical":"observation of preoccupied driver in particular type of vehicle, swerving within his lane of traffic, on highway with reputation for alien smuggling, did not support reasonable suspicion","sentence":"See United States v. Jimenez-Medina, 173 F.3d 752, 755 (9th Cir.1999) (\u201cThe law of this circuit teaches that the presence of such facts as driver preoccupation, slow speed, movement within one\u2019s own lane of traffic, and even coming from the wrong neighborhood\u2019 do not give rise to legally sufficient \u2018reasonable suspicion.\u2019 \u201d); United States v. Rodriguez, 976 F.2d 592, 595-96(9th Cir. 1992) (observation of preoccupied driver in particular type of vehicle, swerving within his lane of traffic, on highway with reputation for alien smuggling, did not support reasonable suspicion); United States v. Hernandez-Alvarado, 891 F.2d 1414, 1418 (9th Cir.1989) (large reduction in speed of vehicle, driver\u2019s \u201cnervous demeanor,\u201d license plate brackets from a dealership associated with drug trafficking, and driver\u2019s residence in neighborhood under investigation for narcotics activity, did not support a finding of reasonable suspicion); see also State v. Lafferty, 291 Mont. 157, 160, 967 P.2d 363 (1998) (dispatcher\u2019s report and officer\u2019s observation of defendant crossing the fog line were insufficient for particularized suspicion that defendant was driving under the influence)."},"case_id":2160907,"label":"b"}
{"context":"This circuit has repeatedly held that movement within ones own lane or other relatively benign driving activity is not a sufficient ground on which to base reasonable suspicion, even when coupled with other suspicious circumstances.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"976 F.2d 592, 595-96","parenthetical":"observation of preoccupied driver in particular type of vehicle, swerving within his lane of traffic, on highway with reputation for alien smuggling, did not support reasonable suspicion","sentence":"See United States v. Jimenez-Medina, 173 F.3d 752, 755 (9th Cir.1999) (\u201cThe law of this circuit teaches that the presence of such facts as driver preoccupation, slow speed, movement within one\u2019s own lane of traffic, and even coming from the wrong neighborhood\u2019 do not give rise to legally sufficient \u2018reasonable suspicion.\u2019 \u201d); United States v. Rodriguez, 976 F.2d 592, 595-96(9th Cir. 1992) (observation of preoccupied driver in particular type of vehicle, swerving within his lane of traffic, on highway with reputation for alien smuggling, did not support reasonable suspicion); United States v. Hernandez-Alvarado, 891 F.2d 1414, 1418 (9th Cir.1989) (large reduction in speed of vehicle, driver\u2019s \u201cnervous demeanor,\u201d license plate brackets from a dealership associated with drug trafficking, and driver\u2019s residence in neighborhood under investigation for narcotics activity, did not support a finding of reasonable suspicion); see also State v. Lafferty, 291 Mont. 157, 160, 967 P.2d 363 (1998) (dispatcher\u2019s report and officer\u2019s observation of defendant crossing the fog line were insufficient for particularized suspicion that defendant was driving under the influence)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"dispatcher's report and officer's observation of defendant crossing the fog line were insufficient for particularized suspicion that defendant was driving under the influence","sentence":"See United States v. Jimenez-Medina, 173 F.3d 752, 755 (9th Cir.1999) (\u201cThe law of this circuit teaches that the presence of such facts as driver preoccupation, slow speed, movement within one\u2019s own lane of traffic, and even coming from the wrong neighborhood\u2019 do not give rise to legally sufficient \u2018reasonable suspicion.\u2019 \u201d); United States v. Rodriguez, 976 F.2d 592, 595-96(9th Cir. 1992) (observation of preoccupied driver in particular type of vehicle, swerving within his lane of traffic, on highway with reputation for alien smuggling, did not support reasonable suspicion); United States v. Hernandez-Alvarado, 891 F.2d 1414, 1418 (9th Cir.1989) (large reduction in speed of vehicle, driver\u2019s \u201cnervous demeanor,\u201d license plate brackets from a dealership associated with drug trafficking, and driver\u2019s residence in neighborhood under investigation for narcotics activity, did not support a finding of reasonable suspicion); see also State v. Lafferty, 291 Mont. 157, 160, 967 P.2d 363 (1998) (dispatcher\u2019s report and officer\u2019s observation of defendant crossing the fog line were insufficient for particularized suspicion that defendant was driving under the influence)."},"case_id":2160907,"label":"a"}
{"context":"This circuit has repeatedly held that movement within ones own lane or other relatively benign driving activity is not a sufficient ground on which to base reasonable suspicion, even when coupled with other suspicious circumstances.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"891 F.2d 1414, 1418","parenthetical":"large reduction in speed of vehicle, driver's \"nervous demeanor,\" license plate brackets from a dealership associated with drug trafficking, and driver's residence in neighborhood under investigation for narcotics activity, did not support a finding of reasonable suspicion","sentence":"See United States v. Jimenez-Medina, 173 F.3d 752, 755 (9th Cir.1999) (\u201cThe law of this circuit teaches that the presence of such facts as driver preoccupation, slow speed, movement within one\u2019s own lane of traffic, and even coming from the wrong neighborhood\u2019 do not give rise to legally sufficient \u2018reasonable suspicion.\u2019 \u201d); United States v. Rodriguez, 976 F.2d 592, 595-96(9th Cir. 1992) (observation of preoccupied driver in particular type of vehicle, swerving within his lane of traffic, on highway with reputation for alien smuggling, did not support reasonable suspicion); United States v. Hernandez-Alvarado, 891 F.2d 1414, 1418 (9th Cir.1989) (large reduction in speed of vehicle, driver\u2019s \u201cnervous demeanor,\u201d license plate brackets from a dealership associated with drug trafficking, and driver\u2019s residence in neighborhood under investigation for narcotics activity, did not support a finding of reasonable suspicion); see also State v. Lafferty, 291 Mont. 157, 160, 967 P.2d 363 (1998) (dispatcher\u2019s report and officer\u2019s observation of defendant crossing the fog line were insufficient for particularized suspicion that defendant was driving under the influence)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"291 Mont. 157, 160","parenthetical":"dispatcher's report and officer's observation of defendant crossing the fog line were insufficient for particularized suspicion that defendant was driving under the influence","sentence":"See United States v. Jimenez-Medina, 173 F.3d 752, 755 (9th Cir.1999) (\u201cThe law of this circuit teaches that the presence of such facts as driver preoccupation, slow speed, movement within one\u2019s own lane of traffic, and even coming from the wrong neighborhood\u2019 do not give rise to legally sufficient \u2018reasonable suspicion.\u2019 \u201d); United States v. Rodriguez, 976 F.2d 592, 595-96(9th Cir. 1992) (observation of preoccupied driver in particular type of vehicle, swerving within his lane of traffic, on highway with reputation for alien smuggling, did not support reasonable suspicion); United States v. Hernandez-Alvarado, 891 F.2d 1414, 1418 (9th Cir.1989) (large reduction in speed of vehicle, driver\u2019s \u201cnervous demeanor,\u201d license plate brackets from a dealership associated with drug trafficking, and driver\u2019s residence in neighborhood under investigation for narcotics activity, did not support a finding of reasonable suspicion); see also State v. Lafferty, 291 Mont. 157, 160, 967 P.2d 363 (1998) (dispatcher\u2019s report and officer\u2019s observation of defendant crossing the fog line were insufficient for particularized suspicion that defendant was driving under the influence)."},"case_id":2160907,"label":"a"}
{"context":"This circuit has repeatedly held that movement within ones own lane or other relatively benign driving activity is not a sufficient ground on which to base reasonable suspicion, even when coupled with other suspicious circumstances.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"dispatcher's report and officer's observation of defendant crossing the fog line were insufficient for particularized suspicion that defendant was driving under the influence","sentence":"See United States v. Jimenez-Medina, 173 F.3d 752, 755 (9th Cir.1999) (\u201cThe law of this circuit teaches that the presence of such facts as driver preoccupation, slow speed, movement within one\u2019s own lane of traffic, and even coming from the wrong neighborhood\u2019 do not give rise to legally sufficient \u2018reasonable suspicion.\u2019 \u201d); United States v. Rodriguez, 976 F.2d 592, 595-96(9th Cir. 1992) (observation of preoccupied driver in particular type of vehicle, swerving within his lane of traffic, on highway with reputation for alien smuggling, did not support reasonable suspicion); United States v. Hernandez-Alvarado, 891 F.2d 1414, 1418 (9th Cir.1989) (large reduction in speed of vehicle, driver\u2019s \u201cnervous demeanor,\u201d license plate brackets from a dealership associated with drug trafficking, and driver\u2019s residence in neighborhood under investigation for narcotics activity, did not support a finding of reasonable suspicion); see also State v. Lafferty, 291 Mont. 157, 160, 967 P.2d 363 (1998) (dispatcher\u2019s report and officer\u2019s observation of defendant crossing the fog line were insufficient for particularized suspicion that defendant was driving under the influence)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"891 F.2d 1414, 1418","parenthetical":"large reduction in speed of vehicle, driver's \"nervous demeanor,\" license plate brackets from a dealership associated with drug trafficking, and driver's residence in neighborhood under investigation for narcotics activity, did not support a finding of reasonable suspicion","sentence":"See United States v. Jimenez-Medina, 173 F.3d 752, 755 (9th Cir.1999) (\u201cThe law of this circuit teaches that the presence of such facts as driver preoccupation, slow speed, movement within one\u2019s own lane of traffic, and even coming from the wrong neighborhood\u2019 do not give rise to legally sufficient \u2018reasonable suspicion.\u2019 \u201d); United States v. Rodriguez, 976 F.2d 592, 595-96(9th Cir. 1992) (observation of preoccupied driver in particular type of vehicle, swerving within his lane of traffic, on highway with reputation for alien smuggling, did not support reasonable suspicion); United States v. Hernandez-Alvarado, 891 F.2d 1414, 1418 (9th Cir.1989) (large reduction in speed of vehicle, driver\u2019s \u201cnervous demeanor,\u201d license plate brackets from a dealership associated with drug trafficking, and driver\u2019s residence in neighborhood under investigation for narcotics activity, did not support a finding of reasonable suspicion); see also State v. Lafferty, 291 Mont. 157, 160, 967 P.2d 363 (1998) (dispatcher\u2019s report and officer\u2019s observation of defendant crossing the fog line were insufficient for particularized suspicion that defendant was driving under the influence)."},"case_id":2160907,"label":"b"}
{"context":"116 While the Utah Supreme Court has not addressed the amended plea withdrawal statute, it has recently reaffirmed that the plea withdrawal statute is unequivocally jurisdictional.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"2005 UT 34, \u00b6 20","parenthetical":"applying the previous plea withdrawal statute and \"confirm[ing] our conclusion ... that [Utah Code] section Ti-13-6(2","sentence":"See State v. Merrill, 2005 UT 34,\u00b6 20, 114 P.3d 585 (applying the previous plea withdrawal statute and \"confirm[ing] our conclusion ... that [Utah Code] section Ti-13-6(2)(b) [ (Supp.2004) ] is indeed jurisdictional\"); see also State v. Mullins, 2005 UT 43,\u00b6 11 n. 2, 116 P.3d 374 (applying the previous plea withdrawal statute and noting that in Merrill the court \"removed any lingering doubt as to the jurisdictional consequences of a failure to seek a timely withdrawal of a plea\")."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"applying the previous plea withdrawal statute and noting that in Merrill the court \"removed any lingering doubt as to the jurisdictional consequences of a failure to seek a timely withdrawal of a plea\"","sentence":"See State v. Merrill, 2005 UT 34,\u00b6 20, 114 P.3d 585 (applying the previous plea withdrawal statute and \"confirm[ing] our conclusion ... that [Utah Code] section Ti-13-6(2)(b) [ (Supp.2004) ] is indeed jurisdictional\"); see also State v. Mullins, 2005 UT 43,\u00b6 11 n. 2, 116 P.3d 374 (applying the previous plea withdrawal statute and noting that in Merrill the court \"removed any lingering doubt as to the jurisdictional consequences of a failure to seek a timely withdrawal of a plea\")."},"case_id":8986175,"label":"a"}
{"context":"116 While the Utah Supreme Court has not addressed the amended plea withdrawal statute, it has recently reaffirmed that the plea withdrawal statute is unequivocally jurisdictional.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"applying the previous plea withdrawal statute and noting that in Merrill the court \"removed any lingering doubt as to the jurisdictional consequences of a failure to seek a timely withdrawal of a plea\"","sentence":"See State v. Merrill, 2005 UT 34,\u00b6 20, 114 P.3d 585 (applying the previous plea withdrawal statute and \"confirm[ing] our conclusion ... that [Utah Code] section Ti-13-6(2)(b) [ (Supp.2004) ] is indeed jurisdictional\"); see also State v. Mullins, 2005 UT 43,\u00b6 11 n. 2, 116 P.3d 374 (applying the previous plea withdrawal statute and noting that in Merrill the court \"removed any lingering doubt as to the jurisdictional consequences of a failure to seek a timely withdrawal of a plea\")."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"2005 UT 34, \u00b6 20","parenthetical":"applying the previous plea withdrawal statute and \"confirm[ing] our conclusion ... that [Utah Code] section Ti-13-6(2","sentence":"See State v. Merrill, 2005 UT 34,\u00b6 20, 114 P.3d 585 (applying the previous plea withdrawal statute and \"confirm[ing] our conclusion ... that [Utah Code] section Ti-13-6(2)(b) [ (Supp.2004) ] is indeed jurisdictional\"); see also State v. Mullins, 2005 UT 43,\u00b6 11 n. 2, 116 P.3d 374 (applying the previous plea withdrawal statute and noting that in Merrill the court \"removed any lingering doubt as to the jurisdictional consequences of a failure to seek a timely withdrawal of a plea\")."},"case_id":8986175,"label":"b"}
{"context":"116 While the Utah Supreme Court has not addressed the amended plea withdrawal statute, it has recently reaffirmed that the plea withdrawal statute is unequivocally jurisdictional.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"applying the previous plea withdrawal statute and noting that in Merrill the court \"removed any lingering doubt as to the jurisdictional consequences of a failure to seek a timely withdrawal of a plea\"","sentence":"See State v. Merrill, 2005 UT 34,\u00b6 20, 114 P.3d 585 (applying the previous plea withdrawal statute and \"confirm[ing] our conclusion ... that [Utah Code] section Ti-13-6(2)(b) [ (Supp.2004) ] is indeed jurisdictional\"); see also State v. Mullins, 2005 UT 43,\u00b6 11 n. 2, 116 P.3d 374 (applying the previous plea withdrawal statute and noting that in Merrill the court \"removed any lingering doubt as to the jurisdictional consequences of a failure to seek a timely withdrawal of a plea\")."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"applying the previous plea withdrawal statute and \"confirm[ing] our conclusion ... that [Utah Code] section Ti-13-6(2","sentence":"See State v. Merrill, 2005 UT 34,\u00b6 20, 114 P.3d 585 (applying the previous plea withdrawal statute and \"confirm[ing] our conclusion ... that [Utah Code] section Ti-13-6(2)(b) [ (Supp.2004) ] is indeed jurisdictional\"); see also State v. Mullins, 2005 UT 43,\u00b6 11 n. 2, 116 P.3d 374 (applying the previous plea withdrawal statute and noting that in Merrill the court \"removed any lingering doubt as to the jurisdictional consequences of a failure to seek a timely withdrawal of a plea\")."},"case_id":8986175,"label":"b"}
{"context":"116 While the Utah Supreme Court has not addressed the amended plea withdrawal statute, it has recently reaffirmed that the plea withdrawal statute is unequivocally jurisdictional.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"applying the previous plea withdrawal statute and \"confirm[ing] our conclusion ... that [Utah Code] section Ti-13-6(2","sentence":"See State v. Merrill, 2005 UT 34,\u00b6 20, 114 P.3d 585 (applying the previous plea withdrawal statute and \"confirm[ing] our conclusion ... that [Utah Code] section Ti-13-6(2)(b) [ (Supp.2004) ] is indeed jurisdictional\"); see also State v. Mullins, 2005 UT 43,\u00b6 11 n. 2, 116 P.3d 374 (applying the previous plea withdrawal statute and noting that in Merrill the court \"removed any lingering doubt as to the jurisdictional consequences of a failure to seek a timely withdrawal of a plea\")."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"applying the previous plea withdrawal statute and noting that in Merrill the court \"removed any lingering doubt as to the jurisdictional consequences of a failure to seek a timely withdrawal of a plea\"","sentence":"See State v. Merrill, 2005 UT 34,\u00b6 20, 114 P.3d 585 (applying the previous plea withdrawal statute and \"confirm[ing] our conclusion ... that [Utah Code] section Ti-13-6(2)(b) [ (Supp.2004) ] is indeed jurisdictional\"); see also State v. Mullins, 2005 UT 43,\u00b6 11 n. 2, 116 P.3d 374 (applying the previous plea withdrawal statute and noting that in Merrill the court \"removed any lingering doubt as to the jurisdictional consequences of a failure to seek a timely withdrawal of a plea\")."},"case_id":8986175,"label":"a"}
{"context":"This failure to notify third parties would have no bearing on J & R's restitution claim against Mississippi Valley itself. In some cases, however, such an arrangement may prevent the restitution claimant from asserting priority against the claims of the bailee's other creditors.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[W]here one party, by means of contract, but without notice to the world, suffers the real ownership of chattels to be in himself, and the ostensible ownership to be in another, the law will postpone the rights of the former to those of the execution or attachment creditors of the latter[.]\"","sentence":"See Chickering v. Bastress, 130 Ill. 206, 22 N.E. 542, 543 (1889) (\u201c[W]here one party, by means of contract, but without notice to the world, suffers the real ownership of chattels to be in himself, and the ostensible ownership to be in another, the law will postpone the rights of the former to those of the execution or attachment creditors of the latter[.]\u201d); see also Matter of Iowa R.R. Co., 840 F.2d 535, 545 (7th Cir.1988) (denying constructive trust where \u201c[n]oth-ing in the way the Iowa did business would have alerted other creditors that the funds ostensibly in its control were held in trust\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"840 F.2d 535, 545","parenthetical":"denying constructive trust where \"[n]oth-ing in the way the Iowa did business would have alerted other creditors that the funds ostensibly in its control were held in trust\"","sentence":"See Chickering v. Bastress, 130 Ill. 206, 22 N.E. 542, 543 (1889) (\u201c[W]here one party, by means of contract, but without notice to the world, suffers the real ownership of chattels to be in himself, and the ostensible ownership to be in another, the law will postpone the rights of the former to those of the execution or attachment creditors of the latter[.]\u201d); see also Matter of Iowa R.R. Co., 840 F.2d 535, 545 (7th Cir.1988) (denying constructive trust where \u201c[n]oth-ing in the way the Iowa did business would have alerted other creditors that the funds ostensibly in its control were held in trust\u201d)."},"case_id":4236842,"label":"a"}
{"context":"This failure to notify third parties would have no bearing on J & R's restitution claim against Mississippi Valley itself. In some cases, however, such an arrangement may prevent the restitution claimant from asserting priority against the claims of the bailee's other creditors.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"22 N.E. 542, 543","parenthetical":"\"[W]here one party, by means of contract, but without notice to the world, suffers the real ownership of chattels to be in himself, and the ostensible ownership to be in another, the law will postpone the rights of the former to those of the execution or attachment creditors of the latter[.]\"","sentence":"See Chickering v. Bastress, 130 Ill. 206, 22 N.E. 542, 543 (1889) (\u201c[W]here one party, by means of contract, but without notice to the world, suffers the real ownership of chattels to be in himself, and the ostensible ownership to be in another, the law will postpone the rights of the former to those of the execution or attachment creditors of the latter[.]\u201d); see also Matter of Iowa R.R. Co., 840 F.2d 535, 545 (7th Cir.1988) (denying constructive trust where \u201c[n]oth-ing in the way the Iowa did business would have alerted other creditors that the funds ostensibly in its control were held in trust\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"840 F.2d 535, 545","parenthetical":"denying constructive trust where \"[n]oth-ing in the way the Iowa did business would have alerted other creditors that the funds ostensibly in its control were held in trust\"","sentence":"See Chickering v. Bastress, 130 Ill. 206, 22 N.E. 542, 543 (1889) (\u201c[W]here one party, by means of contract, but without notice to the world, suffers the real ownership of chattels to be in himself, and the ostensible ownership to be in another, the law will postpone the rights of the former to those of the execution or attachment creditors of the latter[.]\u201d); see also Matter of Iowa R.R. Co., 840 F.2d 535, 545 (7th Cir.1988) (denying constructive trust where \u201c[n]oth-ing in the way the Iowa did business would have alerted other creditors that the funds ostensibly in its control were held in trust\u201d)."},"case_id":4236842,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The only two sister circuits to have addressed this issue directly have held that the plaintiff need not prove a lack of probable cause for the prosecution.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"627 F.3d 1113, 1113","parenthetical":"holding that the investigator's belief that a crime had been committed \"does not permit or excuse deliberate fabrication of evidence\"","sentence":"See Gausvik, 345 F.3d at 817-18 (analyzing whether the allegations met the standard for deliberate fabrication, even though probable cause existed); see also Costanich, 627 F.3d at 1113 (holding that the investigator\u2019s belief that a crime had been committed \u201cdoes not permit or excuse deliberate fabrication of evidence\u201d); Crowe v. County of San Diego, 608 F.3d 406, 432-37 (9th Cir. 2010) (upholding a Fourteenth Amendment coercive-interview claim while rejecting Fourth Amendment claims because of the existence of probable cause)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"345 F.3d 817, 817-18","parenthetical":"analyzing whether the allegations met the standard for deliberate fabrication, even though probable cause existed","sentence":"See Gausvik, 345 F.3d at 817-18 (analyzing whether the allegations met the standard for deliberate fabrication, even though probable cause existed); see also Costanich, 627 F.3d at 1113 (holding that the investigator\u2019s belief that a crime had been committed \u201cdoes not permit or excuse deliberate fabrication of evidence\u201d); Crowe v. County of San Diego, 608 F.3d 406, 432-37 (9th Cir. 2010) (upholding a Fourteenth Amendment coercive-interview claim while rejecting Fourth Amendment claims because of the existence of probable cause)."},"case_id":12276670,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The only two sister circuits to have addressed this issue directly have held that the plaintiff need not prove a lack of probable cause for the prosecution.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"345 F.3d 817, 817-18","parenthetical":"analyzing whether the allegations met the standard for deliberate fabrication, even though probable cause existed","sentence":"See Gausvik, 345 F.3d at 817-18 (analyzing whether the allegations met the standard for deliberate fabrication, even though probable cause existed); see also Costanich, 627 F.3d at 1113 (holding that the investigator\u2019s belief that a crime had been committed \u201cdoes not permit or excuse deliberate fabrication of evidence\u201d); Crowe v. County of San Diego, 608 F.3d 406, 432-37 (9th Cir. 2010) (upholding a Fourteenth Amendment coercive-interview claim while rejecting Fourth Amendment claims because of the existence of probable cause)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"608 F.3d 406, 432-37","parenthetical":"upholding a Fourteenth Amendment coercive-interview claim while rejecting Fourth Amendment claims because of the existence of probable cause","sentence":"See Gausvik, 345 F.3d at 817-18 (analyzing whether the allegations met the standard for deliberate fabrication, even though probable cause existed); see also Costanich, 627 F.3d at 1113 (holding that the investigator\u2019s belief that a crime had been committed \u201cdoes not permit or excuse deliberate fabrication of evidence\u201d); Crowe v. County of San Diego, 608 F.3d 406, 432-37 (9th Cir. 2010) (upholding a Fourteenth Amendment coercive-interview claim while rejecting Fourth Amendment claims because of the existence of probable cause)."},"case_id":12276670,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The Court is not persuaded by appellee's argument that in the context of his bankruptcy, the debtor may raise otherwise time barred issues as a defense or counterclaim to the government's proof of claim. It is clear that the statute of limitations created by specific provisions of the tax code are applicable to bankruptcy proceedings.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"106 B.R. 286, 286","parenthetical":"acknowledging the power of federal bankruptcy court to overlook state law statutes of limitations","sentence":"See e.g. Custom Distribution, 224 F.3d at 244 (holding that court sitting in bankruptcy may allow a taxpayer to use overpayment of taxes as offset of debt to the IRS, but only if that offset request is timely); In re Constable Terminal Corp., 246 B.R. 181, 184 (D.N.J.2000) (agreeing with cited courts which have required taxpayers to file a claim for refund within the time limitations required by federal law, even if used as an offset or counterclaim); In re Dunhill Medical Inc., Civ. No. 92-37700, 1996 WL 354696 at *7 (Bankr.D.N.J. March 27, 1996) (holding that although 11 U.S.C. \u00a7 505(a)(2)(B) does not require a debtor to have filed a claim with the IRS before requesting an offset or stating a counterclaim, but the debtor\u2019s assertion within the context of the bankruptcy must still be timely according to the Internal Revenue Code); see also In re Carter, 125 B.R. 832, 835 (Bankr.D.Kan.1991); In re Murray Industries, 106 B.R. at 286. But cf. In re New Haven Projects Ltd. Liability Co., 225 F.3d 283, 286 (2d Cir.2000) (acknowledging the power of federal bankruptcy court to overlook state law statutes of limitations) (emphasis added)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"224 F.3d 244, 244","parenthetical":"holding that court sitting in bankruptcy may allow a taxpayer to use overpayment of taxes as offset of debt to the IRS, but only if that offset request is timely","sentence":"See e.g. Custom Distribution, 224 F.3d at 244 (holding that court sitting in bankruptcy may allow a taxpayer to use overpayment of taxes as offset of debt to the IRS, but only if that offset request is timely); In re Constable Terminal Corp., 246 B.R. 181, 184 (D.N.J.2000) (agreeing with cited courts which have required taxpayers to file a claim for refund within the time limitations required by federal law, even if used as an offset or counterclaim); In re Dunhill Medical Inc., Civ. No. 92-37700, 1996 WL 354696 at *7 (Bankr.D.N.J. March 27, 1996) (holding that although 11 U.S.C. \u00a7 505(a)(2)(B) does not require a debtor to have filed a claim with the IRS before requesting an offset or stating a counterclaim, but the debtor\u2019s assertion within the context of the bankruptcy must still be timely according to the Internal Revenue Code); see also In re Carter, 125 B.R. 832, 835 (Bankr.D.Kan.1991); In re Murray Industries, 106 B.R. at 286. But cf. In re New Haven Projects Ltd. Liability Co., 225 F.3d 283, 286 (2d Cir.2000) (acknowledging the power of federal bankruptcy court to overlook state law statutes of limitations) (emphasis added)."},"case_id":11101893,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The Court is not persuaded by appellee's argument that in the context of his bankruptcy, the debtor may raise otherwise time barred issues as a defense or counterclaim to the government's proof of claim. It is clear that the statute of limitations created by specific provisions of the tax code are applicable to bankruptcy proceedings.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"224 F.3d 244, 244","parenthetical":"holding that court sitting in bankruptcy may allow a taxpayer to use overpayment of taxes as offset of debt to the IRS, but only if that offset request is timely","sentence":"See e.g. Custom Distribution, 224 F.3d at 244 (holding that court sitting in bankruptcy may allow a taxpayer to use overpayment of taxes as offset of debt to the IRS, but only if that offset request is timely); In re Constable Terminal Corp., 246 B.R. 181, 184 (D.N.J.2000) (agreeing with cited courts which have required taxpayers to file a claim for refund within the time limitations required by federal law, even if used as an offset or counterclaim); In re Dunhill Medical Inc., Civ. No. 92-37700, 1996 WL 354696 at *7 (Bankr.D.N.J. March 27, 1996) (holding that although 11 U.S.C. \u00a7 505(a)(2)(B) does not require a debtor to have filed a claim with the IRS before requesting an offset or stating a counterclaim, but the debtor\u2019s assertion within the context of the bankruptcy must still be timely according to the Internal Revenue Code); see also In re Carter, 125 B.R. 832, 835 (Bankr.D.Kan.1991); In re Murray Industries, 106 B.R. at 286. But cf. In re New Haven Projects Ltd. Liability Co., 225 F.3d 283, 286 (2d Cir.2000) (acknowledging the power of federal bankruptcy court to overlook state law statutes of limitations) (emphasis added)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"225 F.3d 283, 286","parenthetical":"acknowledging the power of federal bankruptcy court to overlook state law statutes of limitations","sentence":"See e.g. Custom Distribution, 224 F.3d at 244 (holding that court sitting in bankruptcy may allow a taxpayer to use overpayment of taxes as offset of debt to the IRS, but only if that offset request is timely); In re Constable Terminal Corp., 246 B.R. 181, 184 (D.N.J.2000) (agreeing with cited courts which have required taxpayers to file a claim for refund within the time limitations required by federal law, even if used as an offset or counterclaim); In re Dunhill Medical Inc., Civ. No. 92-37700, 1996 WL 354696 at *7 (Bankr.D.N.J. March 27, 1996) (holding that although 11 U.S.C. \u00a7 505(a)(2)(B) does not require a debtor to have filed a claim with the IRS before requesting an offset or stating a counterclaim, but the debtor\u2019s assertion within the context of the bankruptcy must still be timely according to the Internal Revenue Code); see also In re Carter, 125 B.R. 832, 835 (Bankr.D.Kan.1991); In re Murray Industries, 106 B.R. at 286. But cf. In re New Haven Projects Ltd. Liability Co., 225 F.3d 283, 286 (2d Cir.2000) (acknowledging the power of federal bankruptcy court to overlook state law statutes of limitations) (emphasis added)."},"case_id":11101893,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The Court is not persuaded by appellee's argument that in the context of his bankruptcy, the debtor may raise otherwise time barred issues as a defense or counterclaim to the government's proof of claim. It is clear that the statute of limitations created by specific provisions of the tax code are applicable to bankruptcy proceedings.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"106 B.R. 286, 286","parenthetical":"acknowledging the power of federal bankruptcy court to overlook state law statutes of limitations","sentence":"See e.g. Custom Distribution, 224 F.3d at 244 (holding that court sitting in bankruptcy may allow a taxpayer to use overpayment of taxes as offset of debt to the IRS, but only if that offset request is timely); In re Constable Terminal Corp., 246 B.R. 181, 184 (D.N.J.2000) (agreeing with cited courts which have required taxpayers to file a claim for refund within the time limitations required by federal law, even if used as an offset or counterclaim); In re Dunhill Medical Inc., Civ. No. 92-37700, 1996 WL 354696 at *7 (Bankr.D.N.J. March 27, 1996) (holding that although 11 U.S.C. \u00a7 505(a)(2)(B) does not require a debtor to have filed a claim with the IRS before requesting an offset or stating a counterclaim, but the debtor\u2019s assertion within the context of the bankruptcy must still be timely according to the Internal Revenue Code); see also In re Carter, 125 B.R. 832, 835 (Bankr.D.Kan.1991); In re Murray Industries, 106 B.R. at 286. But cf. In re New Haven Projects Ltd. Liability Co., 225 F.3d 283, 286 (2d Cir.2000) (acknowledging the power of federal bankruptcy court to overlook state law statutes of limitations) (emphasis added)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"246 B.R. 181, 184","parenthetical":"agreeing with cited courts which have required taxpayers to file a claim for refund within the time limitations required by federal law, even if used as an offset or counterclaim","sentence":"See e.g. Custom Distribution, 224 F.3d at 244 (holding that court sitting in bankruptcy may allow a taxpayer to use overpayment of taxes as offset of debt to the IRS, but only if that offset request is timely); In re Constable Terminal Corp., 246 B.R. 181, 184 (D.N.J.2000) (agreeing with cited courts which have required taxpayers to file a claim for refund within the time limitations required by federal law, even if used as an offset or counterclaim); In re Dunhill Medical Inc., Civ. No. 92-37700, 1996 WL 354696 at *7 (Bankr.D.N.J. March 27, 1996) (holding that although 11 U.S.C. \u00a7 505(a)(2)(B) does not require a debtor to have filed a claim with the IRS before requesting an offset or stating a counterclaim, but the debtor\u2019s assertion within the context of the bankruptcy must still be timely according to the Internal Revenue Code); see also In re Carter, 125 B.R. 832, 835 (Bankr.D.Kan.1991); In re Murray Industries, 106 B.R. at 286. But cf. In re New Haven Projects Ltd. Liability Co., 225 F.3d 283, 286 (2d Cir.2000) (acknowledging the power of federal bankruptcy court to overlook state law statutes of limitations) (emphasis added)."},"case_id":11101893,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The Court is not persuaded by appellee's argument that in the context of his bankruptcy, the debtor may raise otherwise time barred issues as a defense or counterclaim to the government's proof of claim. It is clear that the statute of limitations created by specific provisions of the tax code are applicable to bankruptcy proceedings.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"225 F.3d 283, 286","parenthetical":"acknowledging the power of federal bankruptcy court to overlook state law statutes of limitations","sentence":"See e.g. Custom Distribution, 224 F.3d at 244 (holding that court sitting in bankruptcy may allow a taxpayer to use overpayment of taxes as offset of debt to the IRS, but only if that offset request is timely); In re Constable Terminal Corp., 246 B.R. 181, 184 (D.N.J.2000) (agreeing with cited courts which have required taxpayers to file a claim for refund within the time limitations required by federal law, even if used as an offset or counterclaim); In re Dunhill Medical Inc., Civ. No. 92-37700, 1996 WL 354696 at *7 (Bankr.D.N.J. March 27, 1996) (holding that although 11 U.S.C. \u00a7 505(a)(2)(B) does not require a debtor to have filed a claim with the IRS before requesting an offset or stating a counterclaim, but the debtor\u2019s assertion within the context of the bankruptcy must still be timely according to the Internal Revenue Code); see also In re Carter, 125 B.R. 832, 835 (Bankr.D.Kan.1991); In re Murray Industries, 106 B.R. at 286. But cf. In re New Haven Projects Ltd. Liability Co., 225 F.3d 283, 286 (2d Cir.2000) (acknowledging the power of federal bankruptcy court to overlook state law statutes of limitations) (emphasis added)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"246 B.R. 181, 184","parenthetical":"agreeing with cited courts which have required taxpayers to file a claim for refund within the time limitations required by federal law, even if used as an offset or counterclaim","sentence":"See e.g. Custom Distribution, 224 F.3d at 244 (holding that court sitting in bankruptcy may allow a taxpayer to use overpayment of taxes as offset of debt to the IRS, but only if that offset request is timely); In re Constable Terminal Corp., 246 B.R. 181, 184 (D.N.J.2000) (agreeing with cited courts which have required taxpayers to file a claim for refund within the time limitations required by federal law, even if used as an offset or counterclaim); In re Dunhill Medical Inc., Civ. No. 92-37700, 1996 WL 354696 at *7 (Bankr.D.N.J. March 27, 1996) (holding that although 11 U.S.C. \u00a7 505(a)(2)(B) does not require a debtor to have filed a claim with the IRS before requesting an offset or stating a counterclaim, but the debtor\u2019s assertion within the context of the bankruptcy must still be timely according to the Internal Revenue Code); see also In re Carter, 125 B.R. 832, 835 (Bankr.D.Kan.1991); In re Murray Industries, 106 B.R. at 286. But cf. In re New Haven Projects Ltd. Liability Co., 225 F.3d 283, 286 (2d Cir.2000) (acknowledging the power of federal bankruptcy court to overlook state law statutes of limitations) (emphasis added)."},"case_id":11101893,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Notwithstanding his own observations on June 1, 1993, Brown was entitled to rely on the information conveyed to him by officer Woltring to support his probable cause determination that a violation of former RCW 75.20.100 had occurred.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"29 Wn. App. 642, 646-47","parenthetical":"an arresting officer who does not personally possess sufficient information to constitute probable cause may still make a warrant-less arrest if he acts upon the direction or as a result of a communication from a fellow officer","sentence":"See also State v. Maesse, 29 Wn. App. 642, 646-47, 629 P.2d 1349 (an arresting officer who does not personally possess sufficient information to constitute probable cause may still make a warrant-less arrest if he acts upon the direction or as a result of a communication from a fellow officer), review denied, 96 Wn.2d 1009 (1981)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"76 Wn. App. 32, 39","parenthetical":"under the fellow officer rule, information conveyed by one law enforcement officer to another is sufficient to support probable cause","sentence":"See Torrey v. City of Tukwila, 76 Wn. App. 32, 39, 882 P.2d 799 (1994) (under the fellow officer rule, information conveyed by one law enforcement officer to another is sufficient to support probable cause)."},"case_id":99062,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Notwithstanding his own observations on June 1, 1993, Brown was entitled to rely on the information conveyed to him by officer Woltring to support his probable cause determination that a violation of former RCW 75.20.100 had occurred.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"an arresting officer who does not personally possess sufficient information to constitute probable cause may still make a warrant-less arrest if he acts upon the direction or as a result of a communication from a fellow officer","sentence":"See also State v. Maesse, 29 Wn. App. 642, 646-47, 629 P.2d 1349 (an arresting officer who does not personally possess sufficient information to constitute probable cause may still make a warrant-less arrest if he acts upon the direction or as a result of a communication from a fellow officer), review denied, 96 Wn.2d 1009 (1981)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"76 Wn. App. 32, 39","parenthetical":"under the fellow officer rule, information conveyed by one law enforcement officer to another is sufficient to support probable cause","sentence":"See Torrey v. City of Tukwila, 76 Wn. App. 32, 39, 882 P.2d 799 (1994) (under the fellow officer rule, information conveyed by one law enforcement officer to another is sufficient to support probable cause)."},"case_id":99062,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Notwithstanding his own observations on June 1, 1993, Brown was entitled to rely on the information conveyed to him by officer Woltring to support his probable cause determination that a violation of former RCW 75.20.100 had occurred.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"76 Wn. App. 32, 39","parenthetical":"under the fellow officer rule, information conveyed by one law enforcement officer to another is sufficient to support probable cause","sentence":"See Torrey v. City of Tukwila, 76 Wn. App. 32, 39, 882 P.2d 799 (1994) (under the fellow officer rule, information conveyed by one law enforcement officer to another is sufficient to support probable cause)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"an arresting officer who does not personally possess sufficient information to constitute probable cause may still make a warrant-less arrest if he acts upon the direction or as a result of a communication from a fellow officer","sentence":"See also State v. Maesse, 29 Wn. App. 642, 646-47, 629 P.2d 1349 (an arresting officer who does not personally possess sufficient information to constitute probable cause may still make a warrant-less arrest if he acts upon the direction or as a result of a communication from a fellow officer), review denied, 96 Wn.2d 1009 (1981)."},"case_id":99062,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Notwithstanding his own observations on June 1, 1993, Brown was entitled to rely on the information conveyed to him by officer Woltring to support his probable cause determination that a violation of former RCW 75.20.100 had occurred.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"29 Wn. App. 642, 646-47","parenthetical":"an arresting officer who does not personally possess sufficient information to constitute probable cause may still make a warrant-less arrest if he acts upon the direction or as a result of a communication from a fellow officer","sentence":"See also State v. Maesse, 29 Wn. App. 642, 646-47, 629 P.2d 1349 (an arresting officer who does not personally possess sufficient information to constitute probable cause may still make a warrant-less arrest if he acts upon the direction or as a result of a communication from a fellow officer), review denied, 96 Wn.2d 1009 (1981)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"under the fellow officer rule, information conveyed by one law enforcement officer to another is sufficient to support probable cause","sentence":"See Torrey v. City of Tukwila, 76 Wn. App. 32, 39, 882 P.2d 799 (1994) (under the fellow officer rule, information conveyed by one law enforcement officer to another is sufficient to support probable cause)."},"case_id":99062,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Notwithstanding his own observations on June 1, 1993, Brown was entitled to rely on the information conveyed to him by officer Woltring to support his probable cause determination that a violation of former RCW 75.20.100 had occurred.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"an arresting officer who does not personally possess sufficient information to constitute probable cause may still make a warrant-less arrest if he acts upon the direction or as a result of a communication from a fellow officer","sentence":"See also State v. Maesse, 29 Wn. App. 642, 646-47, 629 P.2d 1349 (an arresting officer who does not personally possess sufficient information to constitute probable cause may still make a warrant-less arrest if he acts upon the direction or as a result of a communication from a fellow officer), review denied, 96 Wn.2d 1009 (1981)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"under the fellow officer rule, information conveyed by one law enforcement officer to another is sufficient to support probable cause","sentence":"See Torrey v. City of Tukwila, 76 Wn. App. 32, 39, 882 P.2d 799 (1994) (under the fellow officer rule, information conveyed by one law enforcement officer to another is sufficient to support probable cause)."},"case_id":99062,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Notwithstanding his own observations on June 1, 1993, Brown was entitled to rely on the information conveyed to him by officer Woltring to support his probable cause determination that a violation of former RCW 75.20.100 had occurred.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"under the fellow officer rule, information conveyed by one law enforcement officer to another is sufficient to support probable cause","sentence":"See Torrey v. City of Tukwila, 76 Wn. App. 32, 39, 882 P.2d 799 (1994) (under the fellow officer rule, information conveyed by one law enforcement officer to another is sufficient to support probable cause)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"an arresting officer who does not personally possess sufficient information to constitute probable cause may still make a warrant-less arrest if he acts upon the direction or as a result of a communication from a fellow officer","sentence":"See also State v. Maesse, 29 Wn. App. 642, 646-47, 629 P.2d 1349 (an arresting officer who does not personally possess sufficient information to constitute probable cause may still make a warrant-less arrest if he acts upon the direction or as a result of a communication from a fellow officer), review denied, 96 Wn.2d 1009 (1981)."},"case_id":99062,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Conceding that an adequate factual basis existed to support a statutory violation under our pre-Bailey law, he asserts that after Bailey, it is unclear whether the conduct acknowledged in the plea agreement still would violate the statute. For this reason, he asks that we vacate his firearm conviction and remand to the district court for further proceedings.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"96 F.3d 246, 254","parenthetical":"factual basis for guilty plea may be insufficient where government proffered only that the defendant \"possessed numerous weapons\" in connection with a narcotics conspiracy","sentence":"See United States v. Abdul, 75 F.3d 327, 329-30 (7th Cir.) (vacating plea for knowing use of firearm where the admitted conduct would not constitute a \u201cuse\u201d under Bailey), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 2569, 135 L.Ed.2d 1085 (1996); see also United States v. Robinson, 96 F.3d 246, 254 (7th Cir.1996) (factual basis for guilty plea may be insufficient where government proffered only that the defendant \u201cpossessed numerous weapons\u201d in connection with a narcotics conspiracy)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"75 F.3d 327, 329-30","parenthetical":"vacating plea for knowing use of firearm where the admitted conduct would not constitute a \"use\" under Bailey","sentence":"See United States v. Abdul, 75 F.3d 327, 329-30 (7th Cir.) (vacating plea for knowing use of firearm where the admitted conduct would not constitute a \u201cuse\u201d under Bailey), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 2569, 135 L.Ed.2d 1085 (1996); see also United States v. Robinson, 96 F.3d 246, 254 (7th Cir.1996) (factual basis for guilty plea may be insufficient where government proffered only that the defendant \u201cpossessed numerous weapons\u201d in connection with a narcotics conspiracy)."},"case_id":7653732,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Conceding that an adequate factual basis existed to support a statutory violation under our pre-Bailey law, he asserts that after Bailey, it is unclear whether the conduct acknowledged in the plea agreement still would violate the statute. For this reason, he asks that we vacate his firearm conviction and remand to the district court for further proceedings.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"vacating plea for knowing use of firearm where the admitted conduct would not constitute a \"use\" under Bailey","sentence":"See United States v. Abdul, 75 F.3d 327, 329-30 (7th Cir.) (vacating plea for knowing use of firearm where the admitted conduct would not constitute a \u201cuse\u201d under Bailey), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 2569, 135 L.Ed.2d 1085 (1996); see also United States v. Robinson, 96 F.3d 246, 254 (7th Cir.1996) (factual basis for guilty plea may be insufficient where government proffered only that the defendant \u201cpossessed numerous weapons\u201d in connection with a narcotics conspiracy)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"96 F.3d 246, 254","parenthetical":"factual basis for guilty plea may be insufficient where government proffered only that the defendant \"possessed numerous weapons\" in connection with a narcotics conspiracy","sentence":"See United States v. Abdul, 75 F.3d 327, 329-30 (7th Cir.) (vacating plea for knowing use of firearm where the admitted conduct would not constitute a \u201cuse\u201d under Bailey), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 2569, 135 L.Ed.2d 1085 (1996); see also United States v. Robinson, 96 F.3d 246, 254 (7th Cir.1996) (factual basis for guilty plea may be insufficient where government proffered only that the defendant \u201cpossessed numerous weapons\u201d in connection with a narcotics conspiracy)."},"case_id":7653732,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Conceding that an adequate factual basis existed to support a statutory violation under our pre-Bailey law, he asserts that after Bailey, it is unclear whether the conduct acknowledged in the plea agreement still would violate the statute. For this reason, he asks that we vacate his firearm conviction and remand to the district court for further proceedings.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"96 F.3d 246, 254","parenthetical":"factual basis for guilty plea may be insufficient where government proffered only that the defendant \"possessed numerous weapons\" in connection with a narcotics conspiracy","sentence":"See United States v. Abdul, 75 F.3d 327, 329-30 (7th Cir.) (vacating plea for knowing use of firearm where the admitted conduct would not constitute a \u201cuse\u201d under Bailey), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 2569, 135 L.Ed.2d 1085 (1996); see also United States v. Robinson, 96 F.3d 246, 254 (7th Cir.1996) (factual basis for guilty plea may be insufficient where government proffered only that the defendant \u201cpossessed numerous weapons\u201d in connection with a narcotics conspiracy)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"vacating plea for knowing use of firearm where the admitted conduct would not constitute a \"use\" under Bailey","sentence":"See United States v. Abdul, 75 F.3d 327, 329-30 (7th Cir.) (vacating plea for knowing use of firearm where the admitted conduct would not constitute a \u201cuse\u201d under Bailey), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 2569, 135 L.Ed.2d 1085 (1996); see also United States v. Robinson, 96 F.3d 246, 254 (7th Cir.1996) (factual basis for guilty plea may be insufficient where government proffered only that the defendant \u201cpossessed numerous weapons\u201d in connection with a narcotics conspiracy)."},"case_id":7653732,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Warch refers to opinions of those who thought he was doing a good job and points to savings he brought the company, arguing that this evidence demonstrates he was meeting OCIC's legitimate performance expectations. As to the opinions, they were offered either by those whose employment with OCIC ended well before Warch's or by third parties who were never employed by OCIC at all. Thus, they lack probative value as to whether Warch was meeting his employer's legitimate expectations at the time he was fired.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"328 F.3d 145, 149-50","parenthetical":"explaining that co-workers' opinions might be relevant in certain situations, but not where they fail to establish what expectations the employer had and whether the employee met them","sentence":"See, e.g., Hawkins v. PepsiCo, Inc., 203 F.3d 274, 280 (4th Cir.2000) (disregarding plaintiffs opinions of her own performance because \u201c[i]t is the perception of the decision maker which is relevant, not the self-assessment of the plaintiff,\u201d and finding the opinions of her co-workers \u201csimilarly close to irrelevant\u201d) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); O\u2019Connor, 56 F.3d at 547 (holding that a review of an employee\u2019s 1989 performance was irrelevant to a determination of whether his performance was satisfactory at the time of his termination in August of 1990); cf. King v. Rumsfeld, 328 F.3d 145, 149-50 (4th Cir.2003) (explaining that co-workers\u2019 opinions might be relevant in certain situations, but not where they fail to establish what expectations the employer had and whether the employee met them)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"56 F.3d 547, 547","parenthetical":"holding that a review of an employee's 1989 performance was irrelevant to a determination of whether his performance was satisfactory at the time of his termination in August of 1990","sentence":"See, e.g., Hawkins v. PepsiCo, Inc., 203 F.3d 274, 280 (4th Cir.2000) (disregarding plaintiffs opinions of her own performance because \u201c[i]t is the perception of the decision maker which is relevant, not the self-assessment of the plaintiff,\u201d and finding the opinions of her co-workers \u201csimilarly close to irrelevant\u201d) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); O\u2019Connor, 56 F.3d at 547 (holding that a review of an employee\u2019s 1989 performance was irrelevant to a determination of whether his performance was satisfactory at the time of his termination in August of 1990); cf. King v. Rumsfeld, 328 F.3d 145, 149-50 (4th Cir.2003) (explaining that co-workers\u2019 opinions might be relevant in certain situations, but not where they fail to establish what expectations the employer had and whether the employee met them)."},"case_id":936159,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In similar circumstances, courts of other states have held that the fact that evidence had been gathered outside an officer's territorial jurisdiction does not require suppression of the evidence. \"The transport of defendant across State lines was merely fortuitous and should not work to clear defendant of the charges.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"113 Idaho 364, 369-70","parenthetical":"officer outside territorial limits of his authority could request motorist to submit to blood alcohol content test in accordance with the Idaho implied consent statute","sentence":"People v. Preston, 205 Ill. App. 3d 35, 42, 563 N.E.2d 80 (1990) (officer lawfully crossed state line in order to provide Illinois implied consent warning for purpose of obtaining blood test to check blood alcohol level of motorist who had been transported to Iowa hospital); see also State v. Griffiths, 113 Idaho 364, 369-70, 744 P.2d 92 (1987) (officer outside territorial limits of his authority could request motorist to submit to blood alcohol content test in accordance with the Idaho implied consent statute); State v. Torgerson, 453 N.W.2d 698 (Minn. 1990) (Minnesota officer properly arrested and administered sobriety tests to defendant after ambulance personnel had transported defendant to a nearby North Dakota hospital); State v. Steinbrunn, 54 Wash. App. 506, 512, 774 P.2d 55 (1989) (defendant, injured in car accident in Washington, transported to Oregon hospital where Washington state trooper arrested him while he lay unconscious and ordered nurse to draw blood samples; held that Washington officer acted lawfully)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"205 Ill. App. 3d 35, 42","parenthetical":"officer lawfully crossed state line in order to provide Illinois implied consent warning for purpose of obtaining blood test to check blood alcohol level of motorist who had been transported to Iowa hospital","sentence":"People v. Preston, 205 Ill. App. 3d 35, 42, 563 N.E.2d 80 (1990) (officer lawfully crossed state line in order to provide Illinois implied consent warning for purpose of obtaining blood test to check blood alcohol level of motorist who had been transported to Iowa hospital); see also State v. Griffiths, 113 Idaho 364, 369-70, 744 P.2d 92 (1987) (officer outside territorial limits of his authority could request motorist to submit to blood alcohol content test in accordance with the Idaho implied consent statute); State v. Torgerson, 453 N.W.2d 698 (Minn. 1990) (Minnesota officer properly arrested and administered sobriety tests to defendant after ambulance personnel had transported defendant to a nearby North Dakota hospital); State v. Steinbrunn, 54 Wash. App. 506, 512, 774 P.2d 55 (1989) (defendant, injured in car accident in Washington, transported to Oregon hospital where Washington state trooper arrested him while he lay unconscious and ordered nurse to draw blood samples; held that Washington officer acted lawfully)."},"case_id":549890,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In similar circumstances, courts of other states have held that the fact that evidence had been gathered outside an officer's territorial jurisdiction does not require suppression of the evidence. \"The transport of defendant across State lines was merely fortuitous and should not work to clear defendant of the charges.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"205 Ill. App. 3d 35, 42","parenthetical":"officer lawfully crossed state line in order to provide Illinois implied consent warning for purpose of obtaining blood test to check blood alcohol level of motorist who had been transported to Iowa hospital","sentence":"People v. Preston, 205 Ill. App. 3d 35, 42, 563 N.E.2d 80 (1990) (officer lawfully crossed state line in order to provide Illinois implied consent warning for purpose of obtaining blood test to check blood alcohol level of motorist who had been transported to Iowa hospital); see also State v. Griffiths, 113 Idaho 364, 369-70, 744 P.2d 92 (1987) (officer outside territorial limits of his authority could request motorist to submit to blood alcohol content test in accordance with the Idaho implied consent statute); State v. Torgerson, 453 N.W.2d 698 (Minn. 1990) (Minnesota officer properly arrested and administered sobriety tests to defendant after ambulance personnel had transported defendant to a nearby North Dakota hospital); State v. Steinbrunn, 54 Wash. App. 506, 512, 774 P.2d 55 (1989) (defendant, injured in car accident in Washington, transported to Oregon hospital where Washington state trooper arrested him while he lay unconscious and ordered nurse to draw blood samples; held that Washington officer acted lawfully)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"officer outside territorial limits of his authority could request motorist to submit to blood alcohol content test in accordance with the Idaho implied consent statute","sentence":"People v. Preston, 205 Ill. App. 3d 35, 42, 563 N.E.2d 80 (1990) (officer lawfully crossed state line in order to provide Illinois implied consent warning for purpose of obtaining blood test to check blood alcohol level of motorist who had been transported to Iowa hospital); see also State v. Griffiths, 113 Idaho 364, 369-70, 744 P.2d 92 (1987) (officer outside territorial limits of his authority could request motorist to submit to blood alcohol content test in accordance with the Idaho implied consent statute); State v. Torgerson, 453 N.W.2d 698 (Minn. 1990) (Minnesota officer properly arrested and administered sobriety tests to defendant after ambulance personnel had transported defendant to a nearby North Dakota hospital); State v. Steinbrunn, 54 Wash. App. 506, 512, 774 P.2d 55 (1989) (defendant, injured in car accident in Washington, transported to Oregon hospital where Washington state trooper arrested him while he lay unconscious and ordered nurse to draw blood samples; held that Washington officer acted lawfully)."},"case_id":549890,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In similar circumstances, courts of other states have held that the fact that evidence had been gathered outside an officer's territorial jurisdiction does not require suppression of the evidence. \"The transport of defendant across State lines was merely fortuitous and should not work to clear defendant of the charges.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"205 Ill. App. 3d 35, 42","parenthetical":"officer lawfully crossed state line in order to provide Illinois implied consent warning for purpose of obtaining blood test to check blood alcohol level of motorist who had been transported to Iowa hospital","sentence":"People v. Preston, 205 Ill. App. 3d 35, 42, 563 N.E.2d 80 (1990) (officer lawfully crossed state line in order to provide Illinois implied consent warning for purpose of obtaining blood test to check blood alcohol level of motorist who had been transported to Iowa hospital); see also State v. Griffiths, 113 Idaho 364, 369-70, 744 P.2d 92 (1987) (officer outside territorial limits of his authority could request motorist to submit to blood alcohol content test in accordance with the Idaho implied consent statute); State v. Torgerson, 453 N.W.2d 698 (Minn. 1990) (Minnesota officer properly arrested and administered sobriety tests to defendant after ambulance personnel had transported defendant to a nearby North Dakota hospital); State v. Steinbrunn, 54 Wash. App. 506, 512, 774 P.2d 55 (1989) (defendant, injured in car accident in Washington, transported to Oregon hospital where Washington state trooper arrested him while he lay unconscious and ordered nurse to draw blood samples; held that Washington officer acted lawfully)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"Minnesota officer properly arrested and administered sobriety tests to defendant after ambulance personnel had transported defendant to a nearby North Dakota hospital","sentence":"People v. Preston, 205 Ill. App. 3d 35, 42, 563 N.E.2d 80 (1990) (officer lawfully crossed state line in order to provide Illinois implied consent warning for purpose of obtaining blood test to check blood alcohol level of motorist who had been transported to Iowa hospital); see also State v. Griffiths, 113 Idaho 364, 369-70, 744 P.2d 92 (1987) (officer outside territorial limits of his authority could request motorist to submit to blood alcohol content test in accordance with the Idaho implied consent statute); State v. Torgerson, 453 N.W.2d 698 (Minn. 1990) (Minnesota officer properly arrested and administered sobriety tests to defendant after ambulance personnel had transported defendant to a nearby North Dakota hospital); State v. Steinbrunn, 54 Wash. App. 506, 512, 774 P.2d 55 (1989) (defendant, injured in car accident in Washington, transported to Oregon hospital where Washington state trooper arrested him while he lay unconscious and ordered nurse to draw blood samples; held that Washington officer acted lawfully)."},"case_id":549890,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In similar circumstances, courts of other states have held that the fact that evidence had been gathered outside an officer's territorial jurisdiction does not require suppression of the evidence. \"The transport of defendant across State lines was merely fortuitous and should not work to clear defendant of the charges.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"officer lawfully crossed state line in order to provide Illinois implied consent warning for purpose of obtaining blood test to check blood alcohol level of motorist who had been transported to Iowa hospital","sentence":"People v. Preston, 205 Ill. App. 3d 35, 42, 563 N.E.2d 80 (1990) (officer lawfully crossed state line in order to provide Illinois implied consent warning for purpose of obtaining blood test to check blood alcohol level of motorist who had been transported to Iowa hospital); see also State v. Griffiths, 113 Idaho 364, 369-70, 744 P.2d 92 (1987) (officer outside territorial limits of his authority could request motorist to submit to blood alcohol content test in accordance with the Idaho implied consent statute); State v. Torgerson, 453 N.W.2d 698 (Minn. 1990) (Minnesota officer properly arrested and administered sobriety tests to defendant after ambulance personnel had transported defendant to a nearby North Dakota hospital); State v. Steinbrunn, 54 Wash. App. 506, 512, 774 P.2d 55 (1989) (defendant, injured in car accident in Washington, transported to Oregon hospital where Washington state trooper arrested him while he lay unconscious and ordered nurse to draw blood samples; held that Washington officer acted lawfully)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"113 Idaho 364, 369-70","parenthetical":"officer outside territorial limits of his authority could request motorist to submit to blood alcohol content test in accordance with the Idaho implied consent statute","sentence":"People v. Preston, 205 Ill. App. 3d 35, 42, 563 N.E.2d 80 (1990) (officer lawfully crossed state line in order to provide Illinois implied consent warning for purpose of obtaining blood test to check blood alcohol level of motorist who had been transported to Iowa hospital); see also State v. Griffiths, 113 Idaho 364, 369-70, 744 P.2d 92 (1987) (officer outside territorial limits of his authority could request motorist to submit to blood alcohol content test in accordance with the Idaho implied consent statute); State v. Torgerson, 453 N.W.2d 698 (Minn. 1990) (Minnesota officer properly arrested and administered sobriety tests to defendant after ambulance personnel had transported defendant to a nearby North Dakota hospital); State v. Steinbrunn, 54 Wash. App. 506, 512, 774 P.2d 55 (1989) (defendant, injured in car accident in Washington, transported to Oregon hospital where Washington state trooper arrested him while he lay unconscious and ordered nurse to draw blood samples; held that Washington officer acted lawfully)."},"case_id":549890,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In similar circumstances, courts of other states have held that the fact that evidence had been gathered outside an officer's territorial jurisdiction does not require suppression of the evidence. \"The transport of defendant across State lines was merely fortuitous and should not work to clear defendant of the charges.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"officer lawfully crossed state line in order to provide Illinois implied consent warning for purpose of obtaining blood test to check blood alcohol level of motorist who had been transported to Iowa hospital","sentence":"People v. Preston, 205 Ill. App. 3d 35, 42, 563 N.E.2d 80 (1990) (officer lawfully crossed state line in order to provide Illinois implied consent warning for purpose of obtaining blood test to check blood alcohol level of motorist who had been transported to Iowa hospital); see also State v. Griffiths, 113 Idaho 364, 369-70, 744 P.2d 92 (1987) (officer outside territorial limits of his authority could request motorist to submit to blood alcohol content test in accordance with the Idaho implied consent statute); State v. Torgerson, 453 N.W.2d 698 (Minn. 1990) (Minnesota officer properly arrested and administered sobriety tests to defendant after ambulance personnel had transported defendant to a nearby North Dakota hospital); State v. Steinbrunn, 54 Wash. App. 506, 512, 774 P.2d 55 (1989) (defendant, injured in car accident in Washington, transported to Oregon hospital where Washington state trooper arrested him while he lay unconscious and ordered nurse to draw blood samples; held that Washington officer acted lawfully)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"officer outside territorial limits of his authority could request motorist to submit to blood alcohol content test in accordance with the Idaho implied consent statute","sentence":"People v. Preston, 205 Ill. App. 3d 35, 42, 563 N.E.2d 80 (1990) (officer lawfully crossed state line in order to provide Illinois implied consent warning for purpose of obtaining blood test to check blood alcohol level of motorist who had been transported to Iowa hospital); see also State v. Griffiths, 113 Idaho 364, 369-70, 744 P.2d 92 (1987) (officer outside territorial limits of his authority could request motorist to submit to blood alcohol content test in accordance with the Idaho implied consent statute); State v. Torgerson, 453 N.W.2d 698 (Minn. 1990) (Minnesota officer properly arrested and administered sobriety tests to defendant after ambulance personnel had transported defendant to a nearby North Dakota hospital); State v. Steinbrunn, 54 Wash. App. 506, 512, 774 P.2d 55 (1989) (defendant, injured in car accident in Washington, transported to Oregon hospital where Washington state trooper arrested him while he lay unconscious and ordered nurse to draw blood samples; held that Washington officer acted lawfully)."},"case_id":549890,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In similar circumstances, courts of other states have held that the fact that evidence had been gathered outside an officer's territorial jurisdiction does not require suppression of the evidence. \"The transport of defendant across State lines was merely fortuitous and should not work to clear defendant of the charges.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"officer lawfully crossed state line in order to provide Illinois implied consent warning for purpose of obtaining blood test to check blood alcohol level of motorist who had been transported to Iowa hospital","sentence":"People v. Preston, 205 Ill. App. 3d 35, 42, 563 N.E.2d 80 (1990) (officer lawfully crossed state line in order to provide Illinois implied consent warning for purpose of obtaining blood test to check blood alcohol level of motorist who had been transported to Iowa hospital); see also State v. Griffiths, 113 Idaho 364, 369-70, 744 P.2d 92 (1987) (officer outside territorial limits of his authority could request motorist to submit to blood alcohol content test in accordance with the Idaho implied consent statute); State v. Torgerson, 453 N.W.2d 698 (Minn. 1990) (Minnesota officer properly arrested and administered sobriety tests to defendant after ambulance personnel had transported defendant to a nearby North Dakota hospital); State v. Steinbrunn, 54 Wash. App. 506, 512, 774 P.2d 55 (1989) (defendant, injured in car accident in Washington, transported to Oregon hospital where Washington state trooper arrested him while he lay unconscious and ordered nurse to draw blood samples; held that Washington officer acted lawfully)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"Minnesota officer properly arrested and administered sobriety tests to defendant after ambulance personnel had transported defendant to a nearby North Dakota hospital","sentence":"People v. Preston, 205 Ill. App. 3d 35, 42, 563 N.E.2d 80 (1990) (officer lawfully crossed state line in order to provide Illinois implied consent warning for purpose of obtaining blood test to check blood alcohol level of motorist who had been transported to Iowa hospital); see also State v. Griffiths, 113 Idaho 364, 369-70, 744 P.2d 92 (1987) (officer outside territorial limits of his authority could request motorist to submit to blood alcohol content test in accordance with the Idaho implied consent statute); State v. Torgerson, 453 N.W.2d 698 (Minn. 1990) (Minnesota officer properly arrested and administered sobriety tests to defendant after ambulance personnel had transported defendant to a nearby North Dakota hospital); State v. Steinbrunn, 54 Wash. App. 506, 512, 774 P.2d 55 (1989) (defendant, injured in car accident in Washington, transported to Oregon hospital where Washington state trooper arrested him while he lay unconscious and ordered nurse to draw blood samples; held that Washington officer acted lawfully)."},"case_id":549890,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Aside from this mistaken interpretation of law, Major Anderson has made no argument or showing that his request to the Board was anything other than informed and carefully contemplated. His mistaken interpretation of the law does not obviate the fact that Major Anderson apparently undertook a careful consideration of his career and circumstances prior to filing his appeal with the Board and making his request to be left in the Reserves.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"397 U.S. 759, 774","parenthetical":"finding that a criminal defendant's guilty plea was a valid waiver of his rights and that \"he assume[d] the risk o[f] ordinary error in either his or his attorney's assessment of the law and facts\"","sentence":"Cf. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 774, 90 S.Ct. 1441, 25 L.Ed.2d 763 (1970) (finding that a criminal defendant\u2019s guilty plea was a valid waiver of his rights and that \u201che assume[d] the risk o[f] ordinary error in either his or his attorney\u2019s assessment of the law and facts\u201d); Bridges v. United States, 794 F.2d 1189, 1194 (7th Cir.1986) (\u201cThe waiver of constitutional rights, in general, may be effective even without specific knowledge of all the implications.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that an express waiver of the right to a hearing before an administrative board was a tactical decision, made knowingly and voluntarily despite the plaintiffs misinterpretation of the applicable law and regulations","sentence":"See Turnage v. Dep\u2019t. of Agriculture, 230 Ct.Cl. 799, 1982 WL 25186 (1982) (holding that an express waiver of the right to a hearing before an administrative board was a tactical decision, made knowingly and voluntarily despite the plaintiffs misinterpretation of the applicable law and regulations)."},"case_id":1225292,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Aside from this mistaken interpretation of law, Major Anderson has made no argument or showing that his request to the Board was anything other than informed and carefully contemplated. His mistaken interpretation of the law does not obviate the fact that Major Anderson apparently undertook a careful consideration of his career and circumstances prior to filing his appeal with the Board and making his request to be left in the Reserves.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding that a criminal defendant's guilty plea was a valid waiver of his rights and that \"he assume[d] the risk o[f] ordinary error in either his or his attorney's assessment of the law and facts\"","sentence":"Cf. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 774, 90 S.Ct. 1441, 25 L.Ed.2d 763 (1970) (finding that a criminal defendant\u2019s guilty plea was a valid waiver of his rights and that \u201che assume[d] the risk o[f] ordinary error in either his or his attorney\u2019s assessment of the law and facts\u201d); Bridges v. United States, 794 F.2d 1189, 1194 (7th Cir.1986) (\u201cThe waiver of constitutional rights, in general, may be effective even without specific knowledge of all the implications.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that an express waiver of the right to a hearing before an administrative board was a tactical decision, made knowingly and voluntarily despite the plaintiffs misinterpretation of the applicable law and regulations","sentence":"See Turnage v. Dep\u2019t. of Agriculture, 230 Ct.Cl. 799, 1982 WL 25186 (1982) (holding that an express waiver of the right to a hearing before an administrative board was a tactical decision, made knowingly and voluntarily despite the plaintiffs misinterpretation of the applicable law and regulations)."},"case_id":1225292,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Aside from this mistaken interpretation of law, Major Anderson has made no argument or showing that his request to the Board was anything other than informed and carefully contemplated. His mistaken interpretation of the law does not obviate the fact that Major Anderson apparently undertook a careful consideration of his career and circumstances prior to filing his appeal with the Board and making his request to be left in the Reserves.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that an express waiver of the right to a hearing before an administrative board was a tactical decision, made knowingly and voluntarily despite the plaintiffs misinterpretation of the applicable law and regulations","sentence":"See Turnage v. Dep\u2019t. of Agriculture, 230 Ct.Cl. 799, 1982 WL 25186 (1982) (holding that an express waiver of the right to a hearing before an administrative board was a tactical decision, made knowingly and voluntarily despite the plaintiffs misinterpretation of the applicable law and regulations)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding that a criminal defendant's guilty plea was a valid waiver of his rights and that \"he assume[d] the risk o[f] ordinary error in either his or his attorney's assessment of the law and facts\"","sentence":"Cf. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 774, 90 S.Ct. 1441, 25 L.Ed.2d 763 (1970) (finding that a criminal defendant\u2019s guilty plea was a valid waiver of his rights and that \u201che assume[d] the risk o[f] ordinary error in either his or his attorney\u2019s assessment of the law and facts\u201d); Bridges v. United States, 794 F.2d 1189, 1194 (7th Cir.1986) (\u201cThe waiver of constitutional rights, in general, may be effective even without specific knowledge of all the implications.\u201d)."},"case_id":1225292,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Aside from this mistaken interpretation of law, Major Anderson has made no argument or showing that his request to the Board was anything other than informed and carefully contemplated. His mistaken interpretation of the law does not obviate the fact that Major Anderson apparently undertook a careful consideration of his career and circumstances prior to filing his appeal with the Board and making his request to be left in the Reserves.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that an express waiver of the right to a hearing before an administrative board was a tactical decision, made knowingly and voluntarily despite the plaintiffs misinterpretation of the applicable law and regulations","sentence":"See Turnage v. Dep\u2019t. of Agriculture, 230 Ct.Cl. 799, 1982 WL 25186 (1982) (holding that an express waiver of the right to a hearing before an administrative board was a tactical decision, made knowingly and voluntarily despite the plaintiffs misinterpretation of the applicable law and regulations)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"794 F.2d 1189, 1194","parenthetical":"\"The waiver of constitutional rights, in general, may be effective even without specific knowledge of all the implications.\"","sentence":"Cf. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 774, 90 S.Ct. 1441, 25 L.Ed.2d 763 (1970) (finding that a criminal defendant\u2019s guilty plea was a valid waiver of his rights and that \u201che assume[d] the risk o[f] ordinary error in either his or his attorney\u2019s assessment of the law and facts\u201d); Bridges v. United States, 794 F.2d 1189, 1194 (7th Cir.1986) (\u201cThe waiver of constitutional rights, in general, may be effective even without specific knowledge of all the implications.\u201d)."},"case_id":1225292,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Aside from this mistaken interpretation of law, Major Anderson has made no argument or showing that his request to the Board was anything other than informed and carefully contemplated. His mistaken interpretation of the law does not obviate the fact that Major Anderson apparently undertook a careful consideration of his career and circumstances prior to filing his appeal with the Board and making his request to be left in the Reserves.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"397 U.S. 759, 774","parenthetical":"finding that a criminal defendant's guilty plea was a valid waiver of his rights and that \"he assume[d] the risk o[f] ordinary error in either his or his attorney's assessment of the law and facts\"","sentence":"Cf. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 774, 90 S.Ct. 1441, 25 L.Ed.2d 763 (1970) (finding that a criminal defendant\u2019s guilty plea was a valid waiver of his rights and that \u201che assume[d] the risk o[f] ordinary error in either his or his attorney\u2019s assessment of the law and facts\u201d); Bridges v. United States, 794 F.2d 1189, 1194 (7th Cir.1986) (\u201cThe waiver of constitutional rights, in general, may be effective even without specific knowledge of all the implications.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that an express waiver of the right to a hearing before an administrative board was a tactical decision, made knowingly and voluntarily despite the plaintiffs misinterpretation of the applicable law and regulations","sentence":"See Turnage v. Dep\u2019t. of Agriculture, 230 Ct.Cl. 799, 1982 WL 25186 (1982) (holding that an express waiver of the right to a hearing before an administrative board was a tactical decision, made knowingly and voluntarily despite the plaintiffs misinterpretation of the applicable law and regulations)."},"case_id":1225292,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Aside from this mistaken interpretation of law, Major Anderson has made no argument or showing that his request to the Board was anything other than informed and carefully contemplated. His mistaken interpretation of the law does not obviate the fact that Major Anderson apparently undertook a careful consideration of his career and circumstances prior to filing his appeal with the Board and making his request to be left in the Reserves.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding that a criminal defendant's guilty plea was a valid waiver of his rights and that \"he assume[d] the risk o[f] ordinary error in either his or his attorney's assessment of the law and facts\"","sentence":"Cf. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 774, 90 S.Ct. 1441, 25 L.Ed.2d 763 (1970) (finding that a criminal defendant\u2019s guilty plea was a valid waiver of his rights and that \u201che assume[d] the risk o[f] ordinary error in either his or his attorney\u2019s assessment of the law and facts\u201d); Bridges v. United States, 794 F.2d 1189, 1194 (7th Cir.1986) (\u201cThe waiver of constitutional rights, in general, may be effective even without specific knowledge of all the implications.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that an express waiver of the right to a hearing before an administrative board was a tactical decision, made knowingly and voluntarily despite the plaintiffs misinterpretation of the applicable law and regulations","sentence":"See Turnage v. Dep\u2019t. of Agriculture, 230 Ct.Cl. 799, 1982 WL 25186 (1982) (holding that an express waiver of the right to a hearing before an administrative board was a tactical decision, made knowingly and voluntarily despite the plaintiffs misinterpretation of the applicable law and regulations)."},"case_id":1225292,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Aside from this mistaken interpretation of law, Major Anderson has made no argument or showing that his request to the Board was anything other than informed and carefully contemplated. His mistaken interpretation of the law does not obviate the fact that Major Anderson apparently undertook a careful consideration of his career and circumstances prior to filing his appeal with the Board and making his request to be left in the Reserves.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that an express waiver of the right to a hearing before an administrative board was a tactical decision, made knowingly and voluntarily despite the plaintiffs misinterpretation of the applicable law and regulations","sentence":"See Turnage v. Dep\u2019t. of Agriculture, 230 Ct.Cl. 799, 1982 WL 25186 (1982) (holding that an express waiver of the right to a hearing before an administrative board was a tactical decision, made knowingly and voluntarily despite the plaintiffs misinterpretation of the applicable law and regulations)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding that a criminal defendant's guilty plea was a valid waiver of his rights and that \"he assume[d] the risk o[f] ordinary error in either his or his attorney's assessment of the law and facts\"","sentence":"Cf. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 774, 90 S.Ct. 1441, 25 L.Ed.2d 763 (1970) (finding that a criminal defendant\u2019s guilty plea was a valid waiver of his rights and that \u201che assume[d] the risk o[f] ordinary error in either his or his attorney\u2019s assessment of the law and facts\u201d); Bridges v. United States, 794 F.2d 1189, 1194 (7th Cir.1986) (\u201cThe waiver of constitutional rights, in general, may be effective even without specific knowledge of all the implications.\u201d)."},"case_id":1225292,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Aside from this mistaken interpretation of law, Major Anderson has made no argument or showing that his request to the Board was anything other than informed and carefully contemplated. His mistaken interpretation of the law does not obviate the fact that Major Anderson apparently undertook a careful consideration of his career and circumstances prior to filing his appeal with the Board and making his request to be left in the Reserves.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"794 F.2d 1189, 1194","parenthetical":"\"The waiver of constitutional rights, in general, may be effective even without specific knowledge of all the implications.\"","sentence":"Cf. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 774, 90 S.Ct. 1441, 25 L.Ed.2d 763 (1970) (finding that a criminal defendant\u2019s guilty plea was a valid waiver of his rights and that \u201che assume[d] the risk o[f] ordinary error in either his or his attorney\u2019s assessment of the law and facts\u201d); Bridges v. United States, 794 F.2d 1189, 1194 (7th Cir.1986) (\u201cThe waiver of constitutional rights, in general, may be effective even without specific knowledge of all the implications.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that an express waiver of the right to a hearing before an administrative board was a tactical decision, made knowingly and voluntarily despite the plaintiffs misinterpretation of the applicable law and regulations","sentence":"See Turnage v. Dep\u2019t. of Agriculture, 230 Ct.Cl. 799, 1982 WL 25186 (1982) (holding that an express waiver of the right to a hearing before an administrative board was a tactical decision, made knowingly and voluntarily despite the plaintiffs misinterpretation of the applicable law and regulations)."},"case_id":1225292,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Therefore, the real issue in this case is not which state's dead man's statute might apply but whether I should apply Maryland's dead man statute; that is, the question is whether Maryland courts would categorize Maryland's dead man's statute as procedural (requiring that it apply in this case) or substantive (permitting its non-application in this case, as the substantive law of Connecticut applies). It seems safe to say, if presented with the question, Maryland would consider the history of the dead man's statute, its own precedent, and the musings of other courts and treatises to determine whether a dead man's statute should ordinarily be characterized as procedural or substantive. If required to decide the issue, I would conclude that the Maryland Court of Appeals more likely than not would determine the statute to be procedural and thus apply the state dead man's statute to all cases tried in Maryland, notwithstanding the application of the substantive law of another state.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"explaining that a procedural statute is one that relates \"solely to the remedy which may be employed to enforce or to protect a right which already exists\"","sentence":"See Wittel v. Baker, 10 Md.App. 531, 272 A.2d 57, 60 (1970) (explaining that a procedural statute is one that relates \u201csolely to the remedy which may be employed to enforce or to protect a right which already exists\u201d); see also Grain Dealers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Van Buskirk, 241 Md. 58, 215 A.2d 467, 472 (1965) (determining that Maryland service of process law applied in a case in which Virginia substantive law was applicable); Finch v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 57 Md.App. 190, 469 A.2d 867, 887 (1984); and see Baker v. General Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 238, 118 S.Ct. 657, 139 L.Ed.2d 580 (1998)(ob-serving that a forum state decides witness competency in its courts)(dicta)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"determining that Maryland service of process law applied in a case in which Virginia substantive law was applicable","sentence":"See Wittel v. Baker, 10 Md.App. 531, 272 A.2d 57, 60 (1970) (explaining that a procedural statute is one that relates \u201csolely to the remedy which may be employed to enforce or to protect a right which already exists\u201d); see also Grain Dealers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Van Buskirk, 241 Md. 58, 215 A.2d 467, 472 (1965) (determining that Maryland service of process law applied in a case in which Virginia substantive law was applicable); Finch v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 57 Md.App. 190, 469 A.2d 867, 887 (1984); and see Baker v. General Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 238, 118 S.Ct. 657, 139 L.Ed.2d 580 (1998)(ob-serving that a forum state decides witness competency in its courts)(dicta)."},"case_id":9436127,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Therefore, the real issue in this case is not which state's dead man's statute might apply but whether I should apply Maryland's dead man statute; that is, the question is whether Maryland courts would categorize Maryland's dead man's statute as procedural (requiring that it apply in this case) or substantive (permitting its non-application in this case, as the substantive law of Connecticut applies). It seems safe to say, if presented with the question, Maryland would consider the history of the dead man's statute, its own precedent, and the musings of other courts and treatises to determine whether a dead man's statute should ordinarily be characterized as procedural or substantive. If required to decide the issue, I would conclude that the Maryland Court of Appeals more likely than not would determine the statute to be procedural and thus apply the state dead man's statute to all cases tried in Maryland, notwithstanding the application of the substantive law of another state.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"215 A.2d 467, 472","parenthetical":"determining that Maryland service of process law applied in a case in which Virginia substantive law was applicable","sentence":"See Wittel v. Baker, 10 Md.App. 531, 272 A.2d 57, 60 (1970) (explaining that a procedural statute is one that relates \u201csolely to the remedy which may be employed to enforce or to protect a right which already exists\u201d); see also Grain Dealers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Van Buskirk, 241 Md. 58, 215 A.2d 467, 472 (1965) (determining that Maryland service of process law applied in a case in which Virginia substantive law was applicable); Finch v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 57 Md.App. 190, 469 A.2d 867, 887 (1984); and see Baker v. General Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 238, 118 S.Ct. 657, 139 L.Ed.2d 580 (1998)(ob-serving that a forum state decides witness competency in its courts)(dicta)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"explaining that a procedural statute is one that relates \"solely to the remedy which may be employed to enforce or to protect a right which already exists\"","sentence":"See Wittel v. Baker, 10 Md.App. 531, 272 A.2d 57, 60 (1970) (explaining that a procedural statute is one that relates \u201csolely to the remedy which may be employed to enforce or to protect a right which already exists\u201d); see also Grain Dealers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Van Buskirk, 241 Md. 58, 215 A.2d 467, 472 (1965) (determining that Maryland service of process law applied in a case in which Virginia substantive law was applicable); Finch v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 57 Md.App. 190, 469 A.2d 867, 887 (1984); and see Baker v. General Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 238, 118 S.Ct. 657, 139 L.Ed.2d 580 (1998)(ob-serving that a forum state decides witness competency in its courts)(dicta)."},"case_id":9436127,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Therefore, the real issue in this case is not which state's dead man's statute might apply but whether I should apply Maryland's dead man statute; that is, the question is whether Maryland courts would categorize Maryland's dead man's statute as procedural (requiring that it apply in this case) or substantive (permitting its non-application in this case, as the substantive law of Connecticut applies). It seems safe to say, if presented with the question, Maryland would consider the history of the dead man's statute, its own precedent, and the musings of other courts and treatises to determine whether a dead man's statute should ordinarily be characterized as procedural or substantive. If required to decide the issue, I would conclude that the Maryland Court of Appeals more likely than not would determine the statute to be procedural and thus apply the state dead man's statute to all cases tried in Maryland, notwithstanding the application of the substantive law of another state.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"522 U.S. 222, 238","parenthetical":"ob-serving that a forum state decides witness competency in its courts","sentence":"See Wittel v. Baker, 10 Md.App. 531, 272 A.2d 57, 60 (1970) (explaining that a procedural statute is one that relates \u201csolely to the remedy which may be employed to enforce or to protect a right which already exists\u201d); see also Grain Dealers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Van Buskirk, 241 Md. 58, 215 A.2d 467, 472 (1965) (determining that Maryland service of process law applied in a case in which Virginia substantive law was applicable); Finch v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 57 Md.App. 190, 469 A.2d 867, 887 (1984); and see Baker v. General Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 238, 118 S.Ct. 657, 139 L.Ed.2d 580 (1998)(ob-serving that a forum state decides witness competency in its courts)(dicta)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"explaining that a procedural statute is one that relates \"solely to the remedy which may be employed to enforce or to protect a right which already exists\"","sentence":"See Wittel v. Baker, 10 Md.App. 531, 272 A.2d 57, 60 (1970) (explaining that a procedural statute is one that relates \u201csolely to the remedy which may be employed to enforce or to protect a right which already exists\u201d); see also Grain Dealers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Van Buskirk, 241 Md. 58, 215 A.2d 467, 472 (1965) (determining that Maryland service of process law applied in a case in which Virginia substantive law was applicable); Finch v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 57 Md.App. 190, 469 A.2d 867, 887 (1984); and see Baker v. General Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 238, 118 S.Ct. 657, 139 L.Ed.2d 580 (1998)(ob-serving that a forum state decides witness competency in its courts)(dicta)."},"case_id":9436127,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Therefore, the real issue in this case is not which state's dead man's statute might apply but whether I should apply Maryland's dead man statute; that is, the question is whether Maryland courts would categorize Maryland's dead man's statute as procedural (requiring that it apply in this case) or substantive (permitting its non-application in this case, as the substantive law of Connecticut applies). It seems safe to say, if presented with the question, Maryland would consider the history of the dead man's statute, its own precedent, and the musings of other courts and treatises to determine whether a dead man's statute should ordinarily be characterized as procedural or substantive. If required to decide the issue, I would conclude that the Maryland Court of Appeals more likely than not would determine the statute to be procedural and thus apply the state dead man's statute to all cases tried in Maryland, notwithstanding the application of the substantive law of another state.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"explaining that a procedural statute is one that relates \"solely to the remedy which may be employed to enforce or to protect a right which already exists\"","sentence":"See Wittel v. Baker, 10 Md.App. 531, 272 A.2d 57, 60 (1970) (explaining that a procedural statute is one that relates \u201csolely to the remedy which may be employed to enforce or to protect a right which already exists\u201d); see also Grain Dealers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Van Buskirk, 241 Md. 58, 215 A.2d 467, 472 (1965) (determining that Maryland service of process law applied in a case in which Virginia substantive law was applicable); Finch v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 57 Md.App. 190, 469 A.2d 867, 887 (1984); and see Baker v. General Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 238, 118 S.Ct. 657, 139 L.Ed.2d 580 (1998)(ob-serving that a forum state decides witness competency in its courts)(dicta)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"ob-serving that a forum state decides witness competency in its courts","sentence":"See Wittel v. Baker, 10 Md.App. 531, 272 A.2d 57, 60 (1970) (explaining that a procedural statute is one that relates \u201csolely to the remedy which may be employed to enforce or to protect a right which already exists\u201d); see also Grain Dealers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Van Buskirk, 241 Md. 58, 215 A.2d 467, 472 (1965) (determining that Maryland service of process law applied in a case in which Virginia substantive law was applicable); Finch v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 57 Md.App. 190, 469 A.2d 867, 887 (1984); and see Baker v. General Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 238, 118 S.Ct. 657, 139 L.Ed.2d 580 (1998)(ob-serving that a forum state decides witness competency in its courts)(dicta)."},"case_id":9436127,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Therefore, the real issue in this case is not which state's dead man's statute might apply but whether I should apply Maryland's dead man statute; that is, the question is whether Maryland courts would categorize Maryland's dead man's statute as procedural (requiring that it apply in this case) or substantive (permitting its non-application in this case, as the substantive law of Connecticut applies). It seems safe to say, if presented with the question, Maryland would consider the history of the dead man's statute, its own precedent, and the musings of other courts and treatises to determine whether a dead man's statute should ordinarily be characterized as procedural or substantive. If required to decide the issue, I would conclude that the Maryland Court of Appeals more likely than not would determine the statute to be procedural and thus apply the state dead man's statute to all cases tried in Maryland, notwithstanding the application of the substantive law of another state.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"ob-serving that a forum state decides witness competency in its courts","sentence":"See Wittel v. Baker, 10 Md.App. 531, 272 A.2d 57, 60 (1970) (explaining that a procedural statute is one that relates \u201csolely to the remedy which may be employed to enforce or to protect a right which already exists\u201d); see also Grain Dealers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Van Buskirk, 241 Md. 58, 215 A.2d 467, 472 (1965) (determining that Maryland service of process law applied in a case in which Virginia substantive law was applicable); Finch v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 57 Md.App. 190, 469 A.2d 867, 887 (1984); and see Baker v. General Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 238, 118 S.Ct. 657, 139 L.Ed.2d 580 (1998)(ob-serving that a forum state decides witness competency in its courts)(dicta)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"explaining that a procedural statute is one that relates \"solely to the remedy which may be employed to enforce or to protect a right which already exists\"","sentence":"See Wittel v. Baker, 10 Md.App. 531, 272 A.2d 57, 60 (1970) (explaining that a procedural statute is one that relates \u201csolely to the remedy which may be employed to enforce or to protect a right which already exists\u201d); see also Grain Dealers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Van Buskirk, 241 Md. 58, 215 A.2d 467, 472 (1965) (determining that Maryland service of process law applied in a case in which Virginia substantive law was applicable); Finch v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 57 Md.App. 190, 469 A.2d 867, 887 (1984); and see Baker v. General Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 238, 118 S.Ct. 657, 139 L.Ed.2d 580 (1998)(ob-serving that a forum state decides witness competency in its courts)(dicta)."},"case_id":9436127,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Therefore, the real issue in this case is not which state's dead man's statute might apply but whether I should apply Maryland's dead man statute; that is, the question is whether Maryland courts would categorize Maryland's dead man's statute as procedural (requiring that it apply in this case) or substantive (permitting its non-application in this case, as the substantive law of Connecticut applies). It seems safe to say, if presented with the question, Maryland would consider the history of the dead man's statute, its own precedent, and the musings of other courts and treatises to determine whether a dead man's statute should ordinarily be characterized as procedural or substantive. If required to decide the issue, I would conclude that the Maryland Court of Appeals more likely than not would determine the statute to be procedural and thus apply the state dead man's statute to all cases tried in Maryland, notwithstanding the application of the substantive law of another state.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"determining that Maryland service of process law applied in a case in which Virginia substantive law was applicable","sentence":"See Wittel v. Baker, 10 Md.App. 531, 272 A.2d 57, 60 (1970) (explaining that a procedural statute is one that relates \u201csolely to the remedy which may be employed to enforce or to protect a right which already exists\u201d); see also Grain Dealers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Van Buskirk, 241 Md. 58, 215 A.2d 467, 472 (1965) (determining that Maryland service of process law applied in a case in which Virginia substantive law was applicable); Finch v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 57 Md.App. 190, 469 A.2d 867, 887 (1984); and see Baker v. General Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 238, 118 S.Ct. 657, 139 L.Ed.2d 580 (1998)(ob-serving that a forum state decides witness competency in its courts)(dicta)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"272 A.2d 57, 60","parenthetical":"explaining that a procedural statute is one that relates \"solely to the remedy which may be employed to enforce or to protect a right which already exists\"","sentence":"See Wittel v. Baker, 10 Md.App. 531, 272 A.2d 57, 60 (1970) (explaining that a procedural statute is one that relates \u201csolely to the remedy which may be employed to enforce or to protect a right which already exists\u201d); see also Grain Dealers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Van Buskirk, 241 Md. 58, 215 A.2d 467, 472 (1965) (determining that Maryland service of process law applied in a case in which Virginia substantive law was applicable); Finch v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 57 Md.App. 190, 469 A.2d 867, 887 (1984); and see Baker v. General Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 238, 118 S.Ct. 657, 139 L.Ed.2d 580 (1998)(ob-serving that a forum state decides witness competency in its courts)(dicta)."},"case_id":9436127,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Therefore, the real issue in this case is not which state's dead man's statute might apply but whether I should apply Maryland's dead man statute; that is, the question is whether Maryland courts would categorize Maryland's dead man's statute as procedural (requiring that it apply in this case) or substantive (permitting its non-application in this case, as the substantive law of Connecticut applies). It seems safe to say, if presented with the question, Maryland would consider the history of the dead man's statute, its own precedent, and the musings of other courts and treatises to determine whether a dead man's statute should ordinarily be characterized as procedural or substantive. If required to decide the issue, I would conclude that the Maryland Court of Appeals more likely than not would determine the statute to be procedural and thus apply the state dead man's statute to all cases tried in Maryland, notwithstanding the application of the substantive law of another state.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"215 A.2d 467, 472","parenthetical":"determining that Maryland service of process law applied in a case in which Virginia substantive law was applicable","sentence":"See Wittel v. Baker, 10 Md.App. 531, 272 A.2d 57, 60 (1970) (explaining that a procedural statute is one that relates \u201csolely to the remedy which may be employed to enforce or to protect a right which already exists\u201d); see also Grain Dealers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Van Buskirk, 241 Md. 58, 215 A.2d 467, 472 (1965) (determining that Maryland service of process law applied in a case in which Virginia substantive law was applicable); Finch v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 57 Md.App. 190, 469 A.2d 867, 887 (1984); and see Baker v. General Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 238, 118 S.Ct. 657, 139 L.Ed.2d 580 (1998)(ob-serving that a forum state decides witness competency in its courts)(dicta)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"272 A.2d 57, 60","parenthetical":"explaining that a procedural statute is one that relates \"solely to the remedy which may be employed to enforce or to protect a right which already exists\"","sentence":"See Wittel v. Baker, 10 Md.App. 531, 272 A.2d 57, 60 (1970) (explaining that a procedural statute is one that relates \u201csolely to the remedy which may be employed to enforce or to protect a right which already exists\u201d); see also Grain Dealers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Van Buskirk, 241 Md. 58, 215 A.2d 467, 472 (1965) (determining that Maryland service of process law applied in a case in which Virginia substantive law was applicable); Finch v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 57 Md.App. 190, 469 A.2d 867, 887 (1984); and see Baker v. General Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 238, 118 S.Ct. 657, 139 L.Ed.2d 580 (1998)(ob-serving that a forum state decides witness competency in its courts)(dicta)."},"case_id":9436127,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Therefore, the real issue in this case is not which state's dead man's statute might apply but whether I should apply Maryland's dead man statute; that is, the question is whether Maryland courts would categorize Maryland's dead man's statute as procedural (requiring that it apply in this case) or substantive (permitting its non-application in this case, as the substantive law of Connecticut applies). It seems safe to say, if presented with the question, Maryland would consider the history of the dead man's statute, its own precedent, and the musings of other courts and treatises to determine whether a dead man's statute should ordinarily be characterized as procedural or substantive. If required to decide the issue, I would conclude that the Maryland Court of Appeals more likely than not would determine the statute to be procedural and thus apply the state dead man's statute to all cases tried in Maryland, notwithstanding the application of the substantive law of another state.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"272 A.2d 57, 60","parenthetical":"explaining that a procedural statute is one that relates \"solely to the remedy which may be employed to enforce or to protect a right which already exists\"","sentence":"See Wittel v. Baker, 10 Md.App. 531, 272 A.2d 57, 60 (1970) (explaining that a procedural statute is one that relates \u201csolely to the remedy which may be employed to enforce or to protect a right which already exists\u201d); see also Grain Dealers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Van Buskirk, 241 Md. 58, 215 A.2d 467, 472 (1965) (determining that Maryland service of process law applied in a case in which Virginia substantive law was applicable); Finch v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 57 Md.App. 190, 469 A.2d 867, 887 (1984); and see Baker v. General Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 238, 118 S.Ct. 657, 139 L.Ed.2d 580 (1998)(ob-serving that a forum state decides witness competency in its courts)(dicta)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"522 U.S. 222, 238","parenthetical":"ob-serving that a forum state decides witness competency in its courts","sentence":"See Wittel v. Baker, 10 Md.App. 531, 272 A.2d 57, 60 (1970) (explaining that a procedural statute is one that relates \u201csolely to the remedy which may be employed to enforce or to protect a right which already exists\u201d); see also Grain Dealers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Van Buskirk, 241 Md. 58, 215 A.2d 467, 472 (1965) (determining that Maryland service of process law applied in a case in which Virginia substantive law was applicable); Finch v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 57 Md.App. 190, 469 A.2d 867, 887 (1984); and see Baker v. General Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 238, 118 S.Ct. 657, 139 L.Ed.2d 580 (1998)(ob-serving that a forum state decides witness competency in its courts)(dicta)."},"case_id":9436127,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Therefore, the real issue in this case is not which state's dead man's statute might apply but whether I should apply Maryland's dead man statute; that is, the question is whether Maryland courts would categorize Maryland's dead man's statute as procedural (requiring that it apply in this case) or substantive (permitting its non-application in this case, as the substantive law of Connecticut applies). It seems safe to say, if presented with the question, Maryland would consider the history of the dead man's statute, its own precedent, and the musings of other courts and treatises to determine whether a dead man's statute should ordinarily be characterized as procedural or substantive. If required to decide the issue, I would conclude that the Maryland Court of Appeals more likely than not would determine the statute to be procedural and thus apply the state dead man's statute to all cases tried in Maryland, notwithstanding the application of the substantive law of another state.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"ob-serving that a forum state decides witness competency in its courts","sentence":"See Wittel v. Baker, 10 Md.App. 531, 272 A.2d 57, 60 (1970) (explaining that a procedural statute is one that relates \u201csolely to the remedy which may be employed to enforce or to protect a right which already exists\u201d); see also Grain Dealers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Van Buskirk, 241 Md. 58, 215 A.2d 467, 472 (1965) (determining that Maryland service of process law applied in a case in which Virginia substantive law was applicable); Finch v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 57 Md.App. 190, 469 A.2d 867, 887 (1984); and see Baker v. General Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 238, 118 S.Ct. 657, 139 L.Ed.2d 580 (1998)(ob-serving that a forum state decides witness competency in its courts)(dicta)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"272 A.2d 57, 60","parenthetical":"explaining that a procedural statute is one that relates \"solely to the remedy which may be employed to enforce or to protect a right which already exists\"","sentence":"See Wittel v. Baker, 10 Md.App. 531, 272 A.2d 57, 60 (1970) (explaining that a procedural statute is one that relates \u201csolely to the remedy which may be employed to enforce or to protect a right which already exists\u201d); see also Grain Dealers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Van Buskirk, 241 Md. 58, 215 A.2d 467, 472 (1965) (determining that Maryland service of process law applied in a case in which Virginia substantive law was applicable); Finch v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 57 Md.App. 190, 469 A.2d 867, 887 (1984); and see Baker v. General Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 238, 118 S.Ct. 657, 139 L.Ed.2d 580 (1998)(ob-serving that a forum state decides witness competency in its courts)(dicta)."},"case_id":9436127,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Therefore, the real issue in this case is not which state's dead man's statute might apply but whether I should apply Maryland's dead man statute; that is, the question is whether Maryland courts would categorize Maryland's dead man's statute as procedural (requiring that it apply in this case) or substantive (permitting its non-application in this case, as the substantive law of Connecticut applies). It seems safe to say, if presented with the question, Maryland would consider the history of the dead man's statute, its own precedent, and the musings of other courts and treatises to determine whether a dead man's statute should ordinarily be characterized as procedural or substantive. If required to decide the issue, I would conclude that the Maryland Court of Appeals more likely than not would determine the statute to be procedural and thus apply the state dead man's statute to all cases tried in Maryland, notwithstanding the application of the substantive law of another state.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"ob-serving that a forum state decides witness competency in its courts","sentence":"See Wittel v. Baker, 10 Md.App. 531, 272 A.2d 57, 60 (1970) (explaining that a procedural statute is one that relates \u201csolely to the remedy which may be employed to enforce or to protect a right which already exists\u201d); see also Grain Dealers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Van Buskirk, 241 Md. 58, 215 A.2d 467, 472 (1965) (determining that Maryland service of process law applied in a case in which Virginia substantive law was applicable); Finch v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 57 Md.App. 190, 469 A.2d 867, 887 (1984); and see Baker v. General Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 238, 118 S.Ct. 657, 139 L.Ed.2d 580 (1998)(ob-serving that a forum state decides witness competency in its courts)(dicta)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"272 A.2d 57, 60","parenthetical":"explaining that a procedural statute is one that relates \"solely to the remedy which may be employed to enforce or to protect a right which already exists\"","sentence":"See Wittel v. Baker, 10 Md.App. 531, 272 A.2d 57, 60 (1970) (explaining that a procedural statute is one that relates \u201csolely to the remedy which may be employed to enforce or to protect a right which already exists\u201d); see also Grain Dealers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Van Buskirk, 241 Md. 58, 215 A.2d 467, 472 (1965) (determining that Maryland service of process law applied in a case in which Virginia substantive law was applicable); Finch v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 57 Md.App. 190, 469 A.2d 867, 887 (1984); and see Baker v. General Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 238, 118 S.Ct. 657, 139 L.Ed.2d 580 (1998)(ob-serving that a forum state decides witness competency in its courts)(dicta)."},"case_id":9436127,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Most courts have held that a state statute of limitations should be borrowed to apply to a cause of action under Title VI or analogous statutes.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"180-day period for filing a complaint under Title VI regulations -- 34 C.F.R. SS 100.7 -- applied to claim brought under Title IX","sentence":"Andrews v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 831 F.2d 678, 683-84 (7th Cir.1987) (Indiana state statute of limitations for actions relating to employment applied to action under Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 794); Chambers v. Omaha Public School Distr., 536 F.2d 222 (8th Cir.1976) (state statute of limitations for actions brought under federal statute covers claims under \u00a7\u00a7 1981, 1983 and Title VI); Lewis v. Russe, 713 F.Supp. 1227 (N.D.Ill.1989) (Illinois statute of limitations for civil actions not otherwise covered by a statute of limitations applied to a Title VI action); Brown v. City of Salem, 40 E.P.D. Para. 36,348, 1986 WL 11750 (D.Mass.1986) (state statute of limitations for personal injury actions applied to \u00a7\u00a7 1981, 1983 and Title VI claims); Champion v. Georgia Bureau of Investigation, 568 F.Supp. 712 (N.D.Ga.1983) (Georgia 180-day statute of limitations for unlawful employment practices applied to Title VI action); Barcia v. Sitian, 89 F.R.D. 382 (S.D.N.Y.1981) (New York statute of limitations for actions based on statute applied to \u00a7 1983 and Title VI claims); Vulcan Society v. Fire Department, 82 F.R.D. 379 (S.D.N.Y.1979) (same); but see, Bougher v. University of Pittsburgh, 882 F.2d 74 (3d Cir.1989) (180-day period for filing a complaint under Title VI regulations \u2014 34 C.F.R. \u00a7 100.7 \u2014 applied to claim brought under Title IX)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"831 F.2d 678, 683-84","parenthetical":"Indiana state statute of limitations for actions relating to employment applied to action under Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. SS 794","sentence":"Andrews v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 831 F.2d 678, 683-84 (7th Cir.1987) (Indiana state statute of limitations for actions relating to employment applied to action under Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 794); Chambers v. Omaha Public School Distr., 536 F.2d 222 (8th Cir.1976) (state statute of limitations for actions brought under federal statute covers claims under \u00a7\u00a7 1981, 1983 and Title VI); Lewis v. Russe, 713 F.Supp. 1227 (N.D.Ill.1989) (Illinois statute of limitations for civil actions not otherwise covered by a statute of limitations applied to a Title VI action); Brown v. City of Salem, 40 E.P.D. Para. 36,348, 1986 WL 11750 (D.Mass.1986) (state statute of limitations for personal injury actions applied to \u00a7\u00a7 1981, 1983 and Title VI claims); Champion v. Georgia Bureau of Investigation, 568 F.Supp. 712 (N.D.Ga.1983) (Georgia 180-day statute of limitations for unlawful employment practices applied to Title VI action); Barcia v. Sitian, 89 F.R.D. 382 (S.D.N.Y.1981) (New York statute of limitations for actions based on statute applied to \u00a7 1983 and Title VI claims); Vulcan Society v. Fire Department, 82 F.R.D. 379 (S.D.N.Y.1979) (same); but see, Bougher v. University of Pittsburgh, 882 F.2d 74 (3d Cir.1989) (180-day period for filing a complaint under Title VI regulations \u2014 34 C.F.R. \u00a7 100.7 \u2014 applied to claim brought under Title IX)."},"case_id":11339741,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Most courts have held that a state statute of limitations should be borrowed to apply to a cause of action under Title VI or analogous statutes.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"state statute of limitations for actions brought under federal statute covers claims under SSSS 1981, 1983 and Title VI","sentence":"Andrews v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 831 F.2d 678, 683-84 (7th Cir.1987) (Indiana state statute of limitations for actions relating to employment applied to action under Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 794); Chambers v. Omaha Public School Distr., 536 F.2d 222 (8th Cir.1976) (state statute of limitations for actions brought under federal statute covers claims under \u00a7\u00a7 1981, 1983 and Title VI); Lewis v. Russe, 713 F.Supp. 1227 (N.D.Ill.1989) (Illinois statute of limitations for civil actions not otherwise covered by a statute of limitations applied to a Title VI action); Brown v. City of Salem, 40 E.P.D. Para. 36,348, 1986 WL 11750 (D.Mass.1986) (state statute of limitations for personal injury actions applied to \u00a7\u00a7 1981, 1983 and Title VI claims); Champion v. Georgia Bureau of Investigation, 568 F.Supp. 712 (N.D.Ga.1983) (Georgia 180-day statute of limitations for unlawful employment practices applied to Title VI action); Barcia v. Sitian, 89 F.R.D. 382 (S.D.N.Y.1981) (New York statute of limitations for actions based on statute applied to \u00a7 1983 and Title VI claims); Vulcan Society v. Fire Department, 82 F.R.D. 379 (S.D.N.Y.1979) (same); but see, Bougher v. University of Pittsburgh, 882 F.2d 74 (3d Cir.1989) (180-day period for filing a complaint under Title VI regulations \u2014 34 C.F.R. \u00a7 100.7 \u2014 applied to claim brought under Title IX)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"180-day period for filing a complaint under Title VI regulations -- 34 C.F.R. SS 100.7 -- applied to claim brought under Title IX","sentence":"Andrews v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 831 F.2d 678, 683-84 (7th Cir.1987) (Indiana state statute of limitations for actions relating to employment applied to action under Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 794); Chambers v. Omaha Public School Distr., 536 F.2d 222 (8th Cir.1976) (state statute of limitations for actions brought under federal statute covers claims under \u00a7\u00a7 1981, 1983 and Title VI); Lewis v. Russe, 713 F.Supp. 1227 (N.D.Ill.1989) (Illinois statute of limitations for civil actions not otherwise covered by a statute of limitations applied to a Title VI action); Brown v. City of Salem, 40 E.P.D. Para. 36,348, 1986 WL 11750 (D.Mass.1986) (state statute of limitations for personal injury actions applied to \u00a7\u00a7 1981, 1983 and Title VI claims); Champion v. Georgia Bureau of Investigation, 568 F.Supp. 712 (N.D.Ga.1983) (Georgia 180-day statute of limitations for unlawful employment practices applied to Title VI action); Barcia v. Sitian, 89 F.R.D. 382 (S.D.N.Y.1981) (New York statute of limitations for actions based on statute applied to \u00a7 1983 and Title VI claims); Vulcan Society v. Fire Department, 82 F.R.D. 379 (S.D.N.Y.1979) (same); but see, Bougher v. University of Pittsburgh, 882 F.2d 74 (3d Cir.1989) (180-day period for filing a complaint under Title VI regulations \u2014 34 C.F.R. \u00a7 100.7 \u2014 applied to claim brought under Title IX)."},"case_id":11339741,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Most courts have held that a state statute of limitations should be borrowed to apply to a cause of action under Title VI or analogous statutes.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"Illinois statute of limitations for civil actions not otherwise covered by a statute of limitations applied to a Title VI action","sentence":"Andrews v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 831 F.2d 678, 683-84 (7th Cir.1987) (Indiana state statute of limitations for actions relating to employment applied to action under Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 794); Chambers v. Omaha Public School Distr., 536 F.2d 222 (8th Cir.1976) (state statute of limitations for actions brought under federal statute covers claims under \u00a7\u00a7 1981, 1983 and Title VI); Lewis v. Russe, 713 F.Supp. 1227 (N.D.Ill.1989) (Illinois statute of limitations for civil actions not otherwise covered by a statute of limitations applied to a Title VI action); Brown v. City of Salem, 40 E.P.D. Para. 36,348, 1986 WL 11750 (D.Mass.1986) (state statute of limitations for personal injury actions applied to \u00a7\u00a7 1981, 1983 and Title VI claims); Champion v. Georgia Bureau of Investigation, 568 F.Supp. 712 (N.D.Ga.1983) (Georgia 180-day statute of limitations for unlawful employment practices applied to Title VI action); Barcia v. Sitian, 89 F.R.D. 382 (S.D.N.Y.1981) (New York statute of limitations for actions based on statute applied to \u00a7 1983 and Title VI claims); Vulcan Society v. Fire Department, 82 F.R.D. 379 (S.D.N.Y.1979) (same); but see, Bougher v. University of Pittsburgh, 882 F.2d 74 (3d Cir.1989) (180-day period for filing a complaint under Title VI regulations \u2014 34 C.F.R. \u00a7 100.7 \u2014 applied to claim brought under Title IX)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"180-day period for filing a complaint under Title VI regulations -- 34 C.F.R. SS 100.7 -- applied to claim brought under Title IX","sentence":"Andrews v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 831 F.2d 678, 683-84 (7th Cir.1987) (Indiana state statute of limitations for actions relating to employment applied to action under Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 794); Chambers v. Omaha Public School Distr., 536 F.2d 222 (8th Cir.1976) (state statute of limitations for actions brought under federal statute covers claims under \u00a7\u00a7 1981, 1983 and Title VI); Lewis v. Russe, 713 F.Supp. 1227 (N.D.Ill.1989) (Illinois statute of limitations for civil actions not otherwise covered by a statute of limitations applied to a Title VI action); Brown v. City of Salem, 40 E.P.D. Para. 36,348, 1986 WL 11750 (D.Mass.1986) (state statute of limitations for personal injury actions applied to \u00a7\u00a7 1981, 1983 and Title VI claims); Champion v. Georgia Bureau of Investigation, 568 F.Supp. 712 (N.D.Ga.1983) (Georgia 180-day statute of limitations for unlawful employment practices applied to Title VI action); Barcia v. Sitian, 89 F.R.D. 382 (S.D.N.Y.1981) (New York statute of limitations for actions based on statute applied to \u00a7 1983 and Title VI claims); Vulcan Society v. Fire Department, 82 F.R.D. 379 (S.D.N.Y.1979) (same); but see, Bougher v. University of Pittsburgh, 882 F.2d 74 (3d Cir.1989) (180-day period for filing a complaint under Title VI regulations \u2014 34 C.F.R. \u00a7 100.7 \u2014 applied to claim brought under Title IX)."},"case_id":11339741,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Most courts have held that a state statute of limitations should be borrowed to apply to a cause of action under Title VI or analogous statutes.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"state statute of limitations for personal injury actions applied to SSSS 1981, 1983 and Title VI claims","sentence":"Andrews v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 831 F.2d 678, 683-84 (7th Cir.1987) (Indiana state statute of limitations for actions relating to employment applied to action under Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 794); Chambers v. Omaha Public School Distr., 536 F.2d 222 (8th Cir.1976) (state statute of limitations for actions brought under federal statute covers claims under \u00a7\u00a7 1981, 1983 and Title VI); Lewis v. Russe, 713 F.Supp. 1227 (N.D.Ill.1989) (Illinois statute of limitations for civil actions not otherwise covered by a statute of limitations applied to a Title VI action); Brown v. City of Salem, 40 E.P.D. Para. 36,348, 1986 WL 11750 (D.Mass.1986) (state statute of limitations for personal injury actions applied to \u00a7\u00a7 1981, 1983 and Title VI claims); Champion v. Georgia Bureau of Investigation, 568 F.Supp. 712 (N.D.Ga.1983) (Georgia 180-day statute of limitations for unlawful employment practices applied to Title VI action); Barcia v. Sitian, 89 F.R.D. 382 (S.D.N.Y.1981) (New York statute of limitations for actions based on statute applied to \u00a7 1983 and Title VI claims); Vulcan Society v. Fire Department, 82 F.R.D. 379 (S.D.N.Y.1979) (same); but see, Bougher v. University of Pittsburgh, 882 F.2d 74 (3d Cir.1989) (180-day period for filing a complaint under Title VI regulations \u2014 34 C.F.R. \u00a7 100.7 \u2014 applied to claim brought under Title IX)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"180-day period for filing a complaint under Title VI regulations -- 34 C.F.R. SS 100.7 -- applied to claim brought under Title IX","sentence":"Andrews v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 831 F.2d 678, 683-84 (7th Cir.1987) (Indiana state statute of limitations for actions relating to employment applied to action under Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 794); Chambers v. Omaha Public School Distr., 536 F.2d 222 (8th Cir.1976) (state statute of limitations for actions brought under federal statute covers claims under \u00a7\u00a7 1981, 1983 and Title VI); Lewis v. Russe, 713 F.Supp. 1227 (N.D.Ill.1989) (Illinois statute of limitations for civil actions not otherwise covered by a statute of limitations applied to a Title VI action); Brown v. City of Salem, 40 E.P.D. Para. 36,348, 1986 WL 11750 (D.Mass.1986) (state statute of limitations for personal injury actions applied to \u00a7\u00a7 1981, 1983 and Title VI claims); Champion v. Georgia Bureau of Investigation, 568 F.Supp. 712 (N.D.Ga.1983) (Georgia 180-day statute of limitations for unlawful employment practices applied to Title VI action); Barcia v. Sitian, 89 F.R.D. 382 (S.D.N.Y.1981) (New York statute of limitations for actions based on statute applied to \u00a7 1983 and Title VI claims); Vulcan Society v. Fire Department, 82 F.R.D. 379 (S.D.N.Y.1979) (same); but see, Bougher v. University of Pittsburgh, 882 F.2d 74 (3d Cir.1989) (180-day period for filing a complaint under Title VI regulations \u2014 34 C.F.R. \u00a7 100.7 \u2014 applied to claim brought under Title IX)."},"case_id":11339741,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Most courts have held that a state statute of limitations should be borrowed to apply to a cause of action under Title VI or analogous statutes.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"Georgia 180-day statute of limitations for unlawful employment practices applied to Title VI action","sentence":"Andrews v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 831 F.2d 678, 683-84 (7th Cir.1987) (Indiana state statute of limitations for actions relating to employment applied to action under Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 794); Chambers v. Omaha Public School Distr., 536 F.2d 222 (8th Cir.1976) (state statute of limitations for actions brought under federal statute covers claims under \u00a7\u00a7 1981, 1983 and Title VI); Lewis v. Russe, 713 F.Supp. 1227 (N.D.Ill.1989) (Illinois statute of limitations for civil actions not otherwise covered by a statute of limitations applied to a Title VI action); Brown v. City of Salem, 40 E.P.D. Para. 36,348, 1986 WL 11750 (D.Mass.1986) (state statute of limitations for personal injury actions applied to \u00a7\u00a7 1981, 1983 and Title VI claims); Champion v. Georgia Bureau of Investigation, 568 F.Supp. 712 (N.D.Ga.1983) (Georgia 180-day statute of limitations for unlawful employment practices applied to Title VI action); Barcia v. Sitian, 89 F.R.D. 382 (S.D.N.Y.1981) (New York statute of limitations for actions based on statute applied to \u00a7 1983 and Title VI claims); Vulcan Society v. Fire Department, 82 F.R.D. 379 (S.D.N.Y.1979) (same); but see, Bougher v. University of Pittsburgh, 882 F.2d 74 (3d Cir.1989) (180-day period for filing a complaint under Title VI regulations \u2014 34 C.F.R. \u00a7 100.7 \u2014 applied to claim brought under Title IX)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"180-day period for filing a complaint under Title VI regulations -- 34 C.F.R. SS 100.7 -- applied to claim brought under Title IX","sentence":"Andrews v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 831 F.2d 678, 683-84 (7th Cir.1987) (Indiana state statute of limitations for actions relating to employment applied to action under Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 794); Chambers v. Omaha Public School Distr., 536 F.2d 222 (8th Cir.1976) (state statute of limitations for actions brought under federal statute covers claims under \u00a7\u00a7 1981, 1983 and Title VI); Lewis v. Russe, 713 F.Supp. 1227 (N.D.Ill.1989) (Illinois statute of limitations for civil actions not otherwise covered by a statute of limitations applied to a Title VI action); Brown v. City of Salem, 40 E.P.D. Para. 36,348, 1986 WL 11750 (D.Mass.1986) (state statute of limitations for personal injury actions applied to \u00a7\u00a7 1981, 1983 and Title VI claims); Champion v. Georgia Bureau of Investigation, 568 F.Supp. 712 (N.D.Ga.1983) (Georgia 180-day statute of limitations for unlawful employment practices applied to Title VI action); Barcia v. Sitian, 89 F.R.D. 382 (S.D.N.Y.1981) (New York statute of limitations for actions based on statute applied to \u00a7 1983 and Title VI claims); Vulcan Society v. Fire Department, 82 F.R.D. 379 (S.D.N.Y.1979) (same); but see, Bougher v. University of Pittsburgh, 882 F.2d 74 (3d Cir.1989) (180-day period for filing a complaint under Title VI regulations \u2014 34 C.F.R. \u00a7 100.7 \u2014 applied to claim brought under Title IX)."},"case_id":11339741,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Most courts have held that a state statute of limitations should be borrowed to apply to a cause of action under Title VI or analogous statutes.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"New York statute of limitations for actions based on statute applied to SS 1983 and Title VI claims","sentence":"Andrews v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 831 F.2d 678, 683-84 (7th Cir.1987) (Indiana state statute of limitations for actions relating to employment applied to action under Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 794); Chambers v. Omaha Public School Distr., 536 F.2d 222 (8th Cir.1976) (state statute of limitations for actions brought under federal statute covers claims under \u00a7\u00a7 1981, 1983 and Title VI); Lewis v. Russe, 713 F.Supp. 1227 (N.D.Ill.1989) (Illinois statute of limitations for civil actions not otherwise covered by a statute of limitations applied to a Title VI action); Brown v. City of Salem, 40 E.P.D. Para. 36,348, 1986 WL 11750 (D.Mass.1986) (state statute of limitations for personal injury actions applied to \u00a7\u00a7 1981, 1983 and Title VI claims); Champion v. Georgia Bureau of Investigation, 568 F.Supp. 712 (N.D.Ga.1983) (Georgia 180-day statute of limitations for unlawful employment practices applied to Title VI action); Barcia v. Sitian, 89 F.R.D. 382 (S.D.N.Y.1981) (New York statute of limitations for actions based on statute applied to \u00a7 1983 and Title VI claims); Vulcan Society v. Fire Department, 82 F.R.D. 379 (S.D.N.Y.1979) (same); but see, Bougher v. University of Pittsburgh, 882 F.2d 74 (3d Cir.1989) (180-day period for filing a complaint under Title VI regulations \u2014 34 C.F.R. \u00a7 100.7 \u2014 applied to claim brought under Title IX)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"180-day period for filing a complaint under Title VI regulations -- 34 C.F.R. SS 100.7 -- applied to claim brought under Title IX","sentence":"Andrews v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 831 F.2d 678, 683-84 (7th Cir.1987) (Indiana state statute of limitations for actions relating to employment applied to action under Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 794); Chambers v. Omaha Public School Distr., 536 F.2d 222 (8th Cir.1976) (state statute of limitations for actions brought under federal statute covers claims under \u00a7\u00a7 1981, 1983 and Title VI); Lewis v. Russe, 713 F.Supp. 1227 (N.D.Ill.1989) (Illinois statute of limitations for civil actions not otherwise covered by a statute of limitations applied to a Title VI action); Brown v. City of Salem, 40 E.P.D. Para. 36,348, 1986 WL 11750 (D.Mass.1986) (state statute of limitations for personal injury actions applied to \u00a7\u00a7 1981, 1983 and Title VI claims); Champion v. Georgia Bureau of Investigation, 568 F.Supp. 712 (N.D.Ga.1983) (Georgia 180-day statute of limitations for unlawful employment practices applied to Title VI action); Barcia v. Sitian, 89 F.R.D. 382 (S.D.N.Y.1981) (New York statute of limitations for actions based on statute applied to \u00a7 1983 and Title VI claims); Vulcan Society v. Fire Department, 82 F.R.D. 379 (S.D.N.Y.1979) (same); but see, Bougher v. University of Pittsburgh, 882 F.2d 74 (3d Cir.1989) (180-day period for filing a complaint under Title VI regulations \u2014 34 C.F.R. \u00a7 100.7 \u2014 applied to claim brought under Title IX)."},"case_id":11339741,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Even after Boykin, these types of eonclusory allegations of discrimination, unsupported by specific factual allegations, have been found insufficient to state a claim under SSSS 1981 and 1982.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"661 F.Supp.2d 249, 269","parenthetical":"dismissing SS 1982 claim where \"[n]o identification of particular events or facts underlying the race-based discrimination claims [was] set forth in the amended complaint\"","sentence":"See Sanders, 367 Fed.Appx. at 175 (concluding that dismissal of \u00a7 1982 claim was proper because the plaintiffs\u2019 allegation \u201cthat \u2018defendants discriminated against plaintiffs on account of their race and national origin in violation of section 1982\u2019 d[id] not state a plausible claim to relief,\u201d and although a different paragraph in the complaint \u201cd[id] allege facts consistent with a discrimination claim, i.e., that non-black residents were granted subsidies, it nevertheless \u2018stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief,\u2019 because plaintiffs d[id] not allege any facts supporting an inference of racial animus\u201d (alterations, emphasis, and citations omitted) (quoting Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949)), Ng, 2010 WL 889256, at *12-13 (concluding that \u00a7\u00a7 1981 and 1982 claims were wholly conclusory and lacked factual specificity); Reyes v. Fairfield Props., 661 F.Supp.2d 249, 269 (E.D.N.Y.2009) (dismissing \u00a7 1982 claim where \u201c[n]o identification of particular events or facts underlying the race-based discrimination claims [was] set forth in the amended complaint\u201d); see also Mian, 7 F.3d at 1088 (dismissing \u00a7 1981 claim because \u201can essential element ... is a requirement that the alleged discrimination took place because of the [plaintiffs] race,\u201d and the \u201ccomplaint fail[ed] to offer more than conclusory allegations that he was discriminated against because of his race\u201d); Dove, 56 F.Supp.2d at 338 (dismissing \u00a7 1981 claim where the amended complaint was \u201cdevoid of facts to support [the plaintiffs] determination that the actions taken by [defendants were motivated by his race\u201d); Harary, 983 F.Supp. at 99-100 (dismissing \u00a7 1982 claims because the plaintiff did not plead facts supporting her contention of intentional racial discrimination or supply any examples other than her own); cf. Barkley, 2007 WL 2437810, at *11-12 (denying motion to dismiss \u00a7\u00a7 1981 and 1982 claims, where the complaint \u201cnot only allege[d] that plaintiffs were targeted for fraud because of their race, but also contain[ed] detailed allegations of defendants\u2019 efforts to accomplish this targeting through advertising and other modes of minority-focused outreach and race-sensitive recruiting,\u201d but acknowledging that standing alone, an allegation that \u201cthe various actions constituting the fraud were taken deliberately and with racially discriminatory intent ... might be too conclusory to allege intentional racial discrimination\u201d (internal quotation marks omitted))."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"7 F.3d 1088, 1088","parenthetical":"dismissing SS 1981 claim because \"an essential element ... is a requirement that the alleged discrimination took place because of the [plaintiffs] race,\" and the \"complaint fail[ed] to offer more than conclusory allegations that he was discriminated against because of his race\"","sentence":"See Sanders, 367 Fed.Appx. at 175 (concluding that dismissal of \u00a7 1982 claim was proper because the plaintiffs\u2019 allegation \u201cthat \u2018defendants discriminated against plaintiffs on account of their race and national origin in violation of section 1982\u2019 d[id] not state a plausible claim to relief,\u201d and although a different paragraph in the complaint \u201cd[id] allege facts consistent with a discrimination claim, i.e., that non-black residents were granted subsidies, it nevertheless \u2018stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief,\u2019 because plaintiffs d[id] not allege any facts supporting an inference of racial animus\u201d (alterations, emphasis, and citations omitted) (quoting Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949)), Ng, 2010 WL 889256, at *12-13 (concluding that \u00a7\u00a7 1981 and 1982 claims were wholly conclusory and lacked factual specificity); Reyes v. Fairfield Props., 661 F.Supp.2d 249, 269 (E.D.N.Y.2009) (dismissing \u00a7 1982 claim where \u201c[n]o identification of particular events or facts underlying the race-based discrimination claims [was] set forth in the amended complaint\u201d); see also Mian, 7 F.3d at 1088 (dismissing \u00a7 1981 claim because \u201can essential element ... is a requirement that the alleged discrimination took place because of the [plaintiffs] race,\u201d and the \u201ccomplaint fail[ed] to offer more than conclusory allegations that he was discriminated against because of his race\u201d); Dove, 56 F.Supp.2d at 338 (dismissing \u00a7 1981 claim where the amended complaint was \u201cdevoid of facts to support [the plaintiffs] determination that the actions taken by [defendants were motivated by his race\u201d); Harary, 983 F.Supp. at 99-100 (dismissing \u00a7 1982 claims because the plaintiff did not plead facts supporting her contention of intentional racial discrimination or supply any examples other than her own); cf. Barkley, 2007 WL 2437810, at *11-12 (denying motion to dismiss \u00a7\u00a7 1981 and 1982 claims, where the complaint \u201cnot only allege[d] that plaintiffs were targeted for fraud because of their race, but also contain[ed] detailed allegations of defendants\u2019 efforts to accomplish this targeting through advertising and other modes of minority-focused outreach and race-sensitive recruiting,\u201d but acknowledging that standing alone, an allegation that \u201cthe various actions constituting the fraud were taken deliberately and with racially discriminatory intent ... might be too conclusory to allege intentional racial discrimination\u201d (internal quotation marks omitted))."},"case_id":4251394,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Even after Boykin, these types of eonclusory allegations of discrimination, unsupported by specific factual allegations, have been found insufficient to state a claim under SSSS 1981 and 1982.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"661 F.Supp.2d 249, 269","parenthetical":"dismissing SS 1982 claim where \"[n]o identification of particular events or facts underlying the race-based discrimination claims [was] set forth in the amended complaint\"","sentence":"See Sanders, 367 Fed.Appx. at 175 (concluding that dismissal of \u00a7 1982 claim was proper because the plaintiffs\u2019 allegation \u201cthat \u2018defendants discriminated against plaintiffs on account of their race and national origin in violation of section 1982\u2019 d[id] not state a plausible claim to relief,\u201d and although a different paragraph in the complaint \u201cd[id] allege facts consistent with a discrimination claim, i.e., that non-black residents were granted subsidies, it nevertheless \u2018stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief,\u2019 because plaintiffs d[id] not allege any facts supporting an inference of racial animus\u201d (alterations, emphasis, and citations omitted) (quoting Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949)), Ng, 2010 WL 889256, at *12-13 (concluding that \u00a7\u00a7 1981 and 1982 claims were wholly conclusory and lacked factual specificity); Reyes v. Fairfield Props., 661 F.Supp.2d 249, 269 (E.D.N.Y.2009) (dismissing \u00a7 1982 claim where \u201c[n]o identification of particular events or facts underlying the race-based discrimination claims [was] set forth in the amended complaint\u201d); see also Mian, 7 F.3d at 1088 (dismissing \u00a7 1981 claim because \u201can essential element ... is a requirement that the alleged discrimination took place because of the [plaintiffs] race,\u201d and the \u201ccomplaint fail[ed] to offer more than conclusory allegations that he was discriminated against because of his race\u201d); Dove, 56 F.Supp.2d at 338 (dismissing \u00a7 1981 claim where the amended complaint was \u201cdevoid of facts to support [the plaintiffs] determination that the actions taken by [defendants were motivated by his race\u201d); Harary, 983 F.Supp. at 99-100 (dismissing \u00a7 1982 claims because the plaintiff did not plead facts supporting her contention of intentional racial discrimination or supply any examples other than her own); cf. Barkley, 2007 WL 2437810, at *11-12 (denying motion to dismiss \u00a7\u00a7 1981 and 1982 claims, where the complaint \u201cnot only allege[d] that plaintiffs were targeted for fraud because of their race, but also contain[ed] detailed allegations of defendants\u2019 efforts to accomplish this targeting through advertising and other modes of minority-focused outreach and race-sensitive recruiting,\u201d but acknowledging that standing alone, an allegation that \u201cthe various actions constituting the fraud were taken deliberately and with racially discriminatory intent ... might be too conclusory to allege intentional racial discrimination\u201d (internal quotation marks omitted))."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"56 F.Supp.2d 338, 338","parenthetical":"dismissing SS 1981 claim where the amended complaint was \"devoid of facts to support [the plaintiffs] determination that the actions taken by [defendants were motivated by his race\"","sentence":"See Sanders, 367 Fed.Appx. at 175 (concluding that dismissal of \u00a7 1982 claim was proper because the plaintiffs\u2019 allegation \u201cthat \u2018defendants discriminated against plaintiffs on account of their race and national origin in violation of section 1982\u2019 d[id] not state a plausible claim to relief,\u201d and although a different paragraph in the complaint \u201cd[id] allege facts consistent with a discrimination claim, i.e., that non-black residents were granted subsidies, it nevertheless \u2018stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief,\u2019 because plaintiffs d[id] not allege any facts supporting an inference of racial animus\u201d (alterations, emphasis, and citations omitted) (quoting Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949)), Ng, 2010 WL 889256, at *12-13 (concluding that \u00a7\u00a7 1981 and 1982 claims were wholly conclusory and lacked factual specificity); Reyes v. Fairfield Props., 661 F.Supp.2d 249, 269 (E.D.N.Y.2009) (dismissing \u00a7 1982 claim where \u201c[n]o identification of particular events or facts underlying the race-based discrimination claims [was] set forth in the amended complaint\u201d); see also Mian, 7 F.3d at 1088 (dismissing \u00a7 1981 claim because \u201can essential element ... is a requirement that the alleged discrimination took place because of the [plaintiffs] race,\u201d and the \u201ccomplaint fail[ed] to offer more than conclusory allegations that he was discriminated against because of his race\u201d); Dove, 56 F.Supp.2d at 338 (dismissing \u00a7 1981 claim where the amended complaint was \u201cdevoid of facts to support [the plaintiffs] determination that the actions taken by [defendants were motivated by his race\u201d); Harary, 983 F.Supp. at 99-100 (dismissing \u00a7 1982 claims because the plaintiff did not plead facts supporting her contention of intentional racial discrimination or supply any examples other than her own); cf. Barkley, 2007 WL 2437810, at *11-12 (denying motion to dismiss \u00a7\u00a7 1981 and 1982 claims, where the complaint \u201cnot only allege[d] that plaintiffs were targeted for fraud because of their race, but also contain[ed] detailed allegations of defendants\u2019 efforts to accomplish this targeting through advertising and other modes of minority-focused outreach and race-sensitive recruiting,\u201d but acknowledging that standing alone, an allegation that \u201cthe various actions constituting the fraud were taken deliberately and with racially discriminatory intent ... might be too conclusory to allege intentional racial discrimination\u201d (internal quotation marks omitted))."},"case_id":4251394,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Even after Boykin, these types of eonclusory allegations of discrimination, unsupported by specific factual allegations, have been found insufficient to state a claim under SSSS 1981 and 1982.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"661 F.Supp.2d 249, 269","parenthetical":"dismissing SS 1982 claim where \"[n]o identification of particular events or facts underlying the race-based discrimination claims [was] set forth in the amended complaint\"","sentence":"See Sanders, 367 Fed.Appx. at 175 (concluding that dismissal of \u00a7 1982 claim was proper because the plaintiffs\u2019 allegation \u201cthat \u2018defendants discriminated against plaintiffs on account of their race and national origin in violation of section 1982\u2019 d[id] not state a plausible claim to relief,\u201d and although a different paragraph in the complaint \u201cd[id] allege facts consistent with a discrimination claim, i.e., that non-black residents were granted subsidies, it nevertheless \u2018stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief,\u2019 because plaintiffs d[id] not allege any facts supporting an inference of racial animus\u201d (alterations, emphasis, and citations omitted) (quoting Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949)), Ng, 2010 WL 889256, at *12-13 (concluding that \u00a7\u00a7 1981 and 1982 claims were wholly conclusory and lacked factual specificity); Reyes v. Fairfield Props., 661 F.Supp.2d 249, 269 (E.D.N.Y.2009) (dismissing \u00a7 1982 claim where \u201c[n]o identification of particular events or facts underlying the race-based discrimination claims [was] set forth in the amended complaint\u201d); see also Mian, 7 F.3d at 1088 (dismissing \u00a7 1981 claim because \u201can essential element ... is a requirement that the alleged discrimination took place because of the [plaintiffs] race,\u201d and the \u201ccomplaint fail[ed] to offer more than conclusory allegations that he was discriminated against because of his race\u201d); Dove, 56 F.Supp.2d at 338 (dismissing \u00a7 1981 claim where the amended complaint was \u201cdevoid of facts to support [the plaintiffs] determination that the actions taken by [defendants were motivated by his race\u201d); Harary, 983 F.Supp. at 99-100 (dismissing \u00a7 1982 claims because the plaintiff did not plead facts supporting her contention of intentional racial discrimination or supply any examples other than her own); cf. Barkley, 2007 WL 2437810, at *11-12 (denying motion to dismiss \u00a7\u00a7 1981 and 1982 claims, where the complaint \u201cnot only allege[d] that plaintiffs were targeted for fraud because of their race, but also contain[ed] detailed allegations of defendants\u2019 efforts to accomplish this targeting through advertising and other modes of minority-focused outreach and race-sensitive recruiting,\u201d but acknowledging that standing alone, an allegation that \u201cthe various actions constituting the fraud were taken deliberately and with racially discriminatory intent ... might be too conclusory to allege intentional racial discrimination\u201d (internal quotation marks omitted))."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"983 F.Supp. 99, 99-100","parenthetical":"dismissing SS 1982 claims because the plaintiff did not plead facts supporting her contention of intentional racial discrimination or supply any examples other than her own","sentence":"See Sanders, 367 Fed.Appx. at 175 (concluding that dismissal of \u00a7 1982 claim was proper because the plaintiffs\u2019 allegation \u201cthat \u2018defendants discriminated against plaintiffs on account of their race and national origin in violation of section 1982\u2019 d[id] not state a plausible claim to relief,\u201d and although a different paragraph in the complaint \u201cd[id] allege facts consistent with a discrimination claim, i.e., that non-black residents were granted subsidies, it nevertheless \u2018stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief,\u2019 because plaintiffs d[id] not allege any facts supporting an inference of racial animus\u201d (alterations, emphasis, and citations omitted) (quoting Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949)), Ng, 2010 WL 889256, at *12-13 (concluding that \u00a7\u00a7 1981 and 1982 claims were wholly conclusory and lacked factual specificity); Reyes v. Fairfield Props., 661 F.Supp.2d 249, 269 (E.D.N.Y.2009) (dismissing \u00a7 1982 claim where \u201c[n]o identification of particular events or facts underlying the race-based discrimination claims [was] set forth in the amended complaint\u201d); see also Mian, 7 F.3d at 1088 (dismissing \u00a7 1981 claim because \u201can essential element ... is a requirement that the alleged discrimination took place because of the [plaintiffs] race,\u201d and the \u201ccomplaint fail[ed] to offer more than conclusory allegations that he was discriminated against because of his race\u201d); Dove, 56 F.Supp.2d at 338 (dismissing \u00a7 1981 claim where the amended complaint was \u201cdevoid of facts to support [the plaintiffs] determination that the actions taken by [defendants were motivated by his race\u201d); Harary, 983 F.Supp. at 99-100 (dismissing \u00a7 1982 claims because the plaintiff did not plead facts supporting her contention of intentional racial discrimination or supply any examples other than her own); cf. Barkley, 2007 WL 2437810, at *11-12 (denying motion to dismiss \u00a7\u00a7 1981 and 1982 claims, where the complaint \u201cnot only allege[d] that plaintiffs were targeted for fraud because of their race, but also contain[ed] detailed allegations of defendants\u2019 efforts to accomplish this targeting through advertising and other modes of minority-focused outreach and race-sensitive recruiting,\u201d but acknowledging that standing alone, an allegation that \u201cthe various actions constituting the fraud were taken deliberately and with racially discriminatory intent ... might be too conclusory to allege intentional racial discrimination\u201d (internal quotation marks omitted))."},"case_id":4251394,"label":"a"}
{"context":"On the videotape, DeSalvo claimed knowledge and expertise in furnishing Medicare providers with substantial, no-risk benefits by subscribing to lost charge audit services. The videotape illustrated DeSalvo's promotion of and proficiency in lost charge audits, thus tending to show that when she previously submitted false Medicare claims, she knew them to be false. Similar cases have found applicability of Rule 404(b) in less persuasive circumstances.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"922 F.2d 1398, 1399","parenthetical":"holding that despite differences in method, evidence of subsequent drug smuggling could be admitted to show prior knowledge and intent","sentence":"See United States v. McDonald, 576 F.2d 1350, 1356 (9th Cir.) (finding that developer\u2019s subsequent statements on land deals implied knowledge of previously fraudulent conduct), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 830, 99 S.Ct. 105, 58 L.Ed.2d 124 (1978); see also United States v. Bibo-Rodriguez, 922 F.2d 1398, 1399 (9th Cir.) (holding that despite differences in method, evidence of subsequent drug smuggling could be admitted to show prior knowledge and intent), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1234, 111 S.Ct. 2861, 115 L.Ed.2d 1028 (1991)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"576 F.2d 1350, 1356","parenthetical":"finding that developer's subsequent statements on land deals implied knowledge of previously fraudulent conduct","sentence":"See United States v. McDonald, 576 F.2d 1350, 1356 (9th Cir.) (finding that developer\u2019s subsequent statements on land deals implied knowledge of previously fraudulent conduct), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 830, 99 S.Ct. 105, 58 L.Ed.2d 124 (1978); see also United States v. Bibo-Rodriguez, 922 F.2d 1398, 1399 (9th Cir.) (holding that despite differences in method, evidence of subsequent drug smuggling could be admitted to show prior knowledge and intent), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1234, 111 S.Ct. 2861, 115 L.Ed.2d 1028 (1991)."},"case_id":7409670,"label":"b"}
{"context":"On the videotape, DeSalvo claimed knowledge and expertise in furnishing Medicare providers with substantial, no-risk benefits by subscribing to lost charge audit services. The videotape illustrated DeSalvo's promotion of and proficiency in lost charge audits, thus tending to show that when she previously submitted false Medicare claims, she knew them to be false. Similar cases have found applicability of Rule 404(b) in less persuasive circumstances.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that despite differences in method, evidence of subsequent drug smuggling could be admitted to show prior knowledge and intent","sentence":"See United States v. McDonald, 576 F.2d 1350, 1356 (9th Cir.) (finding that developer\u2019s subsequent statements on land deals implied knowledge of previously fraudulent conduct), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 830, 99 S.Ct. 105, 58 L.Ed.2d 124 (1978); see also United States v. Bibo-Rodriguez, 922 F.2d 1398, 1399 (9th Cir.) (holding that despite differences in method, evidence of subsequent drug smuggling could be admitted to show prior knowledge and intent), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1234, 111 S.Ct. 2861, 115 L.Ed.2d 1028 (1991)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"576 F.2d 1350, 1356","parenthetical":"finding that developer's subsequent statements on land deals implied knowledge of previously fraudulent conduct","sentence":"See United States v. McDonald, 576 F.2d 1350, 1356 (9th Cir.) (finding that developer\u2019s subsequent statements on land deals implied knowledge of previously fraudulent conduct), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 830, 99 S.Ct. 105, 58 L.Ed.2d 124 (1978); see also United States v. Bibo-Rodriguez, 922 F.2d 1398, 1399 (9th Cir.) (holding that despite differences in method, evidence of subsequent drug smuggling could be admitted to show prior knowledge and intent), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1234, 111 S.Ct. 2861, 115 L.Ed.2d 1028 (1991)."},"case_id":7409670,"label":"b"}
{"context":"On the videotape, DeSalvo claimed knowledge and expertise in furnishing Medicare providers with substantial, no-risk benefits by subscribing to lost charge audit services. The videotape illustrated DeSalvo's promotion of and proficiency in lost charge audits, thus tending to show that when she previously submitted false Medicare claims, she knew them to be false. Similar cases have found applicability of Rule 404(b) in less persuasive circumstances.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"576 F.2d 1350, 1356","parenthetical":"finding that developer's subsequent statements on land deals implied knowledge of previously fraudulent conduct","sentence":"See United States v. McDonald, 576 F.2d 1350, 1356 (9th Cir.) (finding that developer\u2019s subsequent statements on land deals implied knowledge of previously fraudulent conduct), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 830, 99 S.Ct. 105, 58 L.Ed.2d 124 (1978); see also United States v. Bibo-Rodriguez, 922 F.2d 1398, 1399 (9th Cir.) (holding that despite differences in method, evidence of subsequent drug smuggling could be admitted to show prior knowledge and intent), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1234, 111 S.Ct. 2861, 115 L.Ed.2d 1028 (1991)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that despite differences in method, evidence of subsequent drug smuggling could be admitted to show prior knowledge and intent","sentence":"See United States v. McDonald, 576 F.2d 1350, 1356 (9th Cir.) (finding that developer\u2019s subsequent statements on land deals implied knowledge of previously fraudulent conduct), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 830, 99 S.Ct. 105, 58 L.Ed.2d 124 (1978); see also United States v. Bibo-Rodriguez, 922 F.2d 1398, 1399 (9th Cir.) (holding that despite differences in method, evidence of subsequent drug smuggling could be admitted to show prior knowledge and intent), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1234, 111 S.Ct. 2861, 115 L.Ed.2d 1028 (1991)."},"case_id":7409670,"label":"a"}
{"context":"On the videotape, DeSalvo claimed knowledge and expertise in furnishing Medicare providers with substantial, no-risk benefits by subscribing to lost charge audit services. The videotape illustrated DeSalvo's promotion of and proficiency in lost charge audits, thus tending to show that when she previously submitted false Medicare claims, she knew them to be false. Similar cases have found applicability of Rule 404(b) in less persuasive circumstances.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that despite differences in method, evidence of subsequent drug smuggling could be admitted to show prior knowledge and intent","sentence":"See United States v. McDonald, 576 F.2d 1350, 1356 (9th Cir.) (finding that developer\u2019s subsequent statements on land deals implied knowledge of previously fraudulent conduct), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 830, 99 S.Ct. 105, 58 L.Ed.2d 124 (1978); see also United States v. Bibo-Rodriguez, 922 F.2d 1398, 1399 (9th Cir.) (holding that despite differences in method, evidence of subsequent drug smuggling could be admitted to show prior knowledge and intent), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1234, 111 S.Ct. 2861, 115 L.Ed.2d 1028 (1991)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"576 F.2d 1350, 1356","parenthetical":"finding that developer's subsequent statements on land deals implied knowledge of previously fraudulent conduct","sentence":"See United States v. McDonald, 576 F.2d 1350, 1356 (9th Cir.) (finding that developer\u2019s subsequent statements on land deals implied knowledge of previously fraudulent conduct), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 830, 99 S.Ct. 105, 58 L.Ed.2d 124 (1978); see also United States v. Bibo-Rodriguez, 922 F.2d 1398, 1399 (9th Cir.) (holding that despite differences in method, evidence of subsequent drug smuggling could be admitted to show prior knowledge and intent), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1234, 111 S.Ct. 2861, 115 L.Ed.2d 1028 (1991)."},"case_id":7409670,"label":"b"}
{"context":"On the videotape, DeSalvo claimed knowledge and expertise in furnishing Medicare providers with substantial, no-risk benefits by subscribing to lost charge audit services. The videotape illustrated DeSalvo's promotion of and proficiency in lost charge audits, thus tending to show that when she previously submitted false Medicare claims, she knew them to be false. Similar cases have found applicability of Rule 404(b) in less persuasive circumstances.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"922 F.2d 1398, 1399","parenthetical":"holding that despite differences in method, evidence of subsequent drug smuggling could be admitted to show prior knowledge and intent","sentence":"See United States v. McDonald, 576 F.2d 1350, 1356 (9th Cir.) (finding that developer\u2019s subsequent statements on land deals implied knowledge of previously fraudulent conduct), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 830, 99 S.Ct. 105, 58 L.Ed.2d 124 (1978); see also United States v. Bibo-Rodriguez, 922 F.2d 1398, 1399 (9th Cir.) (holding that despite differences in method, evidence of subsequent drug smuggling could be admitted to show prior knowledge and intent), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1234, 111 S.Ct. 2861, 115 L.Ed.2d 1028 (1991)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding that developer's subsequent statements on land deals implied knowledge of previously fraudulent conduct","sentence":"See United States v. McDonald, 576 F.2d 1350, 1356 (9th Cir.) (finding that developer\u2019s subsequent statements on land deals implied knowledge of previously fraudulent conduct), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 830, 99 S.Ct. 105, 58 L.Ed.2d 124 (1978); see also United States v. Bibo-Rodriguez, 922 F.2d 1398, 1399 (9th Cir.) (holding that despite differences in method, evidence of subsequent drug smuggling could be admitted to show prior knowledge and intent), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1234, 111 S.Ct. 2861, 115 L.Ed.2d 1028 (1991)."},"case_id":7409670,"label":"b"}
{"context":"On the videotape, DeSalvo claimed knowledge and expertise in furnishing Medicare providers with substantial, no-risk benefits by subscribing to lost charge audit services. The videotape illustrated DeSalvo's promotion of and proficiency in lost charge audits, thus tending to show that when she previously submitted false Medicare claims, she knew them to be false. Similar cases have found applicability of Rule 404(b) in less persuasive circumstances.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that despite differences in method, evidence of subsequent drug smuggling could be admitted to show prior knowledge and intent","sentence":"See United States v. McDonald, 576 F.2d 1350, 1356 (9th Cir.) (finding that developer\u2019s subsequent statements on land deals implied knowledge of previously fraudulent conduct), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 830, 99 S.Ct. 105, 58 L.Ed.2d 124 (1978); see also United States v. Bibo-Rodriguez, 922 F.2d 1398, 1399 (9th Cir.) (holding that despite differences in method, evidence of subsequent drug smuggling could be admitted to show prior knowledge and intent), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1234, 111 S.Ct. 2861, 115 L.Ed.2d 1028 (1991)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding that developer's subsequent statements on land deals implied knowledge of previously fraudulent conduct","sentence":"See United States v. McDonald, 576 F.2d 1350, 1356 (9th Cir.) (finding that developer\u2019s subsequent statements on land deals implied knowledge of previously fraudulent conduct), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 830, 99 S.Ct. 105, 58 L.Ed.2d 124 (1978); see also United States v. Bibo-Rodriguez, 922 F.2d 1398, 1399 (9th Cir.) (holding that despite differences in method, evidence of subsequent drug smuggling could be admitted to show prior knowledge and intent), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1234, 111 S.Ct. 2861, 115 L.Ed.2d 1028 (1991)."},"case_id":7409670,"label":"b"}
{"context":"On the videotape, DeSalvo claimed knowledge and expertise in furnishing Medicare providers with substantial, no-risk benefits by subscribing to lost charge audit services. The videotape illustrated DeSalvo's promotion of and proficiency in lost charge audits, thus tending to show that when she previously submitted false Medicare claims, she knew them to be false. Similar cases have found applicability of Rule 404(b) in less persuasive circumstances.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding that developer's subsequent statements on land deals implied knowledge of previously fraudulent conduct","sentence":"See United States v. McDonald, 576 F.2d 1350, 1356 (9th Cir.) (finding that developer\u2019s subsequent statements on land deals implied knowledge of previously fraudulent conduct), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 830, 99 S.Ct. 105, 58 L.Ed.2d 124 (1978); see also United States v. Bibo-Rodriguez, 922 F.2d 1398, 1399 (9th Cir.) (holding that despite differences in method, evidence of subsequent drug smuggling could be admitted to show prior knowledge and intent), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1234, 111 S.Ct. 2861, 115 L.Ed.2d 1028 (1991)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that despite differences in method, evidence of subsequent drug smuggling could be admitted to show prior knowledge and intent","sentence":"See United States v. McDonald, 576 F.2d 1350, 1356 (9th Cir.) (finding that developer\u2019s subsequent statements on land deals implied knowledge of previously fraudulent conduct), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 830, 99 S.Ct. 105, 58 L.Ed.2d 124 (1978); see also United States v. Bibo-Rodriguez, 922 F.2d 1398, 1399 (9th Cir.) (holding that despite differences in method, evidence of subsequent drug smuggling could be admitted to show prior knowledge and intent), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1234, 111 S.Ct. 2861, 115 L.Ed.2d 1028 (1991)."},"case_id":7409670,"label":"a"}
{"context":"On the videotape, DeSalvo claimed knowledge and expertise in furnishing Medicare providers with substantial, no-risk benefits by subscribing to lost charge audit services. The videotape illustrated DeSalvo's promotion of and proficiency in lost charge audits, thus tending to show that when she previously submitted false Medicare claims, she knew them to be false. Similar cases have found applicability of Rule 404(b) in less persuasive circumstances.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that despite differences in method, evidence of subsequent drug smuggling could be admitted to show prior knowledge and intent","sentence":"See United States v. McDonald, 576 F.2d 1350, 1356 (9th Cir.) (finding that developer\u2019s subsequent statements on land deals implied knowledge of previously fraudulent conduct), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 830, 99 S.Ct. 105, 58 L.Ed.2d 124 (1978); see also United States v. Bibo-Rodriguez, 922 F.2d 1398, 1399 (9th Cir.) (holding that despite differences in method, evidence of subsequent drug smuggling could be admitted to show prior knowledge and intent), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1234, 111 S.Ct. 2861, 115 L.Ed.2d 1028 (1991)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding that developer's subsequent statements on land deals implied knowledge of previously fraudulent conduct","sentence":"See United States v. McDonald, 576 F.2d 1350, 1356 (9th Cir.) (finding that developer\u2019s subsequent statements on land deals implied knowledge of previously fraudulent conduct), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 830, 99 S.Ct. 105, 58 L.Ed.2d 124 (1978); see also United States v. Bibo-Rodriguez, 922 F.2d 1398, 1399 (9th Cir.) (holding that despite differences in method, evidence of subsequent drug smuggling could be admitted to show prior knowledge and intent), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1234, 111 S.Ct. 2861, 115 L.Ed.2d 1028 (1991)."},"case_id":7409670,"label":"b"}
{"context":"On the videotape, DeSalvo claimed knowledge and expertise in furnishing Medicare providers with substantial, no-risk benefits by subscribing to lost charge audit services. The videotape illustrated DeSalvo's promotion of and proficiency in lost charge audits, thus tending to show that when she previously submitted false Medicare claims, she knew them to be false. Similar cases have found applicability of Rule 404(b) in less persuasive circumstances.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding that developer's subsequent statements on land deals implied knowledge of previously fraudulent conduct","sentence":"See United States v. McDonald, 576 F.2d 1350, 1356 (9th Cir.) (finding that developer\u2019s subsequent statements on land deals implied knowledge of previously fraudulent conduct), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 830, 99 S.Ct. 105, 58 L.Ed.2d 124 (1978); see also United States v. Bibo-Rodriguez, 922 F.2d 1398, 1399 (9th Cir.) (holding that despite differences in method, evidence of subsequent drug smuggling could be admitted to show prior knowledge and intent), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1234, 111 S.Ct. 2861, 115 L.Ed.2d 1028 (1991)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"922 F.2d 1398, 1399","parenthetical":"holding that despite differences in method, evidence of subsequent drug smuggling could be admitted to show prior knowledge and intent","sentence":"See United States v. McDonald, 576 F.2d 1350, 1356 (9th Cir.) (finding that developer\u2019s subsequent statements on land deals implied knowledge of previously fraudulent conduct), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 830, 99 S.Ct. 105, 58 L.Ed.2d 124 (1978); see also United States v. Bibo-Rodriguez, 922 F.2d 1398, 1399 (9th Cir.) (holding that despite differences in method, evidence of subsequent drug smuggling could be admitted to show prior knowledge and intent), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1234, 111 S.Ct. 2861, 115 L.Ed.2d 1028 (1991)."},"case_id":7409670,"label":"a"}
{"context":"On the videotape, DeSalvo claimed knowledge and expertise in furnishing Medicare providers with substantial, no-risk benefits by subscribing to lost charge audit services. The videotape illustrated DeSalvo's promotion of and proficiency in lost charge audits, thus tending to show that when she previously submitted false Medicare claims, she knew them to be false. Similar cases have found applicability of Rule 404(b) in less persuasive circumstances.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding that developer's subsequent statements on land deals implied knowledge of previously fraudulent conduct","sentence":"See United States v. McDonald, 576 F.2d 1350, 1356 (9th Cir.) (finding that developer\u2019s subsequent statements on land deals implied knowledge of previously fraudulent conduct), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 830, 99 S.Ct. 105, 58 L.Ed.2d 124 (1978); see also United States v. Bibo-Rodriguez, 922 F.2d 1398, 1399 (9th Cir.) (holding that despite differences in method, evidence of subsequent drug smuggling could be admitted to show prior knowledge and intent), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1234, 111 S.Ct. 2861, 115 L.Ed.2d 1028 (1991)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that despite differences in method, evidence of subsequent drug smuggling could be admitted to show prior knowledge and intent","sentence":"See United States v. McDonald, 576 F.2d 1350, 1356 (9th Cir.) (finding that developer\u2019s subsequent statements on land deals implied knowledge of previously fraudulent conduct), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 830, 99 S.Ct. 105, 58 L.Ed.2d 124 (1978); see also United States v. Bibo-Rodriguez, 922 F.2d 1398, 1399 (9th Cir.) (holding that despite differences in method, evidence of subsequent drug smuggling could be admitted to show prior knowledge and intent), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1234, 111 S.Ct. 2861, 115 L.Ed.2d 1028 (1991)."},"case_id":7409670,"label":"a"}
{"context":"On the videotape, DeSalvo claimed knowledge and expertise in furnishing Medicare providers with substantial, no-risk benefits by subscribing to lost charge audit services. The videotape illustrated DeSalvo's promotion of and proficiency in lost charge audits, thus tending to show that when she previously submitted false Medicare claims, she knew them to be false. Similar cases have found applicability of Rule 404(b) in less persuasive circumstances.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that despite differences in method, evidence of subsequent drug smuggling could be admitted to show prior knowledge and intent","sentence":"See United States v. McDonald, 576 F.2d 1350, 1356 (9th Cir.) (finding that developer\u2019s subsequent statements on land deals implied knowledge of previously fraudulent conduct), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 830, 99 S.Ct. 105, 58 L.Ed.2d 124 (1978); see also United States v. Bibo-Rodriguez, 922 F.2d 1398, 1399 (9th Cir.) (holding that despite differences in method, evidence of subsequent drug smuggling could be admitted to show prior knowledge and intent), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1234, 111 S.Ct. 2861, 115 L.Ed.2d 1028 (1991)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding that developer's subsequent statements on land deals implied knowledge of previously fraudulent conduct","sentence":"See United States v. McDonald, 576 F.2d 1350, 1356 (9th Cir.) (finding that developer\u2019s subsequent statements on land deals implied knowledge of previously fraudulent conduct), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 830, 99 S.Ct. 105, 58 L.Ed.2d 124 (1978); see also United States v. Bibo-Rodriguez, 922 F.2d 1398, 1399 (9th Cir.) (holding that despite differences in method, evidence of subsequent drug smuggling could be admitted to show prior knowledge and intent), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1234, 111 S.Ct. 2861, 115 L.Ed.2d 1028 (1991)."},"case_id":7409670,"label":"b"}
{"context":"On the videotape, DeSalvo claimed knowledge and expertise in furnishing Medicare providers with substantial, no-risk benefits by subscribing to lost charge audit services. The videotape illustrated DeSalvo's promotion of and proficiency in lost charge audits, thus tending to show that when she previously submitted false Medicare claims, she knew them to be false. Similar cases have found applicability of Rule 404(b) in less persuasive circumstances.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that despite differences in method, evidence of subsequent drug smuggling could be admitted to show prior knowledge and intent","sentence":"See United States v. McDonald, 576 F.2d 1350, 1356 (9th Cir.) (finding that developer\u2019s subsequent statements on land deals implied knowledge of previously fraudulent conduct), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 830, 99 S.Ct. 105, 58 L.Ed.2d 124 (1978); see also United States v. Bibo-Rodriguez, 922 F.2d 1398, 1399 (9th Cir.) (holding that despite differences in method, evidence of subsequent drug smuggling could be admitted to show prior knowledge and intent), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1234, 111 S.Ct. 2861, 115 L.Ed.2d 1028 (1991)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding that developer's subsequent statements on land deals implied knowledge of previously fraudulent conduct","sentence":"See United States v. McDonald, 576 F.2d 1350, 1356 (9th Cir.) (finding that developer\u2019s subsequent statements on land deals implied knowledge of previously fraudulent conduct), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 830, 99 S.Ct. 105, 58 L.Ed.2d 124 (1978); see also United States v. Bibo-Rodriguez, 922 F.2d 1398, 1399 (9th Cir.) (holding that despite differences in method, evidence of subsequent drug smuggling could be admitted to show prior knowledge and intent), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1234, 111 S.Ct. 2861, 115 L.Ed.2d 1028 (1991)."},"case_id":7409670,"label":"b"}
{"context":"On the videotape, DeSalvo claimed knowledge and expertise in furnishing Medicare providers with substantial, no-risk benefits by subscribing to lost charge audit services. The videotape illustrated DeSalvo's promotion of and proficiency in lost charge audits, thus tending to show that when she previously submitted false Medicare claims, she knew them to be false. Similar cases have found applicability of Rule 404(b) in less persuasive circumstances.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding that developer's subsequent statements on land deals implied knowledge of previously fraudulent conduct","sentence":"See United States v. McDonald, 576 F.2d 1350, 1356 (9th Cir.) (finding that developer\u2019s subsequent statements on land deals implied knowledge of previously fraudulent conduct), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 830, 99 S.Ct. 105, 58 L.Ed.2d 124 (1978); see also United States v. Bibo-Rodriguez, 922 F.2d 1398, 1399 (9th Cir.) (holding that despite differences in method, evidence of subsequent drug smuggling could be admitted to show prior knowledge and intent), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1234, 111 S.Ct. 2861, 115 L.Ed.2d 1028 (1991)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"922 F.2d 1398, 1399","parenthetical":"holding that despite differences in method, evidence of subsequent drug smuggling could be admitted to show prior knowledge and intent","sentence":"See United States v. McDonald, 576 F.2d 1350, 1356 (9th Cir.) (finding that developer\u2019s subsequent statements on land deals implied knowledge of previously fraudulent conduct), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 830, 99 S.Ct. 105, 58 L.Ed.2d 124 (1978); see also United States v. Bibo-Rodriguez, 922 F.2d 1398, 1399 (9th Cir.) (holding that despite differences in method, evidence of subsequent drug smuggling could be admitted to show prior knowledge and intent), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1234, 111 S.Ct. 2861, 115 L.Ed.2d 1028 (1991)."},"case_id":7409670,"label":"a"}
{"context":"On the videotape, DeSalvo claimed knowledge and expertise in furnishing Medicare providers with substantial, no-risk benefits by subscribing to lost charge audit services. The videotape illustrated DeSalvo's promotion of and proficiency in lost charge audits, thus tending to show that when she previously submitted false Medicare claims, she knew them to be false. Similar cases have found applicability of Rule 404(b) in less persuasive circumstances.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that despite differences in method, evidence of subsequent drug smuggling could be admitted to show prior knowledge and intent","sentence":"See United States v. McDonald, 576 F.2d 1350, 1356 (9th Cir.) (finding that developer\u2019s subsequent statements on land deals implied knowledge of previously fraudulent conduct), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 830, 99 S.Ct. 105, 58 L.Ed.2d 124 (1978); see also United States v. Bibo-Rodriguez, 922 F.2d 1398, 1399 (9th Cir.) (holding that despite differences in method, evidence of subsequent drug smuggling could be admitted to show prior knowledge and intent), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1234, 111 S.Ct. 2861, 115 L.Ed.2d 1028 (1991)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding that developer's subsequent statements on land deals implied knowledge of previously fraudulent conduct","sentence":"See United States v. McDonald, 576 F.2d 1350, 1356 (9th Cir.) (finding that developer\u2019s subsequent statements on land deals implied knowledge of previously fraudulent conduct), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 830, 99 S.Ct. 105, 58 L.Ed.2d 124 (1978); see also United States v. Bibo-Rodriguez, 922 F.2d 1398, 1399 (9th Cir.) (holding that despite differences in method, evidence of subsequent drug smuggling could be admitted to show prior knowledge and intent), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1234, 111 S.Ct. 2861, 115 L.Ed.2d 1028 (1991)."},"case_id":7409670,"label":"b"}
{"context":"On the videotape, DeSalvo claimed knowledge and expertise in furnishing Medicare providers with substantial, no-risk benefits by subscribing to lost charge audit services. The videotape illustrated DeSalvo's promotion of and proficiency in lost charge audits, thus tending to show that when she previously submitted false Medicare claims, she knew them to be false. Similar cases have found applicability of Rule 404(b) in less persuasive circumstances.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding that developer's subsequent statements on land deals implied knowledge of previously fraudulent conduct","sentence":"See United States v. McDonald, 576 F.2d 1350, 1356 (9th Cir.) (finding that developer\u2019s subsequent statements on land deals implied knowledge of previously fraudulent conduct), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 830, 99 S.Ct. 105, 58 L.Ed.2d 124 (1978); see also United States v. Bibo-Rodriguez, 922 F.2d 1398, 1399 (9th Cir.) (holding that despite differences in method, evidence of subsequent drug smuggling could be admitted to show prior knowledge and intent), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1234, 111 S.Ct. 2861, 115 L.Ed.2d 1028 (1991)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that despite differences in method, evidence of subsequent drug smuggling could be admitted to show prior knowledge and intent","sentence":"See United States v. McDonald, 576 F.2d 1350, 1356 (9th Cir.) (finding that developer\u2019s subsequent statements on land deals implied knowledge of previously fraudulent conduct), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 830, 99 S.Ct. 105, 58 L.Ed.2d 124 (1978); see also United States v. Bibo-Rodriguez, 922 F.2d 1398, 1399 (9th Cir.) (holding that despite differences in method, evidence of subsequent drug smuggling could be admitted to show prior knowledge and intent), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1234, 111 S.Ct. 2861, 115 L.Ed.2d 1028 (1991)."},"case_id":7409670,"label":"a"}
{"context":"On the videotape, DeSalvo claimed knowledge and expertise in furnishing Medicare providers with substantial, no-risk benefits by subscribing to lost charge audit services. The videotape illustrated DeSalvo's promotion of and proficiency in lost charge audits, thus tending to show that when she previously submitted false Medicare claims, she knew them to be false. Similar cases have found applicability of Rule 404(b) in less persuasive circumstances.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding that developer's subsequent statements on land deals implied knowledge of previously fraudulent conduct","sentence":"See United States v. McDonald, 576 F.2d 1350, 1356 (9th Cir.) (finding that developer\u2019s subsequent statements on land deals implied knowledge of previously fraudulent conduct), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 830, 99 S.Ct. 105, 58 L.Ed.2d 124 (1978); see also United States v. Bibo-Rodriguez, 922 F.2d 1398, 1399 (9th Cir.) (holding that despite differences in method, evidence of subsequent drug smuggling could be admitted to show prior knowledge and intent), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1234, 111 S.Ct. 2861, 115 L.Ed.2d 1028 (1991)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that despite differences in method, evidence of subsequent drug smuggling could be admitted to show prior knowledge and intent","sentence":"See United States v. McDonald, 576 F.2d 1350, 1356 (9th Cir.) (finding that developer\u2019s subsequent statements on land deals implied knowledge of previously fraudulent conduct), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 830, 99 S.Ct. 105, 58 L.Ed.2d 124 (1978); see also United States v. Bibo-Rodriguez, 922 F.2d 1398, 1399 (9th Cir.) (holding that despite differences in method, evidence of subsequent drug smuggling could be admitted to show prior knowledge and intent), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1234, 111 S.Ct. 2861, 115 L.Ed.2d 1028 (1991)."},"case_id":7409670,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The Court continued that crimes involving \"failure to report (or to return)\" to detention represent \"a form of inaction, a far cry from the purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct potentially at issue when an offender uses explosives against property, commits arson, burgles a dwelling or residence, or engages in certain forms of extortion.\" Id. at 691-92 (internal marks and citation omitted). Here, we must reexamine Chambers's impact upon our holding that all escape convictions are crimes of violence for purposes of the career offender provisions.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"We are bound by the precedent of prior panels absent en banc reconsideration or a superseding contrary decision by the Supreme Court.\"","sentence":"See United States v. Mitchell, 518 F.3d 740, 752 n. 14 (10th Cir.2008) (\u201cWe are bound by the precedent of prior panels absent en banc reconsideration or a superseding contrary decision by the Supreme Court.\u201d) (emphasis supplied); cf. United States v. Ford, 560 F.3d 420, 422-23 (6th Cir.2009) (\u201c[Chambers ] requires us to modify our prior decisions suggesting that all manner of escape ... including failures to report, constitute crimes of violence. Chambers ... undermines the notion that a \u2018walkaway1 conviction is a crime of violence.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"560 F.3d 420, 422-23","parenthetical":"\"[Chambers ] requires us to modify our prior decisions suggesting that all manner of escape ... including failures to report, constitute crimes of violence. Chambers ... undermines the notion that a 'walkaway1 conviction is a crime of violence.\"","sentence":"See United States v. Mitchell, 518 F.3d 740, 752 n. 14 (10th Cir.2008) (\u201cWe are bound by the precedent of prior panels absent en banc reconsideration or a superseding contrary decision by the Supreme Court.\u201d) (emphasis supplied); cf. United States v. Ford, 560 F.3d 420, 422-23 (6th Cir.2009) (\u201c[Chambers ] requires us to modify our prior decisions suggesting that all manner of escape ... including failures to report, constitute crimes of violence. Chambers ... undermines the notion that a \u2018walkaway1 conviction is a crime of violence.\u201d)."},"case_id":4038189,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Consequently, Defendants' First Amendment arguments must fail. The alleged appropriation of Plaintiffs' marks for commercial purposes is not protected by the First Amendment.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"542 F.3d 1018, 1018","parenthetical":"\"[T]he Lanham Act customarily avoids violating the First Amendment, in part by enforcing a trademark only when consumers are likely to be misled or confused by the alleged infringer's use.\"","sentence":"Facenda, 542 F.3d at 1018 (\u201c[T]he Lanham Act customarily avoids violating the First Amendment, in part by enforcing a trademark only when consumers are likely to be misled or confused by the alleged infringer\u2019s use.\u201d); see also Taubman Co., 319 F.3d at 775 (noting that the misleading commercial speech that the Lanham Act deals with is not entitled to First Amendment protection)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"319 F.3d 775, 775","parenthetical":"noting that the misleading commercial speech that the Lanham Act deals with is not entitled to First Amendment protection","sentence":"Facenda, 542 F.3d at 1018 (\u201c[T]he Lanham Act customarily avoids violating the First Amendment, in part by enforcing a trademark only when consumers are likely to be misled or confused by the alleged infringer\u2019s use.\u201d); see also Taubman Co., 319 F.3d at 775 (noting that the misleading commercial speech that the Lanham Act deals with is not entitled to First Amendment protection)."},"case_id":4291891,"label":"a"}
{"context":"To show prejudice, the defendant must show a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense earlier, the result of the proceeding would have been different. When Brady material is disclosed at trial, the defendant's failure either to object to the admission of the evidence on this basis or to request a continuance waives the error \"or at least indicates that the delay in receiving the evidence was not truly prejudicial.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"314 S.W.3d 576, 586","parenthetical":"holding Brady challenge not preserved because trial court never ruled on complaint","sentence":"See Apolinar v. State, 106 S.W.3d 407, 421 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2003), aff'd on other grounds, 155 S.W.3d 184 (Tex.Crim.App.2005) (holding that failure to request continuance waives complaint that State withheld exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady); see also Smith v. State, 314 S.W.3d 576, 586 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2010, no pet.) (holding Brady challenge not preserved because trial court never ruled on complaint); Jones v. State, 234 S.W.3d 151, 158 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2007, no pet.) (holding that defendant must request continuance and present Brady complaint in motion for new trial to preserve complaint for appellate review); Young v. State, 183 S.W.3d 699, 706 (Tex.App.-Tyler 2005, pet. ref'd) (\u201cThe failure to request [a continuance] waives any Brady violation, as well as any violation of a discovery order.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"106 S.W.3d 407, 421","parenthetical":"holding that failure to request continuance waives complaint that State withheld exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady","sentence":"See Apolinar v. State, 106 S.W.3d 407, 421 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2003), aff'd on other grounds, 155 S.W.3d 184 (Tex.Crim.App.2005) (holding that failure to request continuance waives complaint that State withheld exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady); see also Smith v. State, 314 S.W.3d 576, 586 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2010, no pet.) (holding Brady challenge not preserved because trial court never ruled on complaint); Jones v. State, 234 S.W.3d 151, 158 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2007, no pet.) (holding that defendant must request continuance and present Brady complaint in motion for new trial to preserve complaint for appellate review); Young v. State, 183 S.W.3d 699, 706 (Tex.App.-Tyler 2005, pet. ref'd) (\u201cThe failure to request [a continuance] waives any Brady violation, as well as any violation of a discovery order.\u201d)."},"case_id":7089703,"label":"b"}
{"context":"To show prejudice, the defendant must show a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense earlier, the result of the proceeding would have been different. When Brady material is disclosed at trial, the defendant's failure either to object to the admission of the evidence on this basis or to request a continuance waives the error \"or at least indicates that the delay in receiving the evidence was not truly prejudicial.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"106 S.W.3d 407, 421","parenthetical":"holding that failure to request continuance waives complaint that State withheld exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady","sentence":"See Apolinar v. State, 106 S.W.3d 407, 421 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2003), aff'd on other grounds, 155 S.W.3d 184 (Tex.Crim.App.2005) (holding that failure to request continuance waives complaint that State withheld exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady); see also Smith v. State, 314 S.W.3d 576, 586 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2010, no pet.) (holding Brady challenge not preserved because trial court never ruled on complaint); Jones v. State, 234 S.W.3d 151, 158 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2007, no pet.) (holding that defendant must request continuance and present Brady complaint in motion for new trial to preserve complaint for appellate review); Young v. State, 183 S.W.3d 699, 706 (Tex.App.-Tyler 2005, pet. ref'd) (\u201cThe failure to request [a continuance] waives any Brady violation, as well as any violation of a discovery order.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"183 S.W.3d 699, 706","parenthetical":"\"The failure to request [a continuance] waives any Brady violation, as well as any violation of a discovery order.\"","sentence":"See Apolinar v. State, 106 S.W.3d 407, 421 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2003), aff'd on other grounds, 155 S.W.3d 184 (Tex.Crim.App.2005) (holding that failure to request continuance waives complaint that State withheld exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady); see also Smith v. State, 314 S.W.3d 576, 586 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2010, no pet.) (holding Brady challenge not preserved because trial court never ruled on complaint); Jones v. State, 234 S.W.3d 151, 158 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2007, no pet.) (holding that defendant must request continuance and present Brady complaint in motion for new trial to preserve complaint for appellate review); Young v. State, 183 S.W.3d 699, 706 (Tex.App.-Tyler 2005, pet. ref'd) (\u201cThe failure to request [a continuance] waives any Brady violation, as well as any violation of a discovery order.\u201d)."},"case_id":7089703,"label":"a"}
{"context":"To show prejudice, the defendant must show a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense earlier, the result of the proceeding would have been different. When Brady material is disclosed at trial, the defendant's failure either to object to the admission of the evidence on this basis or to request a continuance waives the error \"or at least indicates that the delay in receiving the evidence was not truly prejudicial.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that failure to request continuance waives complaint that State withheld exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady","sentence":"See Apolinar v. State, 106 S.W.3d 407, 421 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2003), aff'd on other grounds, 155 S.W.3d 184 (Tex.Crim.App.2005) (holding that failure to request continuance waives complaint that State withheld exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady); see also Smith v. State, 314 S.W.3d 576, 586 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2010, no pet.) (holding Brady challenge not preserved because trial court never ruled on complaint); Jones v. State, 234 S.W.3d 151, 158 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2007, no pet.) (holding that defendant must request continuance and present Brady complaint in motion for new trial to preserve complaint for appellate review); Young v. State, 183 S.W.3d 699, 706 (Tex.App.-Tyler 2005, pet. ref'd) (\u201cThe failure to request [a continuance] waives any Brady violation, as well as any violation of a discovery order.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"314 S.W.3d 576, 586","parenthetical":"holding Brady challenge not preserved because trial court never ruled on complaint","sentence":"See Apolinar v. State, 106 S.W.3d 407, 421 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2003), aff'd on other grounds, 155 S.W.3d 184 (Tex.Crim.App.2005) (holding that failure to request continuance waives complaint that State withheld exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady); see also Smith v. State, 314 S.W.3d 576, 586 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2010, no pet.) (holding Brady challenge not preserved because trial court never ruled on complaint); Jones v. State, 234 S.W.3d 151, 158 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2007, no pet.) (holding that defendant must request continuance and present Brady complaint in motion for new trial to preserve complaint for appellate review); Young v. State, 183 S.W.3d 699, 706 (Tex.App.-Tyler 2005, pet. ref'd) (\u201cThe failure to request [a continuance] waives any Brady violation, as well as any violation of a discovery order.\u201d)."},"case_id":7089703,"label":"a"}
{"context":"To show prejudice, the defendant must show a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense earlier, the result of the proceeding would have been different. When Brady material is disclosed at trial, the defendant's failure either to object to the admission of the evidence on this basis or to request a continuance waives the error \"or at least indicates that the delay in receiving the evidence was not truly prejudicial.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"183 S.W.3d 699, 706","parenthetical":"\"The failure to request [a continuance] waives any Brady violation, as well as any violation of a discovery order.\"","sentence":"See Apolinar v. State, 106 S.W.3d 407, 421 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2003), aff'd on other grounds, 155 S.W.3d 184 (Tex.Crim.App.2005) (holding that failure to request continuance waives complaint that State withheld exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady); see also Smith v. State, 314 S.W.3d 576, 586 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2010, no pet.) (holding Brady challenge not preserved because trial court never ruled on complaint); Jones v. State, 234 S.W.3d 151, 158 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2007, no pet.) (holding that defendant must request continuance and present Brady complaint in motion for new trial to preserve complaint for appellate review); Young v. State, 183 S.W.3d 699, 706 (Tex.App.-Tyler 2005, pet. ref'd) (\u201cThe failure to request [a continuance] waives any Brady violation, as well as any violation of a discovery order.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that failure to request continuance waives complaint that State withheld exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady","sentence":"See Apolinar v. State, 106 S.W.3d 407, 421 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2003), aff'd on other grounds, 155 S.W.3d 184 (Tex.Crim.App.2005) (holding that failure to request continuance waives complaint that State withheld exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady); see also Smith v. State, 314 S.W.3d 576, 586 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2010, no pet.) (holding Brady challenge not preserved because trial court never ruled on complaint); Jones v. State, 234 S.W.3d 151, 158 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2007, no pet.) (holding that defendant must request continuance and present Brady complaint in motion for new trial to preserve complaint for appellate review); Young v. State, 183 S.W.3d 699, 706 (Tex.App.-Tyler 2005, pet. ref'd) (\u201cThe failure to request [a continuance] waives any Brady violation, as well as any violation of a discovery order.\u201d)."},"case_id":7089703,"label":"b"}
{"context":"However, our decision here will result in a substantial award to Mrs. Bocanegra, with opposite financial consequences for Mr. Bocanegra. On remand, therefore, the court must reconsider its attorney fee award in light of this decision.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"40 Wn. App. 450, 458","parenthetical":"court vacated attorney fee award on basis of changes in parties' financial circumstances after entry of award","sentence":"See Ovens v. Ovens, 61 Wn.2d 6, 11, 376 P.2d 839 (1962) (court evaluated former spouse's need in light of amount of underlying judgment); see also In re Marriage of Mason, 40 Wn. App. 450, 458, 698 P.2d 1104 (court vacated attorney fee award on basis of changes in parties' financial circumstances after entry of award), review denied, 104 Wn.2d 1017 (1985)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"61 Wn.2d 6, 11","parenthetical":"court evaluated former spouse's need in light of amount of underlying judgment","sentence":"See Ovens v. Ovens, 61 Wn.2d 6, 11, 376 P.2d 839 (1962) (court evaluated former spouse's need in light of amount of underlying judgment); see also In re Marriage of Mason, 40 Wn. App. 450, 458, 698 P.2d 1104 (court vacated attorney fee award on basis of changes in parties' financial circumstances after entry of award), review denied, 104 Wn.2d 1017 (1985)."},"case_id":1754149,"label":"b"}
{"context":"However, our decision here will result in a substantial award to Mrs. Bocanegra, with opposite financial consequences for Mr. Bocanegra. On remand, therefore, the court must reconsider its attorney fee award in light of this decision.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"61 Wn.2d 6, 11","parenthetical":"court evaluated former spouse's need in light of amount of underlying judgment","sentence":"See Ovens v. Ovens, 61 Wn.2d 6, 11, 376 P.2d 839 (1962) (court evaluated former spouse's need in light of amount of underlying judgment); see also In re Marriage of Mason, 40 Wn. App. 450, 458, 698 P.2d 1104 (court vacated attorney fee award on basis of changes in parties' financial circumstances after entry of award), review denied, 104 Wn.2d 1017 (1985)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"court vacated attorney fee award on basis of changes in parties' financial circumstances after entry of award","sentence":"See Ovens v. Ovens, 61 Wn.2d 6, 11, 376 P.2d 839 (1962) (court evaluated former spouse's need in light of amount of underlying judgment); see also In re Marriage of Mason, 40 Wn. App. 450, 458, 698 P.2d 1104 (court vacated attorney fee award on basis of changes in parties' financial circumstances after entry of award), review denied, 104 Wn.2d 1017 (1985)."},"case_id":1754149,"label":"a"}
{"context":"However, our decision here will result in a substantial award to Mrs. Bocanegra, with opposite financial consequences for Mr. Bocanegra. On remand, therefore, the court must reconsider its attorney fee award in light of this decision.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"court vacated attorney fee award on basis of changes in parties' financial circumstances after entry of award","sentence":"See Ovens v. Ovens, 61 Wn.2d 6, 11, 376 P.2d 839 (1962) (court evaluated former spouse's need in light of amount of underlying judgment); see also In re Marriage of Mason, 40 Wn. App. 450, 458, 698 P.2d 1104 (court vacated attorney fee award on basis of changes in parties' financial circumstances after entry of award), review denied, 104 Wn.2d 1017 (1985)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"61 Wn.2d 6, 11","parenthetical":"court evaluated former spouse's need in light of amount of underlying judgment","sentence":"See Ovens v. Ovens, 61 Wn.2d 6, 11, 376 P.2d 839 (1962) (court evaluated former spouse's need in light of amount of underlying judgment); see also In re Marriage of Mason, 40 Wn. App. 450, 458, 698 P.2d 1104 (court vacated attorney fee award on basis of changes in parties' financial circumstances after entry of award), review denied, 104 Wn.2d 1017 (1985)."},"case_id":1754149,"label":"b"}
{"context":"However, our decision here will result in a substantial award to Mrs. Bocanegra, with opposite financial consequences for Mr. Bocanegra. On remand, therefore, the court must reconsider its attorney fee award in light of this decision.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"40 Wn. App. 450, 458","parenthetical":"court vacated attorney fee award on basis of changes in parties' financial circumstances after entry of award","sentence":"See Ovens v. Ovens, 61 Wn.2d 6, 11, 376 P.2d 839 (1962) (court evaluated former spouse's need in light of amount of underlying judgment); see also In re Marriage of Mason, 40 Wn. App. 450, 458, 698 P.2d 1104 (court vacated attorney fee award on basis of changes in parties' financial circumstances after entry of award), review denied, 104 Wn.2d 1017 (1985)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"court evaluated former spouse's need in light of amount of underlying judgment","sentence":"See Ovens v. Ovens, 61 Wn.2d 6, 11, 376 P.2d 839 (1962) (court evaluated former spouse's need in light of amount of underlying judgment); see also In re Marriage of Mason, 40 Wn. App. 450, 458, 698 P.2d 1104 (court vacated attorney fee award on basis of changes in parties' financial circumstances after entry of award), review denied, 104 Wn.2d 1017 (1985)."},"case_id":1754149,"label":"b"}
{"context":"However, our decision here will result in a substantial award to Mrs. Bocanegra, with opposite financial consequences for Mr. Bocanegra. On remand, therefore, the court must reconsider its attorney fee award in light of this decision.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"court vacated attorney fee award on basis of changes in parties' financial circumstances after entry of award","sentence":"See Ovens v. Ovens, 61 Wn.2d 6, 11, 376 P.2d 839 (1962) (court evaluated former spouse's need in light of amount of underlying judgment); see also In re Marriage of Mason, 40 Wn. App. 450, 458, 698 P.2d 1104 (court vacated attorney fee award on basis of changes in parties' financial circumstances after entry of award), review denied, 104 Wn.2d 1017 (1985)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"court evaluated former spouse's need in light of amount of underlying judgment","sentence":"See Ovens v. Ovens, 61 Wn.2d 6, 11, 376 P.2d 839 (1962) (court evaluated former spouse's need in light of amount of underlying judgment); see also In re Marriage of Mason, 40 Wn. App. 450, 458, 698 P.2d 1104 (court vacated attorney fee award on basis of changes in parties' financial circumstances after entry of award), review denied, 104 Wn.2d 1017 (1985)."},"case_id":1754149,"label":"b"}
{"context":"However, our decision here will result in a substantial award to Mrs. Bocanegra, with opposite financial consequences for Mr. Bocanegra. On remand, therefore, the court must reconsider its attorney fee award in light of this decision.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"court vacated attorney fee award on basis of changes in parties' financial circumstances after entry of award","sentence":"See Ovens v. Ovens, 61 Wn.2d 6, 11, 376 P.2d 839 (1962) (court evaluated former spouse's need in light of amount of underlying judgment); see also In re Marriage of Mason, 40 Wn. App. 450, 458, 698 P.2d 1104 (court vacated attorney fee award on basis of changes in parties' financial circumstances after entry of award), review denied, 104 Wn.2d 1017 (1985)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"court evaluated former spouse's need in light of amount of underlying judgment","sentence":"See Ovens v. Ovens, 61 Wn.2d 6, 11, 376 P.2d 839 (1962) (court evaluated former spouse's need in light of amount of underlying judgment); see also In re Marriage of Mason, 40 Wn. App. 450, 458, 698 P.2d 1104 (court vacated attorney fee award on basis of changes in parties' financial circumstances after entry of award), review denied, 104 Wn.2d 1017 (1985)."},"case_id":1754149,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Nguyen v. Med. Quality Assur. However, the full protections enjoyed by criminal defendants are not necessarily available in such quasi-criminal proceedings.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"144 Wn.2d 527, 527-28","parenthetical":"holding that clear and convincing evidence, rather than proof beyond a reasonable doubt, is required to impose sanctions in disciplinary proceedings","sentence":"See Nguyen, 144 Wn.2d at 527-28 (holding that clear and convincing evidence, rather than proof beyond a reasonable doubt, is required to impose sanctions in disciplinary proceedings); cf. Rowe v. Dep\u2019t of Licensing, 88 Wn. App. 781, 784-85, 946 P.2d 1196 (1997) (holding that suspension of a driver\u2019s license for conduct already sanctioned in a criminal case did not violate defendant\u2019s constitutional rights against double jeopardy because it served a remedial purpose beyond the criminal penalties)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"88 Wn. App. 781, 784-85","parenthetical":"holding that suspension of a driver's license for conduct already sanctioned in a criminal case did not violate defendant's constitutional rights against double jeopardy because it served a remedial purpose beyond the criminal penalties","sentence":"See Nguyen, 144 Wn.2d at 527-28 (holding that clear and convincing evidence, rather than proof beyond a reasonable doubt, is required to impose sanctions in disciplinary proceedings); cf. Rowe v. Dep\u2019t of Licensing, 88 Wn. App. 781, 784-85, 946 P.2d 1196 (1997) (holding that suspension of a driver\u2019s license for conduct already sanctioned in a criminal case did not violate defendant\u2019s constitutional rights against double jeopardy because it served a remedial purpose beyond the criminal penalties)."},"case_id":12461595,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Nguyen v. Med. Quality Assur. However, the full protections enjoyed by criminal defendants are not necessarily available in such quasi-criminal proceedings.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"144 Wn.2d 527, 527-28","parenthetical":"holding that clear and convincing evidence, rather than proof beyond a reasonable doubt, is required to impose sanctions in disciplinary proceedings","sentence":"See Nguyen, 144 Wn.2d at 527-28 (holding that clear and convincing evidence, rather than proof beyond a reasonable doubt, is required to impose sanctions in disciplinary proceedings); cf. Rowe v. Dep\u2019t of Licensing, 88 Wn. App. 781, 784-85, 946 P.2d 1196 (1997) (holding that suspension of a driver\u2019s license for conduct already sanctioned in a criminal case did not violate defendant\u2019s constitutional rights against double jeopardy because it served a remedial purpose beyond the criminal penalties)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that suspension of a driver's license for conduct already sanctioned in a criminal case did not violate defendant's constitutional rights against double jeopardy because it served a remedial purpose beyond the criminal penalties","sentence":"See Nguyen, 144 Wn.2d at 527-28 (holding that clear and convincing evidence, rather than proof beyond a reasonable doubt, is required to impose sanctions in disciplinary proceedings); cf. Rowe v. Dep\u2019t of Licensing, 88 Wn. App. 781, 784-85, 946 P.2d 1196 (1997) (holding that suspension of a driver\u2019s license for conduct already sanctioned in a criminal case did not violate defendant\u2019s constitutional rights against double jeopardy because it served a remedial purpose beyond the criminal penalties)."},"case_id":12461595,"label":"a"}
{"context":"{P 33} Moreover, prospective application of R.C. 2929.191 does not implicate double-jeopardy concerns arising from the imposition of multiple punishments for the same offense at successive proceedings. On or after the effective date of R.C. 2929.191, an offender can have no legitimate expectation of finality in a sentence rendered defective by the trial court's failure to properly impose a mandatory term of postrelease control, because an offender is charged with knowledge of the fact that his sentence is legally incomplete and that R.C. 2929.191 provides a statutory mechanism to correct it.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"in which Justice Scalia, in dissent, explained that a defendant cannot argue that his legitimate expectation of finality has been violated when he is charged with knowledge that the court lacked statutory authority to impose the sentence in the first instance","sentence":"See State v. Simpkins, 117 Ohio St.3d 420, 2008-Ohio-1197, 884 N.E.2d 568, \u00b6 36, citing Jones v. Thomas (1989), 491 U.S. 376, 395, 109 S.Ct. 2522, 105 L.Ed.2d 322 (in which Justice Scalia, in dissent, explained that a defendant cannot argue that his legitimate expectation of finality has been violated when he is charged with knowledge that the court lacked statutory authority to impose the sentence in the first instance); see also United States v. Husein (C.A.6, 2007), 478 F.3d 318, 338, quoting United States v. Fogel (C.A.D.C., 1987), 829 F.2d 77, 87 (\u201c \u2018A defendant has a legitimate expectation in the finality of a sentence unless he is or should be aware at sentencing that the sentence may permissibly be increased \u2019 \u201d [emphasis added in Husein])."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"478 F.3d 318, 338","parenthetical":"\" 'A defendant has a legitimate expectation in the finality of a sentence unless he is or should be aware at sentencing that the sentence may permissibly be increased ' \" [emphasis added in Husein]","sentence":"See State v. Simpkins, 117 Ohio St.3d 420, 2008-Ohio-1197, 884 N.E.2d 568, \u00b6 36, citing Jones v. Thomas (1989), 491 U.S. 376, 395, 109 S.Ct. 2522, 105 L.Ed.2d 322 (in which Justice Scalia, in dissent, explained that a defendant cannot argue that his legitimate expectation of finality has been violated when he is charged with knowledge that the court lacked statutory authority to impose the sentence in the first instance); see also United States v. Husein (C.A.6, 2007), 478 F.3d 318, 338, quoting United States v. Fogel (C.A.D.C., 1987), 829 F.2d 77, 87 (\u201c \u2018A defendant has a legitimate expectation in the finality of a sentence unless he is or should be aware at sentencing that the sentence may permissibly be increased \u2019 \u201d [emphasis added in Husein])."},"case_id":4094716,"label":"a"}
{"context":"{P 33} Moreover, prospective application of R.C. 2929.191 does not implicate double-jeopardy concerns arising from the imposition of multiple punishments for the same offense at successive proceedings. On or after the effective date of R.C. 2929.191, an offender can have no legitimate expectation of finality in a sentence rendered defective by the trial court's failure to properly impose a mandatory term of postrelease control, because an offender is charged with knowledge of the fact that his sentence is legally incomplete and that R.C. 2929.191 provides a statutory mechanism to correct it.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"829 F.2d 77, 87","parenthetical":"\" 'A defendant has a legitimate expectation in the finality of a sentence unless he is or should be aware at sentencing that the sentence may permissibly be increased ' \" [emphasis added in Husein]","sentence":"See State v. Simpkins, 117 Ohio St.3d 420, 2008-Ohio-1197, 884 N.E.2d 568, \u00b6 36, citing Jones v. Thomas (1989), 491 U.S. 376, 395, 109 S.Ct. 2522, 105 L.Ed.2d 322 (in which Justice Scalia, in dissent, explained that a defendant cannot argue that his legitimate expectation of finality has been violated when he is charged with knowledge that the court lacked statutory authority to impose the sentence in the first instance); see also United States v. Husein (C.A.6, 2007), 478 F.3d 318, 338, quoting United States v. Fogel (C.A.D.C., 1987), 829 F.2d 77, 87 (\u201c \u2018A defendant has a legitimate expectation in the finality of a sentence unless he is or should be aware at sentencing that the sentence may permissibly be increased \u2019 \u201d [emphasis added in Husein])."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"in which Justice Scalia, in dissent, explained that a defendant cannot argue that his legitimate expectation of finality has been violated when he is charged with knowledge that the court lacked statutory authority to impose the sentence in the first instance","sentence":"See State v. Simpkins, 117 Ohio St.3d 420, 2008-Ohio-1197, 884 N.E.2d 568, \u00b6 36, citing Jones v. Thomas (1989), 491 U.S. 376, 395, 109 S.Ct. 2522, 105 L.Ed.2d 322 (in which Justice Scalia, in dissent, explained that a defendant cannot argue that his legitimate expectation of finality has been violated when he is charged with knowledge that the court lacked statutory authority to impose the sentence in the first instance); see also United States v. Husein (C.A.6, 2007), 478 F.3d 318, 338, quoting United States v. Fogel (C.A.D.C., 1987), 829 F.2d 77, 87 (\u201c \u2018A defendant has a legitimate expectation in the finality of a sentence unless he is or should be aware at sentencing that the sentence may permissibly be increased \u2019 \u201d [emphasis added in Husein])."},"case_id":4094716,"label":"b"}
{"context":"{P 33} Moreover, prospective application of R.C. 2929.191 does not implicate double-jeopardy concerns arising from the imposition of multiple punishments for the same offense at successive proceedings. On or after the effective date of R.C. 2929.191, an offender can have no legitimate expectation of finality in a sentence rendered defective by the trial court's failure to properly impose a mandatory term of postrelease control, because an offender is charged with knowledge of the fact that his sentence is legally incomplete and that R.C. 2929.191 provides a statutory mechanism to correct it.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"in which Justice Scalia, in dissent, explained that a defendant cannot argue that his legitimate expectation of finality has been violated when he is charged with knowledge that the court lacked statutory authority to impose the sentence in the first instance","sentence":"See State v. Simpkins, 117 Ohio St.3d 420, 2008-Ohio-1197, 884 N.E.2d 568, \u00b6 36, citing Jones v. Thomas (1989), 491 U.S. 376, 395, 109 S.Ct. 2522, 105 L.Ed.2d 322 (in which Justice Scalia, in dissent, explained that a defendant cannot argue that his legitimate expectation of finality has been violated when he is charged with knowledge that the court lacked statutory authority to impose the sentence in the first instance); see also United States v. Husein (C.A.6, 2007), 478 F.3d 318, 338, quoting United States v. Fogel (C.A.D.C., 1987), 829 F.2d 77, 87 (\u201c \u2018A defendant has a legitimate expectation in the finality of a sentence unless he is or should be aware at sentencing that the sentence may permissibly be increased \u2019 \u201d [emphasis added in Husein])."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"478 F.3d 318, 338","parenthetical":"\" 'A defendant has a legitimate expectation in the finality of a sentence unless he is or should be aware at sentencing that the sentence may permissibly be increased ' \" [emphasis added in Husein]","sentence":"See State v. Simpkins, 117 Ohio St.3d 420, 2008-Ohio-1197, 884 N.E.2d 568, \u00b6 36, citing Jones v. Thomas (1989), 491 U.S. 376, 395, 109 S.Ct. 2522, 105 L.Ed.2d 322 (in which Justice Scalia, in dissent, explained that a defendant cannot argue that his legitimate expectation of finality has been violated when he is charged with knowledge that the court lacked statutory authority to impose the sentence in the first instance); see also United States v. Husein (C.A.6, 2007), 478 F.3d 318, 338, quoting United States v. Fogel (C.A.D.C., 1987), 829 F.2d 77, 87 (\u201c \u2018A defendant has a legitimate expectation in the finality of a sentence unless he is or should be aware at sentencing that the sentence may permissibly be increased \u2019 \u201d [emphasis added in Husein])."},"case_id":4094716,"label":"a"}
{"context":"{P 33} Moreover, prospective application of R.C. 2929.191 does not implicate double-jeopardy concerns arising from the imposition of multiple punishments for the same offense at successive proceedings. On or after the effective date of R.C. 2929.191, an offender can have no legitimate expectation of finality in a sentence rendered defective by the trial court's failure to properly impose a mandatory term of postrelease control, because an offender is charged with knowledge of the fact that his sentence is legally incomplete and that R.C. 2929.191 provides a statutory mechanism to correct it.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"829 F.2d 77, 87","parenthetical":"\" 'A defendant has a legitimate expectation in the finality of a sentence unless he is or should be aware at sentencing that the sentence may permissibly be increased ' \" [emphasis added in Husein]","sentence":"See State v. Simpkins, 117 Ohio St.3d 420, 2008-Ohio-1197, 884 N.E.2d 568, \u00b6 36, citing Jones v. Thomas (1989), 491 U.S. 376, 395, 109 S.Ct. 2522, 105 L.Ed.2d 322 (in which Justice Scalia, in dissent, explained that a defendant cannot argue that his legitimate expectation of finality has been violated when he is charged with knowledge that the court lacked statutory authority to impose the sentence in the first instance); see also United States v. Husein (C.A.6, 2007), 478 F.3d 318, 338, quoting United States v. Fogel (C.A.D.C., 1987), 829 F.2d 77, 87 (\u201c \u2018A defendant has a legitimate expectation in the finality of a sentence unless he is or should be aware at sentencing that the sentence may permissibly be increased \u2019 \u201d [emphasis added in Husein])."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"in which Justice Scalia, in dissent, explained that a defendant cannot argue that his legitimate expectation of finality has been violated when he is charged with knowledge that the court lacked statutory authority to impose the sentence in the first instance","sentence":"See State v. Simpkins, 117 Ohio St.3d 420, 2008-Ohio-1197, 884 N.E.2d 568, \u00b6 36, citing Jones v. Thomas (1989), 491 U.S. 376, 395, 109 S.Ct. 2522, 105 L.Ed.2d 322 (in which Justice Scalia, in dissent, explained that a defendant cannot argue that his legitimate expectation of finality has been violated when he is charged with knowledge that the court lacked statutory authority to impose the sentence in the first instance); see also United States v. Husein (C.A.6, 2007), 478 F.3d 318, 338, quoting United States v. Fogel (C.A.D.C., 1987), 829 F.2d 77, 87 (\u201c \u2018A defendant has a legitimate expectation in the finality of a sentence unless he is or should be aware at sentencing that the sentence may permissibly be increased \u2019 \u201d [emphasis added in Husein])."},"case_id":4094716,"label":"b"}
{"context":"{P 33} Moreover, prospective application of R.C. 2929.191 does not implicate double-jeopardy concerns arising from the imposition of multiple punishments for the same offense at successive proceedings. On or after the effective date of R.C. 2929.191, an offender can have no legitimate expectation of finality in a sentence rendered defective by the trial court's failure to properly impose a mandatory term of postrelease control, because an offender is charged with knowledge of the fact that his sentence is legally incomplete and that R.C. 2929.191 provides a statutory mechanism to correct it.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"884 N.E.2d 568, \u00b6 36","parenthetical":"in which Justice Scalia, in dissent, explained that a defendant cannot argue that his legitimate expectation of finality has been violated when he is charged with knowledge that the court lacked statutory authority to impose the sentence in the first instance","sentence":"See State v. Simpkins, 117 Ohio St.3d 420, 2008-Ohio-1197, 884 N.E.2d 568, \u00b6 36, citing Jones v. Thomas (1989), 491 U.S. 376, 395, 109 S.Ct. 2522, 105 L.Ed.2d 322 (in which Justice Scalia, in dissent, explained that a defendant cannot argue that his legitimate expectation of finality has been violated when he is charged with knowledge that the court lacked statutory authority to impose the sentence in the first instance); see also United States v. Husein (C.A.6, 2007), 478 F.3d 318, 338, quoting United States v. Fogel (C.A.D.C., 1987), 829 F.2d 77, 87 (\u201c \u2018A defendant has a legitimate expectation in the finality of a sentence unless he is or should be aware at sentencing that the sentence may permissibly be increased \u2019 \u201d [emphasis added in Husein])."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"478 F.3d 318, 338","parenthetical":"\" 'A defendant has a legitimate expectation in the finality of a sentence unless he is or should be aware at sentencing that the sentence may permissibly be increased ' \" [emphasis added in Husein]","sentence":"See State v. Simpkins, 117 Ohio St.3d 420, 2008-Ohio-1197, 884 N.E.2d 568, \u00b6 36, citing Jones v. Thomas (1989), 491 U.S. 376, 395, 109 S.Ct. 2522, 105 L.Ed.2d 322 (in which Justice Scalia, in dissent, explained that a defendant cannot argue that his legitimate expectation of finality has been violated when he is charged with knowledge that the court lacked statutory authority to impose the sentence in the first instance); see also United States v. Husein (C.A.6, 2007), 478 F.3d 318, 338, quoting United States v. Fogel (C.A.D.C., 1987), 829 F.2d 77, 87 (\u201c \u2018A defendant has a legitimate expectation in the finality of a sentence unless he is or should be aware at sentencing that the sentence may permissibly be increased \u2019 \u201d [emphasis added in Husein])."},"case_id":4094716,"label":"a"}
{"context":"{P 33} Moreover, prospective application of R.C. 2929.191 does not implicate double-jeopardy concerns arising from the imposition of multiple punishments for the same offense at successive proceedings. On or after the effective date of R.C. 2929.191, an offender can have no legitimate expectation of finality in a sentence rendered defective by the trial court's failure to properly impose a mandatory term of postrelease control, because an offender is charged with knowledge of the fact that his sentence is legally incomplete and that R.C. 2929.191 provides a statutory mechanism to correct it.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"829 F.2d 77, 87","parenthetical":"\" 'A defendant has a legitimate expectation in the finality of a sentence unless he is or should be aware at sentencing that the sentence may permissibly be increased ' \" [emphasis added in Husein]","sentence":"See State v. Simpkins, 117 Ohio St.3d 420, 2008-Ohio-1197, 884 N.E.2d 568, \u00b6 36, citing Jones v. Thomas (1989), 491 U.S. 376, 395, 109 S.Ct. 2522, 105 L.Ed.2d 322 (in which Justice Scalia, in dissent, explained that a defendant cannot argue that his legitimate expectation of finality has been violated when he is charged with knowledge that the court lacked statutory authority to impose the sentence in the first instance); see also United States v. Husein (C.A.6, 2007), 478 F.3d 318, 338, quoting United States v. Fogel (C.A.D.C., 1987), 829 F.2d 77, 87 (\u201c \u2018A defendant has a legitimate expectation in the finality of a sentence unless he is or should be aware at sentencing that the sentence may permissibly be increased \u2019 \u201d [emphasis added in Husein])."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"884 N.E.2d 568, \u00b6 36","parenthetical":"in which Justice Scalia, in dissent, explained that a defendant cannot argue that his legitimate expectation of finality has been violated when he is charged with knowledge that the court lacked statutory authority to impose the sentence in the first instance","sentence":"See State v. Simpkins, 117 Ohio St.3d 420, 2008-Ohio-1197, 884 N.E.2d 568, \u00b6 36, citing Jones v. Thomas (1989), 491 U.S. 376, 395, 109 S.Ct. 2522, 105 L.Ed.2d 322 (in which Justice Scalia, in dissent, explained that a defendant cannot argue that his legitimate expectation of finality has been violated when he is charged with knowledge that the court lacked statutory authority to impose the sentence in the first instance); see also United States v. Husein (C.A.6, 2007), 478 F.3d 318, 338, quoting United States v. Fogel (C.A.D.C., 1987), 829 F.2d 77, 87 (\u201c \u2018A defendant has a legitimate expectation in the finality of a sentence unless he is or should be aware at sentencing that the sentence may permissibly be increased \u2019 \u201d [emphasis added in Husein])."},"case_id":4094716,"label":"b"}
{"context":"{P 33} Moreover, prospective application of R.C. 2929.191 does not implicate double-jeopardy concerns arising from the imposition of multiple punishments for the same offense at successive proceedings. On or after the effective date of R.C. 2929.191, an offender can have no legitimate expectation of finality in a sentence rendered defective by the trial court's failure to properly impose a mandatory term of postrelease control, because an offender is charged with knowledge of the fact that his sentence is legally incomplete and that R.C. 2929.191 provides a statutory mechanism to correct it.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"491 U.S. 376, 395","parenthetical":"in which Justice Scalia, in dissent, explained that a defendant cannot argue that his legitimate expectation of finality has been violated when he is charged with knowledge that the court lacked statutory authority to impose the sentence in the first instance","sentence":"See State v. Simpkins, 117 Ohio St.3d 420, 2008-Ohio-1197, 884 N.E.2d 568, \u00b6 36, citing Jones v. Thomas (1989), 491 U.S. 376, 395, 109 S.Ct. 2522, 105 L.Ed.2d 322 (in which Justice Scalia, in dissent, explained that a defendant cannot argue that his legitimate expectation of finality has been violated when he is charged with knowledge that the court lacked statutory authority to impose the sentence in the first instance); see also United States v. Husein (C.A.6, 2007), 478 F.3d 318, 338, quoting United States v. Fogel (C.A.D.C., 1987), 829 F.2d 77, 87 (\u201c \u2018A defendant has a legitimate expectation in the finality of a sentence unless he is or should be aware at sentencing that the sentence may permissibly be increased \u2019 \u201d [emphasis added in Husein])."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"478 F.3d 318, 338","parenthetical":"\" 'A defendant has a legitimate expectation in the finality of a sentence unless he is or should be aware at sentencing that the sentence may permissibly be increased ' \" [emphasis added in Husein]","sentence":"See State v. Simpkins, 117 Ohio St.3d 420, 2008-Ohio-1197, 884 N.E.2d 568, \u00b6 36, citing Jones v. Thomas (1989), 491 U.S. 376, 395, 109 S.Ct. 2522, 105 L.Ed.2d 322 (in which Justice Scalia, in dissent, explained that a defendant cannot argue that his legitimate expectation of finality has been violated when he is charged with knowledge that the court lacked statutory authority to impose the sentence in the first instance); see also United States v. Husein (C.A.6, 2007), 478 F.3d 318, 338, quoting United States v. Fogel (C.A.D.C., 1987), 829 F.2d 77, 87 (\u201c \u2018A defendant has a legitimate expectation in the finality of a sentence unless he is or should be aware at sentencing that the sentence may permissibly be increased \u2019 \u201d [emphasis added in Husein])."},"case_id":4094716,"label":"a"}
{"context":"{P 33} Moreover, prospective application of R.C. 2929.191 does not implicate double-jeopardy concerns arising from the imposition of multiple punishments for the same offense at successive proceedings. On or after the effective date of R.C. 2929.191, an offender can have no legitimate expectation of finality in a sentence rendered defective by the trial court's failure to properly impose a mandatory term of postrelease control, because an offender is charged with knowledge of the fact that his sentence is legally incomplete and that R.C. 2929.191 provides a statutory mechanism to correct it.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"829 F.2d 77, 87","parenthetical":"\" 'A defendant has a legitimate expectation in the finality of a sentence unless he is or should be aware at sentencing that the sentence may permissibly be increased ' \" [emphasis added in Husein]","sentence":"See State v. Simpkins, 117 Ohio St.3d 420, 2008-Ohio-1197, 884 N.E.2d 568, \u00b6 36, citing Jones v. Thomas (1989), 491 U.S. 376, 395, 109 S.Ct. 2522, 105 L.Ed.2d 322 (in which Justice Scalia, in dissent, explained that a defendant cannot argue that his legitimate expectation of finality has been violated when he is charged with knowledge that the court lacked statutory authority to impose the sentence in the first instance); see also United States v. Husein (C.A.6, 2007), 478 F.3d 318, 338, quoting United States v. Fogel (C.A.D.C., 1987), 829 F.2d 77, 87 (\u201c \u2018A defendant has a legitimate expectation in the finality of a sentence unless he is or should be aware at sentencing that the sentence may permissibly be increased \u2019 \u201d [emphasis added in Husein])."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"491 U.S. 376, 395","parenthetical":"in which Justice Scalia, in dissent, explained that a defendant cannot argue that his legitimate expectation of finality has been violated when he is charged with knowledge that the court lacked statutory authority to impose the sentence in the first instance","sentence":"See State v. Simpkins, 117 Ohio St.3d 420, 2008-Ohio-1197, 884 N.E.2d 568, \u00b6 36, citing Jones v. Thomas (1989), 491 U.S. 376, 395, 109 S.Ct. 2522, 105 L.Ed.2d 322 (in which Justice Scalia, in dissent, explained that a defendant cannot argue that his legitimate expectation of finality has been violated when he is charged with knowledge that the court lacked statutory authority to impose the sentence in the first instance); see also United States v. Husein (C.A.6, 2007), 478 F.3d 318, 338, quoting United States v. Fogel (C.A.D.C., 1987), 829 F.2d 77, 87 (\u201c \u2018A defendant has a legitimate expectation in the finality of a sentence unless he is or should be aware at sentencing that the sentence may permissibly be increased \u2019 \u201d [emphasis added in Husein])."},"case_id":4094716,"label":"b"}
{"context":"{P 33} Moreover, prospective application of R.C. 2929.191 does not implicate double-jeopardy concerns arising from the imposition of multiple punishments for the same offense at successive proceedings. On or after the effective date of R.C. 2929.191, an offender can have no legitimate expectation of finality in a sentence rendered defective by the trial court's failure to properly impose a mandatory term of postrelease control, because an offender is charged with knowledge of the fact that his sentence is legally incomplete and that R.C. 2929.191 provides a statutory mechanism to correct it.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"478 F.3d 318, 338","parenthetical":"\" 'A defendant has a legitimate expectation in the finality of a sentence unless he is or should be aware at sentencing that the sentence may permissibly be increased ' \" [emphasis added in Husein]","sentence":"See State v. Simpkins, 117 Ohio St.3d 420, 2008-Ohio-1197, 884 N.E.2d 568, \u00b6 36, citing Jones v. Thomas (1989), 491 U.S. 376, 395, 109 S.Ct. 2522, 105 L.Ed.2d 322 (in which Justice Scalia, in dissent, explained that a defendant cannot argue that his legitimate expectation of finality has been violated when he is charged with knowledge that the court lacked statutory authority to impose the sentence in the first instance); see also United States v. Husein (C.A.6, 2007), 478 F.3d 318, 338, quoting United States v. Fogel (C.A.D.C., 1987), 829 F.2d 77, 87 (\u201c \u2018A defendant has a legitimate expectation in the finality of a sentence unless he is or should be aware at sentencing that the sentence may permissibly be increased \u2019 \u201d [emphasis added in Husein])."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"in which Justice Scalia, in dissent, explained that a defendant cannot argue that his legitimate expectation of finality has been violated when he is charged with knowledge that the court lacked statutory authority to impose the sentence in the first instance","sentence":"See State v. Simpkins, 117 Ohio St.3d 420, 2008-Ohio-1197, 884 N.E.2d 568, \u00b6 36, citing Jones v. Thomas (1989), 491 U.S. 376, 395, 109 S.Ct. 2522, 105 L.Ed.2d 322 (in which Justice Scalia, in dissent, explained that a defendant cannot argue that his legitimate expectation of finality has been violated when he is charged with knowledge that the court lacked statutory authority to impose the sentence in the first instance); see also United States v. Husein (C.A.6, 2007), 478 F.3d 318, 338, quoting United States v. Fogel (C.A.D.C., 1987), 829 F.2d 77, 87 (\u201c \u2018A defendant has a legitimate expectation in the finality of a sentence unless he is or should be aware at sentencing that the sentence may permissibly be increased \u2019 \u201d [emphasis added in Husein])."},"case_id":4094716,"label":"b"}
{"context":"{P 33} Moreover, prospective application of R.C. 2929.191 does not implicate double-jeopardy concerns arising from the imposition of multiple punishments for the same offense at successive proceedings. On or after the effective date of R.C. 2929.191, an offender can have no legitimate expectation of finality in a sentence rendered defective by the trial court's failure to properly impose a mandatory term of postrelease control, because an offender is charged with knowledge of the fact that his sentence is legally incomplete and that R.C. 2929.191 provides a statutory mechanism to correct it.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"in which Justice Scalia, in dissent, explained that a defendant cannot argue that his legitimate expectation of finality has been violated when he is charged with knowledge that the court lacked statutory authority to impose the sentence in the first instance","sentence":"See State v. Simpkins, 117 Ohio St.3d 420, 2008-Ohio-1197, 884 N.E.2d 568, \u00b6 36, citing Jones v. Thomas (1989), 491 U.S. 376, 395, 109 S.Ct. 2522, 105 L.Ed.2d 322 (in which Justice Scalia, in dissent, explained that a defendant cannot argue that his legitimate expectation of finality has been violated when he is charged with knowledge that the court lacked statutory authority to impose the sentence in the first instance); see also United States v. Husein (C.A.6, 2007), 478 F.3d 318, 338, quoting United States v. Fogel (C.A.D.C., 1987), 829 F.2d 77, 87 (\u201c \u2018A defendant has a legitimate expectation in the finality of a sentence unless he is or should be aware at sentencing that the sentence may permissibly be increased \u2019 \u201d [emphasis added in Husein])."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"829 F.2d 77, 87","parenthetical":"\" 'A defendant has a legitimate expectation in the finality of a sentence unless he is or should be aware at sentencing that the sentence may permissibly be increased ' \" [emphasis added in Husein]","sentence":"See State v. Simpkins, 117 Ohio St.3d 420, 2008-Ohio-1197, 884 N.E.2d 568, \u00b6 36, citing Jones v. Thomas (1989), 491 U.S. 376, 395, 109 S.Ct. 2522, 105 L.Ed.2d 322 (in which Justice Scalia, in dissent, explained that a defendant cannot argue that his legitimate expectation of finality has been violated when he is charged with knowledge that the court lacked statutory authority to impose the sentence in the first instance); see also United States v. Husein (C.A.6, 2007), 478 F.3d 318, 338, quoting United States v. Fogel (C.A.D.C., 1987), 829 F.2d 77, 87 (\u201c \u2018A defendant has a legitimate expectation in the finality of a sentence unless he is or should be aware at sentencing that the sentence may permissibly be increased \u2019 \u201d [emphasis added in Husein])."},"case_id":4094716,"label":"a"}
{"context":"{P 33} Moreover, prospective application of R.C. 2929.191 does not implicate double-jeopardy concerns arising from the imposition of multiple punishments for the same offense at successive proceedings. On or after the effective date of R.C. 2929.191, an offender can have no legitimate expectation of finality in a sentence rendered defective by the trial court's failure to properly impose a mandatory term of postrelease control, because an offender is charged with knowledge of the fact that his sentence is legally incomplete and that R.C. 2929.191 provides a statutory mechanism to correct it.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"in which Justice Scalia, in dissent, explained that a defendant cannot argue that his legitimate expectation of finality has been violated when he is charged with knowledge that the court lacked statutory authority to impose the sentence in the first instance","sentence":"See State v. Simpkins, 117 Ohio St.3d 420, 2008-Ohio-1197, 884 N.E.2d 568, \u00b6 36, citing Jones v. Thomas (1989), 491 U.S. 376, 395, 109 S.Ct. 2522, 105 L.Ed.2d 322 (in which Justice Scalia, in dissent, explained that a defendant cannot argue that his legitimate expectation of finality has been violated when he is charged with knowledge that the court lacked statutory authority to impose the sentence in the first instance); see also United States v. Husein (C.A.6, 2007), 478 F.3d 318, 338, quoting United States v. Fogel (C.A.D.C., 1987), 829 F.2d 77, 87 (\u201c \u2018A defendant has a legitimate expectation in the finality of a sentence unless he is or should be aware at sentencing that the sentence may permissibly be increased \u2019 \u201d [emphasis added in Husein])."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"478 F.3d 318, 338","parenthetical":"\" 'A defendant has a legitimate expectation in the finality of a sentence unless he is or should be aware at sentencing that the sentence may permissibly be increased ' \" [emphasis added in Husein]","sentence":"See State v. Simpkins, 117 Ohio St.3d 420, 2008-Ohio-1197, 884 N.E.2d 568, \u00b6 36, citing Jones v. Thomas (1989), 491 U.S. 376, 395, 109 S.Ct. 2522, 105 L.Ed.2d 322 (in which Justice Scalia, in dissent, explained that a defendant cannot argue that his legitimate expectation of finality has been violated when he is charged with knowledge that the court lacked statutory authority to impose the sentence in the first instance); see also United States v. Husein (C.A.6, 2007), 478 F.3d 318, 338, quoting United States v. Fogel (C.A.D.C., 1987), 829 F.2d 77, 87 (\u201c \u2018A defendant has a legitimate expectation in the finality of a sentence unless he is or should be aware at sentencing that the sentence may permissibly be increased \u2019 \u201d [emphasis added in Husein])."},"case_id":4094716,"label":"a"}
{"context":"{P 33} Moreover, prospective application of R.C. 2929.191 does not implicate double-jeopardy concerns arising from the imposition of multiple punishments for the same offense at successive proceedings. On or after the effective date of R.C. 2929.191, an offender can have no legitimate expectation of finality in a sentence rendered defective by the trial court's failure to properly impose a mandatory term of postrelease control, because an offender is charged with knowledge of the fact that his sentence is legally incomplete and that R.C. 2929.191 provides a statutory mechanism to correct it.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"in which Justice Scalia, in dissent, explained that a defendant cannot argue that his legitimate expectation of finality has been violated when he is charged with knowledge that the court lacked statutory authority to impose the sentence in the first instance","sentence":"See State v. Simpkins, 117 Ohio St.3d 420, 2008-Ohio-1197, 884 N.E.2d 568, \u00b6 36, citing Jones v. Thomas (1989), 491 U.S. 376, 395, 109 S.Ct. 2522, 105 L.Ed.2d 322 (in which Justice Scalia, in dissent, explained that a defendant cannot argue that his legitimate expectation of finality has been violated when he is charged with knowledge that the court lacked statutory authority to impose the sentence in the first instance); see also United States v. Husein (C.A.6, 2007), 478 F.3d 318, 338, quoting United States v. Fogel (C.A.D.C., 1987), 829 F.2d 77, 87 (\u201c \u2018A defendant has a legitimate expectation in the finality of a sentence unless he is or should be aware at sentencing that the sentence may permissibly be increased \u2019 \u201d [emphasis added in Husein])."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"829 F.2d 77, 87","parenthetical":"\" 'A defendant has a legitimate expectation in the finality of a sentence unless he is or should be aware at sentencing that the sentence may permissibly be increased ' \" [emphasis added in Husein]","sentence":"See State v. Simpkins, 117 Ohio St.3d 420, 2008-Ohio-1197, 884 N.E.2d 568, \u00b6 36, citing Jones v. Thomas (1989), 491 U.S. 376, 395, 109 S.Ct. 2522, 105 L.Ed.2d 322 (in which Justice Scalia, in dissent, explained that a defendant cannot argue that his legitimate expectation of finality has been violated when he is charged with knowledge that the court lacked statutory authority to impose the sentence in the first instance); see also United States v. Husein (C.A.6, 2007), 478 F.3d 318, 338, quoting United States v. Fogel (C.A.D.C., 1987), 829 F.2d 77, 87 (\u201c \u2018A defendant has a legitimate expectation in the finality of a sentence unless he is or should be aware at sentencing that the sentence may permissibly be increased \u2019 \u201d [emphasis added in Husein])."},"case_id":4094716,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The Commission now argues that it discounted Dwyer's testimony because Dwyer was relying on a USWC value study which the Commission found unreliable and expressly refused to consider. However, the record re veals that Dwyer relied on the value study only to determine the percentage of USWCS's activities relating to marketing. Dwyer's testimony that the services rendered by USWCS were not duplicative was not based on the value study, but on his own personal knowledge. Therefore, we conclude that the Commission acted arbitrarily and capriciously in ignoring Dwyer's uneontra-dicted testimony and in concluding that USWC did not meet its burden of proving that the services provided by USWCS were not duplicative.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"The law does not invest the Commission with any such arbitrary power to disbelieve or disregard uncontradicted, competent, credible evidence, as it appears to have done here.\"","sentence":"See Jones v. California Packing Corp., 121 Utah 612, 244 P.2d 640, 644 (1952) (\u201cThe law does not invest the Commission with any such arbitrary power to disbelieve or disregard uncontradicted, competent, credible evidence, as it appears to have done here.\u201d); cf. De Vas v. Noble, 13 Utah 2d 138, 369 P.2d 290, 293 (1962) (arbitrary and unreasoning distortions of justice could occur if courts were permitted to ignore credible and uncontradicted evidence), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 821, 83 S.Ct. 37, 9 L.Ed.2d 61 (1962). Accordingly, we reverse and remand to the Commission to reconsider the reasonableness of USWC\u2019s expenses for marketing services rendered by USWCS. Utah Code Ann. \u00a7 63-46b-16(4)(h)(iv)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"arbitrary and unreasoning distortions of justice could occur if courts were permitted to ignore credible and uncontradicted evidence","sentence":"See Jones v. California Packing Corp., 121 Utah 612, 244 P.2d 640, 644 (1952) (\u201cThe law does not invest the Commission with any such arbitrary power to disbelieve or disregard uncontradicted, competent, credible evidence, as it appears to have done here.\u201d); cf. De Vas v. Noble, 13 Utah 2d 138, 369 P.2d 290, 293 (1962) (arbitrary and unreasoning distortions of justice could occur if courts were permitted to ignore credible and uncontradicted evidence), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 821, 83 S.Ct. 37, 9 L.Ed.2d 61 (1962). Accordingly, we reverse and remand to the Commission to reconsider the reasonableness of USWC\u2019s expenses for marketing services rendered by USWCS. Utah Code Ann. \u00a7 63-46b-16(4)(h)(iv)."},"case_id":10340614,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The Commission now argues that it discounted Dwyer's testimony because Dwyer was relying on a USWC value study which the Commission found unreliable and expressly refused to consider. However, the record re veals that Dwyer relied on the value study only to determine the percentage of USWCS's activities relating to marketing. Dwyer's testimony that the services rendered by USWCS were not duplicative was not based on the value study, but on his own personal knowledge. Therefore, we conclude that the Commission acted arbitrarily and capriciously in ignoring Dwyer's uneontra-dicted testimony and in concluding that USWC did not meet its burden of proving that the services provided by USWCS were not duplicative.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"The law does not invest the Commission with any such arbitrary power to disbelieve or disregard uncontradicted, competent, credible evidence, as it appears to have done here.\"","sentence":"See Jones v. California Packing Corp., 121 Utah 612, 244 P.2d 640, 644 (1952) (\u201cThe law does not invest the Commission with any such arbitrary power to disbelieve or disregard uncontradicted, competent, credible evidence, as it appears to have done here.\u201d); cf. De Vas v. Noble, 13 Utah 2d 138, 369 P.2d 290, 293 (1962) (arbitrary and unreasoning distortions of justice could occur if courts were permitted to ignore credible and uncontradicted evidence), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 821, 83 S.Ct. 37, 9 L.Ed.2d 61 (1962). Accordingly, we reverse and remand to the Commission to reconsider the reasonableness of USWC\u2019s expenses for marketing services rendered by USWCS. Utah Code Ann. \u00a7 63-46b-16(4)(h)(iv)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"369 P.2d 290, 293","parenthetical":"arbitrary and unreasoning distortions of justice could occur if courts were permitted to ignore credible and uncontradicted evidence","sentence":"See Jones v. California Packing Corp., 121 Utah 612, 244 P.2d 640, 644 (1952) (\u201cThe law does not invest the Commission with any such arbitrary power to disbelieve or disregard uncontradicted, competent, credible evidence, as it appears to have done here.\u201d); cf. De Vas v. Noble, 13 Utah 2d 138, 369 P.2d 290, 293 (1962) (arbitrary and unreasoning distortions of justice could occur if courts were permitted to ignore credible and uncontradicted evidence), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 821, 83 S.Ct. 37, 9 L.Ed.2d 61 (1962). Accordingly, we reverse and remand to the Commission to reconsider the reasonableness of USWC\u2019s expenses for marketing services rendered by USWCS. Utah Code Ann. \u00a7 63-46b-16(4)(h)(iv)."},"case_id":10340614,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The Commission now argues that it discounted Dwyer's testimony because Dwyer was relying on a USWC value study which the Commission found unreliable and expressly refused to consider. However, the record re veals that Dwyer relied on the value study only to determine the percentage of USWCS's activities relating to marketing. Dwyer's testimony that the services rendered by USWCS were not duplicative was not based on the value study, but on his own personal knowledge. Therefore, we conclude that the Commission acted arbitrarily and capriciously in ignoring Dwyer's uneontra-dicted testimony and in concluding that USWC did not meet its burden of proving that the services provided by USWCS were not duplicative.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"arbitrary and unreasoning distortions of justice could occur if courts were permitted to ignore credible and uncontradicted evidence","sentence":"See Jones v. California Packing Corp., 121 Utah 612, 244 P.2d 640, 644 (1952) (\u201cThe law does not invest the Commission with any such arbitrary power to disbelieve or disregard uncontradicted, competent, credible evidence, as it appears to have done here.\u201d); cf. De Vas v. Noble, 13 Utah 2d 138, 369 P.2d 290, 293 (1962) (arbitrary and unreasoning distortions of justice could occur if courts were permitted to ignore credible and uncontradicted evidence), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 821, 83 S.Ct. 37, 9 L.Ed.2d 61 (1962). Accordingly, we reverse and remand to the Commission to reconsider the reasonableness of USWC\u2019s expenses for marketing services rendered by USWCS. Utah Code Ann. \u00a7 63-46b-16(4)(h)(iv)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"The law does not invest the Commission with any such arbitrary power to disbelieve or disregard uncontradicted, competent, credible evidence, as it appears to have done here.\"","sentence":"See Jones v. California Packing Corp., 121 Utah 612, 244 P.2d 640, 644 (1952) (\u201cThe law does not invest the Commission with any such arbitrary power to disbelieve or disregard uncontradicted, competent, credible evidence, as it appears to have done here.\u201d); cf. De Vas v. Noble, 13 Utah 2d 138, 369 P.2d 290, 293 (1962) (arbitrary and unreasoning distortions of justice could occur if courts were permitted to ignore credible and uncontradicted evidence), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 821, 83 S.Ct. 37, 9 L.Ed.2d 61 (1962). Accordingly, we reverse and remand to the Commission to reconsider the reasonableness of USWC\u2019s expenses for marketing services rendered by USWCS. Utah Code Ann. \u00a7 63-46b-16(4)(h)(iv)."},"case_id":10340614,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The Commission now argues that it discounted Dwyer's testimony because Dwyer was relying on a USWC value study which the Commission found unreliable and expressly refused to consider. However, the record re veals that Dwyer relied on the value study only to determine the percentage of USWCS's activities relating to marketing. Dwyer's testimony that the services rendered by USWCS were not duplicative was not based on the value study, but on his own personal knowledge. Therefore, we conclude that the Commission acted arbitrarily and capriciously in ignoring Dwyer's uneontra-dicted testimony and in concluding that USWC did not meet its burden of proving that the services provided by USWCS were not duplicative.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"The law does not invest the Commission with any such arbitrary power to disbelieve or disregard uncontradicted, competent, credible evidence, as it appears to have done here.\"","sentence":"See Jones v. California Packing Corp., 121 Utah 612, 244 P.2d 640, 644 (1952) (\u201cThe law does not invest the Commission with any such arbitrary power to disbelieve or disregard uncontradicted, competent, credible evidence, as it appears to have done here.\u201d); cf. De Vas v. Noble, 13 Utah 2d 138, 369 P.2d 290, 293 (1962) (arbitrary and unreasoning distortions of justice could occur if courts were permitted to ignore credible and uncontradicted evidence), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 821, 83 S.Ct. 37, 9 L.Ed.2d 61 (1962). Accordingly, we reverse and remand to the Commission to reconsider the reasonableness of USWC\u2019s expenses for marketing services rendered by USWCS. Utah Code Ann. \u00a7 63-46b-16(4)(h)(iv)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"arbitrary and unreasoning distortions of justice could occur if courts were permitted to ignore credible and uncontradicted evidence","sentence":"See Jones v. California Packing Corp., 121 Utah 612, 244 P.2d 640, 644 (1952) (\u201cThe law does not invest the Commission with any such arbitrary power to disbelieve or disregard uncontradicted, competent, credible evidence, as it appears to have done here.\u201d); cf. De Vas v. Noble, 13 Utah 2d 138, 369 P.2d 290, 293 (1962) (arbitrary and unreasoning distortions of justice could occur if courts were permitted to ignore credible and uncontradicted evidence), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 821, 83 S.Ct. 37, 9 L.Ed.2d 61 (1962). Accordingly, we reverse and remand to the Commission to reconsider the reasonableness of USWC\u2019s expenses for marketing services rendered by USWCS. Utah Code Ann. \u00a7 63-46b-16(4)(h)(iv)."},"case_id":10340614,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The Commission now argues that it discounted Dwyer's testimony because Dwyer was relying on a USWC value study which the Commission found unreliable and expressly refused to consider. However, the record re veals that Dwyer relied on the value study only to determine the percentage of USWCS's activities relating to marketing. Dwyer's testimony that the services rendered by USWCS were not duplicative was not based on the value study, but on his own personal knowledge. Therefore, we conclude that the Commission acted arbitrarily and capriciously in ignoring Dwyer's uneontra-dicted testimony and in concluding that USWC did not meet its burden of proving that the services provided by USWCS were not duplicative.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"The law does not invest the Commission with any such arbitrary power to disbelieve or disregard uncontradicted, competent, credible evidence, as it appears to have done here.\"","sentence":"See Jones v. California Packing Corp., 121 Utah 612, 244 P.2d 640, 644 (1952) (\u201cThe law does not invest the Commission with any such arbitrary power to disbelieve or disregard uncontradicted, competent, credible evidence, as it appears to have done here.\u201d); cf. De Vas v. Noble, 13 Utah 2d 138, 369 P.2d 290, 293 (1962) (arbitrary and unreasoning distortions of justice could occur if courts were permitted to ignore credible and uncontradicted evidence), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 821, 83 S.Ct. 37, 9 L.Ed.2d 61 (1962). Accordingly, we reverse and remand to the Commission to reconsider the reasonableness of USWC\u2019s expenses for marketing services rendered by USWCS. Utah Code Ann. \u00a7 63-46b-16(4)(h)(iv)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"arbitrary and unreasoning distortions of justice could occur if courts were permitted to ignore credible and uncontradicted evidence","sentence":"See Jones v. California Packing Corp., 121 Utah 612, 244 P.2d 640, 644 (1952) (\u201cThe law does not invest the Commission with any such arbitrary power to disbelieve or disregard uncontradicted, competent, credible evidence, as it appears to have done here.\u201d); cf. De Vas v. Noble, 13 Utah 2d 138, 369 P.2d 290, 293 (1962) (arbitrary and unreasoning distortions of justice could occur if courts were permitted to ignore credible and uncontradicted evidence), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 821, 83 S.Ct. 37, 9 L.Ed.2d 61 (1962). Accordingly, we reverse and remand to the Commission to reconsider the reasonableness of USWC\u2019s expenses for marketing services rendered by USWCS. Utah Code Ann. \u00a7 63-46b-16(4)(h)(iv)."},"case_id":10340614,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The Commission now argues that it discounted Dwyer's testimony because Dwyer was relying on a USWC value study which the Commission found unreliable and expressly refused to consider. However, the record re veals that Dwyer relied on the value study only to determine the percentage of USWCS's activities relating to marketing. Dwyer's testimony that the services rendered by USWCS were not duplicative was not based on the value study, but on his own personal knowledge. Therefore, we conclude that the Commission acted arbitrarily and capriciously in ignoring Dwyer's uneontra-dicted testimony and in concluding that USWC did not meet its burden of proving that the services provided by USWCS were not duplicative.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"arbitrary and unreasoning distortions of justice could occur if courts were permitted to ignore credible and uncontradicted evidence","sentence":"See Jones v. California Packing Corp., 121 Utah 612, 244 P.2d 640, 644 (1952) (\u201cThe law does not invest the Commission with any such arbitrary power to disbelieve or disregard uncontradicted, competent, credible evidence, as it appears to have done here.\u201d); cf. De Vas v. Noble, 13 Utah 2d 138, 369 P.2d 290, 293 (1962) (arbitrary and unreasoning distortions of justice could occur if courts were permitted to ignore credible and uncontradicted evidence), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 821, 83 S.Ct. 37, 9 L.Ed.2d 61 (1962). Accordingly, we reverse and remand to the Commission to reconsider the reasonableness of USWC\u2019s expenses for marketing services rendered by USWCS. Utah Code Ann. \u00a7 63-46b-16(4)(h)(iv)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"244 P.2d 640, 644","parenthetical":"\"The law does not invest the Commission with any such arbitrary power to disbelieve or disregard uncontradicted, competent, credible evidence, as it appears to have done here.\"","sentence":"See Jones v. California Packing Corp., 121 Utah 612, 244 P.2d 640, 644 (1952) (\u201cThe law does not invest the Commission with any such arbitrary power to disbelieve or disregard uncontradicted, competent, credible evidence, as it appears to have done here.\u201d); cf. De Vas v. Noble, 13 Utah 2d 138, 369 P.2d 290, 293 (1962) (arbitrary and unreasoning distortions of justice could occur if courts were permitted to ignore credible and uncontradicted evidence), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 821, 83 S.Ct. 37, 9 L.Ed.2d 61 (1962). Accordingly, we reverse and remand to the Commission to reconsider the reasonableness of USWC\u2019s expenses for marketing services rendered by USWCS. Utah Code Ann. \u00a7 63-46b-16(4)(h)(iv)."},"case_id":10340614,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The Commission now argues that it discounted Dwyer's testimony because Dwyer was relying on a USWC value study which the Commission found unreliable and expressly refused to consider. However, the record re veals that Dwyer relied on the value study only to determine the percentage of USWCS's activities relating to marketing. Dwyer's testimony that the services rendered by USWCS were not duplicative was not based on the value study, but on his own personal knowledge. Therefore, we conclude that the Commission acted arbitrarily and capriciously in ignoring Dwyer's uneontra-dicted testimony and in concluding that USWC did not meet its burden of proving that the services provided by USWCS were not duplicative.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"244 P.2d 640, 644","parenthetical":"\"The law does not invest the Commission with any such arbitrary power to disbelieve or disregard uncontradicted, competent, credible evidence, as it appears to have done here.\"","sentence":"See Jones v. California Packing Corp., 121 Utah 612, 244 P.2d 640, 644 (1952) (\u201cThe law does not invest the Commission with any such arbitrary power to disbelieve or disregard uncontradicted, competent, credible evidence, as it appears to have done here.\u201d); cf. De Vas v. Noble, 13 Utah 2d 138, 369 P.2d 290, 293 (1962) (arbitrary and unreasoning distortions of justice could occur if courts were permitted to ignore credible and uncontradicted evidence), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 821, 83 S.Ct. 37, 9 L.Ed.2d 61 (1962). Accordingly, we reverse and remand to the Commission to reconsider the reasonableness of USWC\u2019s expenses for marketing services rendered by USWCS. Utah Code Ann. \u00a7 63-46b-16(4)(h)(iv)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"369 P.2d 290, 293","parenthetical":"arbitrary and unreasoning distortions of justice could occur if courts were permitted to ignore credible and uncontradicted evidence","sentence":"See Jones v. California Packing Corp., 121 Utah 612, 244 P.2d 640, 644 (1952) (\u201cThe law does not invest the Commission with any such arbitrary power to disbelieve or disregard uncontradicted, competent, credible evidence, as it appears to have done here.\u201d); cf. De Vas v. Noble, 13 Utah 2d 138, 369 P.2d 290, 293 (1962) (arbitrary and unreasoning distortions of justice could occur if courts were permitted to ignore credible and uncontradicted evidence), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 821, 83 S.Ct. 37, 9 L.Ed.2d 61 (1962). Accordingly, we reverse and remand to the Commission to reconsider the reasonableness of USWC\u2019s expenses for marketing services rendered by USWCS. Utah Code Ann. \u00a7 63-46b-16(4)(h)(iv)."},"case_id":10340614,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The Commission now argues that it discounted Dwyer's testimony because Dwyer was relying on a USWC value study which the Commission found unreliable and expressly refused to consider. However, the record re veals that Dwyer relied on the value study only to determine the percentage of USWCS's activities relating to marketing. Dwyer's testimony that the services rendered by USWCS were not duplicative was not based on the value study, but on his own personal knowledge. Therefore, we conclude that the Commission acted arbitrarily and capriciously in ignoring Dwyer's uneontra-dicted testimony and in concluding that USWC did not meet its burden of proving that the services provided by USWCS were not duplicative.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"arbitrary and unreasoning distortions of justice could occur if courts were permitted to ignore credible and uncontradicted evidence","sentence":"See Jones v. California Packing Corp., 121 Utah 612, 244 P.2d 640, 644 (1952) (\u201cThe law does not invest the Commission with any such arbitrary power to disbelieve or disregard uncontradicted, competent, credible evidence, as it appears to have done here.\u201d); cf. De Vas v. Noble, 13 Utah 2d 138, 369 P.2d 290, 293 (1962) (arbitrary and unreasoning distortions of justice could occur if courts were permitted to ignore credible and uncontradicted evidence), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 821, 83 S.Ct. 37, 9 L.Ed.2d 61 (1962). Accordingly, we reverse and remand to the Commission to reconsider the reasonableness of USWC\u2019s expenses for marketing services rendered by USWCS. Utah Code Ann. \u00a7 63-46b-16(4)(h)(iv)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"244 P.2d 640, 644","parenthetical":"\"The law does not invest the Commission with any such arbitrary power to disbelieve or disregard uncontradicted, competent, credible evidence, as it appears to have done here.\"","sentence":"See Jones v. California Packing Corp., 121 Utah 612, 244 P.2d 640, 644 (1952) (\u201cThe law does not invest the Commission with any such arbitrary power to disbelieve or disregard uncontradicted, competent, credible evidence, as it appears to have done here.\u201d); cf. De Vas v. Noble, 13 Utah 2d 138, 369 P.2d 290, 293 (1962) (arbitrary and unreasoning distortions of justice could occur if courts were permitted to ignore credible and uncontradicted evidence), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 821, 83 S.Ct. 37, 9 L.Ed.2d 61 (1962). Accordingly, we reverse and remand to the Commission to reconsider the reasonableness of USWC\u2019s expenses for marketing services rendered by USWCS. Utah Code Ann. \u00a7 63-46b-16(4)(h)(iv)."},"case_id":10340614,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The Commission now argues that it discounted Dwyer's testimony because Dwyer was relying on a USWC value study which the Commission found unreliable and expressly refused to consider. However, the record re veals that Dwyer relied on the value study only to determine the percentage of USWCS's activities relating to marketing. Dwyer's testimony that the services rendered by USWCS were not duplicative was not based on the value study, but on his own personal knowledge. Therefore, we conclude that the Commission acted arbitrarily and capriciously in ignoring Dwyer's uneontra-dicted testimony and in concluding that USWC did not meet its burden of proving that the services provided by USWCS were not duplicative.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"arbitrary and unreasoning distortions of justice could occur if courts were permitted to ignore credible and uncontradicted evidence","sentence":"See Jones v. California Packing Corp., 121 Utah 612, 244 P.2d 640, 644 (1952) (\u201cThe law does not invest the Commission with any such arbitrary power to disbelieve or disregard uncontradicted, competent, credible evidence, as it appears to have done here.\u201d); cf. De Vas v. Noble, 13 Utah 2d 138, 369 P.2d 290, 293 (1962) (arbitrary and unreasoning distortions of justice could occur if courts were permitted to ignore credible and uncontradicted evidence), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 821, 83 S.Ct. 37, 9 L.Ed.2d 61 (1962). Accordingly, we reverse and remand to the Commission to reconsider the reasonableness of USWC\u2019s expenses for marketing services rendered by USWCS. Utah Code Ann. \u00a7 63-46b-16(4)(h)(iv)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"244 P.2d 640, 644","parenthetical":"\"The law does not invest the Commission with any such arbitrary power to disbelieve or disregard uncontradicted, competent, credible evidence, as it appears to have done here.\"","sentence":"See Jones v. California Packing Corp., 121 Utah 612, 244 P.2d 640, 644 (1952) (\u201cThe law does not invest the Commission with any such arbitrary power to disbelieve or disregard uncontradicted, competent, credible evidence, as it appears to have done here.\u201d); cf. De Vas v. Noble, 13 Utah 2d 138, 369 P.2d 290, 293 (1962) (arbitrary and unreasoning distortions of justice could occur if courts were permitted to ignore credible and uncontradicted evidence), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 821, 83 S.Ct. 37, 9 L.Ed.2d 61 (1962). Accordingly, we reverse and remand to the Commission to reconsider the reasonableness of USWC\u2019s expenses for marketing services rendered by USWCS. Utah Code Ann. \u00a7 63-46b-16(4)(h)(iv)."},"case_id":10340614,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The Commission now argues that it discounted Dwyer's testimony because Dwyer was relying on a USWC value study which the Commission found unreliable and expressly refused to consider. However, the record re veals that Dwyer relied on the value study only to determine the percentage of USWCS's activities relating to marketing. Dwyer's testimony that the services rendered by USWCS were not duplicative was not based on the value study, but on his own personal knowledge. Therefore, we conclude that the Commission acted arbitrarily and capriciously in ignoring Dwyer's uneontra-dicted testimony and in concluding that USWC did not meet its burden of proving that the services provided by USWCS were not duplicative.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"244 P.2d 640, 644","parenthetical":"\"The law does not invest the Commission with any such arbitrary power to disbelieve or disregard uncontradicted, competent, credible evidence, as it appears to have done here.\"","sentence":"See Jones v. California Packing Corp., 121 Utah 612, 244 P.2d 640, 644 (1952) (\u201cThe law does not invest the Commission with any such arbitrary power to disbelieve or disregard uncontradicted, competent, credible evidence, as it appears to have done here.\u201d); cf. De Vas v. Noble, 13 Utah 2d 138, 369 P.2d 290, 293 (1962) (arbitrary and unreasoning distortions of justice could occur if courts were permitted to ignore credible and uncontradicted evidence), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 821, 83 S.Ct. 37, 9 L.Ed.2d 61 (1962). Accordingly, we reverse and remand to the Commission to reconsider the reasonableness of USWC\u2019s expenses for marketing services rendered by USWCS. Utah Code Ann. \u00a7 63-46b-16(4)(h)(iv)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"arbitrary and unreasoning distortions of justice could occur if courts were permitted to ignore credible and uncontradicted evidence","sentence":"See Jones v. California Packing Corp., 121 Utah 612, 244 P.2d 640, 644 (1952) (\u201cThe law does not invest the Commission with any such arbitrary power to disbelieve or disregard uncontradicted, competent, credible evidence, as it appears to have done here.\u201d); cf. De Vas v. Noble, 13 Utah 2d 138, 369 P.2d 290, 293 (1962) (arbitrary and unreasoning distortions of justice could occur if courts were permitted to ignore credible and uncontradicted evidence), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 821, 83 S.Ct. 37, 9 L.Ed.2d 61 (1962). Accordingly, we reverse and remand to the Commission to reconsider the reasonableness of USWC\u2019s expenses for marketing services rendered by USWCS. Utah Code Ann. \u00a7 63-46b-16(4)(h)(iv)."},"case_id":10340614,"label":"a"}
{"context":"We have upheld stops of persons under ORS 131.615(1) based on information from victims of or witnesses to crimes and confidential informants in several cases.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"invalidating stop based on informant's tip that illegal deer killing was occurring on certain property, when tip did not relate to any particular person or vehicle","sentence":"See State v. Taylor, 62 Or App 586, 661 P2d 569, rev den 295 Or 297 (1983) (informant\u2019s tip that he had observed possession and sale of cocaine in car in which the defendant was subsequently discovered); State v. Dickenson, 43 Or App 1023, 607 P2d 754 (1979) (anonymous phone call and numerous complaints that the defendant was catching salmon out of season); State v. Lindstrom, supra (victim\u2019s complaint); State v. Pent, 29 Or App 249, 562 P2d 1239, rev den 280 Or 1 (1977) (apartment manager\u2019s tip that the defendant had entered an apartment in the absence of its tenant and left five to ten minutes later); but see State v. Odam, 40 Or App 551, 595 P2d 1277 (1979), aff\u2019d by equally divided court 290 Or 160, 619 P2d 647 (1980) (invalidating stop based on informant\u2019s tip that illegal deer killing was occurring on certain property, when tip did not relate to any particular person or vehicle)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"informant's tip that he had observed possession and sale of cocaine in car in which the defendant was subsequently discovered","sentence":"See State v. Taylor, 62 Or App 586, 661 P2d 569, rev den 295 Or 297 (1983) (informant\u2019s tip that he had observed possession and sale of cocaine in car in which the defendant was subsequently discovered); State v. Dickenson, 43 Or App 1023, 607 P2d 754 (1979) (anonymous phone call and numerous complaints that the defendant was catching salmon out of season); State v. Lindstrom, supra (victim\u2019s complaint); State v. Pent, 29 Or App 249, 562 P2d 1239, rev den 280 Or 1 (1977) (apartment manager\u2019s tip that the defendant had entered an apartment in the absence of its tenant and left five to ten minutes later); but see State v. Odam, 40 Or App 551, 595 P2d 1277 (1979), aff\u2019d by equally divided court 290 Or 160, 619 P2d 647 (1980) (invalidating stop based on informant\u2019s tip that illegal deer killing was occurring on certain property, when tip did not relate to any particular person or vehicle)."},"case_id":4381676,"label":"b"}
{"context":"We have upheld stops of persons under ORS 131.615(1) based on information from victims of or witnesses to crimes and confidential informants in several cases.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"invalidating stop based on informant's tip that illegal deer killing was occurring on certain property, when tip did not relate to any particular person or vehicle","sentence":"See State v. Taylor, 62 Or App 586, 661 P2d 569, rev den 295 Or 297 (1983) (informant\u2019s tip that he had observed possession and sale of cocaine in car in which the defendant was subsequently discovered); State v. Dickenson, 43 Or App 1023, 607 P2d 754 (1979) (anonymous phone call and numerous complaints that the defendant was catching salmon out of season); State v. Lindstrom, supra (victim\u2019s complaint); State v. Pent, 29 Or App 249, 562 P2d 1239, rev den 280 Or 1 (1977) (apartment manager\u2019s tip that the defendant had entered an apartment in the absence of its tenant and left five to ten minutes later); but see State v. Odam, 40 Or App 551, 595 P2d 1277 (1979), aff\u2019d by equally divided court 290 Or 160, 619 P2d 647 (1980) (invalidating stop based on informant\u2019s tip that illegal deer killing was occurring on certain property, when tip did not relate to any particular person or vehicle)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"informant's tip that he had observed possession and sale of cocaine in car in which the defendant was subsequently discovered","sentence":"See State v. Taylor, 62 Or App 586, 661 P2d 569, rev den 295 Or 297 (1983) (informant\u2019s tip that he had observed possession and sale of cocaine in car in which the defendant was subsequently discovered); State v. Dickenson, 43 Or App 1023, 607 P2d 754 (1979) (anonymous phone call and numerous complaints that the defendant was catching salmon out of season); State v. Lindstrom, supra (victim\u2019s complaint); State v. Pent, 29 Or App 249, 562 P2d 1239, rev den 280 Or 1 (1977) (apartment manager\u2019s tip that the defendant had entered an apartment in the absence of its tenant and left five to ten minutes later); but see State v. Odam, 40 Or App 551, 595 P2d 1277 (1979), aff\u2019d by equally divided court 290 Or 160, 619 P2d 647 (1980) (invalidating stop based on informant\u2019s tip that illegal deer killing was occurring on certain property, when tip did not relate to any particular person or vehicle)."},"case_id":4381676,"label":"b"}
{"context":"We have upheld stops of persons under ORS 131.615(1) based on information from victims of or witnesses to crimes and confidential informants in several cases.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"informant's tip that he had observed possession and sale of cocaine in car in which the defendant was subsequently discovered","sentence":"See State v. Taylor, 62 Or App 586, 661 P2d 569, rev den 295 Or 297 (1983) (informant\u2019s tip that he had observed possession and sale of cocaine in car in which the defendant was subsequently discovered); State v. Dickenson, 43 Or App 1023, 607 P2d 754 (1979) (anonymous phone call and numerous complaints that the defendant was catching salmon out of season); State v. Lindstrom, supra (victim\u2019s complaint); State v. Pent, 29 Or App 249, 562 P2d 1239, rev den 280 Or 1 (1977) (apartment manager\u2019s tip that the defendant had entered an apartment in the absence of its tenant and left five to ten minutes later); but see State v. Odam, 40 Or App 551, 595 P2d 1277 (1979), aff\u2019d by equally divided court 290 Or 160, 619 P2d 647 (1980) (invalidating stop based on informant\u2019s tip that illegal deer killing was occurring on certain property, when tip did not relate to any particular person or vehicle)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"invalidating stop based on informant's tip that illegal deer killing was occurring on certain property, when tip did not relate to any particular person or vehicle","sentence":"See State v. Taylor, 62 Or App 586, 661 P2d 569, rev den 295 Or 297 (1983) (informant\u2019s tip that he had observed possession and sale of cocaine in car in which the defendant was subsequently discovered); State v. Dickenson, 43 Or App 1023, 607 P2d 754 (1979) (anonymous phone call and numerous complaints that the defendant was catching salmon out of season); State v. Lindstrom, supra (victim\u2019s complaint); State v. Pent, 29 Or App 249, 562 P2d 1239, rev den 280 Or 1 (1977) (apartment manager\u2019s tip that the defendant had entered an apartment in the absence of its tenant and left five to ten minutes later); but see State v. Odam, 40 Or App 551, 595 P2d 1277 (1979), aff\u2019d by equally divided court 290 Or 160, 619 P2d 647 (1980) (invalidating stop based on informant\u2019s tip that illegal deer killing was occurring on certain property, when tip did not relate to any particular person or vehicle)."},"case_id":4381676,"label":"a"}
{"context":"We have upheld stops of persons under ORS 131.615(1) based on information from victims of or witnesses to crimes and confidential informants in several cases.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"invalidating stop based on informant's tip that illegal deer killing was occurring on certain property, when tip did not relate to any particular person or vehicle","sentence":"See State v. Taylor, 62 Or App 586, 661 P2d 569, rev den 295 Or 297 (1983) (informant\u2019s tip that he had observed possession and sale of cocaine in car in which the defendant was subsequently discovered); State v. Dickenson, 43 Or App 1023, 607 P2d 754 (1979) (anonymous phone call and numerous complaints that the defendant was catching salmon out of season); State v. Lindstrom, supra (victim\u2019s complaint); State v. Pent, 29 Or App 249, 562 P2d 1239, rev den 280 Or 1 (1977) (apartment manager\u2019s tip that the defendant had entered an apartment in the absence of its tenant and left five to ten minutes later); but see State v. Odam, 40 Or App 551, 595 P2d 1277 (1979), aff\u2019d by equally divided court 290 Or 160, 619 P2d 647 (1980) (invalidating stop based on informant\u2019s tip that illegal deer killing was occurring on certain property, when tip did not relate to any particular person or vehicle)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"informant's tip that he had observed possession and sale of cocaine in car in which the defendant was subsequently discovered","sentence":"See State v. Taylor, 62 Or App 586, 661 P2d 569, rev den 295 Or 297 (1983) (informant\u2019s tip that he had observed possession and sale of cocaine in car in which the defendant was subsequently discovered); State v. Dickenson, 43 Or App 1023, 607 P2d 754 (1979) (anonymous phone call and numerous complaints that the defendant was catching salmon out of season); State v. Lindstrom, supra (victim\u2019s complaint); State v. Pent, 29 Or App 249, 562 P2d 1239, rev den 280 Or 1 (1977) (apartment manager\u2019s tip that the defendant had entered an apartment in the absence of its tenant and left five to ten minutes later); but see State v. Odam, 40 Or App 551, 595 P2d 1277 (1979), aff\u2019d by equally divided court 290 Or 160, 619 P2d 647 (1980) (invalidating stop based on informant\u2019s tip that illegal deer killing was occurring on certain property, when tip did not relate to any particular person or vehicle)."},"case_id":4381676,"label":"b"}
{"context":"We have upheld stops of persons under ORS 131.615(1) based on information from victims of or witnesses to crimes and confidential informants in several cases.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"invalidating stop based on informant's tip that illegal deer killing was occurring on certain property, when tip did not relate to any particular person or vehicle","sentence":"See State v. Taylor, 62 Or App 586, 661 P2d 569, rev den 295 Or 297 (1983) (informant\u2019s tip that he had observed possession and sale of cocaine in car in which the defendant was subsequently discovered); State v. Dickenson, 43 Or App 1023, 607 P2d 754 (1979) (anonymous phone call and numerous complaints that the defendant was catching salmon out of season); State v. Lindstrom, supra (victim\u2019s complaint); State v. Pent, 29 Or App 249, 562 P2d 1239, rev den 280 Or 1 (1977) (apartment manager\u2019s tip that the defendant had entered an apartment in the absence of its tenant and left five to ten minutes later); but see State v. Odam, 40 Or App 551, 595 P2d 1277 (1979), aff\u2019d by equally divided court 290 Or 160, 619 P2d 647 (1980) (invalidating stop based on informant\u2019s tip that illegal deer killing was occurring on certain property, when tip did not relate to any particular person or vehicle)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"anonymous phone call and numerous complaints that the defendant was catching salmon out of season","sentence":"See State v. Taylor, 62 Or App 586, 661 P2d 569, rev den 295 Or 297 (1983) (informant\u2019s tip that he had observed possession and sale of cocaine in car in which the defendant was subsequently discovered); State v. Dickenson, 43 Or App 1023, 607 P2d 754 (1979) (anonymous phone call and numerous complaints that the defendant was catching salmon out of season); State v. Lindstrom, supra (victim\u2019s complaint); State v. Pent, 29 Or App 249, 562 P2d 1239, rev den 280 Or 1 (1977) (apartment manager\u2019s tip that the defendant had entered an apartment in the absence of its tenant and left five to ten minutes later); but see State v. Odam, 40 Or App 551, 595 P2d 1277 (1979), aff\u2019d by equally divided court 290 Or 160, 619 P2d 647 (1980) (invalidating stop based on informant\u2019s tip that illegal deer killing was occurring on certain property, when tip did not relate to any particular person or vehicle)."},"case_id":4381676,"label":"b"}
{"context":"We have upheld stops of persons under ORS 131.615(1) based on information from victims of or witnesses to crimes and confidential informants in several cases.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"invalidating stop based on informant's tip that illegal deer killing was occurring on certain property, when tip did not relate to any particular person or vehicle","sentence":"See State v. Taylor, 62 Or App 586, 661 P2d 569, rev den 295 Or 297 (1983) (informant\u2019s tip that he had observed possession and sale of cocaine in car in which the defendant was subsequently discovered); State v. Dickenson, 43 Or App 1023, 607 P2d 754 (1979) (anonymous phone call and numerous complaints that the defendant was catching salmon out of season); State v. Lindstrom, supra (victim\u2019s complaint); State v. Pent, 29 Or App 249, 562 P2d 1239, rev den 280 Or 1 (1977) (apartment manager\u2019s tip that the defendant had entered an apartment in the absence of its tenant and left five to ten minutes later); but see State v. Odam, 40 Or App 551, 595 P2d 1277 (1979), aff\u2019d by equally divided court 290 Or 160, 619 P2d 647 (1980) (invalidating stop based on informant\u2019s tip that illegal deer killing was occurring on certain property, when tip did not relate to any particular person or vehicle)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"anonymous phone call and numerous complaints that the defendant was catching salmon out of season","sentence":"See State v. Taylor, 62 Or App 586, 661 P2d 569, rev den 295 Or 297 (1983) (informant\u2019s tip that he had observed possession and sale of cocaine in car in which the defendant was subsequently discovered); State v. Dickenson, 43 Or App 1023, 607 P2d 754 (1979) (anonymous phone call and numerous complaints that the defendant was catching salmon out of season); State v. Lindstrom, supra (victim\u2019s complaint); State v. Pent, 29 Or App 249, 562 P2d 1239, rev den 280 Or 1 (1977) (apartment manager\u2019s tip that the defendant had entered an apartment in the absence of its tenant and left five to ten minutes later); but see State v. Odam, 40 Or App 551, 595 P2d 1277 (1979), aff\u2019d by equally divided court 290 Or 160, 619 P2d 647 (1980) (invalidating stop based on informant\u2019s tip that illegal deer killing was occurring on certain property, when tip did not relate to any particular person or vehicle)."},"case_id":4381676,"label":"b"}
{"context":"We have upheld stops of persons under ORS 131.615(1) based on information from victims of or witnesses to crimes and confidential informants in several cases.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"apartment manager's tip that the defendant had entered an apartment in the absence of its tenant and left five to ten minutes later","sentence":"See State v. Taylor, 62 Or App 586, 661 P2d 569, rev den 295 Or 297 (1983) (informant\u2019s tip that he had observed possession and sale of cocaine in car in which the defendant was subsequently discovered); State v. Dickenson, 43 Or App 1023, 607 P2d 754 (1979) (anonymous phone call and numerous complaints that the defendant was catching salmon out of season); State v. Lindstrom, supra (victim\u2019s complaint); State v. Pent, 29 Or App 249, 562 P2d 1239, rev den 280 Or 1 (1977) (apartment manager\u2019s tip that the defendant had entered an apartment in the absence of its tenant and left five to ten minutes later); but see State v. Odam, 40 Or App 551, 595 P2d 1277 (1979), aff\u2019d by equally divided court 290 Or 160, 619 P2d 647 (1980) (invalidating stop based on informant\u2019s tip that illegal deer killing was occurring on certain property, when tip did not relate to any particular person or vehicle)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"invalidating stop based on informant's tip that illegal deer killing was occurring on certain property, when tip did not relate to any particular person or vehicle","sentence":"See State v. Taylor, 62 Or App 586, 661 P2d 569, rev den 295 Or 297 (1983) (informant\u2019s tip that he had observed possession and sale of cocaine in car in which the defendant was subsequently discovered); State v. Dickenson, 43 Or App 1023, 607 P2d 754 (1979) (anonymous phone call and numerous complaints that the defendant was catching salmon out of season); State v. Lindstrom, supra (victim\u2019s complaint); State v. Pent, 29 Or App 249, 562 P2d 1239, rev den 280 Or 1 (1977) (apartment manager\u2019s tip that the defendant had entered an apartment in the absence of its tenant and left five to ten minutes later); but see State v. Odam, 40 Or App 551, 595 P2d 1277 (1979), aff\u2019d by equally divided court 290 Or 160, 619 P2d 647 (1980) (invalidating stop based on informant\u2019s tip that illegal deer killing was occurring on certain property, when tip did not relate to any particular person or vehicle)."},"case_id":4381676,"label":"a"}
{"context":"We have upheld stops of persons under ORS 131.615(1) based on information from victims of or witnesses to crimes and confidential informants in several cases.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"apartment manager's tip that the defendant had entered an apartment in the absence of its tenant and left five to ten minutes later","sentence":"See State v. Taylor, 62 Or App 586, 661 P2d 569, rev den 295 Or 297 (1983) (informant\u2019s tip that he had observed possession and sale of cocaine in car in which the defendant was subsequently discovered); State v. Dickenson, 43 Or App 1023, 607 P2d 754 (1979) (anonymous phone call and numerous complaints that the defendant was catching salmon out of season); State v. Lindstrom, supra (victim\u2019s complaint); State v. Pent, 29 Or App 249, 562 P2d 1239, rev den 280 Or 1 (1977) (apartment manager\u2019s tip that the defendant had entered an apartment in the absence of its tenant and left five to ten minutes later); but see State v. Odam, 40 Or App 551, 595 P2d 1277 (1979), aff\u2019d by equally divided court 290 Or 160, 619 P2d 647 (1980) (invalidating stop based on informant\u2019s tip that illegal deer killing was occurring on certain property, when tip did not relate to any particular person or vehicle)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"invalidating stop based on informant's tip that illegal deer killing was occurring on certain property, when tip did not relate to any particular person or vehicle","sentence":"See State v. Taylor, 62 Or App 586, 661 P2d 569, rev den 295 Or 297 (1983) (informant\u2019s tip that he had observed possession and sale of cocaine in car in which the defendant was subsequently discovered); State v. Dickenson, 43 Or App 1023, 607 P2d 754 (1979) (anonymous phone call and numerous complaints that the defendant was catching salmon out of season); State v. Lindstrom, supra (victim\u2019s complaint); State v. Pent, 29 Or App 249, 562 P2d 1239, rev den 280 Or 1 (1977) (apartment manager\u2019s tip that the defendant had entered an apartment in the absence of its tenant and left five to ten minutes later); but see State v. Odam, 40 Or App 551, 595 P2d 1277 (1979), aff\u2019d by equally divided court 290 Or 160, 619 P2d 647 (1980) (invalidating stop based on informant\u2019s tip that illegal deer killing was occurring on certain property, when tip did not relate to any particular person or vehicle)."},"case_id":4381676,"label":"a"}
{"context":"We have upheld stops of persons under ORS 131.615(1) based on information from victims of or witnesses to crimes and confidential informants in several cases.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"apartment manager's tip that the defendant had entered an apartment in the absence of its tenant and left five to ten minutes later","sentence":"See State v. Taylor, 62 Or App 586, 661 P2d 569, rev den 295 Or 297 (1983) (informant\u2019s tip that he had observed possession and sale of cocaine in car in which the defendant was subsequently discovered); State v. Dickenson, 43 Or App 1023, 607 P2d 754 (1979) (anonymous phone call and numerous complaints that the defendant was catching salmon out of season); State v. Lindstrom, supra (victim\u2019s complaint); State v. Pent, 29 Or App 249, 562 P2d 1239, rev den 280 Or 1 (1977) (apartment manager\u2019s tip that the defendant had entered an apartment in the absence of its tenant and left five to ten minutes later); but see State v. Odam, 40 Or App 551, 595 P2d 1277 (1979), aff\u2019d by equally divided court 290 Or 160, 619 P2d 647 (1980) (invalidating stop based on informant\u2019s tip that illegal deer killing was occurring on certain property, when tip did not relate to any particular person or vehicle)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"invalidating stop based on informant's tip that illegal deer killing was occurring on certain property, when tip did not relate to any particular person or vehicle","sentence":"See State v. Taylor, 62 Or App 586, 661 P2d 569, rev den 295 Or 297 (1983) (informant\u2019s tip that he had observed possession and sale of cocaine in car in which the defendant was subsequently discovered); State v. Dickenson, 43 Or App 1023, 607 P2d 754 (1979) (anonymous phone call and numerous complaints that the defendant was catching salmon out of season); State v. Lindstrom, supra (victim\u2019s complaint); State v. Pent, 29 Or App 249, 562 P2d 1239, rev den 280 Or 1 (1977) (apartment manager\u2019s tip that the defendant had entered an apartment in the absence of its tenant and left five to ten minutes later); but see State v. Odam, 40 Or App 551, 595 P2d 1277 (1979), aff\u2019d by equally divided court 290 Or 160, 619 P2d 647 (1980) (invalidating stop based on informant\u2019s tip that illegal deer killing was occurring on certain property, when tip did not relate to any particular person or vehicle)."},"case_id":4381676,"label":"a"}
{"context":"We have upheld stops of persons under ORS 131.615(1) based on information from victims of or witnesses to crimes and confidential informants in several cases.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"invalidating stop based on informant's tip that illegal deer killing was occurring on certain property, when tip did not relate to any particular person or vehicle","sentence":"See State v. Taylor, 62 Or App 586, 661 P2d 569, rev den 295 Or 297 (1983) (informant\u2019s tip that he had observed possession and sale of cocaine in car in which the defendant was subsequently discovered); State v. Dickenson, 43 Or App 1023, 607 P2d 754 (1979) (anonymous phone call and numerous complaints that the defendant was catching salmon out of season); State v. Lindstrom, supra (victim\u2019s complaint); State v. Pent, 29 Or App 249, 562 P2d 1239, rev den 280 Or 1 (1977) (apartment manager\u2019s tip that the defendant had entered an apartment in the absence of its tenant and left five to ten minutes later); but see State v. Odam, 40 Or App 551, 595 P2d 1277 (1979), aff\u2019d by equally divided court 290 Or 160, 619 P2d 647 (1980) (invalidating stop based on informant\u2019s tip that illegal deer killing was occurring on certain property, when tip did not relate to any particular person or vehicle)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"apartment manager's tip that the defendant had entered an apartment in the absence of its tenant and left five to ten minutes later","sentence":"See State v. Taylor, 62 Or App 586, 661 P2d 569, rev den 295 Or 297 (1983) (informant\u2019s tip that he had observed possession and sale of cocaine in car in which the defendant was subsequently discovered); State v. Dickenson, 43 Or App 1023, 607 P2d 754 (1979) (anonymous phone call and numerous complaints that the defendant was catching salmon out of season); State v. Lindstrom, supra (victim\u2019s complaint); State v. Pent, 29 Or App 249, 562 P2d 1239, rev den 280 Or 1 (1977) (apartment manager\u2019s tip that the defendant had entered an apartment in the absence of its tenant and left five to ten minutes later); but see State v. Odam, 40 Or App 551, 595 P2d 1277 (1979), aff\u2019d by equally divided court 290 Or 160, 619 P2d 647 (1980) (invalidating stop based on informant\u2019s tip that illegal deer killing was occurring on certain property, when tip did not relate to any particular person or vehicle)."},"case_id":4381676,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The suspension of permits by gubernatorial fiat does not resemble the low-level misconduct at issue in Parrott and Hudson, and allowing a procedural due process claim based on the Governor's involvement in the permit suspension would not make a federal case out of an ordinary tort. To the contrary, such a claim would be consistent with longstanding precedent holding that SS 1983 is available as a remedy for injuries inflicted by the abuse of state power, as well as by state law itself.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"494 U.S. 124, 124","parenthetical":"noting that Monroe \"rejected the view that SS 1983 applies only to violations of constitutional rights that are authorized by state law, and does not reach abuses of state authority that are forbidden by the State's statutes or Con stitution or are torts under the State's common law\"","sentence":"See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 175-76, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961) (explaining that \u00a7 1983 was created, in part, as a remedy \u201cagainst those who representing a State in some capacity were unable or unwilling to enforce a state law\u201d); id. at 183, 81 S.Ct. 473 (\u201cIt is no answer that the State has a law which if enforced would give relief.\u201d); see also Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 124, 110 S.Ct. 975 (noting that Monroe \u201crejected the view that \u00a7 1983 applies only to violations of constitutional rights that are authorized by state law, and does not reach abuses of state authority that are forbidden by the State\u2019s statutes or Con stitution or are torts under the State\u2019s common law\u201d); id. at 125, 110 S.Ct. 975 (\u201c[I]n many cases there is \u2018no quarrel with the state laws on the books\u2019; instead, the problem is the way those laws are or are not implemented by state officials.\u201d (quoting Monroe, 365 U.S. at 176, 81 S.Ct. 473) (citation omitted))."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"365 U.S. 167, 175-76","parenthetical":"explaining that SS 1983 was created, in part, as a remedy \"against those who representing a State in some capacity were unable or unwilling to enforce a state law\"","sentence":"See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 175-76, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961) (explaining that \u00a7 1983 was created, in part, as a remedy \u201cagainst those who representing a State in some capacity were unable or unwilling to enforce a state law\u201d); id. at 183, 81 S.Ct. 473 (\u201cIt is no answer that the State has a law which if enforced would give relief.\u201d); see also Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 124, 110 S.Ct. 975 (noting that Monroe \u201crejected the view that \u00a7 1983 applies only to violations of constitutional rights that are authorized by state law, and does not reach abuses of state authority that are forbidden by the State\u2019s statutes or Con stitution or are torts under the State\u2019s common law\u201d); id. at 125, 110 S.Ct. 975 (\u201c[I]n many cases there is \u2018no quarrel with the state laws on the books\u2019; instead, the problem is the way those laws are or are not implemented by state officials.\u201d (quoting Monroe, 365 U.S. at 176, 81 S.Ct. 473) (citation omitted))."},"case_id":5865240,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The suspension of permits by gubernatorial fiat does not resemble the low-level misconduct at issue in Parrott and Hudson, and allowing a procedural due process claim based on the Governor's involvement in the permit suspension would not make a federal case out of an ordinary tort. To the contrary, such a claim would be consistent with longstanding precedent holding that SS 1983 is available as a remedy for injuries inflicted by the abuse of state power, as well as by state law itself.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting that Monroe \"rejected the view that SS 1983 applies only to violations of constitutional rights that are authorized by state law, and does not reach abuses of state authority that are forbidden by the State's statutes or Con stitution or are torts under the State's common law\"","sentence":"See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 175-76, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961) (explaining that \u00a7 1983 was created, in part, as a remedy \u201cagainst those who representing a State in some capacity were unable or unwilling to enforce a state law\u201d); id. at 183, 81 S.Ct. 473 (\u201cIt is no answer that the State has a law which if enforced would give relief.\u201d); see also Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 124, 110 S.Ct. 975 (noting that Monroe \u201crejected the view that \u00a7 1983 applies only to violations of constitutional rights that are authorized by state law, and does not reach abuses of state authority that are forbidden by the State\u2019s statutes or Con stitution or are torts under the State\u2019s common law\u201d); id. at 125, 110 S.Ct. 975 (\u201c[I]n many cases there is \u2018no quarrel with the state laws on the books\u2019; instead, the problem is the way those laws are or are not implemented by state officials.\u201d (quoting Monroe, 365 U.S. at 176, 81 S.Ct. 473) (citation omitted))."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"365 U.S. 167, 175-76","parenthetical":"explaining that SS 1983 was created, in part, as a remedy \"against those who representing a State in some capacity were unable or unwilling to enforce a state law\"","sentence":"See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 175-76, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961) (explaining that \u00a7 1983 was created, in part, as a remedy \u201cagainst those who representing a State in some capacity were unable or unwilling to enforce a state law\u201d); id. at 183, 81 S.Ct. 473 (\u201cIt is no answer that the State has a law which if enforced would give relief.\u201d); see also Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 124, 110 S.Ct. 975 (noting that Monroe \u201crejected the view that \u00a7 1983 applies only to violations of constitutional rights that are authorized by state law, and does not reach abuses of state authority that are forbidden by the State\u2019s statutes or Con stitution or are torts under the State\u2019s common law\u201d); id. at 125, 110 S.Ct. 975 (\u201c[I]n many cases there is \u2018no quarrel with the state laws on the books\u2019; instead, the problem is the way those laws are or are not implemented by state officials.\u201d (quoting Monroe, 365 U.S. at 176, 81 S.Ct. 473) (citation omitted))."},"case_id":5865240,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The suspension of permits by gubernatorial fiat does not resemble the low-level misconduct at issue in Parrott and Hudson, and allowing a procedural due process claim based on the Governor's involvement in the permit suspension would not make a federal case out of an ordinary tort. To the contrary, such a claim would be consistent with longstanding precedent holding that SS 1983 is available as a remedy for injuries inflicted by the abuse of state power, as well as by state law itself.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"explaining that SS 1983 was created, in part, as a remedy \"against those who representing a State in some capacity were unable or unwilling to enforce a state law\"","sentence":"See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 175-76, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961) (explaining that \u00a7 1983 was created, in part, as a remedy \u201cagainst those who representing a State in some capacity were unable or unwilling to enforce a state law\u201d); id. at 183, 81 S.Ct. 473 (\u201cIt is no answer that the State has a law which if enforced would give relief.\u201d); see also Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 124, 110 S.Ct. 975 (noting that Monroe \u201crejected the view that \u00a7 1983 applies only to violations of constitutional rights that are authorized by state law, and does not reach abuses of state authority that are forbidden by the State\u2019s statutes or Con stitution or are torts under the State\u2019s common law\u201d); id. at 125, 110 S.Ct. 975 (\u201c[I]n many cases there is \u2018no quarrel with the state laws on the books\u2019; instead, the problem is the way those laws are or are not implemented by state officials.\u201d (quoting Monroe, 365 U.S. at 176, 81 S.Ct. 473) (citation omitted))."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"494 U.S. 124, 124","parenthetical":"noting that Monroe \"rejected the view that SS 1983 applies only to violations of constitutional rights that are authorized by state law, and does not reach abuses of state authority that are forbidden by the State's statutes or Con stitution or are torts under the State's common law\"","sentence":"See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 175-76, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961) (explaining that \u00a7 1983 was created, in part, as a remedy \u201cagainst those who representing a State in some capacity were unable or unwilling to enforce a state law\u201d); id. at 183, 81 S.Ct. 473 (\u201cIt is no answer that the State has a law which if enforced would give relief.\u201d); see also Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 124, 110 S.Ct. 975 (noting that Monroe \u201crejected the view that \u00a7 1983 applies only to violations of constitutional rights that are authorized by state law, and does not reach abuses of state authority that are forbidden by the State\u2019s statutes or Con stitution or are torts under the State\u2019s common law\u201d); id. at 125, 110 S.Ct. 975 (\u201c[I]n many cases there is \u2018no quarrel with the state laws on the books\u2019; instead, the problem is the way those laws are or are not implemented by state officials.\u201d (quoting Monroe, 365 U.S. at 176, 81 S.Ct. 473) (citation omitted))."},"case_id":5865240,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The suspension of permits by gubernatorial fiat does not resemble the low-level misconduct at issue in Parrott and Hudson, and allowing a procedural due process claim based on the Governor's involvement in the permit suspension would not make a federal case out of an ordinary tort. To the contrary, such a claim would be consistent with longstanding precedent holding that SS 1983 is available as a remedy for injuries inflicted by the abuse of state power, as well as by state law itself.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"explaining that SS 1983 was created, in part, as a remedy \"against those who representing a State in some capacity were unable or unwilling to enforce a state law\"","sentence":"See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 175-76, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961) (explaining that \u00a7 1983 was created, in part, as a remedy \u201cagainst those who representing a State in some capacity were unable or unwilling to enforce a state law\u201d); id. at 183, 81 S.Ct. 473 (\u201cIt is no answer that the State has a law which if enforced would give relief.\u201d); see also Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 124, 110 S.Ct. 975 (noting that Monroe \u201crejected the view that \u00a7 1983 applies only to violations of constitutional rights that are authorized by state law, and does not reach abuses of state authority that are forbidden by the State\u2019s statutes or Con stitution or are torts under the State\u2019s common law\u201d); id. at 125, 110 S.Ct. 975 (\u201c[I]n many cases there is \u2018no quarrel with the state laws on the books\u2019; instead, the problem is the way those laws are or are not implemented by state officials.\u201d (quoting Monroe, 365 U.S. at 176, 81 S.Ct. 473) (citation omitted))."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting that Monroe \"rejected the view that SS 1983 applies only to violations of constitutional rights that are authorized by state law, and does not reach abuses of state authority that are forbidden by the State's statutes or Con stitution or are torts under the State's common law\"","sentence":"See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 175-76, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961) (explaining that \u00a7 1983 was created, in part, as a remedy \u201cagainst those who representing a State in some capacity were unable or unwilling to enforce a state law\u201d); id. at 183, 81 S.Ct. 473 (\u201cIt is no answer that the State has a law which if enforced would give relief.\u201d); see also Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 124, 110 S.Ct. 975 (noting that Monroe \u201crejected the view that \u00a7 1983 applies only to violations of constitutional rights that are authorized by state law, and does not reach abuses of state authority that are forbidden by the State\u2019s statutes or Con stitution or are torts under the State\u2019s common law\u201d); id. at 125, 110 S.Ct. 975 (\u201c[I]n many cases there is \u2018no quarrel with the state laws on the books\u2019; instead, the problem is the way those laws are or are not implemented by state officials.\u201d (quoting Monroe, 365 U.S. at 176, 81 S.Ct. 473) (citation omitted))."},"case_id":5865240,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The suspension of permits by gubernatorial fiat does not resemble the low-level misconduct at issue in Parrott and Hudson, and allowing a procedural due process claim based on the Governor's involvement in the permit suspension would not make a federal case out of an ordinary tort. To the contrary, such a claim would be consistent with longstanding precedent holding that SS 1983 is available as a remedy for injuries inflicted by the abuse of state power, as well as by state law itself.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"494 U.S. 124, 124","parenthetical":"noting that Monroe \"rejected the view that SS 1983 applies only to violations of constitutional rights that are authorized by state law, and does not reach abuses of state authority that are forbidden by the State's statutes or Con stitution or are torts under the State's common law\"","sentence":"See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 175-76, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961) (explaining that \u00a7 1983 was created, in part, as a remedy \u201cagainst those who representing a State in some capacity were unable or unwilling to enforce a state law\u201d); id. at 183, 81 S.Ct. 473 (\u201cIt is no answer that the State has a law which if enforced would give relief.\u201d); see also Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 124, 110 S.Ct. 975 (noting that Monroe \u201crejected the view that \u00a7 1983 applies only to violations of constitutional rights that are authorized by state law, and does not reach abuses of state authority that are forbidden by the State\u2019s statutes or Con stitution or are torts under the State\u2019s common law\u201d); id. at 125, 110 S.Ct. 975 (\u201c[I]n many cases there is \u2018no quarrel with the state laws on the books\u2019; instead, the problem is the way those laws are or are not implemented by state officials.\u201d (quoting Monroe, 365 U.S. at 176, 81 S.Ct. 473) (citation omitted))."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"explaining that SS 1983 was created, in part, as a remedy \"against those who representing a State in some capacity were unable or unwilling to enforce a state law\"","sentence":"See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 175-76, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961) (explaining that \u00a7 1983 was created, in part, as a remedy \u201cagainst those who representing a State in some capacity were unable or unwilling to enforce a state law\u201d); id. at 183, 81 S.Ct. 473 (\u201cIt is no answer that the State has a law which if enforced would give relief.\u201d); see also Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 124, 110 S.Ct. 975 (noting that Monroe \u201crejected the view that \u00a7 1983 applies only to violations of constitutional rights that are authorized by state law, and does not reach abuses of state authority that are forbidden by the State\u2019s statutes or Con stitution or are torts under the State\u2019s common law\u201d); id. at 125, 110 S.Ct. 975 (\u201c[I]n many cases there is \u2018no quarrel with the state laws on the books\u2019; instead, the problem is the way those laws are or are not implemented by state officials.\u201d (quoting Monroe, 365 U.S. at 176, 81 S.Ct. 473) (citation omitted))."},"case_id":5865240,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The suspension of permits by gubernatorial fiat does not resemble the low-level misconduct at issue in Parrott and Hudson, and allowing a procedural due process claim based on the Governor's involvement in the permit suspension would not make a federal case out of an ordinary tort. To the contrary, such a claim would be consistent with longstanding precedent holding that SS 1983 is available as a remedy for injuries inflicted by the abuse of state power, as well as by state law itself.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"explaining that SS 1983 was created, in part, as a remedy \"against those who representing a State in some capacity were unable or unwilling to enforce a state law\"","sentence":"See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 175-76, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961) (explaining that \u00a7 1983 was created, in part, as a remedy \u201cagainst those who representing a State in some capacity were unable or unwilling to enforce a state law\u201d); id. at 183, 81 S.Ct. 473 (\u201cIt is no answer that the State has a law which if enforced would give relief.\u201d); see also Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 124, 110 S.Ct. 975 (noting that Monroe \u201crejected the view that \u00a7 1983 applies only to violations of constitutional rights that are authorized by state law, and does not reach abuses of state authority that are forbidden by the State\u2019s statutes or Con stitution or are torts under the State\u2019s common law\u201d); id. at 125, 110 S.Ct. 975 (\u201c[I]n many cases there is \u2018no quarrel with the state laws on the books\u2019; instead, the problem is the way those laws are or are not implemented by state officials.\u201d (quoting Monroe, 365 U.S. at 176, 81 S.Ct. 473) (citation omitted))."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting that Monroe \"rejected the view that SS 1983 applies only to violations of constitutional rights that are authorized by state law, and does not reach abuses of state authority that are forbidden by the State's statutes or Con stitution or are torts under the State's common law\"","sentence":"See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 175-76, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961) (explaining that \u00a7 1983 was created, in part, as a remedy \u201cagainst those who representing a State in some capacity were unable or unwilling to enforce a state law\u201d); id. at 183, 81 S.Ct. 473 (\u201cIt is no answer that the State has a law which if enforced would give relief.\u201d); see also Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 124, 110 S.Ct. 975 (noting that Monroe \u201crejected the view that \u00a7 1983 applies only to violations of constitutional rights that are authorized by state law, and does not reach abuses of state authority that are forbidden by the State\u2019s statutes or Con stitution or are torts under the State\u2019s common law\u201d); id. at 125, 110 S.Ct. 975 (\u201c[I]n many cases there is \u2018no quarrel with the state laws on the books\u2019; instead, the problem is the way those laws are or are not implemented by state officials.\u201d (quoting Monroe, 365 U.S. at 176, 81 S.Ct. 473) (citation omitted))."},"case_id":5865240,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The suspension of permits by gubernatorial fiat does not resemble the low-level misconduct at issue in Parrott and Hudson, and allowing a procedural due process claim based on the Governor's involvement in the permit suspension would not make a federal case out of an ordinary tort. To the contrary, such a claim would be consistent with longstanding precedent holding that SS 1983 is available as a remedy for injuries inflicted by the abuse of state power, as well as by state law itself.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"It is no answer that the State has a law which if enforced would give relief.\"","sentence":"See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 175-76, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961) (explaining that \u00a7 1983 was created, in part, as a remedy \u201cagainst those who representing a State in some capacity were unable or unwilling to enforce a state law\u201d); id. at 183, 81 S.Ct. 473 (\u201cIt is no answer that the State has a law which if enforced would give relief.\u201d); see also Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 124, 110 S.Ct. 975 (noting that Monroe \u201crejected the view that \u00a7 1983 applies only to violations of constitutional rights that are authorized by state law, and does not reach abuses of state authority that are forbidden by the State\u2019s statutes or Con stitution or are torts under the State\u2019s common law\u201d); id. at 125, 110 S.Ct. 975 (\u201c[I]n many cases there is \u2018no quarrel with the state laws on the books\u2019; instead, the problem is the way those laws are or are not implemented by state officials.\u201d (quoting Monroe, 365 U.S. at 176, 81 S.Ct. 473) (citation omitted))."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"494 U.S. 124, 124","parenthetical":"noting that Monroe \"rejected the view that SS 1983 applies only to violations of constitutional rights that are authorized by state law, and does not reach abuses of state authority that are forbidden by the State's statutes or Con stitution or are torts under the State's common law\"","sentence":"See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 175-76, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961) (explaining that \u00a7 1983 was created, in part, as a remedy \u201cagainst those who representing a State in some capacity were unable or unwilling to enforce a state law\u201d); id. at 183, 81 S.Ct. 473 (\u201cIt is no answer that the State has a law which if enforced would give relief.\u201d); see also Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 124, 110 S.Ct. 975 (noting that Monroe \u201crejected the view that \u00a7 1983 applies only to violations of constitutional rights that are authorized by state law, and does not reach abuses of state authority that are forbidden by the State\u2019s statutes or Con stitution or are torts under the State\u2019s common law\u201d); id. at 125, 110 S.Ct. 975 (\u201c[I]n many cases there is \u2018no quarrel with the state laws on the books\u2019; instead, the problem is the way those laws are or are not implemented by state officials.\u201d (quoting Monroe, 365 U.S. at 176, 81 S.Ct. 473) (citation omitted))."},"case_id":5865240,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The suspension of permits by gubernatorial fiat does not resemble the low-level misconduct at issue in Parrott and Hudson, and allowing a procedural due process claim based on the Governor's involvement in the permit suspension would not make a federal case out of an ordinary tort. To the contrary, such a claim would be consistent with longstanding precedent holding that SS 1983 is available as a remedy for injuries inflicted by the abuse of state power, as well as by state law itself.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"It is no answer that the State has a law which if enforced would give relief.\"","sentence":"See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 175-76, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961) (explaining that \u00a7 1983 was created, in part, as a remedy \u201cagainst those who representing a State in some capacity were unable or unwilling to enforce a state law\u201d); id. at 183, 81 S.Ct. 473 (\u201cIt is no answer that the State has a law which if enforced would give relief.\u201d); see also Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 124, 110 S.Ct. 975 (noting that Monroe \u201crejected the view that \u00a7 1983 applies only to violations of constitutional rights that are authorized by state law, and does not reach abuses of state authority that are forbidden by the State\u2019s statutes or Con stitution or are torts under the State\u2019s common law\u201d); id. at 125, 110 S.Ct. 975 (\u201c[I]n many cases there is \u2018no quarrel with the state laws on the books\u2019; instead, the problem is the way those laws are or are not implemented by state officials.\u201d (quoting Monroe, 365 U.S. at 176, 81 S.Ct. 473) (citation omitted))."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting that Monroe \"rejected the view that SS 1983 applies only to violations of constitutional rights that are authorized by state law, and does not reach abuses of state authority that are forbidden by the State's statutes or Con stitution or are torts under the State's common law\"","sentence":"See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 175-76, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961) (explaining that \u00a7 1983 was created, in part, as a remedy \u201cagainst those who representing a State in some capacity were unable or unwilling to enforce a state law\u201d); id. at 183, 81 S.Ct. 473 (\u201cIt is no answer that the State has a law which if enforced would give relief.\u201d); see also Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 124, 110 S.Ct. 975 (noting that Monroe \u201crejected the view that \u00a7 1983 applies only to violations of constitutional rights that are authorized by state law, and does not reach abuses of state authority that are forbidden by the State\u2019s statutes or Con stitution or are torts under the State\u2019s common law\u201d); id. at 125, 110 S.Ct. 975 (\u201c[I]n many cases there is \u2018no quarrel with the state laws on the books\u2019; instead, the problem is the way those laws are or are not implemented by state officials.\u201d (quoting Monroe, 365 U.S. at 176, 81 S.Ct. 473) (citation omitted))."},"case_id":5865240,"label":"a"}
{"context":". Other courts in the United States that have considered the issue have reached the same conclusion.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"706 F.2d 479, 481","parenthetical":"\"[Wjhile an innkeeper is often held to a specially high duty of care, the general rule, nationally, falls short of warranty.\"","sentence":"See Ely v. Blevins, 706 F.2d 479, 481 (4th Cir.1983) (\"[Wjhile an innkeeper is often held to a specially high duty of care, the general rule, nationally, falls short of warranty.\u201d); Summers v. Fort Crockett Hotel, Ltd., 902 S.W.2d 20, 27 (Tex.App.1995) (hotel which did not sell or manufacture balcony railing cannot be held liable on design defect theory); cf. Jones v. Keetch, 388 Mich. 164, 167-68, 200 N.W.2d 227, 229 (Mich.1972) (hotel guest has viable claim against hotel for breach of implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"388 Mich. 164, 167-68","parenthetical":"hotel guest has viable claim against hotel for breach of implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose","sentence":"See Ely v. Blevins, 706 F.2d 479, 481 (4th Cir.1983) (\"[Wjhile an innkeeper is often held to a specially high duty of care, the general rule, nationally, falls short of warranty.\u201d); Summers v. Fort Crockett Hotel, Ltd., 902 S.W.2d 20, 27 (Tex.App.1995) (hotel which did not sell or manufacture balcony railing cannot be held liable on design defect theory); cf. Jones v. Keetch, 388 Mich. 164, 167-68, 200 N.W.2d 227, 229 (Mich.1972) (hotel guest has viable claim against hotel for breach of implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose)."},"case_id":1567111,"label":"a"}
{"context":". Other courts in the United States that have considered the issue have reached the same conclusion.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"706 F.2d 479, 481","parenthetical":"\"[Wjhile an innkeeper is often held to a specially high duty of care, the general rule, nationally, falls short of warranty.\"","sentence":"See Ely v. Blevins, 706 F.2d 479, 481 (4th Cir.1983) (\"[Wjhile an innkeeper is often held to a specially high duty of care, the general rule, nationally, falls short of warranty.\u201d); Summers v. Fort Crockett Hotel, Ltd., 902 S.W.2d 20, 27 (Tex.App.1995) (hotel which did not sell or manufacture balcony railing cannot be held liable on design defect theory); cf. Jones v. Keetch, 388 Mich. 164, 167-68, 200 N.W.2d 227, 229 (Mich.1972) (hotel guest has viable claim against hotel for breach of implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"200 N.W.2d 227, 229","parenthetical":"hotel guest has viable claim against hotel for breach of implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose","sentence":"See Ely v. Blevins, 706 F.2d 479, 481 (4th Cir.1983) (\"[Wjhile an innkeeper is often held to a specially high duty of care, the general rule, nationally, falls short of warranty.\u201d); Summers v. Fort Crockett Hotel, Ltd., 902 S.W.2d 20, 27 (Tex.App.1995) (hotel which did not sell or manufacture balcony railing cannot be held liable on design defect theory); cf. Jones v. Keetch, 388 Mich. 164, 167-68, 200 N.W.2d 227, 229 (Mich.1972) (hotel guest has viable claim against hotel for breach of implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose)."},"case_id":1567111,"label":"a"}
{"context":". Other courts in the United States that have considered the issue have reached the same conclusion.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"902 S.W.2d 20, 27","parenthetical":"hotel which did not sell or manufacture balcony railing cannot be held liable on design defect theory","sentence":"See Ely v. Blevins, 706 F.2d 479, 481 (4th Cir.1983) (\"[Wjhile an innkeeper is often held to a specially high duty of care, the general rule, nationally, falls short of warranty.\u201d); Summers v. Fort Crockett Hotel, Ltd., 902 S.W.2d 20, 27 (Tex.App.1995) (hotel which did not sell or manufacture balcony railing cannot be held liable on design defect theory); cf. Jones v. Keetch, 388 Mich. 164, 167-68, 200 N.W.2d 227, 229 (Mich.1972) (hotel guest has viable claim against hotel for breach of implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"388 Mich. 164, 167-68","parenthetical":"hotel guest has viable claim against hotel for breach of implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose","sentence":"See Ely v. Blevins, 706 F.2d 479, 481 (4th Cir.1983) (\"[Wjhile an innkeeper is often held to a specially high duty of care, the general rule, nationally, falls short of warranty.\u201d); Summers v. Fort Crockett Hotel, Ltd., 902 S.W.2d 20, 27 (Tex.App.1995) (hotel which did not sell or manufacture balcony railing cannot be held liable on design defect theory); cf. Jones v. Keetch, 388 Mich. 164, 167-68, 200 N.W.2d 227, 229 (Mich.1972) (hotel guest has viable claim against hotel for breach of implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose)."},"case_id":1567111,"label":"a"}
{"context":". Other courts in the United States that have considered the issue have reached the same conclusion.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"902 S.W.2d 20, 27","parenthetical":"hotel which did not sell or manufacture balcony railing cannot be held liable on design defect theory","sentence":"See Ely v. Blevins, 706 F.2d 479, 481 (4th Cir.1983) (\"[Wjhile an innkeeper is often held to a specially high duty of care, the general rule, nationally, falls short of warranty.\u201d); Summers v. Fort Crockett Hotel, Ltd., 902 S.W.2d 20, 27 (Tex.App.1995) (hotel which did not sell or manufacture balcony railing cannot be held liable on design defect theory); cf. Jones v. Keetch, 388 Mich. 164, 167-68, 200 N.W.2d 227, 229 (Mich.1972) (hotel guest has viable claim against hotel for breach of implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"200 N.W.2d 227, 229","parenthetical":"hotel guest has viable claim against hotel for breach of implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose","sentence":"See Ely v. Blevins, 706 F.2d 479, 481 (4th Cir.1983) (\"[Wjhile an innkeeper is often held to a specially high duty of care, the general rule, nationally, falls short of warranty.\u201d); Summers v. Fort Crockett Hotel, Ltd., 902 S.W.2d 20, 27 (Tex.App.1995) (hotel which did not sell or manufacture balcony railing cannot be held liable on design defect theory); cf. Jones v. Keetch, 388 Mich. 164, 167-68, 200 N.W.2d 227, 229 (Mich.1972) (hotel guest has viable claim against hotel for breach of implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose)."},"case_id":1567111,"label":"a"}
{"context":"We agree that the statute gives the Attorney General discretion, but disagree that this ends the analysis as to whether the Attorney General can promulgate this particular categorical eligibility exclusion. The Supreme Court itself has ruled that the two questions of discretion as to the ultimate relief and discretion as to eligibility exclusions are distinct.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"480 U.S. 443, 443-44","parenthetical":"distinguishing between the discretion in the Attorney General as to the ultimate decision to grant relief and the underlying process and criteria for eligibility for relief","sentence":"See Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 443-44, 107 S.Ct. 1207 (distinguishing between the discretion in the Attorney General as to the ultimate decision to grant relief and the underlying process and criteria for eligibility for relief); see also Goncalves, 144 F.3d at 125 (\u201cAnalytically, the decision whether an alien is eligible to be considered for a particular discretionary form of relief is a statutory question separate from the dis cretionary component of the administrative decision whether to grant relief.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"144 F.3d 125, 125","parenthetical":"\"Analytically, the decision whether an alien is eligible to be considered for a particular discretionary form of relief is a statutory question separate from the dis cretionary component of the administrative decision whether to grant relief.\"","sentence":"See Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 443-44, 107 S.Ct. 1207 (distinguishing between the discretion in the Attorney General as to the ultimate decision to grant relief and the underlying process and criteria for eligibility for relief); see also Goncalves, 144 F.3d at 125 (\u201cAnalytically, the decision whether an alien is eligible to be considered for a particular discretionary form of relief is a statutory question separate from the dis cretionary component of the administrative decision whether to grant relief.\u201d)."},"case_id":9164567,"label":"a"}
{"context":"We agree that the statute gives the Attorney General discretion, but disagree that this ends the analysis as to whether the Attorney General can promulgate this particular categorical eligibility exclusion. The Supreme Court itself has ruled that the two questions of discretion as to the ultimate relief and discretion as to eligibility exclusions are distinct.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"distinguishing between the discretion in the Attorney General as to the ultimate decision to grant relief and the underlying process and criteria for eligibility for relief","sentence":"See Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 443-44, 107 S.Ct. 1207 (distinguishing between the discretion in the Attorney General as to the ultimate decision to grant relief and the underlying process and criteria for eligibility for relief); see also Goncalves, 144 F.3d at 125 (\u201cAnalytically, the decision whether an alien is eligible to be considered for a particular discretionary form of relief is a statutory question separate from the dis cretionary component of the administrative decision whether to grant relief.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"144 F.3d 125, 125","parenthetical":"\"Analytically, the decision whether an alien is eligible to be considered for a particular discretionary form of relief is a statutory question separate from the dis cretionary component of the administrative decision whether to grant relief.\"","sentence":"See Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 443-44, 107 S.Ct. 1207 (distinguishing between the discretion in the Attorney General as to the ultimate decision to grant relief and the underlying process and criteria for eligibility for relief); see also Goncalves, 144 F.3d at 125 (\u201cAnalytically, the decision whether an alien is eligible to be considered for a particular discretionary form of relief is a statutory question separate from the dis cretionary component of the administrative decision whether to grant relief.\u201d)."},"case_id":9164567,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In light of the specific allegations of Defendants' deliberate indifference to the conditions at BCB, Plaintiffs have adequately stated a claim under the second prong of the due process analysis.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"111 F.3d 130, 130","parenthetical":"plaintiffs allegations that he directly spoke to defendants about conditions and that certain defendants directly witnessed conditions were sufficient to satisfy deliberate indifference on motion to dismiss","sentence":"See Walker, 111 F.3d at 130 (plaintiffs allegations that he directly spoke to defendants about conditions and that certain defendants directly witnessed conditions were sufficient to satisfy deliberate indifference on motion to dismiss); see also Gaston v. Coughlin, 249 F.3d 156, 166 (2d Cir.2001) (asserting that defendant prison guards \u201cmade daily rounds of SHU\u201d was sufficient to allege that defendants had actual knowledge of obvious inhumane conditions)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"249 F.3d 156, 166","parenthetical":"asserting that defendant prison guards \"made daily rounds of SHU\" was sufficient to allege that defendants had actual knowledge of obvious inhumane conditions","sentence":"See Walker, 111 F.3d at 130 (plaintiffs allegations that he directly spoke to defendants about conditions and that certain defendants directly witnessed conditions were sufficient to satisfy deliberate indifference on motion to dismiss); see also Gaston v. Coughlin, 249 F.3d 156, 166 (2d Cir.2001) (asserting that defendant prison guards \u201cmade daily rounds of SHU\u201d was sufficient to allege that defendants had actual knowledge of obvious inhumane conditions)."},"case_id":3966146,"label":"a"}
{"context":". The omission of a definition of \"State\" from the modem Bankruptcy Code was recognized as an error almost as soon as the modern Code was enacted. See Lubben, 88 Am. Bankr.L.J. at 573-75. Most assumed that the Code would still apply to Puerto Rico because, despite the significant substantive and procedural changes that the Code made to pre-Code law, those changes were tangential to the continued applicability of the federal bankruptcy law to Puerto Rico.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"523 U.S. 221, 221-22","parenthetical":"explaining that the Code is not to be construed \"to erode past bankruptcy practice absent a clear indication that Congress intended such a departure\"","sentence":"See, e.g., id. at 572-73 & n. 125; see also In re Segarra, 14 B.R. 870, 872-73 (D.P.R.1981) (finding nothing that \"would indicate that anyone in the vast bureaucracy of the federal government has had the slightest doubt that Congress did not intend the Bankruptcy Code to extend to Puerto Rico\u201d); cf. Cohen, 523 U.S. at 221-22, 118 S.Ct. 1212 (explaining that the Code is not to be construed \"to erode past bankruptcy practice absent a clear indication that Congress intended such a departure\u201d); Wellness Int\u2019l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, - U.S. -, 135 S.Ct. 1932, 1939, 191 L.Ed.2d 911 (2015) (describing the Code\u2019s expansion of power given to courts adjudicating bankruptcy cases)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"14 B.R. 870, 872-73","parenthetical":"finding nothing that \"would indicate that anyone in the vast bureaucracy of the federal government has had the slightest doubt that Congress did not intend the Bankruptcy Code to extend to Puerto Rico\"","sentence":"See, e.g., id. at 572-73 & n. 125; see also In re Segarra, 14 B.R. 870, 872-73 (D.P.R.1981) (finding nothing that \"would indicate that anyone in the vast bureaucracy of the federal government has had the slightest doubt that Congress did not intend the Bankruptcy Code to extend to Puerto Rico\u201d); cf. Cohen, 523 U.S. at 221-22, 118 S.Ct. 1212 (explaining that the Code is not to be construed \"to erode past bankruptcy practice absent a clear indication that Congress intended such a departure\u201d); Wellness Int\u2019l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, - U.S. -, 135 S.Ct. 1932, 1939, 191 L.Ed.2d 911 (2015) (describing the Code\u2019s expansion of power given to courts adjudicating bankruptcy cases)."},"case_id":4358040,"label":"b"}
{"context":". The omission of a definition of \"State\" from the modem Bankruptcy Code was recognized as an error almost as soon as the modern Code was enacted. See Lubben, 88 Am. Bankr.L.J. at 573-75. Most assumed that the Code would still apply to Puerto Rico because, despite the significant substantive and procedural changes that the Code made to pre-Code law, those changes were tangential to the continued applicability of the federal bankruptcy law to Puerto Rico.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"14 B.R. 870, 872-73","parenthetical":"finding nothing that \"would indicate that anyone in the vast bureaucracy of the federal government has had the slightest doubt that Congress did not intend the Bankruptcy Code to extend to Puerto Rico\"","sentence":"See, e.g., id. at 572-73 & n. 125; see also In re Segarra, 14 B.R. 870, 872-73 (D.P.R.1981) (finding nothing that \"would indicate that anyone in the vast bureaucracy of the federal government has had the slightest doubt that Congress did not intend the Bankruptcy Code to extend to Puerto Rico\u201d); cf. Cohen, 523 U.S. at 221-22, 118 S.Ct. 1212 (explaining that the Code is not to be construed \"to erode past bankruptcy practice absent a clear indication that Congress intended such a departure\u201d); Wellness Int\u2019l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, - U.S. -, 135 S.Ct. 1932, 1939, 191 L.Ed.2d 911 (2015) (describing the Code\u2019s expansion of power given to courts adjudicating bankruptcy cases)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"explaining that the Code is not to be construed \"to erode past bankruptcy practice absent a clear indication that Congress intended such a departure\"","sentence":"See, e.g., id. at 572-73 & n. 125; see also In re Segarra, 14 B.R. 870, 872-73 (D.P.R.1981) (finding nothing that \"would indicate that anyone in the vast bureaucracy of the federal government has had the slightest doubt that Congress did not intend the Bankruptcy Code to extend to Puerto Rico\u201d); cf. Cohen, 523 U.S. at 221-22, 118 S.Ct. 1212 (explaining that the Code is not to be construed \"to erode past bankruptcy practice absent a clear indication that Congress intended such a departure\u201d); Wellness Int\u2019l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, - U.S. -, 135 S.Ct. 1932, 1939, 191 L.Ed.2d 911 (2015) (describing the Code\u2019s expansion of power given to courts adjudicating bankruptcy cases)."},"case_id":4358040,"label":"a"}
{"context":". The omission of a definition of \"State\" from the modem Bankruptcy Code was recognized as an error almost as soon as the modern Code was enacted. See Lubben, 88 Am. Bankr.L.J. at 573-75. Most assumed that the Code would still apply to Puerto Rico because, despite the significant substantive and procedural changes that the Code made to pre-Code law, those changes were tangential to the continued applicability of the federal bankruptcy law to Puerto Rico.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"135 S.Ct. 1932, 1939","parenthetical":"describing the Code's expansion of power given to courts adjudicating bankruptcy cases","sentence":"See, e.g., id. at 572-73 & n. 125; see also In re Segarra, 14 B.R. 870, 872-73 (D.P.R.1981) (finding nothing that \"would indicate that anyone in the vast bureaucracy of the federal government has had the slightest doubt that Congress did not intend the Bankruptcy Code to extend to Puerto Rico\u201d); cf. Cohen, 523 U.S. at 221-22, 118 S.Ct. 1212 (explaining that the Code is not to be construed \"to erode past bankruptcy practice absent a clear indication that Congress intended such a departure\u201d); Wellness Int\u2019l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, - U.S. -, 135 S.Ct. 1932, 1939, 191 L.Ed.2d 911 (2015) (describing the Code\u2019s expansion of power given to courts adjudicating bankruptcy cases)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"14 B.R. 870, 872-73","parenthetical":"finding nothing that \"would indicate that anyone in the vast bureaucracy of the federal government has had the slightest doubt that Congress did not intend the Bankruptcy Code to extend to Puerto Rico\"","sentence":"See, e.g., id. at 572-73 & n. 125; see also In re Segarra, 14 B.R. 870, 872-73 (D.P.R.1981) (finding nothing that \"would indicate that anyone in the vast bureaucracy of the federal government has had the slightest doubt that Congress did not intend the Bankruptcy Code to extend to Puerto Rico\u201d); cf. Cohen, 523 U.S. at 221-22, 118 S.Ct. 1212 (explaining that the Code is not to be construed \"to erode past bankruptcy practice absent a clear indication that Congress intended such a departure\u201d); Wellness Int\u2019l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, - U.S. -, 135 S.Ct. 1932, 1939, 191 L.Ed.2d 911 (2015) (describing the Code\u2019s expansion of power given to courts adjudicating bankruptcy cases)."},"case_id":4358040,"label":"b"}
{"context":". The omission of a definition of \"State\" from the modem Bankruptcy Code was recognized as an error almost as soon as the modern Code was enacted. See Lubben, 88 Am. Bankr.L.J. at 573-75. Most assumed that the Code would still apply to Puerto Rico because, despite the significant substantive and procedural changes that the Code made to pre-Code law, those changes were tangential to the continued applicability of the federal bankruptcy law to Puerto Rico.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"describing the Code's expansion of power given to courts adjudicating bankruptcy cases","sentence":"See, e.g., id. at 572-73 & n. 125; see also In re Segarra, 14 B.R. 870, 872-73 (D.P.R.1981) (finding nothing that \"would indicate that anyone in the vast bureaucracy of the federal government has had the slightest doubt that Congress did not intend the Bankruptcy Code to extend to Puerto Rico\u201d); cf. Cohen, 523 U.S. at 221-22, 118 S.Ct. 1212 (explaining that the Code is not to be construed \"to erode past bankruptcy practice absent a clear indication that Congress intended such a departure\u201d); Wellness Int\u2019l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, - U.S. -, 135 S.Ct. 1932, 1939, 191 L.Ed.2d 911 (2015) (describing the Code\u2019s expansion of power given to courts adjudicating bankruptcy cases)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"14 B.R. 870, 872-73","parenthetical":"finding nothing that \"would indicate that anyone in the vast bureaucracy of the federal government has had the slightest doubt that Congress did not intend the Bankruptcy Code to extend to Puerto Rico\"","sentence":"See, e.g., id. at 572-73 & n. 125; see also In re Segarra, 14 B.R. 870, 872-73 (D.P.R.1981) (finding nothing that \"would indicate that anyone in the vast bureaucracy of the federal government has had the slightest doubt that Congress did not intend the Bankruptcy Code to extend to Puerto Rico\u201d); cf. Cohen, 523 U.S. at 221-22, 118 S.Ct. 1212 (explaining that the Code is not to be construed \"to erode past bankruptcy practice absent a clear indication that Congress intended such a departure\u201d); Wellness Int\u2019l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, - U.S. -, 135 S.Ct. 1932, 1939, 191 L.Ed.2d 911 (2015) (describing the Code\u2019s expansion of power given to courts adjudicating bankruptcy cases)."},"case_id":4358040,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Because it is not claimed that the product is harmful, the government's underlying -- if unarticulated-- premise must be that consumers have a limited amount of either attention or dollars that could be devoted to pursuing health through nutrition, and therefore products that are not indisputably health enhancing should be discouraged as threatening to crowd out more worthy expenditures. We are rather dubious that this simplistic view of human nature or market behavior is sound, but, in any event, it surely cannot be said that this notion-- which the government does not even dare openly to set forth -- is a direct pursuit of consumer health; it would seem a rather indirect route, to say the least.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"517 U.S. 484, 503","parenthetical":"opinion of Stevens, J., joined by Kennedy, J., and Ginsburg, J.","sentence":"See Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 375, 97 5.Ct. 2691, 53 L.Ed.2d 810 (1977) (\u201c[W]e view as dubious any justification that is based on the benefits of public ignorance.\u201d); cf. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 503, 116 S.Ct. 1495, 134 L.Ed.2d 711 (1996) (opinion of Stevens, J., joined by Kennedy, J., and Ginsburg, J.) (\u201cThe First Amendment directs us to be especially skeptical of regulations [of indisputably non-misleading information] that seek to keep people in the dark for what the government perceives to be their own good.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"433 U.S. 350, 375","parenthetical":"\"[W]e view as dubious any justification that is based on the benefits of public ignorance.\"","sentence":"See Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 375, 97 5.Ct. 2691, 53 L.Ed.2d 810 (1977) (\u201c[W]e view as dubious any justification that is based on the benefits of public ignorance.\u201d); cf. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 503, 116 S.Ct. 1495, 134 L.Ed.2d 711 (1996) (opinion of Stevens, J., joined by Kennedy, J., and Ginsburg, J.) (\u201cThe First Amendment directs us to be especially skeptical of regulations [of indisputably non-misleading information] that seek to keep people in the dark for what the government perceives to be their own good.\u201d)."},"case_id":3668070,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Because it is not claimed that the product is harmful, the government's underlying -- if unarticulated-- premise must be that consumers have a limited amount of either attention or dollars that could be devoted to pursuing health through nutrition, and therefore products that are not indisputably health enhancing should be discouraged as threatening to crowd out more worthy expenditures. We are rather dubious that this simplistic view of human nature or market behavior is sound, but, in any event, it surely cannot be said that this notion-- which the government does not even dare openly to set forth -- is a direct pursuit of consumer health; it would seem a rather indirect route, to say the least.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"433 U.S. 350, 375","parenthetical":"\"[W]e view as dubious any justification that is based on the benefits of public ignorance.\"","sentence":"See Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 375, 97 5.Ct. 2691, 53 L.Ed.2d 810 (1977) (\u201c[W]e view as dubious any justification that is based on the benefits of public ignorance.\u201d); cf. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 503, 116 S.Ct. 1495, 134 L.Ed.2d 711 (1996) (opinion of Stevens, J., joined by Kennedy, J., and Ginsburg, J.) (\u201cThe First Amendment directs us to be especially skeptical of regulations [of indisputably non-misleading information] that seek to keep people in the dark for what the government perceives to be their own good.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"opinion of Stevens, J., joined by Kennedy, J., and Ginsburg, J.","sentence":"See Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 375, 97 5.Ct. 2691, 53 L.Ed.2d 810 (1977) (\u201c[W]e view as dubious any justification that is based on the benefits of public ignorance.\u201d); cf. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 503, 116 S.Ct. 1495, 134 L.Ed.2d 711 (1996) (opinion of Stevens, J., joined by Kennedy, J., and Ginsburg, J.) (\u201cThe First Amendment directs us to be especially skeptical of regulations [of indisputably non-misleading information] that seek to keep people in the dark for what the government perceives to be their own good.\u201d)."},"case_id":3668070,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Because it is not claimed that the product is harmful, the government's underlying -- if unarticulated-- premise must be that consumers have a limited amount of either attention or dollars that could be devoted to pursuing health through nutrition, and therefore products that are not indisputably health enhancing should be discouraged as threatening to crowd out more worthy expenditures. We are rather dubious that this simplistic view of human nature or market behavior is sound, but, in any event, it surely cannot be said that this notion-- which the government does not even dare openly to set forth -- is a direct pursuit of consumer health; it would seem a rather indirect route, to say the least.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"opinion of Stevens, J., joined by Kennedy, J., and Ginsburg, J.","sentence":"See Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 375, 97 5.Ct. 2691, 53 L.Ed.2d 810 (1977) (\u201c[W]e view as dubious any justification that is based on the benefits of public ignorance.\u201d); cf. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 503, 116 S.Ct. 1495, 134 L.Ed.2d 711 (1996) (opinion of Stevens, J., joined by Kennedy, J., and Ginsburg, J.) (\u201cThe First Amendment directs us to be especially skeptical of regulations [of indisputably non-misleading information] that seek to keep people in the dark for what the government perceives to be their own good.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"433 U.S. 350, 375","parenthetical":"\"[W]e view as dubious any justification that is based on the benefits of public ignorance.\"","sentence":"See Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 375, 97 5.Ct. 2691, 53 L.Ed.2d 810 (1977) (\u201c[W]e view as dubious any justification that is based on the benefits of public ignorance.\u201d); cf. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 503, 116 S.Ct. 1495, 134 L.Ed.2d 711 (1996) (opinion of Stevens, J., joined by Kennedy, J., and Ginsburg, J.) (\u201cThe First Amendment directs us to be especially skeptical of regulations [of indisputably non-misleading information] that seek to keep people in the dark for what the government perceives to be their own good.\u201d)."},"case_id":3668070,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Because it is not claimed that the product is harmful, the government's underlying -- if unarticulated-- premise must be that consumers have a limited amount of either attention or dollars that could be devoted to pursuing health through nutrition, and therefore products that are not indisputably health enhancing should be discouraged as threatening to crowd out more worthy expenditures. We are rather dubious that this simplistic view of human nature or market behavior is sound, but, in any event, it surely cannot be said that this notion-- which the government does not even dare openly to set forth -- is a direct pursuit of consumer health; it would seem a rather indirect route, to say the least.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"517 U.S. 484, 503","parenthetical":"opinion of Stevens, J., joined by Kennedy, J., and Ginsburg, J.","sentence":"See Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 375, 97 5.Ct. 2691, 53 L.Ed.2d 810 (1977) (\u201c[W]e view as dubious any justification that is based on the benefits of public ignorance.\u201d); cf. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 503, 116 S.Ct. 1495, 134 L.Ed.2d 711 (1996) (opinion of Stevens, J., joined by Kennedy, J., and Ginsburg, J.) (\u201cThe First Amendment directs us to be especially skeptical of regulations [of indisputably non-misleading information] that seek to keep people in the dark for what the government perceives to be their own good.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[W]e view as dubious any justification that is based on the benefits of public ignorance.\"","sentence":"See Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 375, 97 5.Ct. 2691, 53 L.Ed.2d 810 (1977) (\u201c[W]e view as dubious any justification that is based on the benefits of public ignorance.\u201d); cf. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 503, 116 S.Ct. 1495, 134 L.Ed.2d 711 (1996) (opinion of Stevens, J., joined by Kennedy, J., and Ginsburg, J.) (\u201cThe First Amendment directs us to be especially skeptical of regulations [of indisputably non-misleading information] that seek to keep people in the dark for what the government perceives to be their own good.\u201d)."},"case_id":3668070,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Because it is not claimed that the product is harmful, the government's underlying -- if unarticulated-- premise must be that consumers have a limited amount of either attention or dollars that could be devoted to pursuing health through nutrition, and therefore products that are not indisputably health enhancing should be discouraged as threatening to crowd out more worthy expenditures. We are rather dubious that this simplistic view of human nature or market behavior is sound, but, in any event, it surely cannot be said that this notion-- which the government does not even dare openly to set forth -- is a direct pursuit of consumer health; it would seem a rather indirect route, to say the least.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[W]e view as dubious any justification that is based on the benefits of public ignorance.\"","sentence":"See Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 375, 97 5.Ct. 2691, 53 L.Ed.2d 810 (1977) (\u201c[W]e view as dubious any justification that is based on the benefits of public ignorance.\u201d); cf. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 503, 116 S.Ct. 1495, 134 L.Ed.2d 711 (1996) (opinion of Stevens, J., joined by Kennedy, J., and Ginsburg, J.) (\u201cThe First Amendment directs us to be especially skeptical of regulations [of indisputably non-misleading information] that seek to keep people in the dark for what the government perceives to be their own good.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"opinion of Stevens, J., joined by Kennedy, J., and Ginsburg, J.","sentence":"See Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 375, 97 5.Ct. 2691, 53 L.Ed.2d 810 (1977) (\u201c[W]e view as dubious any justification that is based on the benefits of public ignorance.\u201d); cf. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 503, 116 S.Ct. 1495, 134 L.Ed.2d 711 (1996) (opinion of Stevens, J., joined by Kennedy, J., and Ginsburg, J.) (\u201cThe First Amendment directs us to be especially skeptical of regulations [of indisputably non-misleading information] that seek to keep people in the dark for what the government perceives to be their own good.\u201d)."},"case_id":3668070,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Because it is not claimed that the product is harmful, the government's underlying -- if unarticulated-- premise must be that consumers have a limited amount of either attention or dollars that could be devoted to pursuing health through nutrition, and therefore products that are not indisputably health enhancing should be discouraged as threatening to crowd out more worthy expenditures. We are rather dubious that this simplistic view of human nature or market behavior is sound, but, in any event, it surely cannot be said that this notion-- which the government does not even dare openly to set forth -- is a direct pursuit of consumer health; it would seem a rather indirect route, to say the least.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"opinion of Stevens, J., joined by Kennedy, J., and Ginsburg, J.","sentence":"See Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 375, 97 5.Ct. 2691, 53 L.Ed.2d 810 (1977) (\u201c[W]e view as dubious any justification that is based on the benefits of public ignorance.\u201d); cf. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 503, 116 S.Ct. 1495, 134 L.Ed.2d 711 (1996) (opinion of Stevens, J., joined by Kennedy, J., and Ginsburg, J.) (\u201cThe First Amendment directs us to be especially skeptical of regulations [of indisputably non-misleading information] that seek to keep people in the dark for what the government perceives to be their own good.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[W]e view as dubious any justification that is based on the benefits of public ignorance.\"","sentence":"See Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 375, 97 5.Ct. 2691, 53 L.Ed.2d 810 (1977) (\u201c[W]e view as dubious any justification that is based on the benefits of public ignorance.\u201d); cf. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 503, 116 S.Ct. 1495, 134 L.Ed.2d 711 (1996) (opinion of Stevens, J., joined by Kennedy, J., and Ginsburg, J.) (\u201cThe First Amendment directs us to be especially skeptical of regulations [of indisputably non-misleading information] that seek to keep people in the dark for what the government perceives to be their own good.\u201d)."},"case_id":3668070,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Thus, the policy goal of Iowa tort law appears to be to \"fully compensate\" tort victims. This policy goal is identical under Minnesota tort law.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"313 N.W.2d 10, 12","parenthetical":"\"this court has often said that it is in the interest of this state to see that tort victims are fully compensated.\"","sentence":"See Bigelow v. Halloran, 313 N.W.2d 10, 12 (Minn.1981) (\u201cthis court has often said that it is in the interest of this state to see that tort victims are fully compensated.\u201d); see also Jepson v. General Cas. Co. of Wisconsin, 513 N.W.2d 467, 470 (Minn.1994) (observing that \u201cMinnesota places great value in compensating tort victims.\u201d); Jacobson v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Group, 645 N.W.2d 741, 746-47 (Minn.Ct.App.2002) (noting that it was Minnesota\u2019s \u201cimportant governmental interest\u201d in seeing that all tort victims are fully compensated); Gimmestad v. Gimmestad, 451 N.W.2d 662, 666 (Minn.Ct.App.1990) (\u201cMinnesota is interested in seeing that \u2018tort victims are fully compensated.\u2019 \u201d) (quoting Bigelow, 313 N.W.2d at 12). Iowa\u2019s interest in this litigation, however, is not founded solely on an interest in fully compensating tort victims, Iowa has a further interest in application of its law because the allegedly tortious conduct occurred in Iowa. Therefore, where the court has determined, based on the \u00a7 145(2) \u201ccontacts,\u201d that Iowa\u2019s interest is \u201cdominant,\u201d the \u00a7 6 \u201cfactors\u201d requiring consideration and comparison of the policies and relative interests of the nominee states also weigh in favor of application of Iowa law in this case."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"513 N.W.2d 467, 470","parenthetical":"observing that \"Minnesota places great value in compensating tort victims.\"","sentence":"See Bigelow v. Halloran, 313 N.W.2d 10, 12 (Minn.1981) (\u201cthis court has often said that it is in the interest of this state to see that tort victims are fully compensated.\u201d); see also Jepson v. General Cas. Co. of Wisconsin, 513 N.W.2d 467, 470 (Minn.1994) (observing that \u201cMinnesota places great value in compensating tort victims.\u201d); Jacobson v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Group, 645 N.W.2d 741, 746-47 (Minn.Ct.App.2002) (noting that it was Minnesota\u2019s \u201cimportant governmental interest\u201d in seeing that all tort victims are fully compensated); Gimmestad v. Gimmestad, 451 N.W.2d 662, 666 (Minn.Ct.App.1990) (\u201cMinnesota is interested in seeing that \u2018tort victims are fully compensated.\u2019 \u201d) (quoting Bigelow, 313 N.W.2d at 12). Iowa\u2019s interest in this litigation, however, is not founded solely on an interest in fully compensating tort victims, Iowa has a further interest in application of its law because the allegedly tortious conduct occurred in Iowa. Therefore, where the court has determined, based on the \u00a7 145(2) \u201ccontacts,\u201d that Iowa\u2019s interest is \u201cdominant,\u201d the \u00a7 6 \u201cfactors\u201d requiring consideration and comparison of the policies and relative interests of the nominee states also weigh in favor of application of Iowa law in this case."},"case_id":3862826,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Thus, the policy goal of Iowa tort law appears to be to \"fully compensate\" tort victims. This policy goal is identical under Minnesota tort law.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"645 N.W.2d 741, 746-47","parenthetical":"noting that it was Minnesota's \"important governmental interest\" in seeing that all tort victims are fully compensated","sentence":"See Bigelow v. Halloran, 313 N.W.2d 10, 12 (Minn.1981) (\u201cthis court has often said that it is in the interest of this state to see that tort victims are fully compensated.\u201d); see also Jepson v. General Cas. Co. of Wisconsin, 513 N.W.2d 467, 470 (Minn.1994) (observing that \u201cMinnesota places great value in compensating tort victims.\u201d); Jacobson v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Group, 645 N.W.2d 741, 746-47 (Minn.Ct.App.2002) (noting that it was Minnesota\u2019s \u201cimportant governmental interest\u201d in seeing that all tort victims are fully compensated); Gimmestad v. Gimmestad, 451 N.W.2d 662, 666 (Minn.Ct.App.1990) (\u201cMinnesota is interested in seeing that \u2018tort victims are fully compensated.\u2019 \u201d) (quoting Bigelow, 313 N.W.2d at 12). Iowa\u2019s interest in this litigation, however, is not founded solely on an interest in fully compensating tort victims, Iowa has a further interest in application of its law because the allegedly tortious conduct occurred in Iowa. Therefore, where the court has determined, based on the \u00a7 145(2) \u201ccontacts,\u201d that Iowa\u2019s interest is \u201cdominant,\u201d the \u00a7 6 \u201cfactors\u201d requiring consideration and comparison of the policies and relative interests of the nominee states also weigh in favor of application of Iowa law in this case."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"313 N.W.2d 10, 12","parenthetical":"\"this court has often said that it is in the interest of this state to see that tort victims are fully compensated.\"","sentence":"See Bigelow v. Halloran, 313 N.W.2d 10, 12 (Minn.1981) (\u201cthis court has often said that it is in the interest of this state to see that tort victims are fully compensated.\u201d); see also Jepson v. General Cas. Co. of Wisconsin, 513 N.W.2d 467, 470 (Minn.1994) (observing that \u201cMinnesota places great value in compensating tort victims.\u201d); Jacobson v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Group, 645 N.W.2d 741, 746-47 (Minn.Ct.App.2002) (noting that it was Minnesota\u2019s \u201cimportant governmental interest\u201d in seeing that all tort victims are fully compensated); Gimmestad v. Gimmestad, 451 N.W.2d 662, 666 (Minn.Ct.App.1990) (\u201cMinnesota is interested in seeing that \u2018tort victims are fully compensated.\u2019 \u201d) (quoting Bigelow, 313 N.W.2d at 12). Iowa\u2019s interest in this litigation, however, is not founded solely on an interest in fully compensating tort victims, Iowa has a further interest in application of its law because the allegedly tortious conduct occurred in Iowa. Therefore, where the court has determined, based on the \u00a7 145(2) \u201ccontacts,\u201d that Iowa\u2019s interest is \u201cdominant,\u201d the \u00a7 6 \u201cfactors\u201d requiring consideration and comparison of the policies and relative interests of the nominee states also weigh in favor of application of Iowa law in this case."},"case_id":3862826,"label":"b"}
{"context":"While Plaintiffs may have abandoned this argument given the Florida Supreme Court's amendment of the appellate rules, the Court nonetheless notes that Florida's Act provides a bypass procedure that is every bit as expeditious as procedures that were upheld by the Supreme Court in Akron. In Akron, the Court upheld an Ohio statute that requires the trial court to make its waiver decision within five \"business days\" after the minor files her bypass petition, requires the court of appeals to docket an appeal within four \"days\" after the minor files a notice of appeal, and requires the court of appeals to render a decision within five \"days\" after docketing. Against an argument that Ohio's bypass procedure could take up to 22 calendar days, assuming that the Ohio Legislature meant for all of the references to \"days\" to mean \"business days,\" the Supreme Court wrote: \"[blinder our precedents, the mere possibility that the procedure may require up to 22 days in a rare case is plainly insufficient to invalidate the statute on its face.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"497 U.S. 514, 514","parenthetical":"also suggesting that an interpretation of the term \"days,\" as used in the statute's provision regarding the appellate court's responsibilities, to mean business days instead of calendar days \"seems inappropriate and unnecessary because of the express and contrasting use of 'business days' in [the statute's provision regarding the trial court's responsibilities]\"","sentence":"Akron 497 U.S. at 514, 110 S.Ct. 2972 (also suggesting that an interpretation of the term \u201cdays,\u201d as used in the statute\u2019s provision regarding the appellate court\u2019s responsibilities, to mean business days instead of calendar days \u201cseems inappropriate and unnecessary because of the express and contrasting use of \u2018business days\u2019 in [the statute\u2019s provision regarding the trial court\u2019s responsibilities]\u201d); see also Planned Parenthood Ass\u2019n of Kansas City, Mo., Inc. v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 103 S.Ct. 2517, 76 L.Ed.2d 733 (1983) (upholding a Missouri statute that could require 17 calendar days plus a sufficient time for deliberation and decision-making at both the trial and appellate levels); Planned Parenthood Ass\u2019n of the Atlanta Area, Inc. v. Miller, 934 F.2d 1462, 1482 (11th Cir.1991) (rejecting the plaintiffs lack of expediency argument, stating that \u201cthe mere possibility that a court will utilize all the time allotted to it by the legislature, and thereby extend the petition procedure to nineteen days, would be insufficient to invalidate the [Georgia Parental Notification Act] on its face\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"upholding a Missouri statute that could require 17 calendar days plus a sufficient time for deliberation and decision-making at both the trial and appellate levels","sentence":"Akron 497 U.S. at 514, 110 S.Ct. 2972 (also suggesting that an interpretation of the term \u201cdays,\u201d as used in the statute\u2019s provision regarding the appellate court\u2019s responsibilities, to mean business days instead of calendar days \u201cseems inappropriate and unnecessary because of the express and contrasting use of \u2018business days\u2019 in [the statute\u2019s provision regarding the trial court\u2019s responsibilities]\u201d); see also Planned Parenthood Ass\u2019n of Kansas City, Mo., Inc. v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 103 S.Ct. 2517, 76 L.Ed.2d 733 (1983) (upholding a Missouri statute that could require 17 calendar days plus a sufficient time for deliberation and decision-making at both the trial and appellate levels); Planned Parenthood Ass\u2019n of the Atlanta Area, Inc. v. Miller, 934 F.2d 1462, 1482 (11th Cir.1991) (rejecting the plaintiffs lack of expediency argument, stating that \u201cthe mere possibility that a court will utilize all the time allotted to it by the legislature, and thereby extend the petition procedure to nineteen days, would be insufficient to invalidate the [Georgia Parental Notification Act] on its face\u201d)."},"case_id":5597008,"label":"a"}
{"context":"While Plaintiffs may have abandoned this argument given the Florida Supreme Court's amendment of the appellate rules, the Court nonetheless notes that Florida's Act provides a bypass procedure that is every bit as expeditious as procedures that were upheld by the Supreme Court in Akron. In Akron, the Court upheld an Ohio statute that requires the trial court to make its waiver decision within five \"business days\" after the minor files her bypass petition, requires the court of appeals to docket an appeal within four \"days\" after the minor files a notice of appeal, and requires the court of appeals to render a decision within five \"days\" after docketing. Against an argument that Ohio's bypass procedure could take up to 22 calendar days, assuming that the Ohio Legislature meant for all of the references to \"days\" to mean \"business days,\" the Supreme Court wrote: \"[blinder our precedents, the mere possibility that the procedure may require up to 22 days in a rare case is plainly insufficient to invalidate the statute on its face.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"upholding a Missouri statute that could require 17 calendar days plus a sufficient time for deliberation and decision-making at both the trial and appellate levels","sentence":"Akron 497 U.S. at 514, 110 S.Ct. 2972 (also suggesting that an interpretation of the term \u201cdays,\u201d as used in the statute\u2019s provision regarding the appellate court\u2019s responsibilities, to mean business days instead of calendar days \u201cseems inappropriate and unnecessary because of the express and contrasting use of \u2018business days\u2019 in [the statute\u2019s provision regarding the trial court\u2019s responsibilities]\u201d); see also Planned Parenthood Ass\u2019n of Kansas City, Mo., Inc. v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 103 S.Ct. 2517, 76 L.Ed.2d 733 (1983) (upholding a Missouri statute that could require 17 calendar days plus a sufficient time for deliberation and decision-making at both the trial and appellate levels); Planned Parenthood Ass\u2019n of the Atlanta Area, Inc. v. Miller, 934 F.2d 1462, 1482 (11th Cir.1991) (rejecting the plaintiffs lack of expediency argument, stating that \u201cthe mere possibility that a court will utilize all the time allotted to it by the legislature, and thereby extend the petition procedure to nineteen days, would be insufficient to invalidate the [Georgia Parental Notification Act] on its face\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"497 U.S. 514, 514","parenthetical":"also suggesting that an interpretation of the term \"days,\" as used in the statute's provision regarding the appellate court's responsibilities, to mean business days instead of calendar days \"seems inappropriate and unnecessary because of the express and contrasting use of 'business days' in [the statute's provision regarding the trial court's responsibilities]\"","sentence":"Akron 497 U.S. at 514, 110 S.Ct. 2972 (also suggesting that an interpretation of the term \u201cdays,\u201d as used in the statute\u2019s provision regarding the appellate court\u2019s responsibilities, to mean business days instead of calendar days \u201cseems inappropriate and unnecessary because of the express and contrasting use of \u2018business days\u2019 in [the statute\u2019s provision regarding the trial court\u2019s responsibilities]\u201d); see also Planned Parenthood Ass\u2019n of Kansas City, Mo., Inc. v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 103 S.Ct. 2517, 76 L.Ed.2d 733 (1983) (upholding a Missouri statute that could require 17 calendar days plus a sufficient time for deliberation and decision-making at both the trial and appellate levels); Planned Parenthood Ass\u2019n of the Atlanta Area, Inc. v. Miller, 934 F.2d 1462, 1482 (11th Cir.1991) (rejecting the plaintiffs lack of expediency argument, stating that \u201cthe mere possibility that a court will utilize all the time allotted to it by the legislature, and thereby extend the petition procedure to nineteen days, would be insufficient to invalidate the [Georgia Parental Notification Act] on its face\u201d)."},"case_id":5597008,"label":"b"}
{"context":"While Plaintiffs may have abandoned this argument given the Florida Supreme Court's amendment of the appellate rules, the Court nonetheless notes that Florida's Act provides a bypass procedure that is every bit as expeditious as procedures that were upheld by the Supreme Court in Akron. In Akron, the Court upheld an Ohio statute that requires the trial court to make its waiver decision within five \"business days\" after the minor files her bypass petition, requires the court of appeals to docket an appeal within four \"days\" after the minor files a notice of appeal, and requires the court of appeals to render a decision within five \"days\" after docketing. Against an argument that Ohio's bypass procedure could take up to 22 calendar days, assuming that the Ohio Legislature meant for all of the references to \"days\" to mean \"business days,\" the Supreme Court wrote: \"[blinder our precedents, the mere possibility that the procedure may require up to 22 days in a rare case is plainly insufficient to invalidate the statute on its face.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"upholding a Missouri statute that could require 17 calendar days plus a sufficient time for deliberation and decision-making at both the trial and appellate levels","sentence":"Akron 497 U.S. at 514, 110 S.Ct. 2972 (also suggesting that an interpretation of the term \u201cdays,\u201d as used in the statute\u2019s provision regarding the appellate court\u2019s responsibilities, to mean business days instead of calendar days \u201cseems inappropriate and unnecessary because of the express and contrasting use of \u2018business days\u2019 in [the statute\u2019s provision regarding the trial court\u2019s responsibilities]\u201d); see also Planned Parenthood Ass\u2019n of Kansas City, Mo., Inc. v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 103 S.Ct. 2517, 76 L.Ed.2d 733 (1983) (upholding a Missouri statute that could require 17 calendar days plus a sufficient time for deliberation and decision-making at both the trial and appellate levels); Planned Parenthood Ass\u2019n of the Atlanta Area, Inc. v. Miller, 934 F.2d 1462, 1482 (11th Cir.1991) (rejecting the plaintiffs lack of expediency argument, stating that \u201cthe mere possibility that a court will utilize all the time allotted to it by the legislature, and thereby extend the petition procedure to nineteen days, would be insufficient to invalidate the [Georgia Parental Notification Act] on its face\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"497 U.S. 514, 514","parenthetical":"also suggesting that an interpretation of the term \"days,\" as used in the statute's provision regarding the appellate court's responsibilities, to mean business days instead of calendar days \"seems inappropriate and unnecessary because of the express and contrasting use of 'business days' in [the statute's provision regarding the trial court's responsibilities]\"","sentence":"Akron 497 U.S. at 514, 110 S.Ct. 2972 (also suggesting that an interpretation of the term \u201cdays,\u201d as used in the statute\u2019s provision regarding the appellate court\u2019s responsibilities, to mean business days instead of calendar days \u201cseems inappropriate and unnecessary because of the express and contrasting use of \u2018business days\u2019 in [the statute\u2019s provision regarding the trial court\u2019s responsibilities]\u201d); see also Planned Parenthood Ass\u2019n of Kansas City, Mo., Inc. v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 103 S.Ct. 2517, 76 L.Ed.2d 733 (1983) (upholding a Missouri statute that could require 17 calendar days plus a sufficient time for deliberation and decision-making at both the trial and appellate levels); Planned Parenthood Ass\u2019n of the Atlanta Area, Inc. v. Miller, 934 F.2d 1462, 1482 (11th Cir.1991) (rejecting the plaintiffs lack of expediency argument, stating that \u201cthe mere possibility that a court will utilize all the time allotted to it by the legislature, and thereby extend the petition procedure to nineteen days, would be insufficient to invalidate the [Georgia Parental Notification Act] on its face\u201d)."},"case_id":5597008,"label":"b"}
{"context":"While Plaintiffs may have abandoned this argument given the Florida Supreme Court's amendment of the appellate rules, the Court nonetheless notes that Florida's Act provides a bypass procedure that is every bit as expeditious as procedures that were upheld by the Supreme Court in Akron. In Akron, the Court upheld an Ohio statute that requires the trial court to make its waiver decision within five \"business days\" after the minor files her bypass petition, requires the court of appeals to docket an appeal within four \"days\" after the minor files a notice of appeal, and requires the court of appeals to render a decision within five \"days\" after docketing. Against an argument that Ohio's bypass procedure could take up to 22 calendar days, assuming that the Ohio Legislature meant for all of the references to \"days\" to mean \"business days,\" the Supreme Court wrote: \"[blinder our precedents, the mere possibility that the procedure may require up to 22 days in a rare case is plainly insufficient to invalidate the statute on its face.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"934 F.2d 1462, 1482","parenthetical":"rejecting the plaintiffs lack of expediency argument, stating that \"the mere possibility that a court will utilize all the time allotted to it by the legislature, and thereby extend the petition procedure to nineteen days, would be insufficient to invalidate the [Georgia Parental Notification Act] on its face\"","sentence":"Akron 497 U.S. at 514, 110 S.Ct. 2972 (also suggesting that an interpretation of the term \u201cdays,\u201d as used in the statute\u2019s provision regarding the appellate court\u2019s responsibilities, to mean business days instead of calendar days \u201cseems inappropriate and unnecessary because of the express and contrasting use of \u2018business days\u2019 in [the statute\u2019s provision regarding the trial court\u2019s responsibilities]\u201d); see also Planned Parenthood Ass\u2019n of Kansas City, Mo., Inc. v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 103 S.Ct. 2517, 76 L.Ed.2d 733 (1983) (upholding a Missouri statute that could require 17 calendar days plus a sufficient time for deliberation and decision-making at both the trial and appellate levels); Planned Parenthood Ass\u2019n of the Atlanta Area, Inc. v. Miller, 934 F.2d 1462, 1482 (11th Cir.1991) (rejecting the plaintiffs lack of expediency argument, stating that \u201cthe mere possibility that a court will utilize all the time allotted to it by the legislature, and thereby extend the petition procedure to nineteen days, would be insufficient to invalidate the [Georgia Parental Notification Act] on its face\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"497 U.S. 514, 514","parenthetical":"also suggesting that an interpretation of the term \"days,\" as used in the statute's provision regarding the appellate court's responsibilities, to mean business days instead of calendar days \"seems inappropriate and unnecessary because of the express and contrasting use of 'business days' in [the statute's provision regarding the trial court's responsibilities]\"","sentence":"Akron 497 U.S. at 514, 110 S.Ct. 2972 (also suggesting that an interpretation of the term \u201cdays,\u201d as used in the statute\u2019s provision regarding the appellate court\u2019s responsibilities, to mean business days instead of calendar days \u201cseems inappropriate and unnecessary because of the express and contrasting use of \u2018business days\u2019 in [the statute\u2019s provision regarding the trial court\u2019s responsibilities]\u201d); see also Planned Parenthood Ass\u2019n of Kansas City, Mo., Inc. v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 103 S.Ct. 2517, 76 L.Ed.2d 733 (1983) (upholding a Missouri statute that could require 17 calendar days plus a sufficient time for deliberation and decision-making at both the trial and appellate levels); Planned Parenthood Ass\u2019n of the Atlanta Area, Inc. v. Miller, 934 F.2d 1462, 1482 (11th Cir.1991) (rejecting the plaintiffs lack of expediency argument, stating that \u201cthe mere possibility that a court will utilize all the time allotted to it by the legislature, and thereby extend the petition procedure to nineteen days, would be insufficient to invalidate the [Georgia Parental Notification Act] on its face\u201d)."},"case_id":5597008,"label":"b"}
{"context":"While Plaintiffs may have abandoned this argument given the Florida Supreme Court's amendment of the appellate rules, the Court nonetheless notes that Florida's Act provides a bypass procedure that is every bit as expeditious as procedures that were upheld by the Supreme Court in Akron. In Akron, the Court upheld an Ohio statute that requires the trial court to make its waiver decision within five \"business days\" after the minor files her bypass petition, requires the court of appeals to docket an appeal within four \"days\" after the minor files a notice of appeal, and requires the court of appeals to render a decision within five \"days\" after docketing. Against an argument that Ohio's bypass procedure could take up to 22 calendar days, assuming that the Ohio Legislature meant for all of the references to \"days\" to mean \"business days,\" the Supreme Court wrote: \"[blinder our precedents, the mere possibility that the procedure may require up to 22 days in a rare case is plainly insufficient to invalidate the statute on its face.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"also suggesting that an interpretation of the term \"days,\" as used in the statute's provision regarding the appellate court's responsibilities, to mean business days instead of calendar days \"seems inappropriate and unnecessary because of the express and contrasting use of 'business days' in [the statute's provision regarding the trial court's responsibilities]\"","sentence":"Akron 497 U.S. at 514, 110 S.Ct. 2972 (also suggesting that an interpretation of the term \u201cdays,\u201d as used in the statute\u2019s provision regarding the appellate court\u2019s responsibilities, to mean business days instead of calendar days \u201cseems inappropriate and unnecessary because of the express and contrasting use of \u2018business days\u2019 in [the statute\u2019s provision regarding the trial court\u2019s responsibilities]\u201d); see also Planned Parenthood Ass\u2019n of Kansas City, Mo., Inc. v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 103 S.Ct. 2517, 76 L.Ed.2d 733 (1983) (upholding a Missouri statute that could require 17 calendar days plus a sufficient time for deliberation and decision-making at both the trial and appellate levels); Planned Parenthood Ass\u2019n of the Atlanta Area, Inc. v. Miller, 934 F.2d 1462, 1482 (11th Cir.1991) (rejecting the plaintiffs lack of expediency argument, stating that \u201cthe mere possibility that a court will utilize all the time allotted to it by the legislature, and thereby extend the petition procedure to nineteen days, would be insufficient to invalidate the [Georgia Parental Notification Act] on its face\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"upholding a Missouri statute that could require 17 calendar days plus a sufficient time for deliberation and decision-making at both the trial and appellate levels","sentence":"Akron 497 U.S. at 514, 110 S.Ct. 2972 (also suggesting that an interpretation of the term \u201cdays,\u201d as used in the statute\u2019s provision regarding the appellate court\u2019s responsibilities, to mean business days instead of calendar days \u201cseems inappropriate and unnecessary because of the express and contrasting use of \u2018business days\u2019 in [the statute\u2019s provision regarding the trial court\u2019s responsibilities]\u201d); see also Planned Parenthood Ass\u2019n of Kansas City, Mo., Inc. v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 103 S.Ct. 2517, 76 L.Ed.2d 733 (1983) (upholding a Missouri statute that could require 17 calendar days plus a sufficient time for deliberation and decision-making at both the trial and appellate levels); Planned Parenthood Ass\u2019n of the Atlanta Area, Inc. v. Miller, 934 F.2d 1462, 1482 (11th Cir.1991) (rejecting the plaintiffs lack of expediency argument, stating that \u201cthe mere possibility that a court will utilize all the time allotted to it by the legislature, and thereby extend the petition procedure to nineteen days, would be insufficient to invalidate the [Georgia Parental Notification Act] on its face\u201d)."},"case_id":5597008,"label":"a"}
{"context":"While Plaintiffs may have abandoned this argument given the Florida Supreme Court's amendment of the appellate rules, the Court nonetheless notes that Florida's Act provides a bypass procedure that is every bit as expeditious as procedures that were upheld by the Supreme Court in Akron. In Akron, the Court upheld an Ohio statute that requires the trial court to make its waiver decision within five \"business days\" after the minor files her bypass petition, requires the court of appeals to docket an appeal within four \"days\" after the minor files a notice of appeal, and requires the court of appeals to render a decision within five \"days\" after docketing. Against an argument that Ohio's bypass procedure could take up to 22 calendar days, assuming that the Ohio Legislature meant for all of the references to \"days\" to mean \"business days,\" the Supreme Court wrote: \"[blinder our precedents, the mere possibility that the procedure may require up to 22 days in a rare case is plainly insufficient to invalidate the statute on its face.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"upholding a Missouri statute that could require 17 calendar days plus a sufficient time for deliberation and decision-making at both the trial and appellate levels","sentence":"Akron 497 U.S. at 514, 110 S.Ct. 2972 (also suggesting that an interpretation of the term \u201cdays,\u201d as used in the statute\u2019s provision regarding the appellate court\u2019s responsibilities, to mean business days instead of calendar days \u201cseems inappropriate and unnecessary because of the express and contrasting use of \u2018business days\u2019 in [the statute\u2019s provision regarding the trial court\u2019s responsibilities]\u201d); see also Planned Parenthood Ass\u2019n of Kansas City, Mo., Inc. v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 103 S.Ct. 2517, 76 L.Ed.2d 733 (1983) (upholding a Missouri statute that could require 17 calendar days plus a sufficient time for deliberation and decision-making at both the trial and appellate levels); Planned Parenthood Ass\u2019n of the Atlanta Area, Inc. v. Miller, 934 F.2d 1462, 1482 (11th Cir.1991) (rejecting the plaintiffs lack of expediency argument, stating that \u201cthe mere possibility that a court will utilize all the time allotted to it by the legislature, and thereby extend the petition procedure to nineteen days, would be insufficient to invalidate the [Georgia Parental Notification Act] on its face\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"also suggesting that an interpretation of the term \"days,\" as used in the statute's provision regarding the appellate court's responsibilities, to mean business days instead of calendar days \"seems inappropriate and unnecessary because of the express and contrasting use of 'business days' in [the statute's provision regarding the trial court's responsibilities]\"","sentence":"Akron 497 U.S. at 514, 110 S.Ct. 2972 (also suggesting that an interpretation of the term \u201cdays,\u201d as used in the statute\u2019s provision regarding the appellate court\u2019s responsibilities, to mean business days instead of calendar days \u201cseems inappropriate and unnecessary because of the express and contrasting use of \u2018business days\u2019 in [the statute\u2019s provision regarding the trial court\u2019s responsibilities]\u201d); see also Planned Parenthood Ass\u2019n of Kansas City, Mo., Inc. v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 103 S.Ct. 2517, 76 L.Ed.2d 733 (1983) (upholding a Missouri statute that could require 17 calendar days plus a sufficient time for deliberation and decision-making at both the trial and appellate levels); Planned Parenthood Ass\u2019n of the Atlanta Area, Inc. v. Miller, 934 F.2d 1462, 1482 (11th Cir.1991) (rejecting the plaintiffs lack of expediency argument, stating that \u201cthe mere possibility that a court will utilize all the time allotted to it by the legislature, and thereby extend the petition procedure to nineteen days, would be insufficient to invalidate the [Georgia Parental Notification Act] on its face\u201d)."},"case_id":5597008,"label":"b"}
{"context":"While Plaintiffs may have abandoned this argument given the Florida Supreme Court's amendment of the appellate rules, the Court nonetheless notes that Florida's Act provides a bypass procedure that is every bit as expeditious as procedures that were upheld by the Supreme Court in Akron. In Akron, the Court upheld an Ohio statute that requires the trial court to make its waiver decision within five \"business days\" after the minor files her bypass petition, requires the court of appeals to docket an appeal within four \"days\" after the minor files a notice of appeal, and requires the court of appeals to render a decision within five \"days\" after docketing. Against an argument that Ohio's bypass procedure could take up to 22 calendar days, assuming that the Ohio Legislature meant for all of the references to \"days\" to mean \"business days,\" the Supreme Court wrote: \"[blinder our precedents, the mere possibility that the procedure may require up to 22 days in a rare case is plainly insufficient to invalidate the statute on its face.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"upholding a Missouri statute that could require 17 calendar days plus a sufficient time for deliberation and decision-making at both the trial and appellate levels","sentence":"Akron 497 U.S. at 514, 110 S.Ct. 2972 (also suggesting that an interpretation of the term \u201cdays,\u201d as used in the statute\u2019s provision regarding the appellate court\u2019s responsibilities, to mean business days instead of calendar days \u201cseems inappropriate and unnecessary because of the express and contrasting use of \u2018business days\u2019 in [the statute\u2019s provision regarding the trial court\u2019s responsibilities]\u201d); see also Planned Parenthood Ass\u2019n of Kansas City, Mo., Inc. v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 103 S.Ct. 2517, 76 L.Ed.2d 733 (1983) (upholding a Missouri statute that could require 17 calendar days plus a sufficient time for deliberation and decision-making at both the trial and appellate levels); Planned Parenthood Ass\u2019n of the Atlanta Area, Inc. v. Miller, 934 F.2d 1462, 1482 (11th Cir.1991) (rejecting the plaintiffs lack of expediency argument, stating that \u201cthe mere possibility that a court will utilize all the time allotted to it by the legislature, and thereby extend the petition procedure to nineteen days, would be insufficient to invalidate the [Georgia Parental Notification Act] on its face\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"also suggesting that an interpretation of the term \"days,\" as used in the statute's provision regarding the appellate court's responsibilities, to mean business days instead of calendar days \"seems inappropriate and unnecessary because of the express and contrasting use of 'business days' in [the statute's provision regarding the trial court's responsibilities]\"","sentence":"Akron 497 U.S. at 514, 110 S.Ct. 2972 (also suggesting that an interpretation of the term \u201cdays,\u201d as used in the statute\u2019s provision regarding the appellate court\u2019s responsibilities, to mean business days instead of calendar days \u201cseems inappropriate and unnecessary because of the express and contrasting use of \u2018business days\u2019 in [the statute\u2019s provision regarding the trial court\u2019s responsibilities]\u201d); see also Planned Parenthood Ass\u2019n of Kansas City, Mo., Inc. v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 103 S.Ct. 2517, 76 L.Ed.2d 733 (1983) (upholding a Missouri statute that could require 17 calendar days plus a sufficient time for deliberation and decision-making at both the trial and appellate levels); Planned Parenthood Ass\u2019n of the Atlanta Area, Inc. v. Miller, 934 F.2d 1462, 1482 (11th Cir.1991) (rejecting the plaintiffs lack of expediency argument, stating that \u201cthe mere possibility that a court will utilize all the time allotted to it by the legislature, and thereby extend the petition procedure to nineteen days, would be insufficient to invalidate the [Georgia Parental Notification Act] on its face\u201d)."},"case_id":5597008,"label":"b"}
{"context":"While Plaintiffs may have abandoned this argument given the Florida Supreme Court's amendment of the appellate rules, the Court nonetheless notes that Florida's Act provides a bypass procedure that is every bit as expeditious as procedures that were upheld by the Supreme Court in Akron. In Akron, the Court upheld an Ohio statute that requires the trial court to make its waiver decision within five \"business days\" after the minor files her bypass petition, requires the court of appeals to docket an appeal within four \"days\" after the minor files a notice of appeal, and requires the court of appeals to render a decision within five \"days\" after docketing. Against an argument that Ohio's bypass procedure could take up to 22 calendar days, assuming that the Ohio Legislature meant for all of the references to \"days\" to mean \"business days,\" the Supreme Court wrote: \"[blinder our precedents, the mere possibility that the procedure may require up to 22 days in a rare case is plainly insufficient to invalidate the statute on its face.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"also suggesting that an interpretation of the term \"days,\" as used in the statute's provision regarding the appellate court's responsibilities, to mean business days instead of calendar days \"seems inappropriate and unnecessary because of the express and contrasting use of 'business days' in [the statute's provision regarding the trial court's responsibilities]\"","sentence":"Akron 497 U.S. at 514, 110 S.Ct. 2972 (also suggesting that an interpretation of the term \u201cdays,\u201d as used in the statute\u2019s provision regarding the appellate court\u2019s responsibilities, to mean business days instead of calendar days \u201cseems inappropriate and unnecessary because of the express and contrasting use of \u2018business days\u2019 in [the statute\u2019s provision regarding the trial court\u2019s responsibilities]\u201d); see also Planned Parenthood Ass\u2019n of Kansas City, Mo., Inc. v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 103 S.Ct. 2517, 76 L.Ed.2d 733 (1983) (upholding a Missouri statute that could require 17 calendar days plus a sufficient time for deliberation and decision-making at both the trial and appellate levels); Planned Parenthood Ass\u2019n of the Atlanta Area, Inc. v. Miller, 934 F.2d 1462, 1482 (11th Cir.1991) (rejecting the plaintiffs lack of expediency argument, stating that \u201cthe mere possibility that a court will utilize all the time allotted to it by the legislature, and thereby extend the petition procedure to nineteen days, would be insufficient to invalidate the [Georgia Parental Notification Act] on its face\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"934 F.2d 1462, 1482","parenthetical":"rejecting the plaintiffs lack of expediency argument, stating that \"the mere possibility that a court will utilize all the time allotted to it by the legislature, and thereby extend the petition procedure to nineteen days, would be insufficient to invalidate the [Georgia Parental Notification Act] on its face\"","sentence":"Akron 497 U.S. at 514, 110 S.Ct. 2972 (also suggesting that an interpretation of the term \u201cdays,\u201d as used in the statute\u2019s provision regarding the appellate court\u2019s responsibilities, to mean business days instead of calendar days \u201cseems inappropriate and unnecessary because of the express and contrasting use of \u2018business days\u2019 in [the statute\u2019s provision regarding the trial court\u2019s responsibilities]\u201d); see also Planned Parenthood Ass\u2019n of Kansas City, Mo., Inc. v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 103 S.Ct. 2517, 76 L.Ed.2d 733 (1983) (upholding a Missouri statute that could require 17 calendar days plus a sufficient time for deliberation and decision-making at both the trial and appellate levels); Planned Parenthood Ass\u2019n of the Atlanta Area, Inc. v. Miller, 934 F.2d 1462, 1482 (11th Cir.1991) (rejecting the plaintiffs lack of expediency argument, stating that \u201cthe mere possibility that a court will utilize all the time allotted to it by the legislature, and thereby extend the petition procedure to nineteen days, would be insufficient to invalidate the [Georgia Parental Notification Act] on its face\u201d)."},"case_id":5597008,"label":"a"}
{"context":"We need not determine whether the district court clearly erred in finding that Spaulding knew of the possible criminal charges. Even assuming that Spaulding is correct and that the third factor weighed heavily in his favor, Spaulding would still be required to show actual prejudice because the reason for the delay did not weigh heavily against the government.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"122 F.3d 988, 988","parenthetical":"concluding that the defendant must establish actual prejudice because the reasons for the delay weighed in the government's favor","sentence":"See Ingram, 446 F.3d at 1336 (noting that only if \u201call three of these factors weigh heavily against the Government, the defendant need not show actual prejudice\u201d); see also Schlei, 122 F.3d at 988 (concluding that the defendant must establish actual prejudice because the reasons for the delay weighed in the government\u2019s favor)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"446 F.3d 1336, 1336","parenthetical":"noting that only if \"all three of these factors weigh heavily against the Government, the defendant need not show actual prejudice\"","sentence":"See Ingram, 446 F.3d at 1336 (noting that only if \u201call three of these factors weigh heavily against the Government, the defendant need not show actual prejudice\u201d); see also Schlei, 122 F.3d at 988 (concluding that the defendant must establish actual prejudice because the reasons for the delay weighed in the government\u2019s favor)."},"case_id":4241505,"label":"b"}
{"context":"1 44 Divisions of this court have consistently held that \"the privilege against self-incrimination is not implicated by a court-ordered mental examination when the information obtained therefrom is admitted only on the issue of mental condition.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"765 P.2d 644, 647","parenthetical":"only compulsion of evidence on the issue of guilt implicates a defendant's privilege against self-incrimination","sentence":"Herrera, 87 P.3d at 245 (evidence derived from court-ordered examinations concerning a defendant's capacity to form the requisite mental state is constitutionally admissible); see People v. Galimanis, 765 P.2d 644, 647 (Colo.App.1998) (only compulsion of evidence on the issue of guilt implicates a defendant's privilege against self-incrimination); see also People v. Tally, 7 P.3d 172, 182-83 (Colo.App.1999) (a psychiatrist's testimony at a unitary trial on defendant's silence during a sanity exam did not violate Fifth Amendment)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"87 P.3d 245, 245","parenthetical":"evidence derived from court-ordered examinations concerning a defendant's capacity to form the requisite mental state is constitutionally admissible","sentence":"Herrera, 87 P.3d at 245 (evidence derived from court-ordered examinations concerning a defendant's capacity to form the requisite mental state is constitutionally admissible); see People v. Galimanis, 765 P.2d 644, 647 (Colo.App.1998) (only compulsion of evidence on the issue of guilt implicates a defendant's privilege against self-incrimination); see also People v. Tally, 7 P.3d 172, 182-83 (Colo.App.1999) (a psychiatrist's testimony at a unitary trial on defendant's silence during a sanity exam did not violate Fifth Amendment)."},"case_id":6973406,"label":"b"}
{"context":"1 44 Divisions of this court have consistently held that \"the privilege against self-incrimination is not implicated by a court-ordered mental examination when the information obtained therefrom is admitted only on the issue of mental condition.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"87 P.3d 245, 245","parenthetical":"evidence derived from court-ordered examinations concerning a defendant's capacity to form the requisite mental state is constitutionally admissible","sentence":"Herrera, 87 P.3d at 245 (evidence derived from court-ordered examinations concerning a defendant's capacity to form the requisite mental state is constitutionally admissible); see People v. Galimanis, 765 P.2d 644, 647 (Colo.App.1998) (only compulsion of evidence on the issue of guilt implicates a defendant's privilege against self-incrimination); see also People v. Tally, 7 P.3d 172, 182-83 (Colo.App.1999) (a psychiatrist's testimony at a unitary trial on defendant's silence during a sanity exam did not violate Fifth Amendment)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"7 P.3d 172, 182-83","parenthetical":"a psychiatrist's testimony at a unitary trial on defendant's silence during a sanity exam did not violate Fifth Amendment","sentence":"Herrera, 87 P.3d at 245 (evidence derived from court-ordered examinations concerning a defendant's capacity to form the requisite mental state is constitutionally admissible); see People v. Galimanis, 765 P.2d 644, 647 (Colo.App.1998) (only compulsion of evidence on the issue of guilt implicates a defendant's privilege against self-incrimination); see also People v. Tally, 7 P.3d 172, 182-83 (Colo.App.1999) (a psychiatrist's testimony at a unitary trial on defendant's silence during a sanity exam did not violate Fifth Amendment)."},"case_id":6973406,"label":"a"}
{"context":"1 44 Divisions of this court have consistently held that \"the privilege against self-incrimination is not implicated by a court-ordered mental examination when the information obtained therefrom is admitted only on the issue of mental condition.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"7 P.3d 172, 182-83","parenthetical":"a psychiatrist's testimony at a unitary trial on defendant's silence during a sanity exam did not violate Fifth Amendment","sentence":"Herrera, 87 P.3d at 245 (evidence derived from court-ordered examinations concerning a defendant's capacity to form the requisite mental state is constitutionally admissible); see People v. Galimanis, 765 P.2d 644, 647 (Colo.App.1998) (only compulsion of evidence on the issue of guilt implicates a defendant's privilege against self-incrimination); see also People v. Tally, 7 P.3d 172, 182-83 (Colo.App.1999) (a psychiatrist's testimony at a unitary trial on defendant's silence during a sanity exam did not violate Fifth Amendment)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"765 P.2d 644, 647","parenthetical":"only compulsion of evidence on the issue of guilt implicates a defendant's privilege against self-incrimination","sentence":"Herrera, 87 P.3d at 245 (evidence derived from court-ordered examinations concerning a defendant's capacity to form the requisite mental state is constitutionally admissible); see People v. Galimanis, 765 P.2d 644, 647 (Colo.App.1998) (only compulsion of evidence on the issue of guilt implicates a defendant's privilege against self-incrimination); see also People v. Tally, 7 P.3d 172, 182-83 (Colo.App.1999) (a psychiatrist's testimony at a unitary trial on defendant's silence during a sanity exam did not violate Fifth Amendment)."},"case_id":6973406,"label":"b"}
{"context":". One significant question is the effect of a final judgment of liability resulting from breach of the defense duty notwithstanding a subsequent declaration that the policy did not cover the claim.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"944 P.2d 460, 468","parenthetical":"finding that insurer had no duty to defend but that evidence that insurer had taken position that it had no duty to indemnify until limits of insured's underlying policies were actually paid created fact issue as to whether insurer anticipatorily repudiated policy","sentence":"See Amato v. Mercury Cas. Co., 53 Cal.App.4th 825, 61 Cal.Rptr.2d 909, 914 (1997) (finding that insurer who wrongfully refuses to defend must pay full default judgment even if claim was not covered by policy); cf. Grace v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 944 P.2d 460, 468 (Alaska 1997) (finding that insurer had no duty to defend but that evidence that insurer had taken position that it had no duty to indemnify until limits of insured\u2019s underlying policies were actually paid created fact issue as to whether insurer anticipatorily repudiated policy)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding that insurer who wrongfully refuses to defend must pay full default judgment even if claim was not covered by policy","sentence":"See Amato v. Mercury Cas. Co., 53 Cal.App.4th 825, 61 Cal.Rptr.2d 909, 914 (1997) (finding that insurer who wrongfully refuses to defend must pay full default judgment even if claim was not covered by policy); cf. Grace v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 944 P.2d 460, 468 (Alaska 1997) (finding that insurer had no duty to defend but that evidence that insurer had taken position that it had no duty to indemnify until limits of insured\u2019s underlying policies were actually paid created fact issue as to whether insurer anticipatorily repudiated policy)."},"case_id":11456529,"label":"b"}
{"context":". One significant question is the effect of a final judgment of liability resulting from breach of the defense duty notwithstanding a subsequent declaration that the policy did not cover the claim.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"61 Cal.Rptr.2d 909, 914","parenthetical":"finding that insurer who wrongfully refuses to defend must pay full default judgment even if claim was not covered by policy","sentence":"See Amato v. Mercury Cas. Co., 53 Cal.App.4th 825, 61 Cal.Rptr.2d 909, 914 (1997) (finding that insurer who wrongfully refuses to defend must pay full default judgment even if claim was not covered by policy); cf. Grace v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 944 P.2d 460, 468 (Alaska 1997) (finding that insurer had no duty to defend but that evidence that insurer had taken position that it had no duty to indemnify until limits of insured\u2019s underlying policies were actually paid created fact issue as to whether insurer anticipatorily repudiated policy)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"944 P.2d 460, 468","parenthetical":"finding that insurer had no duty to defend but that evidence that insurer had taken position that it had no duty to indemnify until limits of insured's underlying policies were actually paid created fact issue as to whether insurer anticipatorily repudiated policy","sentence":"See Amato v. Mercury Cas. Co., 53 Cal.App.4th 825, 61 Cal.Rptr.2d 909, 914 (1997) (finding that insurer who wrongfully refuses to defend must pay full default judgment even if claim was not covered by policy); cf. Grace v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 944 P.2d 460, 468 (Alaska 1997) (finding that insurer had no duty to defend but that evidence that insurer had taken position that it had no duty to indemnify until limits of insured\u2019s underlying policies were actually paid created fact issue as to whether insurer anticipatorily repudiated policy)."},"case_id":11456529,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Other courts following SSR 00--4p, however, require the ALJ to elicit an explanation for an apparent conflict from the VE before relying on the VE's evidence and remand to the ALJ if such an inquiry is not made. In particular, many courts remand for further administrative proceedings where the ALJ fails to inquire to the VE about testimony that a claimant limited to simple tasks is capable of performing jobs that are incompatible with the DOT's reasoning level classifications.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"decided before SSR 00-4p but finding work at reasoning level two does not contradict mandate for simple, routine, repetitive work","sentence":"See also Money v. Barnhart, 91 Fed.Appx. 210 (3d Cir.2004) (decided before SSR 00-4p but finding work at reasoning level two does not contradict mandate for simple, routine, repetitive work)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"395 F.3d 1168, 1176","parenthetical":"remanding to ALJ pursuant to SSR 00-4p when apparent conflict between VE's assessment that claimant limited to simple and repetitive tasks could perform certain jobs that DOT classified as reasoning level three","sentence":"See Hackett v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1168, 1176 (10th Cir.2005) (remanding to ALJ pursuant to SSR 00-4p when apparent conflict between VE\u2019s assessment that claimant limited to simple and repetitive tasks could perform certain jobs that DOT classified as reasoning level three); Whitzell v. Barnhart, 379 F.Supp 2d 204, 219 (D.Mass.2005) (remanding in accordance with SSR 00-4p where apparent conflict between limitation of \u201csimple tasks\u201d and jobs with reasoning level of two); Carter v. Barnhart, 2005 WL 3263936 (D.Me.2005) (remanding because ALJ\u2019s limitation to simple repetitive tasks and DOT\u2019s assigned reasoning level of three required ALJ to question the VE about the discrepancy); Mead, supra at n. 3 (citing to SSR 00-4p as requiring ALJ to ask VE whether his opinion conflicted with DOT descriptions of jobs suggested even though claimant\u2019s counsel did not raise issue in administrative proceeding); Cooper, supra at n. 3 (finding ALJ has an affirmative duty to inquire whether VE\u2019s testimony presents any conflicts with DOT and remanding to ALJ because VE\u2019s testimony that claimant who was limited to simple and repetitive tasks could perform work requiring reasoning level two or three possibly conflicted with DOT)."},"case_id":1044016,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Other courts following SSR 00--4p, however, require the ALJ to elicit an explanation for an apparent conflict from the VE before relying on the VE's evidence and remand to the ALJ if such an inquiry is not made. In particular, many courts remand for further administrative proceedings where the ALJ fails to inquire to the VE about testimony that a claimant limited to simple tasks is capable of performing jobs that are incompatible with the DOT's reasoning level classifications.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"remanding because ALJ's limitation to simple repetitive tasks and DOT's assigned reasoning level of three required ALJ to question the VE about the discrepancy","sentence":"See Hackett v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1168, 1176 (10th Cir.2005) (remanding to ALJ pursuant to SSR 00-4p when apparent conflict between VE\u2019s assessment that claimant limited to simple and repetitive tasks could perform certain jobs that DOT classified as reasoning level three); Whitzell v. Barnhart, 379 F.Supp 2d 204, 219 (D.Mass.2005) (remanding in accordance with SSR 00-4p where apparent conflict between limitation of \u201csimple tasks\u201d and jobs with reasoning level of two); Carter v. Barnhart, 2005 WL 3263936 (D.Me.2005) (remanding because ALJ\u2019s limitation to simple repetitive tasks and DOT\u2019s assigned reasoning level of three required ALJ to question the VE about the discrepancy); Mead, supra at n. 3 (citing to SSR 00-4p as requiring ALJ to ask VE whether his opinion conflicted with DOT descriptions of jobs suggested even though claimant\u2019s counsel did not raise issue in administrative proceeding); Cooper, supra at n. 3 (finding ALJ has an affirmative duty to inquire whether VE\u2019s testimony presents any conflicts with DOT and remanding to ALJ because VE\u2019s testimony that claimant who was limited to simple and repetitive tasks could perform work requiring reasoning level two or three possibly conflicted with DOT)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"decided before SSR 00-4p but finding work at reasoning level two does not contradict mandate for simple, routine, repetitive work","sentence":"See also Money v. Barnhart, 91 Fed.Appx. 210 (3d Cir.2004) (decided before SSR 00-4p but finding work at reasoning level two does not contradict mandate for simple, routine, repetitive work)."},"case_id":1044016,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Moreover, \"the Board and its administrative judges have an obligation to inform the parties what is required to establish their cases. This obligation is particularly significant where, as here, the appellant is appearing pro se.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"49 M.S.P.R. 184, 187-89","parenthetical":"stating that \"to ensure fairness, the administrative judge should have advised the appellant prior to the close of the record that she had not provided the evidence to prove her claim\"","sentence":"Harless v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 71 M.S.P.R. 110, 113 (1996) (remanding because the administrative judge failed to instruct the appellant that he must support his claim of financial hardship with appropriate evidence); see also Goodnight v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 49 M.S.P.R. 184, 187-89 (1991) (stating that \u201cto ensure fairness, the administrative judge should have advised the appellant prior to the close of the record that she had not provided the evidence to prove her claim\u201d); cf. Wilson v. Dep\u2019t of Health & Human Servs., 834 F.2d 1011, 1012 (Fed.Cir.1987) (finding that an administrative judge should have informed appellant of deficiencies in her proof of entitlement to attorney\u2019s fees)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"71 M.S.P.R. 110, 113","parenthetical":"remanding because the administrative judge failed to instruct the appellant that he must support his claim of financial hardship with appropriate evidence","sentence":"Harless v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 71 M.S.P.R. 110, 113 (1996) (remanding because the administrative judge failed to instruct the appellant that he must support his claim of financial hardship with appropriate evidence); see also Goodnight v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 49 M.S.P.R. 184, 187-89 (1991) (stating that \u201cto ensure fairness, the administrative judge should have advised the appellant prior to the close of the record that she had not provided the evidence to prove her claim\u201d); cf. Wilson v. Dep\u2019t of Health & Human Servs., 834 F.2d 1011, 1012 (Fed.Cir.1987) (finding that an administrative judge should have informed appellant of deficiencies in her proof of entitlement to attorney\u2019s fees)."},"case_id":9343807,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Moreover, \"the Board and its administrative judges have an obligation to inform the parties what is required to establish their cases. This obligation is particularly significant where, as here, the appellant is appearing pro se.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"834 F.2d 1011, 1012","parenthetical":"finding that an administrative judge should have informed appellant of deficiencies in her proof of entitlement to attorney's fees","sentence":"Harless v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 71 M.S.P.R. 110, 113 (1996) (remanding because the administrative judge failed to instruct the appellant that he must support his claim of financial hardship with appropriate evidence); see also Goodnight v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 49 M.S.P.R. 184, 187-89 (1991) (stating that \u201cto ensure fairness, the administrative judge should have advised the appellant prior to the close of the record that she had not provided the evidence to prove her claim\u201d); cf. Wilson v. Dep\u2019t of Health & Human Servs., 834 F.2d 1011, 1012 (Fed.Cir.1987) (finding that an administrative judge should have informed appellant of deficiencies in her proof of entitlement to attorney\u2019s fees)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"71 M.S.P.R. 110, 113","parenthetical":"remanding because the administrative judge failed to instruct the appellant that he must support his claim of financial hardship with appropriate evidence","sentence":"Harless v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 71 M.S.P.R. 110, 113 (1996) (remanding because the administrative judge failed to instruct the appellant that he must support his claim of financial hardship with appropriate evidence); see also Goodnight v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 49 M.S.P.R. 184, 187-89 (1991) (stating that \u201cto ensure fairness, the administrative judge should have advised the appellant prior to the close of the record that she had not provided the evidence to prove her claim\u201d); cf. Wilson v. Dep\u2019t of Health & Human Servs., 834 F.2d 1011, 1012 (Fed.Cir.1987) (finding that an administrative judge should have informed appellant of deficiencies in her proof of entitlement to attorney\u2019s fees)."},"case_id":9343807,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Moreover, \"the Board and its administrative judges have an obligation to inform the parties what is required to establish their cases. This obligation is particularly significant where, as here, the appellant is appearing pro se.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"49 M.S.P.R. 184, 187-89","parenthetical":"stating that \"to ensure fairness, the administrative judge should have advised the appellant prior to the close of the record that she had not provided the evidence to prove her claim\"","sentence":"Harless v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 71 M.S.P.R. 110, 113 (1996) (remanding because the administrative judge failed to instruct the appellant that he must support his claim of financial hardship with appropriate evidence); see also Goodnight v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 49 M.S.P.R. 184, 187-89 (1991) (stating that \u201cto ensure fairness, the administrative judge should have advised the appellant prior to the close of the record that she had not provided the evidence to prove her claim\u201d); cf. Wilson v. Dep\u2019t of Health & Human Servs., 834 F.2d 1011, 1012 (Fed.Cir.1987) (finding that an administrative judge should have informed appellant of deficiencies in her proof of entitlement to attorney\u2019s fees)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"834 F.2d 1011, 1012","parenthetical":"finding that an administrative judge should have informed appellant of deficiencies in her proof of entitlement to attorney's fees","sentence":"Harless v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 71 M.S.P.R. 110, 113 (1996) (remanding because the administrative judge failed to instruct the appellant that he must support his claim of financial hardship with appropriate evidence); see also Goodnight v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 49 M.S.P.R. 184, 187-89 (1991) (stating that \u201cto ensure fairness, the administrative judge should have advised the appellant prior to the close of the record that she had not provided the evidence to prove her claim\u201d); cf. Wilson v. Dep\u2019t of Health & Human Servs., 834 F.2d 1011, 1012 (Fed.Cir.1987) (finding that an administrative judge should have informed appellant of deficiencies in her proof of entitlement to attorney\u2019s fees)."},"case_id":9343807,"label":"a"}
{"context":"On the opposite side, certain class members and their attorneys argued that the notice was insufficient and requested additional information beyond that set forth in the notice, including access to all discovery taken since class counsel began working on this matter in 1999. Similar such requests have been held to be within the discre tion of the trial court and have been routinely denied by courts examining class action settlements. See e.g., In re Lorazepam & Clorazepate Antitrust Litigation, nos.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"182 F.R.D. 71, 71-72","parenthetical":"exercising discretion to allow individual class member access to discovery materials","sentence":"Cf. NASDAQ Market-Makers, 182 F.R.D. at 71-72 (exercising discretion to allow individual class member access to discovery materials)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"2001 WL 1335702, at *2","parenthetical":"denying individual class member's request to engage in additional discovery","sentence":"MDL 1290(TFH) & 99MS276(TFH), 2001 WL 1335702, at *2 (D.D.C. Sept. 4,2001) (denying individual class member\u2019s request to engage in additional discovery); Prudential I, 962 F. Supp. at 563 (\u201c[OJbjectors have no absolute right to take independent discovery to prepare for a fairness hearing.\u201d)."},"case_id":111069,"label":"b"}
{"context":"On the opposite side, certain class members and their attorneys argued that the notice was insufficient and requested additional information beyond that set forth in the notice, including access to all discovery taken since class counsel began working on this matter in 1999. Similar such requests have been held to be within the discre tion of the trial court and have been routinely denied by courts examining class action settlements. See e.g., In re Lorazepam & Clorazepate Antitrust Litigation, nos.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"182 F.R.D. 71, 71-72","parenthetical":"exercising discretion to allow individual class member access to discovery materials","sentence":"Cf. NASDAQ Market-Makers, 182 F.R.D. at 71-72 (exercising discretion to allow individual class member access to discovery materials)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"962 F. Supp. 563, 563","parenthetical":"\"[OJbjectors have no absolute right to take independent discovery to prepare for a fairness hearing.\"","sentence":"MDL 1290(TFH) & 99MS276(TFH), 2001 WL 1335702, at *2 (D.D.C. Sept. 4,2001) (denying individual class member\u2019s request to engage in additional discovery); Prudential I, 962 F. Supp. at 563 (\u201c[OJbjectors have no absolute right to take independent discovery to prepare for a fairness hearing.\u201d)."},"case_id":111069,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The district court accepted the arguments that Catholic University made on the constitutional issue; namely, that the application of Title VII to the University would violate the Free Exercise Clause on the basis of the ministerial exception as supported by the pr e-Smith case law. If we were to conclude that the court came to the right conclusion through erroneous reasoning because it failed to take the effect of Smith's rejection of the compelling interest test on the exception and the exception's subsequent restora tion by RFRA, we could nonetheless affirm the court by taking account of the Act and its retroactive effect.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"302 U.S. 238, 245","parenthetical":"\"if the decision below is correct, it must be affirmed, although the lower court relied upon a wrong ground or gave a wrong reason\"","sentence":"See Helvering v. Gowran, 302 U.S. 238, 245, 58 S.Ct. 154, 158, 82 L.Ed. 224 (1937) (\u201cif the decision below is correct, it must be affirmed, although the lower court relied upon a wrong ground or gave a wrong reason\u201d); see also Kamen v. Kemper Financial Services, Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 99, 111 S.Ct. 1711, 1718, 114 L.Ed.2d 152 (1991) (\u201c[w]hen an issue ... is properly before the court, the court is not limited to the particular legal theories advanced by the parties, but rather retains the independent power to identify and apply the proper construction of governing law\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"500 U.S. 90, 99","parenthetical":"\"[w]hen an issue ... is properly before the court, the court is not limited to the particular legal theories advanced by the parties, but rather retains the independent power to identify and apply the proper construction of governing law\"","sentence":"See Helvering v. Gowran, 302 U.S. 238, 245, 58 S.Ct. 154, 158, 82 L.Ed. 224 (1937) (\u201cif the decision below is correct, it must be affirmed, although the lower court relied upon a wrong ground or gave a wrong reason\u201d); see also Kamen v. Kemper Financial Services, Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 99, 111 S.Ct. 1711, 1718, 114 L.Ed.2d 152 (1991) (\u201c[w]hen an issue ... is properly before the court, the court is not limited to the particular legal theories advanced by the parties, but rather retains the independent power to identify and apply the proper construction of governing law\u201d)."},"case_id":3693056,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The district court accepted the arguments that Catholic University made on the constitutional issue; namely, that the application of Title VII to the University would violate the Free Exercise Clause on the basis of the ministerial exception as supported by the pr e-Smith case law. If we were to conclude that the court came to the right conclusion through erroneous reasoning because it failed to take the effect of Smith's rejection of the compelling interest test on the exception and the exception's subsequent restora tion by RFRA, we could nonetheless affirm the court by taking account of the Act and its retroactive effect.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"111 S.Ct. 1711, 1718","parenthetical":"\"[w]hen an issue ... is properly before the court, the court is not limited to the particular legal theories advanced by the parties, but rather retains the independent power to identify and apply the proper construction of governing law\"","sentence":"See Helvering v. Gowran, 302 U.S. 238, 245, 58 S.Ct. 154, 158, 82 L.Ed. 224 (1937) (\u201cif the decision below is correct, it must be affirmed, although the lower court relied upon a wrong ground or gave a wrong reason\u201d); see also Kamen v. Kemper Financial Services, Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 99, 111 S.Ct. 1711, 1718, 114 L.Ed.2d 152 (1991) (\u201c[w]hen an issue ... is properly before the court, the court is not limited to the particular legal theories advanced by the parties, but rather retains the independent power to identify and apply the proper construction of governing law\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"302 U.S. 238, 245","parenthetical":"\"if the decision below is correct, it must be affirmed, although the lower court relied upon a wrong ground or gave a wrong reason\"","sentence":"See Helvering v. Gowran, 302 U.S. 238, 245, 58 S.Ct. 154, 158, 82 L.Ed. 224 (1937) (\u201cif the decision below is correct, it must be affirmed, although the lower court relied upon a wrong ground or gave a wrong reason\u201d); see also Kamen v. Kemper Financial Services, Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 99, 111 S.Ct. 1711, 1718, 114 L.Ed.2d 152 (1991) (\u201c[w]hen an issue ... is properly before the court, the court is not limited to the particular legal theories advanced by the parties, but rather retains the independent power to identify and apply the proper construction of governing law\u201d)."},"case_id":3693056,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The district court accepted the arguments that Catholic University made on the constitutional issue; namely, that the application of Title VII to the University would violate the Free Exercise Clause on the basis of the ministerial exception as supported by the pr e-Smith case law. If we were to conclude that the court came to the right conclusion through erroneous reasoning because it failed to take the effect of Smith's rejection of the compelling interest test on the exception and the exception's subsequent restora tion by RFRA, we could nonetheless affirm the court by taking account of the Act and its retroactive effect.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[w]hen an issue ... is properly before the court, the court is not limited to the particular legal theories advanced by the parties, but rather retains the independent power to identify and apply the proper construction of governing law\"","sentence":"See Helvering v. Gowran, 302 U.S. 238, 245, 58 S.Ct. 154, 158, 82 L.Ed. 224 (1937) (\u201cif the decision below is correct, it must be affirmed, although the lower court relied upon a wrong ground or gave a wrong reason\u201d); see also Kamen v. Kemper Financial Services, Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 99, 111 S.Ct. 1711, 1718, 114 L.Ed.2d 152 (1991) (\u201c[w]hen an issue ... is properly before the court, the court is not limited to the particular legal theories advanced by the parties, but rather retains the independent power to identify and apply the proper construction of governing law\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"302 U.S. 238, 245","parenthetical":"\"if the decision below is correct, it must be affirmed, although the lower court relied upon a wrong ground or gave a wrong reason\"","sentence":"See Helvering v. Gowran, 302 U.S. 238, 245, 58 S.Ct. 154, 158, 82 L.Ed. 224 (1937) (\u201cif the decision below is correct, it must be affirmed, although the lower court relied upon a wrong ground or gave a wrong reason\u201d); see also Kamen v. Kemper Financial Services, Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 99, 111 S.Ct. 1711, 1718, 114 L.Ed.2d 152 (1991) (\u201c[w]hen an issue ... is properly before the court, the court is not limited to the particular legal theories advanced by the parties, but rather retains the independent power to identify and apply the proper construction of governing law\u201d)."},"case_id":3693056,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The district court accepted the arguments that Catholic University made on the constitutional issue; namely, that the application of Title VII to the University would violate the Free Exercise Clause on the basis of the ministerial exception as supported by the pr e-Smith case law. If we were to conclude that the court came to the right conclusion through erroneous reasoning because it failed to take the effect of Smith's rejection of the compelling interest test on the exception and the exception's subsequent restora tion by RFRA, we could nonetheless affirm the court by taking account of the Act and its retroactive effect.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"58 S.Ct. 154, 158","parenthetical":"\"if the decision below is correct, it must be affirmed, although the lower court relied upon a wrong ground or gave a wrong reason\"","sentence":"See Helvering v. Gowran, 302 U.S. 238, 245, 58 S.Ct. 154, 158, 82 L.Ed. 224 (1937) (\u201cif the decision below is correct, it must be affirmed, although the lower court relied upon a wrong ground or gave a wrong reason\u201d); see also Kamen v. Kemper Financial Services, Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 99, 111 S.Ct. 1711, 1718, 114 L.Ed.2d 152 (1991) (\u201c[w]hen an issue ... is properly before the court, the court is not limited to the particular legal theories advanced by the parties, but rather retains the independent power to identify and apply the proper construction of governing law\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"500 U.S. 90, 99","parenthetical":"\"[w]hen an issue ... is properly before the court, the court is not limited to the particular legal theories advanced by the parties, but rather retains the independent power to identify and apply the proper construction of governing law\"","sentence":"See Helvering v. Gowran, 302 U.S. 238, 245, 58 S.Ct. 154, 158, 82 L.Ed. 224 (1937) (\u201cif the decision below is correct, it must be affirmed, although the lower court relied upon a wrong ground or gave a wrong reason\u201d); see also Kamen v. Kemper Financial Services, Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 99, 111 S.Ct. 1711, 1718, 114 L.Ed.2d 152 (1991) (\u201c[w]hen an issue ... is properly before the court, the court is not limited to the particular legal theories advanced by the parties, but rather retains the independent power to identify and apply the proper construction of governing law\u201d)."},"case_id":3693056,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The district court accepted the arguments that Catholic University made on the constitutional issue; namely, that the application of Title VII to the University would violate the Free Exercise Clause on the basis of the ministerial exception as supported by the pr e-Smith case law. If we were to conclude that the court came to the right conclusion through erroneous reasoning because it failed to take the effect of Smith's rejection of the compelling interest test on the exception and the exception's subsequent restora tion by RFRA, we could nonetheless affirm the court by taking account of the Act and its retroactive effect.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"111 S.Ct. 1711, 1718","parenthetical":"\"[w]hen an issue ... is properly before the court, the court is not limited to the particular legal theories advanced by the parties, but rather retains the independent power to identify and apply the proper construction of governing law\"","sentence":"See Helvering v. Gowran, 302 U.S. 238, 245, 58 S.Ct. 154, 158, 82 L.Ed. 224 (1937) (\u201cif the decision below is correct, it must be affirmed, although the lower court relied upon a wrong ground or gave a wrong reason\u201d); see also Kamen v. Kemper Financial Services, Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 99, 111 S.Ct. 1711, 1718, 114 L.Ed.2d 152 (1991) (\u201c[w]hen an issue ... is properly before the court, the court is not limited to the particular legal theories advanced by the parties, but rather retains the independent power to identify and apply the proper construction of governing law\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"58 S.Ct. 154, 158","parenthetical":"\"if the decision below is correct, it must be affirmed, although the lower court relied upon a wrong ground or gave a wrong reason\"","sentence":"See Helvering v. Gowran, 302 U.S. 238, 245, 58 S.Ct. 154, 158, 82 L.Ed. 224 (1937) (\u201cif the decision below is correct, it must be affirmed, although the lower court relied upon a wrong ground or gave a wrong reason\u201d); see also Kamen v. Kemper Financial Services, Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 99, 111 S.Ct. 1711, 1718, 114 L.Ed.2d 152 (1991) (\u201c[w]hen an issue ... is properly before the court, the court is not limited to the particular legal theories advanced by the parties, but rather retains the independent power to identify and apply the proper construction of governing law\u201d)."},"case_id":3693056,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The district court accepted the arguments that Catholic University made on the constitutional issue; namely, that the application of Title VII to the University would violate the Free Exercise Clause on the basis of the ministerial exception as supported by the pr e-Smith case law. If we were to conclude that the court came to the right conclusion through erroneous reasoning because it failed to take the effect of Smith's rejection of the compelling interest test on the exception and the exception's subsequent restora tion by RFRA, we could nonetheless affirm the court by taking account of the Act and its retroactive effect.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"58 S.Ct. 154, 158","parenthetical":"\"if the decision below is correct, it must be affirmed, although the lower court relied upon a wrong ground or gave a wrong reason\"","sentence":"See Helvering v. Gowran, 302 U.S. 238, 245, 58 S.Ct. 154, 158, 82 L.Ed. 224 (1937) (\u201cif the decision below is correct, it must be affirmed, although the lower court relied upon a wrong ground or gave a wrong reason\u201d); see also Kamen v. Kemper Financial Services, Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 99, 111 S.Ct. 1711, 1718, 114 L.Ed.2d 152 (1991) (\u201c[w]hen an issue ... is properly before the court, the court is not limited to the particular legal theories advanced by the parties, but rather retains the independent power to identify and apply the proper construction of governing law\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[w]hen an issue ... is properly before the court, the court is not limited to the particular legal theories advanced by the parties, but rather retains the independent power to identify and apply the proper construction of governing law\"","sentence":"See Helvering v. Gowran, 302 U.S. 238, 245, 58 S.Ct. 154, 158, 82 L.Ed. 224 (1937) (\u201cif the decision below is correct, it must be affirmed, although the lower court relied upon a wrong ground or gave a wrong reason\u201d); see also Kamen v. Kemper Financial Services, Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 99, 111 S.Ct. 1711, 1718, 114 L.Ed.2d 152 (1991) (\u201c[w]hen an issue ... is properly before the court, the court is not limited to the particular legal theories advanced by the parties, but rather retains the independent power to identify and apply the proper construction of governing law\u201d)."},"case_id":3693056,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The district court accepted the arguments that Catholic University made on the constitutional issue; namely, that the application of Title VII to the University would violate the Free Exercise Clause on the basis of the ministerial exception as supported by the pr e-Smith case law. If we were to conclude that the court came to the right conclusion through erroneous reasoning because it failed to take the effect of Smith's rejection of the compelling interest test on the exception and the exception's subsequent restora tion by RFRA, we could nonetheless affirm the court by taking account of the Act and its retroactive effect.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"if the decision below is correct, it must be affirmed, although the lower court relied upon a wrong ground or gave a wrong reason\"","sentence":"See Helvering v. Gowran, 302 U.S. 238, 245, 58 S.Ct. 154, 158, 82 L.Ed. 224 (1937) (\u201cif the decision below is correct, it must be affirmed, although the lower court relied upon a wrong ground or gave a wrong reason\u201d); see also Kamen v. Kemper Financial Services, Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 99, 111 S.Ct. 1711, 1718, 114 L.Ed.2d 152 (1991) (\u201c[w]hen an issue ... is properly before the court, the court is not limited to the particular legal theories advanced by the parties, but rather retains the independent power to identify and apply the proper construction of governing law\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"500 U.S. 90, 99","parenthetical":"\"[w]hen an issue ... is properly before the court, the court is not limited to the particular legal theories advanced by the parties, but rather retains the independent power to identify and apply the proper construction of governing law\"","sentence":"See Helvering v. Gowran, 302 U.S. 238, 245, 58 S.Ct. 154, 158, 82 L.Ed. 224 (1937) (\u201cif the decision below is correct, it must be affirmed, although the lower court relied upon a wrong ground or gave a wrong reason\u201d); see also Kamen v. Kemper Financial Services, Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 99, 111 S.Ct. 1711, 1718, 114 L.Ed.2d 152 (1991) (\u201c[w]hen an issue ... is properly before the court, the court is not limited to the particular legal theories advanced by the parties, but rather retains the independent power to identify and apply the proper construction of governing law\u201d)."},"case_id":3693056,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The district court accepted the arguments that Catholic University made on the constitutional issue; namely, that the application of Title VII to the University would violate the Free Exercise Clause on the basis of the ministerial exception as supported by the pr e-Smith case law. If we were to conclude that the court came to the right conclusion through erroneous reasoning because it failed to take the effect of Smith's rejection of the compelling interest test on the exception and the exception's subsequent restora tion by RFRA, we could nonetheless affirm the court by taking account of the Act and its retroactive effect.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"111 S.Ct. 1711, 1718","parenthetical":"\"[w]hen an issue ... is properly before the court, the court is not limited to the particular legal theories advanced by the parties, but rather retains the independent power to identify and apply the proper construction of governing law\"","sentence":"See Helvering v. Gowran, 302 U.S. 238, 245, 58 S.Ct. 154, 158, 82 L.Ed. 224 (1937) (\u201cif the decision below is correct, it must be affirmed, although the lower court relied upon a wrong ground or gave a wrong reason\u201d); see also Kamen v. Kemper Financial Services, Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 99, 111 S.Ct. 1711, 1718, 114 L.Ed.2d 152 (1991) (\u201c[w]hen an issue ... is properly before the court, the court is not limited to the particular legal theories advanced by the parties, but rather retains the independent power to identify and apply the proper construction of governing law\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"if the decision below is correct, it must be affirmed, although the lower court relied upon a wrong ground or gave a wrong reason\"","sentence":"See Helvering v. Gowran, 302 U.S. 238, 245, 58 S.Ct. 154, 158, 82 L.Ed. 224 (1937) (\u201cif the decision below is correct, it must be affirmed, although the lower court relied upon a wrong ground or gave a wrong reason\u201d); see also Kamen v. Kemper Financial Services, Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 99, 111 S.Ct. 1711, 1718, 114 L.Ed.2d 152 (1991) (\u201c[w]hen an issue ... is properly before the court, the court is not limited to the particular legal theories advanced by the parties, but rather retains the independent power to identify and apply the proper construction of governing law\u201d)."},"case_id":3693056,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The district court accepted the arguments that Catholic University made on the constitutional issue; namely, that the application of Title VII to the University would violate the Free Exercise Clause on the basis of the ministerial exception as supported by the pr e-Smith case law. If we were to conclude that the court came to the right conclusion through erroneous reasoning because it failed to take the effect of Smith's rejection of the compelling interest test on the exception and the exception's subsequent restora tion by RFRA, we could nonetheless affirm the court by taking account of the Act and its retroactive effect.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"if the decision below is correct, it must be affirmed, although the lower court relied upon a wrong ground or gave a wrong reason\"","sentence":"See Helvering v. Gowran, 302 U.S. 238, 245, 58 S.Ct. 154, 158, 82 L.Ed. 224 (1937) (\u201cif the decision below is correct, it must be affirmed, although the lower court relied upon a wrong ground or gave a wrong reason\u201d); see also Kamen v. Kemper Financial Services, Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 99, 111 S.Ct. 1711, 1718, 114 L.Ed.2d 152 (1991) (\u201c[w]hen an issue ... is properly before the court, the court is not limited to the particular legal theories advanced by the parties, but rather retains the independent power to identify and apply the proper construction of governing law\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[w]hen an issue ... is properly before the court, the court is not limited to the particular legal theories advanced by the parties, but rather retains the independent power to identify and apply the proper construction of governing law\"","sentence":"See Helvering v. Gowran, 302 U.S. 238, 245, 58 S.Ct. 154, 158, 82 L.Ed. 224 (1937) (\u201cif the decision below is correct, it must be affirmed, although the lower court relied upon a wrong ground or gave a wrong reason\u201d); see also Kamen v. Kemper Financial Services, Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 99, 111 S.Ct. 1711, 1718, 114 L.Ed.2d 152 (1991) (\u201c[w]hen an issue ... is properly before the court, the court is not limited to the particular legal theories advanced by the parties, but rather retains the independent power to identify and apply the proper construction of governing law\u201d)."},"case_id":3693056,"label":"a"}
{"context":"\"The paradigmatic taking requiring just compensation is a direct government appropriation or physical invasion of private property.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[Ejarly constitutional theorists did not believe the Takings Clause embraced regulations of property at all\"","sentence":"Lingle, 544 U.S. at 537, 125 S.Ct. 2074; see, e.g., United States v. Pewee Coal Co., 341 U.S. 114, 71 S.Ct. 670, 95 L.Ed. 809 (1951) (Government\u2019s seizure and operation of a coal mine to prevent a national strike of coal miners effected a taking); United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 65 S.Ct. 357, 89 L.Ed. 311 (1945) (Government\u2019s occupation of private warehouse effected a taking). \u201cIndeed, until the Supreme Court\u2019s watershed decision in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Ma-hon, ... \u2018it was generally thought that the Takings Clause reached only a direct appropriation of property, or the functional equivalent of a practical ouster of the owner\u2019s possession.\u2019 \u201d Lingle, 544 U.S. at 537, 125 S.Ct. 2074 (quoting Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1014, 112 S.Ct. 2886, 120 L.Ed.2d 798 (1992) (internal brackets, citations, and emphasis omitted)); see also Id., at 1028 n. 15, 112 S.Ct. 2886 (\u201c[Ejarly constitutional theorists did not believe the Takings Clause embraced regulations of property at all\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"Government's seizure and operation of a coal mine to prevent a national strike of coal miners effected a taking","sentence":"Lingle, 544 U.S. at 537, 125 S.Ct. 2074; see, e.g., United States v. Pewee Coal Co., 341 U.S. 114, 71 S.Ct. 670, 95 L.Ed. 809 (1951) (Government\u2019s seizure and operation of a coal mine to prevent a national strike of coal miners effected a taking); United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 65 S.Ct. 357, 89 L.Ed. 311 (1945) (Government\u2019s occupation of private warehouse effected a taking). \u201cIndeed, until the Supreme Court\u2019s watershed decision in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Ma-hon, ... \u2018it was generally thought that the Takings Clause reached only a direct appropriation of property, or the functional equivalent of a practical ouster of the owner\u2019s possession.\u2019 \u201d Lingle, 544 U.S. at 537, 125 S.Ct. 2074 (quoting Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1014, 112 S.Ct. 2886, 120 L.Ed.2d 798 (1992) (internal brackets, citations, and emphasis omitted)); see also Id., at 1028 n. 15, 112 S.Ct. 2886 (\u201c[Ejarly constitutional theorists did not believe the Takings Clause embraced regulations of property at all\u201d)."},"case_id":3776695,"label":"b"}
{"context":"\"The paradigmatic taking requiring just compensation is a direct government appropriation or physical invasion of private property.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"Government's seizure and operation of a coal mine to prevent a national strike of coal miners effected a taking","sentence":"Lingle, 544 U.S. at 537, 125 S.Ct. 2074; see, e.g., United States v. Pewee Coal Co., 341 U.S. 114, 71 S.Ct. 670, 95 L.Ed. 809 (1951) (Government\u2019s seizure and operation of a coal mine to prevent a national strike of coal miners effected a taking); United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 65 S.Ct. 357, 89 L.Ed. 311 (1945) (Government\u2019s occupation of private warehouse effected a taking). \u201cIndeed, until the Supreme Court\u2019s watershed decision in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Ma-hon, ... \u2018it was generally thought that the Takings Clause reached only a direct appropriation of property, or the functional equivalent of a practical ouster of the owner\u2019s possession.\u2019 \u201d Lingle, 544 U.S. at 537, 125 S.Ct. 2074 (quoting Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1014, 112 S.Ct. 2886, 120 L.Ed.2d 798 (1992) (internal brackets, citations, and emphasis omitted)); see also Id., at 1028 n. 15, 112 S.Ct. 2886 (\u201c[Ejarly constitutional theorists did not believe the Takings Clause embraced regulations of property at all\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[Ejarly constitutional theorists did not believe the Takings Clause embraced regulations of property at all\"","sentence":"Lingle, 544 U.S. at 537, 125 S.Ct. 2074; see, e.g., United States v. Pewee Coal Co., 341 U.S. 114, 71 S.Ct. 670, 95 L.Ed. 809 (1951) (Government\u2019s seizure and operation of a coal mine to prevent a national strike of coal miners effected a taking); United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 65 S.Ct. 357, 89 L.Ed. 311 (1945) (Government\u2019s occupation of private warehouse effected a taking). \u201cIndeed, until the Supreme Court\u2019s watershed decision in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Ma-hon, ... \u2018it was generally thought that the Takings Clause reached only a direct appropriation of property, or the functional equivalent of a practical ouster of the owner\u2019s possession.\u2019 \u201d Lingle, 544 U.S. at 537, 125 S.Ct. 2074 (quoting Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1014, 112 S.Ct. 2886, 120 L.Ed.2d 798 (1992) (internal brackets, citations, and emphasis omitted)); see also Id., at 1028 n. 15, 112 S.Ct. 2886 (\u201c[Ejarly constitutional theorists did not believe the Takings Clause embraced regulations of property at all\u201d)."},"case_id":3776695,"label":"a"}
{"context":"\"The paradigmatic taking requiring just compensation is a direct government appropriation or physical invasion of private property.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"Government's seizure and operation of a coal mine to prevent a national strike of coal miners effected a taking","sentence":"Lingle, 544 U.S. at 537, 125 S.Ct. 2074; see, e.g., United States v. Pewee Coal Co., 341 U.S. 114, 71 S.Ct. 670, 95 L.Ed. 809 (1951) (Government\u2019s seizure and operation of a coal mine to prevent a national strike of coal miners effected a taking); United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 65 S.Ct. 357, 89 L.Ed. 311 (1945) (Government\u2019s occupation of private warehouse effected a taking). \u201cIndeed, until the Supreme Court\u2019s watershed decision in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Ma-hon, ... \u2018it was generally thought that the Takings Clause reached only a direct appropriation of property, or the functional equivalent of a practical ouster of the owner\u2019s possession.\u2019 \u201d Lingle, 544 U.S. at 537, 125 S.Ct. 2074 (quoting Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1014, 112 S.Ct. 2886, 120 L.Ed.2d 798 (1992) (internal brackets, citations, and emphasis omitted)); see also Id., at 1028 n. 15, 112 S.Ct. 2886 (\u201c[Ejarly constitutional theorists did not believe the Takings Clause embraced regulations of property at all\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[Ejarly constitutional theorists did not believe the Takings Clause embraced regulations of property at all\"","sentence":"Lingle, 544 U.S. at 537, 125 S.Ct. 2074; see, e.g., United States v. Pewee Coal Co., 341 U.S. 114, 71 S.Ct. 670, 95 L.Ed. 809 (1951) (Government\u2019s seizure and operation of a coal mine to prevent a national strike of coal miners effected a taking); United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 65 S.Ct. 357, 89 L.Ed. 311 (1945) (Government\u2019s occupation of private warehouse effected a taking). \u201cIndeed, until the Supreme Court\u2019s watershed decision in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Ma-hon, ... \u2018it was generally thought that the Takings Clause reached only a direct appropriation of property, or the functional equivalent of a practical ouster of the owner\u2019s possession.\u2019 \u201d Lingle, 544 U.S. at 537, 125 S.Ct. 2074 (quoting Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1014, 112 S.Ct. 2886, 120 L.Ed.2d 798 (1992) (internal brackets, citations, and emphasis omitted)); see also Id., at 1028 n. 15, 112 S.Ct. 2886 (\u201c[Ejarly constitutional theorists did not believe the Takings Clause embraced regulations of property at all\u201d)."},"case_id":3776695,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Moreover, plaintiff never actually requested informal counseling or for an extension of time to do so. Instead, she filed an untimely administrative complaint. Consequently, plaintiff is not entitled to equitable tolling.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"333 F.3d 81, 81","parenthetical":"declining to toll EEOC filing deadline where plaintiff failed to act with diligence to preserve her legal rights","sentence":"Zerilli-Edelglass, 333 F.3d at 81 (declining to toll EEOC filing deadline where plaintiff failed to act with diligence to preserve her legal rights); Chapman, 288 F.3d at 512 (\u201ca want of diligence by a plaintiffs attorney generally will not prompt a court to provide relief from a limitations period by way of an equitable toll.\u201d); Boos, 201 F.3d at 185 (rejecting plaintiffs claim to equitable tolling); see also Saab Cars, 28 F.3d at 12 (\u201ca plaintiffs failure to act diligently is not a reason to invoke equitable tolling\u201d); Lynk, 2000 WL 178859, at *7 (equitable tolling denied where plaintiff waited more than 270 days to seek informal counseling)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"28 F.3d 12, 12","parenthetical":"\"a plaintiffs failure to act diligently is not a reason to invoke equitable tolling\"","sentence":"Zerilli-Edelglass, 333 F.3d at 81 (declining to toll EEOC filing deadline where plaintiff failed to act with diligence to preserve her legal rights); Chapman, 288 F.3d at 512 (\u201ca want of diligence by a plaintiffs attorney generally will not prompt a court to provide relief from a limitations period by way of an equitable toll.\u201d); Boos, 201 F.3d at 185 (rejecting plaintiffs claim to equitable tolling); see also Saab Cars, 28 F.3d at 12 (\u201ca plaintiffs failure to act diligently is not a reason to invoke equitable tolling\u201d); Lynk, 2000 WL 178859, at *7 (equitable tolling denied where plaintiff waited more than 270 days to seek informal counseling)."},"case_id":9012893,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Moreover, plaintiff never actually requested informal counseling or for an extension of time to do so. Instead, she filed an untimely administrative complaint. Consequently, plaintiff is not entitled to equitable tolling.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"333 F.3d 81, 81","parenthetical":"declining to toll EEOC filing deadline where plaintiff failed to act with diligence to preserve her legal rights","sentence":"Zerilli-Edelglass, 333 F.3d at 81 (declining to toll EEOC filing deadline where plaintiff failed to act with diligence to preserve her legal rights); Chapman, 288 F.3d at 512 (\u201ca want of diligence by a plaintiffs attorney generally will not prompt a court to provide relief from a limitations period by way of an equitable toll.\u201d); Boos, 201 F.3d at 185 (rejecting plaintiffs claim to equitable tolling); see also Saab Cars, 28 F.3d at 12 (\u201ca plaintiffs failure to act diligently is not a reason to invoke equitable tolling\u201d); Lynk, 2000 WL 178859, at *7 (equitable tolling denied where plaintiff waited more than 270 days to seek informal counseling)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"2000 WL 178859, at *7","parenthetical":"equitable tolling denied where plaintiff waited more than 270 days to seek informal counseling","sentence":"Zerilli-Edelglass, 333 F.3d at 81 (declining to toll EEOC filing deadline where plaintiff failed to act with diligence to preserve her legal rights); Chapman, 288 F.3d at 512 (\u201ca want of diligence by a plaintiffs attorney generally will not prompt a court to provide relief from a limitations period by way of an equitable toll.\u201d); Boos, 201 F.3d at 185 (rejecting plaintiffs claim to equitable tolling); see also Saab Cars, 28 F.3d at 12 (\u201ca plaintiffs failure to act diligently is not a reason to invoke equitable tolling\u201d); Lynk, 2000 WL 178859, at *7 (equitable tolling denied where plaintiff waited more than 270 days to seek informal counseling)."},"case_id":9012893,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Moreover, plaintiff never actually requested informal counseling or for an extension of time to do so. Instead, she filed an untimely administrative complaint. Consequently, plaintiff is not entitled to equitable tolling.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"28 F.3d 12, 12","parenthetical":"\"a plaintiffs failure to act diligently is not a reason to invoke equitable tolling\"","sentence":"Zerilli-Edelglass, 333 F.3d at 81 (declining to toll EEOC filing deadline where plaintiff failed to act with diligence to preserve her legal rights); Chapman, 288 F.3d at 512 (\u201ca want of diligence by a plaintiffs attorney generally will not prompt a court to provide relief from a limitations period by way of an equitable toll.\u201d); Boos, 201 F.3d at 185 (rejecting plaintiffs claim to equitable tolling); see also Saab Cars, 28 F.3d at 12 (\u201ca plaintiffs failure to act diligently is not a reason to invoke equitable tolling\u201d); Lynk, 2000 WL 178859, at *7 (equitable tolling denied where plaintiff waited more than 270 days to seek informal counseling)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"288 F.3d 512, 512","parenthetical":"\"a want of diligence by a plaintiffs attorney generally will not prompt a court to provide relief from a limitations period by way of an equitable toll.\"","sentence":"Zerilli-Edelglass, 333 F.3d at 81 (declining to toll EEOC filing deadline where plaintiff failed to act with diligence to preserve her legal rights); Chapman, 288 F.3d at 512 (\u201ca want of diligence by a plaintiffs attorney generally will not prompt a court to provide relief from a limitations period by way of an equitable toll.\u201d); Boos, 201 F.3d at 185 (rejecting plaintiffs claim to equitable tolling); see also Saab Cars, 28 F.3d at 12 (\u201ca plaintiffs failure to act diligently is not a reason to invoke equitable tolling\u201d); Lynk, 2000 WL 178859, at *7 (equitable tolling denied where plaintiff waited more than 270 days to seek informal counseling)."},"case_id":9012893,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Moreover, plaintiff never actually requested informal counseling or for an extension of time to do so. Instead, she filed an untimely administrative complaint. Consequently, plaintiff is not entitled to equitable tolling.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"288 F.3d 512, 512","parenthetical":"\"a want of diligence by a plaintiffs attorney generally will not prompt a court to provide relief from a limitations period by way of an equitable toll.\"","sentence":"Zerilli-Edelglass, 333 F.3d at 81 (declining to toll EEOC filing deadline where plaintiff failed to act with diligence to preserve her legal rights); Chapman, 288 F.3d at 512 (\u201ca want of diligence by a plaintiffs attorney generally will not prompt a court to provide relief from a limitations period by way of an equitable toll.\u201d); Boos, 201 F.3d at 185 (rejecting plaintiffs claim to equitable tolling); see also Saab Cars, 28 F.3d at 12 (\u201ca plaintiffs failure to act diligently is not a reason to invoke equitable tolling\u201d); Lynk, 2000 WL 178859, at *7 (equitable tolling denied where plaintiff waited more than 270 days to seek informal counseling)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"2000 WL 178859, at *7","parenthetical":"equitable tolling denied where plaintiff waited more than 270 days to seek informal counseling","sentence":"Zerilli-Edelglass, 333 F.3d at 81 (declining to toll EEOC filing deadline where plaintiff failed to act with diligence to preserve her legal rights); Chapman, 288 F.3d at 512 (\u201ca want of diligence by a plaintiffs attorney generally will not prompt a court to provide relief from a limitations period by way of an equitable toll.\u201d); Boos, 201 F.3d at 185 (rejecting plaintiffs claim to equitable tolling); see also Saab Cars, 28 F.3d at 12 (\u201ca plaintiffs failure to act diligently is not a reason to invoke equitable tolling\u201d); Lynk, 2000 WL 178859, at *7 (equitable tolling denied where plaintiff waited more than 270 days to seek informal counseling)."},"case_id":9012893,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Appellant argues that this case presented unusual circumstances because the incidents in question involved three juvenile witnesses who were testifying about events that occurred three to seven years earlier. The proper focus, however, is on the competence of the witnesses while testifying at trial, not their age at the time of the events.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"642 A.2d 1306, 1310-1311","parenthetical":"upholding refusal to admit evidence of excessive drinking by government witness six years before the date of the crime","sentence":"See Smith v. United States, 414 A.2d 1189, 1197-1198 (D.C.1980) (eight-year-old girl found competent to testify about a murder that occurred when she was three and a half); cf. Robinson v. United States, 642 A.2d 1306, 1310-1311 (D.C.1994) (upholding refusal to admit evidence of excessive drinking by government witness six years before the date of the crime)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"414 A.2d 1189, 1197-1198","parenthetical":"eight-year-old girl found competent to testify about a murder that occurred when she was three and a half","sentence":"See Smith v. United States, 414 A.2d 1189, 1197-1198 (D.C.1980) (eight-year-old girl found competent to testify about a murder that occurred when she was three and a half); cf. Robinson v. United States, 642 A.2d 1306, 1310-1311 (D.C.1994) (upholding refusal to admit evidence of excessive drinking by government witness six years before the date of the crime)."},"case_id":9289750,"label":"b"}
{"context":"That language's plain meaning is that Once .the property belongs to the FDIC, that is, when-, the FDIC acts as receiver, no liens shall attach.'') (emphasis omitted). Additionally, courts have consistently found in the context of similar federal laws that the term \"property\" includes both-fee and lien interests'in property.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"597 F.2d 174, 177","parenthetical":"finding -under federal law that Fannie -Mae's mortgage interest iri real property should be treated just like any other property interest","sentence":"See Rust v. Johnson, 597 F.2d 174, 177 (9th Cir.1979) (finding -under federal law that Fannie -Mae\u2019s mortgage interest iri real property should be treated just like any other property interest); see also Simon, 53 F.3d at 21 (\u201c[T]he term \u2018property\u2019 in \u00a7 1825(b)(2) encompasses all forms of interest in- property, including mortgages and other liens.\u201d); Matagorda Cnty., 19 F.3d at 222 (\u201cThe FDIC\u2019s acquired lien interest in the Law lots is clearly a \u2018property\u2019 interest as contemplated in the statute.\u201d); S\/N-1 REO Ltd. Liab. Co. v. City of Fall River, 81 F.Supp.2d 142, 150 (D.Mass.1999) (\"A lien held by the FDIC as mortgagee is \u2018property\u2019 within the meaning of \u00a7 1825(b)(2).\u201d). Accordingly, the \u201cproperty\u201d that is protected from foreclosure by section 4617(j)(3) includes lien interests held by Fannie Mae, such as the mortgage held on the Prop\u00e9rty in this case."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"19 F.3d 222, 222","parenthetical":"\"The FDIC's acquired lien interest in the Law lots is clearly a 'property' interest as contemplated in the statute.\"","sentence":"See Rust v. Johnson, 597 F.2d 174, 177 (9th Cir.1979) (finding -under federal law that Fannie -Mae\u2019s mortgage interest iri real property should be treated just like any other property interest); see also Simon, 53 F.3d at 21 (\u201c[T]he term \u2018property\u2019 in \u00a7 1825(b)(2) encompasses all forms of interest in- property, including mortgages and other liens.\u201d); Matagorda Cnty., 19 F.3d at 222 (\u201cThe FDIC\u2019s acquired lien interest in the Law lots is clearly a \u2018property\u2019 interest as contemplated in the statute.\u201d); S\/N-1 REO Ltd. Liab. Co. v. City of Fall River, 81 F.Supp.2d 142, 150 (D.Mass.1999) (\"A lien held by the FDIC as mortgagee is \u2018property\u2019 within the meaning of \u00a7 1825(b)(2).\u201d). Accordingly, the \u201cproperty\u201d that is protected from foreclosure by section 4617(j)(3) includes lien interests held by Fannie Mae, such as the mortgage held on the Prop\u00e9rty in this case."},"case_id":4362572,"label":"a"}
{"context":"That language's plain meaning is that Once .the property belongs to the FDIC, that is, when-, the FDIC acts as receiver, no liens shall attach.'') (emphasis omitted). Additionally, courts have consistently found in the context of similar federal laws that the term \"property\" includes both-fee and lien interests'in property.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"81 F.Supp.2d 142, 150","parenthetical":"\"A lien held by the FDIC as mortgagee is 'property' within the meaning of SS 1825(b","sentence":"See Rust v. Johnson, 597 F.2d 174, 177 (9th Cir.1979) (finding -under federal law that Fannie -Mae\u2019s mortgage interest iri real property should be treated just like any other property interest); see also Simon, 53 F.3d at 21 (\u201c[T]he term \u2018property\u2019 in \u00a7 1825(b)(2) encompasses all forms of interest in- property, including mortgages and other liens.\u201d); Matagorda Cnty., 19 F.3d at 222 (\u201cThe FDIC\u2019s acquired lien interest in the Law lots is clearly a \u2018property\u2019 interest as contemplated in the statute.\u201d); S\/N-1 REO Ltd. Liab. Co. v. City of Fall River, 81 F.Supp.2d 142, 150 (D.Mass.1999) (\"A lien held by the FDIC as mortgagee is \u2018property\u2019 within the meaning of \u00a7 1825(b)(2).\u201d). Accordingly, the \u201cproperty\u201d that is protected from foreclosure by section 4617(j)(3) includes lien interests held by Fannie Mae, such as the mortgage held on the Prop\u00e9rty in this case."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"597 F.2d 174, 177","parenthetical":"finding -under federal law that Fannie -Mae's mortgage interest iri real property should be treated just like any other property interest","sentence":"See Rust v. Johnson, 597 F.2d 174, 177 (9th Cir.1979) (finding -under federal law that Fannie -Mae\u2019s mortgage interest iri real property should be treated just like any other property interest); see also Simon, 53 F.3d at 21 (\u201c[T]he term \u2018property\u2019 in \u00a7 1825(b)(2) encompasses all forms of interest in- property, including mortgages and other liens.\u201d); Matagorda Cnty., 19 F.3d at 222 (\u201cThe FDIC\u2019s acquired lien interest in the Law lots is clearly a \u2018property\u2019 interest as contemplated in the statute.\u201d); S\/N-1 REO Ltd. Liab. Co. v. City of Fall River, 81 F.Supp.2d 142, 150 (D.Mass.1999) (\"A lien held by the FDIC as mortgagee is \u2018property\u2019 within the meaning of \u00a7 1825(b)(2).\u201d). Accordingly, the \u201cproperty\u201d that is protected from foreclosure by section 4617(j)(3) includes lien interests held by Fannie Mae, such as the mortgage held on the Prop\u00e9rty in this case."},"case_id":4362572,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Under the third prong of plain error review, we inquire whether error affected a defendant's substantial rights. \"[T]he defendant must demonstrate that the error affected the outcome of the district court proceedings.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"558 F.2d 1225, 1230","parenthetical":"holding same under plain error review and finding \"it likely that defendant's expressed desire to remain silent tipped the scales for the jury\"","sentence":"See United States v. Harp, 536 F.2d 601, 602-03 (5th Cir.1976) (\u201cBecause the prosecutor\u2019s comments struck at the jugular of their story, those remarks cannot be classified as harmless.\u201d); see also United States v. Johnson, 558 F.2d 1225, 1230 (5th Cir.1977) (holding same under plain error review and finding \u201cit likely that defendant\u2019s expressed desire to remain silent tipped the scales for the jury\u201d); United States v. Meneses-Davila, 580 F.2d 888, 895-96 (5th Cir.1978) (holding under plain error review that prosecution\u2019s repeated references to defendant\u2019s silence in a one- day trial were not harmless, despite defendant\u2019s responsive comments on silence). Even though Andaverde-Ti\u00f1oco did open the door to some exploration of his companions\u2019 post-arrest statements, and even though Andaverde-Ti\u00f1oco waived his Miranda rights at the station, triggering trial-contested testimony about his own cooperation and duress story, we cannot say that his duress defense presented a frivolous argument that had no chance of success such that the Doyle errors did not affect the outcome of the proceedings."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"536 F.2d 601, 602-03","parenthetical":"\"Because the prosecutor's comments struck at the jugular of their story, those remarks cannot be classified as harmless.\"","sentence":"See United States v. Harp, 536 F.2d 601, 602-03 (5th Cir.1976) (\u201cBecause the prosecutor\u2019s comments struck at the jugular of their story, those remarks cannot be classified as harmless.\u201d); see also United States v. Johnson, 558 F.2d 1225, 1230 (5th Cir.1977) (holding same under plain error review and finding \u201cit likely that defendant\u2019s expressed desire to remain silent tipped the scales for the jury\u201d); United States v. Meneses-Davila, 580 F.2d 888, 895-96 (5th Cir.1978) (holding under plain error review that prosecution\u2019s repeated references to defendant\u2019s silence in a one- day trial were not harmless, despite defendant\u2019s responsive comments on silence). Even though Andaverde-Ti\u00f1oco did open the door to some exploration of his companions\u2019 post-arrest statements, and even though Andaverde-Ti\u00f1oco waived his Miranda rights at the station, triggering trial-contested testimony about his own cooperation and duress story, we cannot say that his duress defense presented a frivolous argument that had no chance of success such that the Doyle errors did not affect the outcome of the proceedings."},"case_id":3897465,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Under the third prong of plain error review, we inquire whether error affected a defendant's substantial rights. \"[T]he defendant must demonstrate that the error affected the outcome of the district court proceedings.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"580 F.2d 888, 895-96","parenthetical":"holding under plain error review that prosecution's repeated references to defendant's silence in a one- day trial were not harmless, despite defendant's responsive comments on silence","sentence":"See United States v. Harp, 536 F.2d 601, 602-03 (5th Cir.1976) (\u201cBecause the prosecutor\u2019s comments struck at the jugular of their story, those remarks cannot be classified as harmless.\u201d); see also United States v. Johnson, 558 F.2d 1225, 1230 (5th Cir.1977) (holding same under plain error review and finding \u201cit likely that defendant\u2019s expressed desire to remain silent tipped the scales for the jury\u201d); United States v. Meneses-Davila, 580 F.2d 888, 895-96 (5th Cir.1978) (holding under plain error review that prosecution\u2019s repeated references to defendant\u2019s silence in a one- day trial were not harmless, despite defendant\u2019s responsive comments on silence). Even though Andaverde-Ti\u00f1oco did open the door to some exploration of his companions\u2019 post-arrest statements, and even though Andaverde-Ti\u00f1oco waived his Miranda rights at the station, triggering trial-contested testimony about his own cooperation and duress story, we cannot say that his duress defense presented a frivolous argument that had no chance of success such that the Doyle errors did not affect the outcome of the proceedings."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"536 F.2d 601, 602-03","parenthetical":"\"Because the prosecutor's comments struck at the jugular of their story, those remarks cannot be classified as harmless.\"","sentence":"See United States v. Harp, 536 F.2d 601, 602-03 (5th Cir.1976) (\u201cBecause the prosecutor\u2019s comments struck at the jugular of their story, those remarks cannot be classified as harmless.\u201d); see also United States v. Johnson, 558 F.2d 1225, 1230 (5th Cir.1977) (holding same under plain error review and finding \u201cit likely that defendant\u2019s expressed desire to remain silent tipped the scales for the jury\u201d); United States v. Meneses-Davila, 580 F.2d 888, 895-96 (5th Cir.1978) (holding under plain error review that prosecution\u2019s repeated references to defendant\u2019s silence in a one- day trial were not harmless, despite defendant\u2019s responsive comments on silence). Even though Andaverde-Ti\u00f1oco did open the door to some exploration of his companions\u2019 post-arrest statements, and even though Andaverde-Ti\u00f1oco waived his Miranda rights at the station, triggering trial-contested testimony about his own cooperation and duress story, we cannot say that his duress defense presented a frivolous argument that had no chance of success such that the Doyle errors did not affect the outcome of the proceedings."},"case_id":3897465,"label":"b"}
{"context":"According to D.M.'s testimony, Silvernail admitted to killing Roberts. Once the jury accepted D.M.'s testimony, the jury did not need to make any factual inferences in order to conclude that Silver-nail caused Roberts's death.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"686 N.W.2d 531, 540","parenthetical":"declining to \"usurp[ ] the jury's role in assessing credibility\"","sentence":"State v. Pippitt, 645 N.W.2d 87, 94 (Minn.2002); see also State v. Bolstad, 686 N.W.2d 531, 540 (Minn.2004) (declining to \u201cusurp[ ] the jury\u2019s role in assessing credibility\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"208 Minn. 91, 95-96","parenthetical":"\"Confessions are held to be direct, rather than circumstantial, evidence of guilt.\"","sentence":"See State v. McClain, 208 Minn. 91, 95-96, 292 N.W. 753, 755 (1940) (\u201cConfessions are held to be direct, rather than circumstantial, evidence of guilt.\u201d). Rather, the jury only needed to conclude that D.M. was a credible witness \u2014 a determination that is \u201ca function exclusively for the jury.\u201d"},"case_id":7061634,"label":"b"}
{"context":"According to D.M.'s testimony, Silvernail admitted to killing Roberts. Once the jury accepted D.M.'s testimony, the jury did not need to make any factual inferences in order to conclude that Silver-nail caused Roberts's death.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"292 N.W. 753, 755","parenthetical":"\"Confessions are held to be direct, rather than circumstantial, evidence of guilt.\"","sentence":"See State v. McClain, 208 Minn. 91, 95-96, 292 N.W. 753, 755 (1940) (\u201cConfessions are held to be direct, rather than circumstantial, evidence of guilt.\u201d). Rather, the jury only needed to conclude that D.M. was a credible witness \u2014 a determination that is \u201ca function exclusively for the jury.\u201d"},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"686 N.W.2d 531, 540","parenthetical":"declining to \"usurp[ ] the jury's role in assessing credibility\"","sentence":"State v. Pippitt, 645 N.W.2d 87, 94 (Minn.2002); see also State v. Bolstad, 686 N.W.2d 531, 540 (Minn.2004) (declining to \u201cusurp[ ] the jury\u2019s role in assessing credibility\u201d)."},"case_id":7061634,"label":"a"}
{"context":"On the record before us, we have no trouble in concluding that Section 127 amended the applicable law and thus does not run afoul of Klein. Section 127 directed the Secretary of the Interior to reissue the Captive-Bred Exemption \"without regard to any other provision of statute or regulation that applies to issuance of such rule.\" Although the three antelope species remain endangered and subject to certain requirements under the Act, Congress acted within its constitutional authority in amending the scope of Section 10.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"672 F.3d 1170, 1174","parenthetical":"dismissing the appellants' challenge under Klein where Congress had amended the law by \"direct[ing] the agency to issue the rule 'without regard to any other provision of statute or regulation that applies to issuance of such rule' \"","sentence":"See Nat\u2019l Coal. to Save Our Mall, 269 F.3d at 1094, 1097 (statute at issue, which applied \u201cNotwithstanding any other provision of law,\u201d did not violate Klein because it \u201camend[ed] the applicable substantive law\u201d); see also All. for the Wild Rockies v. Salazar, 672 F.3d 1170, 1174 (9th Cir. 2012) (dismissing the appellants\u2019 challenge under Klein where Congress had amended the law by \u201cdirect[ing] the agency to issue the rule \u2018without regard to any other provision of statute or regulation that applies to issuance of such rule\u2019 \u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"269 F.3d 1094, 1094, 1097","parenthetical":"statute at issue, which applied \"Notwithstanding any other provision of law,\" did not violate Klein because it \"amend[ed] the applicable substantive law\"","sentence":"See Nat\u2019l Coal. to Save Our Mall, 269 F.3d at 1094, 1097 (statute at issue, which applied \u201cNotwithstanding any other provision of law,\u201d did not violate Klein because it \u201camend[ed] the applicable substantive law\u201d); see also All. for the Wild Rockies v. Salazar, 672 F.3d 1170, 1174 (9th Cir. 2012) (dismissing the appellants\u2019 challenge under Klein where Congress had amended the law by \u201cdirect[ing] the agency to issue the rule \u2018without regard to any other provision of statute or regulation that applies to issuance of such rule\u2019 \u201d)."},"case_id":4322278,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Second, courts have recognized that a court's prior investment of time in preparing a decision is a relevant factor in deciding whether to dismiss. See 16AA Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure SS 3988 (4th ed.2008).","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"354 F.3d 644, 646","parenthetical":"denying motion to dismiss \"[a]fter a draft of [the] opinion had been written\"","sentence":"See Albers v. Eli Lilly & Co., 354 F.3d 644, 646 (7th Cir.2004) (per curiam) (denying motion to dismiss \u201c[a]fter a draft of [the] opinion had been written\u201d); see also Suntharalinkam v. Keisler, 506 F.3d 822, 828 (9th Cir.2007) (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (dissent \u201caware of no case where a motion for voluntary dismissal was granted when it was filed after the case was argued and submitted for decision\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"506 F.3d 822, 828","parenthetical":"dissent \"aware of no case where a motion for voluntary dismissal was granted when it was filed after the case was argued and submitted for decision\"","sentence":"See Albers v. Eli Lilly & Co., 354 F.3d 644, 646 (7th Cir.2004) (per curiam) (denying motion to dismiss \u201c[a]fter a draft of [the] opinion had been written\u201d); see also Suntharalinkam v. Keisler, 506 F.3d 822, 828 (9th Cir.2007) (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (dissent \u201caware of no case where a motion for voluntary dismissal was granted when it was filed after the case was argued and submitted for decision\u201d)."},"case_id":5745692,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The reliability of expert opinion testimony based on psychiatric or psychological observation and analysis does not readily lend itself to evaluation using the specific Daubert factors.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"130 F.3d 1287, 1297-98","parenthetical":"questioning the fit of the Daubert factors to psychological evidence but finding evidence admissible under Daubert's flexible approach","sentence":"See Jenson v. Eveleth Taconite Co., 130 F.3d 1287, 1297-98 (8th Cir.1997) (questioning the fit of the Daubert factors to psychological evidence but finding evidence admissible under Daubert\u2019s flexible approach)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"233 F.3d 747, 747","parenthetical":"court reviewing social science evidence of vocational rehabilitation could only roughly analogize, to Daubert factors","sentence":"Cf. Elcock, 233 F.3d at 747 (court reviewing social science evidence of vocational rehabilitation could only roughly analogize, to Daubert factors)."},"case_id":9408950,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Georgia courts have not specifically addressed the question whether a passenger is \"using\" a vehicle he merely occupies. This Court has, however, addressed the much broader question whether an injury arises out of the \"use\" of a vehicle. See, e.g., Ga. Farm &c.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"250 Ga. App. 673, 676-677","parenthetical":"courts addressing whether injury arose out of \"use\" must consider the physical proximity of the injury site to the vehicle, the nature of the conduct which caused the situation of jeopardy, and whether the vehicle was being \"utilized\" in the plain and ordinary sense of the word","sentence":"Ins. Co. v. Greene, 174 Ga. App. 120, 124 (329 SE2d 204) (1985) (physical precedent only) (injury arose out of \u201cuse\u201d of school bus where \u201cuse\u201d includes not only transportation to and from school but also unloading of the bus); Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Booker, 140 Ga. App. 3 (230 SE2d 70) (1976) (sanitation truck driver was \u201cusing\u201d truck when he was struck by another motorist after unloading a garbage container); see also Old Republic Union Ins. Co. v. Floyd Beasley & Sons, Inc., 250 Ga. App. 673, 676-677 (1) (551 SE2d 388) (2001) (courts addressing whether injury arose out of \u201cuse\u201d must consider the physical proximity of the injury site to the vehicle, the nature of the conduct which caused the situation of jeopardy, and whether the vehicle was being \u201cutilized\u201d in the plain and ordinary sense of the word)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"174 Ga. App. 120, 124","parenthetical":"injury arose out of \"use\" of school bus where \"use\" includes not only transportation to and from school but also unloading of the bus","sentence":"Ins. Co. v. Greene, 174 Ga. App. 120, 124 (329 SE2d 204) (1985) (physical precedent only) (injury arose out of \u201cuse\u201d of school bus where \u201cuse\u201d includes not only transportation to and from school but also unloading of the bus); Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Booker, 140 Ga. App. 3 (230 SE2d 70) (1976) (sanitation truck driver was \u201cusing\u201d truck when he was struck by another motorist after unloading a garbage container); see also Old Republic Union Ins. Co. v. Floyd Beasley & Sons, Inc., 250 Ga. App. 673, 676-677 (1) (551 SE2d 388) (2001) (courts addressing whether injury arose out of \u201cuse\u201d must consider the physical proximity of the injury site to the vehicle, the nature of the conduct which caused the situation of jeopardy, and whether the vehicle was being \u201cutilized\u201d in the plain and ordinary sense of the word)."},"case_id":5626134,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Georgia courts have not specifically addressed the question whether a passenger is \"using\" a vehicle he merely occupies. This Court has, however, addressed the much broader question whether an injury arises out of the \"use\" of a vehicle. See, e.g., Ga. Farm &c.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"250 Ga. App. 673, 676-677","parenthetical":"courts addressing whether injury arose out of \"use\" must consider the physical proximity of the injury site to the vehicle, the nature of the conduct which caused the situation of jeopardy, and whether the vehicle was being \"utilized\" in the plain and ordinary sense of the word","sentence":"Ins. Co. v. Greene, 174 Ga. App. 120, 124 (329 SE2d 204) (1985) (physical precedent only) (injury arose out of \u201cuse\u201d of school bus where \u201cuse\u201d includes not only transportation to and from school but also unloading of the bus); Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Booker, 140 Ga. App. 3 (230 SE2d 70) (1976) (sanitation truck driver was \u201cusing\u201d truck when he was struck by another motorist after unloading a garbage container); see also Old Republic Union Ins. Co. v. Floyd Beasley & Sons, Inc., 250 Ga. App. 673, 676-677 (1) (551 SE2d 388) (2001) (courts addressing whether injury arose out of \u201cuse\u201d must consider the physical proximity of the injury site to the vehicle, the nature of the conduct which caused the situation of jeopardy, and whether the vehicle was being \u201cutilized\u201d in the plain and ordinary sense of the word)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"sanitation truck driver was \"using\" truck when he was struck by another motorist after unloading a garbage container","sentence":"Ins. Co. v. Greene, 174 Ga. App. 120, 124 (329 SE2d 204) (1985) (physical precedent only) (injury arose out of \u201cuse\u201d of school bus where \u201cuse\u201d includes not only transportation to and from school but also unloading of the bus); Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Booker, 140 Ga. App. 3 (230 SE2d 70) (1976) (sanitation truck driver was \u201cusing\u201d truck when he was struck by another motorist after unloading a garbage container); see also Old Republic Union Ins. Co. v. Floyd Beasley & Sons, Inc., 250 Ga. App. 673, 676-677 (1) (551 SE2d 388) (2001) (courts addressing whether injury arose out of \u201cuse\u201d must consider the physical proximity of the injury site to the vehicle, the nature of the conduct which caused the situation of jeopardy, and whether the vehicle was being \u201cutilized\u201d in the plain and ordinary sense of the word)."},"case_id":5626134,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In analyzing these requirements, a reviewing court must presume that the underlying proceedings were correct and the burden of showing otherwise rests on the petitioner. Notably, that burden is substantial, exceeding that of a habeas petitioner.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"870 F.2d 102, 106","parenthetical":"stating that the burden placed on a petitioner seeking a writ of coram nobis exceeds the corresponding burden placed on a habeas petitioner","sentence":"See, e.g., U.S. v. Stoneman, 870 F.2d 102, 106 (3d Cir.1989) (stating that the burden placed on a petitioner seeking a writ of coram nobis exceeds the corresponding burden placed on a habeas petitioner); Jimenez, 91 F.3d at 768 n. 6 (same). Accordingly, successful coram no-bis petitions are exceedingly rare and \u201cgenerally involve[ ] such fundamental defects as deprivation of counsel ... or coerced guilty pleas.\u201d"},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"346 U.S. 512, 512","parenthetical":"stating that \"[w]here it cannot be deduced from the record whether counsel was properly waived, ... no other remedy being then available and sound reasons existing for failure to seek appropriate earlier relief, this motion in the nature of the extraordinary writ of eoram nobis must be heard\"","sentence":"U.S. v. Keogh, 391 F.2d 138, 148 (2d Cir.1968) (citation omitted); see also Morgan, 346 U.S. at 512, 74 S.Ct. 247 (stating that \u201c[w]here it cannot be deduced from the record whether counsel was properly waived, ... no other remedy being then available and sound reasons existing for failure to seek appropriate earlier relief, this motion in the nature of the extraordinary writ of eoram nobis must be heard\u201d)."},"case_id":3826981,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In analyzing these requirements, a reviewing court must presume that the underlying proceedings were correct and the burden of showing otherwise rests on the petitioner. Notably, that burden is substantial, exceeding that of a habeas petitioner.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"stating that \"[w]here it cannot be deduced from the record whether counsel was properly waived, ... no other remedy being then available and sound reasons existing for failure to seek appropriate earlier relief, this motion in the nature of the extraordinary writ of eoram nobis must be heard\"","sentence":"U.S. v. Keogh, 391 F.2d 138, 148 (2d Cir.1968) (citation omitted); see also Morgan, 346 U.S. at 512, 74 S.Ct. 247 (stating that \u201c[w]here it cannot be deduced from the record whether counsel was properly waived, ... no other remedy being then available and sound reasons existing for failure to seek appropriate earlier relief, this motion in the nature of the extraordinary writ of eoram nobis must be heard\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"870 F.2d 102, 106","parenthetical":"stating that the burden placed on a petitioner seeking a writ of coram nobis exceeds the corresponding burden placed on a habeas petitioner","sentence":"See, e.g., U.S. v. Stoneman, 870 F.2d 102, 106 (3d Cir.1989) (stating that the burden placed on a petitioner seeking a writ of coram nobis exceeds the corresponding burden placed on a habeas petitioner); Jimenez, 91 F.3d at 768 n. 6 (same). Accordingly, successful coram no-bis petitions are exceedingly rare and \u201cgenerally involve[ ] such fundamental defects as deprivation of counsel ... or coerced guilty pleas.\u201d"},"case_id":3826981,"label":"b"}
{"context":"As an initial matter, there is no question that the dispatch described the motor vehicle with sufficient particularity such that Trooper Dwyer could be certain that the vehicle he stopped was the same one identified by the caller. The dispatch identified the vehicle's color, make, and license plate number, and the address of the registered owner.","citation_a":{"signal":"contra","identifier":"75 Mass. App. Ct. 791, 792, 795","parenthetical":"caller's report of a man holding a gun in the air not credited, in part because the caller failed to report own location","sentence":"Contrast Commonwealth v. Gomes, 75 Mass. App. Ct. 791, 792, 795 (2009) (caller\u2019s report of a man holding a gun in the air not credited, in part because the caller failed to report own location); Commonwealth v. Mubdi, supra at 396 (caller\u2019s basis of knowledge questioned where the Commonwealth failed to introduce a 911 call showing that the information was \u201cderived from personal observation rather than hearsay or rumor\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"49 Mass. App. Ct. 212, 214","parenthetical":"basis of the caller's knowledge properly was inferred from the report itself, which indicated firsthand observation of erratic operation","sentence":"See Commonwealth v. Lubiejewski, 49 Mass. App. Ct. 212, 214 (2000) (basis of the caller\u2019s knowledge properly was inferred from the report itself, which indicated firsthand observation of erratic operation)."},"case_id":4074818,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Plaintiffs allege violations of section 1921 of the New York Real Property Actions & Proceedings Law (hereinafter, \"NYRPAPL SS 1921\"), which provides that \"[a]fter payment of authorized principal, interest, and any other amounts due ... a mortgagee of real property ... must execute and acknowledge ... a satisfaction of mortgage\" which is to be recorded. A lender may be subjected to monetary penalties for failing to present a certificate of discharge for recording in a timely manner under the terms of the statute. See id.; see also Cassese MTD Opinion at 30. This claim also imposes a substantive, affirmative requirement on lenders to complete the satisfaction of a mortgage within a specific time frame, a requirement that, when applied to federal savings associations, directly impacts their lending activities, particularly with respect to the processing and servicing of mortgages, thereby making preemption warranted pursuant to 12 C.F.R. 560.2(b)(10).","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"255 F.R.D. 94, 94","parenthetical":"noting that the court had previously dismissed NYRPAPL SS 1921 claim as preempted under HOLA","sentence":"See Cassese, 255 F.R.D. at 94 (noting that the court had previously dismissed NYRPAPL \u00a7 1921 claim as preempted under HOLA); accord Cassese MTD Opinion at 30-31; see also Molosky v. Wash. Mut. Bank, No. 07-CV-11247, 2008 WL 183634, at *4 (E.D.Mich. Jan. 18, 2008) (finding M.C.L. 565.41 claim, which requires mortgagees to file discharge of mortgage within statutory time period preempted under HOLA and its implementing regulations)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"2008 WL 183634, at *4","parenthetical":"finding M.C.L. 565.41 claim, which requires mortgagees to file discharge of mortgage within statutory time period preempted under HOLA and its implementing regulations","sentence":"See Cassese, 255 F.R.D. at 94 (noting that the court had previously dismissed NYRPAPL \u00a7 1921 claim as preempted under HOLA); accord Cassese MTD Opinion at 30-31; see also Molosky v. Wash. Mut. Bank, No. 07-CV-11247, 2008 WL 183634, at *4 (E.D.Mich. Jan. 18, 2008) (finding M.C.L. 565.41 claim, which requires mortgagees to file discharge of mortgage within statutory time period preempted under HOLA and its implementing regulations)."},"case_id":3800460,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The Buie \"standard would require the officers to have articulable facts, not a mere hunch, that would warrant a reasonable belief that the rooms they intended to search harbored a dangerous individual posing a threat to those on the arrest scene.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"593 A.2d 576, 581","parenthetical":"\"If the arrest occurs outside the residence, a protective sweep would only be legal if the officers have articulable facts which, taken with the logical implications therefrom, would lead a reasonably prudent officer to believe the area to be searched harbors a person or persons that posed danger to those on the arrest scene.\"","sentence":"Vasquez v. State, 870 So.2d 26, 31 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003); State v. Hedley, 593 A.2d 576, 581 (Del.Sup.Ct.1990) (\u201cIf the arrest occurs outside the residence, a protective sweep would only be legal if the officers have articulable facts which, taken with the logical implications therefrom, would lead a reasonably prudent officer to believe the area to be searched harbors a person or persons that posed danger to those on the arrest scene.\u201d); see Newton v. State, 378 So.2d 297, 298 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979) (\u201csuch a protective measure is only allowable when the officers have some reasonable grounds to suspect additional persons may be present. It cannot be justified routinely.\u201d); see also United States v. Colbert, 76 F.3d 773, 778 (6th Cir.1996) (\u201cLack of information cannot provide an articulable basis upon which to justify a protective sweep\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"378 So.2d 297, 298","parenthetical":"\"such a protective measure is only allowable when the officers have some reasonable grounds to suspect additional persons may be present. It cannot be justified routinely.\"","sentence":"Vasquez v. State, 870 So.2d 26, 31 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003); State v. Hedley, 593 A.2d 576, 581 (Del.Sup.Ct.1990) (\u201cIf the arrest occurs outside the residence, a protective sweep would only be legal if the officers have articulable facts which, taken with the logical implications therefrom, would lead a reasonably prudent officer to believe the area to be searched harbors a person or persons that posed danger to those on the arrest scene.\u201d); see Newton v. State, 378 So.2d 297, 298 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979) (\u201csuch a protective measure is only allowable when the officers have some reasonable grounds to suspect additional persons may be present. It cannot be justified routinely.\u201d); see also United States v. Colbert, 76 F.3d 773, 778 (6th Cir.1996) (\u201cLack of information cannot provide an articulable basis upon which to justify a protective sweep\u201d)."},"case_id":7063793,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The Buie \"standard would require the officers to have articulable facts, not a mere hunch, that would warrant a reasonable belief that the rooms they intended to search harbored a dangerous individual posing a threat to those on the arrest scene.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"593 A.2d 576, 581","parenthetical":"\"If the arrest occurs outside the residence, a protective sweep would only be legal if the officers have articulable facts which, taken with the logical implications therefrom, would lead a reasonably prudent officer to believe the area to be searched harbors a person or persons that posed danger to those on the arrest scene.\"","sentence":"Vasquez v. State, 870 So.2d 26, 31 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003); State v. Hedley, 593 A.2d 576, 581 (Del.Sup.Ct.1990) (\u201cIf the arrest occurs outside the residence, a protective sweep would only be legal if the officers have articulable facts which, taken with the logical implications therefrom, would lead a reasonably prudent officer to believe the area to be searched harbors a person or persons that posed danger to those on the arrest scene.\u201d); see Newton v. State, 378 So.2d 297, 298 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979) (\u201csuch a protective measure is only allowable when the officers have some reasonable grounds to suspect additional persons may be present. It cannot be justified routinely.\u201d); see also United States v. Colbert, 76 F.3d 773, 778 (6th Cir.1996) (\u201cLack of information cannot provide an articulable basis upon which to justify a protective sweep\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"76 F.3d 773, 778","parenthetical":"\"Lack of information cannot provide an articulable basis upon which to justify a protective sweep\"","sentence":"Vasquez v. State, 870 So.2d 26, 31 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003); State v. Hedley, 593 A.2d 576, 581 (Del.Sup.Ct.1990) (\u201cIf the arrest occurs outside the residence, a protective sweep would only be legal if the officers have articulable facts which, taken with the logical implications therefrom, would lead a reasonably prudent officer to believe the area to be searched harbors a person or persons that posed danger to those on the arrest scene.\u201d); see Newton v. State, 378 So.2d 297, 298 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979) (\u201csuch a protective measure is only allowable when the officers have some reasonable grounds to suspect additional persons may be present. It cannot be justified routinely.\u201d); see also United States v. Colbert, 76 F.3d 773, 778 (6th Cir.1996) (\u201cLack of information cannot provide an articulable basis upon which to justify a protective sweep\u201d)."},"case_id":7063793,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The Buie \"standard would require the officers to have articulable facts, not a mere hunch, that would warrant a reasonable belief that the rooms they intended to search harbored a dangerous individual posing a threat to those on the arrest scene.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"378 So.2d 297, 298","parenthetical":"\"such a protective measure is only allowable when the officers have some reasonable grounds to suspect additional persons may be present. It cannot be justified routinely.\"","sentence":"Vasquez v. State, 870 So.2d 26, 31 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003); State v. Hedley, 593 A.2d 576, 581 (Del.Sup.Ct.1990) (\u201cIf the arrest occurs outside the residence, a protective sweep would only be legal if the officers have articulable facts which, taken with the logical implications therefrom, would lead a reasonably prudent officer to believe the area to be searched harbors a person or persons that posed danger to those on the arrest scene.\u201d); see Newton v. State, 378 So.2d 297, 298 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979) (\u201csuch a protective measure is only allowable when the officers have some reasonable grounds to suspect additional persons may be present. It cannot be justified routinely.\u201d); see also United States v. Colbert, 76 F.3d 773, 778 (6th Cir.1996) (\u201cLack of information cannot provide an articulable basis upon which to justify a protective sweep\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"76 F.3d 773, 778","parenthetical":"\"Lack of information cannot provide an articulable basis upon which to justify a protective sweep\"","sentence":"Vasquez v. State, 870 So.2d 26, 31 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003); State v. Hedley, 593 A.2d 576, 581 (Del.Sup.Ct.1990) (\u201cIf the arrest occurs outside the residence, a protective sweep would only be legal if the officers have articulable facts which, taken with the logical implications therefrom, would lead a reasonably prudent officer to believe the area to be searched harbors a person or persons that posed danger to those on the arrest scene.\u201d); see Newton v. State, 378 So.2d 297, 298 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979) (\u201csuch a protective measure is only allowable when the officers have some reasonable grounds to suspect additional persons may be present. It cannot be justified routinely.\u201d); see also United States v. Colbert, 76 F.3d 773, 778 (6th Cir.1996) (\u201cLack of information cannot provide an articulable basis upon which to justify a protective sweep\u201d)."},"case_id":7063793,"label":"a"}
{"context":"However, in the context of alleged procedural violations of the ESA, the public interest and the balance of hardships weighs heavily in favor of a preliminary injunction due the emphasis placed by Congress on the protection of endangered and threatened, species.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"437 U.S. 153, 194","parenthetical":"\"Congress has spoken in the plainest of words, making it abundantly clear that the balance has been struck in favor of affording endangered species the highest of priorities .... \"","sentence":"Cottonwood, 789 F.3d at 1091 (\u201c[Wjhen evaluating a request for injunctive relief to remedy an ESA procedural violation, the equities and public interest factors always tip in favor of the protected species.\u201d); see also Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 194, 98 S.Ct. 2279, 57 L.Ed.2d 117 (1978) (\u201cCongress has spoken in the plainest of words, making it abundantly clear that the balance has been struck in favor of affording endangered species the highest of priorities .... \u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"789 F.3d 1091, 1091","parenthetical":"\"[Wjhen evaluating a request for injunctive relief to remedy an ESA procedural violation, the equities and public interest factors always tip in favor of the protected species.\"","sentence":"Cottonwood, 789 F.3d at 1091 (\u201c[Wjhen evaluating a request for injunctive relief to remedy an ESA procedural violation, the equities and public interest factors always tip in favor of the protected species.\u201d); see also Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 194, 98 S.Ct. 2279, 57 L.Ed.2d 117 (1978) (\u201cCongress has spoken in the plainest of words, making it abundantly clear that the balance has been struck in favor of affording endangered species the highest of priorities .... \u201d)."},"case_id":12274030,"label":"b"}
{"context":"However, in the context of alleged procedural violations of the ESA, the public interest and the balance of hardships weighs heavily in favor of a preliminary injunction due the emphasis placed by Congress on the protection of endangered and threatened, species.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"789 F.3d 1091, 1091","parenthetical":"\"[Wjhen evaluating a request for injunctive relief to remedy an ESA procedural violation, the equities and public interest factors always tip in favor of the protected species.\"","sentence":"Cottonwood, 789 F.3d at 1091 (\u201c[Wjhen evaluating a request for injunctive relief to remedy an ESA procedural violation, the equities and public interest factors always tip in favor of the protected species.\u201d); see also Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 194, 98 S.Ct. 2279, 57 L.Ed.2d 117 (1978) (\u201cCongress has spoken in the plainest of words, making it abundantly clear that the balance has been struck in favor of affording endangered species the highest of priorities .... \u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"Congress has spoken in the plainest of words, making it abundantly clear that the balance has been struck in favor of affording endangered species the highest of priorities .... \"","sentence":"Cottonwood, 789 F.3d at 1091 (\u201c[Wjhen evaluating a request for injunctive relief to remedy an ESA procedural violation, the equities and public interest factors always tip in favor of the protected species.\u201d); see also Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 194, 98 S.Ct. 2279, 57 L.Ed.2d 117 (1978) (\u201cCongress has spoken in the plainest of words, making it abundantly clear that the balance has been struck in favor of affording endangered species the highest of priorities .... \u201d)."},"case_id":12274030,"label":"a"}
{"context":"However, in the context of alleged procedural violations of the ESA, the public interest and the balance of hardships weighs heavily in favor of a preliminary injunction due the emphasis placed by Congress on the protection of endangered and threatened, species.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"789 F.3d 1091, 1091","parenthetical":"\"[Wjhen evaluating a request for injunctive relief to remedy an ESA procedural violation, the equities and public interest factors always tip in favor of the protected species.\"","sentence":"Cottonwood, 789 F.3d at 1091 (\u201c[Wjhen evaluating a request for injunctive relief to remedy an ESA procedural violation, the equities and public interest factors always tip in favor of the protected species.\u201d); see also Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 194, 98 S.Ct. 2279, 57 L.Ed.2d 117 (1978) (\u201cCongress has spoken in the plainest of words, making it abundantly clear that the balance has been struck in favor of affording endangered species the highest of priorities .... \u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"Congress has spoken in the plainest of words, making it abundantly clear that the balance has been struck in favor of affording endangered species the highest of priorities .... \"","sentence":"Cottonwood, 789 F.3d at 1091 (\u201c[Wjhen evaluating a request for injunctive relief to remedy an ESA procedural violation, the equities and public interest factors always tip in favor of the protected species.\u201d); see also Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 194, 98 S.Ct. 2279, 57 L.Ed.2d 117 (1978) (\u201cCongress has spoken in the plainest of words, making it abundantly clear that the balance has been struck in favor of affording endangered species the highest of priorities .... \u201d)."},"case_id":12274030,"label":"a"}
{"context":"For example, care and treatment are the focus of the Ervin Act; similarly \"the overriding goal of the District's Juvenile Act [is] to promote the care and rehabilitation of the juvenile.\" Furthermore, like the Ervin Act, the Juvenile Act does not explicitly authorize the Family Division of Superior Court to order DHS to place juveniles in facilities outside the District of Columbia; rather, it allows the court to order \"[commitment of the child for medical, psychiatric, or other treatment at an appropriate facility on an in-patient basis if ... the Division finds that confinement is necessary to the treatment of the child.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"The [Superior Court] has broad discretion to order the treatment it deems to be in the child's best interest.\"","sentence":"D.C.Code \u00a7 16-2320(a)(4); see id. at - 2320(c)(1). We have held that these provisions enable the Family Division to order DHS to place a juvenile delinquent in a specific program outside the District of Columbia. See A.A.I., 483 A.2d at 1209 (upholding trial court\u2019s placement of juvenile in private residential facility in Annapolis, Maryland); In re J.A.G., 443 A.2d 13, 15 (D.C.1982); id. at 23-24 (Ferren, J., concurring); see also In re C.W.M., 407 A.2d 617, 624 n. 16 (D.C.1979) (\u201cThe [Superior Court] has broad discretion to order the treatment it deems to be in the child\u2019s best interest.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"483 A.2d 1209, 1209","parenthetical":"upholding trial court's placement of juvenile in private residential facility in Annapolis, Maryland","sentence":"D.C.Code \u00a7 16-2320(a)(4); see id. at - 2320(c)(1). We have held that these provisions enable the Family Division to order DHS to place a juvenile delinquent in a specific program outside the District of Columbia. See A.A.I., 483 A.2d at 1209 (upholding trial court\u2019s placement of juvenile in private residential facility in Annapolis, Maryland); In re J.A.G., 443 A.2d 13, 15 (D.C.1982); id. at 23-24 (Ferren, J., concurring); see also In re C.W.M., 407 A.2d 617, 624 n. 16 (D.C.1979) (\u201cThe [Superior Court] has broad discretion to order the treatment it deems to be in the child\u2019s best interest.\u201d)."},"case_id":7368623,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In deciding whether the trial court's erroneous decision to shackle violated due process, a federal habeas court should \"determine whether what [the jurors] saw was so inherently prejudicial as to pose an unacceptable threat to defendant's right to a fair trial.\" Visible shackling during trial is so likely to cause a defendant prejudice that it is permitted only when justified by an essential state interest specific to each trial.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"291 F.3d 583, 583","parenthetical":"holding that defendant who was improperly placed in a leg brace for security reasons suffered no prejudice where no jurors interviewed after trial recalled seeing the brace","sentence":"See, e.g., Williams v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 567, 593 (9th Cir.2004) (juror\u2019s viewing of defendant in handcuffs with a coat draped over his handcuffed hands as he went to or from the courtroom was not inherently or presumptively prejudicial); Ghent v. Woodford, 279 F.3d 1121, 1133 (9th Cir.2002) (no prejudice from jury\u2019s brief glance of shackles outside of courtroom while petitioner was being transported); Rich v. Calderon, 170 F.3d 1236, 1240 (9th Cir.1999) (no constitutional error where defendant was only shackled with ankle chains during trial and shackles were behind curtain or skirt placed around the defense table to insure that they were not visible to the jury), amended, 187 F.3d 1064, 1069 (9th Cir.1999); see also Packer, 291 F.3d at 583 (holding that defendant who was improperly placed in a leg brace for security reasons suffered no prejudice where no jurors interviewed after trial recalled seeing the brace)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"384 F.3d 567, 593","parenthetical":"juror's viewing of defendant in handcuffs with a coat draped over his handcuffed hands as he went to or from the courtroom was not inherently or presumptively prejudicial","sentence":"See, e.g., Williams v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 567, 593 (9th Cir.2004) (juror\u2019s viewing of defendant in handcuffs with a coat draped over his handcuffed hands as he went to or from the courtroom was not inherently or presumptively prejudicial); Ghent v. Woodford, 279 F.3d 1121, 1133 (9th Cir.2002) (no prejudice from jury\u2019s brief glance of shackles outside of courtroom while petitioner was being transported); Rich v. Calderon, 170 F.3d 1236, 1240 (9th Cir.1999) (no constitutional error where defendant was only shackled with ankle chains during trial and shackles were behind curtain or skirt placed around the defense table to insure that they were not visible to the jury), amended, 187 F.3d 1064, 1069 (9th Cir.1999); see also Packer, 291 F.3d at 583 (holding that defendant who was improperly placed in a leg brace for security reasons suffered no prejudice where no jurors interviewed after trial recalled seeing the brace)."},"case_id":4162100,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In deciding whether the trial court's erroneous decision to shackle violated due process, a federal habeas court should \"determine whether what [the jurors] saw was so inherently prejudicial as to pose an unacceptable threat to defendant's right to a fair trial.\" Visible shackling during trial is so likely to cause a defendant prejudice that it is permitted only when justified by an essential state interest specific to each trial.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"291 F.3d 583, 583","parenthetical":"holding that defendant who was improperly placed in a leg brace for security reasons suffered no prejudice where no jurors interviewed after trial recalled seeing the brace","sentence":"See, e.g., Williams v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 567, 593 (9th Cir.2004) (juror\u2019s viewing of defendant in handcuffs with a coat draped over his handcuffed hands as he went to or from the courtroom was not inherently or presumptively prejudicial); Ghent v. Woodford, 279 F.3d 1121, 1133 (9th Cir.2002) (no prejudice from jury\u2019s brief glance of shackles outside of courtroom while petitioner was being transported); Rich v. Calderon, 170 F.3d 1236, 1240 (9th Cir.1999) (no constitutional error where defendant was only shackled with ankle chains during trial and shackles were behind curtain or skirt placed around the defense table to insure that they were not visible to the jury), amended, 187 F.3d 1064, 1069 (9th Cir.1999); see also Packer, 291 F.3d at 583 (holding that defendant who was improperly placed in a leg brace for security reasons suffered no prejudice where no jurors interviewed after trial recalled seeing the brace)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"279 F.3d 1121, 1133","parenthetical":"no prejudice from jury's brief glance of shackles outside of courtroom while petitioner was being transported","sentence":"See, e.g., Williams v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 567, 593 (9th Cir.2004) (juror\u2019s viewing of defendant in handcuffs with a coat draped over his handcuffed hands as he went to or from the courtroom was not inherently or presumptively prejudicial); Ghent v. Woodford, 279 F.3d 1121, 1133 (9th Cir.2002) (no prejudice from jury\u2019s brief glance of shackles outside of courtroom while petitioner was being transported); Rich v. Calderon, 170 F.3d 1236, 1240 (9th Cir.1999) (no constitutional error where defendant was only shackled with ankle chains during trial and shackles were behind curtain or skirt placed around the defense table to insure that they were not visible to the jury), amended, 187 F.3d 1064, 1069 (9th Cir.1999); see also Packer, 291 F.3d at 583 (holding that defendant who was improperly placed in a leg brace for security reasons suffered no prejudice where no jurors interviewed after trial recalled seeing the brace)."},"case_id":4162100,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In deciding whether the trial court's erroneous decision to shackle violated due process, a federal habeas court should \"determine whether what [the jurors] saw was so inherently prejudicial as to pose an unacceptable threat to defendant's right to a fair trial.\" Visible shackling during trial is so likely to cause a defendant prejudice that it is permitted only when justified by an essential state interest specific to each trial.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"291 F.3d 583, 583","parenthetical":"holding that defendant who was improperly placed in a leg brace for security reasons suffered no prejudice where no jurors interviewed after trial recalled seeing the brace","sentence":"See, e.g., Williams v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 567, 593 (9th Cir.2004) (juror\u2019s viewing of defendant in handcuffs with a coat draped over his handcuffed hands as he went to or from the courtroom was not inherently or presumptively prejudicial); Ghent v. Woodford, 279 F.3d 1121, 1133 (9th Cir.2002) (no prejudice from jury\u2019s brief glance of shackles outside of courtroom while petitioner was being transported); Rich v. Calderon, 170 F.3d 1236, 1240 (9th Cir.1999) (no constitutional error where defendant was only shackled with ankle chains during trial and shackles were behind curtain or skirt placed around the defense table to insure that they were not visible to the jury), amended, 187 F.3d 1064, 1069 (9th Cir.1999); see also Packer, 291 F.3d at 583 (holding that defendant who was improperly placed in a leg brace for security reasons suffered no prejudice where no jurors interviewed after trial recalled seeing the brace)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"170 F.3d 1236, 1240","parenthetical":"no constitutional error where defendant was only shackled with ankle chains during trial and shackles were behind curtain or skirt placed around the defense table to insure that they were not visible to the jury","sentence":"See, e.g., Williams v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 567, 593 (9th Cir.2004) (juror\u2019s viewing of defendant in handcuffs with a coat draped over his handcuffed hands as he went to or from the courtroom was not inherently or presumptively prejudicial); Ghent v. Woodford, 279 F.3d 1121, 1133 (9th Cir.2002) (no prejudice from jury\u2019s brief glance of shackles outside of courtroom while petitioner was being transported); Rich v. Calderon, 170 F.3d 1236, 1240 (9th Cir.1999) (no constitutional error where defendant was only shackled with ankle chains during trial and shackles were behind curtain or skirt placed around the defense table to insure that they were not visible to the jury), amended, 187 F.3d 1064, 1069 (9th Cir.1999); see also Packer, 291 F.3d at 583 (holding that defendant who was improperly placed in a leg brace for security reasons suffered no prejudice where no jurors interviewed after trial recalled seeing the brace)."},"case_id":4162100,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In deciding whether the trial court's erroneous decision to shackle violated due process, a federal habeas court should \"determine whether what [the jurors] saw was so inherently prejudicial as to pose an unacceptable threat to defendant's right to a fair trial.\" Visible shackling during trial is so likely to cause a defendant prejudice that it is permitted only when justified by an essential state interest specific to each trial.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"187 F.3d 1064, 1069","parenthetical":"no constitutional error where defendant was only shackled with ankle chains during trial and shackles were behind curtain or skirt placed around the defense table to insure that they were not visible to the jury","sentence":"See, e.g., Williams v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 567, 593 (9th Cir.2004) (juror\u2019s viewing of defendant in handcuffs with a coat draped over his handcuffed hands as he went to or from the courtroom was not inherently or presumptively prejudicial); Ghent v. Woodford, 279 F.3d 1121, 1133 (9th Cir.2002) (no prejudice from jury\u2019s brief glance of shackles outside of courtroom while petitioner was being transported); Rich v. Calderon, 170 F.3d 1236, 1240 (9th Cir.1999) (no constitutional error where defendant was only shackled with ankle chains during trial and shackles were behind curtain or skirt placed around the defense table to insure that they were not visible to the jury), amended, 187 F.3d 1064, 1069 (9th Cir.1999); see also Packer, 291 F.3d at 583 (holding that defendant who was improperly placed in a leg brace for security reasons suffered no prejudice where no jurors interviewed after trial recalled seeing the brace)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"291 F.3d 583, 583","parenthetical":"holding that defendant who was improperly placed in a leg brace for security reasons suffered no prejudice where no jurors interviewed after trial recalled seeing the brace","sentence":"See, e.g., Williams v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 567, 593 (9th Cir.2004) (juror\u2019s viewing of defendant in handcuffs with a coat draped over his handcuffed hands as he went to or from the courtroom was not inherently or presumptively prejudicial); Ghent v. Woodford, 279 F.3d 1121, 1133 (9th Cir.2002) (no prejudice from jury\u2019s brief glance of shackles outside of courtroom while petitioner was being transported); Rich v. Calderon, 170 F.3d 1236, 1240 (9th Cir.1999) (no constitutional error where defendant was only shackled with ankle chains during trial and shackles were behind curtain or skirt placed around the defense table to insure that they were not visible to the jury), amended, 187 F.3d 1064, 1069 (9th Cir.1999); see also Packer, 291 F.3d at 583 (holding that defendant who was improperly placed in a leg brace for security reasons suffered no prejudice where no jurors interviewed after trial recalled seeing the brace)."},"case_id":4162100,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Ciripompa essentially argues that if judicial review occurs more than forty-five days after the first hearing date, which it virtually always will, the court is powerless to remand the matter if it finds a ground to vacate the award. This interpretation completely undermines the purpose of affording judicial review of arbitration awards in teacher-tenure cases, and is contrary to authority granting the court the discretion to remand for an arbitration hearing before a different arbitrator.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"266 N.J.Super. 501, 520-21","parenthetical":"holding that upon vacating an arbitration award, the court has the discretion to remand to the same arbitrator or different arbitrator","sentence":"See In re City of Camden, 429 N.J.Super. 309, 337-38, 58 A.3d 1186 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 215 N.J. 485, 73 A.3d 511 (2013) (permitting a remand to a different arbitrator \u201cwhen deficiencies in the arbitrator\u2019s process call into question the arbitrator\u2019s ability to have an open mind regarding the disposition\u201d); see also Fox v. Morris Cnty. Policemen\u2019s Ass\u2019n, P.B.A. 151, 266 N.J.Super. 501, 520-21, 630 A.2d 318 (App.Div.1993), certif. denied, 137 N.J. 311, 645 A.2d 140 (1994) (holding that upon vacating an arbitration award, the court has the discretion to remand to the same arbitrator or different arbitrator); Manchester Twp. Bd. of Educ., supra, 199 N.J.Super. at 281, 489 A.2d 682 (same)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"429 N.J.Super. 309, 337-38","parenthetical":"permitting a remand to a different arbitrator \"when deficiencies in the arbitrator's process call into question the arbitrator's ability to have an open mind regarding the disposition\"","sentence":"See In re City of Camden, 429 N.J.Super. 309, 337-38, 58 A.3d 1186 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 215 N.J. 485, 73 A.3d 511 (2013) (permitting a remand to a different arbitrator \u201cwhen deficiencies in the arbitrator\u2019s process call into question the arbitrator\u2019s ability to have an open mind regarding the disposition\u201d); see also Fox v. Morris Cnty. Policemen\u2019s Ass\u2019n, P.B.A. 151, 266 N.J.Super. 501, 520-21, 630 A.2d 318 (App.Div.1993), certif. denied, 137 N.J. 311, 645 A.2d 140 (1994) (holding that upon vacating an arbitration award, the court has the discretion to remand to the same arbitrator or different arbitrator); Manchester Twp. Bd. of Educ., supra, 199 N.J.Super. at 281, 489 A.2d 682 (same)."},"case_id":4363805,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Ciripompa essentially argues that if judicial review occurs more than forty-five days after the first hearing date, which it virtually always will, the court is powerless to remand the matter if it finds a ground to vacate the award. This interpretation completely undermines the purpose of affording judicial review of arbitration awards in teacher-tenure cases, and is contrary to authority granting the court the discretion to remand for an arbitration hearing before a different arbitrator.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that upon vacating an arbitration award, the court has the discretion to remand to the same arbitrator or different arbitrator","sentence":"See In re City of Camden, 429 N.J.Super. 309, 337-38, 58 A.3d 1186 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 215 N.J. 485, 73 A.3d 511 (2013) (permitting a remand to a different arbitrator \u201cwhen deficiencies in the arbitrator\u2019s process call into question the arbitrator\u2019s ability to have an open mind regarding the disposition\u201d); see also Fox v. Morris Cnty. Policemen\u2019s Ass\u2019n, P.B.A. 151, 266 N.J.Super. 501, 520-21, 630 A.2d 318 (App.Div.1993), certif. denied, 137 N.J. 311, 645 A.2d 140 (1994) (holding that upon vacating an arbitration award, the court has the discretion to remand to the same arbitrator or different arbitrator); Manchester Twp. Bd. of Educ., supra, 199 N.J.Super. at 281, 489 A.2d 682 (same)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"429 N.J.Super. 309, 337-38","parenthetical":"permitting a remand to a different arbitrator \"when deficiencies in the arbitrator's process call into question the arbitrator's ability to have an open mind regarding the disposition\"","sentence":"See In re City of Camden, 429 N.J.Super. 309, 337-38, 58 A.3d 1186 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 215 N.J. 485, 73 A.3d 511 (2013) (permitting a remand to a different arbitrator \u201cwhen deficiencies in the arbitrator\u2019s process call into question the arbitrator\u2019s ability to have an open mind regarding the disposition\u201d); see also Fox v. Morris Cnty. Policemen\u2019s Ass\u2019n, P.B.A. 151, 266 N.J.Super. 501, 520-21, 630 A.2d 318 (App.Div.1993), certif. denied, 137 N.J. 311, 645 A.2d 140 (1994) (holding that upon vacating an arbitration award, the court has the discretion to remand to the same arbitrator or different arbitrator); Manchester Twp. Bd. of Educ., supra, 199 N.J.Super. at 281, 489 A.2d 682 (same)."},"case_id":4363805,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Ciripompa essentially argues that if judicial review occurs more than forty-five days after the first hearing date, which it virtually always will, the court is powerless to remand the matter if it finds a ground to vacate the award. This interpretation completely undermines the purpose of affording judicial review of arbitration awards in teacher-tenure cases, and is contrary to authority granting the court the discretion to remand for an arbitration hearing before a different arbitrator.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that upon vacating an arbitration award, the court has the discretion to remand to the same arbitrator or different arbitrator","sentence":"See In re City of Camden, 429 N.J.Super. 309, 337-38, 58 A.3d 1186 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 215 N.J. 485, 73 A.3d 511 (2013) (permitting a remand to a different arbitrator \u201cwhen deficiencies in the arbitrator\u2019s process call into question the arbitrator\u2019s ability to have an open mind regarding the disposition\u201d); see also Fox v. Morris Cnty. Policemen\u2019s Ass\u2019n, P.B.A. 151, 266 N.J.Super. 501, 520-21, 630 A.2d 318 (App.Div.1993), certif. denied, 137 N.J. 311, 645 A.2d 140 (1994) (holding that upon vacating an arbitration award, the court has the discretion to remand to the same arbitrator or different arbitrator); Manchester Twp. Bd. of Educ., supra, 199 N.J.Super. at 281, 489 A.2d 682 (same)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"429 N.J.Super. 309, 337-38","parenthetical":"permitting a remand to a different arbitrator \"when deficiencies in the arbitrator's process call into question the arbitrator's ability to have an open mind regarding the disposition\"","sentence":"See In re City of Camden, 429 N.J.Super. 309, 337-38, 58 A.3d 1186 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 215 N.J. 485, 73 A.3d 511 (2013) (permitting a remand to a different arbitrator \u201cwhen deficiencies in the arbitrator\u2019s process call into question the arbitrator\u2019s ability to have an open mind regarding the disposition\u201d); see also Fox v. Morris Cnty. Policemen\u2019s Ass\u2019n, P.B.A. 151, 266 N.J.Super. 501, 520-21, 630 A.2d 318 (App.Div.1993), certif. denied, 137 N.J. 311, 645 A.2d 140 (1994) (holding that upon vacating an arbitration award, the court has the discretion to remand to the same arbitrator or different arbitrator); Manchester Twp. Bd. of Educ., supra, 199 N.J.Super. at 281, 489 A.2d 682 (same)."},"case_id":4363805,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Ciripompa essentially argues that if judicial review occurs more than forty-five days after the first hearing date, which it virtually always will, the court is powerless to remand the matter if it finds a ground to vacate the award. This interpretation completely undermines the purpose of affording judicial review of arbitration awards in teacher-tenure cases, and is contrary to authority granting the court the discretion to remand for an arbitration hearing before a different arbitrator.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that upon vacating an arbitration award, the court has the discretion to remand to the same arbitrator or different arbitrator","sentence":"See In re City of Camden, 429 N.J.Super. 309, 337-38, 58 A.3d 1186 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 215 N.J. 485, 73 A.3d 511 (2013) (permitting a remand to a different arbitrator \u201cwhen deficiencies in the arbitrator\u2019s process call into question the arbitrator\u2019s ability to have an open mind regarding the disposition\u201d); see also Fox v. Morris Cnty. Policemen\u2019s Ass\u2019n, P.B.A. 151, 266 N.J.Super. 501, 520-21, 630 A.2d 318 (App.Div.1993), certif. denied, 137 N.J. 311, 645 A.2d 140 (1994) (holding that upon vacating an arbitration award, the court has the discretion to remand to the same arbitrator or different arbitrator); Manchester Twp. Bd. of Educ., supra, 199 N.J.Super. at 281, 489 A.2d 682 (same)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"429 N.J.Super. 309, 337-38","parenthetical":"permitting a remand to a different arbitrator \"when deficiencies in the arbitrator's process call into question the arbitrator's ability to have an open mind regarding the disposition\"","sentence":"See In re City of Camden, 429 N.J.Super. 309, 337-38, 58 A.3d 1186 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 215 N.J. 485, 73 A.3d 511 (2013) (permitting a remand to a different arbitrator \u201cwhen deficiencies in the arbitrator\u2019s process call into question the arbitrator\u2019s ability to have an open mind regarding the disposition\u201d); see also Fox v. Morris Cnty. Policemen\u2019s Ass\u2019n, P.B.A. 151, 266 N.J.Super. 501, 520-21, 630 A.2d 318 (App.Div.1993), certif. denied, 137 N.J. 311, 645 A.2d 140 (1994) (holding that upon vacating an arbitration award, the court has the discretion to remand to the same arbitrator or different arbitrator); Manchester Twp. Bd. of Educ., supra, 199 N.J.Super. at 281, 489 A.2d 682 (same)."},"case_id":4363805,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Ciripompa essentially argues that if judicial review occurs more than forty-five days after the first hearing date, which it virtually always will, the court is powerless to remand the matter if it finds a ground to vacate the award. This interpretation completely undermines the purpose of affording judicial review of arbitration awards in teacher-tenure cases, and is contrary to authority granting the court the discretion to remand for an arbitration hearing before a different arbitrator.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"266 N.J.Super. 501, 520-21","parenthetical":"holding that upon vacating an arbitration award, the court has the discretion to remand to the same arbitrator or different arbitrator","sentence":"See In re City of Camden, 429 N.J.Super. 309, 337-38, 58 A.3d 1186 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 215 N.J. 485, 73 A.3d 511 (2013) (permitting a remand to a different arbitrator \u201cwhen deficiencies in the arbitrator\u2019s process call into question the arbitrator\u2019s ability to have an open mind regarding the disposition\u201d); see also Fox v. Morris Cnty. Policemen\u2019s Ass\u2019n, P.B.A. 151, 266 N.J.Super. 501, 520-21, 630 A.2d 318 (App.Div.1993), certif. denied, 137 N.J. 311, 645 A.2d 140 (1994) (holding that upon vacating an arbitration award, the court has the discretion to remand to the same arbitrator or different arbitrator); Manchester Twp. Bd. of Educ., supra, 199 N.J.Super. at 281, 489 A.2d 682 (same)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"permitting a remand to a different arbitrator \"when deficiencies in the arbitrator's process call into question the arbitrator's ability to have an open mind regarding the disposition\"","sentence":"See In re City of Camden, 429 N.J.Super. 309, 337-38, 58 A.3d 1186 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 215 N.J. 485, 73 A.3d 511 (2013) (permitting a remand to a different arbitrator \u201cwhen deficiencies in the arbitrator\u2019s process call into question the arbitrator\u2019s ability to have an open mind regarding the disposition\u201d); see also Fox v. Morris Cnty. Policemen\u2019s Ass\u2019n, P.B.A. 151, 266 N.J.Super. 501, 520-21, 630 A.2d 318 (App.Div.1993), certif. denied, 137 N.J. 311, 645 A.2d 140 (1994) (holding that upon vacating an arbitration award, the court has the discretion to remand to the same arbitrator or different arbitrator); Manchester Twp. Bd. of Educ., supra, 199 N.J.Super. at 281, 489 A.2d 682 (same)."},"case_id":4363805,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Ciripompa essentially argues that if judicial review occurs more than forty-five days after the first hearing date, which it virtually always will, the court is powerless to remand the matter if it finds a ground to vacate the award. This interpretation completely undermines the purpose of affording judicial review of arbitration awards in teacher-tenure cases, and is contrary to authority granting the court the discretion to remand for an arbitration hearing before a different arbitrator.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"permitting a remand to a different arbitrator \"when deficiencies in the arbitrator's process call into question the arbitrator's ability to have an open mind regarding the disposition\"","sentence":"See In re City of Camden, 429 N.J.Super. 309, 337-38, 58 A.3d 1186 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 215 N.J. 485, 73 A.3d 511 (2013) (permitting a remand to a different arbitrator \u201cwhen deficiencies in the arbitrator\u2019s process call into question the arbitrator\u2019s ability to have an open mind regarding the disposition\u201d); see also Fox v. Morris Cnty. Policemen\u2019s Ass\u2019n, P.B.A. 151, 266 N.J.Super. 501, 520-21, 630 A.2d 318 (App.Div.1993), certif. denied, 137 N.J. 311, 645 A.2d 140 (1994) (holding that upon vacating an arbitration award, the court has the discretion to remand to the same arbitrator or different arbitrator); Manchester Twp. Bd. of Educ., supra, 199 N.J.Super. at 281, 489 A.2d 682 (same)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that upon vacating an arbitration award, the court has the discretion to remand to the same arbitrator or different arbitrator","sentence":"See In re City of Camden, 429 N.J.Super. 309, 337-38, 58 A.3d 1186 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 215 N.J. 485, 73 A.3d 511 (2013) (permitting a remand to a different arbitrator \u201cwhen deficiencies in the arbitrator\u2019s process call into question the arbitrator\u2019s ability to have an open mind regarding the disposition\u201d); see also Fox v. Morris Cnty. Policemen\u2019s Ass\u2019n, P.B.A. 151, 266 N.J.Super. 501, 520-21, 630 A.2d 318 (App.Div.1993), certif. denied, 137 N.J. 311, 645 A.2d 140 (1994) (holding that upon vacating an arbitration award, the court has the discretion to remand to the same arbitrator or different arbitrator); Manchester Twp. Bd. of Educ., supra, 199 N.J.Super. at 281, 489 A.2d 682 (same)."},"case_id":4363805,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Ciripompa essentially argues that if judicial review occurs more than forty-five days after the first hearing date, which it virtually always will, the court is powerless to remand the matter if it finds a ground to vacate the award. This interpretation completely undermines the purpose of affording judicial review of arbitration awards in teacher-tenure cases, and is contrary to authority granting the court the discretion to remand for an arbitration hearing before a different arbitrator.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"permitting a remand to a different arbitrator \"when deficiencies in the arbitrator's process call into question the arbitrator's ability to have an open mind regarding the disposition\"","sentence":"See In re City of Camden, 429 N.J.Super. 309, 337-38, 58 A.3d 1186 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 215 N.J. 485, 73 A.3d 511 (2013) (permitting a remand to a different arbitrator \u201cwhen deficiencies in the arbitrator\u2019s process call into question the arbitrator\u2019s ability to have an open mind regarding the disposition\u201d); see also Fox v. Morris Cnty. Policemen\u2019s Ass\u2019n, P.B.A. 151, 266 N.J.Super. 501, 520-21, 630 A.2d 318 (App.Div.1993), certif. denied, 137 N.J. 311, 645 A.2d 140 (1994) (holding that upon vacating an arbitration award, the court has the discretion to remand to the same arbitrator or different arbitrator); Manchester Twp. Bd. of Educ., supra, 199 N.J.Super. at 281, 489 A.2d 682 (same)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that upon vacating an arbitration award, the court has the discretion to remand to the same arbitrator or different arbitrator","sentence":"See In re City of Camden, 429 N.J.Super. 309, 337-38, 58 A.3d 1186 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 215 N.J. 485, 73 A.3d 511 (2013) (permitting a remand to a different arbitrator \u201cwhen deficiencies in the arbitrator\u2019s process call into question the arbitrator\u2019s ability to have an open mind regarding the disposition\u201d); see also Fox v. Morris Cnty. Policemen\u2019s Ass\u2019n, P.B.A. 151, 266 N.J.Super. 501, 520-21, 630 A.2d 318 (App.Div.1993), certif. denied, 137 N.J. 311, 645 A.2d 140 (1994) (holding that upon vacating an arbitration award, the court has the discretion to remand to the same arbitrator or different arbitrator); Manchester Twp. Bd. of Educ., supra, 199 N.J.Super. at 281, 489 A.2d 682 (same)."},"case_id":4363805,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Ciripompa essentially argues that if judicial review occurs more than forty-five days after the first hearing date, which it virtually always will, the court is powerless to remand the matter if it finds a ground to vacate the award. This interpretation completely undermines the purpose of affording judicial review of arbitration awards in teacher-tenure cases, and is contrary to authority granting the court the discretion to remand for an arbitration hearing before a different arbitrator.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"permitting a remand to a different arbitrator \"when deficiencies in the arbitrator's process call into question the arbitrator's ability to have an open mind regarding the disposition\"","sentence":"See In re City of Camden, 429 N.J.Super. 309, 337-38, 58 A.3d 1186 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 215 N.J. 485, 73 A.3d 511 (2013) (permitting a remand to a different arbitrator \u201cwhen deficiencies in the arbitrator\u2019s process call into question the arbitrator\u2019s ability to have an open mind regarding the disposition\u201d); see also Fox v. Morris Cnty. Policemen\u2019s Ass\u2019n, P.B.A. 151, 266 N.J.Super. 501, 520-21, 630 A.2d 318 (App.Div.1993), certif. denied, 137 N.J. 311, 645 A.2d 140 (1994) (holding that upon vacating an arbitration award, the court has the discretion to remand to the same arbitrator or different arbitrator); Manchester Twp. Bd. of Educ., supra, 199 N.J.Super. at 281, 489 A.2d 682 (same)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that upon vacating an arbitration award, the court has the discretion to remand to the same arbitrator or different arbitrator","sentence":"See In re City of Camden, 429 N.J.Super. 309, 337-38, 58 A.3d 1186 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 215 N.J. 485, 73 A.3d 511 (2013) (permitting a remand to a different arbitrator \u201cwhen deficiencies in the arbitrator\u2019s process call into question the arbitrator\u2019s ability to have an open mind regarding the disposition\u201d); see also Fox v. Morris Cnty. Policemen\u2019s Ass\u2019n, P.B.A. 151, 266 N.J.Super. 501, 520-21, 630 A.2d 318 (App.Div.1993), certif. denied, 137 N.J. 311, 645 A.2d 140 (1994) (holding that upon vacating an arbitration award, the court has the discretion to remand to the same arbitrator or different arbitrator); Manchester Twp. Bd. of Educ., supra, 199 N.J.Super. at 281, 489 A.2d 682 (same)."},"case_id":4363805,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Ciripompa essentially argues that if judicial review occurs more than forty-five days after the first hearing date, which it virtually always will, the court is powerless to remand the matter if it finds a ground to vacate the award. This interpretation completely undermines the purpose of affording judicial review of arbitration awards in teacher-tenure cases, and is contrary to authority granting the court the discretion to remand for an arbitration hearing before a different arbitrator.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"266 N.J.Super. 501, 520-21","parenthetical":"holding that upon vacating an arbitration award, the court has the discretion to remand to the same arbitrator or different arbitrator","sentence":"See In re City of Camden, 429 N.J.Super. 309, 337-38, 58 A.3d 1186 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 215 N.J. 485, 73 A.3d 511 (2013) (permitting a remand to a different arbitrator \u201cwhen deficiencies in the arbitrator\u2019s process call into question the arbitrator\u2019s ability to have an open mind regarding the disposition\u201d); see also Fox v. Morris Cnty. Policemen\u2019s Ass\u2019n, P.B.A. 151, 266 N.J.Super. 501, 520-21, 630 A.2d 318 (App.Div.1993), certif. denied, 137 N.J. 311, 645 A.2d 140 (1994) (holding that upon vacating an arbitration award, the court has the discretion to remand to the same arbitrator or different arbitrator); Manchester Twp. Bd. of Educ., supra, 199 N.J.Super. at 281, 489 A.2d 682 (same)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"permitting a remand to a different arbitrator \"when deficiencies in the arbitrator's process call into question the arbitrator's ability to have an open mind regarding the disposition\"","sentence":"See In re City of Camden, 429 N.J.Super. 309, 337-38, 58 A.3d 1186 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 215 N.J. 485, 73 A.3d 511 (2013) (permitting a remand to a different arbitrator \u201cwhen deficiencies in the arbitrator\u2019s process call into question the arbitrator\u2019s ability to have an open mind regarding the disposition\u201d); see also Fox v. Morris Cnty. Policemen\u2019s Ass\u2019n, P.B.A. 151, 266 N.J.Super. 501, 520-21, 630 A.2d 318 (App.Div.1993), certif. denied, 137 N.J. 311, 645 A.2d 140 (1994) (holding that upon vacating an arbitration award, the court has the discretion to remand to the same arbitrator or different arbitrator); Manchester Twp. Bd. of Educ., supra, 199 N.J.Super. at 281, 489 A.2d 682 (same)."},"case_id":4363805,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Ciripompa essentially argues that if judicial review occurs more than forty-five days after the first hearing date, which it virtually always will, the court is powerless to remand the matter if it finds a ground to vacate the award. This interpretation completely undermines the purpose of affording judicial review of arbitration awards in teacher-tenure cases, and is contrary to authority granting the court the discretion to remand for an arbitration hearing before a different arbitrator.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that upon vacating an arbitration award, the court has the discretion to remand to the same arbitrator or different arbitrator","sentence":"See In re City of Camden, 429 N.J.Super. 309, 337-38, 58 A.3d 1186 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 215 N.J. 485, 73 A.3d 511 (2013) (permitting a remand to a different arbitrator \u201cwhen deficiencies in the arbitrator\u2019s process call into question the arbitrator\u2019s ability to have an open mind regarding the disposition\u201d); see also Fox v. Morris Cnty. Policemen\u2019s Ass\u2019n, P.B.A. 151, 266 N.J.Super. 501, 520-21, 630 A.2d 318 (App.Div.1993), certif. denied, 137 N.J. 311, 645 A.2d 140 (1994) (holding that upon vacating an arbitration award, the court has the discretion to remand to the same arbitrator or different arbitrator); Manchester Twp. Bd. of Educ., supra, 199 N.J.Super. at 281, 489 A.2d 682 (same)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"permitting a remand to a different arbitrator \"when deficiencies in the arbitrator's process call into question the arbitrator's ability to have an open mind regarding the disposition\"","sentence":"See In re City of Camden, 429 N.J.Super. 309, 337-38, 58 A.3d 1186 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 215 N.J. 485, 73 A.3d 511 (2013) (permitting a remand to a different arbitrator \u201cwhen deficiencies in the arbitrator\u2019s process call into question the arbitrator\u2019s ability to have an open mind regarding the disposition\u201d); see also Fox v. Morris Cnty. Policemen\u2019s Ass\u2019n, P.B.A. 151, 266 N.J.Super. 501, 520-21, 630 A.2d 318 (App.Div.1993), certif. denied, 137 N.J. 311, 645 A.2d 140 (1994) (holding that upon vacating an arbitration award, the court has the discretion to remand to the same arbitrator or different arbitrator); Manchester Twp. Bd. of Educ., supra, 199 N.J.Super. at 281, 489 A.2d 682 (same)."},"case_id":4363805,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Ciripompa essentially argues that if judicial review occurs more than forty-five days after the first hearing date, which it virtually always will, the court is powerless to remand the matter if it finds a ground to vacate the award. This interpretation completely undermines the purpose of affording judicial review of arbitration awards in teacher-tenure cases, and is contrary to authority granting the court the discretion to remand for an arbitration hearing before a different arbitrator.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"permitting a remand to a different arbitrator \"when deficiencies in the arbitrator's process call into question the arbitrator's ability to have an open mind regarding the disposition\"","sentence":"See In re City of Camden, 429 N.J.Super. 309, 337-38, 58 A.3d 1186 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 215 N.J. 485, 73 A.3d 511 (2013) (permitting a remand to a different arbitrator \u201cwhen deficiencies in the arbitrator\u2019s process call into question the arbitrator\u2019s ability to have an open mind regarding the disposition\u201d); see also Fox v. Morris Cnty. Policemen\u2019s Ass\u2019n, P.B.A. 151, 266 N.J.Super. 501, 520-21, 630 A.2d 318 (App.Div.1993), certif. denied, 137 N.J. 311, 645 A.2d 140 (1994) (holding that upon vacating an arbitration award, the court has the discretion to remand to the same arbitrator or different arbitrator); Manchester Twp. Bd. of Educ., supra, 199 N.J.Super. at 281, 489 A.2d 682 (same)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that upon vacating an arbitration award, the court has the discretion to remand to the same arbitrator or different arbitrator","sentence":"See In re City of Camden, 429 N.J.Super. 309, 337-38, 58 A.3d 1186 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 215 N.J. 485, 73 A.3d 511 (2013) (permitting a remand to a different arbitrator \u201cwhen deficiencies in the arbitrator\u2019s process call into question the arbitrator\u2019s ability to have an open mind regarding the disposition\u201d); see also Fox v. Morris Cnty. Policemen\u2019s Ass\u2019n, P.B.A. 151, 266 N.J.Super. 501, 520-21, 630 A.2d 318 (App.Div.1993), certif. denied, 137 N.J. 311, 645 A.2d 140 (1994) (holding that upon vacating an arbitration award, the court has the discretion to remand to the same arbitrator or different arbitrator); Manchester Twp. Bd. of Educ., supra, 199 N.J.Super. at 281, 489 A.2d 682 (same)."},"case_id":4363805,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Ciripompa essentially argues that if judicial review occurs more than forty-five days after the first hearing date, which it virtually always will, the court is powerless to remand the matter if it finds a ground to vacate the award. This interpretation completely undermines the purpose of affording judicial review of arbitration awards in teacher-tenure cases, and is contrary to authority granting the court the discretion to remand for an arbitration hearing before a different arbitrator.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that upon vacating an arbitration award, the court has the discretion to remand to the same arbitrator or different arbitrator","sentence":"See In re City of Camden, 429 N.J.Super. 309, 337-38, 58 A.3d 1186 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 215 N.J. 485, 73 A.3d 511 (2013) (permitting a remand to a different arbitrator \u201cwhen deficiencies in the arbitrator\u2019s process call into question the arbitrator\u2019s ability to have an open mind regarding the disposition\u201d); see also Fox v. Morris Cnty. Policemen\u2019s Ass\u2019n, P.B.A. 151, 266 N.J.Super. 501, 520-21, 630 A.2d 318 (App.Div.1993), certif. denied, 137 N.J. 311, 645 A.2d 140 (1994) (holding that upon vacating an arbitration award, the court has the discretion to remand to the same arbitrator or different arbitrator); Manchester Twp. Bd. of Educ., supra, 199 N.J.Super. at 281, 489 A.2d 682 (same)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"permitting a remand to a different arbitrator \"when deficiencies in the arbitrator's process call into question the arbitrator's ability to have an open mind regarding the disposition\"","sentence":"See In re City of Camden, 429 N.J.Super. 309, 337-38, 58 A.3d 1186 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 215 N.J. 485, 73 A.3d 511 (2013) (permitting a remand to a different arbitrator \u201cwhen deficiencies in the arbitrator\u2019s process call into question the arbitrator\u2019s ability to have an open mind regarding the disposition\u201d); see also Fox v. Morris Cnty. Policemen\u2019s Ass\u2019n, P.B.A. 151, 266 N.J.Super. 501, 520-21, 630 A.2d 318 (App.Div.1993), certif. denied, 137 N.J. 311, 645 A.2d 140 (1994) (holding that upon vacating an arbitration award, the court has the discretion to remand to the same arbitrator or different arbitrator); Manchester Twp. Bd. of Educ., supra, 199 N.J.Super. at 281, 489 A.2d 682 (same)."},"case_id":4363805,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Ciripompa essentially argues that if judicial review occurs more than forty-five days after the first hearing date, which it virtually always will, the court is powerless to remand the matter if it finds a ground to vacate the award. This interpretation completely undermines the purpose of affording judicial review of arbitration awards in teacher-tenure cases, and is contrary to authority granting the court the discretion to remand for an arbitration hearing before a different arbitrator.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"266 N.J.Super. 501, 520-21","parenthetical":"holding that upon vacating an arbitration award, the court has the discretion to remand to the same arbitrator or different arbitrator","sentence":"See In re City of Camden, 429 N.J.Super. 309, 337-38, 58 A.3d 1186 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 215 N.J. 485, 73 A.3d 511 (2013) (permitting a remand to a different arbitrator \u201cwhen deficiencies in the arbitrator\u2019s process call into question the arbitrator\u2019s ability to have an open mind regarding the disposition\u201d); see also Fox v. Morris Cnty. Policemen\u2019s Ass\u2019n, P.B.A. 151, 266 N.J.Super. 501, 520-21, 630 A.2d 318 (App.Div.1993), certif. denied, 137 N.J. 311, 645 A.2d 140 (1994) (holding that upon vacating an arbitration award, the court has the discretion to remand to the same arbitrator or different arbitrator); Manchester Twp. Bd. of Educ., supra, 199 N.J.Super. at 281, 489 A.2d 682 (same)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"permitting a remand to a different arbitrator \"when deficiencies in the arbitrator's process call into question the arbitrator's ability to have an open mind regarding the disposition\"","sentence":"See In re City of Camden, 429 N.J.Super. 309, 337-38, 58 A.3d 1186 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 215 N.J. 485, 73 A.3d 511 (2013) (permitting a remand to a different arbitrator \u201cwhen deficiencies in the arbitrator\u2019s process call into question the arbitrator\u2019s ability to have an open mind regarding the disposition\u201d); see also Fox v. Morris Cnty. Policemen\u2019s Ass\u2019n, P.B.A. 151, 266 N.J.Super. 501, 520-21, 630 A.2d 318 (App.Div.1993), certif. denied, 137 N.J. 311, 645 A.2d 140 (1994) (holding that upon vacating an arbitration award, the court has the discretion to remand to the same arbitrator or different arbitrator); Manchester Twp. Bd. of Educ., supra, 199 N.J.Super. at 281, 489 A.2d 682 (same)."},"case_id":4363805,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Ciripompa essentially argues that if judicial review occurs more than forty-five days after the first hearing date, which it virtually always will, the court is powerless to remand the matter if it finds a ground to vacate the award. This interpretation completely undermines the purpose of affording judicial review of arbitration awards in teacher-tenure cases, and is contrary to authority granting the court the discretion to remand for an arbitration hearing before a different arbitrator.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that upon vacating an arbitration award, the court has the discretion to remand to the same arbitrator or different arbitrator","sentence":"See In re City of Camden, 429 N.J.Super. 309, 337-38, 58 A.3d 1186 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 215 N.J. 485, 73 A.3d 511 (2013) (permitting a remand to a different arbitrator \u201cwhen deficiencies in the arbitrator\u2019s process call into question the arbitrator\u2019s ability to have an open mind regarding the disposition\u201d); see also Fox v. Morris Cnty. Policemen\u2019s Ass\u2019n, P.B.A. 151, 266 N.J.Super. 501, 520-21, 630 A.2d 318 (App.Div.1993), certif. denied, 137 N.J. 311, 645 A.2d 140 (1994) (holding that upon vacating an arbitration award, the court has the discretion to remand to the same arbitrator or different arbitrator); Manchester Twp. Bd. of Educ., supra, 199 N.J.Super. at 281, 489 A.2d 682 (same)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"permitting a remand to a different arbitrator \"when deficiencies in the arbitrator's process call into question the arbitrator's ability to have an open mind regarding the disposition\"","sentence":"See In re City of Camden, 429 N.J.Super. 309, 337-38, 58 A.3d 1186 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 215 N.J. 485, 73 A.3d 511 (2013) (permitting a remand to a different arbitrator \u201cwhen deficiencies in the arbitrator\u2019s process call into question the arbitrator\u2019s ability to have an open mind regarding the disposition\u201d); see also Fox v. Morris Cnty. Policemen\u2019s Ass\u2019n, P.B.A. 151, 266 N.J.Super. 501, 520-21, 630 A.2d 318 (App.Div.1993), certif. denied, 137 N.J. 311, 645 A.2d 140 (1994) (holding that upon vacating an arbitration award, the court has the discretion to remand to the same arbitrator or different arbitrator); Manchester Twp. Bd. of Educ., supra, 199 N.J.Super. at 281, 489 A.2d 682 (same)."},"case_id":4363805,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Ciripompa essentially argues that if judicial review occurs more than forty-five days after the first hearing date, which it virtually always will, the court is powerless to remand the matter if it finds a ground to vacate the award. This interpretation completely undermines the purpose of affording judicial review of arbitration awards in teacher-tenure cases, and is contrary to authority granting the court the discretion to remand for an arbitration hearing before a different arbitrator.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"permitting a remand to a different arbitrator \"when deficiencies in the arbitrator's process call into question the arbitrator's ability to have an open mind regarding the disposition\"","sentence":"See In re City of Camden, 429 N.J.Super. 309, 337-38, 58 A.3d 1186 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 215 N.J. 485, 73 A.3d 511 (2013) (permitting a remand to a different arbitrator \u201cwhen deficiencies in the arbitrator\u2019s process call into question the arbitrator\u2019s ability to have an open mind regarding the disposition\u201d); see also Fox v. Morris Cnty. Policemen\u2019s Ass\u2019n, P.B.A. 151, 266 N.J.Super. 501, 520-21, 630 A.2d 318 (App.Div.1993), certif. denied, 137 N.J. 311, 645 A.2d 140 (1994) (holding that upon vacating an arbitration award, the court has the discretion to remand to the same arbitrator or different arbitrator); Manchester Twp. Bd. of Educ., supra, 199 N.J.Super. at 281, 489 A.2d 682 (same)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that upon vacating an arbitration award, the court has the discretion to remand to the same arbitrator or different arbitrator","sentence":"See In re City of Camden, 429 N.J.Super. 309, 337-38, 58 A.3d 1186 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 215 N.J. 485, 73 A.3d 511 (2013) (permitting a remand to a different arbitrator \u201cwhen deficiencies in the arbitrator\u2019s process call into question the arbitrator\u2019s ability to have an open mind regarding the disposition\u201d); see also Fox v. Morris Cnty. Policemen\u2019s Ass\u2019n, P.B.A. 151, 266 N.J.Super. 501, 520-21, 630 A.2d 318 (App.Div.1993), certif. denied, 137 N.J. 311, 645 A.2d 140 (1994) (holding that upon vacating an arbitration award, the court has the discretion to remand to the same arbitrator or different arbitrator); Manchester Twp. Bd. of Educ., supra, 199 N.J.Super. at 281, 489 A.2d 682 (same)."},"case_id":4363805,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Ciripompa essentially argues that if judicial review occurs more than forty-five days after the first hearing date, which it virtually always will, the court is powerless to remand the matter if it finds a ground to vacate the award. This interpretation completely undermines the purpose of affording judicial review of arbitration awards in teacher-tenure cases, and is contrary to authority granting the court the discretion to remand for an arbitration hearing before a different arbitrator.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"permitting a remand to a different arbitrator \"when deficiencies in the arbitrator's process call into question the arbitrator's ability to have an open mind regarding the disposition\"","sentence":"See In re City of Camden, 429 N.J.Super. 309, 337-38, 58 A.3d 1186 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 215 N.J. 485, 73 A.3d 511 (2013) (permitting a remand to a different arbitrator \u201cwhen deficiencies in the arbitrator\u2019s process call into question the arbitrator\u2019s ability to have an open mind regarding the disposition\u201d); see also Fox v. Morris Cnty. Policemen\u2019s Ass\u2019n, P.B.A. 151, 266 N.J.Super. 501, 520-21, 630 A.2d 318 (App.Div.1993), certif. denied, 137 N.J. 311, 645 A.2d 140 (1994) (holding that upon vacating an arbitration award, the court has the discretion to remand to the same arbitrator or different arbitrator); Manchester Twp. Bd. of Educ., supra, 199 N.J.Super. at 281, 489 A.2d 682 (same)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that upon vacating an arbitration award, the court has the discretion to remand to the same arbitrator or different arbitrator","sentence":"See In re City of Camden, 429 N.J.Super. 309, 337-38, 58 A.3d 1186 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 215 N.J. 485, 73 A.3d 511 (2013) (permitting a remand to a different arbitrator \u201cwhen deficiencies in the arbitrator\u2019s process call into question the arbitrator\u2019s ability to have an open mind regarding the disposition\u201d); see also Fox v. Morris Cnty. Policemen\u2019s Ass\u2019n, P.B.A. 151, 266 N.J.Super. 501, 520-21, 630 A.2d 318 (App.Div.1993), certif. denied, 137 N.J. 311, 645 A.2d 140 (1994) (holding that upon vacating an arbitration award, the court has the discretion to remand to the same arbitrator or different arbitrator); Manchester Twp. Bd. of Educ., supra, 199 N.J.Super. at 281, 489 A.2d 682 (same)."},"case_id":4363805,"label":"a"}
{"context":"It is now clear that the Mothers properly represented their children because no conflicting interests were implicated.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"623 F.2d 1084, 1093","parenthetical":"holding that the minor was \"otherwise represented [because] the child's legal guardian, his mother, brought th[e] action on his behalf\"","sentence":"See Burke v. Smith, 252 F.3d 1260, 1264 (11th Cir.2001) (\"[U]nless a conflict of interest exists between the representative and minor, a district court need not even consider the question whether a guardian ad litem should be appointed.\u201d); Gonzalez-Gonzalez-Jimenez de Ruiz v. United States, 231 F.Supp.2d 1187, 1196 (M.D.Fla.2002) aff'd sub nom. Gonzalez-Jiminez De Ruiz v. United States, 378 F.3d 1229 (11th Cir.2004) (noting that \"[tjypically, the next friend who sues on behalf of the minor is that minor\u2019s parent\u201d and finding that the mother of the minor plaintiffs, as a party to the suit, was not required to bring the action as a \"next friend\u201d); see also Croce v. Bromley Corp., 623 F.2d 1084, 1093 (5th Cir.1980) (holding that the minor was \"otherwise represented [because] the child's legal guardian, his mother, brought th[e] action on his behalf\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"252 F.3d 1260, 1264","parenthetical":"\"[U]nless a conflict of interest exists between the representative and minor, a district court need not even consider the question whether a guardian ad litem should be appointed.\"","sentence":"See Burke v. Smith, 252 F.3d 1260, 1264 (11th Cir.2001) (\"[U]nless a conflict of interest exists between the representative and minor, a district court need not even consider the question whether a guardian ad litem should be appointed.\u201d); Gonzalez-Gonzalez-Jimenez de Ruiz v. United States, 231 F.Supp.2d 1187, 1196 (M.D.Fla.2002) aff'd sub nom. Gonzalez-Jiminez De Ruiz v. United States, 378 F.3d 1229 (11th Cir.2004) (noting that \"[tjypically, the next friend who sues on behalf of the minor is that minor\u2019s parent\u201d and finding that the mother of the minor plaintiffs, as a party to the suit, was not required to bring the action as a \"next friend\u201d); see also Croce v. Bromley Corp., 623 F.2d 1084, 1093 (5th Cir.1980) (holding that the minor was \"otherwise represented [because] the child's legal guardian, his mother, brought th[e] action on his behalf\u201d)."},"case_id":4203339,"label":"b"}
{"context":"It is now clear that the Mothers properly represented their children because no conflicting interests were implicated.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"231 F.Supp.2d 1187, 1196","parenthetical":"noting that \"[tjypically, the next friend who sues on behalf of the minor is that minor's parent\" and finding that the mother of the minor plaintiffs, as a party to the suit, was not required to bring the action as a \"next friend\"","sentence":"See Burke v. Smith, 252 F.3d 1260, 1264 (11th Cir.2001) (\"[U]nless a conflict of interest exists between the representative and minor, a district court need not even consider the question whether a guardian ad litem should be appointed.\u201d); Gonzalez-Gonzalez-Jimenez de Ruiz v. United States, 231 F.Supp.2d 1187, 1196 (M.D.Fla.2002) aff'd sub nom. Gonzalez-Jiminez De Ruiz v. United States, 378 F.3d 1229 (11th Cir.2004) (noting that \"[tjypically, the next friend who sues on behalf of the minor is that minor\u2019s parent\u201d and finding that the mother of the minor plaintiffs, as a party to the suit, was not required to bring the action as a \"next friend\u201d); see also Croce v. Bromley Corp., 623 F.2d 1084, 1093 (5th Cir.1980) (holding that the minor was \"otherwise represented [because] the child's legal guardian, his mother, brought th[e] action on his behalf\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"623 F.2d 1084, 1093","parenthetical":"holding that the minor was \"otherwise represented [because] the child's legal guardian, his mother, brought th[e] action on his behalf\"","sentence":"See Burke v. Smith, 252 F.3d 1260, 1264 (11th Cir.2001) (\"[U]nless a conflict of interest exists between the representative and minor, a district court need not even consider the question whether a guardian ad litem should be appointed.\u201d); Gonzalez-Gonzalez-Jimenez de Ruiz v. United States, 231 F.Supp.2d 1187, 1196 (M.D.Fla.2002) aff'd sub nom. Gonzalez-Jiminez De Ruiz v. United States, 378 F.3d 1229 (11th Cir.2004) (noting that \"[tjypically, the next friend who sues on behalf of the minor is that minor\u2019s parent\u201d and finding that the mother of the minor plaintiffs, as a party to the suit, was not required to bring the action as a \"next friend\u201d); see also Croce v. Bromley Corp., 623 F.2d 1084, 1093 (5th Cir.1980) (holding that the minor was \"otherwise represented [because] the child's legal guardian, his mother, brought th[e] action on his behalf\u201d)."},"case_id":4203339,"label":"a"}
{"context":"It is now clear that the Mothers properly represented their children because no conflicting interests were implicated.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting that \"[tjypically, the next friend who sues on behalf of the minor is that minor's parent\" and finding that the mother of the minor plaintiffs, as a party to the suit, was not required to bring the action as a \"next friend\"","sentence":"See Burke v. Smith, 252 F.3d 1260, 1264 (11th Cir.2001) (\"[U]nless a conflict of interest exists between the representative and minor, a district court need not even consider the question whether a guardian ad litem should be appointed.\u201d); Gonzalez-Gonzalez-Jimenez de Ruiz v. United States, 231 F.Supp.2d 1187, 1196 (M.D.Fla.2002) aff'd sub nom. Gonzalez-Jiminez De Ruiz v. United States, 378 F.3d 1229 (11th Cir.2004) (noting that \"[tjypically, the next friend who sues on behalf of the minor is that minor\u2019s parent\u201d and finding that the mother of the minor plaintiffs, as a party to the suit, was not required to bring the action as a \"next friend\u201d); see also Croce v. Bromley Corp., 623 F.2d 1084, 1093 (5th Cir.1980) (holding that the minor was \"otherwise represented [because] the child's legal guardian, his mother, brought th[e] action on his behalf\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"623 F.2d 1084, 1093","parenthetical":"holding that the minor was \"otherwise represented [because] the child's legal guardian, his mother, brought th[e] action on his behalf\"","sentence":"See Burke v. Smith, 252 F.3d 1260, 1264 (11th Cir.2001) (\"[U]nless a conflict of interest exists between the representative and minor, a district court need not even consider the question whether a guardian ad litem should be appointed.\u201d); Gonzalez-Gonzalez-Jimenez de Ruiz v. United States, 231 F.Supp.2d 1187, 1196 (M.D.Fla.2002) aff'd sub nom. Gonzalez-Jiminez De Ruiz v. United States, 378 F.3d 1229 (11th Cir.2004) (noting that \"[tjypically, the next friend who sues on behalf of the minor is that minor\u2019s parent\u201d and finding that the mother of the minor plaintiffs, as a party to the suit, was not required to bring the action as a \"next friend\u201d); see also Croce v. Bromley Corp., 623 F.2d 1084, 1093 (5th Cir.1980) (holding that the minor was \"otherwise represented [because] the child's legal guardian, his mother, brought th[e] action on his behalf\u201d)."},"case_id":4203339,"label":"a"}
{"context":"IV. Intrusions into the sanctity of the home have long been viewed as at the very core of the rights protected by the Fourth Amendment.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"466 U.S. 170, 178","parenthetical":"\"[T]he Court since the enactment of the Fourth Amendment has stressed 'the overriding respect for the sanctity of the home that has been embedded in our traditions since the origins of the Republic.' \"","sentence":"Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178, 104 S.Ct. 1735, 80 L.Ed.2d 214 (1984) (\u201c[T]he Court since the enactment of the Fourth Amendment has stressed \u2018the overriding respect for the sanctity of the home that has been embedded in our traditions since the origins of the Republic.\u2019 \u201d) (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 601, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980)); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511, 81 S.Ct. 679, 5 L.Ed.2d 734 (1961) (\u201cAt the very core [of the Fourth Amendment] stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.\u201d); see Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 58, 87 S.Ct. 1873, 18 L.Ed.2d 1040 (1967) (noting that proceeding by search warrant is a drastic intrusion that \u201cmust be carefully circumscribed so as to prevent unauthorized invasions of \u2018the sanctity of a man\u2019s home and the privacies of life.\u2019 \u201d) (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630, 6 S.Ct. 524, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886))."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"388 U.S. 41, 58","parenthetical":"noting that proceeding by search warrant is a drastic intrusion that \"must be carefully circumscribed so as to prevent unauthorized invasions of 'the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life.' \"","sentence":"Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178, 104 S.Ct. 1735, 80 L.Ed.2d 214 (1984) (\u201c[T]he Court since the enactment of the Fourth Amendment has stressed \u2018the overriding respect for the sanctity of the home that has been embedded in our traditions since the origins of the Republic.\u2019 \u201d) (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 601, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980)); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511, 81 S.Ct. 679, 5 L.Ed.2d 734 (1961) (\u201cAt the very core [of the Fourth Amendment] stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.\u201d); see Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 58, 87 S.Ct. 1873, 18 L.Ed.2d 1040 (1967) (noting that proceeding by search warrant is a drastic intrusion that \u201cmust be carefully circumscribed so as to prevent unauthorized invasions of \u2018the sanctity of a man\u2019s home and the privacies of life.\u2019 \u201d) (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630, 6 S.Ct. 524, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886))."},"case_id":9232119,"label":"a"}
{"context":"IV. Intrusions into the sanctity of the home have long been viewed as at the very core of the rights protected by the Fourth Amendment.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"466 U.S. 170, 178","parenthetical":"\"[T]he Court since the enactment of the Fourth Amendment has stressed 'the overriding respect for the sanctity of the home that has been embedded in our traditions since the origins of the Republic.' \"","sentence":"Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178, 104 S.Ct. 1735, 80 L.Ed.2d 214 (1984) (\u201c[T]he Court since the enactment of the Fourth Amendment has stressed \u2018the overriding respect for the sanctity of the home that has been embedded in our traditions since the origins of the Republic.\u2019 \u201d) (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 601, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980)); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511, 81 S.Ct. 679, 5 L.Ed.2d 734 (1961) (\u201cAt the very core [of the Fourth Amendment] stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.\u201d); see Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 58, 87 S.Ct. 1873, 18 L.Ed.2d 1040 (1967) (noting that proceeding by search warrant is a drastic intrusion that \u201cmust be carefully circumscribed so as to prevent unauthorized invasions of \u2018the sanctity of a man\u2019s home and the privacies of life.\u2019 \u201d) (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630, 6 S.Ct. 524, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886))."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting that proceeding by search warrant is a drastic intrusion that \"must be carefully circumscribed so as to prevent unauthorized invasions of 'the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life.' \"","sentence":"Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178, 104 S.Ct. 1735, 80 L.Ed.2d 214 (1984) (\u201c[T]he Court since the enactment of the Fourth Amendment has stressed \u2018the overriding respect for the sanctity of the home that has been embedded in our traditions since the origins of the Republic.\u2019 \u201d) (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 601, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980)); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511, 81 S.Ct. 679, 5 L.Ed.2d 734 (1961) (\u201cAt the very core [of the Fourth Amendment] stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.\u201d); see Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 58, 87 S.Ct. 1873, 18 L.Ed.2d 1040 (1967) (noting that proceeding by search warrant is a drastic intrusion that \u201cmust be carefully circumscribed so as to prevent unauthorized invasions of \u2018the sanctity of a man\u2019s home and the privacies of life.\u2019 \u201d) (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630, 6 S.Ct. 524, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886))."},"case_id":9232119,"label":"a"}
{"context":"IV. Intrusions into the sanctity of the home have long been viewed as at the very core of the rights protected by the Fourth Amendment.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"466 U.S. 170, 178","parenthetical":"\"[T]he Court since the enactment of the Fourth Amendment has stressed 'the overriding respect for the sanctity of the home that has been embedded in our traditions since the origins of the Republic.' \"","sentence":"Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178, 104 S.Ct. 1735, 80 L.Ed.2d 214 (1984) (\u201c[T]he Court since the enactment of the Fourth Amendment has stressed \u2018the overriding respect for the sanctity of the home that has been embedded in our traditions since the origins of the Republic.\u2019 \u201d) (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 601, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980)); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511, 81 S.Ct. 679, 5 L.Ed.2d 734 (1961) (\u201cAt the very core [of the Fourth Amendment] stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.\u201d); see Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 58, 87 S.Ct. 1873, 18 L.Ed.2d 1040 (1967) (noting that proceeding by search warrant is a drastic intrusion that \u201cmust be carefully circumscribed so as to prevent unauthorized invasions of \u2018the sanctity of a man\u2019s home and the privacies of life.\u2019 \u201d) (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630, 6 S.Ct. 524, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886))."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting that proceeding by search warrant is a drastic intrusion that \"must be carefully circumscribed so as to prevent unauthorized invasions of 'the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life.' \"","sentence":"Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178, 104 S.Ct. 1735, 80 L.Ed.2d 214 (1984) (\u201c[T]he Court since the enactment of the Fourth Amendment has stressed \u2018the overriding respect for the sanctity of the home that has been embedded in our traditions since the origins of the Republic.\u2019 \u201d) (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 601, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980)); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511, 81 S.Ct. 679, 5 L.Ed.2d 734 (1961) (\u201cAt the very core [of the Fourth Amendment] stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.\u201d); see Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 58, 87 S.Ct. 1873, 18 L.Ed.2d 1040 (1967) (noting that proceeding by search warrant is a drastic intrusion that \u201cmust be carefully circumscribed so as to prevent unauthorized invasions of \u2018the sanctity of a man\u2019s home and the privacies of life.\u2019 \u201d) (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630, 6 S.Ct. 524, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886))."},"case_id":9232119,"label":"a"}
{"context":"IV. Intrusions into the sanctity of the home have long been viewed as at the very core of the rights protected by the Fourth Amendment.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"388 U.S. 41, 58","parenthetical":"noting that proceeding by search warrant is a drastic intrusion that \"must be carefully circumscribed so as to prevent unauthorized invasions of 'the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life.' \"","sentence":"Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178, 104 S.Ct. 1735, 80 L.Ed.2d 214 (1984) (\u201c[T]he Court since the enactment of the Fourth Amendment has stressed \u2018the overriding respect for the sanctity of the home that has been embedded in our traditions since the origins of the Republic.\u2019 \u201d) (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 601, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980)); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511, 81 S.Ct. 679, 5 L.Ed.2d 734 (1961) (\u201cAt the very core [of the Fourth Amendment] stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.\u201d); see Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 58, 87 S.Ct. 1873, 18 L.Ed.2d 1040 (1967) (noting that proceeding by search warrant is a drastic intrusion that \u201cmust be carefully circumscribed so as to prevent unauthorized invasions of \u2018the sanctity of a man\u2019s home and the privacies of life.\u2019 \u201d) (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630, 6 S.Ct. 524, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886))."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[T]he Court since the enactment of the Fourth Amendment has stressed 'the overriding respect for the sanctity of the home that has been embedded in our traditions since the origins of the Republic.' \"","sentence":"Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178, 104 S.Ct. 1735, 80 L.Ed.2d 214 (1984) (\u201c[T]he Court since the enactment of the Fourth Amendment has stressed \u2018the overriding respect for the sanctity of the home that has been embedded in our traditions since the origins of the Republic.\u2019 \u201d) (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 601, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980)); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511, 81 S.Ct. 679, 5 L.Ed.2d 734 (1961) (\u201cAt the very core [of the Fourth Amendment] stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.\u201d); see Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 58, 87 S.Ct. 1873, 18 L.Ed.2d 1040 (1967) (noting that proceeding by search warrant is a drastic intrusion that \u201cmust be carefully circumscribed so as to prevent unauthorized invasions of \u2018the sanctity of a man\u2019s home and the privacies of life.\u2019 \u201d) (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630, 6 S.Ct. 524, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886))."},"case_id":9232119,"label":"b"}
{"context":"IV. Intrusions into the sanctity of the home have long been viewed as at the very core of the rights protected by the Fourth Amendment.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting that proceeding by search warrant is a drastic intrusion that \"must be carefully circumscribed so as to prevent unauthorized invasions of 'the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life.' \"","sentence":"Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178, 104 S.Ct. 1735, 80 L.Ed.2d 214 (1984) (\u201c[T]he Court since the enactment of the Fourth Amendment has stressed \u2018the overriding respect for the sanctity of the home that has been embedded in our traditions since the origins of the Republic.\u2019 \u201d) (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 601, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980)); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511, 81 S.Ct. 679, 5 L.Ed.2d 734 (1961) (\u201cAt the very core [of the Fourth Amendment] stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.\u201d); see Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 58, 87 S.Ct. 1873, 18 L.Ed.2d 1040 (1967) (noting that proceeding by search warrant is a drastic intrusion that \u201cmust be carefully circumscribed so as to prevent unauthorized invasions of \u2018the sanctity of a man\u2019s home and the privacies of life.\u2019 \u201d) (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630, 6 S.Ct. 524, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886))."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[T]he Court since the enactment of the Fourth Amendment has stressed 'the overriding respect for the sanctity of the home that has been embedded in our traditions since the origins of the Republic.' \"","sentence":"Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178, 104 S.Ct. 1735, 80 L.Ed.2d 214 (1984) (\u201c[T]he Court since the enactment of the Fourth Amendment has stressed \u2018the overriding respect for the sanctity of the home that has been embedded in our traditions since the origins of the Republic.\u2019 \u201d) (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 601, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980)); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511, 81 S.Ct. 679, 5 L.Ed.2d 734 (1961) (\u201cAt the very core [of the Fourth Amendment] stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.\u201d); see Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 58, 87 S.Ct. 1873, 18 L.Ed.2d 1040 (1967) (noting that proceeding by search warrant is a drastic intrusion that \u201cmust be carefully circumscribed so as to prevent unauthorized invasions of \u2018the sanctity of a man\u2019s home and the privacies of life.\u2019 \u201d) (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630, 6 S.Ct. 524, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886))."},"case_id":9232119,"label":"b"}
{"context":"IV. Intrusions into the sanctity of the home have long been viewed as at the very core of the rights protected by the Fourth Amendment.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[T]he Court since the enactment of the Fourth Amendment has stressed 'the overriding respect for the sanctity of the home that has been embedded in our traditions since the origins of the Republic.' \"","sentence":"Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178, 104 S.Ct. 1735, 80 L.Ed.2d 214 (1984) (\u201c[T]he Court since the enactment of the Fourth Amendment has stressed \u2018the overriding respect for the sanctity of the home that has been embedded in our traditions since the origins of the Republic.\u2019 \u201d) (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 601, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980)); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511, 81 S.Ct. 679, 5 L.Ed.2d 734 (1961) (\u201cAt the very core [of the Fourth Amendment] stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.\u201d); see Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 58, 87 S.Ct. 1873, 18 L.Ed.2d 1040 (1967) (noting that proceeding by search warrant is a drastic intrusion that \u201cmust be carefully circumscribed so as to prevent unauthorized invasions of \u2018the sanctity of a man\u2019s home and the privacies of life.\u2019 \u201d) (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630, 6 S.Ct. 524, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886))."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting that proceeding by search warrant is a drastic intrusion that \"must be carefully circumscribed so as to prevent unauthorized invasions of 'the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life.' \"","sentence":"Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178, 104 S.Ct. 1735, 80 L.Ed.2d 214 (1984) (\u201c[T]he Court since the enactment of the Fourth Amendment has stressed \u2018the overriding respect for the sanctity of the home that has been embedded in our traditions since the origins of the Republic.\u2019 \u201d) (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 601, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980)); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511, 81 S.Ct. 679, 5 L.Ed.2d 734 (1961) (\u201cAt the very core [of the Fourth Amendment] stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.\u201d); see Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 58, 87 S.Ct. 1873, 18 L.Ed.2d 1040 (1967) (noting that proceeding by search warrant is a drastic intrusion that \u201cmust be carefully circumscribed so as to prevent unauthorized invasions of \u2018the sanctity of a man\u2019s home and the privacies of life.\u2019 \u201d) (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630, 6 S.Ct. 524, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886))."},"case_id":9232119,"label":"a"}
{"context":"IV. Intrusions into the sanctity of the home have long been viewed as at the very core of the rights protected by the Fourth Amendment.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[T]he Court since the enactment of the Fourth Amendment has stressed 'the overriding respect for the sanctity of the home that has been embedded in our traditions since the origins of the Republic.' \"","sentence":"Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178, 104 S.Ct. 1735, 80 L.Ed.2d 214 (1984) (\u201c[T]he Court since the enactment of the Fourth Amendment has stressed \u2018the overriding respect for the sanctity of the home that has been embedded in our traditions since the origins of the Republic.\u2019 \u201d) (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 601, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980)); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511, 81 S.Ct. 679, 5 L.Ed.2d 734 (1961) (\u201cAt the very core [of the Fourth Amendment] stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.\u201d); see Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 58, 87 S.Ct. 1873, 18 L.Ed.2d 1040 (1967) (noting that proceeding by search warrant is a drastic intrusion that \u201cmust be carefully circumscribed so as to prevent unauthorized invasions of \u2018the sanctity of a man\u2019s home and the privacies of life.\u2019 \u201d) (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630, 6 S.Ct. 524, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886))."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"388 U.S. 41, 58","parenthetical":"noting that proceeding by search warrant is a drastic intrusion that \"must be carefully circumscribed so as to prevent unauthorized invasions of 'the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life.' \"","sentence":"Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178, 104 S.Ct. 1735, 80 L.Ed.2d 214 (1984) (\u201c[T]he Court since the enactment of the Fourth Amendment has stressed \u2018the overriding respect for the sanctity of the home that has been embedded in our traditions since the origins of the Republic.\u2019 \u201d) (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 601, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980)); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511, 81 S.Ct. 679, 5 L.Ed.2d 734 (1961) (\u201cAt the very core [of the Fourth Amendment] stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.\u201d); see Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 58, 87 S.Ct. 1873, 18 L.Ed.2d 1040 (1967) (noting that proceeding by search warrant is a drastic intrusion that \u201cmust be carefully circumscribed so as to prevent unauthorized invasions of \u2018the sanctity of a man\u2019s home and the privacies of life.\u2019 \u201d) (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630, 6 S.Ct. 524, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886))."},"case_id":9232119,"label":"a"}
{"context":"IV. Intrusions into the sanctity of the home have long been viewed as at the very core of the rights protected by the Fourth Amendment.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[T]he Court since the enactment of the Fourth Amendment has stressed 'the overriding respect for the sanctity of the home that has been embedded in our traditions since the origins of the Republic.' \"","sentence":"Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178, 104 S.Ct. 1735, 80 L.Ed.2d 214 (1984) (\u201c[T]he Court since the enactment of the Fourth Amendment has stressed \u2018the overriding respect for the sanctity of the home that has been embedded in our traditions since the origins of the Republic.\u2019 \u201d) (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 601, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980)); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511, 81 S.Ct. 679, 5 L.Ed.2d 734 (1961) (\u201cAt the very core [of the Fourth Amendment] stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.\u201d); see Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 58, 87 S.Ct. 1873, 18 L.Ed.2d 1040 (1967) (noting that proceeding by search warrant is a drastic intrusion that \u201cmust be carefully circumscribed so as to prevent unauthorized invasions of \u2018the sanctity of a man\u2019s home and the privacies of life.\u2019 \u201d) (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630, 6 S.Ct. 524, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886))."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting that proceeding by search warrant is a drastic intrusion that \"must be carefully circumscribed so as to prevent unauthorized invasions of 'the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life.' \"","sentence":"Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178, 104 S.Ct. 1735, 80 L.Ed.2d 214 (1984) (\u201c[T]he Court since the enactment of the Fourth Amendment has stressed \u2018the overriding respect for the sanctity of the home that has been embedded in our traditions since the origins of the Republic.\u2019 \u201d) (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 601, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980)); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511, 81 S.Ct. 679, 5 L.Ed.2d 734 (1961) (\u201cAt the very core [of the Fourth Amendment] stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.\u201d); see Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 58, 87 S.Ct. 1873, 18 L.Ed.2d 1040 (1967) (noting that proceeding by search warrant is a drastic intrusion that \u201cmust be carefully circumscribed so as to prevent unauthorized invasions of \u2018the sanctity of a man\u2019s home and the privacies of life.\u2019 \u201d) (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630, 6 S.Ct. 524, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886))."},"case_id":9232119,"label":"a"}
{"context":"IV. Intrusions into the sanctity of the home have long been viewed as at the very core of the rights protected by the Fourth Amendment.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[T]he Court since the enactment of the Fourth Amendment has stressed 'the overriding respect for the sanctity of the home that has been embedded in our traditions since the origins of the Republic.' \"","sentence":"Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178, 104 S.Ct. 1735, 80 L.Ed.2d 214 (1984) (\u201c[T]he Court since the enactment of the Fourth Amendment has stressed \u2018the overriding respect for the sanctity of the home that has been embedded in our traditions since the origins of the Republic.\u2019 \u201d) (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 601, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980)); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511, 81 S.Ct. 679, 5 L.Ed.2d 734 (1961) (\u201cAt the very core [of the Fourth Amendment] stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.\u201d); see Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 58, 87 S.Ct. 1873, 18 L.Ed.2d 1040 (1967) (noting that proceeding by search warrant is a drastic intrusion that \u201cmust be carefully circumscribed so as to prevent unauthorized invasions of \u2018the sanctity of a man\u2019s home and the privacies of life.\u2019 \u201d) (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630, 6 S.Ct. 524, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886))."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting that proceeding by search warrant is a drastic intrusion that \"must be carefully circumscribed so as to prevent unauthorized invasions of 'the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life.' \"","sentence":"Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178, 104 S.Ct. 1735, 80 L.Ed.2d 214 (1984) (\u201c[T]he Court since the enactment of the Fourth Amendment has stressed \u2018the overriding respect for the sanctity of the home that has been embedded in our traditions since the origins of the Republic.\u2019 \u201d) (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 601, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980)); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511, 81 S.Ct. 679, 5 L.Ed.2d 734 (1961) (\u201cAt the very core [of the Fourth Amendment] stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.\u201d); see Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 58, 87 S.Ct. 1873, 18 L.Ed.2d 1040 (1967) (noting that proceeding by search warrant is a drastic intrusion that \u201cmust be carefully circumscribed so as to prevent unauthorized invasions of \u2018the sanctity of a man\u2019s home and the privacies of life.\u2019 \u201d) (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630, 6 S.Ct. 524, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886))."},"case_id":9232119,"label":"a"}
{"context":"IV. Intrusions into the sanctity of the home have long been viewed as at the very core of the rights protected by the Fourth Amendment.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"388 U.S. 41, 58","parenthetical":"noting that proceeding by search warrant is a drastic intrusion that \"must be carefully circumscribed so as to prevent unauthorized invasions of 'the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life.' \"","sentence":"Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178, 104 S.Ct. 1735, 80 L.Ed.2d 214 (1984) (\u201c[T]he Court since the enactment of the Fourth Amendment has stressed \u2018the overriding respect for the sanctity of the home that has been embedded in our traditions since the origins of the Republic.\u2019 \u201d) (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 601, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980)); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511, 81 S.Ct. 679, 5 L.Ed.2d 734 (1961) (\u201cAt the very core [of the Fourth Amendment] stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.\u201d); see Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 58, 87 S.Ct. 1873, 18 L.Ed.2d 1040 (1967) (noting that proceeding by search warrant is a drastic intrusion that \u201cmust be carefully circumscribed so as to prevent unauthorized invasions of \u2018the sanctity of a man\u2019s home and the privacies of life.\u2019 \u201d) (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630, 6 S.Ct. 524, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886))."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"365 U.S. 505, 511","parenthetical":"\"At the very core [of the Fourth Amendment] stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.\"","sentence":"Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178, 104 S.Ct. 1735, 80 L.Ed.2d 214 (1984) (\u201c[T]he Court since the enactment of the Fourth Amendment has stressed \u2018the overriding respect for the sanctity of the home that has been embedded in our traditions since the origins of the Republic.\u2019 \u201d) (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 601, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980)); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511, 81 S.Ct. 679, 5 L.Ed.2d 734 (1961) (\u201cAt the very core [of the Fourth Amendment] stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.\u201d); see Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 58, 87 S.Ct. 1873, 18 L.Ed.2d 1040 (1967) (noting that proceeding by search warrant is a drastic intrusion that \u201cmust be carefully circumscribed so as to prevent unauthorized invasions of \u2018the sanctity of a man\u2019s home and the privacies of life.\u2019 \u201d) (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630, 6 S.Ct. 524, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886))."},"case_id":9232119,"label":"b"}
{"context":"IV. Intrusions into the sanctity of the home have long been viewed as at the very core of the rights protected by the Fourth Amendment.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting that proceeding by search warrant is a drastic intrusion that \"must be carefully circumscribed so as to prevent unauthorized invasions of 'the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life.' \"","sentence":"Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178, 104 S.Ct. 1735, 80 L.Ed.2d 214 (1984) (\u201c[T]he Court since the enactment of the Fourth Amendment has stressed \u2018the overriding respect for the sanctity of the home that has been embedded in our traditions since the origins of the Republic.\u2019 \u201d) (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 601, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980)); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511, 81 S.Ct. 679, 5 L.Ed.2d 734 (1961) (\u201cAt the very core [of the Fourth Amendment] stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.\u201d); see Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 58, 87 S.Ct. 1873, 18 L.Ed.2d 1040 (1967) (noting that proceeding by search warrant is a drastic intrusion that \u201cmust be carefully circumscribed so as to prevent unauthorized invasions of \u2018the sanctity of a man\u2019s home and the privacies of life.\u2019 \u201d) (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630, 6 S.Ct. 524, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886))."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"365 U.S. 505, 511","parenthetical":"\"At the very core [of the Fourth Amendment] stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.\"","sentence":"Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178, 104 S.Ct. 1735, 80 L.Ed.2d 214 (1984) (\u201c[T]he Court since the enactment of the Fourth Amendment has stressed \u2018the overriding respect for the sanctity of the home that has been embedded in our traditions since the origins of the Republic.\u2019 \u201d) (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 601, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980)); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511, 81 S.Ct. 679, 5 L.Ed.2d 734 (1961) (\u201cAt the very core [of the Fourth Amendment] stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.\u201d); see Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 58, 87 S.Ct. 1873, 18 L.Ed.2d 1040 (1967) (noting that proceeding by search warrant is a drastic intrusion that \u201cmust be carefully circumscribed so as to prevent unauthorized invasions of \u2018the sanctity of a man\u2019s home and the privacies of life.\u2019 \u201d) (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630, 6 S.Ct. 524, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886))."},"case_id":9232119,"label":"b"}
{"context":"IV. Intrusions into the sanctity of the home have long been viewed as at the very core of the rights protected by the Fourth Amendment.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting that proceeding by search warrant is a drastic intrusion that \"must be carefully circumscribed so as to prevent unauthorized invasions of 'the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life.' \"","sentence":"Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178, 104 S.Ct. 1735, 80 L.Ed.2d 214 (1984) (\u201c[T]he Court since the enactment of the Fourth Amendment has stressed \u2018the overriding respect for the sanctity of the home that has been embedded in our traditions since the origins of the Republic.\u2019 \u201d) (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 601, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980)); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511, 81 S.Ct. 679, 5 L.Ed.2d 734 (1961) (\u201cAt the very core [of the Fourth Amendment] stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.\u201d); see Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 58, 87 S.Ct. 1873, 18 L.Ed.2d 1040 (1967) (noting that proceeding by search warrant is a drastic intrusion that \u201cmust be carefully circumscribed so as to prevent unauthorized invasions of \u2018the sanctity of a man\u2019s home and the privacies of life.\u2019 \u201d) (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630, 6 S.Ct. 524, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886))."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"365 U.S. 505, 511","parenthetical":"\"At the very core [of the Fourth Amendment] stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.\"","sentence":"Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178, 104 S.Ct. 1735, 80 L.Ed.2d 214 (1984) (\u201c[T]he Court since the enactment of the Fourth Amendment has stressed \u2018the overriding respect for the sanctity of the home that has been embedded in our traditions since the origins of the Republic.\u2019 \u201d) (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 601, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980)); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511, 81 S.Ct. 679, 5 L.Ed.2d 734 (1961) (\u201cAt the very core [of the Fourth Amendment] stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.\u201d); see Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 58, 87 S.Ct. 1873, 18 L.Ed.2d 1040 (1967) (noting that proceeding by search warrant is a drastic intrusion that \u201cmust be carefully circumscribed so as to prevent unauthorized invasions of \u2018the sanctity of a man\u2019s home and the privacies of life.\u2019 \u201d) (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630, 6 S.Ct. 524, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886))."},"case_id":9232119,"label":"b"}
{"context":"IV. Intrusions into the sanctity of the home have long been viewed as at the very core of the rights protected by the Fourth Amendment.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"At the very core [of the Fourth Amendment] stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.\"","sentence":"Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178, 104 S.Ct. 1735, 80 L.Ed.2d 214 (1984) (\u201c[T]he Court since the enactment of the Fourth Amendment has stressed \u2018the overriding respect for the sanctity of the home that has been embedded in our traditions since the origins of the Republic.\u2019 \u201d) (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 601, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980)); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511, 81 S.Ct. 679, 5 L.Ed.2d 734 (1961) (\u201cAt the very core [of the Fourth Amendment] stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.\u201d); see Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 58, 87 S.Ct. 1873, 18 L.Ed.2d 1040 (1967) (noting that proceeding by search warrant is a drastic intrusion that \u201cmust be carefully circumscribed so as to prevent unauthorized invasions of \u2018the sanctity of a man\u2019s home and the privacies of life.\u2019 \u201d) (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630, 6 S.Ct. 524, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886))."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"388 U.S. 41, 58","parenthetical":"noting that proceeding by search warrant is a drastic intrusion that \"must be carefully circumscribed so as to prevent unauthorized invasions of 'the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life.' \"","sentence":"Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178, 104 S.Ct. 1735, 80 L.Ed.2d 214 (1984) (\u201c[T]he Court since the enactment of the Fourth Amendment has stressed \u2018the overriding respect for the sanctity of the home that has been embedded in our traditions since the origins of the Republic.\u2019 \u201d) (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 601, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980)); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511, 81 S.Ct. 679, 5 L.Ed.2d 734 (1961) (\u201cAt the very core [of the Fourth Amendment] stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.\u201d); see Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 58, 87 S.Ct. 1873, 18 L.Ed.2d 1040 (1967) (noting that proceeding by search warrant is a drastic intrusion that \u201cmust be carefully circumscribed so as to prevent unauthorized invasions of \u2018the sanctity of a man\u2019s home and the privacies of life.\u2019 \u201d) (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630, 6 S.Ct. 524, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886))."},"case_id":9232119,"label":"a"}
{"context":"IV. Intrusions into the sanctity of the home have long been viewed as at the very core of the rights protected by the Fourth Amendment.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"At the very core [of the Fourth Amendment] stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.\"","sentence":"Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178, 104 S.Ct. 1735, 80 L.Ed.2d 214 (1984) (\u201c[T]he Court since the enactment of the Fourth Amendment has stressed \u2018the overriding respect for the sanctity of the home that has been embedded in our traditions since the origins of the Republic.\u2019 \u201d) (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 601, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980)); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511, 81 S.Ct. 679, 5 L.Ed.2d 734 (1961) (\u201cAt the very core [of the Fourth Amendment] stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.\u201d); see Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 58, 87 S.Ct. 1873, 18 L.Ed.2d 1040 (1967) (noting that proceeding by search warrant is a drastic intrusion that \u201cmust be carefully circumscribed so as to prevent unauthorized invasions of \u2018the sanctity of a man\u2019s home and the privacies of life.\u2019 \u201d) (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630, 6 S.Ct. 524, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886))."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting that proceeding by search warrant is a drastic intrusion that \"must be carefully circumscribed so as to prevent unauthorized invasions of 'the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life.' \"","sentence":"Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178, 104 S.Ct. 1735, 80 L.Ed.2d 214 (1984) (\u201c[T]he Court since the enactment of the Fourth Amendment has stressed \u2018the overriding respect for the sanctity of the home that has been embedded in our traditions since the origins of the Republic.\u2019 \u201d) (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 601, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980)); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511, 81 S.Ct. 679, 5 L.Ed.2d 734 (1961) (\u201cAt the very core [of the Fourth Amendment] stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.\u201d); see Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 58, 87 S.Ct. 1873, 18 L.Ed.2d 1040 (1967) (noting that proceeding by search warrant is a drastic intrusion that \u201cmust be carefully circumscribed so as to prevent unauthorized invasions of \u2018the sanctity of a man\u2019s home and the privacies of life.\u2019 \u201d) (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630, 6 S.Ct. 524, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886))."},"case_id":9232119,"label":"a"}
{"context":"IV. Intrusions into the sanctity of the home have long been viewed as at the very core of the rights protected by the Fourth Amendment.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"At the very core [of the Fourth Amendment] stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.\"","sentence":"Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178, 104 S.Ct. 1735, 80 L.Ed.2d 214 (1984) (\u201c[T]he Court since the enactment of the Fourth Amendment has stressed \u2018the overriding respect for the sanctity of the home that has been embedded in our traditions since the origins of the Republic.\u2019 \u201d) (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 601, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980)); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511, 81 S.Ct. 679, 5 L.Ed.2d 734 (1961) (\u201cAt the very core [of the Fourth Amendment] stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.\u201d); see Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 58, 87 S.Ct. 1873, 18 L.Ed.2d 1040 (1967) (noting that proceeding by search warrant is a drastic intrusion that \u201cmust be carefully circumscribed so as to prevent unauthorized invasions of \u2018the sanctity of a man\u2019s home and the privacies of life.\u2019 \u201d) (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630, 6 S.Ct. 524, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886))."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting that proceeding by search warrant is a drastic intrusion that \"must be carefully circumscribed so as to prevent unauthorized invasions of 'the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life.' \"","sentence":"Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178, 104 S.Ct. 1735, 80 L.Ed.2d 214 (1984) (\u201c[T]he Court since the enactment of the Fourth Amendment has stressed \u2018the overriding respect for the sanctity of the home that has been embedded in our traditions since the origins of the Republic.\u2019 \u201d) (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 601, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980)); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511, 81 S.Ct. 679, 5 L.Ed.2d 734 (1961) (\u201cAt the very core [of the Fourth Amendment] stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.\u201d); see Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 58, 87 S.Ct. 1873, 18 L.Ed.2d 1040 (1967) (noting that proceeding by search warrant is a drastic intrusion that \u201cmust be carefully circumscribed so as to prevent unauthorized invasions of \u2018the sanctity of a man\u2019s home and the privacies of life.\u2019 \u201d) (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630, 6 S.Ct. 524, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886))."},"case_id":9232119,"label":"a"}
{"context":"IV. Intrusions into the sanctity of the home have long been viewed as at the very core of the rights protected by the Fourth Amendment.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"At the very core [of the Fourth Amendment] stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.\"","sentence":"Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178, 104 S.Ct. 1735, 80 L.Ed.2d 214 (1984) (\u201c[T]he Court since the enactment of the Fourth Amendment has stressed \u2018the overriding respect for the sanctity of the home that has been embedded in our traditions since the origins of the Republic.\u2019 \u201d) (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 601, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980)); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511, 81 S.Ct. 679, 5 L.Ed.2d 734 (1961) (\u201cAt the very core [of the Fourth Amendment] stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.\u201d); see Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 58, 87 S.Ct. 1873, 18 L.Ed.2d 1040 (1967) (noting that proceeding by search warrant is a drastic intrusion that \u201cmust be carefully circumscribed so as to prevent unauthorized invasions of \u2018the sanctity of a man\u2019s home and the privacies of life.\u2019 \u201d) (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630, 6 S.Ct. 524, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886))."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"388 U.S. 41, 58","parenthetical":"noting that proceeding by search warrant is a drastic intrusion that \"must be carefully circumscribed so as to prevent unauthorized invasions of 'the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life.' \"","sentence":"Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178, 104 S.Ct. 1735, 80 L.Ed.2d 214 (1984) (\u201c[T]he Court since the enactment of the Fourth Amendment has stressed \u2018the overriding respect for the sanctity of the home that has been embedded in our traditions since the origins of the Republic.\u2019 \u201d) (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 601, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980)); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511, 81 S.Ct. 679, 5 L.Ed.2d 734 (1961) (\u201cAt the very core [of the Fourth Amendment] stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.\u201d); see Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 58, 87 S.Ct. 1873, 18 L.Ed.2d 1040 (1967) (noting that proceeding by search warrant is a drastic intrusion that \u201cmust be carefully circumscribed so as to prevent unauthorized invasions of \u2018the sanctity of a man\u2019s home and the privacies of life.\u2019 \u201d) (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630, 6 S.Ct. 524, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886))."},"case_id":9232119,"label":"a"}
{"context":"IV. Intrusions into the sanctity of the home have long been viewed as at the very core of the rights protected by the Fourth Amendment.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting that proceeding by search warrant is a drastic intrusion that \"must be carefully circumscribed so as to prevent unauthorized invasions of 'the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life.' \"","sentence":"Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178, 104 S.Ct. 1735, 80 L.Ed.2d 214 (1984) (\u201c[T]he Court since the enactment of the Fourth Amendment has stressed \u2018the overriding respect for the sanctity of the home that has been embedded in our traditions since the origins of the Republic.\u2019 \u201d) (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 601, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980)); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511, 81 S.Ct. 679, 5 L.Ed.2d 734 (1961) (\u201cAt the very core [of the Fourth Amendment] stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.\u201d); see Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 58, 87 S.Ct. 1873, 18 L.Ed.2d 1040 (1967) (noting that proceeding by search warrant is a drastic intrusion that \u201cmust be carefully circumscribed so as to prevent unauthorized invasions of \u2018the sanctity of a man\u2019s home and the privacies of life.\u2019 \u201d) (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630, 6 S.Ct. 524, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886))."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"At the very core [of the Fourth Amendment] stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.\"","sentence":"Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178, 104 S.Ct. 1735, 80 L.Ed.2d 214 (1984) (\u201c[T]he Court since the enactment of the Fourth Amendment has stressed \u2018the overriding respect for the sanctity of the home that has been embedded in our traditions since the origins of the Republic.\u2019 \u201d) (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 601, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980)); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511, 81 S.Ct. 679, 5 L.Ed.2d 734 (1961) (\u201cAt the very core [of the Fourth Amendment] stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.\u201d); see Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 58, 87 S.Ct. 1873, 18 L.Ed.2d 1040 (1967) (noting that proceeding by search warrant is a drastic intrusion that \u201cmust be carefully circumscribed so as to prevent unauthorized invasions of \u2018the sanctity of a man\u2019s home and the privacies of life.\u2019 \u201d) (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630, 6 S.Ct. 524, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886))."},"case_id":9232119,"label":"b"}
{"context":"IV. Intrusions into the sanctity of the home have long been viewed as at the very core of the rights protected by the Fourth Amendment.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"At the very core [of the Fourth Amendment] stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.\"","sentence":"Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178, 104 S.Ct. 1735, 80 L.Ed.2d 214 (1984) (\u201c[T]he Court since the enactment of the Fourth Amendment has stressed \u2018the overriding respect for the sanctity of the home that has been embedded in our traditions since the origins of the Republic.\u2019 \u201d) (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 601, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980)); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511, 81 S.Ct. 679, 5 L.Ed.2d 734 (1961) (\u201cAt the very core [of the Fourth Amendment] stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.\u201d); see Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 58, 87 S.Ct. 1873, 18 L.Ed.2d 1040 (1967) (noting that proceeding by search warrant is a drastic intrusion that \u201cmust be carefully circumscribed so as to prevent unauthorized invasions of \u2018the sanctity of a man\u2019s home and the privacies of life.\u2019 \u201d) (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630, 6 S.Ct. 524, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886))."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting that proceeding by search warrant is a drastic intrusion that \"must be carefully circumscribed so as to prevent unauthorized invasions of 'the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life.' \"","sentence":"Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178, 104 S.Ct. 1735, 80 L.Ed.2d 214 (1984) (\u201c[T]he Court since the enactment of the Fourth Amendment has stressed \u2018the overriding respect for the sanctity of the home that has been embedded in our traditions since the origins of the Republic.\u2019 \u201d) (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 601, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980)); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511, 81 S.Ct. 679, 5 L.Ed.2d 734 (1961) (\u201cAt the very core [of the Fourth Amendment] stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.\u201d); see Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 58, 87 S.Ct. 1873, 18 L.Ed.2d 1040 (1967) (noting that proceeding by search warrant is a drastic intrusion that \u201cmust be carefully circumscribed so as to prevent unauthorized invasions of \u2018the sanctity of a man\u2019s home and the privacies of life.\u2019 \u201d) (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630, 6 S.Ct. 524, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886))."},"case_id":9232119,"label":"a"}
{"context":". The court's dismissal of one count in the five count complaint and denial of defendant's summary judgment motion does not make plaintiff a prevailing party.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"551 U.S. 74, 83","parenthetical":"\"[pjrevailing party status, we hold, does not attend achievement of a preliminary injunction that is reversed, dissolved, or otherwise undone by the final decision in the same case\"","sentence":"Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 760, 107 S.Ct. 2672, 96 L.Ed.2d 654 (1987) (obtaining \u201cinterlocutory ruling that his complaint should not have been dismissed\u2019\u2019 under Rule 12(b)(6) \"is not the stuff of which legal victories are made''); see Sole v. Wyner, 551 U.S. 74, 83, 127 S.Ct. 2188, 167 L.Ed.2d 1069 (2007) (\"[pjrevailing party status, we hold, does not attend achievement of a preliminary injunction that is reversed, dissolved, or otherwise undone by the final decision in the same case\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"482 U.S. 755, 760","parenthetical":"obtaining \"interlocutory ruling that his complaint should not have been dismissed'' under Rule 12(b)(6) \"is not the stuff of which legal victories are made''","sentence":"Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 760, 107 S.Ct. 2672, 96 L.Ed.2d 654 (1987) (obtaining \u201cinterlocutory ruling that his complaint should not have been dismissed\u2019\u2019 under Rule 12(b)(6) \"is not the stuff of which legal victories are made''); see Sole v. Wyner, 551 U.S. 74, 83, 127 S.Ct. 2188, 167 L.Ed.2d 1069 (2007) (\"[pjrevailing party status, we hold, does not attend achievement of a preliminary injunction that is reversed, dissolved, or otherwise undone by the final decision in the same case\u201d)."},"case_id":3783614,"label":"b"}
{"context":". The court's dismissal of one count in the five count complaint and denial of defendant's summary judgment motion does not make plaintiff a prevailing party.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"482 U.S. 755, 760","parenthetical":"obtaining \"interlocutory ruling that his complaint should not have been dismissed'' under Rule 12(b)(6) \"is not the stuff of which legal victories are made''","sentence":"Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 760, 107 S.Ct. 2672, 96 L.Ed.2d 654 (1987) (obtaining \u201cinterlocutory ruling that his complaint should not have been dismissed\u2019\u2019 under Rule 12(b)(6) \"is not the stuff of which legal victories are made''); see Sole v. Wyner, 551 U.S. 74, 83, 127 S.Ct. 2188, 167 L.Ed.2d 1069 (2007) (\"[pjrevailing party status, we hold, does not attend achievement of a preliminary injunction that is reversed, dissolved, or otherwise undone by the final decision in the same case\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[pjrevailing party status, we hold, does not attend achievement of a preliminary injunction that is reversed, dissolved, or otherwise undone by the final decision in the same case\"","sentence":"Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 760, 107 S.Ct. 2672, 96 L.Ed.2d 654 (1987) (obtaining \u201cinterlocutory ruling that his complaint should not have been dismissed\u2019\u2019 under Rule 12(b)(6) \"is not the stuff of which legal victories are made''); see Sole v. Wyner, 551 U.S. 74, 83, 127 S.Ct. 2188, 167 L.Ed.2d 1069 (2007) (\"[pjrevailing party status, we hold, does not attend achievement of a preliminary injunction that is reversed, dissolved, or otherwise undone by the final decision in the same case\u201d)."},"case_id":3783614,"label":"a"}
{"context":". The court's dismissal of one count in the five count complaint and denial of defendant's summary judgment motion does not make plaintiff a prevailing party.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"482 U.S. 755, 760","parenthetical":"obtaining \"interlocutory ruling that his complaint should not have been dismissed'' under Rule 12(b)(6) \"is not the stuff of which legal victories are made''","sentence":"Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 760, 107 S.Ct. 2672, 96 L.Ed.2d 654 (1987) (obtaining \u201cinterlocutory ruling that his complaint should not have been dismissed\u2019\u2019 under Rule 12(b)(6) \"is not the stuff of which legal victories are made''); see Sole v. Wyner, 551 U.S. 74, 83, 127 S.Ct. 2188, 167 L.Ed.2d 1069 (2007) (\"[pjrevailing party status, we hold, does not attend achievement of a preliminary injunction that is reversed, dissolved, or otherwise undone by the final decision in the same case\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[pjrevailing party status, we hold, does not attend achievement of a preliminary injunction that is reversed, dissolved, or otherwise undone by the final decision in the same case\"","sentence":"Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 760, 107 S.Ct. 2672, 96 L.Ed.2d 654 (1987) (obtaining \u201cinterlocutory ruling that his complaint should not have been dismissed\u2019\u2019 under Rule 12(b)(6) \"is not the stuff of which legal victories are made''); see Sole v. Wyner, 551 U.S. 74, 83, 127 S.Ct. 2188, 167 L.Ed.2d 1069 (2007) (\"[pjrevailing party status, we hold, does not attend achievement of a preliminary injunction that is reversed, dissolved, or otherwise undone by the final decision in the same case\u201d)."},"case_id":3783614,"label":"a"}
{"context":". The court's dismissal of one count in the five count complaint and denial of defendant's summary judgment motion does not make plaintiff a prevailing party.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"551 U.S. 74, 83","parenthetical":"\"[pjrevailing party status, we hold, does not attend achievement of a preliminary injunction that is reversed, dissolved, or otherwise undone by the final decision in the same case\"","sentence":"Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 760, 107 S.Ct. 2672, 96 L.Ed.2d 654 (1987) (obtaining \u201cinterlocutory ruling that his complaint should not have been dismissed\u2019\u2019 under Rule 12(b)(6) \"is not the stuff of which legal victories are made''); see Sole v. Wyner, 551 U.S. 74, 83, 127 S.Ct. 2188, 167 L.Ed.2d 1069 (2007) (\"[pjrevailing party status, we hold, does not attend achievement of a preliminary injunction that is reversed, dissolved, or otherwise undone by the final decision in the same case\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"obtaining \"interlocutory ruling that his complaint should not have been dismissed'' under Rule 12(b)(6) \"is not the stuff of which legal victories are made''","sentence":"Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 760, 107 S.Ct. 2672, 96 L.Ed.2d 654 (1987) (obtaining \u201cinterlocutory ruling that his complaint should not have been dismissed\u2019\u2019 under Rule 12(b)(6) \"is not the stuff of which legal victories are made''); see Sole v. Wyner, 551 U.S. 74, 83, 127 S.Ct. 2188, 167 L.Ed.2d 1069 (2007) (\"[pjrevailing party status, we hold, does not attend achievement of a preliminary injunction that is reversed, dissolved, or otherwise undone by the final decision in the same case\u201d)."},"case_id":3783614,"label":"b"}
{"context":". The court's dismissal of one count in the five count complaint and denial of defendant's summary judgment motion does not make plaintiff a prevailing party.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[pjrevailing party status, we hold, does not attend achievement of a preliminary injunction that is reversed, dissolved, or otherwise undone by the final decision in the same case\"","sentence":"Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 760, 107 S.Ct. 2672, 96 L.Ed.2d 654 (1987) (obtaining \u201cinterlocutory ruling that his complaint should not have been dismissed\u2019\u2019 under Rule 12(b)(6) \"is not the stuff of which legal victories are made''); see Sole v. Wyner, 551 U.S. 74, 83, 127 S.Ct. 2188, 167 L.Ed.2d 1069 (2007) (\"[pjrevailing party status, we hold, does not attend achievement of a preliminary injunction that is reversed, dissolved, or otherwise undone by the final decision in the same case\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"obtaining \"interlocutory ruling that his complaint should not have been dismissed'' under Rule 12(b)(6) \"is not the stuff of which legal victories are made''","sentence":"Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 760, 107 S.Ct. 2672, 96 L.Ed.2d 654 (1987) (obtaining \u201cinterlocutory ruling that his complaint should not have been dismissed\u2019\u2019 under Rule 12(b)(6) \"is not the stuff of which legal victories are made''); see Sole v. Wyner, 551 U.S. 74, 83, 127 S.Ct. 2188, 167 L.Ed.2d 1069 (2007) (\"[pjrevailing party status, we hold, does not attend achievement of a preliminary injunction that is reversed, dissolved, or otherwise undone by the final decision in the same case\u201d)."},"case_id":3783614,"label":"b"}
{"context":". The court's dismissal of one count in the five count complaint and denial of defendant's summary judgment motion does not make plaintiff a prevailing party.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"obtaining \"interlocutory ruling that his complaint should not have been dismissed'' under Rule 12(b)(6) \"is not the stuff of which legal victories are made''","sentence":"Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 760, 107 S.Ct. 2672, 96 L.Ed.2d 654 (1987) (obtaining \u201cinterlocutory ruling that his complaint should not have been dismissed\u2019\u2019 under Rule 12(b)(6) \"is not the stuff of which legal victories are made''); see Sole v. Wyner, 551 U.S. 74, 83, 127 S.Ct. 2188, 167 L.Ed.2d 1069 (2007) (\"[pjrevailing party status, we hold, does not attend achievement of a preliminary injunction that is reversed, dissolved, or otherwise undone by the final decision in the same case\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[pjrevailing party status, we hold, does not attend achievement of a preliminary injunction that is reversed, dissolved, or otherwise undone by the final decision in the same case\"","sentence":"Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 760, 107 S.Ct. 2672, 96 L.Ed.2d 654 (1987) (obtaining \u201cinterlocutory ruling that his complaint should not have been dismissed\u2019\u2019 under Rule 12(b)(6) \"is not the stuff of which legal victories are made''); see Sole v. Wyner, 551 U.S. 74, 83, 127 S.Ct. 2188, 167 L.Ed.2d 1069 (2007) (\"[pjrevailing party status, we hold, does not attend achievement of a preliminary injunction that is reversed, dissolved, or otherwise undone by the final decision in the same case\u201d)."},"case_id":3783614,"label":"a"}
{"context":". The court's dismissal of one count in the five count complaint and denial of defendant's summary judgment motion does not make plaintiff a prevailing party.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"obtaining \"interlocutory ruling that his complaint should not have been dismissed'' under Rule 12(b)(6) \"is not the stuff of which legal victories are made''","sentence":"Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 760, 107 S.Ct. 2672, 96 L.Ed.2d 654 (1987) (obtaining \u201cinterlocutory ruling that his complaint should not have been dismissed\u2019\u2019 under Rule 12(b)(6) \"is not the stuff of which legal victories are made''); see Sole v. Wyner, 551 U.S. 74, 83, 127 S.Ct. 2188, 167 L.Ed.2d 1069 (2007) (\"[pjrevailing party status, we hold, does not attend achievement of a preliminary injunction that is reversed, dissolved, or otherwise undone by the final decision in the same case\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"551 U.S. 74, 83","parenthetical":"\"[pjrevailing party status, we hold, does not attend achievement of a preliminary injunction that is reversed, dissolved, or otherwise undone by the final decision in the same case\"","sentence":"Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 760, 107 S.Ct. 2672, 96 L.Ed.2d 654 (1987) (obtaining \u201cinterlocutory ruling that his complaint should not have been dismissed\u2019\u2019 under Rule 12(b)(6) \"is not the stuff of which legal victories are made''); see Sole v. Wyner, 551 U.S. 74, 83, 127 S.Ct. 2188, 167 L.Ed.2d 1069 (2007) (\"[pjrevailing party status, we hold, does not attend achievement of a preliminary injunction that is reversed, dissolved, or otherwise undone by the final decision in the same case\u201d)."},"case_id":3783614,"label":"a"}
{"context":". The court's dismissal of one count in the five count complaint and denial of defendant's summary judgment motion does not make plaintiff a prevailing party.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"obtaining \"interlocutory ruling that his complaint should not have been dismissed'' under Rule 12(b)(6) \"is not the stuff of which legal victories are made''","sentence":"Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 760, 107 S.Ct. 2672, 96 L.Ed.2d 654 (1987) (obtaining \u201cinterlocutory ruling that his complaint should not have been dismissed\u2019\u2019 under Rule 12(b)(6) \"is not the stuff of which legal victories are made''); see Sole v. Wyner, 551 U.S. 74, 83, 127 S.Ct. 2188, 167 L.Ed.2d 1069 (2007) (\"[pjrevailing party status, we hold, does not attend achievement of a preliminary injunction that is reversed, dissolved, or otherwise undone by the final decision in the same case\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[pjrevailing party status, we hold, does not attend achievement of a preliminary injunction that is reversed, dissolved, or otherwise undone by the final decision in the same case\"","sentence":"Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 760, 107 S.Ct. 2672, 96 L.Ed.2d 654 (1987) (obtaining \u201cinterlocutory ruling that his complaint should not have been dismissed\u2019\u2019 under Rule 12(b)(6) \"is not the stuff of which legal victories are made''); see Sole v. Wyner, 551 U.S. 74, 83, 127 S.Ct. 2188, 167 L.Ed.2d 1069 (2007) (\"[pjrevailing party status, we hold, does not attend achievement of a preliminary injunction that is reversed, dissolved, or otherwise undone by the final decision in the same case\u201d)."},"case_id":3783614,"label":"a"}
{"context":". The court's dismissal of one count in the five count complaint and denial of defendant's summary judgment motion does not make plaintiff a prevailing party.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[pjrevailing party status, we hold, does not attend achievement of a preliminary injunction that is reversed, dissolved, or otherwise undone by the final decision in the same case\"","sentence":"Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 760, 107 S.Ct. 2672, 96 L.Ed.2d 654 (1987) (obtaining \u201cinterlocutory ruling that his complaint should not have been dismissed\u2019\u2019 under Rule 12(b)(6) \"is not the stuff of which legal victories are made''); see Sole v. Wyner, 551 U.S. 74, 83, 127 S.Ct. 2188, 167 L.Ed.2d 1069 (2007) (\"[pjrevailing party status, we hold, does not attend achievement of a preliminary injunction that is reversed, dissolved, or otherwise undone by the final decision in the same case\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"obtaining \"interlocutory ruling that his complaint should not have been dismissed'' under Rule 12(b)(6) \"is not the stuff of which legal victories are made''","sentence":"Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 760, 107 S.Ct. 2672, 96 L.Ed.2d 654 (1987) (obtaining \u201cinterlocutory ruling that his complaint should not have been dismissed\u2019\u2019 under Rule 12(b)(6) \"is not the stuff of which legal victories are made''); see Sole v. Wyner, 551 U.S. 74, 83, 127 S.Ct. 2188, 167 L.Ed.2d 1069 (2007) (\"[pjrevailing party status, we hold, does not attend achievement of a preliminary injunction that is reversed, dissolved, or otherwise undone by the final decision in the same case\u201d)."},"case_id":3783614,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Nothing in the record contradicts the trial court's statement that ValueOptions failed to inquire any further into the status of the entry of judgment before its time to appeal expired. The trial judge, as any judge should be, was permitted, indeed required, to draw on his knowledge and experience when determining whether ValueOptions' conduct had been reasonable under the circumstances.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"120 Ariz. 140, 146","parenthetical":"in determining reasonable attorney fees, \"trial judge can draw upon his knowledge of the case and upon his own experience\"","sentence":"See Walker v. Kendig, 107 Ariz. 510, 513, 489 P.2d 849, 852 (1971) (when making discretionary determination, trial court may rely on \u201c \u2018personal wisdom and experience\u2019\u201d), quoting In re Welisch, 18 Ariz. 517, 521, 163 P. 264, 265-66 (1917); cf. Baum v. Baum, 120 Ariz. 140, 146, 584 P.2d 604, 610 (App.1978) (in determining reasonable attorney fees, \u201ctrial judge can draw upon his knowledge of the case and upon his own experience\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"107 Ariz. 510, 513","parenthetical":"when making discretionary determination, trial court may rely on \" 'personal wisdom and experience'\"","sentence":"See Walker v. Kendig, 107 Ariz. 510, 513, 489 P.2d 849, 852 (1971) (when making discretionary determination, trial court may rely on \u201c \u2018personal wisdom and experience\u2019\u201d), quoting In re Welisch, 18 Ariz. 517, 521, 163 P. 264, 265-66 (1917); cf. Baum v. Baum, 120 Ariz. 140, 146, 584 P.2d 604, 610 (App.1978) (in determining reasonable attorney fees, \u201ctrial judge can draw upon his knowledge of the case and upon his own experience\u201d)."},"case_id":3423715,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Nothing in the record contradicts the trial court's statement that ValueOptions failed to inquire any further into the status of the entry of judgment before its time to appeal expired. The trial judge, as any judge should be, was permitted, indeed required, to draw on his knowledge and experience when determining whether ValueOptions' conduct had been reasonable under the circumstances.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"107 Ariz. 510, 513","parenthetical":"when making discretionary determination, trial court may rely on \" 'personal wisdom and experience'\"","sentence":"See Walker v. Kendig, 107 Ariz. 510, 513, 489 P.2d 849, 852 (1971) (when making discretionary determination, trial court may rely on \u201c \u2018personal wisdom and experience\u2019\u201d), quoting In re Welisch, 18 Ariz. 517, 521, 163 P. 264, 265-66 (1917); cf. Baum v. Baum, 120 Ariz. 140, 146, 584 P.2d 604, 610 (App.1978) (in determining reasonable attorney fees, \u201ctrial judge can draw upon his knowledge of the case and upon his own experience\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"584 P.2d 604, 610","parenthetical":"in determining reasonable attorney fees, \"trial judge can draw upon his knowledge of the case and upon his own experience\"","sentence":"See Walker v. Kendig, 107 Ariz. 510, 513, 489 P.2d 849, 852 (1971) (when making discretionary determination, trial court may rely on \u201c \u2018personal wisdom and experience\u2019\u201d), quoting In re Welisch, 18 Ariz. 517, 521, 163 P. 264, 265-66 (1917); cf. Baum v. Baum, 120 Ariz. 140, 146, 584 P.2d 604, 610 (App.1978) (in determining reasonable attorney fees, \u201ctrial judge can draw upon his knowledge of the case and upon his own experience\u201d)."},"case_id":3423715,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Nothing in the record contradicts the trial court's statement that ValueOptions failed to inquire any further into the status of the entry of judgment before its time to appeal expired. The trial judge, as any judge should be, was permitted, indeed required, to draw on his knowledge and experience when determining whether ValueOptions' conduct had been reasonable under the circumstances.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"120 Ariz. 140, 146","parenthetical":"in determining reasonable attorney fees, \"trial judge can draw upon his knowledge of the case and upon his own experience\"","sentence":"See Walker v. Kendig, 107 Ariz. 510, 513, 489 P.2d 849, 852 (1971) (when making discretionary determination, trial court may rely on \u201c \u2018personal wisdom and experience\u2019\u201d), quoting In re Welisch, 18 Ariz. 517, 521, 163 P. 264, 265-66 (1917); cf. Baum v. Baum, 120 Ariz. 140, 146, 584 P.2d 604, 610 (App.1978) (in determining reasonable attorney fees, \u201ctrial judge can draw upon his knowledge of the case and upon his own experience\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"489 P.2d 849, 852","parenthetical":"when making discretionary determination, trial court may rely on \" 'personal wisdom and experience'\"","sentence":"See Walker v. Kendig, 107 Ariz. 510, 513, 489 P.2d 849, 852 (1971) (when making discretionary determination, trial court may rely on \u201c \u2018personal wisdom and experience\u2019\u201d), quoting In re Welisch, 18 Ariz. 517, 521, 163 P. 264, 265-66 (1917); cf. Baum v. Baum, 120 Ariz. 140, 146, 584 P.2d 604, 610 (App.1978) (in determining reasonable attorney fees, \u201ctrial judge can draw upon his knowledge of the case and upon his own experience\u201d)."},"case_id":3423715,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Nothing in the record contradicts the trial court's statement that ValueOptions failed to inquire any further into the status of the entry of judgment before its time to appeal expired. The trial judge, as any judge should be, was permitted, indeed required, to draw on his knowledge and experience when determining whether ValueOptions' conduct had been reasonable under the circumstances.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"489 P.2d 849, 852","parenthetical":"when making discretionary determination, trial court may rely on \" 'personal wisdom and experience'\"","sentence":"See Walker v. Kendig, 107 Ariz. 510, 513, 489 P.2d 849, 852 (1971) (when making discretionary determination, trial court may rely on \u201c \u2018personal wisdom and experience\u2019\u201d), quoting In re Welisch, 18 Ariz. 517, 521, 163 P. 264, 265-66 (1917); cf. Baum v. Baum, 120 Ariz. 140, 146, 584 P.2d 604, 610 (App.1978) (in determining reasonable attorney fees, \u201ctrial judge can draw upon his knowledge of the case and upon his own experience\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"584 P.2d 604, 610","parenthetical":"in determining reasonable attorney fees, \"trial judge can draw upon his knowledge of the case and upon his own experience\"","sentence":"See Walker v. Kendig, 107 Ariz. 510, 513, 489 P.2d 849, 852 (1971) (when making discretionary determination, trial court may rely on \u201c \u2018personal wisdom and experience\u2019\u201d), quoting In re Welisch, 18 Ariz. 517, 521, 163 P. 264, 265-66 (1917); cf. Baum v. Baum, 120 Ariz. 140, 146, 584 P.2d 604, 610 (App.1978) (in determining reasonable attorney fees, \u201ctrial judge can draw upon his knowledge of the case and upon his own experience\u201d)."},"case_id":3423715,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Nothing in the record contradicts the trial court's statement that ValueOptions failed to inquire any further into the status of the entry of judgment before its time to appeal expired. The trial judge, as any judge should be, was permitted, indeed required, to draw on his knowledge and experience when determining whether ValueOptions' conduct had been reasonable under the circumstances.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"120 Ariz. 140, 146","parenthetical":"in determining reasonable attorney fees, \"trial judge can draw upon his knowledge of the case and upon his own experience\"","sentence":"See Walker v. Kendig, 107 Ariz. 510, 513, 489 P.2d 849, 852 (1971) (when making discretionary determination, trial court may rely on \u201c \u2018personal wisdom and experience\u2019\u201d), quoting In re Welisch, 18 Ariz. 517, 521, 163 P. 264, 265-66 (1917); cf. Baum v. Baum, 120 Ariz. 140, 146, 584 P.2d 604, 610 (App.1978) (in determining reasonable attorney fees, \u201ctrial judge can draw upon his knowledge of the case and upon his own experience\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"18 Ariz. 517, 521","parenthetical":"when making discretionary determination, trial court may rely on \" 'personal wisdom and experience'\"","sentence":"See Walker v. Kendig, 107 Ariz. 510, 513, 489 P.2d 849, 852 (1971) (when making discretionary determination, trial court may rely on \u201c \u2018personal wisdom and experience\u2019\u201d), quoting In re Welisch, 18 Ariz. 517, 521, 163 P. 264, 265-66 (1917); cf. Baum v. Baum, 120 Ariz. 140, 146, 584 P.2d 604, 610 (App.1978) (in determining reasonable attorney fees, \u201ctrial judge can draw upon his knowledge of the case and upon his own experience\u201d)."},"case_id":3423715,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Nothing in the record contradicts the trial court's statement that ValueOptions failed to inquire any further into the status of the entry of judgment before its time to appeal expired. The trial judge, as any judge should be, was permitted, indeed required, to draw on his knowledge and experience when determining whether ValueOptions' conduct had been reasonable under the circumstances.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"18 Ariz. 517, 521","parenthetical":"when making discretionary determination, trial court may rely on \" 'personal wisdom and experience'\"","sentence":"See Walker v. Kendig, 107 Ariz. 510, 513, 489 P.2d 849, 852 (1971) (when making discretionary determination, trial court may rely on \u201c \u2018personal wisdom and experience\u2019\u201d), quoting In re Welisch, 18 Ariz. 517, 521, 163 P. 264, 265-66 (1917); cf. Baum v. Baum, 120 Ariz. 140, 146, 584 P.2d 604, 610 (App.1978) (in determining reasonable attorney fees, \u201ctrial judge can draw upon his knowledge of the case and upon his own experience\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"584 P.2d 604, 610","parenthetical":"in determining reasonable attorney fees, \"trial judge can draw upon his knowledge of the case and upon his own experience\"","sentence":"See Walker v. Kendig, 107 Ariz. 510, 513, 489 P.2d 849, 852 (1971) (when making discretionary determination, trial court may rely on \u201c \u2018personal wisdom and experience\u2019\u201d), quoting In re Welisch, 18 Ariz. 517, 521, 163 P. 264, 265-66 (1917); cf. Baum v. Baum, 120 Ariz. 140, 146, 584 P.2d 604, 610 (App.1978) (in determining reasonable attorney fees, \u201ctrial judge can draw upon his knowledge of the case and upon his own experience\u201d)."},"case_id":3423715,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Nothing in the record contradicts the trial court's statement that ValueOptions failed to inquire any further into the status of the entry of judgment before its time to appeal expired. The trial judge, as any judge should be, was permitted, indeed required, to draw on his knowledge and experience when determining whether ValueOptions' conduct had been reasonable under the circumstances.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"163 P. 264, 265-66","parenthetical":"when making discretionary determination, trial court may rely on \" 'personal wisdom and experience'\"","sentence":"See Walker v. Kendig, 107 Ariz. 510, 513, 489 P.2d 849, 852 (1971) (when making discretionary determination, trial court may rely on \u201c \u2018personal wisdom and experience\u2019\u201d), quoting In re Welisch, 18 Ariz. 517, 521, 163 P. 264, 265-66 (1917); cf. Baum v. Baum, 120 Ariz. 140, 146, 584 P.2d 604, 610 (App.1978) (in determining reasonable attorney fees, \u201ctrial judge can draw upon his knowledge of the case and upon his own experience\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"120 Ariz. 140, 146","parenthetical":"in determining reasonable attorney fees, \"trial judge can draw upon his knowledge of the case and upon his own experience\"","sentence":"See Walker v. Kendig, 107 Ariz. 510, 513, 489 P.2d 849, 852 (1971) (when making discretionary determination, trial court may rely on \u201c \u2018personal wisdom and experience\u2019\u201d), quoting In re Welisch, 18 Ariz. 517, 521, 163 P. 264, 265-66 (1917); cf. Baum v. Baum, 120 Ariz. 140, 146, 584 P.2d 604, 610 (App.1978) (in determining reasonable attorney fees, \u201ctrial judge can draw upon his knowledge of the case and upon his own experience\u201d)."},"case_id":3423715,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Nothing in the record contradicts the trial court's statement that ValueOptions failed to inquire any further into the status of the entry of judgment before its time to appeal expired. The trial judge, as any judge should be, was permitted, indeed required, to draw on his knowledge and experience when determining whether ValueOptions' conduct had been reasonable under the circumstances.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"584 P.2d 604, 610","parenthetical":"in determining reasonable attorney fees, \"trial judge can draw upon his knowledge of the case and upon his own experience\"","sentence":"See Walker v. Kendig, 107 Ariz. 510, 513, 489 P.2d 849, 852 (1971) (when making discretionary determination, trial court may rely on \u201c \u2018personal wisdom and experience\u2019\u201d), quoting In re Welisch, 18 Ariz. 517, 521, 163 P. 264, 265-66 (1917); cf. Baum v. Baum, 120 Ariz. 140, 146, 584 P.2d 604, 610 (App.1978) (in determining reasonable attorney fees, \u201ctrial judge can draw upon his knowledge of the case and upon his own experience\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"163 P. 264, 265-66","parenthetical":"when making discretionary determination, trial court may rely on \" 'personal wisdom and experience'\"","sentence":"See Walker v. Kendig, 107 Ariz. 510, 513, 489 P.2d 849, 852 (1971) (when making discretionary determination, trial court may rely on \u201c \u2018personal wisdom and experience\u2019\u201d), quoting In re Welisch, 18 Ariz. 517, 521, 163 P. 264, 265-66 (1917); cf. Baum v. Baum, 120 Ariz. 140, 146, 584 P.2d 604, 610 (App.1978) (in determining reasonable attorney fees, \u201ctrial judge can draw upon his knowledge of the case and upon his own experience\u201d)."},"case_id":3423715,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The Fifth Circuit and two Bankruptcy Appellate Panels have decided the burden of proof issue the same way as the Seventh Circuit.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"209 B.R. 132, 141","parenthetical":"Because the debtor is the party claiming the exception to the non-dischargeability of the property settlement debt, it is the debtor who has the burden of \"coming forward with evidence to establish the viability of either test.\"","sentence":"See In re Jodoin, 209 B.R. 132, 141 (9th Cir. BAP 1997)(Because the debtor is the party claiming the exception to the non-dischargeability of the property settlement debt, it is the debtor who has the burden of \u201ccoming forward with evidence to establish the viability of either test.\u201d); In re Moeder, 220 B.R. 52, 56 (8th Cir. BAP 1998)(concluding that sub-parts (A) and (B) were exceptions that \u201cconstitute affirmative defenses to non-dis-chargeability which must be proven by the debtor to escape non-dischargeability of the disputed debt\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"143 F.3d 223, 226","parenthetical":"the burden of proof rests with the Debtor to show that one of the exceptions applies.","sentence":"In re Gamble, 143 F.3d 223, 226 (5th Cir.1998) (the burden of proof rests with the Debtor to show that one of the exceptions applies.)"},"case_id":9475658,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The Fifth Circuit and two Bankruptcy Appellate Panels have decided the burden of proof issue the same way as the Seventh Circuit.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"220 B.R. 52, 56","parenthetical":"concluding that sub-parts (A) and (B) were exceptions that \"constitute affirmative defenses to non-dis-chargeability which must be proven by the debtor to escape non-dischargeability of the disputed debt\"","sentence":"See In re Jodoin, 209 B.R. 132, 141 (9th Cir. BAP 1997)(Because the debtor is the party claiming the exception to the non-dischargeability of the property settlement debt, it is the debtor who has the burden of \u201ccoming forward with evidence to establish the viability of either test.\u201d); In re Moeder, 220 B.R. 52, 56 (8th Cir. BAP 1998)(concluding that sub-parts (A) and (B) were exceptions that \u201cconstitute affirmative defenses to non-dis-chargeability which must be proven by the debtor to escape non-dischargeability of the disputed debt\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"143 F.3d 223, 226","parenthetical":"the burden of proof rests with the Debtor to show that one of the exceptions applies.","sentence":"In re Gamble, 143 F.3d 223, 226 (5th Cir.1998) (the burden of proof rests with the Debtor to show that one of the exceptions applies.)"},"case_id":9475658,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Even though neither federal nor state law gave Defendant Desrosiers authority as a postal inspector to arrest Plaintiff for a state law crime, the arrest was nevertheless valid if Defendant Desrosiers had the authority to participate in his capacity as a private citizen.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"815 F.2d 313, 313","parenthetical":"observing that secret service agent could make state law arrest in any situation where state law authorized a \"private person\" to do so","sentence":"See Unverzagt, 424 F.2d at 398 (considering whether a warrantless arrest by a postal inspector, not authorized under federal law, was nevertheless valid as a citizen\u2019s arrest); Alexander v. United States, 390 F.2d 101, 105-07 (5th Cir.1968) (same); see also Johnson, 815 F.2d at 313 (observing that secret service agent could make state law arrest in any situation where state law authorized a \u201cprivate person\u201d to do so). Defendant Desrosiers participated in the arrest at two significant junctures."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"424 F.2d 398, 398","parenthetical":"considering whether a warrantless arrest by a postal inspector, not authorized under federal law, was nevertheless valid as a citizen's arrest","sentence":"See Unverzagt, 424 F.2d at 398 (considering whether a warrantless arrest by a postal inspector, not authorized under federal law, was nevertheless valid as a citizen\u2019s arrest); Alexander v. United States, 390 F.2d 101, 105-07 (5th Cir.1968) (same); see also Johnson, 815 F.2d at 313 (observing that secret service agent could make state law arrest in any situation where state law authorized a \u201cprivate person\u201d to do so). Defendant Desrosiers participated in the arrest at two significant junctures."},"case_id":11347586,"label":"b"}
{"context":"As the Commissioner points out, there is no requirement that the Appeals Council \"articulate its own assessment of the additional evidence\" in its decision to deny review. In this case, the Appeals Council could have justifiably refused to consider Dr. Ebert's 2002 opinion because, as pointed out above, it was wholly contradictory with his earlier treatment notes and the objective medical evidence.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"993 F.2d 31, 35","parenthetical":"noting that \"the ALJ holds the discretion to give less weight to the testimony of a treating physician in the face of persuasive contrary evidence.\"","sentence":"See Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 590 (4th Cir.1996) (\"By negative implication, if a. physician\u2019s opinion is not supported by clinical evidence or if it is inconsistent with other substantial evidence, it should be accorded significantly less weight.\u201d); see also Hunter, 993 F.2d 31, 35 (4th Cir.1992) (noting that \"the ALJ holds the discretion to give less weight to the testimony of a treating physician in the face of persuasive contrary evidence.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"76 F.3d 585, 590","parenthetical":"\"By negative implication, if a. physician's opinion is not supported by clinical evidence or if it is inconsistent with other substantial evidence, it should be accorded significantly less weight.\"","sentence":"See Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 590 (4th Cir.1996) (\"By negative implication, if a. physician\u2019s opinion is not supported by clinical evidence or if it is inconsistent with other substantial evidence, it should be accorded significantly less weight.\u201d); see also Hunter, 993 F.2d 31, 35 (4th Cir.1992) (noting that \"the ALJ holds the discretion to give less weight to the testimony of a treating physician in the face of persuasive contrary evidence.\u201d)."},"case_id":8971849,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Because the resentencing is de novo, we have held that both parties may present new evidence bearing on the sentence.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"453 So.2d 784, 786","parenthetical":"rejecting appellant's argument that the state was not permitted to present new evidence at his resentencing and stating that \"[o]ur remand directed a new sentencing proceeding, not just a reweighing\" at which \"both sides may, if they choose, present additional evidence\"","sentence":"See Mann v. State, 453 So.2d 784, 786 (Fla.1984) (rejecting appellant\u2019s argument that the state was not permitted to present new evidence at his resentencing and stating that \u201c[o]ur remand directed a new sentencing proceeding, not just a reweighing\u201d at which \u201cboth sides may, if they choose, present additional evidence\u201d); see also Rich v. State, 814 So.2d 1207, 1208 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) (holding that at resentenc-ing, the State must present evidence on an enhanced sentencing factor despite having done so at the prior sentencing hearing)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"814 So.2d 1207, 1208","parenthetical":"holding that at resentenc-ing, the State must present evidence on an enhanced sentencing factor despite having done so at the prior sentencing hearing","sentence":"See Mann v. State, 453 So.2d 784, 786 (Fla.1984) (rejecting appellant\u2019s argument that the state was not permitted to present new evidence at his resentencing and stating that \u201c[o]ur remand directed a new sentencing proceeding, not just a reweighing\u201d at which \u201cboth sides may, if they choose, present additional evidence\u201d); see also Rich v. State, 814 So.2d 1207, 1208 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) (holding that at resentenc-ing, the State must present evidence on an enhanced sentencing factor despite having done so at the prior sentencing hearing)."},"case_id":7028385,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Here, plaintiffs provide almost no detail that might lead a reasonable trier of fact to an alternate explanation of the complaints against them, nor do they provide any evidence of their own job qualifications beyond their own eonclusory allegations. \"Statements that are devoid of any specifics, but replete with conclusions, are insufficient to defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"92 F.Supp.2d 346, 346-47","parenthetical":"basing grant of summary judgment for defendant in Title VII case, in part, on plaintiffs reliance on con-clusory allegations to rebut defendants' specific evidence","sentence":"See also Ricks, 92 F.Supp.2d at 346-47 (basing grant of summary judgment for defendant in Title VII case, in part, on plaintiffs reliance on con-clusory allegations to rebut defendants\u2019 specific evidence)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"196 F.3d 451, 451-52","parenthetical":"restating principle that to defeat summary judgment, plaintiffs', \"affidavits must be based upon concrete particulars, not eonclusory allegations\"","sentence":"Bickerstaff, 196 F.3d at 451-52 (restating principle that to defeat summary judgment, plaintiffs\u2019, \u201caffidavits must be based upon concrete particulars, not eonclusory allegations\u201d) (citing, inter alia, BellSouth Telecomms., Inc. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 77 F.3d 603, 615 (2d Cir.1996))."},"case_id":11207894,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Having thoroughly reviewed the record, we agree with the district court that the government's affidavits in support of the initial wiretap and the two extensions persuasively demonstrated that the wiretaps were necessary to achieve the objectives of the Task Force investigation.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"733 F.2d 1395, 1399","parenthetical":"upholding necessity determination where traditional techniques \"had failed to reveal the source of the drugs[ ][or] the extent of the drug conspiracy\"","sentence":"See United States v. Newman, 733 F.2d 1395, 1399 (10th Cir.1984) (upholding necessity determination where traditional techniques \u201chad failed to reveal the source of the drugs[ ][or] the extent of the drug conspiracy\u201d); United States v. Johnson, 645 F.2d 865, 867 (10th Cir.1981) (upholding necessity determination where the government was \u201cproperly concerned ... with identifying all of the members of the conspiracy, as well as the precise nature and scope of the illegal activity\u201d); see also United States v. McLee, 436 F.3d 751, 763 (7th Cir.2006) (\u201cThe government\u2019s demonstrated need for a wiretap as a means of identifying all coconspirators and the roles they occupied in the structure of the conspiracy is sufficient for a finding of \u2018neces sity\u2019 under the statute.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"436 F.3d 751, 763","parenthetical":"\"The government's demonstrated need for a wiretap as a means of identifying all coconspirators and the roles they occupied in the structure of the conspiracy is sufficient for a finding of 'neces sity' under the statute.\"","sentence":"See United States v. Newman, 733 F.2d 1395, 1399 (10th Cir.1984) (upholding necessity determination where traditional techniques \u201chad failed to reveal the source of the drugs[ ][or] the extent of the drug conspiracy\u201d); United States v. Johnson, 645 F.2d 865, 867 (10th Cir.1981) (upholding necessity determination where the government was \u201cproperly concerned ... with identifying all of the members of the conspiracy, as well as the precise nature and scope of the illegal activity\u201d); see also United States v. McLee, 436 F.3d 751, 763 (7th Cir.2006) (\u201cThe government\u2019s demonstrated need for a wiretap as a means of identifying all coconspirators and the roles they occupied in the structure of the conspiracy is sufficient for a finding of \u2018neces sity\u2019 under the statute.\u201d)."},"case_id":3702208,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Having thoroughly reviewed the record, we agree with the district court that the government's affidavits in support of the initial wiretap and the two extensions persuasively demonstrated that the wiretaps were necessary to achieve the objectives of the Task Force investigation.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"645 F.2d 865, 867","parenthetical":"upholding necessity determination where the government was \"properly concerned ... with identifying all of the members of the conspiracy, as well as the precise nature and scope of the illegal activity\"","sentence":"See United States v. Newman, 733 F.2d 1395, 1399 (10th Cir.1984) (upholding necessity determination where traditional techniques \u201chad failed to reveal the source of the drugs[ ][or] the extent of the drug conspiracy\u201d); United States v. Johnson, 645 F.2d 865, 867 (10th Cir.1981) (upholding necessity determination where the government was \u201cproperly concerned ... with identifying all of the members of the conspiracy, as well as the precise nature and scope of the illegal activity\u201d); see also United States v. McLee, 436 F.3d 751, 763 (7th Cir.2006) (\u201cThe government\u2019s demonstrated need for a wiretap as a means of identifying all coconspirators and the roles they occupied in the structure of the conspiracy is sufficient for a finding of \u2018neces sity\u2019 under the statute.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"436 F.3d 751, 763","parenthetical":"\"The government's demonstrated need for a wiretap as a means of identifying all coconspirators and the roles they occupied in the structure of the conspiracy is sufficient for a finding of 'neces sity' under the statute.\"","sentence":"See United States v. Newman, 733 F.2d 1395, 1399 (10th Cir.1984) (upholding necessity determination where traditional techniques \u201chad failed to reveal the source of the drugs[ ][or] the extent of the drug conspiracy\u201d); United States v. Johnson, 645 F.2d 865, 867 (10th Cir.1981) (upholding necessity determination where the government was \u201cproperly concerned ... with identifying all of the members of the conspiracy, as well as the precise nature and scope of the illegal activity\u201d); see also United States v. McLee, 436 F.3d 751, 763 (7th Cir.2006) (\u201cThe government\u2019s demonstrated need for a wiretap as a means of identifying all coconspirators and the roles they occupied in the structure of the conspiracy is sufficient for a finding of \u2018neces sity\u2019 under the statute.\u201d)."},"case_id":3702208,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Marvell argues that this Court should follow the holding in Mirror Worlds that \"because [defendant's] sales or offers for sale do not infringe the asserted method patents, they cannot be the basis for damages.\" (Docket No. 357 at 5). The Court does not read Mirror Worlds as Marvell would have it for several reasons, both legal and factual in nature. First, such a restrictive reading is contradictory to Federal Circuit precedent, which does not require a reasonable royalty to be tied only to use of the patented method (i.e., infringement).","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"718 F.2d 1075, 1080-81","parenthetical":"upholding reasonable royalty based on availability of the method, rather than \"actual use of the\" invention","sentence":"See, e.g., Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1334 (\u201cA company licensing a patented method often has strong reasons not to tie the royalty amount strictly to usage.\u201d); cf. Hanson v. Alpine Valley Ski Area, Inc., 718 F.2d 1075, 1080-81 (Fed.Cir.1983) (upholding reasonable royalty based on availability of the method, rather than \u201cactual use of the\u201d invention)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"580 F.3d 1334, 1334","parenthetical":"\"A company licensing a patented method often has strong reasons not to tie the royalty amount strictly to usage.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1334 (\u201cA company licensing a patented method often has strong reasons not to tie the royalty amount strictly to usage.\u201d); cf. Hanson v. Alpine Valley Ski Area, Inc., 718 F.2d 1075, 1080-81 (Fed.Cir.1983) (upholding reasonable royalty based on availability of the method, rather than \u201cactual use of the\u201d invention)."},"case_id":4273712,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The government's immunity in this case rests on the protected discretion of the Comptroller even though Irwin complains of tortious conduct by the Comptroller's subordinates. Examiner Chopel's acts were only one phase of the agency's examination and review process that culminated in the protected decision.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"346 U.S. 15, 36","parenthetical":"acts of subordinates in carrying out government operation according to official directions not actionable","sentence":"See Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 36, 73 S.Ct. 956, 968, 97 L.Ed. 1427 (1953) (acts of subordinates in carrying out government operation according to official directions not actionable)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"630 F.2d 523, 528","parenthetical":"allegations of \"numerous 'mistakes, errors, and omissions in the course of examining' the bank and its holding company ... fall facially within the exception\"","sentence":"See also Emch v. United States, 630 F.2d 523, 528 (7th Cir.1980) (allegations of \u201cnumerous \u2018mistakes, errors, and omissions in the course of examining\u2019 the bank and its holding company ... fall facially within the exception\u201d), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 966, 101 S.Ct. 1482, 67 L.Ed.2d 614 (1981)."},"case_id":10539358,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The government's immunity in this case rests on the protected discretion of the Comptroller even though Irwin complains of tortious conduct by the Comptroller's subordinates. Examiner Chopel's acts were only one phase of the agency's examination and review process that culminated in the protected decision.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"346 U.S. 15, 36","parenthetical":"acts of subordinates in carrying out government operation according to official directions not actionable","sentence":"See Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 36, 73 S.Ct. 956, 968, 97 L.Ed. 1427 (1953) (acts of subordinates in carrying out government operation according to official directions not actionable)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"allegations of \"numerous 'mistakes, errors, and omissions in the course of examining' the bank and its holding company ... fall facially within the exception\"","sentence":"See also Emch v. United States, 630 F.2d 523, 528 (7th Cir.1980) (allegations of \u201cnumerous \u2018mistakes, errors, and omissions in the course of examining\u2019 the bank and its holding company ... fall facially within the exception\u201d), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 966, 101 S.Ct. 1482, 67 L.Ed.2d 614 (1981)."},"case_id":10539358,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The government's immunity in this case rests on the protected discretion of the Comptroller even though Irwin complains of tortious conduct by the Comptroller's subordinates. Examiner Chopel's acts were only one phase of the agency's examination and review process that culminated in the protected decision.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"346 U.S. 15, 36","parenthetical":"acts of subordinates in carrying out government operation according to official directions not actionable","sentence":"See Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 36, 73 S.Ct. 956, 968, 97 L.Ed. 1427 (1953) (acts of subordinates in carrying out government operation according to official directions not actionable)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"allegations of \"numerous 'mistakes, errors, and omissions in the course of examining' the bank and its holding company ... fall facially within the exception\"","sentence":"See also Emch v. United States, 630 F.2d 523, 528 (7th Cir.1980) (allegations of \u201cnumerous \u2018mistakes, errors, and omissions in the course of examining\u2019 the bank and its holding company ... fall facially within the exception\u201d), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 966, 101 S.Ct. 1482, 67 L.Ed.2d 614 (1981)."},"case_id":10539358,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The government's immunity in this case rests on the protected discretion of the Comptroller even though Irwin complains of tortious conduct by the Comptroller's subordinates. Examiner Chopel's acts were only one phase of the agency's examination and review process that culminated in the protected decision.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"346 U.S. 15, 36","parenthetical":"acts of subordinates in carrying out government operation according to official directions not actionable","sentence":"See Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 36, 73 S.Ct. 956, 968, 97 L.Ed. 1427 (1953) (acts of subordinates in carrying out government operation according to official directions not actionable)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"allegations of \"numerous 'mistakes, errors, and omissions in the course of examining' the bank and its holding company ... fall facially within the exception\"","sentence":"See also Emch v. United States, 630 F.2d 523, 528 (7th Cir.1980) (allegations of \u201cnumerous \u2018mistakes, errors, and omissions in the course of examining\u2019 the bank and its holding company ... fall facially within the exception\u201d), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 966, 101 S.Ct. 1482, 67 L.Ed.2d 614 (1981)."},"case_id":10539358,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The government's immunity in this case rests on the protected discretion of the Comptroller even though Irwin complains of tortious conduct by the Comptroller's subordinates. Examiner Chopel's acts were only one phase of the agency's examination and review process that culminated in the protected decision.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"630 F.2d 523, 528","parenthetical":"allegations of \"numerous 'mistakes, errors, and omissions in the course of examining' the bank and its holding company ... fall facially within the exception\"","sentence":"See also Emch v. United States, 630 F.2d 523, 528 (7th Cir.1980) (allegations of \u201cnumerous \u2018mistakes, errors, and omissions in the course of examining\u2019 the bank and its holding company ... fall facially within the exception\u201d), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 966, 101 S.Ct. 1482, 67 L.Ed.2d 614 (1981)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"73 S.Ct. 956, 968","parenthetical":"acts of subordinates in carrying out government operation according to official directions not actionable","sentence":"See Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 36, 73 S.Ct. 956, 968, 97 L.Ed. 1427 (1953) (acts of subordinates in carrying out government operation according to official directions not actionable)."},"case_id":10539358,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The government's immunity in this case rests on the protected discretion of the Comptroller even though Irwin complains of tortious conduct by the Comptroller's subordinates. Examiner Chopel's acts were only one phase of the agency's examination and review process that culminated in the protected decision.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"allegations of \"numerous 'mistakes, errors, and omissions in the course of examining' the bank and its holding company ... fall facially within the exception\"","sentence":"See also Emch v. United States, 630 F.2d 523, 528 (7th Cir.1980) (allegations of \u201cnumerous \u2018mistakes, errors, and omissions in the course of examining\u2019 the bank and its holding company ... fall facially within the exception\u201d), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 966, 101 S.Ct. 1482, 67 L.Ed.2d 614 (1981)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"73 S.Ct. 956, 968","parenthetical":"acts of subordinates in carrying out government operation according to official directions not actionable","sentence":"See Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 36, 73 S.Ct. 956, 968, 97 L.Ed. 1427 (1953) (acts of subordinates in carrying out government operation according to official directions not actionable)."},"case_id":10539358,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The government's immunity in this case rests on the protected discretion of the Comptroller even though Irwin complains of tortious conduct by the Comptroller's subordinates. Examiner Chopel's acts were only one phase of the agency's examination and review process that culminated in the protected decision.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"allegations of \"numerous 'mistakes, errors, and omissions in the course of examining' the bank and its holding company ... fall facially within the exception\"","sentence":"See also Emch v. United States, 630 F.2d 523, 528 (7th Cir.1980) (allegations of \u201cnumerous \u2018mistakes, errors, and omissions in the course of examining\u2019 the bank and its holding company ... fall facially within the exception\u201d), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 966, 101 S.Ct. 1482, 67 L.Ed.2d 614 (1981)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"73 S.Ct. 956, 968","parenthetical":"acts of subordinates in carrying out government operation according to official directions not actionable","sentence":"See Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 36, 73 S.Ct. 956, 968, 97 L.Ed. 1427 (1953) (acts of subordinates in carrying out government operation according to official directions not actionable)."},"case_id":10539358,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The government's immunity in this case rests on the protected discretion of the Comptroller even though Irwin complains of tortious conduct by the Comptroller's subordinates. Examiner Chopel's acts were only one phase of the agency's examination and review process that culminated in the protected decision.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"73 S.Ct. 956, 968","parenthetical":"acts of subordinates in carrying out government operation according to official directions not actionable","sentence":"See Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 36, 73 S.Ct. 956, 968, 97 L.Ed. 1427 (1953) (acts of subordinates in carrying out government operation according to official directions not actionable)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"allegations of \"numerous 'mistakes, errors, and omissions in the course of examining' the bank and its holding company ... fall facially within the exception\"","sentence":"See also Emch v. United States, 630 F.2d 523, 528 (7th Cir.1980) (allegations of \u201cnumerous \u2018mistakes, errors, and omissions in the course of examining\u2019 the bank and its holding company ... fall facially within the exception\u201d), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 966, 101 S.Ct. 1482, 67 L.Ed.2d 614 (1981)."},"case_id":10539358,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The government's immunity in this case rests on the protected discretion of the Comptroller even though Irwin complains of tortious conduct by the Comptroller's subordinates. Examiner Chopel's acts were only one phase of the agency's examination and review process that culminated in the protected decision.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"acts of subordinates in carrying out government operation according to official directions not actionable","sentence":"See Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 36, 73 S.Ct. 956, 968, 97 L.Ed. 1427 (1953) (acts of subordinates in carrying out government operation according to official directions not actionable)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"630 F.2d 523, 528","parenthetical":"allegations of \"numerous 'mistakes, errors, and omissions in the course of examining' the bank and its holding company ... fall facially within the exception\"","sentence":"See also Emch v. United States, 630 F.2d 523, 528 (7th Cir.1980) (allegations of \u201cnumerous \u2018mistakes, errors, and omissions in the course of examining\u2019 the bank and its holding company ... fall facially within the exception\u201d), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 966, 101 S.Ct. 1482, 67 L.Ed.2d 614 (1981)."},"case_id":10539358,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The government's immunity in this case rests on the protected discretion of the Comptroller even though Irwin complains of tortious conduct by the Comptroller's subordinates. Examiner Chopel's acts were only one phase of the agency's examination and review process that culminated in the protected decision.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"acts of subordinates in carrying out government operation according to official directions not actionable","sentence":"See Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 36, 73 S.Ct. 956, 968, 97 L.Ed. 1427 (1953) (acts of subordinates in carrying out government operation according to official directions not actionable)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"allegations of \"numerous 'mistakes, errors, and omissions in the course of examining' the bank and its holding company ... fall facially within the exception\"","sentence":"See also Emch v. United States, 630 F.2d 523, 528 (7th Cir.1980) (allegations of \u201cnumerous \u2018mistakes, errors, and omissions in the course of examining\u2019 the bank and its holding company ... fall facially within the exception\u201d), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 966, 101 S.Ct. 1482, 67 L.Ed.2d 614 (1981)."},"case_id":10539358,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The government's immunity in this case rests on the protected discretion of the Comptroller even though Irwin complains of tortious conduct by the Comptroller's subordinates. Examiner Chopel's acts were only one phase of the agency's examination and review process that culminated in the protected decision.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"acts of subordinates in carrying out government operation according to official directions not actionable","sentence":"See Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 36, 73 S.Ct. 956, 968, 97 L.Ed. 1427 (1953) (acts of subordinates in carrying out government operation according to official directions not actionable)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"allegations of \"numerous 'mistakes, errors, and omissions in the course of examining' the bank and its holding company ... fall facially within the exception\"","sentence":"See also Emch v. United States, 630 F.2d 523, 528 (7th Cir.1980) (allegations of \u201cnumerous \u2018mistakes, errors, and omissions in the course of examining\u2019 the bank and its holding company ... fall facially within the exception\u201d), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 966, 101 S.Ct. 1482, 67 L.Ed.2d 614 (1981)."},"case_id":10539358,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The government's immunity in this case rests on the protected discretion of the Comptroller even though Irwin complains of tortious conduct by the Comptroller's subordinates. Examiner Chopel's acts were only one phase of the agency's examination and review process that culminated in the protected decision.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"acts of subordinates in carrying out government operation according to official directions not actionable","sentence":"See Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 36, 73 S.Ct. 956, 968, 97 L.Ed. 1427 (1953) (acts of subordinates in carrying out government operation according to official directions not actionable)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"allegations of \"numerous 'mistakes, errors, and omissions in the course of examining' the bank and its holding company ... fall facially within the exception\"","sentence":"See also Emch v. United States, 630 F.2d 523, 528 (7th Cir.1980) (allegations of \u201cnumerous \u2018mistakes, errors, and omissions in the course of examining\u2019 the bank and its holding company ... fall facially within the exception\u201d), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 966, 101 S.Ct. 1482, 67 L.Ed.2d 614 (1981)."},"case_id":10539358,"label":"a"}
{"context":". Pursuant to a 2005 amendment, the statute now lists 28 U.S.C. SS 158(d) as 28 U.S.C. SS 158(d)(1). However, this case was filed in 2001, prior to the effective date of the 2005 amendment, so as relevant, references to the Bankruptcy Code throughout this opinion refer to the previous version of the Code.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"discussing the applicability of the pre-2005 statute in the present set of cases pursuant to the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, SS 1501, 119 Stat. 23 (2005","sentence":"See In re Am. Capital Equip., LLC, 296 Fed.Appx. 270, 276 n. 5 (3d Cir.2008) (discussing the applicability of the pre-2005 statute in the present set of cases pursuant to the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, \u00a7 1501, 119 Stat. 23 (2005)); see also In re Krebs, 527 F.3d 82, 84 (3d Cir.2008) (Bankruptcy Code's 2005 amendment not applicable to Chapter 11 case filed prior to amendment's effective date)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"527 F.3d 82, 84","parenthetical":"Bankruptcy Code's 2005 amendment not applicable to Chapter 11 case filed prior to amendment's effective date","sentence":"See In re Am. Capital Equip., LLC, 296 Fed.Appx. 270, 276 n. 5 (3d Cir.2008) (discussing the applicability of the pre-2005 statute in the present set of cases pursuant to the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, \u00a7 1501, 119 Stat. 23 (2005)); see also In re Krebs, 527 F.3d 82, 84 (3d Cir.2008) (Bankruptcy Code's 2005 amendment not applicable to Chapter 11 case filed prior to amendment's effective date)."},"case_id":4147368,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The only apparent foible (and one not raised by Zimmerman here) is that SS 265.03(3) only criminalizes \"unlicensed\" firearm possession. However, given Officer Greco's law enforcement experience and that: (1) the gunshot occurred in a \"high-crime neighborhood\"; (2) in a public parking lot; (3) defendant denied even hearing a gunshot; (4) defendant failed to initially inform her about the weapon or show his license to carry same, this was sufficient information to enable a reasonably cautious person to believe the felony at issue -- the unlawful possession of a loaded firearm -- was being committed.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"462 U.S. 213, 231","parenthetical":"noting that probable cause deals with \"probabilities,\" not \"hard certainties\"","sentence":"See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 231, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983) (noting that probable cause deals with \u201cprobabilities,\u201d not \u201chard certainties\u201d); see also United States v. Delossantos, 536 F.3d 155, 161 (2d Cir.2008) (noting that, despite possible innocent explanations, a court \u201cmust evaluate the facts in light of the training and experience of the arresting agents\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"536 F.3d 155, 161","parenthetical":"noting that, despite possible innocent explanations, a court \"must evaluate the facts in light of the training and experience of the arresting agents\"","sentence":"See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 231, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983) (noting that probable cause deals with \u201cprobabilities,\u201d not \u201chard certainties\u201d); see also United States v. Delossantos, 536 F.3d 155, 161 (2d Cir.2008) (noting that, despite possible innocent explanations, a court \u201cmust evaluate the facts in light of the training and experience of the arresting agents\u201d)."},"case_id":4305436,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The only apparent foible (and one not raised by Zimmerman here) is that SS 265.03(3) only criminalizes \"unlicensed\" firearm possession. However, given Officer Greco's law enforcement experience and that: (1) the gunshot occurred in a \"high-crime neighborhood\"; (2) in a public parking lot; (3) defendant denied even hearing a gunshot; (4) defendant failed to initially inform her about the weapon or show his license to carry same, this was sufficient information to enable a reasonably cautious person to believe the felony at issue -- the unlawful possession of a loaded firearm -- was being committed.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting that probable cause deals with \"probabilities,\" not \"hard certainties\"","sentence":"See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 231, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983) (noting that probable cause deals with \u201cprobabilities,\u201d not \u201chard certainties\u201d); see also United States v. Delossantos, 536 F.3d 155, 161 (2d Cir.2008) (noting that, despite possible innocent explanations, a court \u201cmust evaluate the facts in light of the training and experience of the arresting agents\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"536 F.3d 155, 161","parenthetical":"noting that, despite possible innocent explanations, a court \"must evaluate the facts in light of the training and experience of the arresting agents\"","sentence":"See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 231, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983) (noting that probable cause deals with \u201cprobabilities,\u201d not \u201chard certainties\u201d); see also United States v. Delossantos, 536 F.3d 155, 161 (2d Cir.2008) (noting that, despite possible innocent explanations, a court \u201cmust evaluate the facts in light of the training and experience of the arresting agents\u201d)."},"case_id":4305436,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The only apparent foible (and one not raised by Zimmerman here) is that SS 265.03(3) only criminalizes \"unlicensed\" firearm possession. However, given Officer Greco's law enforcement experience and that: (1) the gunshot occurred in a \"high-crime neighborhood\"; (2) in a public parking lot; (3) defendant denied even hearing a gunshot; (4) defendant failed to initially inform her about the weapon or show his license to carry same, this was sufficient information to enable a reasonably cautious person to believe the felony at issue -- the unlawful possession of a loaded firearm -- was being committed.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting that probable cause deals with \"probabilities,\" not \"hard certainties\"","sentence":"See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 231, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983) (noting that probable cause deals with \u201cprobabilities,\u201d not \u201chard certainties\u201d); see also United States v. Delossantos, 536 F.3d 155, 161 (2d Cir.2008) (noting that, despite possible innocent explanations, a court \u201cmust evaluate the facts in light of the training and experience of the arresting agents\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"536 F.3d 155, 161","parenthetical":"noting that, despite possible innocent explanations, a court \"must evaluate the facts in light of the training and experience of the arresting agents\"","sentence":"See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 231, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983) (noting that probable cause deals with \u201cprobabilities,\u201d not \u201chard certainties\u201d); see also United States v. Delossantos, 536 F.3d 155, 161 (2d Cir.2008) (noting that, despite possible innocent explanations, a court \u201cmust evaluate the facts in light of the training and experience of the arresting agents\u201d)."},"case_id":4305436,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The error here, if any, was not clear and obvious. One year prior to Sanders's trial, we noted there was a circuit split over whether a defendant violates SS 1512 when he attempts to persuade others to invoke their Fifth Amendment right to remain silent.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"280 F.3d 907, 913","parenthetical":"\"[T]here is a difference in approach among the circuits about whether merely attempting to persuade a witness to withhold cooperation or not to disclose information to law en forcement officials -- as opposed to actively lying -- falls within the ambit of SS 1512(b","sentence":"United States v. Khatami, 280 F.3d 907, 913 (9th Cir.2002) (\u201c[T]here is a difference in approach among the circuits about whether merely attempting to persuade a witness to withhold cooperation or not to disclose information to law en forcement officials \u2014 as opposed to actively lying \u2014 falls within the ambit of \u00a7 1512(b).\u201d). We declined to rale on the issue, leaving the question open in this circuit."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"122 F.3d 1167, 1170","parenthetical":"noting that to be clear and obvious an error must be \"so clear-cut, so obvious,[that] a competent district judge should be able to avoid it without benefit of objection\"","sentence":"See United States v. Turman, 122 F.3d 1167, 1170 (9th Cir.1997) (noting that to be clear and obvious an error must be \u201cso clear-cut, so obvious,[that] a competent district judge should be able to avoid it without benefit of objection\u201d)."},"case_id":8936903,"label":"a"}
{"context":"However, this case did not turn on a finding that Herrera's impairments were not severe at step two; rather, the ALJ concluded that Herrera was not disabled because, despite his severe impairments, he retained the residual functional capacity to do other work. Therefore, the ALJ's failure to assess the severity of Herrera's anxiety or learning impairments at step two is not a basis for remand.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"837 F.2d 1362, 1365","parenthetical":"\"[I]f the ALJ proceeds past the impairment step in the sequential evaluation process the court must infer that a severe impairment was found.\"","sentence":"See Adams v. Bowen, 833 F.2d 509, 512 (5th Cir.1987) (ALJ\u2019s failure to make a severity finding at step two not a basis for remand where ALJ proceeded to later steps of the analysis); see also Mays v. Bowen, 837 F.2d 1362, 1365 (5th Cir.1988) (per curiam) (\u201c[I]f the ALJ proceeds past the impairment step in the sequential evaluation process the court must infer that a severe impairment was found.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"833 F.2d 509, 512","parenthetical":"ALJ's failure to make a severity finding at step two not a basis for remand where ALJ proceeded to later steps of the analysis","sentence":"See Adams v. Bowen, 833 F.2d 509, 512 (5th Cir.1987) (ALJ\u2019s failure to make a severity finding at step two not a basis for remand where ALJ proceeded to later steps of the analysis); see also Mays v. Bowen, 837 F.2d 1362, 1365 (5th Cir.1988) (per curiam) (\u201c[I]f the ALJ proceeds past the impairment step in the sequential evaluation process the court must infer that a severe impairment was found.\u201d)."},"case_id":4087876,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The Florida burglary statute is, to some extent, divisible -- it proscribes \"entering or remaining in a structure or a conveyance with the intent to commit an offense therein.\" SS 810.02, Fla. Stat. (emphasis added). Insofar as the statute distinguishes between structures and conveyances, it is indeed divisible.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"133 S.Ct. 2281, 2281","parenthetical":"explaining that a divisible statute \"sets out one or more elements of the offense in the alternative -- for example, stating that burglary involves entry into a building or an automobile\"","sentence":"Descamps, 133 S.Ct. at 2281 (explaining that a divisible statute \u201csets out one or more elements of the offense in the alternative \u2014 for example, stating that burglary involves entry into a building or an automobile\u201d): accord Howard, 742 F.3d at 1348; cf. Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602, 110 S.Ct. 2143 (explaining that \u201c[f]or example, in a State whose burglary statutes include entry of an automobile as well as a building, ... then the Government should be allowed to use the conviction for enhancement\u201d if it can present appropriate documents showing that the defendant was charged with, and necessarily found guilty of, burglary of a building rather than burglary of an automobile)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"495 U.S. 602, 602","parenthetical":"explaining that \"[f]or example, in a State whose burglary statutes include entry of an automobile as well as a building, ... then the Government should be allowed to use the conviction for enhancement\" if it can present appropriate documents showing that the defendant was charged with, and necessarily found guilty of, burglary of a building rather than burglary of an automobile","sentence":"Descamps, 133 S.Ct. at 2281 (explaining that a divisible statute \u201csets out one or more elements of the offense in the alternative \u2014 for example, stating that burglary involves entry into a building or an automobile\u201d): accord Howard, 742 F.3d at 1348; cf. Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602, 110 S.Ct. 2143 (explaining that \u201c[f]or example, in a State whose burglary statutes include entry of an automobile as well as a building, ... then the Government should be allowed to use the conviction for enhancement\u201d if it can present appropriate documents showing that the defendant was charged with, and necessarily found guilty of, burglary of a building rather than burglary of an automobile)."},"case_id":4341809,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The Florida burglary statute is, to some extent, divisible -- it proscribes \"entering or remaining in a structure or a conveyance with the intent to commit an offense therein.\" SS 810.02, Fla. Stat. (emphasis added). Insofar as the statute distinguishes between structures and conveyances, it is indeed divisible.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"133 S.Ct. 2281, 2281","parenthetical":"explaining that a divisible statute \"sets out one or more elements of the offense in the alternative -- for example, stating that burglary involves entry into a building or an automobile\"","sentence":"Descamps, 133 S.Ct. at 2281 (explaining that a divisible statute \u201csets out one or more elements of the offense in the alternative \u2014 for example, stating that burglary involves entry into a building or an automobile\u201d): accord Howard, 742 F.3d at 1348; cf. Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602, 110 S.Ct. 2143 (explaining that \u201c[f]or example, in a State whose burglary statutes include entry of an automobile as well as a building, ... then the Government should be allowed to use the conviction for enhancement\u201d if it can present appropriate documents showing that the defendant was charged with, and necessarily found guilty of, burglary of a building rather than burglary of an automobile)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"explaining that \"[f]or example, in a State whose burglary statutes include entry of an automobile as well as a building, ... then the Government should be allowed to use the conviction for enhancement\" if it can present appropriate documents showing that the defendant was charged with, and necessarily found guilty of, burglary of a building rather than burglary of an automobile","sentence":"Descamps, 133 S.Ct. at 2281 (explaining that a divisible statute \u201csets out one or more elements of the offense in the alternative \u2014 for example, stating that burglary involves entry into a building or an automobile\u201d): accord Howard, 742 F.3d at 1348; cf. Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602, 110 S.Ct. 2143 (explaining that \u201c[f]or example, in a State whose burglary statutes include entry of an automobile as well as a building, ... then the Government should be allowed to use the conviction for enhancement\u201d if it can present appropriate documents showing that the defendant was charged with, and necessarily found guilty of, burglary of a building rather than burglary of an automobile)."},"case_id":4341809,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The Florida burglary statute is, to some extent, divisible -- it proscribes \"entering or remaining in a structure or a conveyance with the intent to commit an offense therein.\" SS 810.02, Fla. Stat. (emphasis added). Insofar as the statute distinguishes between structures and conveyances, it is indeed divisible.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"495 U.S. 602, 602","parenthetical":"explaining that \"[f]or example, in a State whose burglary statutes include entry of an automobile as well as a building, ... then the Government should be allowed to use the conviction for enhancement\" if it can present appropriate documents showing that the defendant was charged with, and necessarily found guilty of, burglary of a building rather than burglary of an automobile","sentence":"Descamps, 133 S.Ct. at 2281 (explaining that a divisible statute \u201csets out one or more elements of the offense in the alternative \u2014 for example, stating that burglary involves entry into a building or an automobile\u201d): accord Howard, 742 F.3d at 1348; cf. Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602, 110 S.Ct. 2143 (explaining that \u201c[f]or example, in a State whose burglary statutes include entry of an automobile as well as a building, ... then the Government should be allowed to use the conviction for enhancement\u201d if it can present appropriate documents showing that the defendant was charged with, and necessarily found guilty of, burglary of a building rather than burglary of an automobile)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"742 F.3d 1348, 1348","parenthetical":"explaining that a divisible statute \"sets out one or more elements of the offense in the alternative -- for example, stating that burglary involves entry into a building or an automobile\"","sentence":"Descamps, 133 S.Ct. at 2281 (explaining that a divisible statute \u201csets out one or more elements of the offense in the alternative \u2014 for example, stating that burglary involves entry into a building or an automobile\u201d): accord Howard, 742 F.3d at 1348; cf. Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602, 110 S.Ct. 2143 (explaining that \u201c[f]or example, in a State whose burglary statutes include entry of an automobile as well as a building, ... then the Government should be allowed to use the conviction for enhancement\u201d if it can present appropriate documents showing that the defendant was charged with, and necessarily found guilty of, burglary of a building rather than burglary of an automobile)."},"case_id":4341809,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The Florida burglary statute is, to some extent, divisible -- it proscribes \"entering or remaining in a structure or a conveyance with the intent to commit an offense therein.\" SS 810.02, Fla. Stat. (emphasis added). Insofar as the statute distinguishes between structures and conveyances, it is indeed divisible.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"742 F.3d 1348, 1348","parenthetical":"explaining that a divisible statute \"sets out one or more elements of the offense in the alternative -- for example, stating that burglary involves entry into a building or an automobile\"","sentence":"Descamps, 133 S.Ct. at 2281 (explaining that a divisible statute \u201csets out one or more elements of the offense in the alternative \u2014 for example, stating that burglary involves entry into a building or an automobile\u201d): accord Howard, 742 F.3d at 1348; cf. Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602, 110 S.Ct. 2143 (explaining that \u201c[f]or example, in a State whose burglary statutes include entry of an automobile as well as a building, ... then the Government should be allowed to use the conviction for enhancement\u201d if it can present appropriate documents showing that the defendant was charged with, and necessarily found guilty of, burglary of a building rather than burglary of an automobile)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"explaining that \"[f]or example, in a State whose burglary statutes include entry of an automobile as well as a building, ... then the Government should be allowed to use the conviction for enhancement\" if it can present appropriate documents showing that the defendant was charged with, and necessarily found guilty of, burglary of a building rather than burglary of an automobile","sentence":"Descamps, 133 S.Ct. at 2281 (explaining that a divisible statute \u201csets out one or more elements of the offense in the alternative \u2014 for example, stating that burglary involves entry into a building or an automobile\u201d): accord Howard, 742 F.3d at 1348; cf. Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602, 110 S.Ct. 2143 (explaining that \u201c[f]or example, in a State whose burglary statutes include entry of an automobile as well as a building, ... then the Government should be allowed to use the conviction for enhancement\u201d if it can present appropriate documents showing that the defendant was charged with, and necessarily found guilty of, burglary of a building rather than burglary of an automobile)."},"case_id":4341809,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The right of access to the courts, if it has constitutional grounding, probably stems from the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process or Equal Protection Clauses. A liberal reading of Boswell's complaint uncovers another claim, however -- that of a First Amendment violation of the sort prohibited by this court's Muhammad opinion.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"87 F.3d 174, 174","parenthetical":"recognizing a First Amendment right to receive mail, subject to uniform policies of opening mail to ensure prison security","sentence":"See Muhammad, 35 F.3d at 1085 (\u201c[T]he conduct that is challenged in the present case ... burdens Plaintiffs First Amendment rights.\u201d); see also Kensu, 87 F.3d at 174 (recognizing a First Amendment right to receive mail, subject to uniform policies of opening mail to ensure prison security)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"35 F.3d 1085, 1085","parenthetical":"\"[T]he conduct that is challenged in the present case ... burdens Plaintiffs First Amendment rights.\"","sentence":"See Muhammad, 35 F.3d at 1085 (\u201c[T]he conduct that is challenged in the present case ... burdens Plaintiffs First Amendment rights.\u201d); see also Kensu, 87 F.3d at 174 (recognizing a First Amendment right to receive mail, subject to uniform policies of opening mail to ensure prison security)."},"case_id":11760328,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The right of access to the courts, if it has constitutional grounding, probably stems from the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process or Equal Protection Clauses. A liberal reading of Boswell's complaint uncovers another claim, however -- that of a First Amendment violation of the sort prohibited by this court's Muhammad opinion.","citation_a":{"signal":"but cf.","identifier":"418 U.S. 575, 575","parenthetical":"\"[Tjhis Court has not yet recognized First Amendment rights of prisoners in this context [of opening mail from attorneys].\"","sentence":"But cf. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 575, 94 S.Ct. 2963 (\u201c[Tjhis Court has not yet recognized First Amendment rights of prisoners in this context [of opening mail from attorneys].\u201d) (citations omitted)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"35 F.3d 1085, 1085","parenthetical":"\"[T]he conduct that is challenged in the present case ... burdens Plaintiffs First Amendment rights.\"","sentence":"See Muhammad, 35 F.3d at 1085 (\u201c[T]he conduct that is challenged in the present case ... burdens Plaintiffs First Amendment rights.\u201d); see also Kensu, 87 F.3d at 174 (recognizing a First Amendment right to receive mail, subject to uniform policies of opening mail to ensure prison security)."},"case_id":11760328,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The right of access to the courts, if it has constitutional grounding, probably stems from the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process or Equal Protection Clauses. A liberal reading of Boswell's complaint uncovers another claim, however -- that of a First Amendment violation of the sort prohibited by this court's Muhammad opinion.","citation_a":{"signal":"but cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[Tjhis Court has not yet recognized First Amendment rights of prisoners in this context [of opening mail from attorneys].\"","sentence":"But cf. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 575, 94 S.Ct. 2963 (\u201c[Tjhis Court has not yet recognized First Amendment rights of prisoners in this context [of opening mail from attorneys].\u201d) (citations omitted)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"35 F.3d 1085, 1085","parenthetical":"\"[T]he conduct that is challenged in the present case ... burdens Plaintiffs First Amendment rights.\"","sentence":"See Muhammad, 35 F.3d at 1085 (\u201c[T]he conduct that is challenged in the present case ... burdens Plaintiffs First Amendment rights.\u201d); see also Kensu, 87 F.3d at 174 (recognizing a First Amendment right to receive mail, subject to uniform policies of opening mail to ensure prison security)."},"case_id":11760328,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The right of access to the courts, if it has constitutional grounding, probably stems from the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process or Equal Protection Clauses. A liberal reading of Boswell's complaint uncovers another claim, however -- that of a First Amendment violation of the sort prohibited by this court's Muhammad opinion.","citation_a":{"signal":"but cf.","identifier":"418 U.S. 575, 575","parenthetical":"\"[Tjhis Court has not yet recognized First Amendment rights of prisoners in this context [of opening mail from attorneys].\"","sentence":"But cf. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 575, 94 S.Ct. 2963 (\u201c[Tjhis Court has not yet recognized First Amendment rights of prisoners in this context [of opening mail from attorneys].\u201d) (citations omitted)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"87 F.3d 174, 174","parenthetical":"recognizing a First Amendment right to receive mail, subject to uniform policies of opening mail to ensure prison security","sentence":"See Muhammad, 35 F.3d at 1085 (\u201c[T]he conduct that is challenged in the present case ... burdens Plaintiffs First Amendment rights.\u201d); see also Kensu, 87 F.3d at 174 (recognizing a First Amendment right to receive mail, subject to uniform policies of opening mail to ensure prison security)."},"case_id":11760328,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The right of access to the courts, if it has constitutional grounding, probably stems from the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process or Equal Protection Clauses. A liberal reading of Boswell's complaint uncovers another claim, however -- that of a First Amendment violation of the sort prohibited by this court's Muhammad opinion.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"87 F.3d 174, 174","parenthetical":"recognizing a First Amendment right to receive mail, subject to uniform policies of opening mail to ensure prison security","sentence":"See Muhammad, 35 F.3d at 1085 (\u201c[T]he conduct that is challenged in the present case ... burdens Plaintiffs First Amendment rights.\u201d); see also Kensu, 87 F.3d at 174 (recognizing a First Amendment right to receive mail, subject to uniform policies of opening mail to ensure prison security)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[Tjhis Court has not yet recognized First Amendment rights of prisoners in this context [of opening mail from attorneys].\"","sentence":"But cf. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 575, 94 S.Ct. 2963 (\u201c[Tjhis Court has not yet recognized First Amendment rights of prisoners in this context [of opening mail from attorneys].\u201d) (citations omitted)."},"case_id":11760328,"label":"a"}
{"context":"As noted above, where the ultimate fact yielded by the impermissible presumption remained as a contested issue in the case, the Sand-strom error will still be deemed harmless if the evidence produced at trial as to that ultimate fact was overwhelming. When that is the case, the error is harmless because the jury would have found it unnecessary to rely on the invalid presumption; the predicate facts of the crime are such that we can say beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have inferred intent from these facts.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"819 F.2d 988, 995","parenthetical":"after repeatedly telling victim that he was about to die, defendant ordered victim to lie on ground and then shot him","sentence":"See, e.g., High v. Kemp, 819 F.2d 988, 995 (11th Cir.1987) (after repeatedly telling victim that he was about to die, defendant ordered victim to lie on ground and then shot him); Potts v. Kemp, 814 F.2d 1512, 1515-16 (11th Cir.1987) (defendant drove victim to dirt road, forced him out of car, and then shot him); Burger v. Kemp, 785 F.2d 890, 892 (11th Cir.1986) (defendant locked victim in car trunk and then submerged car in pond), aff'd, \u2014 U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 3114, 97 L.Ed.2d 638 (1987); Dobbs v. Kemp, 790 F.2d 1499, 1509 (11th Cir.1986) (defendant ordered victim to lie on floor and then shot him in stomach), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 2203, 95 L.Ed.2d 858 (1987); Tucker v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 1496, 1502-03 (11th Cir.1985) (en banc) (victim died of one crushing blow to skull), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 106 S.Ct. 3340, 92 L.Ed.2d 743 (1986); cf. Francis v. Franklin, 720 F.2d 1206, 1212 (11th Cir.1983) (evidence of intent not so overwhelming as to render Sandstrom error harmless where defendant\u2019s gun went off after victim slammed door into it), aff'd, 471 U.S. 307, 105 S.Ct. 1965, 85 L.Ed.2d 344 (1985)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"720 F.2d 1206, 1212","parenthetical":"evidence of intent not so overwhelming as to render Sandstrom error harmless where defendant's gun went off after victim slammed door into it","sentence":"See, e.g., High v. Kemp, 819 F.2d 988, 995 (11th Cir.1987) (after repeatedly telling victim that he was about to die, defendant ordered victim to lie on ground and then shot him); Potts v. Kemp, 814 F.2d 1512, 1515-16 (11th Cir.1987) (defendant drove victim to dirt road, forced him out of car, and then shot him); Burger v. Kemp, 785 F.2d 890, 892 (11th Cir.1986) (defendant locked victim in car trunk and then submerged car in pond), aff'd, \u2014 U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 3114, 97 L.Ed.2d 638 (1987); Dobbs v. Kemp, 790 F.2d 1499, 1509 (11th Cir.1986) (defendant ordered victim to lie on floor and then shot him in stomach), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 2203, 95 L.Ed.2d 858 (1987); Tucker v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 1496, 1502-03 (11th Cir.1985) (en banc) (victim died of one crushing blow to skull), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 106 S.Ct. 3340, 92 L.Ed.2d 743 (1986); cf. Francis v. Franklin, 720 F.2d 1206, 1212 (11th Cir.1983) (evidence of intent not so overwhelming as to render Sandstrom error harmless where defendant\u2019s gun went off after victim slammed door into it), aff'd, 471 U.S. 307, 105 S.Ct. 1965, 85 L.Ed.2d 344 (1985)."},"case_id":1788495,"label":"a"}
{"context":"As noted above, where the ultimate fact yielded by the impermissible presumption remained as a contested issue in the case, the Sand-strom error will still be deemed harmless if the evidence produced at trial as to that ultimate fact was overwhelming. When that is the case, the error is harmless because the jury would have found it unnecessary to rely on the invalid presumption; the predicate facts of the crime are such that we can say beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have inferred intent from these facts.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"819 F.2d 988, 995","parenthetical":"after repeatedly telling victim that he was about to die, defendant ordered victim to lie on ground and then shot him","sentence":"See, e.g., High v. Kemp, 819 F.2d 988, 995 (11th Cir.1987) (after repeatedly telling victim that he was about to die, defendant ordered victim to lie on ground and then shot him); Potts v. Kemp, 814 F.2d 1512, 1515-16 (11th Cir.1987) (defendant drove victim to dirt road, forced him out of car, and then shot him); Burger v. Kemp, 785 F.2d 890, 892 (11th Cir.1986) (defendant locked victim in car trunk and then submerged car in pond), aff'd, \u2014 U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 3114, 97 L.Ed.2d 638 (1987); Dobbs v. Kemp, 790 F.2d 1499, 1509 (11th Cir.1986) (defendant ordered victim to lie on floor and then shot him in stomach), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 2203, 95 L.Ed.2d 858 (1987); Tucker v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 1496, 1502-03 (11th Cir.1985) (en banc) (victim died of one crushing blow to skull), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 106 S.Ct. 3340, 92 L.Ed.2d 743 (1986); cf. Francis v. Franklin, 720 F.2d 1206, 1212 (11th Cir.1983) (evidence of intent not so overwhelming as to render Sandstrom error harmless where defendant\u2019s gun went off after victim slammed door into it), aff'd, 471 U.S. 307, 105 S.Ct. 1965, 85 L.Ed.2d 344 (1985)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"evidence of intent not so overwhelming as to render Sandstrom error harmless where defendant's gun went off after victim slammed door into it","sentence":"See, e.g., High v. Kemp, 819 F.2d 988, 995 (11th Cir.1987) (after repeatedly telling victim that he was about to die, defendant ordered victim to lie on ground and then shot him); Potts v. Kemp, 814 F.2d 1512, 1515-16 (11th Cir.1987) (defendant drove victim to dirt road, forced him out of car, and then shot him); Burger v. Kemp, 785 F.2d 890, 892 (11th Cir.1986) (defendant locked victim in car trunk and then submerged car in pond), aff'd, \u2014 U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 3114, 97 L.Ed.2d 638 (1987); Dobbs v. Kemp, 790 F.2d 1499, 1509 (11th Cir.1986) (defendant ordered victim to lie on floor and then shot him in stomach), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 2203, 95 L.Ed.2d 858 (1987); Tucker v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 1496, 1502-03 (11th Cir.1985) (en banc) (victim died of one crushing blow to skull), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 106 S.Ct. 3340, 92 L.Ed.2d 743 (1986); cf. Francis v. Franklin, 720 F.2d 1206, 1212 (11th Cir.1983) (evidence of intent not so overwhelming as to render Sandstrom error harmless where defendant\u2019s gun went off after victim slammed door into it), aff'd, 471 U.S. 307, 105 S.Ct. 1965, 85 L.Ed.2d 344 (1985)."},"case_id":1788495,"label":"a"}
{"context":"As noted above, where the ultimate fact yielded by the impermissible presumption remained as a contested issue in the case, the Sand-strom error will still be deemed harmless if the evidence produced at trial as to that ultimate fact was overwhelming. When that is the case, the error is harmless because the jury would have found it unnecessary to rely on the invalid presumption; the predicate facts of the crime are such that we can say beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have inferred intent from these facts.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"evidence of intent not so overwhelming as to render Sandstrom error harmless where defendant's gun went off after victim slammed door into it","sentence":"See, e.g., High v. Kemp, 819 F.2d 988, 995 (11th Cir.1987) (after repeatedly telling victim that he was about to die, defendant ordered victim to lie on ground and then shot him); Potts v. Kemp, 814 F.2d 1512, 1515-16 (11th Cir.1987) (defendant drove victim to dirt road, forced him out of car, and then shot him); Burger v. Kemp, 785 F.2d 890, 892 (11th Cir.1986) (defendant locked victim in car trunk and then submerged car in pond), aff'd, \u2014 U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 3114, 97 L.Ed.2d 638 (1987); Dobbs v. Kemp, 790 F.2d 1499, 1509 (11th Cir.1986) (defendant ordered victim to lie on floor and then shot him in stomach), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 2203, 95 L.Ed.2d 858 (1987); Tucker v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 1496, 1502-03 (11th Cir.1985) (en banc) (victim died of one crushing blow to skull), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 106 S.Ct. 3340, 92 L.Ed.2d 743 (1986); cf. Francis v. Franklin, 720 F.2d 1206, 1212 (11th Cir.1983) (evidence of intent not so overwhelming as to render Sandstrom error harmless where defendant\u2019s gun went off after victim slammed door into it), aff'd, 471 U.S. 307, 105 S.Ct. 1965, 85 L.Ed.2d 344 (1985)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"819 F.2d 988, 995","parenthetical":"after repeatedly telling victim that he was about to die, defendant ordered victim to lie on ground and then shot him","sentence":"See, e.g., High v. Kemp, 819 F.2d 988, 995 (11th Cir.1987) (after repeatedly telling victim that he was about to die, defendant ordered victim to lie on ground and then shot him); Potts v. Kemp, 814 F.2d 1512, 1515-16 (11th Cir.1987) (defendant drove victim to dirt road, forced him out of car, and then shot him); Burger v. Kemp, 785 F.2d 890, 892 (11th Cir.1986) (defendant locked victim in car trunk and then submerged car in pond), aff'd, \u2014 U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 3114, 97 L.Ed.2d 638 (1987); Dobbs v. Kemp, 790 F.2d 1499, 1509 (11th Cir.1986) (defendant ordered victim to lie on floor and then shot him in stomach), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 2203, 95 L.Ed.2d 858 (1987); Tucker v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 1496, 1502-03 (11th Cir.1985) (en banc) (victim died of one crushing blow to skull), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 106 S.Ct. 3340, 92 L.Ed.2d 743 (1986); cf. Francis v. Franklin, 720 F.2d 1206, 1212 (11th Cir.1983) (evidence of intent not so overwhelming as to render Sandstrom error harmless where defendant\u2019s gun went off after victim slammed door into it), aff'd, 471 U.S. 307, 105 S.Ct. 1965, 85 L.Ed.2d 344 (1985)."},"case_id":1788495,"label":"b"}
{"context":"As noted above, where the ultimate fact yielded by the impermissible presumption remained as a contested issue in the case, the Sand-strom error will still be deemed harmless if the evidence produced at trial as to that ultimate fact was overwhelming. When that is the case, the error is harmless because the jury would have found it unnecessary to rely on the invalid presumption; the predicate facts of the crime are such that we can say beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have inferred intent from these facts.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"evidence of intent not so overwhelming as to render Sandstrom error harmless where defendant's gun went off after victim slammed door into it","sentence":"See, e.g., High v. Kemp, 819 F.2d 988, 995 (11th Cir.1987) (after repeatedly telling victim that he was about to die, defendant ordered victim to lie on ground and then shot him); Potts v. Kemp, 814 F.2d 1512, 1515-16 (11th Cir.1987) (defendant drove victim to dirt road, forced him out of car, and then shot him); Burger v. Kemp, 785 F.2d 890, 892 (11th Cir.1986) (defendant locked victim in car trunk and then submerged car in pond), aff'd, \u2014 U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 3114, 97 L.Ed.2d 638 (1987); Dobbs v. Kemp, 790 F.2d 1499, 1509 (11th Cir.1986) (defendant ordered victim to lie on floor and then shot him in stomach), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 2203, 95 L.Ed.2d 858 (1987); Tucker v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 1496, 1502-03 (11th Cir.1985) (en banc) (victim died of one crushing blow to skull), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 106 S.Ct. 3340, 92 L.Ed.2d 743 (1986); cf. Francis v. Franklin, 720 F.2d 1206, 1212 (11th Cir.1983) (evidence of intent not so overwhelming as to render Sandstrom error harmless where defendant\u2019s gun went off after victim slammed door into it), aff'd, 471 U.S. 307, 105 S.Ct. 1965, 85 L.Ed.2d 344 (1985)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"819 F.2d 988, 995","parenthetical":"after repeatedly telling victim that he was about to die, defendant ordered victim to lie on ground and then shot him","sentence":"See, e.g., High v. Kemp, 819 F.2d 988, 995 (11th Cir.1987) (after repeatedly telling victim that he was about to die, defendant ordered victim to lie on ground and then shot him); Potts v. Kemp, 814 F.2d 1512, 1515-16 (11th Cir.1987) (defendant drove victim to dirt road, forced him out of car, and then shot him); Burger v. Kemp, 785 F.2d 890, 892 (11th Cir.1986) (defendant locked victim in car trunk and then submerged car in pond), aff'd, \u2014 U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 3114, 97 L.Ed.2d 638 (1987); Dobbs v. Kemp, 790 F.2d 1499, 1509 (11th Cir.1986) (defendant ordered victim to lie on floor and then shot him in stomach), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 2203, 95 L.Ed.2d 858 (1987); Tucker v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 1496, 1502-03 (11th Cir.1985) (en banc) (victim died of one crushing blow to skull), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 106 S.Ct. 3340, 92 L.Ed.2d 743 (1986); cf. Francis v. Franklin, 720 F.2d 1206, 1212 (11th Cir.1983) (evidence of intent not so overwhelming as to render Sandstrom error harmless where defendant\u2019s gun went off after victim slammed door into it), aff'd, 471 U.S. 307, 105 S.Ct. 1965, 85 L.Ed.2d 344 (1985)."},"case_id":1788495,"label":"b"}
{"context":"As noted above, where the ultimate fact yielded by the impermissible presumption remained as a contested issue in the case, the Sand-strom error will still be deemed harmless if the evidence produced at trial as to that ultimate fact was overwhelming. When that is the case, the error is harmless because the jury would have found it unnecessary to rely on the invalid presumption; the predicate facts of the crime are such that we can say beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have inferred intent from these facts.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"720 F.2d 1206, 1212","parenthetical":"evidence of intent not so overwhelming as to render Sandstrom error harmless where defendant's gun went off after victim slammed door into it","sentence":"See, e.g., High v. Kemp, 819 F.2d 988, 995 (11th Cir.1987) (after repeatedly telling victim that he was about to die, defendant ordered victim to lie on ground and then shot him); Potts v. Kemp, 814 F.2d 1512, 1515-16 (11th Cir.1987) (defendant drove victim to dirt road, forced him out of car, and then shot him); Burger v. Kemp, 785 F.2d 890, 892 (11th Cir.1986) (defendant locked victim in car trunk and then submerged car in pond), aff'd, \u2014 U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 3114, 97 L.Ed.2d 638 (1987); Dobbs v. Kemp, 790 F.2d 1499, 1509 (11th Cir.1986) (defendant ordered victim to lie on floor and then shot him in stomach), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 2203, 95 L.Ed.2d 858 (1987); Tucker v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 1496, 1502-03 (11th Cir.1985) (en banc) (victim died of one crushing blow to skull), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 106 S.Ct. 3340, 92 L.Ed.2d 743 (1986); cf. Francis v. Franklin, 720 F.2d 1206, 1212 (11th Cir.1983) (evidence of intent not so overwhelming as to render Sandstrom error harmless where defendant\u2019s gun went off after victim slammed door into it), aff'd, 471 U.S. 307, 105 S.Ct. 1965, 85 L.Ed.2d 344 (1985)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"814 F.2d 1512, 1515-16","parenthetical":"defendant drove victim to dirt road, forced him out of car, and then shot him","sentence":"See, e.g., High v. Kemp, 819 F.2d 988, 995 (11th Cir.1987) (after repeatedly telling victim that he was about to die, defendant ordered victim to lie on ground and then shot him); Potts v. Kemp, 814 F.2d 1512, 1515-16 (11th Cir.1987) (defendant drove victim to dirt road, forced him out of car, and then shot him); Burger v. Kemp, 785 F.2d 890, 892 (11th Cir.1986) (defendant locked victim in car trunk and then submerged car in pond), aff'd, \u2014 U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 3114, 97 L.Ed.2d 638 (1987); Dobbs v. Kemp, 790 F.2d 1499, 1509 (11th Cir.1986) (defendant ordered victim to lie on floor and then shot him in stomach), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 2203, 95 L.Ed.2d 858 (1987); Tucker v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 1496, 1502-03 (11th Cir.1985) (en banc) (victim died of one crushing blow to skull), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 106 S.Ct. 3340, 92 L.Ed.2d 743 (1986); cf. Francis v. Franklin, 720 F.2d 1206, 1212 (11th Cir.1983) (evidence of intent not so overwhelming as to render Sandstrom error harmless where defendant\u2019s gun went off after victim slammed door into it), aff'd, 471 U.S. 307, 105 S.Ct. 1965, 85 L.Ed.2d 344 (1985)."},"case_id":1788495,"label":"b"}
{"context":"As noted above, where the ultimate fact yielded by the impermissible presumption remained as a contested issue in the case, the Sand-strom error will still be deemed harmless if the evidence produced at trial as to that ultimate fact was overwhelming. When that is the case, the error is harmless because the jury would have found it unnecessary to rely on the invalid presumption; the predicate facts of the crime are such that we can say beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have inferred intent from these facts.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"evidence of intent not so overwhelming as to render Sandstrom error harmless where defendant's gun went off after victim slammed door into it","sentence":"See, e.g., High v. Kemp, 819 F.2d 988, 995 (11th Cir.1987) (after repeatedly telling victim that he was about to die, defendant ordered victim to lie on ground and then shot him); Potts v. Kemp, 814 F.2d 1512, 1515-16 (11th Cir.1987) (defendant drove victim to dirt road, forced him out of car, and then shot him); Burger v. Kemp, 785 F.2d 890, 892 (11th Cir.1986) (defendant locked victim in car trunk and then submerged car in pond), aff'd, \u2014 U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 3114, 97 L.Ed.2d 638 (1987); Dobbs v. Kemp, 790 F.2d 1499, 1509 (11th Cir.1986) (defendant ordered victim to lie on floor and then shot him in stomach), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 2203, 95 L.Ed.2d 858 (1987); Tucker v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 1496, 1502-03 (11th Cir.1985) (en banc) (victim died of one crushing blow to skull), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 106 S.Ct. 3340, 92 L.Ed.2d 743 (1986); cf. Francis v. Franklin, 720 F.2d 1206, 1212 (11th Cir.1983) (evidence of intent not so overwhelming as to render Sandstrom error harmless where defendant\u2019s gun went off after victim slammed door into it), aff'd, 471 U.S. 307, 105 S.Ct. 1965, 85 L.Ed.2d 344 (1985)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"814 F.2d 1512, 1515-16","parenthetical":"defendant drove victim to dirt road, forced him out of car, and then shot him","sentence":"See, e.g., High v. Kemp, 819 F.2d 988, 995 (11th Cir.1987) (after repeatedly telling victim that he was about to die, defendant ordered victim to lie on ground and then shot him); Potts v. Kemp, 814 F.2d 1512, 1515-16 (11th Cir.1987) (defendant drove victim to dirt road, forced him out of car, and then shot him); Burger v. Kemp, 785 F.2d 890, 892 (11th Cir.1986) (defendant locked victim in car trunk and then submerged car in pond), aff'd, \u2014 U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 3114, 97 L.Ed.2d 638 (1987); Dobbs v. Kemp, 790 F.2d 1499, 1509 (11th Cir.1986) (defendant ordered victim to lie on floor and then shot him in stomach), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 2203, 95 L.Ed.2d 858 (1987); Tucker v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 1496, 1502-03 (11th Cir.1985) (en banc) (victim died of one crushing blow to skull), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 106 S.Ct. 3340, 92 L.Ed.2d 743 (1986); cf. Francis v. Franklin, 720 F.2d 1206, 1212 (11th Cir.1983) (evidence of intent not so overwhelming as to render Sandstrom error harmless where defendant\u2019s gun went off after victim slammed door into it), aff'd, 471 U.S. 307, 105 S.Ct. 1965, 85 L.Ed.2d 344 (1985)."},"case_id":1788495,"label":"b"}
{"context":"As noted above, where the ultimate fact yielded by the impermissible presumption remained as a contested issue in the case, the Sand-strom error will still be deemed harmless if the evidence produced at trial as to that ultimate fact was overwhelming. When that is the case, the error is harmless because the jury would have found it unnecessary to rely on the invalid presumption; the predicate facts of the crime are such that we can say beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have inferred intent from these facts.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"814 F.2d 1512, 1515-16","parenthetical":"defendant drove victim to dirt road, forced him out of car, and then shot him","sentence":"See, e.g., High v. Kemp, 819 F.2d 988, 995 (11th Cir.1987) (after repeatedly telling victim that he was about to die, defendant ordered victim to lie on ground and then shot him); Potts v. Kemp, 814 F.2d 1512, 1515-16 (11th Cir.1987) (defendant drove victim to dirt road, forced him out of car, and then shot him); Burger v. Kemp, 785 F.2d 890, 892 (11th Cir.1986) (defendant locked victim in car trunk and then submerged car in pond), aff'd, \u2014 U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 3114, 97 L.Ed.2d 638 (1987); Dobbs v. Kemp, 790 F.2d 1499, 1509 (11th Cir.1986) (defendant ordered victim to lie on floor and then shot him in stomach), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 2203, 95 L.Ed.2d 858 (1987); Tucker v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 1496, 1502-03 (11th Cir.1985) (en banc) (victim died of one crushing blow to skull), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 106 S.Ct. 3340, 92 L.Ed.2d 743 (1986); cf. Francis v. Franklin, 720 F.2d 1206, 1212 (11th Cir.1983) (evidence of intent not so overwhelming as to render Sandstrom error harmless where defendant\u2019s gun went off after victim slammed door into it), aff'd, 471 U.S. 307, 105 S.Ct. 1965, 85 L.Ed.2d 344 (1985)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"evidence of intent not so overwhelming as to render Sandstrom error harmless where defendant's gun went off after victim slammed door into it","sentence":"See, e.g., High v. Kemp, 819 F.2d 988, 995 (11th Cir.1987) (after repeatedly telling victim that he was about to die, defendant ordered victim to lie on ground and then shot him); Potts v. Kemp, 814 F.2d 1512, 1515-16 (11th Cir.1987) (defendant drove victim to dirt road, forced him out of car, and then shot him); Burger v. Kemp, 785 F.2d 890, 892 (11th Cir.1986) (defendant locked victim in car trunk and then submerged car in pond), aff'd, \u2014 U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 3114, 97 L.Ed.2d 638 (1987); Dobbs v. Kemp, 790 F.2d 1499, 1509 (11th Cir.1986) (defendant ordered victim to lie on floor and then shot him in stomach), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 2203, 95 L.Ed.2d 858 (1987); Tucker v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 1496, 1502-03 (11th Cir.1985) (en banc) (victim died of one crushing blow to skull), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 106 S.Ct. 3340, 92 L.Ed.2d 743 (1986); cf. Francis v. Franklin, 720 F.2d 1206, 1212 (11th Cir.1983) (evidence of intent not so overwhelming as to render Sandstrom error harmless where defendant\u2019s gun went off after victim slammed door into it), aff'd, 471 U.S. 307, 105 S.Ct. 1965, 85 L.Ed.2d 344 (1985)."},"case_id":1788495,"label":"a"}
{"context":"As noted above, where the ultimate fact yielded by the impermissible presumption remained as a contested issue in the case, the Sand-strom error will still be deemed harmless if the evidence produced at trial as to that ultimate fact was overwhelming. When that is the case, the error is harmless because the jury would have found it unnecessary to rely on the invalid presumption; the predicate facts of the crime are such that we can say beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have inferred intent from these facts.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"814 F.2d 1512, 1515-16","parenthetical":"defendant drove victim to dirt road, forced him out of car, and then shot him","sentence":"See, e.g., High v. Kemp, 819 F.2d 988, 995 (11th Cir.1987) (after repeatedly telling victim that he was about to die, defendant ordered victim to lie on ground and then shot him); Potts v. Kemp, 814 F.2d 1512, 1515-16 (11th Cir.1987) (defendant drove victim to dirt road, forced him out of car, and then shot him); Burger v. Kemp, 785 F.2d 890, 892 (11th Cir.1986) (defendant locked victim in car trunk and then submerged car in pond), aff'd, \u2014 U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 3114, 97 L.Ed.2d 638 (1987); Dobbs v. Kemp, 790 F.2d 1499, 1509 (11th Cir.1986) (defendant ordered victim to lie on floor and then shot him in stomach), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 2203, 95 L.Ed.2d 858 (1987); Tucker v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 1496, 1502-03 (11th Cir.1985) (en banc) (victim died of one crushing blow to skull), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 106 S.Ct. 3340, 92 L.Ed.2d 743 (1986); cf. Francis v. Franklin, 720 F.2d 1206, 1212 (11th Cir.1983) (evidence of intent not so overwhelming as to render Sandstrom error harmless where defendant\u2019s gun went off after victim slammed door into it), aff'd, 471 U.S. 307, 105 S.Ct. 1965, 85 L.Ed.2d 344 (1985)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"evidence of intent not so overwhelming as to render Sandstrom error harmless where defendant's gun went off after victim slammed door into it","sentence":"See, e.g., High v. Kemp, 819 F.2d 988, 995 (11th Cir.1987) (after repeatedly telling victim that he was about to die, defendant ordered victim to lie on ground and then shot him); Potts v. Kemp, 814 F.2d 1512, 1515-16 (11th Cir.1987) (defendant drove victim to dirt road, forced him out of car, and then shot him); Burger v. Kemp, 785 F.2d 890, 892 (11th Cir.1986) (defendant locked victim in car trunk and then submerged car in pond), aff'd, \u2014 U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 3114, 97 L.Ed.2d 638 (1987); Dobbs v. Kemp, 790 F.2d 1499, 1509 (11th Cir.1986) (defendant ordered victim to lie on floor and then shot him in stomach), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 2203, 95 L.Ed.2d 858 (1987); Tucker v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 1496, 1502-03 (11th Cir.1985) (en banc) (victim died of one crushing blow to skull), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 106 S.Ct. 3340, 92 L.Ed.2d 743 (1986); cf. Francis v. Franklin, 720 F.2d 1206, 1212 (11th Cir.1983) (evidence of intent not so overwhelming as to render Sandstrom error harmless where defendant\u2019s gun went off after victim slammed door into it), aff'd, 471 U.S. 307, 105 S.Ct. 1965, 85 L.Ed.2d 344 (1985)."},"case_id":1788495,"label":"a"}
{"context":"As noted above, where the ultimate fact yielded by the impermissible presumption remained as a contested issue in the case, the Sand-strom error will still be deemed harmless if the evidence produced at trial as to that ultimate fact was overwhelming. When that is the case, the error is harmless because the jury would have found it unnecessary to rely on the invalid presumption; the predicate facts of the crime are such that we can say beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have inferred intent from these facts.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"785 F.2d 890, 892","parenthetical":"defendant locked victim in car trunk and then submerged car in pond","sentence":"See, e.g., High v. Kemp, 819 F.2d 988, 995 (11th Cir.1987) (after repeatedly telling victim that he was about to die, defendant ordered victim to lie on ground and then shot him); Potts v. Kemp, 814 F.2d 1512, 1515-16 (11th Cir.1987) (defendant drove victim to dirt road, forced him out of car, and then shot him); Burger v. Kemp, 785 F.2d 890, 892 (11th Cir.1986) (defendant locked victim in car trunk and then submerged car in pond), aff'd, \u2014 U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 3114, 97 L.Ed.2d 638 (1987); Dobbs v. Kemp, 790 F.2d 1499, 1509 (11th Cir.1986) (defendant ordered victim to lie on floor and then shot him in stomach), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 2203, 95 L.Ed.2d 858 (1987); Tucker v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 1496, 1502-03 (11th Cir.1985) (en banc) (victim died of one crushing blow to skull), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 106 S.Ct. 3340, 92 L.Ed.2d 743 (1986); cf. Francis v. Franklin, 720 F.2d 1206, 1212 (11th Cir.1983) (evidence of intent not so overwhelming as to render Sandstrom error harmless where defendant\u2019s gun went off after victim slammed door into it), aff'd, 471 U.S. 307, 105 S.Ct. 1965, 85 L.Ed.2d 344 (1985)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"720 F.2d 1206, 1212","parenthetical":"evidence of intent not so overwhelming as to render Sandstrom error harmless where defendant's gun went off after victim slammed door into it","sentence":"See, e.g., High v. Kemp, 819 F.2d 988, 995 (11th Cir.1987) (after repeatedly telling victim that he was about to die, defendant ordered victim to lie on ground and then shot him); Potts v. Kemp, 814 F.2d 1512, 1515-16 (11th Cir.1987) (defendant drove victim to dirt road, forced him out of car, and then shot him); Burger v. Kemp, 785 F.2d 890, 892 (11th Cir.1986) (defendant locked victim in car trunk and then submerged car in pond), aff'd, \u2014 U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 3114, 97 L.Ed.2d 638 (1987); Dobbs v. Kemp, 790 F.2d 1499, 1509 (11th Cir.1986) (defendant ordered victim to lie on floor and then shot him in stomach), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 2203, 95 L.Ed.2d 858 (1987); Tucker v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 1496, 1502-03 (11th Cir.1985) (en banc) (victim died of one crushing blow to skull), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 106 S.Ct. 3340, 92 L.Ed.2d 743 (1986); cf. Francis v. Franklin, 720 F.2d 1206, 1212 (11th Cir.1983) (evidence of intent not so overwhelming as to render Sandstrom error harmless where defendant\u2019s gun went off after victim slammed door into it), aff'd, 471 U.S. 307, 105 S.Ct. 1965, 85 L.Ed.2d 344 (1985)."},"case_id":1788495,"label":"a"}
{"context":"As noted above, where the ultimate fact yielded by the impermissible presumption remained as a contested issue in the case, the Sand-strom error will still be deemed harmless if the evidence produced at trial as to that ultimate fact was overwhelming. When that is the case, the error is harmless because the jury would have found it unnecessary to rely on the invalid presumption; the predicate facts of the crime are such that we can say beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have inferred intent from these facts.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"785 F.2d 890, 892","parenthetical":"defendant locked victim in car trunk and then submerged car in pond","sentence":"See, e.g., High v. Kemp, 819 F.2d 988, 995 (11th Cir.1987) (after repeatedly telling victim that he was about to die, defendant ordered victim to lie on ground and then shot him); Potts v. Kemp, 814 F.2d 1512, 1515-16 (11th Cir.1987) (defendant drove victim to dirt road, forced him out of car, and then shot him); Burger v. Kemp, 785 F.2d 890, 892 (11th Cir.1986) (defendant locked victim in car trunk and then submerged car in pond), aff'd, \u2014 U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 3114, 97 L.Ed.2d 638 (1987); Dobbs v. Kemp, 790 F.2d 1499, 1509 (11th Cir.1986) (defendant ordered victim to lie on floor and then shot him in stomach), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 2203, 95 L.Ed.2d 858 (1987); Tucker v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 1496, 1502-03 (11th Cir.1985) (en banc) (victim died of one crushing blow to skull), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 106 S.Ct. 3340, 92 L.Ed.2d 743 (1986); cf. Francis v. Franklin, 720 F.2d 1206, 1212 (11th Cir.1983) (evidence of intent not so overwhelming as to render Sandstrom error harmless where defendant\u2019s gun went off after victim slammed door into it), aff'd, 471 U.S. 307, 105 S.Ct. 1965, 85 L.Ed.2d 344 (1985)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"evidence of intent not so overwhelming as to render Sandstrom error harmless where defendant's gun went off after victim slammed door into it","sentence":"See, e.g., High v. Kemp, 819 F.2d 988, 995 (11th Cir.1987) (after repeatedly telling victim that he was about to die, defendant ordered victim to lie on ground and then shot him); Potts v. Kemp, 814 F.2d 1512, 1515-16 (11th Cir.1987) (defendant drove victim to dirt road, forced him out of car, and then shot him); Burger v. Kemp, 785 F.2d 890, 892 (11th Cir.1986) (defendant locked victim in car trunk and then submerged car in pond), aff'd, \u2014 U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 3114, 97 L.Ed.2d 638 (1987); Dobbs v. Kemp, 790 F.2d 1499, 1509 (11th Cir.1986) (defendant ordered victim to lie on floor and then shot him in stomach), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 2203, 95 L.Ed.2d 858 (1987); Tucker v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 1496, 1502-03 (11th Cir.1985) (en banc) (victim died of one crushing blow to skull), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 106 S.Ct. 3340, 92 L.Ed.2d 743 (1986); cf. Francis v. Franklin, 720 F.2d 1206, 1212 (11th Cir.1983) (evidence of intent not so overwhelming as to render Sandstrom error harmless where defendant\u2019s gun went off after victim slammed door into it), aff'd, 471 U.S. 307, 105 S.Ct. 1965, 85 L.Ed.2d 344 (1985)."},"case_id":1788495,"label":"a"}
{"context":"As noted above, where the ultimate fact yielded by the impermissible presumption remained as a contested issue in the case, the Sand-strom error will still be deemed harmless if the evidence produced at trial as to that ultimate fact was overwhelming. When that is the case, the error is harmless because the jury would have found it unnecessary to rely on the invalid presumption; the predicate facts of the crime are such that we can say beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have inferred intent from these facts.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"785 F.2d 890, 892","parenthetical":"defendant locked victim in car trunk and then submerged car in pond","sentence":"See, e.g., High v. Kemp, 819 F.2d 988, 995 (11th Cir.1987) (after repeatedly telling victim that he was about to die, defendant ordered victim to lie on ground and then shot him); Potts v. Kemp, 814 F.2d 1512, 1515-16 (11th Cir.1987) (defendant drove victim to dirt road, forced him out of car, and then shot him); Burger v. Kemp, 785 F.2d 890, 892 (11th Cir.1986) (defendant locked victim in car trunk and then submerged car in pond), aff'd, \u2014 U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 3114, 97 L.Ed.2d 638 (1987); Dobbs v. Kemp, 790 F.2d 1499, 1509 (11th Cir.1986) (defendant ordered victim to lie on floor and then shot him in stomach), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 2203, 95 L.Ed.2d 858 (1987); Tucker v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 1496, 1502-03 (11th Cir.1985) (en banc) (victim died of one crushing blow to skull), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 106 S.Ct. 3340, 92 L.Ed.2d 743 (1986); cf. Francis v. Franklin, 720 F.2d 1206, 1212 (11th Cir.1983) (evidence of intent not so overwhelming as to render Sandstrom error harmless where defendant\u2019s gun went off after victim slammed door into it), aff'd, 471 U.S. 307, 105 S.Ct. 1965, 85 L.Ed.2d 344 (1985)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"evidence of intent not so overwhelming as to render Sandstrom error harmless where defendant's gun went off after victim slammed door into it","sentence":"See, e.g., High v. Kemp, 819 F.2d 988, 995 (11th Cir.1987) (after repeatedly telling victim that he was about to die, defendant ordered victim to lie on ground and then shot him); Potts v. Kemp, 814 F.2d 1512, 1515-16 (11th Cir.1987) (defendant drove victim to dirt road, forced him out of car, and then shot him); Burger v. Kemp, 785 F.2d 890, 892 (11th Cir.1986) (defendant locked victim in car trunk and then submerged car in pond), aff'd, \u2014 U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 3114, 97 L.Ed.2d 638 (1987); Dobbs v. Kemp, 790 F.2d 1499, 1509 (11th Cir.1986) (defendant ordered victim to lie on floor and then shot him in stomach), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 2203, 95 L.Ed.2d 858 (1987); Tucker v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 1496, 1502-03 (11th Cir.1985) (en banc) (victim died of one crushing blow to skull), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 106 S.Ct. 3340, 92 L.Ed.2d 743 (1986); cf. Francis v. Franklin, 720 F.2d 1206, 1212 (11th Cir.1983) (evidence of intent not so overwhelming as to render Sandstrom error harmless where defendant\u2019s gun went off after victim slammed door into it), aff'd, 471 U.S. 307, 105 S.Ct. 1965, 85 L.Ed.2d 344 (1985)."},"case_id":1788495,"label":"a"}
{"context":"As noted above, where the ultimate fact yielded by the impermissible presumption remained as a contested issue in the case, the Sand-strom error will still be deemed harmless if the evidence produced at trial as to that ultimate fact was overwhelming. When that is the case, the error is harmless because the jury would have found it unnecessary to rely on the invalid presumption; the predicate facts of the crime are such that we can say beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have inferred intent from these facts.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"785 F.2d 890, 892","parenthetical":"defendant locked victim in car trunk and then submerged car in pond","sentence":"See, e.g., High v. Kemp, 819 F.2d 988, 995 (11th Cir.1987) (after repeatedly telling victim that he was about to die, defendant ordered victim to lie on ground and then shot him); Potts v. Kemp, 814 F.2d 1512, 1515-16 (11th Cir.1987) (defendant drove victim to dirt road, forced him out of car, and then shot him); Burger v. Kemp, 785 F.2d 890, 892 (11th Cir.1986) (defendant locked victim in car trunk and then submerged car in pond), aff'd, \u2014 U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 3114, 97 L.Ed.2d 638 (1987); Dobbs v. Kemp, 790 F.2d 1499, 1509 (11th Cir.1986) (defendant ordered victim to lie on floor and then shot him in stomach), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 2203, 95 L.Ed.2d 858 (1987); Tucker v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 1496, 1502-03 (11th Cir.1985) (en banc) (victim died of one crushing blow to skull), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 106 S.Ct. 3340, 92 L.Ed.2d 743 (1986); cf. Francis v. Franklin, 720 F.2d 1206, 1212 (11th Cir.1983) (evidence of intent not so overwhelming as to render Sandstrom error harmless where defendant\u2019s gun went off after victim slammed door into it), aff'd, 471 U.S. 307, 105 S.Ct. 1965, 85 L.Ed.2d 344 (1985)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"evidence of intent not so overwhelming as to render Sandstrom error harmless where defendant's gun went off after victim slammed door into it","sentence":"See, e.g., High v. Kemp, 819 F.2d 988, 995 (11th Cir.1987) (after repeatedly telling victim that he was about to die, defendant ordered victim to lie on ground and then shot him); Potts v. Kemp, 814 F.2d 1512, 1515-16 (11th Cir.1987) (defendant drove victim to dirt road, forced him out of car, and then shot him); Burger v. Kemp, 785 F.2d 890, 892 (11th Cir.1986) (defendant locked victim in car trunk and then submerged car in pond), aff'd, \u2014 U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 3114, 97 L.Ed.2d 638 (1987); Dobbs v. Kemp, 790 F.2d 1499, 1509 (11th Cir.1986) (defendant ordered victim to lie on floor and then shot him in stomach), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 2203, 95 L.Ed.2d 858 (1987); Tucker v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 1496, 1502-03 (11th Cir.1985) (en banc) (victim died of one crushing blow to skull), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 106 S.Ct. 3340, 92 L.Ed.2d 743 (1986); cf. Francis v. Franklin, 720 F.2d 1206, 1212 (11th Cir.1983) (evidence of intent not so overwhelming as to render Sandstrom error harmless where defendant\u2019s gun went off after victim slammed door into it), aff'd, 471 U.S. 307, 105 S.Ct. 1965, 85 L.Ed.2d 344 (1985)."},"case_id":1788495,"label":"a"}
{"context":"As noted above, where the ultimate fact yielded by the impermissible presumption remained as a contested issue in the case, the Sand-strom error will still be deemed harmless if the evidence produced at trial as to that ultimate fact was overwhelming. When that is the case, the error is harmless because the jury would have found it unnecessary to rely on the invalid presumption; the predicate facts of the crime are such that we can say beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have inferred intent from these facts.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"720 F.2d 1206, 1212","parenthetical":"evidence of intent not so overwhelming as to render Sandstrom error harmless where defendant's gun went off after victim slammed door into it","sentence":"See, e.g., High v. Kemp, 819 F.2d 988, 995 (11th Cir.1987) (after repeatedly telling victim that he was about to die, defendant ordered victim to lie on ground and then shot him); Potts v. Kemp, 814 F.2d 1512, 1515-16 (11th Cir.1987) (defendant drove victim to dirt road, forced him out of car, and then shot him); Burger v. Kemp, 785 F.2d 890, 892 (11th Cir.1986) (defendant locked victim in car trunk and then submerged car in pond), aff'd, \u2014 U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 3114, 97 L.Ed.2d 638 (1987); Dobbs v. Kemp, 790 F.2d 1499, 1509 (11th Cir.1986) (defendant ordered victim to lie on floor and then shot him in stomach), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 2203, 95 L.Ed.2d 858 (1987); Tucker v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 1496, 1502-03 (11th Cir.1985) (en banc) (victim died of one crushing blow to skull), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 106 S.Ct. 3340, 92 L.Ed.2d 743 (1986); cf. Francis v. Franklin, 720 F.2d 1206, 1212 (11th Cir.1983) (evidence of intent not so overwhelming as to render Sandstrom error harmless where defendant\u2019s gun went off after victim slammed door into it), aff'd, 471 U.S. 307, 105 S.Ct. 1965, 85 L.Ed.2d 344 (1985)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"defendant locked victim in car trunk and then submerged car in pond","sentence":"See, e.g., High v. Kemp, 819 F.2d 988, 995 (11th Cir.1987) (after repeatedly telling victim that he was about to die, defendant ordered victim to lie on ground and then shot him); Potts v. Kemp, 814 F.2d 1512, 1515-16 (11th Cir.1987) (defendant drove victim to dirt road, forced him out of car, and then shot him); Burger v. Kemp, 785 F.2d 890, 892 (11th Cir.1986) (defendant locked victim in car trunk and then submerged car in pond), aff'd, \u2014 U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 3114, 97 L.Ed.2d 638 (1987); Dobbs v. Kemp, 790 F.2d 1499, 1509 (11th Cir.1986) (defendant ordered victim to lie on floor and then shot him in stomach), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 2203, 95 L.Ed.2d 858 (1987); Tucker v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 1496, 1502-03 (11th Cir.1985) (en banc) (victim died of one crushing blow to skull), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 106 S.Ct. 3340, 92 L.Ed.2d 743 (1986); cf. Francis v. Franklin, 720 F.2d 1206, 1212 (11th Cir.1983) (evidence of intent not so overwhelming as to render Sandstrom error harmless where defendant\u2019s gun went off after victim slammed door into it), aff'd, 471 U.S. 307, 105 S.Ct. 1965, 85 L.Ed.2d 344 (1985)."},"case_id":1788495,"label":"b"}
{"context":"As noted above, where the ultimate fact yielded by the impermissible presumption remained as a contested issue in the case, the Sand-strom error will still be deemed harmless if the evidence produced at trial as to that ultimate fact was overwhelming. When that is the case, the error is harmless because the jury would have found it unnecessary to rely on the invalid presumption; the predicate facts of the crime are such that we can say beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have inferred intent from these facts.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"defendant locked victim in car trunk and then submerged car in pond","sentence":"See, e.g., High v. Kemp, 819 F.2d 988, 995 (11th Cir.1987) (after repeatedly telling victim that he was about to die, defendant ordered victim to lie on ground and then shot him); Potts v. Kemp, 814 F.2d 1512, 1515-16 (11th Cir.1987) (defendant drove victim to dirt road, forced him out of car, and then shot him); Burger v. Kemp, 785 F.2d 890, 892 (11th Cir.1986) (defendant locked victim in car trunk and then submerged car in pond), aff'd, \u2014 U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 3114, 97 L.Ed.2d 638 (1987); Dobbs v. Kemp, 790 F.2d 1499, 1509 (11th Cir.1986) (defendant ordered victim to lie on floor and then shot him in stomach), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 2203, 95 L.Ed.2d 858 (1987); Tucker v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 1496, 1502-03 (11th Cir.1985) (en banc) (victim died of one crushing blow to skull), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 106 S.Ct. 3340, 92 L.Ed.2d 743 (1986); cf. Francis v. Franklin, 720 F.2d 1206, 1212 (11th Cir.1983) (evidence of intent not so overwhelming as to render Sandstrom error harmless where defendant\u2019s gun went off after victim slammed door into it), aff'd, 471 U.S. 307, 105 S.Ct. 1965, 85 L.Ed.2d 344 (1985)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"evidence of intent not so overwhelming as to render Sandstrom error harmless where defendant's gun went off after victim slammed door into it","sentence":"See, e.g., High v. Kemp, 819 F.2d 988, 995 (11th Cir.1987) (after repeatedly telling victim that he was about to die, defendant ordered victim to lie on ground and then shot him); Potts v. Kemp, 814 F.2d 1512, 1515-16 (11th Cir.1987) (defendant drove victim to dirt road, forced him out of car, and then shot him); Burger v. Kemp, 785 F.2d 890, 892 (11th Cir.1986) (defendant locked victim in car trunk and then submerged car in pond), aff'd, \u2014 U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 3114, 97 L.Ed.2d 638 (1987); Dobbs v. Kemp, 790 F.2d 1499, 1509 (11th Cir.1986) (defendant ordered victim to lie on floor and then shot him in stomach), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 2203, 95 L.Ed.2d 858 (1987); Tucker v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 1496, 1502-03 (11th Cir.1985) (en banc) (victim died of one crushing blow to skull), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 106 S.Ct. 3340, 92 L.Ed.2d 743 (1986); cf. Francis v. Franklin, 720 F.2d 1206, 1212 (11th Cir.1983) (evidence of intent not so overwhelming as to render Sandstrom error harmless where defendant\u2019s gun went off after victim slammed door into it), aff'd, 471 U.S. 307, 105 S.Ct. 1965, 85 L.Ed.2d 344 (1985)."},"case_id":1788495,"label":"a"}
{"context":"As noted above, where the ultimate fact yielded by the impermissible presumption remained as a contested issue in the case, the Sand-strom error will still be deemed harmless if the evidence produced at trial as to that ultimate fact was overwhelming. When that is the case, the error is harmless because the jury would have found it unnecessary to rely on the invalid presumption; the predicate facts of the crime are such that we can say beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have inferred intent from these facts.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"evidence of intent not so overwhelming as to render Sandstrom error harmless where defendant's gun went off after victim slammed door into it","sentence":"See, e.g., High v. Kemp, 819 F.2d 988, 995 (11th Cir.1987) (after repeatedly telling victim that he was about to die, defendant ordered victim to lie on ground and then shot him); Potts v. Kemp, 814 F.2d 1512, 1515-16 (11th Cir.1987) (defendant drove victim to dirt road, forced him out of car, and then shot him); Burger v. Kemp, 785 F.2d 890, 892 (11th Cir.1986) (defendant locked victim in car trunk and then submerged car in pond), aff'd, \u2014 U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 3114, 97 L.Ed.2d 638 (1987); Dobbs v. Kemp, 790 F.2d 1499, 1509 (11th Cir.1986) (defendant ordered victim to lie on floor and then shot him in stomach), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 2203, 95 L.Ed.2d 858 (1987); Tucker v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 1496, 1502-03 (11th Cir.1985) (en banc) (victim died of one crushing blow to skull), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 106 S.Ct. 3340, 92 L.Ed.2d 743 (1986); cf. Francis v. Franklin, 720 F.2d 1206, 1212 (11th Cir.1983) (evidence of intent not so overwhelming as to render Sandstrom error harmless where defendant\u2019s gun went off after victim slammed door into it), aff'd, 471 U.S. 307, 105 S.Ct. 1965, 85 L.Ed.2d 344 (1985)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"defendant locked victim in car trunk and then submerged car in pond","sentence":"See, e.g., High v. Kemp, 819 F.2d 988, 995 (11th Cir.1987) (after repeatedly telling victim that he was about to die, defendant ordered victim to lie on ground and then shot him); Potts v. Kemp, 814 F.2d 1512, 1515-16 (11th Cir.1987) (defendant drove victim to dirt road, forced him out of car, and then shot him); Burger v. Kemp, 785 F.2d 890, 892 (11th Cir.1986) (defendant locked victim in car trunk and then submerged car in pond), aff'd, \u2014 U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 3114, 97 L.Ed.2d 638 (1987); Dobbs v. Kemp, 790 F.2d 1499, 1509 (11th Cir.1986) (defendant ordered victim to lie on floor and then shot him in stomach), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 2203, 95 L.Ed.2d 858 (1987); Tucker v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 1496, 1502-03 (11th Cir.1985) (en banc) (victim died of one crushing blow to skull), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 106 S.Ct. 3340, 92 L.Ed.2d 743 (1986); cf. Francis v. Franklin, 720 F.2d 1206, 1212 (11th Cir.1983) (evidence of intent not so overwhelming as to render Sandstrom error harmless where defendant\u2019s gun went off after victim slammed door into it), aff'd, 471 U.S. 307, 105 S.Ct. 1965, 85 L.Ed.2d 344 (1985)."},"case_id":1788495,"label":"b"}
{"context":"As noted above, where the ultimate fact yielded by the impermissible presumption remained as a contested issue in the case, the Sand-strom error will still be deemed harmless if the evidence produced at trial as to that ultimate fact was overwhelming. When that is the case, the error is harmless because the jury would have found it unnecessary to rely on the invalid presumption; the predicate facts of the crime are such that we can say beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have inferred intent from these facts.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"evidence of intent not so overwhelming as to render Sandstrom error harmless where defendant's gun went off after victim slammed door into it","sentence":"See, e.g., High v. Kemp, 819 F.2d 988, 995 (11th Cir.1987) (after repeatedly telling victim that he was about to die, defendant ordered victim to lie on ground and then shot him); Potts v. Kemp, 814 F.2d 1512, 1515-16 (11th Cir.1987) (defendant drove victim to dirt road, forced him out of car, and then shot him); Burger v. Kemp, 785 F.2d 890, 892 (11th Cir.1986) (defendant locked victim in car trunk and then submerged car in pond), aff'd, \u2014 U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 3114, 97 L.Ed.2d 638 (1987); Dobbs v. Kemp, 790 F.2d 1499, 1509 (11th Cir.1986) (defendant ordered victim to lie on floor and then shot him in stomach), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 2203, 95 L.Ed.2d 858 (1987); Tucker v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 1496, 1502-03 (11th Cir.1985) (en banc) (victim died of one crushing blow to skull), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 106 S.Ct. 3340, 92 L.Ed.2d 743 (1986); cf. Francis v. Franklin, 720 F.2d 1206, 1212 (11th Cir.1983) (evidence of intent not so overwhelming as to render Sandstrom error harmless where defendant\u2019s gun went off after victim slammed door into it), aff'd, 471 U.S. 307, 105 S.Ct. 1965, 85 L.Ed.2d 344 (1985)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"defendant locked victim in car trunk and then submerged car in pond","sentence":"See, e.g., High v. Kemp, 819 F.2d 988, 995 (11th Cir.1987) (after repeatedly telling victim that he was about to die, defendant ordered victim to lie on ground and then shot him); Potts v. Kemp, 814 F.2d 1512, 1515-16 (11th Cir.1987) (defendant drove victim to dirt road, forced him out of car, and then shot him); Burger v. Kemp, 785 F.2d 890, 892 (11th Cir.1986) (defendant locked victim in car trunk and then submerged car in pond), aff'd, \u2014 U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 3114, 97 L.Ed.2d 638 (1987); Dobbs v. Kemp, 790 F.2d 1499, 1509 (11th Cir.1986) (defendant ordered victim to lie on floor and then shot him in stomach), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 2203, 95 L.Ed.2d 858 (1987); Tucker v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 1496, 1502-03 (11th Cir.1985) (en banc) (victim died of one crushing blow to skull), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 106 S.Ct. 3340, 92 L.Ed.2d 743 (1986); cf. Francis v. Franklin, 720 F.2d 1206, 1212 (11th Cir.1983) (evidence of intent not so overwhelming as to render Sandstrom error harmless where defendant\u2019s gun went off after victim slammed door into it), aff'd, 471 U.S. 307, 105 S.Ct. 1965, 85 L.Ed.2d 344 (1985)."},"case_id":1788495,"label":"b"}
{"context":"As noted above, where the ultimate fact yielded by the impermissible presumption remained as a contested issue in the case, the Sand-strom error will still be deemed harmless if the evidence produced at trial as to that ultimate fact was overwhelming. When that is the case, the error is harmless because the jury would have found it unnecessary to rely on the invalid presumption; the predicate facts of the crime are such that we can say beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have inferred intent from these facts.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"720 F.2d 1206, 1212","parenthetical":"evidence of intent not so overwhelming as to render Sandstrom error harmless where defendant's gun went off after victim slammed door into it","sentence":"See, e.g., High v. Kemp, 819 F.2d 988, 995 (11th Cir.1987) (after repeatedly telling victim that he was about to die, defendant ordered victim to lie on ground and then shot him); Potts v. Kemp, 814 F.2d 1512, 1515-16 (11th Cir.1987) (defendant drove victim to dirt road, forced him out of car, and then shot him); Burger v. Kemp, 785 F.2d 890, 892 (11th Cir.1986) (defendant locked victim in car trunk and then submerged car in pond), aff'd, \u2014 U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 3114, 97 L.Ed.2d 638 (1987); Dobbs v. Kemp, 790 F.2d 1499, 1509 (11th Cir.1986) (defendant ordered victim to lie on floor and then shot him in stomach), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 2203, 95 L.Ed.2d 858 (1987); Tucker v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 1496, 1502-03 (11th Cir.1985) (en banc) (victim died of one crushing blow to skull), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 106 S.Ct. 3340, 92 L.Ed.2d 743 (1986); cf. Francis v. Franklin, 720 F.2d 1206, 1212 (11th Cir.1983) (evidence of intent not so overwhelming as to render Sandstrom error harmless where defendant\u2019s gun went off after victim slammed door into it), aff'd, 471 U.S. 307, 105 S.Ct. 1965, 85 L.Ed.2d 344 (1985)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"defendant locked victim in car trunk and then submerged car in pond","sentence":"See, e.g., High v. Kemp, 819 F.2d 988, 995 (11th Cir.1987) (after repeatedly telling victim that he was about to die, defendant ordered victim to lie on ground and then shot him); Potts v. Kemp, 814 F.2d 1512, 1515-16 (11th Cir.1987) (defendant drove victim to dirt road, forced him out of car, and then shot him); Burger v. Kemp, 785 F.2d 890, 892 (11th Cir.1986) (defendant locked victim in car trunk and then submerged car in pond), aff'd, \u2014 U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 3114, 97 L.Ed.2d 638 (1987); Dobbs v. Kemp, 790 F.2d 1499, 1509 (11th Cir.1986) (defendant ordered victim to lie on floor and then shot him in stomach), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 2203, 95 L.Ed.2d 858 (1987); Tucker v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 1496, 1502-03 (11th Cir.1985) (en banc) (victim died of one crushing blow to skull), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 106 S.Ct. 3340, 92 L.Ed.2d 743 (1986); cf. Francis v. Franklin, 720 F.2d 1206, 1212 (11th Cir.1983) (evidence of intent not so overwhelming as to render Sandstrom error harmless where defendant\u2019s gun went off after victim slammed door into it), aff'd, 471 U.S. 307, 105 S.Ct. 1965, 85 L.Ed.2d 344 (1985)."},"case_id":1788495,"label":"b"}
{"context":"As noted above, where the ultimate fact yielded by the impermissible presumption remained as a contested issue in the case, the Sand-strom error will still be deemed harmless if the evidence produced at trial as to that ultimate fact was overwhelming. When that is the case, the error is harmless because the jury would have found it unnecessary to rely on the invalid presumption; the predicate facts of the crime are such that we can say beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have inferred intent from these facts.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"evidence of intent not so overwhelming as to render Sandstrom error harmless where defendant's gun went off after victim slammed door into it","sentence":"See, e.g., High v. Kemp, 819 F.2d 988, 995 (11th Cir.1987) (after repeatedly telling victim that he was about to die, defendant ordered victim to lie on ground and then shot him); Potts v. Kemp, 814 F.2d 1512, 1515-16 (11th Cir.1987) (defendant drove victim to dirt road, forced him out of car, and then shot him); Burger v. Kemp, 785 F.2d 890, 892 (11th Cir.1986) (defendant locked victim in car trunk and then submerged car in pond), aff'd, \u2014 U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 3114, 97 L.Ed.2d 638 (1987); Dobbs v. Kemp, 790 F.2d 1499, 1509 (11th Cir.1986) (defendant ordered victim to lie on floor and then shot him in stomach), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 2203, 95 L.Ed.2d 858 (1987); Tucker v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 1496, 1502-03 (11th Cir.1985) (en banc) (victim died of one crushing blow to skull), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 106 S.Ct. 3340, 92 L.Ed.2d 743 (1986); cf. Francis v. Franklin, 720 F.2d 1206, 1212 (11th Cir.1983) (evidence of intent not so overwhelming as to render Sandstrom error harmless where defendant\u2019s gun went off after victim slammed door into it), aff'd, 471 U.S. 307, 105 S.Ct. 1965, 85 L.Ed.2d 344 (1985)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"defendant locked victim in car trunk and then submerged car in pond","sentence":"See, e.g., High v. Kemp, 819 F.2d 988, 995 (11th Cir.1987) (after repeatedly telling victim that he was about to die, defendant ordered victim to lie on ground and then shot him); Potts v. Kemp, 814 F.2d 1512, 1515-16 (11th Cir.1987) (defendant drove victim to dirt road, forced him out of car, and then shot him); Burger v. Kemp, 785 F.2d 890, 892 (11th Cir.1986) (defendant locked victim in car trunk and then submerged car in pond), aff'd, \u2014 U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 3114, 97 L.Ed.2d 638 (1987); Dobbs v. Kemp, 790 F.2d 1499, 1509 (11th Cir.1986) (defendant ordered victim to lie on floor and then shot him in stomach), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 2203, 95 L.Ed.2d 858 (1987); Tucker v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 1496, 1502-03 (11th Cir.1985) (en banc) (victim died of one crushing blow to skull), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 106 S.Ct. 3340, 92 L.Ed.2d 743 (1986); cf. Francis v. Franklin, 720 F.2d 1206, 1212 (11th Cir.1983) (evidence of intent not so overwhelming as to render Sandstrom error harmless where defendant\u2019s gun went off after victim slammed door into it), aff'd, 471 U.S. 307, 105 S.Ct. 1965, 85 L.Ed.2d 344 (1985)."},"case_id":1788495,"label":"b"}
{"context":"As noted above, where the ultimate fact yielded by the impermissible presumption remained as a contested issue in the case, the Sand-strom error will still be deemed harmless if the evidence produced at trial as to that ultimate fact was overwhelming. When that is the case, the error is harmless because the jury would have found it unnecessary to rely on the invalid presumption; the predicate facts of the crime are such that we can say beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have inferred intent from these facts.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"evidence of intent not so overwhelming as to render Sandstrom error harmless where defendant's gun went off after victim slammed door into it","sentence":"See, e.g., High v. Kemp, 819 F.2d 988, 995 (11th Cir.1987) (after repeatedly telling victim that he was about to die, defendant ordered victim to lie on ground and then shot him); Potts v. Kemp, 814 F.2d 1512, 1515-16 (11th Cir.1987) (defendant drove victim to dirt road, forced him out of car, and then shot him); Burger v. Kemp, 785 F.2d 890, 892 (11th Cir.1986) (defendant locked victim in car trunk and then submerged car in pond), aff'd, \u2014 U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 3114, 97 L.Ed.2d 638 (1987); Dobbs v. Kemp, 790 F.2d 1499, 1509 (11th Cir.1986) (defendant ordered victim to lie on floor and then shot him in stomach), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 2203, 95 L.Ed.2d 858 (1987); Tucker v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 1496, 1502-03 (11th Cir.1985) (en banc) (victim died of one crushing blow to skull), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 106 S.Ct. 3340, 92 L.Ed.2d 743 (1986); cf. Francis v. Franklin, 720 F.2d 1206, 1212 (11th Cir.1983) (evidence of intent not so overwhelming as to render Sandstrom error harmless where defendant\u2019s gun went off after victim slammed door into it), aff'd, 471 U.S. 307, 105 S.Ct. 1965, 85 L.Ed.2d 344 (1985)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"defendant locked victim in car trunk and then submerged car in pond","sentence":"See, e.g., High v. Kemp, 819 F.2d 988, 995 (11th Cir.1987) (after repeatedly telling victim that he was about to die, defendant ordered victim to lie on ground and then shot him); Potts v. Kemp, 814 F.2d 1512, 1515-16 (11th Cir.1987) (defendant drove victim to dirt road, forced him out of car, and then shot him); Burger v. Kemp, 785 F.2d 890, 892 (11th Cir.1986) (defendant locked victim in car trunk and then submerged car in pond), aff'd, \u2014 U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 3114, 97 L.Ed.2d 638 (1987); Dobbs v. Kemp, 790 F.2d 1499, 1509 (11th Cir.1986) (defendant ordered victim to lie on floor and then shot him in stomach), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 2203, 95 L.Ed.2d 858 (1987); Tucker v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 1496, 1502-03 (11th Cir.1985) (en banc) (victim died of one crushing blow to skull), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 106 S.Ct. 3340, 92 L.Ed.2d 743 (1986); cf. Francis v. Franklin, 720 F.2d 1206, 1212 (11th Cir.1983) (evidence of intent not so overwhelming as to render Sandstrom error harmless where defendant\u2019s gun went off after victim slammed door into it), aff'd, 471 U.S. 307, 105 S.Ct. 1965, 85 L.Ed.2d 344 (1985)."},"case_id":1788495,"label":"b"}
{"context":"As noted above, where the ultimate fact yielded by the impermissible presumption remained as a contested issue in the case, the Sand-strom error will still be deemed harmless if the evidence produced at trial as to that ultimate fact was overwhelming. When that is the case, the error is harmless because the jury would have found it unnecessary to rely on the invalid presumption; the predicate facts of the crime are such that we can say beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have inferred intent from these facts.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"defendant locked victim in car trunk and then submerged car in pond","sentence":"See, e.g., High v. Kemp, 819 F.2d 988, 995 (11th Cir.1987) (after repeatedly telling victim that he was about to die, defendant ordered victim to lie on ground and then shot him); Potts v. Kemp, 814 F.2d 1512, 1515-16 (11th Cir.1987) (defendant drove victim to dirt road, forced him out of car, and then shot him); Burger v. Kemp, 785 F.2d 890, 892 (11th Cir.1986) (defendant locked victim in car trunk and then submerged car in pond), aff'd, \u2014 U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 3114, 97 L.Ed.2d 638 (1987); Dobbs v. Kemp, 790 F.2d 1499, 1509 (11th Cir.1986) (defendant ordered victim to lie on floor and then shot him in stomach), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 2203, 95 L.Ed.2d 858 (1987); Tucker v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 1496, 1502-03 (11th Cir.1985) (en banc) (victim died of one crushing blow to skull), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 106 S.Ct. 3340, 92 L.Ed.2d 743 (1986); cf. Francis v. Franklin, 720 F.2d 1206, 1212 (11th Cir.1983) (evidence of intent not so overwhelming as to render Sandstrom error harmless where defendant\u2019s gun went off after victim slammed door into it), aff'd, 471 U.S. 307, 105 S.Ct. 1965, 85 L.Ed.2d 344 (1985)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"evidence of intent not so overwhelming as to render Sandstrom error harmless where defendant's gun went off after victim slammed door into it","sentence":"See, e.g., High v. Kemp, 819 F.2d 988, 995 (11th Cir.1987) (after repeatedly telling victim that he was about to die, defendant ordered victim to lie on ground and then shot him); Potts v. Kemp, 814 F.2d 1512, 1515-16 (11th Cir.1987) (defendant drove victim to dirt road, forced him out of car, and then shot him); Burger v. Kemp, 785 F.2d 890, 892 (11th Cir.1986) (defendant locked victim in car trunk and then submerged car in pond), aff'd, \u2014 U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 3114, 97 L.Ed.2d 638 (1987); Dobbs v. Kemp, 790 F.2d 1499, 1509 (11th Cir.1986) (defendant ordered victim to lie on floor and then shot him in stomach), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 2203, 95 L.Ed.2d 858 (1987); Tucker v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 1496, 1502-03 (11th Cir.1985) (en banc) (victim died of one crushing blow to skull), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 106 S.Ct. 3340, 92 L.Ed.2d 743 (1986); cf. Francis v. Franklin, 720 F.2d 1206, 1212 (11th Cir.1983) (evidence of intent not so overwhelming as to render Sandstrom error harmless where defendant\u2019s gun went off after victim slammed door into it), aff'd, 471 U.S. 307, 105 S.Ct. 1965, 85 L.Ed.2d 344 (1985)."},"case_id":1788495,"label":"a"}
{"context":"As noted above, where the ultimate fact yielded by the impermissible presumption remained as a contested issue in the case, the Sand-strom error will still be deemed harmless if the evidence produced at trial as to that ultimate fact was overwhelming. When that is the case, the error is harmless because the jury would have found it unnecessary to rely on the invalid presumption; the predicate facts of the crime are such that we can say beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have inferred intent from these facts.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"790 F.2d 1499, 1509","parenthetical":"defendant ordered victim to lie on floor and then shot him in stomach","sentence":"See, e.g., High v. Kemp, 819 F.2d 988, 995 (11th Cir.1987) (after repeatedly telling victim that he was about to die, defendant ordered victim to lie on ground and then shot him); Potts v. Kemp, 814 F.2d 1512, 1515-16 (11th Cir.1987) (defendant drove victim to dirt road, forced him out of car, and then shot him); Burger v. Kemp, 785 F.2d 890, 892 (11th Cir.1986) (defendant locked victim in car trunk and then submerged car in pond), aff'd, \u2014 U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 3114, 97 L.Ed.2d 638 (1987); Dobbs v. Kemp, 790 F.2d 1499, 1509 (11th Cir.1986) (defendant ordered victim to lie on floor and then shot him in stomach), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 2203, 95 L.Ed.2d 858 (1987); Tucker v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 1496, 1502-03 (11th Cir.1985) (en banc) (victim died of one crushing blow to skull), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 106 S.Ct. 3340, 92 L.Ed.2d 743 (1986); cf. Francis v. Franklin, 720 F.2d 1206, 1212 (11th Cir.1983) (evidence of intent not so overwhelming as to render Sandstrom error harmless where defendant\u2019s gun went off after victim slammed door into it), aff'd, 471 U.S. 307, 105 S.Ct. 1965, 85 L.Ed.2d 344 (1985)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"720 F.2d 1206, 1212","parenthetical":"evidence of intent not so overwhelming as to render Sandstrom error harmless where defendant's gun went off after victim slammed door into it","sentence":"See, e.g., High v. Kemp, 819 F.2d 988, 995 (11th Cir.1987) (after repeatedly telling victim that he was about to die, defendant ordered victim to lie on ground and then shot him); Potts v. Kemp, 814 F.2d 1512, 1515-16 (11th Cir.1987) (defendant drove victim to dirt road, forced him out of car, and then shot him); Burger v. Kemp, 785 F.2d 890, 892 (11th Cir.1986) (defendant locked victim in car trunk and then submerged car in pond), aff'd, \u2014 U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 3114, 97 L.Ed.2d 638 (1987); Dobbs v. Kemp, 790 F.2d 1499, 1509 (11th Cir.1986) (defendant ordered victim to lie on floor and then shot him in stomach), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 2203, 95 L.Ed.2d 858 (1987); Tucker v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 1496, 1502-03 (11th Cir.1985) (en banc) (victim died of one crushing blow to skull), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 106 S.Ct. 3340, 92 L.Ed.2d 743 (1986); cf. Francis v. Franklin, 720 F.2d 1206, 1212 (11th Cir.1983) (evidence of intent not so overwhelming as to render Sandstrom error harmless where defendant\u2019s gun went off after victim slammed door into it), aff'd, 471 U.S. 307, 105 S.Ct. 1965, 85 L.Ed.2d 344 (1985)."},"case_id":1788495,"label":"a"}
{"context":"As noted above, where the ultimate fact yielded by the impermissible presumption remained as a contested issue in the case, the Sand-strom error will still be deemed harmless if the evidence produced at trial as to that ultimate fact was overwhelming. When that is the case, the error is harmless because the jury would have found it unnecessary to rely on the invalid presumption; the predicate facts of the crime are such that we can say beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have inferred intent from these facts.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"790 F.2d 1499, 1509","parenthetical":"defendant ordered victim to lie on floor and then shot him in stomach","sentence":"See, e.g., High v. Kemp, 819 F.2d 988, 995 (11th Cir.1987) (after repeatedly telling victim that he was about to die, defendant ordered victim to lie on ground and then shot him); Potts v. Kemp, 814 F.2d 1512, 1515-16 (11th Cir.1987) (defendant drove victim to dirt road, forced him out of car, and then shot him); Burger v. Kemp, 785 F.2d 890, 892 (11th Cir.1986) (defendant locked victim in car trunk and then submerged car in pond), aff'd, \u2014 U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 3114, 97 L.Ed.2d 638 (1987); Dobbs v. Kemp, 790 F.2d 1499, 1509 (11th Cir.1986) (defendant ordered victim to lie on floor and then shot him in stomach), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 2203, 95 L.Ed.2d 858 (1987); Tucker v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 1496, 1502-03 (11th Cir.1985) (en banc) (victim died of one crushing blow to skull), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 106 S.Ct. 3340, 92 L.Ed.2d 743 (1986); cf. Francis v. Franklin, 720 F.2d 1206, 1212 (11th Cir.1983) (evidence of intent not so overwhelming as to render Sandstrom error harmless where defendant\u2019s gun went off after victim slammed door into it), aff'd, 471 U.S. 307, 105 S.Ct. 1965, 85 L.Ed.2d 344 (1985)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"evidence of intent not so overwhelming as to render Sandstrom error harmless where defendant's gun went off after victim slammed door into it","sentence":"See, e.g., High v. Kemp, 819 F.2d 988, 995 (11th Cir.1987) (after repeatedly telling victim that he was about to die, defendant ordered victim to lie on ground and then shot him); Potts v. Kemp, 814 F.2d 1512, 1515-16 (11th Cir.1987) (defendant drove victim to dirt road, forced him out of car, and then shot him); Burger v. Kemp, 785 F.2d 890, 892 (11th Cir.1986) (defendant locked victim in car trunk and then submerged car in pond), aff'd, \u2014 U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 3114, 97 L.Ed.2d 638 (1987); Dobbs v. Kemp, 790 F.2d 1499, 1509 (11th Cir.1986) (defendant ordered victim to lie on floor and then shot him in stomach), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 2203, 95 L.Ed.2d 858 (1987); Tucker v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 1496, 1502-03 (11th Cir.1985) (en banc) (victim died of one crushing blow to skull), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 106 S.Ct. 3340, 92 L.Ed.2d 743 (1986); cf. Francis v. Franklin, 720 F.2d 1206, 1212 (11th Cir.1983) (evidence of intent not so overwhelming as to render Sandstrom error harmless where defendant\u2019s gun went off after victim slammed door into it), aff'd, 471 U.S. 307, 105 S.Ct. 1965, 85 L.Ed.2d 344 (1985)."},"case_id":1788495,"label":"a"}
{"context":"As noted above, where the ultimate fact yielded by the impermissible presumption remained as a contested issue in the case, the Sand-strom error will still be deemed harmless if the evidence produced at trial as to that ultimate fact was overwhelming. When that is the case, the error is harmless because the jury would have found it unnecessary to rely on the invalid presumption; the predicate facts of the crime are such that we can say beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have inferred intent from these facts.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"790 F.2d 1499, 1509","parenthetical":"defendant ordered victim to lie on floor and then shot him in stomach","sentence":"See, e.g., High v. Kemp, 819 F.2d 988, 995 (11th Cir.1987) (after repeatedly telling victim that he was about to die, defendant ordered victim to lie on ground and then shot him); Potts v. Kemp, 814 F.2d 1512, 1515-16 (11th Cir.1987) (defendant drove victim to dirt road, forced him out of car, and then shot him); Burger v. Kemp, 785 F.2d 890, 892 (11th Cir.1986) (defendant locked victim in car trunk and then submerged car in pond), aff'd, \u2014 U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 3114, 97 L.Ed.2d 638 (1987); Dobbs v. Kemp, 790 F.2d 1499, 1509 (11th Cir.1986) (defendant ordered victim to lie on floor and then shot him in stomach), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 2203, 95 L.Ed.2d 858 (1987); Tucker v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 1496, 1502-03 (11th Cir.1985) (en banc) (victim died of one crushing blow to skull), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 106 S.Ct. 3340, 92 L.Ed.2d 743 (1986); cf. Francis v. Franklin, 720 F.2d 1206, 1212 (11th Cir.1983) (evidence of intent not so overwhelming as to render Sandstrom error harmless where defendant\u2019s gun went off after victim slammed door into it), aff'd, 471 U.S. 307, 105 S.Ct. 1965, 85 L.Ed.2d 344 (1985)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"evidence of intent not so overwhelming as to render Sandstrom error harmless where defendant's gun went off after victim slammed door into it","sentence":"See, e.g., High v. Kemp, 819 F.2d 988, 995 (11th Cir.1987) (after repeatedly telling victim that he was about to die, defendant ordered victim to lie on ground and then shot him); Potts v. Kemp, 814 F.2d 1512, 1515-16 (11th Cir.1987) (defendant drove victim to dirt road, forced him out of car, and then shot him); Burger v. Kemp, 785 F.2d 890, 892 (11th Cir.1986) (defendant locked victim in car trunk and then submerged car in pond), aff'd, \u2014 U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 3114, 97 L.Ed.2d 638 (1987); Dobbs v. Kemp, 790 F.2d 1499, 1509 (11th Cir.1986) (defendant ordered victim to lie on floor and then shot him in stomach), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 2203, 95 L.Ed.2d 858 (1987); Tucker v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 1496, 1502-03 (11th Cir.1985) (en banc) (victim died of one crushing blow to skull), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 106 S.Ct. 3340, 92 L.Ed.2d 743 (1986); cf. Francis v. Franklin, 720 F.2d 1206, 1212 (11th Cir.1983) (evidence of intent not so overwhelming as to render Sandstrom error harmless where defendant\u2019s gun went off after victim slammed door into it), aff'd, 471 U.S. 307, 105 S.Ct. 1965, 85 L.Ed.2d 344 (1985)."},"case_id":1788495,"label":"a"}
{"context":"As noted above, where the ultimate fact yielded by the impermissible presumption remained as a contested issue in the case, the Sand-strom error will still be deemed harmless if the evidence produced at trial as to that ultimate fact was overwhelming. When that is the case, the error is harmless because the jury would have found it unnecessary to rely on the invalid presumption; the predicate facts of the crime are such that we can say beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have inferred intent from these facts.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"790 F.2d 1499, 1509","parenthetical":"defendant ordered victim to lie on floor and then shot him in stomach","sentence":"See, e.g., High v. Kemp, 819 F.2d 988, 995 (11th Cir.1987) (after repeatedly telling victim that he was about to die, defendant ordered victim to lie on ground and then shot him); Potts v. Kemp, 814 F.2d 1512, 1515-16 (11th Cir.1987) (defendant drove victim to dirt road, forced him out of car, and then shot him); Burger v. Kemp, 785 F.2d 890, 892 (11th Cir.1986) (defendant locked victim in car trunk and then submerged car in pond), aff'd, \u2014 U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 3114, 97 L.Ed.2d 638 (1987); Dobbs v. Kemp, 790 F.2d 1499, 1509 (11th Cir.1986) (defendant ordered victim to lie on floor and then shot him in stomach), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 2203, 95 L.Ed.2d 858 (1987); Tucker v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 1496, 1502-03 (11th Cir.1985) (en banc) (victim died of one crushing blow to skull), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 106 S.Ct. 3340, 92 L.Ed.2d 743 (1986); cf. Francis v. Franklin, 720 F.2d 1206, 1212 (11th Cir.1983) (evidence of intent not so overwhelming as to render Sandstrom error harmless where defendant\u2019s gun went off after victim slammed door into it), aff'd, 471 U.S. 307, 105 S.Ct. 1965, 85 L.Ed.2d 344 (1985)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"evidence of intent not so overwhelming as to render Sandstrom error harmless where defendant's gun went off after victim slammed door into it","sentence":"See, e.g., High v. Kemp, 819 F.2d 988, 995 (11th Cir.1987) (after repeatedly telling victim that he was about to die, defendant ordered victim to lie on ground and then shot him); Potts v. Kemp, 814 F.2d 1512, 1515-16 (11th Cir.1987) (defendant drove victim to dirt road, forced him out of car, and then shot him); Burger v. Kemp, 785 F.2d 890, 892 (11th Cir.1986) (defendant locked victim in car trunk and then submerged car in pond), aff'd, \u2014 U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 3114, 97 L.Ed.2d 638 (1987); Dobbs v. Kemp, 790 F.2d 1499, 1509 (11th Cir.1986) (defendant ordered victim to lie on floor and then shot him in stomach), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 2203, 95 L.Ed.2d 858 (1987); Tucker v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 1496, 1502-03 (11th Cir.1985) (en banc) (victim died of one crushing blow to skull), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 106 S.Ct. 3340, 92 L.Ed.2d 743 (1986); cf. Francis v. Franklin, 720 F.2d 1206, 1212 (11th Cir.1983) (evidence of intent not so overwhelming as to render Sandstrom error harmless where defendant\u2019s gun went off after victim slammed door into it), aff'd, 471 U.S. 307, 105 S.Ct. 1965, 85 L.Ed.2d 344 (1985)."},"case_id":1788495,"label":"a"}
{"context":"As noted above, where the ultimate fact yielded by the impermissible presumption remained as a contested issue in the case, the Sand-strom error will still be deemed harmless if the evidence produced at trial as to that ultimate fact was overwhelming. When that is the case, the error is harmless because the jury would have found it unnecessary to rely on the invalid presumption; the predicate facts of the crime are such that we can say beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have inferred intent from these facts.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"720 F.2d 1206, 1212","parenthetical":"evidence of intent not so overwhelming as to render Sandstrom error harmless where defendant's gun went off after victim slammed door into it","sentence":"See, e.g., High v. Kemp, 819 F.2d 988, 995 (11th Cir.1987) (after repeatedly telling victim that he was about to die, defendant ordered victim to lie on ground and then shot him); Potts v. Kemp, 814 F.2d 1512, 1515-16 (11th Cir.1987) (defendant drove victim to dirt road, forced him out of car, and then shot him); Burger v. Kemp, 785 F.2d 890, 892 (11th Cir.1986) (defendant locked victim in car trunk and then submerged car in pond), aff'd, \u2014 U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 3114, 97 L.Ed.2d 638 (1987); Dobbs v. Kemp, 790 F.2d 1499, 1509 (11th Cir.1986) (defendant ordered victim to lie on floor and then shot him in stomach), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 2203, 95 L.Ed.2d 858 (1987); Tucker v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 1496, 1502-03 (11th Cir.1985) (en banc) (victim died of one crushing blow to skull), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 106 S.Ct. 3340, 92 L.Ed.2d 743 (1986); cf. Francis v. Franklin, 720 F.2d 1206, 1212 (11th Cir.1983) (evidence of intent not so overwhelming as to render Sandstrom error harmless where defendant\u2019s gun went off after victim slammed door into it), aff'd, 471 U.S. 307, 105 S.Ct. 1965, 85 L.Ed.2d 344 (1985)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"defendant ordered victim to lie on floor and then shot him in stomach","sentence":"See, e.g., High v. Kemp, 819 F.2d 988, 995 (11th Cir.1987) (after repeatedly telling victim that he was about to die, defendant ordered victim to lie on ground and then shot him); Potts v. Kemp, 814 F.2d 1512, 1515-16 (11th Cir.1987) (defendant drove victim to dirt road, forced him out of car, and then shot him); Burger v. Kemp, 785 F.2d 890, 892 (11th Cir.1986) (defendant locked victim in car trunk and then submerged car in pond), aff'd, \u2014 U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 3114, 97 L.Ed.2d 638 (1987); Dobbs v. Kemp, 790 F.2d 1499, 1509 (11th Cir.1986) (defendant ordered victim to lie on floor and then shot him in stomach), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 2203, 95 L.Ed.2d 858 (1987); Tucker v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 1496, 1502-03 (11th Cir.1985) (en banc) (victim died of one crushing blow to skull), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 106 S.Ct. 3340, 92 L.Ed.2d 743 (1986); cf. Francis v. Franklin, 720 F.2d 1206, 1212 (11th Cir.1983) (evidence of intent not so overwhelming as to render Sandstrom error harmless where defendant\u2019s gun went off after victim slammed door into it), aff'd, 471 U.S. 307, 105 S.Ct. 1965, 85 L.Ed.2d 344 (1985)."},"case_id":1788495,"label":"b"}
{"context":"As noted above, where the ultimate fact yielded by the impermissible presumption remained as a contested issue in the case, the Sand-strom error will still be deemed harmless if the evidence produced at trial as to that ultimate fact was overwhelming. When that is the case, the error is harmless because the jury would have found it unnecessary to rely on the invalid presumption; the predicate facts of the crime are such that we can say beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have inferred intent from these facts.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"evidence of intent not so overwhelming as to render Sandstrom error harmless where defendant's gun went off after victim slammed door into it","sentence":"See, e.g., High v. Kemp, 819 F.2d 988, 995 (11th Cir.1987) (after repeatedly telling victim that he was about to die, defendant ordered victim to lie on ground and then shot him); Potts v. Kemp, 814 F.2d 1512, 1515-16 (11th Cir.1987) (defendant drove victim to dirt road, forced him out of car, and then shot him); Burger v. Kemp, 785 F.2d 890, 892 (11th Cir.1986) (defendant locked victim in car trunk and then submerged car in pond), aff'd, \u2014 U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 3114, 97 L.Ed.2d 638 (1987); Dobbs v. Kemp, 790 F.2d 1499, 1509 (11th Cir.1986) (defendant ordered victim to lie on floor and then shot him in stomach), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 2203, 95 L.Ed.2d 858 (1987); Tucker v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 1496, 1502-03 (11th Cir.1985) (en banc) (victim died of one crushing blow to skull), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 106 S.Ct. 3340, 92 L.Ed.2d 743 (1986); cf. Francis v. Franklin, 720 F.2d 1206, 1212 (11th Cir.1983) (evidence of intent not so overwhelming as to render Sandstrom error harmless where defendant\u2019s gun went off after victim slammed door into it), aff'd, 471 U.S. 307, 105 S.Ct. 1965, 85 L.Ed.2d 344 (1985)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"defendant ordered victim to lie on floor and then shot him in stomach","sentence":"See, e.g., High v. Kemp, 819 F.2d 988, 995 (11th Cir.1987) (after repeatedly telling victim that he was about to die, defendant ordered victim to lie on ground and then shot him); Potts v. Kemp, 814 F.2d 1512, 1515-16 (11th Cir.1987) (defendant drove victim to dirt road, forced him out of car, and then shot him); Burger v. Kemp, 785 F.2d 890, 892 (11th Cir.1986) (defendant locked victim in car trunk and then submerged car in pond), aff'd, \u2014 U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 3114, 97 L.Ed.2d 638 (1987); Dobbs v. Kemp, 790 F.2d 1499, 1509 (11th Cir.1986) (defendant ordered victim to lie on floor and then shot him in stomach), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 2203, 95 L.Ed.2d 858 (1987); Tucker v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 1496, 1502-03 (11th Cir.1985) (en banc) (victim died of one crushing blow to skull), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 106 S.Ct. 3340, 92 L.Ed.2d 743 (1986); cf. Francis v. Franklin, 720 F.2d 1206, 1212 (11th Cir.1983) (evidence of intent not so overwhelming as to render Sandstrom error harmless where defendant\u2019s gun went off after victim slammed door into it), aff'd, 471 U.S. 307, 105 S.Ct. 1965, 85 L.Ed.2d 344 (1985)."},"case_id":1788495,"label":"b"}
{"context":"As noted above, where the ultimate fact yielded by the impermissible presumption remained as a contested issue in the case, the Sand-strom error will still be deemed harmless if the evidence produced at trial as to that ultimate fact was overwhelming. When that is the case, the error is harmless because the jury would have found it unnecessary to rely on the invalid presumption; the predicate facts of the crime are such that we can say beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have inferred intent from these facts.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"defendant ordered victim to lie on floor and then shot him in stomach","sentence":"See, e.g., High v. Kemp, 819 F.2d 988, 995 (11th Cir.1987) (after repeatedly telling victim that he was about to die, defendant ordered victim to lie on ground and then shot him); Potts v. Kemp, 814 F.2d 1512, 1515-16 (11th Cir.1987) (defendant drove victim to dirt road, forced him out of car, and then shot him); Burger v. Kemp, 785 F.2d 890, 892 (11th Cir.1986) (defendant locked victim in car trunk and then submerged car in pond), aff'd, \u2014 U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 3114, 97 L.Ed.2d 638 (1987); Dobbs v. Kemp, 790 F.2d 1499, 1509 (11th Cir.1986) (defendant ordered victim to lie on floor and then shot him in stomach), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 2203, 95 L.Ed.2d 858 (1987); Tucker v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 1496, 1502-03 (11th Cir.1985) (en banc) (victim died of one crushing blow to skull), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 106 S.Ct. 3340, 92 L.Ed.2d 743 (1986); cf. Francis v. Franklin, 720 F.2d 1206, 1212 (11th Cir.1983) (evidence of intent not so overwhelming as to render Sandstrom error harmless where defendant\u2019s gun went off after victim slammed door into it), aff'd, 471 U.S. 307, 105 S.Ct. 1965, 85 L.Ed.2d 344 (1985)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"evidence of intent not so overwhelming as to render Sandstrom error harmless where defendant's gun went off after victim slammed door into it","sentence":"See, e.g., High v. Kemp, 819 F.2d 988, 995 (11th Cir.1987) (after repeatedly telling victim that he was about to die, defendant ordered victim to lie on ground and then shot him); Potts v. Kemp, 814 F.2d 1512, 1515-16 (11th Cir.1987) (defendant drove victim to dirt road, forced him out of car, and then shot him); Burger v. Kemp, 785 F.2d 890, 892 (11th Cir.1986) (defendant locked victim in car trunk and then submerged car in pond), aff'd, \u2014 U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 3114, 97 L.Ed.2d 638 (1987); Dobbs v. Kemp, 790 F.2d 1499, 1509 (11th Cir.1986) (defendant ordered victim to lie on floor and then shot him in stomach), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 2203, 95 L.Ed.2d 858 (1987); Tucker v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 1496, 1502-03 (11th Cir.1985) (en banc) (victim died of one crushing blow to skull), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 106 S.Ct. 3340, 92 L.Ed.2d 743 (1986); cf. Francis v. Franklin, 720 F.2d 1206, 1212 (11th Cir.1983) (evidence of intent not so overwhelming as to render Sandstrom error harmless where defendant\u2019s gun went off after victim slammed door into it), aff'd, 471 U.S. 307, 105 S.Ct. 1965, 85 L.Ed.2d 344 (1985)."},"case_id":1788495,"label":"a"}
{"context":"As noted above, where the ultimate fact yielded by the impermissible presumption remained as a contested issue in the case, the Sand-strom error will still be deemed harmless if the evidence produced at trial as to that ultimate fact was overwhelming. When that is the case, the error is harmless because the jury would have found it unnecessary to rely on the invalid presumption; the predicate facts of the crime are such that we can say beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have inferred intent from these facts.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"evidence of intent not so overwhelming as to render Sandstrom error harmless where defendant's gun went off after victim slammed door into it","sentence":"See, e.g., High v. Kemp, 819 F.2d 988, 995 (11th Cir.1987) (after repeatedly telling victim that he was about to die, defendant ordered victim to lie on ground and then shot him); Potts v. Kemp, 814 F.2d 1512, 1515-16 (11th Cir.1987) (defendant drove victim to dirt road, forced him out of car, and then shot him); Burger v. Kemp, 785 F.2d 890, 892 (11th Cir.1986) (defendant locked victim in car trunk and then submerged car in pond), aff'd, \u2014 U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 3114, 97 L.Ed.2d 638 (1987); Dobbs v. Kemp, 790 F.2d 1499, 1509 (11th Cir.1986) (defendant ordered victim to lie on floor and then shot him in stomach), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 2203, 95 L.Ed.2d 858 (1987); Tucker v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 1496, 1502-03 (11th Cir.1985) (en banc) (victim died of one crushing blow to skull), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 106 S.Ct. 3340, 92 L.Ed.2d 743 (1986); cf. Francis v. Franklin, 720 F.2d 1206, 1212 (11th Cir.1983) (evidence of intent not so overwhelming as to render Sandstrom error harmless where defendant\u2019s gun went off after victim slammed door into it), aff'd, 471 U.S. 307, 105 S.Ct. 1965, 85 L.Ed.2d 344 (1985)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"defendant ordered victim to lie on floor and then shot him in stomach","sentence":"See, e.g., High v. Kemp, 819 F.2d 988, 995 (11th Cir.1987) (after repeatedly telling victim that he was about to die, defendant ordered victim to lie on ground and then shot him); Potts v. Kemp, 814 F.2d 1512, 1515-16 (11th Cir.1987) (defendant drove victim to dirt road, forced him out of car, and then shot him); Burger v. Kemp, 785 F.2d 890, 892 (11th Cir.1986) (defendant locked victim in car trunk and then submerged car in pond), aff'd, \u2014 U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 3114, 97 L.Ed.2d 638 (1987); Dobbs v. Kemp, 790 F.2d 1499, 1509 (11th Cir.1986) (defendant ordered victim to lie on floor and then shot him in stomach), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 2203, 95 L.Ed.2d 858 (1987); Tucker v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 1496, 1502-03 (11th Cir.1985) (en banc) (victim died of one crushing blow to skull), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 106 S.Ct. 3340, 92 L.Ed.2d 743 (1986); cf. Francis v. Franklin, 720 F.2d 1206, 1212 (11th Cir.1983) (evidence of intent not so overwhelming as to render Sandstrom error harmless where defendant\u2019s gun went off after victim slammed door into it), aff'd, 471 U.S. 307, 105 S.Ct. 1965, 85 L.Ed.2d 344 (1985)."},"case_id":1788495,"label":"b"}
{"context":"As noted above, where the ultimate fact yielded by the impermissible presumption remained as a contested issue in the case, the Sand-strom error will still be deemed harmless if the evidence produced at trial as to that ultimate fact was overwhelming. When that is the case, the error is harmless because the jury would have found it unnecessary to rely on the invalid presumption; the predicate facts of the crime are such that we can say beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have inferred intent from these facts.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"defendant ordered victim to lie on floor and then shot him in stomach","sentence":"See, e.g., High v. Kemp, 819 F.2d 988, 995 (11th Cir.1987) (after repeatedly telling victim that he was about to die, defendant ordered victim to lie on ground and then shot him); Potts v. Kemp, 814 F.2d 1512, 1515-16 (11th Cir.1987) (defendant drove victim to dirt road, forced him out of car, and then shot him); Burger v. Kemp, 785 F.2d 890, 892 (11th Cir.1986) (defendant locked victim in car trunk and then submerged car in pond), aff'd, \u2014 U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 3114, 97 L.Ed.2d 638 (1987); Dobbs v. Kemp, 790 F.2d 1499, 1509 (11th Cir.1986) (defendant ordered victim to lie on floor and then shot him in stomach), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 2203, 95 L.Ed.2d 858 (1987); Tucker v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 1496, 1502-03 (11th Cir.1985) (en banc) (victim died of one crushing blow to skull), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 106 S.Ct. 3340, 92 L.Ed.2d 743 (1986); cf. Francis v. Franklin, 720 F.2d 1206, 1212 (11th Cir.1983) (evidence of intent not so overwhelming as to render Sandstrom error harmless where defendant\u2019s gun went off after victim slammed door into it), aff'd, 471 U.S. 307, 105 S.Ct. 1965, 85 L.Ed.2d 344 (1985)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"720 F.2d 1206, 1212","parenthetical":"evidence of intent not so overwhelming as to render Sandstrom error harmless where defendant's gun went off after victim slammed door into it","sentence":"See, e.g., High v. Kemp, 819 F.2d 988, 995 (11th Cir.1987) (after repeatedly telling victim that he was about to die, defendant ordered victim to lie on ground and then shot him); Potts v. Kemp, 814 F.2d 1512, 1515-16 (11th Cir.1987) (defendant drove victim to dirt road, forced him out of car, and then shot him); Burger v. Kemp, 785 F.2d 890, 892 (11th Cir.1986) (defendant locked victim in car trunk and then submerged car in pond), aff'd, \u2014 U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 3114, 97 L.Ed.2d 638 (1987); Dobbs v. Kemp, 790 F.2d 1499, 1509 (11th Cir.1986) (defendant ordered victim to lie on floor and then shot him in stomach), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 2203, 95 L.Ed.2d 858 (1987); Tucker v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 1496, 1502-03 (11th Cir.1985) (en banc) (victim died of one crushing blow to skull), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 106 S.Ct. 3340, 92 L.Ed.2d 743 (1986); cf. Francis v. Franklin, 720 F.2d 1206, 1212 (11th Cir.1983) (evidence of intent not so overwhelming as to render Sandstrom error harmless where defendant\u2019s gun went off after victim slammed door into it), aff'd, 471 U.S. 307, 105 S.Ct. 1965, 85 L.Ed.2d 344 (1985)."},"case_id":1788495,"label":"a"}
{"context":"As noted above, where the ultimate fact yielded by the impermissible presumption remained as a contested issue in the case, the Sand-strom error will still be deemed harmless if the evidence produced at trial as to that ultimate fact was overwhelming. When that is the case, the error is harmless because the jury would have found it unnecessary to rely on the invalid presumption; the predicate facts of the crime are such that we can say beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have inferred intent from these facts.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"evidence of intent not so overwhelming as to render Sandstrom error harmless where defendant's gun went off after victim slammed door into it","sentence":"See, e.g., High v. Kemp, 819 F.2d 988, 995 (11th Cir.1987) (after repeatedly telling victim that he was about to die, defendant ordered victim to lie on ground and then shot him); Potts v. Kemp, 814 F.2d 1512, 1515-16 (11th Cir.1987) (defendant drove victim to dirt road, forced him out of car, and then shot him); Burger v. Kemp, 785 F.2d 890, 892 (11th Cir.1986) (defendant locked victim in car trunk and then submerged car in pond), aff'd, \u2014 U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 3114, 97 L.Ed.2d 638 (1987); Dobbs v. Kemp, 790 F.2d 1499, 1509 (11th Cir.1986) (defendant ordered victim to lie on floor and then shot him in stomach), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 2203, 95 L.Ed.2d 858 (1987); Tucker v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 1496, 1502-03 (11th Cir.1985) (en banc) (victim died of one crushing blow to skull), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 106 S.Ct. 3340, 92 L.Ed.2d 743 (1986); cf. Francis v. Franklin, 720 F.2d 1206, 1212 (11th Cir.1983) (evidence of intent not so overwhelming as to render Sandstrom error harmless where defendant\u2019s gun went off after victim slammed door into it), aff'd, 471 U.S. 307, 105 S.Ct. 1965, 85 L.Ed.2d 344 (1985)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"defendant ordered victim to lie on floor and then shot him in stomach","sentence":"See, e.g., High v. Kemp, 819 F.2d 988, 995 (11th Cir.1987) (after repeatedly telling victim that he was about to die, defendant ordered victim to lie on ground and then shot him); Potts v. Kemp, 814 F.2d 1512, 1515-16 (11th Cir.1987) (defendant drove victim to dirt road, forced him out of car, and then shot him); Burger v. Kemp, 785 F.2d 890, 892 (11th Cir.1986) (defendant locked victim in car trunk and then submerged car in pond), aff'd, \u2014 U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 3114, 97 L.Ed.2d 638 (1987); Dobbs v. Kemp, 790 F.2d 1499, 1509 (11th Cir.1986) (defendant ordered victim to lie on floor and then shot him in stomach), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 2203, 95 L.Ed.2d 858 (1987); Tucker v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 1496, 1502-03 (11th Cir.1985) (en banc) (victim died of one crushing blow to skull), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 106 S.Ct. 3340, 92 L.Ed.2d 743 (1986); cf. Francis v. Franklin, 720 F.2d 1206, 1212 (11th Cir.1983) (evidence of intent not so overwhelming as to render Sandstrom error harmless where defendant\u2019s gun went off after victim slammed door into it), aff'd, 471 U.S. 307, 105 S.Ct. 1965, 85 L.Ed.2d 344 (1985)."},"case_id":1788495,"label":"b"}
{"context":"As noted above, where the ultimate fact yielded by the impermissible presumption remained as a contested issue in the case, the Sand-strom error will still be deemed harmless if the evidence produced at trial as to that ultimate fact was overwhelming. When that is the case, the error is harmless because the jury would have found it unnecessary to rely on the invalid presumption; the predicate facts of the crime are such that we can say beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have inferred intent from these facts.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"defendant ordered victim to lie on floor and then shot him in stomach","sentence":"See, e.g., High v. Kemp, 819 F.2d 988, 995 (11th Cir.1987) (after repeatedly telling victim that he was about to die, defendant ordered victim to lie on ground and then shot him); Potts v. Kemp, 814 F.2d 1512, 1515-16 (11th Cir.1987) (defendant drove victim to dirt road, forced him out of car, and then shot him); Burger v. Kemp, 785 F.2d 890, 892 (11th Cir.1986) (defendant locked victim in car trunk and then submerged car in pond), aff'd, \u2014 U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 3114, 97 L.Ed.2d 638 (1987); Dobbs v. Kemp, 790 F.2d 1499, 1509 (11th Cir.1986) (defendant ordered victim to lie on floor and then shot him in stomach), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 2203, 95 L.Ed.2d 858 (1987); Tucker v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 1496, 1502-03 (11th Cir.1985) (en banc) (victim died of one crushing blow to skull), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 106 S.Ct. 3340, 92 L.Ed.2d 743 (1986); cf. Francis v. Franklin, 720 F.2d 1206, 1212 (11th Cir.1983) (evidence of intent not so overwhelming as to render Sandstrom error harmless where defendant\u2019s gun went off after victim slammed door into it), aff'd, 471 U.S. 307, 105 S.Ct. 1965, 85 L.Ed.2d 344 (1985)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"evidence of intent not so overwhelming as to render Sandstrom error harmless where defendant's gun went off after victim slammed door into it","sentence":"See, e.g., High v. Kemp, 819 F.2d 988, 995 (11th Cir.1987) (after repeatedly telling victim that he was about to die, defendant ordered victim to lie on ground and then shot him); Potts v. Kemp, 814 F.2d 1512, 1515-16 (11th Cir.1987) (defendant drove victim to dirt road, forced him out of car, and then shot him); Burger v. Kemp, 785 F.2d 890, 892 (11th Cir.1986) (defendant locked victim in car trunk and then submerged car in pond), aff'd, \u2014 U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 3114, 97 L.Ed.2d 638 (1987); Dobbs v. Kemp, 790 F.2d 1499, 1509 (11th Cir.1986) (defendant ordered victim to lie on floor and then shot him in stomach), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 2203, 95 L.Ed.2d 858 (1987); Tucker v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 1496, 1502-03 (11th Cir.1985) (en banc) (victim died of one crushing blow to skull), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 106 S.Ct. 3340, 92 L.Ed.2d 743 (1986); cf. Francis v. Franklin, 720 F.2d 1206, 1212 (11th Cir.1983) (evidence of intent not so overwhelming as to render Sandstrom error harmless where defendant\u2019s gun went off after victim slammed door into it), aff'd, 471 U.S. 307, 105 S.Ct. 1965, 85 L.Ed.2d 344 (1985)."},"case_id":1788495,"label":"a"}
{"context":"As noted above, where the ultimate fact yielded by the impermissible presumption remained as a contested issue in the case, the Sand-strom error will still be deemed harmless if the evidence produced at trial as to that ultimate fact was overwhelming. When that is the case, the error is harmless because the jury would have found it unnecessary to rely on the invalid presumption; the predicate facts of the crime are such that we can say beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have inferred intent from these facts.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"evidence of intent not so overwhelming as to render Sandstrom error harmless where defendant's gun went off after victim slammed door into it","sentence":"See, e.g., High v. Kemp, 819 F.2d 988, 995 (11th Cir.1987) (after repeatedly telling victim that he was about to die, defendant ordered victim to lie on ground and then shot him); Potts v. Kemp, 814 F.2d 1512, 1515-16 (11th Cir.1987) (defendant drove victim to dirt road, forced him out of car, and then shot him); Burger v. Kemp, 785 F.2d 890, 892 (11th Cir.1986) (defendant locked victim in car trunk and then submerged car in pond), aff'd, \u2014 U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 3114, 97 L.Ed.2d 638 (1987); Dobbs v. Kemp, 790 F.2d 1499, 1509 (11th Cir.1986) (defendant ordered victim to lie on floor and then shot him in stomach), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 2203, 95 L.Ed.2d 858 (1987); Tucker v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 1496, 1502-03 (11th Cir.1985) (en banc) (victim died of one crushing blow to skull), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 106 S.Ct. 3340, 92 L.Ed.2d 743 (1986); cf. Francis v. Franklin, 720 F.2d 1206, 1212 (11th Cir.1983) (evidence of intent not so overwhelming as to render Sandstrom error harmless where defendant\u2019s gun went off after victim slammed door into it), aff'd, 471 U.S. 307, 105 S.Ct. 1965, 85 L.Ed.2d 344 (1985)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"defendant ordered victim to lie on floor and then shot him in stomach","sentence":"See, e.g., High v. Kemp, 819 F.2d 988, 995 (11th Cir.1987) (after repeatedly telling victim that he was about to die, defendant ordered victim to lie on ground and then shot him); Potts v. Kemp, 814 F.2d 1512, 1515-16 (11th Cir.1987) (defendant drove victim to dirt road, forced him out of car, and then shot him); Burger v. Kemp, 785 F.2d 890, 892 (11th Cir.1986) (defendant locked victim in car trunk and then submerged car in pond), aff'd, \u2014 U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 3114, 97 L.Ed.2d 638 (1987); Dobbs v. Kemp, 790 F.2d 1499, 1509 (11th Cir.1986) (defendant ordered victim to lie on floor and then shot him in stomach), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 2203, 95 L.Ed.2d 858 (1987); Tucker v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 1496, 1502-03 (11th Cir.1985) (en banc) (victim died of one crushing blow to skull), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 106 S.Ct. 3340, 92 L.Ed.2d 743 (1986); cf. Francis v. Franklin, 720 F.2d 1206, 1212 (11th Cir.1983) (evidence of intent not so overwhelming as to render Sandstrom error harmless where defendant\u2019s gun went off after victim slammed door into it), aff'd, 471 U.S. 307, 105 S.Ct. 1965, 85 L.Ed.2d 344 (1985)."},"case_id":1788495,"label":"b"}
{"context":". In construing a statute, Courts may look to constructions of analogous statutes as interpretive aids.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"549 F.Supp. 830, 832","parenthetical":"\"[AJssistance in interpreting statutory language may be drawn from the interpretation of similar language in earlier analogous legislation.\"","sentence":"See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 110, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 2300, 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972) (To determine the meaning of a state statue which has not yet been interpreted by the state courts, federal courts may look to, inter alia, interpretations the state courts have given to analogous statutes); United States v. Deutsch, 451 F.2d 98, 110 (2d Cir.1971) (As aids in interpreting the Investment Company Act, the court looked to, inter alia, interpretations of statutes analogous to the act); see also United States v. Rose, 549 F.Supp. 830, 832 (S.D.N.Y.1982) (\"[AJssistance in interpreting statutory language may be drawn from the interpretation of similar language in earlier analogous legislation.\u201d)"},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"408 U.S. 104, 110","parenthetical":"To determine the meaning of a state statue which has not yet been interpreted by the state courts, federal courts may look to, inter alia, interpretations the state courts have given to analogous statutes","sentence":"See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 110, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 2300, 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972) (To determine the meaning of a state statue which has not yet been interpreted by the state courts, federal courts may look to, inter alia, interpretations the state courts have given to analogous statutes); United States v. Deutsch, 451 F.2d 98, 110 (2d Cir.1971) (As aids in interpreting the Investment Company Act, the court looked to, inter alia, interpretations of statutes analogous to the act); see also United States v. Rose, 549 F.Supp. 830, 832 (S.D.N.Y.1982) (\"[AJssistance in interpreting statutory language may be drawn from the interpretation of similar language in earlier analogous legislation.\u201d)"},"case_id":3768791,"label":"b"}
{"context":". In construing a statute, Courts may look to constructions of analogous statutes as interpretive aids.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"549 F.Supp. 830, 832","parenthetical":"\"[AJssistance in interpreting statutory language may be drawn from the interpretation of similar language in earlier analogous legislation.\"","sentence":"See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 110, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 2300, 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972) (To determine the meaning of a state statue which has not yet been interpreted by the state courts, federal courts may look to, inter alia, interpretations the state courts have given to analogous statutes); United States v. Deutsch, 451 F.2d 98, 110 (2d Cir.1971) (As aids in interpreting the Investment Company Act, the court looked to, inter alia, interpretations of statutes analogous to the act); see also United States v. Rose, 549 F.Supp. 830, 832 (S.D.N.Y.1982) (\"[AJssistance in interpreting statutory language may be drawn from the interpretation of similar language in earlier analogous legislation.\u201d)"},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"92 S.Ct. 2294, 2300","parenthetical":"To determine the meaning of a state statue which has not yet been interpreted by the state courts, federal courts may look to, inter alia, interpretations the state courts have given to analogous statutes","sentence":"See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 110, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 2300, 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972) (To determine the meaning of a state statue which has not yet been interpreted by the state courts, federal courts may look to, inter alia, interpretations the state courts have given to analogous statutes); United States v. Deutsch, 451 F.2d 98, 110 (2d Cir.1971) (As aids in interpreting the Investment Company Act, the court looked to, inter alia, interpretations of statutes analogous to the act); see also United States v. Rose, 549 F.Supp. 830, 832 (S.D.N.Y.1982) (\"[AJssistance in interpreting statutory language may be drawn from the interpretation of similar language in earlier analogous legislation.\u201d)"},"case_id":3768791,"label":"b"}
{"context":". In construing a statute, Courts may look to constructions of analogous statutes as interpretive aids.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"To determine the meaning of a state statue which has not yet been interpreted by the state courts, federal courts may look to, inter alia, interpretations the state courts have given to analogous statutes","sentence":"See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 110, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 2300, 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972) (To determine the meaning of a state statue which has not yet been interpreted by the state courts, federal courts may look to, inter alia, interpretations the state courts have given to analogous statutes); United States v. Deutsch, 451 F.2d 98, 110 (2d Cir.1971) (As aids in interpreting the Investment Company Act, the court looked to, inter alia, interpretations of statutes analogous to the act); see also United States v. Rose, 549 F.Supp. 830, 832 (S.D.N.Y.1982) (\"[AJssistance in interpreting statutory language may be drawn from the interpretation of similar language in earlier analogous legislation.\u201d)"},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"549 F.Supp. 830, 832","parenthetical":"\"[AJssistance in interpreting statutory language may be drawn from the interpretation of similar language in earlier analogous legislation.\"","sentence":"See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 110, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 2300, 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972) (To determine the meaning of a state statue which has not yet been interpreted by the state courts, federal courts may look to, inter alia, interpretations the state courts have given to analogous statutes); United States v. Deutsch, 451 F.2d 98, 110 (2d Cir.1971) (As aids in interpreting the Investment Company Act, the court looked to, inter alia, interpretations of statutes analogous to the act); see also United States v. Rose, 549 F.Supp. 830, 832 (S.D.N.Y.1982) (\"[AJssistance in interpreting statutory language may be drawn from the interpretation of similar language in earlier analogous legislation.\u201d)"},"case_id":3768791,"label":"a"}
{"context":". In construing a statute, Courts may look to constructions of analogous statutes as interpretive aids.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"549 F.Supp. 830, 832","parenthetical":"\"[AJssistance in interpreting statutory language may be drawn from the interpretation of similar language in earlier analogous legislation.\"","sentence":"See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 110, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 2300, 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972) (To determine the meaning of a state statue which has not yet been interpreted by the state courts, federal courts may look to, inter alia, interpretations the state courts have given to analogous statutes); United States v. Deutsch, 451 F.2d 98, 110 (2d Cir.1971) (As aids in interpreting the Investment Company Act, the court looked to, inter alia, interpretations of statutes analogous to the act); see also United States v. Rose, 549 F.Supp. 830, 832 (S.D.N.Y.1982) (\"[AJssistance in interpreting statutory language may be drawn from the interpretation of similar language in earlier analogous legislation.\u201d)"},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"451 F.2d 98, 110","parenthetical":"As aids in interpreting the Investment Company Act, the court looked to, inter alia, interpretations of statutes analogous to the act","sentence":"See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 110, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 2300, 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972) (To determine the meaning of a state statue which has not yet been interpreted by the state courts, federal courts may look to, inter alia, interpretations the state courts have given to analogous statutes); United States v. Deutsch, 451 F.2d 98, 110 (2d Cir.1971) (As aids in interpreting the Investment Company Act, the court looked to, inter alia, interpretations of statutes analogous to the act); see also United States v. Rose, 549 F.Supp. 830, 832 (S.D.N.Y.1982) (\"[AJssistance in interpreting statutory language may be drawn from the interpretation of similar language in earlier analogous legislation.\u201d)"},"case_id":3768791,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The O'Hare opinion has been cited for this holding, but not since 1920 and only in the context of this particular section of the Espionage Act, which has since been repealed. Further, there has been significant developmenl in First Amendment jurisprudence in the context of civil rights suits.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"482 U.S. 461, 461","parenthetical":"First Amendment protects significant amount of verbal criticism and challenge directed to police officers","sentence":"See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 611-12 & n. 9, 93 S.Ct. 2908, 37 L.Ed.2d 830 (1973) (as long recognized, First Amendment needs breathing space, and statutes attempting to burden or restrict its exercise must be narrowly drawn and represent considered legislative judgment that specific mode of expression must give way to other compelling needs of society); see also City of Houston, 482 U.S. at 461, 107 S.Ct. 2502 (First Amendment protects significant amount of verbal criticism and challenge directed to police officers)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"as long recognized, First Amendment needs breathing space, and statutes attempting to burden or restrict its exercise must be narrowly drawn and represent considered legislative judgment that specific mode of expression must give way to other compelling needs of society","sentence":"See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 611-12 & n. 9, 93 S.Ct. 2908, 37 L.Ed.2d 830 (1973) (as long recognized, First Amendment needs breathing space, and statutes attempting to burden or restrict its exercise must be narrowly drawn and represent considered legislative judgment that specific mode of expression must give way to other compelling needs of society); see also City of Houston, 482 U.S. at 461, 107 S.Ct. 2502 (First Amendment protects significant amount of verbal criticism and challenge directed to police officers)."},"case_id":3702628,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The O'Hare opinion has been cited for this holding, but not since 1920 and only in the context of this particular section of the Espionage Act, which has since been repealed. Further, there has been significant developmenl in First Amendment jurisprudence in the context of civil rights suits.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"First Amendment protects significant amount of verbal criticism and challenge directed to police officers","sentence":"See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 611-12 & n. 9, 93 S.Ct. 2908, 37 L.Ed.2d 830 (1973) (as long recognized, First Amendment needs breathing space, and statutes attempting to burden or restrict its exercise must be narrowly drawn and represent considered legislative judgment that specific mode of expression must give way to other compelling needs of society); see also City of Houston, 482 U.S. at 461, 107 S.Ct. 2502 (First Amendment protects significant amount of verbal criticism and challenge directed to police officers)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"as long recognized, First Amendment needs breathing space, and statutes attempting to burden or restrict its exercise must be narrowly drawn and represent considered legislative judgment that specific mode of expression must give way to other compelling needs of society","sentence":"See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 611-12 & n. 9, 93 S.Ct. 2908, 37 L.Ed.2d 830 (1973) (as long recognized, First Amendment needs breathing space, and statutes attempting to burden or restrict its exercise must be narrowly drawn and represent considered legislative judgment that specific mode of expression must give way to other compelling needs of society); see also City of Houston, 482 U.S. at 461, 107 S.Ct. 2502 (First Amendment protects significant amount of verbal criticism and challenge directed to police officers)."},"case_id":3702628,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The O'Hare opinion has been cited for this holding, but not since 1920 and only in the context of this particular section of the Espionage Act, which has since been repealed. Further, there has been significant developmenl in First Amendment jurisprudence in the context of civil rights suits.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"482 U.S. 461, 461","parenthetical":"First Amendment protects significant amount of verbal criticism and challenge directed to police officers","sentence":"See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 611-12 & n. 9, 93 S.Ct. 2908, 37 L.Ed.2d 830 (1973) (as long recognized, First Amendment needs breathing space, and statutes attempting to burden or restrict its exercise must be narrowly drawn and represent considered legislative judgment that specific mode of expression must give way to other compelling needs of society); see also City of Houston, 482 U.S. at 461, 107 S.Ct. 2502 (First Amendment protects significant amount of verbal criticism and challenge directed to police officers)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"as long recognized, First Amendment needs breathing space, and statutes attempting to burden or restrict its exercise must be narrowly drawn and represent considered legislative judgment that specific mode of expression must give way to other compelling needs of society","sentence":"See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 611-12 & n. 9, 93 S.Ct. 2908, 37 L.Ed.2d 830 (1973) (as long recognized, First Amendment needs breathing space, and statutes attempting to burden or restrict its exercise must be narrowly drawn and represent considered legislative judgment that specific mode of expression must give way to other compelling needs of society); see also City of Houston, 482 U.S. at 461, 107 S.Ct. 2502 (First Amendment protects significant amount of verbal criticism and challenge directed to police officers)."},"case_id":3702628,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The O'Hare opinion has been cited for this holding, but not since 1920 and only in the context of this particular section of the Espionage Act, which has since been repealed. Further, there has been significant developmenl in First Amendment jurisprudence in the context of civil rights suits.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"First Amendment protects significant amount of verbal criticism and challenge directed to police officers","sentence":"See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 611-12 & n. 9, 93 S.Ct. 2908, 37 L.Ed.2d 830 (1973) (as long recognized, First Amendment needs breathing space, and statutes attempting to burden or restrict its exercise must be narrowly drawn and represent considered legislative judgment that specific mode of expression must give way to other compelling needs of society); see also City of Houston, 482 U.S. at 461, 107 S.Ct. 2502 (First Amendment protects significant amount of verbal criticism and challenge directed to police officers)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"as long recognized, First Amendment needs breathing space, and statutes attempting to burden or restrict its exercise must be narrowly drawn and represent considered legislative judgment that specific mode of expression must give way to other compelling needs of society","sentence":"See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 611-12 & n. 9, 93 S.Ct. 2908, 37 L.Ed.2d 830 (1973) (as long recognized, First Amendment needs breathing space, and statutes attempting to burden or restrict its exercise must be narrowly drawn and represent considered legislative judgment that specific mode of expression must give way to other compelling needs of society); see also City of Houston, 482 U.S. at 461, 107 S.Ct. 2502 (First Amendment protects significant amount of verbal criticism and challenge directed to police officers)."},"case_id":3702628,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The O'Hare opinion has been cited for this holding, but not since 1920 and only in the context of this particular section of the Espionage Act, which has since been repealed. Further, there has been significant developmenl in First Amendment jurisprudence in the context of civil rights suits.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"as long recognized, First Amendment needs breathing space, and statutes attempting to burden or restrict its exercise must be narrowly drawn and represent considered legislative judgment that specific mode of expression must give way to other compelling needs of society","sentence":"See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 611-12 & n. 9, 93 S.Ct. 2908, 37 L.Ed.2d 830 (1973) (as long recognized, First Amendment needs breathing space, and statutes attempting to burden or restrict its exercise must be narrowly drawn and represent considered legislative judgment that specific mode of expression must give way to other compelling needs of society); see also City of Houston, 482 U.S. at 461, 107 S.Ct. 2502 (First Amendment protects significant amount of verbal criticism and challenge directed to police officers)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"482 U.S. 461, 461","parenthetical":"First Amendment protects significant amount of verbal criticism and challenge directed to police officers","sentence":"See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 611-12 & n. 9, 93 S.Ct. 2908, 37 L.Ed.2d 830 (1973) (as long recognized, First Amendment needs breathing space, and statutes attempting to burden or restrict its exercise must be narrowly drawn and represent considered legislative judgment that specific mode of expression must give way to other compelling needs of society); see also City of Houston, 482 U.S. at 461, 107 S.Ct. 2502 (First Amendment protects significant amount of verbal criticism and challenge directed to police officers)."},"case_id":3702628,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The O'Hare opinion has been cited for this holding, but not since 1920 and only in the context of this particular section of the Espionage Act, which has since been repealed. Further, there has been significant developmenl in First Amendment jurisprudence in the context of civil rights suits.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"First Amendment protects significant amount of verbal criticism and challenge directed to police officers","sentence":"See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 611-12 & n. 9, 93 S.Ct. 2908, 37 L.Ed.2d 830 (1973) (as long recognized, First Amendment needs breathing space, and statutes attempting to burden or restrict its exercise must be narrowly drawn and represent considered legislative judgment that specific mode of expression must give way to other compelling needs of society); see also City of Houston, 482 U.S. at 461, 107 S.Ct. 2502 (First Amendment protects significant amount of verbal criticism and challenge directed to police officers)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"as long recognized, First Amendment needs breathing space, and statutes attempting to burden or restrict its exercise must be narrowly drawn and represent considered legislative judgment that specific mode of expression must give way to other compelling needs of society","sentence":"See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 611-12 & n. 9, 93 S.Ct. 2908, 37 L.Ed.2d 830 (1973) (as long recognized, First Amendment needs breathing space, and statutes attempting to burden or restrict its exercise must be narrowly drawn and represent considered legislative judgment that specific mode of expression must give way to other compelling needs of society); see also City of Houston, 482 U.S. at 461, 107 S.Ct. 2502 (First Amendment protects significant amount of verbal criticism and challenge directed to police officers)."},"case_id":3702628,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Further, the record shows that D. L. T. has been in the same foster home since she was about five months old, that she is bonded to her foster parents and is doing very well in their home, and that the foster parents want to adopt her. Evidence that the mother failed to take the steps necessary for reunification, that the foster parents have provided the child with a stable and secure home, and that they want to adopt the child will support a finding that the child would be harmed by further deprivation.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"251 Ga. App. 859, 862","parenthetical":"finding insufficient evidence that keeping the children in foster care while their mother worked on completing the case plan would harm the children, when the children's foster family did not wish to adopt the children and there were no identifiable prospects for placing the children in a permanent adoptive home","sentence":"In the Interest of C. J., 279 Ga. App. at 217-218 (1); see also In the Interest of A. K, 272 Ga. App. 429, 438 (1) (d) (612 SE2d 581) (2005) (the court is \u201cauthorized to consider the adverse effects of prolonged foster care in determining that continued deprivation is likely to cause serious physical, mental, emotional, or moral harm\u201d to the child) (footnote omitted); In the Interest of B. I. F, 264 Ga.App. 777, 781 (1) (592 SE2d441) (2003) (\u201citis well established that children need permanence of home and emotional stability or they are likely to suffer serious emotional problems\u201d) (footnote omitted); cf. In the Interest of D. F., 251 Ga. App. 859, 862 (555 SE2d 225) (2001) (finding insufficient evidence that keeping the children in foster care while their mother worked on completing the case plan would harm the children, when the children\u2019s foster family did not wish to adopt the children and there were no identifiable prospects for placing the children in a permanent adoptive home)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"272 Ga. App. 429, 438","parenthetical":"the court is \"authorized to consider the adverse effects of prolonged foster care in determining that continued deprivation is likely to cause serious physical, mental, emotional, or moral harm\" to the child","sentence":"In the Interest of C. J., 279 Ga. App. at 217-218 (1); see also In the Interest of A. K, 272 Ga. App. 429, 438 (1) (d) (612 SE2d 581) (2005) (the court is \u201cauthorized to consider the adverse effects of prolonged foster care in determining that continued deprivation is likely to cause serious physical, mental, emotional, or moral harm\u201d to the child) (footnote omitted); In the Interest of B. I. F, 264 Ga.App. 777, 781 (1) (592 SE2d441) (2003) (\u201citis well established that children need permanence of home and emotional stability or they are likely to suffer serious emotional problems\u201d) (footnote omitted); cf. In the Interest of D. F., 251 Ga. App. 859, 862 (555 SE2d 225) (2001) (finding insufficient evidence that keeping the children in foster care while their mother worked on completing the case plan would harm the children, when the children\u2019s foster family did not wish to adopt the children and there were no identifiable prospects for placing the children in a permanent adoptive home)."},"case_id":3549122,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Further, the record shows that D. L. T. has been in the same foster home since she was about five months old, that she is bonded to her foster parents and is doing very well in their home, and that the foster parents want to adopt her. Evidence that the mother failed to take the steps necessary for reunification, that the foster parents have provided the child with a stable and secure home, and that they want to adopt the child will support a finding that the child would be harmed by further deprivation.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"251 Ga. App. 859, 862","parenthetical":"finding insufficient evidence that keeping the children in foster care while their mother worked on completing the case plan would harm the children, when the children's foster family did not wish to adopt the children and there were no identifiable prospects for placing the children in a permanent adoptive home","sentence":"In the Interest of C. J., 279 Ga. App. at 217-218 (1); see also In the Interest of A. K, 272 Ga. App. 429, 438 (1) (d) (612 SE2d 581) (2005) (the court is \u201cauthorized to consider the adverse effects of prolonged foster care in determining that continued deprivation is likely to cause serious physical, mental, emotional, or moral harm\u201d to the child) (footnote omitted); In the Interest of B. I. F, 264 Ga.App. 777, 781 (1) (592 SE2d441) (2003) (\u201citis well established that children need permanence of home and emotional stability or they are likely to suffer serious emotional problems\u201d) (footnote omitted); cf. In the Interest of D. F., 251 Ga. App. 859, 862 (555 SE2d 225) (2001) (finding insufficient evidence that keeping the children in foster care while their mother worked on completing the case plan would harm the children, when the children\u2019s foster family did not wish to adopt the children and there were no identifiable prospects for placing the children in a permanent adoptive home)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"264 Ga.App. 777, 781","parenthetical":"\"itis well established that children need permanence of home and emotional stability or they are likely to suffer serious emotional problems\"","sentence":"In the Interest of C. J., 279 Ga. App. at 217-218 (1); see also In the Interest of A. K, 272 Ga. App. 429, 438 (1) (d) (612 SE2d 581) (2005) (the court is \u201cauthorized to consider the adverse effects of prolonged foster care in determining that continued deprivation is likely to cause serious physical, mental, emotional, or moral harm\u201d to the child) (footnote omitted); In the Interest of B. I. F, 264 Ga.App. 777, 781 (1) (592 SE2d441) (2003) (\u201citis well established that children need permanence of home and emotional stability or they are likely to suffer serious emotional problems\u201d) (footnote omitted); cf. In the Interest of D. F., 251 Ga. App. 859, 862 (555 SE2d 225) (2001) (finding insufficient evidence that keeping the children in foster care while their mother worked on completing the case plan would harm the children, when the children\u2019s foster family did not wish to adopt the children and there were no identifiable prospects for placing the children in a permanent adoptive home)."},"case_id":3549122,"label":"b"}
{"context":"(See J.A. 93-94.) Likewise, Smith testified that she heard shots coming from behind them and then turned and saw Joseph fall to the ground, also indicating a lack of provocation. (J.A. 142-43.)","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"273 F.3d 299, 319","parenthetical":"noting that victim was shot twice in the back as a factor in establishing defendant's specific intent to kill","sentence":"See Nicholas, 56 V.I. at 736 (highlighting the lack of argument and the circumstance that the victim was shot from behind as indicators of premeditation); see also Szuchon v. Lehman, 273 F.3d 299, 319 (3d Cir. 2001) (noting that victim was shot twice in the back as a factor in establishing defendant\u2019s specific intent to kill)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"56 V.I. 736, 736","parenthetical":"highlighting the lack of argument and the circumstance that the victim was shot from behind as indicators of premeditation","sentence":"See Nicholas, 56 V.I. at 736 (highlighting the lack of argument and the circumstance that the victim was shot from behind as indicators of premeditation); see also Szuchon v. Lehman, 273 F.3d 299, 319 (3d Cir. 2001) (noting that victim was shot twice in the back as a factor in establishing defendant\u2019s specific intent to kill)."},"case_id":3589278,"label":"b"}
{"context":"(Comply 16.) The Tenth Circuit has held that a recording device attached to a home telephone extension, such as that alleged in this case, qualifies for the Extension Phone Exemption because it is the telephone receiver, and not the recording device, that constitutes the intercepting mechanism.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"listing possible exceptions to liability where one spouse records conversation of another spouse and including Extension Phone Exemption contained in SS 2510(5","sentence":"See United States v. Harpel, 493 F.2d 346, 350 (10th Cir.1974); see also Thompson, 970 F.2d at 748 n. 5 (listing possible exceptions to liability where one spouse records conversation of another spouse and including Extension Phone Exemption contained in \u00a7 2510(5)(a)(i)); Newcomb, 944 F.2d at 1536 (\u201cThe interception of a family member\u2019s telephone conversations by use of an extension phone in the family home is arguably permitted by a broad reading of the exemption contained in 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 2510(5)(a)(1).\u201d); cf. Scheib, 22 F.3d at 151 (addressing merits of the plaintiffs Extension Phone Exemption argument without first discussing whether \u201cintercepting equipment\u201d \u2014 answering machine attached to a home phone extension' \u2014 qualified for the Extension Phone Exemption)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"22 F.3d 151, 151","parenthetical":"addressing merits of the plaintiffs Extension Phone Exemption argument without first discussing whether \"intercepting equipment\" -- answering machine attached to a home phone extension' -- qualified for the Extension Phone Exemption","sentence":"See United States v. Harpel, 493 F.2d 346, 350 (10th Cir.1974); see also Thompson, 970 F.2d at 748 n. 5 (listing possible exceptions to liability where one spouse records conversation of another spouse and including Extension Phone Exemption contained in \u00a7 2510(5)(a)(i)); Newcomb, 944 F.2d at 1536 (\u201cThe interception of a family member\u2019s telephone conversations by use of an extension phone in the family home is arguably permitted by a broad reading of the exemption contained in 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 2510(5)(a)(1).\u201d); cf. Scheib, 22 F.3d at 151 (addressing merits of the plaintiffs Extension Phone Exemption argument without first discussing whether \u201cintercepting equipment\u201d \u2014 answering machine attached to a home phone extension' \u2014 qualified for the Extension Phone Exemption)."},"case_id":4223633,"label":"a"}
{"context":"(Comply 16.) The Tenth Circuit has held that a recording device attached to a home telephone extension, such as that alleged in this case, qualifies for the Extension Phone Exemption because it is the telephone receiver, and not the recording device, that constitutes the intercepting mechanism.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"944 F.2d 1536, 1536","parenthetical":"\"The interception of a family member's telephone conversations by use of an extension phone in the family home is arguably permitted by a broad reading of the exemption contained in 18 U.S.C. SS 2510(5","sentence":"See United States v. Harpel, 493 F.2d 346, 350 (10th Cir.1974); see also Thompson, 970 F.2d at 748 n. 5 (listing possible exceptions to liability where one spouse records conversation of another spouse and including Extension Phone Exemption contained in \u00a7 2510(5)(a)(i)); Newcomb, 944 F.2d at 1536 (\u201cThe interception of a family member\u2019s telephone conversations by use of an extension phone in the family home is arguably permitted by a broad reading of the exemption contained in 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 2510(5)(a)(1).\u201d); cf. Scheib, 22 F.3d at 151 (addressing merits of the plaintiffs Extension Phone Exemption argument without first discussing whether \u201cintercepting equipment\u201d \u2014 answering machine attached to a home phone extension' \u2014 qualified for the Extension Phone Exemption)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"22 F.3d 151, 151","parenthetical":"addressing merits of the plaintiffs Extension Phone Exemption argument without first discussing whether \"intercepting equipment\" -- answering machine attached to a home phone extension' -- qualified for the Extension Phone Exemption","sentence":"See United States v. Harpel, 493 F.2d 346, 350 (10th Cir.1974); see also Thompson, 970 F.2d at 748 n. 5 (listing possible exceptions to liability where one spouse records conversation of another spouse and including Extension Phone Exemption contained in \u00a7 2510(5)(a)(i)); Newcomb, 944 F.2d at 1536 (\u201cThe interception of a family member\u2019s telephone conversations by use of an extension phone in the family home is arguably permitted by a broad reading of the exemption contained in 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 2510(5)(a)(1).\u201d); cf. Scheib, 22 F.3d at 151 (addressing merits of the plaintiffs Extension Phone Exemption argument without first discussing whether \u201cintercepting equipment\u201d \u2014 answering machine attached to a home phone extension' \u2014 qualified for the Extension Phone Exemption)."},"case_id":4223633,"label":"a"}
{"context":". Appellant cites to several cases in this jurisdiction where we found error in the giving of instructions that permitted a non-unanimous verdict. All are distinguishable from the present case in that they each involved two separate incidents chargeable as two separate offenses.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"284 U.S. 299, 301-03","parenthetical":"successive sales of morphine to same person constitute distinct and separate offenses","sentence":"Hack v. United States, 445 A.2d 634, 641 (D.C.1982) (possession of separate packets of marijuana in plastic bag on street and in police car; harmless error); Hawkins v. United States, 434 A.2d 446 (D.C.1981) (assault on complaint by swinging fist through open window of car and, after initial fight, assault on complainant with tire jack outside of car); Johnson v. United States, 398 A.2d 354, 368-70 (D.C.1979) (assault with intent to kill by pushing complainant partially out of fifth floor window and later by throwing complainant into Potomac River); see also Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 301-03, 52 S.Ct. 180, 181-82, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932) (successive sales of morphine to same person constitute distinct and separate offenses); cf. Davis v. United States, 448 A.2d 242 (D.C.1982) (possession of two separate packets of marijuana, one that appellant had thrown into a taxicab, the other that he had later hidden in the rear seat of a police car)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"assault on complaint by swinging fist through open window of car and, after initial fight, assault on complainant with tire jack outside of car","sentence":"Hack v. United States, 445 A.2d 634, 641 (D.C.1982) (possession of separate packets of marijuana in plastic bag on street and in police car; harmless error); Hawkins v. United States, 434 A.2d 446 (D.C.1981) (assault on complaint by swinging fist through open window of car and, after initial fight, assault on complainant with tire jack outside of car); Johnson v. United States, 398 A.2d 354, 368-70 (D.C.1979) (assault with intent to kill by pushing complainant partially out of fifth floor window and later by throwing complainant into Potomac River); see also Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 301-03, 52 S.Ct. 180, 181-82, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932) (successive sales of morphine to same person constitute distinct and separate offenses); cf. Davis v. United States, 448 A.2d 242 (D.C.1982) (possession of two separate packets of marijuana, one that appellant had thrown into a taxicab, the other that he had later hidden in the rear seat of a police car)."},"case_id":7923086,"label":"b"}
{"context":". Appellant cites to several cases in this jurisdiction where we found error in the giving of instructions that permitted a non-unanimous verdict. All are distinguishable from the present case in that they each involved two separate incidents chargeable as two separate offenses.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"assault on complaint by swinging fist through open window of car and, after initial fight, assault on complainant with tire jack outside of car","sentence":"Hack v. United States, 445 A.2d 634, 641 (D.C.1982) (possession of separate packets of marijuana in plastic bag on street and in police car; harmless error); Hawkins v. United States, 434 A.2d 446 (D.C.1981) (assault on complaint by swinging fist through open window of car and, after initial fight, assault on complainant with tire jack outside of car); Johnson v. United States, 398 A.2d 354, 368-70 (D.C.1979) (assault with intent to kill by pushing complainant partially out of fifth floor window and later by throwing complainant into Potomac River); see also Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 301-03, 52 S.Ct. 180, 181-82, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932) (successive sales of morphine to same person constitute distinct and separate offenses); cf. Davis v. United States, 448 A.2d 242 (D.C.1982) (possession of two separate packets of marijuana, one that appellant had thrown into a taxicab, the other that he had later hidden in the rear seat of a police car)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"52 S.Ct. 180, 181-82","parenthetical":"successive sales of morphine to same person constitute distinct and separate offenses","sentence":"Hack v. United States, 445 A.2d 634, 641 (D.C.1982) (possession of separate packets of marijuana in plastic bag on street and in police car; harmless error); Hawkins v. United States, 434 A.2d 446 (D.C.1981) (assault on complaint by swinging fist through open window of car and, after initial fight, assault on complainant with tire jack outside of car); Johnson v. United States, 398 A.2d 354, 368-70 (D.C.1979) (assault with intent to kill by pushing complainant partially out of fifth floor window and later by throwing complainant into Potomac River); see also Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 301-03, 52 S.Ct. 180, 181-82, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932) (successive sales of morphine to same person constitute distinct and separate offenses); cf. Davis v. United States, 448 A.2d 242 (D.C.1982) (possession of two separate packets of marijuana, one that appellant had thrown into a taxicab, the other that he had later hidden in the rear seat of a police car)."},"case_id":7923086,"label":"a"}
{"context":". Appellant cites to several cases in this jurisdiction where we found error in the giving of instructions that permitted a non-unanimous verdict. All are distinguishable from the present case in that they each involved two separate incidents chargeable as two separate offenses.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"successive sales of morphine to same person constitute distinct and separate offenses","sentence":"Hack v. United States, 445 A.2d 634, 641 (D.C.1982) (possession of separate packets of marijuana in plastic bag on street and in police car; harmless error); Hawkins v. United States, 434 A.2d 446 (D.C.1981) (assault on complaint by swinging fist through open window of car and, after initial fight, assault on complainant with tire jack outside of car); Johnson v. United States, 398 A.2d 354, 368-70 (D.C.1979) (assault with intent to kill by pushing complainant partially out of fifth floor window and later by throwing complainant into Potomac River); see also Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 301-03, 52 S.Ct. 180, 181-82, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932) (successive sales of morphine to same person constitute distinct and separate offenses); cf. Davis v. United States, 448 A.2d 242 (D.C.1982) (possession of two separate packets of marijuana, one that appellant had thrown into a taxicab, the other that he had later hidden in the rear seat of a police car)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"assault on complaint by swinging fist through open window of car and, after initial fight, assault on complainant with tire jack outside of car","sentence":"Hack v. United States, 445 A.2d 634, 641 (D.C.1982) (possession of separate packets of marijuana in plastic bag on street and in police car; harmless error); Hawkins v. United States, 434 A.2d 446 (D.C.1981) (assault on complaint by swinging fist through open window of car and, after initial fight, assault on complainant with tire jack outside of car); Johnson v. United States, 398 A.2d 354, 368-70 (D.C.1979) (assault with intent to kill by pushing complainant partially out of fifth floor window and later by throwing complainant into Potomac River); see also Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 301-03, 52 S.Ct. 180, 181-82, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932) (successive sales of morphine to same person constitute distinct and separate offenses); cf. Davis v. United States, 448 A.2d 242 (D.C.1982) (possession of two separate packets of marijuana, one that appellant had thrown into a taxicab, the other that he had later hidden in the rear seat of a police car)."},"case_id":7923086,"label":"b"}
{"context":". Appellant cites to several cases in this jurisdiction where we found error in the giving of instructions that permitted a non-unanimous verdict. All are distinguishable from the present case in that they each involved two separate incidents chargeable as two separate offenses.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"assault on complaint by swinging fist through open window of car and, after initial fight, assault on complainant with tire jack outside of car","sentence":"Hack v. United States, 445 A.2d 634, 641 (D.C.1982) (possession of separate packets of marijuana in plastic bag on street and in police car; harmless error); Hawkins v. United States, 434 A.2d 446 (D.C.1981) (assault on complaint by swinging fist through open window of car and, after initial fight, assault on complainant with tire jack outside of car); Johnson v. United States, 398 A.2d 354, 368-70 (D.C.1979) (assault with intent to kill by pushing complainant partially out of fifth floor window and later by throwing complainant into Potomac River); see also Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 301-03, 52 S.Ct. 180, 181-82, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932) (successive sales of morphine to same person constitute distinct and separate offenses); cf. Davis v. United States, 448 A.2d 242 (D.C.1982) (possession of two separate packets of marijuana, one that appellant had thrown into a taxicab, the other that he had later hidden in the rear seat of a police car)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"possession of two separate packets of marijuana, one that appellant had thrown into a taxicab, the other that he had later hidden in the rear seat of a police car","sentence":"Hack v. United States, 445 A.2d 634, 641 (D.C.1982) (possession of separate packets of marijuana in plastic bag on street and in police car; harmless error); Hawkins v. United States, 434 A.2d 446 (D.C.1981) (assault on complaint by swinging fist through open window of car and, after initial fight, assault on complainant with tire jack outside of car); Johnson v. United States, 398 A.2d 354, 368-70 (D.C.1979) (assault with intent to kill by pushing complainant partially out of fifth floor window and later by throwing complainant into Potomac River); see also Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 301-03, 52 S.Ct. 180, 181-82, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932) (successive sales of morphine to same person constitute distinct and separate offenses); cf. Davis v. United States, 448 A.2d 242 (D.C.1982) (possession of two separate packets of marijuana, one that appellant had thrown into a taxicab, the other that he had later hidden in the rear seat of a police car)."},"case_id":7923086,"label":"a"}
{"context":". Appellant cites to several cases in this jurisdiction where we found error in the giving of instructions that permitted a non-unanimous verdict. All are distinguishable from the present case in that they each involved two separate incidents chargeable as two separate offenses.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"284 U.S. 299, 301-03","parenthetical":"successive sales of morphine to same person constitute distinct and separate offenses","sentence":"Hack v. United States, 445 A.2d 634, 641 (D.C.1982) (possession of separate packets of marijuana in plastic bag on street and in police car; harmless error); Hawkins v. United States, 434 A.2d 446 (D.C.1981) (assault on complaint by swinging fist through open window of car and, after initial fight, assault on complainant with tire jack outside of car); Johnson v. United States, 398 A.2d 354, 368-70 (D.C.1979) (assault with intent to kill by pushing complainant partially out of fifth floor window and later by throwing complainant into Potomac River); see also Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 301-03, 52 S.Ct. 180, 181-82, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932) (successive sales of morphine to same person constitute distinct and separate offenses); cf. Davis v. United States, 448 A.2d 242 (D.C.1982) (possession of two separate packets of marijuana, one that appellant had thrown into a taxicab, the other that he had later hidden in the rear seat of a police car)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"398 A.2d 354, 368-70","parenthetical":"assault with intent to kill by pushing complainant partially out of fifth floor window and later by throwing complainant into Potomac River","sentence":"Hack v. United States, 445 A.2d 634, 641 (D.C.1982) (possession of separate packets of marijuana in plastic bag on street and in police car; harmless error); Hawkins v. United States, 434 A.2d 446 (D.C.1981) (assault on complaint by swinging fist through open window of car and, after initial fight, assault on complainant with tire jack outside of car); Johnson v. United States, 398 A.2d 354, 368-70 (D.C.1979) (assault with intent to kill by pushing complainant partially out of fifth floor window and later by throwing complainant into Potomac River); see also Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 301-03, 52 S.Ct. 180, 181-82, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932) (successive sales of morphine to same person constitute distinct and separate offenses); cf. Davis v. United States, 448 A.2d 242 (D.C.1982) (possession of two separate packets of marijuana, one that appellant had thrown into a taxicab, the other that he had later hidden in the rear seat of a police car)."},"case_id":7923086,"label":"b"}
{"context":". Appellant cites to several cases in this jurisdiction where we found error in the giving of instructions that permitted a non-unanimous verdict. All are distinguishable from the present case in that they each involved two separate incidents chargeable as two separate offenses.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"52 S.Ct. 180, 181-82","parenthetical":"successive sales of morphine to same person constitute distinct and separate offenses","sentence":"Hack v. United States, 445 A.2d 634, 641 (D.C.1982) (possession of separate packets of marijuana in plastic bag on street and in police car; harmless error); Hawkins v. United States, 434 A.2d 446 (D.C.1981) (assault on complaint by swinging fist through open window of car and, after initial fight, assault on complainant with tire jack outside of car); Johnson v. United States, 398 A.2d 354, 368-70 (D.C.1979) (assault with intent to kill by pushing complainant partially out of fifth floor window and later by throwing complainant into Potomac River); see also Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 301-03, 52 S.Ct. 180, 181-82, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932) (successive sales of morphine to same person constitute distinct and separate offenses); cf. Davis v. United States, 448 A.2d 242 (D.C.1982) (possession of two separate packets of marijuana, one that appellant had thrown into a taxicab, the other that he had later hidden in the rear seat of a police car)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"398 A.2d 354, 368-70","parenthetical":"assault with intent to kill by pushing complainant partially out of fifth floor window and later by throwing complainant into Potomac River","sentence":"Hack v. United States, 445 A.2d 634, 641 (D.C.1982) (possession of separate packets of marijuana in plastic bag on street and in police car; harmless error); Hawkins v. United States, 434 A.2d 446 (D.C.1981) (assault on complaint by swinging fist through open window of car and, after initial fight, assault on complainant with tire jack outside of car); Johnson v. United States, 398 A.2d 354, 368-70 (D.C.1979) (assault with intent to kill by pushing complainant partially out of fifth floor window and later by throwing complainant into Potomac River); see also Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 301-03, 52 S.Ct. 180, 181-82, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932) (successive sales of morphine to same person constitute distinct and separate offenses); cf. Davis v. United States, 448 A.2d 242 (D.C.1982) (possession of two separate packets of marijuana, one that appellant had thrown into a taxicab, the other that he had later hidden in the rear seat of a police car)."},"case_id":7923086,"label":"b"}
{"context":". Appellant cites to several cases in this jurisdiction where we found error in the giving of instructions that permitted a non-unanimous verdict. All are distinguishable from the present case in that they each involved two separate incidents chargeable as two separate offenses.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"398 A.2d 354, 368-70","parenthetical":"assault with intent to kill by pushing complainant partially out of fifth floor window and later by throwing complainant into Potomac River","sentence":"Hack v. United States, 445 A.2d 634, 641 (D.C.1982) (possession of separate packets of marijuana in plastic bag on street and in police car; harmless error); Hawkins v. United States, 434 A.2d 446 (D.C.1981) (assault on complaint by swinging fist through open window of car and, after initial fight, assault on complainant with tire jack outside of car); Johnson v. United States, 398 A.2d 354, 368-70 (D.C.1979) (assault with intent to kill by pushing complainant partially out of fifth floor window and later by throwing complainant into Potomac River); see also Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 301-03, 52 S.Ct. 180, 181-82, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932) (successive sales of morphine to same person constitute distinct and separate offenses); cf. Davis v. United States, 448 A.2d 242 (D.C.1982) (possession of two separate packets of marijuana, one that appellant had thrown into a taxicab, the other that he had later hidden in the rear seat of a police car)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"successive sales of morphine to same person constitute distinct and separate offenses","sentence":"Hack v. United States, 445 A.2d 634, 641 (D.C.1982) (possession of separate packets of marijuana in plastic bag on street and in police car; harmless error); Hawkins v. United States, 434 A.2d 446 (D.C.1981) (assault on complaint by swinging fist through open window of car and, after initial fight, assault on complainant with tire jack outside of car); Johnson v. United States, 398 A.2d 354, 368-70 (D.C.1979) (assault with intent to kill by pushing complainant partially out of fifth floor window and later by throwing complainant into Potomac River); see also Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 301-03, 52 S.Ct. 180, 181-82, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932) (successive sales of morphine to same person constitute distinct and separate offenses); cf. Davis v. United States, 448 A.2d 242 (D.C.1982) (possession of two separate packets of marijuana, one that appellant had thrown into a taxicab, the other that he had later hidden in the rear seat of a police car)."},"case_id":7923086,"label":"a"}
{"context":". Appellant cites to several cases in this jurisdiction where we found error in the giving of instructions that permitted a non-unanimous verdict. All are distinguishable from the present case in that they each involved two separate incidents chargeable as two separate offenses.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"possession of two separate packets of marijuana, one that appellant had thrown into a taxicab, the other that he had later hidden in the rear seat of a police car","sentence":"Hack v. United States, 445 A.2d 634, 641 (D.C.1982) (possession of separate packets of marijuana in plastic bag on street and in police car; harmless error); Hawkins v. United States, 434 A.2d 446 (D.C.1981) (assault on complaint by swinging fist through open window of car and, after initial fight, assault on complainant with tire jack outside of car); Johnson v. United States, 398 A.2d 354, 368-70 (D.C.1979) (assault with intent to kill by pushing complainant partially out of fifth floor window and later by throwing complainant into Potomac River); see also Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 301-03, 52 S.Ct. 180, 181-82, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932) (successive sales of morphine to same person constitute distinct and separate offenses); cf. Davis v. United States, 448 A.2d 242 (D.C.1982) (possession of two separate packets of marijuana, one that appellant had thrown into a taxicab, the other that he had later hidden in the rear seat of a police car)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"398 A.2d 354, 368-70","parenthetical":"assault with intent to kill by pushing complainant partially out of fifth floor window and later by throwing complainant into Potomac River","sentence":"Hack v. United States, 445 A.2d 634, 641 (D.C.1982) (possession of separate packets of marijuana in plastic bag on street and in police car; harmless error); Hawkins v. United States, 434 A.2d 446 (D.C.1981) (assault on complaint by swinging fist through open window of car and, after initial fight, assault on complainant with tire jack outside of car); Johnson v. United States, 398 A.2d 354, 368-70 (D.C.1979) (assault with intent to kill by pushing complainant partially out of fifth floor window and later by throwing complainant into Potomac River); see also Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 301-03, 52 S.Ct. 180, 181-82, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932) (successive sales of morphine to same person constitute distinct and separate offenses); cf. Davis v. United States, 448 A.2d 242 (D.C.1982) (possession of two separate packets of marijuana, one that appellant had thrown into a taxicab, the other that he had later hidden in the rear seat of a police car)."},"case_id":7923086,"label":"b"}
{"context":". Appellant cites to several cases in this jurisdiction where we found error in the giving of instructions that permitted a non-unanimous verdict. All are distinguishable from the present case in that they each involved two separate incidents chargeable as two separate offenses.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"284 U.S. 299, 301-03","parenthetical":"successive sales of morphine to same person constitute distinct and separate offenses","sentence":"Hack v. United States, 445 A.2d 634, 641 (D.C.1982) (possession of separate packets of marijuana in plastic bag on street and in police car; harmless error); Hawkins v. United States, 434 A.2d 446 (D.C.1981) (assault on complaint by swinging fist through open window of car and, after initial fight, assault on complainant with tire jack outside of car); Johnson v. United States, 398 A.2d 354, 368-70 (D.C.1979) (assault with intent to kill by pushing complainant partially out of fifth floor window and later by throwing complainant into Potomac River); see also Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 301-03, 52 S.Ct. 180, 181-82, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932) (successive sales of morphine to same person constitute distinct and separate offenses); cf. Davis v. United States, 448 A.2d 242 (D.C.1982) (possession of two separate packets of marijuana, one that appellant had thrown into a taxicab, the other that he had later hidden in the rear seat of a police car)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"possession of two separate packets of marijuana, one that appellant had thrown into a taxicab, the other that he had later hidden in the rear seat of a police car","sentence":"Hack v. United States, 445 A.2d 634, 641 (D.C.1982) (possession of separate packets of marijuana in plastic bag on street and in police car; harmless error); Hawkins v. United States, 434 A.2d 446 (D.C.1981) (assault on complaint by swinging fist through open window of car and, after initial fight, assault on complainant with tire jack outside of car); Johnson v. United States, 398 A.2d 354, 368-70 (D.C.1979) (assault with intent to kill by pushing complainant partially out of fifth floor window and later by throwing complainant into Potomac River); see also Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 301-03, 52 S.Ct. 180, 181-82, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932) (successive sales of morphine to same person constitute distinct and separate offenses); cf. Davis v. United States, 448 A.2d 242 (D.C.1982) (possession of two separate packets of marijuana, one that appellant had thrown into a taxicab, the other that he had later hidden in the rear seat of a police car)."},"case_id":7923086,"label":"a"}
{"context":". Appellant cites to several cases in this jurisdiction where we found error in the giving of instructions that permitted a non-unanimous verdict. All are distinguishable from the present case in that they each involved two separate incidents chargeable as two separate offenses.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"possession of two separate packets of marijuana, one that appellant had thrown into a taxicab, the other that he had later hidden in the rear seat of a police car","sentence":"Hack v. United States, 445 A.2d 634, 641 (D.C.1982) (possession of separate packets of marijuana in plastic bag on street and in police car; harmless error); Hawkins v. United States, 434 A.2d 446 (D.C.1981) (assault on complaint by swinging fist through open window of car and, after initial fight, assault on complainant with tire jack outside of car); Johnson v. United States, 398 A.2d 354, 368-70 (D.C.1979) (assault with intent to kill by pushing complainant partially out of fifth floor window and later by throwing complainant into Potomac River); see also Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 301-03, 52 S.Ct. 180, 181-82, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932) (successive sales of morphine to same person constitute distinct and separate offenses); cf. Davis v. United States, 448 A.2d 242 (D.C.1982) (possession of two separate packets of marijuana, one that appellant had thrown into a taxicab, the other that he had later hidden in the rear seat of a police car)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"52 S.Ct. 180, 181-82","parenthetical":"successive sales of morphine to same person constitute distinct and separate offenses","sentence":"Hack v. United States, 445 A.2d 634, 641 (D.C.1982) (possession of separate packets of marijuana in plastic bag on street and in police car; harmless error); Hawkins v. United States, 434 A.2d 446 (D.C.1981) (assault on complaint by swinging fist through open window of car and, after initial fight, assault on complainant with tire jack outside of car); Johnson v. United States, 398 A.2d 354, 368-70 (D.C.1979) (assault with intent to kill by pushing complainant partially out of fifth floor window and later by throwing complainant into Potomac River); see also Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 301-03, 52 S.Ct. 180, 181-82, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932) (successive sales of morphine to same person constitute distinct and separate offenses); cf. Davis v. United States, 448 A.2d 242 (D.C.1982) (possession of two separate packets of marijuana, one that appellant had thrown into a taxicab, the other that he had later hidden in the rear seat of a police car)."},"case_id":7923086,"label":"b"}
{"context":". Appellant cites to several cases in this jurisdiction where we found error in the giving of instructions that permitted a non-unanimous verdict. All are distinguishable from the present case in that they each involved two separate incidents chargeable as two separate offenses.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"successive sales of morphine to same person constitute distinct and separate offenses","sentence":"Hack v. United States, 445 A.2d 634, 641 (D.C.1982) (possession of separate packets of marijuana in plastic bag on street and in police car; harmless error); Hawkins v. United States, 434 A.2d 446 (D.C.1981) (assault on complaint by swinging fist through open window of car and, after initial fight, assault on complainant with tire jack outside of car); Johnson v. United States, 398 A.2d 354, 368-70 (D.C.1979) (assault with intent to kill by pushing complainant partially out of fifth floor window and later by throwing complainant into Potomac River); see also Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 301-03, 52 S.Ct. 180, 181-82, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932) (successive sales of morphine to same person constitute distinct and separate offenses); cf. Davis v. United States, 448 A.2d 242 (D.C.1982) (possession of two separate packets of marijuana, one that appellant had thrown into a taxicab, the other that he had later hidden in the rear seat of a police car)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"possession of two separate packets of marijuana, one that appellant had thrown into a taxicab, the other that he had later hidden in the rear seat of a police car","sentence":"Hack v. United States, 445 A.2d 634, 641 (D.C.1982) (possession of separate packets of marijuana in plastic bag on street and in police car; harmless error); Hawkins v. United States, 434 A.2d 446 (D.C.1981) (assault on complaint by swinging fist through open window of car and, after initial fight, assault on complainant with tire jack outside of car); Johnson v. United States, 398 A.2d 354, 368-70 (D.C.1979) (assault with intent to kill by pushing complainant partially out of fifth floor window and later by throwing complainant into Potomac River); see also Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 301-03, 52 S.Ct. 180, 181-82, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932) (successive sales of morphine to same person constitute distinct and separate offenses); cf. Davis v. United States, 448 A.2d 242 (D.C.1982) (possession of two separate packets of marijuana, one that appellant had thrown into a taxicab, the other that he had later hidden in the rear seat of a police car)."},"case_id":7923086,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The definition of \"insured\" is therefore linked to the \"actual use\" of one of the two automobiles covered by the Policy, and the plaintiffs reasoning overlooks the critical fact that neither vehicle had any involvement in the accident in this case. See PL's Mem. at 1-2. Indeed, by the plaintiffs own admission, the only vehicle involved here was driven by Mr. Carr.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"780 A.2d 1127, 1127","parenthetical":"\"[The Court] may not 'indulge in forced constructions to create an obligation against the insurer.' \" (quoting Cameron, 733 A.2d at 968","sentence":"See Chase 780 A.2d at 1127 (\u201c[The Court] may not \u2018indulge in forced constructions to create an obligation against the insurer.\u2019 \u201d (quoting Cameron, 733 A.2d at 968)); see also Unfoldment, Inc. v. D.C. Contract Appeals Bd., 909 A.2d 204, 209 (D.C.2006) (\u201cA court must honor the intentions of the parties as reflected in the settled usage of the terms they accepted in the contract ... and will not torture words to import ambiguity where the ordinary meaning leaves no room for ambiguity.\u201d) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); 1010 Potomac Assocs. v. Grocery Mfrs. of Am., Inc., 485 A.2d 199, 205 (D.C.1984) (\u201cThe writing must be interpreted as a whole, giving a reasonable, lawful, and effective meaning to all of its terms.\u201d) (emphasis added) (citations omitted)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"485 A.2d 199, 205","parenthetical":"\"The writing must be interpreted as a whole, giving a reasonable, lawful, and effective meaning to all of its terms.\"","sentence":"See Chase 780 A.2d at 1127 (\u201c[The Court] may not \u2018indulge in forced constructions to create an obligation against the insurer.\u2019 \u201d (quoting Cameron, 733 A.2d at 968)); see also Unfoldment, Inc. v. D.C. Contract Appeals Bd., 909 A.2d 204, 209 (D.C.2006) (\u201cA court must honor the intentions of the parties as reflected in the settled usage of the terms they accepted in the contract ... and will not torture words to import ambiguity where the ordinary meaning leaves no room for ambiguity.\u201d) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); 1010 Potomac Assocs. v. Grocery Mfrs. of Am., Inc., 485 A.2d 199, 205 (D.C.1984) (\u201cThe writing must be interpreted as a whole, giving a reasonable, lawful, and effective meaning to all of its terms.\u201d) (emphasis added) (citations omitted)."},"case_id":4010754,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The definition of \"insured\" is therefore linked to the \"actual use\" of one of the two automobiles covered by the Policy, and the plaintiffs reasoning overlooks the critical fact that neither vehicle had any involvement in the accident in this case. See PL's Mem. at 1-2. Indeed, by the plaintiffs own admission, the only vehicle involved here was driven by Mr. Carr.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"733 A.2d 968, 968","parenthetical":"\"[The Court] may not 'indulge in forced constructions to create an obligation against the insurer.' \" (quoting Cameron, 733 A.2d at 968","sentence":"See Chase 780 A.2d at 1127 (\u201c[The Court] may not \u2018indulge in forced constructions to create an obligation against the insurer.\u2019 \u201d (quoting Cameron, 733 A.2d at 968)); see also Unfoldment, Inc. v. D.C. Contract Appeals Bd., 909 A.2d 204, 209 (D.C.2006) (\u201cA court must honor the intentions of the parties as reflected in the settled usage of the terms they accepted in the contract ... and will not torture words to import ambiguity where the ordinary meaning leaves no room for ambiguity.\u201d) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); 1010 Potomac Assocs. v. Grocery Mfrs. of Am., Inc., 485 A.2d 199, 205 (D.C.1984) (\u201cThe writing must be interpreted as a whole, giving a reasonable, lawful, and effective meaning to all of its terms.\u201d) (emphasis added) (citations omitted)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"485 A.2d 199, 205","parenthetical":"\"The writing must be interpreted as a whole, giving a reasonable, lawful, and effective meaning to all of its terms.\"","sentence":"See Chase 780 A.2d at 1127 (\u201c[The Court] may not \u2018indulge in forced constructions to create an obligation against the insurer.\u2019 \u201d (quoting Cameron, 733 A.2d at 968)); see also Unfoldment, Inc. v. D.C. Contract Appeals Bd., 909 A.2d 204, 209 (D.C.2006) (\u201cA court must honor the intentions of the parties as reflected in the settled usage of the terms they accepted in the contract ... and will not torture words to import ambiguity where the ordinary meaning leaves no room for ambiguity.\u201d) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); 1010 Potomac Assocs. v. Grocery Mfrs. of Am., Inc., 485 A.2d 199, 205 (D.C.1984) (\u201cThe writing must be interpreted as a whole, giving a reasonable, lawful, and effective meaning to all of its terms.\u201d) (emphasis added) (citations omitted)."},"case_id":4010754,"label":"a"}